

The Second Book of the Sentences of the most excellent professor of Sacred Theology,



Gregory of Rimini

The First Book of the former Prior General of the entire
Order of Hermit Friars of Saint Augustine

DISTINCTION 1

QUESTION 1

WHETHER Aristotle and his Commentator Averroes held that all beings other than the first were made, or whether, on the contrary, they were of the opinion that several beings do not have an effective principle.

Because the **Master** [Peter Lombard], in the first distinction of this second book, striking down the errors of certain philosophers, shows by sacred authorities that all things other than **God** were brought into being by Him efficiently, and created not eternally but with a beginning of time, therefore, by inquiring into these matters individually, it will first be seen what **Aristotle**—of whom the Master makes special mention—held concerning the first [being].

Let the question, then, be this: whether **Aristotle** and his Commentator **Averroes** held that all beings other than the first were made, or whether, on the contrary, they were of the opinion that several beings do not have an effective principle.

And for the first part, it is argued that in the second book of the **Metaphysics**, he [Aristotle] proves by design that in efficient causes there is no process to infinity, and that it is necessary that there be some first efficient cause which is the efficient cause of all others; otherwise, as he says, it would not be the first.

To the opposite is the **Master** in the text.

I respond. In this question, since there is a controversy among theological doctors as to what the **Philosopher** held concerning the efficiency of the first with respect to others—some saying he held that all beings other than the first, which is **God**, were produced by Him mediately or immediately: immediately indeed the eternal things, and mediately the generable and corruptible things, for whose generation the movement of the heaven (which he actively moves as an appropriated motor) concurs as a medium; others, on the contrary, defending that he held many things to be entirely unproduced, and that the first itself produces nothing immediately, nor even acts as an active or immediate motor appropriated to any sphere to move any heaven by which it might be the cause of inferior things, but only moves the active motors of the spheres by way of an **end**—therefore, there will be two articles to this question.

For first, it will be seen whether it was the intention of the **Philosopher** and his **Commentator** that there be several beings in the universe entirely unproduced, or only one, with the rest coming from it mediately or immediately. Second, whether it was the intention of the same that the first being, which is **God**, moves the first movable thing immediately and actively as an appropriated motor, and not only by way of an **end**.

ARTICLE 1

As to the first article, since it is established that generable and corruptible things are made, there is no doubt what they thought of such things; the question concerns only those things that are naturally incorruptible, such as the heavens and the **intelligences**. And concerning these, some have said the **Philosopher** held that all things universally, except the first, were produced; others, however, said that the celestial bodies are indeed produced, but not the intelligences.

First, therefore, those arguments shall be introduced together which are brought forward by both sides to prove the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator** held the celestial bodies to be produced; second, those arguments introduced by the former to prove the same regarding the intelligences, and generally regarding all beings.

[Arguments for the First Part]

For the first, a word of the **Philosopher** from the second book of the **Metaphysics** is introduced, where he says: "The principles of things that always exist must always be most true, for they are not true at one time" and not another; "nor is there any cause for them to be, but they are the cause for others." Where the **Commentator**, in comment 4, says that by this the **Philosopher** "hints at the disposition of the principles of celestial bodies with the celestial bodies." Therefore, according to them, celestial bodies have principles which are the cause of their being, and consequently an **efficient principle**.

The second authority of the **Philosopher** is from the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**, in the chapter *On the Necessary*, where he says: "Of these things, therefore, one has a cause of its necessary being, while of others there is none, but because of these others exist by necessity." Where it is clear that of some necessary things there is a cause.

And in the eighth book of the **Physics**, he says of **Democritus** that "he himself, who never wished to seek a principle, spoke correctly in some things, but in all things not correctly. For a triangle always has angles equal to two right angles. But nevertheless, there is another cause of its perpetuity. Of principles, therefore, there is no other cause, but they are perpetual." Where the **Commentator**, at the end of comment 15, says: "Necessary things, which are principles, do not have a cause, and if they did, then a principle would have a principle and this would proceed to infinity. And he intended to declare that many necessary things have causes, etc." From which, as before, it is clear that of some eternal things—namely those which are not principles, such as celestial bodies—there is a principle and a cause.

The third authority is from the **Commentator** on the sixth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 2, upon that word of the **Philosopher**: "It is necessary that all causes be eternal and especially these; for these are the causes of the manifest things among the divine," the **Commentator** says: "And he intends that immobile things must be eternal more than the mobile divine eternal things, namely the celestial bodies. For they are the cause of those, namely that the abstract substance is the cause of the celestial bodies." Thus the **Commentator**.

The fourth is from the same in the booklet *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 2, where he says: "For we see that the heaven has one power not only moving all things, but **acting** and **preserving**, just as is the disposition in the body of a man and a body made for its own end. For the end signifies the agent with a proper significance," or "necessary," as another text has it. And it follows: "And since certain people were

ignorant that this was among the opinions of **Aristotle**, they said that he"—namely Aristotle—"did not speak of an acting cause of the whole, but only of a moving cause; and that was very absurd, and there is no doubt in this that the agent itself is the mover itself." This authority is so express, as they say, that it neither lacks explanation nor accepts a gloss.

[Arguments for the Second Part]

As for the second, namely concerning the making of the intelligences, a word of the **Commentator** from the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 43, is introduced, where he says that in the intelligences "there is cause and caused according as we say that the understood is the cause of the understander." And in the same book, the **Philosopher** says that the first moves as the **beloved**. And the **Commentator** there, in comment 35, maintains that the good apprehended is the **acting cause** of desire. And by the same reasoning, the object understood is the efficient cause of the intellection. Since, therefore, the other intelligences both understand and love the first according to him, and the intelligences themselves (according to the same) are their own act of understanding, it follows that the first intelligence effects the others according to their substances, just as it effects their intellections.

Another is from the same, seventh book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 31, at the end, where he says that "it moved **Aristotle** to posit a mover separate from matter in the making of intelligible powers, because intellectual powers with him are not mixed with matter. Hence it is necessary that that which is not mixed with matter be generated in some way by what is simply not mixed with matter, just as it is necessary that everything mixed with matter be generated by something mixed with matter." Where he expressly posits that the intelligences are made by an immaterial agent.

Generally, moreover, they prove that all things are made by the first by the authority of the **Commentator** on the second book of the **Metaphysics**, upon that word of the **Philosopher**: "Wherefore also that which is the cause of subsequent things being true is most true," where the **Commentator**, in comment 4, says: "And it is manifest that, if this is the first cause of all beings, as has been declared in the science of natural things, that cause is more worthy both in **being** and in **truth** than all beings. For all beings do not acquire being and truth except from that cause. It is therefore alone being through itself, and true through itself, and all other things are beings and true through its being and truth." Thus the **Commentator**.

Likewise, in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator** maintain that all things other than the first have a **final cause**. Therefore, they maintain that all other things are produced **effectively**. The consequence is clear, because the causality of the end is nothing except to move the efficient to act. For the end is that for the sake of which the agent acts.

It is therefore, as is clear from what has been said, the opinion of the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator** that all things other than **God** are made.

Nevertheless, one must distinguish regarding the "making." For one kind is through **transmutation** and motion, and with the novelty of being of that which is made; and in this way, eternal things are not "made" according to them. Another kind, however, is without transmutation and without novelty of the thing made, through a simple quasi-emanation and following of the thing made upon that by which it is made; and in this way, they understood all eternal things to be made by the first.

And the **Commentator** hints at this distinction enough in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 43, where he says that "there is no cause and caused there except according as we say that the understood is the cause of the understander," and in *On the Substance of the Orb*, from which his previously introduced authority was taken, where he says that "of agents, one kind is prior in time to the act, and it is everything that is made in the sphere of the world," and "another kind is prior **naturally**, etc.," hinting that the agent of celestial bodies is prior in nature only, and not in time.

[Against, from two foundations of Aristotle and the Commentator]

Although, however, this opinion has for it the sound, in some measure, of certain words of the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator**, nevertheless it was never their intention. And this can be made manifest from two foundations upon which nearly their whole doctrine is founded.

One of these is that everything that is made, is made **from something**, and nothing is made from nothing or from pure non-being. This they indeed held as a principle, and they judged the opposite to be entirely impossible. Hence, in the first book of the **Physics**, the **Philosopher** proves the third principle of generation—the subject for contraries—which is the **matter** from which what is made is made. "For there is always something which is subjected, from which what is made is made," as the **Philosopher** says there. And in introducing this, the **Commentator** also declares it there in comment 62.

Likewise, in the seventh book of the **Metaphysics**: "All things that are made, are made by something, and from something, and [become] something"; the **Philosopher** posits the same in the twelfth book. Upon this foundation is sustained a great part of his doctrine; for example, that matter is **unbegotten**, as is clear in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**; and that generation is perpetual, as is clear in the first book of *On Generation*; and many other things.

Nor can anyone who has seen their words doubt this—however false—to have been entirely of their mind. Hence, in the Prologue to the third book of the **Physics**, the **Commentator** says that this is a manifest proposition in which "all and the ancients agree, that nothing is generated from nothing."

Likewise, in the eighth book of the same, comment 4, he strives to prove that **creation** is impossible, as will be clear in the following question, where his reasons will be solved. And he says there that those who think something can be made from nothing "think the impossible can be; and they strive to confirm this from the fact that it is the custom to say that for a subject to be necessary for an agent—namely the subject from which generation is made—is a diminution of the agent. And all these are common estimations." And it follows: "For an agent not to be able to do something impossible is not said to be a diminution; but to say that he does something impossible, and can do it, is a deception." From which it is clear that he himself judges this to be impossible in itself: "something is made with no entity presupposed," such that this is impossible for any agent whatsoever. And in the first book of *On the Heavens*, comment 109, he says that "none of the ancients said the world was generated from nothing, since it is unthinkable and impossible." And all the books, both his and the **Philosopher's**, are full of this.

Similarly, just as they thought it impossible for something to be made from nothing, so they said it was impossible for any agent to act [on] anything from nothing. Hence, in the seventh book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 28, the **Commentator** says that "the action of an agent is nothing other than to

draw that which is in **potency** into **act**." And in the twelfth book, comment 18, having posited the opinions of those speaking of creation and those speaking of the latency of forms, he adds: "The third opinion, however, is that of **Aristotle**, and it is that an agent does not make anything except the composite of matter and form, and this is done by moving the matter and transmuting it, until there comes out of it that which is in it in potency, to that form in act."

Which is also confirmed because, wherever the **Philosopher** has spoken of an **efficient cause**, he always defines it as being "from whence is the principle of motion," and similarly, **active power** as being "the principle of transmuting," as is clear in the fifth and ninth books of the **Metaphysics**. Nor has he anywhere said that any agent acts without transmutation, as those [others] imagine. On the contrary, he himself in the first book of *On Generation* and the **Commentator** in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 3, maintain that "**every agent is a mover**," although not every mover is an agent. Just as every action is a change, although not conversely. Nor is it anywhere found that they posited any action without change.

Their second foundation is that the **motion of the heaven** never began, but is eternal. That this was their intention is superfluous to prove. From which it is also clear that both the celestial bodies and their motors are eternal. And this is known from the eighth book of the **Physics** and the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**.

(Deductions from these foundations)

From these two foundations, it is clearly concluded that they [Aristotle and Averroes] never intended for all things besides the first to be made.

And from the **first** [foundation], it is clear that they were not of the opinion that **matter** was made; because, if it were made, it would have been made from something pre-existing. And thus matter would have existed before it was made.

Hence, at the end of the first book of the **Physics**, the **Philosopher**, proving that it [matter] is not made, says: "For if it is made, it is necessary that something first be subjected from which it is made; but this is this very nature," namely matter; "therefore it will exist before it is made. For I call matter," that is, I understand by matter, "the first subject for each thing, from which something is made because it is in it non-accidentally." And by the same foundation, he proves the same conclusion in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** by a deduction to the impossible—namely, that there will be a process to infinity if matter is made. And all these things are sustained upon this: that nothing which is made, is made from nothing. This being denied, it is clear that he proves nothing.

By the same [foundation], it is clear that according to them the **celestial bodies** are not made. For since they, according to them, are simple and not composed of matter and form (as are the bodies of the four simple elements), as the **Commentator** says in the first book of *On the Heavens*, comment 20, and in several other places, it would be necessary for them—if they were made—to be made from nothing.

From the same foundation, the **Commentator** proves the world is not made in the first book of *On the Heavens*, at the end of comment 109. Whence he says: "But to say that the world is generated from

nothing, as the speakers [theologians] say, happens to them so that it is not generated. For generation is not essentially from privation, just as heat is not essentially made from cold, unless a contrary receives its contrary." This reason, however, will be solved in the following question.

Thirdly, by the same foundation, it is clear that the **intelligences** and **abstract substances** were not produced, since they are essentially simple according to them. Hence the **Commentator**, in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 43, reciting the opinion of **Avicenna**—that "from the intelligences some follow others as the caused follows the cause," and that "from the motor of the first heaven proceeds the soul of the first heaven and the motor of the following sphere"—says that "this speech is [only] imaginable. For there is neither a proceeding nor a following nor an action there, such that we might say that one action follows one agent." And below: "The custom," he says, "which already exists among the moderns in saying that from such a motor proceeds such a motor, or follows, or comes forth, or such words, are not truly understood of these abstract principles. For all these are dispositions of agents on the surface, not in truth."

Where it is clear that he denies to the intelligences every action which is truly action by which they might be made, by whatever name it is signified—whether it is called a proceeding, a consequence, a following, or any other way. And that this is so, he introduces a proof from which his intention is more clear, saying: "For from an agent nothing proceeds, as we said before, except to extract that which is in potency into act. But there [in the intelligences] there is no potency, hence neither an agent. For there is only intellect and the understood, and the perfect and the perfecting, etc."

From these things it is manifestly clear that that distinction concerning the **agent** and concerning "**being made**"—by which they [the opposing doctors] think to evade the reasons made against them and explain the authorities, saying that the Commentator intends to deny to the intelligences that they have an agent and are made through transmutation, motion, and with novelty of being, but not that they are produced through a certain simple emanation and eternally—is entirely outside the intention of the Commentator. For it is established that **Avicenna** did not say the intelligences were made in time and through the transmutation of a subject, but eternally and through a simple emanation. And against this understanding, the Commentator argues by the aforementioned reason, maintaining that no agent acts otherwise than by transmuting and drawing out what is in potency to act. And because no such potential transmutable thing is in the intelligences, he therefore concludes that none of them has an agent. He intends, therefore, to conclude that they are entirely not made; otherwise, he would conclude nothing against Avicenna. Whence that distinction concerning the agent and the action, which those of the contrary opinion make, would be judged by the Commentator as a mere fiction.

From the **second foundation** [the eternity of motion] also, it is manifestly concluded according to their intention that neither the celestial bodies, nor the intelligences, nor primary matter (since even it is posited by them as eternal) are made. For it is established that according to them, in the first book of *On the Heavens*, "**eternal**" and "**unbegotten**" are universally mutually convertible. For everything eternal is unbegotten, and everything unbegotten is eternal, as they say. And by this they prove that everything unbegotten is incorruptible, and vice versa.

Likewise, in the same place, the **Philosopher** defines "**begotten**" saying: "Begotten is a being which happens formerly not to be," and the **Commentator**, in comment 124: "Generable is that which in past

time is non-being, but now is being." And immediately after, defining "**unbegotten**," he says: "Unbegotten indeed is that which is now, and formerly it was not true to say it was not."

Likewise, in the same place, they prove that the begotten is neither always being nor always non-being, but a medium between both—namely, sometimes being and sometimes non-being. From which it evidently appears (nor can it be turned into doubt for anyone diligently considering that place where they determine this) that according to them, a manifest contradiction is included in saying that something eternal is made.

Likewise, the **Commentator** in the fourth book of *On the Heavens*, comment 1, says: "For eternal things do not have an agent except according to a **likeness**, nor do they have from the four causes anything except the formal and final. And if they have something that is an agent, it will not be except insofar as it is a **form** to it and preserving it." Where the same as before is clear—namely, that no eternal thing according to him has an acting cause properly taken, as it is distinguished from a formal and final cause.

Likewise, in the first book of *On the Heavens*, comment 108, he says that "those defending **Plato** say that the assimilation of the generation of the world from its elements to the generation of figures from lines and surfaces, made by Plato, signifies that the world was always with Plato; and that he did not intend by this speech anything except that its parts are prior by nature to the whole, not that it was truly generated. And if he intended this," says the Commentator, "he differs nothing from Aristotle; but nevertheless, he did badly in saying manifestly that the world was generated and not corruptible. For this is not understood from generation except with difficulty." Thus the Commentator. Where it is clear he says the intention of the Philosopher is that the world is not truly generated, although its parts are prior to it, not in time but in nature.

And in the following comment, he says that Aristotle "intended that, when it is posited that the world is made, it will happen that those things from which it is made are prior to it in time." And consequently, if it is made, according to them it will not be eternal.

This same thing is proved from another [source]. For it is established that according to the intention of the Philosopher, as touched upon above and can be had from the third and fifth books of the **Physics** and other innumerable places of his *Physics*, **every generation and universally every making is motion or change**, and every motion is finite and measured by finite time, and every change by an instant. If, therefore, any eternal thing—such as the heaven or an intelligence—is begotten or made, it was either made in an instant or was being made in time. And if in time, since it is not now being made according to the Philosopher but is perfected, it follows that its "being made" preceded its "having been made," and consequently it is not eternal. If also in an instant, it follows that it is not eternal, since no instant was eternal; rather, before any [instant] according to the Philosopher, infinite time preceded.

Likewise, according to them, every motion or change is from an opposite into an opposite. This is clear from the fifth book of the **Physics**. And consequently, no made thing is eternal; for every such making was from non-being into being, and non-being preceded being.

Likewise, the **Commentator**, in the third book of *On the Soul*, comment 5, near the beginning, against **Theophrastus** and **Themistius**—who say that "the speculative intellect is eternal" because "the recipient

is eternal and the agent also eternal," from which it follows that "the thing made is also eternal"—says that "because they thought this, it happens in truth that there is neither an active intellect nor a thing made, since agent and made are not understood except with generation in time. Or it will be said that to call this 'agent' and this 'made' is only according to a likeness."

(Objection)

But against what has been said, it seems to be the mind of the **Philosopher** and also the **Commentator**, who likewise say that generation is eternal and similarly the motion of the heaven, and yet it is established that generation truly has an acting cause, and similarly the motion of the heaven is truly made, as the Commentator posits in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 40.

To this it must be said that certainly generation has an acting cause according to the Philosopher, if this is understood correctly; nevertheless, according to him, **no generation is eternal** or was from eternity, just as nothing begotten was from eternity, whether it was or is eternal. Whence also according to him, this [proposition] is false by the force of the speech: "generation is eternal," because every singular instance of it is false, as is clear of itself. On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, before any generation there was another generation, and consequently none is or was eternal. And because before any there was another, therefore the Philosopher concedes that **from eternity there was generation**. But it is not the same to say "from eternity there was generation" and "generation was from eternity." For the first, according to the Philosopher, is true, and the second false. Just as according to the same, this is true: "from eternity or always there was man," and this is false: "man was from eternity, or man was always."

If, however, anywhere this is found: "generation is eternal," it is to be taken for this: "from eternity there was generation" or "at all time or always there was generation." Thus, in its own way, it must be said of the motion of the heaven.

For since motion, according to the manner of speaking of others, has parts succeeding one another (each of which is called "made"), motion is said to be eternal and made because before any part of it there was another, and before any revolution there was a revolution. And each one is made; nevertheless, **no part of motion is eternal**. Whence, by imagining that motion is some entity caused in the movable thing by the motor (as many imagine), it is not to be conceded that any entity of motion is eternal, nor that any entity made in the movable thing by the motor is eternal, since every singular [part] is false. **Addition 1:** For example, in saying "from eternity there was this motion, namely of the heaven," the proposition is entirely false by the force of the speech. Nevertheless, according to the Philosopher, this would be true: "from eternity there was some part of the motion of the heaven," because the predicate stands only confusedly. And this the Philosopher intends when he says the motion of the heaven is eternal or was from eternity—because there was always some part of the motion of the heaven, and before any part of it there was another, and none was first before which there was none; and because always without beginning there is or was some part of it. And therefore he says it never began and is eternal.

And if it is said that, although no part of motion is eternal, nevertheless the **whole motion** is eternal, and this is true: "motion is eternal," taking motion for the whole continuous and perpetual motion of the

heaven; it must be said that by the force of the speech this is entirely false according to **Aristotle**: "the whole motion is eternal." For either "whole" is held syncategorematically, and it is clear then that it is false, because that is equivalent to this: "every part of motion is eternal," which is false. Or [it is held] categorically, and then also it is clear that it is false, since "whole" thus taken signifies nothing other than something perfected from its parts. And consequently, the parts of motion would be eternal, which is false.

And thus it is clear that by the force of speech that is false, yet this according to Aristotle would be conceded: "**always there was motion**" and this "**from eternity there was motion**," because then it stands only confusedly, on account of the universal sign equivalently imported in these terms "always" and "from eternity." When, however, it is placed on the side of the subject, it stands determinately and the proposition is false for the assigned reason.

And let these be the things said speaking of motion according to the aforementioned imagination which posits such motion to be some thing made. For he who would not posit this would easily free himself by denying that the motion of the heaven has an effective cause. But concerning this, it will be seen in the following.

From all these things, it is only held that no made entity, whether it be generation or motion, is eternal according to the Philosopher. And consequently, what was objected concerning generation and motion in no way hinders what was said—**Addition 2**: namely, that it is of the mind of the Philosopher that **no eternal thing is begotten or made**.

Furthermore, it is also clear here, as before, that it was never of the mind of the Philosopher or the Commentator to posit any agent which acts upon some thing eternally without transmutation (as those imagine), since they judge this to be entirely impossible. And consequently, neither is that distinction according to their intention or doctrine; for nowhere can it be found that they posited such a distinction.

(To the authorities for the first part)

To the authorities introduced for the other part, I respond. To the **first**, it must be said that nothing is held through it except that the intelligence is a principle and cause of the heaven. Now, however, it does not follow: "it is a cause, therefore it is an efficient cause." And it is a wonder concerning those arguing thus. For it is established that they themselves do not say the Commentator or the Philosopher wished that the intelligence moving the heaven should effectively produce it; unless perhaps they would say this of the first intelligence only. And yet it is established that according to them, every intelligence is the cause of its own heaven, as the alleged authority hints and will soon be more clear. It must be said, therefore, that every such intelligence according to them is the **formal cause** of its heaven in the manner that will be said, and also the **final**, though not the ultimate; but the first alone is ultimate, as will be clear in the following article.

To the **second** authority, it must be said that it is not to the purpose. For there the Philosopher is not speaking of some necessary things or entities, but of necessary **propositions** from which demonstrations

are made. Of which some are principles and causes, but others are from principles, as for instance conclusions.

And this is clear to one reading there. Whence he says: "Further, demonstration is of necessary things, etc.," and it is clear through the whole up to the alleged authority that he is speaking of necessary propositions or their total significates.

And the same must be said of the **third** authority. Which is clear from the examples the Philosopher posits. Furthermore, even granted that he were speaking of necessary beings, they would still not have their point, because it does not follow: "this has a cause, therefore an efficient cause," as has been said. And similarly must be said to the authority of the Commentator from the sixth book of the **Metaphysics**.

For the understanding of the authority of the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Orb*, it must be known that, as he says in the fourth book of *On the Heavens* and was had above, **agent** can be taken in two ways: namely, **properly**, and thus it is that which transmutes matter from potency to act and which is the "principle from whence is motion," as was said above, and thus it is a cause per se distinguished against the three other kinds of causes. In another way, "agent" is taken **improperly and by way of likeness**, and thus everything which is a cause for the sake of which something is such or such can be called an agent and is said to "make" or "act" upon that thing thus or thus. And in this way, both **form** and **end** can be called an agent with respect to that of which it is the form or end. For the substantial form of something is the cause for the sake of which such or such proper accidents follow it, just as the form of fire is the cause that fire is light and dry and hot, and that it naturally belongs to it to be moved upward, and so of its other proper accidents. Similarly, the end is the cause for the sake of which "that which is toward the end" is such or such. Whence according to one end or another of a thing, the thing itself is disposed in one way or another, as is clear in the second book of the **Physics**. And from this also, it is customary sometimes to say of form and end that they "act" or "make." Whence we say that the form of a man "makes" him to be of such a figure and such members and the like. Similarly, we say of the end.

From these things, it must be said to the purpose that it is not the intention of the Commentator that the intelligence acts upon the orb in the first way (namely, productively and properly), but only in the second way (namely, by way of likeness, and as form or end is said to act).

For the understanding of which, it must be known that the intention of the Commentator, as is clear in the second chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*, was that the celestial body is a simple substance, not composed of matter and form. Nevertheless, it is not matter properly called, since it is not potency toward form, but is **matter in act**. Nor also is it the nature of a form; for every natural form is the principle of some natural motion and of its natural dispositions. The celestial body, however, of itself is not the principle of any natural motion; not indeed of straight motion, since it is neither heavy nor light; nor of circular motion, since this is proper to the soul, as he says there. And since the heaven itself has a proper motion (namely circular), which is the motion of the soul, and a proper figure and other properties which belong to none except from a form, the Commentator concludes that "the celestial body is **quasi-matter**" of some form which is "of the genus of soul." And this is the intelligence moving it. This intelligence, however, relates to the celestial body just as material forms to their matters in some respects, and in some respects dissimilarly.

For material forms—since they have matter which is pure potency and is not in act any of the beings—perfect it and with it constitute some determinate being, for example fire or earth or some other. Likewise, since such forms come to matter by means of dimensions, they are divided by the division of the subject or matter and are constituted through their matters.

But neither of these belongs to the intelligence with respect to the heaven. For they do not constitute with it some thing per se one of this or that species, since the celestial body is not matter which is potency, but is being in act. "Whence it is more worthily called a **subject** than matter," as he says. Likewise, the intelligence is not united to the heaven by means of dimensions, and therefore it is not divided by the division of the celestial body, and consequently is not constituted through it. "For it does not exist in it, neither in the whole nor in a part, and universally neither in the divisible nor in the indivisible," as the Commentator says.

Again, material forms are the cause of a determinate magnitude and quantity in matter. Likewise, of a determinate action and proper motion. Likewise, some are causes of a determinate figure, like the form of living things. Item, they are for the body the cause of a due permanence; whence according as bodies have one form or another and one proper disposition or another belonging to the form, thus they endure more or less in being. Thus also we see that form preserves its proper subject in being; whence, it being corrupted, both the body and its dispositions are corrupted, as is clear in the bodies of animals.

And in all these, the **abstract form** (that is, the intelligence) agrees with material forms. For the celestial body, by reason of its corporeity precisely, does not determine for itself circular motion, since this is proper to the soul, as was said; nor this or that figure, since only animated things naturally have a "limited figure," as we see by sense; nor even such or such a magnitude, and so of others. But all these come to it from its form, which is the intelligence.

Whence in the second chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*, he says: "Because it has been declared that this body is unbegotten and incorruptible, it appears that it is necessary that it be a simple body, not composed of matter and form. And because it is a demonstrated individual in act and having one figure, and all these things are in a body by nature and are in matter on account of form, it is necessary that this celestial body be the **matter of celestial animals**, which are moved circularly of themselves." And below: "And you ought to know that this celestial body does not need a moving power in place always only, but a power bestowing eternal permanence in itself and in its substance." And he proves and concludes: "And therefore it is necessary that the **intellect**"—that is, the aforementioned intelligence—"be bestowing upon it eternal permanence, just as it bestows upon it eternal motion. And not this only, but it is necessary that this"—namely the intellect—"be the power which bestows upon it the motion proper to its action (which is eternity) among other motions (namely local motion in a circuit), and the figure proper to the motion (namely spherical), and the measure proper to each of these bodies and the agreement between them in turn in order and quantity, so that from all is perfected one act, namely the whole world." And it follows with nothing interposed: "For there is no difference between the need for an active power in every simple body, or in one body composed of such simple bodies, and indifferently whether that body be generated or not generated. For we see the heaven having etc.," as is alleged above.

From all these things it is clear that, when he says the heaven has a power acting upon it, he does not understand it to be an agent properly by way of an efficient, but by way of a likeness in the manner of a

form. Whence he says that "there is no difference of active power in every body etc., whether it was generated or not." For he calls every form "active" with respect to its body. And it is established that it cannot be understood that it [form] effects its own body.

Likewise, in the authority alleged by them, he says: "Just as is the disposition in a body made for its own end." It is established, however, that the soul of a man does not properly "act" [produce] its own body, but only is said to act upon it in necessary dispositions and to bestow those upon it determinatively and by way of requirement. And again below, when he says it is the agent of the orb, he explains himself with nothing interposed, saying: "namely, making it in necessary dispositions in finding the end for which it was." For according to the requirement of its proper end (which is its motion), it bestows upon it proper dispositions. And this is that agent which he says "signifies the end with a necessary significance." Which also is more clear in what he adds after that which is introduced above, when he says: "And there is no doubt that the agent itself is the mover itself." For how he understands "it is the agent" without any medium, he explains saying: "for that which moves it with a motion proper to it, is that which bestows upon it first the dispositions on account of which it acquires proper motion." And thus it is clear that it is not an agent except by way of a likeness, just as form is said to give being to the composite and to "make" it in such dispositions.

From this also it appears why he says it is "**not a mover only**"—because the Commentator does not think that the celestial body of itself or from some other form besides the intelligence has such dispositions, and the intelligence itself only moves it just as a potter moves a wheel (to which he does not give such dispositions proper for motion), but he maintains that the moving intelligence is the cause for it of all such dispositions just as other forms for their bodies. To be an agent in this way, however, is not to be an agent properly, nor by having such an agent is it argued (according to the Commentator) that the heaven is made in the sense in which the question is treated. Rather, according to him, such an agent can belong to a body whether it is generated or made, or whether it is not made, as has already been said.

And that he ought to be thus understood, he himself taught when in the fourth book of *On the Heavens*, comment 1, he said that "eternal things do not have an agent except according to a likeness. And if they have something that is an agent, it will not be except insofar as it is a form to it and preserving it," as was alleged above.

(To the authorities for the second part)

To those arguments which are introduced for the making of the **intelligences**, it must be said to the **first** [authority] that it assumes two false things:

One is that it was the intention of the **Commentator** that the intellection by which the second [intelligence] understands the first is the substance of the second intelligence itself. This indeed is false. Rather, he held that such intellection is the substance of the **first intelligence** (the one understood), as will be clear in the following article.

The second [false assumption], whose falsity is clear from this first one, is that the first intelligence is the **efficient cause** of the intellection by which it is understood by the second. For it would follow that it would be the efficient cause of itself.

Nor is the first proof valid which is introduced for that. For the Commentator does not say that there is a cause there just as the "understood" is the cause of "intellection," but just as it "is the cause of the **understander**." It is established, however, that the "understood" taken for the object distinct from the intellection (in which sense the arguer takes it) is not the efficient cause of the understander according to him, even if in us it may sometimes be the cause of intellection. Therefore, the Commentator takes "understood" for the intellection itself, according to his usual manner in the third book of *On the Soul*, where he calls intellection "**intellect in act**." Intellection, however, is not the efficient cause of the understander, but rather the **formal**. And if indeed it be an accident and distinct from the object, it is a form inhering in the understander just as in us; but if it be a substance subsisting per se and the same as that which is understood (as it is according to the Commentator in things separate from matter), then it is according to him a form perfecting only, not however inhering; just as if it were posited (per impossible or possible) that the intellection by which we understand a stone were to subsist per se, and nevertheless by it we would understand the stone.

In this way, therefore, he says there is cause and caused there when he says: "For there is only cause and caused there according as we say that the understood is the cause of the understander." And what follows hints at this enough: "And since it is so," he says, "it is not impossible that that which is per se intelligence and understood should be the cause of several beings, according as many modes are understood in it."

He maintains, therefore, that the **first** of which he speaks is per se intelligence (that is, intellection and understood). And because it is the intellection of many (because of all separate substances), it is the cause of many, diversely however, according as many modes are understood in it (that is, according as it is understood by them in diverse modes). For although it is the same intellection of all, nevertheless through it, according to him, one intelligence understands the first more perfectly than another.

And in this way, every intelligence is said to be perfected by the first, not as by an inhering form, nor as by an agent causing in it some quality or formal perfection or its substance, as those [others] think. And this is also clear from the words which he immediately premises, for he says that "there is neither a proceeding nor a following nor an action there, such that we might say that one action follows one agent. For there is only cause and caused there etc.," as above; where it is expressly clear that he universally denies there to be an agent or action properly speaking, and consequently every efficiency.

The **second authority** is not to the purpose, because the Commentator says that is true in us, not however in the intelligences. Rather, he immediately posits the opposite, as will be shown in the following article.

The other authority from the seventh book of the **Metaphysics** is not to the purpose, because the Commentator is not speaking there of intellectual virtues which are intelligences and abstract substances (of which the speech is now), but he speaks of intellectual or intelligible virtues which are **universal intentions** and understood things in act and abstract from matter and its conditions. On account of whose making Aristotle was compelled to posit the **agent intellect**, which is a power abstract from matter.

Finally, to those arguments which prove generally concerning all beings, it must be said to the **first authority** that nothing more is held through it except that the first is the cause of all and that all have

being through it. From this, however, it does not follow that it is an **efficient cause**, nor does the Commentator intend this.

And that this is so, is manifestly clear through the same [Commentator] in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 4, where he says that "when Aristotle considered the celestial appetitive powers, he saw them moved toward an appetible thing nobler than themselves." And it follows: "And when he considered the continuation of their motion"—namely of the celestial bodies—"it was declared that the cause of continuation is not that by which they are moved, but that which bestows upon them continuation is that appetible thing"—namely that toward which they are moved. From which it is clear that the cause of the continuation of celestial motion is a **final cause**. And it follows: "And it was declared that the giver of continuation to motion is the giver of the motion of the heaven, and unless it were, the motion would be destroyed; and if the motion, also the heaven. For the heaven is for the sake of its motion. And if the motion of the heaven were destroyed, the motion of the inferior spheres would be destroyed, and thus the world. From which it is verified that the giver of continuation" to motion itself "is the giver of being to other beings."

From which it is clear in what sense he says it gives being to all beings, namely because it gives being to the **first motion** as its final cause, and consequently to the **heaven**, which is for the sake of its proper motion and from its form first has proper dispositions agreeing with that motion. And since the other spheres are for the sake of the first, nor would they be if that were not, it gives also consequently being to them. And because the heavens are the cause of elements and mixed things and other generable and corruptible things, it follows from the first to the last that the first gives being to all beings and preserves them—not because it produces all things according to the intention of the Commentator, but because it is the **end** of the first motion and of others.

To the **second** [authority], it must be said that whatever may be the case regarding this—namely, whether from the fact that God is the end of the rest, it would follow that the rest are produced or not—it is nevertheless certain that the Philosopher and Commentator did not believe this to follow. Whence they manifestly posited one and denied the other. As for the proof of the consequence, the response will be clear below in question 3 of this distinction.

The distinction also which they give concerning the **double making**, as was shown in many ways above, is not according to the doctrine of the Philosopher or Commentator, but according to **Avicenna**, who in this greatly disagrees from them.

Nor is the first proof of that distinction from the saying of the Commentator in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 43, valid, as was shown above. The second also is less valid. For when he says that "a certain thing made is prior naturally to time itself" (and it is the orb which time follows and to which time is an accident), and "a certain agent is also prior naturally to time itself" (and that is the intelligence making the orb in necessary dispositions), he does not take "**agent**" and "**made**" properly, but only by way of **likeness**, as was shown above.

ARTICLE 2

[Opinion of Peter Auriol]

As to the second article, there is a certain opinion saying that the mind of the **Philosopher** and **Commentator** was that every orb has **two motors**.

One indeed **proper** and naturally united to it, by way of a form bestowing its perfections upon the same, in the manner previously explained in the preceding article; and this one moves only by way of an agent and immediately the said orb, namely executing immediately its circular motion; and in this way every abstract intelligence except the first is conjoined and moves.

It has another motor, not indeed proper as **Avicenna** thought, but **common**, moving only by way of an **end**, as beloved and desired by the conjoined and active motors; and this motor is the intelligence simply first, which they call **God** and the **first cause**. The mode of its motion according to this opinion is that it virtually, and like a certain universal art exemplarily containing all things, and eminently existing in the mind of every other intelligence, causes efficiently the desire or love and complacency of itself in them, so that it is the same itself which immediately effects the desire and which terminates or ends it.

For it is that which they desire and in which they find complacency. From such complacency, every other motor moves to explicate that universal art in matter through the motion of its orb—more and less, however, according as they understand it more and less. For the motor of the first orb, understanding it totally and universally, intends the **good simply** of the whole universe, just as a general having in mind the total military art for directing the whole army. Then the motor of the second orb understands more particularly the aforesaid universal art, and therefore intends a good also more particularly contained under the good which the first motor intends, just as a soldier having the equestrian art contained under the military intends not the total regimen of the whole army, but something contained under it. And so forth in order, descending according to the order of the orbs, so that the universal art itself alone is the end of every conjoined motor and of its motion. And it effects nothing except the desire of itself in them. From which it is clear also, as they say, that it is not devoid of every action, although it does not immediately effect the motion or move the heaven itself.

This opinion, which has been substantially recited (although it is declared much more prolixly by its defenders), is proved by authorities and reasons.

[Opinion of Peter Auriol proved by authorities]

The first authority is of the **Philosopher** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, saying of the first principle that it moves as **appetible** and **desired** and **beloved**. Upon which the **Commentator**, in comment 35, says: "From this it appears well that the celestial bodies are animated, and that they do not have of the powers of the soul except intellect and the desiderative power which moves in place." And at the end of the comment he adds: "Because the celestial bodies, since they have appetite on account of intellect (intellect however desires a good greater than itself), it happens necessarily that the celestial bodies desire in this motion some good greater than themselves." Thus the **Commentator**. Since therefore the celestial bodies do not desire or understand insofar as they are bodies, but rather the abstract form united to them (which the **Commentator** calls soul) desires and understands, it follows that if it desires a

greater good, that [good] is the ultimate end and does not move executively, since there is no good greater than it.

The second is what the **Philosopher** adds in the same place, saying that "the principle of celestial motion is **imagination through intellect**." Where the **Commentator**, in comment 36: "Since he declared," he says, "the first motor to be eternal, and a pure substance without matter, and a motor without that which is moved, and that it moves as desired and pleasurable, but the principle of every motion is from something and to something, he wishes here to narrate the principle of this motion in the moved thing, what it is and what is that to which the motion is. And he said: 'But the principle of this motion existing in the celestial body is imagination through intellect.'" Where it also appears that beyond the motor which moves as **beloved**, he posits an **executive motor**, which is imagination through intellect.

The third authority is of the **Commentator** in the same twelfth book, comment 40, saying that "the celestial motion is composed of two motors, of which one is of finite motion, and is the **soul** existing in it; the other indeed of infinite, and is the **power** which is not in matter." And he adds that "if we posit that towards which the celestial bodies are moved, namely the first motor," not to be transmutable in any way, it happens that they will always be moved. And he concludes that "the celestial body is animated necessarily." Where it is also clear that beyond the conjoined motor (which he calls the soul of the heaven), he posits a motor by way of an **end**.

The fourth authority is of the same in the same place, comment 43, where he says that "that which the motor of the body of the heaven understands of the first motor and is in the soul of the heaven, is other than that which the motor of the orb of Saturn understands of it." And he adds that the "perfection of each" motor consists in "understanding the proper cause and the first cause." Behold that besides the executive motor, he posits the **first cause** moving by way of an end.

The fifth authority is of the **Philosopher** in the second book of *On the Heavens*, saying that "the noble perfect is one, which does not need operation by which it might become more noble." Where the **Commentator**, in comment 64, says that "all beings do not intend by their operations except that they be assimilated to the noble perfect which is God, which does not need action in the acquisition of its nobility." From which it is clear also that God has no action.

The sixth is of the **Commentator** in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 4, where he says that when Aristotle considered "the celestial body to be eternal"—but everything moved is moved by a power existing in it—he found that that power is a "soul not mixed with matter," abstract and separate from the body, and he found "it to be an appetitive power. And when he considered the celestial appetitive powers, he found them moved toward an appetible thing nobler than themselves. And it was declared to him that the cause of the continuation of motion is not that by which it is moved, but is another appetible thing." From this also it is clear that he posits two motors: one **executive**, the other as **appetible and end**.

[Opinion of Peter Auriol proved by reasons]

Second, the same opinion is proved by reasons. First, because the philosophers did not attribute that to God which argues in Him some potentiality or materiality, since He according to them is **pure act** entirely. But if He is a motor conjoined to some orb, it follows that He is in some way material and

potential, because every such motor is united to the moved thing as a form making the celestial body under necessary dispositions—figure and motion and the like. And therefore in the second book of *On the Heavens*, comment 3, he says: "And the truth is in this nature"—and he speaks of the intelligence moving the orb—"that it is similar to a natural form and is similar to an abstract form. For it is assimilated to a natural form because it gives to this body circular motion and is in the body which is moved by it; and it is assimilated to an abstract form because it is not divided by the division of the body in which it is. For the recipient of this form and united with it is the celestial corporeal body, to which follow corporeal dimensions and other accidents; and therefore the form and the formed are in it the same in number." Thus the Commentator.

Furthermore, the **Philosopher** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** never says that the first moves as **desiring** or **loving**, but only as **appetible** and **beloved**. And he assumes for the proof of this, because nothing moves as entirely unmoved, except that which moves by way of an end and beloved. For the end moves the agent and the executive motor; therefore, if the first were to move executively, it would be moved by an end and would not be a motor entirely unmoved.

(Against, through three conclusions)

This opinion, in three things which it says, is false, as it seems to me.

One is because it denies that God, according to the Philosopher and Commentator, is a **motor conjoined** to some orb, moving executively or actively.

Another, because it denies that other inferior intelligences move their orbs by way of an **end**.

Third, because it says the first intelligence or God **effects the desire** of Himself in other intelligences, from which desire they move the orbs.

And therefore I posit against these things three conclusions:

First is that the Philosopher and Commentator held that God is a motor appropriated to the first movable thing and moving it immediately and actively.

Second, that they held every other intelligence moves as an end and is the end of its motion, although not the ultimate, but an end under the end, as will be declared.

Third, that they did not posit the desire or love of Himself to be caused efficiently by the first in other intelligences, from which they might move the orbs.

[First conclusion proved by first authority]

I prove the **first conclusion** first by express authorities, second by reasons.

The **first authority** is of the **Philosopher** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, where distinguishing between abstract principles moving orbs, he says: "But indeed both that which is good and that which is for its own sake eligible are in the same coordination, and the best." And the translation of the comment has: "And that which is chosen for its own sake in the unity of elements, and is very noble." Where the **Commentator**, explaining in comment 36, says: "And that which is loved for its own sake in the unity of these elements is very noble, that is: and also that which is loved for its own sake and is desired among these abstract principles (of which each one is some one simple thing and an element of the body which it moves) is that which of them is in the end of nobility and simplicity and unity. And he intended—namely Aristotle—by this speech to distinguish between the **first principle** and **other abstract principles**. For the others seem to be chosen and desired for the sake of others, namely the principles of other celestial motions besides"—or "on account of" according to another text—"the diurnal motion. That which makes this motion, however, seems to be chosen for itself; since towards it is moved everything with a motion faster and greater than the motions proper to each of them, it is chosen for itself and beloved by all. Such is the perfect in the end." Thus the Commentator.

This authority is so expressly for the conclusion that no one, if he attends diligently, is permitted to feel the opposite. For it is established that according to the intention of the Philosopher and Commentator, only the **principle simply first**, which is God, is chosen for itself, and others for its sake, and is beloved by all and perfect in the end and in the end of nobility and simplicity and unity. Since therefore, in giving the difference between the principles of celestial motions, he says such is the principle of the **diurnal motion** (which is established to be of the first movable thing), it is manifestly concluded that according to their intention God is the principle of that motion in the way in which He is not the principle of others, and in the way in which other abstract principles (from which this first is distinguished) are principles of other motions; and consequently as an **executive** and **appropriated** and **conjoined motor** to the first orb, since even of the others He is the end according to the intention of the Philosopher (as the opinion says), and the other principles are conjoined and appropriated to their orbs and actively moving.

[First conclusion proved by second authority]

The **second authority** of the same Philosopher is below in the same book where he asks whether several eternal substances are to be posited and how many. For he speaks thus: "But we see besides the simple lation of the universe, which we say the **first substance** existing here moves, other lations etc." And afterwards he concludes that according to the number of lations is the number of eternal and immobile substances. And the **Commentator** [says] the same entirely there in comment 42.

Behold that he expressly says the first substance moves the **first lation**. But the first substance is that which we call God. Nor can it be said that He moves only as an end: Both because thus also He moves other lations; whence he would not say specifically this lation is made by Him. And because from motion he does not conclude the number of substances moving precisely by way of an end, as even the contrary opinion is forced to confess, since then there would be only one sempiternal substance. And because the Philosopher seems thus to compare the first substance to the first lation just as the others to the other lations, but he compares them as **active principles**, as is clear; wherefore etc.

[Objections]

Perhaps it will be said that by the "first substance" there the Philosopher does not understand the substance simply first which is God, but the first among those moving executively and naturally united to orbs, and such indeed is that which makes the first motion. But than this there is another prior not moving except by way of an end, namely God Himself, who is the substance simply first.

This response is nothing according to the intention of the Philosopher and Commentator, indeed entirely repugnant to it. Which is clear first indeed, because the **Commentator** immediately in the following comment (namely 43) reproves this saying (which indeed was **Avicenna's**) speaking thus: "But that which the moderns say, that the first substance is prior to the motor of the whole, is false. For every one of these substances is a principle of sensible substance according to the **motor** and the **end**. And therefore Aristotle says that if some substances were not moving, they would be idle." Thus the Commentator.

To this authority the defenders of the contrary opinion respond saying that the Commentator intends that the first substance moves by causing desire in the conjoined motor. And thus it is not idle and without action, the opposite of which **Avicenna** opined, saying that the first intelligence by understanding itself caused the motor of the first heaven, but afterwards caused nothing but remained in idleness. In which the Commentator now reproves him.

This response is nothing: Both because he expressly says "it is false that the first substance is prior to the motor of the whole"; but if it were not the mover of the whole, but some other intelligence (however it might cause desire or move or not move), certainly it would be prior to the motor of the whole. And because he says that every such substance is a principle of sensible substance (such as a celestial body) both according to the **motor** and according to the **end**; but it cannot be understood to be a principle of it according to the motor (distinguishing from principiation according to the end) unless because it **moves the heaven actively**.

Furthermore, that he understands [this] of motion which is the **translation of the heaven** is proved from the fact that he alleges Aristotle in this. But that the Philosopher understands [this] of such motion is manifestly clear from the fact that at the end of the said chapter, after he investigated the number of moving substances from the number of celestial motions, he concludes that there is no other nature besides these. And he proves [it]: "For if there were," he says, "others, they would move existing as ends of motion," where the **Commentator**, in comment 47: "Since we have posited," he says, "that there is no abstract substance which does not move (because then it would be found in a diminished disposition), since we have posited that every orb is for the sake of a star, and if not, it would be idle, it is manifest that the way of numbering these abstract substances is the way of numbering the motion of the stars."

Behold that Aristotle says there is no other besides the moving ones. And he says that "if there were others" besides that number which is equal to the number of motions, those also would move, and consequently (as the Commentator infers) there would be "other motions besides those which are comprehended" in the celestial bodies, and also other bodies; and certainly this consequence would be nothing according to them, if there were some [substance] not moving. The Commentator also says that "there is no abstract substance which does not move, otherwise it would be in a diminished disposition." And it is clear that he understands [this] of motion by way of an agent and not of an end only, although every one also moves in that way, as has already been touched upon, and will be more clear in the second conclusion.

It is confirmed, because the Philosopher in the same twelfth book, in that chapter "But since there were three substances," near the beginning says that "it profits nothing if we make substances sempiternal, if some principle able to transmute is not in them." And the **Commentator** there, in comment 30, says: "It profits nothing to posit an eternal substance in which there is no **principle of moving**." Here it is clear that the Philosopher and he are speaking of the principiation of **local motion**, since the causation of desire is not transmutation, of which they speak.

Further, in comment 43, the **Commentator** says that "just as for the first prince in cities it is necessary that he have a **proper action** which is the noblest of actions—and if not, he would be idle—which action all who are under the first prince intend by their action" (and he also adduces many examples from the arts, of which the inferior intend the action of the superior), "so," he adds, "it is to be understood of these bodies with their forms by which they are moved, and of these forms in turn." From which it is clear that he maintains the **first prince of the universe**, who is God, has a **proper action** which the inferior motors intend and serve. Such an action, however, is the **diurnal motion** as is clear by the words which he premises. For he says that "all intend this diurnal motion, which is the **action of the first motor** and the principle of other actions."

From the aforesaid, another proof can be gathered directly for the conclusion. For according to the mind of the Philosopher and Commentator, as is clear from the aforesaid, it is that **every abstract substance moves some celestial body**, otherwise it would be superfluous in the universe and idle and in a diminished disposition, that is, imperfect. And because this according to them would be the greatest inconvenience concerning the first substance, which is the noblest of all, it follows that they indubitably opined that the first substance moves some celestial body; and if so, it follows [it moves] the first, which is the nobler and supreme among all. And it is clear that they speak of motion which is **corporeal translation**, although their motive is nothing according to the truth, since there are many perfect abstract substances, and not idle or superfluous, not moving [bodies]. Now however, it is asked not what is true, but what they held.

[First conclusion proved by reasons]

Next, the conclusion is proved by reasons:

First, because according to the intention of the Philosopher, the physicist proves the same substance to be, and to be abstract from all matter and entirely immobile; and the metaphysician proves [it] to be the first form and ultimate end of all. Therefore, according to his intention, God moves the heaven actively.

The antecedent is clear first from the saying of the **Commentator** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 6, where he says that "the formal and final and moving principle are not three in number, but one in subject and three in reason. According as it is **moving**, it is declared to be in natural science; and that it is not in matter. And according as this science"—namely metaphysics—"concedes that this moving [principle] is not in matter, it declares that it is the **form** and **end** of that sensible substance, not in that it is sensible, but in that it is being." And in the preceding comment he says that the Philosopher "began to declare the principles of eternal substance. And he posited also this which was declared in natural things. And he considered them with a consideration proper to this science, for example that it is substance and first form and that it is the first end."

Second, because in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, the Philosopher repeating the reason made in the eighth book of the **Physics** proves the motor of the heaven to be simply abstract from matter and immobile. Then, that such motors are several and each is a substance. And afterwards, that the first of them is the end of the others.

The consequence is clear. For the ultimate end, according to the intention of the Philosopher, is nothing but **God**, as all concede; therefore, the physicist proves God to be, and to be separate from matter, according to the Philosopher. It is established, however, that by no other reason than by that of the eighth book of the **Physics**—namely that He moves in infinite time. Which reason, as appears to anyone understanding, proceeds entirely from **moving actively**. Nor is it found anywhere that he proved any substance to be abstract by any other reason.

Second, the same substance according to the Philosopher is the first and the measure of all substances and the first motor and form and end. Therefore God according to him moves actively.

The antecedent is clear through the **Commentator** in the tenth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 7, who, where the **Philosopher** says that "just as in colors one color is to be sought [as] the one itself, so also in substance one substance, the one itself," the Commentator says: "'Just as in colors etc.,' that is, because it is the principle of substances and the principle of their number which exists in substance. And he intends"—namely Aristotle—"that (since that which was declared in the Physics has been joined, namely that this is the **first eternal motor** and absolute from all matter, and he declared afterwards that this is not only a principle as a motor but as form and end) it will be declared that that is the **One** concerning which it was declared here that it is the principle of substance just as it is declared that it is the ultimate act to which potency is not mixed at all."

Here it is clear that the Commentator maintains that the first substance, which is the ultimate act to which potency is not mixed at all, and is the principle of number and the measure of all others, is a **motor** (namely, moving actively). Which exposition is clear from the fact that he says that "it is not only a principle as a motor but as form and end." Where he distinguishes the principiation of a motor from the reason of principiating according to an end. The consequence, however, is clear, since according to all, God Himself alone is the measure of substances and the first of all.

[Second conclusion proved]

The **second conclusion** is proved first by the **Philosopher** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, who, after he concluded that there is something which moves not moved, sempiternal and substance and being in act, immediately adds of such a motor: "But it moves just as the **appetible** and **intelligible** move not moved," where according to all (even those who are of the contrary opinion), he intends that such a moving [principle] moves by way of an **end**. And afterwards he asks concerning such a moving substance, whether it is one or several, and determines that they are **several**. Therefore he maintains that not only the first motor but also others move by way of an end and are the ends of their motions.

Furthermore, he himself at the end of that chapter "But whether one is to posit such a substance or several," after he concluded that they are several and that their number is according to the number of motions, adds, as was alleged above, that besides them there is no other. And he proves that "if there

were," he says, "others, they would move existing as **ends** of motion." This consequence would be nothing according to him, unless all [substances] which move were also ends of their motions.

This same thing is proved by the **Commentator**, first indeed because upon that part previously alleged "but it moves as appetible etc." he says in comment 35 that this "moving [principle] is intellect and is moving because it **acts the motion** and because it is the **end of motion**." And that he understands this of every celestial motor is clear, because after he placed the example of the form of a bath and said that "if it were not in matter, it would move both according to the agent and according to the end." "Thus," he says himself, "it is to be understood of those moving celestial bodies; therefore according as those understood things are **forms** of them, they are moving according to the agent; according however as they are **ends** of them, they [the bodies] are moved by them according to desire."

Likewise, in comment 47 he says that "every one of those moving substances is the perfection and **end of motion**."

Item, the same in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 1, says that "since the forms of celestial bodies are not constituted by their subjects, it is necessary that the form by which they are moved be that **to which** they are moved. For in forms constituted by their subjects they differ, namely that the form by which they are moved is not that to which they are moved. And for every form of this kind—namely which is moved to perfect itself by another—it is necessary that its moving be finite, since it does not move unless it is moved" (supply: as by an end to be acquired, which being acquired the motion ceases). Item, he adds that "there is nothing in celestial bodies by which the form by which is motion differs from that to which is motion, rather they are the **same form**, and do not differ except in disposition." Thus the Commentator.

From all of which it is clear that the same form (or intelligence) itself is that by which the heaven is moved and is the principle of motion as agent, and that to which it is moved, that is, it is the **end of motion**.

(Third conclusion proved)

The **third conclusion** is proved, first because if the first [intelligence] were to cause the desire of itself in the intelligence moving the orb (as was said), it would follow that the intelligence itself would move being moved by an extrinsically desired thing. And thus the **celestial animal** would not be composed of one mover and one moved only. The consequent is against the **Commentator** in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 2, where he says that "the forms of celestial bodies, and especially the form of the last containing body, are in a certain way a **soul** (namely through the appetite existing in them and 'to move') and in a certain way **intellect**; and it is a simple first form, through which the celestial animal is composed of one mover and one moved. Contrariwise concerning animals which are here. For it appears that in these the mover is composed of two movers, namely of the soul and the thing desired extrinsically moving the soul. And therefore the motion in them is found to be composed, not simple." Thus the Commentator.

The consequence, however, is clear, since then the desired thing would move the intelligence by causing desire, and thus there would be a double mover (namely the desired thing and the intelligence itself).

Likewise, there would be a double moved thing (namely the celestial body and the intelligence itself, which also would be a mover moved, just as in animals which are here).

Second, forms simply abstract and separate from matter, when they are understood by other abstract forms, do not cause (according to the Philosopher and Commentator) the intellection of themselves in them, but are understood **by themselves**, so that the intellection and the understood are essentially the same. Therefore, when they are desired by the same, they do not cause the desire of themselves in them, but are desired **by themselves**. And the desire and the desired are essentially the same.

The antecedent is clear through the **Philosopher** in the third book of *On the Soul*, saying that "in those things which are without matter, the intellect and what is understood are the same." And he takes "intellect" for the act or for "to understand." Which is clear: Both from what immediately follows; for he says: "For speculative science and that which is thus speculated are the same." And from the translation of the comment which is this: "For to form through the intellect and the formed through the intellect in those things which are outside matter are the same"; by "to form," however, he himself understands everywhere simple intelligence, or simple understanding which is not affirmation or negation (which by him are called "faith"). And the **Commentator** says the same there in comment 15. And below in comment 27 he says that "the science of separate intellects is the thing known itself in all ways, contrary to the disposition in things known by the material intellect."

Likewise in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 36, speaking of abstract forms moving orbs, he says that in them "intellect" (that is, understanding) "is the understood, as was said in the book *On the Soul*." And afterwards he adds that such understood things "are understood **through themselves** and not through assimilation like material understood things" (which namely are understood through assimilation, because through an intellection distinct from themselves which is their likeness). And he says many things to the same point in the same comment and similarly in comment 50.

The consequence is proved according to the same Commentator, as can be had in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 35, in the beginning: **Desire** and **intellection** in such beings do not differ just as in us. Whence he says that in us "the motion into another of the desired differs from the motion into another of the understood," that is, desire [differs] from intellection. And it follows: "And it seems concerning these principles which are in celestial bodies, that the desired in them is the same with the understood. For the desired with us differs from the understood." And he takes "understood" here for **intellection**, just as frequently in the third book of *On the Soul* he calls intellection "intellect in act," and similarly "desired" for "to desire." Otherwise, if [he took it] for the object outside, he would speak falsely, for everything we desire, we understand.

And this sense is confirmed by the proof which he adjoins immediately: "Because the power," he says, "by which the desired is comprehended differs from the power by which the understood is comprehended." Which proof, whether the assumption be true or not, would be nothing unless "desired" and "understood" were taken for acts and not for the object, because from the diversity of the powers of intellect and will is not argued a diversity of object, but well a **diversity of acts**.

Third, the conclusion is proved by the same [Commentator] in the same place, who showing how the same abstract form which is intellect and appetite moves the celestial body as **agent** and as **end**, declares

how "in us they differ"—that which moves as agent and that which moves as end—by the example of a **bath**, whose form existing in the soul, as he says, "is the agent of desire and motion"; understand desire "not of itself" but of the form existing outside the soul, and similarly it is the agent (namely mediately or immediately) of the corporeal motion by which we are moved to the bath existing outside the soul, which indeed "is the end of such motion and not the agent," as the Commentator says.

And then he adds that "if the form of the bath were not in matter, it would move according to the agent and according to the end **without any contingent motion**." "And thus," he says, "it is to be understood of those moving celestial bodies etc." He maintains therefore that the same abstract form which moves as agent of the motion of the celestial body, moves also as ending it without any contingent motion. Which cannot be understood of the motion of the celestial body itself on account of the implication of contradiction following (for thus it would be said that it moved the celestial body, and yet it would not be moved). But it is understood "without motion contingent to the form itself acting the motion," since the abstract form itself (whether it be loved by itself or by another abstract form) does not cause a **love of itself distinct from itself** in the lover, by which the lover might be moved by the loved thing—contrary to that which happens in us as was predicted. And these are conformable to the things said by the same and alleged in the first reason for this third conclusion.

(Proper determination)

I say therefore as to this article that the mind of the **Philosopher** and **Commentator** was that the first intelligence, which is God, actively moves and is a **motor conjoined and appropriated** to the first orb. And similarly every other intelligence actively moves its own orb, to which also it is naturally united. Again, every moving intelligence moves for its own sake and is the **end** of its own motion.

Whence it is not to be understood according to them that the end primarily intended of the moving intelligence is the motion itself or the generation of inferior things following it, but its own **proper goodness and perfection**, which, as the **Commentator** says, it sees itself to be in moving. For if it were not to move, it would be idle and in a not good disposition. So that therefore it might always be in the best disposition, it always moves, just as the Commentator gives an example in comment 35 of him who for the sake of the preservation of his health is exercised in the operation of some art, by which he makes some artificial things. The end of this indeed by first intention is the preservation of his health and good disposition, but by second intention the operation of the art itself.

He says the same in the second book of *On the Heavens*, comment 21, and in the same place comment 17: In divine things, he says, their action by first intention is for the sake of their own being, and by second for the sake of another. And this is to be declared in divine science. And in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 88: "Of such kind," he says, "is the disposition of the necessary being simply, namely that it is not for the sake of its action, but its action for the sake of it."

In this, however, there is a difference between the celestial motors themselves. For the **first** is so the end of its own motion that no other motor is the end of that motion; but of every other motion not only its own proper motor is the end, but also the first motor, since the first is the end of every other motor, and to it

and for its sake as ultimate end is every other. Whence both the actions and motions of others serve and are ordered into the action of the first. And this is what the **Commentator** says in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 43: "And it is to be understood," he says, "that the motions of the other orbs intend the motion of the starry orb, and that the perfection of each of those moving each of them (that is, of the first orbs) is perfected through the first motor of all. And therefore all intend this diurnal motion, which is the action of the first motor and the principle of other actions. For it appears that other proper motions are for the sake of that motion and following it and helping in the order which they intend, and it is the principle of their actions," namely the **final principle**.

And then moving a doubt upon this, the Commentator [says]: "But someone," he says, "will ask, since if the motions of all orbs intend one and the same action and the same order common to all, it is necessary that they have the same understood form extrinsic to the forms which each intends by itself (namely proper forms). Will therefore the form as an end be added above the proper form by which each orb of the other orbs is moved?" And he answers: "Let us say therefore that no form is as an end and common and universal except that of those which has a common action. And this is the disposition of the form moving the first heaven with the diurnal motion. For the disposition in the help of celestial bodies to each other in creating beings which are here, and preserving them, is like the disposition of good regents, who help each other in ruling a good city, since all their actions are towards the action of the first prince. For they place their actions serving and following the action of the first prince." From these things the intention of the Commentator is clear which was premised above.

(To the alleged authorities)

Then to the authorities alleged for the other opinion I respond. And to the **first**, I say that the Commentator does not understand that they desire a greater good for themselves (the moving intelligences), but for the **moved bodies themselves**. For the moving intelligences, as was said, move for their own sake by first intention, and therefore in moving they desire, or speaking more properly **love** as an end, some good greater than the moved bodies themselves. And this is his intention, who there wishes to declare what is the end of celestial motion, just as also by declaring he premised approving the exposition of **Alexander** in comment 30.

To the **second**, it must be said that it does not make for them in any way. For, as is clear by the words immediately following, the Commentator says this to declare that "the principle of this motion is not phantasy nor sense but **imagination through intellect**." From this, however, it does not follow that such a moving principle is other than the principle to which the motion is, nor does the Commentator say this.

To the **third authority** concerning those two motors, it must be said that those words are not to be taken strictly according to their proper signification, since then manifestly by them the Commentator would contradict those things which he said in chapter 1 of *On the Substance of the Orb*, where he says thus: "It is not to be said that the forms by which the celestial bodies are moved are other than those to which they are moved, and that those which ought to be not in matter entirely and which lack site are the forms to which they are moved, while those by which they are moved are forms in matters."

Behold that he expressly says two such distinct motors are not to be posited: One to which they are moved, and another by which they are moved; and the former not in matter entirely, the latter however in matter (that is, conjoined). And these expressly contradict those things which the alleged words sound to the opposite.

Furthermore, if two such motors be posited according to the intention of the opposite opinion (namely that one should move actively only and the other only finally), he expressly contradicts himself and also the **Philosopher** who posit expressly that every intelligence acting the motion is also the end of motion, as is clear from the proofs of the second conclusion.

It must be said therefore, unless we wish to concede he contradicts himself (just as some in this pass concede), that he spoke **improperly**. For, because every celestial motor moves both as agent and as end (as was said above), on account of this **double mode of moving** or double reason which in us belongs to two distinct motors (as was had above through the same), he says that motion is composed of **two motors**, although essentially there is only one, at least in the first motion. For as to the others, it could be said that there are several: one **common** which is conjoined to the first orb, and another **proper**. And the common would move the inferiors only by way of an end; the proper, however, as agent and as end according to the mode premised. And the common itself would move its own proper orb in both ways. But if we wish to understand the word of the Commentator even of the first motion, it is to be understood improperly according to the given sense.

And such an exposition can be had from the same [Commentator]. For with few things interposed, he adds after the words already alleged from chapter 1 of *On the Substance of the Orb*, concluding thus: "Therefore there is nothing in celestial bodies by which the form by which is motion differs from that to which is motion; rather they are the same form and do not differ except in disposition." It is established, however, that the form by which is motion is the form which is the principle acting the motion, and that to which is motion is that which is the end of motion. "And they are the same," as he says, "they do not differ except in disposition," that is, by the reason of moving—that is, it is said to move by differing reasons. And such a motor, insofar as it moves as agent, is called **form** and **soul of the heaven**; insofar however as [it moves] as end, it is said to be separate and not in matter. Just as he hints is to be understood in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 35, where he says that "those understood things according as they are forms of them, are moving according to the agent; according however as they are ends, they are moved by them etc." For this reason, however, he says "one is of finite motion, the other indeed of infinite and not in matter," because motion does not have infinity from the motor as it is agent, but as it is its end. Since, as the Commentator says there by the authority of **Themistius**, if some motor should move for the sake of an end existing in potency, that being adept and deduced to act, the motion will cease. Wherefore it is necessary that eternal motion be toward something always in act. Item, if the end were something in a body, it would not always be equally distant and uniformly related to the motor, but now it would be here, now there. And consequently the motor would now speed up, now slow down the motion, and thus the motion would not be uniform and regular. Since therefore the celestial motion is eternal and regular, the Commentator concludes from this deduction that that motion is towards something always being in act, existing in no matter. From which it follows that the celestial motor is separate from matter. And this he intends.

To the **fourth**, it must be said that when he says the perfection of each motor consists in understanding the proper cause and the first cause, he understands [this] of the **second motors** only, as is clear by the words immediately following: "And it is to be understood," he says, "that the motions of other orbs etc.," as was recited just above in the response to the article.

To the **fifth**, I say that if it be understood absolutely, it is against the arguer. For according to this it would follow that God would not cause desire in other intelligences (as they say), since such causation, if it be posited, is a certain operation. I say nevertheless to the authority in itself according to the understanding of the Philosopher and Commentator that by "mobile perfect" they do not understand God alone, but the **whole genus of abstract intelligences**, as is expressly clear through the Commentator in the same place, comments 63 and 66. Whence in 66, after he had declared that something has its perfection without action, something by few, something however by much action, he speaks thus: "And according to this he said"—namely Aristotle—"the orders seem to be four and every order has a latitude besides the last order. The first order therefore is the order of beings which comprehend perfect nobility **without operation**, and they are diversified according to more and less, these however are abstract beings. The second however, of those which approach perfect nobility through operation. And these are in two modes: Either through little operation, and this is not found except in celestial bodies; or through much operation—and this is found in celestial bodies and in man." Then he posits the third and fourth order, but I do not recite them, because it is not necessary to the purpose.

From this, however, it is clear that if that authority were understood in the sense of the arguer, it would prove that no abstract intelligence moves any heaven executively, which is manifestly against the intention of the Philosopher and Commentator even according to the opposite opinion. And therefore I say that by **operation** or **action**, the Philosopher and Commentator understand **motion**. And they say that such perfect beings do not need operation in the acquisition of their nobility, that is, they do not need to be moved so that they might be in their nobility, nor do they acquire their nobility by any motion by which they might be moved. And to this point go the examples of other things which acquire their perfection by means of operation. Which also is declared from the fact that assigning the fourth order he adds: "The fourth indeed is the earth which cannot comprehend nobility through operation but without, namely through rest only. And this order is very distant from the first, although each is without operation. And in the first it was on account of the nobility of itself and its end, in this however on account of its vileness and that of its end," namely proper.

From these things it is clear that it cannot be concluded to the understanding of the Philosopher and Commentator that abstract intelligences, whether the first or others, do not move actively locally, but only that they are not moved.

To the **sixth**, it is clear what must be said from those things which were said to the third.

(To the alleged reasons)

Then to the **first reason**, it must be said that from such a conjunction of the first to the orb, no materiality or potentiality according to the Philosopher or Commentator is argued in it. Which is clear, because

neither is it argued in other inferior motors thus conjoined. Rather, speaking of all generally in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 30, he says: "It is necessary that **potency** be not mixed with this motor at all, neither in substance nor in place nor in any other of the modes of potency"; and he adds the reason: "Because the cause," he says, "of potency in things in which there is potency, is **matter**, as was said in the Physics." And in comment 37 he says that "that which moves the first motion, since it is not moved, because it is pure act without any potency, it is impossible that it have any disposition etc." And by "that which moves the first motion" he understands generally every celestial motor, and by "first motion" all orbs, as it seems to me. Or he understands the motor conjoined to the first orb and executively moving it. And whether this way or that, the purpose is had.

The authority, however, which he introduces for the proof of the consequence, it is clear that it does nothing for his purpose. Therefore it is not necessary to respond to it.

To the **second reason**, when it is said that "the Philosopher never says that the first moves as loving, but only that it moves as beloved," I say first that if from this you wish to argue that the first does not move actively (since by "first" there he understands the whole genus of celestial motors, as was shown above), it follows that no celestial motor would move as loving and actively, which according to you yourself is against the Philosopher.

I say therefore that he says "as beloved" for this reason: to show that it moves **not moved**, just as in us the appetible or beloved moves not moved. He does not deny, however, that it moves **loving**, although not as "loving" moves in us (which moves moved by an extrinsically desired thing moving the soul, as was said above by the Commentator).

And when it is said that "if the first were to move executively, it would be moved by an end and would not be a motor entirely unmoved," it must be said that if by "being moved by an end" nothing else entirely be understood than absolutely to move for the sake of some end (either of itself insofar as it moves, or of its motion or the moved thing insofar as it is moved), the Philosopher or Commentator would not deny, but would concede the first to be moved by an end—not however distinct from itself, just as each would concede that the first moves for its own sake and that it is the end of its own motion. But if by "being moved by an end" be understood to receive in itself some action of the end just as in us the animal soul according to the Commentator receives the action of the appetible (namely its intentional form in the apprehensive power and desire in the appetitive), as is clear enough from the things alleged above, they would not only deny "the first to be moved by an end" but also every celestial motor, and would posit every one "not moved" in this way, contrary to animals which are here. Although nevertheless every celestial motor is thus not moved by an end, there is yet a difference among them as to "moving for the sake of an end" in the first sense, because (as was had above) the first moves for its own sake only, but every one of the others not only for its own sake but also for the sake of the first, without however any motion contingent in them from it, as was said.

To the **principal reason of the question**, I say first that the Philosopher is not speaking there of efficient causes not moving, but of **moving causes** only, as appears in the text by his examples. Also because he posited no efficient in the world not moving, although he posited some moving, not however efficient (namely immediately), as is clear from the first article. Whence according to his intention it cannot be had

through that reason that there is one efficient of all. For if so, it would be necessary that something made by it be from nothing, and then it would be its efficient in such a way that it was not moving.

Second, I say that even taking "efficient" or "moving" in whatever way, the Philosopher understands there by "first efficient" **God** no more than the first material or formal cause, since in the same place he proves there is no process to infinity in material and formal causes. But he only understands that it is [necessary] to give some moving [principle] which moves not moved, whatever that may be. When therefore he says that it is [necessary] to arrive at one first motor or efficient which is the cause of others, it is to be understood that it is the cause of all other efficient or moving [causes] per se subordinate to one motion or caused thing, whose efficient causes are proved not to be infinite in number. It is not, however, to be understood that it is the efficient of all other beings of the universe, as the arguers imagine.

Furthermore, the reason itself according to itself does not prove that there is some such **efficient of all beings**. Which is clear, because in no effect's per se efficient or moved thing's motors is there a process to infinity, but it is [necessary] to arrive at a first which does not move (because it is [not] moved) nor effects (because it is [not] effected by another). It is established, however, that one does not always arrive at the **same first**, but of diverse caused things there are diverse firsts. Just as in the motion of a donkey there is one first mover, another in the motion of a dog, another in the motion of a man.

And similarly when something is impelled by something impelled by the air, and the air by another, there is a different first mover from any of the premises. Similarly also it is in moving and efficient causes. For of one caused or effect and another, there is one and another first efficient cause, taking "first" as it is distinguished against middle and last, as the Philosopher takes it there and in the eighth book of the **Physics**.

Nor is it always necessary for such a "first cause" to run all the way to the heaven or God, as many do. Whence when a carpenter makes a bench by means of an adze, it is foolish to ascend to the heaven as to the first mover or efficient; or when fire generates fire; for it is established that a fire entirely resting [quiescent] and which for then according to the Philosopher is produced by nothing properly speaking, produces another fire. And consequently it is the **first efficient** of it. Nor nevertheless is it the efficient of all beings of the universe. The reason therefore proves nothing else, nor through it does he wish to prove anything else except that of no thing (having an efficient or moving cause) are there **infinite per se causes** essentially ordered such that one is from another to infinity.

With this, however, it stands that that first [cause] was caused by some other, which nevertheless for then is not a per se cause of this last caused thing. Just as some fire is the first cause of some other, of which nevertheless that fire is not the cause which was the cause of it [the first fire], which perhaps either is not in the nature of things, or is distant by a great distance. And thus it is clear to that reason.

Whatever things, however, I have said in its solution or any other part of this question, are said according to the intention of the **Philosopher** and **Commentator**. Among which many are simply **false**, although they were thought true by them.

(Delineation of an additional question)

WHETHER it can be naturally and evidently known that there is one universal principle from which all other beings are produced.

Addition 3: Consequently, it is asked whether it can be naturally and evidently known that there is one universal principle from which all other beings are produced.

And it is argued that it cannot. Because nothing repugnant to appearances can be evidently known to be true. But for there to be some being from which all other things are made is repugnant to appearances; therefore etc. The major is clear. Because every evident cognition naturally had by us takes its beginning from some things appearing to us. The minor is declared. Because it is repugnant to appearances for all things except one to be corruptible, since several things appear to the sense to be perpetual, for example the celestial bodies. It also appears that everything made is corruptible. Therefore it is repugnant to those things which appear to us for all things to be made.

Second, because if this could be evidently known from natural things, the philosophers who most diligently investigated this would have known it most of all. But this is false. Which is clear, because the chief of philosophers, Aristotle, did not know this. Rather he thought it false, as is clear in the first book of the **Physics** concerning primary matter, which he calls "unbegotten." And he says the same concerning the heaven in the first book of *On the Heavens*. And it is established that he feels the same concerning the **intelligences**.

Third, because for all things to be made by one is an article of faith. An article of faith, however, cannot be naturally known evidently.

The opposite is proved, because the **Philosopher** in the second book of the **Metaphysics** proves that in efficient causes one cannot proceed to infinity, but it is necessary to arrive at **one first efficient**. The first efficient, however, is the efficient of all others, as he says there; otherwise it would not be first. Therefore it can naturally be known that there is some first, from which the rest are made. And this also, as is clear from the reason made, the Philosopher knew. Likewise in the text it is had that the philosophers knew there to be one principle, which was not made and from which all things were.

I respond. Because in the arguments and also in the text it is touched upon what the philosophers felt concerning the proposed question, and concerning this also there is a controversy among modern doctors, therefore two things will be discussed. The **first** will be what was the opinion of the Philosopher (namely Aristotle), whose science and doctrine is more familiar to us among other doctrines of philosophers, and also the opinion of his Commentator Averroes concerning the present inquiry. The **second** is what can be known through the reason of **natural light** concerning that which is asked.

ARTICLE 1

As to the first, it must be known that there is no doubt concerning the intention of the aforesaid philosophers regarding generable and corruptible things. For it is established that those things are produced and made.

But concerning eternal things there is doubt what they felt. And as to this there is a diversity among doctors: Some saying that according to the opinion of the Philosopher and Commentator all eternal beings besides the first being are effectively caused, both the celestial bodies and also the intelligences; certain others saying that the Philosopher and Commentator opined indeed that the celestial bodies were made, but they did not opine this concerning the intelligences, but posited them to be entirely unproduced.

ARTICLE 2

Addition 3a: As to the second article I posit three conclusions. First is: Every being in act "possible not to be" is made. Second: Every being in act besides the first is "possible not to be." Third: Every being in act besides the first is made. Fourth: The first being is not made. Fifth: From these I will infer certain corollaries.

Although no philosopher denies the first proposition, nevertheless, because "to verify a thing, since no one is found contradicting it" (that is, from the fact that no one contradicts), "is a probable locus," as the **Commentator** says in the first book of *On the Heavens*, comment 85, therefore I prove it by reasons. And first thus: If some being in act "possible not to be" were not made, it would follow that no being for its actual being would need any cause making it to be in act. The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is proved, because if some being needed an efficient cause so that it might be in act, either that would be a necessary being, or possible or contingent.

Not **necessary**, is clear, because if some possible [being] can be in act without a cause giving it being efficiently, much more strongly will this be possible for any necessary [being]. Nor a **contingent** being, because if some such [being] can be in act without being made by another, equally will any [such being] be able to be.

QUESTION 2

WHETHER the aforesaid conclusion of Aristotle, namely that several beings lack an effective principle, was evidently proved by him with an efficacious reason, or could be proved from his sayings.

Having seen that, as the **Master** says, Aristotle posited several beings lacking an effective principle, it remains consequently to ask whether the aforesaid conclusion was evidently proved by him with an efficacious reason, or could be proved from his sayings.

And it is argued that **yes**, by such a reason: If all things besides one were made, something would be made from nothing. But this is impossible, therefore etc. The major is known and the minor, as the **Commentator** says in the second book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 15, is a first proposition and "conceded by all."

But to the **opposite** it is argued. No false position is strengthened by an efficacious proof. This is clear, because every argumentation whose conclusion is false sins in matter or in form and consequently is inefficacious. But a position of this kind is false, by the witness of **Divine Scripture**, whose sentence cannot be false. Therefore etc.

In the question there will be two articles: In the **first** will be recited the reasons which the Philosopher and Commentator adduce in diverse parts to prove their premised position. And it will be shown that those are not efficacious and fail in many things. **Second**, some reasons of theologians wishing to prove naturally the opposite conclusion will be adduced, and it will be shown that neither do they evidently convince their purpose.

ARTICLE 1

[Aristotle's process from four ways]

As to the first, it must be known that from the sayings of the Philosopher several reasons can be assumed from diverse foundations for the proof of his position. For some proceed from the possibility of the **perpetual duration** of naturally incorruptible beings. Some from the impossibility of **creation**. Some from the property of the **agent**, and some from those things which are required for **action**.

[From the first way, first]

From the first way he proceeds in the first book of *On the Heavens*. And it can be argued first from his sayings to the purpose thus: Every made thing can at some time not be. No "eternal a parte post" or perpetual thing can at some time not be. Therefore no perpetual thing is made. And further: Therefore several beings are not made. And the last consequence is clear, since several beings are perpetual, such as several heavens, and several intelligences, and primary matter. Since every one of such things will always be.

The major proposition is proved, just as the Philosopher proves, that every **begotten** thing is **corruptible**, and by the same terms taking "begotten" and "made" in the same signification and similarly "corruptible" and "being potent at some time not to be"; and in the same sense their opposites namely "unbegotten" and "incorruptible." Which I say for this [reason]: so that the proof may be universal, however such beings be posited to be made—whether through generation properly called or through creation or another making; for in every way the Philosopher denies such beings are made. Therefore that major is proved thus. Every incorruptible is unbegotten and every unbegotten is incorruptible, therefore every corruptible is begotten and every begotten is corruptible.

The antecedent is known and the consequence is proved through that rule: If there be four terms of which two are contradictory opposites to each other, and the remaining two similarly will be opposites, and one of one opposition is converted universally with one of the other opposition: it is necessary that the remainder be converted universally with the remainder. And the rule is clear through the first principle. Of such kind, however, are the premised terms as is clear.

The minor indeed is proved, because if some perpetual thing can at some time not be, let it be posited in being that at some time it will not be. Therefore the perpetual will at some time not be. And consequently, since the perpetual is called that which always will be, it follows that something which always will be, at some time will not be. And if so, therefore at the same time it will be and will not be; and when it will not be, it will be. Which is impossible. But from the position of the possible in being, although sometimes the false follows, never however does the **impossible** follow, as is clear from the definition of the possible. Therefore that posited thing was not possible, and consequently this is false: "some perpetual thing can at some time not be." Therefore its opposite, which is the minor of the reason, is true.

That minor can also be proved according to the intention of the **Commentator**, comments 123 and 124, since if something is perpetual, it can always be. And if some perpetual thing can at some time not be, something which can always be, can at some time not be. And thus in the same thing are congregated potencies to immediate opposites, or the same thing is at once in potency to immediate opposites. But this is impossible, since then it would be possible for those opposites to be in the same thing at once, for example that the same thing at once be and not be. Whence the **Commentator**, in comment 124 upon that word of the **Philosopher** "For it does not happen that the same and one thing is able always to be and able always not to be," says that Aristotle "induced this to demonstrate that just as it is impossible for contraries to be found at once in act, so it is impossible for two potencies to be found at once to two contraries (namely immediate), but potencies succeed in a subject just like contraries." And he adds: "And if it is impossible for contraries to be congregated, it is impossible for something to be always being and to be corruptible in some hour." This same thing the Philosopher also seems to say below when he says: "Therefore if we posit to exist those things which can, opposites exist at once."

Further, the Philosopher proves that minor below, because every corruptible will necessarily be corrupted, and consequently at some time will not be. Therefore if some perpetual thing is corruptible or potent at some time not to be, at some time it will not be. And consequently something which always will be, at some time will not be. At the same time therefore it will be and will not be, which is impossible. Therefore the Philosopher says: "Manifest that [it is] impossible for a corruptible being not to be corrupted at some time." And the **Commentator** proves this there in comment 140: "Since it will happen," he says, "if it is not corrupted in some time, that there is not in it a potency to corruption. For this is the definition of that in which there is not a potency to something, namely that it never goes out into act." And he adds: "And because, when we have posited something having a potency to corruption without the fact that it be corrupted, these impossibilities follow—namely that in it there is potency and there is not, or in it there is potency to two opposites at once, namely that it be always and not be; it is necessary therefore that [that] having a potency to corruption, be corrupted in the end."

And in comment 127, where he had touched the same reason, he says that "if in something there is a potency to corruption without the fact that it be corrupted," such a potency will be "**idle**" in it.

The Philosopher proves the same proposition around the beginning of this treatise by induction, since "all things which are generated, appear to be corrupted." And the **Commentator** does this same thing in the same place, comment 105.

[From the first way, second]

The second reason to the same [point] can be formed thus. No eternal in the past and future is made. This has been proved according to them in the preceding question, article 1. But every eternal in the future or perpetual is eternal in the past and in the future. Therefore no perpetual thing is made. From which further as before it follows that several beings are not made.

The minor is proved, because if the opposite be given, it follows that there will be an **infinite greater than an infinite**. For eternal time on both sides adds over eternal on one side only the remaining eternal time on the remaining side, just as [eternal time] over eternal in the past only adds eternal time in the future only, and conversely. Since therefore every eternal in the future is being in infinite time, it follows that it was also being in infinite past time.

And it is confirmed according to the intention of the **Commentator**, first book of *On the Heavens*, comment 136 and also book 3, comment 52, since everything which has a nature or potency so that it be in infinite future time, has an infinite potency. But than an infinite potency none is greater, neither finite nor infinite. Therefore that which has a potency so that it be in infinite future time, has a potency so that it be also in infinite past time. Otherwise that which could be in time infinite on both sides, would be of greater potency, and consequently an infinite potency would be greater than an infinite potency, whose opposite was said in the antecedent.

The **Philosopher** touches this reason in that part "For either in infinite or some certain determined time" which the **Commentator** explains in comment 136. He puts it however also in comment 127 where the Commentator says: "And you ought to know that it is impossible to imagine a being having a potency to being and non-being infinite in past time without the future, nor in future time without the past, unless an infinite would add over an infinite, which is impossible. Wherefore it happens, if something be found having an infinite potency, that the action" (that is, the act) "of that potency be in the whole time. If therefore the potency to non-being were infinite, it will happen that it be non-being in all time. And if the potency to being were infinite, it will happen that it be being in the whole time." He posits the same sentence in comment 131 and in others already alleged.

And as far as appears to me, all their reasons in the first book of *On the Heavens*, by which they strive to prove the world is not made (taking making universally), are reduced to these two.

[From the second way]

From the second way it can be argued thus from their sayings: If several beings were not unproduced, it would follow that some things were created or made from nothing. The consequence is clear, because primary matter and the simple substances of angels would certainly be made from nothing. But the falsity of the consequent is proved by the same [philosophers] in multiple ways.

First indeed **inductively**. For we see that everything which is made, is made from something pre-existing and under its making there is some subject remaining under both terms of the making. It is clear in the generations of accidents, for example when someone becomes white or musical, the subject of music and whiteness pre-exists. And it is the same concerning any other qualities. In the generations also of substances the same is seen. Whence vegetables are made from seed, animals from menstruum, and universally we see in every transmutation, whether substantial or accidental, the same something is

transferred from one disposition into another. The **Philosopher** posits this reason in the first book of the **Physics** and the **Commentator** also in comment 63.

The reason is confirmed, because no agent acts except by transmuting matter and deducing to act what was in potency. Therefore by no agent is something made from nothing. The consequence is clear, the antecedent is proved by induction. For the heater transmutes a body potentially hot to actual heat, and so of other agents. And the reason can be, because everything which is actually such after it was not, formerly was potentially such, because that which was impossible to be made, is impossible to have been made. The **Commentator** posits the proof of this antecedent in the eighth book of the **Physics**, comment 4, and the reason itself in the seventh book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 31, and the twelfth of the same, comments 18 and 43.

Second to the same thus: If something could be made from nothing, it would follow that either there would be motion and nothing would be moved, or something would be changed which formerly was not moved. Each of these is impossible. And the impossibility of the first is clear from the **definition of motion** which is "the act of a being in potency as it is in potency." Of the second however, from the sixth book of the **Physics**, where it is demonstrated that before every "changed being" there was some "being moved." But the consequence is proved. For if something is made from nothing, either it will be made through motion and successively part before part, and thus motion will be without a mobile and subject and by this nothing will be moved, and thus the first part of the consequent will be had. Or it will be made suddenly so that it only has "made being," and then there will be something made which formerly was not being made, and changed which before was not being moved, and this is the second part of the consequent. The **Commentator** posits this reason in the first book of the **Physics**, comment 71, and particularly in comment 60. And it is touched upon in some way in the eighth book of the **Physics**, comment 4.

Third, when we say something is made from nothing, either the word "from" is a note of the **subject** or **matter**, or a note of the **term from which** or the opposite. This is clear enough in the first book of the **Physics**. The first cannot be said, because non-being and pure nothing cannot be the matter or constitutive of any entity. Nor the second, because then in saying something is made from nothing the sense would be such as when we say that from non-white is made white. But this is only per accidens insofar namely as it happens to the subject which becomes white that it was non-white, and thus it would be necessary that "nothing" itself should happen to something from which something was made.

It is confirmed, because it is impossible for the nature of one opposite to be changed into the nature of another, as whiteness to be changed into blackness. Therefore much more is it impossible for non-being itself and pure nothing to be changed into being. If therefore something be said to be made from nothing or from non-being, this will only be because it is made from something to which this privation or negation of being happens. Just as from black something is said to become white, because it is made from that to which it happens to be black. By saying thus, however, it is clear that some **subject** is supposed. Therefore it is clear to be impossible for something to be made from nothing. And the **Commentator** posits this reason in the eighth book of the **Physics**, comment 4, and the first book of *On the Heavens*, comment 109 at the end.

[From the third way]

From the third way it can be argued thus: Every begotten and made thing is made by something transmuting and altering, and every alterer is a **body**. Therefore not all things are made. The consequence is clear: Both because intelligences are not made through transmutation or alteration. And because, if they were made, they would be made by the first; it however is not a body but an **abstract intelligence**, as is proved in the eighth book of the **Physics** and twelfth of the **Metaphysics**. The antecedent is proved: Both by inducing in all things which we see to be made or generated. And by reason, because every making and generation is from a **contrary** and through active and passive qualities. These however belong to bodies alone. The **Philosopher** posits the virtue of this reason in the first book of *On the Heavens*, and the **Commentator** also in comments 20 and 33, and in the seventh book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 31, and similarly in book 12 and several places.

Second by others it is argued thus: To every active power corresponds a proper passive power. For they are said relatively to each other and mutually define each other, as is clear in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**, chapter *On Power*. And this is universally true of active power, whether it be active through motion, or through simple emanation. Therefore it is not possible for something to be made from nothing. The consequence is clear, because "nothing" is not a **passive power**.

[From the fourth way]

From the fourth way it can be argued thus: If there were not several unmade things, then the **first celestial body** would be made. This is clear. But the **Philosopher** proves this to be impossible in the third book of *On the Heavens*, whose reason the **Commentator** forms thus in the same place, comment 29: "It is impossible that any body be generated except in a place. If therefore the whole world was generated or the first body, it is necessary that it had a place in which it was generated, prior to it in time or nature. Place however is either a vacuum or the boundary of a containing body. But if the whole world was generated, it did not have a containing body, since before it there was no body. Therefore before it there was a **vacuum**. But a vacuum is not possible." Thus the Commentator. These are the reasons by which the aforesaid conclusion is proved through the Philosopher and Commentator.

(Against four foundations through four conclusions)

Now second, their inefficacy and infirmity is to be shown. On account of which it must be known that all the aforesaid reasons are sustained principally upon **four** [foundations], as can be clear to one willing to pay attention.

One is that it is impossible for the same thing to be at once in potency to **opposites**; or, what is said in other less proper words, that it is impossible for potencies to opposites to be in the same thing at once.

Another is that whatever potencies are at once in something, can be reduced to act at once; or in other words, to whatever things something is at once in potency, it can have those at once in act or can be both at once in act.

Another, that every potency will **necessarily** go out to act.

The last is that it is impossible for something to be made from **nothing**.

These foundations, however, are utterly **false** and therefore the reasons are invalid. Therefore, for the declaration of the assumption, I prove **four conclusions**, and afterwards I will respond to the singular reasons made.

(First conclusion)

The **first conclusion** therefore is: It is possible for the same thing to be at once in potency to opposites.

I prove this **first** by their express words. For the **Philosopher** in the fourth book of the **Metaphysics**, against **Anaxagoras** (whom he says agrees with those positing contradictories to be true at once, because he saw contraries generated from the same subject and by this contraries pre-existed at once in the subject according to him, since according to him nothing could be made from nothing; but if contraries at once, therefore also contradictories true at once), solving this immediately after shows how contraries are at once in the same thing, saying: "For it happens that the same thing is contraries in potency at once, but in act not." Where the **Commentator**, in comment 20: "To say," he says, "that contraries exist at once in the same thing in potency, is true, but in act is false." And below in the same comment: "For those men erred and could not distinguish between potency and act, namely because when they found contraries to be at once in the same, they judged that it is possible for them to be found in act. But in act is impossible, in potency however necessary on account of generation." Thus the Commentator.

If however contraries exist at once in the same thing in potency, therefore the same thing is at once in potency to contraries.

Second, the same is clear from the ninth book of the **Metaphysics**, where giving the difference between natural and rational potencies he says: "Such indeed"—namely natural—"it is necessary, when passive and active approach so that they can, to do this indeed, but suffer that. Those however"—namely rational—"it is not necessary." He maintains therefore that given the active and passive approach so that they can act and suffer, it is not necessary to act this and suffer that in rational potencies. Therefore when powers of this kind can act, they can also **not act**. And thus they are at once in potency to contradictory opposites.

The **Commentator** also says the same thing sententially there in comment 10, and again the **Philosopher** in the second book of *On Interpretation*. Item, below the Philosopher, namely in the ninth book of the **Metaphysics**, says: "Every potency is at once of contradiction"; and the text of the comment has: "It is of contradictories at once."

Item, below in that chapter "Since however better and more honorable," the Philosopher says: "For whatever things are said according to 'to be able', the same is potent to contraries, just as that which is said to be able to convalesce, the same is also languishing at once," namely in potency. And a little after: "To be able contraries indeed exists at once. But for contraries to exist at once is impossible, as to be healthy and to labor."

The Commentator says the same through all things there in comment 19. And many other things from their sayings could be adduced to the same [point]. From which also it is gathered evidently enough that in this saying the Commentator was opposed to himself.

Second, the conclusion is proved by reasons. The first is because, if it were not possible for the same thing to be at once in potency to opposites, it would follow that nothing would be **contingent to either side**. The consequent is false even according to them as is clear in the first book of *On Interpretation*, and according to the truth, because otherwise the **liberty of choice** would perish. The consequence indeed is known.

Second, it is possible for the same thing to be in act under one opposite and at once in potency to the remaining. Therefore it is possible for the same thing to be at once in potency to opposites. The antecedent is clear. For he who is actually sitting can not sit, and similarly in others, and just as the **Philosopher** says in the ninth book of the **Metaphysics** where he proves potency to be distinguished from act: "It happens indeed that possible something is, but is not; and possible not to be, but is. Similarly also in other categories, possible going not to go, and not going possible to go etc." The consequence is proved by the locus from the lesser, since it ought to seem less possible concerning act and potency to the opposite act, than concerning potencies at once. For the whole repugnance which would be in potencies, if there were any, would be on account of the repugnance of acts. Whence if the acts were not repugnant, neither also would the potencies which are to them be repugnant.

(Second conclusion)

The **second conclusion** is that not all potencies existing at once in something (speaking to the good understanding premised) can be reduced to act at once.

This conclusion is proved **first** as to man, because it would follow that contraries could belong to the same thing at once actually. The consequent, as was proved in book 1 distinction 17, is false according to the Philosopher, and also as is clear in the pre-alleged authorities. The consequence is known, since the same thing is at once in potency to contraries, as was proved also through the same in the preceding conclusion.

Second, the same is proved according to itself, because it would follow that it would be possible for contradictories to be true at once. The consequence is proved, since the same thing is in potency to each of contradictorily enunciable opposites. For at once I am in potency that tomorrow I read and tomorrow I do not read. And the same part of the air is in potency now that tomorrow it be illuminated, and in potency that it not be illuminated tomorrow. And so of many things.

Third, it would follow that matter could be informed at once by any forms to which it is at once in potency, and consequently by many forms repugnant and impossible naturally, which the Philosopher would not concede nor the Commentator.

Fourth, it would follow that the same body could be moved at once up and down, and forwards and backwards, and right and left. The consequence is clear, because the same body (for example this stone demonstrated here) can indifferently be transferred to these parts and those. And yet the consequent would not be conceded by the **Philosopher**. Similarly the same wax or other body could be at once round and square, straight and curved, which implies contradiction. The consequence is clear, because at once it is in potency that it become round and that it become square, and so of others divisively.

(Third conclusion)

The **third conclusion** is that not every potency will necessarily go out to act, nor will every "possible to be" be, or every "possible not to be" not be, in the way in which it is possible.

It is proved **first**, because it is possible for something to be made in some instant or certain and determined time, for example in the time or instant which is A. And it is possible also for that not to be made in A. And if it be posited that it not be made in A, as is possible to be posited, it follows that the potency of being made in A will never go out to act, or that that which is possible to be made in A, will never be made in A, because neither will A ever be [again].

Second, I posit that a brute having sight has a visible opposite to itself and closes its eyes: It is established that it is in potency, and very close, to the vision or species of that visible possible to be caused in it by the opposite visible. And all these being thus posited, it is possible that before the opening of the eyes the brute dies; which being posited, it follows that the species of that visible or even the vision, which was possible to be generated in it, will **never be generated**. The proof of which is because, if it will be generated, either it will be generated from that sight which is posited to be corrupted—and this is false, because that sight will never be anymore, rather according to them it is impossible for it ever to be for the rest, since it is corrupted—or it will be generated from some other sight—and this cannot be said according to them, since no natural form, educible naturally from some subject, can naturally be educed the same in number from another subject according to them and according to all whom I have seen. And it can be proved by reason, because if the same form in number could be produced from diverse subjects (whether by the same or by diverse agents), it would follow that those subjects being posited entirely similar and uniformly close to the same agent, either the same form in number would be caused in both (which is judged impossible according to nature), or in neither would any be caused. Which also, the case being posited, is naturally impossible, because active and passive naturals existing in due disposition, it is necessary to act this, suffer that. And the consequence is clear, because there is no reason why it should be caused rather from one than from another, unless this perhaps were reduced to **God**, who would will to co-act with the agent for the production of that form from one subject and not from another. But it is certain that the Philosopher would not say this.

From this nevertheless the principal reason is not hindered, because God is not compelled to co-act with the creature and can not co-act. And consequently that form or vision or generable species can never for the rest be generated, which is the purpose.

Third, some part of fire existing immediately next to the orb of the moon is naturally corruptible just as another similar to it existing next to the air, and similarly is in potency to generating heat and fire. And yet it is not necessary for it to be corrupted at some time or even to generate any heat or fire. Therefore not every potency will necessarily go out to act nor even will every corruptible necessarily be corrupted. The consequence is clear. I prove the antecedent as to the second part; for the first is clear. Because if that [part of fire] ought to be corrupted, either it would be corrupted in the same place in which it is—and this not: Both because there is no natural corruptive there, nor is it necessary, rather nor naturally possible, for it to be there; and because nothing could be naturally generated from its matter there, as is known. Or it will be corrupted in another place—and if so, it would be necessary that it descend below its sphere, which neither appears necessary nor naturally possible, since neither by natural motion would it descend (as is certain) nor by violent, since there is nothing there or can naturally be anything impelling it violently downwards. And by the same it is proved that it will never generate any fire or heat, since it does not have or can naturally have a proximate passive naturally transmutable by it.

(Fourth conclusion)

The **fourth conclusion** is that it is not impossible for something to be made from **nothing**, that is, for something to be made and not be made from something.

I prove it thus: It does not follow, if something is made from nothing in the sense touched upon, that contradictories are, or can be, true at once. Therefore it is not impossible for something to be made from nothing. The consequence is clear from the things said in book 1 distinction 42 question 1 article 2. But I declare the antecedent. For it does not per se belong to "**made**" insofar as it is such, that it be made or become from something. Rather if it be made not from something, it seems more to be made, since by how much less is presupposed to the making of the thing made and more it accepts being anew from it, by so much more is it made. Whence if every part of it were made, it would be more made, than if something were made from it, and something were not made but had pre-existed. Therefore it does not follow: "This is made and nothing of it pre-existed, therefore this is not made." And in the same way it does not follow: "This is made, and is not made from something, therefore it is not made."

By a similar [reason] also it can be declared otherwise. For a substantial composite is not less truly said to be generated and made, than a composite of substance and accident. Rather that is said simply to be generated, this however **secundum quid**. And yet to substantial generation nothing of the generated pre-exists except matter alone, at least in those where there are not several substantial forms. To accidental generation however pre-exists not only matter but also substantial form and being in act.

Second, a **natural form** is made, and is not made from something. Therefore it is not impossible for something to be made from nothing. Proof of the antecedent. For although a form is not made per se as something per se subsisting, nevertheless it is truly made, because truly it is from an agent, after it was not. And that it is not made **from** something is certain, although it be made **in** something namely in matter. I suppose however for now that nothing of the form pre-exists its generation in matter, distinct from it. Which nevertheless if it were denied, the purpose is not removed, since beyond that which pre-existed, it would still be necessary to posit something to be made anew, of which nothing pre-existed,

or to deny every making properly called, as perhaps will be declared below. Although however a form is thus made from nothing, nevertheless not every one which is thus made from nothing, is created, as will be clear in the fourth book.

If it be said that although a form is not made from something, from which it is made as from an extrinsic part of it, it is nevertheless made **from** something, **in** which it is as in a subject. The philosophers however saying it is impossible for something to be made from nothing, did not understand "from nothing" in the first way only, but either in the first or second.

This is not valid nor does it hinder the purpose. It is not valid indeed, since if the sayings of those positing the aforesaid proposition be attended to diligently, it appears indubitably that they said it in the **first sense** only. Whence also **Anaxagoras** (so that he might avoid something being made from nothing in that sense) posited the latency of forms. And others said beings are generated or corrupted by congregation and segregation alone, so that no entity according to them was made, of which not every part pre-existed. Contrariwise, however, the **Philosopher** denied form is made, because according to him form does not pre-exist generation nor is made from something of itself; otherwise one would proceed, as he says, to infinity.

It is established, however, that neither would they have posited form to pre-exist, nor would he have denied it is made, if according to them it had sufficed that it had been made "**in something**" for this: that something not be made from nothing.

Furthermore this saying does not hinder the purpose. For that a form is made in a subject, is not therefore, because it is made—for a substantial composite per se one is truly made, and yet is not made in a subject nor in something, although it be made **from** something intrinsic to it—but therefore because it naturally does not per se subsist. Whence even if it were and were not made, still it would be in a subject, just as according to the **Philosopher** the celestial qualities are in a subject, and are not made. And if some form were potent to be per se, that could be made, granted that it were not made in a subject. From which it is concluded that it does not belong per se to "made" insofar as it is made that it be made **in** something.

Furthermore, something is made, and is not made in something, like a **substantial composite**. And something is made, and is not made from something in the first sense, like a **substantial form**. Nor are "to be made from something" and "to be made in something" immediate opposites concerning "made" or that which is made. Therefore it does not appear impossible that something be made and not be made in something nor from something, and consequently in both ways **from nothing**.

That however those are not immediate opposites concerning "made" is clear. For it happens for something to be made from something and in something, for example in the intension of an accidental form and in the augmentation of a substantial. For in both places the total form is made **from** something (namely from a pre-existing part of it), and is made **in** something (namely in a subject). This conclusion is also clear indirectly, since the reasons proving the opposite are inefficacious, as will be clear in solving.

(To the first reason from the first way)

To the **first** therefore of the reasons of the Philosopher, these things being premised, I respond by conceding the major and denying the minor, which is "no perpetual thing can at some time not be." And to its first proof, when it is said "if it can at some time not be, let it be posited that at some time it will not be, and then it follows that the perpetual at some time will not be etc.," I say that it does not follow. Because, since this "perpetual can at some time not be" is not true except in the **divided sense** (indeed nor by the force of speech does it have another sense), that possible ought not be so posited in being, that this proposition of inherence "perpetual at some time will not be" be given to be true, but that this "this at some time will not be" (demonstrating something of which it is truly said that it is perpetual, for example the heaven or some intelligence). The example is clear in this "white can be black."

To the **second** proof, I concede that something which can always be, can at some time not be, and that the same thing is at once in potency to opposites. And when from this it is inferred that it would be possible for those opposites to be in the same thing at once, I **deny** the consequence. And the reasonableness of the negation is clear from the **second conclusion** proved against them. And from the **first** it is clear it is not false what the **Commentator** judges impossible, namely for potencies to opposites to be congregated in the same thing at once. And if it be said that every potency can be reduced to act and every possible can be posited in being, I respond that it is true, nevertheless not whatever potencies can be reduced to act **at once** like those which are to opposite acts concerning the same thing, nor can whatever possibles be posited in being at once; this is clear of contingent contradictories. And therefore although the potencies are at once, nevertheless it is not possible for the acts to be at once or for them to be reduced to act at once. And this therefore, because they are not to acts conjunctively but divisively. On account of which when it is said that the same is at once in potency to opposites or at once can [do/be] opposites, it is accustomed to be said that the **simultaneity of potency** is to be understood, not however the **potency of simultaneity**, that is that at once it is in potency to opposites, not that it is in potency to opposites at once (that is, that it have opposites at once).

And the **Philosopher** himself says this in the ninth book of the **Metaphysics** where his sentence is that, although rational potencies can [do] opposites, if someone however were to desire to do opposites at once, he would not do [them], because "neither is there a potency of doing at once," says the Philosopher. And the **Commentator** in comment 10: "If he shall have desired," he says, "to act contraries at once, he cannot, because he does not have a potency to them at once."

To the purpose therefore I say that some perpetual thing (for example the heaven) can always be, and can at some time not be. And each of these divisively can be posited in being, not however conjunctively. Just as also **Socrates** can sit this whole day, and also can not sit in some part of this day, because he sits freely, as I suppose. And every part divisively of this possibility can be posited in being, not however both conjunctively, as is clear. And just as it is true that he who can sit this whole day, can not sit some part of this day, so it is true that that which can always be, can at some time not be.

To the **other** proof, by which it is said that "every corruptible will necessarily be corrupted," is clear from the **third conclusion** that what is assumed is false. And similarly it is false what the **Commentator** says to its proof, namely that "the definition of that in which there is not potency to something" is "that it never goes out to act." But he ought to have said "that it cannot go out to act." For many things can go out to act, which will never go out, as was shown above. Wherefore if every such potency be called idle, it is to

be conceded that **very many potencies in the world are idle**, which also the Commentator inferred as an inconvenience.

What however was further adduced to the proof of the same from the **Philosopher**, namely that "all things which are generated appear to be corrupted," I say that that is not true, taking generation universally for making, in which way it ought to be taken, if it must be argued to the purpose. Nor is its proof (which, as the **Commentator** says there, is from induction) valid in all "made things," since it is not universal, as will be said in the solution of the same reason following. Further I say that neither also is it universally true in material generated things. The instance is clear concerning the element of **fire**, according to the whole, or the parts neighboring the lunar orb.

(To the second reason from the first way)

To the **second** principal reason I deny the minor, and I say that the proof equally militates against the **Philosopher**, who posited time eternal in the past and in the future, since nevertheless eternal in the past is infinite, and similarly eternal in the future, and eternal on both sides comprehends both. Because however, according to what I will say below, it was possible for time to be eternal (although in fact it had a beginning), and by this it was possible for an infinite to comprehend in itself several infinities, I say that this is not an inconvenience, as was declared in the first book, distinction 44. And for now let the example suffice of some **continuum**, whose each half contains infinite proportional parts other than those which the remaining contains.

To the **other** proof of the same, which is taken from the **Commentator**, I respond that any perpetual thing just as it can endure through an infinite future, so, if it had been from eternity, it could have endured through an infinite past and an infinite future. Whence no created perpetual exceeds another as to "to be able," although of "inherence" one was prior to another, just as angels before the human soul. And thus it is clear that that proof is of no efficacy against us.

It would have, however, some appearance against those who would posit some perpetual thing to be able to endure only in infinite future time, or to have endured only in infinite past, and some to be able in both past and future, which we **Christians** do not posit, but [we posit] every one to be able both in past and in future, just as it shall have pleased God to preserve it.

(To the reasons from the second way)

Then to the reason which proceeds by the **second way** to prove the conclusion of the Philosopher, concede the consequent inferred (namely some things are made from nothing in the sense which was touched upon above, and soon enough will be explained more).

Then to the first proof of the falsity of the consequent, which is by **induction**, I respond that, as the **Commentator** himself says in the eighth book of the **Physics**, comment 33, "induction in which it is not perceived that the predication is essential, does not give **universal certainty**,"—or "necessary," as another text has—"unless all particulars are induced in it." And therefore he says that the induction made there by **Aristotle** that "everything moved is moved by another" does not give certainty, since he does not induce through all particulars, and "especially," as he says in the beginning of the comment, "among those

positing that there is something which moves itself, just as **Plato** posits." Thus in the purpose I say that the induction of the Philosopher, since it is not made through all particular makings, but through those only by which a form is educed from matter or some subject is transmuted, is not sufficient, so that from it it be concluded universally that "everything which is made, is made from something," and especially since it is not perceived that this predication by which it is said "everything which is made, is made from something" is essential, any more than this "everything which is moved, is moved by another," of which the Commentator speaks there.

To the **confirmation**, I say that the antecedent is false, and to its first proof, which is by induction, it must be said just as to the preceding.

To the **other**, concede that everything which actually is, formerly was possible to be. Nevertheless not everything which was possible to be, was possible through some **proper power** or intrinsic to itself, but something was possible through the sole power of the agent which caused it. Whence from this the intent of the argument is not had.

If it be said that the agent is defined as "being from whence is the principle of motion," and similarly active power as "being the principle of transmuting," and consequently "no agent acts except by transmuting," as the premised antecedent says, I say with **Avicenna** in the first book of the *Sufficiency*, chapter 11, that that definition is not of the agent universally, but only of the natural and physical: "The efficient," he says, "in natural things is sometimes called the principle of motion in another from itself according as it is other, but motion here is understood as every exit from potency to effect through form in matter." And having declared this definition and posited distinctions concerning such an agent, he concludes: "This therefore is the principle with respect to natural things. But when the efficient principle is taken not with respect to natural things only, but with respect to **being itself**, it will be of a more common intention than this, and this will be whatever is a cause of being, but remote from its essence." And therefore, just as Aristotle said that not every mover is an agent, so according to the truth not every agent is a mover.

To the **other** proof, I say first that **creation**, which does not happen in a subject, whether it be successive or all at once, is not motion nor change properly called, according as it is taken in the argument, and the Philosopher has spoken of these; although speaking largely of change—according as not only [that] which now is otherwise than before, but also [that] which now is and was not before can be said to be changed—creation may be a change. In which sense is to be understood the Parisian article 215 saying: "That creation ought not be called a change to being: error, if it be understood of every mode of change"; but taking it thus not every change has a subject.

Second, I say that the consequent is not impossible according to the whole, since it is possible for something to be changed which formerly was not moved. Rather frequently thus it happens in fact in the **intellect** and **will** and many others, in which are indivisible changes, not following any motion of their subjects. Neither does the **Philosopher** in the sixth book of the **Physics** prove the opposite nor intend to prove it, but he proves this only of **local motion of a continuum**, since otherwise it would follow, as he says (and well), that a continuum would be composed of indivisibles. In the same way I say also, that it is not impossible for something to be made which formerly was not being made.

To the **third**, I say that when we say something is made from nothing, the word "from" is a note of **matter**. But this can be understood in two ways, just as **Anselm** teaches in *Monologion* 8: In one way that it be a note constitutively so that by that enunciation it be given to be understood that from nothing, that is "from that which is entirely nothing," as if from matter something is made, just as if "nothing" itself were something existing, "from which something could be made," just as we say that from flour bread is made, and in this sense the proposition is false. In another way, that it be a note of matter but **negatively**, so that namely every matter be denied, so that when we say "something made from nothing," we understand indeed—as Anselm says—"made," "but there is not whence it is made." To which "by a similar signification it seems to be said, when a man saddened without cause is said to be saddened from nothing." These are his words. And "according to this sense," as he adds, it is to be understood that all things "were made by God from nothing, that is not from something."

Augustine also teaches this sense *To Orosius against the Priscillianists*, chapter 2: "When it is asked," he says, "whence God made his creature, a certain matter is sought just as wood for a carpenter or any body. Which unless he had, he could not at all make those things which are sought from his art. When therefore it is answered 'from nothing', what is answered except that no matter was subject to him which he himself had not made, that he might have whence he might make, if he willed anything, and which unless he had, he would not be able to make?" And he adds: "When it is said 'God made from nothing', nothing else is said except 'there was not whence he might make', and yet because he willed, he made."

According to this sense it is clear that the reason proceeds in nothing, nor its confirmation, but only against the first [sense], which we do not give.

It is also to be noted that this term "nothing," just as **Anselm** teaches sententially in *Monologion* 19, can be held in enunciations in two ways: namely **syncategorematically** and **categorematically**. In the first way it is equivalent in signifying to this complex "no being," in the second way however to this "non-being" or "what is not." And according to this diverse acceptation of it propositions are greatly diversified in truth and falsity and other conditions of the same. For if it be said "nothing can corrupt God" and "nothing" stands syncategorematically, it is worth the same as this "no being can corrupt God" and then it is a universal negative proposition and true. If however it be held categorically, then it is equivalent to this "non-being or what is not can corrupt God" and then it is an indefinite affirmative and false.

Similarly are to be distinguished these: "nothing can satisfy the miser," "nothing taught me to fly" and other similar ones. When therefore the philosophers say "nothing is made from nothing," according to them "nothing" cannot be held in the subject and predicate categorically, for then the sense would be that non-being is made from non-being, which certainly according to them is false. They wish therefore that it be held in the subject syncategorematically, in the predicate however it can be held both categorically (and then the sense is that no being is made from non-being) and syncategorematically (and the sense is that no being is made from no being). And in both ways according to them that proposition is true. According to us however in the second sense it is false, and its opposite true, namely some being is made from no being, so however that it be equivalent to this copulative "some being is made and it is made from no being, or is not made from any being." And then it is clear that if it be asked, whether it be made from nothing per se or per accidens, the question is impertinent because it proceeds as if "nothing" were held categorically, and it were a merely affirmative proposition; it is not however

so, but by reason of one part negative. For it is affirmed that it is made and it is denied to be made from something, per se or per accidens.

(To the reasons from the third way)

To the reason which proceeds by the **third way** I respond by denying the antecedent and I say that the induction is not sufficient, as I said before. Item, the proposition assumed in the proof, namely that "every making is from a contrary etc." is false. And according to the same Commentator both the antecedent and the assumption (taking generally "made" and "making") has an instance in the making of **intelligible species** by the agent intellect which is not transmuting nor altering through active or passive qualities, of which it is argued. Whence in the seventh book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 31, he says that Aristotle was compelled to posit an agent separate from matter in the making of intelligible powers, which with him are not mixed with matter. And he understands this of the agent intellect and intelligible species, as was said in the preceding question.

To the **second** I say that active power can be taken in two ways: In one way generally as it is said universally of productive power, in another way contractedly as it is said only of transmutative. In the first way a passive [power] does not always respond to every active [power], nor is it said relatively to a passive, but to an **agible** or **producible**. It is not necessary however for the producible to be something. In the second way however a passive corresponds to active power, and thus also the **Philosopher** takes it in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**. **Creative power** however is not insofar as such transmutative according to the common understanding of the Philosopher.

(To the reason from the fourth way)

To the **last** reason I say that just as it is not necessary for every body to be in a place (rather neither in fact is it, as is clear of the first and all-containing [body]), so it is not necessary for every body which is made to be made in a place, speaking of making universally as in the preceding. And therefore the assumed proposition "it is impossible that any body be generated except in a place" is simply false. If nevertheless it ought to contain any truth, it is to be understood only of bodies which are generated through the transmutation of natural agents which must be approximated according to a due distance to passives, and of inherence, because of those it is true in fact that they are in a place, whatever may be of the possible. The heaven however is not thus made, therefore the reason is not valid to the purpose.

ARTICLE 2

[Quadruple reason of Scotus and others]

It remains now to see whether by natural reasons it can be shown that there are not several beings not having an effective principle.

And it is said by several theologians that **yes**. To which some argue thus:

"Whatever is other than the first essentially depends on the first. This is clear, both by the authority of **Aristotle** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** saying that 'upon it depend heaven and nature'. But he does not posit the heaven to depend more than the intelligence, because he posits the heaven formally necessary just as the intelligence. And by reason, because if something other than the first did not depend essentially on it, that would be nothing of the universe itself, because the unity of the universe is according as 'all things other than the first have an order to the first', as is clear from the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**. Whence nothing is in the unity of the order of the universe, unless because it has an essential order to the first itself. But whatever has an essential order to the first, depends on it. Therefore whatever is other than the first, essentially depends on it. But nothing depends essentially on it except what is caused by it, because if it were not caused by it, it would be necessary being from itself and of itself. Therefore non-being would be repugnant to it, any other being circumscribed, and consequently it would not depend essentially on the first." Therefore every other than the first is produced by it. And consequently there are not several beings not having an effective principle.

Second, from the sayings of the same doctor elsewhere it can be argued thus: If there were several such beings, there would be several **necessary beings**. This is clear enough, because every non-necessary being has being from another, if it is, and consequently is produced. But he himself proves the consequent to be false thus: "Because if there are two necessary beings, they are distinguished by proper real reasons, and let those reasons be called A and B; these either are formally reasons of necessarily being, or not. If so, and besides this those two through that in which they agree are formally necessary, therefore each by two formal reasons will be necessary being, which is impossible. Because since neither of those reasons includes the other, either of them being circumscribed, it would be necessary being through the other; and thus something would be necessary being through that which, being circumscribed, it would no less be necessary being. If however through those reasons by which they are distinguished, neither of them is formally necessary being, therefore those reasons are not reasons of necessarily being. And thus it follows that neither is included in necessary being, because whatever entity is not necessary being, is of itself possible and consequently is not included in necessary being. Because in necessary being something is not included which is not necessary being and a reason of necessarily being."

Third, others to the same [point] thus: Everything which left to itself is non-being, is effectively produced. But all things besides the ultimate end left to themselves are non-beings. Therefore etc. The minor is proved because, if through the impossible the ultimate end be removed, either some beings will remain, or not. The first cannot be said, because then they would not depend essentially on the end. Therefore they will not remain, and consequently left to themselves they would be non-beings.

Fourth, according to these and several others, everything which has a final cause, has an efficient cause, because the causality of the end is to be that for the sake of which something is made. If therefore there were several unproduced beings, there would be several not having a final cause, whose opposite is clear enough from the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**. Other reasons could be adduced to the same, but these seem to me stronger.

(To the first reason)

Although however the conclusion of these reasons be true, nevertheless it does not appear to me that they efficaciously conclude it against the **Philosopher**. Whence to the **first** the Philosopher would respond by conceding that everything other than the first essentially depends on it, but denying that everything which depends essentially on it, is caused by it, understanding of the causality of efficiency. For in fact they posit intelligences and celestial bodies to depend essentially on the first end, and yet to be made by none. And when it is proved that, if it were not caused by another, of itself it would be necessary being, he would say this consequence is not valid, speaking in the same way of causality. If however it be understood more universally of causality, he would concede them to be caused by the first as by an end, which is more to be **to** the first and **for the sake of** the first than **by** the first, properly and strictly speaking.

[Objection]

But against [this]. Every being essentially dependent on another as to its existing, either is possible not to be or necessary being. If possible not to be, therefore it is made, otherwise any "possible not to be" could everywhere be said to be not made, and efficient cause would be entirely superfluous. Because if "possible not to be" is without efficient cause, much more is any "necessary being" without efficient cause. But every being is possible not to be, or necessary being. And consequently no being would have an efficient cause, whose opposite the **Philosopher** declares clearly enough from known things to the sense both in the first and in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, where he shows by what necessity the philosophers were moved to posit an acting cause, and at the same time the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 30, and also in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 48. If however it is necessary being, either it is necessary being of itself or through another. If of itself, therefore it does not depend on another as to necessary being, and consequently neither as to being, because in necessary being is included being. And therefore what suffices for itself for necessary being, suffices for itself for being. If therefore it depends on another, it is not of itself necessary being, nor can it be said that through another it is necessary being, because if it is not of itself necessary being, therefore of itself it is possible not to be. And consequently it is not necessary through another. Otherwise the same would be of itself possible not to be, and through another necessary being, which the **Commentator** declares well to include a contradiction in the first book of *On the Heavens* and the ninth and twelfth of the **Metaphysics**.

I respond that the Philosopher could respond by conceding that no dependent being is **of itself** necessary being, taking "of itself" as the same value as "not through another," in which sense the proof proceeds, and yet denying that **of itself** it is possible not to be. For it does not follow "this is not of itself necessary being, therefore of itself it is not necessary being or of itself it is possible not to be." Just as it does not follow "this is not of itself white, therefore it is of itself non-white." Similarly it does not follow "this is not of itself necessary being, therefore this is not necessary being." Just as it does not follow "this is not of itself white, therefore it is not white." Therefore the Philosopher would say that some necessary being is of itself necessary being, namely the first being dependent on none; some others indeed are certainly necessary, not however of themselves but through the first. Nor however of themselves are they possible

not to be, nor even simply speaking is it true to say they are possible not to be. Nor does the opposite of this appear yet to be evidently proved.

(To the second reason)

The **second** reason also is not valid. For it is founded upon a falsehood, namely that whatever things agree and are distinguished, agree by one thing of themselves and are distinguished by another. Whose opposite has been said many times in the first book, and will also be said below. Therefore the **Philosopher** would say that those two necessary beings are first distinguished **numerically** and **specifically** by their whole selves, and agree in **genus**.

Furthermore, the reason can be deduced against the arguer. For in fact both **God** is a substance and an **angel** is a substance, therefore they are two substances distinguished by proper reasons, and agreeing in the reason of substance. Then therefore either that by which God agrees with the angel is a reason of necessarily being, or not. If not, therefore God is not necessary being, because in necessary being nothing is included, as they say, which is not a reason of necessarily being. If however it is a reason of necessarily being, since (by the same reason which was just touched upon) the proper reason by which He is distinguished from the angel is also a reason of necessarily being, it follows that God would be necessary being by **two formal reasons** of necessarily being. And then further, just as he deduces, it follows against him. And furthermore, since that reason is common also to the angel, it follows that in fact the angel would be necessary being, just as it is substance and being, because the reasons of being and substance according to the imagination of that argument are reasons common to God and the angel.

(To the third reason)

To the **third**, although the major according to the form of the word implies a contradiction, nevertheless taking it to a good understanding so that it is equivalent to this "every being which, if something else were not, itself would not be, is effectively produced," I say that this is true, if that other be **possible not to be**. Now however the **first** itself, at whose non-being any other would not be, is not possible not to be. If however that other be not possible not to be, the major does not have evidence, and would certainly be denied by the **Philosopher**.

And an instance can be made against it well enough in a similar case in two true necessary things, of which one is consequent to the other. And by this if the consequent were not true, the antecedent would not be true. Nor nevertheless does it follow that it [the antecedent] is possible not to be true. Whence if this were not true "no man is a stone," this would not be true "no animal is a stone," and yet this "no animal is a stone" is simply necessary and not contingent. So according to the **Philosopher** the intelligences are simply necessary and not possible not to be, they depend nevertheless on the first necessary, so that if it were not, neither would they be. That major however according to the intention of the arguer is proved by this "everything which, if another were not, itself would not be, is possible not to be" and from this it follows that it is produced. Whence it is clear that it is not efficacious against the **Philosopher**.

(To the fourth reason)

To the **fourth** I say that that has still less efficacy. For according to the Philosopher this certainly is false "everything which has a final cause, has an efficient cause"; and what is added concerning the causality of the final cause, even according to the Philosopher is false.

I say therefore that although the conclusion be true, namely that there are not several unproduced beings, nevertheless those reasons (nor others which I have seen) do not demonstrate it simply. Whence by **faith** alone and the authority of **Sacred Scripture** we hold it.

To the reason made in the beginning of the question the response is clear from the aforesaid.

ADDITIONAL QUESTION 2

WHETHER by natural reason it is evidently probable that God is the universal and ultimate end of all other beings.

Addition 4: Consequently concerning the second [point], which the **Master** touches in this distinction, I ask whether by natural reason it is evidently probable that God is the universal and ultimate end of all other beings.

And it is argued that **no**, because it is not evidently probable that all things other than God are made, therefore neither is it evidently probable that all other things are ordered to some end. The antecedent seems to be had well enough from the preceding question. The consequence is proved. For the causality of the end is to be that **for the sake of which** something is made or has been made. And consequently only that has a final cause, which is made or has been made. Of what therefore it cannot be known evidently that it is made, it cannot be known that it is ordered to some end.

To the **opposite** it can be argued from the fact that in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** it seems to be naturally proved that there is one end and prince of the universe. Such a one however we understand to be none other than God.

Of this question there will be two articles: In the **first** will be inquired what is the causality of the end and what is its caused, in the **second** that which the question principally asks.

ARTICLE 1

[First saying of the opinion]

As to the first it is said that the **causality of the end** is to be that, **by love of which something is acted**. "To be acted" however is taken not only for "to be made," as it is distinguished against "to be," but also for "to be effectively from another," which belongs to the creature according to its whole duration. This love indeed, according to them, is understood not only as the act of cognitive appetite, but generally of appetite as it is common to natural and cognitive.

This conclusion is proved **first** thus: The causality of the end is to be "that for the sake of which," as is clear everywhere through the **Philosopher**. "But to be that for the sake of which is nothing other than to be that by whose love something is acted etc." The assumption is proved, because to be for the sake of something is nothing other than to be intended on account of that. But nothing can be intended except by an agent. Which is proved, because the one intending something for the sake of an end either is itself the same end (and this not, because the end is intended, does not intend). Or it is that which is intended for the sake of the end (which also cannot be said, because to intend is not to be ordered to an end, but rather to order something to attain the end). Or it is the agent intending that for the sake of the end. And consequently to be intended for the sake of an end is to be acted for the sake of an end; from which further it follows, that the end is that for the sake of which something is acted.

Second thus: The causality of an end corresponding to an agent through intellect and will is to be that by whose love something is acted. Therefore the causality of the end universally taken is to be that for the sake of which something is acted. The antecedent is proved, because such an agent acts that effect which he loves or wills to make. Either therefore he loves his effect for its own sake only, or for the sake of another by whose love he wills to make his effect. The first cannot be said, because then his effect would be his ultimate and principal end. And since such an end is simply nobler than every other diverse from itself, it would follow that the effect would be simply nobler than its principal cause, which is false. It is left therefore, that such an agent loves to make his effect for the sake and love of another. That indeed is the end. Therefore the end of an agent through intellect and will is that by whose love something is acted.

The consequence is proved, because everything which has a final cause, has an efficient cause. Every effect however of an efficient cause is a mediated or immediate effect of an efficient cause through intellect and will. Therefore everything which has an efficient cause, has an efficient cause through intellect and will. And consequently every causality of an end corresponds to a voluntary agent.

Third, because the end gives a certain **lovability** to those things which are for the end (that is, it is that for the sake of which, or in order to which those things which are for the end, besides their proper goodness by which each is lovable according to itself, have "lovable being"). This however does not belong to it, except with respect to the agent loving it for the sake of the end.

[Confirmed by the Commentator, doubly]

This conclusion is confirmed by other authorities of the **Commentator**, of which the **first** is in the third book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 3, where he says that the end is not "in immobile things, because the end is the end of action and motion. Therefore what lacks motion, lacks an end, unless 'end' be said equivocally." Thus the Commentator.

Another is in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 2: "The end," he says, "signifies the agent with a proper signification." From which it seems according to the intention of the Commentator, that the end is not an end, except of that which is acted for its sake. And consequently the causality of the end is to be that for the sake of which something is acted.

[Second saying of the opinion]

The **caused** of the final cause, according to this opinion, is that only which has being from an agent for the sake of an end, and this is clear enough from the sayings. Whence they say that, when it is said some agent (whether primary or secondary) acts for the sake of an end, the "for the sake of" does not import the causality of the end with respect to the agent, but with respect to its effect which it acts for the sake of the end itself. For every end is nobler than that of which it is the end. But no effect is nobler than its principal cause.

[Against the first part of the opinion]

This opinion as to neither of the aforesaid, as it seems to me, is true.

Whence against the **first** I argue first thus: It happens for something to be an end, and by its love nothing to be acted. Therefore the causality of the end is not to be that by whose love something is acted. The consequence is clear.

I prove the antecedent. For it happens for something to be willed, and by its love nothing to be acted. For example someone existing at a window can will to see passers-by, and act nothing by love of such a vision. Similarly someone can will to hear one singing sweetly and will to understand some truth, granted that neither by love of this hearing or understanding does he act or will to act anything. But according to **Augustine** in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, every willed thing, whether it be willed for itself or for another, is the end of its volition: "The will," he says, "of seeing has no end except vision, whether it refers it to another or does not refer. For if it does not refer vision to another, but only willed that it might see, it is not to be disputed how it be shown that vision is the end of the will. For it is manifest." And he adds many things to the purpose.

Second the antecedent is proved. Since it happens for something to be an end, before something is acted for the sake of the end, rather even if no action is to follow for the sake of the end. Which is clear in agents from purpose concerning whom the **Philosopher** speaks in the third book of the **Ethics**, and his saying is evident by experience, that "none of such will take counsel concerning the end, but positing some end, how and by what means it will be, they intend. And if indeed it seem to be done by several means, by which most easily and best, they intend. If however by one, it is procured how by this it will be and that by what, until they come to the first cause, which is last in discovery; and what is last in resolution, is first in generation." And he adds: "And if they find something impossible, they depart; for instance if money is needed, but this is not possible to be given. If however it seem possible, they begin to operate."

From these things it is clear, that the end is an end before every operation to be done for its sake, rather even before every counsel concerning the operation to be done, and sometimes when no operation follows.

Nor is it valid, if it be said as to the authority of **Augustine**, that the vision itself, which is the end of volition, is that which is acted; or as to both authorities, that the volition of the end itself is that which is acted for the sake of the end.

Not indeed the **first**: Both because it follows, that the vision itself would be the end of itself, and would be made for its own sake as for the sake of an end, and by this, according to the sayings of the opinion,

would be "simply nobler" than itself, which is false. And because it happens for someone to will to see, who nevertheless does not see, and consequently then the vision is not acted.

Nor is the **second** valid, because the volition of the end itself is the love of the end. Just as therefore that love is not made by itself, so neither is the volition of the end made by the love of the end; the opinion says, however, that the end is that by whose love something is acted. By which it is clear, according to it, that that which is acted by the love of the end, is other than that love.

Furthermore to the same principally I argue thus: Just as it happens for someone to act for the sake of an end, so also it happens for someone for the sake of some end to desist from action or **not act**, for example in those abstaining and fasting and also continent for the sake of God, similarly in those who by the love of God do not act vicious and prohibited works. Therefore the causality of the end is not to be that by whose love something is acted. The consequence is clear, since such persons act nothing for the sake of the end and yet truly intend the end. The final cause certainly is [the reason] that they **do not** act.

Furthermore, when someone walks to the market, that he may find a debtor, the finding of the debtor is truly the final cause, and is not that for the sake of which something is acted. Therefore that is not the causality of the end. The first part of the antecedent is clear, because, if it be asked "on account of what" he goes to the market, and it be answered "that he may find a debtor," and the question be concerning the cause—since "on account of what" is a question concerning the cause, as is clear in the second book of the **Physics**—and similarly the answer is concerning the cause, and it is clear, that not concerning another than the final. The second part is clear also, because neither the walker is acted, nor the space through which he walks, nor any thing, as appears. Nor is it valid to say that the walking or that motion is acted, since the motion of walking is not any thing other than the walker and the space, as will be clear in the following. Although therefore the finding of the debtor be the cause, that he walk and that the space be walked, it is not nevertheless the cause, that any thing then be acted.

[Authorities against the opinion]

Furthermore, there is no doubt that according to the intention of the **Philosopher** and **Commentator** that opinion is false. Which is clear, because they said many things have a final cause, which nevertheless they opined to be entirely unproduced. Such as is **primary matter**, whose end nevertheless is **form** according to them in the second book of the **Physics**, comments 24 and 81. Item, they said God is the final cause of the **intelligences**, as is clear in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**. And yet they opined both matter and intelligences to be not made, as is clear from the preceding question.

And if it be said, that according to them God is the end of the intelligences not as to their essences, but as to the operations which they act for His sake, this is clear to be false from the fact that the **Commentator**, in comment 43, says: "The perfection," he says, "of each of those moving each of the orbs is perfected through the first motor of all, and therefore all intend this diurnal motion, which is the action of the first motor and the principle of other actions. For it appears, that other proper motions are for the sake of this one." Item, in comment 51: "It is common," he says, "to all, that all are for the sake of one and that their actions are towards that one and it is the first cause." From which it is clear, that all other things not only act for the sake of the first cause finally, but also **are** for the sake of it and that therefore they act for the sake of it, because for the sake of it they **are**. And generally it is true that, because things are for the sake

of this or that end, therefore for the sake of it they operate. "And in truth the diversity of ends in things is the cause of the diversity of their actions," as the same **Commentator** says in the second book of *On the Heavens*, comment 65.

It is confirmed according to their intention. For they maintain that the **earth** according to the whole has some proper end, which is its completion and perfection, as is clear in the second book of *On the Heavens* through the Philosopher and Commentator, comment 66. This end therefore either is that for the sake of which the earth is moved or moves; and this not, according to them, because, as the Commentator says in the aforesaid comment, it attains its end without all operation and motion. Or that for the sake of which it is made, which also is false, according to them; for the same **Commentator** says below in comment 102, that "the earth is not begotten according to the whole." Or that for the sake of which it **is**, and then it follows that not every end is that for the sake of which something is acted. And by this that is not its causality, which they say, which is the purpose.

The saying of the **Philosopher** in the seventh book of the **Metaphysics**, last chapter, also favors this, where he maintains that the acting cause "is only sought of a thing in becoming and being corrupted; the **final** however also in **being**," so that it not only happens to ask on account of what a thing becomes or is corrupted, but also on account of what a thing **is**. Similarly in book 1 he reprehends the ancients, who imperfectly touched the final cause, for although they said that it is the good, nevertheless they did not say that good is a cause as that for the sake of which something **is** or **is made**, hinting that not only is that a final cause for the sake of which something is made or becomes, but also that for the sake of which something **is**.

From all these things it is clear that that which they assign is not the causality of the end or, what is the same to say, this definition "that for the sake of or by love of which something is acted" is not the proper definition of the end or final cause convertible with it. And let these suffice against the first saying of the opinion.

(Against the second part of the opinion)

From these things also it is clear enough that the **second** saying of the opinion, namely concerning the **caused of the final cause**, is false. For everything, whose final cause is the final cause, is the caused of the final cause. But the end is the final cause of something which is not acted by the grace or love of its end (for example, of the volition of the end itself, as is clear in the first reason against the first saying of the opinion); therefore etc.

Furthermore, whenever something is a final cause, it is the final cause of some caused thing of it. And not always, when something is a final cause, is it the final cause of something which is acted by its love, as is clear through the second and third reason; therefore etc.

Furthermore, according to the **Philosopher** in the second book of the **Physics** and the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 31, the end is the cause of other causes and consequently of the **efficient cause**. Which is not to be understood as if the end insofar as it is an end is the cause of being, or that for the sake of which the efficient **is**, but it is the cause for the sake of which the efficient **is efficient** or for the sake of which it effects.

Which sense the **Commentator** explains well enough in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 1, at the end, where he says that among all principles of a thing the first "is the final cause. For all causes," he says, "are not principles, except on account of that first," that is on account of the final cause. More expressly however **Avicenna** in the first book of the *Sufficiency*, chapter 12, says: "The end is the cause on account of which the efficient has to be efficient. Therefore it itself is a cause to it, that it be a cause, and the efficient is not a cause of the end, that the end be a cause. And this will be declared in first philosophy."

Hence also is the common saying, that the end is the **cause of the causality** of other causes, that is that other causes are causes. Therefore that the efficient is efficient is the caused of the final cause. Therefore not only that which is effected by an agent for the sake of an end is the caused of the end. And let these suffice against the aforesaid opinion.

(Proper response to the article)

I respond therefore to this article in such order: For **first** I will say what is the **causality of the end**. Then I will posit some **distinctions** concerning ends, and I will infer certain **corollaries**. **Third** I will say what is the **caused of the end**. And **fourth** concerning the sayings I will move some **doubts**.

(First, concerning the causality of the end)

As to the **first** I say that the causality of the end is **to be that, into which by appetite another tends**; and I take appetite commonly for natural and others. Something is said however to tend into another by appetite, whether it itself be formal appetition, or the appetent be something having appetite for the sake of another. So that this be the description of the end: "that into which by appetite another tends."

Perhaps it would be better said, that it is one thing to be an end, another to be a **final cause**. For not every end is the final cause of that of which it is the end. For the willed by God is the end of the volition of God, especially if that willed thing is not given (as is proved from the authority of **Augustine** in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity*), and yet of the volition of God (since it is God) there is no final cause. To be a final cause therefore is to be that **by whose love another is loved**, taking love generally for love or appetite natural, animal, and voluntary. And to this agrees the saying of the **Philosopher**, who everywhere describes or calls the final cause "that for the sake of which," which is nothing other to say than "by whose love." To be indeed the **caused** of the final cause is to be loved because another is loved. And according to this way that authority of **Augustine** in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity* would not be valid against the other opinion nor for it.

Examine these things, because according to this you are not compelled to posit God in any way to have a cause, whose opposite certainly does not sound well.

This is declared **first** from the intention of the **Philosopher** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, where wishing to show how the celestial motor moves, he says that "it moves as appetible and intelligible" or, according to the text of the comment, "as desired and understood." In which words according to the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 35, the Philosopher hints that the said motor moves in a double way, namely as **agent** and as **end**. For in that he says "as understood," he hints that it moves as agent; in that indeed he says "as desired or appetible," he hints that it moves as end, as is clear to one diligently inspecting that comment. To move therefore as end is to move another as **loved**; and that is nothing other than "to be that into which another tends by love." And if by the same the love be effected, in which also it is terminated, he does not say that to be loved insofar as it effects, but only insofar as it **terminates** the love, as is clear where the efficient and the terminating are distinguished. For not "the form of the bath in the soul," which according to the **Commentator** effects the love, is loved by that love, but that which is outside, at which the love is terminated. Therefore to be loved or intended or that into which appetite tends, is to be an end or the **causality of the end**, as here the speech is concerning the end.

And just as I touched concerning appetite, so also I say that **love** generally ought to be understood both for natural appetite and others, so that the description be common and convertible with the described. For as is clear in the second book of the **Physics**, not only animals but also other natural beings act for the sake of an end and have proper ends.

This same thing is declared from the intention of **Avicenna** in the book of his *Sufficiency*, 5, chapter 15, where he says that "the **true end** is that which is intended for its own sake and for the sake of which other things are desired." He does not describe here the end in common, but specially the end not referred to another or ultimate, to which others are referred. And he calls that the true end, because per se and primarily it belongs to it to be an end. But if it ought to be described commonly according to his intention, it is clear that it will be called "end is that which is intended," which is nothing other to say than "into which appetite tends" or "is objectively terminated."

To this also agrees the sentence of **Augustine** in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, where he calls any object of volition its end, whether the will refers that to another or does not refer. And in the same way that into which the will or appetite or natural inclination is borne, is its end.

True, because nothing can properly be called the end of itself primarily and per se—as we are now speaking of the end, which namely is the final cause—so neither can anything properly be called the cause of itself primarily. Therefore it is to be understood that "that is the end, into which **another** tends through appetite." "Another," I say which is: Either the appetition which is not that which is desired and itself tends into that, is the tendency itself; or the appetent not the same as that which it desires, or something desired for the sake of another desired, which is not itself. And therefore I added in the description of the end "another." And thus I understand when I say, that "the end is that into which by appetite another tends."

(By reason the same is declared)

By reason also this same thing can be declared in that way in which such descriptions can be declared. For to whatever belongs the aforesaid reason (whatever others being circumscribed), it is truly called an end; and to whatever it does not belong (whatever others belong), it is not an end, therefore etc. The assumption is declared both in voluntary ends and natural. For if someone goes to the market intending to receive a debt from a debtor, not however intending to find a treasure in the way, thus the reception of the debt is the end of his going which the finding of the treasure is not, positing even that he finds the treasure. Nor can any reason be assigned except because this was intended, that indeed not, since in other concurring things they agree. For every operation which preceded the reception of the debt, preceded the finding of the treasure, nor was more acted toward one than toward the other. And therefore although each be the end of going (calling "end" what is the terminus and ultimate, and consequently "another"), nevertheless not each is the final cause, nor is the end as end a cause on account of the assigned reason.

It is confirmed. Because positing that this goer does not receive the debt, but finds the treasure, it is established that he will be said to be frustrated of his end, not however if contrariwise he received the debt, and did not find the treasure; nor of this is there another reason, except because he intended to receive the debt, not however to find the treasure. This also confirms the saying of **Avicenna** where above, chapter 13, who distinguishes between the end and that which follows the end. Whence he says that the beauty following health is not the end of exercise, but health, "because by exercise beauty is not intended, but health, and from health beauty follows."

In natural ends also the same is clear. For the end of the **earth** is to be down, and precisely because it is naturally inclined to that. Whence positing that it were not produced by anyone (as the **Philosopher** opined), and that neither it moved nor were moved, and whatever other reasons of the end assigned by others or possible to be assigned [being circumscribed], this alone being retained that it naturally desires or is inclined that it be down, this is its end. Contrariwise this being circumscribed, positing whatever others, it will not be its natural end, certainly not more than to be up.

(Second, concerning the distinction of ends)

And since it happens in multiple ways for something to tend into another by appetite, therefore also a multiple distinction can be given concerning the end. I will posit however not all, but some more useful and availing to the following. Let therefore the **first distinction** be that of ends one kind is **natural**, and is that into which it is tended naturally by appetite; another indeed **voluntary**, and is that which someone freely constitutes for himself for an end. And between these is a difference according to the **Commentator** in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 31, "since the ultimate intended" (that is the end) "in voluntary things many times seems good and is not in truth; the intended indeed in natural things is the true good."

Another distinction is that of ends one kind is **inhering**, like health in the body and goodness in the soul; another indeed **subsisting**, like the lord of servants. And the **Commentator** posits this in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 36: "Of perfections," he says, "on account of which the perfect is moved, some are qualities, by which that which is moved is perfected, like that which is moved on account of health. And some are substances extrinsic from the thing which is moved to them, that it may be

assimilated to them, as are found all actions of servants, since they are towards the intention of their lord. Therefore they are said to be on account of the lord. And similarly all beings with the first principle."

To which distinction agrees well enough that by which it is said, that there is an **end by which** [finis quo] and an **end of which** [finis cuius]. "End by which" is called that by which formally the thing is perfected, and that is the one which is called inhering. "End of which" indeed is called that by which the thing is not perfected formally, although it be perfected extrinsically through it, but "of which is the thing, of that is the end," just as a servant is said to be something of a lord, and that is the one called subsisting. And the **Commentator** posits this in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 24.

Another is that one kind is an end **not actually existing** and on account of which the agent acts **that it may be**, just as health is the end of him who is moved on account of acquiring health. Another indeed **actually existing** and on account of which the agent does not act that it may be, but **because it is**, just as the lord is the end of servants. Which distinction the **Philosopher** posits in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** saying: "For there is to someone that for the sake of which, of which this indeed is, this indeed is not." And the first, as some say, can properly be called **desired**; the second however ought more to be called **loved** or **cherished**. But in the purpose I do not care much about this.

Another distinction is that one kind is an **ultimate** end and intended for its own sake, another indeed **middle** or referred, that is intended for the sake of another further end. Example of the first, health; example of the second, thinning or exercise. And this is posited by the **Philosopher** in the second book of the **Physics** and the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 29, and is hinted at well enough by **Augustine** in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6.

It is to be adverted however that we can speak of the end in two ways: In one way **commonly** according to the definition given above, and thus the aforesaid distinction has place. In another way **specially and more strictly**, namely of that to which not by reason of another, but for its own sake it belongs to another to be an end. And thus the **Philosopher** speaks in the second book of the **Metaphysics** where he says: "The end is, which is not for another cause, but another for it." And the **Commentator** there, namely comment 9, when he says, that the description of the final cause is, that it be not for the sake of another cause. And similarly **Avicenna** in the *Sufficiency* where above he was alleged.

Another distinction is that of ends one kind is intended by **first intention**, another indeed by **second** and from consequence. An example is clear in him, who for the sake of God principally exercises acts of temperance, and from consequence for the sake of the health of the body. And the **Commentator** posits a similar distinction in other examples in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 35, and the second of *On the Heavens*, comments 17 and 21. And it is to be noted that every aforesaid difference of ends happens to be found both in natural ends and also voluntary, as can easily occur to one inspecting.

And **another distinction** common also to natural and voluntary end can be assigned, namely that one kind is something **signifiable complexly only**, just as "earth naturally desires to be down," which indeed is not something incomplexly signifiable, as some entity actually existing or possible to be. Which is clear, because it is not earth—for earth does not desire nor is moved to itself—nor any other entity like place or anything else which someone would wish to estimate; for no such other entity being posited,

nevertheless earth would descend to the center of the world. Similarly in voluntary things, as is clear in him who intends to be over others or something similar.

Another indeed is something **incomplexly signifiable** as some actual or possible entity. An example is health, which is the end of art, and sometimes also of nature.

(Two corollaries)

These things being premised I infer two corollaries: The **first** is that not every end is nobler simply than that of which it is the end. And that is clear both of an **inhering** end, and also **subsisting**, not intended for its own sake however but for the sake of another (whether natural or voluntary), and for the sake of which the agent acts, not because it is, but **that it may be**, and which is intended not by first but by second intention. For neither is health nobler than the man who intends it; nor always the begotten or the form of the begotten, than the begetter himself; nor the work, than the artificer. Nor those generable things, than the celestial motors; for the sake of generating and preserving which in being nevertheless they move by second intention according to the **Commentator** in the second book of *On the Heavens*, comment 17, and the twelfth of the **Metaphysics**, comment 35.

Every natural subsisting ultimate end however intended by **first intention** and for the sake of which the agent acts not that it may be, but **because it is**, is simply nobler and more perfect than every other from itself, of which it is the end. And according to this understanding is to be understood the saying of **Alexander** approved by the **Commentator** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 30, saying, that "that to which according to desire the celestial body is moved, is not man nor any of the beings which are here, since the nobler does not tend by desire into the viler." The same in the second book of *On the Heavens*, comment 21. Of such an end also the **Commentator** speaks in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, last comment, when he says that "that for the sake of which something moves, is more good than that good moving."

In **voluntary** things however it is not always so. For where the will is not right, such an ultimate end etc. can be less noble both than the agent for its sake and those things which are ordered finally into it by the agent. But if the will be right nor erring, the judgment is the same concerning such a voluntary end as concerning a natural.

The **second corollary** is that it is possible and sometimes in fact happens, that something **not actually existing** is an end. And this is clear enough from one distinction premised and proved. It is proved also, because appetite both natural and voluntary can tend into something which is not. It is clear of health, for the sake of which nature frequently operates in the body of the sick causing sweats and flux of blood and the like. For the sake of which also man according to the command of art acts, that in him health, which is not, may be generated. Whence if it be asked of such a one, on account of what he acts, he will answer "that he may be healed," willing to assign a cause and none but final.

Furthermore, generation is for the sake of form just as for the sake of an end, as the **Commentator** says in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 70. It is established however that, while there is generation or

while a thing is generated, the form, which is intended, is not in act, rather that being attained it ceases to be generated. Whence the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 22:

"Complement," he says, "and end is said also of that, to which when generated things arrive, their motions of generation cease." Then therefore form is the end of generation, when the form itself is not in act.

(Third, concerning the caused of the end)

As to the **caused of the end**, of which third it was proposed to speak, I say that every other than the end tending into the end by proper appetite or that of another is the caused of the end. I take "other" however generally, as was said sometimes in the first book, namely as it is said both of the signifiable complexly only, and of the signifiable incomplexly actual or possible. By the appetite of another however I say to tend into the end everything which by an appetite, which is not itself, is intended or desired for the sake of the end. It is proved, because to every such thing the end is a final cause. Therefore every such thing is the caused of the final cause. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved, because concerning every such thing it happens conveniently to interrogate "**on account of what**," and to answer the final cause, as occurs well enough to one discoursing well.

(Three corollaries)

From this also follow some corollaries: One is that, just as above against the other opinion was said, not only that which is made by an agent for the sake of an end, is the caused of the end, but also the agent **to act** itself and sometimes **not to act**, and something **to move** or **to be moved** and similar complexly signifiabiles. Which is proved from the fact that someone can will himself to act for the sake of some end and similarly for the sake of some end can will himself not to act and will to move and will himself to be moved, both also because upon every such thing can congruously be erected a question concerning the final cause.

Another is that, just as above was said that something can be actually a final cause, while it is not actually, so also something can be actually the **caused** of a final cause, when it is not actually. And this is said in one way because its final cause not only be actually a cause, but also actually be. In another, because neither even the final cause be actually, although it be actually a cause.

The **first** is clear. Because a man for the sake of God or some servant for the sake of his lord can will to do something which is not. And then that will be the caused of an existing end, because such is desired for the sake of it.

The **second** is clear. For someone can intend to cause several effects in a certain order and one for the sake of another. Which being posited the effect intended for the sake of causing another is the caused of the other, and the other conversely its final cause, and neither nevertheless actually exists.

Another is that of the same thing there can be **several voluntary ends** not subordinate to each other and equally primarily intended. It is clear, because someone can will something for the sake of two ends equally primarily, for example to go to the market both that he may exact a debt from his debtor and that he may pay a debt to his creditor.

Item there can be several ends of the same thing subordinate both **natural** and **voluntary**. Of natural it is clear in the actions of nature, which through many means in a certain order arrives at the intended end. Similarly it happens in voluntary actions.

Item there can be several subordinate ends, of which one be **natural**, the other **voluntary**. Just as is clear in him, who wills to acquire some habit of virtue, that he may operate according to it and from such works God may be praised or others also may be provoked to virtuous works. For the proper operation of the habit exists as its natural end. But the imitation of the neighbor and the praise of God are voluntary ends.

Many other corollaries could be deduced from the sayings, but these for the present suffice.

(Fourth, some doubts are moved)

Now fourth some doubts are to be moved against the sayings, and **first** against that which was said concerning the **causality of the end**. For according to that it seems to follow that of God there is some final cause. It is clear, because God by His appetite tends into another. For He loves creatures and wills to produce some and to do well.

But the consequent is impossible: Both because otherwise it follows that something could be **nobler** than God, since the end is always nobler than that which is for the end or of which it is the end. And because then God could be **perfected** by something else; for "the end is that, to which is moved that, which is innate to be perfected by it," as the **Commentator** says in the third book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 3. And because God would not be simply **independent**, since every caused thing depends on its cause. And finally, because it is altogether absonant to say God in any way is caused, since He is the first cause simply.

Second, against the corollary by which it is said that something, while it is not actually, is actually an end or final cause. For the opposite of this is expressly had in the second book of the **Physics**, where it is said that "causes in act and singulars and of which they are causes, are and are not at once. Those however according to potency, not always. For not at once is the house corrupted and the builder." If therefore the caused of the end is in act also the end itself is in act and conversely; and this also is against the second corollary posited concerning the caused of the end itself. It is confirmed by reason, because what is not, can be the cause of nothing.

Third, since in the second book of the **Physics** it is said that sometimes the end and the efficient are causes to each other in turn, and above it was said that the end is the cause that the efficient is a cause, there is a doubt, how the efficient is the cause of the end itself.

(To the first doubt)

I respond. To the **first** I say that for there to be some final cause of God can be understood in two ways: In one way, as of that which is **naturally for the sake of an end**, and thus it is impossible. And I deny the consequence. Nor is it proved to this sense.

In another way, as of that which **acts for the sake of some end** or intends an end or whose will tends into another. And thus I say that, if it be understood of an **ultimate** end and intended for its own sake, there is no end of Him. Neither natural, is clear. Nor voluntary, since His will cannot be but right and consequently referring to itself and for its own sake ultimately acting whatever it acts, and willing whatever other than itself it wills, since He Himself is the end naturally intended by all, as will be clear in the second article. And similarly He is the end, whom every will ultimately and for His own sake ought to will; and whatever other than Him it wills, it [ought] to will for His sake. So that, just as He is the principle **from whom** all things, so He be also the end **to whom** all things are referred according to that of Apocalypse 1: "I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end." Nor is the consequence valid to this understanding.

If indeed it be understood of a voluntary end **not ultimate**, but intended for the sake of another, I say that the consequent is not to be denied, just as it is not to be denied that God wills something other than Himself and acts something for the sake of something else, just as **for the sake of our salvation** He was incarnate and died, as the **Symbol** [Creed] testifies, and the **Apostle** testifies that "He rose for our justification." And it is established that the "for the sake of" in both places demonstrates a final cause. And yet our salvation and justification, of which the aforesaid speak, are other than God, although He Himself causally is the salvation and justification of all the just.

To this is added that, as the **Philosopher** says in the second book of the **Metaphysics**, "he who has intellect always makes [acts] as the cause of something." And **Avicenna** in the first book of the *Sufficiency*, chapter 12, says universally of the efficient that it makes nothing except for the sake of an end. Therefore it is not to be denied, but that God acts something for the sake of another end, ultimately however for the sake of Himself according to that of Proverbs 16: "**The Lord has operated all things for himself.**"

(To the four proofs of the falsity of the consequent)

Then to the proofs of the falsity of the consequent, it must be said for the **first**, that not every end (and especially voluntary) is nobler than that of which it is the end, as is clear above.

To the **second**, that the Commentator speaks there of a **natural inhering end**, as is clear from his words. For he says: "That which is per se and naturally an end, is that to which is moved that, which is innate to be perfected by it." But no such end is God's, nor any other inhering in Him, or that it be possible to inhere in Him.

To the **third** I say that "every caused depends on its cause" can be understood in three ways, that is properly and improperly and most improperly.

In the first way, so that the sense be, that no caused thing can exist, unless its cause exists and preserves it in being so that, if that were not or did not preserve, it itself would not be.

In another way, that no caused thing would be caused, if its cause were not.

And in both ways the proposition is false, if it be understood that every caused thing in some of such ways depends on every cause of it. It is clear from the things said above, since of some truly existing and caused thing, something not existing is the final cause.

In the third way, that no caused thing can be caused, unless its cause be its cause. And in this way the proposition can be conceded. But in this way "to depend" is taken most improperly. For in like manner it would be said that every cause depends on the caused, since no cause can be a cause unless its caused be caused. And in this way it would be to be conceded that the causing depends on the caused and the causative on the causable and the preserving on the preserved, since it is impossible for the causing to be causing, unless the caused be caused. Nor is it possible for the causative to be causative, unless the causable be causable, nor the preserving to be preserving, unless the preserved be preserved. And in this way it can be said that every caused of an end depends on the final cause, because nothing can be the caused of an end, but that the end be its final cause.

To the **last proof** I say that, although a good and true understanding of this oration "God is caused" can be had—for by this can be understood that God wills something other than Himself and that He operates for the sake of some end which is not Himself, although not for the sake of that ultimately (which sense also is properly generated from this which is said, that there is some end of God not ultimately intended)—nevertheless because from more common use, when something is said to be caused, it is understood that it be an **effect** or efficiently produced by another, and similarly when something is said to have a final cause, it is understood more usually of an **ultimate final cause** (whence also such an end is more properly called an end), and each is repugnant to God, therefore at first aspect it appears absonant to say God is caused or God has a final cause. And therefore I say that, granted a good understanding could be drawn thence according to the aforesaid, nevertheless such propositions are not to be used, just as the saints also repelled from use many, which according to themselves can have a good understanding, to avoid the error of the simpler.

(To the second doubt)

To the **second** it can **first** be said that the **Philosopher** does not speak universally of all causes, but of efficient or acting ones only, and by this the argument from his saying is not to the purpose. That however it is so, is clear from his words, for he says: "They differ however in so much that operating and singulars etc." and in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics** he says: "Acting indeed and singulars." He does not however say universally "causes in act," as is alleged in arguing. But he speaks of acting and operating causes, as moreover the examples which he adds demonstrate. For he says: "Just as this one healing with this one who becomes healthy, and this builder with this built." Whose saying, if it be understood well, is certainly true.

Taken universally however and to the understanding of the arguers it is false, which is clear also in another genus of cause. For whether composite or form be the caused of matter, this matter nevertheless is not at once corrupted with this composite or this form, of which it is the cause, just as the Philosopher says that "the house and the builder are not corrupted at once."

It could however **secondly** be understood well enough conveniently that saying of all causes generally according to the sense which **Avicenna** delivers in the first book of the *Sufficiency*, chapter 13, concerning the end: "Know," he says, "that the cause in potency is against the caused in potency, because as long as the cause shall be cause in potency, so long the caused will be caused in potency." And consequently when the caused shall be actually caused, the cause will be actually cause. And this also in the purpose is true, because when the caused of the end is actually caused, that is actually is caused, the end also is actually cause, although it itself be not actually. And conversely, when the end is actually cause, its caused is actually caused. Which happens also, when neither actually exists. For when one effect is intended finally for the sake of another by an agent, although neither actually be actually, nevertheless one is intended for the sake of the other, and consequently this is actually cause, that caused.

To the **confirmation** it must be said that that proposition is not true universally of the final cause, since, just as into something which is not, another can tend by appetite, so what is not, can be actually a final cause, since that is its causality, as is clear from the sayings.

(To the third doubt)

To the **third** it must be said that they are not causes to each other in turn in the same way, because as was said above, the end is not the cause of the efficient, **that it be**, but **that it be efficient**. But conversely the efficient is cause; it is not the cause of the end, **that it be an end**, but **that it be**. Which is to be understood of the end which accepts being through the action of the agent. Of others indeed it is not true that the efficient is the cause of the end, but well conversely according to the given understanding. And this is what **Avicenna** says in the first book of the *Sufficiency*, chapter 12: "The difference," he says, "is between being something and being, as you have already learned, and the end is the cause on account of which the efficient has to be efficient. Therefore it itself is a cause to it, that it be that cause, and the efficient is not a cause of the end, that the end be a cause." And in the beginning of the chapter he had said: "The efficient in a certain respect is the cause of the end. For how will it not be so, since the efficient is what makes the end to be?"

(To the reasons of the other opinion)

Now to the reasons of the other opinion it is necessary to respond. To the **first** I respond that the minor is false, as is clear in many ways from the sayings. To the **proof**, when it is said "to be for the sake of something is nothing other than to be intended on account of that etc.," it must be said that this is false. For not only what is intended on account of something is for the sake of that (to the understanding posited above), but also the intention itself or appetite of the end is for the sake of it. And similarly the one

intending the end or something for the sake of the end is for the sake of this end, and yet to be intending is not to be intended.

Furthermore, that disjunctive taken for the proof is not sufficient, since something can intend an end and something for its sake, which neither is the end, nor the agent, nor that which is intended by the agent. Just as when someone for the sake of an end desists from acting or does not act, as was said above, and several other instances against this can be gathered from the things said above.

To the **second** it must be said that it fails in multiple ways: First indeed the antecedent is false, since the end of an agent through intellect not only is the cause on account of which is acted what is acted, but also on account of which the agent acts, and the final cause also of the volition of the agent himself.

Second, the proposition assumed, by which it is said that a voluntary agent cannot love his effect for its own sake, is false, as experience teaches in those who enjoy things to be used nor have a right will.

Third, it is false that the ultimate end is simply nobler than those things which are for the end, if the proposition be understood universally and that ultimate be understood, which is loved for its own sake. And this is clear above.

Fourth, granted that all these things assumed for the proof of the antecedent were true, still the antecedent is not proved sufficiently. For it proves no more than that the end is that by whose love something is acted. With this however it stands, that it be also that by whose love something is acted and by whose love something does not act, and by whose love something is moved or rests, and many other things. And consequently that is not its causality according to the understanding of the question as if the corresponding definition were convertible with the end, as is intended in the purpose.

The consequence also is not proved, but assumes a falsehood, namely that everything which has a final cause, has an efficient cause, speaking generally of the end, as is clear above. Other defects also in the aforesaid consequence could be assigned, which for the sake of brevity I omit.

To the **third** it must be said that it does not prove the intended conclusion. For although that which is for the end be lovable on account of the end, it is not had from this, that the general reason of the end is to be that on account of which something is lovable or loved, since not only the loved is loved on account of the end, but also the lover is loving also on account of the end. Furthermore, positing that something be loved by another for its own sake and nothing be loved on account of it, still it will be the end of the lover. Whence the **Philosopher** maintains in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** that the first beloved moves the first lover by way of an end, and consequently that would be an end, and yet it would not be that on account of which something is loved.

Furthermore, not every loved thing on account of an end is loved by an agent, rather something is loved on account of an end by a non-agent, just as someone on account of God loves not to eat or not to contract and similar things.

(To the authorities of the other opinion)

To the **first authority** it can **first** be said that it is not much to be weighed because there neither the Philosopher nor the Commentator speaks anything determinatively. Whence the **Commentator** in the beginning of that comment calls the sermons of that book logical, and in one reason assigns the fallacy of the consequent.

Second it must be said that that reason does not prove universally the end not to be in immobile things, but only of an inhering end and on account of which something is moved, that it may be formally perfected by it. But besides such an end there is also a subsisting end and there is no doubt such is in immobile things according to the Philosopher and Commentator; for they posited the first intelligence to be the end of all others. On account of which that reason is particular, and therefore as if solving it the **Philosopher** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, where he shows the first substance to be the first end (because someone could doubt whether there were an end in immobile things), says: "But that the 'for the sake of which' is in immobile things, the division shows. For to someone is that for the sake of which; of which this indeed is, this indeed is not," that is of which this indeed is actually existing, this indeed not actually but in potency only. Or, as the **Commentator** explains "this indeed is, that is existing per se; this indeed is not, that is is not existing per se but in another." And the first is in immobile things, not the second according to them.

And therefore the **Commentator** says in comment 36 that Aristotle "said this, lest anyone judge that he intended perfection, which is an accident in the perfect," supply to be the first end. And perhaps the Commentator attended to this in the authority alleged for the opinion, when he said "unless end be accepted equivocally," because an end of another reason is found in immobile things, as was already clear.

To the **other** it must be said that the Commentator does not take agent properly there, so that namely it signifies the efficient cause, whose causality is condistinguished against the other three genera of causes, but by way of likeness and improperly, as was declared sufficiently in the first question of this distinction article one, where the same authority, though to another purpose, was introduced.

ARTICLE 2

[Three conclusions]

As to the second article of the question I posit three conclusions naturally probable, as appears: **First** is that in the universality of beings there is some being, which all others naturally intend as their end and good. **Second**, that there is some being, which naturally they desire for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else; it indeed naturally intends no other end. **Third**, that that such good, universally intended by others by nature, is a good per se subsisting and not a perfection inhering in anything.

(First conclusion)

I prove the **first conclusion** thus: Whatever things are naturally connected and ordered to each other, naturally intend one good and end of themselves. But all beings are naturally connected and ordered. Therefore all beings naturally intend one good and one end. From which further it follows that in the universality of beings there is some being etc.

[Major proved triply]

The **major** is proved triply: **First** indeed by **induction**. For inducing in all animals and plants, of which each is constituted of diverse members and parts, if no member lacks due order, all intend one common end namely the health and "well being" of that, and serve for this through proper operations and offices, as is clear to one diligently considering. If indeed any [member] does not serve the said end, it holds neither connection nor order with others, as is clear of a withered or otherwise useless member. We see the same in plants and generally all natural things, perfect in their species, constituted of several parts. Whence even in the minimal multitude, which is only of two (for example in the composite of soul and body and generally of matter and form), matter is ordered to form naturally and according to the requirement of the form is disposed with due dispositions, as is clear from the second book of the **Physics**.

Second the same major is proved by **example**. For we see in one art, that its diverse works have an order precisely because they are ordered to one end. Item those arts are ordered to each other, which intend one end, as is clear of bridle-making, equestrian and military, whom others serve; of which indeed there is not one common end, their works have no order or mutual connection. It is clear of naval and medicinal, even if the same man operates according to both.

Third it is proved by **reason**. For every order and connection of several to each other is through agreement in some one thing. Either therefore such things will be ordered, because they are from one efficient, as because they are from one matter, or because they have one form, or because they are for the sake of one end. It does not appear in what habitude others can have themselves to some one common thing. Not on account of the first, since from the same agent several effects having no order among themselves can proceed for the sake of one and another end. Similarly from the same matter diverse effects, having no connection. On account of the same form indeed not, since of beings suppositally distinct there is not the same form. It is left therefore that [it is] on account of one end.

It is confirmed. Because positing the unity of the end, however diverse the agents and diverse the matters be, order is posited among them. It is clear in an army well disposed, in which all intend one common end, although not all works proceed from one agent. Contrariwise, positing the unity of the agent not positing the unity of the end, among them there is no order; as is clear of an unstable man, who now intends one now another end, whose works have no order or mutual connection. Therefore whatever several things are ordered to each other by nature, naturally intend one end. And because the end naturally intended is truly good, as is clear from the preceding article, it follows that whatever things are naturally ordered, naturally desire one good and common end of themselves.

[Minor proved]

The **minor** of the reason is declared. For we see in every multitude constituted by nature its parts naturally have an order among themselves to some one thing, if it be perfect according to its proper species, and a defect has not happened in the operation of nature. For thus, whatever things are united in some of the elements or mixed things or natural composites, are ordered by the form of that or proper operation; also the members of living things both insensitive and sensitive and rational, if they be perfect and not bereft, also naturally have an order according as the health and perfection of the whole demands. Simple bodies also are naturally ordered among themselves according as their natural places manifest, and their motions to them. Mixed things moreover are also naturally ordered among themselves, so that inanimate for the sake of animate, and animate insensitive for the sake of sentient, and irrational for the sake of man are made by nature, as is proved from the utilities of one to another.

Whence just as the **Philosopher** says in the first book of the **Politics**, chapter 5: "Just as animals, which do not generate a complete animal from the beginning, but make eggs, naturally bring forth only food in the eggs themselves, which suffices for the sake of generating the animal itself from the egg, until it can seek food by itself. And those which bring forth some worms bring forth food at the same time with them. And those which generate a perfect animal, have in themselves milk for a time for the begotten themselves." And all these, namely milk and what were aforesaid, we know to be naturally made and ordered for the sake of the begotten themselves, as he says. "Similarly it is plain, that for the begotten it is to be esteemed that plants are for the sake of animals, and other animals for the sake of men. Domestic indeed both for the sake of use and for the sake of food; of wild however, although not all, yet very many for the sake of food and other help, so that both clothing and other organs may be made from them. If therefore nature makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it is necessary that nature made all things themselves for the sake of men." The **Commentator** also in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 24, says that "man is the end of things caused for his sake."

We see moreover that the natural order is more preserved by nature in more perfect things as in animals more than in vegetables. Whence fewer monsters happen in men than other animals and fewer in animals than in vegetables and their fruits. Since therefore we see so much natural order in these sensible things and greater in more perfect things and again greater in celestial bodies and their motions insomuch, that they never lack their order, much more ought it to be manifest that the universal multitude of beings, which is far more perfect and worthy than any particular multitude, exists naturally ordered and connected. And consequently it naturally intends one good and universal end.

The **Philosopher** posits this reason in virtue in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics** at the end, where he says that "those positing principles other for each, make the substance of the universe unconnected." Which is mostly and only true of final principles, as was shown; and in this he touches the major of the reason. And he adds: "But beings do not wish to be disposed badly, nor is a plurality of principedoms good," and by this the whole world is one connected and ordered principedom, which was assumed in the minor of the reason. And then he concludes the intended conclusion saying: "**One therefore the prince.**"

(Two parts of the second conclusion)

The **second conclusion** has two parts, namely that all beings desire some good for its own sake, not for the sake of anything else. And that that [good] desires no other naturally.

I prove the **first part** first from the preceding conclusion. For if they desired no end for its own sake, but desired every one for the sake of another, it would follow that in the whole universality of beings there would be none, which would be the end of all others. This however is repugnant to the prior conclusion. And the consequence is clear, since whatever be posited to be the end, it will not be the end of that, for the sake of which it itself is desired and is its end; nor also of any of the other ends of its end.

Second, because then there would be a **process to infinity** in natural ends with respect to the same, so that the same would naturally desire infinite ends one for the sake of another. But this is false, which is clear triply:

First, because every natural appetite is terminated at something determinately, beyond which it does not tend, just as also every motion and operation following it.

Second, because such an infinite process is impossible naturally in voluntary ends, therefore also in natural. The consequence is clear, since natural appetite is more determined than voluntary. The antecedent is known by experience, and is clear also by reason, since otherwise every action would be in vain, since it is impossible to attain infinite things as such. Similarly every such desire would be empty and idle. And the **Philosopher** makes this reason in the first book of the **Ethics** and second of the **Metaphysics**.

Third it can be proved by the same mode, by which the **Philosopher** proves in the second book of the **Metaphysics** that there is not a process to infinity in per se movers. For if there were infinite ends subordinate in the premised mode, none would be ultimate and intended for its own sake, but all would be middle. If however all be middle, it follows that none of them is an end and consequently, if there are infinite ends, **none is an end**, which implies a contradiction.

The first consequence is known and the second is declared. And that it may be more easily clear, let us posit examples in the ends of an agent from purpose, and let its subordinate ends be A B C D. So, that A be not intended for its own sake, but for the sake of B; and B not for its own sake, but for the sake of C; and C not for its own sake, but for the sake of D. It is established however, that if B were not intended, A would not be intended; nor would B be intended, if C were not intended; nor C, if not D. And therefore the three prior are intended precisely, because the fourth is intended for its own sake and is the ultimate end. And it is the same, if such means be posited a hundred or a thousand or in whatever other number, since none of the means nor all at once would be intended, nor also for the sake of any of them, or all at once, would the agent act, unless something were intended for its own sake and for the sake of which all others were intended. And the reason is, because to a middle end according as it is middle, it is repugnant to be an end without an ultimate. And consequently, if middle ends be posited precisely, however many they be finite or infinite, none would be an end.

And the **Philosopher** hints at this reason, as I think, in the second book of the **Metaphysics**, where proving a process infinite in ends not to be possible he says: "Further that which is for the sake of which is the end; it is such indeed, that not for the sake of another cause, but another for the sake of it." As if he

says that the end primarily and essentially, and on account of which others are ends, is such. Wherefore that being removed others will not be.

The **second part** of the same conclusion, namely that that such [end] naturally desires no other end, is proved, because, since it is the ultimate end naturally intended by all others, and nothing can be the natural end of its ultimate end into which it naturally tends, no natural end will be able to be of it.

(Third conclusion)

The **third conclusion**, namely that the ultimate natural end of all beings is a **subsisting perfection** and not inhering, is proved. **First**, because the proper natural end of some part of the universe is some subsisting good or perfection. For it has been proved that man is the end of all corporeal things and similarly the end of milk is the begotten animal and so of several others. Therefore the proper natural end of the whole universe is some subsisting good. The consequence is clear. Since of a nobler thing the proper end naturally intended is nobler, as is clear inductively and is had in the first book of the **Politics**.

Second, because the ultimate end naturally intended by all is not something existing only in potency and for the sake of which the rest act, that it may be. Because, either that being posited in being it will not be further an end and thus beings will be unconnected and badly disposed, and further, since beings would desire its being, which existing they would be imperfect, it would follow that beings would naturally desire their own **imperfection**, which is false. Or it itself posited in being will be an end, for the sake of which—because it is—others act; existing however such an end, intended for its own sake and by first intention, is nobler than all, of which it is the end. And thus it would follow that something made and "possible to be" would be nobler than all others, which is inconvenient. Therefore such an end is something existing in act and nobler than all others and consequently something per se subsisting, since no inhering is nobler than every subsisting.

Third, if the ultimate end of the universe were something inhering, there would not be **one end** of all, and consequently the Universe would not be connected,

(Doubt)

But against this there is one doubt. For the **Commentator** in the second book of *On the Heavens*, comment 64, says that "all beings do not intend [anything], unless that they be assimilated to the **perfect noble** which is God." And in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 36, he says that "the first heaven is moved by the first motor according to desire, that it be **assimilated** to it according to its power." From which it seems that the end of other beings is not **God Himself**, but the **assimilation** of the others to Him.

It must be said to this, that according to the **Commentator** the **first itself**, which is God, is certainly the **ultimate end** of all and the good **loved for its own sake** naturally. And because it is so, and all things which have some end of this kind **serve** it, and if they are active, have actions serving and following that end and its action—just as is clear concerning servants with respect to a lord and concerning artifices

ordered to some other artifice—and by this **assimilate** and **conform** themselves to it, therefore he says that such things intend to be assimilated and to conform themselves to the end; not that the **assimilation** or **conformation** or **service** be intended for its own sake and by **first intention**, but for the sake of the **lord himself**, who is loved and cherished by them for his own sake. And thus it is according to him concerning other beings with respect to **God**, as he himself declares in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 43.

To the **principal reason**, the consequence is to be denied, nor is the proof valid, but it assumes a falsehood, as is clear from the **first article** of this question.

QUESTION 3

WHETHER through any power it would have been possible for any thing other than God to have been from eternity or to have been without a beginning of its duration.

As to the **third** which the **Master** touches in this first distinction, I ask whether through any power it would have been possible for any thing other than God to have been from eternity or to have been without a beginning of its duration.

And it seems that **no**. Because it is not now possible for any other thing from God to have been from eternity. Therefore this was not possible. The antecedent is proved, because just as it is impossible for that which was before this instant not to have been before this instant (because "**God is deprived of this alone etc.**"), so it is impossible that that which was not before this instant, have been before this instant. And in the same way it is impossible that that which was not from eternity, have been from eternity. It is confirmed, because every proposition merely about the past, if it is true, is necessary, and consequently its opposite is impossible with respect to that instant, with respect to which it is true. The consequence indeed is clear, because just as in this instant every such singular [proposition] about the past "this was not from eternity" (whatever thing other than God be demonstrated) is true and necessary, so also in every past instant, which was or was possible to be, it would have been true, and consequently necessary, and its opposite impossible, if it had been formed. Therefore in no instant was it possible for any such [proposition] to be true "this was from eternity" (whatever other than God be demonstrated). But it follows: In no instant was it possible for that to be true; therefore it was not possible for it to be true.

Second, if it was possible for some other thing to have been from eternity, by the same reason it was possible for any, which now is, to have been, and consequently the **whole world** with all its species and natural motions and actions. But the consequent is false, since it would follow that **infinities** were traversed, as infinite days, infinite generations, and many other impossibilities would follow.

To the **opposite** thus: If it had been impossible, either this would have been from the impotence of God, and it is clear that not; or because it is repugnant to every such thing that it have always been without beginning, and this also is not true. For to no such thing is it repugnant that it be future always without end, therefore neither that it have been always without beginning. The antecedent is clear according to faith. The consequence is proved, because to whom eternity into the future is not repugnant, neither is it repugnant into the past, as can be had well enough from the first book of *On the Heavens*.

In this question there will be two articles: In the **first** it will be seen, whether it was possible for any thing other than God to have been from eternity. **Second**, whether it was possible for the whole world to have been from eternity according to the mode in which it now is, and was from when it began.

ARTICLE 1

[That no, through fifteen reasons]

As to the first article it is said by many solemn doctors that it was not possible even through divine power for any other thing from God to have been from eternity.

This however some prove **first** thus: Whatever things are impossible for the same instant of duration, such an order as they have of nature, such they necessarily have according to duration. But **being** and **non-being** of a creature are impossible for the same instant of duration, and non-being belongs to it prior by nature. Therefore necessarily non-being belongs to it prior according to duration than being, and consequently being cannot be posited to belong to it from eternity.

The minor is proved because, what belongs to someone **of itself**, belongs to it prior according to nature than what belongs to it **from another**. But non-being belongs of itself to every creature; being however, from another only. Therefore etc.

Second, if God had produced some thing other than Himself from eternity, necessarily He would have produced it. The consequent is impossible, therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is proved, because God could not have not produced it. For not before He produced it, because before the eternal there is nothing; nor while He produced it because "**everything which is, when it is, is necessary to be**"; nor after He produced it, because what has been made, cannot not have been, sixth book of the **Ethics**.

Third, God could as quickly produce some thing (for example a horse) from **matter**, as He could from **nothing**. It is clear because, whenever God could produce matter, He could produce the composite, otherwise matter would be produced without form. But God could not produce a horse from matter from eternity, therefore neither from nothing, and consequently in no way. Proof of the minor. For if He had produced from matter, either through motion, or through sudden mutation. If through **motion**, therefore not from eternity, since motion precedes the term in duration. Nor through **sudden mutation**, because that would have been measured by some instant, and consequently it would have had a **first instant** of its being, and by this it would not have been from eternity.

Fourth, everything which communicates something to someone through **election**, necessarily pre-understands that under the opposite of that communicated. But God in producing a creature communicates being to it through election. Therefore He pre-understands it **not to be**. He does not understand however except the true. Therefore necessarily prior it is not than it is produced. And consequently it could not be produced from eternity.

It is confirmed, because election is not with respect to the present, but only the future, third book of the **Ethics**. Therefore, if God elected to produce a creature, that was **future**, and not present. Whence these say that it is a contradiction to say that some creature be freely produced, and yet from eternity.

Fifth it is argued thus by others: "No production measured by a **passing instant** can be eternal. But every production of a creature, from the force by which it is production of a creature, has it that it be measured by a passing instant. Therefore etc."

The major is clear: Both because a passing instant cannot be eternal, otherwise it would not be passing but standing, and consequently neither the production measured by it. And because before every instant there was time. And because in everything measured by a passing instant production differs from **maintenance**, and the instant of production was the beginning of the time measuring maintenance. Therefore the time of maintenance is finite *a parte ante*, and consequently production was not from eternity, therefore neither the produced thing.

The minor is proved, because a creature from the force of its production does not have it that it endure, except through an instant. Otherwise through some duration it could endure without a preserver, and by equal reason through the whole time, which is false and against the faith. Therefore the production of a creature is measured by a passing instant. The consequence is clear, because if another measure [were given], therefore the creature from the force of its production would endure through another whole measure, and not through an instant only, which is repugnant to the antecedent.

Sixth, to the same by others it is argued thus: Every **factum** from nothing, which is not in continuous becoming, began in some instant. But the world or some other thing is made by God from nothing, and is not in continuous becoming. Therefore it began in some instant, and consequently was not from eternity. The premises are necessary, therefore also the conclusion. The major is clear, because if it did not begin in some instant and is made from nothing, as long as it is, it is always produced, and consequently is in continuous becoming. The minor is clear because, what is in continuous becoming, is not a "factum" [made thing], but is successive and becomes continuously. But the world and permanent things are not thus.

Seventh, to be created either is the same as to have being from another and not from something, or the same as to have **first** being from another and not from something. Not the first, because a creature as long as it is, has being from another and not from something, and yet is not created as long as it is. Otherwise it would be in continuous becoming just like "**day and contest**." Therefore it is necessary to give the second. But to have now first being and not from something includes "**not being**" from eternity. Therefore it is impossible for any thing to have been created from eternity.

Eight, if God had produced some other thing from eternity, He would have passed from a contradictory into a contradictory. It is clear, because in fact He did not produce from eternity. Therefore there would have been some change; and not in God certainly, therefore in the produced thing. And thus that thing would have passed from non-being to being. But what passes from non-being, was not from eternity. Therefore, if God had produced from eternity, He would not have produced from eternity, which implies [a contradiction].

Ninth, whatever is in potency to two contradictory opposites, if it acquire one of them, necessarily leaves the remaining, since there is no medium between contradictories. But from eternity it was true to say "the world or this thing (for example B) can be." Similarly, "B can not be." Therefore if B had acquired being, it would have left non-being. But nothing can leave non-being, unless formerly it were under non-being. And thus, if B was from eternity, formerly it was not; which is impossible.

Tenth, whatever can have been eternal, was eternal. But no other thing from God was eternal. Therefore no other thing from God could have been eternal. The minor is certain. The major is proved, because a potency which is necessarily conjoined to act, necessarily infers the act. It is clear. But the potency to **being eternal** is necessarily conjoined to act. Which is proved doubly: First because, wherever potency is not necessarily conjoined to act, the act can follow its potency according to duration. But being eternal *a parte ante* cannot follow its potency according to duration, because then that would not have been from eternity. Therefore the potency to being eternal is necessarily conjoined to its act, namely to this "being eternal." Second, by that of the **Philosopher**: "In perpetual things being and being able do not differ."

Eleventh, if an effective cause acting **naturally** had been from eternity, it could not have produced its effect coeval with itself. Therefore, if a cause **freely** effective was from eternity, it could not have produced an effect coeval with itself. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved because, if the opposite be given (for example that if fire had been from eternity, it would have produced splendor coeval to itself), either it would have produced it from nothing, or from something. Not from nothing, because then it would have created and thus would have been God. Nor from something, because either through motion or through mutation, because every reduction of a being in potency to act is by one of these modes. But if a natural agent were to produce an effect from something, it would produce as from something which is in potency to the act of that effect. Therefore either through motion or through mutation. Not through motion, because then such an effect would not be coeval to its cause, which is the purpose. Nor through mutation, because every mutation is measured by some instant, and consequently before that instant there would not have been such an effect (namely splendor) and by this neither from eternity.

Twelfth, by others thus: If God could produce the world or some other thing (for example B) from eternity, either He could this by creating or producing anew, or He could by not creating or not producing anew. Not in the second way, because B was not from eternity; therefore He could not produce it except through a **new production**, just as now no future thing can be unless it be made anew. Nor in the first way, because this includes a contradiction namely the new production of something with its eternity.

Thirteenth thus: God could have produced the world from eternity. Therefore He could have produced **this** world, therefore God could have produced **this created** world from eternity. The consequent includes a contradiction; and the consequence is clear, at least as now, because the terms of the antecedent and consequent convert as now, and are singulars.

Fourteenth, if God could produce B from eternity, either before He produced B, He could produce B from eternity; or when He first produced B, He could etc.; or after He produced B, He could etc.: Let B be some singular anew produced by God for example this horse or this man. It cannot be said that **before**, because then it follows that in some instant before He could. But this consequent is impossible, because then in this instant He could do the same (namely produce B from eternity). Nor can it be said that **then**,

when He produced, because, let that instant be accepted and let it be the present instant, it follows that **now** God can have produced B from eternity, which is false: Both because this cannot be through any sudden or successive action. And because God cannot now make the past not to have been, therefore neither can He make "not past before A" to have been before A. And by the same it is clear that not **after** He produced B, could He produce it from eternity.

Fifteenth and last it can be argued thus: If some other thing from God could be from eternity, some **contingent** could be **necessary being**. But this is false, because everything which could be necessary being, was necessary being. And if it was, it is. Therefore, if some contingent could be necessary being, some contingent is necessary being. Which consequent implies a contradiction. The consequence is proved, because every other thing from God is contingent. If therefore some such thing could be from eternity, let it be posited that it was, then thus: This thing was from eternity, therefore it could not be annihilated by God, without having been formerly in infinite time. Therefore through infinite time it was independent from God, and not possible not to be. Therefore in infinite time it was necessary being; and further, therefore it was necessary being, therefore from the first to the last it follows: This thing was from eternity, therefore this thing was necessary being. If therefore the antecedent is possible, therefore also the consequent. The first consequence is proved because, if it could be annihilated so that formerly it was not in infinite time, therefore the case being given before the instant of annihilation there would not have preceded except finite time in which it was, and consequently it was not from eternity, which is the opposite of the antecedent. Other consequences are apparent enough.

[That no, through the intention of the saints]

This conclusion is shown to be of the intention of the saints. For **Ambrose** says in the *Hexameron*: "What so inconvenient as that the eternity of the work be joined to the eternity of God?"

Item **Damascene** book 1 chapter 9: "Creation is a work existing from the will of God and is not coeternal with God, because it is not apt born, that which is deduced from non-being to being, to be coeternal to that which is without beginning and always is." If therefore no work of God is apt born that it be coeternal, it follows that none could be from eternity.

Item **Augustine** *Against Felicianus* chapter 19 defining creature: "Creature is, from the fact that either it is not yet or at some time was not, of any corruptible thing whatever, as much as is in itself, a substance made by the will of the omnipotent God." From this it is clear that the being of any creature was preceded by non-being.

Item **Hugh** [of St. Victor] *On the Sacraments* book 1 chapter 1 says, the inestimable power of the omnipotent God "could not have another coeternal besides itself."

These are [the arguments] by which the said conclusion is more efficaciously strengthened.

[That yes, through four conclusions]

This conclusion does not appear to me true. For the reprobation of which and of some things, which are taken for its proof, I posit three conclusions.

First is that it is possible for some thing to be made **all at once** by God, and yet neither itself nor any part of it then to begin to be.

Second, that it is possible for some thing to be made all at once by God **without any sudden or successive mutation**.

Third, that it was possible for some thing other than God to have been from eternity.

Fourth conclusion could probably be posited, if it were held that the **past can through divine power not have been**, just as some doctors held and still some hold, as was touched in the First [Book] distinction 42 question 1. And this fourth conclusion would be (which nevertheless I do not assert): That it is possible **even now** for some other thing from God to have been from eternity, and I speak always of the **absolute power** of God.

[First conclusion proved]

I prove the **first conclusion** thus first: It is possible for some thing to be produced all at once and neither itself nor any part of it then to begin to be. Therefore it is possible for some thing to be made all at once etc. The antecedent is clear in fact, for now the **Son of God** is produced by the Father, as is clear through **Origen** and **Hilary** and the **Master** in distinction 9 of the first book. And it is established that [He is produced] all at once, and that neither He nor any part of Him now begins to be. The consequence is proved, because it is not more impossible that something be made, and when it is made, not begin to be, than that something be generated or otherwise truly produced, and when it is produced, not begin to be. Nor can God do this possible less than that.

Second, if the **sun** or another luminous body illuminating some part of the air quiescent were to rest for some time in the same opposition to it, and that [air] were in no way more disposed to light, nor otherwise changed so that light were intended in it, the light would at some time be made **all at once**, when neither itself nor any part of it would begin to be. Therefore it is possible for some thing to be made etc. The antecedent is clear, because according to what **Augustine** says in the 8th *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* chapter 19 concerning small things: "The air is not made lucid by the present light, but **becomes**." Therefore that light becomes [is made]. And whenever the air would be lucid, its light would become. The case therefore being posited it is established that in every instant of that time that light would become and all at once, since not one part of it before, and another after; and yet in no instant of that time except the first, would that light or any part of it begin to be. The consequence indeed is proved, because the antecedent is a true conditional, as was proved, and its antecedent is possible, as is clear to anyone. Therefore also its consequent. Therefore this is possible "light becomes all at once, and neither itself nor any part of it begins to be." But from this it follows that this is possible "some thing becomes all at once etc.," which is equivalent to or infers the principal consequent.

This conclusion is also confirmed from the intention of **Augustine** in book 4 and 9 *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* who, as is clear in distinction 45 of the first book, expressly maintains that God

always makes and operates every existing creature. And yet it is established that not every one or part of it always begins to be.

[Second conclusion proved]

The **second conclusion** is proved thus: It is possible for some thing to be made all at once and then neither itself nor any part of it to begin to be. Therefore it is possible for some thing to be made all at once **without any sudden or successive mutation**. The antecedent has been proved, and the consequence is clear. Because from the opposite of the consequent (namely "it is impossible for some thing etc."), it follows that it is impossible for some thing to be made all at once and neither itself nor any part of it to begin to be, which is the opposite of the antecedent. That however it follows thus, is clear. Because it is impossible for something to be made with mutation, without a transit being made from non-being to being. For every mutation is from an opposite into an opposite, fifth book of the **Physics**. And a mutation of this kind cannot be except from non-being into being, as is certain. If however something be made all at once and with mutation from non-being into being, therefore when it becomes, it is; and immediately before it was not, and consequently then it begins to be.

Second it is proved by the case posited in the second reason of the preceding conclusion. For that being posited light would become all at once, when no mutation would be there.

[Third conclusion proved]

The **third conclusion** is proved first thus: If of some thing other than God, which could be produced all at once, the **total productive cause** was from eternity without defect of any requisite for producing it, it was possible for some thing other than God to have been from eternity. But of some thing other than God, which could be produced all at once (for example angels), the total productive cause namely God was from eternity without defect of any requisite for producing it. Therefore etc. The minor is certain and the major is proved. Because, if such a cause was from eternity, either it was a cause **naturally** active or **freely**. If naturally, therefore it produced from eternity. If freely, therefore for it to have produced from eternity was possible. Since although for a free total cause, all necessary requisites for acting concurring, it is not necessary to act, rather indeed it is in its power that it not act—in which it is distinguished from a naturally active cause—nevertheless it is not necessary for it not to act or to precede its action or effect. And consequently, if any such was from eternity, for it to act from eternity was possible.

Furthermore the same major is proved from the intention of **Augustine** in the sixth book of *On the Trinity*, chapter 1, where he makes such a consequence: If fire were eternal, splendor generated by it would be coeternal. But it is established that this consequence does not hold except by virtue of this proposition "a sufficient naturally active cause being posited with other necessary requisites, the action is posited at once." Since therefore not less from the position of a **free total cause** without defect of any requisite for acting is inferred the possibility of action for then, than from the position of a natural created cause is inferred the actuality or actual position of the action of the same (rather more, speaking of necessity simply, since no such is a total cause). Rather indeed it is necessary for a superior cause to concur namely God freely acting, whose concurrence Augustine supposes in his consequence, and thus it is necessary, otherwise indeed it would not be valid. Since, I say, it is so, it is clear that not less is this proposition true "a free total cause being posited etc. its action can be posited at once." Nor less with

Augustine would this consequence "if a created will had been from eternity with other requisites for willing, it would have been possible for its volition to have been coeternal" be necessary than that which he makes.

From this is removed the response of those saying that the consequence of Augustine is good, because it is concerning a cause naturally acting, but a similar consequence concerning a free cause would not be valid.

Second to the conclusion thus: The **Son of God** was truly produced from eternity. Therefore some other thing from God could be produced from eternity. The antecedent is certain according to faith. And the consequence is clear from the fact that no contradiction seems to be implied, if something other than God be said to be produced from eternity, more than if it be said that God the Son is produced from eternity. For if any [contradiction] seemed to be implied, this precisely would seem [so], because **eternity a parte ante** would be repugnant to the produced. This however is common to both. And if it be said that the repugnance is not because eternity is absolutely repugnant to the produced, but because to the produced **freely** and electively, or because to the produced in an **alien nature** from the producing, neither is valid. Not the first, because where the agent does not deliberate, it is not necessary for election to precede action. God however does not deliberate in acting. Nor the second, because that the produced be of another nature or the same with the producing, does not refer as to this, provided the producing [cause] be total and sufficient eternal, and the effect can be produced all at once.

It is confirmed, because otherwise the aforesaid consequence of Augustine would be nothing, since it is established that splendor generated by fire is not of the same nature with the generating fire.

Item from such a mode of arguing nothing could be concluded against **Arius**, who said the Son is of another nature from the Father and denied Him to be eternal. Against whom nevertheless from such a consequence Augustine proceeds in the same place.

[Fourth conclusion proved]

The **fourth conclusion** could be proved thus: God can from eternity have willed to make A. Let A be the name of some thing which God could make from eternity. Therefore God can from eternity have made A. The consequence is clear, because it follows: God willed from eternity to have made A, therefore God from eternity made A. Otherwise His will would not have been omnipotent. Therefore, if the antecedent is possible, the consequent is possible. The antecedent indeed is proved, because everything which God could will from eternity, He can now have willed from eternity. This is clear through the **Master** in book 1 distinction 43 at the end saying that God "has the power of willing both now and from eternity, what nevertheless neither now He wills, nor from eternity willed." It can also be proved by those things which were said in the same book distinction 40 article 3 of the question. But to make A from eternity God could will from eternity. It is clear, because He could make, as is clear from the preceding conclusion, and He could not except by willing. It is certain therefore God can have willed from eternity "to make A from eternity."

It is confirmed, because it is possible for God to have willed from eternity to produce some thing which He did not will from eternity to produce. Otherwise no non-future could be future, nor could God make

anything which never will be made, which cannot be catholicly conceded. Therefore, although God did not will from eternity to produce A from eternity, it is possible for God to have willed from eternity to produce A from eternity. The consequence is clear, because there is equal reason on both sides.

Addition 5: This same thing I prove from the sayings of those doctors, who hold that the world could be from eternity. For that follows to that. Whence if they wished to speak consequently, they ought also to say this. Which I prove thus: The world could be from eternity, therefore this could in some instant be true "the world was from eternity," therefore also now this can be true "the world was from eternity." Consequently the world can have been from eternity.

The first consequence is clear, and the second is proved. Because it was not more possible yesterday for this to be true "the world was from eternity" than today, nor another prior day more than yesterday, and universally in no past instant more than in another, as is clear.

(To the fifteen reasons)

Now I respond to the reasons of the other opinion.

To the **first** reason it must be said that, if the propositions be taken properly, each is false. For that major "whatever things are impossible for the same instant of duration, such an order as they have of nature etc.," if "order of nature" be taken properly, implies a contradiction. Since, as is clear in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**, "prior according to nature are said whatever things happen to be without others, and those not without them," and consequently the posterior by nature does not happen to be without the prior, therefore they are **at once**. If however some things are not compossible for the same instant of duration or for the same time—which does not refer in the purpose—they are not at once, therefore neither between them is there an order of nature. And therefore to posit things to be impossible according to duration and to have an order of nature, is to affirm contradictories. More expressly however the minor in the same way implies a contradiction, as is clear to one attending. To the **proof** it must be said that it assumes another falsehood namely that non-being belongs to every creature of itself. For this is utterly false, since, if non-being belonged to a creature of itself, being could belong to it from no other, and if of itself it were non-being, from no other could it be being. Just as, because the diameter of itself is incommensurable to the side of its square, from no other could it be commensurable to it. But it is true that being does not belong to any creature of itself and that no creature is of itself and from itself being, but every one is from another.

And authors understand such negatives by those affirmatives where they put them. And those understand them so, who understand them rightly. From such negatives however those affirmatives are not inferred. Nor even can it be concluded that "non-being" prior by order of nature belongs to a creature than being.

But perhaps it will be said that priority of nature is not taken thus in the argument, but for so much it is said that non-being prior by nature belongs to a creature than being, because a creature proceeds from non-being to being, or perhaps because there is a priority of consequence. For it follows: Creature is, therefore formerly it was not. And it does not follow: Creature was not, therefore creature is. For the antecedent would have been true before the creation of the world, and the consequent false. And similarly of every singular creature it is clear such a consequence is not converted.

If it be said thus, nothing to the purpose. Because they argue only in fact that the creature formerly was not than it was. Which is not denied. They do not prove however but that the opposite was possible, for those consequences are not simple, but only as now.

To the **second** I deny the consequence. And to the **proof** I say that it is nothing, for by a similar mode it would be proved that God did not **predestine** anyone from eternity, which is heretical. For I will argue thus: If He predestined, therefore necessarily; which is false. Proof of the consequence, because He could not have not predestined then nor before nor after, each of which is proved similarly, as in the purpose.

I say therefore to the argument that it is founded upon a **false imagination**. For it imagines that, if God had produced from eternity some thing, that in some first instant He would have produced it. And then it asks, whether then or before or after He could not produce. But this imagination is entirely false, since "to have produced from eternity" is not to have produced first in some eternal instant, but is to have produced before every finite time actual or possible or imaginable. From which manifestly it is denied that there was any such **first eternal instant**.

Whence that which is said "from eternity" in the purpose is not a sentence [oratio] but a diction [dictio] and equivalently **syncategorematic**, just as this diction "whole." For it includes in its signification equivalently a universal distributive sign with its distributable, which is time. And it is worth the same, as was said, as this sentence "before every time," taking time most generally in the mode touched before.

And therefore according to the doctrine of certain modern logicians that diction would be more to be preposed than postposed to the verb, so that it be said "from eternity He produced" than "He produced from eternity." For according to them from the second it seems to be able to be inferred "therefore in some instant He produced from eternity" just as follows "Socrates was white, therefore in some instant he was white." From the first however that cannot be inferred. If nevertheless one be put indifferently for the other to the sense which the first makes properly, then no such first instant is conceived. Which not being conceived it is clear that the argumentation following is entirely impertinent, since it supposes some determinate instant, in which first the thing be produced, and asks then, whether then or before or after etc.

If however conformably to the true sense it be asked, whether God **from eternity** (that is before every finite time) could not produce, it must be said that **yes**. For every singular of that universal is true. Nor nevertheless from this does it follow that **before eternity** He could not produce, since there was no such eternity. Second I say that, when God produced and whenever He produced, He could not produce. And whatever is to be said to the proof to the contrary is clear in book one distinction 38 question 1 article 3.

To the **third** I say that from eternity God could produce a horse from matter. And when it is proved that no, because, if He had produced from matter, either He would have produced through motion or through mutation, I **deny** the consequence. For the opposite of the consequent can stand with the antecedent, as is clear from the **second conclusion**.

To the **fourth** I say that **election** is taken in two ways: In one way strictly as it is, namely the conclusion of counsel, according as is had in the third book of the **Ethics**, and thus it does not fall in God. In another way, commonly for the free volition of a contingently willable thing. If it be taken in the first way, I deny

the minor. If in the second way, I deny the major. For it is not necessary, if anything is communicated to someone electively (election taken thus), that that be understood to be under the opposite or to lack that, but it suffices that it be possible for that to be under the opposite, and that it would be, if that were not communicated to it.

To the **confirmation** it must be said that election taken in the second way is also with respect to the present, although the first is only with respect to the future.

To the **fifth** I suppose that **production** is not another thing from the thing produced, which will be declared below. And from this for production to be in something in an instant or in time, to a good understanding, is nothing other than for that produced thing to be in an instant or in time. When therefore it is said: No production measured by a passing instant can be eternal, speaking to the purpose there can be a double sense. One: No production etc., that is it is impossible for something produced in a passing instant to be or to have been from eternity. Another sense is: No production etc., that is it is impossible for something from eternity to have been produced in a passing instant. And in both ways I say the proposition is false.

To the **first proof** I concede that no instant can be eternal, to a good understanding. And I deny the consequence by which is inferred "therefore neither production measured by an instant," whether that consequent be understood according to the first sense of the major, or according to the second. Since it is possible for something to be produced and to be produced even actually in an instant, and yet in no instant to be **first** produced or first produced. Just as it is possible for something to become in some instant and in that instant **not begin to be**, as was proved in the **first conclusion**; nor less is it possible absolutely in no instant for it to begin to be or to have begun.

If therefore the consequent be understood conformably to the **first sense** of the major, the consequence is not valid. For it is possible for something produced, and which even actually in an instant is produced, to have been from eternity.

Item neither in the **second sense** is it valid, since it is possible for something from eternity to have been produced in an instant, and with this it stands that no instant was eternal or from eternity. For when it is said: It is possible for something from eternity to have been produced in an instant, the "instant" supposes confusedly only.

The **second proof** also fails in the consequence in a similar way.

To the **third proof**, when it is said "in every measured passing instant production differs from maintenance," I say that by the force of speech the proposition is simply **false**. Taking it nevertheless in some good sense namely that every produced and preserved thing in some instant is produced, in which it is not preserved, or in some instant was produced, in which it was not preserved, the proposition is to be conceded as true of inherence as now, since every such thing began in some instant, in which it was not preserved; or if it begins now, in this instant it is not preserved, because not properly is said to be preserved or maintained except what pre-existed immediately. And according to this mode proceeds the argumentation. And therefore in fact it proves no such thing was from eternity. Because however it was possible, and is, for something to be made and in no instant to have begun—and if such a thing were, it in

no instant would have been produced, in which it would not have been preserved—it is clear that that is not necessary, and that the reason does not prove it to have been impossible, for some thing to have been produced from eternity.

To the **sixth** first it can be said that, the conclusion being conceded, the intent is not had. For it does not follow: This is necessary "A began," therefore it was not possible for A not to have begun; just as it does not follow: This is necessary "Adam was," therefore it was not possible for Adam not to have been.

Second it must be said that for something to be in **continuous becoming** can be understood in two ways: In one way that successive part of it after part becomes, and thus "to become" is distinguished from "to have been made," and what becomes in such a way, is not. In another way, that although it be and have been made, yet in the whole time and every instant of it it has being and actually all at once becomes by the agent. Just as if a luminous body and the subject of light rest, the light caused in the whole time of rest and in every instant of it all at once becomes and is made, as was said above. Then if in the major "to become" be taken in the first way, I deny it is necessary; and to the proof I say that the consequent does not follow, accepting "to become" in the same way. If indeed in the major "to become" be taken in the second way, still it is false on account of false implication. For it implies something to be made from nothing, and not continuously to become in that way, and consequently neither to be preserved by God. Furthermore in the same sense the minor is false, and similarly its proof.

To the **seventh** it must be said that "**to be created**" can be expounded in both ways, and by authors sometimes in one way, sometimes in another sententially is found expounded. If however it be expounded in the **first way**, it is to be conceded that, as long as a creature has being from another, and not from something, it is always created; nevertheless it is not "in continuous becoming like day and contest" and "to become" said in the first way in the preceding solution, but it is in continuous becoming in the second way. And thus Augustine concedes in [books] 4 and 9 *On Genesis*, as was said above of every creature. And in the same way it ought to be conceded that it is continuously created, thus accepting "to be created" how to preserve is to create and to be preserved to be created. If indeed it be taken in the **second way**, then it is to be said to be impossible that a creature have been created from eternity.

But from this it does not follow that it could not have been **made** from eternity. For they stand well at once that from eternity it have been made and not from something, and yet not have been at some time **first** made, and consequently neither created, thus expounding the name of creation, rather indeed the first infers the second. And the first is, what I intend and what is asked in the question.

To the **eighth** it must be said that it is nothing valid; for thus it would be proved that God could not from eternity **predestine** the soul of Antichrist or any of the reprobate, because in fact He did not predestine, therefore He would have passed from a contradictory into a contradictory. And not through a mutation made in the predestined, it is established, since nothing utterly was or had been, even granted that he had been predestined; nor through a mutation in God. And in the same way it would be proved that nothing, which God did not foreknow, could He from eternity have foreknown. All which are false and erroneous.

I respond therefore to the reason and **deny** the consequence. Nor is the proof valid because, although in fact it be true that He did not produce, if nevertheless from eternity He had produced, never would it have

been true He did not produce and consequently He would not have passed from not-producing into producing, or from not-having-produced into having-produced, so to speak.

To the **ninth** it must be said that it also is nothing valid; for equally it concludes both parts of the contradiction. Which is clear because, as he assumes in the minor, from eternity it was true to say "the world can be," and similarly "the world can not be." Therefore, if the world was not from eternity, it acquired one extreme of the contradiction namely non-being. And consequently, if the argument is valid, it left the remaining namely being; therefore formerly it was. And consequently, if the world was not from eternity, the world was from eternity.

In the same way it would be proved that God could **predestine** no one from eternity. For whoever could be predestined, could also not be predestined. If therefore someone was predestined from eternity, and acquired that extreme, according to the mode of speaking of the arguer, he left the remaining. And consequently formerly he was under that, therefore formerly he was non-predestined. Therefore if from eternity he was predestined, he was not from eternity predestined. Which is impossible.

It must be said therefore that the major is false, accepting properly "to leave" just as it is accepted in the further deduction of the argument. But if "to leave" be accepted for "not to have" or "not to be under," to a good understanding, it is true. But then what he intends is not concluded, because it is not true "nothing can not have non-being, unless formerly it had non-being," just as neither conversely is it true "nothing can not have being, unless formerly it had being." And consequently it is not true, accepting "to leave" in the same signification, "nothing can leave non-being unless formerly it were under non-being."

To the **tenth** I say that "**eternal**" can be taken in two ways: In one way properly and strictly, and thus it is said of that only which is and was without beginning, and will be without end, and is unchangeable entirely and impossible not to be. Whence **Augustine** 83 *Questions* question 19 maintains that that which is changeable is not rightly called eternal. And in the 4th *On the Trinity* chapter 18 he maintains the same, just as in distinction 9 of the First [Book] was had.

In another way eternal can be taken largely and improperly, and this triply: Namely *a parte post*, and thus something created and possible non-being, which into eternity (that is without end) will endure, can be called eternal. And *a parte ante*, as if some such thing had been from eternity, it would be called eternal. Or from both sides, as if it had been from eternity and were future into eternity, it could, though improperly, be called eternal.

Then to the argument. If eternal be taken properly namely in the first way, concede the major and the conclusion similarly. Whence I say that it was impossible for any other thing from God to have been eternal, because it was impossible for any other thing from God to have been necessary being and unchangeable. But with this it stands that it was possible for another thing from God to have been from eternity, since although it had been from eternity, it would not have been however eternal, properly taking eternal, since it had been possible not to be. And just as was said in distinction 9 of the First [Book], still God would have been prior to it by priority of eternity. Whence properly speaking it is one thing "**to have been able to have been from eternity**," another "**to have been able to have been eternal**," just as also it is one thing "to be able to be about to be into eternity" and "to be able to be about to be eternal"; for certain creatures will be into eternity and yet will not be eternal. If indeed in the major "eternal" be taken

improperly namely in the second way, then I deny it and at the same time that proposition assumed for its proof, if it be universal, as it must be if it ought to conclude, namely "potency to being eternal is necessarily conjoined to act," positing "eternal" for "from eternity."

Then to the **first proof**, when it is said "wherever potency is not necessarily conjoined to act, act can follow potency according to duration," or potency precede act, I **deny** it, speaking of act and potency just as the arguer speaks. The instance is clear. For it is established that "to be able to be predestined from eternity" is not necessarily conjoined to act, otherwise it would not have been possible for no one to be predestined from eternity, and everyone who could be predestined, would have been predestined. Each however is heretical. And yet "to be from eternity predestined" cannot follow according to duration its potency, because then that would not have been from eternity predestined.

To the **other proof** it must be said that in that proposition "in perpetual things etc." perpetual is taken for eternal said in the first way, and thus it is true. If indeed it were taken in the second way, it would be false.

To the **eleventh** I deny the antecedent. To the proof I say that fire would have produced splendor **from something**, just as now it is said that it produces it from something. And when it is inferred "therefore either through motion or through mutation," I deny the consequence. For just as after the first instant of its being in every instant of time, in which it endures, splendor is produced, and not however through mutation or motion, supposing that the fire and the subject of splendor is changed according to no other transmutation, as is clear above in the **second conclusion**, so if from eternity fire had been and the subject, splendor would have been produced without motion and mutation. And when it is said that every reduction of a being in potency to act is by one of these modes, I say that it is true of "being in potency" rejecting act or distant from act, according to the mode of speaking of the **Philosopher**, not however of "being in potency" not distant. And it is clear from that which has already been said.

To the **twelfth**, when it is said "either He could by creating or not creating," if "creating" be accepted according to the first exposition of "to be created" given in the response to the seventh argument, I say that He could produce by creating not however by producing anew. Nor does it withstand that in fact it was not, because it does not follow "B was not from eternity, therefore it could not have been except anew, or after it was not" just as also it does not follow "therefore it could not have been from eternity." And similarly I say that every future [thing] could be produced not anew, and from eternity. But if "creating" be accepted according to the second exposition of the word "to be created" just as the argument seems to accept on account of that addition "or by producing anew" so that the "or" stands there expositively, I say that God could not from eternity produce B by creating. But from this it does not follow that absolutely and simply He could not produce.

To the **thirteenth** I concede that God could from eternity have produced **this** world, and I deny the ulterior consequence by which it is said "therefore He could from eternity have produced this **created** world," if "created" be accepted in the second aforesaid way, that is "produced anew" just as also the argument accepts. Nor is the proof of the consequence valid. For just as well are converted as now "this man" and "this reprobate man" (demonstrating some reprobate), as are converted "this world" and "this created world," and so also are singulars, and yet it does not follow "God could from eternity have predestined this man, therefore He could from eternity have predestined this reprobate man." For the antecedent is true, and the consequent implies a contradiction, taken by the force of speech, just as that

implies a contradiction "God predestined this reprobate man." This nevertheless is true "this reprobate man God could from eternity have predestined," and similarly this is true "this created world God could from eternity have produced."

To the **fourteenth**, which certainly among all is more difficult in my judgment, if the **fourth conclusion** posited above were held (namely that that which was not, can through divine power have been), then it would be to be said that, both before He produced B and when He produced and similarly after, He could have produced it from eternity; and to be conceded that even now He can have produced from eternity, and further that through sudden action (that is by producing all at once), not however in any first instant. If indeed that be not held, it does not seem otherwise possible to be said except that, before He produced, He could have produced from eternity, and yet that in no instant, before He produced, could He have produced from eternity. Whence is to be denied that consequence "therefore in some instant before A He could etc.," just as many say to that case "Socrates omitted before A, and yet in no instant before A." And if it be asked for what the "before" supposes, it must be said that for the whole eternal time imaginable categorically.

To whom this response does not please, let him procure a better.

To the **fifteenth** I deny the first consequence. When it is proved, because it follows "this thing was from eternity, therefore it could not be annihilated by God without having been formerly in infinite time," concede the consequence. But the other which follows "therefore this thing through infinite time was independent from God and not possible not to be," I deny because, although supposing that from eternity it was necessary for it to have been through infinite time before its annihilation, through no infinite time however was it necessary for it to have been before its annihilation, rather indeed in every past instant it could be annihilated. The example is clear in others, for if something is moved locally, it is necessary for it to be moved through some space, and yet through no space is it necessary for it to be moved. For whatever be given, it is possible that it be moved through a part of it only. Similarly in the purpose conversely it is clear; for positing that there was time from eternity, and B was not from eternity, it follows "B was not from eternity, therefore B could not be or be created without formerly not having been through infinite time." Nor nevertheless does it further follow "therefore through infinite time B could not be, or through infinite time could not be created," since no time was but that, before its end, B could have been.

(To the authorities)

To the **authorities** consequently it is to be responded. And to that of **Ambrose** I say that it is to be understood according to the proper acceptance of eternity, as was said in the response to the tenth argument. According to which understanding, granted that some work of God had been from eternity, still its eternity would not be equated to the eternity of God, rather indeed neither would it rightly and properly be called eternal.

To **Damascene** it must be said that he accepts coeternal in the same way. Furthermore still his proposition can be conceded, accepting "to be eternal" for "to be from eternity" but in the composite sense, not however in the divided sense. And in the first sense it is not against the sayings.

To **Augustine** *Against Felicianus* it must be said that that definition certainly in fact belongs to every creature. And this suffices for him. If however some had been from eternity, it would not be convenient universally. Or if so, because names are at pleasure, it would be to be said that that thing produced by God would not be a creature, it would be nevertheless a thing made by God according to that which was said to the twelfth argument.

And to the authority of **Hugh** it could be said in the same way. But second, and better, it must be said that the authority is alleged diminutively, since there the sentence is not terminated. For these are his words: "Of whose omnipotence the ineffable virtue just as it could not have another coeternal besides itself, by which in making it were helped, so when it willed for itself etc." Now however it does not follow: The omnipotence of God could not have another coeternal by which it were helped, therefore it could not have another coeternal (that is which from eternity was **Addition 6:** made by it). Whence he wills only to deny some eternal matter not made by God, from which He made other things, nor without it and not except from it could He make, what He made, and thus by something coeternal were helped, just as the Manichees opined. On account of which thing Augustine says they deny God is omnipotent in the book *On Faith and the Symbol* chapter 1, where he says that "builders of houses and other artificers, unless they are helped by prepared matter, cannot arrive at the effect of their art." For the opposite of the consequent can excellently stand with the antecedent.

For if He had made something from eternity, nevertheless He would not be helped by that (His omnipotence) for making something else.

And conformably **Augustine** himself speaks in the book *On Faith and the Symbol* chapter 1, where against the Manichees he says that "they understand the fabricator of the world not to be omnipotent, if he could not fabricate the world, unless some nature, not fabricated by him, helped him as matter." And he speaks from the similitude of mechanic artificers, of whom immediately he premised that, unless they are helped by prepared matter, they cannot arrive at the effect of their art.

From these things it is clear that it is not the intention of Hugh to deny absolutely that it was possible for some thing other than God to have been from eternity, but only something not made by Him by which in making He were helped as matter. And the words which follow continuously manifest this also. For he says: "So it was under Him when He willed, that what He willed, when and how much He willed, He created from nothing. All things therefore which are made, God not only made from matter, but He made the matter of all from nothing."

ARTICLE 2

[That yes, even with respect to the whole world]

As to the second article I respond briefly that **yes**. And the proof is clear from the sayings; for by what reason it was possible for some thing to have been from eternity, it was possible also for any perpetual thing (for example heavens and intelligences and elements); nor less was it possible for celestial bodies to have always been moved and to have acted into these inferior things, and thus for there to have been from eternity generations and corruptions of things, just as they have been now for so many thousands of years, since in none of the aforesaid is any contradiction implied, or inferred from them. Therefore also it was possible for the world to have been from eternity.

[Other eight contrary reasons]

But against this, besides the reasons of the other opinion for the first article, which all are against the conclusion of this second article, it is argued by the same [doctors] very difficultly against this conclusion in special. And although many reasons be made by them, because nevertheless they are rooted upon certain few foundations, I will recite some. From whose solutions will be clear the solution of the rest.

First therefore it is argued thus: If the world had been from eternity, **infinite time** would be past. The consequent is impossible, therefore also the antecedent. The impossibility of the consequent is clear, because of the reason of the past is that it be wholly accepted and complete and nothing of it be in potency and to be accepted in the future. Of the reason of the infinite however is that it be incomplete, nor wholly accepted and posited in act, but always something of it be in potency, and what remains to be accepted. These reasons however are repugnant and impossible.

Second it would follow that to an infinite or infinites **addition** could be made, which is impossible. The consequence is clear. For infinite days would have preceded today, and to all preceding can be added the morrow day and afterwards another and so always.

Third it would follow that either something would be **greater than an infinite** or some things more than infinites, or a **part would not be less than the whole**. Each however is impossible. The consequence is proved. For days preceding yesterday are part of the whole time which was until today inclusive, and so it would be if the world had been from eternity. And it is established that that being posited infinite days would have preceded yesterday. Either therefore all those together with yesterday and today would be more than those only, and thus it follows that some things would be more than infinites, or they would not be more and consequently neither would those be fewer. And then it follows that that partial multitude will not be less than its whole.

Fourth it would follow that one infinite would be **multiple** to another for example double and triple, and so according to other certain proportions. It is clear. For just as every six is double to three, so an infinite multitude of sixes would be double to an infinite multitude of threes, if each were. It is clear, because every six of the infinites would contain two threes. If however the world had been from eternity, infinite threes and infinite sixes of days would have preceded. The impossibility of the consequent is proved, because one infinite is not greater than another infinite, and consequently neither multiple.

Fifth, if the world had been from eternity, infinite horses would have been generated successively, and yet some would have been the **first** horse before whom none, and some **last**. The consequent is impossible. For extremes being posited it is not possible for the means to be infinite. The consequence is proved. For

if the world had been from eternity, it would have been made by God, because otherwise it could not be. The action of God however would not have been terminated at things in universal but in singular and determinately at this or that. Therefore if from eternity He had made the world, of every species of generables He would have made immediately some signated individual, and from that would have been afterwards the rest successively generated until the horse now newly generated. Let it be posited that some is now first generated, and this would be the last, and that, immediately made by God, would have been first.

Sixth it would follow that actually there would be an infinite multitude of **rational souls**. For infinite men would have preceded of whom singles would have had single and proper souls, and none would have been corrupted. Therefore now they would be at once in act infinite. But the consequent is impossible, since it is impossible for there to be a multitude actually infinite.

Seventh it would follow that it would have been possible for there to be an **infinite magnitude**. Which similarly is false just as of multitude. The consequence is clear. For God could on every day have created one cubit stone and united it to the prior. Infinite cubits however, no doubt but that they would constitute an infinite magnitude.

Eight it would follow that God could have made one **infinite triangle**. This however implies a contradiction, because since it would be a triangle, it would have sides constituting angles, and consequently terminated at some points. And by this they would be finite. If however it were infinite, it would be necessary that its sides be infinite. And thus the sides of an infinite triangle would be infinite and finite, which implies a contradiction. But the consequence is proved, first because on every day He could have made one triangle and on every day greater than the triangle made on the preceding day, according to some certain quantity, and according to this today's triangle would be infinite. For it would contain in itself infinitely the determined quantity of excess. Second the consequence is proved, because He could from eternity have made one triangle, and then on every day have augmented its two sides to the quantity of one cubit. Which being posited, now it would be infinite.

In a similar way it could be proved of a **circle**. For just as God could from eternity have made the empyrean heaven, so on every day, retaining its figure according to species according to concave and convex, He could have augmented it according to a determined quantity. And thus now it would be infinite, and yet both in concave and in convex circular, which implies a contradiction.

(Solution of the eight reasons)

To the **first** [reason] I concede the consequence to a good understanding of the consequent, and I deny the impossibility of the consequent. To the proof, when it is said that these and those are of the reason of the infinite, I say that it is false as was shown in distinction 44, last question of the first book.

To the **second** I concede the consequent. And it is clear that it is not impossible, from the pre-alleged question.

To the **third** is clear in the same place.

To the **fourth** I deny the consequence. For I say that infinite **threes** would also be infinite **sixes**, and not only [that], but also infinite hundreds and infinite thousands. And so of every other species of numbers. On account of which infinite sixes would not be rather multiple to infinite threes, than conversely. Nor is the proof valid because, although such multiplicity is between finite proportional multitudes, it does not follow nevertheless that it is also between infinite ones, between which there is no numeral proportion.

To the **fifth** I concede that infinite horses would have been generated. I say nevertheless that it would not have been necessary that some would have been **first** before whom none. Rather indeed it would have been possible that every one would have been generated by another horse generated before, just as the **Philosopher** would say was in fact.

To the proof of the consequence I concede that, if the world had been from eternity, it would have been made by God. And further I say that the action of God would not have been terminated at things in universal but in **particular**, that is God would not have acted universal things (since no such things are except universal signs), but singular things; and that He would not have made except a singular horse, and that from eternity He would have made some singular horse, another singular horse generated before mediating or concurring to its generation. Nevertheless, He would have made no horse from eternity mediating another horse generated before. And thus none would be first.

Nor is this **second proposition** repugnant to the **first**. Since it does not follow: "From eternity He made some horse, therefore some horse He made from eternity." Just as it does not follow: "Before every time (which was or could be) He made some horse, therefore some horse He made before every time which was or could be," as is clear even to one knowing a modicum of logic.

And a similar thing to this appears in the continuous **intension** of a form, which is intended [intensified] through the addition of a new degree. For infinite parts of the form are generated and the generator does not generate some universal form but singular only. And yet it generates no part **first** nor among those was any first, since the half of any one was generated prior to it.

Through this nevertheless I do not deny but that God could have made one horse from eternity, and that from it also infinite [horses] would have been successively generated. But this being posited I say that none would have been **first generated** by that horse, just as, granted that the agent intending [intensifying] the form be new and begotten, nevertheless it causes successively infinite parts of the form. But none is first simply among them, and first generated or caused by it.

To the **sixth** I say that the consequent is not impossible. It is clear in the question alleged above.

To the **seventh** in the same way. And further I add that those arguing thus are deduced no less necessarily to the same consequent. For it is established that, if God could on every day have created one stone etc., so also He could in every **proportional part** of the same proportion of one hour create one stone and continue [unite] it, just as is said there. Since therefore these are infinite, it follows that in the end of the hour there will be an **infinite stone**.

To the **eighth** I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that, because supposing the eternity of the world infinite [days] would have preceded every day, it would not have been possible that on every day He had made a triangle greater in determined excess, since then on every day an **infinite triangle** would have

been made. But for a triangle to be infinite implies a contradiction, although it does not imply a contradiction for there to be an infinite magnitude.

And similarly I say to the second proof of the consequence. For if God had made some triangle from eternity, it would not have been possible that He augmented it on every day according to a certain excess, and with this on every day that augmented thing be a triangle. Rather indeed supposing such augmentation on no day would there have been a triangle, but a certain magnitude having only one angle, whose sides in the other part were infinite.

And by the same it must be said to the other deduction concerning the **circle**. For that case being posited on no day would it have had a convex. And advert that to anyone positing the **continuum** not to be composed of indivisibles, the aforesaid difficulties can be similarly ingested [imposed]. Since this being posited in every hour there are infinite proportional parts of the same proportion. Let there be posited therefore now some triangle or circle. Then I will argue that God could in every **proportional part** of one following hour make a greater triangle or circle according to a determined excess, or augment the given one in that mode. And I take the proportional parts giving the **last**, and not the first. For example that the posterior half of the whole hour be the last part, and the posterior half of the first half of the whole be the penultimate part, and so forth according to the same proportion dividing towards the beginning of the hour. According to which mode it is clear that infinite [parts] of the same proportion precede every part. And it is established that God can act whatever He wills no less in however small a part of time than in one day or in one year. This however being posited, it is clear that it follows that in the end of the hour, rather certainly even in every part of that aforesaid proportion there will be an **infinite circle** and an **infinite triangle**.

Therefore it must be responded by all in common in the aforesaid mode.

Then to the **principal reasons**. To the **first** it must be said conformably according to those things which were said to the fourteenth argument of the other opinion, in the preceding article.

To the **second** I concede the consequent. And to its improbation I say that it is not impossible for **infinities** to be traversed where none of them is first traversed. It is clear in proportional parts of the same hour or of some finite magnitude according to the division already posited. Or if some is first traversed, but none last, just as is clear in proportional parts according to the converse division of the one already posited, as for instance that the first part be the half of the whole, and the second be the first half of the following half of the whole, and so subsequently dividing according to the same proportion.

And concerning this it was spoken more diffusely in the last question of distinction 44 of the first book.

Addition 7: To the **first reason of the question** I respond, first by denying the antecedent. And to all proofs it is clear what must be said from the things said in the **fourth conclusion**, and also in the first book, where this matter is treated.

Second, if anyone did not wish to hold the aforesaid fourth conclusion with those things which follow to it, he could in some way respond to the reason—I do not know however whether sufficiently fully, at least apparently, perhaps however improbably—namely by conceding the antecedent, and denying the consequence.

Then to the proof it could be conceded that now this is necessary "this was not from eternity" (whatever other than God be demonstrated). And further, that in every past instant it was necessary, and its opposite impossible namely this "this was from eternity."

And when it is argued further "in no instant was this possible, therefore this was not possible," the consequence could be denied. And in the same way, if it is argued thus "in no instant could this be from eternity, therefore this could not be from eternity." And consequently other consequences would be to be enumerated, by which from the opposites of the consequents would be inferred the opposites of the antecedents, for example as to the first "this was possible, therefore in some instant this was possible"; as to the second "this could be from eternity, therefore in some instant it could be from eternity."

Here follows the Ordinary Text.

First general conclusion proved, second)

The **second reason** to the same is this. If motion were some such thing [distinct from permanent things], it would follow that some thing, and similarly every part of it, would be **first generated and corrupted in the same time**. But the consequent is impossible. Therefore also the antecedent.

I prove the consequence. I take one motion, for example the motion by which some mobile is moved in some first time, and let that time be **A-B**. In this time that motion is **first generated**, calling "generated" every being which has gone out from non-being to being, or whose entity is in act which first was in potency, just as the **Commentator** also in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 16, says that "generation is the exit of that which is in potency into act." Those positing motion to be a thing distinct from all permanent things cannot deny that motion is made in this way. This motion therefore went out to being and was generated in the time **A-B** first. The proof of which is, since it did not go out to being before that time; because thus it would have been, before the mobile was moved by it. And thus motion was, and nothing was moved. And because it follows that the same demonstrated motion would have been successively in two parts of time, namely before time **A-B** and in time **A-B**, and thus it would be a **permanent thing**.

Nor did that motion go out to being **after** that whole time **A-B**, because since it is posited to be in that time, it would follow that it had been before it had gone out to being, which does not happen.

Nor did that whole motion go out to being in **some part** of time **A-B**, because not in the prior part, for instance **A-C**. For I ask, whether the motion itself has being in the following part namely **C-B**, or not. If yes, therefore it is a permanent thing; if not, since the mobile is posited to be moved through the whole time **A-B**, it follows that it is moved through the part **C-B**. But then there is not such a thing distinct from permanent things, by the response. Therefore something is truly moved, no such thing existing. Wherefore such a thing is posited in vain, in whatever it be posited.

Since therefore that motion does not go out to being before the whole **A-B**, nor after the whole, nor in any part of it, and in some time it goes out to being, it remains that first and adequately it becomes and takes being in time **A-B**.

Furthermore, since this same motion is not always, but at some time loses being, I ask **when?** For either before the whole time A-B, and this is impossible, since it is not possible for something to cease to be before it is, nor to be corrupted prior than to be, or prior than to be generated. Or after the whole A-B, and this also is impossible, whether this be posited to be in an instant or in time, because it follows that that whole motion or some part of it has being according to its whole self in diverse parts of time, and the prior part of motion is at once with the posterior in the mobile. And again it follows that the mobile would be moved by some motion after the last "mutatum esse" [having-been-changed] of it, which implies a contradiction. Or third, that motion lost being wholly in some part of time A-B, and this also is impossible, because not in the first, because then no part of motion would be in the following part of time A-B, and yet the mobile then is moved, or it would be after it lost whole being. Nor in the second, because then some preceding part according to its whole self would be in diverse parts of time.

It remains therefore that just as that whole motion accepts being first in time A-B, and part of motion in part of time, so the whole ceases to be and is corrupted first in the same time A-B, and part in part. And thus the consequence is clear.

The impossibility indeed of the consequent I show in multiple ways.

Addition 9: First, because everything which becomes and goes out from non-being to being in time, while it accepts being, is not. Otherwise it would not go out from non-being, but from being to being. It is clear also from the fifth book of the **Physics** and through the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 13, where he says that "man, while he is in generation, is not man." Whence what is generated, is not. The same can be had from the tenth book of the **Ethics**, where it is proved that **delight** is not made in time. But everything which is corrupted or loses being in time, while it is corrupted, is. It is clear from the sayings and from the fifth book of the **Physics**. Therefore if something, while it accepts being, loses being, or while it is generated, is corrupted, it follows that the same at once, while it is, is not. Which implies contradictions. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

First, because if to some subject at once and in the same time first be acquired some form (for example whiteness), and be lost another (namely sweetness), at once first in it will be acquired whiteness and lost sweetness, and in the same first instant will be whiteness and will not be sweetness. Therefore if the same essence of motion is acquired at once in something and is lost, in the same first instant it will be perfectly acquired and lost, and in the same instant its generation and corruption will be perfect, and it will be and will not be.

It is confirmed, because everything which is begotten, when it is first begotten, is; and everything which is corrupted, when it is first corrupted, is not. Just as universally everything "which is changed, when it is first changed, is in that to which it is changed": if to being, it is in being; if to non-being, it is in non-being. And so in every genus of change, as is clear from the sixth book of the **Physics**. If therefore motion is first begotten and corrupted, in the same instant it is and is not.

Second, it is impossible for the same mobile in the same first time to acquire one place and lose the same, or one form and lose that, or to be augmented according to some quantity and diminished according to the same. Nor can anyone grasp in mind any of these to be possible. Therefore by the same reason it is

impossible for the same thing to acquire and lose the same essence (whatever that be) in the same first time.

Third the impossibility of this consequent is clear from the intention of the **Philosopher** in the eighth book of the **Physics** and of the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 62 and following, where for a manifest principle they take it to be impossible, for the generation and corruption of the same to be at once, rather neither to be able to be one after another without a middle time. Item the **Philosopher** and **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 14, found one reason upon this: that nothing is corrupted while it is generated, as upon a manifest foundation, to prove that motion is not generated.

Fourth the same is clear. For it is impossible for the same thing by whatever power at once in the same instant or same first time to be created and annihilated. And no one would deny this. Therefore from the same cause it is impossible for the same thing at once to be generated and corrupted. And always I understand that not only the whole categorically but also every part of it in the same first time be generated and corrupted.

(First general conclusion proved, third)

The **third reason**. If motion be such a thing, it follows that the thing which is moved, either at once has infinite equal motions according to duration, or that before the motion which it has, it had successively infinite [motions] of which every one was as great according to duration, as is that which it has. The consequent as to both parts is false.

I prove the consequence. For everything which has in itself actually some entity, which before it had only in potency, is insofar as such **changed** to it. This is clear: Both because according to it it has itself otherwise than before, and by this is changed. And because, if it were not changed, just as before it lacked that entity nor had it in act but only in potency, so also now it would not have it in act. And because everything which before was under one opposite, and now is under another, is changed from one into another. For the name of change sounds this, as is said in the fifth book of the **Physics**. But everything which has some entity actually, which before it did not have actually, is such as is clear. But every thing which is moved, according to the opinion has the essence of motion which, before it was moved, it did not have. Therefore it is changed to it. Either therefore the thing which is moved, before had that change or motion by which it is changed to the given motion, than it would have this motion; or at once. If **before**, since also it will have had the second given motion at some time, since before it did not have [it], therefore before it was changed to that and had a prior [motion], and so to infinity. If indeed **at once** with the motion which it has, it has also the motion by which it is changed to it, and by the same reason at once has the motion by which it is changed to that other, and so to infinity, it follows that at once it has infinite motions.

That however all those motions are **equal** according to duration, whether they be posited at once, or succeeding each other, is clear, since always in equal time motion is caused and that thing to which is motion is acquired according to this opinion, whence also they are divided by the same or equal divisions. Otherwise either some part of the thing would be acquired without motion (for instance if in less time

motion were made than the thing acquired), or if it were conversely, sometimes the mobile would be moved and something would not be acquired by that motion nor lost. All which are not possible according to that way.

The **falsity of the consequent** is clear as to the **first part** from the fifth book of the **Physics**. And it is proved by reason, because otherwise it would follow that it would be impossible for something to be moved after it was not moved, which contradicts sense. The consequence is clear, because it would be impossible to be moved by any motion however small, unless before it had been moved by a motion equal to it, and so to infinity. And consequently between the time of rest and the time of motion infinite parts of time of the same quantity would succeed each other, which is impossible.

The **falsity** also of the **second part** is clear, because there appears no necessity nor congruity, but rather impossibility through natural virtue, that the same agent cause in the same mobile at once infinite equal motions.

(First general conclusion proved, fourth)

Fourth, if motion be such a distinct thing, it follows that the mobile at once acquires **two distinct things** namely the motion itself and the permanent thing according to which is motion, neither of which is intrinsic to the other. Therefore through divine power it will be possible that it acquire one without the other, namely that permanent thing (for example place or quality) **not acquiring** or not having that other successive thing. From which it follows that it could successively continue to be in one place and another, and consequently be moved from place to place without another thing and thus be moved without motion, according to that way. Which they reckon impossible. And according to the truth it follows that such other thing is posited in vain, since to posit it neither necessary reason nor any evidence compels, or even authority which it is not allowed to deny.

Similarly conversely, it will be possible that it acquire motion **not acquiring** the permanent thing, for example ascent not acquiring place, or blackening not acquiring blackness, and consequently something will be able to ascend not changing place in any way (namely acquiring or losing), and something most white to be blackened not acquiring blackness nor losing whiteness in any way. And not only this, but also it follows that something could perpetually ascend with an ascent equally fast as is the ascent of an arrow thrown upwards, and yet never be more distant from the earth than now—let it be posited that now it rests—which is too absurd. The consequence is clear because, as was proved, it will be possible that the whole ascent, by which the mobile would ascend up to a certain distance, God could cause in it, granted that it did not change place. This however being posited, still it could ascend to that distance changing place. Either therefore by means of another motion, and then by the same reason He could cause that other in the time following the time of the first already caused, granted that it did not acquire another place, and by similar reason infinite such ones successively. If indeed it were said that, the first being caused, it would arrive at that distance without motion, the purpose is had, because by the same reason such motion is posited in vain ever.

In the same way, that some white thing could be blackened by a perpetual uniform motion, and never be black or less white.

And it is confirmed also, because according to the opinion motion in a certain way is prior to form, which is acquired by means of it, whence it according to them is as if the way and reason or medium of acquiring form. And therefore through divine virtue it will be able to be caused without that, although according to truth it follows that also conversely that will be able to be caused without it, if they be thus distinguished, as the opinion says.

(First general conclusion proved, fifth)

Fifth, if motion were some such thing, it would follow that there would be some true thing outside the soul constituted of parts, of which none is or can be in the nature of things, and thus some true thing would be constituted of **impossibles**. Which absurdity no one of sound mind would concede. The consequence is proved, since according to these every part of motion is past or future, and neither past is nor future, as they concede. But that also neither can be, I prove. For if the past could be, either it could be existing precisely past, just as it is now, or existing present, or existing future. Not in the first way, because it would follow that also it **is** now, which they deny. Nor in the second way, because according to them every part of motion is divisible according to prior and posterior, nor otherwise is it possible, therefore it is not possible that any be present. Furthermore by the same reason a whole great motion could be present and at once. Nor in the third way, because by the same reason now in fact the future part is, which they deny. In a similar way it can be proved, that no future part can be.

To this reason perhaps it will be said according to the doctrine of some that to the being of permanent things, having parts, is required the coexistence of parts, but to the being of successive things is not required the coexistence of parts, but order and continuity suffice. And so it is in the parts of motion. For the future part follows the past and is continued to it by means of the present "**mutatum esse**" [having-been-changed]. And by reason of such order and continuation it is said that motion has being and is a true thing, although not permanent.

This solution is nothing: Both because—since no whole is other than all its parts, or speaking more properly, than all things of which each is a part of it, or at least each consists of its parts—it is impossible for any whole to be, unless every part of it be. And because it is not intelligible that some non-beings, nor possible to be beings, be continued to some being or together constitute some entity. Whence it could equally be said that, although a chimera is nothing nor a tragelaph, nevertheless they are continued to each other by means of some being, and that taken at once or precisely themselves or even with some being are one entity constituted of chimera and tragelaph and one entity. Which no wise man would say.

And because "**mutatum esse**" is no entity, such as they imagine, as will be proved in the following conclusion.

And because, granted that there were some such entity, since the future part of motion does not succeed the past, nor pass into the past except through the present—otherwise it would not be continued to it by

means of the present "mutatum esse" as they say—it follows that the whole future part will pass into the past through the present through its "mutata esse" precisely, because according to them nothing of motion besides "mutatum esse" can be present. And thus further it follows that motion be composed precisely of "mutata esse" succeeding each other, and by this time is from instants, continuum from indivisibles, whose opposite is demonstrated in the sixth book of the **Physics**.

(First general conclusion proved, sixth)

Sixth, if motion were such a thing, as they imagine, motion would not be "**the act of a being in potency as it is in potency**." And consequently since motion is defined thus, as I suppose from the third book of the **Physics** (and they also concede), it follows that no motion is motion. The consequence is proved, because neither the past part is the act of the mobile, nor the future, because neither is and neither the mobile has in act, nor anything else of the motion itself is besides the past part and future. Therefore the mobile has nothing of motion, nor according to anything of it is motion the act of it. Nor can it be said that therefore motion is called and is the act of the mobile, because "**mutatum esse**," which is something of it, is the act of the mobile. For according to this imagination "mutatum esse" is utterly **indivisible**. But act posited in the definition of motion signifies the perfection of the mobile or divisible act according to the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 21. Whence he says that "perfection accepted in the definition of motion, which is as a genus, is not found in the transmutation, which is in generation." And he adds that "the cause in this is, because form is indivisible." And furthermore it is not [possible] to give such an indivisible which they call "mutatum esse," as [will be clear] in the following conclusion.

(Second general conclusion proved, first)

The **second conclusion** is that there is not some thing outside the soul, distinct from all permanent things, such as they say "**mutatum esse**" is. This I prove first thus. For if there is some such thing, let some mobile be taken which is moved continuously. Then I argue: Either some of such indivisible things, which are called "mutata esse," is in this mobile **more than through an instant**. Or none is more than through an instant in the mobile itself. But neither can be truly conceded. Therefore etc.

For it cannot be said, that it is more than through an instant. For thus some singular "mutatum esse" would be in the mobile through **time**. From which further it follows that, since in that time the mobile is so continuously moved and in every instant of that time it has another "mutatum esse" according to their imagination, at once in the same mobile will be several "mutata esse" successively caused in it. This however is impossible according to the sayings of those thus opining, because, by what reason one "mutatum esse" remains in the mobile with the following, by the same reason every one mediating between those "mutata esse" and consequently also every motion comprehended by those "mutata esse" [would remain]. Otherwise, since in every motion there are several "mutata esse," if some part of motion ceased, not every "mutatum esse" would have remained. And thus further it follows that one part of motion will be in the mobile at once with the following, which is repugnant to motion and to every successive thing, according to them.

Addition 10: Also because, when "mutatum esse" is in the mobile, the mobile is formally first changed by it. Wherefore, if several be formally at once in the mobile, the mobile will be formally first changed by several at once. But by one "mutatum esse" it is not changed, except to one place; therefore by several to several, and consequently at once to several places successively changed, which is a contradiction.

Also because as long as "mutatum esse" is in the mobile, so long the mobile is in this place first, and conversely. And thus the mobile would be through time in the same place first. But it was posited to be moved continuously.

Item from this the purpose is had; for thus every such thing will be truly a **permanent thing**, nor could it more be denied to be permanent than whiteness and sweetness or any other form. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

Neither can the second be said, namely that none be more than through an instant. Because this is not naturally possible of any thing, as was proved in the first book distinction 17 question 2 article 2.

It is proved also by the authority of the **Philosopher** in the eighth book of the **Physics** in that chapter "But that local change," where he says that "it will seem inconvenient, if what is made must immediately be corrupted and remain in no time." Where he maintains manifestly that every made being remains in being through time, and not only through an instant. And the **Commentator** proves this in the same place, comment 63, saying: Every generated thing has being in act "and every existing thing in act is in a demonstrated time. Otherwise nature would act idly."

Whence they maintain expressly in the same place that it is impossible for the corruption of some thing to follow its generation without a **middle time**. And by this as by a principle they prove it to be impossible, for two contrary motions to succeed each other in the same mobile without a **middle rest**. But if "mutatum esse" or some other thing be only through an instant, its generation and corruption will not be mediated by time, as is clear.

Nor is it valid to say that the Philosopher and Commentator speak of permanent things, not however of successive. Because their reason equally proves of all, if it proves anything. Similarly one could say that they speak of substances, not of accidents. Either therefore their saying and reason is valid in all or in none.

Addition 11: Second indeed it is proved by reason. For if some such thing be only through an instant, it is corrupted therefore. Either therefore it is corrupted first in **time**, or in an **instant**. And I understand "to be corrupted in time or instant" not as in a subject or term, but as in a measure, just as we say light is caused in an instant, or some other form. It cannot be said that in time, because then it would be necessary that something of it be corrupted before something of it, and thus "mutatum esse" would be divisible into some things, of which one is before another and by this would be motion. If indeed it be said that in an instant, let the instant be signated in which it is posited to be, and let it be A. Either therefore it is corrupted in A, which cannot be said, because—since it is in that, and what is corrupted in an instant, is not corrupted before it is corrupted—if in instant A it is corrupted, therefore in A it is corrupted and consequently is not. And thus in instant A it is and is not. Or it is corrupted in another instant, and if so, since between any two instants there is a middle time, either it will be in the middle time, whose opposite

is given in the response; or it will not be, and then it follows that it will be corrupted before it is corrupted, which implies a contradiction.

(Against the reason is instanced, quadruply)

To this reason however it is responded quadruply. **First** indeed it is said that it assumes a falsehood, when it says: If it is in an instant only, therefore it is corrupted. For not everything, which sometimes is and afterwards is not, is corrupted, nor everything, which is not and afterwards is, is generated, or when it is, is begotten. For just as the **Philosopher** says in the first book of *On the Heavens*: "In one way something is called unbegotten, if there be something now, formerly not being, without generation and transmutation, just as some say 'to be touched' and 'to be moved'. For they do not say touch and motion are generated." And immediately after he says that something is called "incorruptible, which without corruption sometimes indeed is being, sometimes however non-being, for instance touch, because without being corrupted formerly existing things lastly are not." From these things it is clear that sometimes something after non-being has being which nevertheless is not begotten, and something after being has non-being which is not corrupted. Of such however is **motion** and "**mutatum esse**," as is clear here through the **Philosopher** and also in the fifth book of the **Physics**, where he proves that "of motion there is not motion nor generation (of generation)." Item the **Philosopher** in the eighth book of the **Metaphysics** says that "certain things without generation and corruption are and are not." Thus in the purpose it will be said that "**mutatum esse**" is not corrupted, but without corruption is not after it was.

Second, granted that it be conceded "**mutatum esse**" is corrupted, that disjunctive is denied, which says: either it is corrupted in time or in an instant. For it is said neither part is true.

Third it is said that "**mutatum esse**" is corrupted in time, not however first. And if it be asked in what it is corrupted first, it is said that in no first is it corrupted as in a measure.

Fourth, it is responded by distinguishing a double sense of this proposition "**mutatum esse** is corrupted or ceases to be"—which they say signify the same: One is, that it be understood by position of the present and negation of the future, and then thus it is expounded: This now ceases to be, that is this now is and immediately after will not be. Another is by negation of the present and position of the past, and then it is expounded: This now ceases to be, that is this now is not, and immediately before was. Then to the purpose they say that "**mutatum esse**" ceases to be in an instant according to the first sense, and in the instant in which it is. For this is true: This "**mutatum esse**" now is, and immediately after will not be, for in the whole following time it will not be. Nor from this does it follow that in that instant it is not, but that in the time immediately following. And according to this it is conceded that in the same instant it begins and ceases, expounding "begins" by position of the present and negation of the past, that is now is and immediately before was not. For all these are true: This "**mutatum esse**" now is, this "**mutatum esse**" immediately before was not, this "**mutatum esse**" immediately after will not be; and consequently this: This "**mutatum esse**" now begins and ceases, according to the given senses.

In the second sense indeed they say "**mutatum esse**" in no instant ceases to be, because this is never true: This "**mutatum esse**" now is not and formerly immediately was. Thus also they say that it does not begin in any instant, expounding "to begin" by negation of the present and position of the future. For this is never true: This "**mutatum esse**" in this instant is not, and immediately after will be. For it will not be in

any instant immediately following after, because there is no such, nor will it be in time immediately, because "mutatum esse" is not in time. It could nevertheless be conceded that "mutatum esse" in this second sense ceases to be in time, so that it be expounded: This "mutatum esse" is not in this time, namely which immediately follows the instant in which it was, and immediately before was, because namely in the preceding instant. Similarly in the second given sense it can be conceded that it begins to be in time, that is "mutatum esse" is not in this time and immediately after will be, for it will be in the instant terminating that time. And thus "to begin" is conceded, or denied. Thus equally it is conceded or denied it is generated, because they say the same is signified by to be generated and to begin, just as the same according to them is signified by to be corrupted and to cease.

(To the first instance)

Of these responses however none is sufficient. **First** indeed not, because according to the truth every thing outside the soul, which formerly was non-being and now is being, is begotten. And every thing, which formerly was being and now is non-being, is corrupted.

Notwithstanding of such things certain are **composites of substances**, which since formerly they were not, through the transmutation of a mere part of them are deduced to being, and these are said per se and simply to be generated. Certain however are **simple forms**, which are not generated except per accidens. And because such are not per se generated, the **Philosopher** says in the eighth book of the **Metaphysics**, where he was alleged, he says them to be and not be without generation and corruption, not because they are not begotten truly, but because they are not per se begotten from something of themselves transmuted. And that this is his intention, is clear; for after the alleged words with nothing interposed he says: "As points, if indeed they are," that is if points be, "and totally species and forms. For not white," that is the form of whiteness, "becomes, but wood white, or from something and something becomes everything which becomes." And thus it is expounded there by all.

Thus also sometimes those, which sometimes are not and sometimes are, are called ingenerable, because they are of difficult generation, as is said in the first book of *On the Heavens* where above. Similarly some, because they are generated suddenly and without time, are said to be ingenerable. And thus they are said "to be and not be without generation and corruption," truly however they are begotten and corrupted. And this is the intention of the **Philosopher** in the first book of *On the Heavens*, where he is alleged above. Whence the **Commentator** there in comment 114 expounding the alleged words says: "Not generable principally, when something shall have been formerly deprived, then afterwards was being, when its exit from privation to being shall have been without transmutation and without alteration, namely that its generation be without time. And this he intended, when he said 'without generation and without alteration, as some say of touch and motion' etc." And that such things nevertheless are truly generable he adds saying: "And it is manifest that this is not called non-generable except through similitude, because everything which after non-being is, necessarily is generated." And near the end of the same comment he says: "For that, of which is said non-generable, either is said truly or not truly. If not truly, it will be said of the generated without causes of generation"—this however is, what is generated without transmutation in time, as is clear there—"and of that, which is of difficult generation." And the cause, on account of which these are called "non-generable not truly," he immediately assigns saying: "For it is said not truly, because it is placed under the definition of generated, which is being after it was not being."

From which it is clear, that everything which is being, after it was not, is truly begotten; and everything, which is not being and was being, is truly corrupted according to the intention of the Philosopher. And so plainly below the Philosopher defines begotten and corrupted truly taken and the Commentator there in comment 124. Thus therefore it is concluded that every entity or true thing outside the soul, which sometimes was and afterwards is not, is truly corrupted. I do not distinguish for the present between corrupted and annihilated, nor between created and generated, because it is not necessary to the purpose.

It is confirmed. For the adversaries concede that that entity, which is "**mutatum esse**," is begotten in the mobile. From which it is a wonder that they deny it is corrupted. Why however motion is said not to be generated nor corrupted, will be clear below. Thus therefore the first response is not valid.

(To the second instance)

The **second** response also is insufficient, which is proved. I take one "mutatum esse," for example A, and I argue thus: Either in some of A itself formerly was corrupted something of it, or in none of A itself was formerly corrupted something of it. If the first be said, therefore something of it will be formerly corrupted and something later, and consequently it will be corrupted in **time**, for also every such thing we commonly say is corrupted in time. If the second, therefore suddenly and indivisibly it will be corrupted, and consequently in an **instant**.

Confirmation: And I posit that some body, for instance B, be moved continuously over some space. Then thus: Either in some place, B existing equal to it, something of A itself will be corrupted and something to be corrupted; or in no place, B existing equal to it, something of A itself will be corrupted and something to be corrupted. It is clear, because the parts are contradictory. If the first be given, thus A will be corrupted in **time** to the true sense, which is had, when something is said to be corrupted in time. If the second—and it is established that A will be corrupted within the time, in which B will be moved, as I suppose—it follows that in some place, B existing equal to it, something will be corrupted so, that before B will be in that place, nothing of A itself will be corrupted nor something after to be corrupted. And consequently it whole at once will be corrupted, B existing in that place, and consequently in an **instant**, since in some instant B will be in that place, as is clear from the sixth book of the **Physics**. Or there could be taken for the sake of example the sun and some determined part of it, which is opposite directly to no part of the earth equal to it more than through an instant.

Furthermore, just as they concede motion to be made in time, and indivisible mutation and "mutatum esse" to be made in an instant, so necessarily it is necessary to concede motion to be corrupted in time, mutation indeed and "mutatum esse" in an instant.

(To the third instance)

The **third** response also fails, since everything which is corrupted in some time, either is corrupted first in that time or is corrupted first in some [part] of it. And this is clear, because otherwise it would not be corrupted in that. Just as what is corrupted on Sunday, cannot be said to be corrupted on Monday, because Sunday is not Monday nor a part of it. But what is corrupted in some hour of Sunday can be said to be corrupted on Sunday, although not first, because it is corrupted in a part of it.

It is confirmed. For just as something cannot be said to be in some place, unless it be in it and its parts—and then it is in that first—or be in some part of it first, just as someone is said to be in a house, because his proper place, in which he is first, is a part of the house, and then he is said to be in the house not first. So in the purpose.

Thus therefore notwithstanding the premised solutions the reason remains in its strength. Whose virtue in another form also could be put, so that the **composite** of the mobile (as subject) and that entity which is called "mutatum esse" be taken, and it be asked when this composite is corrupted, as above.

Item in another way, asking concerning the subject itself namely the mobile, which receives in itself "mutatum esse" which before it did not have, and loses it, whether it loses it in time or an instant, as above.

It is confirmed also what was said above, namely "mutatum esse" or any thing not to have being only through an instant, since equally it could be conceded that it is [possible] to give a **last being** of a permanent thing, as the last being of light in the air. Which is reprobated expressly in the eighth book of the **Physics**, nor will any reason conclude more against this than against that.

(To the fourth instance)

Finally the **fourth** solution also is not valid, nor takes away the efficacy of the reason made. For not by all those words is said other than that "mutatum esse" is through a unique instant only. And against this proceeds the reason made. Which reason does not ask concerning the measure of the "mutatum esse" itself in which it is, or concerning the measure of its being nor its non-being, but concerning the measure of its **becoming** and **being corrupted** and the measure of its transit from being into non-being, or the transit of the subject from the being of the "mutatum esse" itself into the non-being of the same, or from affirmation into negation according to the common mode of speaking to a good understanding; and to this nothing is responded.

Whence I reduce the reason thus: Either "mutatum esse" passes from being into non-being in time, or in an instant. If in time, therefore it is partible and endures through time. If in an instant, therefore at once it passes and has passed. Either therefore in the same instant, in which it passed from non-being into being, and thus at once it is and is not, or in another etc., as above.

Or otherwise it can be formed thus: Either the subject passes from the being of "mutatum esse" into the non-being of the same in time, or in an instant. Neither in time, as before; nor in an instant, because not in the same, in which it passed from its non-being into being, otherwise it follows that at once it receives and loses the same "mutatum esse"; and consequently that at once is and is not. Not in another, as is deduced above.

Furthermore the solution fails, because equally it could be conceded that it is [possible] to give a **last instant of being** of a permanent thing, as the last being of light in the air and of sensation in the sense; which is reprobated expressly in the eighth book of the **Physics**, nor will any reason conclude more against this than against that.

Item it could be conceded that some such form will be only through one instant, and by this its generation and corruption would be continued without a **middle rest**. Whose opposite from intention the **Philosopher** strives to prove in the eighth book of the **Physics** and the **Commentator** there in comment 62 and following.

Insuper, if the solution were sufficient, most universally it could be said that every substantial form, and vision, and the like, would be generated and corrupted in time, and what is more, in the **same time**. Both of which utterly contradicts philosophy. The consequence is clear expounding "to be corrupted" by position of the present and negation of the future, and "to be generated" by position of the present and negation of the past, just as the response says. For all these are true: This substantial form is in this whole time, and after this time immediately will not be (namely this time which measures adequately its being). Item this is true: Before this time immediately it was not.

Therefore the measure of generation and corruption is not to be given in this way, but the measure in which the subject passes from one opposite into another, as just before was said. It is clear therefore that the reason remains in its firmness.

(Second general conclusion proved, additionally second)

Addition 12: Let some "**mutatum esse**" be signated, which is in a mobile which is moved by continuous motion, and let that be A. And let another certain one following it be signated, and let it be B. Either therefore B has itself consequently [immediately] to A, or between B and A mediate other "**mutata esse**." The first cannot be, as is clear from the sixth book of the **Physics**; nor the second, because either those, which mediate, would be said to be finite in number—and then necessarily it would be necessary to arrive at some others which would be immediate, which is false, or to posit motion not including some "**mutata esse**"—or those mediating would be infinite in number, and then it follows that between two extremes are infinite means, of which one is prior to another, and totally excluding themselves so that one is not part of another, and that an infinite would be begun to be accepted and the whole would be then successively accepted. Which is repugnant to the **reason of the infinite**, which is that to those accepting a part of it there is always something to be accepted and never is the whole accepted. Whence some part being accepted, everything which afterwards is accepted, necessarily is finite, as is clear from the third book of the **Physics**.

Other inconveniences also could be adduced, as will be clear below, where it will be inquired, whether by every motion a new permanent thing be acquired to the mobile; and others which are accustomed to be induced against the **traversal of the infinite** and against the infinite in act. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

Second reason to the same conclusion is this. I suppose from the aforesaid that the mobile loses one signated "**mutatum esse**" in an instant, or in an instant passes from its being into non-being. Then I argue: Either in that instant, in which the mobile continuously moved loses some "**mutatum esse**," for example A, it acquires some entity which is motion or "**mutatum esse**," or it acquires no such thing. If yes, either it acquires motion, and this cannot be said, because every motion according to being is divisible into parts succeeding each other and which cannot be at once, therefore neither acquired in the same instant. Or it acquires "**mutatum esse**." And if so, let that be B, and I ask: Between A and B was there any middle

motion? And then it follows that motion is in an instant. Or no motion was middle? And then it follows that "mutata esse" are consequently having themselves [immediate]. Since therefore all the aforesaid are impossible, it remains that no entity is then acquired which is motion or "mutatum esse." But then, since in every instant of time, measuring the continuous motion of something, the mobile is moved and changed, it follows that then the mobile is changed **without such a distinct thing**. And consequently in every other it is posited in vain.

(Second general conclusion proved, second)

Second reason. I suppose two things demonstrated in the sixth book of the **Physics**. One is that "everything which is changed, when it is first changed, is in that to which it is changed." Another is that every "mutatum esse" is measured by an **instant**. Which certainly is true of every "mutatum esse," whether it be translated being or augmented or diminished being or altered being or generated being or corrupted being, because equally of all proves the reason made there.

These things being supposed I take some of such entities which are called "mutata esse," and let it be A. It is established that this sometimes is begotten, and sometimes corrupted, from the things said before. Therefore it has "**genitum esse**" [having-been-begotten] and "**corruptum esse**" [having-been-corrupted] according to them, who speak thus.

And if it be said that it is begotten without nevertheless a thing which is "genitum esse," and corrupted without "corruptum esse," the purpose is conceded. For by equal reason it is not necessary in others to imagine such things.

From these I argue. Either the "genitum esse" of A itself and its "corruptum esse" are at once, or one prior to the other. If at once, therefore A at once is and is not. The consequence is clear, from the first supposition. If one prior to the other, therefore they are in one and another instant, from the second supposition. But since between any two instants there is a middle time, it follows that A is in that whole middle time between its "genitum esse" and its "corruptum esse." And consequently A is measured by **time**, which is against the second supposition. Also these inconveniences touched in the first reason of this conclusion follow.

(Second general conclusion proved, third)

Third, either "mutatum esse" is some thing **intrinsic** to motion, or something **extrinsic** to it, necessarily nevertheless accompanying it in the subject, or something extrinsic contingently having itself to motion so, that something could be moved not having some "mutatum esse."

The **first** cannot be; which nevertheless they seem more to opine saying that "mutatum esse" is a certain **indivisible of motion** just as they say a point is an indivisible intrinsic to a line. This I say cannot be, because either motion under its essence includes precisely such "mutata esse" and no other entity entirely which is not one or several "mutata esse" precisely. And then it follows that motion is composed of "mutata esse" alone, which is reprobated in the sixth book of the **Physics**. Or it includes some entity besides "mutata esse," which neither is one or several "mutata esse," or precisely integrated from them. And if so, it is necessary that it either include no "mutatum esse" or have some part of itself, which

neither is nor includes any "mutatum esse." Any such being given, it follows that the mobile having it is moved and is changed **without such "mutato esse."** And by this it is vain to posit it. This consequence is clear, because through however much space the mobile be moved through that part of motion, in which some "mutatum esse" is not enclosed, it is certain that it is first moved to the middle of the space than to the last of it. And thus it is changed without such a fictive thing.

The **second** also cannot be given. Because, since in every instant of time measuring continuous motion it is true, that A is changed to something of space, it will be necessary to say that there is a certain **multitude** of "mutata esse" themselves succeeding each other in the mobile, adequating in duration the whole motion by which the mobile is moved in that time. And thus by the same adequate measure will be measured that multitude of "mutata esse" with that motion. And this consequence is clear, since, if it did not adequate the motion itself, already something of the motion itself would be, when no "mutatum esse" would be, and thus something would be changed without "mutato esse," which is the purpose. The consequent however is false, because, since every "mutatum esse" is measured by an instant, if some multitude, including precisely "mutata esse," were measured first by some time, that time would be composed of **sole instants**, as is clear from the sixth book of the **Physics**.

The **third** also cannot be given on account of those things, which were said against the second. And nevertheless, if it were given, the purpose would be had, because, since such "mutata" follow motion contingently, it will be possible to be moved and changed **without such entities**.

Third general conclusion proved)

The **third conclusion** is that sudden mutation is not some indivisible thing measured by an instant, distinct from all permanent things, as they imagine. This conclusion indeed is efficaciously proved by the first and third reason of the **second conclusion**.

Besides those indeed I adduce another reason. For if mutation be some such thing distinct from the mobile and from the thing to which it is changed and from which it is changed, it follows that of **mutation there be mutation** to infinity. And by this whenever something is changed, there are in it at once actually infinite mutations. The consequent is false, the consequence is proved. Because, just as a subject having actually a permanent thing which before it did not have, is changed, so it having actually that thing which is called mutation, which formerly it did not have, is according to that and to that changed. And this is clear by the proofs induced in the third reason of the **first conclusion**. Therefore it has in itself mutation, by which formally it is changed to the first mutation. And by the same reason it follows that it have a third, and so further to infinity.

Or it will be necessary to say that it is changed to some entity **without mutation distinct from that entity**, by which it be changed to it. And by what reason this will be able to be posited in one, it will be able also in any. Nor will reason compel to the opposite in one more than in another. Therefore it posits such things in vain.

This conclusion will be more clear from the proofs of the special conclusions which will be induced.

(First special conclusion proved)

Second in special I show the purpose of every genus of motion and mutation, and first of **local motion**.

And that it itself is not such a thing, is unshakenly proved by all reasons made to the **first conclusion**. In special however I argue first thus: Something can be moved locally without such a thing. Therefore local motion is not a thing of this kind. The consequence is clear. I prove the antecedent. Something can be in some place **first**, in which immediately it was not and all its parts, nor immediately after will be; and it will be in some, in which it is not etc. It is certain however that such a located thing will be truly moved locally, when these shall be true of it. But for this it is not necessary to imagine some thing besides permanent ones. For by this that I say it not to have been immediately in this place, no such thing is signified to be in it. It is clear. Nor by this, that it is in this place, some thing in it is necessary besides itself and place. Or if some **respect** be posited, as some wish, nothing to the purpose, since a respect of this kind is not a thing distinct from all permanent things, nor is motion or part of it, even according to those opining.

Second, every act of a bearable thing [feribilis] insofar as such is **lotion**. Some permanent thing is of this kind. Therefore some permanent thing is lotion. And further, therefore in nothing, which is borne or locally moved, is there any lotion distinct from all permanent things. The major is clear from the definition given in the third book of the **Physics**. The minor is proved. For of that permanent thing, which continuously partly is acquired by that which is continuously borne, or which continuously partly becomes the place of that which according to it is moved locally, some part is actually the place of it or of a part of it, of which immediately before it was place actually, but potentially only, although some part of it was place of a part of that. Item immediately after some part will be actually place of that which is borne or of its part, which only in potency is its place. Since therefore every potency is said with respect to act, as is clear in the ninth book of the **Metaphysics**, that part, which is actually place and to which the mobile was in potency, is its act.

Again, because of the thing itself, which continuously becomes place, immediately some part will be acquired and will be the act of the same, which not yet is its place except in potency—and this per se belongs to it insofar as such, otherwise it would not continuously be acquired but would be completely acquired—it is clear, because the permanent thing itself, which is continuously acquired insofar as such is "**the act of a bearable thing insofar as it is bearable**." And thus the minor is clear, and consequently that it is lotion.

Since therefore everything which is continuously borne, continuously by its motion acquires some permanent thing thus partly—for every such thing is moved from place to place, taking "place" commonly—it follows that every thing which is moved locally, some permanent thing is lotion. And if so, no other thing besides permanent ones is to be posited which is lotion, because then of anything there would be two lations, which would be superfluous.

And if it be said that place is not the act of the mobile, since it is not subjectively in it, it must be said that this is not valid, since not every act is subjectively in that, whose act it is. For the act of the active is not in it, but in the patient, as is clear in the third book of the **Physics**. So neither the act of the translatable is in it.

Whence, just as the **Commentator** notes in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 4, motion "does not have a definition said univocally." Which therefore is, because act is not said univocally in all motions. For otherwise translation is the act of the translated, and otherwise alteration of that which is altered. For to that it is extrinsic; to this however intrinsic that is formally inhering.

Third, if local motion were a thing distinct from permanent things, existing in the mobile, as they say, it would follow that every thing moved locally per se would be mutated according to some being. The consequent false. The consequence is clear, because every such moved thing would acquire in itself a new form namely motion itself, rather even would acquire several and lose several, according as several parts of motion successively it would lose and acquire. The falsity of the consequent is clear through the **Philosopher** in the eighth book of the **Physics** in that chapter "But indeed concerning things making a principle" in which he proves translation to be the first motion. For he says there that "according to this motion alone nothing is mutated in being" which is moved. For he maintains that the mobile changes place in such a way, that per se it does not change any being.

Against this however seems to be the saying of the **Commentator** in the twelfth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 40, where he says that "the motion of the heaven is possible of itself, necessary however from another," because namely "it has being from another namely from a motor." And he says that it is made by an eternal motor etc. These however can be verified of no permanent thing. Not indeed of the heaven: Both because it is necessary in its substance according to the **Commentator** there; and because it is not made by a motor according to the intention of the **Commentator**, as is clear above in question one. Nor can they be verified of place, about which it is moved, on account of the same cause. Nor some other permanent thing is caused there. For mostly this would seem true of "**where**" itself. But "**where**" is not some new thing existing in the heaven, as will be proved below in distinction two. It is left therefore that it is some successive entity, which is motion, such as those so opining say to be.

To this however it must be said that it is not the intention of the **Commentator** that motion is some eternal entity caused by a motor in the heaven itself, which is of itself possible, and necessary from the motor. For it is established even according to those so opining that no entity of motion is necessary from a motor. Rather every one is contingent and ceases to be; and there is none to signate, which does not cease to be, according to them. But when he says motion becomes by a motor and is eternal and necessary, from that he understands nothing other than that the heaven is moved eternally and necessarily by an eternal motor. By this however it is not necessary to imagine any such thing to be caused in the heaven. And thus the motor of the heaven is so "moving" that not "acting." According to them however it would be also acting, and not only moving. And universally every mover would be an agent, whose contrary the same **Commentator** says in the same book, comment 23.

(Second special conclusion proved)

Second I prove the same of **alteration**: And first indeed, similarly to the first reason made concerning local motion. Since not positing that thing distinct from the subject and quality, which is acquired, something can truly be altered. Therefore that is not to be posited. The antecedent is proved. For this alone being posited that the subject have some part of a form which immediately before it did not have,

and immediately will have some which it does not have, it is truly altered. But these can be without that third thing. Therefore etc.

Second, a quality which continuously becomes, which commonly is called **flowing**, is alteration. Therefore there is not any such thing distinct from quality which is alteration, as the opinion imagines. The consequence is clear, since then in the same thing at once would be two alterations, while one quality precisely were acquired, which is superfluous to posit. And some motions would be of the genus of permanent things and some of the genus of successive. And many other things irrationally said would follow. The antecedent indeed is proved, since of this quality insofar as such some part is the act of that which is altered, and immediately after some will be the act to which it itself is now in potency, and by this it is the act of the alterable insofar as it is alterable, therefore it is alteration.

It is confirmed since, positing that third thing which they posit, in no way will it be able to appear that the aforesaid definition of motion belongs to it more than to the form which is partly acquired.

Through this it is clear that the objection is not valid which is accustomed to be made concerning a **remiss form**, which certainly is incomplete act and is the act of a subject which is in potency still to a similar form, and yet it is not motion. It is not valid, I say, since of the remiss form itself nothing is in potency, but the whole is in act. And by this neither its subject is in potency to something of the remiss form itself, although it be in potency to something perhaps similar of which nothing is [in act]. And therefore it, although it be the act of a being which indeed is in potency, is not nevertheless the act of it **insofar as it is in potency**, since it is not in potency to something of it. And by this it is not motion, since that is the act of that which is in potency and according as it is in potency. On account of which it is of the reason of motion that something of it be in potency. Whence precisely that which of motion is in act, is not motion; nor precisely that which of it is in potency, but both at once.

And this is what the **Commentator** says in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 57, where he says: "To be infinite in a thing is not except according to potency existing in it, just as the substantial differences of several things, which preserve their being in the conjunction of potency with them, as in things, whose being is in motion. For of things some are in pure act as a demonstrated man, and some are according as potency is mixed with act. And if potency were not, act would not be, as day. For this name is said of a part of time, and time is with motion, and universally everything which is with motion." Thus the Commentator.

And therefore in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 21, he says that the definition of motion given in book 3 is not verified of generation and corruption, because in generation "there is not a perfection or diminished act of the genus of that to which is motion, namely of the genus of complete perfection. And the cause in this is, since form is indivisible," of which supply there cannot be something in act and something in potency.

Item **Avicenna** in the *Sufficiency* 2, chapter 1: "Of those things," he says, "which are, some are in act in every way, some indeed are in act according to something, and according to something in potency; and it is impossible that some thing be in potency in every way, which does not have being in act in some way." And immediately after he says that motion is of the number of those, which according to something are in potency, and according to something in act.

And from this the Commentator says where above that it is an **act mixed with potency**. But a remiss form is not according to something of it in potency. Whence, as **Avicenna** says, "black indeed, when it becomes black in act, there does not remain in potency something of the whole blackness which it has. And a square, when it becomes square in act, there does not remain in potency something of the whole squareness which it has. But a mobile, when it becomes mobile in effect, it is thought that it is still in potency mobile, on account of the universality of the whole continuous motion etc." Such is a form, which continuously becomes, which also is accustomed to be named "**flowing**" by many.

Whence advert that "motion" does not suppose precisely for the thing which is actually act of the mobile, nor for that which is only in potency, but at once for this and that.

This conclusion is also proved by the authorities of the **Commentator**. He indeed in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 4, says that opinion is truer, which says that "motion does not differ from the perfection to which it goes, except according to more and less," that is according to complete and incomplete. For motion is incomplete and imperfect act, as the **Philosopher** says in the same place.

Item in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 17, he says that "that to which is motion, is of the nature of motion." And in 48 he says the converse, namely "the substance of motion is of the nature of that to which it is." Item in the same place, comment 21, he says that "perfection," that is act, "posited in the definition of motion is diminished perfection of the genus of that, to which is motion namely of the genus of complete perfection." These are his words. Item in comment 31 he says that the cause of specific agreement and diversity of motions is the specific agreement and difference of those to which they are. And many other things he says, from which he hints manifestly that he feels that motion is not another thing from that to which the mobile is moved.

(Third special conclusion proved)

Third the same can be proved of **augmentation** and **decrease**. For something can be truly augmented without such a distinct successive thing. Therefore that is not to be posited. The antecedent is proved. For just as they posit that that, which is augmented, acquires at once that successive thing and the quantity by which it becomes greater, so, if it acquired the quantity alone, it would be augmented and become greater. Whence it can be argued thus: If augmentation were a thing distinct from the quantity, through which that which is augmented is augmented, that would not be augmented nor would it be augmented, if without that third thing that quantity were acquired by the subject. This of itself is evident. But the consequent is false. For that being posited, there is no doubt that that would become greater and be augmented. In a similar way the first reason concerning local motion and the first concerning alteration can be formed. And this form against the adversary seems more valid, although the virtue is the same.

(Fourth special conclusion proved)

Fourth that same thing is proved of **sudden generation**. And first by the first reason made concerning "**mutatum esse**." For according to that imagination it is necessary to say sudden generation has being only through an instant, which that reason destroys.

Item by the third reason made in the same place. Item by the reason made to prove it concerning mutation in general.

Besides those however I argue thus: It is possible for matter to have some entity actually in itself, to which it was before in potency, granted that there be not some thing distinct from that entity and from matter, which be the **generation** of it. Therefore generation is not such a thing, as they say. The consequence is clear since, whenever matter receives actually some entity which before it had only in potency, then there is truly generation. For it is changed then from non-being into opposite being. And all things which are required for the reason of generation, then concur. If therefore without such a thing, which is feigned by others, this can be in something, superfluously it is posited in anything. But I prove the antecedent. For when matter receives some **substantial or accidental form** in act, which before it had only in potency, either necessarily there is there a third entity distinct from matter and form which is the generation of this form, or not. If not, the purpose is had. If so, therefore matter has then first that third entity actually, to which nevertheless it was in potency. Either therefore it has a certain other distinct from the three aforesaid entities, which be the generation of that third, or not. If not, the purpose is had. If so, let it be asked concerning that fourth, as before. And thus either it will be [necessary] to arrive at some entity, which so actually will be received anew in matter, that there will not be some other, which be its generation, and then the antecedent will be conceded. Or it is necessary to say that at once actually are in matter infinite such entities, which is false.

In a similar way it is proved of **corruption**. For when matter loses some entity or first does not have actually some entity which before it had, either always it has some distinct entity, which is the corruption of the first, or not always. If not always, the purpose is had, as above. If always, therefore, when it loses that corruption of the first entity, it has another corruption of the first corruption etc., as before.

Furthermore commonly of both. If generation and corruption be things distinct from permanent things and from each other, as those opining thus say, an **actual infinity** of such entities follows. For when matter loses some form, for example air light when it is obscured, there is a new entity which is the corruption of light, according to that way. Therefore there is there a generation of that new entity for instance obscuration. And when matter loses at some time that entity, which is the generation of obscuration, there will be there another entity, which will be the corruption of that generation. And since this corruption also is a new entity in matter, there will be there a generation of it; and of that generation, again a corruption, and so always of every generation a corruption, and of corruption a generation to infinity. And since so great this multitude of generations and corruptions does not exceed the duration of one instant, it follows that all those entities in the same instant be in matter.

(Recapitulation)

From the aforesaid therefore it evidently appears that, when something is moved, there are not there three distinct things, one namely which is moved, another which is acquired, and a third distinct both from this and from that and both at once, which is motion, as the recited opinion imagines, but the **same thing itself**—which the mobile continuously acquires according as it is the incomplete act of the same with continuous tendency to complement, according to the common mode of speaking, or according as it is the act of a being in potency as it is in potency, that is of a being which has something of it actually which immediately it did not have, and immediately will have something which it does not have actually—is **motion**.

Whence just as was touched above, neither that precisely which the mobile has actually, nor precisely that which it will have and to which it is in potency, is motion, but **both at once**. And of both or for both at once this name "motion" is verified. Wherefore the **Commentator** in the fourth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 28, says that "motion is composed of being and non-being. And therefore it is described thus: Motion is the perfection of that which is in potency in that which is in potency," by "being" understanding that of motion which actually is the perfection of the mobile, and by "non-being" that which is not, but can be its perfection.

And therefore it does not seem it ought to be absolutely conceded "motion is act" but with such an addition "of a being in potency insofar as in potency." Or "**imperfect act**," as also in the third book of the **Physics** the **Philosopher** says, on account of the touched reason. Which also the **Commentator** explains in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 54, where he says that "motion is diminished perfection, because it is conjoined with potency." He posits the same sententially in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 57, and **Avicenna** in 2 of his *Sufficiency*, as is alleged just above.

Or if it be conceded absolutely, this is to be understood to be verified of it by reason of a **part**, since a part of it certainly is the act of the mobile.

By the same it is clear that not of every motion is it rightly said that it "**is**," for example of alteration, whose part to be made "**is**" not, whether even properly or improperly it can be said to have a part. Properly nevertheless it is said that something is altered. And this according to the saying ought to be understood by this "alteration is," when it is found posited by authors.

By the same also it is clear that such alteration is not rightly and properly called entity or thing simply, but that something of alteration is a thing and something will be a thing. Nevertheless because not only those things which are, but also those which can be, we are accustomed to call "**beings**," and by this more conveniently "those of which something is actually and something in potency" can be called beings or things (a good understanding being had). Therefore the **Commentator** and **Avicenna**, as is clear above, call motion even whose part is in potency "thing" and "being." Nor is such a mode of speaking to be rejected, if a true understanding be had.

Some motion nevertheless can properly be said "**to be**," just as that whose, although not every part is the act of the mobile, every one nevertheless "**is**," for example some existing magnitude, which continuously becomes the place of something which according to it is moved.

That however motion is such a thing is clear, both by reason because to every such thing belongs the definition of motion, as was declared above concerning local motion and alteration. And in a similar way it is clear concerning augmentation. And to no other does the aforesaid definition belong as is well clear to one diligently advertent.

Both also from the authority of the **Philosopher** in the third book of the **Physics** saying "motion not to be besides things" according to which something is moved. Where the **Commentator** in comment 4 says that the way, which says that "motion does not differ from the perfection to which it goes, except according to more and less, and is of the genus of that perfection, is **truer**." That however which says that "it is a way other than that perfection, is **more famous**." And he says that "it is necessary that motion, which is in substance, be found in the genus of substance, and motion, which is in quantity, in the genus of quantity and similarly that which is in where and quality."

Item in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 9, he says that "to go to heat is heat in some way, and similarly to go to cold." But to go to heat is to be heated or the motion of calefaction. But because as was said "motion is imperfect act," and therefore the motion to heat the Commentator says is heat in some way, because namely that part only, which is in act, is heat. For that which is only in potency, is not heat, although it can be heat. And therefore the motion which is called calefaction is not properly called heat simply and absolutely, but to be heated or calefaction.

On account of which it is to be noted according to the intention of the **Commentator** there that of things, according to which something can be moved, some are continuously acquired to the mobile itself; and these are motions, as was said, and the Commentator calls them "**mobile forms**." Some indeed are not acquired continuously, although perhaps sometimes they were acquired so; and these are not motions, and the Commentator calls them "**quiescent**." The first properly speaking according to the Commentator are signified by infinitives of verbs or nouns signifying the act of a verb. For example that thing, which is continuously acquired by that which becomes hot, is not properly called heat, but to be heated or calefaction. And similarly that which is continuously acquired by that which becomes white, is not properly called whiteness, but to be whitened or dealbation. And so of others in their way.

Others indeed are properly signified by nouns not signifying the act of a verb, like heat, whiteness and the like. Whence the whiteness of snow would not rightly be called dealbation or to be whitened, and therefore the Commentator says there that "on account of the fame of this division, namely that all intentions are divided into quiescent and mobile habits, all nations agree in this that they posited principles of nominations noun and verb, and posited a noun for every quiescent form, and a verb for every mobile form."

The same also is clear through other authorities of the same alleged above from the fifth book of the **Physics**, comments 17 and 48, and many others elsewhere. It is clear therefore what thing motion is, and of what the definition of motion given by the Philosopher is verified.

But because some motions are **acquisitive**, some indeed **deperditive** according to a common enough mode of distinguishing, and those things which have been said agree only with acquisitive, it must be seen, what thing is depreritive motion or continuous deprerdition.

And it must be said that, just as that whose part is the act of something of which before immediately it was not, and immediately a part will be the act of the same which not yet is its act, is acquisitive motion, so conversely that whose immediately before a part was the act of something which now is not the act of it, and some part is the act of the same which immediately not according to its whole self but according to a part only will be its act, is **deperditive motion**.

Or under plainer and more usual words, deperditive motion is of which continuously part after part is lost to something, just as acquisitive is of which continuously part after part is acquired to something which namely is said to be moved. And because, just as such a thing which is moved by acquisitive motion is being in potency to acquiring, and insofar as it is such, acquisitive motion is act, so also, because that which continuously loses some thing is in potency to losing, insofar as it is such, such a thing which is continuously lost, is its act, and consequently motion.

To **mutation** however, as it is distinguished from motion, according to the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 21, such a definition does not belong. And therefore it can be said that acquisitive mutation, which is not motion, is a thing according to its whole self first acquired to something. And its definition can be: Act of a being, which to it according to the whole immediately was in potency, that is which immediately before had nothing of that act, but was only in potency to having. Deperditive mutation however, which is not motion, for example sudden corruption is **no thing**. It can nevertheless have such a quid nominis: Total absence of that, which immediately was the act of something. Whence that is said to be changed suchly which before immediately had some act, which neither any part of it now has.

If however it be asked what is "**mutatum esse**," as it is distinguished against motion and sudden mutation, in one way it can be said that it is nothing. And such a question is entirely irrational and unintelligible, just as that by which it would be asked, what thing is "mobile is changed to this or to that," although reasonably it can be asked, what this whole sentence signifies "mobile is to this changed" or "acquired or lost this."

Whence also authorities saying that "mutatum esse is in an instant" and "every mutatum esse was preceded by some being moved" are not to be understood as if this, which is called "mutatum esse," signifies some thing according to itself and supposes for it in the aforesaid sentences. But the first is to be expounded thus that "every changed thing is changed in an instant," and the second thus "to whatever a mobile is changed, to it before it was moved" and so also the rest in their way. In another way it can be said that "mutatum esse" is the thing first acquired, whose immediately before part after part was acquired. And in both ways can be saved whatever authority sanely understood. Nor is it necessary to imagine such impossible things, which they call "mutata esse." Let these suffice as to the first article.

ARTICLE 2

[Eighteen objections]

Now second it is to be objected against the aforesaid. And first it is proved in general that motion is a thing distinct from permanent things, such as the opinion imagines.

First indeed thus: Every thing which can be corrupted or cease to be, no permanent thing ceasing to be, is a thing distinct from every and all permanent things at once. But motion is such a thing, which can etc.; therefore. The major holds immediately from the first principle of every being or non-being. And the minor is evident. For something, which is moved locally, can rest, granted that no permanent thing be corrupted; but if it rest, the motion by which it is moved will cease to be. Therefore that motion can cease to be, no permanent thing ceasing to be.

In the same way it is proved that **mutation** is a thing distinct from permanent things. For mutation ceases to be, some permanent thing not ceasing. It is clear of mutation which is generation, which after the instant, by which it is measured, is not. And yet it is necessary for no permanent thing to be corrupted, as is clear in the illumination of the air and the generation of intellection and volition, and so of others.

Second, to parts of motion it is repugnant to be at once, not however to parts of permanent things, therefore motion is a thing distinct from permanent things.

Third, no motion can be in an instant, and every permanent thing can be in an instant, therefore no permanent thing is motion.

Fourth, every acquisition by which one thing acquires another is a thing distinct from each of them singly and conjunctively. It is clear, because nothing is a medium of acquiring itself, or to itself that it acquire another. But every acquisitive motion is such, according to the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 48, where he says that "motion is nothing other than to acquire part after [part] from that to which the moved thing is moved, until it acquires that, to which it is moved, perfectly and then ceases." And in the third book comment 4 he says: "For motion is nothing other than the generation of part after part of that perfection, to which motion tends, until it be perfected and be in act." Therefore etc.

Fifth, if motion were not a thing distinct from permanent things, there would not be five "**common sensibles**," just as the **Philosopher** says in the second book of *On the Soul*. The consequence is clear, because among them is numbered motion, and it is established that every permanent thing which is of the common sensibles, is comprehended under some of the other four numbered there.

Sixth, every motion is swift or slow, no permanent thing is swift or slow, therefore no permanent thing is motion.

Seventh specially it is argued that motion is not the thing which is acquired, because **to** that is motion, and **to** no motion is motion. It is clear in the fifth book of the **Physics**. It is confirmed by the express authority of the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 5, saying that "albification is motion, not whiteness." And his reason is what was just made.

Eight to the same. Every "way to a thing is distinguished from that thing," is clear through the **Commentator** in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 4. But every motion is a way to a permanent thing, as is clear through the same in the fourth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 2, and the first of *On*

the Heavens, comment 1; and it is established that it is not a way except to that, which is acquired through it, therefore etc.

Ninth it is argued to the same from the intention of the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 9, where he says that "motion according to its matter is of the genus of that to which it is. But according as it is form" in this matter "it is in the predicament of passion." And afterwards he says that "according to its form it is transmutation conjoined with time." It is clear therefore that the thing, which is acquired, is not motion formally taken which is transmutation, as here we speak of motion, but is its matter.

Tenth it is argued, that the magnitude which is acquired is not local motion. For every motion is the act of the mobile, and is in the mobile. But place or space or magnitude over which the mobile is moved neither is the act of the mobile, nor in the mobile.

Eleventh, let it be posited that over magnitude A is moved body B which nevertheless never otherwise was moved over it, then thus. This magnitude namely A was, before B was moved over A; this motion by which B is moved was not, before B was moved over A. Therefore motion is not this magnitude.

Item thus: It is possible for this magnitude to be, no motion existing. But it is impossible for this motion, by which B is moved over A, to be, no motion existing. Therefore this motion is not this magnitude.

Twelfth it is argued. If space or magnitude, over which the mobile is moved, or place were motion, contrary motions would be the same, which is impossible. The consequence is clear, because over the same magnitude the mobile can be moved first from one part to another, and then conversely. Which motions certainly are contrary, just as motion up and motion down over the same space.

Thirteenth, motion corrupted would return the same in number by nature. For if something is moved now through some space, and afterwards rests, and again through the same space is moved, the motion which is afterwards and which was before will be the same, if motion is not other than the space itself.

Fourteenth, in the sixth book of the **Physics** it is proved that motion is divided by the division of the mobile and by the division of space. Which would not be true, if motion were not other than space.

Fifteenth, then the motion of the heaven would be the earth about which it is moved. And since the motion of the heaven numbered is time or at least the subject of time, the earth would be time or the subject of time, which are absurd.

Sixteenth, the motion of the heaven is the universal cause of generation and corruption of inferior things, as is clear in the second book of *On Generation* and the twelfth of the **Metaphysics** through the **Commentator**. But it is established that the earth is not such a cause. Therefore it is not the motion of the heaven.

Seventeenth, if no local motion were or could be, which were not magnitude or space which was acquired, it would follow that it would be impossible for something to be moved locally unless it acquired some space. But the consequent is false. For it is established that God could influence the intelligence

moving the lunar heaven just as now He influences, and that [intelligence] act about it just as now it acts, and with this annihilate every other body of the world.

Also God could create one heaven wholly solid intrinsic [solid inside], and annihilate every other body, and yet rotate it just as now it is actually turned. This however being posited, it is clear that it would be moved locally and yet it would acquire no magnitude or even any permanent thing.

Eighteenth it is argued in special, that **alteration** is not the quality which is acquired or lost. Because if so, it would follow that motion from one contrary form into another, as from whiteness into blackness, would not be one in number but two. The consequence is clear. Because there are two forms, of which one continuously is lost and the other continuously acquired. But the consequent is against the **Philosopher** in the fifth book of the **Physics** in the chapter *On the contrariety of motion*.

(To objection 1-15)

To the **first** [reason] I concede the major and deny the minor. To the proof, concede that that which is continuously moved can rest, granted that no permanent thing be corrupted. And when it is added "if it shall have rested, motion will cease to be," I say that if it shall have rested, no permanent thing ceasing to be (as was assumed before), that motion will not cease to be, but the mobile certainly will cease to be moved and motion will cease to be motion. This however will not be on account of the desition [ceasing to be] of some thing, but therefore because that of motion, which is to be acquired while the mobile is moved, will be acquired completely, and immediately nothing will be to be acquired, just as is required for this that some thing be motion, as is clear above.

Addition 13: Nor immediately will something be acquired, and consequently no thing then will be the act of that mobile according as it is mobile and in potency. And by this none will be motion. Thus therefore the thing, which now is motion, then also will be, but then will not be motion, because no part of it will be in potency that it be the act of the mobile in the mode posited above.

And therefore, if sometimes by authors or others rightly understanding it is said that motion ceases, where no permanent thing ceases, it is to be understood in the aforesaid mode. Which the **Commentator** teaches well enough in the eighth book of the **Physics**, comment 62, where he says: "Every motion ceasing does not cease, unless when potency is transferred from that in which it was into act, and this will be when that becomes in act." And in the ninth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 11, at the end he says that "the significate of potency" accepted in the definition of motion "is not to cease nor to be separated from that to which it can, since, if that potency went out to act, motion would be destroyed." Where it is clear according to him that, since it is of the reason of motion that to something of it the mobile be in potency, this being removed, motion is destroyed. But it is established that this can happen without the desition of some thing, rather indeed by the position of something in act which was only in potency, as is clear in alteration itself, or because something is the act of the mobile, which before was not its act, although before it was actually in the nature of things. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

In the same way I say that **mutation** does not cease to be, but ceases to be mutation. And the reason is, because that thing is not mutation, unless when it is true to say that it is the act of that, which to it according to the whole immediately before was in potency. Which only truly is said in that instant in

which first the subject is changed to it. Nor is this, because some thing then be corrupted, but therefore because it is continued in being.

To the **second** I say that this proposition "to parts of motion it is repugnant to be at once" in its propriety is false. If nevertheless it be taken not in its proper signification, but so that be denoted by it, this to be impossible "parts of motion are acquired at once or become at once the act of the mobile," in which sense those rightly understanding give it, it is true. But from it in such a sense, and from the other part of the antecedent in whatever sense it be taken, the consequent inferred does not follow.

To the **third** I say that that major "no motion can be in an instant" by the force of speech is false. If nevertheless it be taken, just as those understanding well take it, in place of this "nothing is moved to something in an instant," it is true. But from that and the minor the conclusion does not follow, as is clear. **Addition 13a:** This also is true "this aging one is in an instant" and yet this is false "this is aging in an instant," for it is equivalent to this "this ages in an instant" which is false. Item this is true "this going from Paris to Rome is in an instant" and this is false "this is going from Paris to Rome in an instant," for it is worth this "this goes from Paris to Rome in an instant" which is manifestly false. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

To the **fourth**, whatever be of the major, I say that the minor, rightly taken "under" to the understanding of the major according to the proof of the same, is false. And to the first authority of the comment, when it is said that "motion is nothing other than to acquire etc.," it must be said that "to acquire" can be taken verbally and nominally. If in the **first way**, I say that, as is clear to one attending, if this proposition ought to be intelligible, there this word "motion" is put in place of this infinitive "**to be moved**," so that it be said: "to be moved" is nothing other than to acquire part after part etc.; to which infinitives the prejoined ought to be understood to be supposits, so that thus the sentence be perfected: "for some thing to be moved" is nothing other than for it to acquire etc. But by such a sentence is not denoted, what thing motion be or be not, but rather what be signified by this that something is said to be moved; since not other, than what is signified when it is said "itself which continuously partly acquires some thing." And according to this the authority is nothing valid to the purpose of the argument.

If indeed it be taken **nominally** as if it be said "motion is the acquisition of part after part," according to which mode the argument seems to take it, I say that there is an intransitive construction "acquisition of part," that is **part acquired**, or **which is acquired**. And the sense is "motion is etc." that is motion is that, of which continuously part after part is acquired. Or thus "whose part is acquired and immediately after a part will be acquired." And in this way it is not had that motion is another thing from that which is acquired, but rather the same.

And that this is the understanding of the **Commentator** there is clear. For immediately he adds that "that which is acquired, is a part of the substance of motion." And again that "the substance of motion is of the nature of that to which it is."

In the same way is to be understood the other authority of the same in the third book of the **Physics**: "Motion is nothing other than generation etc.," that is it is nothing other than the thing which continuously partly is generated. And "is generated" is to be accepted commonly, as if it were said "is acquired" or "becomes the act of the mobile." And thus it is to be understood according to the Commentator. It is clear,

because there he says that motion thus accepted "does not differ from the perfection to which it goes except according to more and less." And afterwards he adds that every motion taken suchly is in the genus of that thing to which it goes.

To the **fifth** it must be said that, when the **Philosopher** says that common sensibles are motion, rest etc., he does not understand that every one of such is a certain thing distinct from others, perceptible by all or several senses. For it is clear this is false of **rest** according to all understanding; and similarly of **number**, as in the First [Book] distinction 24 was proved. But his intention is that through several senses can be had notice, by whose virtue can be known the sensible of that sense to be moved or to rest. And if several be sensed, can be known how many they are. And similarly both through touch and through sight, to which two senses only according to the **Commentator** there in comment 64 magnitude and figure are said to be common, can be had notice, of how great magnitude or of what figure be its sensible. And although neither rest nor motion nor number and perhaps neither figure be such things according to themselves distinct from other proper and common sensibles, because nevertheless sometimes thus it happens to be known that the sensed is moved, that it is not known of how great magnitude it be or of what figure, or whether only one be sensed or several; and if several, it is not known how many—and similarly sometimes is known, of what figure, and ignored, whether it be moved or rest, and so of others—therefore are connumbered in turn five common sensibles.

Otherwise also it can be said to the saying of the Philosopher, not repugnantly to that which was said, just as in distinction 24 of the first book question 2 was said.

To the **sixth** I say that the major properly taken is false. But if it be taken in place of this "everything which is moved, is moved swiftly or slowly," just as those rightly understanding posit it, it is true. And then the minor, if it be taken rightly under, will be false. For this is false "no permanent thing is moved swiftly or slowly."

To the **seventh** it must be said that, just as the **Commentator** says in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 12, "motion is the translation of existing things from quiescent form into quiescent form, and thence it follows that translation does not need translation, except per accidens." And in the following comment: "Transmutation," he says, "essentially is from quiescent into quiescent, and I understand here by quiescent that which lacks transmutation whether in place or in another." From these things it is clear that the term of motion properly according to the Philosopher and Commentator is not the thing which is acquired through motion, which as is clear above the Commentator calls "**mobile form**," but the term is "**quiescent form**" according to the exposition given above. But quiescent form is not mobile form or which is acquired, although it will have been such. And therefore that proposition which is assumed "motion is to the thing which is acquired," as namely to a term, is false. Rather indeed it itself is motion.

And therefore the Commentator says that "albification is motion, not however whiteness." For as is clear above, whiteness is the name of quiescent form, albification however the name of mobile form. And because never is quiescent form mobile form, therefore whiteness is not albification nor motion. And that this is his intention, is clear there, for he speaks thus: "And because it is manifest that whiteness is a quiescent immobile form—and who feigns it to be moved, is not to be spoken with in this science—he said," namely **Aristotle**: "'It is worthy that albification be motion, not whiteness'."

To the **eighth** it must be said that "**way**" can be taken in two ways: In one way properly, and thus the space intercepted between some bodies, through which from one can be gone to another, is called way, and such certainly is distinguished from the thing to which it is. In another way way is taken transumptively, and in this way multiply. However as much as makes to the purpose, in one way "something imperfect or less perfect, previous to something perfect of the same reason" is called way with respect to that. And in this way motion, which is imperfect act, is called way to perfect act. And thus is understood the Commentator when he says motion is a way, as is clear through the same in the second book of the **Physics**, comment 14, where showing, how natural transmutation is called way into form, he says: "The way in generable things by nature is of the species of that to which it comes, but they differ according to more and less."

Item in the fifth book of the **Physics**, comment 9, he says that the way from potency to act "is of the genus of act which is complement, but they differ according to more and less. For to go to heat is heat in some way, and similarly to go to cold."

From this however it is clear that it is not concluded motion is some such thing distinct from permanent things, rather indeed to be of the same species with some permanent things.

To the **ninth** it must be said that the Commentator did not wish to distinguish in motion two things, of which one be its matter, the other indeed form, as the argument imagines, but a double consideration or reason of the same thing, according to one of which it is in one predicament, and according to the other in another.

Whence for example **calefaction** which is nothing but **transmutable heat**, according to the mode of speaking of the Commentator, can be considered according to its actual and possible entity absolutely according to itself, and thus according to the Commentator it is considered according to its **matter**, not according to its form that is quidditative reason. For if continuously and partly some heat were made without a subject, neither would it be the act of any subject; it would be indeed such an entity as another which partly were made in a subject, not however would it be motion, because it would not be the act of a being in potency etc. And consequently that does not suffice for the perfect quiddity of motion, and therefore it is an imperfect and partial consideration of motion. As such however it is in the same genus with heat quiescent or perfect, and does not differ according to the Commentator except according to more and less. And therefore he says that "to go to heat is heat in some way." And in this way the Commentator says motion is considered according to its matter.

And that he thus accepts the matter of motion, not for some matter in which it be subjectively, as the argument imagines, is clear through the same below in comment 15 in the beginning, where he distinguishes the double matter of transmutation, namely matter "which is the genus in which is transmutation," that is according to which something is transmuted, and matter "in which is transmutation which namely is of another genus from the genus of transmutation." And in the same way at the end of the comment he distinguishes the double subject of motion saying: "The subject of motion is understood in two ways, of which one is in which is motion namely the moved body; the second indeed is the genus, in which is transmutation namely transmutable quality, or substance, or where, or quantity."

Behold that he distinguishes a double subject and double matter of motion, one **in which** it is, and that is the body which is moved; such matter properly none of motions has except alteration or generation. And another, not in which is motion, but which **is** motion itself by identity, and that is the thing which is acquired.

In another way it can be considered according to its **form**, that is according to its perfect quidditative reason. And then it is considered as it is the act of a being in potency as it is in potency, or as the act of the heatable insofar as such. And thus it is called "to be heated" and is in the **predicament of passion**, as the Commentator says.

And that the Commentator understands thus motion to be considered according to its form, is clear. For he says: "According however to form, that is according as it is transmutation conjoined with time," that is successive, "etc." It is established however that according as it is the act of the mobile insofar as such it is transmutation. And according to this is "to be such transmutation" which is "to be the act of a being in potency insofar as in potency," as is clear above. Whence also when he says that "motion according as it is form in this matter is a predicament per se," he maintains that, as such it be "in the predicament of passion." There "matter" is not taken just as when he says that motion is considered according to its matter, but he accepts matter for the mobile which in another way is called the matter of motion, as is clear in his premised distinction concerning the subject and matter of motion. For according as it is the act of the mobile, thus it is in the predicament of **passion**. Just as also according as it is the act of the motor it is in the predicament of **action**, as is clear through the **Philosopher** and the same **Commentator** in the third book of the **Physics**.

And according to this the same essence of motion according to its triple reason or consideration pertains to a **triple predicament**.

To the **tenth** it must be said that every motion is the act of the mobile; not however every motion is the act of the mobile intrinsic or inhering, but some is extrinsic as the place of the located, as was said above.

What indeed is added, that every motion is **in** the mobile, if "to be in" be taken by real information, it is false. If indeed by predication, and the terms suppose materially, it is true. And then the exercised act is taken for the signated, as if it were said "of every mobile motion is predicated," and ought thus to be exercised "every mobile is moved." And thus ought to be understood such propositions, when they are found posited by authors.

Similarly, when they say that motion is an **accident** of the mobile, "accident" ought not be taken for a thing inhering in another, but for a predicable which contingently is predicated of another, in the way accident is one of the five predicables; although also some motion is an accident in the first way, namely alteration.

To the **eleventh** I say that the minor of the first form, namely that "this motion was not before B was moved over A," is false; supposing that the major be true. Whence, just as this magnitude was before, so also this motion, although this motion not before was motion.

To the **second form** I say that, if the minor be taken in the **composite sense**, however the major be taken, each is true. But from them that conclusion does not follow. Just as it does not follow: God is possible to

be, no beatifiable creature existing; this beatifying [one] is impossible to be, no beatifiable creature existing; therefore the beatifier is not God. For each premise is true, if the minor be taken in the composite sense, and yet the conclusion is false. If the minor indeed be taken in the **divided sense**, I deny it. For this motion can certainly be, no motion existing; since it can be, and not be motion. Just as also this beatifying [one] can be, no beatifying [one] existing. For he can both be, and not be beatifying.

To the **twelfth** I deny the consequence. And to the proof I say that, although the same magnitude in one time be motion up and in another time motion down, never nevertheless is motion up motion down with respect to the same moved [thing], supposing that nothing be moved up and down over the same magnitude first. If nevertheless something were posited to be so moved at once, I would concede that the same would be motion up and motion down, but I would say that they would not be contrary motions. Just as it would be necessary also to say that to be moved up and to be moved down would not be contrary terms, because at once of the same they would be verified.

To the **thirteenth** I deny the consequence. Nor is the proof valid, because the local motion, which was before, afterwards was not corrupted.

To the **fourteenth** it must be said that the sense of authors saying that "motion is divided by the division of the mobile" is, that to one and another part of the mobile one and another part of motion corresponds. And this is well saved of local motion, positing that it be the magnitude which is acquired, as is clear to one looking into it.

When however they say that it is divided by the division of space, they understand that one and another part of space is one and another part of motion, and the prior part of space is the prior part of motion; and the posterior, posterior.

To the **fifteenth** it can be said that the motion of the heaven is the magnitude of the containing [body] which is its place. And this is universally true of every moved heaven, because every one according to the truth is contained by a superior.

If nevertheless it were so, as the **Philosopher** opined, that the **first mobile** is not contained by any other heaven, it would be to be said that, just as the heaven is said to be moved locally, not because it is moved in place but about place—in which mode however the **Philosopher** saves in the sixth book of the **Physics**, it to be moved from place to place about the convex of the earth—so it would be to be said, I say, that the earth would be the motion of the heaven, insofar as it is its extrinsic act insofar as it is mobile.

When indeed it is further inferred that the earth would be time because the motion of the heaven is time, I say that in its proper signification taken this proposition "the motion of the heaven is time" is false.

Improperly however accepted, namely in place of this "the heaven, which is continuously moved, is time," as will be declared below, it is true.

(Additional response to objection 10-11)

Addition 14: To the special doubts concerning local motion, when it is said that "every motion is the act of the mobile," it was responded above. For just as form is the act of potency to form, so "where" and "place" is the act of potency to where or to place.

When it is added that "every motion is **in** the mobile," if "to be in" be accepted, just as form is said to be in matter and real accident in a subject, that universal proposition is not true. For neither local motion, nor motion of augmentation and decrease is subjectively in the mobile, although it be true of the motion of alteration which is to an inhering form. And therefore if this proposition be found in the sayings of authors "motion is in the mobile," it is not to be accepted universally.

That universal [proposition] nevertheless can be true, if "to be in" be understood by **predication**, and the exercised act be accepted for the signated. And then the sense is "motion is in the mobile" that is motion is predicated of the mobile, in which the terms suppose materially and it ought thus to be exercised "the mobile is moved"; and this is true of every motion.

And in the same way it ought to be understood, when it is found in authors that motion is an **accident** of the mobile. For "accident" is accepted there not for a thing, which can be present and absent to someone, but for a **predicable** term contradistinguished against the other four predicables.

Of some motion nevertheless it is truly said that it is a **real accident**, for example of some alteration.

To the other, when it is said: Magnitude is **before** the mobile is moved locally, but local motion is not before the mobile is moved locally, therefore local motion is not magnitude, it must be said that the major is particular and the Syllogism is in the second figure, and therefore the conclusion does not follow. If however the major become universal, then I say that, if each premise be posited to be true at once, the conclusion is also true. Nothing nevertheless is had against the sayings. For that case being posited, the subject of the conclusion does not suppose for anything, nor then is any motion. It is certain however that, when motion is not, it itself is not magnitude. If however some local motion be posited to be or something to be moved over magnitude, then the major will be false, namely this "every magnitude is before the mobile is moved locally." But if it be argued from those about the past and expositively saying: "This magnitude was before this mobile was moved, this motion was not before the mobile was moved," it follows—the subject in each premise supposing for those things, which are—"therefore this motion is not this magnitude"; it must be said that certainly the form is good, but the **minor** is false and its opposite true, namely this "this motion was before the mobile was moved." Just as this is true "this white was before whiteness was in it," demonstrating something which now first is white and yet for a long time was in the nature of things. For to the truth of this "this motion was etc." it suffices that this was true "this is," demonstrating that for which this subject "motion" supposes in that [proposition], when this was not true "this mobile is moved." It is not necessary however that when the mobile was not moved this was true "this motion is," although however this then was true "this is," demonstrating that for which now motion supposes; and this be true "this motion was," yet this is not true "this motion was motion" or this "this was motion before the mobile was moved." Just as neither in the prior case is this true "this white was white," or this "this was white before whiteness was in it." And the reason of both is, because the predicate **appellates** its proper form, not however the subject, as logicians say.

For it is to be noted that, although these names "**magnitude**" and "**motion**" signify the same thing, nevertheless this name motion connotes something, which this name magnitude does not connote, namely the **mobile**, to which its part after part without rest actually coexists. And therefore although the same thing be motion and magnitude, sometimes nevertheless that thing is magnitude and is not motion, namely when the mobile does not coexist to it in the aforesaid mode. Sometimes however it both is motion and is magnitude, namely when the mobile has itself to it, as was aforesaid. And if nothing be moved, "to be to exist" will be verified of this term "magnitude" significatively taken, which is not verified of this term "motion" even significatively taken. And therefore this is possible "magnitude is and nothing is moved." And this is impossible "motion is and nothing is moved," notwithstanding that motion is not another thing from magnitude.

To that however, which is annexed in the same argumentation saying "part of local motion after part of it is continuously generated," it must be said that accepting "to be generated" **properly**, namely for to accept being in effect, the proposition by the virtue and property of locution is false. For it signifies that a part of that thing, which is motion, truly accepts being and passes from non-being to being after another part of it, which certainly is false.

Another sense is from the **transsumption** [metaphor] of speakers, signified through it. And it is that the mobile first coexists to one part of magnitude than to another, and first is moved to one than to another. And this is true, and those have this sense through that proposition who understand rightly. Understanding the proposition thus however nothing is concluded. For it does not follow: Part of magnitude does not become after part of it; the mobile first coexists to one part of magnitude than to another, therefore motion is not magnitude, as is clear to anyone. Or the sense of that proposition is that one part of magnitude is first the act of the mobile and first becomes the act of the mobile than another. It becomes however the act of the mobile insofar as it becomes its "**where**" or place, for although it was magnitude before, nevertheless it was not place or "where" of the mobile before. And according to this are to be understood the authorities, which say that where and place is continuously and partibly generated. And in the premised mode also is to be understood one part of motion to be generated before another. Understanding the proposition thus however it is clear that nothing is concluded against our purpose.

To the other, when it is said, that contrary motions would be the same, I deny the consequence. For in order that some motions be the same, it is necessary for each to be. And thus, in order that that consequent would follow, it would be necessary that that magnitude be at once motion upwards and motion downwards. This however is not, because, if the mobile first will be moved upwards, but afterwards downwards, while it is moved downwards, the magnitude itself is not motion upwards, although it was motion upwards. Whence neither is it true to say that that motion upwards is. And by this, neither [is] it [true] it to be the same as the motion downwards which is afterwards.

(Additional response to objection 13-15)

To the other some concede that local motion, which was yesterday, is today, and which is today, was yesterday and will be tomorrow, because the space is the same and the mobile same. And they would deny that motion to be properly corrupted, which was yesterday. Concerning the motion of alteration however they say the opposite, because the same form in number cannot naturally be acquired twice. But

that does not seem said philosophically, as is clear from the fifth book of the **Physics**, where it is had that **unity of time** is required for the numeral unity of motion.

Item, just as the space itself and the mobile does not suffice for this, that motion **be**—as even these concede; otherwise the mobile resting motion would be, and motion would be and nothing would be moved—so for this, that motion which was, **be**, it does not suffice that the same mobile be moved over the same space, otherwise at once there would be motion up and down of the same mobile.

I say therefore, that, just as in order that magnitude be motion, something is required, which is not required, in order that it be magnitude, so something is required for this, in order that it be the **same motion in number**, which is not required for this, in order that it be the same magnitude in number. This however among other things is **unity of time**, as is clear in the fifth book of the **Physics** through the **Philosopher** and through the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 35. And therefore, if some mobile in one time be moved over this demonstrated magnitude, then rest, and again the same be moved over the same, that magnitude is not the same motion in number, because it is not in one continuous time. And the reason is, because just as magnitude absolutely is not motion, but according as this mobile or that coexists to it partibly and successively—and consequently a mobile is required, that it have the reason of motion—so the same mobile is required, that it be the same motion. The same time is also required. For it itself is motion insofar as something of it now coexists to the mobile or conversely, which before that "now" did not coexist; and something of it after that "now" will coexist, which before it does not coexist nor in it coexists. And because, when the mobile is moved secondly after the rest following the prior motion, nothing of the magnitude coexists to the mobile in that "now" in which before, and consequently neither is the whole motion in the same whole first time, therefore neither also the same motion per se, although it be the same magnitude and the same thing, which was that motion. Just as if for this, that this subject, for example Plato were this white in number, were required this demonstrated whiteness, just as for this, that he be white, is required whiteness: If that whiteness were corrupted and afterwards another were generated in him, thus he would be the same man, but would not be the same white. So therefore it is in the purpose, since for the numeral unity of motion necessarily is required a determined part of time, in which the mobile be moved. And by this it could be said, that also in **alteration**, granted that the same form in number were acquired twice, it would not be nevertheless the same alteration, because it would not be in the same time in number.

And it is to be adverted that those positing motion to be a thing distinct from magnitude and from the mobile (of whom the speech was had) have the same difficulty. For it is not more impossible for God to repair the same successive entity—if any such were—corrupted the same in number than a permanent one. Nor can a reason be assigned, unless one proceeds in the premised mode. Wherefore either it will be necessary to concede the same motion can be repaired, which nevertheless they deny or at least many of them, or to solve, as it seems, by the way just posited. If however they shall have conceded the same motion thus corrupted through divine virtue can return, equally reasonably can be conceded the same motion through nature can be, which was before, positing that no entity of it be corrupted, as some concede, as was just recited.

To the **other** it must be said that this "motion is divided by the division of the mobile" ought to be expounded thus: that is to diverse parts of the mobile correspond diverse parts of place or magnitude. This indeed "motion is divided by the division of space," thus: the mobile first coexists to one part of space

than to another; or thus: the mobile first acquires one part of space than another. And this is the true sense, which the authors had who posited such propositions.

To the **other**, when it is said that "the motion of the heaven would be the earth about which it is moved," I say that—granted that the **first mobile** were not contained by some superior body, just as philosophers opined, and by this were not moved in something, but about something—the **earth** itself quiescent, about which the heaven is moved, is its motion, not indeed insofar as it is earth, but insofar as it is the **extrinsic act** of the heaven itself, insofar as it is moved. Nor do I reckon this more inconvenient, than that magnitude, through which something is moved, be its motion. Because nevertheless it is contained by a superior heaven it can be conceded that its motion be the magnitude of its containing [body], in the mode in which concerning the local motions of other bodies was said, although it be not altogether similar in all things concerning circular and straight motion.

When indeed further it is inferred that "the earth would be time," I deny the consequence. And when it is said that "the motion of the heaven is time," I say that this properly taken is false. For the sense is, that that thing which is the motion of the heaven, is time, which is false. Taken however **improperly**, namely in place of this "the moved heaven is time," it is true. For the **first mobile** itself, not indeed insofar as heaven nor insofar as moved absolutely, but insofar as **uniformly and regularly moved**, by which the soul measures the motions of all other bodies or knows how much every other body is moved, and what more and what less, and what swiftly and what slowly, is **time**. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

(To objection 16-18)

To the **sixteenth** it must be said that that proposition "the motion of the heaven is the cause of generation and corruption of inferior things" is to be distinguished according to amphibology. For by the force of speech, and in the sense which it makes first, it is false. **Improperly** nevertheless and accepted in place of this "the heaven which is moved, is the cause of generation and corruption" it is true. And this is the understanding of authors. By such propositions they do not wish to signify other, except that, because the heaven is moved and sometimes certain parts of it approach us more and sometimes less, sometimes there is generation, sometimes there is corruption in these inferior things. And that this is the intention of the Philosopher, when he speaks similar things, is declared in the following distinction question 1 article 1 proposition 3, where it is said what thing time is.

And certainly the generation of these, even if the motion of the heaven were some such successive thing in the heaven, as the other opinion imagines, it would be foolish to reduce into such a thing as into a cause, and not rather into the heaven itself and its form, virtually contentive of these inferior things.

To the **seventeenth** concede the consequence and the consequent, understanding always the mobile to acquire place or space suchly, as it is moved locally. To the proof of the falsity of the consequent I say that, if nothing besides the heaven were, notwithstanding that the intelligence apply its motive virtue just as now it influences, nevertheless it would not then move the heaven locally, nor would the heaven be moved so that then it would be true to say "the intelligence moves the heaven" or "the heaven is moved locally."

And it is a wonder, if anyone here conceives the opposite. For just as it is impossible for something to be moved according to quality, acquiring or losing no quality, so it is impossible for something to be moved according to place, unless it acquire place or lose, or according to it in some mode be transmuted. This however is impossible, if only the heaven and no other body be in the nature of things.

Furthermore it is established that "every mutation is from something into something," as is clear in the fifth book of the **Physics**. Nor is it possible for something to be changed except from something into something. And further neither locally to be changed except from place or to place or in both ways or in some way otherwise according to place. Because for now I do not care whether in place or to place or about place or in some other mode, but only this I intend that it is impossible for something to be moved locally, if there be no place at all. I say therefore that in that case this would not be true "the heaven is moved locally," but this conditional would be well true "if something located the heaven"—in whatever way now the heaven is said to be located, of which I do not care, granted that that and all other bodies rested, the rest having themselves as now—"the heaven would be moved and the intelligence would move the heaven."

To the **eighteenth** I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that it is founded in a falsehood namely that the same mobile at once first loses one form according to essence and acquires another contrary also according to essence. This indeed is false, since then contrary forms would be at once in the same subject first, which is false, as was shown in the First [Book] distinction 17. But a mobile existing under one contrary form, if it ought to be transmuted to another by continuous motion, first loses that partly and afterwards acquires the opposite, according to the mode which was said where above. And yet, when the mobile continuously loses the first form, it is said to be moved to the contrary according to the Philosopher, not indeed according to the essence of that, but according to disposition, as was declared there.

To the **principal argument** of the question it must be said that this name "**successive**" can have a double definition explaining what it signifies, one such: Something having parts, succeeding each other according to prior and posterior, of which none can be at once with another in any instant or time; and none also according to its whole self can be first through time. Another definition can be: Whose part becomes before part or is acquired to someone and none is acquired at once with another.

"**Permanent**" indeed is described [as] what according to its whole self first can endure through time and be in diverse instants. And from this it follows that if some such thing has parts, its parts can be at once.

Then to the argument I say that, if the first be the definition of successive, just as seems to be according to the reprobated opinion, that both the major and the minor is false. The major indeed on account of false implication. For it implies, since it is affirmative, that there be some successive thing; which not only is false but also impossible, as is clear enough from the above.

To the **proof** I say that certainly, if that be the definition of successive, successive and permanent are distinguished by opposition, that is to say that their reasons include opposition and repugnance. And therefore also I concede that no successive is permanent. But it does not follow from this, that every or even some successive is a thing distinct from permanent, since no thing is or can be successive [in that

sense], just as it does not follow: No chimera is a permanent thing, therefore every chimera is a thing distinct from permanent.

Item the **minor** is false. For no motion is whose parts all are not, or can be at once. And therefore no motion is a successive thing, accepting "successive" thus. If indeed the second be the definition of successive or if we use this name "successive" in the signification of the second definition, then the minor is true, but the major is false. For of every thing, which partly and successively is acquired, the parts can be at once and endure through time. Rather indeed also in fact the parts of some are at once and endure, as is clear of space or magnitude, which partly continuously is acquired and becomes the place of that which is moved.

(Third conclusion proved)

I prove the **third conclusion** first thus: Of every agent the thing, which it makes, is act as it itself is agent. Therefore of no agent is action a thing distinct from the thing which it makes. The consequence is clear. Because, if the thing which it makes is its act as it is agent, it itself is its action. It is clear from the description of action posited above through the **Philosopher**. If however it itself is action, no other thing is action, by means of which it makes that first action. Which is clear: Both because it would be posited superfluously and uselessly; and because by the same reason also of that action there would be another distinct action, and again of that another, and so to infinity.

I prove the antecedent, both because of that thing the active power of the agent is the principle. But of whatever active power insofar as such is the principle, it itself is the act and operation of the agent, as it is agent.

It is confirmed, because of the agent, which by acting transmutes the subject into which it acts, the transmutation itself is its act insofar as it is agent. It is clear from the definition of active power, by which it is said that it is the principle of transmutation in another or insofar as other, in the ninth and fifth books of the **Metaphysics**. But the thing itself, which becomes in the patient, and only it, is transmutation, as is clear from the preceding conclusion. Therefore it itself is the act of the agent insofar as such.

Second the same antecedent is proved. Since, if God were co-acting with some agent for the causation of that thing which it makes, for example with fire for causing heat in wood, and in the same way entirely, as in fact now He co-acts with it for causing heat, nor for the causation of any other entity from heat were He co-acting with fire, as to every theologian is well clear to be possible: It is established that there would be some act of fire insofar as it is agent, otherwise it would not act according to act, and no other thing would be its act insofar as such than the heat itself which it would make, as is clear. Therefore also now that heat, which it makes, is its act insofar as it is agent, since by the case not otherwise would that heat have itself to the fire, and conversely, than now it has itself.

Second principally to the conclusion thus: The agent makes some thing without a distinct action mediating from that thing. Therefore it makes none by means of an action distinct from it. The consequence is clear from the fact that there is not greater reason, that it make one without a mediating action than another. Rather indeed vainly and supervacuously is imagined such a mediating action in making some thing.

I prove the antecedent, and I take the premised example. For either fire causes heat in wood without a distinct action, and I have the purpose, or by means of a distinct action. And if so, since, whatever kind of thing that action be, it becomes also then by some agent—since it does not pass through itself from non-being to being, because this is utterly impossible—it follows that some agent makes it. Either therefore an agent makes it by means of another action, and then by the same reason also that other an agent makes—whatever agent that be, because it does not vary the purpose—by means of another action, and so further to infinity. Or it makes it not by means of another action, and the purpose is had.

Third, if action were such a thing, for example the action of fire which is calefaction were a thing distinct from the heat which it makes, it would follow that at least by divine virtue fire could heat water causing no heat in it, and could cause heat in it, not heating it. Or let it be argued that God Himself could this immediately.

But the consequent seems to imply or infer a manifest contradiction, for if it heated water, that would be heated, and if it were heated, it would become hot. And if so, heat would become in it, and not except by fire. Therefore fire would cause heat in it. And similarly, if it caused heat in it, it would become hot, and consequently would be heated, since "to be heated" and "to become hot" signify the same. And if it were heated, something and not except fire would heat it, not excluding thence the first cause. And thus it is clear that of each part of the consequent the first part infers the opposite of the second, therefore it infers contradictories.

The consequence indeed is proved. For God could co-act with fire for the causation of calefaction, not co-acting for the causation of heat, if they are distinct things, of which neither includes the other. But this being posited, fire would heat, because truly the calefactive power of fire would be reduced to its act or would have its proper act, and yet it would not cause heat. Item God could co-act for the causation of heat, not co-acting for the causation of calefaction. And then it would cause heat, nor yet heat [facere calidum], since it is impossible to heat [calefacere] without calefaction.

Fourth, I take the action of some thing, for example of some substantial form impartibly factible, or of some intellection or other such form which becomes all at once; and I take this name "action" specially—as it is not said of conservation—how a thing which becomes all at once, becomes nevertheless in the first instant of its being. And I ask, whether that action is a thing distinct from that thing which becomes, or not. If not, therefore vainly is posited some action distinct from the thing which becomes, since all these things are saved which are required for verifying something to act or suffer. If they are distinct, just as those say who are of the opposite opinion, either that [action] or something of it endures after the instant in which the thing becomes, or not it nor anything of it. The second cannot be said, because then that would be the last instant of its being, after which nothing of it would be. Item it itself and every part of it would be only through an instant. Which according to the **Philosopher** are impossible, as is clear from the preceding question. And according to truth also they are impossible naturally, as in the first book distinction 17 question 2 article 2 was proved.

If it be said that it itself or something of it remains after the instant in which the thing becomes, therefore also after that instant still the thing becomes and the agent makes it, which implies a contradiction, accepting action in the aforesaid mode. For everything which so becomes, immediately before was not.

The consequence is clear because, as long as there is action, the agent acts; and as long as it acts, properly speaking it makes some thing, and that becomes.

Nor can it be said according to that way that action is after that instant, but is not action: Both because it could not be assigned, what thing that would be other from the thing of which action was posited, since neither any substance nor quality or quantity, as is clear; nor any respect, since it would not be to another term than it was, when it was action. And therefore just as then it was action, so also afterwards it is action. And also because much more reasonably is it posited that the thing itself which becomes, is in the first instant of its being action, and afterwards is not action, although it be.

Fifth I argue the same concerning the action of a thing which becomes continuously and partibly. For if it become by means of another action, either that action is indivisible into parts of which one be prior in duration than another, and then it is necessary to say that it be the action of every part of that thing which becomes partibly, and consequently after one part is made, still remains its action, and by this it still becomes, which is impossible, accepting action as it is distinguished against conservation, just as in the preceding reason. And again it will be necessary that something of that form which continuously becomes, become in an instant, and some part of it be first made, just as also it will be to give a first instant in which is that action, since in the aforesaid mode it is indivisible. This however is not necessary, rather indeed it is possible for some thing according to every part of itself continuously and partibly to become, as is clear from the 17th distinction of the first book.

Or that action has such parts succeeding each other. And if so, either some remains with the following, and then it follows that, when the posterior part of the thing becomes, still at once becomes the prior part of it, just as also at once is its action. Or none remains with the following, according to the imagination of some concerning parts of motion reprobated in the preceding question, and this is entirely impossible just as by the same several reasons can be proved, by which concerning motion was proved.

By similar reasons it can be proved that **passion** is not a thing distinct from the thing, which becomes in the patient. First indeed, because it itself truly is the act of the patient insofar as such. Which is clear: Both because its passive power insofar as such is the principle. And because it itself is the transmutation of it by another or insofar as other. And because, if God were co-acting for the precise causation of heat in a subject, heat itself would be the act of the patient insofar as such. Therefore also now it is its act insofar as such.

Second, because the patient suffers some thing without a distinct passion. Therefore also it suffers none by means of a distinct passion. The consequence is clear just as above. And the antecedent is proved, because otherwise the process would be infinite in passions just as concerning actions was said.

Third also, because then through the power of God it would be possible for something to be heated, receiving no heat, and could not be heated, receiving heat. And the falsity of the consequent and the consequence are declared just as in the third premised reason.

Similarly also the fourth and fifth reason can be adapted to proving that passion is not a thing distinct from that which becomes in the patient.

Sixth it can be argued commonly that irrationally it is posited action or passion to be a thing distinct from that which becomes. Since it is possible for something truly to act into another, and something truly to suffer from another, positing precisely that thing which acts (for example fire with its qualities), and the subject (as for instance water or wood), and the thing which becomes (for example heat). And this is clear, because God could co-act with fire for the causation of heat precisely, as was said, and then fire would truly act and wood would suffer. Nor does any experience teach us that there is any such distinct thing, nor also the authority of Sacred Scripture. Therefore irrationally any such and uselessly and superfluously is posited.

(Third conclusion proved by authorities)

This conclusion is also of the intention of the **Philosopher** in the second book of *On the Soul*, where, after he said that the act of the sensible and sentient is the same, declaring by example he says that "of the sounding the act is sounding, and of the hearing the act is hearing or auditus." It is established however that hearing or auditus is not other than that thing or quality, which becomes in the sense of hearing. That therefore is the act of the hearer and audible, and consequently according to the Philosopher action and passion.

This also is the express intention of the **Commentator** in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 25, where—upon that word of the **Philosopher** according to our translation: "when this indeed makes, that indeed becomes, there is an intermediate making," and according to his translation, which in this part is nearer and clearer and through which it is clear how these are to be understood, is had: "for when something acts and another suffers, passion is between them"—the Commentator says: "When something shall have acted in some [thing] some action, and that something suffer from it, that which becomes between them is called a disposition, but in respect of the agent is called action, and in respect of the patient is called passion."

Behold expressly that that, which becomes between agent and patient, is action and passion.

(Fourth conclusion proved)

The **fourth conclusion** is proved thus: Every thing, which becomes by something in something, is action and passion. This is clear from the things said in the preceding conclusion. But some thing, which becomes by something in something, is motion, as is clear from the preceding question. Therefore some action is motion, and also some passion is motion. And thus one part of the conclusion is clear.

For this also is the authority of **Damascene**, where above, giving this indefinite [proposition] "action is motion" and it is established that no less true is this "passion is motion."

Item the Author of the **Six Principles** in the chapter *On Action* says: "For to be moved is action." Therefore by conversion some action is to be moved. Nor less is this true "some passion is to be moved."

For this is the intention of the **Philosopher** in the third book of the **Physics**, where he proves that action is not in the agent, by this consequence because "either every mover will be moved, or having motion will not be moved."

Item in the fifth book of the **Physics** he proves that to action there is not motion, because to motion there is not motion. Nor is there doubt that each argumentation is founded upon this, that every action is motion, although some expound otherwise, and in my judgment not according to the intention of the same.

The **second part** of the conclusion is proved thus: Something becomes in something or happens to become without mutation of that, in which it becomes. Therefore some action is not motion, and some passion is not motion. The consequence is clear from the sayings. And the antecedent was proved above in question 4 of this distinction.

But then there is a doubt, because it seems that this second part of the conclusion contradicts the intention of **Aristotle**, of whom it was already said that he intends that every action is motion.

To this it must be said that action can be taken in two ways: In one way **commonly** for that action also, which is called conservation and by which "preserving something" is said to act it, as in the question alleged before was shown. And thus I take action in this conclusion. In another way action is taken **specially**, as to act is distinguished against to preserve, according to which mode that alone is said to become which formerly immediately was not, or something of it is now first made and immediately something will be made, which now is not made, as in those things which continuously and partly become. And action taken thus every action of something in something is motion or mutation. And thus understands the Philosopher, and truly. Nor is this repugnant to this conclusion.

(Fifth conclusion proved)

The **fifth conclusion** is that no action is in the agent, unless the same be agent and patient. This is proved, because in whatever is passion, it is patient. But in whatever is action, in it is passion. This is clear because every action, which is in something, is passion, as is proved from the things said in the second conclusion. Therefore in whatever is action, it is patient. And further, therefore no action is in the agent, unless it be agent and patient.

Furthermore in whatever is the thing, which is made by the agent, that is patient. This is clear because that into which the agent acts, suffers from the agent. But in whatever is action, is the thing which is made by the agent, because every action is the thing which is made by the agent, as is clear from the third conclusion. Therefore in whatever is action, it suffers from the agent.

From this conclusion it follows that no action of an agent, which so acts that then it does not suffer, is in it subjectively; and that every action not subsisting, but existing in something, is in the patient. And because, as was said, the **Philosopher** thought every action to be such, therefore he said every action is in the patient, and none in the agent, understand, when the agent is not also patient. This is his determination in the third book of the **Physics**, where he discusses this question, as is clearly evident to one advertent.

Item in the second book of *On the Soul*, where above, he says that "motion and action and passion are in that which is acted" that is in that which suffers, as is clear by the translation of the comment, which is more proper in this part, which, where this has "in that which is acted," has "in the passive." Item the

Philosopher adds there that "of the active and motive the act becomes in the patient." The text of the comment has: "For the action of the agent and mover is in the patient."

This also is the intention of the **Commentator** in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 18, where he says: "The action of the motor which is to move, is of it, not in it." Item in the second book of *On the Soul*, comment 137: "It is necessary," he says, "that every action which proceeds from an agent, and every motion which proceeds from a mover, not be found except in the thing suffering and moved."

ARTICLE 2

[Against the first and second conclusion]

Now second I object against the aforesaid conclusions. And **first** against the **first** I argue that action is not a thing distinct from the agent, since if it were, it would follow that action would become by an agent, and thus of action there would be action, and of generation generation, against the **Philosopher** in the fifth book of the **Physics**.

Then it is argued against the **second conclusion**, showing that action and passion are not one thing. And **first** thus: "Whatever opposite and real habitudes are necessarily really distinguished." This is clear, since it is impossible for opposite things to be the same, "just as is clear in every genus of opposition." But action and passion are opposite real habitudes; for action begins from the agent and is terminated at the patient and passion conversely.

It is confirmed by the **Commentator** in the third book of the **Physics**, comment 18, where he says that "the action made between motor and moved is the same, but in respect of one is called to move, and in respect of the other to be moved, and they are greatly opposite."

Second, whatever things are the same according to subject, different indeed according to quiddity, if their quiddities are real, are really distinguished; for to be distinguished by real quiddities is to be distinguished really. But according to the **Commentator** in the third book of the **Physics** in several places, "action and passion are the same according to subject" and differ according to quiddity; but their quiddities certainly are real, since they are before every act of understanding. Therefore etc.

Third, the same is proved by the **Philosopher** in the same place saying that "action and passion are not properly the same, but to which these belong, motion." So that his intention is that action and passion are distinct things among themselves, but are in the same motion as in a subject.

Fourth by others it is argued thus to the same: In the first book of the **Posterior Analytics** it is had that a negative immediate [proposition] is, in which one most general genus is denied of another universally. This therefore is true "no passion is action, therefore no action is the same thing with passion."

Fifth to the same. Whatever differ in genus, differ in species and number, is clear in the fifth book of the **Metaphysics**. But action and passion differ in genus since they are two predicaments, therefore they differ in number, therefore they are not one thing in number.

(Against the third conclusion)

Against the **third conclusion** also it is argued multiply, **first** thus. Whenever some things so have themselves, that one remains really, the other passing and not remaining really, they are not the same really. This is clear, because from the opposite it follows that the same remains really and does not remain really, and passes and does not pass, and thus is taken away the truth of the first principle. But the thing which is produced remains really, action passing really. Therefore etc. The minor is proved. For "to generate" passing and similarly "to be generated" the generated fire remains. Otherwise a candle lit by another, wherever it were borne, would always be lit, and another would always light it, which is false.

Furthermore the same minor is proved by the same elsewhere, supposing one maxim of theologians, "namely that every effect of a created efficient cause God can do immediately. The sun therefore existing in the same site in the heaven, God can immediately preserve both the sun and the ray which is from the sun, so that He will maintain the ray without the sun, and consequently will pass according to the thing the habitude imported by 'to be from the sun'" and by this the action of the sun.

Furthermore "every form, which a natural agent can induce, God can induce immediately by Himself alone. Let it be posited therefore that in that instant, in which the sun ought to induce a ray, or a generator a substantial form, that God induce it (or her) by Himself" and suspend the action of the sun or generator. "Then it is true to say that neither the ray is from the sun, nor the substantial form from the generator, but both from God; and yet it is the same substantial form and the same ray, which would be from the sun and from the generator." Therefore that habitude imported by "to be from the sun" is not the same with the ray, nor the habitude imported by "to be from the generator" the same with substantial form.

It is confirmed because, if such a habitude were not other than the aforesaid, there would be no reason, why, if God had not induced the ray nor suspended the action of the sun, then rather it would be said that the ray was from the sun than standing the first case, since so then would be the entity of the sun and similarly of the ray, just as now in the case.

And it can still be confirmed according to the mode of arguing of others: Whenever some proposition is verified for things, if for its truth two things do not suffice, a third is required; and if not three, a fourth is to be posited. And so further, until there be as many, as are required and suffice for its truth. But for the truth of this "a ray is produced by the sun" the entities of the ray and sun do not suffice precisely. It is clear in the posited case. Therefore a third is required. That however is the **middle habitude** between the ray and the sun, imported by "to be from the sun."

Second it is argued thus: "It is impossible for any thing in the order of effective causality to depend on itself." But a produced thing depends effectively on action and passion. Therefore etc.

Third, that which is a way into another, differs from that. Action is a way into the produced thing. Therefore etc.

Fourth, that which is a medium conjoining the effect with the producer, differs from the effect. Action is of this kind. Therefore etc.

Fifth, when I say "ray is from the sun," either I say precisely the ray, or precisely the ray and the sun, or something other from them. The first cannot be said, because then not more would the ray be from the sun than from a stone; nor the second, because rather the ray would not be from the sun than conversely. It is left therefore the third, which is the purpose.

Sixth, this preposition "from" [a/ab] when I say "ray is from the sun," either connotes something outside the intellect, or not. If not, it follows that the act of the intellect being circumscribed the ray would not be "from" the sun, which is false. If yes, either that is the ray only or the sun only or both at once or something else. The three first are improbated. Therefore remains the last.

(Against the fourth conclusion)

Against the **fourth conclusion** it can be argued from the words of the Author of the **Six Principles**; for he says in the chapter *On Action* thus: "If anyone acts, he moves necessarily. Therefore every action is in motion." And he adds: "Therefore it is proper to action to be in motion." From this authority is had against the first part of the conclusion, by which it is said that certain action is motion. For if this were true, since this Author says that every action is in motion and that it is proper to action to be in motion, it would follow that some motion would be in motion, which is against the **Philosopher** in the fifth book of the **Physics** proving that no motion is the subject of motion. Item every part of the alleged authority is repugnant to the proof of the second part of the aforesaid conclusion. For if everything which acts, necessarily moves, and every action is in motion, and this is proper to it, it is impossible for something to become in something without the mutation of that in which it becomes, whose opposite is assumed there.

(Against the fifth conclusion)

Against the **fifth conclusion** also it is argued multiply and proved that action is in the agent subjectively, and not in the patient.

First thus: It is impossible for a formal effect to be separated from the form. But to be an agent is the formal effect of action, for an agent is said formally to act by action. Therefore action is in it subjectively.

Second, every perfection is formally in that which is perfected by it, because nothing is perfected by that which is in another, and not in it. But action is the perfection of the agent; for then an agent is in its ultimate perfection, when it acts. Therefore action is in it.

Third, if action were in the patient, the crucifixion and blasphemy of the Jews active would have been in Christ. But this is false, because, since those were sins, sins would have been in Christ.

Fourth, it is impossible for opposite forms to be in the same. Action and passion are opposite forms, and passion is in the patient. Therefore action is not in the patient.

Fifth, every form denominates its subject. But action does not denominate the patient, because then the patient would be called agent. Therefore the patient is not its subject.

Sixth "of whom is the potency, of him is the act," as the **Philosopher** says in *On Sleep and Waking*. But active potency is of the agent and in the agent. Therefore also its act namely action.

Seventh, the **Philosopher** in the eighth book of the **Physics** says that, if God were to act anew, He would be changed. This however would not happen, unless because He would receive something new in Himself. It does not appear however, what, unless action itself. Therefore that will be in Him, and consequently in fact every action is in the agent.

Eight, if one fire heat two heatables, either there will be one action only, or two. Not two, because of one agent there is unique action. Therefore one only. And if so, either that is in the patient, or in the agent. Not in the patient, because, by what reason in one, also in both; and thus the same accident would be in two subjects, which is impossible. Therefore it is in the agent, which is the purpose.

Ninth, whenever some two are impossible in the same subject precisely on account of the previous impossibility of certain others in the same subject, if the consequents do not comport themselves in the subject, neither do those antecedents. But relations of the second mode of relatives are impossible in the same, and this precisely on account of the previous impossibility of action and passion which they follow. For therefore the same cannot be father and son, because the same cannot be generated by itself, or generate itself. Therefore action and passion are not compossible in the same. But passion is in the patient, therefore action is not in it.

Tenth, where relation is subjectively, there is the reason of founding that relation. But the relation of agent to patient is in the agent subjectively. Therefore in it is also the reason of founding that. This reason however is action. For therefore father, because he begot, fifth book of the **Metaphysics**.

Eleventh, either action denominates the agent by extrinsic denomination only or intrinsic. Not extrinsic, because everything which denominates something by extrinsic denomination, denominates a certain other by intrinsic denomination. It is clear of vision which denominates its object by extrinsic denomination "seen," and by intrinsic denominates the subject "seeing." Nor anywhere is an instance found, unless it be instanced in the purpose, which is not allowed. It is asked therefore, what action denominates intrinsically. For it is established that not the patient, because the patient is not called agent. Nor can be given, what other it denominate intrinsically besides the agent. Therefore it is left that not by extrinsic but by intrinsic denomination it denominates the agent, and consequently is in it subjectively.

Twelfth, every form gives some being formally to its subject. Action does not give some being formally to the patient. Therefore the patient is not its subject, therefore it is in the agent. The minor is clear. Because it does not give to it to be agent, is clear; nor to be patient, because that is proper to passion. For this seems to be the authority of the **Commentator** in the eighth book of the **Metaphysics**, comment 5, where he says that "the action of the form of fire, which follows the form of fire, is heat mostly and

motion to upward. Heat therefore in fire is just as cutting in a knife, and the action of the hand in the hand."

(To the reasons against the first and second conclusion)

I respond to these. To the **first** when it is said that "it follows that action would become by an agent," I concede that consequent just as **Gregory Nazianzen** and **Damascene** concede, as was alleged for the first conclusion, and just as the **Commentator** also concedes, as was alleged above for the third.

And when it is further inferred that "of action there would be action," I deny the consequence. For of the thing which becomes there is not action, but it itself is action.

Then to those which are against the **second conclusion**. To the **first** concede the major. And to the minor I say first that he manifestly contradicts himself arguing thus. For in the same question article 2 solving the reason of another doctor, proving action not to be in the patient in which is passion, because "action and passion are opposite forms," he says that "action and passion in their realities are not opposed formally, but in their denominations. Since action denominates the agent from whom it goes out, passion indeed the effect which goes out." These are his words. Which, as is manifestly clear, contradict the aforesaid minor.

Second I say that that minor is simply false and its proof is nothing, since it is founded upon a certain fiction concerning those habitudes, which are nothing, as they imagine; but the act itself of the agent which is the same as that of the patient, is action and passion: Action, insofar as it is the act of the agent or active power—which otherwise sometimes is expressed by this that is said "as it is **from** this" namely from the agent, for therefore it is the act of the agent because it is from it—it is however passion, as it is the act of the passive power, which therefore is its act because **in** it.

To the **confirmation** from the saying of the **Commentator** it must be said that, when the Commentator says that the same action in respect of the mover is called "**to move**" and in respect of the moved is called "**to be moved**" and adds: "and they are greatly opposite," he did not say "and to move and to be moved are greatly opposite." And if he had said, he would not have taken those terms nominally and according to personal supposition, so that it be signified by that sentence, that that thing which is called "to move" and that which is called "to be moved" would be greatly opposite, just as the argument intends to have from him. For if he had understood thus, he would have contradicted himself there, since he says that the **same** action is called "to move" and "to be moved"; but "the same" is not "opposite things."

I say therefore that, when he says "and they are greatly opposite," either he refers his intention to those, with respect to which is said "to move" and "to be moved," and then the sentence ought to be supplied adding thus the subject to the verb: and **mover** and **moved** are greatly opposite. And this the Philosopher and Commentator say frequently in the Physics. Which saying, of what opposition or of what movers and moved things it is to be understood, elsewhere will be able to be declared more pertinently.

Or the sentence can also be supplied thus: and "**to move**" and "**to be moved**" are greatly opposite. And then those infinitives stand verbally and it is denoted that the complex significates of the propositions enunciating "something to move" and "that to be moved" are opposite, just as the **Philosopher** After the Predicaments in the chapter *On Opposites* says that to be deprived and to have a habit are opposite, nor are to be deprived and to have a habit habit and privation, and each opposition is reduced to the same genus of opposition. Similarly, that the significates of contradictory propositions are opposite in the same mode of opposition. And below in the same way he says that contraries also are said according to complexion, as Socrates to be healthy and Socrates to be sick. Thus in the purpose the Commentator says that for something to move and it to be moved, or it to act and it to suffer, or to be agent and patient are opposite, just as also it would be said that to be father and to be son are opposite. Nor nevertheless is it to be understood that such significatively taken suppose for some entities, just as in the First [Book] was frequently said.

Whence although the mover be some entity and similarly the moved, nevertheless for something to be moving is not some entity nor for something to be moved, just as neither for Socrates to sit or to be sitting—which is signified by this "Socrates sits"—is some entity, nor for Socrates not to sit or what is the same not to be sitting—which is signified by this "Socrates does not sit," and according to the **Philosopher** is opposed to "Socrates to be sitting"—is some entity.

The Commentator could also be expounded thirdly, so that these infinitives would suppose materially for their indicatives or their participles. And thus by the saying of the Commentator would be signified, those terms "is moved" and "moves" or these "mover" and "moved" to be opposite in that way in which opposite terms are accustomed to be called. Which exposition could be accepted well enough from that verb "is called" [dicitur] which is posited there.

And any of these expositions I believe well enough good and according to the mind of the Commentator. The second however pleases more. According to none however is it had that the entity which is action, to that which is passion, be opposite, as the argument intended.

To the **second** it must be said that "some things to be the same according to subject and different according to quiddity," can be understood in two ways, according as both subject and quiddity can be taken in two ways. For in one way subject is accepted for the subject of information or what is informed by some form; and quiddity is accepted in one way for the essence itself which the definition explains. And these names accepted thus the sense of the proposition would be: Whatever are diverse essences existing in the same subject, are really distinguished. And thus I concede it, and I deny the minor in the same sense.

In another way subject is accepted for the **subject of predication**, and quiddity for the **definition** itself, whether it be saying the quid rei, or quid nominis. And then the sense of the proposition is that, whatever things are said of the same subject (which properly is understood of terms only), and their definitions are diverse, those are distinguished really, that is suppose for distinct things. Then the proposition is false, and the minor in the same sense is true. And thus that is the sense which the Commentator had; for he wills that those names "action" and "passion" significatively taken be verified of a pronoun demonstrating the same thing in number, and therefore he adds that "they are the same according to subject." Because nevertheless according to one reason and another—for according as that thing is the act of the active

insofar as such, of it or for it is verified this name "action"; and according as it is the act of the passive insofar as such, is verified this name "passion"—and those definitions, although they belong to the same, are nevertheless diverse, therefore he says that "they differ according to quiddity." And this mode of speaking in this sense is used well enough by him, as is established to those, who have seen his sayings.

To the **third** it must be said that the Philosopher therefore says that "they are not the same properly," because they are not the same by reason and definition. But nevertheless the motion, to which these names (namely "action" and "passion") belong not indeed by information but by predication, is the same in number. So that he is not against, but for.

And that he understands thus, is clear by the proof of his saying, which he immediately subjoins. For he speaks thus: "For that of this in this and that of this from this act to be is other in reason." But to be of this from this and to be the act of this in this he says belong to the same motion, and it is true. Thus therefore he maintains that the same motion is action and passion, according nevertheless to one and another reason each is said.

To the **fourth** it must be said that the Philosopher is falsely alleged, since nowhere there does he posit those words or even their sentence, but well his sentence is that that negative is immediate, whose predicate is universally denied of the subject, and of no superior of the subject is denied universally. And he exemplifies in general terms namely letters. Such an immediate however is found from terms of the same predicament. Whence, just as **Averroes** says there and it is true, this is immediate "no ass is rational" and at the same time this is immediate "no man is irrational." Perhaps however also some can be immediate, in which one most general genus is universally denied of another, just as this "no substance is quality"; not nevertheless every one, in which one most general genus is universally denied of another, is immediate, rather indeed neither true.

To the **fifth**, since the conclusion is indefinite, it can be conceded, so nevertheless that action suppose for some action, which is not passion, for example that which is of an agent, which does not act into a patient, as was said in the **second conclusion**.

But if we speak precisely of the action of an agent which acts into a patient, I concede the major properly taken, and I deny the minor. For although the predicaments of action and passion are distinct, nevertheless every thing, which is action, is in the predicament of action and in the predicament of passion. And every thing, which is passion, is in the predicament of passion and in the predicament of action. And therefore action and passion are not distinguished predicamentally, but the same thing, which is action and passion, is in **diverse predicaments** in that mode in which a thing, which is not a sign, is said to be in a predicament.

(To the reasons against the third conclusion)

To the arguments which were made against the third conclusion, it remains to respond.

To the **first** of which, although it suffer defect in form, going nevertheless to the difficulty which it intends, I say that, if now in an instant some fire were generated, now indeed is fire begotten, and the action of the generating itself which is not other than the begotten fire itself or the form of it. And I say

that just as it is impossible for this begotten fire to cease to be, this same fire not ceasing to be, so it is impossible for this action of the one generating this fire to cease to be, this fire not ceasing to be. It is possible nevertheless both for this fire and this action to cease to be action, this fire and this action also not ceasing to be. Whence this action after this instant will be and will be fire, but it will not be action. And the reason is, because for this that some be action, is required that it be actually from an active [principle], and that be its cause. Otherwise it would not be the act of it insofar as such, and consequently neither action.

And this also the **Philosopher** wished to note in the third book of the **Physics** when he says that the act of the agent is "in a certain other and not cut off, but of this in this." And the text of the comment has: "But is from this in this," where the **Commentator** in comment 20 expounding says: "And we do not say that the action of the agent is in the patient, according as it is cut off from the agent. Since, if this were, it would not be of the agent. But according as it is continuous from this in this that is from the agent in the patient." Thus the Commentator.

And because after that instant that thing, which now is action, will not be from that generator, it, although it will be truly in the nature of things, will not however be action and consequently neither will this fire be generated afterwards nor will the generator generate it.

To the **other proof** of the minor of the aforesaid reason I concede God can that, and that in the given case He alone will maintain the ray. And when it is inferred that "the habitude imported by 'to be from the sun', and by this the action of the sun, will pass according to the thing," I say that no thing in the world, whether it be called habitude or anything else, will pass or cease to be, but the same thing itself which is now from the sun and is a habitude or relation to the sun, will be afterwards, but will not be from the sun nor will be a habitude to the sun such namely which be called the action of the sun, but will be from God and will be the action of God.

And further I say that it is too puerile and rude a thought to imagine, when it is said "the ray is from the sun," that some thing is signified by that preposition "from" distinct from the ray and from the sun, since the preposition itself is a pure **syncategorem** and signifying nothing according to itself. Nor less rude would it be to say that not by that preposition "from" is signified such a middle habitude, but by that whole sentence, just as from the first book in several places is clear, and a little above I recalled.

And furthermore these have to concede this itself. For supposing that there be such a **middle habitude** of the ray from the sun which they call action, it is established that that according to them is also from the sun. Whence also in the solution of that reason of the other doctor, of which above I made mention, they say that "both action and passion is from the agent," and again that action goes out from the agent. And if they had never said this, this is true that every entity which is in the world, whether great or small, is from God. If therefore by "from" or by "to be from this or from that" some middle thing is imported, therefore beyond that habitude there is a habitude. And it is established that that is not less from the agent than the first. And consequently still beyond it is another, and so to infinity.

Furthermore from that theological maxim which they assume, if action be such a thing from an agent, God will be able to preserve immediately by Himself alone that action, by which the ray is from the sun. And then neither the ray nor that habitude will be from the sun. And yet that habitude and that ray will be.

It is necessary therefore for them also to concede that something, which is from another, can be and not be from that, without some thing great or small ceasing to be.

Furthermore, if there be such a distinct habitude, God will be able to co-act with the sun for the causation of the ray, not co-acting with the sun or any other for the causation of that habitude, nor causing that by Himself, which being posited, still the ray will be from the sun—otherwise the sun would not produce it—and there will be no such middle habitude.

Furthermore, according to the same arguer in the reason immediately after to be solved, the thing, which is produced, depends on its action in the order of **effective causality**. Therefore by the maxim now assumed by him God will be able to produce the thing immediately without such action, and then it is established that that thing will be from God, and there will not be such a fictive habitude imported by "from." By this the solution also to the following proof is clear.

To the **confirmation** indeed I say that, if God had not suspended the action of the sun, it would be said that the ray was from the sun, because the sun certainly would be the cause and principle of it, so that, if the sun were not nor God acted otherwise, others being posited, the ray would not be. In the posited case however the ray is not said to be from the sun, because the others having themselves as now is posited in the case, granted that the sun were not, still the ray would be, and by this the sun is not its cause. Whence also I ask of the one arguing thus: In the posited case, since there is the ray and there is the sun, why is the habitude, by which the ray be said to be from the sun, not in the ray, just as in it is the habitude, by which it is said to be from God? I think that he will not be able to respond otherwise except because God is the principle and cause of the ray, and not the sun.

To the **last confirmation** I deny the minor. For I say that the entities of the ray and sun and God suffice for the truth of this "ray is from the sun," nor is any other opportune. Not however always those being posited is that proposition true, but then only, when the sun is the cause of the ray or when the ray is; and the rest uniformly having themselves and acting or not acting, if the sun were not, the ray would not be. And for this also see what I said in the First [Book] distinction 17 question 1 in solving the third objection against the first conclusion of the second article.

To the **second reason** against the aforesaid conclusion I respond by denying the minor.

To the **third** it must be said that, if **successive** action is accepted, that can be conceded [to be] a "way," just as also motion is called a way, although transumptively. And thus it is not argued against, but for, as is clear in the response to the eighth objection of the preceding question. If indeed sudden action is accepted, or which becomes all at once, the minor is simply to be denied, and similarly the minor of the fourth reason is to be denied.

To the **fifth**, first the argument can be reduced against the arguer, asking: Since that habitude, which he posits middle, is said to be from the agent, according to him, what does he say? Either the habitude itself and the agent only, or something else etc.; and totally it proceeds against him. I say therefore, just as he also (unless he posits an infinity of such habitudes) is forced to say, that precisely the ray and the sun are signified, understanding precisely that no other entity is imported by them. It is consigned nevertheless with this, that, if the rest uniformly acted or did not act, and the sun were not, that ray would not be. It is

not consigned however equally, that, if the ray were not, the sun would not be. And therefore the sun is not said to be from the ray, but conversely.

And by this it is clear to the **sixth**, which also could be reduced against him, concerning that habitude which he posits. Furthermore it is established that every entity, which is in the nature of things, great or small, exists "**through**" God as through its preserver; and certainly, if concerning this preposition "from" it is asked, what it signifies or consignifies, and one wishes to conclude that it imports some thing according to itself which is not imported through some categorematic diction, not less will it be necessary to say that also that preposition "through" signifies some such thing. And it is established that that [thing] will be also preserved "through" God as dependent on Him, and consequently that other "through" will signify another. And because there will not be an end in the "through," there will not be a number of such things. Therefore such an irrational imagination concerning syncategorematic dictions is to be driven away.

(To the reason against the fourth conclusion)

To that, which against the **fourth conclusion** is argued from the saying of the Author of the **Six Principles**, it must be said that the Author accepts "to be in" not by real information, as the argument takes, but by predication. Which is manifestly clear: Both because immediately thus he premises: "But it must be known that everything, which is in motion, is action." And he proves: "For to be moved is action." Behold that therefore he says action is in motion, because to be moved is action. Both because immediately after he said: "Therefore every action is in motion," immediately he adds: "And every motion will be firmed in action." And similarly when he said: "It is proper to action to be in motion," immediately he subjoined: "Just as it is proper to motion to be in action." It is established however that these cannot be understood of "to be in" by information, because, if in this way every action is in motion, not every motion is in action. Otherwise either it would be necessary that one action being given, at once infinite distinct motions and infinite actions be given; or it would be necessary that some motion and some action reciprocally be in themselves, one namely in the other by information and conversely, which no one of sound mind would say. He understands therefore that "every action is in motion" by predication; and "every motion in action," because namely every motion is action according to him, and every action is motion.

He accepts action however not so universally, as I spoke of it in the **fourth conclusion**, but specially for that which is not conservation, and which is the act of an agent which acts that into a patient. And similarly he does not accept motion universally, but for that only, whose part not only after part is acquired to the mobile, but also becomes. And from this it is clear that his saying is not against the other part of the said conclusion.

(To the reasons against the fifth conclusion)

Now to those things which were argued against the **fifth conclusion** it is consequently to be responded.

To the **first** it must be said that the **formal effect** of something can be accepted in two ways: In one way for the caused of the form, and thus it is nothing other than the matter itself or subject which it informs, or the composite which consists of the form itself. Speaking thus of formal effect, whatever be of the major—for in some sense it would be to be conceded, in some not—the minor simply is to be denied. For the agent neither is the matter of its action nor is composed of it.

In another way formal effect can be accepted, although very improperly, for the **denomination** of the subject by something. And then the sense of the major is that it is impossible for something to be denominated such by something, unless that be subjectively in it. And in this sense I say that the major is false. For it is clear that vision, by which a wall is seen, is not in the wall, yet by it it is denominated and called seen.

To the **second** it must be said that, if we speak of an agent which is only agent and not patient, the minor is false. For although action be a perfection and be of the agent, it is not nevertheless a perfection perfecting the agent itself. For the heating of the sun does not perfect the sun itself, but that which becomes hot. It is nevertheless a **sign** of the perfection of the sun. And thus every action is a sign of the perfection of the agent. For from the fact that it acts, some perfection of the agent is argued.

To the **third**, if **crucifixion** is accepted for the fixing of the body of Christ on the cross, properly speaking it is nowhere subjectively, because crucifixion is not some thing according to itself distinct from the body which is fixed and that to which it is fixed. If nevertheless it were posited that there were some such thing existing somewhere subjectively, I know not what madman would say that was in the crucifying Jews, and not rather in the body of Christ or on the cross.

Concerning **blasphemy** however it must be said that it was there, where the blasphemy was. And it is established indeed that mental blasphemy was not in Christ, but in the impious hearts of the Jews. Vocal also was not in Christ, but rather in the air in which the voice was formed. And therefore it is clear that the consequence as to each part of the consequent can be denied. Positing nevertheless that crucifixion had been in Christ, it would be to be said to the proof of the falsity of the consequent—supposing that exterior action be a sin, of which in its place will be seen—that that crucifixion was a sin, but was not the sin of Christ but of the Jews. For such actions, if they be conceded to be sins, are not understood rightly to be sins of those in whom they are received, but of those by whom they are acted. And this is what others wish to say, when they say that crucifixion was in Christ **subjectively** and in the Jews **imputatively**.

To the **fourth** it must be said that the minor is false.

To the **fifth** it must be said that, although every form denominate its subject, it does not nevertheless denominate it according to every name of the form itself, for example the form which is doctrine, as the **Philosopher** says in the third book of the **Physics**, is in the learner, and yet it does not denominate him according to this name "doctrine," because he is not called "teaching" [docens], but it denominates him according to another name of the same namely "discipline." And therefore he is called "disciple" or "learning." So I say that the form, which is action, denominates certainly that in which it is according to some name of it, for example according to this name "passion" or "light" or another such agreeing to it according as it is in it, not however according to this name "action" or "agency," because it does not agree

to it, except insofar as it is from another, and by this also according to this name it denominates that from which it is, and that is called **agent**.

To the **sixth** I concede that "of whom is the potency, of him is the act." And further I concede that action is the act of the agent. It does not follow nevertheless that it be of it as of a subject and passive power, but it is of it as of an **active principle**. And this therefore because the power of the agent is active power, which is not insofar as such susceptible of act, but elicitive and productive.

To the **seventh** I say that the **Philosopher** not therefore says that He would be changed, because a new action would be in Him, but therefore because he thought that He would not act anew except on account of a new disposition or new will which He would have for acting, since before He did not act, as is clear through the **Commentator** there in comment 15, who founds almost his whole error there upon this root.

To the **eighth** I say that in that case there would be two actions, nor is it inconvenient for there to be two or more actions of the same agent in diverse patients. And, what the argument does not ask, I say that conversely, if two fires were heating the same heatable first (for instance because those fires were in the same place first by divine virtue and one heat in number were produced by them), of both there would be **one action** as of one total agent.

To the **ninth** I deny the minor. To the proof I say that not therefore can the same not be father of himself or son or even of one other father and son, because generation action and generation passion cannot be in the same, but because the same cannot be from whom is generation, and who is generated; nor can the same be from whom is generated he from whom he himself is generated.

To the **tenth** I say that it proceeds more strongly against its maker. For not less, rather more inconvenient seems that a relation be in something, and the **reason of founding** be not in the nature of things, than if it be in another. Now however in the father according to these is founded paternity, and the generation by which he begot is the reason of founding. And according to them that generation, although it was, now nevertheless is not, just as neither he generates now nor his son is generated. I say nevertheless to the argument that generation is not the reason of founding a relation of this kind properly speaking, but well is it true that, because this one begot and from him was the generation of this one, therefore this one is the father of this one.

To the **eleventh** it must be said that it denominates the agent by **extrinsic denomination** according to the customary mode of speaking. And to the ulterior process of the argument it must be said, just as was said to the fourth [fifth] against this same conclusion.

And by the same it must be responded to the **twelfth**. To the authority of the comment, which is introduced last, it must be said that the **Commentator** and **Philosopher** also use this name "action" equivocally.

For sometimes with them this name "action" signifies the same as these names "**act**" or "**form**." Whence soon enough after, according to the translation of the comment, the **Philosopher** says: "Of every matter the action is other from the action of other matter," and according to the translation which we use he says: "The act is other of other matter." And the **Commentator** there expounding in comment 6 says: "And that, which is in act in every matter and is its form, is other from that which is in act in other matter."

Sometimes action is accepted for the **principle of acting** or active power. Whence in the ninth book of the **Metaphysics**, where the **Philosopher** says that active power is in the maker as heat in the calefactive and edificative (that is the art of building) in the edificative (that is builder or carpenter according to the text of the comment), the **Commentator** says expounding in comment 2 thus: "That is, the action of the carpenter's art is in the carpenter and the action of the builder's art is in the builder." It is clear however that, if that exposition ought to be to the purpose, there the action of the art is accepted for the art itself, so that there be an intransitive construction. And furthermore that he accepted thus is clear from that which follows without medium. For it follows thus: "Then he says," namely Aristotle, "and therefore they are at once'," that is says the Commentator, "and because some of active powers are in the agent, therefore it is necessary that the agent act nothing until it be at once with the patient, that is in the same place." Thus he.

Sometimes indeed action is accepted for the **operation** and **act** of active power, as was said above, and sometimes in other modes.

Now to the purpose I say that the **Commentator** accepts action, in the alleged authority, in one of the two first modes or both. And his intention is that maximum heat is the act or form and active principle following the substantial form of fire. And this agrees much with the sentence of which immediately he spoke. And in a similar way he accepts the cutting of a knife for the sharpness or principle of cutting, whatever that be in the knife, and the action of the hand for the principle by which the hand acts, not however does he accept action in the third mode, and as the present question is concerning action.

To the **principal argument** of the question, for as much as it argues action to be distinguished from the thing which becomes, the response is clear from the things said above. To the authority from the book of the **Six Principles**, by which is proved that it is distinguished from passion, it must be said that that Author does not therefore say that "passion is the effect of action," because it be effected by it, just as a thing is effected by its effective cause, but because from the fact that something acts—speaking of action, just as he speaks namely that it demands into what the agent act—causally, it is inferred that that suffers into which it acts. And although conversely from the fact that something suffers, it be inferred that something acts into it, because nevertheless it is not inferred causally, therefore he says passion is the **effect** and **illation** of action; and does not say conversely, although according to the same mode of speaking it could also be said that action is the illation of passion, not however effect. For it is clear that, although it follow "this wood suffers or becomes hot, therefore something acts into this wood and something heats it," not however is this causal [proposition] "because this wood becomes hot, something heats it" true, just as this is true "because something heats this wood, this wood becomes hot." And on account of this causal illation he says that "passion is the effect and illation of action," according to his customary improper mode of speaking in that whole book.

QUESTION 6

WHETHER creation and conservation are entities distinct between themselves and from the thing which God creates or preserves.

Addition 6: Last as to this distinction I ask, whether creation and conservation are entities distinct between themselves and from the thing which God creates or preserves.

And it is argued that **yes**. And because the judgment as to this is the same of all things, I show that the creation of this demonstrated thing (for example of this angel) is a thing distinct from this angel and from its conservation, and I argue thus: This angel, and similarly its creation, was before its conservation was. And this angel did not cease, when its creation ceased. Therefore this angel is an entity distinct from its conservation and from its creation; and similarly its creation from its conservation. The consequence seems to hold from the fact that it is impossible for some entity to have been, before it was, or at once to have ceased and not to have ceased. The antecedent as to the first part is proved. For this angel was in the first instant in which he was, and similarly his creation. But in that instant his conservation was not, for conservation is the continuation of a thing in being. But everything, which is continued, was before.

As to the second part also it is proved. For the creation of this angel was in the first instant, in which this angel was and immediately after was not, just as this angel in the first instant of his being was created and immediately after was not created. For creation properly taken is the production of a thing which neither even anything of it was immediately before. But this angel immediately after the first instant of his being was. Therefore he did not cease at once with his creation.

To the **opposite**, action and conservation of a thing, which a created agent acts or preserves, are not entities distinct between themselves and from the thing, which it preserves or acts. Therefore neither creation nor conservation are distinct entities between themselves and from the thing, which God preserves or creates. The consequence is clear enough and the antecedent proved from the things said in the preceding question. For there it was proved that the thing, which becomes, is the action itself of the agent. And by some of the same reasons it can be proved that the conservation of the agent preserving the thing, which it produced, is the thing itself which is preserved.

For the understanding of this question I premise some **distinctions**:

First is that this term "**to create**" can be expounded in two ways, just as above concerning "to be created" was said in question 4. In one way "to create" that is to make something from nothing. In another way that is to make something **first** from nothing or to make something from nothing, which immediately before was not. In the first way "to create" is not accepted as it is distinguished against "**to preserve**," rather indeed even something which God preserves (for example an existing angel), He also creates according to this signification. For He makes it as long as it is, just as in the pre-alleged question was touched and more diffusely in the first book distinction 45, and He makes it also from nothing. Since therefore doctors speak of "to create" distinguishing it against "to preserve," they accept this term according to the second definition. And so in the present question I will use it, and similarly this term "to be created" correspondently, so that to be created signify the same as for something, which immediately before was not, to become from nothing.

To preserve however according to doctors commonly is the same as to continue or hold in being a thing made, or which immediately before was. And in this signification I accept it in the purpose.

Second distinction is that just as this name "**action**" is accepted sometimes for active power, sometimes for the act or operation of active power, as was said in the preceding question, so this name "**creation**" can be accepted for creative power itself; and this name "**conservation**" for conservative power or principle. And "creation" can be accepted in the second way for the **act** or **operation** of creative power,

and similarly "conservation" can be accepted for the operation of conservative power. In the first way these terms are not taken in the purpose, but in the second.

Third distinction is that it happens for something to be created **per se subsisting** and not in another, for example an angel or even any other thing, which God would create not in some subject. And it happens also for something to be created **in some subject**, just as according to doctors grace is created in the human or rational soul, and the rational soul in the body.

ARTICLE 1

[Six conclusions]

These things being premised I posit to the purpose six conclusions: **First** is that **creation**, supposing that God creates something, is an entity distinct from God. And similarly **conservation** is an entity distinct from God. **Second**, that no thing is created by God by a creation distinct from itself. **Third**, that no thing is preserved by God by a conservation distinct from itself. **Fourth**, that no creation is conservation nor any conservation is creation. **Fifth**, that some creation is **passion**, and some is not passion; every creation however is **action**. And lest calumny arise, saying that now there is not some creation or at least it is not established to us that there is any, just as neither is it established that in this present instant He creates something, let this term "is" be accepted for "happens" or in the aforesaid locutions let it be supposed God to create something or some things actually, and thus through the whole following process of the question let such propositions be understood. **Sixth conclusion** is that some conservation is **passion** and some not; every [conservation] however is **action**.

[First conclusion proved]

The **first conclusion** is proved, because everything, of which creative power insofar as such is the principle, is an entity distinct from God. It is clear. But creative power insofar as such is the principle of creation, therefore etc. The minor is proved, because every active power insofar as such is the principle of its act or operation, just as also every transmutative active [power] of its transmutation and factive of its making.

Second, every operation not coeternal to God existing from the will of God is an entity distinct from God. It is clear. But creation is such, **Damascene** saying in book 1 chapter 9: "Creation is a work existing from the will of God and is not coeternal to God."

In the same way it is proved that **conservation** is an entity distinct from God, because, just as creation is the act of creative power, so conservation is the act of conservative power. And conservative power insofar as such is its principle.

[Second conclusion proved]

The **second conclusion** is proved: **First**, because, if some thing is created by a creation distinct from itself, let that be for example an angel, either therefore the creation of the angel is created by God by

another creation distinct from itself, or not by another creation distinct from itself. This is clear, because every entity, which is not God, is made by God, as was sufficiently proved in distinction 45 of the first book. Therefore this creation, if it is an entity other than the angel, since also it is distinct from God, is made by God. And it is established also according to those opining that it becomes from nothing just as the angel himself, and that also immediately before it was not. Therefore it is created. And if so, either by another creation, or not by another. If by another, by the same reason also that other is created by another creation, and so to infinity. If not by another, by the same reason neither the angel, because, by what reason one entity is created without such a distinct creation, the same and any, since no reason nor authority compels more concerning one than concerning any other.

It is confirmed, because superfluously and without reason it is posited in something that its creation be distinguished from it, since something is created without a creation distinct from itself. Nor does evidence or any reason or authority, to which must be stood, compel more in one to that than in another.

Second, it is established that God can repair the same entity in number corrupted or annihilated and place it in the same subject, in which it was before, if it were in some before. Since not more in one instant is it repugnant to some subject to be informed by one form than in another. If therefore the creation of the angel **Michael** was such a certain thing existing then only, when Michael was first created, God can recreate that same in number in some present or future instant in Michael himself, whom I suppose to be, and, from when he was created, always to have been and to be about to be. In that instant it will be true to say "Michael is created." But it follows "Michael is created, therefore Michael immediately before was not." But it is posited that he was, therefore he was and was not.

Third, either God can create some thing without a creation distinct from that thing, or not. If yes, since no authority or experience is had through which it can be known that He create some [thing] by means of a distinct creation, and consequently neither also any reason, since the opposite is possible—for every such would proceed either by experience or authority—it follows that irrationally is posited ever such a superfluous multitude of things.

If indeed He cannot without such a middle thing—since it is not intrinsic to the thing which is created—either it will be its effect naturally consequent, or an accident inhering in it, or in some way per se an extrinsic cause of it. For it does not appear, by what other reason that thing cannot be created without this.

But not the first, because God can impede the effect of every secondary cause. It is clear of the fire of the three boys. Nor the second, because God can make that without any accident of the thing. Just as from the intention of **Augustine** can be had in the epistle *To Consentius*, where he says that "divine power is strong enough to take away from that visible and tractable nature of bodies qualities which He wishes, some remaining." Whence He could make fire without heat. And just as of these so of other accidents with respect to their subjects it is to be felt. Furthermore He can make accident without subject, therefore conversely. Nor the third, because He can make the effect of every secondary cause without it, as is commonly conceded and the Parisian article 63 says.

Addition 15: Fourth it follows that God can create an angel without creation and consequently create by not creating, which implies a contradiction. The consequence is clear, because, if creation is a thing

distinct from the angel nor an intrinsic part of him, since God can make an angel just as any other thing without any other thing which is not part of him, whether it be his accident or his cause or whatever it be, as is clear through the article on omnipotence, God will be able to make an angel without his creation. Since therefore He will make him from nothing, who immediately before will not have been, He will create him. But because it is not possible for God to create without creation, He will not create him, therefore He will create by not creating. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

[Third conclusion proved]

The **third conclusion** is proved **first** because, if an angel were preserved by a conservation distinct from himself, since every thing, which is not God, is preserved by God, as was proved in distinction 45 of the First [Book], either that conservation is preserved by God by a conservation distinct from itself, and so another also to infinity, or is preserved without another conservation, and by the same reason the angel himself.

Second, if conservation be a thing distinct from the angel, since God needs no other from Himself for the conservation of any thing and can make any and continue in being without any other from it and any intrinsic of it and distinct from God, it follows that God can preserve the angel without conservation, and thus He will preserve by not preserving.

Third, a created agent preserves its effect without a conservation distinct from it. Therefore much more God. I prove the assumption and I take for the sake of example a body which causes and preserves its image in a mirror or species in the eye. And I suppose that every effect of the genus of permanent things naturally produced by a created agent, whether it be produced suddenly or successively, even if nothing of it be first produced, it nevertheless in some instant has being first. And this is certain and commonly conceded. I suppose also from the sayings that no thing is preserved in the first instant of its being.

Let the given effect be A. If its conservation is an entity distinct from it, it is not in the first instant of the being of A. Either therefore after that instant it will become partly, or all at once. If **all at once**, therefore in some instant after the first instant of being A it will have being first, and consequently through the whole middle time A was preserved by its created agent without a middle conservation. From which further it follows that also afterwards it is not to be posited. If indeed it be not produced all at once, but **part after part**, either therefore every one of those parts is conservation, or not, but all at once, as if conservation itself were a certain heterogeneous whole. If it be said in the second way, it follows just as before, that through some time namely through that which precedes the instant in which conservation is first perfected, A will have been without conservation.

If however it be said in the **first way**, it follows that conservation essentially is intended [intensified] and receives more and less and consequently that something can be more intensely and more remissly preserved; and more remissly indeed by a more remiss conservation, and more intensely by a more intense. But the opposite of this totally follows in the purpose because not otherwise can something be understood to be more intensely or more preserved unless because it is continued longer in being. It is established however that A will be continued longer by one part of its conservation as for instance by the first made, than by the whole. For through the whole time, in which it will be after the complete creation

of its conservation, it will be preserved by that part, and beyond this through that time preceding the creation of the whole and following the creation of the part.

Addition 16: And because that first less and afterwards more is preserved, just as a subject, whose whiteness is intended [intensified], first is less white and afterwards more white. But this is not intelligible since, since to be preserved is nothing other than to be maintained or continued in being, not otherwise can be understood that A first less and afterwards more be preserved, unless that first less and afterwards more or longer it be maintained, so that the **intension of conservation** and the **protension of duration**, speaking to a good understanding, be correspondently divided.

And that is not intelligible, because through every intensive part of conservation always the angel will be preserved as long as he will be. Therefore not longer through the whole conservation than through its part. The assumption is clear: Both because every part of that conservation will always be in him. And because, if he will not endure always through however great a part of conservation, therefore through a finite and determined some measure of duration. And since the whole conservation contains precisely finite parts equal to however great a part taken, it follows that through the whole conservation he will not endure perpetually, but precisely through so many times as much duration, as are such parts. But it is certain according to truth that the angel will endure perpetually.

Furthermore, if conservation is so intended, the substance of the angel not being intended nor varied in itself, it will be able also, the substance of the angel not being varied nor destroyed, at least by divine virtue, to be **remitted**. Rather certainly also totally consumed. And thus its conservation having regressed or even totally taken away, no less will the angel be continued in being and endure. Here follows the Ordinary Text.

[Fourth conclusion proved]

The **fourth conclusion** is proved thus: No thing, which is created, is preserved. Therefore no creation is conservation. The antecedent is clear, because from the opposite it follows that of the same thing it be at once true to say "this thing immediately before was" and "this thing immediately before was not," which are contradictory. For it follows "this thing is preserved, therefore this thing immediately before was." Similarly it follows "this thing is created, therefore this thing immediately before was not." Therefore if this thing is preserved and created, this thing immediately before was and immediately before was not. The consequence is proved, because if some creation were conservation, since every creation is the thing which is created, by the fact that every one be an entity distinct from God as is clear from the first conclusion, and no thing be created by a creation distinct from itself as is clear from the second, and similarly every conservation be the thing which is preserved as from the same conclusions similarly is clear, it would follow that some thing, which were created, would be preserved, which contradicts the antecedent.

Furthermore granted that creation were distinguished from the thing which is created, and conservation from the thing which is preserved, then every creation would be of a thing which is created, and conservation of a thing which is preserved. Therefore, if some creation were conservation, it would be the creation of a thing which were created, and the conservation of a thing which were preserved. And it is

established that it is not of another creation and of another conservation, therefore of the same. And thus the same thing would be created and preserved.

But the first proof of the consequence seems to be repugnant to the conclusion. For if creation is the thing itself which is created for example the angel himself, and similarly the conservation of the angel is the angel himself, it seems to follow that conservation be creation, both by that principle "whatever things are the same to one and the same, are the same to each other"; and by an **expository syllogism** arguing thus "this angel is creation, this angel is conservation, the same being demonstrated on both sides, it follows therefore conservation is creation."

To the **first** I concede that major to a good understanding. But the minor to be taken under, namely this "but creation and conservation are the same to the same for example to the angel," I deny. For the angel is not creation except when first he is, and then he is not conservation, just as neither then is he preserved but only after he was. And therefore, although the thing which was creation be conservation, or which is creation will be conservation, never nevertheless that which is creation is conservation. And therefore for no instant can this be true "creation and conservation are the same to the same."

To the **second** I say that the premises are never at once true. But when one is true, the remaining is false. And it is clear from the just said.

[Fifth conclusion proved]

The **fifth conclusion** as to the **first part** is proved, because some creation is the act of a passive insofar as it is passive, and some is not the act of a passive. Therefore some is passion, and some not. The consequence is proved from the things said in the preceding question. The first part of the antecedent is clear, when grace is created in the soul or something else received in another. The second part is clear in the creation of something per se subsisting.

The **second part** of the conclusion is proved, because every creation is the act of active power insofar as it is active. Therefore every creation is action. The antecedent is clear, because creative power insofar as such is truly active.

[Sixth conclusion proved]

The **sixth conclusion** is proved in a similar way. For the conservation of grace in the soul is passion, the conservation indeed of an angel is not passion. But because every conservation of God is the act of active power insofar as such, for the conservative power of an agent insofar as it is conservative is active, just as also the preserving agent itself, insofar as it preserves, acts. And I use the "insofar as" specifically; for a preserving agent by another reason is called preserving with respect to its effect, and by another reason a form is said to preserve its proper matter, just as the soul is said to preserve the body, in the second book of *On the Soul* through the **Philosopher** and in *On the Substance of the Orb* chapter 2 through the **Commentator**. Because therefore an agent does not preserve except by continuously producing or acting its effect, therefore, insofar as it preserves, it acts. And consequently such conservative power insofar as such is active.

ARTICLE 2

[Against the aforesaid conclusions]

Against the aforesaid and mostly against the second and third conclusions, besides some reasons made against the third conclusion of the preceding question which are also against the second of this, there are certain other reasons of the same doctor.

[Against the second conclusion]

Whence **first** against the **second conclusion** it is argued thus: Everything which is the efficient cause of something is an entity distinct from it. But creation is the efficient cause of the thing which is created. Therefore creation is a thing distinct from that which is created, and consequently a thing is created by a creation distinct from itself, whose opposite the second conclusion says. The major is known, the minor is proved.

First, because the whole being which the thing which is created (for example a stone) has from God, it has through creation. And therefore it has being from God, because it has being through creation. Therefore to the same genus of causality will be reduced "being through creation" and "being from God." But being from God is reduced to the genus of efficient cause, therefore also being through creation. And therefore this doctor says that, when it is said "a stone is created by creation," that ablative is held in the reason of efficient cause, not formal, as some have thought.

Second, because creation is nothing other than that which is imported by "to be from God effectively." But this "to be effectively" precedes the stone by causality of origin; the proof of which is, because not therefore the stone is from God or is created, because it is, but therefore the stone is, because it is created. But this is not, except because "its going out from God" is the cause to it that it be. Therefore what is signified by "to be from God" is prior to the stone, by priority of origin and causality; and it is established that of no other than efficient.

Third, because if God subtract His action, the creature will cede into nothing. Therefore the cause, why the creature was, was that action.

Second principally against the same conclusion: Creation is not created, therefore it is not the thing which is created. The consequence is clear, because everything, which is the thing which is created, is created. The antecedent is proved because otherwise creation would fall upon creation, and there would be a process to infinity in creations of creations.

Third it can be argued thus: It is impossible for creation to be preserved. But it is possible for the thing which is created to be preserved. Therefore the thing which is created, is not creation. The major is clear because, if creation were preserved, it would follow that it would be in some instant before which immediately it was. And since, whenever there is creation, something is created, it would be true to say then something is created which immediately before was, which implies a contradiction. The minor however is known. For it is possible that an angel, who is now created, supposing that some be now created, endure and be preserved by God even forever.

[Against the third conclusion]

Against the **third conclusion** it can be argued from the same foundations: **First** indeed, because the conservation or maintenance of a creature is its cause. Therefore it is distinguished from it. The assumption is proved: Both because the creature is preserved through the maintenance of God nor is preserved by God except through His maintenance. And because not therefore a thing is preserved, because it endures in being, but because it is preserved, therefore it endures. Therefore its being preserved is the cause of it that it be. And because, if God subtracted His maintenance, the creature would cede into nothing. Therefore maintenance is its cause.

Second, because it is impossible for conservation to be created or preserved. For if it could be preserved, an actual infinity of conservations would be possible. If indeed it could be created, it could be first in some instant, and consequently some thing could be preserved first in some instant. But this is false, since not in the instant in which it is created, because before that it was not; nor in another following, because no following one is first, and yet in every one it is preserved. But it is established that it is possible for a thing, which is preserved, to be preserved and created, since it can be annihilated, and again created and preserved.

Third against both conclusions. For commonly is said "creation of a stone" and "conservation of a stone," but it is not said "creation of creation" or "conservation of conservation." But this would not happen, unless both creation and conservation of a stone were something distinct in the stone.

(To the reasons against the second conclusion)

To the **first** I deny the minor. To the first proof, when it is said "a stone has being from God through creation," I say that, if the said proposition be taken according to propriety so that force be made in the words, as the one arguing thus does, it is simply false: Both because by it is denoted that "being" be a certain entity distinct from the stone which the stone has from God, just as we say "air has light from the sun," which indeed is false even according to this doctor. And because by it is denoted that creation be some entity through which the stone is from God, which certainly is false. And therefore taken in its propriety I deny it, nor is it to be accepted thus, if anywhere by any author it is written. If indeed it be taken as **improper**, and in place of this "a stone is created by God" or of this equivalent "a stone becomes by God from nothing, since immediately before it was not," it is true. And thus those understand it who feel rightly, nor from it thus accepted is drawn the ulterior deduction.

What indeed he adds "that, when it is said 'a stone is created by creation', that ablative is held in the reason of efficient cause, not formal," it must be said that in neither way according to the truth is it held nor even is that properly said, but it is a false proposition by the force of speech.

To the **second proof** it must be said that neither by "from" [a/ab] nor by "to be effectively from God" is imported any entity in the world, for which either "from" or this whole complex "to be from God effectively" can significantly suppose, as the argument imagines. For neither **syncategorematic dictions** nor **sentences** [orationes] can significantly suppose. And because upon this is founded the

argument, therefore it is nothing valid. I concede well nevertheless this causal [proposition] "therefore the stone is, because God creates it," referring this to the first instant of the being of the stone; and "because God preserves," referring to the following time. But from this it does not follow that creation is some middle thing, through which efficiently the stone has being. What also he says of the "going out of the stone" is an inanity fiction. For neither other is to be thought there than God creating and from whom it "goes out" according to the mode of speaking of these, and the stone created or which from God "goes out." And therefore the going out of the stone is not other than the stone going out. And therefore just as the stone going out is not the cause of itself, so neither its going out that is which is itself.

To the **third** I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence going to the force of the words. Whence I say that not therefore, if He subtracts action, the creature cedes into nothing, because the action of God is the cause of the creature, but because it itself is the creature itself.

This response is confirmed since according to what was proved above, and this doctor also concedes, the action itself of God is a thing distinct from God. Positing therefore that also it were the cause of the creature, still without it God could create and preserve the creature, since every thing which He can cause at once with another cause He can alone without it, just as this doctor and all theologians concede, and the article concerning the omnipotence of God orders to concede. Therefore not necessarily to the subtraction of the action of God does the creature cede into nothing, because it is the cause of the creature, but rather because it is that very creature. Nevertheless that common saying "if God subtracted His action etc." I do not think is to be understood as if it be signified some entity to be subtracted, which pre-existed, but as if it were said "if God did not act, creating namely or preserving the creature, that would cede into nothing." And from such a sense it is clear that the argument does not have process.

To the **second reason** I deny the antecedent. Nor is the proof valid, because neither creation nor the thing which is created, which is the same, is created by a creation distinct from itself, and therefore creation does not fall upon creation nor are creations multiplied to infinity. This however would follow, if the thing were created by a creation distinct from itself. And therefore that proof helps the principal purpose.

To the **third** it must be said that, if the major be taken in the **composite sense** and the minor in the **divided sense**, each is true. And thus proceed their proofs. But from them does not follow that conclusion of inherence, just as it does not follow: It is impossible for the sitting to stand; it is possible for him, who sits, to stand; therefore he who sits is not sitting. For the major in the composite sense is true and the minor in the divided sense, and yet the conclusion is false, supposing that there is someone who sits.

If indeed the major be taken in the **divided sense**, I deny it. Nor to this sense is the proof valid because, although creation can be preserved, this nevertheless is impossible "creation is preserved." And therefore when it is said "if creation were preserved, it would follow etc.," nothing to me concerning the consequence, because I do not give that antecedent. I say nevertheless this to be possible "this is preserved," demonstrating that for which this name "creation" supposes, when it is said "creation can be preserved." And further if it be posited true, I say that it is in some instant, before which immediately it was, but it is not in that instant creation. And therefore it does not follow that it be true then to say "something is created etc."

Item, if the minor be taken in the **composite sense**, it is false. Because this is impossible "the thing which is created is preserved," accepting these terms, as above in the beginning of the question was said. Its proof however proceeds to the divided sense.

(To the reasons against the third conclusion)

To that which is argued against the **third conclusion** it is clear what must be said from the premises. For it is to be denied that conservation is the cause of the creature, to the understanding of the arguer. Nor is the **first proof** valid, because accepted by the force of speech this is false "the creature is preserved through the maintenance of God." But this certainly is true "the creature is preserved by God maintaining"; and similarly this "the creature is maintained by God." And in place of these or one of them those who feel rightly posit that first one. And to the remaining two proofs similarly in their own way it must be said, just as was said of **creation**.

To the **second** it must be said that conservation can be preserved, not nevertheless is it proceeded to infinity, because it is not preserved by a conservation distinct from itself. Item I say that conservation can be created. This nevertheless is impossible "conservation creates."

To the **third** it must be said that that common saying to a true understanding is to be understood according to an **intransitive construction**, so that the sense be "creation of a stone that is creation which is a stone." And in this sense I use such propositions, if anywhere I posit them, nor nevertheless according to a similar construction is it usually said "creation of the creator," just as, although the essence of God be said intransitively, not nevertheless is said "essence of the essence," nor "God of God," nor ever to the rectum in such a way was accustomed to be added its oblique.

To the **principal reason** of the question I respond by denying first the **first part of the antecedent**. To the proof I say that in the first instant in which the angel was, the conservation of the angel also was, but it itself was not then **conservation**. And further I say that conservation is the continuation of a thing in being, that is the thing which is continued in being. And the thing which is continued in being was in the first instant in which it was, but not in that was it continued in being.

To the **second part of the antecedent**, although it could be conceded absolutely nor would any inconvenience follow, I say nevertheless that it can be accepted in two ways:

In **one way** as simply negative, so that this whole "he ceased, when his creation ceased" be understood to be denied of the subject, and thus I concede it, and I deny the consequence as to that which is inferred from it. Nor is the proof valid since it assumes that the creation of the angel ceased, which neither do I concede; nor from that antecedent simply negative does it follow.

In **another way** it can be accepted as **implicative** of this affirmative "creation ceased," so that it be accepted in place of this temporal [proposition] "when the creation of this angel ceased, this angel did not cease," and then I deny it on account of the falsity of that implicated affirmative.

To the proof I say that the creation of this angel was certainly in the first instant in which the angel was and also in the following, but in the first only was it **creation**. And therefore it ceased to be creation, not

nevertheless did it cease to be. And thus also the angel himself in the first instant was creation, and not after, although after he was. Whence this name "**creation**," although it does not signify a thing distinct from the thing which is created, for which it might suppose, but [signifies] the very same thing, connotes nevertheless the **agent itself** as the principle from whom it is; and with this it connotes that it be true to say that neither it nor anything of it immediately before was. And because all these things happen in the first instant only, therefore the angel only in the first instant is creation, and similarly in the first instant only creation is creation, and then only is this true "creation is." Because indeed for this that that thing be, the aforesaid are not required, nor for this that it be an angel or substance, therefore not from this that it ceases to be creation, does it cease to be substance or angel or simply to be.

DISTINCTION 2

ADDITIONAL QUESTION 1

WHETHER angels were created together with time, or before time, or after.

Addition 17: Regarding the second distinction, I ask first with the **Master**, whether angels were created together with time, or before time, or after.

And it is argued first, that they were created before. Because angels were not created after time, nor with time, therefore they were created before time. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved regarding the first part: because no corporal creature was created before a spiritual one, namely the angelic, as is clear in the text. Therefore, neither was time, since **time could not exist except in a corporal creature**. Regarding the second part, it is also proved: because no angel was created successively or partly, nor before another angel, and yet **time was created partly and successively**. Therefore, time was not created together with the angels. The antecedent is clear regarding the first part: because the substance of any angel is indivisible, and all angels were created together according to the saints. Regarding the second part, it is proved from the fact that the entity of time is essentially successive, having namely past and future parts succeeding one another, with none of which any other can exist. And consequently, no parts can be created together. The consequence is clear, because it is impossible for things to be made together, and yet one of them be made successively and the other entirely at once. Otherwise, since that which is made partly is made in time, and that which is made impartibly is made in an instant, it would follow that an **instant would be equal to time** and not be exceeded by it.

Second to the same point: Angels were created before the soul according to the at least more common opinion, which posits that man was created on the sixth day and not together with the angels, as is held below in distinction 12. Therefore, angels were created before time. This consequence is clear, because **time could not be before the soul existed**, as is clear through the **Philosopher** in the 4th book of the *Physics*, final chapter, where from the fact that time is a number, and number cannot exist without one who numbers—and "nothing," as he says, "is fit to number except the soul and the intellect of the soul"—he concludes that "**it is impossible for time to be if the soul is not.**"

Then it is proved that angels were created after time thus: Angels were created after they were not, therefore after time. The antecedent is clear, because angels did not always exist. At some time, therefore, they did not exist, and afterwards they were created. The consequence is clear, because "at some time not to have been" is the same as "in some time not to have been." There was, therefore, some time in which they were not. And it is certain that this was not after they were created, therefore it was before.

Third, it is proved that they were created together by the **Master** in the text.

To the opposite, it is proved that they were created neither before, nor after, nor together. And that they were created neither before nor after is sufficiently proved by the **Master** in the text. But that they were not created together, I prove: because if so, they would have been created together either because they were in the same instant or because they were in the same time. For it cannot otherwise be understood that they are "together" according to duration, as we are speaking here of before, after, and together. Because they are not together by eternity, since neither angels nor time are eternal beings, whose being alone is measured by eternity. But it cannot be said that they were in the same instant or time, because **time cannot be made in time nor in an instant**, otherwise there would be a time of time, and time would be measured by an instant or a time. Likewise, not in an instant, because time cannot be made indivisibly and all at once. Nor in time, because angels cannot be made partibly and successively.

In this question, it is necessary first to see concerning the entity of time itself, or for what entity this name "time" stands. And then concerning what is asked.

ARTICLE 1

(The Acceptance of Time)

For the first article, I premise one distinction concerning the acceptance of time. For in one way, speaking conformably to the saints and philosophers, **time is sometimes taken for the delay or duration of moving or resting**, and also of the existing of mutable things and things not necessarily existing; according to which mode we say that one thing moved or rested or even was and endured for a longer time than another, and conversely another for less time, and some equally.

In another way, time can be taken for some measure or for something by which the delay of motion and rest can be properly measured—that is, through which we can be certified and know how long something was moving or resting or enduring.

(Three Conclusions)

Now I posit some conclusions. And because the opinion of many is that time is a certain successive thing and continuously flowing, distinct from all and every permanent thing, having parts of which none can exist together—while an instant is a certain indivisible thing, also not permanent, but passing rapidly according to the imagination they have concerning motion and "having been changed" (which was more extensively declared and refuted above in distinction 1, question 5)—therefore:

The first conclusion is that time or an instant, accepted in neither way, is any such non-permanent thing as that opinion feigns.

The second, that time accepted in either way is a thing existing outside the soul.

The third, that no thing existing outside the soul is time in the second way without the operation of the soul, but in the first way, it is.

(The First Conclusion is Proved, First)

The first conclusion, as far as what it contains concerning time, is evidently proved by three reasons from those which were made in the previously alleged question to prove the first conclusion—namely, that motion is not any such successive thing—specifically the first, second, and fifth reasons.

Besides those, I also argue thus: If time is such a thing, it follows that it would be possible, at least by the power of God, for something to be moved from one place to another distant place continuously and partly without delay and time. The consequent is false. Proof of the consequence: For whatever thing time may be and in whatever subject it may be placed, since it is a thing distinct from the mobile and from the place and space to be acquired, **God could place one body in one place, causing or conserving no other thing distinct from the body and the place, and immediately in another place**, and so on, just as is now actually done when one body passes from one place to another without rest. But this being posited, such a body would truly be moved continuously without delay and time. The falsity of the consequent is proved, because, that case being posited, that body will still reach a nearby place sooner than a remote one, and it will be sooner true to say "it is in this nearer place" than it is true to say "it is in that more remote one." Therefore, there will then be time.

Similarly, God could transfer two bodies through an equal space, and one will be at the end of the space sooner than the other. And consequently, the remaining one will be moved longer than it, and through this, also for a greater time. And thus such a body will be moved with delay and time, and without delay and time. Which implies a contradiction.

It is confirmed: It is certain that in fact many bodies are moved and one more swiftly than another. Either, therefore, time is a thing distinct from every mover and thing moved and according to which something is moved, or not. If not, the proposition is held. If so, whether there be one such thing or many, or in this or in that mobile, **God could co-act or co-move with any secondary mover to which He now co-acts, for the acquisition of that permanent thing according to which its mobile is moved**, without co-acting for the acquisition or production of that other thing which you posit is time, nor by Himself causing it. For whatever God does or co-acts, He does or co-acts freely and contingently, and He can not act and not co-act. But this being posited, it is certain that one body will still be moved more quickly and another more slowly, and one will be at the term sooner than another, and through this there will still be time; and thus there will be time and there will not be time, unless it be said that then some permanent thing will be time. But then the proposition is held, since by the same reason that very thing must be said now, as no evidence is had for the existence of such a non-permanent thing, nor an authority which must be stood upon, and it seems to be posited superfluously. For that case being given, whatever things are now truly said of time would then also be truly said.

(Objection)

Perhaps someone would say to this reason that, given the aforesaid cases, neither would one body be moved longer than another, nor would the same thing be sooner in a nearer part than in a more remote one, or one be sooner at the term of its motion than another, speaking of "before" and "after" according to time.

To the contrary: First, because it is certain that, those cases being given, there will be "before" and "after" in magnitude, and that the mobile will not coexist with all parts of the magnitude simultaneously, nor will it rest in any. Therefore, it will truly be moved, and sooner to a nearer part than to a more remote one; and thus, according to the manner of speaking of the **Philosopher** in the 4th book of the *Physics*, there will be "before" and "after" in motion, and that motion could just as well be numbered and divided by the soul as any motion which is now. Therefore, there will then be time, and "before" and "after" according to time.

Furthermore, in those cases, with the body existing in some intermediate part of the magnitude, it will be true to say "this body is here, and was not here," with the same part of the magnitude demonstrated. And similarly, it will be true to say "this body was here, and is not here," with the nearer part demonstrated; and "this body is not here and will be here," with the more remote part demonstrated. But these things being precisely given, "before" and "after" are posited according to *having been*, *being*, and *about to be*, or according to past, present, and future, and consequently "before" and "after" according to time.

Furthermore, by whatever power you say that in that case there will be no time, by that same power anyone can say that now there is no time, nor is anything before another according to time; because now it is no more certain to us that time exists than it would then be certain, since whatever we perceive in moved bodies, we would then also perceive. Since, therefore, we now say in fact that there is time, so also then it must be said. And just as it would then be, and yet no such non-permanent thing would exist, so also now it must be felt that there is no such thing, and yet truly time is.

(The First Conclusion is Proved, Second)

Secondly, principally thus: If time were such a thing, it follows that it would be possible for the whole of time, which we call a year, not to be greater than the time of one hour. This consequent is false. For since an hour is a part of a year, and time cannot be lessened through remission like remissible forms, but precisely through truncation (so to speak) if such a thing exists—wherefore whoever takes less time than a day or anything else necessarily takes a part of it and not the whole of it—if the total time of one year were equal to the time of one hour and did not exceed it, then that would not be complete and total, which implies a contradiction, and a part would be equal to its whole; indeed, it would even be the whole itself, because in it there would be no other part. Which is clear, because if there were another part, it would be either after or before. And whichever is given, both together would be a greater time than only one of them, and thus it would be a part and would not be a part, and that would be the whole and would not be the whole. And all these things are impossible.

But I prove the consequence. Because according to that opinion, the motion of the heaven is also a certain entirely successive entity, which either is time itself according to some, or time follows it; whether that motion alone or also others, so that as many motions as there are, so many simultaneous times there are, I

do not care. Now it is certain that the whole entity of the motion of a future year, whose first day in fact will be tomorrow, with every entity that follows it, **God could produce in as much a space of time as is one hour**, since He can accelerate motion as much as He wishes. But this being posited, that whole year would not be greater than one hour of this day will be. Similarly, since He could move the heaven as much more slowly as He wished, and consequently produce its motion more slowly—supposing that motion is such an entity distinct from permanent things—He could produce the motion, which in fact is produced in one hour, in the space of time of one year. And thus an hour would be equal to a year.

(The First Conclusion is Proved, Third)

Third, if so, it follows that God could, while the heaven neither according to itself nor according to any part of it acquires another place but retains entirely the same one, produce in it those successive entities which they call time and motion, if they are distinct, or that entity, if they do not say they are distinguished. And thus it follows that the **heaven, while entirely resting, will be moved**, or in something there will be motion and it will not be moved, both of which are impossible.

The first consequence is clear, because since the heaven itself is naturally apt to receive in itself such an entity and God can produce it—however the heaven may relate to permanent things—God could produce it in the heaven, especially since no permanent thing concurs with the heaven for the reception of such an entity.

The second consequence is also clear. Because that case being given, the heaven will not behave otherwise according to place or according to any other thing according to which something can be moved, but in entirely the same way; therefore it rests by the definition of one resting. But because motion and time will be produced in it continuously, either it will be moved, and the first part of the consequent is had; or not, and the second is had.

(Concerning the Instant)

Now, that an instant is not such an indivisible, non-permanent, and non-enduring thing, I prove. For since it is not a substance, as they concede, either it is subjectively in the mobile itself (for example, the heaven), or in some other indivisible and also non-enduring thing, such as they call "having been changed." The second cannot be said, because no such "having been changed" exists or can exist, as was proved above in distinction 1, question 5. If the first is said, then the heaven, by newly acquiring the instant itself, is truly changed to it, and by losing it, is truly changed from it. But everything that is changed is changed either in time or in an instant, according to the **Philosopher** in the 6th book of the *Physics*. Therefore the subject, while it is changed from the instant, is changed from it either in time—and if so, it follows that it loses one part of it before another, and consequently it will be divisible and a part of it will endure through time—or in an instant. And if so, either in itself, and this not because it would be and not be at the same time; or in another immediate one, which also cannot be said, since no instant can be immediate to an instant; or in another mediately, and then it follows that it endures through time.

Perhaps it will be said that the heaven is neither changed to an instant by acquiring it, nor is it changed from it by losing it, since neither time nor an instant are terms of motion or change, but measures.

Secondly, it will be said that the heaven is not changed from an instant in any instant, because then there would be an instant of an instant and a process to infinity.

The first response is not valid. Because if an instant is a thing distinct from the heaven, which previously was not and now is in it, it is certain that the heaven just as well passed from the non-being of it to the being, as matter now first having some form passed from non-being to the being of it. But this is "to have been changed." And that to which it passed is called the *term to which* of the change. Wherefore, just as you say the heaven has an instant, which it previously did not have, and is not changed to it, so I will say to you that matter is not changed to the form which it first has.

Furthermore, it is certain that the heaven having that entity of an instant behaves otherwise according to it than it behaved before. Therefore, when it is changed according to that, according to the common manner of speaking, it is changed to it. And in the same way, not having it after it nevertheless had it, it is changed from it.

The second response is also not rational, because with equal ease it could be said that matter is not changed from a substantial or accidental form in an instant. As for what he brings forward, that then there would be a process to infinity in instants, it helps the proposition. For therefore it is proved that no such thing should be posited, if anything can be generated or corrupted in an instant, granted that there is no other such non-permanent thing which is called an instant.

Furthermore, since it is impossible for anything to be generated or corrupted without being generated or corrupted in time or in an instant, as was proved above in the previously alleged question of the preceding distinction, and will also be declared from what follows: if an instant is corrupted and is not corrupted in an instant, therefore in time, and consequently partly, which they deny and has also just been refuted.

To the same point, the other reasons made above can be applied to prove that "having been changed" is not some indivisible thing not enduring through time. Furthermore, this response can be refuted just as that one which is given to the first reason concerning "having been changed" in the previously alleged question.

It is necessary, therefore, to concede that an instant, if it is such a thing as they say, is generated in an instant and also the heaven is changed from it in an instant, and the reason made proceeds. And consequently, one can argue against the said position through all the reasons made above to prove that "having been changed" is not such an indivisible non-permanent thing as they also think.

Furthermore, either in every mobile continuously moved locally there is subjectively such a thing or instant, or not in every one, but in some only. The second cannot be said reasonably, because there is no greater reason that a stone or any other body can be moved continuously without such a thing than that the heaven and any other can. Since, therefore, in other mobiles there are no such things, nor does any experience or reason convince us of this in one more than in another, in none should it be said that such a thing exists. It is confirmed: because just as, if all celestial bodies rested and other bodies were moved here below, there would still be time according to **Augustine** in the 11th book of the *Confessions*—and it is true—so there would still be an instant. And a body thus continuously moved would be just as truly said (according to a good understanding of the word) "to be in an instant in this place," with a place equal

to itself demonstrated (for example, A), as it would be said "to be moved in time over such a space or from this place to that." If, therefore, there were not then any such non-permanent thing, then neither now is it reasonably to be said to exist in anything.

If, however, it is said that in every mobile continuously moved there is its own instant, I take then some instant of an inferior moved body. It is certain that it is corrupted or will be corrupted, nor will it always be true to say that it is corrupted. Either, therefore, to its corruption there corresponds a single instant of the heaven, or several successively. Not several, because this is not corrupted partibly, therefore a single one. Either, therefore, that same one which corresponds to its generation—and then it follows that in the same instant it is generated and corrupted, and consequently it is and is not—or another instant corresponds to the generation and another to the corruption of the same thing; and since between any two instants there is a middle time, it follows that that instant of the inferior body endures through time.

And in the same way, one can argue concerning the instant of the heaven by asking whether to its corruption and its generation also there corresponds a single instant of the inferior moved body, or one and another. And an inconvenience is equally concluded.

This very thing is proved by the authority of the **Philosopher** in the 4th book of the *Physics*, whose expressed intention there is that there are not diverse instants according to the thing in time, but one and the same, although it is diversified according to being and reason. Wherefore, determining the question moved at the beginning of the chapter *On Time* concerning the unity or plurality of instants, he says: "The 'now' itself is indeed as the same; but it is as not the same. For insofar as it is in one and in another, it is different. But this will be to the 'now' itself. Insofar, however, as the 'now' itself is a certain being, it is the same." Behold, expressly that the "now" itself or instant, insofar as it is a certain being, is the same, and not one after another. However, according as that same thing is in one and another place, it is said to be different according to being, as will be more fully declared in the solutions of the objections.

It is confirmed, because he himself at the beginning, arguing for the aforementioned question, proves that there is not one "now" after another, because then it would be necessary that the preceding "now" be corrupted, which he himself proves to be impossible, because it would be corrupted either in the same or in another or in time. And he shows each of these to be impossible, as was virtually touched upon above. This reason he nowhere afterwards solves—certainly because it is insoluble and demonstratively concluding against the aforesaid imagination concerning the instant—nay rather, in determining the question, he approves its conclusion, as is clear in the previously alleged words. This same is the intention of the **Commentator** in the same place, as will be clear below. But it is certain that, if an instant were such a non-enduring thing, it would not be the same, but always one after another. Therefore, according to the mind of the Philosopher, it is not such a thing.

(Concerning time specifically)

Furthermore, specifically concerning time taken in the first mode, it is proved that it is not such a **successive thing**, because it would follow in a possible case that the same thing would be simultaneously moved and entirely at rest, which is impossible. The proof of the consequence: For it is certain that it is possible by God's power for no mobile to be moved in any way, but for all to rest. Let this be posited; this being posited, it is certain that any of these things will rest in time, and one will be able to rest longer than another, for one could be annihilated while the other remains and rests further. If therefore this **duration**

of rest or time is such a successive thing, it will be in some or every resting thing; and thus that in which it will be will continuously receive another and another part of it, and consequently it will be moved.

It is confirmed, because according to the imagination of the aforesaid opinion, such a successive thing will truly be the "**act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency**," and consequently it will be motion, and its subject will truly be moved. And thus it will rest and be moved simultaneously.

Furthermore, let it be posited, just as it is well possible, that God preserves precisely permanent things; which being posited, He annihilates one while the others are not annihilated, and again another. It is certain, as before, that each will endure, and some longer, some less enduringly. And the duration of no thing will be a thing distinct from itself, because neither a **successive thing** (since by the case there will be none), nor a **permanent thing** (since no thing endures formally through another permanent thing, although effectively some may be preserved by another, and every one by God). Therefore, now no such thing is to be posited which is the duration or delay of anything distinct from it.

(The second conclusion is proved)

The **second conclusion** is proved. And first indeed that time is a thing and a certain entity, is clear, because according to **Augustine** in *On Genesis* (the imperfect work) near the beginning, and similarly in the other work *On Genesis* book 5, chapter 7, "**time is a creature**." And in the 11th book of the *Confessions*, he says many times that He is the **creator of times**. Which implies they would not be true if time were no entity. Nor is there doubt that he speaks of time taken in either mode, as is clear to one attending to his preceding process in the same place. But that it is an entity existing outside the soul is clear. And first indeed, concerning time taken in the first mode, since if the soul were the duration or delay of motions or temporal things, the duration of all things would be the same and all things would endure equally, which contradicts experience. Likewise, if a thought or other entity existing in the soul were the duration of things outside, it would be in the power of man—if it is supposed that there is only one—that no created thing would endure, since he could choose not to elicit such a thought. Likewise, it could not be saved why the duration of one thing would be greater than another, unless perhaps it were said that greater duration is a more intense thought or judgment by which the soul judges some thing to endure more than another. But this is frivolous, since then it would follow that the soul could make a dog endure more than the heavens. For it could both think more intensely about the existence of the dog and also judge this falsely, that it endures more.

Furthermore, if no soul were thinking or even existed, nevertheless other things outside the soul would endure, and one more, another less; bodies also would be moved, and one more swiftly, and another more slowly. Certain ones also would rest longer, certain ones less long. And it is certain that now there is no other duration of such things than there would be then. Therefore neither the soul, nor anything existing within, is the duration of things outside, and consequently neither is time taken in this way. Since therefore **time taken in this way is an entity**, and is not an entity in the soul, it follows that it will be a thing outside the soul.

Furthermore, no thing endures by another duration or by a duration distinct from itself. This is clear, because then it could be preserved by God without its duration, and consequently **endure without duration**. Therefore neither the soul, nor anything existing in it, is the duration of a thing outside the soul.

Furthermore, according to **Augustine** in the 12th book of *The City of God*, chapter 15, and in *On Genesis* (the imperfect work), if before the heaven and earth there had been the motion of thoughts in the angels, there would truly have been time. And his reason is because there would have been something **prior** and something **posterior**, which cannot be understood without an interval of time. But it is certain that that time would not have been a thing distinct from the angels and their thoughts, because it was neither successive (according to the understanding reprobated in the preceding, since no such thing is possible) nor permanent (because neither substance nor quality, as can be clear enough to one willing to run through the species of the genus of predicaments). But it is certain that there would be time no less if the heavens and other bodies were moved and no soul existed, nor would time be an entity distinct from the aforesaid bodies and their motions. That time taken in the **second mode** is also an entity outside the soul is proved, because taken in this way it is nothing other than **the heaven itself or its motion**. This is clear, since through the motion of the heaven itself or, to speak more properly the truth, through the heaven itself regularly moved (as will be declared), we measure the delays and durations of other things, as the general experience of almost everyone proves.

To this is also the authority of Scripture, Genesis 1, where it is read that God made lights in the firmament of heaven, **that they might be for times and for days and years**. But by years and days and other distinctions of celestial motions, we measure the delays and durations of other things. Wherefore **Saint Augustine** in *On Genesis* (the imperfect work) well past the middle says this was said because "the interval of delays can be more evidently distinguished by men through the motion of those lights." This same thing the **Philosopher** also expressly holds, and also the **Commentator** on the 4th *Physics*. To this is one of the Parisian articles saying: "**That aevum and time are nothing in reality, but only in apprehension: error.**"

(Recapitulatio)

But if time is a thing outside the soul, and not some non-permanent thing, which is it therefore? To which I say that, speaking of time accepted in the **first mode**, namely for the delay or duration of motion and rest and the permanence of a mutable thing not necessarily existing, it is nothing other than the **thing itself continuously moved or resting or enduring**. Wherefore the duration of motion is the very thing continuously moved or which is continuously moved, concerning which namely it is true to say that it was immediately moving, is actually moving, and will immediately move; and this is "**its motion enduring**," or the same is signified by both locutions. Similarly, for the rest of something to have delay and to endure is nothing other than for that thing to have immediately rested, to rest, and to be about to rest immediately. Also for a thing to endure is nothing other than for it to have immediately been, to actually be, and to be about to be immediately. And of whatever thing such a copulative of past, present, and future is not true, that is not duration nor enduring. Wherefore if concerning some thing it is true to say "this is and immediately will be," but it is not truly said "this immediately was," it certainly does not endure, although it begins to endure (expounding through the negation of the present). If however concerning something it is truly said that it immediately was, but it is not truly said that it is, it is clear that it is not truly said to endure. Likewise if concerning something it is true to say "this immediately was, and actually is," but it is not true to say that it immediately will be, it is also not said to endure.

In its own way, it is so concerning motion. For if it were possible for it to be truly said of something that it is moved and immediately will be moved, but not that it immediately was moved—just as those would

have to concede who posit a first part of motion—it would not be truly said that the motion of that thing endures in the sense which is commonly taken. In the same way neither would that part concerning the past be true without that concerning the present, nor either without the truth of that concerning the future. And it is to be understood similarly concerning rest in the aforesaid manner in its own way.

And according to this mode, namely regarding *to have been*, *to be*, and *to be about to be*, the delay or diuturnity or duration of the aforesaid things is to be conceived, that is, that quantitative distension of which authors frequently speak. It must not be thought, however, that there is in reality outside some quantitative distension, of which no parts are together, continuously flowing over the moved or resting thing itself, and that this is its duration and delay, as some falsely conceive. For although such a thing can be feigned, nevertheless there is no such thing, as has been sufficiently shown in the superiors. Which also from now is evidently confirmed. For, this precisely being posited, that some thing immediately was, is, and immediately will be, it is posited to endure. And this not being posited, it is not posited. But to this it is clear that no such thing is necessary as they think, since through no such thing does a thing exist, or was, or will be. Nor do words of this kind thus precisely signify some thing inherent to it, for which they supposit and of which they are said, as is known enough, and as the **Philosopher** expressly posits in the 1st *Perihermeneias*, the 4th *Metaphysics*, and the 6th.

In the same way, this precisely being posited, that something immediately rested, rests, and immediately will rest—for which, as is clear, no such thing is necessary—the delay of resting is posited. Similarly, it is concerning that which immediately was moved, is moved, and immediately will be moved. For neither for this is any thing other than permanent things necessary, as was proved above in distinction 1, question 5.

According to this acceptance, it must be conceded that **there are many times** and that any corporal or spiritual thing, possible not to be (of which kind is every thing which is not God), which nevertheless immediately was and is and immediately will be, is time. And if conformably to time taken in this way we wish to take an **instant**, that thing is an instant which is, but immediately was not and immediately will not be, if such a thing exists—just as it is possible indeed to be, although it is not possible for any to be of which nothing immediately was and nothing immediately will be, as was proved for both in distinction 17 of the First.

But **time accepted in the second mode**—namely for the measure by which we can be certified concerning the delay of motion and rest and the duration of temporal things, how great it is, that is, how much or how long some thing was moved or rested or existed, and which longer and which less long and which equally—speaking of that to which it most or alone properly belongs to be a measure in this way, is the **First Mobile** itself, which indeed among other things which are moved, is moved most regularly and most swiftly, and its being moved thus, as has been said, is most known to all men. Wherefore through it men can most be certified concerning other things, how great is their motion or rest and also duration. Wherefore the **Philosopher** in the 10th *Metaphysics* says: "And they measure motion by the simple and most swift motion, for this has the least time. Wherefore in astrology such a one is the principle and meter. For they suppose a regular motion and the most swift one, that of the heaven, to which they judge others." And he posits the same in the 4th *Physics* near the end, and his reason is that which was touched upon. Nor is it necessary to posit in the heaven itself any successive thing which is time, as others say. Nay rather, suppose there were such a thing in it, it would not be time, as we speak of time now. Indeed,

even if it exists, nevertheless it is not known to many, and I dare to say to none. And therefore men cannot be certified by it concerning the motions and rests of others.

The **instant** also is not another thing than the **First Mobile** itself, so that the same thing is called time and instant, but not according to the same aspect. For insofar as it is numbered by the soul according to the *before* and *after* of its motion or, what is the same, of the magnitude about which it is moved, it is time.

For through it accepted in this way we can judge concerning the delay of motions and rests and durations in other things. For when anyone considers that something here below began to be moved, with the sun or another determined part of the heaven existing in direct opposition to a demonstrated fixed part of the earth, and ceases to be moved with the same part of the heaven existing opposite another part of the earth; but a certain other thing which began to be moved simultaneously ceases to be moved with the same part of the heaven existing opposite a yet posterior part of the earth: knowing that the heaven is regularly moved from a prior part to a posterior, he immediately knows that this one was moved longer, but that one less long. And if they traversed an equal space, he knows that this one was moved more slowly, that one more swiftly. And in the same way he can know what rested longer, and what less long, and which thing endured more and which less. According to this mode of numbering the **First Mobile**, we measure other motions by hours, days, and years. For if, from the time something begins to be moved until it ceases, the **First Mobile** is moved through such a space, we say that that thing is moved for an hour. If indeed it is completely revolved, we say for a day. If it is revolved so many or so many times, we say for a week, a month, or a year. And so of others.

To this understanding the definition of the **Philosopher** concerning time is to be accepted, by which he says that it is "**the number of motion according to before and after.**" And afterwards he expounds that he understands it of the *numbered number*, so that the sense is: Time is the motion regularly numbered according to the *before* and *after* of its motion. It is said to be numbered according to *before* and *after* when the same thing is applied or compared to a prior and posterior part of motion or, what is the same, of the magnitude about which it is moved.

But the **instant** is called the same mobile itself, insofar as it is here or there determinately, or coexists with this determinate place or part of magnitude, with which it immediately did not coexist and immediately will not coexist. Wherefore this name "instant" or "now" taken nominally signifies the **First Mobile** itself connoting the place with which it coexists, and with this it also connotes that it immediately did not coexist with it and immediately will not coexist.

(The third conclusion is proved)

The **third conclusion** is proved clearly enough from what has been said. And regarding the first part, since the **first moved** which is continuously moved is not numbered according to before and after except through the soul, therefore neither is it time without the operation of the soul. The antecedent is clear, since both in itself it is continuous, and it is also moved continuously such that outside the soul no discretion occurs; but insofar as it is moved, it is divided or even numbered according to before and after by the soul itself in the manner already premised. The consequence is known from what has been said. For neither it nor any other thing continuously moved can be time unless it is numbered and divided according to before and after.

To this is the express authority of the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, where he determines this conclusion and by the same reason, just as was touched upon in arguing for the question. To the same is the authority of the **Commentator** saying in the same book, comment 109: "Let us say that outside the mind there is nothing but the moved" and motion; "and **time is not made unless when the mind divides motion into before and after**; and this is the intention of 'number of motion,' that is, motion to be numbered." And below in comment 131: "Time," he says, "is nothing other than before and after in motion, but according to that they are numbered. And therefore it needs the soul in this, that it be in act, namely according to that it is numbered before and after." Let these suffice for now, because something was also said of this in the First, distinction 24, question 2, article 1, in the response to the sixth argument.

The **second** part of the conclusion is evident from what was said in the second conclusion. For things outside the soul endure as to being and as to moving and resting, and more and less, **not through the operation of the soul**. Therefore also the thing outside the soul without the operation of the soul is time, speaking of time in the first mode.

(Dubia concerning time and the instant)

Now against the aforesaid, doubts are to be moved, and first against those things which were said concerning time, secondly against those things which were said concerning the instant.

Concerning time the doubts are: First, for it seems that time is not any permanent thing outside the soul. Second, that it is not any thing outside the soul. Third, that it is absolutely no thing. Fourth, that no created thing is its duration.

The **first** is shown first, because every time is divisible into prior and posterior parts which are not together, as is clear from the 4th and 6th *Physics* and through **Augustine** in the 11th *Confessions*, as well as through the common saying of all. But no permanent thing is divisible in this way, for the parts of any such thing are together.

Second, it is possible that two equal mobiles are moved over equal spaces, one more swiftly, the other more slowly, and consequently one in a greater time, the other in a lesser. Therefore neither the greater time of the slower nor the lesser time of the swifter is the mobile or the space, since those are equal. Nor does it appear what other permanent thing is this time or that. Furthermore, since we commonly say that some things are moved in equal time, certain ones in greater, certain ones in lesser, we do not intend to signify that such things are moved in a greater mobile or space, or in any other greater or lesser or equal permanent thing. Furthermore, the same heaven, with no permanent thing increased or diminished, newly made or corrupted, could be moved in a greater time than it is now moved, and similarly could be moved in a lesser. Therefore the time in which it is now moved is not any permanent thing; nor would the time in which it would be moved be any permanent thing.

Third, as is clear from the 6th *Physics*, motion is divided both by the division of space and by the division of the mobile and by the division of time, and these divisions are distinct, since over the same space the same mobile can be moved now in greater, now in lesser time; and over unequal spaces, unequal mobiles in equal time. Therefore time is neither the mobile, nor the space over which there is motion, nor is it even any permanent thing other than those. Therefore it is not a permanent thing.

Fourth, that the heaven is not time, is proved through the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, who contemns as foolish the opinion saying time is the sphere of the whole.

Fifth, because if so, it follows that if there were many worlds and many heavens equally moved, there would be many times simultaneously. Nay rather, this also follows in fact from the things said above, if namely every body actually moved is time. The consequent is false according to the **Philosopher**, where above.

Sixth, either the heaven would be an hour or a year or a day or some other time or any of these. And whichever is given is false, since it would follow that, just as the whole heaven is present, so also the whole day or the whole year, indeed both, since there is no greater reason why the heaven is a day than a year or conversely. It would also follow that a year would not be a greater time than a day, for they would be the same. And consequently one living for a year would not live longer than one living for a single day. Further it would follow that whoever lived for any time, suppose for an hour, would live also for a day and for a year and for a century and universally for every time. And the consequence is clear, because the heaven according to this way would be any time. And all these things which follow are absurd. Likewise it would follow that past time would be future and conversely, and both would be present, which are manifestly impossible. The consequence is clear, because past time was the heaven which now is, and similarly future time is the heaven itself.

Seventh, it is proved that no thing outside the soul is time, and this from the express determination of **Blessed Augustine** in the 11th *Confessions*, who proves this diffusely and finally concludes that time is an affection of the mind, and a long future is a long expectation of the future, and a long past is a long memory of the past.

Eighth, it is proved that time is absolutely no thing, thus: No past or future is. Every time is past or future. Therefore no time is. But every thing is. Therefore no thing is time. The major is clear, because as **Augustine** says in the 11th *Confessions*, and it is clear of itself, "**the past is now not and the future is not yet.**" And from this he proves that there is neither a long past nor a long future. And below: "For if," he says, "there are future and past things, I wish to know where they are. But if I am not yet able, I know nevertheless, wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but present. For if they are future there also, they are not yet there; if they are past there also, they are no longer there. Wherever therefore they are, whatever they are, they are not unless present." These are his words. But it is certain that no past or future is present, therefore no past or future is. The minor is proved, because, as **Augustine** proves in the same place, no present is divisible. But it is certain that every time is divisible. And consequently no time is present. Therefore every time is past or future.

Ninth, it is proved that duration is not the enduring thing itself, for example the duration of an angel, the angel itself; because the essence of the angel is all at once, but its duration is not. Otherwise it would not have endured more at the end of the world than at the beginning, which is false.

Tenth, to the same point. If an angel were its duration, the angel would be infinite. The consequence is clear, because its duration is infinite.

Eleventh, if so, to be, to have been, and to be about to be would be the same in an angel. But God cannot destroy the "having been" of an angel, because He cannot make it so that the angel has not been. Therefore He cannot destroy its "being" and "being about to be," and consequently that the angel not be, and consequently He cannot destroy an angel, which is erroneous.

Twelfth, then the duration of one angel would not be greater than the duration of another. And then an angel created in the beginning of the world would not have endured more than one who had been created first yesterday.

Thirteenth, it is argued that the **First Mobile** regularly moved is not time, according to that time is taken for a measure, since if it were not moved, and other bodies were moved here below, we would still measure their motions. Therefore the **First Mobile** etc. is not the measure.

Fourteenth, it is shown that the instant is not the **First Mobile**.

The Ordinary Text follows.

QUESTION 1

WHETHER angels were created before time or after.

Regarding the second distinction, I ask with the **Master**, whether angels were created before time or after.

And it is argued first that they were created before: Angels were created neither together with time nor after time, therefore they were created before time. The consequence is evident.

I prove the antecedent regarding the first part in two ways: First, because every angel was created all at once since it is an impartible substance, and all angels were created together, not one before another, as the doctors commonly hold. But time was not created all at once, since every time is divisible into parts according to before and after, which cannot be together; and through this no time can be created all at once. Therefore time was not created together with the angels. The consequence is clear, because it is impossible for things to be made together, and one partly, but the other all at once; otherwise, since that which is made partly is made in time as in an adequate measure, but that which is made all at once is made in an instant, it would follow that an instant would be equal to time, which is impossible. Second, if angels had been created together with time, then either in the same instant or in the same time; for otherwise things cannot be understood to be made together according to duration, as we speak here of simultaneity. But both are impossible, because time cannot be made in an instant nor in time, otherwise there would be a time of time to infinity.

The second part of the antecedent is proved, because if they were created after time, then time was before; either therefore it was in some corporal creature, or spiritual. Neither is true, because no corporal or spiritual creature was before the angels, the scripture saying in Ecclesiasticus 1: "**Wisdom was created first of all**," that is "angelic nature," as the **Master** expounds in the text.

Second, it is argued that they were created after time thus: Time was eternal and angels were not eternal and yet are. Therefore they were created after time. The consequence is clear. And the first part of the antecedent is proved through the **Apostle** to Titus 1, where according to the letter of the Septuagint Interpreters he says: "In hope of eternal life, which God, who does not lie, promised before eternal times." Behold that he posits some times as eternal. But the second part of the antecedent is certain through faith.

To the opposite, it is argued from the determination of the **Master** saying that "**together with time the corporal and spiritual creature was made.**"

In this question it is necessary first to see whether time is any created thing; and if so, what thing it is. Then the inquiry will be seen.

ARTICLE 1 PART 1

(The Opinion of Burley)

As for the first, one opinion says that "**time commonly accepted is duration having from itself before and after,**" and it is indeed a true thing outside the soul distinct from every permanent thing and also from motion, which according to the same opinion is also a thing distinct from permanent things and is of the genus of passion, in which subjectively is that thing which is time; and this is a **per se existing quantity having part outside of part only according to before and after**, which cannot be together, but when the prior is, the posterior is not. And through this successive quantity, the motion in which it is has parts according to before and after only. So that this duration or successive quantity is in no way divisible into simultaneous parts, just as motion is divisible by the divisibility of the mobile in which it is, but only into parts succeeding one another, as has been said. And in every motion they say there is subjectively some such successive quantity, which is its duration. He posits many other things regarding this matter, which I omit, because they are not necessary for our purpose.

But he proves first that time is a thing having from itself primarily *before* and *after* according to duration, or which cannot be together.

First indeed, for in certain things we see *before* and *after* according to the aforesaid understanding, as is clear in agonistic games. Therefore there is something in which primarily and per se there is *before* and *after* in this way. But whatever that may be, it is time. Which is clear through the common conception of the mind, since everyone conceiving "before and after according to duration" conceives time; and everyone conceiving time conceives "before and after according to duration."

It is confirmed, because in whatever things *before* and *after* are found according to duration, they are found according to a relation to time. Wherefore "one motion is not called prior to another unless because it was in a prior time; nor was the flood prior to the Trojan war unless because it was in a prior time." But *before* and *after* are found in time not through a relation to something else, nor on account of the concomitance of some other thing. "For one time is not called prior to another because it was in a prior

motion or with a prior motion. Therefore **time from itself primarily has before and after according to duration.**"

Second to the same point: "It is certain that in many things *before* and *after* are found according to duration, and it is reasonable to ask through what one thing is formally prior to another. Either therefore it will be necessary to proceed to infinity, or it is necessary to give something in which primarily and from itself *before* and *after* are formally. And that, whatever it may have been, is time." But from this he infers that "**time is essentially and per se a quantity.**" It is proved: "That which primarily and from itself has part outside of part is per se a quantity; time is of this kind, therefore. The major is clear from the 1st *Physics*, where it is said that it belongs to quantity per se to be divisible into part outside of part, and such divisibility does not belong to other predicaments except by accident. The minor is clear, because time has primarily and per se a prior and posterior part, as has been proved; therefore primarily and per se it has part outside of part. It is confirmed through the **Philosopher** in the *Categories*, who posits time to be a continuous quantity. And the **Commentator** on the 5th *Metaphysics* says that time is per se a quantity."

From these things it is also clear that it follows that time is not any permanent thing, but distinct from any permanent thing, since the parts of any permanent thing can exist together.

It follows also that it is a thing distinct from motion, since motion does not have from itself *before* and *after* according to duration. Wherefore "I can conceive and opine," says the opiner, "that motion is all at once, as that something is suddenly moved from the place of fire to the place of earth. Wherefore in the definition of motion, succession nor *before* and *after* according to duration is not posited." But concerning time not so, as is clear above.

Lastly, regarding the purpose, he proves that it is subjectively in motion: "For time, as has been proved, is a quantity. Either therefore it is the quantity of a permanent thing immediately, or of a successive thing. Not of a permanent thing, suppose of a substance or quality immediately, because if so, the permanent thing would become greater or lesser on account of time itself, which is false." Therefore it is "**the quantity of a successive thing, namely of motion itself.**"

These things have been said, albeit sparsely, by the aforesaid opinion concerning time itself. But concerning the **instant** he says that it is a certain **indivisible not enduring**, intrinsic to time and continuing the prior part with the posterior, just as many also imagine concerning the point in a line.

(Against the opinion of Burley, three conclusions)

This opinion, regarding what it posits that motion is a thing distinct from the mobile and from the thing which is acquired by the mobile, has been sufficiently, as I think, reprobated in distinction 1 of this Second, question 5. And therefore for now I do not insist against that, but only against those things which he says concerning time and the instant. And I posit against it three conclusions: **The first** is that time is not any non-permanent thing, divisible and successive in such a way as the opinion says. **The second**, that supposing motion is a thing distinct from the mobile and that which is acquired as these think, time is not a thing distinct formally inhering in motion, as the opinion says. **The third**, that an instant is not an "indivisible not enduring."

(The first conclusion is proved by reason 1-3)

I prove the **first conclusion** thus: If time is such a thing, it follows that some thing and every part of it also is primarily and adequately at once, and is continuously and partly made anew.

Second, it would follow that the same thing and every part of it would primarily be made and corrupted at once. Both the consequence and the falsity and impossibility of both consequents can be proved, just as the necessity of the consequences and the falsity of the consequents were proved in the first two reasons made in the previously alleged question of the preceding distinction to prove that motion is not such a successive thing, as the opinion says.

Third, I prove this very thing by a very ancient reason also posited there in the fifth place, which the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics* adduces; nor is there doubt that it concludes demonstratively, if by time is understood something composed of such parts, prior and posterior, not possible to be together, just as the opinion says—which also at that time, as I think, was held by some, just as today also it is held by many. I argue therefore thus: If time were such a thing, it would follow that there is some thing composed of parts of which none is. The consequent is impossible. The consequence is proved, because according to this imagination every part of time is past or future; but no past or future part is.

(To the third reason, in three ways)

To this reason it is responded in two ways by the defenders of the opinion:

First indeed, by denying the consequent to be impossible; for they say that for the being of successive things it is not required that all its parts be nor that any part of it be all at once, but it suffices and is required that certain parts be after certain others, and there actually be a certain indivisible continuing its parts to one another. And this solution seems to be given by the **Philosopher** and in the same place by the **Commentator** in comment 103 and similarly in comment 88, where solving the aforesaid reason he says: "**And the deception is in this speech, since it is so concerning motion; for motion is comprehended by sense**" and consequently, supply, is. "**And no part of it,**" says the **Commentator**, "**is in act, but every demonstrated part has receded. Therefore it is composed of this which has already failed, and of this which is not yet.**"

Second, the proposition assumed in proving the consequence is destroyed, namely this: "every part of time is past or future." For they say that time is present, and "**of any present time there are infinite parts**" existing and present, because of any present time there are infinite parts "**having one past and another future; for example the present year has infinite parts, of which any has a past and a future, namely the present month, and fortnight, and week, day and hour, and so to infinity. Nevertheless no part of time is all at once.**"

Third, it can be responded according to **Avicenna** in the 2nd of his *Sufficientia*, chapter 13 at the beginning. For that no part of time is, can be understood in two ways: In one way that absolutely it is not; in another way that it is not in this instant. And these, as he says, differ enough. Neither does it follow "this is, therefore it is in this instant," nor conversely does it follow "this is not in this instant, therefore this is not." For to be and not to be in this instant are not opposites. If it is understood in the first way, the

proposition which says that no part of time is, is false. If in the second way, it is true. And in the same way it is conceded that time is not. For it is not in this instant, unless in the soul and intellect.

(Against the first response, first)

None of the aforesaid responses is sufficient. The **first** indeed is not, which is clear first thus. I take some time which is said to be, and let it be A, and let its past part be B, and let the future part be C, and let the instant continuing these be D. Since therefore A is not any other thing besides B, C, D together, as I suppose—or if it is any other, let that be F; nor is the proposition varied, since then A stands for the same things entirely for which all those stand together—I argue thus: "A is, therefore B, C and D are." The consequence is declared by inducing in a similar case. For it follows "this house is, therefore this wall and this roof and this foundation are," with the parts of that demonstrated house demonstrated. Similarly it follows "this man is, therefore this body and this soul are." Similarly in a continuum it follows "this two-cubit length is, therefore this cubit and this cubit are," with those which are its parts demonstrated. And universally from a term standing for some whole to all terms standing for the parts of that, with respect to "to be to exist," is a necessary consequence affirmatively and in the present. But further it follows "B, C and D are, therefore B is," and similarly it follows "therefore C is." And both are false, since B is past and is not, and C is future which also is not.

It is confirmed because, notwithstanding that the matter which will be a part of the Antichrist actually is, because nevertheless his soul is not—since Antichrist stands as well for the matter as for the soul—it follows well "the soul of Antichrist is not, therefore Antichrist is not." And from more causes this very consequent would be true and could be inferred, if neither the matter were. So in the proposition, from more causes it is truly said "A is not" than it is said "Antichrist is not." Which nevertheless anyone of sound mind concedes.

Nor is it valid to say that these things are true of permanent things, but not of successive ones: Both because with equal ease another could say that it would be so also of permanent things, and concede that some house is whose wall is past, and roof is future, and foundation is present. Nor could this be reprobated more strongly than that. And because for whatever kind of things terms stand, provided one stands precisely for the same things for which others stand simultaneously, it is impossible to affirm truly of that "to be to exist" through a proposition *de inesse* and in the present, and to deny it of those, although conversely there is not always a simple consequence, as suppose when the name of the whole signifies parts behaving in a determinate way, for example conjoined or compounding (just as this name "man" signifies soul and body compounding one another). But the names of the parts do not signify them thus.

(Against the first response, second)

Second against the same solution. If by the name of time some such composite is signified, it follows that no time is present, therefore no time is. The first consequence is clear, because no present is divided into past and future. Wherefore **Augustine** in the 11th *Confessions*, chapter 16, says that **"if any time is understood which can be divided into no parts of moments, even the most minute, that alone is what is called present, which nevertheless flies so rapidly from the future into the past, that it is extended by no delay. For if it is extended, it is divided into past and future. But the present has no space."** These are his words.

But from this consequence of **Augustine**—namely if anything of time is present, it is indivisible—it follows that this is true: "no present is divided into past and future," and consequently no time is present. Otherwise some time does not have a prior and posterior part, which is repugnant to their aforesaid statements. Therefore the first consequence is clear.

And the second is proved through the same in the same place, chapter 19, where he says thus: "**For if there are future and past things, I wish to know where they are. But if I am not yet able, I know nevertheless, wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but present. For if they are future there, they are not yet there; if also they are past there, they are no longer there. Wherever therefore they are, whatever they are, they are not unless present.**" These are his words. According to **Augustine** therefore, if anything is, it is present. Therefore, if anything is not present, it is not. And through this, if no time is present, no time is.

Furthermore, what is said—that for the being of successive things it suffices that certain of their parts exist after certain others—is nothing other to say than that it suffices that some of its parts have been, and some are about to be. But from this it cannot be truly said that the composite of both "is," or that something existing is a composite of both, as is clear to anyone of sound mind. For it is not intelligible that from those things which are entirely nothing, some true entity is integrated or partially consists.

Furthermore, what the response adds concerning the continuation of those parts to an instant which actually is, is not intelligible, since that which is entirely nothing can be continued or copulated to no being or non-being. Otherwise one long dance could be made of goat-stags and tragelaphs and chimeras, which is most absurd.

(Response of Burley)

To this the said doctor responds that "**a non-being, which never was a being, nor ever will be a being, is copulated to nothing. Nevertheless a non-being, which at some time was or will be a being, can be copulated to something.**"

(Against Burley)

To the contrary. First, because according to this it would follow that it would be possible for one whiteness corrupted or annihilated and one to be caused to be continued and copulated to something, and to be one whiteness in number; which no one would say.

Second, their saying being conceded, the proposition is still had, since past time, taken according to their understanding, not only is not but neither ever was nor was possible to be. Similarly neither will the future ever be nor is it possible for it to be. Therefore it is not possible for such things to be copulated to something. The consequence is clear through the response. I prove the antecedent, just as **Augustine** proves where above, chapter 16, that past time never was long. I argue therefore thus: If past time ever was, either it was while it was past, or while it was present, or while it was future. Not while it was past, because by the same reason it would now be true to say that past time is. Nor while it was present, because it never was present, because it is impossible for any time to be present, otherwise some time

would be indivisible. Nor also while it was future, because by the same reason it would be true to say that future time now is, which they do not say.

By the same it is proved that future time never will be. Because neither will it be while it will be future, nor while it will be present, nor while it will be past. And the proof is clear similarly.

And from this a reason can be formed more strongly that time is not any such thing, because it would follow that there would be some thing composed of non-beings and things impossible to be, which no one ought to say.

But what they add concerning the **Philosopher** is not according to his intention, as will be clear below. The solution also of the **Commentator** is not valid from the instance which he induces, because it is equally proved that motion is not any such thing of which no part is, just as is proved of time; nor also is it valid for them from authority, for they wish that motion and also time, just as we speak of it now, be true things, to whose being the soul contributes nothing. But the **Commentator** immediately adds that "**such things do not have complete being, but their being is composed of the action of the soul in that which is in them outside the soul etc.**" Either therefore they contradict the **Commentator** or the **Commentator** accepts time otherwise than they, and consequently his word does not support them.

But what the **Commentator** says, that "**there is a deception in this speech,**" is to be understood that there is a deception in it if one intends by it to prove absolutely that time is not, just as those intended whose reason he adduces. But there is not a deception if one intends to prove by it that time is not any thing according to itself distinct from permanent things, composed of those which are not. Nor from this second is the first inferred. For, as will be clear, time is a true thing and yet it is not such a thing. But they, because they did not know how to see what kind of thing it was unless it was such as has been said, and concluding most certainly that such a one was not possible, absolutely denied that time was. And in this was the deception.

(Against the second response)

The **second solution** also is not valid, because it assumes what is expressly false, namely that some time is present. For the opposite has already been had through **Augustine**. And again this is proved by his reason in the same place. For wishing to prove that no present time can be long, he proves that no time can be present, supposing namely the aforesaid imagination of time, against which alone his reason labors, as is clear to one considering. First indeed he proves that a hundred years cannot be present, then that neither one year. And because his words are clear and placed in due form of argumentation, I recite them only: "See," he says, "at least whether the year which is passing is itself present. For if the first month of it is passing, the rest are future; if the second, already the first has passed and the remainder are not yet. Therefore neither is the year which is passing wholly present. And if it is not wholly present, the year is not present. For the year is twelve months, of which any one month which is passing is itself present, but the others past or future. Although neither is the month which is passing present, but one day; if the first, with the rest future; if the last, with the rest past; if any of the middle ones, between past and future." And he adds: "But let us discuss even that, because neither is one day wholly present. For it is completed by twenty-four hours of night and day, of which the first has the rest future, the last past. But some of the intermediate ones have past ones before them, future ones after them. And that one hour is

passed in fugitive particles. Whatever of it has flown away is past; what remains to it is future." And therefore he concludes: **"If any time is understood which can be divided into no parts of moments, even the most minute, that alone is what is called present etc.,"** as was recited above.

Behold that that solution is patently reprobated both by the authority of **Augustine** and by his valid proof, which is founded on this, that **no time is wholly present**. And if not wholly present, neither is it present. The proof of which is because it is all those things of which any is a part of it. And therefore he says to the proof of that last consequence: "For the year is twelve months." And note that in the aforesaid consequence he takes this term "whole" syncategorematically. Furthermore, by what reason a year is called present—namely because it has a past and future part copulated to an instant which actually is—by the same reason both a century and a millennium and even the age itself (according as "age" is taken for the whole time of the present life from the beginning of the world to the end) can be called present; which no one would say who understands what this word "present" signifies.

(Against the third response)

The solution of **Avicenna** also is insufficient, since however it ought to be understood that something is or is not in this instant, nevertheless **to be actually or now presently** (as it is distinguished against *to have been* and *to be about to be*) and **not-to-be** are certainly opposed. Nor is it possible that of the same thing it be truly affirmed to be through a verb of the present (for example saying "this is") and truly denied to be now presently (so that it be truly said "this is not actually or now presently"). For through this enunciation by which it is absolutely affirmed to be, it is given to be understood—and so everyone takes it—that that thing is now presently and actually. Since it has been demonstratively concluded that no such thing as the opinion feigns is presently and actually, it is necessarily and evidently concluded that **no such thing is, and through this neither is time such a thing**.

(The first conclusion is proved by a fourth reason)

Fourth, principally to the conclusion I argue thus: It is possible for time to be, with no non-permanent thing existing; therefore time is not a non-permanent thing, essentially having *before* and *after* which cannot be together. The consequence is evident. But I prove the antecedent. For it is possible, at least by the absolute power of God, for God to place one body in one place, causing or conserving no other thing distinct from the placed body and the place (since He causes and conserves freely and contingently whatever thing He causes or conserves); and together with this, causing no other thing, it is possible that He immediately place that body in another place and so on, just as is actually done now when one body is transferred from one place to another without intermediate rest. But this being posited, it is certain that such a body will be sooner in a nearer place than in a more remote one, and consequently there will be time.

It is confirmed. Let two bodies be taken of which one in fact is moved more swiftly and the other more slowly; if there is not any such non-permanent thing, the proposition is had. If there is, God could co-act with the mover of each for the acquisition of place without co-acting with any agent for the action of such a successive or non-permanent thing. But this being posited, it is certain that the body which now is moved more swiftly will then also be moved more swiftly and will come sooner to the end of an equal space, and through this in a lesser time. Therefore there will be time.

Perhaps it would be said to this that, the aforesaid cases being given, neither will one body be sooner in a nearer place than in a more remote one, nor will one be sooner or earlier at the end of the space than another, since just as nothing can be white unless there be in it that which is essentially whiteness, so nothing can be here or there prior to another in duration and another posterior, unless there be in them that which is essentially *prior* and *posterior* or duration having from itself *prior* and *posterior*. But in the aforesaid cases there would not be such a thing, therefore etc.

Against this. Because with what ease you say that in that case a body will not be sooner in one place than in another nor will there be time, with the same ease it can be said to you that now in fact there is no time nor is anything prior to another according to duration, since it is no more certain to us now concerning any such thing than it would be certain then. For whatever things we perceive now in moved bodies, we would then also perceive. Since therefore we now concede time to be and one body to be in one place prior in duration than in another, it is also to be conceded that then it would be. And if then it would be, and there would not be any non-permanent thing, so also now it must be said to be. Otherwise such another thing is posited gratuitously and irrationally.

(The first conclusion is proved by a fifth reason)

Fifth, if time is such a thing, it follows that it is possible for two bodies A and B to begin to be moved together, and for A to be moved only for one hour, but B for a thousand years (or a time equal to the time of a thousand years) continuously, and yet to cease to be moved together first with A, so that neither would A rest sooner than B nor would B be moved longer than A. This consequent is most absurd and the consequence is declared. For, whether time is a successive thing distinct from motion as these say, or whether it is the very thing which is motion, provided however it is a thing successively distinct from permanent things in such a way, the whole motion which would be caused in B in a thousand years—if it were moved over some space by its own force, with God co-acting according to the common course—God could cause by His own power with all its accident as quickly as A will be moved, since He can accelerate the motion of B and of any body in whatever velocity He wishes. But this being posited, it follows that in the motion of B there will be a time of a thousand years, if time is distinguished from motion, or that in B itself there will be a time of a thousand years if it is not distinguished; and consequently **B will be moved for a thousand years and yet will begin and cease to be moved together with A.**

This reason proceeds directly against those who posit a proper time in every motion, but it can also be effectively reduced against those who posit time only in the motion of the heaven, or the motion of the heaven itself. For every motion which in fact will be caused in the heaven through the space of a thousand years, God could cause in the heaven in the space of one hour. For as many times as the heaven will be revolved in a thousand years from the same point to the same point, so many times He could revolve it in the space in which it is now turned through the twenty-fourth part of its circuit. Wherefore, standing the uniformity of the motion of some clock which now in one hour is moved by so many lines, while the wheel of the clock will be moved precisely by so many lines, God could completely turn the heaven as many times as in fact it will be turned in a thousand years, and cause the same parts of motion in number in the heaven with all their same accidents.

Conversely the consequence could be declared by positing that God would cause the motion of A or of the heaven, which in fact will be caused in one hour, in the space of a thousand years; which certainly He could, since He can slow any motion in whatever proportion. The force of this reason, although otherwise, **Augustine** posits where above, chapter 24, to prove that the motion of the heaven is not time; whose process proceeds directly, supposing that motion is any such thing existing in the heaven.

(The second conclusion is proved by reason 1-2)

I prove the **second conclusion** first thus: If time is a thing inhering in motion, it will be possible by divine power for something to be truly moved without time or with no time existing. It is clear, because God can preserve any subject without its accident. He could therefore preserve any existing motion, preserving no time. Which if He did, bodies would truly be moved, since in them would be true motions, and yet there would be no time.

I prove the falsity of the consequent. Because, if something were moved, truly and properly speaking of motion, it would truly successively and not simultaneously acquire or lose that thing according to which it is moved, or acquire part after part, and thus a part before and a part after, which cannot be without time, as even they concede.

It is confirmed through the **Commentator** on the 3rd *Physics*, comment 4, saying that "**motion is nothing other than the generation of part after part of that perfection to which it tends.**" Therefore in motion there is *before* and *after*.

To this reason perhaps they would say, as is clear from the things recited above, that it is true that in motion there is *before* and *after*, but this does not belong to it from itself and essentially, but through something inhering in it. Wherefore they say "they can conceive and opine that motion is all at once, as that something is suddenly moved from the place of fire to the place of earth." Wherefore if motion were made without an accident inhering in it, it would not have in itself *before* and *after*.

To the contrary. It is impossible for something to be moved unless it is the "**act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency.**" And consequently, unless some part of it is yet to be acquired by the mobile while some of it is acquired. Therefore it is impossible that any motion be all at once. Wherefore although it is possible that something be suddenly transferred from the place of fire to the place of earth, nevertheless that translation would not be motion if it were posited, but would be an indivisible change, to which the premised definition of motion would not belong, just as it does not belong to indivisible generation according to the **Commentator** on the 5th *Physics*, comment 21.

And from this it further follows that no one can truly conceive or opine something to be moved by conceiving it to be wholly at once the act of the mobile. It is confirmed, because it is essential to motion that it be an imperfect act and admixed with potency, as was copiously proved in the preceding distinction, question 5.

Furthermore, if all parts of motion can be together, therefore motion is of the number of permanent things, which nevertheless they deny.

Second principally thus: If motion is the subject of time, either the whole itself is its subject, or something of it. And if so, either divisible or indivisible; for it cannot otherwise be understood that it is its subject. The first cannot be said: Both because nothing is indivisible in motion nor in any extended thing in that way, as will be clear in the following. And because, suppose there were such indivisibles, there is no reason why it is subjectively in one indivisible of it rather than in another. Therefore either in none or in all.

And in the same way it is proved that it is not in any divisible part of motion precisely—and I speak always of division according to the dimension of the mobile and simultaneous parts—which if nevertheless were given, an inconvenience to be inferred would still be inferred.

If the last be posited, namely that it is in the whole motion, then it follows that time will be divisible into simultaneous parts, and according to length, breadth and depth, and another part of the time of the heaven will be in the East, another in the South, another in the West, which these utterly spurn.

(The third conclusion is proved, first)

I prove the **third conclusion** first thus: Either the instant, if it is such an indivisible not enduring thing, is subjectively in the mobile itself or in some accident of the mobile itself. If in the mobile, since the mobile loses it, therefore it is changed from it; either therefore divisibly or indivisibly. Not divisibly, because the instant is posited as indivisible, again because it would follow that some part of the instant would endure through time, which they deny. Therefore indivisibly. And if so, therefore it is simultaneously changed from the instant and has been changed from it. Either therefore simultaneously it has been changed from it and has been changed to it, or first it has been changed to it and afterwards changed from it. If the first is given, therefore the instant is simultaneously generated and corrupted, and is and is not. If first it has been changed to it, therefore it endures through time.

To this also can be applied all the reasons made above in distinction 1, question 5, to prove that there is not given "having been changed" things non-permanent, as some opine.

Nor could one say that the mobile is not changed to the instant nor changed from it, because it is not intelligible that the mobile first be in potency to having some entity and afterwards have that in act, or conversely first have and afterwards not have, and yet not be changed to it and be changed from it, since "to be changed according to some entity" is nothing other than to behave otherwise according to it afterwards than before. Furthermore, everything passing from the non-being of something into the being of the same, or conversely, is changed according to that, as is clear from the 5th *Physics*.

It is confirmed, because with the same ease it could be said that in the acquisition of a permanent thing or loss, the subject is not changed. Which no one would say who wished to use words in their signification.

If however it is said that it is subjectively in some accident of the mobile itself, either in a permanent accident, or in a non-permanent accident. If the first is given, it is argued against, just as has already been argued. If in a non-permanent accident, either divisible according to extension and the division of simultaneous parts, or indivisible according to total division. Neither can be said, because if it were in a divisible accident, the instant itself would be divisible according to length, breadth and depth, which is to

be reputed by them more inconvenient than that time be so divisible, or at least not less. But that they repute entirely impossible. Therefore this also.

Furthermore, since according to the aforesaid opinion the instant continues the past part of time with the future, and time does not have such simultaneous parts, the question stands, according to which part of itself the instant continues the parts of time. And there will not be a stronger reason for one than for another.

If it is said that it is in an indivisible accident, as perhaps they would say that it is subjectively in "having been changed" which is indivisible according to extension, this is false, because then it would be necessary to ask concerning the subject of "having been changed" itself. For either it is some indivisible of the mobile itself, and it is clear that not, because there is no reason why one indivisible of the mobile, for example of the heaven, be the subject of "having been changed" rather than another; and consequently either it is in every indivisible of the heaven—and consequently is extended, since no corporal accident can be wholly in diverse parts of a subject—or in none. Or the subject of "having been changed" is the heaven itself, and consequently it is divisible just as the heaven, and through this also the instant, to which it is subjected; and it returns to what they think inconvenient, namely that the instant has simultaneous parts distant according to site.

(The third conclusion is proved, second)

Second, if the instant is such a thing, it follows that in any time many instants distinct according to reality and essence succeed one another; nor is the same instant itself according to itself, which was before, posterior. The consequence is clear. But the consequent is expressly against the determination of the **Philosopher** in the *Physics*, where determining the question concerning the unity or plurality of instants in time, moved in the beginning of that treatise, he says: "**The 'now' itself is indeed as the same, but it is as not the same. For according as it is in one and another, it is different. But this will be to the 'now' itself. But insofar as the 'now' itself is whatsoever being, it is the same.**" Behold that the "now" is one and another according as it is in one and another place; but insofar as it is a certain being according to itself, thus it is the same, and not one after another.

It is confirmed, since where he moved the aforesaid question he proved that it would be the same instant, because otherwise the instant would be corrupted; and then, either when it is or in the following instant etc., as is clear there. And this reason he nowhere solves. Nor was there another cause, unless because he approved its conclusion as true and knew it to conclude demonstratively.

ARTICLE 1 PART 2

Having seen what thing time is not, and what thing also an instant is not, it must be seen what thing each of these is. And regarding this I posit three conclusions.

(First conclusion)

The **first** is that time is some thing. I prove this thus: Time is a creature of God, therefore time is a thing. The consequence is evident; the antecedent is proved by the authority of **Augustine** in *On Genesis* (the

imperfect work), where he says: "This certainly must be accepted in faith, even if it exceeds the mode of our thought, that every creature has a beginning, and time itself is a creature and through this itself has a beginning etc." Also in the 11th *Confessions* in many places he says God is the creator of times.

Second, it is argued through the Parisian article 199 saying: "**That aevum and time are nothing in reality but only in the apprehension of the soul: error.**"

Third, by reason thus: Everything by which we measure the delays and durations of motions is time. Some thing is of this kind, therefore etc. The major is clear from the common speech and conception of men concerning time. For therefore we call one motion longer than another because it is done in a greater time, and another less long because in a lesser time, and another equal because it is performed in equal time. The minor is proved. For by the heaven itself continuously moved we measure other motions, as will be declared below.

(Second conclusion)

The **second conclusion** is that it is necessary, if something is moved, for time to be; and if time is, for something to be moved, so that each of these copulatives is impossible: "something is moved and no time is," "time is and no thing is moved."

The **first part** is proved by the authority of the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, penultimate chapter, saying: "**It is manifest that everything which is moved is necessarily moved in time.**" Also from the intention of **Augustine**. For indeed in the 11th *Confessions*, chapter 24, he expressly says that if there were no motion of celestial bodies, and here a potter's wheel were moved, there would still be time. Furthermore in *On Genesis* (the imperfect work) he holds that the motion of a spiritual creature, for example of an angel or the human soul, when it is moved with thoughts, cannot be without time. And he says the same in the 12th *City of God*, chapter 15. Wherefore in both places he concludes that if before heaven and earth there were angelic motions, there was also time. From which it is manifestly clear that according to him it is impossible for something to be moved without time.

Second, the same is proved by his reason in the previously alleged places. For it is impossible for *before* and *after* which are not together (or *before* and *after*) to be, without time being. And it is necessary, if something is moved, for there to be *before* and *after*, as he says; and it was proved immediately in the second conclusion against the recited opinion. Therefore etc.

Addition 18: Second, the same is proved by the reason of the **Philosopher** immediately where above. For if something is moved, it is moved either swiftly or slowly. Therefore, if something is moved, it is moved in time, and consequently time is. The consequence is clear, because the swift is defined "to be that which traverses much in a little time."

Perhaps a calumny would be placed concerning the first consequence which is "if something is moved, it is moved either swiftly or slowly." For it would be said that if only one mobile were moved, it would not be moved swiftly nor slowly, because nothing is said to be moved swiftly unless in comparison to another which is moved more slowly or less swiftly.

It must be said that whether the assumption be true or not, the reason is not impeded then. Because if two were moved, they would be moved either equally swiftly, or one more swiftly than the other. And consequently either in equal time, or greater, or lesser. And through this time would be. But it is certain that one of them would be moved no less in time if it alone were moved than if another is moved with it, although it would not be moved in equal or greater or lesser time than another.

Furthermore, posited that one alone were moved, either it would be moved over the second half of the space equally swiftly, or more, or less than it was moved over the first. And then the argument proceeds in the same way, so that although it could not be compared to another mobile, nevertheless the same thing moved over one part of space can be compared to itself moved over another in the premised manner. And the reason of the **Philosopher** stands. The Ordinary Text follows.

I prove the **second part** of the conclusion first by the authority of **Augustine** in the 5th *On Genesis* (the literal commentary), chapter 7 concerning small things, where he says that "**if there were no motion of either spiritual or corporal creature, by which through the present future things succeed past things, there would be no time at all.**" But if this consequence is good, the opposite of the consequent is not compatible with the antecedent, and consequently this copulative is impossible: "some time is and no motion is." And because it follows "nothing is moved, therefore no motion is," and to what the consequent is repugnant, the antecedent is repugnant, therefore this also is impossible: "nothing or no thing is moved, and some time is," which was to be proved.

Also in the 12th *City of God*, chapter 15: "Where no creature is," he says, "**whose mutable motions perform times, times cannot be at all.**"

To this also is the authority of the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, where he expressly says and tries to show that without motion time cannot be. He also holds the same in the 8th *Physics*, where he proves that if time was eternal, motion also was eternal, since, as he says, "**if time is, it is necessary for motion to be, since indeed time is a certain passion of motion.**"

(Third conclusion is proved by reasons)

The **third conclusion** is that a body continuously and regularly moved is time.

I prove this thus: Everything according to which we can measure the delays of motions and rests and also the durations of things (that is, know how long a thing is moved or rests or endures) is time. But a body continuously and regularly moved is of this kind. Therefore etc. The major is clear from those things which men commonly speak concerning time. For we call that motion longer or that thing to be moved longer which is moved in a greater time; and that less long, which in a lesser time; and that equally, which in equal time. In the same way we speak of rest and similarly of the duration of things, for we call that to endure more or longer which endures for a longer time; and that less, which for a shorter; and equally, which for an equal. So that we measure all these by time and not by anything else, as is clear. And consequently everything to which these belong is time. The minor is declared. For if there is some body which is moved continuously and regularly, anyone knowing this can measure by it and know concerning others, how much they are moved, and which longer and which less long.

For let A be a body which someone knows to be moved regularly. And let B, C be moved bodies, of which he wishes to know which is moved longer, by applying through consideration or comparing each to A itself. And seeing that B began to be moved while A was in such a demonstrated place (for example D), and was moved continuously until A will come to another place (suppose E), and then ceases to be moved; but C beginning also to be moved with A existing in D, was moved continuously until A came to a place more remote from place D than place E is (namely to place F); or conversely C beginning to be moved with A existing in a place prior to D itself (that is, more remote from place E toward the part from which A is moved), was moved up to E, he immediately knows that C was moved longer than B. And if both began to be moved with A existing in D, and both also cease to be moved with A existing in E, knowing this, he says they were moved equally or for an equal time. And in the same way, if B begins to be moved with A existing in D, and C begins to be moved with A existing in E or in any other place, according to what he sees this or that to have ceased to be moved with A more or less or equally distant from the place in which it was while this began, than from the place in which it was while the other began to be moved, he knows whether they were moved for an equal time; and if not, which longer. Which he could not, unless A had been moved continuously and regularly through both spaces. Through this mode we are certified concerning the delay of other motions by clocks and also celestial bodies, and so we could by others, if any were moved continuously and regularly, and their being so moved were known to us. Through a similar mode we can measure and know how long some temporal thing endures or how long a resting thing rests, and which more and which less and which equally.

From this it is clear that for knowing the aforesaid, there is not opportune any thing distinct from the mobile and motion and other permanent things, such as those of whom mention was made above feign. Nay rather, if there were any such thing, it would be useful in absolutely no way for measuring the motions or rests or even durations of others in this way, because it is entirely latent and utterly unknown or at least less known than is opportune for having such knowledge of others. For by unknown things no one is able to measure anything. For this same cause motion itself properly accepted (namely the thing which is continuously acquired by the mobile or moved thing) is not time. For frequently such a thing is not known, or less than is necessary for having such knowledge of others. This is clear concerning the motion of the heaven and of clocks. But the mobiles themselves are more manifest than the motions, and therefore we measure rather by them, and through this it belongs more truly to the mobile itself to be time.

But because "to be a measure" belongs most to unity, and consequently to number, and thence to others insofar as in some way they are reduced to number or to one, as is clear in the 10th *Metaphysics* (wherefore also continuous quantity or magnitude is not a measure unless reduced to number or to unity: to unity indeed if it is minimal at least according to institution, as is said there, how for example a digit; but to number as a palm which consists of so many digits, or an ell which contains so many or so many palms in number determinately, and unless it were thus numbered by palms and the palm by digits as by unities, it would not be a measure, nor would it be properly called an ell according as an ell is a species of measure). Which discretion or numbering nevertheless need not be done through a real section of parts, but it suffices that it be through the signification of the soul, as was said in the First, distinction 24, question 2, in the response to one argument. Because, I say, it is so, and the moved thing itself is in itself continuous and is moved continuously—nor is time or a measure such (as was said) as this or that body is, but as it is moved—it is necessary that it be numbered in some way and reduced to number.

But it is numbered not according to itself, but according to the *before* and *after* of its motion. For it is considered as it was in a prior place and as it is in a posterior place, and as from the prior it comes continuously through the medium to the posterior, and then we say it is time.

(The third conclusion is proved by authorities)

And this is what the **Philosopher** says in the 4th *Physics*, where he says that "then we say time is made, when we perceive the sense of prior and posterior in motion. But we determine it by accepting one and another itself, and the medium of them another. For when we understand the extremes of the medium, and the soul itself says 'two,' as this indeed prior, that indeed posterior, then also we say this is time," (this I say namely the mobile). And therefore, what the **Commentator** says in the same place, comment 100—"and it follows from this speech that motion divided by two instants, prior and posterior, is time itself"—is to be understood by concomitance only, so that the sense is: Motion divided etc. is time, that is, when motion is thus divided, then it is time. And the alleged words of the **Philosopher** hint this enough.

Which is further confirmed from others which he adds a little after. For, the definition of time having been given, he says: "**Therefore motion is not time, but according as motion has number,**" that is, but time is that according to which motion has number. And the **Commentator** there expounding in comment 101 says that "**time is not motion, but according to before and after is the number of motion, that is, numbered through its prior and posterior parts.**" But it is certain that only the mobile itself is that according to which motion is numbered according to its prior and posterior parts. But it is numbered in the mode exposed above.

Therefore the definition of time given by the **Philosopher**—namely "**number of motion according to before and after,**" where, as he adds, "**numbered number**" is accepted—either is to be understood by concomitance in the aforesaid mode, so that this proposition "time is the number of motion according to before and after" is equivalent to this: "time is when motion is numbered according to before and after." Or let motion be taken for the moved thing, just as frequently saints and philosophers speaking of motion understand by this name "motion" the moved thing, and then the sense is "it is the number of motion" that is, it is the moved thing numbered according to before and after. For when the moved thing itself is accepted as in this prior place and as in this posterior place, and thus is applied to many by consideration, it is replicated many times, and from this to the sense of the **Philosopher** in a certain way it is numbered.

Wherefore also in the following chapter he says that that which is borne is the same and is numbered according to *before* and *after*. And he gives the example of Coriscus, who existing the same according as he is elsewhere prior, and elsewhere posterior, is said in a certain way to be another. And the **Commentator** in the same place, comment 104, says that "when the translated thing is accepted per se, it will be one; and when it is received in respect to diverse places in which it is during its translation, it will be diverse according to priority and posteriority and number happens to it." And below he says that "**the translated thing is numbered, that is multiplied through before and after.**" Which cannot be understood except in the aforesaid mode.

And according to the other of the aforesaid expositions, all authorities saying that time is motion are to be expounded.

But it must be known that, just as **Augustine** sententially posits in the 12th *City* chapter 15, time can be taken in two ways, namely commonly and properly: Time taken in the **first mode**, everything continuously moved, with whatever genus of motion it is moved, is time. For any such thing numbered by the soul can be the measure of the delay of motion and rest in others, according to the sense posited before. But in the **second mode** only celestial bodies continuously moved are called times. Wherefore he says thus: When the Lord instituted them, He said "And let them be for signs and for times and for days and for years." Therefore according to them, as through those things which are commonly known to all to be moved both always and also more regularly than others, generally all judge concerning the quantities of the delays of motions and rests and durations of temporal things. And therefore, as **Augustine** says, they are called "**times usually and properly.**"

Nevertheless both in the first and in the second mode there are degrees. Since even of other movers those which are moved locally, and of these even those which are moved circularly (like clocks), are more properly called times. Since the conditions of measure belong more truly to them as to things moved more manifestly and regularly.

Likewise among celestial bodies the **First Mobile** is most properly called time because it is moved more swiftly and regularly than the others in every way, and therefore by it judgment is made concerning the others. And therefore the **Philosopher** says in the 10th *Metaphysics* that it measures "motion by the simple and most swift motion. For this has the least time. Wherefore in astrology such a one is the principle and meter. For they suppose a regular motion and the most swift one, that of the heaven, to which they judge others." Where the **Commentator** in comment 4 expounds saying: "**That is, and they posit the simple motion, which is the most swift of all motions, the measure through which they measure all motions. And this motion is the diurnal motion of the heaven. For the time of this motion is the least of all times.**" And he adds: "**And therefore they measure the motion of the orbs of stars by the motion itself which is the principle of all motions.**" But by the motion of the heaven they understand the **moved heaven itself**. For it is certain that the motion of the heaven cannot be such a measure, as was said above.

And this mode of speaking is very much used among authors. Wherefore in the 2nd *On Generation*, penultimate chapter, where the **Philosopher** says that the lation which is about the oblique circle is the cause of generation and corruption, by "lation" he understands the **heaven itself borne**, which is clear through the cause which he renders a little after. For he says: "**For it happens sometimes to become far, sometimes near. But with the distance being unequal, the motion will be unequal. Wherefore if in approaching and being near it generates, and in receding and becoming far it corrupts that same thing etc.**" But it is certain that the mobile itself is that which approaches and becomes near and recedes and becomes far. Therefore by "lation about the oblique circle" he understands the heaven borne obliquely. And to this mode many sayings of saints and philosophers speaking of motion and time are to be accepted.

(On the instant)

But concerning the **instant** I say that it also can be accepted in two ways, namely commonly and properly: In the **first mode**, everything which is moved is an instant. In the **second mode**, the **First Mobile** is the instant, so that the same thing itself is the instant and time. Nevertheless these two names

are not synonyms nor do they signify the same thing according to the same reason. Where it must be known that *time* signifies the mobile, connoting it to have been in a place in which it is not, and to be in a place in which immediately it was not nor immediately will be, and immediately to be about to be in a place in which it is not. So that of nothing is it truly said that it is time, unless these are true of it. But *instant* signifies the same mobile itself, connoting the place in which it is, and with this also connoting that immediately in that place it was not and immediately in it will not be. And instant can be taken commonly, just as was said of time. And taken most properly, the instant is the **First Mobile itself**.

But that the instant is the mobile itself is clear through the **Philosopher** in the words alleged against the other opinion. In which he says that the "now" itself, according as it is in one and another, is different; but insofar as it is whatsoever being, it is the same. But it is certain that only the mobile itself is that which existing the same according to itself is prior in one and posterior in another. Therefore according to the intention of the **Philosopher** the mobile itself, which is moved, is the "now" or instant.

(Against the conclusions, fifteen dubia)

Regarding the aforesaid there are doubts, and **first** against the first conclusion. For it seems that no thing is time. Since no thing is composed of those which are not, as was assumed against the other opinion. But every time is composed of those which are not. Therefore etc. The minor is proved. Since every time is divided into prior and posterior or into past and future. But neither the past nor the future is.

Or otherwise thus: No time is, every thing is, therefore no thing is time. The minor is known. The major is proved, because no past time is, and no future time is, therefore no time is. The antecedent is clear and the consequence is proved, because every time is past or future.

Second, the **Commentator** on the 4th *Physics*, comment 88, says that "**no part of motion is in act.**" And he adds that "**motion is composed of this which now fails and of this which is not yet.**" And he says the same is of time. The **Philosopher** also seems to say similar things in that chapter "And just as motion," where he solves the reason proving time not to be. But it is certain that no thing is composed of those which are not. Wherefore etc.

Third, it is argued against the first part of the second conclusion. Because it is possible for something to be moved, and not be numbered according to the *before* and *after* of its motion. Therefore it is possible for something to be moved and no time to be. The consequence is proved from the things said above, namely that time is "numbered number" according to the understanding given there.

Fourth, against the other part of the same conclusion it is argued that it is possible for time to be, and no thing to be moved. Since it is possible for *before* and *after* which are not together to be, and no thing to be moved. Therefore it is possible for time to be and no thing to be moved. The consequence is clear, because it is impossible for *before* and *after* to be, without time being, as was assumed in the proof of the first part of the same conclusion. But I prove the antecedent in three ways:

First, since it is possible that nothing be moved, and yet something be suddenly changed. But it is impossible that something be suddenly changed, without it having been before under one opposite, and afterwards being under another, and consequently there being *before* and *after* which are not together.

Second, for God could destroy every creature. Which being posited, He could create a single soul and could annihilate that created one. These being precisely posited, there would be no motion or nothing would be moved, and yet that soul would not be and not be at the same time, but first it would not be, and afterwards it would be; and again after it had been, it would not be.

Third, because it is certain that God created the soul of Adam before the soul of Abraham. And if no thing had ever been moved, He could have created this one and that one just as He created, namely not both together, but that one before, this one after.

It is confirmed because, the case being posited, with God creating the soul of Adam (speaking strictly of creation as it is distinguished from conservation), this copulative would have been true, if it had been: "the soul of Adam is created and the soul of Abraham is not created, and the soul of Abraham will be created." And again with God creating the soul of Abraham, this would have been true: "the soul of Abraham is created and the soul of Adam was created, and is not created." And thus *before* and *after* would be given, and past and future and present.

Fifth, against the same part of the same conclusion thus: It is possible for all mobiles to rest. Therefore it is possible for time to be, and nothing to be moved. The antecedent is clear speaking of the possible by the absolute power of God, as "possible" is accepted in all the aforesaid. The consequence is clear also because, just as what is moved is moved in time, so also everything which rests rests in time.

Sixth, against the third conclusion it is argued that not everything continuously moved is time, since then there would be many times simultaneously, and similarly, that an angel and a soul would be certain times; both of which seem inconvenient.

Seventh, the **Philosopher** reprobates both the opinion saying that time is the motion of the whole and the one saying that it is the sphere itself moved. Therefore according to him, time, most properly spoken, is not the **First Mobile** continuously moved.

Eighth, to the same point. Since it would follow that whatever things are moved, are moved in equal, indeed in the same time. And through this nothing is moved more swiftly or more slowly than another. The consequence is clear, because for all there is the same **First Mobile**. And by the same it follows that things which hitherto were moved, were moved in the same time in which now are moved things which are actually moved; and that they lived in the same time who were once and who afterwards and who now (for example Adam, Abel and Abraham and Isaac and we who actually live). And all these are absurd.

Ninth, if the **First Mobile** is time, either it is a day or a year or some other time. And because there is no greater reason for one than for another, it follows that it is all these. But this is absurd, since then neither would a year exceed a month, nor would a month be greater than a day, nor a day than an hour. Nay rather a year would not be other than a day or than an hour. And thus, one who lived for one day, lived also for one year, nay rather for a thousand years, and universally for every time, which not even a fool would say.

Tenth, the **First Mobile** is moved in time, and is not moved in itself. Also it could, neither increased nor diminished, be moved in a lesser time and also in a greater, just as it pleased God. For it could be moved both more swiftly and more slowly, and consequently it is not time.

Eleventh, there are many authorities saying that time is an accident and passion of the first motion, but the **First Mobile** is neither an accident nor a passion of anything.

Twelfth, it is argued that it is not an instant. Since then time would be an instant and consequently whatever things are made in an instant would be made in time and conversely; and whatever things were moved in time would be moved in an instant.

Thirteenth, to the same point by the reason of the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*. For it follows that things which were in the thousandth year were in the same instant with those which were in the hundredth. And consequently they were together. And similarly it follows that things which will be tomorrow will be together with future things at the end of the world, and not prior to them. It is clear, because they will be in the same. Furthermore from the same it follows that contradictories will be true together. For if Socrates is now white and tomorrow will be black, this is true in the present instant "Socrates is white," and tomorrow this will be true and in an instant "Socrates is not white"; and if the heaven is the instant, it will be true in the same instant, and consequently together.

Fourteenth, by another reason of the same. Since then there would not be many instants in time, but one only. But this is false. For of any finite time there are two terms and not one only; but time is terminated by instants. It is confirmed, because the common saying is that something is made in one instant, and another in another instant, and that many, nay infinite instants are in time, which would not be true if the **First Mobile** were the instant.

Fifteenth, **Augustine** in the 11th *Confessions*, chapter 21, expressly seems to hold that neither time nor the instant are outside the soul. "**For these three**," he says, "**are certain things in the soul, and elsewhere I do not see them: the present of past things is memory, the present of present things is intuition, the present of future things is expectation.**" And because, as he said in chapter 18, only that which is entirely indivisible can be called present, it is clear that by present is understood the instant. Thus therefore both time and the instant are in the soul according to him. Therefore the **First Mobile**, which is a true thing outside the soul, is not time nor the instant.

(To the doubts 1-15)

I respond. **To the first**, I deny the minor. To the proof, when it is said "every time is divided into prior and posterior etc.," it must be said that by accepting *prior* and *posterior* which are not together, as it seems to assume, the proposition in its propriety is simply false.

Nevertheless, it is true in the sense which authors and those who rightly understand them have from it. Where it must be known that *prior* and *posterior*, or *past* and *future*, are not to be thought of as parts constituting that essence which is called **time**. For this is utterly impossible, as was proved above. But they are to be accepted according to *to be*, *to have been*, and *to be about to be*, and by mutual negations, of the same **mobile continuously moved**. I do not say, however, *to be* or *to have been* or *to be about to be* simply, but to be **here** or **there**, or such or such, or in another mode according to which something can be said to be moved (for example, in that which is continuously moved locally). For every such thing was somewhere where it is not, and is somewhere where immediately it was not nor immediately will be; and

immediately it will be somewhere where it is not. And I speak of place primarily, which is not called the place of a body by reason of a part of it.

Therefore, what is said, that time is divided into past and future, the true sense is that the **mobile continuously moved** (by which we measure the delays of motions etc., according to the understanding given above) was somewhere where it is not, and immediately will be where it is not. Similarly, time is divided into *prior* and *posterior*, that is, the mobile continuously moved etc. was somewhere prior, and somewhere posterior. And similarly in its own way, it must be expounded concerning a mobile moved according to some other species of motion. And because this name **instant** does not connote these things, therefore it is called indivisible.

To the **other form** which is made to the same point, I respond by denying that major: "no time is." To the proof, if *past* and *future* are accepted properly, namely as they are distinguished against *present*, I concede the antecedent, and I deny the consequence and that proposition assumed for its proof, namely this: "every time is past or future." For its contradictory is true; nay rather, according to **Augustine** in the 11th *Confessions*, chapter 21 and also 29, even the contrary is true, namely this: "no time is past or future." For he says that "**it is not properly said 'there are three times, past, present and future'.**" And that "**custom abuses**" to say this. And his reason is because neither future things are nor past things. But what is not, is not time.

To the second, it must be said that the **Commentator** says motion and time are composed of that which now has failed and of that which is not yet, insofar as that which is continuously moved and is time immediately was where it is not now, and immediately will be where it is not yet. Nor are he and the **Philosopher** to be understood to have wished to say anything else.

To the third, it must be said that "numbered" can be accepted in two ways: namely, according to **act** and according to **proximate and propinquous potency**. And what is numbered in this second way is more properly called *numeral* than *numbered*. Nevertheless, according to the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, "**we call both number.**" Time therefore can be accepted either for that which is actually numbered according to *before* and *after* (in which way the **Philosopher** also accepts it when he says that "**it is impossible for time to be if the soul is not,**" for although time could be, with the soul not existing, nevertheless time cannot be *time*, with the soul not existing; and therefore this copulative is impossible: "time is and no soul is," just as this one: "the numbered [that is, what is numbered by the soul] is and the soul is not"). And thus the argument proves best. But I do not accept it thus in that second conclusion. And it can also be accepted for that which the soul **can** thus number, and so I accept it in that conclusion. And so also the authorities induced for its proof accept it, so that by the name of time is understood something which **can** be numbered by the soul according to the *before* and *after* of motion; and by it thus numbered, the duration or delay of another can be measured, as was said above. And against this understanding the reason does not proceed.

Addition 19: It could also be said that, although no soul were, still the **mobile continuously moved** would be in that way actually numbered by God, and consequently would be time and the measure of others—not *by which* they would be actually measured (because properly speaking God measures no thing by any other thing, since nothing is unknown to Him; but properly one is not said to measure something unless that thing were unknown to him, regarding how great it was, and he acquires this

complex knowledge through another thing known to him)—but it would be the measure *through which* [it is measurable]. The Ordinary Text follows.

To the fourth, I deny the antecedent, and I concede it to be possible that something be suddenly changed and nothing be moved, properly speaking; and that, if it were so, that thing would not be under one opposite *prior* than under another, nor yet simultaneously under both. Where it must be adverted that it is impossible for any two things to be compared according to *prior* and *posterior*, except through comparison to some third thing.

Wherefore of two halves of the same magnitude, neither is prior to the other except in comparison to something else, to which the one which is nearer is prior, and the one which is more remote is called posterior. In motion also, no part is called prior to another, except through comparison to that from which the motion began. And similarly in time, as the **Philosopher** says in the 4th *Physics*, there is *prior* and *posterior* through comparison to the "now," although conversely in past and future things, as he declares there and similarly in the 5th *Metaphysics*, chapter *On the Prior*. If therefore no thing were moved continuously and there were some white stone, and God suddenly destroyed its whiteness and caused blackness in it, or it were in the East and suddenly were located in the West, it would not be truly said that *prior* it had been white and *posterior* black, nor *prior* in the East and *posterior* in the West, because some other thing would not be given to which it could be compared in such a way according to the aforesaid. Nay rather, if such a comparison ought to be, it would be necessary that it be of several things in comparison to the term from which it was changed. And then it would not be a sudden change, but a continuous or divisible motion.

To the second proof of the same antecedent, I say, that case being posited, although it would be true to say that that soul was not *before*, nevertheless it would not be truly said that it *prior* was not and *afterwards* was, and *after* it was, is not. But it would be well said that, **if time had been** and it [the soul] were, it *prior* would not have been and *afterwards* would have been etc. And this is clear, because nothing else would be signified when it was said "it was prior" (as we speak of *prior* in the proposition) than if it were said "it was in a prior time." And certainly, if time had been, it would have been in that time.

But if it is posited that time was not, it was not in a prior time and consequently neither was it *prior*. **Augustine** consorts with this in the 11th *Confessions*, chapter 14, where he sententially denies God to have been *prior* to the creature, speaking of the priority of time. And this is because **no time was before the creature**. Wherefore he also says that God does not precede times by time, but by eternity.

This also is similar: just as if there were no place and there were only three bodies A, B, C, none would be prior to another according to place. If however place were, A would be prior to B etc.

If however it be insisted: This consequence is good "Socrates is white, therefore Socrates now is white" and "Socrates was white, therefore Socrates prior was white," then in the given case those copulatives are to be denied. If indeed it is not permitted to infer thus, but conditionally only—for example "Socrates was white, therefore, **if time was**, Socrates prior was white"—the antecedent is to be conceded and the consequence by which it is said "and thus *prior* and *posterior* would be given etc." is to be denied, although the verb of the past and future tense would be given.

To the fifth, I deny the consequence. To the proof it must be said that, although everything which rests rests in time, nevertheless this is not a simple consequence: "if something rests, it rests in time." Wherefore, if besides God there were only bodies and none were moved, it is certain that no time would be, and consequently nothing would rest in time, and yet many things would rest.

To the sixth, it must be said that **time** can be accepted in two ways: namely commonly, and specially for that to which it belongs to be time most of all. In the **first mode**, concede that there are many times; but in the **second mode**, not. And this is the express determination of the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, last chapter, and of the **Commentator** in the same place, comments 132 and 133. But time spoken of most properly is the **First Mobile**, as was said above. And this the **Commentator** calls in comment 133 "the first time," and says that it is "**prior to other times and numbering them**"; also in the 10th *Metaphysics*, comment 4, he expressly posits many times, just as was alleged above.

And if it is said that then it follows that, if there were many worlds and many First Mobiles continuously moved, there would be many times simultaneously—but the consequent is impossible, as is clear from the 4th *Physics* through the **Philosopher** who deduces **Plato** to this inconvenience, and yet the antecedent is possible according to truth—it must be said that according to truth both the antecedent and the consequent are possible, and according to the **Philosopher** both are impossible; nevertheless according to **Plato** the antecedent was possible (as the **Commentator** hints there in comment 93), but the consequent was impossible. And therefore the reason of the **Philosopher** is good against the man.

Furthermore this difficulty can be made thus against those saying time is the motion of the heaven or an accident inhering in motion, since if there were many worlds and first moved heavens, there would be many such accidents. Similarly if a thing existing subjectively in the soul is posited, in many souls simultaneously there can be such things. I concede also consequently that both an angel and a soul and universally whatever is continuously moved is time, speaking of time commonly.

To the seventh, it must be said that the **Philosopher** does not inquire in that chapter *what*, that is *what thing*, time is, but what is the definition of time commonly taken. But at the end of the book he inquires to what thing that definition belongs. Since therefore, where he inquires the definition of time, he says "time not to be the motion of the whole or the sphere etc.," he does not intend to say that the thing which is time is not this or that, but that such things are not one or the same according to definition or do not have the same definition. Wherefore even if they signify the same thing, they do not however signify according to the same aspect like synonymous names. And this is clear enough, because his reasons prove nothing more, as is clear to one diligently considering.

To the eighth, it must be said that whatever thing is posited to be time, according to no opinion, when it is said *something is or is moved in time*, is it signified *that thing is or is moved in that thing which is time*. Wherefore neither do those who posit time to be a successive accident of the heaven (whether it be motion or distinct from motion), when they say a horse runs some space in time, understand that it runs in some accident existing in the heaven, but they understand that its running can be measured through that thing which is time.

And thus also the **Philosopher** expounds in the 4th *Physics*, saying that "**for motion to be in time is to be measured by time**." Which is nothing other than to be moved as long as another mobile moved most

regularly is moved from this or that point to that, or so many times or so many times from the same to the same, just as was declared above. According to this therefore, for something to be moved in a greater time than another is the same as to be moved while the **First Mobile** (speaking of time most properly called) traverses a greater part of its circuit or the whole of its circuit more times. And conversely it is to be understood by "to be moved in a lesser time." But those are said to be moved in an **equal** [time], of which one is moved while the **First Mobile** traverses as great a part of its circuit or the whole so many times, as great or as many times as it traverses the whole while the other is moved. Finally those are said to be moved in the **same** time, of which one is moved while the heaven is moved by the whole turn, by which turn it is moved while the other is moved. Which ordinal number indeed can be taken by the distance from the first turn of its turning or from some other determined past one. Which I say on account of the opinion of the **Philosopher** denying the **First Mobile** to have been revolved for a *first* time.

From these things it is clear that the inconveniences which are induced do not follow. Not the first, because not however much the heaven is turned or however many times while one thing is moved, so much or so many times is it turned while any other thing is moved. Nor the second, because, even supposing that Adam and Abraham lived for an equal time, nevertheless they are not said to have lived simultaneously or in the same time, because not by what turn the heaven was turned when Adam began to live or when he ceased, by that whole turn was it turned when Abraham began or ceased. And in a similar way it is to be said of others.

Addition 20: To the eighth it must be said that, although the **First Mobile** is time, nevertheless these names, as was said, are not synonyms. Nor is the same signified if it is said that "something is moved in time" and if it be said that "it is moved in the heaven." But by the first is signified that the motion of that thing is measured by time, that is, as was said above, that through time it is known or can be known how long it is moved. And therefore the **Philosopher** says in the 4th *Physics* that "**for motion to be in time is to be measured in time.**" So also "some things to be moved in the same time" is not "those things to be moved in the same heaven" or the same is not signified by each saying, but by the first it is given to be understood that both were moved while a determined part of the regularly moved body (for example the heaven) was moved through a determined space. But "to be moved in equal time" is: One to be moved while a determined part is moved through an equal space, and if [one is moved] while it is moved more times through its whole circuit, to be moved so many times through just as much, as many times as it was moved while the other body was moved. And "to be moved in a greater time" is to be moved while the heaven itself, to the aforesaid understanding, was moved through a greater space, or more times through an equal one. And conversely it is understood by "to be moved in a lesser time." The Ordinary Text follows.

To the ninth, it must be said that those temporal names—hour, day, year and similar ones—do not properly have an *incomplex signification*, so that they could stand for some entity. But when they are assumed in enunciations, they are equivalent in signifying to one oration; for example if it is said "Socrates was in Paris for one month" or "it is a month or one month has passed since Socrates was first in Paris," nothing else is signified than if it were said "**the First Mobile has been completely revolved thirty times since Socrates was first in Paris.**" And according to this it is clear that the argument does not proceed, because it is founded on a false imagination, namely that such names have such a signification that, with some thing demonstrated, it happens to truly say "this is a year" and so of others, which certainly is false.

And the opinion positing time to be some successive thing (whether motion or existing in motion) distinct from the heaven and other permanent things is most compelled to say this, according to the understanding reprobated in the preceding. Since if "year" signifies some part of such a successive thing including other minor parts which are called months or days, it is most truly said "no year is a thing" just as was proved above. And consequently no thing is a year.

To the tenth, it must be said that speaking of time commonly, it is truly said that the **First Mobile** is moved in time, just as also truly it happens to measure the motion of the heaven by something moved below, as is clear in the 4th *Physics* through the **Philosopher**. And similarly by the common use of clocks, by whose motion we know how great a part of the day or night has passed since we began to write or read or do something else, that is, by how many degrees the sun has been moved. And according to this mode the heaven is not said to be moved in itself just as neither is it said to be measured by itself, but just as it can be measured by another time, so in another time it is said to be moved. And according to this it is clear how it could be moved more swiftly and more slowly.

If however we speak of time most properly called, thus it is not rightly said that the **First Mobile** is moved in time, but rather that it **is time**.

To the eleventh, it must be said that in such authorities and common sayings the terms stand simply or materially, not however personally. And "accident" and "passion" are taken for certain predicables, not for some things informing other things. Now however it does not follow: "Time is a passion of the first motion, the First Mobile is not a passion of anything, therefore the First Mobile is not time," if "time" in the conclusion stands personally. For in the major it stands simply, otherwise it is false. Example, it does not follow: "Risible is a passion of man, man is not a passion of man, therefore man is not risible." But it is a fallacy of equivocation regarding the third mode, if the major is posited to be true. And with this also is a fallacy of the accident. Similarly it does not follow: "Creative is a passion of God, God is not a passion of God, therefore God is not creative." For in both places the premises are true, and the conclusion false.

To the twelfth, I say that by the virtue of speech that is to be conceded: "**time is the instant**" because the subject and predicate stand for the same thing; because however those names are not synonyms, and something is connoted by one which is not connoted in the same way by the rest, therefore another thing can be signified by an enunciation in which one of them is posited, than is signified by that in which the rest is posited. And in fact common use admits so. Wherefore when it is said "something is made in an instant," they do not understand that that thing is made in the thing which is the instant, whatever that may be. Wherefore those positing that the instant is an indivisible accident passing rapidly, existing in the heaven, do not intend to signify by an enunciation of this kind that that thing is made in such an accident. For such a sense would be too insipid. Just as neither do those saying "something is made in time" wish, if they understand rightly, to signify that that thing is made in the substance of the heaven or some accident of it, as was said above. But by the first they wish to signify that that whole thing is made while the heaven, or another continuously moved, is in **this place or that demonstrated**, in which neither immediately was it nor immediately will it be, so that nothing of it was made while the mobile was in another place, nor will be first made while it will be in another place. Nor let force be made here regarding how the heaven is said to be in a place or to be moved locally, but let it be received according to a good understanding.

And this is also "the making of something to be measured by an instant," according to a good understanding of that common saying, whether "to be measured" is accepted properly or not. But that is said to be made in **time**, of which something was made while the heaven was in a prior place, and something while it was in a posterior place, and something will be made while it will be in a posterior place. Although therefore the same thing is the heaven, time, and the instant, nevertheless not the same is signified when something is said to be made in time, and when it is said to be made in an instant, or when it is said to be made in the heaven. And therefore they are not indiscriminately admitted or rejected.

To the thirteenth, it must be said conformably as was said to the eighth. For according to a good understanding some things are said to be in the same instant, not because they are in the same substance or in the same some accident of the heaven, but because, while the **First Mobile** is in this demonstrated place or site in which immediately it was not nor immediately will be (and that either by the whole turn, or by the quota it is in that place), each of them is. If however one had been while the **First Mobile** was in one place, and the remainder had been while it was in another place—or if each had been while the **First Mobile** was in this same place, one nevertheless while the **First Mobile** was there for the hundredth turn, but the remainder had been while the **First Mobile** was there for the fiftieth turn—it would not be said to have been in the same instant with that one, but in another prior one. If however it had been while the **First Mobile** was there for the thousandth turn, it would be said to have been in another posterior instant. And things which are said to be in the same instant in this way, are said to be **together**. But those which are in one and another, one is said to have been prior, the other posterior.

From these things it is clear that any consequence of those is to be denied in the sense in which the consequent is reputed false. Nor does any proof proceed to the purpose.

To the fourteenth, although it might be conceded that there are many instants just as there are also many mobiles, nevertheless speaking about the same mobile and time (for example about the First), I say that going to the force of speech it would have to be absolutely denied that there are many instants or that many instants succeed one another; and it must be said that that very instant which is, was and will be, nor is one corrupted and another generated. But that "many instants" are spoken of, is not properly said, nevertheless it is true according to the understanding of those understanding rightly. Where it must be known that, although the **instant** is not another thing than the **mobile itself**, nevertheless this name "instant" connotes something else besides the mobile, as was said above. And among other things it connotes **this place determinately**, or **that determinately**. And through such a connotation of this place in which it is, and of that in which it was or of that in which it will be, the instant has been accustomed to be distinguished by "now" and "then," so that taking "now" more strictly it connotes determinately the place in which it is, but "then" not the place in which it is, but in which it was, or in which it will be. For we add "then" both to verbs of past time and of future. On account of this plurality of places, in which the mobile is successively, it is said that instants are many in time, and that another is prior, another posterior, another past, another present, another future. Nor is their sense that there are many things succeeding one another in the mobile, as some imagine.

This is the express determination of the **Philosopher** in the 4th *Physics*, where he determines that the "now" or instant, according as it is some being, is the same; but according to being and according to reason it is different and different. But this he declares saying: **"For indeed according as it is in one and in another, it is different. But this will be to the 'now' itself."** And afterwards he still adds the example

of **Coriscus** who, according as he is a certain being, is the same one who was in the market and who is in the theater; and yet according as he is in the theater and in the market he is different and different. But it is certain that according to the thing Coriscus himself is not different in the market, different in the theater. Nevertheless he is called different according to reason on account of the diversity of the theater and the market. Wherefore the reason signifying Coriscus and consignifying determinately the market and not the theater is other than that which signifies Coriscus connoting determinately the theater and not the market. And from this it follows that he is also different and different according to being—not that by "being" ought to be understood some entity distinct from Coriscus existing in him; but the sense is that one thing is signified when it is said "Coriscus is in the market" or "Coriscus is in the market," and another when it is said that he is in the theater, or that "Coriscus is in the market" is one complex signifiable, "Coriscus is in the theater" another. And briefly the **Commentator** teaches this expounding the aforesaid in comment 104, when he says: "**For 'Socrates is in the market' is other than 'he is in the house'.**"

Through the aforesaid it is clear how two instants are said to be the terms of any finite time. Since namely everything which is moved finitely is moved from some determined place to some determined place; and itself, as it is in the place in which it begins to be moved, is called one term; and as it is in the place in which it ceases, is called the other term.

The response to the confirmation is also clear and how the common saying is to be understood, that in time there are many and infinite instants.

Addition 21: Through these things also is clear the sense of that distinction accustomed to be given concerning the instant, namely that one is **continuative** of time, another **initiating**, another indeed **terminating**. For then the mobile is called a **continuative** instant, when it is in some determined place in which immediately it was not, but also immediately it was in another, and again immediately it will be in another in which it is not, or that prior immediately it was moved and afterwards immediately it will be moved. But then it is called **initiating**, when existing somewhere not immediately prior was it moved, but afterwards immediately it will be moved. Conversely indeed then it is called **terminating**, when existing somewhere prior immediately it was moved, but not immediately afterwards will it be moved.

And to distinguish the instant thus concerning secondary times is available enough. But concerning the **first time** the **Philosopher** opined otherwise, who posited the **First Mobile** to be moved from eternity and into eternity. And through this, in time itself he gave neither an initiating nor a terminating instant, but said any one was the term of past time and the principle of future. But the truth holds otherwise, which [holds] that to be effected, and says it began to be moved and also is about to cease to be moved. The Ordinary Text follows.

For the solution indeed of the **fifteenth argument** it is to be known that, just as in the general name of *measure* we understand that by which it is known how great some thing is, so also in the special name of *time*—speaking commonly nevertheless of time—we understand that by which it is known how much some moved thing was or rested or even endured, as was said above.

Now however that by which this is known is twofold. For this is known by something which is the knowledge of it, and that has not been accustomed to be called time. In another way this is known by something which is **foreknown**; and this is twofold. For something is foreknown in itself, but something

not in itself, but in its representative. Which diversity of the mode of knowing was sufficiently declared in the First, distinction 3.

An example can be given in the measure of magnitude. For someone accustomed to measure cloth by means of an ell, and from this having in mind the species or representative (whatever that may be) in which he knows the quantity of the ell, will know by means of such a foreknown representative whether the cloth is greater or less than the ell, and also how great it is, although that measurement is not as certain as if he applied the ell actually known immediately in itself to the cloth.

In the proposition, since through the heaven or another body regularly moved we know how long something is moved, since we cannot do this except by knowing from what point to what point it was moved continuously while the other was moved, nor could we do this except by knowing it to have been successively in all intermediate places—which cannot be done except by means of some **representative** (for it was not nor is simultaneously in all)—it is clear that in such measurement two things are foreknown: one in itself immediately, namely the **representative** which the soul has with itself; the other foreknown in another (namely in its representative), namely the **moved body itself** according to which we judge of the other. And each of these can be called **time**. And accepted in the first mode time is **in the soul only**. And so **Augustine** accepts it in the 11th *Confessions* where he is alleged, and also in chapter 28 and 29. But in the second mode time is a **thing outside the soul**. And in this way he accepts time in the 5th *On Genesis*, chapter 7 concerning small things, where he says that time is "**the motion of the creature etc.**," that is the moved creature, as was expounded above.

And it is to be adverted that by time called in this second mode one cannot measure without time called in the first mode, on account of the assigned cause. But it is otherwise concerning the measure of magnitude; for through an ell known in itself and intuitively he can measure cloth, suppose that then he foreknows no representative of it. And on account of this also perhaps authors say of time specially that it has being from the soul.

(To the reasons of Burley)

Now to the reasons of the other opinion. **To the first** it must be said that neither in agonistic games nor in any thing of the world is there found *before* and *after* to that sense which the opinion has, but certainly in such games someone and some persons successively operate many things; because also what is continuously moved locally, successively according to itself or its parts coexists with many parts of magnitude. And similarly in its own way *before* and *after* is found to this understanding in others continuously moved. But on account of this, as is clear, it is not necessary to posit some thing other than permanent things, composed of prior and posterior parts, such as the opinion imagines.

From this it is clear that neither the confirmation nor the second reason are valid for the purpose, since they do not prove time to have *before* and *after* to the sense which he intends. For not therefore is one thing said to have been prior in time to another or in a prior time because it was in some prior part of some such thing, but because it was while the **First Mobile** was or coexisted with prior places or the same ones by a turn of a lesser quota, according to the understanding exposed above in the response to the 8th argument and also to the 13th.

To the others which he says consequently there is no need to respond, since all are founded on this false foundation. And if it is argued, because time is *per se* quantity, and not permanent, therefore successive—the first part of the antecedent is clear through the **Commentator**, as they say, in the 5th *Metaphysics*, and the second part is proved above by them—it must be said that, although following the property of speech it could be said that time is a quantity or permanent quantum, nevertheless no thing becomes greater on account of time, since it does not inhere in the thing which is measured by time (as the opinion imagines), nor is added and united to anything so that from them another greater thing results. Nevertheless emulating the common use of speaking, by which one time is said to be greater than another, and one thing to be of greater time, another of less, it can be conceded that **time is a successive quantum** to that understanding according to which time is said to be greater or less. But it is called greater because [it is] moved regularly over a greater space, or because more times over the same. And according to this the first part of the antecedent can be denied. Nor is the proof valid, because although the **Commentator** says there that "motion and time are quantities *per se* and continuous," the **Philosopher** nevertheless expressly says the opposite in the same place; and similarly the same **Commentator** immediately after, expounding the **Philosopher**. For both hold that motion is quantitative on account of the space over which the mobile is moved, and time is quantitative on account of motion. And they say the same expressly in the 4th *Physics*. And therefore either that text is corrupt and a negation is missing there by the vice of the scribe, or the **Commentator** expressly contradicts himself and **Aristotle**. And through this his authority is not to be received in this.

Furthermore it is also against those alleging it for themselves in this that he says motion is *per se* quantity. For since according to them it cannot be called *per se* permanent quantity—for such a thing has parts together, but motion does not have parts together *per se* according to them, but by accident namely from the mobile in which it is—it is left that it is *per se* successive quantity, and consequently from itself having *before* and *after*, which they deny. Nor can they say that the **Commentator** there accepts motion for time, as they are sometimes accustomed to say, since the **Commentator** there names both and enunciates plurally that they are *per se* quantities.

ARTICLE 2

(Four Conclusions)

As for the second article, I posit four conclusions.

The first is that no time was created before the angels. This is clear first by the express authority of **Augustine** in the 12th *Confessions*, chapter 15. It is also proved by a reason founded nevertheless on authorities, thus: No thing was created before the angels, therefore no time was created before the angels. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, both from the opinion of **Augustine** immediately above, and from the saying of **Hugh of Saint Victor** in *On the Sacraments*, book 1, part 5, chapter 5, saying that "**angels were made in the beginning, and the first creature, before which nothing was made.**" Of this opinion were **Gregory Nazianzen** and **John Damascene**, book 2, chapter 3. And generally today all doctors and saints hold that in the beginning all angels and corporal matter were created together. Whose opinion the authority confirms saying: "**In the beginning God created heaven**

and earth"; the Gloss: "**That is, spiritual and corporal nature.**" This also the Church expressly determines in the *Extra, De summa trinitate et fide catholica*, "Firmiter credimus."

The second conclusion is that, time taken commonly, not before *every* time were angels created. This is proved, because with some bad angel demonstrated, who is actually moved by some continuous motion—whether according to qualities by which they are tormented (in which it is credible enough that there are vicissitudes, so that now by one punishment now by another they are tormented, just as is read of damned men), or whether according to their thoughts and depraved affections, which perhaps sometimes they have more intense sometimes more remiss according to that: "**The pride of those who hate you ascends always**"—or who sometimes was moved thus (with some such angel demonstrated I say, and consequently someone who is or was time, as follows from the things said above), it is true to say "before this [time/motion] angels were not created." It is clear. For this angel was created together with others, therefore not before *every* time were angels created. And the consequence is clear.

The third conclusion is that, speaking of time primarily and most properly called, if the opinion is true which says that all celestial bodies and spiritual or angelic nature were created together (even according to the form and disposition which they have), angels were not created before time. But otherwise, if the other opinion is true which posits that they were not made together, but on the second day the firmament was made, and so the rest successively. Nor does this conclusion need proof.

The fourth is that, however time be taken, angels were created before some time was time. This is proved, because all were created before it was true to say of anything "this is moved," because never of anything continuously moved is it *first* true to say that it is moved, since there is not given a first part of motion. Therefore all were created before anything was time.

From this it follows that not together time was and time was time, although some time together was and began to be time, just as together the **First Mobile** (for example) was and began to be moved, as I suppose probably enough. At least thus it was possible to be, as in many others we see in fact.

To the principal reasons of the question I respond. **To the first** I say that for angels to have been created *together* with time can be understood in two ways: In one way "together" that is in some one common measure of duration (for example time or an instant), and so I deny the consequence. The instance is clear in a similar case: if there were two bodies only, A and B, it would not follow "A is not posterior according to place than B, nor together in place with B, therefore it is prior in place than B." For the antecedent would be true, and the consequent false, because neither would be in place. Similarly positing that besides A and B no time was or had been, but both or one (namely A only) had been time, it would not follow "B was not created after A, nor together with A, therefore it was created before A." For the antecedent would be true and the consequent false, because no third common thing is posited which was time or an instant in which A and B were together, or one prior or posterior to the other.

In another way "together," not in some such common measure (because perhaps there is none), but either because if some such were, they would be together in a common measure, or because of them it happens to say truly copulatively "this is and that is," and in both ways I deny the antecedent. And I say that if some common time or instant had been, time and angels would have been created in the same instant. But what is said, that it is impossible for time to be created in an instant, is false conceiving truly of time,

although it be true supposing the false imagination of time reprobated above. Again that copulative would always have been true: "angels are and this is" (with something demonstrated which is or was time).

To the second it must be said that the first part of the antecedent is false. To the saying of the **Apostle** it must be said, just as **Augustine** says *To Orosius against the Priscillianists*, chapter 5, that the Apostle "**called 'eternal' those things which have no time before them.**" But these are the first times, which nevertheless were not eternal properly and to the common sense of eternal, but had a beginning of duration.

QUESTION 2

WHETHER an angel is in an indivisible or divisible place.

Regarding the second part of the same distinction in which the **Master** asks and determines in what place angels were created, I ask whether an angel is in an indivisible or divisible place.

And it is argued that it is in an indivisible place thus. An angel is in place, and not in a divisible place, therefore in an indivisible place. The consequence is clear. And the first part of the antecedent is proved by the authority of **Damascene**, book 1, chapter 18, saying that "**an angel is contained in place corporally.**" The second indeed from the 4th *Physics*, where it is said that "**place is equal to the placed.**" But it is certain that no divisible is equal to an indivisible. But an angel is indivisible. Therefore no divisible is the place of an angel.

To the opposite it is argued. For as is held in the text, **Strabus** and **Bede** say that the empyrean heaven, "**as soon as it was created, was filled with holy angels.**" But from this it follows that an angel has a divisible place. For if everyone had been in an indivisible place, and the heaven was filled with them, it would follow that the heaven was composed of indivisibles, which is impossible.

In this question two things are to be seen: The **first** is whether magnitude is composed of indivisibles, which is touched upon in the argument; and whether in magnitude there is anything indivisible. For to know both of these is necessary enough for the principal inquiry. The **second** is what is asked.

ARTICLE 1

(Three Conclusions)

As for the first I posit three conclusions: **The first** is that no magnitude is composed of indivisibles, from which it follows that every magnitude is composed of magnitudes. **The second**, that every magnitude is composed of infinite magnitudes. **The third**, that in no magnitude is there anything indivisible intrinsic to it.

(The First Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the **first conclusion** thus: If some magnitude is composed of indivisibles, either it is composed of infinite ones in multitude, or of finite ones only. Taking "infinite" categorically, not of infinite ones, since then it would be infinite according to extension, which in fact I suppose to be false. The consequence is clear. For it would have in itself parts mutually equal according to magnitude infinite in multitude, namely infinite parts of which any would be constituted from four or ten indivisibles, since in an infinite multitude of indivisibles there would be infinite quaternaries and infinite denaries of indivisibles; and any quaternary would be of equal magnitude to any other quaternary, and any denary to any denary of the said multitude.

Nor can it be said, just as those holding such composition from indivisibles more commonly say, that it is composed of finite indivisibles only. Which I show by mathematical and physical reasons.

(Mathematical Reasons 1-9)

First indeed I argue thus: If magnitude (for example a line) is composed of indivisibles (suppose points), it follows that in a continuum there is something less than a point, and that a point is greater than a line, and a smaller line is greater than a greater one. But any of these is manifestly impossible. Therefore also the posited.

I declare the consequence. For let there be some line, for example of six points, or however many you wish, and let this line be A-A. And upon it (by the first corollary of the first of the First of **Euclid**) let an equilateral triangle be constituted, of which each side is greater than line A, and let each be (for example's sake) of 15 points, which constitute an angle in point S. But it is certain that lines A-S on either part are nowhere equidistant, since they are straight and concur in point S (but equidistant lines if protracted to infinity never concur). Let there be taken therefore in each line A-S a part of two points, and let it be A'-B and A'-B'. It is certain that B and B' are less distant than A' and A'. But A' and A' were distant by four points only, since the whole [base] is precisely of six points. Therefore B and B' will be distant at most by three. And by the same reason the third point of one will be less distant from the third of the other (for example C and C'), therefore by two at most. And the fourth of one from the fourth of the other by one only (suppose D from D'). Therefore the fifth and the fifth (namely E and E') will be distant by less than a point, and always any subsequent ones up to S will be distant less than the preceding ones. And so the consequence is clear as to the first part of the consequent [that there is something less than a point].

Description: A diagram showing an equilateral triangle with base A-A' consisting of 6 points. The sides A-S and A'-S consist of 15 points meeting at vertex S. Horizontal lines connect corresponding points on the sides (A'-B to A'-B', C to C', etc.) showing decreasing distance as they approach S.

Again, these lines A-S and A'-S in their points near point S are distant by some amount. Let those be R and R' which are distant by at least a point. Also others which follow (namely Q and Q'), since they are more distant, are distant by at least two, and others (suppose P and P') by three, and others (namely O and O') by four points, and again other subsequent ones (suppose N and N') will be more distant, at least by five points. And so on, descending up to A, always between co-opposite points there will be a greater distance and of more points. Since therefore distance D-D' is greater than distance E-E', and any other

toward S, and it [E-E'] is punctual only [a single point's width], as was proved before, it follows that a point is greater than a line [since the gap near S is smaller than a point but is a line distance], which is the second part of the consequent.

Also, because line C-C' is greater than any higher distance toward S, and it is of two points only, and through this distance I-I' (which is of nine points) is greater than it, it follows that line C-C' (smaller) is greater than a line greater than itself, which was the third inferred thing.

The second reason is, since it follows that a greater line falls between the sides of a triangle near the angle which they constitute than is the base of that angle. And thus the sides of some triangle are more distant from each other near the angle which they comprehend than they are distant in the base, from which they are drawn, which to the sense is clear to be false. It is also clear that if from the extremities of the base equidistant lines are drawn, the lines constituting the angle will fall within them, as is clear to the sense.

The consequence is declared. Let there be angle C, whose base is line A-B. Then I will constitute another triangle within this upon the same base, and let it be triangle ADB; it is certain that angle D is greater than angle C by the 21st of the First of **Euclid**. Also I will make another within that, and let it be AEB. Let it be posited therefore that line A-C is of 20 points, as many as line B-C is also, but the base (namely line A-B) is only of 6 points; and let there be signed near C two points proximate to it, one in line A-C, the rest in line C-B, and let them be F, F'. These cannot be less distant than by a point, and immediately under that point let there be angle D, which also in its two points proximate to itself will be greater, and will be expanded more than C, and consequently at least by two points. And by the same reason the expansion of angle E in its proximate points will be at least of three points, and so always descending and at any point constituting an angle within the preceding, one will come to an angle within whose two proximate points of the sides will fall a line of 15 points and more; and the base is posited of 6 points only. Wherefore the proposition is had.

Third, let there be a straight line of three points A-B-C, and by the first of the First of **Euclid** let an equilateral triangle be erected and let it be ADC, and let the points of one side be D, E, C, but of the rest D, F, A. Then I ask, either the sides concur in points F, E, or not, but only in point D. If so, then it is not an equilateral triangle, against the posited. For line A-F is only of two points and similarly line C-E, but line A-C which is the base is of three, wherefore they are unequal.

If however those points F, E do not concur simultaneously: either one point is intercepted, or less than a point, or greater than a point. If one only, since also between A and C only one point falls, it follows that line A-F is equidistant to line C-E, and since they protracted in their rectitude concur in point D, it follows further that they are not equidistant, which is a contradiction. If less than a point is intercepted between points F, E: therefore a point is not indivisible. If something greater than a point, therefore there those lines are more distant than in their beginnings, and consequently protracted in a straight line they never concur, nay rather by how much longer they are protracted, by so much more will they be distant. But it was posited that they concur in point D. Therefore they concur and do not concur.

Fourth, it follows that the diameter of a square is equal to the side, which is a manifest impossible. And although the **Subtle Doctor** [Scotus] deduces to this inconvenience, and well, nevertheless I prove the consequence otherwise than he.

For let there be square ABCD, whose diameter is E. Then let line D be protracted in a straight line in the part where it is joined to line A, as much as you please, and similarly line B in the same part; by the second part of the first petition of the First of **Euclid** it is valid "to protract a defined line into a continuum and straight line however much." Then by the 31st of the same First, from point F let a line be drawn equidistant to line A which is the side of the square, until it cuts line B in point G. Then by the first part of the first petition of the same, I wish that from the first point of the diameter which is outside line D, to the first point of line F-G which is outside the same line D, a straight line be drawn.

Addition 22: Then these things being disposed, this line which certainly passes through the side of the square (namely through A), certainly touches it in its final [point]. Then concerning this line I ask whether it concurs with line D in any point of D itself, or not. The first cannot be said: Both because, since D is straight, this line would not be straight because the middle would go out of the extremes. For each of its extremes is outside the extremes [of D]. The Ordinary Text follows.

Then it is certain that this line passes through some point of line A which is the side of the square. Either therefore through the point which is in line D and is the final of line A, or through the proximate point, which is the first of those which are outside line D, or through some other higher point toward G.

The first cannot be said: Both because then the middle of this line would go out of its extremities, since its extremities are outside the extremities of line D, and the middle is in line D (which line D certainly is straight), and consequently this line would not be straight, which is against the posited.

And because, since this line is posited straight, it follows by the 13th of the First of **Euclid** that line A falling upon it constitutes with it on either part two angles equal to two right angles, or right angles. But this is manifestly false. For line A with line D constitutes two right angles, since one is within the square and consequently is right, and line D is straight throughout; but the angles which are comprehended by this line and line A on either part of it are *parts* of those two right angles (this one of that, and that one of that), since this line on either part is terminated *within* line D and line A, and through this divides or at least takes away from the angle comprehended by both. Therefore both this and that is less than a right angle, and consequently both are not equivalent to two right angles.

Addition 23: And third, because it would follow that two straight lines enclose a surface, against the fifth petition of the First. The consequence is declared. For by the 31st of the First, from the third point of the diameter—which namely is the second outside line D, and immediate to the point from which the other line is posited drawn—I will draw an equidistant to line D up to the given line F-G. It is certain that this will be terminated at the third point of line F-G, which namely is the second outside line D and proximate to it, to which the preceding line is terminated. Otherwise if it fell below or above, it would not be equidistant to line D, since on the part of the diameter it is distant precisely by one middle point. Therefore this will be joined to the first line, and will touch it in its extremities, just as the third point of the diameter is immediately joined to the second, and similarly in line F-G. But it was posited that in the middle about the line (namely A), it will not be joined to it, nay rather a point will be intercepted,

otherwise it would not be equidistant to line D. From which it follows that there a surface will be enclosed between them and each [side], each of which is straight. The Ordinary Text follows.

It is left therefore that that first line does not pass through the final point of line A which is in line D.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved)

The **second conclusion** is that every magnitude is composed of infinite magnitudes. But on account of the sayings of some in this matter, it must be distinguished concerning this term "infinite," which can be accepted in two ways according to the common saying, namely **syncategorematically** and **categorematically**. In the **first mode** it is worth the same as this phrase: "not so much but that there is a greater" (as to continuous things) or "not so many but that there are more" (as to discrete things). But I think it would be more properly said: "greater than however much finite" or "more than however many finite."

But **categorematically**, if it is accepted in continuous things, it is expounded by this phrase: "so much that there is not greater" (supply: is or can be); as to discrete things indeed: "so many that not more."

But this exposition does not seem congruent, since according to the **Philosopher** the first heaven or at least the whole world is so much that there is not nor can be greater than it, and yet it is not infinite. Also according to many modern doctors, than infinite things there can be, nay rather there are, more. And therefore better according to others "infinite" is expounded: that is, greater than two-cubit and than three-cubit and so of other finite quanta. And this in continuous things. But in discrete things: "more than two and than three and than four" and so of other finite multitudes.

Or otherwise, although not to the sense, "infinite" in this way as to continuous things is defined by this phrase "greater than however much finite"; and as to discrete things, "more than however many finite."

But these acceptations differ enough. For "infinite" retained on the part of the subject **syncategorematically** renders the proposition universal; but taken **categorematically**, not. Also sometimes taken in one way the proposition is true and in the other way, false. For example, posited that the world were perpetuated in dispositions such as it is now acted, if it were said "infinite men will have been past," if *infinite* is taken **syncategorematically**, the proposition is true, since more than however many finite will have been past; but **categorematically** false, since not more than however many finite will have been past.

(Proof of the Conclusion)

This being premised, I say that, this term taken in either way, every magnitude is composed of infinite partial magnitudes according to multitude, or that in any magnitude there are infinite parts, of which any is a magnitude. I prove therefore three things in order.

The first is that the parts of any magnitude are actually many. **The second**, that of any magnitude there are infinite parts, of which any is a magnitude, taking *infinite* syncategorematically. **The third**, that of any magnitude there are infinite parts, of which any is a magnitude, taking *infinite* categorematically. And in

this whole article I speak of parts **properly**, namely calling those parts of magnitude from which magnitude results, or of which any is an aliquot part of the whole, or of some part of it, or constituted from such; in which way points, suppose that they are, are not parts of magnitude, as is clear from the preceding conclusion.

I prove the **first** first thus: Of any magnitude some parts are actually distant, therefore the parts of any magnitude are actually many. The antecedent is clear, since every magnitude has part and part from which it is composed and, as is clear from the preceding conclusion, no magnitude is composed of indivisibles. Therefore every part of magnitude has parts. But some part of one part is actually distant from some part of another part, for example the extreme half of one half (which is a fourth of the whole) from a part of the other half of the whole. The consequence is evident enough, since it necessarily follows "this is actually distant from this, therefore this is actually other than this" (with the same things demonstrated); and further, "therefore this and this are actually many."

Second, than some part of any magnitude some part is less. Therefore the parts of any magnitude are actually many. The antecedent is known, since the half of a half is less than the half of any magnitude. The consequence is evident of itself.

Furthermore, the judgment as to this is the same concerning any parts of a truly continuous magnitude. But now to the sense we see that of some magnitude some part is actually white, with another existing actually black; one hot, another simultaneously existing cold; one dense, another rare; one straight, another curved. Also one can be corrupted with another remaining safe. All which necessarily convince those parts not only to actually be, but also to be actually many, and distinct from one another.

It must be adverted nevertheless that, although the parts of magnitude be actually, and actually parts and also actually many, nevertheless they are not many **actual** parts, but **potential**, according to the difference given concerning parts in the first book, distinction 24, question 1, where also is shown the sense of authors saying that parts are in potency in the whole, and that they are not many in act. And those things which could be argued against this conclusion can be sufficiently solved from the things said there, and therefore for now I do not argue here against it, but let the things already said suffice.

I prove the **second** thus: Of any magnitude any part has a part. Therefore of any magnitude there are infinite parts. The antecedent is proved, because if not of any magnitude any part etc., it would follow that some part would be indivisible, and through this some magnitude would be composed of indivisibles, the opposite of which was proved in the preceding conclusion. But the consequence is known, because if of any magnitude any part has a part, given whatever number of parts, beyond that (or more than those) will be parts of those parts accepted in the given number. And from this it is clear also that any is a magnitude.

Then the **third**, by which also the second is proved, I prove thus: Of any magnitude any part has a part, as was proved. Therefore of any magnitude the parts are more than however many finite, and consequently infinite.

The consequence is clear, since every part of a part is a part of the whole of that part. Therefore, taking all parts of the whole collectively and to a good understanding, they are more than 4 and than 100, and so of

however many determined numbers. Otherwise it would be to give a maximum number of them and then none of them would have a part and a part, which is repugnant to the antecedent.

Second, of any magnitude all parts are many, and they are not finite, therefore the parts of any magnitude are infinite. The antecedent is clear, taking *all* collectively. For the first part was proved in the first part of this conclusion. But the second is proved, because if all taken simultaneously were finite only, in however much a number they were placed, it would be necessary that any one would be indivisible or lacking parts, the opposite of which is clear from the first conclusion. The consequence is proved, because let the number of all taken simultaneously be given and let it be (for example's sake) 1000; if some of them has parts, since its parts are parts also of the whole magnitude, it follows that they are more than 1000.

The consequence is clear, since every multitude is either finite or infinite, taking this term categorematically.

Third, every multitude exceeding some finite multitude beyond every finite proportion is infinite. This is clear. But the multitude of all parts of any magnitude taken collectively exceeds some finite multitude (for example duality) beyond every finite proportion, as is clear from the preceding foundations. Therefore etc.

Fourth, of any magnitude infinite are the parts, therefore of any magnitude **all** parts are infinite. The antecedent has been proved, taking in it *infinite* syncategorematically. And the consequence is clear, taking in the consequent categorematically and *all* collectively. For if the opposite is given, namely that all simultaneously are not thus infinite, therefore all are some finite number. And further, therefore not more than however many finite are the parts of that magnitude, because they are not more than so many as all are simultaneously; therefore neither are its parts infinite (taking *infinite* syncategorematically), which is repugnant to the antecedent. Wherefore generally of whatever things it is truly said *de inesse* and *de praesenti* that they are infinite syncategorematically, it is truly said also that they are infinite categorematically, and conversely. Wherefore as much as appears, those say a repugnance who concede the parts of magnitude to be infinite syncategorematically, and deny it if it is taken categorematically.

It must be adverted however that saying in the aforesaid "all parts of magnitude" (taking *all* collectively) I have followed the common mode of speaking more than the property of speech. For more properly it would be said "**all things of which any is a part**," as frequently was said in the first book. And saying thus the proposition is concluded equally, since all things of which any is a part of magnitude, taken simultaneously are infinite magnitudes, as easily appears to one considering from the application of the reasons made.

If it is said against this, just as I have heard some say, that this term *all* (omnia) or *all* (omnes) cannot be added to a term having infinite supposits or standing for infinite things, especially taken collectively, it must be said this is false and irrationally spoken. Which is clear: Both because the expressly opposite is clear from the saying of **Augustine** in the 12th *City of God*, chapter 18, where he says that "**each single numbers are finite, and all are infinite.**" And he adds that God knows all numbers and not on account of their infinity "**does God's knowledge arrive up to a certain sum of numbers and is ignorant of the rest.**" And it is clear that he takes *all* collectively.

And also from the saying of the **Philosopher** in the 1st *On the Heavens*, where against **Democritus** (positing some body to be constituted of infinite indivisibles of the same species) he argues thus: Either **all** would be heavy, and then no body would be light; or **all** light, and then no body would be heavy. And the **Commentator** says there in comment 76 that "**this follows from their position that they are infinite,**" and "**that nothing is found outside them.**" And it is clear that each takes *all* also collectively.

Furthermore, the **Commentator** in the 3rd *On the Soul*, comment 19, says that "**through the material intellect we judge things infinite in number in a universal proposition.**" But this would be false if a universal sign could not be added to a term having infinite significates.

Furthermore, the office of a sign of this kind, as the **Philosopher** says in the 1st *Perihermeneias*, is to consignify universally. And **Boethius** says there that "**that which is called 'every', that to which it is added, it collects and brings into one body**"; and "universal," to which it is added, "**consignifies universality.**" But whether that to which it is added has infinite suppositis or not, is accidental to the sign.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved from the Intention of Augustine)

The premised conclusion is manifestly proved as to the singulars which have been said, from the intention of **Augustine** in the 2nd *On Free Will*, chapter 15, where he says that "**whatever of body is attained by sense is convinced not to be one, but many; for it is a body and therefore has innumerable parts.**" From which it is clear that according to him every body has innumerable parts, otherwise the consequence which he hints by that "and therefore" would be null. But if it has innumerable, therefore many and also infinite.

Which also appears more from the declaration of the aforesaid word which he adds soon after: "**But that I may not pursue,**" he says, "**each minute and less articulated part, however small that body may be, it certainly has one part right, another left, another lower, another upper, another further, another nearer, others final, another middle. For it is necessary that we confess these to be in however exiguous a module of body.**" Behold that every body and however small a part of a body has many parts. And below similarly he adds: "**Of whatever corpuscle the half part consists of as many two parts as the whole, it also has a half.**"

But from these it manifestly follows that every body has parts not only many, but also infinite. But in what way no such thing is one, and how also it is one, was declared in the First, distinction 24, question 1.

(Arguments of the Hibernian against the Second Conclusion)

Against this conclusion, insofar as it posits infinite parts to be in magnitude (taking this term categorematically), a certain **doctor** [The Hibernian] argues beautifully and subtly proving that in any magnitude it is [possible] to give a **last proportional part** or minimal one. And because it is certain that it is [possible] to give a first and maximal one, it follows necessarily that they are not infinite.

He proves the assumption **first** thus: Let there be two magnitudes A and B touching each other, and let proportional parts be taken in B so that the first is half of it and the second is half of the half, and so on proceeding toward A, then it is argued thus: The multitude of all these parts of B is joined immediately to

A itself. Therefore some part of this multitude is immediately joined to A. The antecedent is known. And the consequence is proved, because it is impossible to imagine that some multitude be joined immediately or be contiguous to something, unless some unity of it be joined immediately to that. If so, therefore some [unity] is the **last**, namely that which is immediately joined to A itself. And it can be confirmed, because if the magnitude which is B were actually divided according to all such proportional parts (retaining nevertheless the same sites, so that they were contiguous just as now they are continuous), some one would immediately touch A, nor is it possible to imagine the opposite; therefore also now, while they are continuous, since in absolutely nothing according to nearness or distance or order of parts would they behave otherwise than they behave now.

Second, let it be posited that some body begins in the extreme point A to be moved toward B, then thus: In this instant that body begins to be moved. "Therefore some one future motion begins in this instant. And I call," he says, "'one motion' which is made over one continuous space with other conditions posited in the 5th *Physics*. But whatever that motion may be, it follows that it is made over a **last proportional part**, because otherwise it would not begin in this instant."

Third, let two mobiles D and C be posited to be moved over B toward A, "and let D be moved twice as fast as C, so that always, when it comes to the end of some proportional part, it rests there until C comes there, either over the same line or over another equal one; for they could over the same" if they were "glorified bodies, because then they would not impede each other. Let it be posited also that C comes to A in one hour terminated in this instant (for example's sake), then it follows that C and D arrive in this instant at A, and neither before the other. But the consequent is against the posited, because D traverses any proportional part sooner than C, therefore all sooner D than C, therefore D comes to A sooner. And the first consequent follows, because in this instant C is at A. If therefore D was at A sooner, therefore for some time sooner it was at A. But let such a time be E, then in time E (a part of this hour) D was not moved, because it was at A for the whole time E, as is said, and C for the whole time E was moved, therefore C in time E either traversed one proportional part only (and consequently the **last**, which is to be proved) or many. If many, therefore not in every proportional part did D wait for C, which is against the posited. Therefore from this that proportional parts are posited actually infinite with another possible not repugnant, these two contradictories follow, namely that C and D arrive at A simultaneously, and do not arrive simultaneously. Therefore that position encloses a contradiction."

Fourth, "in the same case it is argued that in this instant some motion of body C is terminated, because no aggregated motion is terminated in this instant unless through this that some part of it is terminated. Therefore some one motion of C is terminated in this instant. And it follows necessarily that that was made over the **last proportional part**, because otherwise it would not be one, but aggregated from many."

Fifth, "in the same case it follows concerning D that in this instant some motion of it is terminated, or some rest of it. If some motion of it, that was over the **last proportional part**, because that is truly one by reason of space and time, since there is not any aggregated continuous motion of D in time by the posited, and that is some last part. If however rest is terminated, either that is finite or infinite. Not infinite, it is certain, therefore sometime in some instant it began, and let that be F. Then in F some motion was terminated, and it follows necessarily just as before that that was over the last part."

Sixth, let it be so that over such infinite proportional parts there are infinite men having glorified bodies, "so that one body is terminated in the middle point of B itself, and the second body is terminated in the end of the second part, and so of infinite ones over infinite parts proceeding toward A, so that many are not together. Let also C be some body existing over magnitude A, distant from magnitude B by a pedal quantity, then it is argued thus: Some man is closest to C, because if he approached until he came to the men, he would touch some one of them first. Let that man closest to C therefore be Socrates. Either Socrates touches A, or not. If not, therefore he is distant, therefore by a certain part of magnitude B, and so in that part of magnitude are infinite proportional parts, and before that only finite ones. And consequently before that part there are only finite men, nor more over the whole according to this response, against the posited. If Socrates touches A, therefore some proportional part touches A, because the closest extreme of Socrates to C is together with the term of one proportional part of B, by the posited. That part cannot be posited indivisible, because then it would not be a proportional part; nor divisible, because then there would be some posterior to it, which is false; both because necessarily that would be the **last**, which similarly includes contradictories, nay rather, as he says, this is the proposition."

Seventh, "in the same case it follows that with Socrates annihilated some man is closest to C, and so that one is distant from A. Therefore between him and A there are infinite proportional parts, against the posited, because then there would have been infinite men there. Nay rather it follows that that one is over the penultimate proportional part, which encloses contradictories, just as that there is some last one, since one infers the other and conversely."

On account of these reasons—which although that doctor makes principally to prove that it is not possible for there to be infinite proportional parts in act separated, because nevertheless, as he says, they proceed equally and prove that neither are there infinite proportional parts in potency (that is potential, and mutually continued)—he holds simply that in magnitude there are not infinite proportional parts, holding this term "infinite" categorematically. But if it is held syncategorematically and is placed on the part of the subject preceding the distributed term (for example "infinite proportional parts are in magnitude"), he says the proposition is true and to be conceded.

(Arguments of Kilmington and others against the conclusion)

Eighth it is argued by **another doctor** [Richard Kilmington] thus: In no magnitude are there more than two parts. Therefore in no magnitude are there infinite parts. The consequence is clear from the significate of the term. The antecedent is proved, because in no magnitude are there more parts than two halves. Which is proved, because two halves are four fourths and eight eighths and so to infinity, because the whole is its parts. But of no magnitude are there more parts than four fourths and eight eighths, and so the parts are to infinity. Nevertheless this doctor concedes that infinite proportional parts are in magnitude. But from this he says it does not follow that infinite parts are in magnitude, "because it is argued from the inferior to the superior with distribution."

Ninth, by others thus: If in every magnitude there are infinite parts, of which any is a magnitude, as was said above, every magnitude is actually infinite extensively. The consequent is clear to the sense to be false. The consequence is proved because, of whatever things any added to another makes a greater, and two greater than one, and three greater than two, and so of any to infinity of such a kind, if they are

infinite, they make an infinite. But it is certain that any magnitude, of however great quantity it may be, or large or small, added to another makes a greater, and three greater than two, and so to infinity.

Tenth, if in magnitude etc., either in it are infinite parts of the same quantity or of the same proportion. If of the same quantity, therefore any is infinite, which is false. If of the same proportion, the same follows, since if they are infinite of the same proportion, it follows that they are infinite of the same quantity.

Which is proved in two ways: First, because just as two halves are of the same quantity, so also the halves of those halves are of the same quantity, and again the halves of those are of the same quantity. And so, whatever are of the same proportion, are of the same quantity. Second, if there are infinite of the same proportion, not so many finite but that there are more of the same quantity. And if so, therefore infinite of the same quantity. The second consequence is clear and the first is proved. Because beyond every finite multitude of parts of the same quantity, if those are divided as before into parts of similar proportion, more parts are had which are of the same quantity. And because all parts which can be divided are already actually in the whole, it follows that actually in it are infinite parts of the same quantity.

Eleventh, if so, therefore in any part of magnitude there are infinite parts, and consequently either there are not more in the whole than in the part, and through this neither does the total multitude exceed its partial multitude, which is against that principle "every whole is greater than its part"; or one infinite is exceeded by another, which is against the nature of the infinite.

Twelfth, then not more parts would be in the magnitude of the heaven than of a grain of mustard, which seems absurd. And the consequence is clear, because in both places they would be infinite.

Many other reasons could be made to the same point. But because from the solutions of these and from those which were said in the First, distinction 44, last question, the rest can be solved, therefore for now let these suffice.

(Response to the Arguments of the Hibernian)

I respond therefore to these, and **first** I say that the reasons of the first doctor [The Hibernian], if they conclude anything, conclude against him. Which is clear. For he concedes that infinite proportional parts are in magnitude, taking *infinite* syncategorematically. But from this it follows that none of them is the last; and conversely, if some is the last, therefore not infinite proportional parts are in magnitude. The consequence is declared, since if some is the last of some proportion, since also some is the first, therefore all taken simultaneously are of some finite multitude. Otherwise, since any of the preceding is greater than the last (if given), it would follow that the magnitude resulting from all such proportions would include infinite equal parts, and so would be extensively infinite, which is false. Therefore all simultaneously are in some finite multitude, or are some finite multitude. And since there are not more in magnitude than all taken simultaneously, it follows that not more parts are in magnitude than however many finite proportional parts of magnitude. Therefore **infinite proportional parts are not in magnitude**.

Furthermore, if some is the last of proportional parts, either that is divisible or indivisible. If indivisible, therefore it is not a proportional part, because of an indivisible to a divisible there is no proportion. He

himself also makes this consequence in the sixth reason. If however it is divisible, therefore some is posterior to it, as he himself infers in the same place. And I further infer: Therefore it is not the last; and the consequence is evident. And therefore I wonder much about him, since he posits the continuum infinitely divisible and infinite proportional parts to be in it, that he simultaneously posits a last of such parts. Nor does he advert to the mutual repugnance of these sayings.

I respond however to the **first** and I deny that consequence "the multitude of all parts of B is immediately joined to A, therefore some part of B is immediately joined to A," understanding of proportional parts. And he has to deny a similar consequence, if he posits points in a continuum and yet none to be immediate to another, just as he manifestly hints himself to hold in the same question. But when it is added that "it is impossible to imagine etc.," I say that if to someone this is impossible, this is because he imagines parts in a certain number and some one of them the last. But he who understands, just as truly is, that there are infinite and no last, grasps best that none is immediate to A, since he sees well that this necessarily follows from that. Similarly to the confirmation I say that, that division given, no part will be immediate to A, just as neither before the division.

To the **second** I say first that to the understanding which he seems to have, it proceeds even against him and against the **Philosopher** in the 6th *Physics*. For according to this it follows that it is possible to give a first part of motion, the opposite of which the **Philosopher** posits, and it is true, and even he himself [posits] if he wishes to speak consequently.

Second I respond and deny that consequence just as, posited that body A now begins to be moved over magnitude F, this similar consequence is to be denied: "now by A begins to be acquired some part of F, therefore some part of F now begins to be acquired by A." For the antecedent is true, because each exponent is true, namely both this "by A now is not acquired some part of F" and this "by A immediately after now will be acquired some part of F" (because no time will be after now, before some part of F be acquired by it, the case being posited). And yet the consequent is false, since this is false "some part of F immediately will be acquired by A." For a part of it will be acquired *sooner* than it, and thus some time will be, before *it* be acquired.

To the **third**, the case being conceded, I say that simultaneously in this instant D and C arrive at A and neither before the other. And when it is said that this is against the posited, I deny it. To the proof, when it is said "D traverses any proportional part sooner than C, therefore D traversed all sooner than C" and further "therefore D was or came to A sooner," I say that the second consequence is not valid. And the reason is, since by that "D traversed all sooner than C" it is not denoted that in some one instant all those parts were completely traversed by D sooner than by C, but that in some instant *this* part was completely traversed by D sooner than by C, and in some instant *that* part was completely traversed by D sooner than by C, and so of each. Just as neither by this "God created Adam and Noah sooner than Abraham" is it denoted that in some one instant Adam and Noah were created sooner than Abraham. For that would then be false, for in no instant were they created by God, just as in no instant were they. But only it is denoted that Adam in some instant was created sooner than Abraham, and similarly Noah in some instant was created sooner than Abraham, although Noah was created in another instant from that in which Adam was created. But by this "D was at A sooner than C" it is denoted that in some instant D was at A sooner than C, to which it follows that in some instant all those parts were completely traversed by D sooner than by C. And because it does not follow "in some instant *this* part was completely traversed by D sooner than by

C and in some instant *that* part was traversed by D sooner than by C and so of each, therefore in some instant *all* those parts were completely traversed by D sooner than by C" (just as also it does not follow "in some instant Adam was created sooner than Abraham and in some instant Noah was created sooner than Abraham, therefore in some instant both of these namely Adam and Noah were created sooner than Abraham"—for it is manifest that the antecedent is true and the consequent false), therefore also it does not follow "D traversed all parts of this sooner than C, therefore D was at A sooner than C," because, what does not precede to the consequent, does not precede to the antecedent.

Perhaps however it would follow well "sooner D traversed all parts than C, therefore sooner D was at A than C," because in the antecedent the word "sooner" (*prius*) does not follow a plural number nor a verb of past time nor anything else on account of which it be taken away but that it stands for some instant determinately. But then the first consequence would be to be denied, namely this "D traversed any part sooner than C, therefore D traversed all sooner than C," just as this is to be denied "God created each of these namely Adam and Noah sooner than Abraham, therefore sooner God created both namely Adam and Noah than Abraham."

A certain **other doctor** [Adam Wodeham] solves the aforesaid reason by saying that "it is not to be given simultaneously that in a continuum there are infinite proportional parts of this kind, and that all can be traversed in that mode in a certain time with such rests intercepted."

But that is not said sufficiently, since according to himself in a continuum there are infinite such parts, nor is it possible but that it be so. And it is certain that that case is not impossible of itself, but certainly possible, at least by the power of God. Therefore both are compossible, and consequently each can reasonably be given simultaneously.

Furthermore, the same difficulty entirely can be made in another case, which no one would deny to be possible, namely by positing that both D and C are moved continuously without intercepted rest, but that D then first begins to be moved over B, when C first traversed the first half of B itself. And then it follows that they arrive simultaneously at A and yet C traversed any part of B sooner than D. Otherwise if D traverses some part simultaneously or sooner than C, D will traverse the rest of the space sooner than C (otherwise the fast would not traverse an equal space in less time than the slow). And thus D would come to A sooner than C. But that this is false, is clear. Because it was posited that D is twice as fast as C, and consequently in the same time it will traverse the whole of B, in which C will traverse the half only. If therefore they begin to be moved simultaneously [relative to remaining distance/time], as was said, it follows that they also perfect their motions simultaneously.

To the **fourth** and **fifth** simultaneously I say that either by "one motion and not aggregated" they understand a motion made precisely over one proportional part of space, and then I say that no one motion of C or D is terminated in this instant; or they understand a motion made over one continuous space with other required conditions, suppose that in that space many proportional parts are included, and then I concede that some motion of C, nay rather the motion of C itself made over the whole magnitude B, is terminated in this instant. Which to a true understanding is nothing else to say than that now first C traversed that whole magnitude completely. But from this no *last* part of B is concluded, as is clear.

But concerning D itself, which is not posited to be moved continuously except through a single proportional part, I say that no motion of it, nor also any rest, is first terminated in this instant, just as neither is there any last proportional part of B. Nor does he prove that disjunctive. Wherefore and consequently, that case being given, I concede that immediately before this instant D was moved, and immediately it was resting and immediately also it was not moved. Nor are those two repugnant, although these are repugnant "immediately before this instant D was moved," "not immediately before this instant D was moved."

Also concede that posterior to when it was resting, it was moved; and posterior to when it was moved, it was resting; but not posterior was it moved than it was resting, nor prior was it resting than it was moved. Nor nevertheless does it follow that simultaneously it was moved and was resting. Nor also does it follow "immediately before this instant it was resting and was not moved before this instant after it was resting, therefore not immediately before this instant was it moved." Nor from the other part does it follow "immediately before this instant it was moved and was not resting before this instant after it was moved, therefore not immediately before this instant was it resting." And this is clear, if the exponents are considered, and it is recalled that the word "than" (quam) confounds.

Simultaneously with the aforesaid it can and ought to be conceded that D simultaneously ceases to be moved and to rest, expounding "ceases" by the negation of the present and the position of the past. For each of these is true "D does not rest in this instant" and "immediately before this instant D was resting," which are the exponents of this "in this instant it ceases to rest." Also each of these is true "in this instant D is not moved" and "immediately before this instant D was moved," which expound this "in this instant D ceases to be moved." Therefore both these are true "in this instant D ceases to be moved," "in this instant D ceases to rest"; therefore in this same instant and consequently simultaneously D ceases to be moved and to rest, which, although it is true, nevertheless it is not true nor is it consequent to that that in this instant D ceases simultaneously to be moved and to rest, joining "simultaneously" with "to be moved" and "to rest," and this because not simultaneously was it moved and resting. Also consequently it is to be conceded that D simultaneously ceases and begins to rest. For in this instant it ceases to rest, as was proved; also in this instant it begins to rest. Proof: Because in this instant it does not rest, and immediately after this instant it will rest, by the case. Therefore in this same instant and consequently simultaneously, it begins and ceases to rest. All these things are clear enough to those instructed in logic.

To the **sixth**, the case being admitted, I deny the first assumption namely "some man is closest to C." To the proof I deny that, if C approached until it came to the men, it would touch some one of them first. Nor does he prove this nor certainly can he prove it, just as neither can it be proved that some body traverses some part of space first, as the **Philosopher** demonstrates in the 6th *Physics*.

To the **seventh** there is no need to respond, since it is founded on the false premise namely that someone is closest to C (for example Socrates). And by the same it is clear to the argument as if similar, as if it be posited that the first proportional part is white, the second black, the third white, the fourth black and so proceeding alternately toward A, and that C would touch some white part or some black part first if it came to B, or that some white or some black is closest to C itself. For both are false.

(Response to the Argument of Kilmington)

To the **eighth** I say first that, if that mode of arguing is valid, similarly it can be proved that in magnitude there are not infinite proportional parts, which is against the arguer himself. I prove it; for I will argue thus: In no magnitude are there more than two proportional parts. Therefore in no magnitude are there infinite proportional parts. The consequence holds in the same mode as his. I prove the antecedent as he [did], because two proportional parts are two halves (and if not of the same whole of which they are proportional, nevertheless of the same magnitude which is integrated from them); and they are four fourths, and eight eighths, and so to infinity. But of no magnitude are there more proportional parts than two halves, and four fourths and eight eighths and so to infinity are the parts, therefore etc.

Furthermore it seems that that doctor says repugnant things, conceding that in magnitude there are infinite proportional parts, and denying that there are infinite parts. For conversely negatively in all terms the consequence from the superior to the inferior is valid, for example it follows well "there are not infinite animals, therefore there are not infinite men," "there are not infinite quanta, therefore there are not infinite two-cubits," "there are not infinite qualities, therefore there are not infinite colors." And nowhere will an instance be found. Therefore so in the proposition it follows "there are not infinite parts, therefore there are not infinite proportional parts." And consequently from the opposite of the consequent inferring the opposite of the antecedent it follows "there are infinite proportional parts, therefore there are infinite parts."

Now therefore to his reason I respond, distinguishing a double sense which can be had of this proposition "in no magnitude are there more than two parts." For one is that no magnitude is so many parts but that two parts are also so many; or that in no magnitude are included so many parts, but that so many parts are also included in two parts. Another sense is that in no magnitude is the number of parts greater than duality, so that no magnitude has in itself two some parts and, besides those and each of them, some other which is not a part of the other of them; and through this in no magnitude are there three parts totally excluding each other.

In the first sense I concede the proposition, but then I deny the consequence. Nor is the proof valid since, when it is said that infinite are more than two etc., the sense is not that infinite are not so many but that also some two are so many, but that infinite are not two only nor three only and so of others, but are two and, besides those, some others, which also are not parts of those two or of any of them. And similarly they are three and some others, and they are four and some others, and so on. And in this mode proportional parts are infinite. For they are more than two since, given whatever two mutually proportional (for example a half of the whole and a half of the remaining half of the whole), still besides those totally there are other proportional parts, and similarly besides three there are others, and besides four others, and so to infinity. And if it is said that besides the two halves of the whole there are not any other parts not included in them, it must be said that it is true, but those two halves are not mutually proportional parts, but equal.

But what that doctor says—that it does not follow "infinite proportional parts are in magnitude, therefore infinite parts are in magnitude"—is clear to be false from the premises. But to the reason which he assigns, namely "because it is argued," as he says, "from the inferior to the superior with distribution," I say first that it is false, where *infinite* is held categorematically just as in the proposition. For taken thus that term does not distribute any term, since it is purely a categorema, and that suffices for the argument. Second I say that, if *infinite* is held syncategorematically, still the consequence is not good. The reason is

because, although from an inferior distributed to a superior distributed the consequence is not always good, nevertheless from an inferior not distributed to a superior not distributed (suppose that a distributive sign precedes them and the propositions are universal), the consequence is always good. For example it follows necessarily "to however many men herbs are more, therefore to however many men bodies are more," and yet "bodies" is superior to "herbs," but it does not follow "therefore to however many bodies herbs are more"; and this is the reason which was touched upon.

But in the proposition when it is said "infinite proportional parts are in magnitude," because, if *infinite* is held syncategorematically, it is equivalent to this "than however many finite proportional parts of magnitude, the proportional parts of magnitude are more" and "parts of magnitude etc." is not distributed but only "finite proportional parts of magnitude": therefore it follows well "therefore than however many finite proportional parts of magnitude the parts of magnitude are more," although it does not follow "therefore than however many proportional parts proportional parts are more," since than infinite proportional parts (or the total multitude of proportional parts) there are not more proportional parts in magnitude. From this it is clear that it also follows "infinite proportional parts are in magnitude, therefore infinite parts are in magnitude."

Nevertheless the first solution pleases me more.

(Response to the Arguments of Others)

To the **ninth** I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that that major is not true, unless such infinite added things are infinite equal things or including infinite equal things, or infinite of which any is equal to any. But it is not so in the proposition, as is clear.

To the **tenth** it must be said that for infinite parts of the same quantity to be in some magnitude, can be understood in multiple ways: In one way, that they are of the same quantity, not according to every dimension, but according to one or two only. In another way, according to every dimension. And this in two ways: In one way, that those parts mutually partially include each other; in another way, that they include each other in no way, but any is outside any totally.

In the **first mode** infinite parts of the same quantity are in magnitude; for given a magnitude whose length is of 10 palms, but breadth and depth as many, if in it are taken infinite proportional parts according to length, any of them will be of 4 palms in two dimensions namely breadth and depth of the total magnitude. And so all according to two dimensions will be equal, but according to length not, but the first will be of 5 palms, the second of two and a half, and so on any will be less proportionably.

In the **second mode** also in a continuum there are infinite parts of the same quantity; for in a magnitude, for example of two palms, of which the first is A, the second B, there are infinite palms partially including each other; for example A is one, also from the middle of A to the middle of B is another, and let it be C. Also from the half of the half of C, which is between A and B, to the middle of the second half of B is another, and let it be D. And so beginning from the middle of that part of D which is before B, and always from the middle of the residue of any palm before B another palm will be had, nor is there a stop at any last, since that residue is divisible without end in such a way.

But to be infinite parts of the same quantity in the **third mode** can be understood in two ways according to the double acceptation of this term "infinite." Since if it is taken **categorematically**, it is not to be conceded that they are infinite, since necessarily it would follow that that magnitude would be actually extensively infinite. If indeed it is taken **syncategorematically**, there can be a double sense of this proposition "infinite parts of the same quantity are in magnitude." One is that to some certain and determined quantity (for example a foot or a half-foot) infinite are equal, and this sense is false. The other is that however many parts are equal to some certain quantity, still more are equal to some quantity, not however the same to which the fewer were equal. For example in a magnitude of 10 palms there are 10 tenths of the same quantity; for any is equal to a palm; also 20 twentieths are of the same quantity, for any is equal to a half-palm; but not any twentieth is equal to a palm, just as any tenth is equal to a palm. And in this sense it is to be conceded that infinite parts of the same quantity are in any magnitude.

And therefore perhaps according to the property of speech this would be to be conceded "**infinite** parts of the same quantity are in magnitude" and this would be to be denied "**of the same quantity** infinite parts are in magnitude," for the reason that in the second "of the same quantity" stands determinately from the virtue of speech and consequently makes the first sense, which is false. But in the first, for the reason that it follows that syncategorematic diction (which has the virtue of confounding), it stands confusedly only, and therefore does not cause, as much as is from its force, that first false sense.

Then to the form of the reason it must be said that in magnitude there are infinite parts of the same quantity, in the first mode and second, however "infinite" stands. Nor nevertheless does it follow what is inferred.

In the **third mode** also they are infinite, taking *infinite* syncategorematically and in the second sense of the said proposition given, and from this also it does not follow what is inferred. But they are not infinite categorematically, nor also syncategorematically in the first sense.

To the proofs it must be said that each proceeds in the second sense and neither in the first, as is clear enough.

To the **eleventh**, the response is clear from the things said in the First, distinction 44, last question, article 1, in the response to the 2nd objection.

To the **twelfth**, I concede that there are not more proportional parts in the heaven than in a grain of mustard, but certainly in the heaven they are greater. Nor is this absurd, nay rather most true and most clear. For it is clear that in the heaven there are not more halves of the whole than two nor more fourths than four, and certainly so two halves are in one small body and four also fourths; and universally in whatever proportion, as many parts the heaven has, so many any body has. Nor in this is there a difference between a small body and a large one, but the difference is that parts of the same proportion on both sides are not equally large, but in the larger they are larger, and in the smaller smaller.

(Third Conclusion)

The **third conclusion** is that in no magnitude is there anything indivisible intrinsic to it. I say "intrinsic," lest it be insisted calumniously concerning the intellective soul or an angel, both of which are indivisible

and yet in a body; but neither is the soul in the body as something intrinsic to it [as a quantitative part], but as form in matter, nor also is an angel something intrinsic of the body, but is in it as in a place according to the mode to be explained below. Concerning such indivisibles therefore I do not speak, but concerning such as those imagine who posit situational indivisibles or wholly indivisibles such as they call "points," or divisible according to one dimension only such as they call "lines," or according to two only such as they call "surfaces"; whose opinion, because it is very commonly known, it is not necessary to declare.

(The Third Conclusion is Proved)

But against it I prove the aforesaid conclusion. **First** therefore I prove that in no magnitude is there any point. And because the judgment is the same concerning all, I take for example's sake one magnitude, which let be A, and I argue thus: If in A is some point, either one precisely, or many. If one precisely, therefore some part of A itself will be entirely without a point, namely that which is distant from it, and consequently some magnitude is without a point. Therefore also any, since the judgment is the same concerning all. Furthermore, there would not be a reason in which part rather than unique point would be.

If many points are in A, either besides single and any and all simultaneous points of A itself there is some entity in A, or not. If not, therefore A consists precisely of points, the opposite of which was demonstrated in the first conclusion. If so, therefore in A there is some entity, which neither is a point nor includes a point, otherwise besides single and all points a point would be given, which is impossible. Since therefore that is not a point, therefore it is divisible, and consequently some magnitude, lacking points and a point. In vain therefore in A is a point posited.

It is confirmed, because I posit that God, just as He can well since He is omnipotent, destroys all points of A and precisely them, then either some entity remained, which prior was the entity of A, or none at all. If none, therefore A consisted precisely of points. If some, it is certain that that is not indivisible, because then it would be a point and consequently some destroyed point would still be (or not every point of A is destroyed, which is against the posited). Therefore it is divisible and lacking a point simply on account of the same reason. And so, as before, some magnitude lacking a point is had.

Second I posit that magnitude A is superimposed on magnitude B equal to itself, and then, that God preserves all points of A, preserving no other entity of A (if there is any), and similarly establishing no point in another site; this case to any Catholic and one confessing the omnipotence of God ought to seem possible. This being posited I ask, either those points occupy the whole magnitude B just as before magnitude A occupied the whole; or not, but some or some parts of B remain empty, or on which no entities, which were of A, are superimposed. If the first is given, it follows that a point is immediate to a point in magnitude B itself and it is consisting of points precisely, and similarly that A did not contain within itself any entity besides its points. If the second, therefore those parts [of B] some parts of A occupied before, which neither were nor included points, and consequently were magnitudes without points, which is the proposition.

Also it follows that either more points are in magnitude B than were in A—which is not said conveniently, because they were equal magnitudes by the case—or some parts are in B lacking points, from which the proposition is inferred.

Third, no experience or reason forces to posit such points, nor also an authority which it is not permitted to refute. Therefore such are not to be said to be. The consequence is evident. I prove the antecedent, and concerning experience indeed, that none is had concerning points is certain enough, nay rather it is most difficult, not to say impossible, to think them. Authority also is none authentic concerning this. But that neither reason forces, I declare since, if this were argued from something, this, as appears through those positing such points, either would be argued from the finitude of magnitude, or from its continuity, that is from the fact that magnitude is finite or from the fact that it is continuous. Wherefore they do not posit any point except terminating or continuing.

But not on account of the **first** is a point to be posited. I prove, because I ask how they understand magnitude to be finished by a point. For either they understand thus that from such a point magnitude is of a certain measure and protension and having a last part of itself of terminated quantity so that, if a point did not terminate it, it would not be of a certain protension nor would have a last part of itself; nay rather beyond any part of such quantity it would have another of the same quantity and would be infinitely extensive. Or they do not understand thus magnitude to be finished by a point, but perhaps in some other mode. But no other mode, by which magnitude is said to be finite, is evident nor necessarily to be posited from any things known to us. Therefore neither through any other mode of finitude is a point to be posited finishing magnitude. For I do not speak here of the finitude of perfection, because it is not to the purpose, nor also would a point attribute that to magnitude, nay rather it would increase its perfection more. Therefore if it is necessary to posit a point so that a line be finite, this is to the first understanding.

But that neither in that mode is it necessary I prove since, if so, it would follow that, if a point of such kind were destroyed and the magnitude remained, with no other point added or caused to it in place of the first, and with no magnitude also newly added to it, it would certainly be infinite extensively or protracted to infinity. The consequence is clear, but the consequent is false, since no magnitude by the sole ablation of something from itself would become greater. For it is not to be imagined that a point impedes magnitude from being protracted further, as if with it not impeding it would pour its parts through the whole world, just as that which stops the hole of a jar impedes wine from being poured outside the jar through parts of the house. Therefore that case being posited the line would not be infinite, but finite.

(Response of Alnwick)

To that a certain **doctor** [William of Alnwick] responds in virtue saying that it is impossible for a point to be destroyed with the magnitude remaining. The reason is, as he says, "**since that which is not except by the virtue of another precisely, cannot be annihilated except through the annihilation of that through which it is. Wherefore since a point does not have being except by the entity of the line, it is not annihilated except by the annihilation of the line.**"

(Against the Response of Alnwick)

This response is not valid: Both because, since a point according to them is a thing distinct from the line, if it has being by the entity of the line, it does not have being by that entity except as through a cause, either intrinsic or extrinsic. But it is certain that this is false, since in no genus of cause is a line the cause of a point. Furthermore, suppose it were, since nothing prohibits any cause by divine power from being able to be without its caused, by the power of God magnitude could exist without a point.

And because the major assumed—namely that it does not have being except by the virtue of another etc.—is utterly false. For thus it would follow that no creature could be annihilated except through the annihilation of God. Thus therefore it is clear that not for this reason, that magnitude be finite, is a point necessary.

But that it is not necessary for this, that magnitude be continuous, is proved easily. Since it is no less possible and easy to know for one part of magnitude to be continued with another and to constitute one magnitude *per se* than for a point itself with some part or parts of magnitude, and yet they do not posit a point to make *per se* one with parts of magnitudes, with another point mediating. Therefore equally easily, nay rather much more, one part with another, since they are of the same reason, could constitute *per se* one.

Furthermore, when two waters previously discrete are continued to each other, if they are continued by means of a point, I ask in what is that point subjectively. For either it is in some indivisible of the matter of one water of them only, or both in one indivisible of one and in one other of the other, or in some indivisible of matter common to both newly generated. The first cannot be said, because there is not a stronger reason for one part than for the other. Nor the second, because then it would have two equally primary subjects, which does not seem possible naturally.

And by those two also it is concluded that it is not in some divisible part of the other or parts of both, nor also in some divisible accident, which also from other causes is more impossible, as I think is clear enough to one attending, and sufficiently shown by others disproving points. Nor also can it be said that it is subjectively in some indivisible accident, because also concerning the subject of that there would be a like question. It is left therefore that it is in some indivisible of matter or in some indivisible matter common newly generated. And where then is the voice of all philosophy crying that matter is ingenerable? And of theology holding that it can be produced by God alone, and that no creature can produce anything material unless with it presupposed?

Furthermore, when water previously continuous is divided, the point continuing either remains or is corrupted. It does not remain, because not in both parts, nor in one rather than in another; therefore it is corrupted. But then either the indivisible of matter, which previously was informed by it, remains or is corrupted. It does not remain, because neither by itself apart from both parts (as is certain), nor with one part only (since there is not a stronger reason for one than for the other). Nor with both, since it cannot naturally be in many distant sites. Therefore it is corrupted.

And is not the voice of philosophy also that matter is not naturally corruptible? And certainly much more would it cry that it is not annihilable, which in the proposition nevertheless would follow.

(The Conclusion is Proved by Physical Reasons, First)

Then I prove this same conclusion principally by physical reasons and founded on demonstrations and the intention of the **Philosopher**. For he himself in the 6th *Physics* near the end proves that no indivisible can be moved for this reason, because nothing can be moved through a space greater than itself unless it is first moved through an equal one. And consequently, if an indivisible were moved, it would be moved sooner through an equal to itself than through a greater, and inferring from this: "**Wherefore**," says the

Philosopher, "a line will be from points." And he proves the consequence saying: "For always a thing moved through an equal will measure every line."

Then similarly I argue: If there is some indivisible of magnitude, it follows that, with that moved over another magnitude, it also will be moved, and continuously moved through an equal to itself it will measure that whole magnitude. Therefore that [magnitude] is composed of points. This consequent the **Philosopher** reputes impossible. And so also was proved in the first conclusion above. The first consequence is known, since magnitude cannot be moved, with its point whether continuing or terminating (if it has such) not moved. And if it will be moved continuously, it will be continuously in a site equal to itself just as other moved things. And so always moved through an equal it will traverse the magnitude and measure it.

But the second consequence is clear through the **Philosopher**, and enough through reason if one attends.

(Instance)

But to this reason it is said that it is not valid, although that of the **Philosopher** is valid for this reason, because the **Philosopher** proves an indivisible cannot be moved *per se*, since if it were moved so, then always it would be moved through an equal and from an equal to an equal; and so it would be necessary for that whole magnitude to be constituted from equals to it. But it is not so, if it is moved only *per accidens*. On account of which this reason does not prove an indivisible not to be in magnitude, nor also not to be able to be moved continuously to the motion of that.

This response is utterly null. For with equal ease it will be able to be denied that that inconvenience follows, if an indivisible is moved *per se*, just as it denies it to follow, if it is moved *per accidens*. Which is clear, because nothing is assumed in that proof which is not equally verified of the moved *per accidens* and of the moved *per se*. For it is certain that an indivisible moved *per accidens* is not moved through a greater but that first it is moved through an equal. And thus also continuously moved it measures magnitude through equals to itself, just as if it were separated and were moved over that *per se*. Wherefore equally of both that very thing is concluded.

Furthermore this same thing is clear thus: Because it is certain that magnitude is argued to be composed of indivisibles, if an indivisible is moved *per se* over that, from no other reason than because an indivisible thus moved, by commensurating itself to it always through equals to itself, perfects and measures the whole. But those equals to the moved indivisible it does not have from that, but pre-has in itself. But it is certain that indifferently it has such indivisibles, if an indivisible is moved over it *per accidens*, just as if *per se*, and equally in both ways it would be measured by the indivisible.

Wherefore from this I form such a reason: If some whole magnitude were measured by an indivisible, if it were moved over that *per se*, it is composed of indivisibles. This is conceded. But if some magnitude were measured by an indivisible moved *per accidens*, it would be measured wholly by an indivisible, if *per se* it were moved over it. Therefore if some magnitude is measured wholly by an indivisible moved *per accidens*, it is constituted from indivisibles.

Furthermore, that the said response is nothing but a verbal flight, is clear from another. Since magnitude is no less argued to be composed of parts of some determined quantity equal to some quantum or part of quantity moved *per accidens*, than from equals to that which is moved *per se*. For example if there be a magnitude of 20 cubits and over it is moved a two-cubit body, it is certain that neither the cubit (which is half of this body) nor the semi-cubit (which is a fourth of it) is moved *per se* but *per accidens* to the motion of the whole. And yet, because that magnitude is measured wholly by the cubit and semi-cubit just as by the two-cubit, therefore, just as we say it is composed of 10 two-cubits, so also we say it is composed of 20 cubits and 40 semi-cubits. Thus therefore it will be in the proposition, if it be measured by an indivisible moved *per accidens*, no less than if it were measured by an indivisible moved *per se*.

(The Conclusion is Proved by Physical Reasons, Second)

Furthermore to the conclusion. If there were such indivisibles, in every body continuously moved locally there would be some indivisible according to which it would be first changed. The consequent is expressly and from the intention of the **Philosopher** reprobated in the 6th *Physics*. The consequence is clear, since the indivisible terminative of the moved body will be that according to which the moved thing itself will be first moved.

Furthermore, the same follows from the part of the space over which it is moved. Which is also reprobated in the same place. The consequence is clear. For with two bipedal magnitudes posited contiguous, according to the aforesaid imagination concerning indivisibles these will have diverse last indivisibles of their own, although together; then let another bipedal body be taken and superimposed on one of them so that the last [points] of this body be superimposed on the last [points] of that magnitude, and let it be moved then over the other contiguous magnitude. Then it is clear that it will be possible to give a first acquired from that magnitude; and consequently, according to which or to which that moved thing is first moved, namely the indivisible terminating that magnitude over which it is moved.

Nor can it be said that the **Philosopher** does not intend to deny simply a first acquired from space but only a first acquired *through motion*; but that indivisible is not acquired through motion. This, I say, is not valid, since he intends universally to deny a first acquired. Which is clear, because immediately after from this concluded as from a principle he concludes further that before every *having been changed* precedes *to be moved*. Which would not be true if there were a first to which the mobile would be changed.

Thus therefore I say that no entity outside the soul is in magnitude simply indivisible (such as they estimate a point), nor any divisible according to one dimension only (such as they say a line to be), nor any divisible only according to two (such as they opine a surface to be). Which two last could be proved by the same reasons, by applying them, by which the first was proved. Of this intention, as I think, undoubtedly was the **Philosopher**, just as from the reasons induced above lastly appears evidently.

This he also expressly says in his book *On the Motions of Animals*. Wherefore in that part "But someone will doubt," reprobating those who said the heaven is moved by poles on account of a certain virtue existing in them, he adduces reasons against this. The first is that of poles, as they are taken like certain indivisibles, there is no essence. Therefore in them is no virtue for moving. Another, because one motion is not from two movers. And these are his words: "**But that they think poles to have a certain virtue, having no magnitude, but existing as extremes and points, not well,**" supply, do they think. And he

joins the proof that they do not speak well: **"With this indeed that it is [impossible] for no substance to be of no such things, and for one motion to be moved by two, [it is] impossible. But they make two poles."** But in that which he says "for no substance to be of no such things" he touches the first reason, which is to our purpose. But in the remaining words, the other.

Of this intention also expressly is **Augustine** who, as will be clear a little below, holds that in a body outside the soul there is absolutely no indivisible whether point or line or surface.

Addition 24: Also **Augustine** in *On the Quantity of the Soul*, chapter 10: **"Length alone,"** he says, **"can be understood only by the mind, it cannot be found in a body."**

Behold how expressly he says that length alone cannot be found in a body. He holds therefore that in the body itself there is no entity which is length only. And so consequently it is to be felt that also there is none which is width only. And much more strongly, that there is none which is neither length nor width nor depth, nor having any parts at all. The Ordinary Text follows.

(Against the Third Conclusion, Doubts 1-8)

Against this conclusion there are many doubts: **First** indeed, since it seems to dissonate with almost all physics, geometry and logic. For according to any of the aforesaid such indivisibles are to be posited. And concerning logic indeed it is clear in the *Categories*, where the **Philosopher** says that parts of a line are copulated to a point, and of a surface to a line, and of a body to a surface.

In the 6th also of the *Physics* in the beginning he says that **"contiguous are those whose last are together; continuous indeed, whose last is the same."** Which would in no way be true if there were no indivisibles. For it is certain that no divisibles of two contiguous things are together, but one outside the other.

Also the **Geometer** posits such indivisibles. And he defines them: A point indeed, which **"is that of which there is no part"**; a line, which **"is length without width"**; but a surface he says to be that which **"has length and width only."** Similarly he says that the point which is in the middle of a circle **"is called the center,"** and he demonstrates such can be found in any circle, **Euclid** book 3 proposition 1.

Augustine also in the book *On the Quantity of the Soul* posits such indivisibles almost throughout.

Second, if there were no surface, there would be no place of a body. For it is said in the 4th *Physics* that place is the surface of the containing body. Nor can it be said that the containing body is the place and not some indivisible of it which is a surface, because, as is said there, place is equal to the placed, but the containing body and any divisible part of it also surrounding the placed exceeds the placed.

Third, some bodies touch each other; and it is certain that not according to their depth, otherwise they would mutually penetrate. Therefore according to their last indivisible surfaces only.

Fourth, the surface of a body is seen, and its depth is not seen. Therefore surface is other than depth. The antecedent is clear by sense and the consequence holds by the first principle.

The consequence is confirmed also by the **Philosopher** in the 2nd *On the Soul* in that chapter "But that there are not senses beyond five," where he says that, because by some sense we know magnitude, by which we do not know color, it becomes manifest to us that magnitude is other and color other. So in the proposition.

Fifth, this seems to be argued most strongly geometrically thus: If it is not possible to give some point, it follows that if a spherical body were placed on a plane, it would touch it according to something divisible. The consequent is false. And the consequence is proved, because it is certain that it would touch it. But if not according to something divisible, therefore according to something indivisible. And consequently there would be some indivisible, which is repugnant to the antecedent.

Sixth a certain **doctor** [Walter Chatton] argues thus: God can make a line indivisible according to width, and similarly a wholly indivisible point. Therefore of such the continuum is composed and consequently such things are. The consequence is proved, because God can apply one indivisible to another in an immediate and yet distinct site, and then in a plane surface, to which they would be thus superimposed, immediate indivisibles correspond necessarily, therefore etc. The antecedent is proved, because for such a thing to be does not appear evidently to include a contradiction. Therefore to be able to make such is not to be denied to the omnipotence of God.

Seventh, the same thus: God can make this length (with whatever demonstrated) to be without width, because He can make its parts not to be distant according to width. Similarly He can make an angel in the world, and yet that he not be in diverse places, therefore some site is indivisible.

Last to the same point it can be argued thus: If there be not in permanent things anything simply indivisible, therefore neither in successive things is there anything indivisible simply, for example an instant. But the consequent is false, because then the generation of a substance, which is not a term *per se* of continuous motion, would be nothing or at least in nothing as in a measure. And so it would not be in an instant.

Furthermore, **Augustine** in the 11th *Confessions*, chapter 16, expressly posits such an indivisible in time. Wherefore he says that "**if any time is understood, which can be divided into no parts of moments, even the most minute, that alone is what is called present etc.**" Behold that he holds that of time it is for the present to be utterly indivisible. These are the major doubts which occur against this conclusion.

(Preamble for the solution of doubts)

For the solutions of the aforesaid I premise that these names "line," "surface" and "body" can be accepted in two ways:

In one way, as they signify true magnitudes really existing outside the soul, and thus the same magnitude, according to diverse aspects however, is called a line, surface and body. A **line** indeed, insofar as it is extended according to one dimension or situational difference. But insofar as it is extended according to two, it is called a **surface**. But insofar as according to three, it is called a **body**. And because every magnitude existing outside the soul is extended according to one and according to two and according to three—and none at all is there which is extended according to one only, or according to two only, as from the things

said above can be proved, and immediately will be confirmed from the intention of **Augustine**—therefore every line accepted in this way is a surface and a body, and conversely of each.

In this way the **Philosopher** accepts the aforesaid in the 5th *Metaphysics*, chapter *On Quantity*, where distinguishing the species of magnitude he says: "**Of magnitude indeed, that which is continuous to one, is length; that which to two, width; that which to three, depth.**" And he adds: "**But length is a line, and width a surface, and depth a body.**" Not that by these he wishes to be understood distinct real magnitudes, of which one is only length, another width only, but distinct specific aspects, on account of which they are also called diverse species of magnitude. Wherefore of the reason of a line or magnitude, insofar as it is a line, is nothing other than to be continuous or extended, as the **Commentator** expounds, into one (that is according to one dimension).

And from this sometimes authors say that a line is a magnitude extended according to one dimension only. Which exclusion indeed is not posited to signify that the thing which is a line is not extended according to more dimensions than one, but that in the definition of a line is not included that it is extended according to more, but precisely that it is extended according to one. Nevertheless with this it stands that that thing is extended according to more. Consimilarly to this speaks **Avicenna** in the 5th of his *Metaphysics*, when he says that "**equinity is not anything except equinity only. For it from itself is not one nor many nor existing in these senses, nor in the soul.**" By which words it is certain that, unless he had been entirely fatuous, he did not intend to say that equinity was not really one nor many nor outside the soul nor in the soul, but that none of these is posited in the definition of it.

In another way these names can be accepted as they signify feigned and imaginary magnitudes or images of magnitudes, which the soul feigns within itself, not indeed in some sensitive virtue, but in the intellect itself. And although in reality outside there is not a width not deep, nor a length not wide, nevertheless we experience that we feign for ourselves and gaze upon a certain width not gazing upon depth, or some magnitude protracted into two parts only, and similarly some pure length without width, and also some depth or magnitude extended into three situational differences or dimensions. And such feigned magnitudes we call line, surface and body.

In this way **Augustine** accepts in *On the Quantity of the Soul*, chapter 10, where he says thus to the disciple: "**Strive to think a length, which has not yet assumed any width. D.: I can [think] nothing such. For if I shall have constituted a thread of a spider in the mind, than which we are accustomed to see nothing thinner, there occurs to me even in it nevertheless both length *per se* and width and height, which however small they may be, I cannot deny nevertheless to be. A.: Your response is not entirely absurd. But certainly, when you understand these three to be in the thread of a spider, you discern this, and you know what they differ among themselves. D.: Could I see otherwise that nothing of these was lacking to this thread?**" And then **Augustine** concludes: "**By what intellect therefore you discerned this, by this you will be able also, with those separated, to think length alone, lest you turn over some body in the mind. For whatever it shall have been, it will not lack all these. For it is incorporeal, which I desire you to understand. For length alone can only be understood by the mind, it cannot be found in a body.**" And he adds: "**Let us call this mere and simple length therefore, if it pleases you, a line. For by this name it is accustomed to be called by many learned men.**"

From these we have two things for our purpose: One is that in the body itself there is not any thing which is length only, but mere length certainly is incorporeal and in the mind only; the other is that this incorporeal length and existing in the mind has been accustomed by the learned to be called a line, and so he wishes it to be called by himself. And just as he said of length, so in the following he says of width and point.

Wherefore, and with many things as to this matter treated thoroughly, concluding the principal proposition: "Say, I ask you," he says, "**whether true line is that which can be cut lengthwise, or true sign**" (that is point) "**that which can be cut in any way or true width that which, when it is erect, as we said, admits section lengthwise downwards? D.: Nothing less,**" supply, is true than any of these. "**A.: Have you ever therefore seen with these bodily eyes either such a point or such a line or such a width? D.: Entirely never. For these are not corporeal.**" And soon from these **Augustine** concludes: "**But if corporeal things are seen by corporeal eyes by a certain wondrous kinship of things, it is necessary that the mind, by which we see those incorporeal things, be not corporeal or a body.**"

Also in the 7th *On Genesis* (literal commentary) chapter 17 concerning small things he says that, if the soul were corporeal, "**in no way could it know such lines, which cannot be cut lengthwise, such as it knows nevertheless cannot be found in a body.**"

From these words, and the means to his principally intended conclusion (which is that the soul is not corporeal), it appears that according to **Augustine** there is in a body no mere line or length or surface, nor can any such thing be seen by the bodily eye but by the mind only. The opposite of which also they say, at least concerning surface, who posit such indivisibles outside the soul.

Addition 25: I respond to these. For the understanding of which it is to be noted that—although outside the soul there is none, and every magnitude is a body and extended according to three situational differences or dimensions, nor is there any at all which is extended only in one or only in two—nevertheless the intellect can so understand magnitude to be extended according to one dimension, that it does not understand for then it to be extended according to two. And so also it can understand it to be extended according to two, that it does not understand it to be extended according to three. Not only however can it have such distinct complex knowledges concerning magnitude, but it can also form for itself and feign in itself some concept or intention thus representing magnitude as it is extended in one part, which will not represent it as it is extended in two. And similarly some things are thus represented so etc. The Ordinary Text follows.

(Solution of doubts)

These things being premised I respond to the objections. And for the **first two**, it must be known that, as is clear from diverse parts of the philosophy of **Aristotle**, a certain opinion was famous in the times of **Aristotle**, which posited such indivisibles not only in the soul, but also outside the soul. And from them they said magnitude was composed. Which opinion also many today follow as to both sayings, and many as to the first only (namely who posit such indivisibles outside the soul in magnitude itself, and yet deny magnitude to be composed of them).

Of this opinion were not **Augustine**, as is clear from what has been said, nor the **Philosopher**; nay rather the second he impugned in many places. But the first, namely points to be outside the soul, sometimes he

placed under doubt, as is clear in the 8th *Metaphysics*, penultimate chapter, where he says: "**Since indeed certain things without generation and corruption are and are not, as points, if indeed they are,**" that is if points are. But sometimes he expressly denied it as in the book *On the Motions of Animals*, as was alleged above.

Nevertheless nowhere did he discuss it exquisitely in proper form. And therefore as was his custom, before he had treated the matter from purpose and where also it was not principally acted concerning that, to speak according to the more famous opinion, frequently he spoke of points and lines and surfaces and contiguous and continuous things according to that famous opinion, and not according to his own. Among which is that which was alleged from the *Categories*; which manifestly appears from this that in the same place he says that "**parts of place are copulated to the same term, to which also parts of the body**" (namely the placed), as **Boethius** expounds, nor can it be expounded otherwise. And it is certain that that saying is not according to his opinion, but according to that which posited the space between the sides of the container to be place. Which the **Philosopher** from intention reprobates in the 4th *Physics*.

To that also concerning continuous and contiguous things it must be said similarly that he spoke according to that opinion, and on account of the aforesaid cause, and also because from such descriptions given by them he argued strongly against them the principal proposition, namely that magnitude was not composed of points. Wherefore soon from those definitions he assumes that points are not continuous nor contiguous, so that from this he may deduce further that they do not compose magnitude.

To that which is added concerning the **Geometer** it must be said that he does not posit such real indivisibles outside the soul, but only feigned ones in the soul. And those he defines in the aforesaid modes. And similarly **Augustine**, as was shown before by the same. But the cause is because of magnitudes, of which the Geometer considers, although any is long, wide and deep, because nevertheless certain ones are passions of magnitude insofar as it is long, certain others insofar as it is wide, and certain insofar as it is deep—wishing to hand down distinct knowledge concerning all such things—so that it may be grasped more easily, he feigns pure length, so that those things which he demonstrates concerning that, may be understood to belong to magnitude as it is long or length. And similarly he feigns width, so that what he says concerning that, may be understood to be of magnitude as it is wide.

He feigns points also, but not so that by them he wishes to be understood some indivisible thing outside the soul, but so that, where he feigns a point to be, every magnitude be understood to be denied; for example when he says some lines concur in a point, he does not understand that between them intervenes some indivisible, but that no space is intercepted between them. And when from some point he says a line is drawn or to some is terminated, he understands nothing else than that it is not protracted further. And consimilarly of others in which he uses points. The indivisible center also he does not posit except feigned and imaginary, by which he does not wish to be understood some real indivisible to which lines drawn from the circumference concur, but only that they concur with no space mediating. And that he teaches to find the center in a circle, is not to teach to find some indivisible thing outside, but rather whence there is equal distance on all sides to the circumference. And for certain for no geometric truth are necessary any indivisibles or points outside the soul, as is well clear to anyone instructed in that science. He uses nevertheless such fictions so that through such the truth, which he intends to demonstrate, may be grasped more easily.

To the second it must be said that not therefore is place called "**the surface or the last of the container**" because some width lacking depth is place, but because the containing body itself is not place as it is deep, but insofar as it is wide. And because as such it does not exceed the content nor is exceeded by it, therefore it is called **equal** to it.

To the third it must be said that for bodies to touch each other according to depths can be understood in two ways: In one way, so that the sense is that they or some parts of them are in the same primary place. And then it follows well that they penetrate each other, and so I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. In another way, so that the sense is that between their depths or between the depths which are they or parts of them—for no others are to be thought—there is no medium according to site. And so the antecedent is false.

To the fourth I say that the sense of the antecedent can be double: One is that some thing, which is wide and not deep, is seen. And this sense is false according to **Augustine**, as is clear above, and according to truth. The other is that the body itself is seen according to that it is wide, and not according to that it is deep; that is by a vision, by means of which it is known that it is wide, and it is not known to be deep. And in this sense it happens that the antecedent is true. But from this it does not follow that surface is another thing, depth another.

To the fifth, concerning the touch of a spherical and plane [body] some have said that, speaking of a sphere and a plane existing really outside the soul and of real touch, the antecedent is false. Nay rather, if such were posited to touch each other, they would touch first over something divisible. If indeed we speak of such as have imagined being, their imaginary touch is over a point. And this response seems to lean on the saying of the **Commentator** in the 1st *On the Heavens*, comment 32.

But it cannot stand because it concedes an impossible. For to that which it concedes, it follows that the angles of a triangle are worth more than two right angles, and that a part is equal to the whole, both of which is impossible. I declare the consequence. For let there be circle Z, whose center is D, and let there be a straight line touching it K-M. If therefore the circle touches this according to some part of itself, however small that may be, it is necessary that it be straight. For it is impossible for something straight according to its whole self to touch something not straight, as is known. Let therefore that part of the circle, according to which first is the touch, be A-B; I will draw therefore from center D a straight line to A, and again another from D to B, which certainly by the definition of a circle will be equal, therefore by the fifth of the First of **Euclid** the angles on the base of this triangle, which is line A-B, are equal. Then I will divide line A-B into two means in point C by the tenth of the First, and then from C I will draw another straight line to D, and two triangles will be made namely ACD and BCD.

Description: A diagram showing a circle Z with center D. A tangent line K-M touches the circle at the bottom. A segment A-B on the circle is shown touching the tangent line. Lines are drawn from center D to A and D to B, forming an isosceles triangle DAB. Line segment AB is bisected at point C, and a line is drawn from D to C, creating two triangles ACD and BCD.

And because line C-D goes out from the center to the circumference of the same circle with the remaining two, therefore to each of them it is equal and consequently the angles of each of those triangles on its base are mutually equal. Therefore angle CBD is equal to angle BCD, and angle ACD equal to angle CAD, and

because angle CAD was equal to angle CBD—and "things equal to the same are equal to each other"—therefore angle ACD is equal to angle CBD. And by the same reason angle BCD is equal to angle CAD. From which further it follows that angle BCD is equal to angle ACD, therefore both are right, since they are from two parts of the same line, as is clear by the definition of right angles. But from these it follows that the angles of each of those triangles, which are on the base and are equal, are worth two right angles, nay rather each is right. And since in each there is still a third angle around the center, the three angles of each of those triangles simultaneously are worth as much more than two right angles as is the angle around the center. And this is the first thing which was to be inferred.

The second however is clear from the things said. For angle ACD is extrinsic to BCD and consequently is worth the two intrinsics opposite to it, namely angle CBD and angle BDC, by the 32nd of the First. But to angle ACD, as was proved, is equal angle CBD, therefore angle CBD is worth itself and angle BDC, therefore the part is worth the whole and is equal to it.

In the same way it can be proved concerning angle BCD and triangle ACD. And the consequence is clear as to the second thing to be inferred.

Furthermore, to the same concession it follows that the whole circumference of the circle is one straight line, and consequently that one line is straight and curved simultaneously, which implies a contradiction. The consequence is clear, because that part of the circle, according to which first is the contact, touches the whole part of the plane, which certainly is straight. And consequently the whole is co-apted to it and its extremes touch the extremes of the straight, and its middle the middle of the straight, and through this its middle does not go out of its extremes, therefore it is straight by the definition of a straight line. But since that straight [part] according to that same part can successively touch the whole circle, it follows that the whole circumference of the circle is composed of straight lines precisely. And since those constitute no angle—otherwise not all lines drawn from the center to the circumference would be equal, for greater would be those which were drawn to the angles—it follows that that total circumference is one straight line, which is the proposition.

Otherwise sometimes it has been responded, namely by denying a spherical body to be in nature, which response is nothing but a flight, since even given that it were so, nevertheless it is not impossible for some such thing to be and be applied to a plane, and then the argument remains. Furthermore, this is against the **Philosopher** in the 2nd *On the Heavens*, where he proves from purpose the heaven to be a spherical body.

I say therefore to the argument that in a double sense it can be said that some things touch each other:

One sense is, by which it is understood that between them there is no medium, and so I say that a spherical [body] superimposed on a plane does not touch it, nor conversely. And the reason is, since with them thus disposed still between the whole of one half of the spherical [body] and the opposite half of the plane there is a medium, as is clear. And similarly between the other half of the spherical [body] and the other half of the plane opposite to it there is a medium, and through this nothing at all is of the spherical from one part, which is immediate to anything of the plane itself from the other.

Another sense is, by which it is understood that they are so near, that they (saving their proper figures) cannot be nearer nor one protracted further toward the other, and the case being posited thus, the spherical can be said to touch the plane. And if then it is asked also in this sense, whether it touches it according to

something divisible of itself first, or according to something indivisible, it must be said that in neither mode. Not indeed according to something indivisible, because none is in it. Nor according to something divisible, since no divisible part is of it, of which every part is protracted up to the plane. And by the same it is clear that neither according to its whole self first does it touch it. Notwithstanding this however, by **infinite parts of it** it touches the plane namely by its half and by the half of its half and so to infinity dividing the sphere from the top to the lowest toward the plane, since infinite such parts are protracted up to the plane.

And it is similar to this also concerning two planes touching each other for example AK. For according to one mode of dividing by infinite parts of themselves they touch each other, namely by beginning the division from the near extreme and proceeding to the other according to proportional parts, as suppose that the half of A touching K be B, and another part be the half of the half, which is B', and so on.

Description: A diagram showing two parallel planes (or lines representing planes) A and K touching or very close. A is divided into proportional parts (halves) starting from one end. Lines connect corresponding points or show the divisions. The text references points/parts like C-E, E-F, F-G proceeding towards one end.

Nevertheless none of these first touches K or something of it, because not every part of none is protracted up to it, nay rather infinite parts of any do not arrive at it, as is clear by dividing transversely. For the first half of A itself, beginning from the other extreme, which is C-E, does not touch K nor anything of it. Also neither the half of the second half namely E-F. Also neither F-G, and so always proceeding toward A.

But then what will be said to the **Philosopher**, who says in the 1st *On the Soul* that a sphere touches a plane according to a point? It must be said that he does not understand that it touches according to a point, as if a point were something of the sphere by which it touches the plane or conversely, but the sense is that it touches according to a point that is **punctally** or indivisibly, which is nothing other than so to touch the plane that neither the spherical itself nor any part of it—according to whatever dimension it be taken—according to every [part] of itself touches the plane, nor conversely the plane or any part of it according to every [part] of itself touches the spherical. The opposite of which happens in planes mutually touching each other, and therefore they are not said to touch each other punctally. And this whole is nothing other than to touch each other in the second mode, and not the first.

To the sixth, whatever be of the antecedent, I deny the first consequence. To the proof I say that it would not be possible for one indivisible to be applied to another in a plane surface in an immediate and distinct site, as he says, if it is understood of an indivisible site, since in such a surface there is no such site.

And furthermore, if any were, either those indivisibles would be in the same primary site, or in distant and mediate sites, just as now in fact I would say concerning two angels, who cannot be in the same indivisible place nor in diverse immediate indivisibles.

To the seventh in the same way I say that posited that God made the parts of some body to be distant according to no dimension, nevertheless it would not be possible for it to be in some indivisible or punctual site, but either it would be in none or it would be in some divisible [place] and [in] parts of it simultaneously. Therefore it is clear that the consequence both as to a body and as to an angel is null,

because it does not follow "it is not simultaneously in many places, therefore it is in some indivisible place," unless there were added to the antecedent "and it is in some place." But then the antecedent is impossible.

To the last I concede no indivisible successive [thing] to be to the understanding of the argument, and that generation is not said to be in an instant to that understanding, but to that which was said in the preceding question. Or according to a more familiar sense it is said "to be in an instant" because what is generated is generated all at once and not part before part. If nevertheless it is to be reduced to measure, speak as was said there.

But what is added from **Augustine** does not obviate. For **Augustine** does not posit such successive things outside the soul, neither divisible nor indivisible, as is well clear in the preceding question, and the saying which is induced does not prove the opposite, since it is merely conditional. And let these suffice concerning the first article.

ARTICLE 2

(On the Existence of an Angel in Place)

The **second article**, which is concerning the principal question, as is clear, supposes an angel to be in place. Concerning which the common accord is among theologians, doctors and saints. For all commonly say that an angel is in place, not indeed dimensionally, or circumscriptively according to the more modern use of the word, but definitively only.

Wherefore **Hugh of Saint Victor** in *On the Sacraments*, book 1 part 3 chapter 18, says that "**let us pronounce without doubt a created spirit not only to be in place, but also to be local.**" And he adds: "**A body which has dimension is circumscribed by place, because a beginning and middle and end is assigned to it according to place. But a spirit, since it does not take dimension but is terminated by definition alone, does not receive indeed the circumscription of place, and yet in a certain way is concluded by place. Since when it is present here somewhere whole, it is not found elsewhere.**" In which words are had both the aforesaid distinction and the understanding of the distinction.

It must be known nevertheless that "to be circumscribed by place" is found to be accepted in two ways, namely **commonly** and **properly**: In the **first mode** it is the same as to be concluded and contained by place, which is common to body and created spirit. In the **other mode** it is the same as to be coextended to place, so that the whole be in the whole place and a part in a part, but not the whole in a part. And this belongs to corporeal things only.

Wherefore the **Master** in book 1, distinction 37: "**In two ways,**" he says, "**is something said in Scripture to be local or circumscribable, and conversely, namely because taking the dimension of length, height and width it makes distance in place, like a body; or because it is defined and determined by place, since when it is somewhere, it is not found everywhere. Which belongs not only to a body, but also to every created spirit.**" According to this understanding **Damascene** says in book 2 chapter 3: "**Through the Word of God all angels were created.**" And it follows: "**Circumscribable, for when they are in heaven, they are not on earth; and when they are sent by God to earth, they do not**

remain in heaven." And below: "Intellects indeed existing intellectually are in places not circumscribed corporally, for they are not figured corporally according to nature, nor do they have three dimensions; but because they are present intellectually and operate wherever they are ordered, and because they cannot be or operate here and there according to the same time." He posits the same opinion in book 1 chapters 17 and 18.

It is the common opinion therefore that every angel is in place and not only [is], but is properly **local**. Which is said to the difference of the uncreated spirit that is God, who, as **Hugh** adds where above, "**since He is present to every place, nor yet can be concluded or circumscribed in any place, is said truthfully to be in every place nor yet is called local at any time by any reason.**"

(Opinion of Thomas and Giles)

But concerning the mode of an angel existing in place there is not full consensus. Since some [Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome] say an angel is not in place through its substance but only through its operation about place. And the common reason of these is, since through this something is in place, that it is applied to it according to the contact of its quantity, either dimensive like a body, or virtual like a spirit. But that spiritual contact is precisely through operation. Therefore also a spirit or angel is in place precisely through its operation about place.

For this opinion also are adduced the authorities of **Damascene** saying in book 1 chapter 17: "**An incorporeal nature, where evidently it is, also operates.**" And in the following chapter: "**It is circumscribed where it also operates.**" And again in book 2, as was alleged before: "**Intellectually,**" he says, "**they are present and operate wherever they are ordered.**"

Those positing this conclusion therefore agree in this that an angel is in place through its operation about place, so that it is not where it does not operate; and that, if it operated about no place, it would be nowhere. And they understand of operation passing into a body. But they differ, since **certain of them** [Thomas] say it is not inconvenient for an angel sometimes to be nowhere, just as it is not inconvenient for an angel sometimes to operate about no body. **Others** indeed [Giles] repute both inconvenient.

(Against Thomas and Giles)

Against this opinion is expressly that **Parisian article 203**: "**That separate substances are in place through operation; and that they can be moved from extreme to extreme, not in the middle, because they can will to operate in the extreme or in the extremes, not in the middle: Error, if it is understood that the substance without operation is not in place nor passes from place to place.**" Behold that it says it is an error to say a separate substance is not in place without operation.

Furthermore angels, as soon as the empyrean heaven was first created, were in it as in a place, as is clear through the **Master** in this distinction, who proves this by the authorities of **Strabus** and **Bede**. But then they did not operate, nay rather neither now also do they operate about it, therefore etc.

(Instance)

To this nevertheless **some** [Giles] strive to respond. For they say that, although angels "**do not transmute the empyrean heaven, nevertheless in some way they apply their virtue about it, by reason of which they are said to be there.**"

To the contrary. Either this application is understood to be through some second act or actual operation of the angel into the heaven itself, or precisely through the presence of the angelic virtue to it. Not in the first mode, because they have no actual operation into it, since they transmute it neither according to substance nor according to quality nor according to quantity or according to *where* or place, even as they concede and it is true, even if they did not concede. If in the second mode, therefore they are there, and do not operate into it, and consequently neither through operation. Wherefore these speak less reasonably, as it seems, than the first.

Furthermore, either an angel is said to be in place through operation, and not through substance, because precisely in that place is its operation and not substance, or because, although both be there, nevertheless therefore substance is there, because the operation of the angel is in it, and not conversely. The first cannot be said: Both on account of another **Parisian article**, which says "**that separate substances are nowhere according to substance: Error, if it is understood thus, namely that substance is not in place.**" And also because **Hugh** says, where above: "**A spirit, since it is concluded in place through the presence of nature and operation, is itself also rightly named local.**" Where he posits not only the presence of operation, but also of nature, that is of substance. And similarly **Damascene** says, as is had above, that "**intellectually they are present and operate wherever they are ordered,**" and that they are circumscribed where they operate. Through which he manifestly posits not only the operation of an angel but also its substance to be present and to be circumscribed or located in the place where they operate. Also because he says that "**when they are sent by God to earth, they do not remain in heaven.**" And when they are in heaven, they are not on earth. In which he manifestly hints that the angelic substance is presentially on earth, when it is sent to earth, where before it was not. Also because it does not appear that any creature immediately moves some body locally without another action into it or another mediate body (just as it belongs to angels that they move), unless it according to itself be present to it, as is clear from the 7th *Physics*.

Nor can the second be said since not therefore, because something operates into a body, is it therefore present to it, but rather prior by nature and consequence it is present than it operates. It is confirmed because, not because something operates into something, is it therefore powerful to operate into it, but therefore rather it operates, because it is powerful and wills to operate, if it is freely operative. Nor also therefore, because it can and wills, is it therefore present, nay rather certainly for this that it be powerful, it is required that it be present. And I speak of proximate and propinquous power according to the mode of the **Philosopher** in the 9th *Metaphysics*.

Furthermore, if an angel is not in place except in that in which it operates, it follows that in fact sometimes an angel would be nowhere, which is inconvenient according to the **second doctor** at least, and I think according to truth. The consequence is declared. For when an angel descends from heaven to earth, in that time it does not operate in the empyrean heaven, it is certain; nor in the intermediates, since it is not the mover of any of them, nor also is any heaven moved otherwise than it was moved before; nor is it to be said that on account of this its mover moves otherwise, so that that descending angel moves simultaneously with it. Therefore in the time of that descent, it is not somewhere.

I say therefore that not only through operation is an angel in place, but also through its **substance**, understanding thus that its substance also is present to place and is defined and concluded by it; which also happens, even if it does not operate there.

The reason of the opinion is not valid, since for this that something be in place definitively only, some such contact is not required, but only that it be present to it, and be contained by it, as was said above. The authorities also of **Damascene** are not for them, because nowhere does he say that angels are in place *because* they operate in it or *on account of* their operation into place, although he says that where they operate, there they are, and conversely. But note that he does not say universally that wherever they are there they operate, although he says that they are present and operate wherever they are ordered, supply, to operate or to be present.

(On the Principal Inquiry)

As for that which is principally asked, I say that an angel is not in an indivisible place properly speaking of place namely corporal, but is in a divisible place. The reason is because no such indivisible is in the nature of things, as was proved in the first article.

(Dubium)

But then a doubt remains, whether an angel can naturally be in however much a place, or determines for itself a magnitude of place to which it can coexist. And if so, it is a doubt whether it so determines for itself a *somuch* magnitude of place, that neither in a greater can it be naturally nor in a lesser (although no determined place according to number does it determine for itself); just as one body of so much quantity (for example of a foot) although it can be now here, now there, cannot be in a place greater or lesser than of pedal quantity. Or whether it does not determine such a determined measure of magnitude, but only as to the **maximum**, namely that it is [possible] to give a maximum to which it can coexist, or also as to the **minimum**, or as to both?

And as for this it is commonly said that an angel cannot be in however much a place indifferently, nay rather it determines for itself a **maximum** naturally. And the reason is because an angel is naturally of limited and finite essence. And to this saying I also consent. And I add that an angel is naturally determined to a maximum quantity of place according to any dimension, that is to a longest and to a widest and to a deepest or grossest. Which is proved, because otherwise it would follow that an angel could naturally simultaneously be in heaven and in the sphere of fire and of air and of earth, against the saying of **Damascene** alleged above. The consequence is clear because, if it is given that an angel does not determine for itself a maximum according to any dimension, now according to that according to which it does not have a maximum, it will be able to have as large a place as was said.

From this is solved the argument accustomed to be made namely that, if an angel could be in some maximum square, it could also be in some quadrangle equal to it, as long as is the diameter of the whole world, and by so much more proportionally narrow, as that quadrangular is longer than the given square.

(Opinion of the Hibernian)

As for the other, a certain **doctor** [The Hibernian] says that an angel determines for itself a certain measure of place, to a greater or lesser than which it cannot coexist naturally *per se* separated and not united to a body. And it determines also for itself a **spherical figure** so that, if some body be less than that quantity, the angel will not only be in it, but also will be in another outside it nearby, to so much a part of which it will coexist, that it have integrally the quantity of its place. And he says the same of the figure.

(Common Reasons Against the Hibernian)

Although however that saying [of the Hibernian] is beautiful enough and probable, nevertheless commonly the opposite is held, which also seems to me more probable. Which can be persuaded from this that an angel does not seem more limited naturally to a certain quantity of place to which it can coexist, than to a certain magnitude of a body which it can assume and unite to itself. This seems probable, because greater union seems between an angel and an assumed body than between an angel and place. But it is certain that an angel now a greater now a lesser body, if it wills, can assume, and now of one figure now indeed of another. Therefore etc.

It is confirmed because, when an angel assumes to itself some body in the form for example of a human, it does not seem reasonable that then not only is it in that body, but also in the surrounding air, and consequently for then it does not have that measure of place, which before that assumption it had.

To this also persuades in some way what we see in the human soul, whose union and conformity to the body is much greater than an angel's to place, and yet now a lesser now a greater body it informs according as that is increased or diminished naturally, and sometimes also by truncation of a member or part.

These reasons nevertheless do not force so much, but that the opposite could be defended.

As for the **last** [doubt], namely whether in the minimum it determines for itself a place, it must be distinguished. Because either this is understood of a **partial place**, and it must be said that not. The proof of which is, since an angel is whole in any part of its place, and because there is not a minimal part of place, therefore etc. And just as in any continuous part of its place it exists whole, so I say that in any discontinuous part, however small it be. For an angel does not require a place of one nature only, nor more continuous than discrete and contiguous. Wherefore so it can be in one whole house and any part of it, notwithstanding that some are stones, some wood, some iron, and so of others, not continuous to each other at least by nature, just as in one part of continuous air.

Or it is understood of a **total place**, which namely is not a part of any angelic place.

(Opinion of Scotus and Others)

And concerning this is a greater doubt among doctors, some saying that it is not [possible] to give a minimum in which it can be, nay rather, in however small a [place] it is posited to be able to exist, still it can be, if it pleases, in a smaller; **others** [Scotus] reputing the opposite more probable, whose motives are two:

One is, because otherwise it would follow that an angel could be in a place however great, at least according to some dimension, and thus simultaneously in heaven and on earth. The opposite of which was said above. The consequence is proved, because everything which can be in some place so large, can be in any other equal to it, if the figuration of the place is not repugnant to it. But to an angel the figuration of place is not repugnant. Therefore, if it can be in some square however small, it can also be in a quadrangle however narrow equal to it etc. as above.

The second is, because it would seem that an angel would be of infinite power. Since an angel seems of greater power, if it can locate itself in so large a place; and again of greater, if it can also in a smaller; and if in an infinitely smaller, it is of infinite [power].

(Against the Opinion of Scotus)

But these motives do not force.

Not indeed the **first**, since from the assumptions, if they be true, is proved the opposite of what he intends, namely that it is not [possible] to give a minimum place possible to an angel; and similarly that neither a maximum, the opposite of which also he reputes true. I declare. For it is certain that an angel can according to this doctor be in some square place. Let it be given therefore that it is in a pedal square. Therefore, if to an angel the figuration of place is not repugnant, it can be in however much a quadrangle wide or narrow, long or short, equal to the pedal square. And then it follows further what was said.

And therefore it must be said that that proposition is not universally true. For just as it is falsified, if it be posited that that locale determines for itself a minimum, suppose that it does not determine a figure for itself (as this doctor has to say), so also it is falsified, if it determines for itself a maximum.

Furthermore, simultaneously they stand that an angel determines for itself a maximum, and yet not a minimum, because a place however small being given it will be able to be in a smaller according to any dimension, nor will it be necessary, if it be in a narrower place, that from this it become in a longer place.

The **second** also does not force, since it does not appear that it is of greater power in an angel to be able to locate itself in a smaller place than in a greater below the maximum possible to itself. And therefore neither if in an infinitely smaller, is it argued that it is of infinite power. And it is strange concerning this doctor, who does not repute it inconvenient that an angel could be in a point, and seems to repute it inconvenient that in however small a [place] it could be; and especially, since by his second reason most of all it seems to be able to be argued the infinity of angelic power, if also in a point it can locate itself, as is easy to see.

I say therefore that I do not see the impossibility of either part; nor yet the necessity. Let anyone choose therefore what he wishes, provided he affirm nothing rashly. For this matter is hidden to us, while we are here. And divine Scripture manifests nothing such to us.

To the **principal argument** of the question it must be said that the antecedent is false on account of its second part. To the proof it must be said that that saying of the **Philosopher** is to be understood of a

placed thing which is dimensionally and circumscriptively in place, but not of that which is definitively only.

This concludes the translation of the second question. Would you like to proceed with the next question?

QUESTION 3 **WHETHER** an angel can be in several places at the same time.

Secondly, concerning the same part of the distinction, I ask whether an angel can be in several places at the same time.

It is argued that he cannot, because if he were in several, he would be distant from himself. The consequent is impossible. The consequence is proved because whatever things are distant from one and the same thing are themselves distant from each other. But two distant places are not non-distant nor at once. Therefore they are not non-distant from the same thing which is non-distant from itself. Since, therefore, the place is non-distant from the thing located, if the same thing located were in two places, it would not be non-distant from itself. Therefore it would be distant from itself, which is the consequent to be inferred.

To the contrary. Several angels can be in the same place; therefore one angel can be in different places. The consequence seems apparent. The antecedent is proved by that passage in Mark 5, where it is read that a legion of demons was in the body of that possessed man.

I respond. There are two articles here: one concerning the question asked, the other concerning what is implied in the argument to the contrary, namely, whether several angels can be in the same place.

ARTICLE 1

(Concerning the question)

Regarding the first, I say that the question can be understood both concerning divine power and concerning the proper natural power of the angel himself. Likewise, it can be understood concerning partial places and total places.

If it be understood of the **divine power**, it does not seem to me that the question ought to be doubtful to a theologian, since anyone would grant that by the power of God one body can be in several places at once, both partial and total. This is clear concerning the body of Christ. Therefore, also one angel, since it does not appear less possible than that. Furthermore, no contradiction is implied by that being posited; therefore, etc.

If, however, it be understood of the **angel's own power**, standing however with the common influence of God, and concerning partial places, it must be said that yes; indeed, it so happens in fact. For any angel is whole in any part of his place, and I do not distinguish whether those parts constitute one continuous total place or a discontinuous one—provided that all such partial places taken together do not exceed the quantity of the maximum place naturally possible for an angel—since I do not think, as I touched upon in the preceding question, that continuity or homogeneity of place is required for the unity of an angelic place, but contiguity suffices.

But if it be understood of **total places**, and consequently mediated and distant, I say no. Which is proved by the authority of Damascene saying in Book 2, chapter 3, that "angels cannot at the same time be and operate here and there." Likewise in Book 1, chapter 18: "An angel cannot operate in different places according to the same thing; for it belongs to God alone to operate everywhere according to the same thing." But if he could be in different places at once, he could also operate in different places at once.

But against this seems to be the saying of Augustine in *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, book 11, chapter 36, where he holds that the devil spoke to Eve in the serpent. But in the woman "by a hidden instinct he was helping interiorly what he had done exteriorly through the serpent." Where he seems to wish that the devil was in the serpent and in Eve at the same time.

To which it must be said, this does not follow from the saying of Augustine. Indeed, he rather suggests the opposite by the fact that he says "he had done" (*egerat*), he does not say "he was doing" (*agebat*). He implies, therefore, that he first spoke through the serpent, and then interiorly persuaded Eve, which he could do by his speed without perceptible delay.

ARTICLE 2

(Concerning several angels in the same place, first)

Regarding the second article, I say first that by the **power of God** several angels can be in the same place. It is proved first, because two bodies can be in the same place, therefore also two angels. The antecedent is certain through faith. The consequence is evident by the argument *a minori*, since this seems less possible for bodies than for spirits. Furthermore, no contradiction appears; therefore, etc.

However, certain doctors hold the opposite of this, one of whose reasons is: It is impossible for two complete causes to be of one and the same thing immediately. But this would follow if two angels were in the same place. Because, since they are not in a place except through operation, each would operate concerning the same thing and each perfectly. Therefore, etc.

Others prove the same thus: No things which are compared to a place in the same way can be in the same place at the same time. But any angels are compared to a place in the same way. Therefore no angels can be in the same place. The minor is known. The major is proved inductively concerning non-glorified bodies among themselves, and concerning glorified bodies, and concerning souls and many such things.

To the first, whatever may be the case regarding the impossibility of the consequent—because of this elsewhere—I deny the consequence. Its weakness is clear: first because it supposes an angel cannot be in a place unless he operates concerning it, the opposite of which was proved in the preceding question; second because, granted that he did operate, it still does not follow that there would be two total causes, or two perfect movers. For since they move freely, anyone could move short of the ultimate of his power, and short of that which would be required for moving that body, so that each would be a partial mover and both together would be equivalent to one perfect mover.

To the second, I say that the major is simply false, and all the proofs assumed as well. For by the power of God, even two non-glorified bodies can be in the same place, and also two glorified ones, and also two

separate souls can be together in something as in a place; I do not say to inform the same thing at the same time. And all these things are clear, since no contradiction is implied in them.

(Concerning several angels in the same place, second)

If, however, we speak of **natural power**, it seems to certain doctors, and to me also with them, that it can probably be held that yes. One reason is that which was touched upon in arguing to the contrary of the question. For in the body of that possessed man there were several demons at once, as the Scripture says. By which also Richard of Saint Victor argues in *On the Trinity* that demons do not have bodies, for otherwise several could not have been in the same thing at once. He feels, therefore, that the demons were substantially in the body of that man, although they cannot "substantially flow into the soul," as is said in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas*.

Furthermore, as another argues, matter and form, each of which is quantified and dimensionally in a place, are in the same place. Therefore also two spirits, which are only in a place definitively. Furthermore, this does not seem more impossible naturally than that a human soul be in the same body, as in the matter which it informs, and an angel be as in a place. But this is possible, and in fact happens many times, as is clear in the possessed.

To the argument in the opposite, I respond by denying the consequence. To the proof, I say that that major is false. An instance is clear. For God is at once with many things which are most distant from each other. And also the human soul is at once with several parts of the body distant from each other. And yet neither God nor the soul is distant from itself.

DISTINCTIONS 3-5

QUESTION 1 **WHETHER** an angel could have sinned or merited in some first instant.

Regarding Distinction 3 and the two following, in which the Master inquires what sort of angels were created according to goodness and malice, and concerning the sin of the wicked and the merit of the good, I ask whether an angel could have sinned or merited in some first instant.

And it is argued that he could not, first thus: In no first instant could an angel have any act of the will; therefore in no instant could an angel first sin or merit. The consequence is clear, because merit and demerit consist in the will, according to that saying of Augustine in *On Free Will*, chapter 14: "The eternal law has confirmed with unchangeable stability that merit lies in the will; but in beatitude and misery, reward and punishment." The antecedent is proved because, if the opposite be granted, it follows that it was possible for there to be in the will of the angel some indivisible change which was not the end of some successive transmutation, which is against the Commentator [Averroes] on the 6th book of the *Physics*, comment 32. The consequence is known.

Secondly, if he could have first sinned in some instant, then he could also have sinned in the first instant of his being. This consequence is clear, because in that instant the angel had, or at least could have had,

sufficient knowledge of good and evil and the freedom to choose both good and evil. Therefore, if he could in any instant, he could just as well in the first. But the consequent is false because, if he sinned in the first instant, he could not have avoided it, and consequently he did not sin, according to that saying of Augustine in the 3rd book of *On Free Will*, chapter 38: "For who sins in that which can in no way be avoided?" Proof of the consequence: For he could not have avoided it before, because he did not exist before; nor then, because then he did it, and "everything that is, when it is, [necessarily is]"; nor afterward, because it was already past, and could not have not been.

To the contrary, it is argued thus: The evil angel sinned in the first instant of his being, therefore he could have sinned in some first instant. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved by that word of the Savior saying of him in John 8: "He was a murderer from the beginning and stood not in the truth"; "and this from the beginning from which he was created," as Augustine explains in the 11th book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 28, concerning the little ones, and it is alleged in this third distinction.

In this question there will be three articles: The first will be whether an angel could have sinned or merited in some first instant, which is directly asked. The second, whether he could have sinned or merited in the first instant of his being, which is implied in one argument of the question. The third, whether in fact the evil angel sinned in the beginning of his creation or the first instant in which he existed.

ARTICLE 1

(The opinion of the Irishman)

Regarding the first article, it should be known that a certain modern doctor [the Irishman] is of the opinion that no volition in angels or humans is producible all at once, but each partly and successively, so that there is no first instant in which the will wills or in which the volition is in the will, although every volition is in the will in some first instant, just as in corporal forms which are acquired by continuous motion—for example, when something is heated by continuous motion, one cannot give a first instant in which the heat is in it, but rather before any instant in which heat is in it, there was some partial heat in it; nevertheless, any partial or total heat existing in it was in it in some first instant. And according to this, that doctor has to hold consequently—and also expressly holds—that neither an angel nor a human could first sin or merit.

(The opinion of the Irishman is proved, 1-14)

He proves this universal conclusion of his in many ways. **First** thus: If any volition could be made in an instant, it would be possible that someone might sin in the first instant of his being. The consequence is proved as in the second argument made for the first part of the question, and the falsity of the consequent similarly. And besides that proof, it is also proved thus: If this be possible, let it be put into being. Then I argue thus: That sin is a vice of the will, therefore it harms the will, therefore it takes away some good from the will, therefore that good taken away pre-existed in the will, and consequently the will itself pre-existed in which that good pre-existed, therefore this is not the first instant of its being. And so from

that being posited, contradictory things follow, namely that this is the first instant, and that this is not the first instant.

This is entirely the way of arguing of Augustine in the 12th book of *The City of God*, chapter 7, where he proves that no evil will can be evil from eternity. See there. In several other places he also uses a similar argument.

Likewise the same [Augustine] in the 11th book of *The City of God*, chapter 15, reproves the opinion of those who said the angel sinned in the first instant, by the authority of the blessed John in his first epistle, chapter 3, saying "because from the beginning the devil sins." And Augustine says that "they do not understand that if it is natural, it is in no way a sin." Where he expressly implies that from the fact that it is posited to be in the first instant, it follows that it is natural and consequently that it is not a sin.

Second, if so, someone could merit in the first instant of his being. The consequent is false, because no one can merit except when he can lose justice. But he cannot lose justice in the first instant, because then he is and "everything that is, etc."; nor before, because before he was not; therefore then he cannot merit. For so Anselm argues in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 5, that the good angels could have sinned before the evil ones fell. "Because if they could not sin," he says, "they preserved justice not by power but by necessity. Wherefore they no more merited" by preserving justice than by preserving rationality, "which they were unable to lose."

Third, then, a possible case being posited, someone would sin unwillingly and necessarily. I prove it: because posited that God in this instant creates one angel giving him perfect knowledge and freedom of choice and a precept that he elicit an act of loving God as quickly as he can, and yet with this He suspends the act of the angel's will for precisely this instant; this being posited, he will love God in some instant, because such a love will be produced all at once. Let that instant be A, then thus: Between this instant and A there will be a middle time, in which that angel does not love God, therefore in that time he omits against the precept. Whether he wills it or not, he will sin.

If it be said that he will love in the time immediately following this instant, then that love will be produced partibly and in time. But then to the contrary: Let it be posited that another angel, not hindered, elicits in this instant one love regarding God; then these two acts of the two angels will be of the same species; therefore if one is produced in time, so is the other, and conversely if one is in an instant, so is the remaining one, because "it is necessary that that which exists in one of the individuals of a species from essential things, exists in all individuals of that species," says the Commentator on the 2nd book of *On the Heavens*, comment 59.

Nor does it help if it be said that such a precept cannot be given in that case, because even if it be not posited that it is given, it still follows that he sins because of ingratitude by waiting through time before he loves God.

Fourth, as before, someone could merit in an instant, and then it would follow that it was possible for there to be two equal merits, of which one—all other things being equal on the part of each meriting party—would be in time, and the other in an instant. Which is false, because then it would be of no profit to continue the merit. The consequence is proved, because let it be posited that one merits through an

instant only and another through an hour, other conditions and circumstances being equal in both; then the merit made in one hour is greater, and not infinitely so, because no finite thing exceeds a finite thing infinitely. Let it be, for example, that it is double. Then let another be posited who, other things being equal, merits through half of one hour only; the merit of this third will be half of the merit of the second meriting party, therefore it will be equal to the instantaneous merit of the first. The assumption is proved, because the merit of the second for the first half-hour is simply equal to the merit of the third. Which is proved, because if the second had had some interruption between those half-hours in which he merited, then it would be manifest that his merit in each half would be equal to the merit of the third. But now his merit is as much as it would be if it were interrupted, because it is with similar conditions. Therefore, etc.

Fifth, it would follow that for an instantaneous sin a certain eternal punishment would be owed. And further, therefore, a possible case being posited, God could not sufficiently punish the sin of someone, which does not seem fitting to grant. The consequence is proved, since any created will is of a finite nature, and consequently it is possible to assign a maximum punishment which it can receive, or at least one so great that it will not be able to receive it. Let there be, therefore, some such punishment which the angel cannot receive, **A**. It is certain that there is some proportion between **A** and the punishment owed for the instantaneous sin of this angel, because both are finite. Let it be tenfold, then thus: Any time being taken, this angel can sin ten times as gravely as he did in one instant, therefore in finite time he can merit ten such punishments, and consequently punishment **A**; and he cannot receive punishment **A**, as was posited, therefore the intended conclusion. Moreover, the assumption is proved, because in any time however small, he himself—standing the same sufficient knowledge—could put away the evil volition by which he thus sinned, and resume it more than ten times, indeed as often as he wished, having a free will and not yet confirmed, because an angel suffers no difficulty in willing.

Sixth, if so, then a man or an angel could have merit in an instant, as was said before, and then further it would follow that by continuing one good volition made in an instant uniformly in all conditions through a certain time, he merits a reward infinite intensively, and since he cannot take such a reward, it would follow that he cannot be sufficiently rewarded by God. The first consequence is proved, because just as for the first extrinsic instant of that time some reward is precisely owed to the one meriting, so for any following instant of that time some reward is precisely owed. Therefore, either for any of the following instants a reward is owed equal to that which is owed for the first, or for each always more and more, or always less; and whichever be given, it follows that for all at once equal infinite rewards are owed, because after any instant and similarly before any instant of this time there are infinite instants. And therefore if always greater, then infinitely greater than the first. If always less, then any given in that time, before it there were infinite ones, for each of which a greater is owed. And thus the intended conclusion is clear.

Seventh, it would follow that according to common law someone could be more heavily punished for finite venial sins than for a maximum mortal sin done in the same time or a greater, because for a venial sin of one instant some punishment would be owed and that would not be exceeded infinitely by the punishment owed for a mortal sin. Therefore as many times according to a finite multitude as gravely, etc.

Eighth, it would follow that in the angel who sinned and similarly in the first man, merit and demerit were immediate, so that there was no instant nor middle time. And further, since each of these, when he stood in justice and merited, was always wise, and when he sinned, was foolish, it follows that between

the wisdom and foolishness of these there was no middle—namely a passage from one to the other—which passage was neither wise nor foolish, which is against Augustine in the 3rd book of *On Free Will*, chapter 52, where he asks whether the first man fell away from God foolishly or wisely, and he determines that neither thus nor thus, but there is a middle to be given; for "the passage itself was neither wise nor foolish," as he also declares in other examples. See there.

Ninth, then for instantaneous merit an increase of charity would be owed. Since, therefore, there is a certain proportion of that increase to the charity of Christ, it follows that in a time however small someone could acquire as much charity as Christ had, which is false. The consequence is proved, because in any small time he can so many times suddenly will, as often as that increase is contained in the charity of Christ, and the conclusion to be inferred follows.

Tenth, it would follow that it would be detrimental to a man to continue his meritorious act, because it is certain that for that a certain reward would be owed to him, and for an instantaneous merit a certain reward would also be owed to him, although less. Let it be, for example, that it is less tenfold. Since, therefore, ten, indeed a hundred such sudden acts he could produce in that time in which he continues one act, he could acquire a greater reward by not continuing it. Therefore it is detrimental to him to continue it.

Eleventh, it would follow that someone would necessarily be idle while having the highest freedom of choice. Because, posited that God suspends the action of one angel for precisely one instant, then he would first will in some mediated instant, and consequently in the middle time he would be idle.

Twelfth, it would follow that someone, having for one hour the highest merit possible for him regarding some object, could in the same hour merit tenfold more by having diverse acts regarding diverse objects, or even regarding the same one intercalatedly, and thus it would be expedient not to continue an act regarding one; which is false, because in this happiness is most commended by the Philosopher in the 10th book of the *Ethics*, that it is "most continuous."

Thirteenth, it would follow that if someone sinned venially by continuing his act through time, at the end of which he died, it would follow that for any instant of that time some punishment would be owed to him in purgatory. And if his sin were mortal, for any instant some punishment would be owed to him even in hell and consequently an infinite punishment intensively, and through this God could punish no one sufficiently.

Fourteenth, if a first instant is to be given in which the will wills or in which the volition is in the will, therefore this will be either concerning a volition freely produced by the will, or concerning that which is naturally produced, which namely necessarily follows upon some apprehension. Not concerning the free one, because every sudden change is the end of a successive one, by the Commentator on the 6th book of the *Physics*, comment 32; but when the will freely produces a volition, its first production, if there be any first, is not then the end of a successive change immediately preceding, therefore etc.

Nor concerning the volition naturally following the apprehension of some object—for example, of beatitude or some other pleasing thing—because there is no first instant to be given in which the intellect thinks of such a thing willed (let that be **A**); therefore neither a first instant in which the will wills it. The

assumption is proved, because the new thought would either be freely caused, and then it would not be the end of a successive change against the previously alleged authority of the Commentator; or that actual thought would be generated naturally from some imaginative species, and then either there is some weakest and minimum species of **A** itself in the imaginative power which can act upon the intellect, or there is some maximum which cannot. The first cannot be said, because if so, let that minimum which can be **B**, and the intention which it can cause be **C**. Therefore some other imaginative species weaker than **B** can cause in the intellect some intention, yet weaker than **C**. For so it is in other natural actions that, if some power can move something with some velocity, a lesser power can move that same thing more slowly. Which is proved from this, that the same thing moved can be moved more slowly by a weaker power, and so it follows that there is not some weakest and minimum species in the imagination able to cause in the intellect an actual thought about **A**.

It remains, therefore, that there is some maximum which cannot, and any more intense one can act upon the intellect. From this he proves that there is no first instant in which the imaginative species acts upon the intellect, and consequently neither of the thought in the intellect, if the thought be caused naturally by the imaginative species, because if there be any such first instant, let it be the present instant, then thus: The imaginative species acts now upon the intellect naturally and not freely, therefore now for the first time is this species strong enough to act, because if it had been strong enough before, it would have acted before. Therefore there is some minimum or weakest species in the imagination which can act upon the intellect. The opposite of which has already been proved. Therefore there is not any first instant in which the species in the imagination acts upon the intellect. And through this there is not any first instant in which the intellect thinks, when its thought is made naturally by the imaginative species. And the principal proposition follows.

(Against the opinion of the Irishman through three conclusions)

This opinion does not appear to me to be true. Therefore, because of it and for the sake of the response to the article, I posit three conclusions: The first is that it is possible for some volition to be produced indivisibly, or all at once. The second, that it is possible for some volition to be produced successively and partly. The third, directly addressing the article, is that an angel could have sinned in some first instant.

(The first conclusion is proved, first and second)

I prove the first by certain arguments of others that are quite probable, as it seems to me. First thus: It is possible for someone's charity to be corrupted all at once; therefore, it is possible for some volition to be produced all at once. The antecedent is proved. For it is possible that someone having charity sins mortally for the first time; but by mortal sin all charity is corrupted at once, as all concede. The consequence is clear, because charity is not corrupted by sin before that sin exists. This is certain; otherwise, punishment would precede the fault. Nor does that sin exist before charity itself is corrupted, since they are not compatible in the same subject according to common law. Therefore, at the same time charity first is not, and the mortal fault is, and the proposition is held.

Second, it is possible for knowledge, both sensory and intellectual, to be produced all at once; therefore, also volition. The consequence is clear: first because the intellect or sense is not more powerful regarding

its act than the will is regarding its own. Second, because once sufficient knowledge of a pleasing object is posited, volition regarding it can be posited at once.

Addition 26: I prove the antecedent. I suppose from what was said in the First [Book], distinction 3, that every "minimum visible" at a certain distance from a certain sight (certain dispositions and circumstances remaining) can be seen. I posit, therefore, that some colored thing, quite weak and unable to move the sight or cause vision at distance **A-B** from a given sight, is intensified by continuous motion until it is of precisely such intensity as is required for the minimum perceptible or visible by that sight at that distance. It is certain that in some first instant it will be of such intensity. Let that instant be **C**. Then thus: In **C** there is first a visible thing proportioned to this sight according to distance, quantity, intensity, and other requirements. Therefore, in **C** there is a vision of it. The consequence is proved since, if some such visible thing were generated or created entirely anew in an instant in that place, in that same instant there would be a vision of it, as is clear through Augustine in the 14th book of *On the Trinity*, chapter 10, where he says: "Certain knowable things precede knowledge by the interposition of time, such as those sensible things which were already in temporal things before they were known... but certain things begin to be at the same time [as their knowledge], as if something visible, which was not at all, should arise before our eyes; it certainly does not precede our knowledge; or if something sounds where a hearer is present, the sound and its hearing certainly begin to be together and cease together." Therefore, in the proposed case, that visible thing of such intensity and the vision of it begin to be together. Therefore, some vision is made all at once.

(Response)

To this, I believe that doctor would say, as he says to something else similar, namely that in the given case that quality which is caused in the eye in that instant **C** is first a vision and is first made a vision, and is even made a vision all at once; nevertheless, it is not made all at once nor is it then first made, but a part of it was made before—although that part was not before a vision—so that the visible thing, before it was of due intensity for it to be seen, simultaneously, while it was being intensified, caused such a quality which was not then a vision and in instant **C** is first a vision.

(Against the response)

This response, first, can be excluded if it be posited that some such visible thing is produced all at once, which is certainly possible, at least by God.

Second, because it is necessary not only to give a minimum possible to be seen at a certain distance, but also a minimum power able to cause such a quality in the eye, as can be proved from the same things as above in the First [Book]. Let it be posited, therefore, that in some instant it is first able to cause a quality of this sort in the sight. Therefore, some such quality will be made all at once. And certainly it does not seem less possible that some volition be made all at once.

Third, that which the response concedes seems to suffice for the principal proposition. For if in **C** that quality is first a vision, therefore in **C** it is first seen, and first understood, and similarly first desired or loved. And thus it is fitting to give a first instant in which the will wills it; which is against his principal proposition.

Fourth, even granting that such a quality were first made partly before it was a vision, it does not seem it can be reasonably said that, before it was a vision, it caused in the will some quality which was not a volition but was to be a volition in the future. Consequently, the volition which is in C is produced all at once then for the first time.

I prove the assumption and I suppose one thing which no one, I believe, would deny, namely that no quality naturally causable in the will is indifferent to being a volition or a nolition (rejection) of the same object; but that which is a volition, or is naturally apt to be a volition of this or that object, is not naturally apt to be a nolition of the same; indeed, the quality of a nolition is of a different species from that which is or can be a volition, whatever that may be.

I suppose secondly another thing commonly conceded and proved above in general: that once actual knowledge of such an object is posited, the will can not-will it, and indeed can even nill it.

From these, the intent is declared quite easily, since if some quality is caused in the will during that time, either that which can be a volition is caused, or only that which can be a nolition, or both at once. The first cannot be said, since then it follows that either the will will not be able to nill it in instant C, contrary to the second supposition, or it will be able to elicit in that instant some nolition all at once, which is the proposition. By the same reasoning it is proved that the second cannot be given, because either it could not then will, or it would be given that it could elicit some volition all at once. Nor can the third be said, because then it follows that in instant C it would simultaneously will it and nill it. Thus, therefore, the argument made stands. The Ordinary Text follows.

I prove the antecedent from the fact that some visible thing existing in darkness, if light is suddenly caused in the medium (as is possible), will suddenly cause vision in the sight, posited that someone is near and disposed.

To this also is the express authority of the Commentator on the 3rd book of *On the Soul*, comment 28, where he says "that sensing is of itself a perfect action and without time and without a diminished action preceding it." And he says the same immediately concerning understanding. And he concludes that Aristotle intends there "to declare the cause for which the intellect understands without time."

To this authority, it is responded by saying that the intent of the Commentator in the aforesaid authority and others similar is that, although actions of this sort—namely sensing and understanding—are intensified by some cause through some time, nevertheless at the term of that time and in all following instants they are said to be perfect in their species when there is perfect rest in the soul, nor do they then require a successive action immediately preceding. And this he understands by saying that a diminished action does not precede those actions, namely necessarily and immediately.

But this gloss is in no way according to the mind of the Commentator or the Philosopher [Aristotle] whom the Commentator is explaining there. This is clear. For the Philosopher wishes there to give the difference between the transmutation of a sense (when from not actually sensing it becomes actually sensing) and of the intellect (when from not actually understanding it becomes actually understanding) and the transmutation of material things. Therefore, he does not take those actions according to how they

are already produced and at rest, but according to how they are made in the sense or intellect and acquired after they were not. And this is clearly evident from the words of the Philosopher according to the letter which the Commentator explains; for they are these: "And we see the sensed object making the sensing in act after it was in potentiality, not by undergoing alteration." And in saying "not by undergoing alteration," he implies the difference he intends. Whence also without intermediary he adds: "And therefore this is another mode of motion. For motion is an action, but not a perfection. But action simply is another motion, and the action of the perfect," where the Commentator explaining says: "We see, etc., that is, and because we see the sensible making the sensing in act after it was in potentiality, not so that the sensing, at its exit from potentiality into act, is transmuted or altered, etc."

Likewise below: "And the cause why transmutation happens to that motion [material change], but not to this one, is because that motion to which transmutation happens is an imperfect action and a way to a complement; but this one is a perfect action, indeed, the complement."

From these it is clear, first, that as was said, he speaks of such actions not according to how they were previously made, etc., as the response says, but according to how they are made and go out into act after they were not. Second, that thus they are not imperfect and successive actions and as it were "ways to a complement," but perfect and complete, and consequently indivisible and all at once. And according to this understanding the Philosopher also speaks in the 10th book of the *Ethics*, where he says that vision and delight are among the number of "wholes" and "perfect things."

It must be noted, however, that although it happens that such things are made all at once, nevertheless it also happens that sometimes they are made partly, as will be clear in the following conclusion. But this does not happen to them *per se* nor always, and this the Commentator also noted, adding where above on the 3rd book of *On the Soul*: "And since it is so," he says, namely that sensing and understanding are perfect actions, "to be an imperfect action in the intellect happens to it because of matter, not according to what it is as an action. And when this happens to an action, it is necessary that some action be freed from this accident." From which, as is clear, he also concludes that it is necessary that some action be, or be able to be, not imperfect and diminished, which is the proposition.

With this the Philosopher also agrees in the 10th book of the *Ethics*, by whose saying in the same place the present conclusion is also proved, when he says that it happens that one is delighted "in no time" and "in the now itself," and that "delight is something whole."

(The first conclusion is proved, third)

Third, principally thus: Christ, according to his soul, had an act of meritorious love which was increased through no time. Therefore, he had a volition all at once, and not one partly produced. The consequence is clear, because if that love had been produced successively and partly, a greater or more intense love would have been in him at the end of that time than in the middle. But the antecedent is proved by the authorities of the Master [Peter Lombard] in book 3, distinction 18, chapter 2, saying that Christ from his very conception merited "through charity, justice, and other virtues." And it follows that "such a fullness of gifts was in him, that in them he could not profit, and therefore his soul could not be made better than it was from the beginning of its condition." Likewise Gregory, whom the Master alleges there, says: "Christ

did not at all have, according to the merit of his soul, anything by which he could have profited," therefore neither could his merit or meritorious volition be increased.

To this, that doctor [the Irishman] responds that Christ did not have that merit from a human will, but through creation. And therefore it does not follow from this that an act of volition naturally produced is made in an instant.

To the contrary: This cannot stand according to his own sayings, because according to him no act is a merit of anyone by whom it is not produced. Therefore, if that act was not produced by the soul of Christ, it was not a merit of the soul of Christ—even granting it could be said it was a merit of Christ because of his divinity, by which it would have been produced, as he himself seems to want to say. But now the aforesaid authorities say that he merited "according to his soul"; therefore according to that man's doctrine it was produced by the soul.

Furthermore, Christ merited, and it is certain that it was not according to his divinity; therefore according to his humanity. And if so, therefore according to his soul, and consequently that merit was from his soul.

(The second conclusion is proved)

I prove the second conclusion first thus: It happens that a volition is intensified; therefore it happens that a volition is partly produced. The consequence is clear. For the intensification of a form does not happen except by the addition of a new part of the form, as was proved in the First [Book], distinction 17. The antecedent is proved, since it happens that in someone the knowledge or estimation of the goodness of some thing which he desires is intensified—as of a book through a more diligent examination of its beauty or truth, or of a horse through greater experience of its strength or speed. Therefore, it also happens that the desire for it is intensified. And the consequence is clear, since as the Commentator says on the 12th book of the *Metaphysics*, comment 35—and we also experience it thus—"the more the thing desired is estimated to be a greater good, the greater the desire will be."

Second, it happens that some volition is partly corrupted; therefore it happens that some is partly produced. The consequence is clear. Experience proves the antecedent. For one experiences that sometimes he intensely and fervently desires some thing not possessed, or even is delighted and pleased by a thing possessed, and little by little such pleasure or desire grows lukewarm and is diminished, and finally ceases. But such remission does not happen without the successive corruption of the said acts.

Third, it is possible for corporal and even intellectual vision to be partly acquired; therefore also volition. The consequence is clear: first because a repugnance does not appear more on the part of volition than of vision, especially intellectual vision; second because frequently a more intense volition follows upon a clearer and more perfect knowledge of a thing, as was touched upon above. The antecedent is clear when something first seen from afar approaches the viewer, and according to the greater approach it is seen more clearly. Likewise when a weak visible thing, actually seen, is continuously intensified and is seen more clearly and perfectly. In which case it can be more evidently argued that the vision is made partly; for continuously new parts of color according to intensity are generated in the same subject first with the preceding ones, and those, just like the others, are certainly seen, and are not seen before they are, nor are they before they are seen. This is clear through Augustine in the 14th book of *On the Trinity*,

chapter 10, saying: "Certain knowable things begin to be at the same time as the knowledge [of them], as if something visible, which was not at all, should arise before our eyes, it certainly does not precede our knowledge; or if something sounds where a hearer is present, the sound and its hearing certainly begin to be together and cease together."

And that which was last posited is also very valid for the principal proposition. For just as exterior speech is successively formed, so also hearing is successively generated. This is also clear by reason. For otherwise a natural active thing would remain through time in sufficient disposition toward a sufficient passive thing, with other requirements concurring, before it acted. Therefore, at the same time as those parts of color are made, they are seen, and as they are successively made, they are successively seen. And it is certain that they are not seen by precisely that vision by which the prior ones were seen, as is clear from the previously alleged authority and also by reason, since the vision of one thing cannot naturally become the vision of another; therefore it is seen by some partial vision, and not a pre-existing one, because no vision naturally precedes the thing seen, since any vision is caused by the thing seen according to Augustine in the 11th book of *On the Trinity*, chapter 2, and similarly in the 14th book as above.

Likewise, in another example the same is effectively demonstrated. For if some large visible thing, only a part of which someone sees through a certain hole, be moved with continuous motion before that hole—for example from right to left—the part first seen will successively exit the opposition of the eye and will be hidden from it, and another part not previously seen will succeed it. And because it is certain that the succeeding part will not be seen by the vision of the preceding part, nor will it all succeed at once but part by part, it follows that it will be seen by a new vision partly and successively acquired, which is what was to be proved.

(Objections against the second conclusion)

Against this conclusion are the reasons of some who hold that an act of loving is entirely impartible. The first of which is: because if it were partible and consequently divisible into more remiss [weaker] parts to infinity, it follows that in the love by which one loves God, there is contained some part more remiss and imperfect than the act of love by which one loves a fly. And since any part of a love is a love, it follows that some love of God is more imperfect, or at least less perfect, than the love of a fly, which seems absurd.

Second, it would follow that someone would simultaneously love the same object perfectly and imperfectly: perfectly by the whole act, and imperfectly by a part of the act. And thus the Blessed Virgin would love God as imperfectly as some person who is least dear to God.

Third, take two loves of different kinds [species], and I ask whether every individual of one of those species is more perfect than any individual of the other species, or not. If not, then the species are not like numbers, against the Philosopher in the 8th book of the *Metaphysics*. If so, then any part of one of those loves is more perfect than the other love; and further, since any part has in itself infinite proportional parts, it follows that any part contains in itself infinite parts, any of which is more perfect than the other certain love—namely that other first taken—and if so, any part therefore is infinitely perfect, which is false.

(To the objections)

To the first, it must be said that in the final consequent, the comparison can be taken according to **proportionality**, such that the sense is that some love of God is less perfect *in its own species* than some certain given love of a fly is in its own species. In this sense, the consequent is not inconvenient. Secondly, it can be taken according to the **proportion** of one to the other, and then I deny the consequence when speaking of natural perfection, not of gracious (supernatural) perfection. For I say that any love of God, however weak, is more perfect than any intense love of a fly, just as any weak intellection is more perfect than any perfect or intense blackness.

To the second, it must be said that the term "imperfectly" can be taken in two ways. In one way, **negatively**, so that the prefix "im-" is equivalent to a negation, such that the sense is that one would perfectly love God and *not* perfectly love God; then I deny the consequence, nor is the proof valid in this sense, as is clear. In another way, it can be taken as **weakly** (*remisse*), such that the sense is that one would love God perfectly (or intensely) and weakly at the same time; even so, the consequence can still be denied, although it could be conceded that one loves God with an intense and a weak love, just as it can be conceded that the same subject is hot with an intense heat and a weak heat, which is a part of the intense one. Yet, by common usage, it is not conceded that the same thing is intensely and weakly hot, whatever might be conceded by the force of logic (*virtute sermonis*), as was said in the First Book, distinction 17.

If anyone wishes to make the first sense identical with the second—about which I do not wish to contend—then concede the consequence and the consequent, both the first and the second. Yet it does not follow from that second that the Blessed Virgin does not love more perfectly than that person who is least dear to God, although even that second consequence is not valid by the force of logic because of the word "as" (*sicut*), which has a confusing force. Therefore this is false: "Some love of the Virgin is as weak or small as the love of that least devoted person," because for any love or part of the love of the Virgin, there is some part of the love of the least devoted person that is weaker. For the same reason, it is also not to be conceded conversely that any part of his love is as weak as a part of the Virgin's love.

To the third, I say that any individual of a more perfect species is more perfect than any individual of an imperfect species. And further, I concede that any part of a love of a more perfect species contains infinite parts, any of which is more perfect, etc. But I deny the consequence which infers "therefore it is **infinitely perfect**"; the reason is that the comparison is made between things of a different kind (*alterius rationis*), in which such a consequence is not valid.

PROVING THE THIRD CONCLUSION

(That an angel could have sinned in some first instant)

I prove the **third conclusion** thus: It was possible for the angel, before he sinned, to have charity, and for his first sin to have been mortal; therefore, it was possible for him to have sinned in some first instant. The consequence is clear, because once the antecedent is posited as real, it follows that in some instant he

first sinned, namely in that in which his charity first was not. The antecedent is true according to everyone, especially according to the doctor of the opposite opinion [Hibernicus].

Secondly, the angel could have elicited some evil volition all at once anew and, before he elicited it, in no other way had he sinned. Therefore, he could have sinned in some first instant. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is clear: first from the first conclusion; second because it is not repugnant to volition (good or evil) to exist all at once—even according to the opposite opinion—nor is it repugnant to the agent to produce it all at once, since it is not even repugnant to a natural agent.

Addition 27: Thirdly, I prove the conclusion thus: It is impossible for the will to be changed (*transmutatam*) to any volition without being changed to it in some **first instant**. Therefore, it is impossible for any volition to be produced, whether all at once or successively, without it being produced in some first instant. This deduction is clear from the 6th book of the *Physics*.

From this antecedent, I infer that it is impossible for any volition to be produced all at once anew in the will without there being some instant in which it first was or is; or, as some think, that one should not speak of a "first instant of its being," but rather a "last instant of its non-being." This inference is proved because if a volition is produced anew, the will is first changed to it in some instant. Either that instant is the instant of its **non-being**, and then it follows that in that same instant the will has it (thus it simultaneously is and is not, which is impossible); or it is the instant of its **being**, and the proposition is held.

From this I further infer that if the will does not have a volition in the present, it is impossible for it to produce a volition in itself all at once **immediately after**. If God could produce this angel or this possible volition all at once immediately after this instant, then I ask: when God produces this angel, does the sun coexist first and adequately to point A [in its movement], or not? If so, then He does not produce it *after* now, but *in* the now, which contradicts the premise. If not, then the sun will have moved from A. If it moved by a divisible part, then time has passed, so it wasn't "immediately after." If by an indivisible part, then you are positing that a continuum is composed of indivisibles, which is impossible.

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS (THE MONK'S ARGUMENTS)

But against this conclusion, it is argued (by the Monk) thus:

1. **Divine Destruction:** God can destroy the whole world all at once immediately after this instant. Therefore, He can produce a volition all at once immediately after. Otherwise, God would be forced to let a creature endure against His will.
2. **Instantaneous Being:** God could make an angel that exists for only an instant. Therefore, it would cease to be immediately after that instant.
3. **Illumination:** God can choose not to cooperate with the sun to illuminate the air for exactly one instant, and then cooperate immediately after. The light would then be produced all at once.
4. **The Obstacle:** If an obstacle is between the sun and the air, God can destroy it in an instant, causing light immediately after.

5. **Simultaneous Parts:** Parts of a volition are not repugnant to existing together immediately after an instant.
 6. **Conservation:** God can conserve a thing immediately after this instant. But divine conservation is its true production.
 7. **Equal Heat (The Caloric Argument):** Take two objects, A and B, where A is twice as hot as B. Let A cool continuously and B heat up continuously. At the exact middle point, they are equal. There must be an instant where they are *not* equal, but *immediately after* they are.
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REFUTATION OF THE MONK'S ARGUMENTS

To the first, I deny the antecedent. God cannot destroy a thing "immediately after" in an instant because there is no such thing as an "immediate instant" to another instant. Nor can He destroy it in the "immediate time" all at once, for that implies a contradiction (it would be destroyed after it was already destroyed).

To the third, I concede that the sun will produce light "immediately after," but it does so **partibly and successively** in the time immediately following instant A. If you add "all at once" to the premise, I deny it.

To the fourth, I say that in that case, the sun produces the light in the *very same instant* that God annihilates the obstacle, not after.

To the sixth, I concede the consequent, but distinguish. God conserves the whole thing all at once immediately after, but He does not produce it **anew** all at once immediately after. One can conserve what already exists, but "producing anew" implies a transition from non-being to being that requires a first instant.

To the ninth (The Heat Argument), I say that no such instant can be selected. Between any selected instant and the "middle instant" where they are equal, there will always be a period of time in which A and B are not precisely equal. To suggest otherwise assumes that one instant can be "next to" another instant, which is false.

To the last, I concede that even a creature (like a candle) produces light "immediately after" this instant, but it is a continuation of the act, not a "new production." If you add "produces anew," I deny the consequence.

Note on "Immediate Time": When I say "time immediate to an instant," I do not mean by excluding all parts (for every time has a part that comes before the rest of it), but rather by excluding any *extrinsic* medium. This is how we say two magnitudes are immediate or touching.

ARTICLE 2

(Proper Opinion)

Regarding the **second article**, there is a diversity of opinions, and many favor either side. However, it seems to me more probable to say—with those who hold it—that an angel could have merited in the first instant and could also have sinned.

The reason that moves me is this: everything the angel had when he sinned that was necessarily required for him to be able to sin, he had or could have had in the first instant. Therefore, he could have sinned in the first instant. Similarly, everything the angel had when he merited that was required for the ability to merit, he had or could have had in the first instant. Therefore, it was possible for him to merit. Both consequences are clear, and the antecedent is easily declared.

For on the part of the **intellect**, he had or could have had the same and equal knowledge, since knowledge is producible in an instant (as was previously held), and all the *per se* causes of such knowledge could have existed in the first instant, as is clear by going through them. Similarly, the **will** was just as powerful and free in the beginning as it was later, and God could have infused **grace** then just as well as afterward.

What has been said concerning knowledge is confirmed by the intention of **Augustine** in *The City of God*, Book 11, where he says: "In no way, according to a space of time, were those spirits whom we call angels previously darkness; but as soon as they were made, they were made light, not only created so that they might live in some way, but also illuminated so that they might live wisely and blessedly." From this, it is clear that the wisdom and knowledge from which the evil ones fell, they possessed in their very beginning.

That which was said concerning the power and freedom of their will falls into no doubt.

Secondly, Christ, according to His soul, merited in the first instant of His creation; therefore, it was possible for an angel to have merited in the first instant, and similarly to have sinned. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved from the intention of the **Master** [Peter Lombard], where he holds that Christ merited from the beginning of His condition and could not profit [increase] in merits. This cannot be glossed as "immediately after the beginning," because either He would have merited immediately after in an instant (and then one instant would be immediate to another, which is impossible) or in an immediate time (and then He would have profited in merit, contrary to the Master).

COUNTER-ARGUMENTS (OPINIONS OF THOMAS AND PETER AUREOLI)

Against this part, several arguments are made, two of which are stronger.

First, it is argued thus: If an angel had sinned in the first instant, **God would have been the cause of his sin**. But the consequent is impossible, therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is proved because every operation that begins simultaneously with the being of a thing is from the agent from which it has being, "just as to be moved upward belongs to fire from its generator."

Second, an angel could not have had **perfect deliberation** in the first instant, therefore he could not sin in the first instant. The antecedent is proved: first because deliberation requires counsel and a practical syllogism, which can only concern the future; and second because such deliberation necessarily requires a determined judgment of the intellect following opposite estimations. "For perfect deliberation is a discourse conceiving both parts of a contradiction." An angel could not have had a judgment following opposite estimations in the first instant (e.g., understanding an affirmative conclusion in one principle and a negative in another simultaneously), for he would have had opposite syllogisms at once.

REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF THOMAS

To the first: if the consequent is understood to mean that God was the **immediate and total cause** of that sin, or that God was the cause for the angel eliciting that evil act—in which sense it must be considered inconvenient and is not conceded—I deny that consequence. Regarding the proof, while it may hold for naturally consequent operations, it has no appearance of truth regarding a **freely elicited act**.

This response is confirmed because, as a certain doctor says, **Augustine** seems to deny this consequence in *The City of God*, Book 11, where he says that those who hold the devil was never blessed do not agree with the **Manichaeans** (who believe the devil has a nature of evil from a contrary principle). Thus, according to Augustine, it does not follow that if he sinned from the beginning, he was from a contrary and evil principle. It stands together that he sinned from the beginning and yet was produced by a good God, who was not the cause of his sin in the aforementioned way.

This is expressly confirmed by Augustine in *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, where he says: "It is thought that the devil never stood in the truth... but fell from the very beginning of his condition; this is not to be understood as if he were not depraved by his own will, but created evil by a good God. Otherwise, he would not be said to have fallen; for he did not fall if he was made such."

Furthermore, as the same doctor says, if that reasoning were valid, it could be argued that now, in fact, God is the cause of every sin, since He is the cause of the soul not only when He first creates it, but always while He conserves it.

REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF PETER AUREOLI

To the second, a distinction must be made concerning **deliberation**, as another doctor [Ockham] distinguishes. For deliberation is twofold:

1. One which is with a **perfect investigation** of a doubt, involving arguments for both sides of a contradiction.
2. The other, which is a **perfect knowledge or assent** regarding a practical principle or conclusion.

The first is not required for a meritorious or demeritorious act; the second suffices, along with freedom of choice, to conformably elicit or not elicit a volition. And such can certainly exist in an instant. Thus, if the antecedent refers to the first kind of deliberation, the consequence is invalid; if the second, it is false.

Counsel is not required when one already has sufficient knowledge of the conclusion; indeed, it would be superfluous. Likewise, a syllogism concerning the future is not always required, nor that opposite estimations precede. In a **perfectly virtuous man**, such estimations do not precede, although they may in one not perfectly habited, like the incontinent.

REFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE IRISHMAN

Now to the arguments of the opinion rejected in the preceding article.

To the first, although the consequence is denied by many, I say the consequent is not false. An angel could sin in the first instant. When it is proved from Augustine's way of arguing that "sin removes a good," I say that for Augustine's intention it suffices that the good which vice corrupts **precedes by nature**, and it need not precede in time. That diminished good is the **aptitude for attaining beatitude**, for by sin, a good nature is rendered less apt for it. This is clear from the beginning of Augustine's argument.

When Augustine later proves that an evil will could not be sempiternal (everlasting) to any nature, he means it could not be **connatural** or naturally following it (as the Manichaeans held). For then it would not vitiate it nor diminish its good by depriving it of a good possessed. If it is to harm the nature, the nature must have actually had a good of which it is deprived, or been born to have one which it now lacks and for which it is less powerful—not less than it *was*, but less than it *would have been* if it had not sinned. For this, **priority of nature** suffices over priority of time.

To the second (that one cannot merit unless he can lose justice), I say one can be said to "lose justice" in two ways:

1. Because he no longer has what he once had.
2. Because he does not have what he **would have had**.

Augustine uses this distinction, saying the devil "deserted and lost" the sweetness of angelic life, not that he threw away what he had received, but that he "fell from what he was about to receive" if he had willed to be subject to God.

When it is assumed that "no one can merit unless he can lose justice," if "lose" is taken strictly in the first sense, the proposition is not absolutely true, nor does **Anselm's** saying prove it. Anselm's reasoning is: "If they could not sin, they preserved justice not by power but by necessity. Therefore, they no more merited." Anselm means that if they could not sin, they preserved justice by necessity. From the opposite of the consequent, he infers: the good angels merited by preserving justice, therefore they preserved it by power, therefore they were **able not to preserve it**. It does not follow that they must have already

possessed it for a period of time to be able to lose it; they only needed the power to not-preserve it at that moment.

To the third (concerning species and time), I say it is possible for one light to be produced in an instant while another of the same species is produced in time. Being acquired in an instant or in time is not among those things that belong **essentially** to these species.

To the fourth (concerning equal merits), I say it is one thing for a meritorious act to be in an instant or through time, and another for it to be **meritorious** in an instant or through time. For a certain brief time, an act is, but it is not "more meritorious" than it was in its first instant. It does not follow that from any continuation of a meritorious act, the act becomes a "greater merit" or worthy of a "greater reward" than it was in the first instant of its being. Thus, I concede that for some period of time, the same act is not more meritorious than it was in the first instant in which it existed.

But then against this is the fact that it then seems that the continuation of a meritorious act profits nothing—nay, rather it hinders—and that it would be expedient frequently to interrupt the act and abandon the first and elicit a new one.

To this I say that not every continuation of an act is profitable, such as, for instance, that which is **not free and with knowledge**, as is that which occurs through that brief, **imperceptible time**. Nor is it the case that none is profitable, but some is; namely, that which proceeds from **knowledge and liberty**, as when someone can knowingly and freely desist by himself from an elicited act and elicit another, which happens in one who continues an act beyond the time imperceptible to him. And concerning such a continuation, I say that he who so continues the act **merits no less** than if he were to elicit a new one. And it is more expedient so to continue than to interrupt it in order to elicit a new one, because he who would so interrupt would **expose himself to the danger** of not resuming the act so quickly; and yet, if he were to resume it many times, he would not merit more than if he spontaneously continued an equal act for as much time as he could so many times elicit a new act.

You will say: let it be granted that God in any instant of that imperceptible time should infuse sufficient knowledge, or in some one instant should infuse such perfect knowledge that the angel himself in any instant of that time could knowingly abandon that act and elicit another; then it follows that in each [instant] he will merit as much **new reward** as in the first instant, and consequently in any part of time he will merit an **infinite reward**.

I respond that the consequent is no less possible or less to be conceded, or more impossible or to be denied, than the case which is given; and therefore he who would admit the case as possible could consequently concede the consequent. Nor for now do I see an inconvenience following, especially since it is **not impossible for God to cause a reward infinite intensively**, as can be clear from what was said in the *First Book*, distinction 44.

To the fifth, it is clear that the second consequence is not valid and that what is assumed for its proof is **false**: namely, that in any time whatever one can sin as many times and as gravely as he sinned in the first instant. For within that brief time, of which it was spoken, not only could he not elicit a new sin demeritoriously many times, but **not even once**, just as he could not elicit a new merit, as has been said.

And by the same it is clear to the sixth. For it is founded upon the same **false imagination**: namely, that for every instant of time in which the act lasts, it is meritorious of a new reward.

To the seventh, it must be said that "to be punished more gravely" can be understood in two ways: namely, **intensively and extensively** according to the duration of the punishment. If in the first way, the consequent does not seem to be denied. Hence perhaps, as a certain doctor says, some who are punished eternally in hell are punished **more intensively** for a time in purgatory. But if in the second way, then I deny the consequence and the assumption in the proof likewise. For as much as pertains to extension, the punishment due to **mortal sin** infinitely exceeds the punishment due to venial sin, since to the former an **eternal** punishment is due, to the latter a **temporal** one.

To the eighth, concede the consequent, just as the one arguing himself and anyone has to concede, unless he wishes to posit a **middle ground** between the whole time in which one is in charity and that in which he lacks charity, and by this, in which both contradictories would be false. Then to the proof it must be said that **Augustine** does not intend to posit such a middle ground according to duration as the argument imagines, but he only wishes to say that such a transition from one opposite into another—or rather the one so transitioning—is **not named from either of the opposites**, in the same way we are accustomed to name operations from habits, saying that a man operates in such a way when he elicits an operation according to the habit which he has; for example, as the **Philosopher** says in the *2nd Book of Ethics*, we then say a grammarian does something "grammatically" when it is done according to the grammar which he has. Now, however, when someone passes from one opposite into another—for example, in the instance of Augustine, when from **wisdom into folly**—he does not pass according to the wisdom which he has, as is clear, therefore neither "wisely"; likewise not according to folly, because in him there was not yet folly by means of which he might pass, and therefore he is not said to pass "foolishly." And by this Augustine concludes that there is a **middle ground** between "doing something wisely" and "doing something foolishly," because, namely, it happens to do something neither foolishly nor wisely. Yet from this it is not concluded that there is some time or instant that is a medium between the time of folly and of wisdom, in which he is **neither foolish nor wise**, as the argument intends.

To the ninth and tenth, it is clear from the response to the fourth. To the eleventh, it must be said that he will will in an immediate time, and in **no first instant** will he will. To the twelfth, it is clear from the things said to the fourth. And by the same it is clear to the thirteenth.

To the fourteenth, I say first that it is concerning **"free volition."** And when it is proved that it is not, from the authority of the Comment [Averroes], it must be said that the **Commentator** speaks of **corporeal mutations**, but not spiritual ones. And this is clear there both from the examples and also from the cause which he treats, namely concerning saving the demonstration of **Aristotle** for proving that "every movable thing is divisible" is universal to every mutation. For it is certain that the Philosopher does not speak there except of corporeal mutations, nor can his proofs be adapted to spiritual ones. Then also because in the *3rd Book on the Soul*, as was held above, the Commentator expressly says the **opposite** concerning intellection, and similarly the Philosopher.

Secondly, I say that in a case it is also possible to give a **first instant of volition** naturally following apprehension—for example, if such an apprehension were caused suddenly—which at least no Catholic, as I think, would deny could be done by God.

Addition 28: Furthermore, I do not see why there cannot be given a **minimum imaginative species** capable of causing intellection there. And when it is proved that not, because then some weaker one could cause a weaker intellection (because we see this in natural actions, etc.), I say that that consequence is **neither existent nor apparent**, since I have already posited a "minimum" capable [species]. The proof also is founded on a **falsehood**. For not everything of the same nature with that which can act upon this demonstrated passive object can act upon the same passive object; nor, if such a great power can move this movable thing at such a velocity through such a space, will every lesser power be able to move the same movable thing (though more slowly) through the same space; nay, rather there will be some which **cannot move it in any way**. Whence the Philosopher also rejects this rule in the *7th Book of the Physics*. The ordinary text follows.

ARTICLE 3

(Four conclusions)

As much as pertains to the third article, I posit **four conclusions**:

1. The **first** pertains to the fifth distinction: namely, that **all angels**, both good and bad, were **created in grace and charity**.
2. The **second**: that they were **not created with perfect beatitude**, and this pertains to the fourth distinction.
3. The **third**: that the **bad angel did not sin in the first instant of his being**, which pertains to the third distinction.
4. The **fourth**: that he did not sin immediately after the first instant, but there was a **delay [mora]** between creation and the fall.

(The first conclusion is proved in three ways)

I prove the **first conclusion** first by the authority of **Damascene**, who says in Book 2, chapter 3: "By the word of God all angels were created, and by the Holy Spirit through sanctification they were made perfect according to the proportion of their dignity and order, participating in illumination and grace." Here, as is clearly evident, he speaks of **all**.

Secondly, the same is proved by the authority of **Augustine**, in *The City of God*, Book 12, chapter 9, where he says that the angels, "at the same time as they were made, adhered to Him by whom they were made, by the **love** with which they were made. And by this those [the bad] were separated from the society of these [the good], because these remained in that same **good will**, while those were changed by falling away from it." And of what kind of love he speaks, he explains below: "And who," he says, "had made this good will except Him who created them with a good will, that is, with a **chaste love** by which they adhere to Him, at the same time creating their nature and **bestowing grace**?" Behold, they were created with chaste love; but chaste love is that which **proceeds from charity**. Furthermore, he expressly

says "and bestowing grace." And lest anyone should think he wishes this to be understood of the good alone because it follows immediately, "whence it is to be believed that the holy angels were never without a good will, that is, the love of God," attend to what follows immediately: "These, however," he says, "who, when they had been made good, became bad by their own bad will, either received a **lesser grace** of divine love than those who persisted in the same, or if both were created **equally good**, while these were falling by a bad will, those were more helped to arrive at that fullness of beatitude." Behold, he asserts that grace was **conferred on all**, although he leaves in doubt whether it was equal.

Thirdly, the **Gloss**—and it seems to be of **Jerome**—upon that of Hosea 3: "They love the husks of grapes": "By the husks," he says, "he means the demons who were created in the **great fatness of the Holy Spirit**." The great fatness of the Holy Spirit is nothing other than **charity**. Many other authorities could be adduced, but let these suffice.

(Against the first conclusion, in three ways)

Against this conclusion are expressly **Hugh [of St. Victor]** in *The Sacraments*, Book 1, part 5, chapter 19 and chapter 23, and likewise the **Master [Peter Lombard]** here in distinction 5.

Against this also seems to be **Augustine**, Book 1 *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 2, on that word "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," where he says that the **formless matter** of spiritual and corporeal creatures was called heaven and earth; namely, the spiritual life, such as it can be in itself, **not turned toward the Creator**; for by such a turning it is formed and perfected. From this it is clear that it was first created not turned nor perfected, and consequently **without charity**.

Likewise, in Book 4, chapter 28, he says that the spiritual creature "after darkness was made **light**, where it is understood to have been turned and formed toward the Creator from its own certain informity, etc."

It is also argued by **reason**, because then the angels would have been in a **state of meriting**, which does not seem true: first, because in the angels before sin there was **no difficulty** in willing well; but there is no merit where there is no difficulty. And for this reason the Master says below in distinction 24 that, "because there was nothing which impelled toward evil" the first man in the state of innocence, therefore it would not have been merit for him not to consent to temptation, "just as also to the angels," he says, "who did not fall, it was **not merit that they stood**." Also because it seems inconvenient to concede that the **devil ever actually merited**.

(Response to the three arguments)

To the first, it must be said that **neither the Master nor Hugh** is to be held in this part, since the saints say the opposite.

To the second, it must be said that Augustine does not mean that it was formless **prior in time** than formed, but in **nature and causal order**, as is clearly evident by the same author explaining himself in Book 5, chapter 8: "Therefore," he says, "not by temporal but by **causal order** was the formless and formable matter made first... and it follows that its formation preceded it **not in time but in origin**."

To the third, the consequent must be conceded; and to the first proof of its falsity it can be said that, saving the reverence of the Master, even where there is no difficulty, an act of love elicited by means of **charity** can be **meritorious**. Which is effectively confirmed by this: that if the first man had not sinned and had possessed sanctifying grace, he could have **merited eternal life**. Nor do I think anyone would deny this.

Furthermore, **Anselm** expressly in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 5, says that the good angels **merited grace** because they stood and preserved justice, and yet in them according to the Master there was no such difficulty.

Others respond to the same that although in them there was no difficulty from contrariety or the inclination of the will toward the opposite, there could nevertheless be difficulty from the **arduousness of the work** exceeding the power of nature, such as perhaps is to love God **above all things**.

To the second proof, without rash assertion, it seems it can be probably said that he **merited for some small delay**, but yet he did not persevere. And to this the saying of **Augustine** in *The City of God*, Book 11, chapter 15, favors, where he says that word of the Savior saying of the devil that "he did not stand in the truth" is to be taken so "that he **was in the truth, but did not remain**." And he says the same in *On Correction and Grace*, near the middle. Likewise, as was alleged above, he had **chaste love and grace**, therefore it seems that he merited. Likewise, in Ezekiel 28 it is written: "In the midst of the fiery stones you walked, **perfect in your ways** from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you." These words are commonly understood spiritually of Lucifer. Now, it does not seem that he "walked perfect" without having merited, supposing that he was then in **charity**, as the saints say.

(The second conclusion is proved)

The **second conclusion** is proved first as to the bad angels: because, if they had been created with **perfect beatitude**, they would **never have lost it**. For, as Augustine says in *The City of God*, Book 11, chapter 12, "beatitude is produced by both [things] joined together, which the intellectual nature desires by a right purpose: that a man may both enjoy the **unchangeable good**, which is God, without any trouble, and that he may know without any doubt and be deceived by no error that he is to **remain in it forever**"; so that according to him there and in the preceding chapter, and in the *13th Book on the Trinity*, chapter 7, and several other places—and according to the truth—for being **perfectly blessed** there is required **certainty** of so being perpetually, which it is impossible for anyone to have who is at some time to be miserable. And on account of this Augustine immediately subjoins: "That the **angels of light** have this [perfect beatitude], we believe by pious faith; that the **sinning angels** did not have this even before they fell... we gather by consequent reason."

But as to the good, it is proved thus: The good angels were able by their own **liberty** to love God no more than themselves and to sin, therefore they were **not created in perfect beatitude**. The consequence is clear because, if so, they were not certain that they would never sin, and consequently that they would always remain in the love of God and thereby in **true beatitude**. Therefore neither were they perfectly blessed, as is consequent from the things said. The antecedent is proved by the authority of **Augustine** (Fulgentius) in *On Faith to Peter*, chapter 3, where he says that God created the higher Spirits "eternal and inserted in them the faculty and intelligence of thinking, knowing, and loving the Divinity; whom

nevertheless He so created, that they should love Him even **above themselves**." "But that this love might have just and fitting praise, He also granted them **liberty of the will**, so that it might be possible for them either to raise the intention of holy love toward Him who is above them, or to bend themselves down by the **weight of depraved desire** toward themselves or toward those things which are below them."

Likewise a little after: "He so gave them the faculty and will of loving, that each one could both **have it and lose it**." Behold, he speaks universally of every created spirit. Which is also confirmed by that which he adds, that "a part of them departed from God by a **voluntary aversion**," and "while they were falling, He **confirmed** the rest in the eternity of His love."

The antecedent is also clear through **Anselm**, who in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 5, intentionally proves that before the fall of the bad, even the **good were able to sin**. It remains, therefore, that **no angel was created in perfect beatitude**.

And so all doctors commonly hold. And therefore, the fact that the saints are frequently found to say that they were created in beatitude and felicity—as Augustine himself in the chapters of both books recently alleged and several other places—is **not to be taken of perfect beatitude**, but of a certain **excellence and nobility of state**, which in a certain way is accustomed to be called felicity. According to which manner also in this life we are accustomed to call many mortals "blessed," and the first man in the state of innocence was called "blessed." And so Augustine expressly teaches to understand in the *11th Book of The City of God* as above.

(The third conclusion is proved)

The **third conclusion** is proved thus: The bad angel in the first instant of his being was in **grace**, therefore he did **not sin in the first instant**. The consequence is clear because his sin was not compatible with grace. The antecedent was proved in the first conclusion.

Furthermore, in the *Decretals* (Extra), "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith," in the chapter "We firmly believe," it is said: "The devil and other demons were indeed created **good by nature** by God, and they became bad **by themselves**." And in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas* it is written that "the devil himself was created good by God." Likewise **Augustine**, in the *3rd Book on Free Will*, chapter 54, says of him that "the devil was made **from a good angel**." And **Anselm**, in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 3, says that "he **expelled a good will** when a bad one came upon it." And thence throughout he maintains that he received **justice** just as the good angel did, but did not persevere in it.

From all these things it is clearly evident that he **did not sin in the first instant**. And so all Catholic doctors concordantly hold.

And **Augustine**, in *The City of God*, Book 11, chapter 13, says that it must indeed be believed that the angels had **some beatitude** and lived a life before sin. And afterward in chapter 15 he explains all the authorities of Scripture which seem to sound for the opposite side.

I prove the **fourth conclusion** thus: the angel was in grace, therefore he did not sin **immediately after the first instant**. The antecedent has been proved; the consequence is proved because, if in the first instant he was in grace, therefore he was also after the first instant, since there is **no last instant** in which grace

existed and after which nothing of it remained—just as does not happen in other things according to created natural power, whatever may be the case according to the absolute power of God.

To this also is the authority of **Origen** *On Ezekiel*, which the Master recites in the present 3rd distinction: "The serpent," he says, "is an enemy contrary to the truth, yet **not from the beginning**; nor did he immediately walk upon his breast and belly, just as Adam and Eve did not immediately sin." From which authority the Master concludes that "**some delay, though very brief**," fell between his creation and the fall.

THE ARGUMENTS OF THOMAS AGAINST THE CONCLUSION

Against this conclusion is the opinion of one doctor [**Thomas Aquinas**] who holds that there was **no intervening delay**, granted that in the first instant he had an act of free choice (as I conceded above) and also was created in grace (as that doctor holds and I likewise). His reason is that it then follows that he would have had some **merit**, therefore he would have attained his **perfect beatitude**, which is false. The consequence is proved because an angel through any meritorious act whatever attains his beatitude. This is proved because **grace perfects nature** according to the mode of nature; but it is proper to the angelic nature that it does not acquire natural perfection through discourse [step-by-step reasoning], but possesses it **immediately by nature**. Just as, therefore, from nature the angel has an order to natural perfection, so from merit he has an order to glory. And therefore **immediately after merit** he attains beatitude.

AGAINST THOMAS

In my judgment, this doctor says things that are **incompatible** and repugnant to his own sayings. This I show thus: If the bad angel had in the first instant some act of free choice, he had then either a meritorious act or a demeritorious one; this is clear through him. If **meritorious**, then according to him he was **blessed**, which nevertheless he intends to avoid as false. If **demeritorious**, then he did not have grace then, because grace does not stand with that demerit; for it was not a venial sin, but a **mortal** one.

Furthermore, the angel sinned in some **first instant**, as this doctor has to concede, since he posits that the angel produces his act in an instant, as is clear there in the preceding article. Therefore he sinned either in the first instant or in some other. **Not in the first**, because then in the first instant he would have been bad, which is erroneous, and he himself also denies it; and he himself also concedes the consequence in that same preceding article. Therefore he sinned in some **following first instant**; but between any two instants there falls **time and a delay**, therefore etc.

To this reason he himself responds that he sinned in another instant from the first; and to the assumed proof he says that "it has truth insofar as **time is continuous**, as is proved in the *6th Book of the Physics*. But in the angels, who are not subject to celestial motion (which is primarily measured by continuous time), **time is taken for the very succession of operations** of the intellect or affect. The first instant in angels, therefore, corresponds to the **first operation** of the angelic mind by which it turns itself into itself,

and this in all was good. But from this operation some were turned to the praise of the Word," while others indeed were not, but swelled in themselves, and in this they were separated. "And therefore in the first instant all were good, and in the **second they were separated.**"

This response is **worth nothing** for the purpose. For I ask: granted that there was then the continuous time of heaven (just as was possible), was heaven in the same first place when the angel was first created and when he first sinned, or in one and then another—according to which we say heaven is now in one place, now in another? If in the **same**, then in the same instant of time he was created and was bad, and he was bad and was not bad, which is **impossible**. If in **another**, then a **middle time** elapsed. Whether, therefore, angelic operations are measured by time or an instant of continuous time, or not, they nevertheless **coexist with it**, if it exists; and consequently, if such a time had been between the creation of the angel and his sin, some time would have flowed by, which is what was proposed.

It is confirmed, because by equal reason, positing that a bad angel—or even a good one—now has some new knowledge, it could be said that immediately after his creation he has it and **no delay or time** was between his creation and this knowledge, which no one would say.

TO THE REASON OF THOMAS

Their reason does not conclude. For I **deny the second consequence** and the proposition assumed for its proof. Then to the proof I say that whatever may be the case as to whether an angel acquires natural perfection through discourse or not, nevertheless he does **not acquire supernatural beatitude simultaneously with merit**; and although grace perfects nature, it does not however make it so that a supernatural reward follows any merit whatever naturally. Nor even from divine disposition does that beatitude follow any merit whatever, but **persevering and enduring merit** according to the disposition of the divine will—which kind of merit was not in the bad angels, but was in the good. And this is the reason according to **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 6, why the latter attained perfect beatitude, but the former did not, but rather **perpetual damnation**.

To the principal reason of the question, I respond by **denying the antecedent**. To the first proof, a response was given in the preceding article. To the second, I say that when he sinned, he **could have not sinned**. And as to that which is said, "everything that is, when it is, etc.," the response is clear, as others say and well, that the proof is not valid; for by the same it would be proved that God could not from eternity "not predestine" anyone predestined from eternity, which is **erroneous**. Now, what must be said to that proof, and in what sense it has truth and does not hinder our proposal, is clear from the things said in the 38th distinction of the *First Book*, question 1.

DISTINCTION 6

QUESTION 1

WHETHER an angel can be moved locally by itself.

Because the **Master** [Peter Lombard] in the sixth distinction speaks of the local fall of the **evil angels** from the empyrean heaven into this murky air, and of their daily descent from here into hell, where they lead souls to be tortured, therefore something must be sought commonly concerning the local motion of both **good** and **evil angels**.

I ask, therefore, first: whether an angel can be moved locally by itself.

And it is argued that it cannot, first as follows: An angel cannot be moved locally; therefore, it cannot be moved locally by itself. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved by the authority of **Augustine**, *8 Literal Commentary on Genesis*, chapter 20, where he says that a **corporeal creature** is moved through time and place, but a **spiritual** one through time and not through place, while the **Creator** Himself is moved neither through time nor through place.

It is also proved by reason, because everything that is moved locally continuously acquires one "**where**" (*ubi*) after another. Hence the **Philosopher** [Aristotle] calls local motion "motion in *ubi*" and says it belongs to its own category (*praedicamentum*) in *5 Physics*. But an angel cannot acquire any *ubi*, since it is not "placeable" (*ubicabilis*), nor is it circumscribable by place. "Now *ubi* is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of a place," as the **Author of the Six Principles** says. This is confirmed by the intention of the same author in the same place. For he proves that the **soul** does not have an *ubi* because it does not fill a place nor is it circumscribed by it. The same reasoning applies to an angel, as is evident.

Secondly as follows: If an angel could be moved locally by itself, it would be moved either by itself **essentially** (*per se*) or **accidentally** (*per accidens*). Not essentially, since no thing can move itself essentially and primarily, as the **Philosopher** proves in *7 and 8 Physics*. Nor accidentally, because then it would be moved according to the motion of something else moved by it essentially. But that does not seem possible unless it be a **body**. Therefore, it is either a body **naturally united** to the angel—and this is not the case, because according to the common opinion of the saints and doctors, angels are naturally **incorporeal**—or a body **voluntarily assumed** for a time, which also cannot be said, because such an assumption would have to be preceded by the local motion of the angel himself to the body to be assumed, especially if he were in a place where there is no assumable body, for example, in the empyrean heaven. And then the same question remains: whether in $\sqsubset$ preceding motion he is moved essentially or accidentally.

To the contrary, it is argued as follows: Some bodies are moved or happen to be moved by themselves locally; therefore, an angel can, etc. The consequence is evident by the argument from the **lesser** [a fortiori]. The antecedent is proved regarding simple **heavy** and **light** bodies, for such things are naturally

moved to their places; and if naturally, then by an **intrinsic principle**. This is evident from the definition of nature in *2 Physics*, and by the difference between the **natural** and the **violent** in *3 Ethics*.

In this question, two things are implied: One is whether an angel can be moved locally; the other is whether it can be moved by itself. And regarding both, something is also implied from the arguments. For concerning the first, it is implied whether *ubi* is some **thing** existing formally in the located object, according to which that which is moved locally is moved. Concerning the second, it is implied whether simple bodies are moved by themselves. And these two implications contribute sufficiently to the declaration of the main things sought.

There will be, therefore, four articles in this question. First, it will be seen whether an angel can be moved locally. **Second**, whether it or anything else, while being moved, acquires some thing in itself formally which is called *ubi*, and what thing the *ubi* of an angel or of another thing is. **Third**, whether simple bodies are moved locally by themselves. **Fourth**, whether an angel can be moved locally by itself.

ARTICLE 1

Regarding the first, the **doctors** commonly say that they can. And this is because of the sayings of **Scripture** and the **saints**. For we read in *Luke 1* that "the angel **Gabriel** was sent by God into a city of Galilee etc." and it follows that "the angel, having entered to the virgin"—that is, to the place where the virgin was—"said: Hail, full of grace etc." Likewise, in *Acts 12*, it is written that an angel was sent to **Peter** in prison and that Peter, led out from there, followed the angel, and that finally "the angel departed from him."

And in many other parts of Scripture, both of the New and Old Testament, it is held that angels were sent and went from place to place. Likewise, in *Isaiah 6*, the prophet says: "One of the **seraphim** flew to me," regarding which word **Ambrose** says in the book *On the Holy Spirit* (and it is cited by the **Master** in the first book, distinction 37): "And the Holy Spirit indeed is said to be sent, but the seraphim to one, the Holy Spirit to all. The seraphim is sent in ministry, the Holy Spirit works the mystery; the seraphim passes from place to place—for he does not fill all things—but he himself is filled by the Spirit." Behold, he expressly says that the seraphim passes from place to place. Therefore, he is moved locally.

Likewise, **Damascene** in the first book: "The angel," he says, "since by the swiftness of nature and because he is ready, namely, he passes through quickly, operates in diverse places." And before he had premised that "an angel cannot at the same [time] operate in diverse places"; he intends, therefore, that he is moved quickly from place to place. Likewise, in book 2, chapter 3, he says that "angels, when they are in heaven, are not on earth, and when they are sent to earth by God, they do not remain in heaven." Therefore, they are then truly moved locally.

This same thing is evident through the **Master** in the text, who says that the **demons** fell from heaven and that they daily lead souls into hell.

ARTICLE 2

(Two Conclusions)

Regarding the second article, I propose two conclusions: The **first** is that neither an angel nor any other thing, while it is moved, acquires any such thing of the genus of **permanent** things, distinct from itself and the place, formally inhering in itself, such as many imagine and call *ubi*. The **second** is that *ubi* is not any thing distinct from the **place** and the **located object**.

(The first conclusion is proved, first)

I prove the first conclusion, and to make it clearer, I prove it regarding a **body** that is moved locally, concerning which it would most seem (even according to those who posit such things) that it ought to acquire such a thing. And I argue as follows: If a body moved locally, insofar as it is so moved, acquires a new *ubi*—understanding by *ubi* some thing formally inhering in it, whether it be absolute or a respect of it to the located object or something else, as different people think differently—therefore it also **loses** some *ubi*, so that it is moved from one *ubi* to another *ubi*, just as from one place to another. And those who posit such things concede this. If so, it is moved from one *ubi* into another either in **time** or in an **instant**; in neither way, therefore, etc.

I prove that it is not in time. Because if so, then it is moved **partibly** and **successively**, that is, earlier according to one part and later according to another, and earlier according to a part than according to the whole. Either, therefore, according to the parts of the **mobile** object, or according to the parts of the *ubi* itself—and this either according to **dimensional** parts or those it has according to the extension of the mobile, or according to intrinsic **essential** parts according to intensity, in the manner that a form which is intensified is posited to have such parts not distant in position.

If the first is said—namely, that the mobile is moved from the *ubi* it has earlier according to one part of itself than according to another and then according to the whole—I then ask about the other part of the mobile: for either it still has its whole *ubi*, or the part it had before, and then it follows that it **rests** while the other part is actually moved, which is impossible, assuming it to be a continuous whole with perfect continuity; or it has some part of the first *ubi*, but not that which it had before, which cannot be unless it has some part that the other part of the mobile had before, and then it follows that that part of the *ubi* which it has **migrated** from subject to subject, which is not naturally possible.

If the second is given—namely, that the mobile is therefore moved partibly from the *ubi* because it is moved earlier from one dimensional part of the *ubi* than from another—then I ask about the other part of the *ubi*, in which part of the mobile it remains subjectively through that time in which the mobile is moved from the other part: either indeed in that in which it first was, and consequently that part of the mobile rests and with one part resting the whole is moved, which does not happen naturally; or in another part of the mobile, and then it follows that it has passed from subject to subject.

If the third is said—namely, that the whole mobile itself is moved earlier simultaneously from one essential part of the *ubi* than from another—on the contrary:

First, because according to those people, *ubi* does not have such parts, otherwise it would admit of "**more and less**," the opposite of which the Author of the *Six Principles* says. Furthermore, this is clearly false by reason, for never is any body said to be more in one and the same first whole place than it was, nor less at one time than at another.

Secondly, because according to this, it would follow that any part of the mobile has some same part of the first *ubi* which it had before, although it does not have every part, nor an *ubi* so intense, and consequently it is still in the same place in which it was before. For it does not change its *ubi* except by changing its **place**, even according to that opinion, and from this it follows that every part is at rest.

In the same way, it can be argued that it does not acquire a new *ubi* partly, because this would be either according to the partibility of the mobile, so that one part of it would acquire a new *ubi* earlier than another, and then it follows that one is moved while the other is not moved; or according to the partibility of the *ubi* precisely, so that the whole mobile simultaneously acquires one essential part of the new *ubi* earlier than another, because it cannot be conceived regarding a dimensional part, and then either the first part remains simultaneously with the second part of the *ubi*, or not. If so, then for a time it has the same part of the *ubi*, and consequently the whole is in the same first place in which it was before; therefore, while it is moved, it is at rest. If not, then in every instant it has a new *ubi* and loses another, and consequently it is not moved partly and successively from *ubi* to *ubi*, the opposite of which was given. It remains, therefore, that the mobile, moved locally, is not moved in time or partly and successively from one *ubi* into another.

I prove that it is not in an **instant** either. For example, let P be some body resting in some determined place and having an *ubi* which is A, and let P begin to be moved continuously. If, therefore, in some instant P is moved from A, let that instant be B; then as follows: Either P in instant B is in the same first place, itself and all its parts, in which it was during the time of rest, or not. If so, then it has the same *ubi* A in instant B, and consequently it has simultaneously been changed from A and has not been changed from A. If not, then it has been changed to something of a new place or magnitude; therefore, either to something **divisible** or to something **indivisible** precisely. Not the first, because in the continuous motion of any divisible part, a part is acquired earlier and no whole is acquired simultaneously, as is clear from *6 Physics*. Nor the indivisible, since then it follows that in continuous local motion there is a "first of magnitude" to which the mobile has been changed, and, according to the accustomed way of speaking, there is a "first having-been-changed" which no "moving" or "having-been-changed" preceded. These things were refuted in *6 Physics*. According to this also, all continuous motion is destroyed. For it would be necessary to say that the mobile is always either wholly in the **starting point** (*terminus a quo*) or wholly in the **ending point** (*terminus ad quem*).

Secondly as follows: Suppose that P is moved continuously, and let A be one *ubi* from which it is moved or which it loses in instant B; then as follows: Either P acquires some *ubi* in instant B, or not. If not, then neither does it lose *ubi* A in instant B; for simultaneously in local motion the mobile loses the starting point and acquires the ending point. But if in instant B it acquires some new *ubi*, let it be C. And then I also ask whether P loses C in instant B or in another. If in another, then P has *ubi* C through a time, and consequently either in that time it is simultaneously moved and at rest, or it is moved and loses no such thing, and through this it neither acquires any, which is the point proposed. But if in instant B, then in the same instant it loses and acquires *ubi* C, and it has simultaneously been changed from C and to C. And

further it follows that in that instant it has C and does not have C, which is impossible. And the consequence is clear through that conclusion demonstrated in *6 Physics*: "Everything that has been changed, when it first has been changed, is in that to which it has been changed," and similarly it is true that "nothing that has been changed, when it first has been changed, is in that from which it has been changed."

Furthermore, in the same instant P is first changed to *ubi* C and C itself is first generated, and in the same instant P is first moved from C and C itself is first corrupted; therefore, if in the same instant P is moved from C and to C, in the same instant C is generated and corrupted, and is and is not.

Furthermore, according to this, the **generation** and **corruption** of the numerically same thing succeed each other without an intermediary and are continued, which the Philosopher considers impossible in *8 Physics*, and similarly the **Commentator** [Averroes] in comment 63.

Furthermore, if in instant B it loses *ubi* C, then, as before, in the same instant it acquires another *ubi*, say D; and by further arguing as before, it follows that it acquires many, indeed all *ubi* in instant B, and consequently the whole continuous motion of P takes place in a single instant, which is impossible.

Thirdly, if P is moved or changed from every *ubi*—I do not care for now—in an instant, and is changed to every [ubi] in an instant, it follows that the whole continuous motion of P is composed precisely of "**having-been-changeds**," and the time measuring it [is composed] of instants, according to the common way of speaking. The consequent has been refuted in *6 Physics*. I prove the consequence just as in the *First Book*, distinction 17, question 4, article 2, and it is the fourth reason against the opinion which is refuted there.

(The first conclusion is proved again)

The second reason for the conclusion is this: The **first heaven** [the outermost sphere], according to the Philosopher, is truly moved locally, and yet it acquires no *ubi*, since it is neither circumscribed nor contained by a place, and consequently according to this way, it does not have any *ubi* in itself.

And this is confirmed by the **Author of the Six Principles**, who expressly says that the ultimate sphere does not have an *ubi* because nothing contains it. Therefore, not everything that is moved locally acquires such a thing in itself.

From which I further infer that, since in no other moved thing do we experience such a thing being acquired, nor does any worthy authority say this, such a thing is irrationally feigned in anything else.

Thirdly, if every mobile moved continuously, etc., it would follow that the locally moved thing would be moved simultaneously by two distinct motions, and one would have to grant a fifth genus of motions besides those four which the Philosopher posited in *5 Physics* and which are commonly posited. This consequence is evident. For what is moved locally from place to place acquires place partly and is moved according to place. If, therefore, it simultaneously acquires *ubi* continuously, it is also moved according to *ubi*, and thus by two distinct motions, which was the first thing to be inferred.

Again, according to those people, motion toward *ubi* belongs to the category of *ubi*, but motion toward place (since place, according to them, is not *ubi*) will not belong to the same category. And it is certain that it does not belong to the category of **substance** or **quality**, nor even of **quantity**, since it is neither increase nor decrease, nor is the mobile changed according to its own quantity; therefore, it is necessary to grant a **fifth category** in which that motion is placed. And certainly, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find it while saving the common number of categories.

Fourthly, if so, then it is possible for something to be moved continuously according to the *ubi* of some place and to be at rest according to that place at the same first time, and conversely to be at rest according to *ubi* and to be moved according to place. But this is false. For to be at rest according to *ubi* is nothing other than for itself and all its parts to be where it was before, and this itself is nothing other than for itself and all its parts to be in the same place in which it was before. If, therefore, something were at rest according to *ubi*, it would be at rest according to place, and vice versa. The consequence is declared because, according to the hypothesis, *ubi* is a thing distinct essentially, and also in subject and position, from the place itself, nor does one have any causality over the other which God could not fully supply. God can, therefore, transfer a located object partly from its place while totally preserving the *ubi* in the located object itself, and conversely He could continuously innovate the *ubi* in the located object and retain it in the same equated and first place.

(The second conclusion is proved)

The **second conclusion** can be proved from the same, because if *ubi* were such a thing, it would be possible by the power of God for the same located object to be in the same place in which it was before and not be where it was before; and conversely to be where it was before and not in that place in which it was before, which things are not intelligible.

Furthermore, if *ubi* is such a thing, let God annihilate the *ubi* which **Socrates** has while existing in this demonstrated place, for example A, and let Him make no other change in Socrates or any other thing, which is well possible to His omnipotence. This being done, I ask whether Socrates is in A or not. If not, then Socrates has been changed according to another change, because he was previously in A, which is against what was posited. If so, then for Socrates to be in A, no other such thing is required. And since no experience of it is had, nor revelation from God, nor any other reason for which it ought to be posited, it follows that it is posited irrationally and uselessly.

Furthermore, if it is such a thing, it is either some **absolute** thing or a **respect** [relation], according to those who posit respects. Not absolute; for it is not substance, nor quantity, nor quality, as is evident. Nor a respect, because, as it seems, it would be either the respect of the located to the place, or conversely of the place to the located, or both. The second cannot be said, nor the third, according to that way; otherwise, the place would have an *ubi*, and one could conveniently ask, "**Where is this place?**" and further, there would be a place of the place, which they would not concede. Nor can the first be said according to their way, which they nevertheless say. Proof: The respect of the place to the located is of the genus of **relation**; therefore, so is the respect of the located to the place. The antecedent is evident, for it cannot be reduced to any other category, as it seems, according to their doctrine. The consequence is proved because, as **Augustine** says in *7 On the Trinity* and the **Philosopher** also in the *Categories*, "all relatives are said in terms of convertibility," and consequently according to their way, they have mutual

respects. But all mutual respects belong to the same category; therefore, if one is of the category of relation, the other is too. But according to these people, *ubi* is not a thing of the category of relation; therefore, *ubi* is not such a thing distinct from the located object and the place.

Furthermore, every question made through interrogatives pertaining to the category of *ubi* asks about **place**, and every answer given through the predicables of the said category to a question of this kind answers about place; therefore, *ubi* is place and vice versa. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved as to the first part. For these questions are equivalent in meaning: "Where is Socrates?" and: "In what place is Socrates?" And these likewise: "To where did Socrates go or from where did he come?" and: "To what place did he go or from what place did he come?" Nor does anyone understand anything else by one than by the other, as I think anyone would confess. It is also evident as to the second part. For he who says: "He is here," and he who says: "He is in this place," answers exactly the same thing. And he who says: "He went there or came from there," and he who says: "He went to that place or came from that place."

It is confirmed. If someone asks about Socrates: "Where is he?" and it is answered: "He is in the **church**," or: "In the **schools**," it is answered conveniently and well, if it be true. If, therefore, "in the church" and "in the schools" are terms pertaining to the category of *ubi*—otherwise they would not be conveniently so answered—therefore this adverb *ubi* is interrogative of the same thing that those terms signify; but they signify the external places themselves and not some thing formally inhering in the located object, therefore neither does *ubi* ask about any such thing, and consequently no such thing is *ubi*.

This is evident also by the authority of the **Commentator** on *5 Metaphysics*, where he says that according to what is said "that a place has a located object," there is the category of *ubi*. Likewise, in *4 Physics*, he says several times that the place of a located body is its *ubi*. Hence he says that the Philosopher intends to distinguish "between being located in a body which is its *ubi*, and between being a part in a whole." And he repeats the same words in the same comment. Therefore, according to him, the body in which the located object is, is its *ubi*.

This is also the intention of **Boethius** in the book *On the Trinity*, where he says: "*Ubi* can be predicated either of man or of God: of man as in the forum, of God as everywhere. But in such a way that the thing which is predicated is not as if it were the thing itself of which it is said. For a man is not said to be in the forum in the same way as being white or long, nor as if surrounded and determined by some property by which he could be designated according to himself, but only that he is informed by other things; through this predication, it is specifically shown." Which words the **commentator** [Gilbert de la Porrée] there explains thus: "*Ubi*, that is, place, can indeed be predicated, etc.," and it follows: "But a man is said to be in the forum or God everywhere in such a way that, although in predicating those things 'is' is said, yet it is not so said as if the thing itself of which it is said were that thing—that is, has its being—by that which is predicated." And below: "So therefore, by that which is said, 'a man is in the forum,' a property inhering in the man—by which he truly is—is by no means noted in the proper signification of the grammarians or dialecticians; but by this predication, only this consequent is shown, namely, that that which is surrounded and determined is said to be by 'being in the forum,' while it is truly informed by things other than what the surrounding and determination are. And indeed, in this sense, place is predicated of man." Thus the commentator.

From these things, it clearly appears according to the intention of Boethius that *ubi* signifies **place** and that by the proper predication of that category, no property or thing inhering in the subject is denoted, but only the **extrinsic** thing which is the place.

But if someone should challenge this based on what he says, "informed by other things," and should wish to infer from this that by a predication of this kind something is imported which, properly speaking, informs the located object and inheres in it, let him attend to what Boethius adds below. For he says simultaneously of **action**, **habit** [state], **ubi**, and **when**: "All this predication is given to external things, and all these things are in a certain way referred to another." The commentator: "All these things, that is, habits and actions, of which we are now speaking, and places and times, of which we spoke before, are in a certain way referred to another, that is, to things other than those by which something is subsisting." And below: "Thus therefore, one predication is that by which what is truly inhering is predicated to inhere; another is that which, although it becomes a form of things inhering, yet it is so given to external things that nothing is understood to inhere in anything." Thus he says. Where it is evident that no form inhering in the subject is predicated through such a predication, but only an **extrinsic thing**.

(OBJECTIONS)

Against these things it can be argued, first: because it seems to follow that **ubi** is a species of the category of **quantity**, and consequently there are not ten categories. The consequence is evident because **place** is a species of quantity according to the **Philosopher** in the *Categories*.

Second, the **Author of the Six Principles** says that "*ubi* is the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of a place." Now it is certain that place is not the circumscription of a body proceeding from the circumscription of a place; otherwise, there would be a place for every place unto infinity.

Furthermore, he adds: "Place and *ubi* are not in the same thing; rather, place is in that which contains (*capit*), while *ubi* is in that which is circumscribed and embraced." From these words, it is clear that place and *ubi* are distinguished not only essentially but also by their subject.

(REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS)

To the first, I first deny the consequence, nor is the proof valid, because it does not follow: "Place is a species of quantity; *ubi* is place; therefore *ubi* is a species of quantity." Just as it does not follow: "Discipline is a species of relation (or of the category of *toward something*); grammar is a discipline; therefore grammar is a species of relation." For according to the **Philosopher** in the chapter *On Quality* in the *Categories*, and similarly in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* in the chapter *On Toward Something*, the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. In such a consequence, a fallacy is committed through **equivocation** resulting from the varied supposition of the middle term.

Secondly, I say that even granted that place is quantity, place is nevertheless not a **species** of quantity—in whatever way that term "place" is supposed—but I say it is a **property** (*passio*) of quantity, and then it is

supposed materially or simply. And so the **Commentator** [Averroes] says expressly in *5 Metaphysics* in the chapter *On Quantity*, where he also adds that the Philosopher, in enumerating those species in the *Categories*, spoke only according to common opinion (*famositatem*). Therefore, although place and quantity (or surface) are the same thing, it is not called surface and place according to the same formal reason. Rather, insofar as it is divisible in two ways or according to two dimensions, it is called a **surface**; but insofar as it is that in which another thing is, in that mode of "being-in," it is called a **place**. And therefore, notwithstanding the identity of the thing signified, those predicables are nevertheless reduced per se to different categories because of such diversity of concepts. Those things belong more properly to the category [*ubi*] which are conveniently answered to an interrogation made by "where" or another interrogative of place, whether they be adverbs, or prepositions with their cases, or the oblique forms of local nouns and similar things.

To the second, it must be said that that **Author** [of the *Six Principles*] speaks very improperly and figuratively in that little book, which is why many who take his words according to their literal property are deceived by them. It must be said, therefore, that he does not intend to say that *ubi* is some thing distinct from the place and the located object, existing in it, which he calls "circumscription." Just as by the "circumscription of place" (from which he says the circumscription of the body proceeds), he does not mean some thing distinct from the place by which the place is circumscribed or by which it circumscribes. For it cannot be imagined what that thing might be.

But through those words, he wishes only to give an understanding of what the proper categorical reason of *ubi* itself is, and what is imported by such predications as "**Socrates is in the forum**" or "**in the schools**" and similar ones formed from predicates belonging to the category of *ubi*. He wishes to say that nothing else is imported than that the thing is contained and circumscribed by that place, so that according to him, "**to be somewhere**" or "**in some place**" is the same as "**to be circumscribed and contained by it**." And he manifests this sufficiently from what he adds immediately: "Therefore, whatever is circumscribed and embraced by a place is in a place."

To the other point, it must be said that he accepts "**to be in**" not through inherence, but through predication, and the act performed for the thing signified. And the sense is that place and *ubi* (that is, the predicables of the category of *ubi*) are not said or predicated of the same thing. For "place" is said of the **container**, but such predicables [of *ubi*] are said of the **content**. Hence, one does not say "the forum is in the forum," but one correctly says "Socrates is in the forum." The reason is what has already been said: because to be in the forum is to be contained by the forum, and the forum is not contained by the forum, but Socrates is contained by the forum, and therefore he is correctly said to be in the forum. "In the forum" is a predicable of the category of *ubi*. Conversely, it is correctly said that the container is the place, and it is not correctly said that Socrates or any other thing contained by the place is the place. And this is his intention.

However, whether it be true that *ubi* (or the predicables of said category) is predicated only of that which is circumscribed and embraced by a place, and that this is the formal reason for *ubi* or place, I do not care for now. For that difficulty is common to me and others.

ARTICLE 3

Regarding the third article—namely, whether **simple bodies** are moved locally by themselves—I mean motion that is neither **violent** nor **mixed** (such as when a heavy object is moved downward by being pushed by something so that it descends faster than it would if nothing were pushing it), but rather **pure and simple natural motion**, since regarding this there is the greater question. To exclude certain ways of speaking, both ancient and modern, I propose several conclusions.

(First Conclusion)

The first is that such bodies are not moved immediately by the **heaven**. I propose this to exclude a certain ancient opinion which posited that the motion of the heaven was the cause of the descent of the **earth** to the center; it is said to have been the opinion of **Empedocles** in *2 De Coelo* by the Philosopher and the Commentator. Some moderns also agree with this, who, being unwilling to concede that bodies of this kind are moved by themselves and being unable to assign another motor, reduce such motions to the celestial body as to an active and immediate principle of their motion—although these moderns say they are moved **naturally**, while the ancients would say they are moved **violently**.

I prove this conclusion, first as follows: If bodies of this kind were moved by the heaven immediately, it would follow that the further a heavy object were distant from the heaven, the slower it would descend. The consequent is false, as the senses perceive. For we see it move faster at the end of the motion than at the beginning. The consequence is evident because the more a moved object is distant from the motor (all else being equal), the less the motor can do upon it, and consequently, it moves it more slowly, if it moves it at all. This is also evident to the senses in all other motions, whether local or otherwise.

[Image showing a weight falling toward Earth, illustrating increased velocity as it nears the center and distance from the celestial spheres]

Secondly as follows: If it were so, it would follow that a larger heavy object would not descend faster than a smaller heavy object of the same kind and similar dispositions in all things except for magnitude and smallness. The consequent is also evident to the senses as false. The consequence is proved because where moved objects are merely **passive** (as is assumed in this proposal) and other things are equal, a larger thing is never transmuted faster by the same natural agent than a smaller thing. This is evident in violent local motions. It is also evident in **alterations**; for given a uniform disposition of the patient, a larger patient is not altered faster by the same agent than a smaller one, even if there were the highest disposition without any resistance of contrariety. These two reasons are posited by the **Philosopher** in *1 De Coelo* and the **Commentator** against the aforementioned ancient opinion—though he holds this second one in another form, which I have not kept, so that he may conclude even more evidently and without cavil against that modern way of speaking.

Thirdly, if so, then heavy things would be moved by the heaven through **expulsion** or **impulsion**, and light things through **attraction**, as is clear from the descriptions of the aforementioned in *7 Physics*. And if so, it would follow that whenever a heavy thing descended, the heaven would expel the fire nearest to it and the subsequent air, and universally all the intermediate bodies down to the heavy object, and finally, by means of those, the heavy object itself. But this is false: First, because according to this, at the descent

of any heavy object, the fire would be moved violently. Second, because if at the same time some fire were ascending perpendicularly through the same line through which the heavy object was descending, the heaven would draw to itself the fire nearest to it and the other intermediate bodies down to the ascending fire, and consequently all those intermediate bodies would simultaneously ascend and descend according to the same straight line, and thereby would be moved by **contrary motions**.

Thirdly also, because in such expulsion, either the heaven itself or a part of it would follow the nearest fire which it expelled; and then it follows that either the whole heaven would descend, or a part of it would be cut off from it to follow the fire. Or, in such expulsion, neither the heaven nor a part of it would follow the fire; and then it follows that a **vacuum** would remain next to the heaven, unless it be said that another lateral part of the fire becomes rarefied until it fills the place of the expelled part, which does not seem naturally possible, since that fire has the highest rarefaction naturally possible to it. Or, without rarefaction, it succeeds it through local motion, and then by the same reason, a third part will come to the place of the second, and a fourth to the place of the third, and so on, and consequently the whole **sphere of fire** will be changed. All of which I consider too absurd.

Furthermore, it is laughable to say that if I have a small stone in my hand and let it fall, the whole superior region is immediately agitated. Yet this would follow according to the aforementioned things. The consequence is sufficiently evident since, as we see, nothing ever expels another thing unless it be next to it, or by expelling something next to it and, by means of that, expelling another, and so on until the last thing expelled. This also appears through the **Philosopher** in *7 Physics* and the **Commentator**. It is confirmed, moreover, by the intention of the Commentator in *2 De Coelo*, where he says: "It is impossible for something to be moved by something in a place by means of something not moved by the first motor." And from this, he infers that the part of the air opposite the sun cannot be moved locally (namely by straight motion through expulsion by the sun itself), because the part of the heaven intermediate between the air and the sun cannot be so moved by the sun. Hence he says: "If therefore the part of the air which is opposite the sun is moved by the sun by means of the part of the heaven which is between the air and the sun by local motion, it is necessary that that part of the heaven be moved by the sun by local motion, which is impossible." Thus the Commentator.

(Second Conclusion)

The second conclusion is that bodies of this kind are not moved **actively** by the **places** toward which they tend, as some of the ancients thought. I prove this first because then a larger heavy object would not move faster toward the center than a smaller one, all else being equal. Which is clearly false, and the consequence is proved as above.

Secondly, because such motion would be of **attraction**, as is evident. And since in such motion something distant from the motor cannot be moved unless all intermediate things are moved (as is well known), it follows that whenever a small amount of fire generated here ascended, all intermediate bodies up to the concave of the heaven would ascend. And if then, on the contrary, some heavy object descended perpendicularly, all intermediate things would also simultaneously descend, which is inconvenient.

Furthermore, the part of the fire touching the heaven ought to ascend or be condensed, and consequently that whole sphere.

Furthermore, in all true attraction, it is necessary for the attractor to be moved with the attracted, as is held in *7 Physics*, and is evident to the sense. And consequently, it would be necessary for the heaven to descend, which things are utterly absurd.

(Instance)

And if it be said that there is a certain attraction by a resting attractor, such as the attraction of **iron by a magnet**, it must be said that a resting attractor never moves properly and actively, but rather **metaphorically** by way of a **final cause**. Hence the Commentator in *7 Physics*: "Regarding that which is asked, since many attractive things seem to attract without touch and without motion, it must be said that this is called attraction **equivocally**. For attraction in truth is that in which the attractor is moved with the attracted." And he adds: "But attraction in which the attractor is resting and the attracted is moved is not attraction in the truth of the matter, but the attracted is moved by itself toward the attractor that it may perfect itself, as a stone is moved downward and fire upward. And similarly, it is necessary to understand this regarding the motion of iron to the magnet." Thus the Commentator.

Hence the Philosopher in *4 De Coelo* and the Commentator never attribute the active causality of such motions to places, but wish them to be causes only by way of a **final cause**.

(Third Conclusion)

The third conclusion is that they are not moved by the **media** in which they are. I prove this first because then the same natural active thing would per se move toward several differences of position and according to contrary motions. But this is repugnant to a natural active thing, which is determined of itself toward one thing. Therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: for through the same part of the medium through which a light thing ascends, a heavy thing happens to descend, and vice versa. And simultaneously, while a light thing ascends through one part, a heavy thing happens to descend through another entirely similar and nearby part.

Secondly, if so, either the same part of the medium would continuously move the moved body from the beginning of motion until the end, or one part after another, as many say happens in the motion of **projectiles**. The first cannot be said reasonably, because then it would follow that when a heavy thing generated above in the air (for example, hail or snow) descended, some part of the air would descend from that upper region all the way to the earth, which does not seem possible to be said conveniently. Nor the second, because if so, then the more it descended, the slower it would be moved, which is clearly false. The consequence is evident because in such motion the second mover moves less than the first, and the third than the second, and so on, as is evident in projectiles.

Thirdly, it would be moved by the medium either as by a **primary motor** (or one not moved by another) or as by a **secondary motor** (and one moved by another). The second cannot be said because then it would be necessary to assign who that prior motor was, nor is it convenient; and furthermore, we are inquiring here about such a first motor. Nor can the first be said, because from whatever part of the medium the heavy thing generated above is posited to be moved—whether from that which is above it, or that which is under it, or from the side—it follows that that part moves itself downward of itself, and consequently moves itself against its nature, which seems to include a contradiction.

Furthermore, it follows that **violent motion** and motion against nature (such as that of the air itself downward) is *per se* prior causally to the natural motion of the heavy thing downward. And that there is no natural motion that is not preceded, at least causally, by a violent motion, which does not seem conveniently said, and is expressly against the Commentator at the end of *12 Metaphysics*.

Furthermore, if such a heavy thing is precisely in a **passive potency** to be moved and the medium itself is the total, immediate, particular cause and the thing moving it, it is a wonder that it does not move such a heavy thing rather toward the superior region (where the medium itself is naturally apt to be moved) or at least does not retain it there (where the medium naturally rests) rather than moving it lower, where the medium is moved only violently.

It does not seem possible, therefore, to say reasonably that such things are moved by their media. For which reason the Philosopher in *3 De Coelo* says that air is like an **organ** [instrument] in both motions—namely toward the superior and the inferior—and consequently is not the first motor.

(Fourth Conclusion)

The fourth conclusion is that such things are not moved immediately by the **generator**. I prove this first because when a heavy thing is generated above in the air, the generator is either the air in which it is generated or the heaven; but it is moved locally by neither, as was proved above. And if any other generator is assigned (which I do not wish to dispute), it is proved by the same reasons that it is not moved by that. Similarly, when fire is generated here below from the **refraction of rays** in a mirror or from the striking of a **flint against iron**, no generator can be assigned by which it is immediately moved upward, as is evident to anyone wishing to apply the reasons made above, whatever generator might be assigned.

Secondly, it is certain that a stone generated here below and later carried upward for a time, when it descends, is not actually moved by the generator; nor would anyone of sound mind say the opposite, since it happens to be moved from a place most distant from the generator itself.

Thirdly, and more strongly, since it happens that, the generator having been corrupted long ago, bodies of this kind are moved to their places if they have been carried away from them; now it is certain that they are not then moved by that which is no longer in the nature of things.

(Regarding the Mind of the Philosopher)

But then what must be said to the **Philosopher**, who says that they are moved **per se** by the generator, but **per accidens** by the one removing the obstacle (*removente prohibens*)?

I respond that the Philosopher—as is evident to one carefully attending to his words in *8 Physics* and those of the Commentator there, and again in *4 De Coelo* and the Commentator also there, where he seems to say this more expressly—does not intend that they be moved by the generator **immediately**, but only **mediately**. This is because the generator causes in the generated thing the **form** by which the generated thing itself, unless it be impeded, is immediately moved to its proper place; however, the immediate principle of that motion is not the generator, but the form of the thing generated.

Hence in *4 De Coelo*, in that part "When therefore air is made from water," the text of the comment has it thus: "Let us return and say that when water is transmuted into air, then it will be transmuted from heaviness to lightness, and then it will be moved to the superior region." Explaining which, the Commentator says: "By saying 'then it will be moved to the superior region,' he does not mean 'then' according to time, but according to **cause and effect**; that is, that its motion to the superior region is caused by its **lightness**." Thus the Commentator.

Likewise, the Commentator in *3 De Coelo* says: "But because motions do not exist from the generator except by means of the generated thing, and motion primarily and essentially is not made except by a motor and by no other intermediary, because of this, that motion is not primary nor essential"—that is, primarily and essentially—"from an extrinsic motor, but from the **form of the thing**." Thus he says.

Likewise in *8 Physics*: "And since this," he says, "is a question asking whether these simple bodies are moved in a place by an extrinsic motor or of themselves, a distinction must be made in responding to it. Since the motion which is in natural potency—and is in the potency which is in the thing from which the simple body is generated, in which the motion is found—necessarily needs a motor essentially, and that is what is extrinsic, namely the **generator**. For the generator is that which generates for the simple body its form and all the accidents contingent upon the form, one of which is motion in a place. And therefore, when the form has been completed in it, its due *ubi* and other accidents will be completed, unless something impedes it. But the potency for motion which happens to be found in a simple body when it is impeded at the time of its generation from being moved to its natural place by some impediment, or when it is generated in an extrinsic place, or when it goes out from its natural place by someone dragging it out—it does not need an extrinsic motor essentially in this, that it may go out into act, since it is an **accidental potency**." Thus the Commentator.

Therefore his determination (and also that of the Philosopher which he explains there) stands in this: that a body is either in **essential potency** to motion—as, for example, earth or any other body not actually light is in potency to upward motion—and such a thing needs an extrinsic motor, namely the generator giving it the form which is the principle of upward motion, and consequently mediately (unless it be impeded) giving upward motion. Or a body is in **accidental potency** only to motion—as is a body actually light when it is generated outside its proper place or is dragged from its proper place—and then it does not need an extrinsic motor per se.

Now, however, the question at present is not about a body that is in essential potency to the form of an element by which it might be moved with a motion proper to that element to whose form it is in potency; nor about an element that is generated in its natural place, for that is not moved. But the question is about an element **actually having the form** of such motion, which indeed is not in its natural place. And regarding such a thing, he says that it does not need an essential motor (that is, an extrinsic one per se), but, as he says there and in *De Coelo et Mundo*, the one **removing the obstacle** suffices, and it is moved by that not per se but only per accidens. Nevertheless, a remover of the obstacle distinct from itself is not always necessary; rather, sometimes it itself by its own power removes the obstacle—as if a very heavy body were tied above with a weak cord and, because of its heaviness and with no other thing breaking it, the cord finally being broken, it should fall downward.

(Fifth Conclusion)

The fifth conclusion is that such things are **immediately moved by themselves**, not excluding however the first and universal motor, which is **God**. I prove this thus: These things are moved by some motor immediately, and not by any extrinsic one; therefore, by themselves. The consequence is evident, and similarly the antecedent as to the first part; for everything moved is moved by some motor immediately. As to the second part, it is proved because if their motor were extrinsic, it would be either the heaven, or the medium, or something of the others which were excluded in the preceding conclusions, since it does not appear what other motor can be found.

This conclusion is also proved by the authority of **Augustine** in *3 On Free Choice*, chapter 1, where he expressly says that the motion of a stone—not "by which we move it or it is moved by some alien force, such as when it is thrown into the sky, but by which it verges and falls to the earth by its own **striving** (*nisu*)"—is its motion. Now it is certain that he does not only mean that this motion is properly the stone's as the thing moved, since in that way even the motion by which it is thrown upward is its motion; therefore, he intends that it is its as the **motor**.

For this there are also several authorities of the Commentator cited above. Likewise in *2 Physics*: "We do not doubt," he says, "that these are moved from themselves, not from an extrinsic motor, namely the four elements. But whether the motor in them is other than the moved thing, he investigated in another place." And several other authorities of his could be brought to the same effect.

Likewise **Avicenna** in *1 Suffientia*: "We shall say," he says, "that to the bodies which are among us there come actions and motions, and we find that some of them come from causes which are outside them, from which there are made in them those actions and motions, such as the heat of water and the ascent of a stone. And we find that for some of them the actions and motions are from **themselves**, not from an extrinsic cause—as heated water, when it is left alone, cools of itself from its nature, and a stone thrown high, when it is left alone, descends from its nature." And below he also adds other things to the point.

(Sixth Conclusion)

The sixth conclusion is that bodies of this kind move themselves **per se** and not only **per accidens**. I propose this especially because of the opinion of the Commentator, who in *3 De Coelo* holds that such things do not move themselves except per accidens. For although according to him they are "moving per se," they are not "moved per se." But that which is moved per se is only the **medium**. Hence he says that "a stone is not moved per se and essentially nor does it move itself essentially; and since it is so, and everything that moves itself accidentally, it is necessary that it move itself because it essentially moves another thing moved by it—as, for example, because a man does not move himself accidentally in a ship unless because he essentially moves the ship, and since it is so, the stone therefore does not essentially move anything except the air in which it is, and it moves itself because its moving itself follows the motion of the air, just as with the man and the ship." And he says exactly the same in *4 [De Coelo]*.

But I prove the opposite of this: first, because it is certain (and from his own words the same is gathered) that in such motion the air is not moved except when pushed by the stone; it yields therefore to the stone, and consequently the stone itself is moved earlier **causally** (though simultaneously in time) than the air, and it is not that the stone is moved because the air is moved, but on the contrary, the air is moved because the stone is moved. And again, because the stone is moved, therefore it moves the air, and not

vice versa. And it is in this regard just as if someone pushed a stone; for then, although the stone and the air would be moved simultaneously, and the stone would also move the air, nevertheless the stone would be moved earlier causally than the air would be moved, and the stone would also be moved earlier than it would move the air. For it would move because it was moved. So in this proposal: it moves because it is moved, though not by another but by itself. Therefore, it is not moved per accidens to the motion of the air.

Furthermore, if all the air which is between the stone and the earth were removed so that there were a **vacuum** between the stone and the earth, and the stone remained tied by a weak cord and were left to its nature, there is no doubt that finally, the cord being broken, that stone would either be changed suddenly or moved in time to the earth—although the Commentator himself says in the previously cited comment that "if we take away the medium so that there were a vacuum, it would not be possible for these bodies to be moved, contrary to what is thought by some, namely that they would be moved faster in a vacuum, because they likened them to those things which are moved per se essentially, namely animals."

But these words must be understood as being said by him taking "to be moved" properly as it is distinguished from "to be changed suddenly," in which way namely animals would properly be moved in a vacuum, according to him in *4 Physics*. If, however, he meant "to be moved" simply, as it is commonly taken to include "to be changed suddenly," he spoke falsely. For it is certain that the whole reason why a stone and any similar body remains outside its proper place is that it is impeded by the medium (unless there be some other impediment) from being in its proper place. Hence, when that medium is removed, it comes to its proper place. And the faster it is removed, the faster it comes. For which reason, even if the whole medium were suddenly removed and there were no other impediment, it would suddenly be in its proper place. And to feel the opposite is to judge against nature.

Again, if with the medium remaining the stone were not moved nor any other thing moved the air, certainly the air would not be moved nor would the stone move the air, as is well known. Therefore, in fact, the stone is not moved per accidens to the motion of the stone [air], nor is it that because it moves the air, it itself is moved, but on the contrary: because the stone is moved, it moves the air.

Addition 29: Furthermore, let it be posited that a heavy thing has included within it some light thing which nevertheless cannot resist the downward tendency of the heavy thing—for example, let there be a small fire included in a large bronze vessel. It is certain that just as this heavy thing, while it descends, pushes the air which it has under it, so also it carries the fire included in it. And just as while the air is moved, that heavy thing is moved, so also while that fire is moved, the heavy thing itself is also moved; and both this and that [the air and the fire] the heavy thing moves per se, though in a different mode of motion, because it moves the fire by **carrying** it, but the air by **pushing** it. And just as while the air is pushed, the heavy thing descends, so also while the fire is carried. And similarly, both this and that are moved violently by the heavy thing, and in all things similarly the heavy thing relates to this and that. But no one would say that that vessel is therefore moved downward because the carried fire is moved downward, nor even that the vessel is moved per accidens to the motion of that fire. But on the contrary: because the vessel is moved, therefore the fire is moved; and similarly, because the vessel is moved, therefore it carries and moves the fire. Therefore, similarly, it must not be said that the vessel is moved per accidens to the motion of the pushed air, nor that because the air is pushed, therefore the vessel pushes

or is moved; but on the contrary, because it is moved, it pushes the air, and because it pushes it, the air is pushed.

Furthermore, if to a descending heavy thing there is tied some light thing or something less heavy which it drags with it or pulls downward with a motion faster than the natural motion of the thing dragged, it is certain that it is not moved per accidens to the motion of the body dragged. Nor does it descend because that thing is dragged, but it drags that thing with it and that thing is dragged because it itself descends. Therefore, neither is it moved per accidens to the motion of the air which it pushes violently. Nor even does it descend because that [air] is pushed and once pushed descends, but on the contrary.

The example of the Commentator is not suitable to the proposal, since the air does not carry the stone downward as he imagines, but once pushed it yields; just as when fire ascends and in ascending moves the air, the air does not drag or carry the fire, but is pushed by the fire which ascends. Furthermore, it is in some way against him if the example must be entirely applicable, since a sailor never moves a ship without first causally moving himself in his whole or some of his members, which being moved, he moves the ship; and therefore, although consequently he is moved to the motion of the ship in one mode of motion (namely of carrying), nevertheless he first causally moves himself, and being moved he moves the ship by a motion of pushing.

From these things, it can be argued directly to the conclusion thus: Bodies of this kind, when they are naturally moved, are moved per se and not by an extrinsic thing; therefore, they are moved per se by themselves.

(OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SIXTH CONCLUSION)

Against this conclusion, it can be argued both by authority and by the multiple reasonings of the **Philosopher**; specifically, in *8 Physics*, in the chapter "Of those things which move, etc.," [Aristotle], setting forth certain divisions of things moved, says among other things that some are moved by another **according to nature**, and some are moved by another **outside of nature**. And afterward, he adds that the first kind are **heavy and light things**. Therefore, according to him, such things, even in natural motion, are moved by another and not of themselves.

Furthermore, he immediately adds these words: "And indeed, to say that they move of themselves is impossible."

Furthermore, he immediately adduces reasons for this, through which his intention appears indubitably. The **first** is because to be moved by oneself "is proper to **living things**"; but these things [elements] do not live.

The **second**, because then "they could **stop themselves**," which is clearly false.

The **third**, because they could be moved to **diverse differences of position**, such as fire being carried downward as well as upward, which we also do not see.

The **fourth**, because no continuous and one thing (not just according to touch) that consists of **similar parts** moves itself; this is evident because no part of it is determinately apt to act or to suffer more or

rather than another. And therefore the **Commentator** [Averroes] says there that it is necessary for those things which are moved of themselves to be divided into a **motor** and a **moved thing**, which are distinct either according to definition and being simultaneously (as is the case in those moved by an extrinsic thing), or according to definition only (as is the case in **animals**, in which there are soul and body, which are distinguished according to definition and essence, though not according to being, because it is impossible for the soul to be without the body). But such [elemental] bodies are truly continuous and not just contiguous, and are of similar parts; therefore, etc.

Fifth, it can be argued from what he says later in the chapter "It is necessary therefore that everything that is moved, etc.": If such things moved themselves, it would be either such that a part of them moved a part, or the whole moved the whole. Not in the first way, because there is no reason why one part should move another rather than vice versa, since they are entirely similar. Nor in the second way: First, because then the same thing, according to the same species of motion, would move and be moved, as it would "carry and be carried"; and by like reason, the same thing would "**alter and be altered**," and "**teach and be taught simultaneously**," which are inconvenient. Second, because the same thing would be simultaneously in **act** and **potency**, which is impossible. The consequence is evident because everything that is moved is in potency (as clear from the definition of motion), and everything that moves is in act, "as the hot heats and entirely as the generator has the species," that is, the form. Third, by his reasoning in *7 Physics*, because if so, then it would be moved by itself **primarily** (*primo*). But this is false, because then it would not rest because something else rested, and consequently, if a part rested, the thing itself would not rest. This, however, is false, as is proved there.

Sixth, the Philosopher proves there by intention that "**everything that is moved is moved by another**"; which would certainly be false according to what was said, and if that were denied, nothing would remain for him by which to prove the **First Immobile Mover**.

Seventh, active potency, in *5 and 9 Metaphysics*, is defined as being a principle of **transmuting another**; therefore, nothing transmutes itself.

Eighth, a certain **doctor** [Peter Aureoli] argues thus: If the same thing moved itself primarily, the same thing according to the same respect would simultaneously be under **opposite dispositions**. The consequent is impossible; the consequence is proved because the mover is always in an opposite disposition to the moved, and vice versa. For the mover assimilates the moved to itself and draws it to a disposition similar to itself; therefore, the moved is dissimilar to it while it is moved. And therefore in *De Generatione* it is said that the agent and the patient are **dissimilar in the beginning and similar at the end**.

Ninth, the same doctor argues thus: If such bodies moved themselves per se and primarily, by the same reason the **heaven** would move itself per se and primarily. For there appears no reason why the heaven could not be so moved circularly by itself just as those [elements] are moved straight.

Tenth, the same argues thus: It would follow that in the same time, through an **equal space**, a larger and a smaller heavy object would be moved—for example, a large millstone and a half of it—which is false, as is clear to the senses. The consequence is declared by the rule of the Philosopher in *7 Physics*: If a certain power moves a magnitude in a certain time, **half the power will move half the magnitude** in an equal

time. And the reason is that as is the proportion of the whole power to the whole motion, such is the proportion of half the power to half the motion. If therefore the whole power of the millstone moves the whole millstone in such a time, half the power of the millstone will move half the millstone in an equal time. And by the same method, it can be proved that any equal or unequal heavy things are moved equally, and similarly any light things.

He adduces several other reasons, but because they proceed specifically regarding motion toward form (and regarding this there will be a special investigation below when treating the activity of the **will**), I do not discuss those for now.

(REPLY TO OBJECTIONS 1-4)

For the solution of these, I premise that something's being moved of itself and not by an extrinsic thing can be understood in two ways: In one way, by the **exclusion of an extrinsic particular motor** moving it per se and immediately; in another way, by the exclusion of such a motor and also by the exclusion of **anything else whatsoever whose motion is necessary** so that it may be able to be moved. In the first way, simple bodies move of themselves, but not in the second way. For, so that they may be able to be moved—since they are not apt to be moved in their own places nor from them to other places—it is necessary, if they ought to be moved, that they be **outside their proper places** and not impeded there (by an impediment, namely, that they cannot remove of themselves); but they cannot place themselves in such a disposition. Rather, this happens to them either from some **generator** generating them outside their proper places, or from someone carrying them outside their proper places after they are generated; and if there was something impeding their motion in the aforesaid manner, something is required to remove it.

In this **second** way, **animals** move themselves. For they neither need a particular motor moving them per se immediately, nor anyone placing them in a disposition so that they may be able to move. For they can move themselves in whatever places they are and place themselves outside any places they are in. And therefore the Philosopher says that these [animals] move of themselves **absolutely**, but simple bodies he sometimes says move of themselves and not by an extrinsic thing—and then he understands it in the **first way**—and sometimes he says they do not move of themselves but by another, and then he understands it in the **second way**.

The **Commentator** suggests this difference in meaning in *8 Physics*. For in comment 28 at the end, he says that in simple bodies "there does not appear a **difference of the motor from the moved**, as appears in those having souls; rather in them there is no difference at all, and these are, as he said, heavy and light. For these are found to be moved to their natural places of themselves, and to places opposite their natural places by others." Behold, here he says such bodies are moved to natural places **of themselves**, and that in them there is no difference of motor and moved. And immediately in the following comment, where the Philosopher proves these things do not move of themselves by the reasons recited above, he says that these do not move by a principle existing in them **without the need of an extrinsic cause**, whereas animals "are moved by a principle in them without the need of an extrinsic cause."

And so throughout, wherever the Philosopher says "those things do not move of themselves," the Commentator, in explaining, adds "without the need of an extrinsic cause." By "extrinsic cause," however, he cannot mean an extrinsic cause moving immediately per se, otherwise he would contradict his words just cited and many others adduced above, in which he says they are **not moved by an extrinsic thing**. Rather, he means an extrinsic cause making them to be in the **disposition** in which they can move, as was said above.

And through these points, the response to the authorities of the Philosopher is clear, and similarly to the first four reasons. For moving of oneself in the **second way** is proper to living things. And those things that move of themselves thus can stop and cease from motion and be moved to diverse parts; and again, they have in themselves **dissimilar parts**, of which one moves the other. And all these are evident in animals. These things are not true, however, of those things which move of themselves in the **first way**, in which way the Philosopher does not intend to prove simple bodies cannot be moved.

(REPLY TO THE FIFTH OBJECTION)

To the **fifth**, speaking of whole and quantitative parts (as the argument seems to take it), I say that the **whole moves the whole**, and any part also moves itself. If, however, it is about qualitative or formal parts, it can be said that a part—say, **gravity** in a heavy thing—moves the whole and similarly moves itself; and if it were separated from matter and from substantial form, it would still move itself, as is clear in the **Eucharist**.

Then, when it is proved that the whole does not move the whole by those things inferred as inconveniences, I say that those, accepted simply, are **not inconveniences**. For the same thing alters itself, as is clear of **hot water** which of itself returns to coldness, as is clear through Avicenna and as experience teaches. And similarly the **will** causes volition in itself, as will appear below; and so of several other things.

Likewise, taken simply thus, they are not considered inconveniences by the Philosopher, except only in those things in which the motion is **univocal**, that is, in which the principle of moving is of the **same special species** as the term of the motion. In such motion indeed, the Philosopher says the same thing cannot move itself primarily; for example, the cold does not make itself cold by the coldness it actually has, nor does the hot heat itself by its own heat. And that this is his intention is evident; for immediately there, without intermediary, he adds: "Similarly also of each of the others of whichever movers it is necessary to have a univocal [term]," where the Commentator in comment 40: "And this speech," he says, "is understood from the aforesaid, namely that it is impossible that something move according to that by which it is moved. And this is in moved things and movers which are called **univocal**." And the Commentator adds that the Philosopher "said this because this is not impossible except in motors which are **bodies or powers in bodies**." The reason is that only in those is such univocal motion found (though not found in all), and in many, **equivocal motion** is found. Such univocal motion, however, is not in the local motion of simple bodies, as is evident, unless it were said that by the places in which they actually are, they move themselves to places of the same special species. And perhaps to exclude this among other inconveniences, he said "it would both carry and be carried."

And similarly it must be said to the other inference, namely that "the same would be in act and in potency"—namely in formal act and in **virtual act** (even univocal) and in formal potency, if it moved itself by such univocal motion. If, however, the motion be **equivocal**, it follows only that it is in virtual act (not univocal) and in formal potency, according to the common distinction. And this is not an inconvenience, as is clear from **hot water**, which is cold in virtual act (since it actually has the substantial form which virtually contains the coldness which it does not have formally, but can have). So also many other things virtually contain qualities to which according to species they are in formal potency—for example, **silver** contains blackness. For even when drawn over a white cloth or parchment, it makes a black line, and yet it itself can also be blackened, though not by itself. So also it is said of **pepper** and many other spices, which are actually virtually hot and yet can be formally heated by fire. Indeed, what is more, it is not altogether impossible for the same thing to be in formal potency and also in formal act, if by "being in formal potency" nothing more is meant than **being able to receive a form**, and by "being in formal act" nothing else than **actually having a form**. And this is evident; for something weakly hot is in potency to another degree of heat and can become more hot, and water of itself returning to coldness is first weakly cold actually, and yet is in potency to other degrees of coldness—nay, it even causes them in itself, though not by the heat it has.

To the other proof, I say by **distinguishing the senses** of the first consequent. For "something being moved by itself primarily" in one way is the same as being moved by itself **according to the whole** (and not according to a part only), so that any part of it is a mover and any part moved; according to which mode the Philosopher takes it in *5 and 6 Physics*, when he says something is moved in some time primarily, that is, in every part of that time. In **another way**, so that the sense is that "to be moved" is verified of it primarily, and similarly "to move"; according to which mode "primarily" is taken in the definition of a **universal** in *1 Posterior Analytics*, and just as we say that a **triangle** primarily has three [angles], etc., that is, "having three" is verified primarily of a triangle, so that speaking thus we use the "act exercised for the sign" (*actu exercito pro signato*).

If it be understood in the first way, I concede the first consequent and the consequent; but the further consequence I deny, and that it does not hold is clear enough. For in a similar way, it would be proved that **nothing is moved by another primarily** in that sense—the opposite of which is very frequently held in physics, and as experience teaches. And it is evident that any such thing would rest if its part rested.

If indeed it be understood in the second way, then the first consequent is altogether false, but the first consequence does not hold. For although some body is moved according to the whole and is a mover according to the whole, nevertheless neither predicate is said primarily of it; rather it is said of something of which it itself is not said—namely, of a **part**. For any part of it is a mover and any part moved.

(REPLY TO OBJECTIONS 6-10)

To the **sixth**, it must be said that, as is expressly clear from the text, the Philosopher speaks of a **divisible moved thing** and of local motion, and taking it thus I say that that conclusion of the Philosopher is true, understanding it thus: that everything that is moved is moved by another **extrinsic** motor or **intrinsic** motor, whether total or partial. And so a heavy thing, even granted that it moves itself, is nevertheless

moved by another, because it is moved by **any part of itself** as by a partial intrinsic motor. For just as it itself is the total thing moved, composed of partial moved things, so it is the total mover, composed of partial movers.

And if it be said that from that conclusion thus understood it cannot be proved that the First Mover is altogether immobile (as the Philosopher intends), I certainly concede it, and I say that the Philosopher did not sufficiently prove that by this, nor perhaps by any other of his principles, although perhaps he thought the opposite.

To the **seventh**, I say that in whatever way that definition is to be understood (for concerning this below), it is nothing to the point, because such a motive potency is not in that respect properly "**active**"; nor is moving locally properly "**acting**," since no entity at all is produced by such moving, but only a pre-existing place is acquired. Hence also the Philosopher wishes that **not every mover is an agent**.

To the **eighth**, I deny the consequence, and to the proof, I say that not every mover is in an opposite disposition to the moved, but a mover which is properly an **agent** and a moved thing which is properly a **patient**—transmuting each other according to active and passive qualities—are in opposite dispositions, and dissimilar in the beginning and similar at the end. And such an agent is that which assimilates the patient to itself. Nor is there doubt that the Philosopher speaks of such things.

That which moves **precisely locally**, however, does not have such conditions, as is clear in one throwing a stone upward and similarly in that which moves it downward, whatever that may be. Likewise, not every agent is of such a condition in respect to the patient, as will appear elsewhere.

To the **ninth**, it must be said that many would not consider the inference an inconvenience, nor perhaps is it very improbable. I say however, whatever may be of that, that the reason is not equal in both cases: First, because it does not appear that any body moves naturally **away from its proper place**, or existing in it moves within it, but rather rests; but the **heaven** is in its proper place and is continuously moved within it. Second, because that which moves naturally, in whatever genus of motion it moves, if it has no resistance, it moves in an **instant**. Hence, if there were no medium resisting a heavy thing or other impediment, it would descend in an instant, as is clear from *4 Physics*. If however the heaven moved itself, it would move merely naturally and would have no resistance at all—not of the moved to the motor, because nothing resists itself; nor of a medium, since there is none—and consequently it would be moved in an instant, which is false.

Because of these points (whether they compel sufficiently or not) and because of many other reasons that could be assigned, it can be seen that the heaven is not moved by a motor moving merely naturally, but by **purpose and will**, and consequently not by itself, but by another. From which it is clear that the reason is not equal in both cases.

To the **tenth**, I deny the consequence; to the proof, I say that that **proportion** ought to be attended to between the moving power and the moved magnitude **resisting** the mover, just as for the sake of resistance alone time is assigned in the motors of natural powers. And because the same thing does not resist itself, the time in those motions is not according to the proportion of the whole millstone to the whole millstone and the half to the half. Because truly the **medium** (which is also moved per se and

pushed by the millstone) resists it, and because of such resistance the millstone descends not in an instant but in time, therefore the proportion of time is to be taken according to the proportion of the moving power to the **moved medium** itself, always saving the good understanding of that rule, about which there is no need to discourse for now.

ARTICULUS 4

Regarding the fourth article—namely, whether an angel can be moved locally by itself—it seems to me that it must be said that it can. For since an angel can be moved locally, as is clear from the **first article**, and it is not impossible for the same thing to move itself locally, as is clear from the **third**, it was possible for God to confer upon it the power to move itself. And it seems reasonable enough to estimate that He did in fact confer this, especially since we see this granted to more imperfect mobile things.

Furthermore, according to the **saints**, demons go from place to place to tempt men and make them fall into sin. In that case, therefore, they are moved either by themselves—and I have my point—or by God alone (which I would not willingly say, for it does not seem very religious or pious to say that God is the total motor leading the devil to make men sin) or by some other creature; and that does not appear very suitable. Whatever the truth may be, it is not certain to us, as it is not expressed through Scripture. Yet, that it is possible, if it pleased God, to attribute such a power of moving to them, does not seem to me to be a matter of doubt.

Addition 30: Furthermore, angels do not have bodies naturally united to them, and they can of themselves (God however permitting and co-acting according to His general influence) assume bodies; therefore they can move themselves locally. The antecedent as to the first part is evident through **Damascene** in book 2, chapter 3, where he says that angels are "incorporeal and stripped of every corporeal passion." As to the second part, he adds in the same place: "They are transfigured, however, into whatever the Ruler [God] has willed and commanded, and thus they appear to men." And he speaks of the **good** angels. Concerning the **evil** ones, however, in the following chapter he says: "By the permission of God, they both have formation and are transmuted and transfigured into whatever figure they wish according to phantastic imagination."

It must be observed, however, that just as an angel and a body are not said **univocally** to be in a place—because a body is there **dimensionally** and **circumscriptively**, filling the place and making the parts of the place distant, while an angel is there **definitively** only, not filling the place nor creating distance within it—so neither are a body and an angel said univocally to be moved locally. For a body is moved in such a way that it cuts or pushes the medium or moves it in some other way and creates a distance of place, while an angel does none of these in its motion. It agrees with the body only in this: that it both deserts a place and acquires a place, so that, if one may speak thus, they agree as to the **substance of the motion**, but not as to the **mode**. Therefore, when I say an angel is moved locally, I do not intend to affirm the mode of motion which we see in the motion of a body, but the substance only—that is, that it truly deserts a place and acquires a place in that way which is suitable for it to be in a place.

Augustine teaches this by way of similarity in *12 Literal Commentary on Genesis*, chapter 32, where, asking whether the **soul**, when it exits the body, is carried to any corporeal places, he says: "I would quickly answer that it is either not carried to corporeal places except with some body, or it is not carried

locally. Now whether it has some body when it has exited from this body, let him show who can. I, however, do not think so; for I judge it to be spiritual, not corporeal." From these words it is evident, according to him, that it is not carried to corporeal places with a body. But since, as the **Master** says in this distinction, demons lead souls to hell, and Augustine himself wishes certain souls to be there in the *Retractions*, and in the *Enchiridion* says that the souls of the dead until the resurrection "are contained in hidden receptacles, according as each is worthy of rest or misery," it follows that the soul is carried to corporeal places, yet not **locally** [in the corporeal mode]; and consequently it is moved locally in one way (namely, in the first sense) and in another way (namely, in the second sense) it is not moved locally. And so it is to be judged concerning the motion of an angel.

Through this, the answer to the arguments of the question is clear. For the antecedent of the first is false in the first sense; the proof, however, is not valid, because Augustine only intends to deny the **mode of motion**, just as also regarding the separated soul, as has been said. And that he ought to be understood thus is evident also through the **Master** in the first book, distinction 37, where, explaining the same authority, he says that "therefore Augustine attributes change of place to the body, not to the spirit, because although the spirit passes from place to place, it is not however in such a way that, circumscribed by dimensions, it creates distance by the interposition of its place, as a body does."

To the other proof of the antecedent, it is clear from the **second article**. To the confirmation, it must be said that neither the soul nor an angel has a dimensional "**where**" (*ubi*) such as bodies have, which are dimensionally in a place (which is all that author treats of there); but they certainly have a definitive *ubi*, which is nothing else in reality than the place in which it is definitively located.

To the second, it must be said that an angel is moved by itself **per se**; and to the proofs to the contrary, the response is clear from what was said in the **third article**.

QUESTION 2

WHETHER an angel can move itself from place to place in some time **successively**.

Secondly, I ask whether an angel can move itself from place to place in some time successively.

It is argued that it cannot, because no **indivisible** thing can be moved according to place in any time **continuously**; therefore, neither can an angel. The consequence is evident, because an angel is simply indivisible according to substance. The antecedent is proved from the intention of **Aristotle** in *6 Physics*. And by reason also in two ways:

First, indeed, because everything moved continuously over any magnitude passes an equal to itself before a greater, and measures that whole through things equal to itself successively. If, therefore, an indivisible thing were moved continuously, it would measure the whole magnitude by things equal to itself, and consequently by **indivisibles**. From which it would further follow that a magnitude was constituted of indivisibles, the opposite of which was proved above. **Second**, because everything that is moved locally is either wholly in the **starting point**, or wholly in the **ending point**, or **partly in one and partly in the**

other. The first cannot be said, because as long as the mobile is in the starting point, it is at rest; nor the second, because then the motion is finished; therefore the third. But no indivisible thing can be partly in one term and partly in another, since it lacks parts; therefore, etc.

To the contrary: Notwithstanding the indivisibility of an angel, an angel is in a **divisible place**, and it can be moved; therefore, notwithstanding its indivisibility, it can be moved continuously according to place.

I respond by premising some distinctions, and then conclusions regarding the proposal.

ARTICLE 1

(Two Preliminary Distinctions)

The **first distinction** is that it happens for an angel to be moved according to place in two ways: namely, **per accidens** to the motion of some body assumed and united to it; in another way **per se** with no body assumed, as if an angel comes from the empyrean heaven to the earth—at least as far as the sphere of the moon, it is moved per se without a body, since there is no body there assumable by it.

The **other distinction** is that for an angel to be moved per se according to place can be understood in three ways: One way, that it be moved by **deperditive motion** only, that is, by deserting a place only. Another way, by **acquisitive motion** only, so that it acquires a new place and does not desert the former. Third, in both ways simultaneously, namely by deserting one and acquiring another.

(Four Conclusions)

These things having been premised, I propose probably and without rash assertion four conclusions: The **first** is that an angel can move itself **per accidens** according to place in some time continuously. The **second**, that it can move itself **per se** continuously by **deperditive motion** only. The **third**, that it can move itself continuously by **acquisitive motion** only. The **fourth**, that it can move itself per se continuously by **both ways** simultaneously.

(The first conclusion is proved)

The first conclusion is proved. For it is gathered from Holy Scripture that angels were at some time moved continuously through time in bodies, as is clear in the one who **wrestled with Jacob** until morning, and in the one who, in human form, accompanied the younger **Tobias** for many days, going and returning. And we read similar things of many others.

Now, whether those bodies in which they appeared and were moved were then first formed and assumed by them, or were some naturally united to them from the beginning and then transformed into another figure—although this is not held expressed from Scripture—it is more commonly held that they were then **first assumed**, because the saints and doctors more commonly judge angels to be spiritual only and naturally incorporeal, as is clear from **Damascene** and from **Dionysius** in the book *On the Divine Names*. And although **Augustine** sometimes seems to say the opposite, it is nevertheless only according to the

opinion of others, as clearly appears in *21 The City of God*, where he responds according to both opinions, inclining determinately to neither. But also in the book *On the Faith to Peter*, which he composed later, he determinately asserts them to be incorporeal, saying that God made the "superior spirits to have **no natural fellowship** with corporeal elements."

And from this, it is commonly held that in assumed bodies angels can be moved continuously.

(The second conclusion is proved)

I prove the second conclusion thus: An angel existing in a place maximal to itself can spontaneously desert a part of that place successively and continuously and remain in the rest; therefore, it can move itself continuously by deperditive motion. The consequence is evident; the antecedent is proved. For, as was said above in **distinction 2**, an angel does not so determine for itself the measure of place that it cannot exist now in a greater and now in a lesser; and consequently, since it can recede from that whole place and again return to a part of it precisely, if it pleases it, it does not appear why it cannot **desert a part only** and retain a part. That it can desert a part successively, not the whole at once, is evident, because since an angel is in this place or that not naturally but **freely**, it seems just as able to desert a part of the place successively as it would successively cease to be in it if it were successively annihilated.

This is confirmed, and similarly the conclusion. For it is possible that the human **soul** successively ceases to inform some part of its matter; therefore also an angel can, etc. The antecedent is evident, since if some part of the flesh or blood is successively and continuously corrupted, as is naturally possible, the soul will continuously cease to inform it. The consequence seems probable enough since, just as the soul which is naturally united to matter naturally deserts it in that case successively, so an angel who is freely joined to a place can freely desert a part successively. For the soul is so whole in every part of the body, just as an angel is whole in every part of the place.

Furthermore, according to **Damascene**, a demon, if God permits, can at will assume bodies in whatever figure, and by the same reason in greater or lesser quantity; and having assumed some large body, it can desert a part no less than the human soul, which is more intimately [joined] to its body. Therefore, much more strongly, existing in a large place, it can desert one part of it and remain in the other only, since its conjunction to an assumed body is greater than to a place.

(The third conclusion is proved)

The third conclusion can be proved from the same points, as it were. For an angel can be in a place smaller than its possible maximal, and it can be in its maximal possible; therefore, existing in a smaller place, it can, without deserting it, **acquire a nearby one**.

Second, because the human soul can—if it is generated for it partibly and continuously, as is possible, as I think—successively inform a **new part of matter**, without deserting the prior parts which it informs; therefore, etc.

Third, because existing united to some body, that body growing, it can unite itself to new parts, etc.

(The fourth conclusion is proved)

I prove the fourth conclusion: First, because the human soul can simultaneously desert one part of matter and continuously inform another anew; therefore an angel can desert one place and simultaneously acquire another. The assumption is evident, positing that in one part of the body new flesh is generated and in another it is corrupted.

Second, an angel can spontaneously desert one whole place successively, and it can acquire another whole place successively. Therefore, it can simultaneously acquire one successively and desert another successively. The antecedent as to the first part is proved from the **second conclusion**; for it can no less desert the whole successively than a part. And by the same, the second part is proved from the **third conclusion**. And the consequence seems clear enough, since to desert one and acquire another are not impossible.

Thirdly thus: It is possible for an angel to coexist successively with diverse parts of the same body continuously moved around it, and vice versa; and simultaneously for one part to depart from it successively and continuously, while another approaches. Therefore, conversely, it is possible for an angel to coexist successively and continuously with diverse parts of a **resting body**; and simultaneously to depart from one and approach another. I judge the consequence plain to anyone conceding that an angel can be moved locally and freely, as I assume from the preceding question. The antecedent is true not only as to possibility but also as to fact according to common opinion. For if angels are the **movers of the heavens**, as **Augustine** wishes and the **Philosopher** and other doctors more commonly hold, and they are in a determined part—say, in the circumference and in the eastern part, as the same **Philosopher** wishes—in which part they say it exists always unmoved, so that it is never in the south or west or other part, and to it (as if placed there quasi-extrinsically) parts of the sphere successively and continuously coexist—and it is certain that no indivisible thing of the heaven coexists with it adequately (both because no such thing is in it, and because since the whole sphere coexists thus successively, it would follow that it was composed of indivisibles)—it follows that in every instant it coexists with some **divisible part**, and successively and continuously one departs from it and another approaches. And I judge this reason to be sufficiently probable.

(To the contrary, the opinion of the Irishman)

Against this conclusion, which is primarily sought, is the opinion of a certain modern doctor [**The Irishman**] holding that it is impossible for an angel by any **created power** to be able to be moved locally continuously, although he concedes it can be so moved immediately by **God**.

He argues first as follows: If this were possible, it would follow that magnitude, motion, and time were **composed of indivisibles**, contrary to what was demonstrated in *6 Physics*. The consequence is proved, because if an indivisible were moved per se, it would measure the whole space over which it was moved, and the indivisibles in that space would be **immediate** [contiguous], as is clear, and consequently the magnitude would consist of indivisibles. And because motion and time are of the same nature as to division with magnitude, because they are divided by the same divisions, it follows also that motion and time are composed of indivisibles.

Secondly, if so, then in its motion it would have **no resistance**, and consequently there would be no succession in that motion, since all succession in motion is due to resistance, as is clear from *4 Physics* and by the Commentator.

Thirdly, then a more perfect angel of greater power could not move itself **faster** than an angel of lesser power. The consequent is false; the consequence is proved because according to this position, anyone could move himself through whatever distance in whatever time, because it would not be more difficult for him to move himself through a great distance than a small, since he has no resistance, and thus one could not move himself faster than another. The falsity of the consequent is proved: for let it be posited that two angels, one stronger and the other weaker, move themselves as fast as they can; if they are moved equally fast, therefore a greater power and a lesser power perform equal actions in time when they act according to the ultimate of their potency, which is not intelligible; and since this is against the Philosopher and the Commentator, and *7 Physics*, and many other places.

Fourthly, it would follow that some power **lesser than the power of an angel** could be moved faster with some resistance than an angel without resistance, which is absurd and impossible. The consequence is proved. For let one angel be taken who is moved from the earth to the concave of the moon as fast as he can, and let it be posited that he does so in time A; it is certain that some **fire** can be moved through the medium to the same place in some time, and let that be B. Then there is some proportion of time B to time A—let it be tenfold for the sake of example—then as follows: A fire tenfold to the former can be moved in this medium in a time tenfold smaller than time B, therefore in a time equal to A, and a fire hundredfold can in a time smaller than A. And it is certain that any fire in its motion will have resistance from the medium in which it is moved; an angel, however, will have none.

Fifthly, then by the same reason "the human soul, when it wished to be somewhere, would first move itself and thus would be a first moved thing from itself in name," contrary to the determination of the Philosopher and the Commentator in many comments where they wish that the first thing moved from itself be composed of **two parts**, of which one primarily moves the other.

(Response to the reasons of the Irishman 1-2)

To the **first**, I say first that it [the argument] militates against him in that which he concedes—namely, that God can move an angel continuously over a magnitude. For if that followed positing that an angel was moved per se by itself, it would equally follow if it were moved per se by another. Hence the Philosopher no more disproves that an indivisible can be moved per se by itself than by another, nor does his reason prove more of one than of the other. And I wonder that this doctor did not observe that.

I respond, therefore, and **deny the consequence**; and to the proof, I say that it is good regarding an indivisible to which an indivisible in space would correspond precisely, or which would not coexist simultaneously with a divisible part of space, if there were any such thing. An angel, however, is not such; for although it is indivisible in itself, it nevertheless **coexists with a divisible space**, just as also the indivisible intellectual soul coexists with and informs a divisible body; and therefore it does not measure magnitude by indivisibles but by **divisibles only**.

To the **second**, I concede the first consequence and **deny the second**; for a free mover can move successively even without resistance. It is evident even according to the arguer, for he says that God could move an angel successively, and it is certain that then also there would be no resistance. Similarly, the medium does not resist a **glorified body**, nor does a glorified body resist the moving power, and yet **Christ** after the glorification of His body was moved successively and continuously. Therefore, the saying of the Philosopher is to be understood regarding **natural motion**; for in such, succession is precisely from some resistance.

(INSTANCE)

But against this, that **doctor** [the Irishman] argues: "Because then," he says, "the succession would be precisely because the angel willed to move itself with precisely such a velocity; and then it further follows that it actually knows all parts of the space successively, or that sometimes it passes through and does not know how fast."

I respond first that the same argument can be made against him and against others regarding men having **glorified bodies**.

Second, I say that an angel's knowing with what velocity it is moved can be understood in two ways: In one way, that it distinctly knows in how much time it traverses any part determinately—for example, in how much time a tenth part, a hundredth, or a thousandth—and so of any part determinately and distinctly it knows in what determinate and certain part of time it traverses it. In another way, that it does not have such a distinct notice of each individual part, but knows determinately regarding the whole magnitude in how much time it traverses it, and [knows] the parts confusedly.

If it be understood in the first way, the consequence seems to be conceded, and the consequent also as to the second part—if there be given a minimum part of magnitude perceivable by an angel or a maximum non-perceivable part; just as notwithstanding that the **free will** can intend its act and accelerate it, it nevertheless does not distinctly know every part of the act and every part of the time measuring that intensification. And this seems quite reasonable to say not only of the human will, but also of the angelic. If, however, the opposite is held, the consequent must be conceded for the first part.

If indeed it be understood in the second way, the consequence is to be denied. For even granted that it does not distinctly know every part of the magnitude and of the time, it can nevertheless know that in such a time it traverses the whole space.

(RESPONSE TO THE REASONS OF THE IRISHMAN 3-5)

To the **third**, I concede the consequent. For I say that any angel, through whatever finite space, can move itself in an **instant**, taking "to move" commonly and broadly. Nor is it necessary that every greater power be able to surpass a lesser in every effect—for example, a more luminous body cannot illuminate a determinate part of the medium faster or more quickly than a less luminous one can, since the less luminous one can do it in an instant. Similarly, if there were a **vacuum** (as is possible by the power of God, as at least any Catholic must concede), any heavy object through whatever finite distance would descend in an instant, even according to the principles of that doctor, nor would a heavier one descend

more quickly than a less heavy one. It suffices, however, that it [the greater power] exceeds in some effect. And so it is in the examples given. For even if a more luminous thing does not illuminate more quickly than a less luminous one, it nevertheless illuminates a greater part of the medium and more intensely than a less luminous one. Similarly, although a heavier object does not surpass a less heavy body in moving itself (assuming a vacuum), it nevertheless surpasses it in moving itself through a full medium. So in the proposal, I say that a stronger angel does not surpass a weaker in moving itself, yet it does surpass it in **moving some body**. For it can move a larger body, and the same or an equal one faster, and this suffices; the proof, however, proceeds regarding temporal actions, not sudden ones.

Through these points, the answer to the **fourth** is clear. For it is founded upon a falsehood, namely, that there is given a **minimum time** in which an angel can move itself through a certain distance.

To the **fifth**, speaking of the conjoined soul (as the argument seems to proceed), the consequence does not hold. Second, I say that whatever may be of the consequent, that saying of the Philosopher nevertheless does not prove it to be false. For the **Philosopher** speaks of a divisible and quantitative moved thing, as is manifest throughout his whole process there and similarly in the beginning of the seventh book, where he begins to speak of such matter; and he accepts "to move of itself" according to the second sense given in the preceding question, responding to the first objection of the third article. Third, I say that even granted the consequent were against the Philosopher, his authority ought not to be weighted in this part. The reason is that to him, it would have been no less, but much more impossible for an angel to be able to be moved according to place—whether by itself or by another—than that some thing could move itself; and yet this doctor concedes the opposite, and whoever does not wish to contradict the words of Holy Scripture must concede it.

To the **principal argument**, I say that "indivisible" can be taken in two ways: In one way, that it be indivisible in itself and according to its essence only; in another way, that it be indivisible according to **local coexistence**, that is, that it coexist with an indivisible place or site, as some imagine a **point**. Regarding an indivisible taken in the second way, I concede the antecedent, and of such it is not a doubt that Aristotle speaks and his reason proceeds.

But regarding an indivisible in the first way only—such as is an **angel**, who, although he is indivisible according to himself, nevertheless **coexists with a divisible place**—the antecedent is false, nor does the reason proceed against this. For such an indivisible, in its motion, does not pass an equal to itself before a greater, but passes an equal to its **place** before a greater; and because its place is not indivisible, it does not follow that it measures magnitude by indivisibles, or that indivisibles are immediate [contiguous].

To the other proof, I say that, speaking universally of that which is moved according to place, not everything that is moved is partly in the starting point and partly in the ending point; but either it is so, or the **whole is in a part of the starting point and the whole in a part of the ending point**, and either one separately suffices for "being moved." An angel behaves in this way while it is moved, but a **body** behaves in the first way.

QUESTION 3

WHETHER an angel can be moved from place to place in an **instant**.

Thirdly regarding this distinction, I ask whether an angel can be moved from place to place in an instant.

And it is argued that it cannot: Because if so, it would be possible either by **passing through the medium** or by **not passing through the medium**. Not in the first way, because since the medium is prior according to position than the extreme, and from the prior and posterior in magnitude "there is a prior and posterior in motion" (as held in *4 Physics*), it follows that the angel is moved to the medium earlier than to the extreme; but prior and posterior in motion do not fall within an instant, since they are either time or not without time, therefore etc. Nor can it be said that it is moved without passing through the medium, because then that would not be a medium, which implies a contradiction. The consequence is evident: for "the medium is that which it comes to first—that which is continuously changed—before it comes to the last," according to the definition of the **Philosopher** in *5 Physics*.

To the contrary, it is argued: An angel passing from place to place finds **no resistance**; therefore it can pass from place to place in an instant. The consequence is evident from the intention of the Philosopher in *4 Physics* in the chapter *On the Vacuum* and the Commentator. And the antecedent is proved: because it neither has the resistance of the **medium** (since a body does not resist a spirit; rather they coexist simultaneously), nor the resistance of the **mobile** (since the same thing does not resist itself).

In this question, first, a certain opinion will be treated. Second, a response to the question will be given. Third, objections will be raised against what has been said.

ARTICLE 1

(Opinion of Thomas and Giles)

There is indeed one opinion [**Thomas Aquinas** and **Giles of Rome**] which posits that an angel can be moved from place to place both by **continuous motion** and by **non-continuous motion**. For, as it says, "it can successively leave the divisible place in which it is, and thus its motion will be continuous; and it can also leave the whole place simultaneously and apply itself to another whole place simultaneously, and thus its motion will not be continuous."

But in whichever way it is moved, it [the opinion] says that it is moved in **time** and not in an **instant**. That it is moved in time if it is moved by continuous motion is not a matter of doubt. But that it is also moved in time if it is moved in the second way [non-continuously] is proved as follows:

In whatever motion there are **several "nows"** (*nunc*) succeeding each other, there is time, since time is nothing else than the succession of prior and posterior in motion. But in such [non-continuous] motion there are several succeeding "nows." Proof: For there is a "now" in which it is **first** in the term to which (*terminus ad quem*), and another in which it was **lastly** in the term from which (*terminus a quo*); and these succeed each other, because the angel is not in both terms simultaneously, since it cannot be in several places at once, therefore etc.

As for the claim that there is a "now" in which it was lastly in the term from which—which is the only doubtful part among the assumptions—they prove it thus: "It is of the nature of **rest** that that which rests

behaves similarly *now* and *before*; and therefore in every 'now' of the time measuring the rest, the thing resting is in the same [disposition]—in the first, and middle, and last. But it is of the nature of **motion** that that which is moved behaves differently *now* and *before*; and therefore in every 'now' of the time measuring the motion, the mobile behaves in one disposition after another. Hence it is necessary that in the last 'now' it has a form which it did not have before. And thus it is evident that to rest in a whole time in something (say, in whiteness) is to be in it in every instant of that time. Hence it is not possible for something to rest in one term for a whole preceding time, and then in the last instant of that time be in another term. But this [different behavior] is characteristic of motion, because to be moved in some whole time is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time." It is necessary, therefore, to grant a "now" in which it lastly rested in some place, and consequently **two succeeding "nows"**, and through this, time.

They say, however, that "this time—whether it be continuous or not—is not the same as the time which measures the **motion of the heaven** and other corporeal things which have mutability from the motion of the heaven. For the motion of an angel does not depend on the motion of the heaven."

Others holding the same path confirm it thus: In every mutation "there is something prior and something posterior"; for this is what the name 'mutation' signifies. Therefore, this must be assigned in the aforesaid motion of an angel. Priority and posteriority can be conceived in five ways:

1. According to **two instants** including a time.
2. According to **two times** continued at one instant.
3. According to **an instant and a time** (either an initial instant or a terminating one).
4. According to **two instants not including a time**.
5. According to **two times not including any instant**.

This fifth mode, they say, is impossible, because an instant relates to time as a **point to a line**. It is impossible to take two lines between which a point is not enclosed (if they are continuous) or several points (if they are discontinuous). Therefore it is impossible to take two times between which some instant does not fall.

In the aforesaid motion of an angel, therefore, there must be prior and posterior in one of the aforesaid ways. But it cannot be by any of the first three, because those are found only in motion measured by continuous time; therefore, it must be by the **fourth way**. "Therefore one must grant one instant in which it is in the term from which, and another in which it is in the term to which"; between which instants **no time is enclosed**. "And because such a succession of instants can be called time, therefore such motion of an angel will be in time."

(Against Thomas and Giles)

This opinion—regarding what it says about the non-continuous motion of an angel, or more properly regarding the **indivisible local mutation**—does not appear true to me, nor does its foundation.

Hence against the first point, I argue first: An angel, according to that opinion, in such motion leaves the whole place from which it departs simultaneously; let the place from which it recedes be A, and the place to which it approaches be B. The angel leaves the whole of A simultaneously, therefore it leaves it in an

instant. Let that instant be C: Either the angel in instant C is in place B or in place A. This is clear because otherwise it would not be changed from A into B, but from A into some place other than B, or simply into non-A. If it is in A, then it does not leave A whole simultaneously, because what leaves something whole simultaneously, leaves it and has left it simultaneously; but what has left something is not in it. Therefore, if it is in A in instant C, it does not leave all of A simultaneously in instant C, contrary to the position. If it is in B, then in an instant it is changed from A to B, because it is not changed from A except precisely while it leaves A; indeed, its leaving A is nothing else than being changed from A.

This is also evident by similarity. For because matter simultaneously leaves or loses one **substantial form** and simultaneously receives another, we say that it is changed from one to the other in an instant. Thus it is in this proposal.

Furthermore, even granted that neither the angel nor its motion depends on the motion of the heaven, it nevertheless so coexists with it that it happens truly to say that "while the sun is in such a place, the angel is in such a place." Thus, whatever may be said of that "angelic time," I take our **whole time** in which the sun moved as long as the angel rested in A, and the whole time in which the sun will move as long as the angel will be in B; it is certain that between these two times, **no time is intermediate**; they are coupled, therefore, by **one instant**, and let that be C. Then: Either the angel in instant C is in A only, or in B only, or in both, or in neither. Not in neither, for the reason stated before; nor in both, because it cannot be in two places at once according to the opinion. If it is in A, then in instant C it has not been changed from A; and since by the opinion there is a first instant in which it is in the term to which (say B), either that instant corresponds in our time to instant C itself, or to another following it. If C, then it is changed to B when it has not yet been changed from A, and thus it is not changed *into B from A*, which is contrary to the position. If however another instant after C corresponds, since in our time (even according to the opinion) there are no **immediate instants**, there will be some time after C in which the angel will still be in A, and consequently the whole time before instant C was not the *whole* time in which the angel was in place A, and yet it was taken as the whole.

It remains, therefore, that the angel in instant C is not in A. It is therefore in B. From which it further follows that in the whole time before C it was in place A. And in instant C terminating that time, it is in place B. And through this, it is **changed in an instant** from A to B, which is the point proposed.

For those commonly asking whether an angel can be changed from place to place in an instant are speaking of the **instant of our time**, whether that mutation be measured by such an instant or only coexist with it. Therefore, to respond regarding some other [discrete] instant or time is not to speak to the common understanding of those asking.

Against the second point—namely, that there is a "last instant" in which the angel rested in the term from which when it leaves it all at once (on which saying the opinion is founded)—I also argue. First, from what has already been proved: namely, that in the case posited, the angel was in the term from which through the whole time terminated at instant C, and in instant C terminating it, it was not in it, but in the term to which. From this, the point is clear. For if there were some last instant of its rest in the term from which, it would either be **immediately before** C (which is not possible [in continuous time]) or there would be an intermediate time between it and C in which it still rested, and consequently that was not the *last* instant of its rest.

Nor is it valid here to flee to some other instant or time besides our own commonly known to us, since in every rest, even measured by our time, they are forced to say this by the reason they make.

Furthermore, if in every rest there is a last instant, then when matter is transmuted from one indivisible substantial form into another, there will be a **last instant** in which it was under the form from which it is transmuted. Either therefore in that same instant it is under the form *to* which (and it is clear it is not), or in another following. And since none follows without an intermediary, it follows that there would be a time in which matter would **lack both substantial forms**.

Furthermore, it follows from this that there would be a **last instant of being** for a permanent thing, after which nothing of it will exist, which is contrary to the Philosopher in *8 Physics* and contrary to what was proved above in various places.

(To the Reason of Thomas)

To the reason of the first doctor, I respond by **denying the last instant of rest** in such an indivisible mutation. When it is proved—because in every instant of time measuring rest, the thing resting is in the same disposition as before, and consequently in the last instant—I say that this is not true except in every instant in which it is true to say that the thing *is resting*; but beyond every such instant, there is another instant in which it is not true to say that it is resting, but that it **ceases to rest** (explaining this by the negation of the present and the position of the past), and that is the instant that **terminates** that time.

And therefore it is not of the nature of rest that it is in every instant of the time [including the terminal one], but that it is in every instant in which it rests, or rather in which it is true to say that it rests.

This appears by similarity from their own words. For according to them, it is of the nature of motion that that which is moved behaves differently than before, just as it is of the nature of rest that it behaves similarly. But not in every instant of the time measuring a continuous motion does the moved thing behave differently; for it does not in the **initial instant**, otherwise there would be a "first having-been-changed" in such motion, which is impossible.

And again, if in that instant it behaved differently than before—since that same instant is the terminus of the time measuring the preceding rest—then (both according to the opinion and according to truth) when something is moved by continuous motion after rest, it has in that instant its "lastly-having-rested," and consequently it does *not* behave differently than before. It would follow that in the same instant it behaves differently and does not behave differently, which are mutually contradictory. Therefore those things are true of an **interconnecting instant** (*instanti continuante*) both in motion and in rest. In continuous motion, however, it is not true of the initial instant, nor in the rest preceding an indivisible mutation is it true of the terminating instant.

(To the Reason of Giles)

To the reason of the other [Giles], I say that that priority and posteriority ought to be attended to according to **time and instant**, understanding it thus: that in the whole preceding time it was in the term from which, and in the terminating instant it was or is in the term to which.

Nor does it stand in the way that he says such priority and posteriority are found only in those things measured by continuous time, since besides continuous time there appears no necessity for positing another **discrete time**, since all things can be well saved through coexistence with continuous time.

ARTICLE 2

Regarding the second article, I say that the question is not to be understood regarding motion taken strictly (namely, successively), because it is certain that no thing can be moved thus in an instant, but regarding "being moved" taken broadly, as it is common to **indivisible mutation**.

Or if we wish to speak properly, let the question be: **Whether an angel can be changed from place to place in an instant**. And then I say that the question can be understood in two ways:

1. Whether it can be changed thus **by itself**.
2. Commonly, whether **by itself or by God**.

Likewise, that it be changed from place to place can be understood either as passing **through the medium**, or as passing **immediately** from place to place without passing through the medium, even though there is a medium between them.

(Two Conclusions)

These things having been premised, I propose two conclusions:

1. **The first is that an angel can, by itself, be changed from place to place in an instant, passing through the whole medium.**
2. **The second is that it can, by God, be changed from place to place in an instant, without passing through the medium.**

(The first conclusion is proved)

I prove the first conclusion first thus: If a heavy body descended from place to place through a **vacuum**, it would descend in an **instant**; therefore an angel can change itself from place to place in an instant through a medium. The antecedent is evident from *4 Physics* in the chapter *On the Vacuum*. The consequence is proved because the whole cause of the truth of the antecedent is that then in such a descent it would have **no resistance**. Since, therefore, no body resists an angel, and an angel can move itself through a medium, it follows that it can change itself through a medium in an instant.

(Instance)

To this reason, it can be responded according to the words of one doctor [**Giles of Rome**] that the resistance because of which time is assigned in motion is manifold:

- One is of the **medium to the mobile**.

- Another is of the **mobile to the motor**; and this occurs "whenever the mobile is distinct from the motor. For by the very fact that the mobile is in another place than the motor wishes, a certain resistance is observed there."

The first is only in the motion of simple bodies; the second is only in the motion of celestial bodies, and would be in the motion of animals through a vacuum. But both together are in the motion of animals through a full medium.

An angel, however, can be moved in two ways:

1. In an **assumed body**, and in such motion time is assigned both because of the resistance of the mobile to the motor (since it is distinct from it) and the medium to the mobile.
2. By the "**application of power to diverse spaces**," and here also there is a certain resistance, insofar as the one applying it is elsewhere, distinct from that to which it must apply its power. And because of such resistance, time falls in the motion of an angel, although a time of a different nature from that which is a property of the motion of the heaven.

(Against the Instance)

This response contains a falsehood, as it appears to me, in that it says that "whenever the mobile is distinct from the motor," there is resistance. If this were true, it would follow that **God could change nothing in an instant**, which I do not judge to be well said theologically. The consequence is evident, because everything He would change would be distinct from Him.

Furthermore, it would follow that every body would **equally resist all angels** when moved by them, because it would be equally distinct from any of them; and consequently no one could move a body in non-time, nor the same body through the same space in less time than another, nor could the strongest of angels move the sphere of the moon faster than the one who actually moves it. Yet, according to the response, he could move it only in time, and since he is of finite power, there would be a minimum time in which he could move it.

Furthermore, it would follow that, positing a vacuum, if an animal were at the top of a high tower and threw itself to the earth through the vacuum, it would not descend in an instant but in time. For the mobile would be distinct from the motor and elsewhere than where the motor wished it to be. But the consequent is false, even according to the opinion. For they say that "the whole cause why time is required in the motion of simple bodies and in the natural motion of animals is the resistance of the medium." Therefore, with the medium removed, they will not be moved in time. Now it is certain that if an animal, beyond its natural power of descending (namely gravity), applies its **animal power** to the descent, time is not assigned because of this; indeed, even in a full medium, it would move faster because of this.

Furthermore, if the mere distinction of the mobile from the motor sufficed for the resistance because of which time is required in local motion, it ought to be so in **other motions**; and consequently no alterative power could alter something alterable (however well disposed but distinct from itself) in an instant—the opposite of which is evident even according to them in the same question regarding the **illumination of a medium**, the causation of a **species** in a medium, and **vision** in the eye.

Likewise, what he says—namely, that in the motion of an angel through the application of power, its distinction from the place to which it wishes to apply its power is sufficient resistance—is not well said:

- Because at an equal distance all angels would be able to move equally fast, which is inconvenient, assuming that none can move except in time.
- Because even in a **vacuum** an angel could only change itself in time, which no one (unless absurdly) seems able to concede who says that a heavy object would descend in non-time.
- Because such a distinction of place ought no less to be a sufficient cause for time in the motion of an **animal** as in the motion of an angel.

(The first conclusion is proved again)

Secondly to the conclusion: If all the medium contained in this house were a **glorified body** with the gift of **subtlety** (by which one body does not resist another), and some heavy object were placed above, it would descend no less than it does now; and it would descend not in time but in an **instant**, because there would be no resistance. Therefore an angel can change itself from place to place in an instant.

Thirdly, if a man or an angel had a united **glorified body** with the gifts of both **subtlety** and **agility**, he could move it from place to place in an instant; therefore an angel can now in fact change itself. The antecedent is proved, since every cause because of which time is required would be absent. For because of the gift of subtlety, the medium would not resist the mobile, and because of the gift of agility, the mobile would not resist the motor.

It is proved secondly because, according to truth, those who will have such gifts after the resurrection will be able to pass from place to place in an instant. Otherwise, if only in time, they would necessarily take more time to traverse a greater space than a smaller one, which is expressly against **Augustine**, who says that a glorious body "**reaches both intervals with equal speed**" like a ray of the sun. And the consequence is noted because in the motion of an angel by itself, there is **no resistance at all**.

(The second conclusion is proved)

I prove the **second conclusion** thus: The **Body of Christ** existing in heaven is changed to the **sacramental host** by an acquisitive change, although not a des-perditiva [loss-based] one, without passing through the **medium**. Therefore **God** could place one **angel** existing in one place in another distant one without carrying him through the **medium**. This is evident, because this is not less possible than that. Therefore by equal power he could change an **angel** thus from place to place not through the **medium**, such that he would acquire the new and abandon the first. For it seems more above nature to be changed by acquiring a new place and retaining the prior one than by simultaneously acquiring a new one and abandoning the prior one. Nay rather, whatever things are moved naturally according to place, while they acquire one, they abandon another.

But whether an **angel** can change himself by his own proper power, although some solemn **doctors** say that he can, is nevertheless doubtful to me, nor well clarified. Therefore nothing on this for the present.

ARTICLE 3 (Arguments of the Hibernicus [Irish Doctor] against the aforesaid)

Against the aforesaid objection can be made in many ways, and first against the **first conclusion** a certain **modern doctor** argues thus: If an **angel** could be changed locally **suddenly** [subito] by himself, it is possible that the **angel** is in this house and not outside, and that in **instant A** he is changed **suddenly**, so that he is in heaven or in another place outside this house. Which being done, this is true: "in **A** this **angel** is changed from this house, therefore in **A** he left this house." This is evident, because if he did not leave before **A** nor after **A**, as is evident by the position, and did not leave in **A**, therefore he would never leave the house, and so he would be outside the house, after he was inside, and yet he would not leave; which is not intelligible. But it is proved that the consequent is false in the posited case, because, if he left this house in **A**, either he left through the door or through another part, and consequently he was there. But this is false, because he was not there in **instant A**, since then he was in heaven by the position; nor in another instant, because then his change would not have been **sudden**, against the position; therefore it seems impossible that an **angel** be changed **suddenly** from this house.

Secondly, if so, then something could be changed from **extreme** to **extreme** not through the **medium**, against the **Philosopher** [Aristotle] and the **Commentator** [Averroes] in Physics Book 5.

Thirdly, then an **angel** whenever he wished to be in another place, then he would be there, and so an **angel** could not be elsewhere than he is; and so consequently he would not have **freedom of the will**, which is false.

Fourthly, then it would not be more difficult for an **angel** to move himself **suddenly** to a great distance than to a small one, but from **volition** alone he would be wherever he wished. And so the **Devil**, if he were not impeded, could be **suddenly** in the **empyrean heaven** and among men, which does not seem true.

Fifthly, if the **angel** is changed **suddenly** thus, then in the **instant** of change he is in the place which he intends; therefore in that **instant** he does not will to be elsewhere than he is then, and consequently in that **instant** he does not will to be changed locally, because to will to be changed locally is to will to be elsewhere than he is. And so it follows that in that **instant** he is not changed voluntarily.

Sixthly, an **angel** existing in heaven in some **instant** can will in that **instant** to be on earth as quickly as he will be able. Let it be posited therefore that he wills thus, and it follows that **suddenly** he will be on earth, and consequently in some **instant** he will be changed to the earth, and not in some **instant** mediated to this **instant**, because then he would not be changed as quickly as he could. Therefore in the **instant** immediate after this, and so an **instant** will be immediate to an **instant**, which is impossible.

Seventhly, against one saying in the **first reason** of the said conclusion, namely that positing a **vacuum** a **heavy body** would descend in an **instant**, he argues, because, if so, let it be posited that above there is some **heavy body**, and in this **instant** **God** annihilates the whole **medium**, which is below it down to the earth, therefore in this **instant** that **heavy body** will be on the earth. Let it be posited therefore that simultaneously with this **God** in this **instant** creates one **impenetrable body** and places it in the middle between that **heavy body** and the earth according to a straight line; and it follows still, that in that **instant** that **heavy body** would be on the earth, which is impossible. Whence also by equal reason, if he created a body filling the whole **medium**, still in that **instant** the **heavy body** would be on the earth. And further by the same reason, with that **medium** standing, the **heavy body** would descend in an **instant**, which is false.

The consequence is truly proved, because positing that **impenetrable body**, as is said, if the **heavy body** were not in that **instant** on the earth, this would be because it would be impeded by it. But it could not be impeded unless it be in this **instant** in some site, through which the **heavy body** must pass, if it ought to come to the earth; and if so, therefore even not positing that body, still that **heavy body** would be in that middle site in this **instant**; and by the same it is proved that it would be in any middle site between it and the earth. Which completely encloses a contradiction concerning natural existence.

Eighthly, against another assumption in the **second reason** of the same conclusion. For let it be posited that the whole **medium** is not glorified, but in its middle there is some part not glorified, and one **angel** wills to move a **heavy body** existing above as quickly as he can to the earth, then it follows that that **heavy body** immediately divides that part of the **medium**, and so it does not touch it before it divides it, which does not seem intelligible.

Furthermore, let it be posited that that **heavy body** is square, and is in that part of the **medium** not glorified, yet such that nothing of that not glorified part is under the **heavy body**, then it follows, if in an **instant** it descends, that the site of it will be filled in an **instant** by that surrounding body, therefore the sides will naturally run together in an **instant**.

Furthermore, positing the whole **medium** glorified and the **heavy body** above, let it be posited with this that here below there is **fire** according to a straight line opposite to that **heavy body**, it is constant that just as that descends, so this ascends, and consequently they will meet each other mutually. But this is false, because there is no reason why they should meet each other in one site of the **medium** rather than in another.

Nor is it valid to say that they meet each other in the middle, if they are of equal power, or in another site proportioned to the proportion of them in virtue, since then positing that the **fire** were of greater power, it would follow that it would meet it above the middle of the whole distance. But this is false, because, when nothing resists, a smaller body can be changed equally easily as a larger one.

(Reply to the arguments of the Hibernicus)

To the **first** I concede the last consequent, namely that in that case the **angel** was in the door, if he went out through the door in **instant A**. And when it is argued against this, because then he was in heaven, I concede it and say that from this it does not follow that he was not in the door. For in the same **instant** he was in all intermediate places and in the term. And if it is said that it is not possible naturally for the same thing to be simultaneously in several places, I answer that for something to be simultaneously in several places can be understood in two ways: In one way, that it be permanently and quietly, and thus it is not possible by nature; in another way, in **rapture** and **sudden transit**, and thus it is possible naturally for that which in its transit does not find resistance, just as it is regarding an **angel** and glorified bodies, and would be regarding a **heavy body**, positing a **vacuum**.

To the **second**, whatever may be regarding the consequent, I deny the consequence, which he does not prove.

To the **third**, accepting the consequent in a good understanding, it can be conceded, just as **Augustine** concedes regarding those about to have glorified bodies, saying that "wherever the **spirit** will have willed,

there also will be the **body**." And because the ulterior consequence is logical precisely, I concede the consequent also, namely that an **angel** cannot be elsewhere than where he is, and so concerning any demonstrable thing it must be conceded that it cannot be elsewhere than where it is. For with anything demonstrated this is impossible: "this is elsewhere than where it is." Yet this is true: "elsewhere than where the **angel** is, he is able to be." For if the **angel** is in **A** only, and can be in place **B**, then this is true, nor does the opposite of this follow from that concession. Nor does it thus follow that he does not have **freedom of the will**.

To the **fourth** I concede the whole. And if the consequent should seem absurd at first glance, let him consider that the whole absurdity arises precisely from this, that the **Devil** would be mixed with the blessed and so noble a society. And certainly this itself would seem equally absurd, if not in an **instant** but even in time he were to approach there; which nevertheless any one would concede he is able to do, unless he were impeded.

To the **fifth** I concede the first consequent and also the second, but I deny the ulterior consequence, accepting "to be changed" indivisibly. For that which is changed thus, while it is changed, is changed [has changed]; but that which is changed [has changed], is not changed to a place where it is not, but to a place where it was not immediately before, if then firstly it is changed there. And therefore then the **angel** certainly wills to be changed and to have been changed locally, because he wills to be where he was not immediately before.

To the **sixth**, if it is conceded that his **will** can be of impossible things, which perhaps concerning the **Devil** can be conceded, I say the case is possible. But then I deny the consequence. For it does not follow: The **Devil** wills after this **instant** to be in place **A** as quickly as he can, therefore he will be in place **A** as quickly as he will be able. Just as also it does not follow that he after this **instant** can produce one **volition** in an **instant** as quickly as he can, and yet he can will this.

To the **seventh** I say that in that case the **heavy body** will not be in that **instant** on the earth, but upon that **impenetrable body**, by which it will be impeded, lest it be on the earth. And further I concede that, that not being posited, that **heavy body** will be in that **instant** in every middle site, just as was said to the **first argument**.

To the **eighth** I say that neither will it immediately divide completely that part of the **medium** nor in that **instant** will it be on the earth.

To the other against the same it can reasonably be said that that site will not be filled in that **instant**, but in the time immediately following and through some small time the sides would be distant, and there would be a **vacuum** there or between them there would not be a **medium**, which however with them not having been approached could be. Nor does this make for me a greater difficulty than if it were absolutely posited that **God** in an **instant** were to annihilate one large mountain, which no Catholic would deny he is able to do. But this being posited either it will be necessary to grant a **vacuum** through some time, or to concede the sides of the surrounding body run together in an **instant**. I think it more reasonable that the first be conceded than the second. If however the second is conceded, so in our case it will be able to be conceded.

To the last I say that in that case however great be the **fire** and however great be the **heavy body**, they will meet each other in the middle of the distance. The reason is because not more swiftly will one ascend than the other descend, or vice versa, because each will be changed in an **instant**. And it is similar in this case as to this, just as if each were moved in time equally swiftly. In which case it is constant that they would meet each other mutually in the middle of the distance.

(Reply to the principal argument of the question)

I say that the **angel** will pass through the **medium**. Nor however prior in time or duration will he come to the **medium** than to the **extreme**. To the proof I say that, although speaking regarding physical good, prior and posterior are in motion from the prior and posterior in magnitude, nevertheless not from that precisely. Whence just as, positing magnitude alone, motion is not posited, but beyond that many other things are required, so not, with that alone posited and its parts situated as prior and posterior, is prior and posterior posited in motion, that is, not prior over one part of it is something moved than over another. But beyond this another thing is required: Either some resistance, or that the mover thus wills to pass through it successively, supposing that it is in his power to pass through it as **suddenly** as successively.

Item I say that by the power of **God** he will be able to be changed to the **extreme**, not through the **medium**. And then I say that that will be a **medium** according to site, not however according to transit.

To the proof it must be said that the **Philosopher** [Aristotle] describes the **medium** thus: "**Medium** is that into which the changing thing is apt born to reach first than into that which is the ultimate, changing according to nature continuously," where it is evident that he speaks concerning that which is moved continuously and naturally, which is not in the proposed case. Item he says that "it is apt born etc.," and this still agrees well with it, granted that in fact it would not be changed into it first, and so there is no contradiction.

DISTINCTION 7

QUESTION 1 WHETHER an obdurate angel can by his own power, with the common influence of God standing, elicit some good will.

About the first part of the seventh distinction, in which the **Master** [Peter Lombard] treats of the confirmation of good angels and the obduration of bad ones, I ask whether an **obdurate angel** can by his own power, with the common influence of **God** standing, elicit some good will.

It is argued that yes, because he has **free will**, therefore he can will well. The consequence is evident, because **free will** is a rational power, which is valid for opposites, according to **Metaphysics** Book 9; and as **Jerome** says, and is held in the letter, in others it "can be bent into either part" by **God**. The antecedent is evident, because according to **Dionysius** in *On the Divine Names* chapter 5, the angelic goods are integral. And it must be understood concerning natural goods, concerning which is **free will**.

To the opposite. **Confirmed angels** cannot elicit any evil will, therefore neither can **obdurate angels** elicit any good will. The antecedent is evident through the **Master** in the letter. The consequence is

proved, because it is easier to act badly than well. Therefore if those obdurate in evil can do well, much more strongly will those confirmed in good be able to do badly.

In this question firstly it will be seen concerning the thing asked. Secondly the cause of the confirmation of the good and the obduration of the bad will be asked.

ARTICLE 1 (Opinion of Scotus)

As to the first there is **one opinion** which posits concerning this two conclusions: One is that an **obdurate angel** can not have any evil act or be without any evil act. Second, that he can have some good act, not with **gratuitous** goodness, but **moral**, not only from the genus and from the circumstance of the object, but also according to all circumstances, which make a **moral act** to be perfectly good morally.

He proves the **first conclusion**, because his **will** could from its liberty have no act, therefore also no evil act. The antecedent is proved, "because according to **Augustine** in *Retractations* book 1 chapter 22 'nothing is so much in the power as the **will** itself'. Which is not understood concerning the **will** as to its first being, because as to that non-will is more in its power than **will**, but it is understood as to operation. Therefore the **will** is more in its power as to operation than any inferior power. But the **will** can suspend any inferior power from any act. Therefore also itself."

He proves the **second conclusion** thus: A man existing in **sin** and in **moral vice** can from pure natural things, supposing the general influence of **God**, have a perfectly good will according to all circumstances. Therefore much more can an **obdurate angel** do this from pure natural things. The consequence is proved through the authority of **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* chapter 3, where he says "that, if it were possible that human nature, after it lost the goodness of the **will** having turned away from **God**, could have it again from itself, much more possibly would the **angelic nature** have this, which by how much less it is burdened by the weight of an earthly body, by so much more would it be endowed with this faculty."

Secondly, in **angels** natural things remain "integral and most splendid," according to **Dionysius**. But to will well according to no moral circumstance in the act exceeds the natural faculty of the **will**, just as neither according to the substance of the act, because those circumstances are born naturally to agree with such an act, because through natural reason such a circumstance is concluded to owe to be in such an act, just as is evident through the reasons of the **philosophers**, because they proved this by natural reason. However, that naturally follows something, which is proved to owe to be in it through natural reason. Therefore just as the act of willing according to the substance of the act does not exceed the **will** of the **angel**, so neither according to any circumstance. Therefore, since the **angel** is able in an act, which does not exceed his natural faculty, it follows that he is able in an act perfectly good **morally**.

Thirdly, the **intellect** of the **angel** is not so blinded, that he errs concerning practical principles, because those are known from the terms, just as also speculative principles. And therefore, since the **angel** can apprehend the terms and compose them, he can assent to the truth of that principle. Moreover from that principle he can deduce a necessary practical conclusion. And if he does not know by discursive reasoning, the conclusion can be seen by the **angel** in the principle, just as by us it is deduced demonstratively from the principle. Therefore just as our **will** concerning such a conclusion deduced from

such a principle can have a right **volition**, so the **angel** by following the dictate of his **intellect** can have a volition well circumstanced.

Fourthly, it is held commonly that an **angel** from pure natural things can love **God** above all things; and to this he would be bound, if he were in pure natural things in the state of the way, and consequently to this is his natural inclination. Therefore since his nature remains integral and similarly his natural inclination, it follows that still he can love **God**. But the act of loving, from the fact that it passes over that good, is without every evil circumstance, because he cannot be loved too intensely. Therefore concerning **God** he can have an act of loving good **morally**.

(Four inconveniences of the opinion of Scotus)

This opinion, as much as appears to me, contains many things repugnant to the sayings of the **saints**. The first is that an **obdurate angel** of himself can lack every act of the **will**. Second, that he can have no **evil** will. Third, that he can have some will perfectly good **morally**. Fourth, that his natural goods remained to him integral. This indeed, if it is understood, that they are integral that is equally perfect and powerful just as they were before **sin**, as it behooves this **doctor** to understand, is also against the intention of the **saints**.

(Against the first inconvenience)

Therefore against the first I argue first thus: The **Devil** cannot deprive himself of every punishment of sense, therefore he cannot of himself lack every act of the **will**. The antecedent is evident: Both by the express determination of **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* chapter 3, as immediately will be alleged against the second saying of the opinion. And because, if he could, it is not to be doubted that he would deprive himself of it and so at some time his punishment would be finished, which is against the sacred authority saying: "These will go into eternal punishment etc.," and again: "Their fire will not be extinguished and their worm will not die." Furthermore, this is worse than the saying of **Origen**; for he said the punishments of the damned are to be finished at some time from the **mercy of God**. But it would be said worse, that it is from the proper liberty and power of the damned. And yet the saying of **Origen** is reputed erroneous. The consequence is proved, because, if he could lack every act of the **will**, he could consequently not have displeasure of his damnation, and universally nullification with respect to anything inflicted upon him, and through this none of the things inflicted on him would be a punishment to him.

Secondly, if the **Devil** could lack every act etc., he could also be without pain and sadness. The consequence is evident, because all his pain or sadness is an act of the **will**, or cannot be without an act of the **will**.

Addition 31: Secondly, from the fact that they cannot lack punishment, it is evident that the foundation of the proof of the said conclusion is false. Since, if the **will** could have no act, it could have no sadness or pain, and consequently no punishment. The consequence is evident, since sadness is an act of the **will**, or cannot naturally be without an act.

(Against the second inconvenience)

If **obdurate angels** can have no evil act, therefore **confirmed angels** can also have no good act, and consequently they can deprive themselves of their beatitude, and through this they are neither confirmed nor blessed. The consequence is evident, since by a similar sentence of **God** those are obdurate in evil, and these are confirmed in good.

And it is confirmed by the similitude of the consequence, which blessed **Gregory** makes against the **Origenists** in *Morals* 34 around the middle: "If at some time," he says, "the punishments of the reprobate are to be finished, therefore at some time also the joys of the blessed are to be finished." And he proves the consequence: "For the truth speaks through itself: 'These will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life'." Nor is there doubt that on account of the same cause, not only concerning the being in, but also concerning the possible the consequence ought to hold, nor less concerning the evil will of these and the good of those than concerning the punishment of these and the joy of those; and in these things similarly **angels** are compared to **angels** and men to men.

Furthermore, the reason of these men, if it is valid, equally proves that good **angels** can suspend themselves from every act of the **will**, and consequently deprive themselves of every good act, just as it proves concerning the bad that they can suspend the **will** from every act, as is immediately evident to anyone looking closely. The *Textus Ordinarius* follows.

Against the second I argue through the express authority of **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* chapter 3, where he says that "a part of the **angels**, which departed from **God** by a voluntary aversion, **God** so commanded the whole to remain in eternal punishment, that he even prepared eternal fire for it, in which all those prevaricating **angels** can neither ever lack an evil will nor punishment, but with the evil of unjust aversion remaining in them eternal damnation of just retribution also remains." From this authority it is evident that they cannot lack an evil will; which is against the conclusion.

(Against the third inconvenience)

Against the third I argue first through the authority of **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* chapter 3, where he says that "the beginning of a good will and thought is not born to man from himself, but is both prepared and granted divinely, in this **God** evidently shows, because neither the **Devil** nor any of his **angels**, from the time when, by the merit of that ruin, they were thrust down into this lower darkness, could or can resume a good will." And a little after: "**God** shows," he says, "whence a good will is given to men, which the **angels** so lost when they had it, that having lost it they cannot thenceforth have it."

Nor can it be said that he speaks only concerning a good will with **gratuitous** goodness making one pleasing [grace], nay rather concerning a good will simply, according to which a good man is accustomed to be distinguished from a depraved one, and a faithful from an infidel, which is certainly called **moral** goodness. For that man cannot have a good will from himself **Augustine** expressly intends, just as is specially evident in the book *On the Predestination of the Saints* and in innumerable other places, as will be shown more prolixly below. And that man cannot have such from himself he proves here by this, that neither can an **angel**, concerning whom however it would seem more likely.

Which also is confirmed by the same in the epistle to **Vitalis**, where he says: "Neither does he himself" the **Devil** "have free judgment to doing well but is hardened into the greatest malevolence by the

punishment of his crime." From this also it is evident that he cannot have a morally good act, since he says he is hardened in malevolence, which certainly is nothing but an evil volition.

Secondly thus: Whoever can elicit some good will **morally**, can love **justice** and have the affection of goodness. But no bad **angel** can do this, therefore etc. The major is evident, since no will is possible to be perfectly good **morally**, unless it is a will of the just or the right insofar as it is just and right. Whence even if someone wills something just, not however because it is just but because it is useful or commodious or for another reason, even if he wills a good thing, he does not however will well. On account of which the **Philosopher** in *Ethics* Book 3 in the chapter On Fortitude says that "the end of every virtuous operation is that which is according to the habit; and to the brave man **fortitude** is the good, that is the end." And he adds that "for the sake of the good certainly the brave man sustains and works those things which are according to **fortitude**." So that according to him the brave man works the works of **fortitude** on account of the good of **fortitude** itself. And in the following chapter he says that those who on account of shame or fear of punishment operate, not fleeing the base but the sad, are not truly brave. "For it behooves one," he says, "not on account of necessity to be brave, but, because it is good."

The minor is proved. For as to this there is the same judgment concerning damned men and the **angels** themselves, since, although the **angel** is more outstanding in nature, he is not however more potent in this condition for the state of his damnation, so namely that he can will well, but man cannot, nay rather an equal sentence constrains both. Whence **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* in the pre-alleged chapter says concerning both that **God** "so granted to them the faculty and will of knowing and loving himself, that each one could both have it and lose it. If anyone however lost it spontaneously, he would not thenceforth be able to resume it by his own decision." Therefore as to this the condition of these and those is one. But such an affection of **justice** damned men cannot have, just as **Augustine** expressly posits there below in the same chapter, where he says that, even if such will then have penitence, they will not however obtain pardon. And he assigns the reason: "Because although," he says, "there will be there the stimulus of regret, there will however be no correction of the **will**. For by such iniquity will be so blamed, that in no way can **justice** be loved or desired by them. For their **will** will be such, that it has in itself always the punishment of its malignity, but never can it receive the affection of goodness." In which words, if they are inspected well, also the proof of the major of the made reason is posited.

Thirdly, good **angels** are so **confirmed**, that they can have no evil will, therefore the bad are so **obdurate**, that they can have no good one. The consequence is evident, because as to this such is the comparison of **angels** to **angels**, as of men to men. But from men to men a similar consequence is good, therefore etc. The assumption is evident through **Augustine**, who adds in the same place immediately and by way also of proof of the premises saying: "Because just as those, who will reign with **Christ**, will have no relics of an evil will in themselves, so those, who will be deputed to the punishment of eternal fire with the **Devil** and his **angels**, just as they will have no further rest, so they will be able to have a good will in no way."

Fourthly I argue from the sayings of the opiner. For he says that the **Devil** can love **God** above all things and that he can lack every evil will and have a good one according to all good **moral** circumstances. From these however it follows that it is in his power to be contrite on account of **God** and to grieve concerning his faults; for from the love of **God** he will be able to grieve that he offended him; further he will be able to hope for the mercy of **God** and ask for pardon.

And these things are proved through the foundations of the opiner, because such acts do not exceed, as the opiner has to say, the faculty of his **will**.

Again, because it is greater to be able to love **God** above all things, or at least it is not less. But if the **Devil** were to do this, certainly he would be justified and would obtain pardon, saying **Augustine** in *On True and False Penitence* chapter 5: "The **Devil**, if he could hope and feel fault in himself, which he does not find in himself, would receive in the piety of **God**." "Which however he does not find in himself" is certainly understood as **justice**.

(Against the fourth inconvenience)

Against the fourth it can be argued first from the saying of the **Master** [Peter Lombard] in this distinction 7 chapter 2 saying that "**bad angels** have **free will** but depressed and corrupt, which is not able to rise to the good."

The same is proved from many authorities of **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* already alleged. Beyond those however still more expressly by that which he says in *Enchiridion* chapter 28 saying that after the first evil of the rational creature "even to the unwilling entered ignorance of things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things, from which as from fountains of diseases not of fertility but of indigence every misery of rational nature emanates." And immediately in the following chapter he says: "Truly these common evils are both of men and **angels**, condemned by the **justice of God** for their malice." So that according to **Augustine** by the merit of their **sin** **bad angels** both in **intellect** and in affect are infirm, just as also men. On account of which just as men cannot of themselves will well, so neither can they.

The authority of **Dionysius** does not prove the opposite but the proposed. For it lies thus: "And the angelic goods given to them we say have not been changed, but they are both integral and most splendid, although they themselves do not see, closing their inspective virtues of the good. Wherefore because they are and are from the good and are good, and they desire the beautiful and the good to be and to live and to understand, desiring the things which are existing." By "angelic goods" however, as it is commonly expounded, not any of their goods but natural ones, namely essence and natural powers, are understood. These certainly are integral as to substance and their natural inclinations to the good. Whence they desire "to be and to live and to understand other things," as he says.

And **Augustine** in *Enchiridion* the pre-alleged chapter says that "rational nature in its evils could not lose the appetite for beatitude." With this integrity however it stands that as to other things it is debilitated and darkened. Which **Dionysius** himself also expressed, when he says "although they themselves do not see, closing their inspective virtues of the good." For they closed to themselves through **sin** "their inspective virtues of the good"; on account of which they suffer both "ignorance of things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things" as punishments of their **sin**, as **Augustine** says. And therefore the said holy **doctors** agree well.

But what **Dionysius** says that those are "most splendid" is to be understood in comparison to us, whom they greatly surpass in acumen of knowledge, not however in comparison to their state before **sin**, as if they were in the same sublimity of intelligence, unless perhaps only as to the knowledge of speculative

things. For in the knowledge of things to be desired and done, depraved by malice, they suffer the greatest errors*.

Marginal Note: Thus St. Thomas also expounds the second part of this authority in 4 Sentences distinction last, where he asks, whether every will of the damned is evil.

(Reply to the reasons of Scotus)

From these things it can be responded to the reasons. To the **first** it must be said that the antecedent is false nor is the proof valid, because **Augustine** there accepts **will** for the second act or for willing itself, as is clearly evident from *Retractations* 2 chapter 1 and *On Free Will* book 3 chapter 4. And although nothing is more in our power than willing itself, nevertheless from this it does not follow that every willing is in our power, nay rather granted that some willing is more in the power than anything else, still the saying of **Augustine** is true, as was said in the First [Book] distinction 1 question 2.

Secondly, granted that it were understood concerning the power of the **will**, as to its operation, as the opiner says, still in the proposed the intent would not be concluded. For the **Devil** cannot deprive any of his powers of every act; for he cannot deprive the **intellect** of the perception of punishments, and another power is not in him.

Item, if the proof were valid, in a similar way it would be proved that a blessed **angel** could deprive himself of his beatitude and every joy; which I do not think consonant with the sayings of the **saints**.

To the **first reason** for the second conclusion, I deny the antecedent, whose falsity will be shown prolixly below in distinction 26. For now however let the authority of **Augustine** in the same place suffice, whence the proof of the consequence is taken, and it is that which was alleged against the **third** saying of the opiner.

And it is to be wondered concerning one arguing thus, since **Augustine**, as is evidently clear to one reading, makes that consequence and destroys the consequent, so that he infers the opposite of the antecedent, which as a truth to be proved he premised.

To the **second**, as to that which he assumes from the saying of blessed **Dionysius**, the response is evident from the sayings against the fourth saying of the opiner. But to that which is further assumed, namely that to will well according to no **moral** circumstance exceeds the faculty of the **will**, it must be said that, whatever may have been concerning the faculty of the **will** before **sin** and in the state of integral nature, in which perhaps even without grace added to nature it could not will well, nevertheless it exceeds the faculty of the corrupt **will** so much that unless it is divinely helped, it can neither perfectly know such circumstances, nor will according to them. Whence: "It is not of him willing nor of him running etc.," "nor are we sufficient to think anything of ourselves," and "without me, says the Savior, you can do nothing," which I esteem to be true both of men and **angels**.

To the **third**, first I say that, if malice is corruptive of the principle, as is said in *Ethics* Book 6 reasonably enough, it can be said that the **intellect** of the most malicious **Devil** errs in such practical principles. Secondly, positing that it does not, still what is intended is not concluded: Both because that such a principle comes into his mind and, if it comes, that under it something to be assumed occurs to him, is not

in his power just as neither of man, as the **Apostle** teaches in the words already alleged. Both also because still having the knowledge of the practical conclusion, still without the **grace of God** the **will** cannot conformably elicit a good will, nay rather it was one error of **Pelagius** that the **grace of God** was necessary to us only so that we might know what was to be done; since having such knowledge, it was in our power to will what we knew was to be willed. Furthermore, in the **Devil** there is continuous actual malice, with which every perfectly good **moral** will is impossible. These things will be more evident below, where it will be inquired concerning the power of man from natural things to the good.

To the **fourth** it must be said that the **Devil** in the state of integral nature could certainly love **God** above all things, I do not say however that from his own natural things alone without another **gratuitous** gift or help of **God**. But in the state of depraved nature, although he can do this itself by remote power, and just as also any one of us, nevertheless he cannot go out into act of himself. And this **Augustine** expressly wills in *De fide ad Petrum*, where above. For he himself says that "**God** so created the **angels**, that they would love him even before themselves, whose work they knew themselves created such to be," or as another letter has: "by work they had known." And below he says, as was alleged above, that he so gave them the faculty of loving him, that each one could have this love and lose it. "If anyone however," he says, "lost it spontaneously, thenceforth by his own decision he would not be able to resume it."

Furthermore according to the same, as was alleged against the second point of this opinion, in **angels** aversion remains continuously. How therefore can they actually turn to **God**, by loving him above all things, since they are impossible, and they cannot remove the first from themselves?

ARTICLE 2 (Opinion of Thomas)

As to the second article **one doctor** says that the cause of the obduration of the **angel** is, because such is the nature of the **angel** that, to whatever his **will** adheres, it adheres immovably, contrary to the human **will**, which adheres movably, "able to depart and adhere to the contrary. And therefore, if the **will** of the **angel** be considered before adhesion, it can freely adhere both to this and to the opposite, namely in those things which he does not will naturally; but after he adhered, he adheres immovably. And therefore," as they say, "it is accustomed to be said that the **free will** of man is flexible to the opposite both before election and after; but the **free will** of the **angel** is flexible to either before, but not after. Thus therefore good **angels** always adhering to **justice** are confirmed in it, but bad ones sinning are obstinate in **sin**."

(Against Thomas)

This mode of speaking does not seem sufficient nor true to me, just as to many others. First indeed, since the foundation assumed is false and against the **saints**, namely concerning the immovable adhesion of the angelic **will**. For **Damascene** says in book 2 chapter 3 that "an **angel** is an intellectual substance always mobile, free in judgment." And a little after he adds: "Free in judgment, turnable according to mind, namely turnable in will." But this would not be true, if he adhered thus immovably.

Furthermore, according to this way it follows that blessed **angels** are immovable and inflexible naturally to evil, when they will have adhered to **justice** by their **will**. But this consequent is expressly against **Damascene** in the same place. For he says concerning holy **angels**: "They are difficultly mobile to evil,

but not immovable; but now immovable to evil not by nature but by **grace**." And **Augustine** says the same in book 2 *Against Maximinus*, and is alleged in this distinction.

Furthermore, as was proved in distinction 3, there was some delay between the creation of the **angel** and his **sin**. And it is constant that in that delay he had some will and, as is evident from the things alleged in the preceding article, he loved **God** before himself. If therefore his **will** adhered thus immovably, he would never have sinned, which is false.

Furthermore, it is constant that the **Devil** does not always will everything which he once wills, nay rather now one thing, now its opposite. Whence, as is said, first he willed **Christ** to die, and afterwards he willed that he not die; whence he suggested to the wife of **Pilate**, that the passion of **Christ** be impeded. And it is probable enough that in his **will** there is the greatest change of contrary volitions, although all are evil and related to an evil end.

Furthermore, what cause will be assigned for the obstinacy of damned men? For it is constant that it is not the aforesaid according to these men.

(Opinion of Peter Aureoli)

Therefore **another doctor** assigned another common cause, namely that into the **angel** in his lapse **God** infuses and daily into the death of a damned man infuses a certain most intense habit of malice inclining to the act of displeasure and hatred of **God** and necessitating the **will** so, that against its inclination it cannot be moved. And this mode also in part the **first doctor** held in his Script on the 2nd of Sentences distinction 7.

(Against Peter Aureoli)

This mode of speaking does not appear convenient to me, first indeed, because he posits such a vicious habit to be caused by **God** alone immediately. And to not say this moves me that blessed **Augustine**, holding that **original sin** is the vice of concupiscence which makes man to concupisce, when **Julian** the defender of the **Pelagian heresy** asked, whether such a habit was caused by **God** in the soul - which if it were granted, he inferred that it would not be evil - **Augustine** is never found to have conceded, that it was caused by **God**, but the opposite expressly in book 4 against the same, and similarly in *Hypognosticon* response 4.

Secondly, because he assumes one thing which is very doubtful, namely that some habit can necessitate the **will** so, that it cannot elicit an act contrary to the act, to which the habit inclines.

Thirdly, because whatever may be concerning this, nevertheless no habit can necessitate the **will**, so that it is always under its act. For it is in its power to use the habit, when it will have willed. Therefore notwithstanding such a habit, the **will** will be able, unless something else opposes, to deprive itself of the act, and consequently to lack punishment and evil volition, the opposite of which **Augustine** says, as is evident in the preceding article.

(Opinion of Scotus)

Another says that therefore the bad **angel** is obstinate, because in that act or in those acts, in which he sinned, he is perpetually conserved by **God**, so that the **angel** cannot not have it or them. Nevertheless that act thus conserved by **God** is so deformed and evil that it is not demeritorious to the **angel**, just as neither is the act of the blessed meritorious, although it is good and right. Concerning the damned man however he says that he is obstinate through the same mode in that last evil act, after the soul is separated from the body.

(Against Scotus)

This mode of speaking does not appear to me entirely reasonable, first indeed, because, if it does not seem reasonable to be able to be conceded that some vicious habit be caused in the soul by **God** immediately as by a total cause, as was said against the other mode of speaking, much less does it seem this can be posited concerning a vicious act.

Secondly, because, if **God** conserves such a depraved act immediately as a total cause in the mind of the **Devil**, so that his **will** concurs in no way actively to this, in an equal way it would seem to be conceded that **God** could from the beginning cause that act in the mind of the **Devil**, and consequently the **will** of the **Devil** could be subjected by his superior to so great depravity, the opposite of which seems to follow from the sentence of **Augustine** 1 and 3 *On Free Will*, who tries to prove that by no thing can a rational **will** be forced, so that it be a slave of lust, because not by an inferior, "because it cannot," nor by a superior, "because it is unjust," as he says in chapter 1 of the third book.

Furthermore, according to this it would have to be granted that **God** by himself alone can immediately cause in a rational mind hatred of himself that is of **God**, which I would not freely grant.

(Own Opinion)

And therefore I say otherwise, asserting nothing however, that the obduration of the bad **angel**, as appears from the things said above, consists in two things, namely in not being able to have a good will and in not being able to lack an evil one. The cause of the first is the universal subtraction of **grace** and the special help of **God**, without which special help no one can have any good will. And **Augustine** hints at this cause in *De fide ad Petrum*, where above, when he says: "Concerning the **angels** indeed **God** disposed and fulfilled this, that if any of them lost the goodness of the will, he would never repair it by a divine gift," hinting manifestly that he is not able to repair except by a "divine gift," which gift however the divine will "both disposed and fulfilled" not to impart. And the judgment is the same concerning damned men.

But the cause of the second, namely that they cannot lack an evil will, seems to be able to be assigned the perpetual continuation of the most bitter punishment of Gehenna and of the actual consideration of lost felicity, with all manner of desperation of recovering; in which punishments he is most justly detained by **God**. Constituted however in these, and also destitute of the special help of **God**, agitated by the spirit of impatience, he rises into continuous murmur and hatred of **God** punishing, from which also he falls into many other worst wills.

But concerning the confirmation of the good, which contrariwise consists in not being able to lack a good will and in not being able to have an evil one - or otherwise to sin in any way - it can be said that the

cause is the perpetual continuation of their good will, which is the beatific fruition of **God**, which **God** so causes in him that the **will** of the blessed cannot not have it; and insuper preservation by **God** from every inordinate will and thought and universally any thing inclining or alluring to any inordination of the **will**.

To the argument of the question I respond by denying the consequence. To the **first proof**, because a rational power is valid for opposites, first it can be said that the **Philosopher** speaks according to the state in which we are, because he knew no other; and therefore his authority does not suffice for the proposed. Secondly, it must be said that, although it is valid for opposites, nevertheless not for any opposites and always or in any case. Whence also the **Devil** does many things freely and voluntarily concerning men, which he could not will to do and not do, but he is saddened and grieves in punishments, in which he cannot not be saddened.

To the authority of **Jerome** it must be said, as the **Master** teaches in the letter, that it must be understood according to the state in which rational nature was created. "For such," as the **Master** says, "both man and **angel** was created, that he could be bent to either. But afterwards good **angels** were so confirmed by **grace**, that they could not sin; and the bad so obdurate by vice, that they cannot live well."

(Against the fourth inconvenience)

Against the fourth it can be argued first from the saying of the **Master** [Peter Lombard] in this distinction 7 chapter 2 saying that "**bad angels** have **free will** but depressed and corrupt, which is not able to rise to the good."

The same is proved from many authorities of **Augustine** in *De fide ad Petrum* already alleged. Beyond those however still more expressly by that which he says in *Enchiridion* chapter 28 saying that after the first evil of the rational creature "even to the unwilling entered ignorance of things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things, from which as from fountains of diseases not of fertility but of indigence every misery of rational nature emanates." And immediately in the following chapter he says: "Truly these common evils are both of men and **angels**, condemned by the **justice of God** for their malice." So that according to **Augustine** by the merit of their **sin** bad **angels** both in **intellect** and in affect are infirm, just as also men. On account of which just as men cannot of themselves will well, so neither can they.

The authority of **Dionysius** does not prove the opposite but the proposed. For it lies thus: "And the angelic goods given to them we say have not been changed, but they are both integral and most splendid, although they themselves do not see, closing their inspective virtues of the good. Wherefore because they are and are from the good and are good, and they desire the beautiful and the good to be and to live and to understand, desiring the things which are existing." By "angelic goods" however, as it is commonly expounded, not any of their goods but natural ones, namely essence and natural powers, are understood. These certainly are integral as to substance and their natural inclinations to the good. Whence they desire "to be and to live and to understand other things," as he says.

And **Augustine** in *Enchiridion* the pre-alleged chapter says that "rational nature in its evils could not lose the appetite for beatitude." With this integrity however it stands that as to other things it is debilitated and darkened. Which **Dionysius** himself also expressed, when he says "although they themselves do not see,

closing their inspective virtues of the good." For they closed to themselves through **sin** "their inspective virtues of the good"; on account of which they suffer both "ignorance of things to be done and concupiscence of harmful things" as punishments of their **sin**, as **Augustine** says. And therefore the said holy **doctors** agree well.

But what **Dionysius** says that those are "most splendid" is to be understood in comparison to us, whom they greatly surpass in acumen of knowledge, not however in comparison to their state before **sin**, as if they were in the same sublimity of intelligence, unless perhaps only as to the knowledge of speculative things. For in the knowledge of things to be desired and done, deprived by malice, they suffer the greatest errors*.

Marginal Note: Thus St. Thomas also expounds the second part of this authority in 4 Sentences distinction last, where he asks, whether every will of the damned is evil.

(Reply to the reasons of Scotus)

From these things it can be responded to the reasons. To the **first** it must be said that the antecedent is false nor is the proof valid, because **Augustine** there accepts **will** for the second act or for willing itself, as is clearly evident from *Retractations* 2 chapter 1 and *On Free Will* book 3 chapter 4. And although nothing is more in our power than willing itself, nevertheless from this it does not follow that every willing is in our power, nay rather granted that some willing is more in the power than anything else, still the saying of **Augustine** is true, as was said in the First [Book] distinction 1 question 2.

Secondly, granted that it were understood concerning the power of the **will**, as to its operation, as the opiner says, still in the proposed the intent would not be concluded. For the **Devil** cannot deprive any of his powers of every act; for he cannot deprive the **intellect** of the perception of punishments, and another power is not in him.

Item, if the proof were valid, in a similar way it would be proved that a blessed **angel** could deprive himself of his beatitude and every joy; which I do not think consonant with the sayings of the **saints**.

To the **first reason** for the second conclusion, I deny the antecedent, whose falsity will be shown prolixly below in distinction 26. For now however let the authority of **Augustine** in the same place suffice, whence the proof of the consequence is taken, and it is that which was alleged against the **third** saying of the opiner.

And it is to be wondered concerning one arguing thus, since **Augustine**, as is evidently clear to one reading, makes that consequence and destroys the consequent, so that he infers the opposite of the antecedent, which as a truth to be proved he premised.

To the **second**, as to that which he assumes from the saying of blessed **Dionysius**, the response is evident from the sayings against the fourth saying of the opiner. But to that which is further assumed, namely that to will well according to no **moral** circumstance exceeds the faculty of the **will**, it must be said that, whatever may have been concerning the faculty of the **will** before **sin** and in the state of integral nature, in which perhaps even without grace added to nature it could not will well, nevertheless it exceeds the faculty of the corrupt **will** so much that unless it is divinely helped, it can neither perfectly know such

circumstances, nor will according to them. Whence: "It is not of him willing nor of him running etc.," "nor are we sufficient to think anything of ourselves," and "without me, says the Savior, you can do nothing," which I esteem to be true both of men and **angels**.

To the **third**, first I say that, if malice is corruptive of the principle, as is said in *Ethics* Book 6 reasonably enough, it can be said that the **intellect** of the most malicious **Devil** errs in such practical principles. Secondly, positing that it does not, still what is intended is not concluded: Both because that such a principle comes into his mind and, if it comes, that under it something to be assumed occurs to him, is not in his power just as neither of man, as the **Apostle** teaches in the words already alleged. Both also because still having the knowledge of the practical conclusion, still without the **grace of God** the **will** cannot conformably elicit a good will, nay rather it was one error of **Pelagius** that the **grace of God** was necessary to us only so that we might know what was to be done; since having such knowledge, it was in our power to will what we knew was to be willed. Furthermore, in the **Devil** there is continuous actual malice, with which every perfectly good **moral** will is impossible. These things will be more evident below, where it will be inquired concerning the power of man from natural things to the good.

To the **fourth** it must be said that the **Devil** in the state of integral nature could certainly love **God** above all things, I do not say however that from his own natural things alone without another **gratuitous** gift or help of **God**. But in the state of depraved nature, although he can do this itself by remote power, and just as also any one of us, nevertheless he cannot go out into act of himself. And this **Augustine** expressly wills in *De fide ad Petrum*, where above. For he himself says that "**God** so created the **angels**, that they would love him even before themselves, whose work they knew themselves created such to be," or as another letter has: "by work they had known." And below he says, as was alleged above, that he so gave them the faculty of loving him, that each one could have this love and lose it. "If anyone however," he says, "lost it spontaneously, thenceforth by his own decision he would not be able to resume it."

Furthermore according to the same, as was alleged against the second point of this opinion, in **angels** aversion remains continuously. How therefore can they actually turn to **God**, by loving him above all things, since they are impossible, and they cannot remove the first from themselves?

ARTICLE 2 (Opinion of Thomas)

As to the second article **one doctor** says that the cause of the obduration of the **angel** is, because such is the nature of the **angel** that, to whatever his **will** adheres, it adheres immovably, contrary to the human **will**, which adheres movably, "able to depart and adhere to the contrary. And therefore, if the **will** of the **angel** be considered before adhesion, it can freely adhere both to this and to the opposite, namely in those things which he does not will naturally; but after he adhered, he adheres immovably. And therefore," as they say, "it is accustomed to be said that the **free will** of man is flexible to the opposite both before election and after; but the **free will** of the **angel** is flexible to either before, but not after. Thus therefore good **angels** always adhering to **justice** are confirmed in it, but bad ones sinning are obstinate in **sin**."

(Against Thomas)

This mode of speaking does not seem sufficient nor true to me, just as to many others. First indeed, since the foundation assumed is false and against the **saints**, namely concerning the immovable adhesion of the

angelic **will**. For **Damascene** says in book 2 chapter 3 that "an **angel** is an intellectual substance always mobile, free in judgment." And a little after he adds: "Free in judgment, turnable according to mind, namely turnable in will." But this would not be true, if he adhered thus immovably.

Furthermore, according to this way it follows that blessed **angels** are immovable and inflexible naturally to evil, when they will have adhered to **justice** by their **will**. But this consequent is expressly against **Damascene** in the same place. For he says concerning holy **angels**: "They are difficultly mobile to evil, but not immovable; but now immovable to evil not by nature but by **grace**." And **Augustine** says the same in book 2 *Against Maximinus*, and is alleged in this distinction.

Furthermore, as was proved in distinction 3, there was some delay between the creation of the **angel** and his **sin**. And it is constant that in that delay he had some will and, as is evident from the things alleged in the preceding article, he loved **God** before himself. If therefore his **will** adhered thus immovably, he would never have sinned, which is false.

Furthermore, it is constant that the **Devil** does not always will everything which he once wills, nay rather now one thing, now its opposite. Whence, as is said, first he willed **Christ** to die, and afterwards he willed that he not die; whence he suggested to the wife of **Pilate**, that the passion of **Christ** be impeded. And it is probable enough that in his **will** there is the greatest change of contrary volitions, although all are evil and related to an evil end.

Furthermore, what cause will be assigned for the obstinacy of damned men? For it is constant that it is not the aforesaid according to these men.

(Opinion of Peter Aureoli)

Therefore **another doctor** assigned another common cause, namely that into the **angel** in his lapse **God** infuses and daily into the death of a damned man infuses a certain most intense habit of malice inclining to the act of displeasure and hatred of **God** and necessitating the **will** so, that against its inclination it cannot be moved. And this mode also in part the **first doctor** held in his Script on the 2nd of Sentences distinction 7.

(Against Peter Aureoli)

This mode of speaking does not appear convenient to me, first indeed, because he posits such a vicious habit to be caused by **God** alone immediately. And to not say this moves me that blessed **Augustine**, holding that **original sin** is the vice of concupiscence which makes man to concupisce, when **Julian** the defender of the **Pelagian heresy** asked, whether such a habit was caused by **God** in the soul - which if it were granted, he inferred that it would not be evil - **Augustine** is never found to have conceded, that it was caused by **God**, but the opposite expressly in book 4 against the same, and similarly in *Hypognosticon* response 4.

Secondly, because he assumes one thing which is very doubtful, namely that some habit can necessitate the **will** so, that it cannot elicit an act contrary to the act, to which the habit inclines.

Thirdly, because whatever may be concerning this, nevertheless no habit can necessitate the **will**, so that it is always under its act. For it is in its power to use the habit, when it will have willed. Therefore notwithstanding such a habit, the **will** will be able, unless something else opposes, to deprive itself of the act, and consequently to lack punishment and evil volition, the opposite of which **Augustine** says, as is evident in the preceding article.

(Opinion of Scotus)

Another says that therefore the bad **angel** is obstinate, because in that act or in those acts, in which he sinned, he is perpetually conserved by **God**, so that the **angel** cannot not have it or them. Nevertheless that act thus conserved by **God** is so deformed and evil that it is not demeritorious to the **angel**, just as neither is the act of the blessed meritorious, although it is good and right. Concerning the damned man however he says that he is obstinate through the same mode in that last evil act, after the soul is separated from the body.

(Against Scotus)

This mode of speaking does not appear to me entirely reasonable, first indeed, because, if it does not seem reasonable to be able to be conceded that some vicious habit be caused in the soul by **God** immediately as by a total cause, as was said against the other mode of speaking, much less does it seem this can be posited concerning a vicious act.

Secondly, because, if **God** conserves such a depraved act immediately as a total cause in the mind of the **Devil**, so that his **will** concurs in no way actively to this, in an equal way it would seem to be conceded that **God** could from the beginning cause that act in the mind of the **Devil**, and consequently the **will** of the **Devil** could be subjected by his superior to so great depravity, the opposite of which seems to follow from the sentence of **Augustine** 1 and 3 *On Free Will*, who tries to prove that by no thing can a rational **will** be forced, so that it be a slave of lust, because not by an inferior, "because it cannot," nor by a superior, "because it is unjust," as he says in chapter 1 of the third book.

Furthermore, according to this it would have to be granted that **God** by himself alone can immediately cause in a rational mind hatred of himself that is of **God**, which I would not freely grant.

(Own Opinion)

And therefore I say otherwise, asserting nothing however, that the obduration of the bad **angel**, as appears from the things said above, consists in two things, namely in not being able to have a good will and in not being able to lack an evil one. The cause of the first is the universal subtraction of **grace** and the special help of **God**, without which special help no one can have any good will. And **Augustine** hints at this cause in *De fide ad Petrum*, where above, when he says: "Concerning the **angels** indeed **God** disposed and fulfilled this, that if any of them lost the goodness of the will, he would never repair it by a divine gift," hinting manifestly that he is not able to repair except by a "divine gift," which gift however the divine will "both disposed and fulfilled" not to impart. And the judgment is the same concerning damned men.

But the cause of the second, namely that they cannot lack an evil will, seems to be able to be assigned the perpetual continuation of the most bitter punishment of Gehenna and of the actual consideration of lost felicity, with all manner of desperation of recovering; in which punishments he is most justly detained by **God**. Constituted however in these, and also destitute of the special help of **God**, agitated by the spirit of impatience, he rises into continuous murmur and hatred of **God** punishing, from which also he falls into many other worst wills.

But concerning the confirmation of the good, which contrariwise consists in not being able to lack a good will and in not being able to have an evil one - or otherwise to sin in any way - it can be said that the cause is the perpetual continuation of their good will, which is the beatific fruition of **God**, which **God** so causes in him that the **will** of the blessed cannot not have it; and insuper preservation by **God** from every inordinate will and thought and universally any thing inclining or alluring to any inordination of the **will**.

To the argument of the question I respond by denying the consequence. To the **first proof**, because a rational power is valid for opposites, first it can be said that the **Philosopher** speaks according to the state in which we are, because he knew no other; and therefore his authority does not suffice for the proposed. Secondly, it must be said that, although it is valid for opposites, nevertheless not for any opposites and always or in any case. Whence also the **Devil** does many things freely and voluntarily concerning men, which he could not will to do and not do, but he is saddened and grieves in punishments, in which he cannot not be saddened.

To the authority of **Jerome** it must be said, as the **Master** teaches in the letter, that it must be understood according to the state in which rational nature was created. "For such," as the **Master** says, "both man and **angel** was created, that he could be bent to either. But afterwards good **angels** were so confirmed by **grace**, that they could not sin; and the bad so obdurate by vice, that they cannot live well."

QUESTION 2 WHETHER whatever thing an angel understands, he understands by an intellection as essentially distinct from the thing, which he understands, as from his intellect.

Because the **Master** [Peter Lombard] in the second part of this 7th distinction treats of the multiple knowledge, by which bad **angels** flourish, therefore to have knowledge concerning the cognition of the **angels** themselves generally more things are to be asked. First therefore I ask, whether whatever thing an **angel** understands, he understands by an intellection as essentially distinct from the thing, which he understands, as from his **intellect**.

And it seems that no, because the human **intellect** does not understand whatever thing it understands by an intellection essentially distinct from itself and from that thing, therefore neither does the angelic **intellect** understand whatever thing etc. The consequence is evident, because the angelic **intellect** is more perfect than the human; and it is of perfection to understand by an intellection indistinct from oneself. Whence we attribute this to **God**. If therefore this in some way agrees with the human **intellect**, it ought not to be denied universally from the **angel**. The antecedent is proved triply: First, because the human **intellect** does not understand itself by an intellection essentially distinct from it. Which is proved, because, where the object is the same as the power, the act of the power onto the object is indifferent from both. For the **medium** agrees more or not less with the **extremes** than an **extreme** with an **extreme**. But

the act is the **medium** between the power and the object. But when the **intellect** understands itself, the power is the same as the object, therefore etc.

Secondly, because some beings essentially distinct from itself, yet existing in it subjectively, it does not understand by an intellection distinct from itself and from them, as for instance its **intellection** concerning a material thing and the **species** abstracted from it, since these are essentially present to it; therefore etc.

Thirdly, because not even every thing outside itself does it understand by an intellection essentially distinct from that, namely abstract and immaterial substances. For the **Philosopher** says in *On the Soul* book 3 that "in those things which are without matter, the **intellect** and that which is understood are the same." By **intellect** however he understands the actual **intellection** of the intellectual power. Which is evident through the translation, which the **Commentator** [Averroes] expounds. For in place of this word "intellect" that translation has "to form"; but by "to form" he signifies the operation of the **intellect** which we call simple intelligence or of simples, as not long after is evident from the collation of the text of both translations and also the exposition of the **Commentator** in comment 21. Therefore etc.

Secondly to the question: No **intellection** of an **angel** is essentially distinct from himself, therefore not whatever thing etc. The consequence is evident; the antecedent is proved, because if any, certainly that would be a certain immaterial and abstract form, as is clear. Therefore it itself would be a certain **intellect** and would understand, and by the same reason it would understand by an **intellection** distinct from itself, and that also would understand further, and so actually in any **angel** there would be infinite **intellects** and **intellections**; which is inconvenient.

The first consequence is proved by the authority of the **Commentator** saying in *Metaphysics* Book 12 comment 35 that in the book *On the Soul* it was declared "abstract forms are **intellects**," and in *On the Soul* book 3 comment 16, that "that which from things understood does not have matter, is its **intellect** an **intellect** in itself and it always understands. But what has matter, each of the things understood is in it in potency; and therefore material things understood do not understand." These things the **Commentator**.

To the opposite. An **angel** understands himself by an **intellection** essentially distinct from him, therefore whatever thing he understands etc. The consequence is evident, because no thing understood by an **angel** is so intimate to the **angel** as he himself is, and consequently he ought more to understand himself without an extraneous **medium** than anything else. The antecedent is proved thus: An **angel** loves himself by a **dilection** distinct from him, therefore he understands himself by an **intellection** distinct from him. The consequence is evident, because not less is the **will** of the **angel** the same as the **angel** than his **intellect**, nor less is the **volition** the same as the **will** than the **intellection** to the **intellect**. The assumption is proved, because an **angel** can hate himself, since he can will himself not to be; indeed many say that the **Devil** so wills in fact. Therefore his **dilection** is not himself, otherwise **dilection** would be hatred, and conversely.

I respond. Since concerning the knowledge and mode of knowing of **angels** we cannot investigate anything through reason except from those things, which we know in us, therefore there will be two articles in this question: In the first it will be seen, whether whatever thing the human **intellect** understands actually, it understands by an **intellection** as essentially distinct from the thing understood as from the **intellect** itself. In the second it will be seen concerning the principal thing asked.

ARTICLE 1 (Three conclusions)

About the first, because everything understood by us, either is the **intellect** itself, or something else from it, yet existing in it, or something which is neither it nor in it, therefore about this I posit distinctly some conclusions: The **first** is that, if the **intellect** understands itself, the actual **intellection**, by which it understands itself, is essentially distinct from it. The **second**, that, if it understands another from itself, yet existing in it as in a subject, the **intellection**, by which it understands, is as essentially distinct from it as from that, which it understands. The **third**, that, if it understands something outside itself, whatever that may be, the **intellection** is essentially distinct from both.

(First conclusion proved, first)

I prove the **first conclusion** first thus: If the **intellection**, by which the **intellect** understands itself, when it actually understands itself, were not distinct from it, therefore it itself would be the **intellection** of itself, it is evident. And further, therefore it would always actually understand itself and always also actually understand itself to understand itself. The consequent is most certainly against experience.

Item the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* book 3 supposing as certain and experienced, that the **intellect** does not always understand, asks the cause of this. It follows however: The **intellect** does not always understand, therefore it does not always understand itself.

And if it is said that **Augustine** in 10 and 14 *On the Trinity* in many places says that the mind always knows and understands itself, it must be responded that he does not speak concerning actual **intellection**, by which one actually thinks and understands, but concerning habitual, just as, as he himself posits an example in 10 *On the Trinity* chapter 5, concerning one skilled in many doctrines, whom even while he thinks only of one for example of medicine, we say he knows also another for example grammar. In the proposed I take **intellection** according to our common usage for thought itself. Under which understanding, there is no doubt that **Augustine** would not say the mind always understands itself, since in the same place, and in book 14 chapter 5 and 6 and in many other places, he says that the mind, although it always has known itself, does not however always think itself.

The consequence is evident, since, if at one time the mind is the **knowledge** of its very self, by the same reason also always, since always uniformly it is both object and power, and everything which is required to understand itself; supposing this nay rather it itself is everything required for this.

If it is said that beyond this the intention of the **will** is required, which when it is not present, the mind is not **knowledge** of itself, but it is when it is present, and because not always is the intention of the **will** present for this, therefore not always is it **knowledge** of itself, against: The intention of the **will** is required for no **knowledge** except on account of the copulation of the object with the power, in which it ought to cause actual **knowledge**, as to couple the sensible to sense and the species in memory to the **intellect**, and universally only to join the parent to the offspring, as **Augustine** declares diffusely in 11 *On the Trinity* chapter 8 and 9. Whence there he finally concludes saying: "Everywhere however the **will** appears only as a copulatrix as of parent and offspring." But if, when the mind understands itself, there is not there any **intellection** other besides itself, there is no offspring there nor parent just as neither is any thing begotten there, therefore neither is the intention of the **will** opportune.

(First conclusion proved, again)

Secondly to the conclusion I argue through the same in 14 *On the Trinity* chapter 6, where he says: "The mind when by thought it beholds itself, understands itself and recognizes; therefore it begets this understanding and its **knowledge**." And from this willing to conclude that in such **knowledge** there is also a certain trinity, just as he shows in others, he adds: "But these two, begetting and begotten, are coupled by a third **dilection**."

And to the same below chapter 10: "When the mind," he says, "is turned to its very self by thought, a trinity is made, in which now also a word could be understood. For indeed **knowledge** is formed from itself with the **will** joining both." But there would not be there begotten **knowledge**, nor something begetting nor even any true trinity, unless such **knowledge** were a thing essentially distinct from it.

Item in book 9 chapter 12: "Clearly," he says, "it must be held that every thing, whatever we know, congenerates in us **knowledge** of itself; for from both **knowledge** is born, from the knower and the known. Therefore the mind, when it knows its very self, is the sole parent of its **knowledge**; for it itself is both known and knower. But it was knowable to itself, even before it knew itself, but **knowledge** of itself was not in it, when it had not known its very self." From these also the proposed is evident: Both because no thing begets its very self, but the mind begets **knowledge** of itself. And because no thing is in its very self, after it was not; but **knowledge**, by which the mind knows itself, while it knows itself, since before it did not know, is in it, although before however it was not in it, according to **Augustine**. Whence he says: "But **knowledge** of itself was not in it etc."

Thirdly, I prove the same by the express authority of the same in 9 *On the Trinity* chapter 4, where he says: "Just as there are certain two things, the mind and its love, when it loves itself; so there are certain two things, the mind and its **knowledge**, when it knows itself."

Fourthly, if **knowledge** of this kind were not essentially distinct from the **intellect**, it would follow that the **intellect** would be understood through its very self, and not through an intention added, just as other things are understood. But the consequent is false according to the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* book 3, where he says that "it itself is intelligible just as intelligibles," and the **Commentator** expounds in comment 15: "That is, it is understood through an intention in it, just as other things understood." Wherefore etc.

(First part of the second conclusion proved)

The **second conclusion** has two parts: One is that the **intellection**, by which the **intellect** understands something distinct from itself existing in it, is distinct from the **intellect** itself.

This is proved **first** thus: The **intellection**, by which the **intellect** understands itself, is distinct from it; therefore any, by which it understands another from itself, is distinct from it. The antecedent was proved in the **first conclusion**. The consequence seems to hold through the place from the lesser. For less would it seem concerning that, by which it understands itself, and this on account of the identity of the understood to the understanding. Whence the **Commentator** in *Metaphysics* Book 12 comment 50 says that "the essence of the **intellect** is not the same with understanding, which is the action of the **intellect** in us; and with the understood in us understanding is not the same in all modes. And the cause in this is,

because the understood in us is other from the understanding. But in those, which are not in matter, it happens that the understood and the **intellect** and the action of the **intellect** are the same." And below he adds the cause, because "the understood is not other from the **intellect**." Where, as is evident, from the distinction of the **intellect** from the understood in us he argues the distinction of the **intellect** from the **intellection**, and conversely in things separated from matter. And although in things separated from matter his saying, as it sounds, may not be true, nevertheless according to him it appears that, if where the **intellect** and the thing understood are the same, understanding is not the same as the **intellect**, much less where the **intellect** and the thing understood are distinguished.

Secondly, if the **intellect** by its very self understood something existing in it, and not through an **intellection** distinct from itself, it would always understand that as long as it was in the **intellect**, and it would understand also whatever else existing in it. The consequent is false according to experience. For not always does it understand the **species** of the thing which it has in itself, nor every habit or **species**. The consequence is proved through that which was touched in the **first reason** of the preceding conclusion, namely that there is no reason, why one **species** existing in it be understood at one time by it more than at another, standing the hypothesis that it itself be not understood by an **intellection** distinct from the **intellect**.

Thirdly, **intellection** is understood by the **intellect** by an **intellection** distinct from it, therefore also whatever else existing in the **intellect** is understood etc. The consequence is evident enough, since there is nothing in the **intellect**, concerning which it would seem more that it could be understood by the **intellect** itself alone than concerning **intellection** itself. The antecedent is evident through **Augustine** in 15 *On the Trinity* chapter 12, where he wills that, when "I know that I know," there are two knowings; and this, by which I know these two, is a third knowing, and so into infinity they will be multiplied, as often as I reflect myself upon knowing.

Fourthly, the **will** does not will by its very self anything existing in it, but whatever such it wills, it wills by a **volition** distinct from the **will** itself; therefore the **intellect** etc. The consequence is evident, because the reason is the same here and there. The antecedent is proved, since, if the **will** willed by its very self anything existing in itself, it could not will that. For it is impossible that some one created essence simultaneously or successively, remaining the same, be contrary. Item it could not will that more intensely and more remissly, since it itself is not intensible and remissible. Furthermore, since it itself can rejoice about one thing and be sad about another, it itself could be joy and sadness. And all these things seem inconveniences. Therefore etc.

(Second part of the second conclusion proved)

The **second part of the conclusion**, namely that, whenever the **intellect** understands something existing in itself, the **intellection** by which it understands is distinct from that, which it understands, is proved from many things said already. First indeed, because, if any such were understood by its very self and not by an **intellection** other from itself, it would always be understood, since not rather at one time than at another would it be the **intellection** of itself.

Secondly, because whatever such, when it is understood, causes **intellection** of itself according to that authority of **Augustine** pre-alleged to the **first conclusion**: "Clearly it must be held etc"; which sentence

also he posits in book 14 chapter 8 and 10. The same also is evident through the consequence which he makes in the authority in the second reason to the **first conclusion**: "Therefore it begets this understanding etc."

Thirdly, because **intellection** is understood by an **intellection** distinct from itself, as is evident through the authority of **Augustine** concerning the multiplication of reflex acts in the third reason to the first part of this conclusion, and through those things which were said in the **first distinction of the First [Book]** to prove that the reflex act is other from the direct act. Therefore also whatever else existing in the **intellect**, which is understood by it, is understood by an **intellection** distinct from itself.

(First part of the third conclusion proved by reasons)

The **third conclusion** also has two parts, of which one is namely that whatever thing outside itself the **intellect** understands, it understands by an **intellection** essentially distinct from its very self. It is proved first from the **first conclusion**, since from the fact that it understands its very self through an **intellection** distinct from itself, therefore much more strongly others. And the consequence can be declared just as the first made to the **second conclusion**.

Secondly it is proved also from the **second conclusion**. For since those things, which are in the **intellect**, are by their very selves present to the **intellect**, and yet are understood by an **intellection** distinct from the **intellect**, much more reasonably must it be said that those things, which are outside, are understood through a distinct **intellection**.

Thirdly, if the **intellect** understood any thing outside itself by its very self without an added **intellection**, either that is immaterial or material. If material, either it understands it intuitively and immediately in its very self, or abstractively in its representative. This is evident from the things said in the **third distinction of the First [Book]**. If abstractively, therefore by an **intellection** distinct from itself. It is evident from the **second conclusion**, in which it was proved that every thing existing in itself it understands by an **intellection** distinct from itself.

If intuitively, as for instance when immediately we intuit color outside, or sound, the same follows, first because otherwise we would not need the presence of those to intuit them. For unless in some way they immuted the **intellect**, they would not be necessary for this, that the **intellect** understand them, just as neither are they necessary for this, that **God** understand them. Nor can it be assigned, in what they immute, given the hypothesis, that it helps the proposed; since, even if it is said that they cause a **species**, it helps nothing, because that **species** serves for nothing for such intuitive vision, even positing that it itself be distinct from the **intellect**, as is in the truth of the thing; much less however, if it is not other than the **intellect**. But to what it serves and on account of what it is caused, will be evident in the following.

That is confirmed from the intention of the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* book 2. For there he asks, why the senses do not sense without an exterior sensible, and he responds, because sense - or the sensitive according to another letter - "is not in act but in potency only." Which reason if it is sufficient, it follows that, if sense were in act and not only potency, certainly it would sense without them. Therefore not less, if the **intellect** were in act and not only potency with respect to them, it would understand without them.

But if it were the actual **intellection** of them, certainly it would be in act with respect to them nor would it be further actuated through them, therefore etc.

That is confirmed from the intention of **Augustine**, who wills that "whatever thing we know, congenerates in us **knowledge** of itself." Which is to be understood concerning that, which we know immediately, whether it be in us or outside us.

Addition 32: But to that it seems possible to be responded from a certain saying in the **third distinction of the First [Book]** or that [saying] to be impugned from this. For it was said there, that one quality sometimes can successively be **knowledge** and non-knowledge; and again **knowledge**, after it was non-knowledge. Whence if a quality, which is vision, were conserved by **God**, with the exterior visible totally destroyed, it itself would not be vision, and, if again the exterior visible were replaced just as before, it itself would again be vision, and yet nothing would be caused in it, nor would vision become through any thing caused in it. Why therefore cannot it be said similarly in the proposed that, the object of this **intellection** not existing, it is not the **intellection** of it; but with it existing, it is the **intellection** of it, without that that some other thing be caused in it? But if this cannot be said, neither [can] that also.

I respond that, speaking concerning simple **knowledges**, which according to the instituted course of nature are had, there is no **knowledge** of any thing immediately, which is not in some way the cause of it and on which **knowledge** itself does not depend in being, just as we are taught from experience, and there also was proved enough. And therefore if some such were conserved by **God** alone - even with the object existing or replaced, supposing that it had been removed or destroyed - it itself would not be the vision of it more than if it were not in the nature of things. But if in such reposition of the object **God** leaves it to the conservation of the object partially just as before, certainly it will be the vision of it; and so it was said there.

Further, if **God** made a vision of another nature, which namely in nothing depended from its nature on a visible object - just as perhaps would be possible -, that would always be the vision of it, whether that visible were in the nature of things, or not, just as is the vision, by which **God** intuitis other things.

But in the proposed it is constant that the **intellect** in no way depends causally on the exterior object. Wherefore, if it itself is the vision or **intellection** of that, with that existing, or placed here or there, so it will be the **intellection** of it, with that not being here or even existing in no way, which is false. Thus the reason stands. The Textus ordinarius follows.

Secondly, because, if the **intellect** is essentially the **intellection** of some material thing, by the same reason also of any, and consequently is the unique **intellection** of all material things, and certainly not only of existing, but also of past and future, just as **God**; which is most absurd.

But if that thing, which it understands by its very self, is immaterial, either it understands that intuitively, or in some representative of it which it has in itself. If the second is given, the proposed is had as before. But if the first is given, against: First, because then in this life we would know separate substances intuitively, the opposite of which is certain by experience. The consequence is evident, because already the **intellect** would be the **intellection** of them, if ever it ought to be.

Secondly, because then it would follow that the **intellect** seeing **God** intuitively would be essentially the vision of **God**; and further that it could not not see **God**, provided that in the nature of things it were conserved by **God**. For with this posited nothing would be lacking for this that it itself be the vision of **God**.

Item any **intellects** existing equally perfect according to nature would see **God** equally, and not one more perfectly than another. But these are utterly absurd and erroneous. Therefore also that, from which they follow.

Fourthly, to the same part of the conclusion I argue, because, if its opposite were true, it would follow that one would understand no thing at one time more imperfectly, at another truly more perfectly, the opposite of which we experience in the vision of an exterior thing, which simultaneously with sense the **intellect** apprehends, now more clearly, now less clearly, according as it holds itself in another and another disposition to us. So also it is concerning many others. But the consequence is evident, since the **intellect** does not receive intension and remission.

Fifthly, if the **intellect** were the **intellection** itself, no habit would be generated in us. The consequent is false. For we experience after understanding many times or having understood to understand that same thing more promptly and easily. The consequence is evident: Both because it does not appear, from what or from which immediately such a habit would be generated. And because it would be posited in vain; for since the **intellect** would be actual **intellection**, the habit would confer nothing to **intellection**, because the **intellect** could not be more perfect nor more expeditious, nor otherwise in any way **intellection** than it is. And therefore so promptly or not promptly would be the **intellection**, and one would understand without the habit just as with the habit. And I take here **intellection** for the knowledge of the **intellect** about that, with respect to which we concede the **intellect** to be habituated, whatever that be.

Sixthly, it does not appear how in the **intellect** there could be so great a multitude of acts as we experience, namely of simple intellective universal and singular, and complex affirmative and negative; item of acts apprehensive and judicative and assertive, and many others of this kind, unless it were said that the **intellect** is the simple intellective of one intelligible, and the confused of this, the distinct of that, and the complex intellective of another intelligible, not essentially but objectively, and the affirmative judgment of one and negative of another, and similarly concerning all, just as we say concerning the divine **intellection**. Which I do not think well said theologically, nor philosophically, nor consonant even with experience, by which we know evidently sometimes to understand one, with another not simultaneously understood, and one before to affirm and that same afterwards to deny, and before to assent and afterwards to dissent to the same, before to err afterwards to know, and other intellectual changes, which with that hypothesis given could in no way be.

(The first part of the third conclusion is proved by authorities)

To this it can also be argued from authorities. For **Augustine** says in 5 *On the Trinity* chapter 4 that "because the soul lives more, while it is wise, and less when it is foolish, therefore some change is made in it." Both of these would be false, if it itself were the **intellection**, by which it understands.

Item in book 6 chapter 6 he says that "in the soul it is one thing to be skillful, another to be inert, another acute, another mindful, another desire, another fear, etc." And finally from these he concludes it "is not simple but manifold."

Item in book 8 chapter 2 he says that "the essence of the mind is not the essence of **truth** itself just as the trinity is the one, sole, great, true, truthful **God**, the **truth**."

Item in book 15 chapter 13 he says that "our knowledge is losable and receivable, because to be is not for us [the same as] to know or to be wise, since we can be, even if we do not know, nor are wise."

Item in 11 *City of God* chapter 10 he says that "the soul is not **wisdom**." And immediately from this he infers that it can be changed and become foolish. And afterwards he says that just as the air is illuminated by light, which is not itself, so the soul becomes wise by **wisdom**, which is not itself. All these would be false, as is evident to one understanding, if the **intellect** were the **intellection** of things.

That this is also the intention of **Aristotle** and the **Commentator** [Averroes] in *On the Soul* Book 3 is not doubtful, since everywhere they say that the **intellect** is moved by the **agent intellect** and by **phantasms** to the last perfection, which is nothing other than to understand, and that to understand is to suffer, and similar things. Which can never be saved unless by positing that **intellection** is a thing distinct from the **intellect**.

To this also one word of the **Commentator** in *On the Soul* Book 3 comment 20 makes well, who against **Themistius** - who, as is evident in comment 5 of the same book, posited the speculative **intellect** to be nothing other than the **potential intellect** perfected by the **agent intellect** or some composite from both, so that in the **potential intellect**, when it understands actually, nothing is generated anew. To which mode those approach enough who say that the **intellect** is its **intellection** when it understands, nor is anything made new in it; indeed perhaps they do not differ from this mode. Against this man, I say, the **Commentator** argues where above that according to this way it would not be necessary to posit except "the **material intellect** only," that is the possible [potential], "or the **material** and **agent intellect** according to the mode of similitude. For where there is not true generation, there is not an agent." These things the **Commentator**.

That these things however are against the intention of the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator**, can be doubtful to no one who has read them.

(Second part of the third conclusion is proved by an addition)

Addition 33: I prove the second part of the conclusion first: If the **intellection**, by which the **intellect** understands a thing outside itself, were not distinct from that thing, but the thing itself were understood by its very self or were the **intellection** of itself, much more would the mind itself and whatever is in the **intellect** be the **intellection** of itself. The consequent is evident as false from the preceding conclusions; and the consequence seems clear enough, because there is not a stronger reason for things outside, but contrariwise, on account of the greater presence and intimation of those things, which are in the **intellect**, to the **intellect**, and on account of the identity of the intelligible to the intellectual or the **intellect**.

Secondly, either, when some thing outside is understood by the **intellect** which before was not understood, some new entity is caused in the **intellect**, or in the thing understood; or none in this, or in that.

If some, and it is constant that not in the thing outside, therefore in the **intellect**. And certainly, if that alone with the **intellect** and the thing outside suffices for this that the thing outside be actually understood, I call that **intellection**.

If however none is caused, therefore neither does the thing act on the **intellect**, nor conversely; and through this whenever and wherever the thing may be, the **intellect** will understand it, and so it will always understand it actually; the opposite of which we experience. Item, whatever thing one man will understand, everyone will understand. For according to this one thing will not have another comparison to the **intellect** of one than of another. Item, everyone will understand everything actually on account of the same cause; for every comparison of the **intellect** to some thing more than another, or conversely, would be by accident. Item, this contradicts all authors positing, as is evident from the pre-alleged, that every thing, which is known, begets **knowledge** of itself.

Thirdly, as was said before, one thing could not be known more perfectly at one time by one **intellect** than at another, supposing that it itself is not varied in itself from less perfect to more perfect.

Fourthly, what will be said, when things, which were and are not, are understood, for how then will they be **intellections**? Many other things could be argued against this.

But although it is posited by none today or by very few that any thing is its own **intellection**, nevertheless not a few have posited that things separated from matter are understood not through another intention, but by their very selves; therefore against this it can be specially argued, because we understand no such thing **intuitively** in this life, as is evident through experience, and I speak according to the common natural course, but in certain representatives, simple or composite, existing at the **intellect**. It is constant however that those are not the abstract substances themselves; nor is the **intellection**, by which any such is understood, that substance, of which that is a representative; therefore etc. The Textus Ordinarius follows.

(Second part of the third conclusion is proved)

The second part of the conclusion, namely that whatever thing outside the **intellect** understands, it understands by an **intellection** distinct from that thing, is proved. For every thing outside is material, or immaterial and abstract.

If it is material and is understood, either it is understood **abstractively** in its representative, or **intuitively** and immediately in its very self. And this is evident from the things said in the third distinction of the First [Book].

If it is understood **abstractively**, immediately it is evident that [it is] by an **intellection** distinct from itself: Both because in this mode the thing is known equally, whether it is, or was and is not; and it is constant that, when it is not, the **knowledge** by which it is understood is not it essentially. And because through the **knowledge**, by which it is known **abstractively**, its representative is known **intuitively**, as is evident where above; and much more reasonably would it be said that that representative is that

knowledge than that the thing outside [is], and yet that **knowledge** is essentially distinct from that representative, as is evident from the **second conclusion**, therefore etc.

If however it is understood **intuitively**, just as when one intuits color on a wall, which he perceives immediately by both sensual and intellectual vision - whether the visions be distinct or not - as was proved in the third distinction of the First [Book], still it is evident that [it is] by an **intellection** distinct from itself.

First indeed, because otherwise it would follow that for this, that one see color, no thing is necessary to be caused anew in the color or in the sense of sight, but with the color and sense precisely posited one would see it. But this is false.

Both because according to this neither propinquity nor distance of the color to the sense, nor disposition or indisposition of the sense, certainly neither closing nor opening of the eyes would confer or hinder to seeing or not seeing, or seeing more perfectly or less perfectly, the opposite of which we experience. And that this would follow, is evident, since such things are not required for any operation unless on account of the action of one into another.

And through **Augustine** 11 *On the Trinity* chapter 2, who expressly says that "when we see some body, three things are to be considered there: First the thing itself which we see; then that vision, which was not, before we sensed that thing objected to the sense; thirdly, that which in that thing which is seen, as long as it is seen, holds the sense of the eyes, that is the intention of the mind." And he adds that "in these therefore three there is not only a manifest distinction, but also a discrete nature." And a little after he adds: "Although, with the visible thing detracted, there be no vision nor can any be at all, if the body is not which can be seen, nevertheless in no way is the body of the same substance, by which the sense of the eyes is formed, when the same body is seen, and the form itself, which is imprinted by the same on the sense, which is called vision."

And also, because with this given it does not appear, why the one having sense would rather see the color than conversely the color would see him. Indeed certainly that seems more to be said, if the color itself be the vision.

The first consequence is proved, since, if it is necessary that some new thing be caused, therefore either that will be the vision or something required for the causation of the thing which will be the vision. For if the vision were already in act, it would not be necessary that this be caused, so that one might see.

Furthermore, it is constant that it is not necessary that any such thing be caused in the color, therefore in the sense. Whatever however that be, provided that with it posited one sees, the proposed is had. For such a thing, as **Augustine** says, "is called vision." But if you wish to call not that, but the color itself the vision, it is not to be contended concerning the name. For it suffices that besides the object and the sense something else is begotten in the sense, without which we cannot see, and with it posited we see.

It is evident therefore that sensual vision is essentially distinct from the thing seen. From this however it follows that also intellectual [vision] is distinct from that thing seen, since, if in man sensual and intellectual vision is unique, as certain men think, it is clear. If however they are diverse, still the same

follows: Both because pure **intellection** agrees less with a sensible thing than sensation. And because sensation precedes causally **intellection** of this kind, if they are diverse.

If truly the thing understood is immaterial and abstract, since no such thing is understood by us naturally and in the state of the present life **intuitively**, but in certain concepts, as was shown in the First [Book] where above, it follows manifestly that it is understood by an **intellection** distinct from itself.

(The same part is proved again)

Secondly thus: It is impossible to understand any thing or to be intellective by an **intellect**, which is not oneself nor in oneself like a form. Therefore it is impossible to understand any thing or to be understanding by an **intellection**, which is not oneself nor in oneself like a form. And further, therefore it is impossible for the human **intellect** to understand any thing outside itself by an **intellection**, which is not itself or in it as a form, and consequently by an **intellection** indistinct from that thing. The first consequence is evident enough from itself, since just as through the **intellect** a thing is intellective, so through **intellection** a thing is actually understanding; the second is clear also. The antecedent will be proved below, where it will be inquired, whether the intellective soul is the form of the body.

I confirm, since, if any actual **intellection** were present to the **intellect** and conjoined by whatever mode of presence or conjunction imaginable, provided however it did not inform it, the **intellect** would not be understanding through it nor would that be its **intellection**. Just as neither is the **Body of Christ** in the sacrament round or white by sacramental roundness or whiteness precisely through this, because it is not informed by them; for otherwise those forms are so conjoined and near to the **Body of Christ** just as proper accidents.

Similarly however much the **Devil** be united to any body or another **angel**, or an **angel** to an **angel** or to a human soul, provided however he does not inform, by none of the aforesaid is that to which he is united intellective, or understanding by his **intellection**, which is equally united to it. Certainly neither by **God** himself, who is most intimate to every creature, because he does not inform, is any creature intellective or understanding in the mode in which we speak in the proposed. For otherwise "from him and through him are all things."

Thirdly, if any thing outside were thus the **intellection** of itself to our **intellect**, this would seem most of all concerning **God** in the state of the beatific **intellect**, so that **God** would be the vision itself of the human **intellect**. This consequence is clear enough: Both because **God** is maximally abstract and immaterial; on account of which cause they are moved who say that separate substances are understood by their very selves without a middle **intellection**. And because he himself is maximally intimate to the mind, and especially to one already actually blessed. But the consequent is false. Which is evident, because the vision, by which blessed **angels** see creatures in the **Word**, is a created vision according to **Augustine** 2 *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* chapter 13 concerning the small [works], where he says: "The condition of heaven was first in the **Word of God** according to begotten **wisdom**; then it was made in the spiritual creature, that is in the knowledge of the **angels** according to the **wisdom** created in them. Then heaven was made, so that the creature of heaven itself would be also in its proper genus." But the knowledge of the thing preceding in the **angel** the condition of the thing itself certainly according to **Augustine** is knowledge in the **Word**, as from the immediately following can be had, and most expressly

in book 4 chapter 31 and 35 concerning the small [works]. By that also the **Word of God** himself is seen immediately, as is certain; therefore the vision by which man sees immediately the divine **Word** himself in the blessed life is created in him, and consequently distinct from **God** himself seen.

It is confirmed. For it is constant that by the **beatific vision** man sees **God** intuitively. But according to the **Decretal of Pope Benedict XII** that is created, since there it is determined that beatitude consists in two acts, namely vision and fruition.

For this make the authorities alleged above that every thing, which we know, begets **knowledge** of itself in us.

(Opinion against the first part of the third conclusion)

Against this third conclusion are two opinions: **One** is against the **first** part of the conclusion. For it posits that **intellection** does not add anything absolute upon the intellective power, but only a certain respect to the object; and this also is against the two first conclusions.

(Contrary opinion is proved by reasons)

This position is proved **first** thus: "Those things, which are distinguished as opposites, cannot be one and the same. But the **first** and **second act** are distinguished, as is evident in *On the Soul* Book 2; but the **first act** is an absolute form, therefore the **second act** and operation is a respective form."

Secondly, "if operation were an absolute form," distinct from the power, it would proceed into infinity, since every absolute form "could have an operation; but this is inconvenient, therefore etc."

Thirdly, "just as to shine holds itself to the shining thing, so to understand to the understanding thing; for each is an immanent act, to shine of light itself, and to understand of the **intellect** itself. But it is manifest that to shine is not something absolute added to light, therefore etc."

Fourthly, "every absolute **God** can separate, but **God** cannot separate to understand from the **intellect**, therefore etc."

Fifthly, "in no absolute can contraries be united; by the same act of sensing white and black are seen; therefore to see is not any absolute form, and consequently much less to understand."

(Contrary opinion is confirmed by authorities)

This conclusion as to this, namely that **intellection** is not a thing distinct from the **intellect**, is confirmed by others through authorities.

First indeed, the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* Book 3 wills that the **intellect** does not suffer just as other things. But, as the **Commentator** says in comment 14, "the passion of the **intellect** is reception only without transmutation." This however, as it seems, is nothing other than to suffer objectively only and not subjectively.

It is confirmed by the example of the **Philosopher** in the same place concerning the tablet and the picture. For it is constant that, when the tablet is painted, color is not educed from the potency of the tablet, but a colored body is applied to the body of the tablet. Just as therefore color is not received in the tablet subjectively, so neither **intellection** in the **intellect**.

Secondly, according to the **Philosopher** one intelligence does not suffer from another subjectively when it understands it, but through essence it understands it, that is not through a form inherent to its substance; therefore similarly it is concerning the **intellect**.

Thirdly, it would follow that after a strong intelligible it would understand a weak one less just as it is concerning sense. For the cause of this in sense is, because the sense or organ for some time retains the **species** received. But if the **intellect** receives **species** subjectively, it will retain better than sense, therefore etc.

Nor can it be said that spirituality would obstruct. For also the sensible has being more spiritually in the sense than outside, and yet from that spirituality that is not removed.

(Opinion against the second part of the third conclusion)

Against the **second** part of the same conclusion was **another opinion** modern enough, which held that the **beatific vision**, by which the creature sees **God**, is not a created vision, but uncreated, namely **God** himself who is seen.

This is proved first thus: By any blessed person can, according to the ordained law of **God**, any creature be known distinctly in the **Word** through his beatific knowledge; and not through created beatific knowledge, because then either that would be corruptible by the common law and then it would not be beatitude - because beatitude is not beatitude unless it be to be perpetuated without end - or it itself would be a knowledge of infinite perfection, because [it is] knowledge of infinities and of any distinct one. Each inferred is inconvenient; therefore beatific knowledge is such uncreated, which is the intent.

Addition 34: First thus: Any blessed person sees any creature existing or possible distinctly in the **Word** through his beatific knowledge; and not through created beatific knowledge, therefore through uncreated. The consequence is evident; the antecedent is proved, because, if some blessed person does not see any etc., let him be Peter. It is constant that he can see in the **Word** some creature which he does not see, since he does not see all. Either therefore he can this through the same act of vision by which he sees now, or through another. If through the same, therefore by the same reason also through the same he can still see any other which he does not see, and similarly any one, and consequently that act is infinite knowledge and of infinite perfection, which is repugnant to a created act. The *Textus Ordinarius* follows.

Secondly, because, if it were not so, "then the sumptuously blessed could not, standing his beatitude in the highest, have so perfect a knowledge in the proper genus concerning some creature as the lowest blessed" having equal natural things. The consequent is inconvenient and the consequence is evident, because a soul filled by one such created form cannot, with that filling, simultaneously capture as much of disparate knowledge as a soul equal in natural things not so filled; otherwise it could simultaneously naturally receive not as many most intense but more of diverse **species**, which seems to be repugnant to any creature, therefore etc.

Thirdly, the same is proved through **Augustine 8** *On Genesis* chapter 34 concerning the small [works], who says that **God** through his substance speaks to intellectual creatures "to be illuminated when already they can capture his locution, such as is in his **Word**."

For this way it can be argued from the intention of the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator**, which, as was proved in the first distinction of this Second [Book] question 1 article 2, is that the first himself, **God** himself, is understood through his very self without an **intellection** middle from other abstract intelligences, so that he himself is both what is understood and his **intellection**, which understands him. Similarly however it is in us.

(Replies to reasons against the first part of the third conclusion)

To the **first** against the **first part** of the conclusion I respond that, if that argumentation were duly perfected, it would conclude our proposed [point], namely that **intellection** and **intellect** are distinguished.

But what is further inferred, that **operation** is not an **absolute form**, does not follow by virtue of the argument. For it is not a consequent that if the **first act** is an **absolute form** and the **second act** is distinguished from that, that the **second act** be not an **absolute form**; just as it does not follow that if whiteness is a **quality** and blackness is distinguished from whiteness and even opposed to it, that blackness be not a **quality**.

To the **second** the consequence must be denied and similarly what is assumed for its proof. For according to the **Commentator** [Averroes] in *Physics* Book 4 comment 84 **quantity** is not active. Many other forms also do not have **operations**, unless one wishes to say even those forms have **operations** which can cause in the **intellect** at least partially some **operation** namely **knowledge** of themselves. And then I will concede that **intellection** can have an **operation**, and that another into infinity, just as was said concerning reflex acts. But **operative forms** or having proper **operations** are not accustomed to be spoken of in this sense.

To the **third** it must be said that, if the comparison ought to be true, it is necessary that by "to shine" be understood **light** itself and by "to understand" **intellection**, so that it be said that just as **light** holds itself to the shining thing so **intellection** to the understanding thing. And concede then the similitude. But in this way it proves rather the proposed, as is evident.

Nevertheless what he adds that to shine is an **immanent act** of **light**, is neither properly nor truly said. For to shine is not an act, that is an **immanent operation**, more than to be white or to be hot, which nowhere by any author of any condition are called **operations** neither immanent nor transient. But the similitude of the diction of those infinitives deceived those arguing thus.

To the **fourth** concede that **God** could separate **intellection** from the **intellect**, yet that separated would not be **intellection**, as was said elsewhere.

To the **fifth** it must be said that it is deficient in many ways: First indeed, because so against the arguer it can be proved, since not more in one respective [thing] can contraries be united than in one absolute, and so it would be proved that **intellection** and **sensation** would not be **absolute** nor **respective** forms.

Secondly, because the form of arguing is nothing, because there is not a due assumption of the minor under the major; and if it were duly assumed, for example "in the act of sensing contraries can be united," certainly it would be false properly accepted. Thirdly, because also it is false that by the same act of sensing white and black are seen. For although sometimes white and black are seen simultaneously, not however by a unique act.

(Replies to authorities against the first part of the third conclusion)

To the **first authority** it must be said that he understands concerning **transmutation** strictly taken, which is from a contrary. For with such **transmutation** is not the reception of **intellection**, but certainly it is well with **transmutation**, which is salvation and perfection, or according to the letter of the comment "evasion," that is exit, "of that which is in potency by that which is in act, and is similar" - and "not contrary," as the **Commentator** supplies, "but extracting it from potency to act," as is held in *On the Soul* Book 2 by the **Philosopher** and **Commentator** in the same place comments 57 and 58. Therefore the **Commentator** denies only the first **transmutation** in the reception of **intellection**, where he is alleged from *On the Soul* Book 3, as is evident from the alleged comments concerning the second, and again from this that he says those alleged words precisely to save that the **intellect** is immaterial, notwithstanding that to understand is a **passion**. For **passion** which is with **transmutation** in the first mode is in material things only, but the second is in the **intellect**. And this is clear to one reading the **Philosopher** and **Commentator** in the same place.

To the **confirmation** it must be said that on account of that which is argued, and perhaps on account of another thing, the **Commentator** says in the same place that "that example is not true, yet it is a way to understanding. And this mode of doctrine is necessary in such things, although it is rhetorical." Therefore as to that which is taken, it is not an example, but according to the exposition of the **Commentator** it is so to the proposed, since just as the tablet, says the **Commentator**, "has no picture in act nor in potency close to act, so in the **material intellect** there is not any of the understood forms, which it receives, neither in act nor in potency close to act etc."

To the **second** it must be said that that does not make for that way, because it is not his intention that an **intelligence** through its proper essence as through an **intellection** understands another **intelligence**, but through the essence of the understood **intelligence**, as was shown above in the first distinction.

To the **third** the consequence must be denied. To the proof it must be said that that is not the cause neither according to truth nor according to the intention of the **Philosopher** or the **Commentator**. But according to the **Philosopher** the cause is, as he writes there, since "the sensitive indeed is not without the body, but this," namely the **intellect**, "is separated"; and the **Commentator** says the same in the same place comment 7. And according to truth, and so perhaps the **Philosopher** understood, the cause is, because the organ of sensing, by the mediation of which sensation is made by a strong sensible, is altered by an alteration debilitating and corruptive, from which it is indisposed and becomes less apt for the following sensation. But it is not so concerning the **intellect**, whose operation is elicited by no mediating organ.

(Replies to reasons against the second part of the third conclusion)

To the reasons against the **second part** of the conclusion I respond. To the **first**, because he assumes determinately concerning the ordained **power of God**, I deny the antecedent. For, although concerning the absolute **power of God** the blessed person cannot see so many finite creatures in number in the **Word** without being able to see more, nevertheless he sees or will see at some time so many that never more. But from this the difficulty of the argument can be reduced thus: If the blessed person can see more in the **Word** than he sees, either through the same act by which he sees now, or through another. If through the same, since still with those seen he could see more, and again more than those, he will be able through the same to see all actually existing and possible [things] and consequently infinite [things]. And then it follows that that vision would be infinite **knowledge** and of infinite perfection. If through another and another act, either with the second arriving the first cedes, and then **beatitude** will be corruptible, or with the second the first remains, and then, since each is a vision of the **Word** and consequently beatific, his **beatitude** would grow or at least he would be more blessed than before and consequently not uniformly blessed, which does not seem to be granted. Item just as he would have more visions, so he would have consequently more **dilections**, which also does not seem to be conceded.

To this deduction I respond that [it is] through another act; and when it is added that either with the first ceding or remaining, it is said that each divisively can be given. And if the first is given, it must be conceded that **beatitude** or the **beatific vision** is corruptible. If however it were corrupted, it is not **beatitude**, accepting the word thus as the first argument accepts, namely as it connotes perpetuity or that by that act one will see **God** perpetually. With this however it can stand that the seeing person is blessed, because, if simultaneously the first cedes and another is posited, so that never is it that he does not see the **Word** himself, always he will be blessed, although no vision of his will be or is **beatitude** or beatific to that sense. And according to this whatever authorities say that **beatitude** is perpetual, ought to be expounded concerning the blessed person.

Secondly, it can be said that the first act remains with the second through this mode, that namely in the blessed person there is a certain perpetual vision, by which he himself sees the **Word** and the whole blessed **Trinity** precisely or in the **Word** also some creatures, just as it pleases **God** to show to him in himself. When truly **God** shows anew some creatures to the blessed person also in the **Word**, there is created in him another vision of another **species** from the first, by which also the **Word** and other creatures in the **Word** are seen. Through this however the **beatitude** of that one does not grow intensively nor is he more blessed or does he see **God** more perfectly intensively, because those, since they are of another reason, do not compose any one vision. And although he sees many other things in him, nevertheless not on account of those is he more blessed but on account of **God** alone, that is from that precisely that he sees **God**, is he blessed according to the common authority of **Augustine 5 Confessions**. This second vision however remains as long as it pleases **God** that the blessed person see that thing, and afterwards it cedes; and if again he shows another to him, another vision is caused. And so such succeed each other, with the first however always remaining.

And although each of these modes is possible concerning the **power of God**, and a certain solemn **doctor** posits each choosing neither over the other, to me however the second mode pleases more on this account, because it saves more the permanence of the **beatific vision**; indeed strictly taking it alone posits some beatific [vision]. In fact however, in what mode it happens, whether by one of these or by another, that other things are revealed to the blessed in the **Word**, **God** knows.

There occurs to me however one third mode, which I do not doubt is possible, and I think is more in fact, namely that any blessed person from the beginning of his beatification has the vision of the **Word** and of all others in the **Word** which it pleases **God** to show him; nor afterwards is any new revelation made to him, but always simultaneously and by one act he sees whatever things he is going to see in the **Word**. To this more consounds, as it seems, the intention of **Augustine**, who in 15 *On the Trinity* chapter 16 says: "Then," namely when "we will see **God** just as he is," "perhaps our thoughts will not be voluble going and returning from others into others but we will see all our **knowledge**," namely all things which we will know, "simultaneously in one gaze." And although here he speaks with a note of doubt, not asserting, it is hinted however through this that he opines that more. But in 12 *Confessions* chapter 13 he affirms this same thing concerning **angels** without a note of doubt saying that they are "that intellectual 'heaven of heaven,' where it is for the **intellect** to know simultaneously, not 'in part,' not 'in a riddle,' not 'through a mirror,' but wholly; in manifestation, 'face to face,' not now this, now that, but what is said to know simultaneously without any vicissitude of times." And this same thing must be thought concerning blessed men, who will be equal to the **angels of God** according to the word of the Savior.

If however we wish altogether to posit, that anew some things are revealed to them, it could be said that [it is] through another **knowledge**, which will not be intuitive of the uncreated **Word**, just as is well possible to him, as I held, when I began the Lecture of the Sentences.

And through these modes the variation of the **beatific vision** is avoided entirely which certainly the **saints** strive to avoid, as they hint in their words. Nor through this mode would it be denied, that through another **knowledge** he understands some things anew but that not through **knowledge** in the **Word**. Neither of these however assertively, but only doubtfully and for the sake of inquisition be it said.

To the **second reason** I deny the consequence and its proof; and further concede that he cannot receive so many most intense finite [species] in number simultaneously without being able [to receive] more. Nor is this repugnant to the creature. Just as notwithstanding that some part of the **medium** be filled with a **species** of whiteness even most intense in that mode in which the most intense ought to be given, namely than which according to nature it cannot be more intense in the **medium**, it can still be filled with a most intense **species** of blackness, and again with a **species** of redness, and not so many of such without [being able to receive] more, if there were so many causatives of **species**.

Whence such infinite receptivity, so to speak, is not repugnant to the creature nor does it argue any infinity of intrinsic perfection in it; nay rather it is not of greater perfection to be able to receive infinite things than two, because by what reason it can two, it can infinite.

So also it is instanced concerning habits in the soul, of which not so many without [being able to have] more can be in it simultaneously. For one does not indispose to the reception of another, but rather confers.

And if it is said that it is otherwise concerning acts or actual **intellections**, and concerning habits. For many habits certainly we could naturally have simultaneously equally intense; we experience however that we cannot have many acts simultaneously equally intense. Nay rather while we think intently on one thing, the mind is diverted from another thought, in whole or in part, so that it does not think equally perfectly concerning that thing.

I respond that this certainly is true for this state, and this is to us the punishment of **sin**, just as also according to **Augustine** 1 *On Free Will* chapter 10, the punishment of **sin** is that the mind sometimes dreads clear reasonings and despairs of the finding of truth; sometimes also it attempts into the light of understanding, and again falls back fatigued. And he posits many other punishments of the mind. But all will cease then and it will be able to think freely, whatever things **God** will have willed to show to it.

And note that by a similar reason it could be proved against those arguing thus that there is not in the blessed any created **knowledge** concerning things in the proper genus, because then with that standing in the sumptuously blessed, he could not receive another of another **species** equally perfect just as another less blessed, equal to him in natural things, and yet I think that they would not deny such created **knowledge** in blessed **angels**.

To the authority of **Augustine** it must be said that **Augustine** understands that he speaks through his substance not as through a locution or **knowledge** by which they formally hear or know, but as through an object and immediate representative of their **knowledge**, so that no other **medium** intervenes, in which [being] known they know, what **God** reveals to them.

Otherwise however it happens, when he speaks to those who are not suitable for this locution, since to them he speaks through some middle creatures, which they intuit immediately, and in those or through those other things, which they represent.

And this sense is evident from that which he adds immediately: "But to those," he says, "who cannot capture it, when **God** speaks, he speaks only through a creature, either only spiritual, whether in sleep, or in ecstasy in the similitude of corporal things; or also through a corporal itself, while to the senses of the body either some **species** of body appears or voices sound."

Behold that in a similar mode he compares his substance to that locution just as to this corporal similitudes and voices. These however are not actual **knowledges**, by which those, to whom he speaks, know formally, but objects known, just as we through significative voices, which we hear, apprehend the things signified.

And just as **one doctor** says beautifully, those arguing thus ought to notice that **Augustine**, even if he says that **God** speaks through his substance, does not however say, that they hear through the substance of **God**. Therefore **God** can speak through his substance in the mode pre-exposed, and they hear through a created act received in themselves, by which they hear intellectually the substance of **God**, just as also to others he speaks through corporal voices, and they hear through an act received in themselves, by which they apprehend those voices.

To the **last** it must be said that that certainly is of the intention of the **Philosopher** and the **Commentator**; but that similarly it be as to this also concerning abstract **intelligences**, this they do not intend, but expressly the opposite, as is evident from the things adduced in the same place. Nevertheless however also their saying even concerning **intelligences** is false nor do they prove it.

ARTICLE 2 (First conclusion)

As to the second article and the principal thing asked I say two conclusions. The **first** is that he understands some thing by an **intellection** essentially distinct from himself and from the thing understood.

It is proved first, because the **angel** knows the creature in the **Word** through knowledge created in him as is evident from the authority of **Augustine 2 On Genesis** alleged in the third reason for the third conclusion of the preceding article. It is evident also from another, which he writes in the same chapter. For he says: "Just as the reason, by which the creature is founded, is prior in the **Word of God** than the creature itself, which is founded, so also the knowledge of the same reason is made prior in the spiritual creature, which is not darkened by **sin** etc." But that reason is nothing other than the **Word** himself. If however his knowledge is made in that spiritual creature, therefore it is essentially distinct both from the **Word** and from the creature, in which it is made. Therefore the **angel** understands the **Word** himself through an **intellection** essentially distinct from the **Word** and from himself. The consequence is evident, since through that knowledge they understand the **Word** himself immediately.

Furthermore, that they understand whatever thing outside themselves, which they understand, by an **intellection** distinct from that thing, can be sufficiently proved through the **second reason** of the third conclusion of the preceding article, and through **Augustine** from 4 *On Genesis* in many places.

That truly the knowledge of such things is also distinct from the **angel** himself, can be had also from the same in the same place. And it is proved moreover through the Parisian article 84, which is such: "That the substance of the intelligence does not differ from its knowledge, for there is not diversity of the understood from the understanding, nor diversity of things understood: error."

Furthermore, if no **intellection** of the intelligence were distinct from it, any intelligence would be equally simple as **God**. The consequent is false and against theology and philosophy also, as is evident in *Metaphysics* Book 12 comment 50 and *On the Soul* Book 3 comment 5. The consequence is evident, because with this composition, which is the **intellect** with its **intellection**, removed - which happens, if no **intellection** is a form inherent to the **intellect** - it does not appear likely, that any other composition would remain in the intelligence, for the reason that any other would seem less to be in it.

(Second conclusion)

The **second conclusion** is that whatever thing the **angel** understands, he understands by an **intellection** distinct from himself and from that.

This is proved, because every thing which he understands, either is outside him or in him or himself. But everything outside him he himself understands by an **intellection** distinct from himself and from that, as was proved.

Item he understands himself by an **intellection** distinct from himself, because, if the **intellection** by which he understands himself were the same as he, also the **dilection** by which he loves himself would be the same as he. And if so, then he could not love himself more and less. But this is false. For the **Devil** could love himself less or more remissly; otherwise by loving himself as much as he loved, he would not have loved more than he ought or immoderately; and through this he would not have sinned by a perverse and

immoderate love of himself, the opposite of which sententially **Augustine** posits 11 *On Genesis* chapters 21 and 22, and 14 *City of God* the last chapter.

Item a thing existing in him he understands by an **intellection** distinct from himself and from that. And this is evident, because the reason is the same as to this concerning him and concerning us.

(Replies to the principal reasons)

To the **principal reasons** I respond. To the **first** I deny the antecedent and similarly the antecedent of its first proof, and also the proposition assumed for its proof. Nor is the ulterior proof to the proposed, because the act, by which the **intellect** understands itself, is not middle between itself understanding and itself understood; otherwise it would be distinguished from its very self. And furthermore if the act mediated thus, therefore it would be distinguished from those, between which it mediated, and consequently the proposed would be concluded and the opposite of that which the argument intends.

To the **second** proof also the antecedent must be denied. To the proof it must be said that on account of such presence it is not removed, but that by a distinct **intellection** they are understood, but only that through some **species** or other representative, while they are actually in the **intellect**, they are not represented.

To the **third** proof it must be said that the antecedent is false, and similarly its proof, as was said. Although, even if it were true, it would not prove that which directly it intends, because that word of the **Philosopher** is said concerning abstract intelligences, not concerning the human **intellect**, as was touched above.

Addition 35: To the **second principal reason** also I deny the antecedent. To the proof I say that abstract form is accepted doubly: In one mode commonly for act, in another mode specially for informing act. And according to this immaterial and abstract form is to be taken doubly: In one mode for act abstracted from matter and act not conjoined to matter and subsisting through itself, according to which mode intelligences or even separate substances themselves are frequently called abstract forms; and **Augustine** also calls **God** form 15 *On the Trinity* chapter 16. In another mode it is taken for the act of informing. The *Textus Ordinarius* follows.

To the **second principal reason** also I deny the antecedent. To the proof concede that that would be an immaterial and abstract form. And when it is inferred that it would be an **intellect**, I deny the consequence. To the proof it must be said that the word of the **Commentator** is to be understood concerning immaterial substantial forms, such as are rational souls and separate substances themselves, not however their accidents. And they themselves indeed are called forms, not indeed from the act of informing but from the actuality of being, or not because they inform but because they are certain acts. Whence also form frequently is accepted for act, according to which acceptance in many places the **Commentator** calls intelligences themselves forms and also **God** himself. And **Augustine** similarly 15 *On the Trinity* chapter 16, and 2 *On Free Will* chapter 30 and many others. Such substances are also called forms, because they are principles of operations; for from form egresses operation. Whence it is said that operation makes known the form.

ADDITIONAL QUESTION 3 WHETHER an angel understands through a species distinct from actual intellection.

Addition 36: Secondly concerning this matter about the knowledge of **angels** I ask, whether an **angel** understands through a **species** distinct from actual **intellection**.

And I argue that no, because man does not understand through a **species** distinct from **intellection**, therefore neither does an **angel**. The consequence is evident, because an **angel** does not need more things for understanding, since he is more perfect in actual nature than man. The antecedent is proved, because man does (not) sense through a **species** distinct from **sensation**, therefore neither does he understand etc. The consequence is evident, because the **intellect** is more powerful than sense. The assumption is proved concerning sensual vision. For there we experience no **species**, nor by any reason can we convict a **species** of this kind distinct from the act. For precisely with color and light and sight well disposed in itself and to the color posited, vision is posited, nor is anything else required.

To the opposite it is argued by the authority of **Dionysius** 4 *On the Divine Names*, who says that **angels** are illuminated by sciential forms of things and reasons. And in the tenth proposition of *On Causes* also it is written that "every intelligence is full of forms." Forms however and **species** signify the same.

I respond. In this question it must be seen first concerning us, which also is implied in the argument of the question; then concerning **angels**, concerning whom principally it is asked.

Truly, because concerning us there are various opinions, with some denying altogether the **species** both in senses and in the **intellect**, with some positing indeed **species** but saying they are not essentially distinguished from **intellections**, with some also positing them distinct from **intellections**, therefore there will be three principal articles in the question. The first will be, whether there are any **species** in the senses or **intellect**. The second will be, given that there are such **species**, whether the knowledge of the thing and the **species** of the same are things essentially distinct. The third will be concerning the principal thing asked.

ARTICLE 1 (Opinion of Ockham)

As to the first there is **one opinion** which denies universally **species** both in senses and in the **intellect**. Whence from diverse questions of the opiner five conclusions can be taken for the proposed.

(First conclusion of Ockham)

Of which "the **first** is: To have **intuitive cognition** of the **intellect** it is not necessary to posit anything besides the **intellect** and the thing known, and no **species** entirely."

It is proved first, "because in vain is done through more what" equally "can be done through fewer. But through the **intellect** and the thing known without any **species** **intuitive cognition** can be had; therefore etc. The assumption is proved, because with the active and passive sufficient posited, and them approximated, the effect can be posited without any other. But the **agent intellect** with the object are" agents "sufficient of that cognition; the **possible** [intellect] however is the sufficient passive, therefore etc."

Secondly, "nothing is to be posited necessarily required naturally for any effect, unless a certain reason proceeding from per se known things leads to it, or certain experience. But neither of these leads to positing a **species**, therefore etc. The assumption is proved. Because experience does not lead to this, because that requires **intuitive knowledge**, just as if someone experiences something to be white or whiteness to be in him; but he sees no **species** intuitively, therefore etc."

Item neither a reason proceeding from per se known things. Because "no reason can prove that it is required, unless it has efficiency; because every effect sufficiently depends on its causes. But that something created is an efficient cause cannot be proved demonstratively, but only through experience, through this namely that to its presence the effect follows, and to its absence not. But now without any **species**, to the presence of the object with the **intellect** follows the act of understanding, just as with a **species**; therefore etc. Item, if it is posited that a **species** is necessarily required for **intuitive cognition** just as an efficient cause, since that **species** could be conserved in the absence of the object, it could in the absence of the object cause naturally **intuitive cognition**; which is false and against experience."

(Second conclusion of Ockham)

"The **second conclusion** is: To have **abstractive intellectual cognition** it is necessary to posit something previous besides the object and the **intellect**.

It is proved, because every power, which now is able into some act, into which before it was not able, with the object and the power remaining equally now as before, has now something which before it did not have. But the **intellect** having **intuitive knowledge** is able into **abstractive**, and not having is not able, with the object remaining in itself equally after **intuitive knowledge** and before. Therefore with **intuitive cognition** had something is left in the **intellect**, by reason of which it is able into **abstractive cognition**, into which before it was not able; therefore etc."

Secondly, "according to the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* Book 3, when something is in essential and accidental potency, it has something when it is in accidental potency, which it did not have when it was in essential potency. Which also is true in sensitive potency; for **phantasy** after **intuitive cognition** of the particular sense is able into that sensed in the absence of the sensible thing, into which before the **intuitive cognition** of the particular sense it was not able. And consequently in the **phantastic virtue** there is something left mediating that **intuitive knowledge**. In the same mode it is concerning the **intellect**, which before **intuitive cognition** is in essential potency to **abstractive cognition**; but with it had it is in accidental potency, so that it is able into **abstractive**, and before it was not able; therefore etc. This also is evident concerning the separated soul, which after **intuitive cognition** is able into some **abstractive**, into which before it was not able, and this on account of something left; therefore in the same mode it is concerning our **intellect**."

(Third conclusion of Ockham)

"The **third conclusion** is that that left is not a **species**, but a **habit**.

This is proved, because that, which is left from acts, follows the act; but a **species** does not follow, but precedes, therefore etc."

Secondly, "when something is in accidental potency with respect to cognition, it is not necessary to posit anything besides that through which it is in accidental potency to eliciting the act. But with a **habit** posited in the **intellect**, the **intellect** is in accidental potency; therefore besides the **habit** it is not necessary to posit another in the **intellect**. The assumption is evident through the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* Book 3, where he says that otherwise is the **intellect** in potency before learning than after; because before it is in essential potency, and after, when through act some **habit** is left, it is in accidental potency to another similar [act]. Therefore the **intellect** through a **habit** generated from act is in accidental potency. Whence never does anyone experience himself to be in accidental potency with respect to cognition, unless after **intellection**. For if a thousand **species** previous to the act of the **intellect** be posited, if the **intellect** have no act, no more is it, nor does it experience more" itself to be in accidental potency "than if there be no **species** there. And if no **species** is posited in the **intellect**, and yet an act of understanding be posited, immediately the **intellect** experiences itself to be in accidental potency with respect to another cognition; which cannot be unless through a **habit** left from the first act."

Thirdly, "all things which can be saved through a **species**, can be saved through a **habit**; and a **habit** is necessarily required, therefore a **species** is superfluous. That a **habit** is necessarily required, is evident, because, if not, but a **species** sufficed, therefore, if after a thousand **intellections** the **species** be corrupted, the **intellect** could not otherwise understand that object, whose **species** is that, than before every **intellection**; which seems absurd.

If it is said that through many cognitions the **species** is increased; against. Then through such augmentation of the **species** the **intellect** is always inclined more to understanding, and consequently the **habit**, which is posited by all, would be totally superfluous, and not the **species**"; therefore the **species** is superfluous.

Fourthly, "**species** is not posited unless either on account of assimilation, or on account of causation of **intellection**, or on account of representation of the object, or on account of determination of the power, or on account of union of the mover and moved. But on account of none of these is it necessary to posit, therefore it is not to be posited." The minor is proved. "For not on account of assimilation, since that assimilation either is in the essence and nature of the **intellect** through which it itself is assimilated to the known object, or is assimilation of the effect to the cause. Not in the first mode, because, if the **intellect** understands substance, then it is more assimilated through its proper nature to the object which is substance, than through a **species** which is an accident. For substance is more assimilated to substance than accident to substance. Neither in the second mode, because that assimilation of the patient to the agent is through this that it receives some effect caused by the agent; but in this mode the **intellect** is sufficiently assimilated through **intellection** caused by the object and received in the **intellect**. Therefore any **species** is not necessary.

If you say that a **species** previous is required to assimilate the object itself, which is the agent, to the **intellect** itself passively, for this that it receive **intellection**, against: In the same mode I will say that that received **species** requires another previous to assimilate the object to the **intellect**, for this that it receive that **species** which you posit. And that again requires another previous, and so into infinity.

Nor on account of representation is a **species** necessary, because **intuitive knowledge** does not require any representing other from the object and act, as is evident above. Therefore neither **abstractive**, which

immediately follows. The consequence is evident, because just as the object sufficiently represents itself in **intuitive**, so in that which immediately follows that.

Item the represented must be previously known, otherwise the representing would not lead into the cognition of the represented. But according to those positing **species**, the **species** is previous to every act of understanding the object; therefore it cannot be posited on account of representation of the object.

Item, if it is posited on account of representation, this is not, unless because the distant cannot act on the distant. But this is false, for if the distant object could not cause **intellection**, unless first it caused a **species**, because it must be present, in the same mode it could not cause a **species** in the **intellect** unless by positing something previous to the **species**, through which it itself would be present to the **intellect** to cause that **species**. And similarly before that it is necessary to posit another (and so) into infinity.

Nor can it be posited on account of causation of **intellection**. For this would be, according to others, because the corporal and material cannot act immediately on the spiritual"; but this is false, because then it could not also cause a **species** in the **intellect**.

"Nor on account of determination of the power, because every passive power is sufficiently determined through a sufficient agent, especially when it itself is active. But the object is a sufficient agent, as was proved, therefore etc."

Nor on account of union of the mover and moved, because then by the same reason it would be necessary to posit another **species** previous to that for this that the object moving acting be united to the **intellect**, so that a **species** could be caused in it, and so into infinity.

It is evident therefore that in the **intellect** it is not necessary to posit **species**, but a **habit** only, and this on account of experience.

(Fourth conclusion of Ockham)

The **fourth conclusion** is that in the **interior sense** it is not necessary to posit any **species** of the object, but only some **habit** caused or left from the act of the same power, inclining to a similar act and eliciting of the same, not however terminative.

That however a terminative **species** of such act is not opportune, is proved first. The object of the exterior and **interior sense** is the same. But no impression in the **interior sense** is the object of the exterior sense; therefore etc.

Secondly, if there were any such terminating **species**, "either it would be of the same reason with the exterior object, or of another. If of the same, it follows that in the soul is left true color, true sound, true heat. But this is absurd. Which is proved, because every active of the same reason" on a passive of the same reason "can increase some augmentable effect previously caused by an agent of the same reason." And consequently another extrinsic hot [thing] can increase the same heat previously caused in the soul. "And so that power could become much hot and cold, and white and black, from inspection alone"; which is absurd.

Nor can it be said that it is of another reason, "because every power able to discern between less dissimilar things can discern between more dissimilar. But this power can discern between individuals outside of the same species; therefore more can it discern between that terminating **species** and the object outside, whose **species** and image it is. Which is false and against experience."

That however some **habit** is in such a power, is proved. Because otherwise it itself is reducible to act after the first act, and before, because before it is not reduced to act except in the presence of the sensible really, and after the first act it can be reduced to act in absence. Therefore something is left in it after the first act.

It is confirmed, "because it is not more inconvenient to posit some such in the interior power than in the exterior. But in the exterior organ is posited a certain quality thus habitually inclining, as is evident in writers and singers and all operating manually," which "not only inclines to something of the same reason, but to the same Individual in number. It is evident in someone accustomed to passing through a certain place and door in a certain part of the house. If the door is changed, still frequently he returns to the place, where the first door was, until through many acts a quality inclining to passing through the second door is generated. Therefore in the same mode it can be posited that there is some quality in the **phantastic virtue** inclining the power to similar acts," which can be called a **habit**.

Nor besides this is it necessary to posit any **species**, to which the act of this power be terminated. Nay rather mediating such a left **habit** it can elicit its act "terminated at the same sensible in number, which it saw before, not however at any similitude or image, as some falsely imagine."

(Fifth conclusion of Ockham)

The **fifth conclusion** is that in the exterior sense no **species** is to be posited. And this is proved through the same reason, through which the **first conclusion** was proved.

(Against the opinion of Ockham)

This opinion does not seem true to me. For the showing of whose falsity and response to the present article I premise a double distinction.

One concerning **habit**; for it can be accepted doubly, as much as suffices for now: In one mode commonly, for every form remaining firmly in the soul or difficultly mobile, concurring to elicit an actual **operation**. And in this mode the **species** also, which I posit, after it is firmed in the power, can be named "**habit**." In another mode strictly and more properly according to the use of the word **habit** can be taken for some form caused in the soul from preceding acts, inclining to acts of the same reason to them, from which it was caused. Which form is not an imaginal or representative similitude of the object of the act to which it inclines.

Another distinction is concerning this name "**species**," which, although it is very equivocal and has a multiple signification, dismissing many significations of it impertinent to the proposed and taking it only, as it falls in the use of disputants and those treating concerning knowledge and the mode in which the soul knows, I say that it can be accepted quadruply: In one mode, most commonly for every form concurring

to having knowledge. And according to this mode also the form itself of the body, which is known, is called **species**.

Secondly, more commonly for every form, which is in some mode a reason of knowing another thing. And according to this mode art and other cognitive **habits** can be called **species**.

In the third mode, commonly for any form, which is a similitude and image of the thing known and through which that thing is known. And according to this mode also the actual knowledge itself is called **species**.

In the fourth mode it is taken properly, namely for the form, which is a similitude or image of the thing known, remaining naturally in the soul, even after actual knowledge has ceased or after the soul has ceased actually to know, apt born to lead the soul into the knowledge of the thing of which it is the image and similitude.

In the first and the last two modes **Augustine** uses the name of **species** 11 *On the Trinity* chapter 9; and in the second mode the **Philosopher** accepts 7 *Metaphysics* in that chapter "Of those things however which are made," when he says: "But the medicinal and edificatory is the **species** of health and of the house."

In the present **species** is taken in the fourth mode only, and **habit** in the second mode. For thus the question has difficulty and is discussed among various opinions.

(Four conclusions)

And with the words accepted thus I posit four conclusions: The **first** is that in the exterior sensitive power there are no **species**. The **second**, that **species** are in the **interior sensitive power**. The **third**, that they are also in the **intellect**. The **fourth**, that besides the **species** there is not in the sensitive power a **habit** elicitive of its **abstractive knowledge**.

(First conclusion is proved)

The **first conclusion** is proved first by the authority of **Augustine** 11 *On the Trinity* chapter 2, where he says that with the visible thing detracted "no form remains, which was in the sense while that which was seen was present; but the sense itself remains which was, even before anything was sensed." And yet at the end of the said chapter he says that with the visible thing detracted "its similitude remains in memory."

This also all commonly will. And by reason it is evident, because otherwise sight could through that **species** know the absent sensible at least abstractively, which is not true. The consequence is evident, since, as will be evident in the following, therefore precisely do **species** of sensibles remain in the soul, that in the absence of sensibles they may supply their place, so that through them known absent sensibles may be known.

Furthermore, no experience or reason compels to posit such a **species**, therefore it is not to be posited.

(Second conclusion is proved by the first reason)

The **second conclusion** I could prove by very many authorities of **Augustine** and the **Philosopher**; but because those were posited in the first book distinction 3, where it is inquired, whether sensible things are naturally understood by us, and it is proved that concerning sensibles we have some sensual **knowledges**, terminated not at them immediately, but at their **species**, therefore I omit those here and prove the conclusion by reasons, first thus: I suppose one thing which anyone can experience, if he wishes, in his very self, namely that, when he remembers or thinks of some thing, which he saw at another time, he then intuits something actually. Then thus: That, which he intuits, either is the thing itself which he saw at another time the same in number, or some similitude of it reserved in the soul after its vision had at another time. But the first cannot be given, which nevertheless the preceding opinion gives.

I prove it first indeed, because then he could through **knowledge** of this kind evidently know, whether that thing were or were not, and other singular and contingent truths concerning it.

The consequent is false according to experience; for I remember now the city of Rome, and yet I do not know nor can I know through this **knowledge**, whether it is or is not, and what is done or not done in it. (Nor concerning a friend) can I know evidently, whether he is alive, or dead, or even annihilated.

I prove the consequence first by the authority of **Augustine** *On the Quantity of the Soul* chapter 8, where he makes the same consequence entirely. Whence, just as also where above was touched, to **Adeodatus** responding that he remembered the city of Milan, which he had seen at another time, and the middle spaces, and this could be done through memory - although his soul were not extended outside his body, so that it be present to those places - **Augustine** infers: "Therefore images of those places are contained by memory." **Adeodatus** responds: "So I feel. For, even what is done there now, I do not know; which certainly I would not be ignorant of, if my mind were extended all the way to those (places) and sensed present things." And **Augustine** responds: "You seem to me to speak the truth." Behold that here expressly a similar consequence is made and **Augustine** approves it and the principal conclusion also, as is evident in the beginning of the authority. And the same consequence he himself makes in *On True Religion* chapter 60.

Secondly it is evident by reason, since there is no other reason, on account of which seeing some thing immediately by exterior sense he knows that it "is" and other contingent truths of it, unless because he knows it immediately in its very self. And so it would be in the proposed, if the **interior sense** knew it immediately in its very self.

Nor is it valid to say that the cause is, because the exterior [sense] knows it intuitively, but the interior abstractively only. For if that **knowledge** be called intuitive, which is terminated immediately at the thing known, then also the **interior sense** will know intuitively, according to you; but if that only be called intuitive, by which it can be known that the thing is, if it is, or not be, if it is not, and similar contingent truths, then to say that this cannot be known through **knowledge** of this kind, because it is not intuitive, and through that it can, because it is intuitive, is not other than to say that through this it can, because it can through this, and through that it cannot because it cannot through that. And it is to solve the question through its very self. And similarly another could say that through the interior power that can be known, and not through the exterior.

Secondly, that that which one intuitus thus is not the thing itself outside, is proved: Because it is possible that then that thing is not, and ceased to be a long time before; but no **knowledge**, naturally had by us, can be terminated immediately at that which is not; therefore etc.

The assumption is proved first by the express authority of **Augustine** 11 *Confessions* chapter 18, where he says: "For neither can that be seen, which is not. And those who narrate past things, would certainly not narrate true things, if they did not discern them in mind; which, if they were nothing, could not be discerned at all." And a little after explaining, how past things "are," namely because in their image, and that is what those narrating past things discern, he says: "Although past things when true things are narrated, are brought forth from memory not the things themselves which passed, but words conceived from images of them, which they fixed in the mind like footsteps by passing through the senses." And he gives an example: "For my boyhood, which is no longer, is in past time, which is no longer. But its image, when I recall and narrate it, I intuit in present time, because it is still in my memory." Behold that suffices for the proposed, and also for the principal conclusion. For he also immediately adds other things, confirming the proposed.

Secondly, because, as in the preceding question was proved by many authorities of the same, "every thing, which we know immediately, begets in us **knowledge** of itself." Which also this **doctor** against whom I argue must concede. Indeed implicitly he concedes in one of the questions, in which he treats this matter. For by assigning the cause, as why, notwithstanding that one **intellection** "is equally assimilated to many individuals" of the same species, it leads however determinately into the **knowledge** of one, he says that this is, because it "from its nature determines for itself that it lead the **intellect** into the **knowledge** of that object, by which it is partially caused, because so it determines for itself to be caused by that object, that it cannot be caused by another; and therefore so it leads into its cognition that it does not lead into the cognition of another." And he adds that, if some were caused by **God** alone, through it "would be known that singular, by which it were caused determinately, if it were caused by a creature." Therefore according to him no **knowledge** leads naturally determinately into the **knowledge** of any [thing], unless it be caused partially by it. But it is constant that no [thing] is caused partially by that which is not, by causality I say of efficiency, concerning which also he himself speaks; therefore into the **knowledge** of no [thing], which is not, does it lead at least immediately. And consequently that thing, which is not, is not immediately known through that **knowledge**.

(Second conclusion is proved by the second reason)

Furthermore, to the conclusion principally thus: It happens to someone thinking concerning some thing, which he never saw, a similar [thing] to occur objectively to him, as occurs to another thinking concerning the same thing, which however he saw at another time. For example, if someone narrates to someone who never saw an elephant, of what figure and disposition of members it is, a similar [thing] will occur to the hearer as occurs to the narrator, especially if he narrates distinctly and perfectly, and the hearer flourishes in interior virtues, "just as **Aristotle** narrates concerning a certain ancient, who so informed things translated to him through hearing which he never saw; and when those forms were experienced, they were found according to true disposition," as the **Commentator** says in *On Memory and Reminiscence*. I ask then: Either this hearer sees through the **interior sense** immediately in his very self a true elephant, or its image.

The first cannot be said: Both because he never saw it or sensed through exterior sense; and it is impossible that anyone naturally apprehend any thing outside through an interior power immediately, which neither then nor before he apprehended through exterior sense. And because it is constant that then he does not know immediately any elephant, nor is there a reason on account of which he would know one determinately more than another; therefore he apprehends immediately no true elephant.

Therefore only the image of an elephant occurs to his sight. And since a similar [thing] occurs to the narrator, also to him an image only occurs. Nor is there a difference, except that that of the narrator was caused from a thing outside, but this feigned by the interior virtue of the hearer according to the mode said in the First [Book] distinction 3, where this matter is inquired prolixly enough. And consequently in the interior virtue there are **species** and images of things.

Furthermore, if it be, just as this opinion says, it follows that to dreamers and frenetics awake not images of things but the things themselves truly outside would occur immediately. The consequent is false and against experience. For they see chimeras and many things which are nowhere.

And if it is said that they see true things outside, but judge them to be other things than they are, against: Often such see absent things and dead and non-existing things, and judge themselves to see them present and existing. What therefore do they see immediately? Not the things themselves, because they are not present, nay rather often they are not anywhere. Therefore their images. But those are not in exterior sense, therefore in interior. Therefore etc.

(Second conclusion is proved by authorities)

The same conclusion is proved by authorities of **Augustine** 12 *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* in many chapters.

First indeed in chapter 6, distinguishing three kinds of visions, he says: "One is corporal, by which we see heaven and earth; another spiritual, by which we see corporal similitudes absent" - note - "or also things which we have not seen, by imagination of our spirit" - note - "conceived; the third intellectual, by which we see those things, which neither are bodies nor similitudes of bodies, as that by which we see mind and **virtue** and **dilection**."

In which words he expressly says that by spiritual vision "we see corporal similitudes absent," or which we have not seen; not therefore the bodies themselves immediately. And below in the same chapter he says that "spiritual vision is, by which we think absent bodies," and "is, by which we see similitudes of bodies in spirit."

Also it is not valid to say that by "images" ought to be understood **knowledges** themselves. For we do not intuit **knowledges**, but objects of **knowledges**. And lest you say, just as the predicted opiner was accustomed to say sometimes, that through "images" the things themselves outside are to be accepted - for they say that image and phantasm and similar words signify singular things themselves outside, connoting the act of fantasizing, so that a phantasm is not other than the thing itself fantasized - attend what follows immediately. For speaking concerning the third kind of vision, "the third," he says, "that by which **dilection** understood is beheld, contains those things, which do not have images like themselves which

are not what they themselves are." By which he manifestly demonstrates that images, which are seen by the second kind of vision, "are not that which the things themselves are," of which they are called images.

Item in chapter 14 he describes spirit, according to which spiritual vision is denominated from it, saying that it is "a certain force inferior to mind, where similitudes of corporal things are expressed." Item in chapter 16: "When something is discerned by the eyes, immediately an image of it is made in the spirit; but it is not recognized made, unless when, with the eyes removed from that which we saw through the eyes, we find its image in the soul. And if indeed the Spirit is irrational, like of a beast, the eyes announce up to this. But if the soul is rational, also to the **intellect** it is announced, which also presides over the spirit." Behold that an image is made in the spirit, and also in the **intellect**, if it is a man who sees with eyes of the body.

Nor can it be said that through the image, which is made when something is discerned by the eyes, he understands some "**habit**," such as the opinion feigns: Both because according to the opinion that **habit**, and according to truth no **habit** properly taken, is an image or similitude of the thing outside. And because according to the opinion the **habit** does not terminate the act of that power, but is a reason of eliciting it. But the image concerning which **Augustine** speaks terminates the act of the power or cognition, as is evident in the authority first alleged.

And again in the same chapter he says that "**King Balthasar** saw the joints of a hand writing on the wall, and immediately through the sense of the body the image of the thing corporally made was impressed on his spirit, and with that seen thing made and passed, it remained to him in thought: It was seen in the spirit and was not understood etc." Behold that the image impressed on the spirit was seen in the spirit, therefore it terminated the spiritual vision. Item a little after he says that **Balthasar** himself "had seen the sign corporally made corporally, and by thinking discerned the image of it passed in the spirit." Where that same thing is evident.

Item 10 *Confessions* chapter 10: "Not them," he says, namely mountains and rivers and other corporal things which he forenames, "by seeing was I absorbed, when I saw with eyes; nor are they themselves at me, but their image." Item in the following chapter: "For certainly those things are not sent into it," namely memory, "but only their images are captured with wonderful celerity." And many other things making for the same he says thence up to chapter 18 inclusive.

Item, *Against the Fundamental Epistle* he says that through the power "by which **truth** is understood" - that is the **intellect** - "one Carthage is seen to be true, another which the thinking person feigns."

Item this same thing he himself says below in chapter 29 and proves from the sense of hearing, saying: "Unless the spirit formed in its very self and memory retained the image of the voice perceived in the ears immediately, the second syllable would be ignored, whether it were the second, since already the first certainly would be nothing, which with the ear struck had passed; and so every use of locution, every sweetness of singing, finally every corporal motion in our acts would fall having slipped away nor would obtain any progress, if the spirit did not hold the passed motions of the body by memory. Which certainly it does not hold unless [as] made imaginally by itself in itself." These things **Augustine**.

Many other authorities both of the **Philosopher** and of the **Commentator** and of **Avicenna** can be adduced for this conclusion, which to avoid excessive prolixity I omit.

(Third conclusion is proved)

As to the **third conclusion** I say three things: The first is that in the **intellect species** of insensible and merely intelligible things are to be posited, such as of **intellections** and **volitions** and other acts of the **intellect** or **will**.

This is proved, because it happens to the **intellect** to remember such past acts and to understand them in their **species** left; and those **species** are not in any **interior** or exterior **sense**. Therefore in the **intellect species** of this kind are to be posited. The consequence is clear. And the first part of the antecedent was proved in the first book distinction 3 in that question "Whether intelligible things are naturally understood by us." The second part is evident enough from itself, because just as no sense is cognitive of that merely intelligible thing, so of no **species** of such things is it conservative.

It is confirmed through that of **Augustine** 15 *On the Trinity*: "For although," he says, "the memory of man and especially that which beasts do not have, that is by which intelligible things are so contained, that they did not come into it through the senses of the body etc." Where it is evident expressly that in the intellectual part he posits memory and intelligible **species** of intelligible things. But I suppose for now that intellectual memory is not a power distinct from the **intellect** according to **Augustine**, and as is held more commonly.

Item in book 14 chapter 2 and 3 he says that in the fatherland we will remember faith, which we have now, through its **species** which will remain in us. And so it is to be believed that now separated souls of the blessed remember which lack every sense.

The second is that in the **intellect** are to be posited **species** of sensible things feigned by it, which by moderns are called concepts, just as in the same place where above it is distinguished concerning **species**.

I prove this first thus: It happens to the **intellect** to understand sensible things by a common and confused **intellection** by which also no singular is understood determinately and distinctly. Therefore in the **intellect** there is, or it happens to be some **species** of sensibles. The antecedent is evident through experience; for one defining man or triangle certainly understands and notifies sensible things; and it is constant that not determinately this man or this triangle. The consequence is proved, because such common and confused cognition is terminated at something immediately, it is certain; and not at any thing outside the soul, because not at a universal thing, since no such is - as I suppose now and will be proved in book three - nor at any singular determinately, as experience proves. Therefore at some thing in the soul.

Therefore that either is a similitude of things and representative of them, and consequently is a **species**, as now the speech is concerning **species**, in the **intellect**, or received from things, because concerning this for now I do not care; for I use this name "**species**" generally for all manners of **species**, concerning which it is distinguished sufficiently in book 1 distinction 3 in the response to the fourth doubt of that question. Or that thing, at which such **intellection** is terminated, is not a **species**; and this cannot be said, since then through that **intellection** things outside would not be understood.

Again, that **species** is not in any sensitive force, just as no sensitive force is apprehensive universally. Which is proved, because, if any were, this would seem most of all concerning the **cogitative** of man, which is more perfect than all sensitive forces. But concerning that it is not true, as is evident through the **Commentator** 3 *On the Soul* comment 6; and in the same place comment 19 he says that it is proper to the **intellect** to judge infinities in a universal proposition. Item 2 *On the Soul* comment 65 he says that "comprehension of the intention of the individual is of senses and comprehension of the intention of the universal is of the **intellect**."

Secondly, it happens to the **intellect** to understand sensible quality, for example whiteness, by abstracting from every site and quantity, and similarly quantity by abstracting from every site and quality. Therefore it happens in the **intellect** to be some concepts or **species** of sensible things. The antecedent is evident from 3 *On the Soul* through the experience of speculative men, who can distinguish and distinctly define quiddities of things and advert to their proper passions. The consequence is proved. For to understand quality or quantity such the **intellect** cannot intuitively, as is known; nor abstractively in any sensible **species** of **interior** or exterior sense, since any **species** of sense represents the thing concerning quantity and quality and its site, as **Avicenna** says 6 *of Naturals* part 2 chapter 2. Therefore, since it is necessary to give some representative, in which it apprehends things of this kind such, it remains that that be some concept or **species** at the **intellect**.

The third is that in the **intellect** are to be posited **species** of sensible things, caused by them and received in the **intellect**. This is proved, because otherwise the separated soul could not naturally remember actually singular sensible things distinctly and determinately.

And further, since according to the sentence of **Augustine** in the book *On Care to be Had for the Dead* souls of the defunct naturally of themselves have no knowledge besides recordative concerning these things, which are at us or are done presently in this life at men, no more than we concerning them, it would follow that the separated soul would have entirely no distinct knowledge concerning any singular sensible; which according to the **saints** is false. And it is proved through that evangelical concerning the rich feaster who said he had five brothers in the world, as is written Luke 16. The consequence is evident, since such recording cannot become unless through a **species**, and not through a feigned **species**, as in the First [Book] is evident where above, therefore through a **species** derived from the things themselves, while they were sensed.

This conclusion is confirmed by the authority of **Augustine** 12 *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* chapter 16 pre-alleged for the second premise conclusion: "When something is discerned by the eyes etc." And through that also of the **Philosopher** 3 *On the Soul*: "And well saying are they that the soul is the place of **species**, except that not the whole, but the intellective," and through the **Commentator** in the same place comment 6.

(Fourth conclusion is proved)

The **fourth conclusion** is proved easily. Because **species** existing in the sensitive virtue sufficiently intense and firmed suffice to save all appearances and experiences about simple interior **knowledges** of this kind; therefore in vain would any habits be posited besides them.

Furthermore, in exterior sense any **habit** is not posited, according also to another opinion, but the object itself with the power suffices to elicit that **knowledge**; therefore neither in **interior sense** is any such **habit** to be posited, but the **species** itself retained equally with the cognitive power suffices to elicit the act or interior **knowledge**. The consequence is evident, since, just as in the First [Book] distinction three was shown diffusely, the **species** holds itself so to interior **knowledge**, just as the sensible outside to exterior; and so immediately interior **knowledge** is terminated at the **species** and is intuitive with respect to the **species** - although it be abstractive with respect to the thing outside -, just as exterior **knowledge** or exterior sense is terminated immediately at the sensible outside and is intuitive of it.

Not however through this do I deny any **habit**, by which intuiting a **species** of this kind he knows habitually that to be a **species** and similitude of another thing, just as where above was exposed. But this **habit** is not elicitive of that **knowledge** terminated immediately at the **species**.

Furthermore, **habit**, as now we speak of **habit**, inclines to acts similar to those, from which it is begotten; but intuitive **knowledge** of a thing outside and abstractive **knowledge** of the same are not similar nor of the same reason, even according to that opinion elsewhere. Therefore what is left from intuitive **knowledge** of something and does not incline to intuitive **knowledge** of the same but only to abstractive, is not a **habit**. Whatever therefore be that which inclines thus, the proposed is had; and certainly, another does not appear than a **species**.

(Replies to the reasons of Ockham)

Now it must be responded to the reasons of the opinion. And to those indeed, which are for the **first conclusion** and also for the **fifth**, whether they be efficacious or not, it is not work to respond, because concede those conclusions, if they intend to deny **species** to the sense posited above, not however, if universally, because, as was said, also the **knowledge** itself is called "**species**," nor so does that opinion intend to deny **species**.

Similarly I concede the **second conclusion**, but I say that that previous [thing] is a **species**; nor with respect to such simple **knowledge** is it necessary to posit another elicitive **habit**.

(Replies to the reasons of Ockham for his third conclusion)

And then it remains to respond to the reasons of the **third conclusion**. To the **first** I say first that not everything which is left from act or acts is a **habit**, accepting **habit** as in the proposed; nay rather also a **species** is left from act or after an act of intuition. Secondly I say that a **species**, even if it precedes certain acts namely of abstraction, nevertheless not every act, because not that intuitive, by the mediation of which it is acquired.

To the **second** I deny the minor, if it is taken to the proposed. And to the proof I say that the **Philosopher** does not speak concerning any **habit** which is with respect to such simple **knowledge**, but with respect to sciential and complex **knowledge**. Secondly I say that with respect to such simple **knowledge** the **intellect** is in accidental potency through the **species** itself, nor is another thing necessary for this.

And when further it is said that no one experiences himself to be in accidental potency with respect to cognitions, unless after **intellection**, I concede; for neither does anyone also have naturally a **species**

before every **intellection**. And when further it is added that, "if a thousand **species** previous etc. were posited," I say that that is impossible naturally just as well, as it is impossible concerning a **habit**, that it be had before every **intellection**. If however by divine virtue a **species** were caused in the **intellect** before every act, and with that also **knowledge** by which he would know that **species** to be a similitude of another without any other **habit**, such certainly would experience himself to be in accidental potency to **knowledge** of this kind, and when he willed, he could elicit that. And I add that with whatever **habit** posited, whether after **intellection** or before, and with the **species** representative of the object not posited, or with it entirely abolished so that it cannot be revoked by the **intellect**, never will the **intellect** be able to go out into such abstractive **knowledge**. And consequently neither will he experience himself to be, nor will he be in accidental potency to that, as is evident through **Augustine** 11 *On the Trinity* chapter 3 and 5, and what is stronger by experience itself.

And through these is evident to the **third argument**.

To the **fourth** I say that a **species** is required on account of representation of the object, and so that it may supply its place. Whence just as **Augustine** says 10 *On the Trinity* chapter 5, because "the soul cannot bring into itself inwardly as into a region of incorporeal nature bodies themselves, it rolls together and seizes their images." And in book 11 chapter 9: "So that," he says, "there can be the vision of the thinking person, therefore in memory from the vision of the sensing person some similar is made, to which the gaze of the mind may convert itself so in thinking, just as the gaze of the eyes converts itself to the body in discerning." Item 12 *On Genesis* chapter 29 he says that "when first we see some body which before we had not seen, its image begins to be in our spirit, which when that will have been absent we remember."

Item the **Philosopher** 3 *On the Soul*: To the intellectual soul, he says, "**phantasms** are as sensibles." And the **Commentator** there in comment 39 says that images of sensibles are to the **intellect** in place of sensibles.

Many other testimonies could be induced and were induced where above in the First [Book], by which it appears **species** themselves are made naturally in us for no other, unless so that we may be able to know absent things in them or through them; and that so our cognition is terminated at them in the absence of things which they represent, just as at the things themselves when they exist present.

Now to the proofs which are against this. To the first I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. And the proof has no appearance; for it is not a consequent that the object in absence, or when it is not at all, present itself to the power, if, while it is actually and duly opposite, it presents itself or rather is present so, that it can be known immediately.

To the second I concede that the presented is previously known, namely through intuitive **knowledge**; and a **species** does not precede that but accompanies and remains after that, as from the said appears enough, and more fully in the first book.

To the third it must be said, that whether that be true or not, nevertheless it is not the cause in the proposed; but the cause is that which was touched, namely that, because the thing cannot always be objected immediately through its very self to the soul, whether because it ceased entirely or because it is

absent, nature or rather **God** the institutor of nature succors, so that through something similar to the thing present to us it would be in [us], through which we could know the thing absent or not now existing.

Reply to the arguments of Ockham for his fourth conclusion

To the arguments for the fourth conclusion, it must be answered: To the first, indeed, it must be said that not every object of the interior sense is, or even can be, an object of the exterior sense, although something can be an object of the exterior sense and of some interior sense. However, that which is an **object of the interior** [sense], and **not of the exterior**, is the **species itself**; likewise also the sensation of the exterior sense, as is clear through Augustine in the 2nd book of *On Free Will*, chapters 7 and 8, and through the Philosopher in the 2nd book of *On the Soul*.

To the second, it must be said that that species is not of the same but of a **different nature** from the object outside. And when it is assumed that a power capable of discerning between individuals less dissimilar, etc., it must be said that **likeness** can be understood in two ways: In one way, for an **essential agreement** according to genus or species, just as two men and two individuals of the same species are said to be alike; in another way, for a certain **accidental agreement**, by which an image is said to be like that of which it is an image. And by the opposite, dissimilarity can be understood.

If, however, the assumed proposition is understood concerning things dissimilar by a dissimilarity opposed to likeness in the first way, it is not universally true. And an instance is clear; for it is certain that a **wolf and a sheep** are less dissimilar in this way than a wolf and a wooden statue of a wolf, and yet a lamb will distinguish well between a true wolf and a sheep—indeed, even between its mother sheep and another sheep, which agree even more essentially—but **not between a true wolf and a statue of a wolf**. For if it saw a very imperfect statue, it would flee from it just as from a true wolf. Many other instances could be given. And because in this sense, as it seems, the argument proceeds, therefore it does not conclude. If, however, it is understood in the second way, then the minor premise is false. For a species is **more like the thing** of which it is, according to this mode of likeness, than two external individuals of the same nature.

Furthermore, that major premise, even if one wished to admit it, ought to be understood: "If other things were equal in themselves and in relation to the cognitive power itself"; which does not happen in the present case. For two external individuals can be **apprehended intuitively** in distinct places both simultaneously and separately, but not so regarding the species and the thing outside. For never can the thing and its species be apprehended intuitively by the same power at the same time, neither in distinct places nor in the same place.

And many other differences could be assigned on both sides, because of which that power cannot so distinguish an image from the thing of which it is an image as it can two things outside, granted that such an interior power could intuitively apprehend things outside, as some concede this to be possible, provided however the exterior sense concurs.

And what has been said ought to be understood concerning the **sensitive power**, about which the argument was made; since, if the argument were about the **intellective power**, it would have to be said

that it certainly can distinguish between a thing and its species; but concerning the sensitive power, it can more easily be turned into a doubt.

To the other point, by which it is proven that a habit is placed in the power, it must be answered just as to the arguments for his third conclusion. For all that is preserved through the **species without a habit**, but not through a habit so understood. The Ordinary Text follows.

QUESTION 3: Whether angels know things through species distinct from the actual cognitions by which they know the things themselves.

Secondly, concerning this matter of the knowledge of angels, I ask whether angels know things through species distinct from the actual cognitions by which they know the things themselves.

And it is argued that they do not. Man does not know through species distinct from his cognitions, therefore neither does an angel. The consequence is clear, because an angel does not need more things for knowing, since he is **more perfect in intellectual nature** than man. The antecedent is proved, because man does not sense through a species distinct from sensation, therefore neither does he understand through a species distinct from intellection; therefore man does not know through a species distinct from cognition. The first consequence is clear, because the intellect is more powerful than the sense; the second is proved, because every cognition of man is sensation or intellection. The first antecedent is clear, because in exterior sensitive vision we experience no species, nor can we by any reason prove a species of this kind distinct from the act. For given precisely **color and light and sight**, well-disposed in itself and toward the color, vision is produced, nor is anything else required.

To the contrary is argued by the authority of **Dionysius** in the 4th book of *On the Divine Names*, saying that angels are illuminated through scientific forms of things and reasons. Likewise, in the 10th proposition of *On Causes* it is written: "Every intelligence is full of forms." Moreover, forms and species signify the same thing.

I respond. Here there will be three articles: For first it will be inquired whether man knows through species. Second, whether through species **essentially distinct from cognitions**, which two things are implied in the argument of the question. Third, that which is principally sought.

ARTICLE 1

Although the matter of the first article was treated in some way in the first book, distinction 3, question 1, nevertheless for its fuller discussion and because of the comparison had concerning it in the *Principia* of the books of the Sentences among certain bachelors competing with me in the Lecture, I wish to treat it again here in some way, yet not repeating what was said in the First Book except insofar as it shall be necessary because of some objects or contrary sayings against those things.

Distinction concerning the Species

Lest the equivocation of this word "**species**" disturb such an inquiry in any way, I premise a certain distinction concerning the name itself. Although this name "species" is highly equivocal to many things, nevertheless, having dismissed many of its significations and taking it only as it falls into the use of those disputing and treating of cognition and the way in which the soul knows, I say that it can be understood in four ways:

1. First, most commonly for **every form concurring** toward having cognition. And according to this mode, even the form of the body itself which is known is called a species.
2. Second, more commonly for **every form which is in some way a reason** for knowing another thing. And according to this mode, art and other cognitive habits can be called species.
3. Third way, commonly for **any form which is a likeness and image** of the thing known and through which that thing is known. And according to this mode, the actual cognition itself is called a species.
4. Fourth way, it is taken specially and properly, namely for the **form which is a likeness or image** of the thing known, **remaining naturally in the soul** even after the soul has ceased to know actually, suited by nature to lead the soul into the cognition of the thing of which it is an image and likeness.

Augustine uses the name of species in the first and the two last ways in the 11th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 9; and the Philosopher uses it in the second way in the 7th book of the *Metaphysics* in that chapter "Of those things which come to be," when he says: "The medical and the building [arts] are the species of health and of a house." In the present case, however, this name species is taken only in the **fourth way**.

Four principal conclusions

These things having been premised, concerning this article I pose four conclusions:

- The first is that in our soul there are **such species of sensible things**.
- The second, that in the soul there are also species of some **insensible and purely intelligible** things.
- The third, that the soul or man sometimes knows some things **through species**.
- The fourth, that man sometimes knows some things, and **not through species**.

The first principal conclusion is proved, first

I prove the first conclusion first by supposing one thing which anyone can experience in himself, namely that whenever he thinks of some sensible thing not then present which he nevertheless saw at another time—for example, a **lion**—something is immediately presented to his thought which is a lion or something like a lion, just as when one gazes with the eyes at a color on a wall, that color is immediately presented to his vision.

So I always experience for certain. **Augustine** suggested that he experienced himself thus when in the 11th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 8, he said: "So it happens that everyone who thinks of corporeal things, whether he himself fashions something or hears or reads one narrating past things or foretelling future things, recurs to his memory and there finds the mode and measure of all forms which he beholds in thinking." For it is certain that this could not be known to him except through the **experience** by which he

experienced that whenever he thought of something sensible not present, something was immediately presented, as was said, to his thought. And so he argued that others experienced it.

And because he proved by reason that such a thing is **not some thing existing outside the soul**, and yet is some true entity, he concluded that it was some **form in the memory**, such as I said is signified by the name of species.

The Philosopher showed that he experienced the same thing in *On Memory and Reminiscence*, where he says that when someone understands some quantity, even not insofar as it is a quantity, some **quantity is placed before his eyes**. And it is certain that he was not speaking of the exterior eyes, otherwise we could not understand such things in the night. Likewise, he himself would not prove from this his intent, namely that "the understanding of such things is not without a phantasm." But what is it "to be placed before the eyes" except to be seen or presented to vision?

Since, therefore, these men thus experienced in themselves and I likewise always experience, I wonder much that a **certain associate** [Scotus] denied this supposition, saying that such an experience was not common to him. Nor do I believe him for certain, saving his grace, supposing that he is equivocally a man with me.

This experience being supposed, therefore, I prove the proposition thus: That which is so presented to one thinking of a sensible not present is **not some thing existing outside the soul**, therefore it is some species or image or phantasm of it existing in the soul; for I do not care about the name. For the authors frequently use any of the aforesaid in the same signification. The consequence is clear enough.

The antecedent is proved, first

I prove the antecedent because if such a thing were some true thing outside the soul, one so thinking could **evidently know that thing to exist**, and know where it is, and what it is doing, and similar contingent truths about it; which is against common experience.

This consequence is proved by authority and reason. By authority indeed of **Augustine**, since he approves the same consequence and for the same purpose in *On the Quantity of the Soul*, chapter 8. Whereupon, with the disciple speaking of the city of **Milan** not present to him, which he had seen at another time and was then remembering, and saying: "What is being done there, I do not know; which surely I would not be ignorant of, if my mind were stretched out as far as those places and sensed them as present," Augustine responds: "You seem to me to say the truth."

Moreover, this saying cannot be understood of local presence, since, even if he had been within that city with his eyes closed and had then thought about it, he would likewise have been ignorant of what was being done there. He was speaking, therefore, of the **presence of objective immediacy**, as if he were saying: "If my thought were immediately terminated at those places, or if those things at which it is immediately terminated were those which I saw, I would not be ignorant of what is now being done there."

He also makes a similar consequence in *On True Religion*, chapter 60: "If Rome is one, etc.," as was alleged in the First Book; and again he adds: "If that friend of mine is one, this one is false whom I

fashion in thinking." And he proves it: "For where that one may be, I know not; **this one is fashioned there, where I wish.**"

I also prove it by reason, because there is no reason why one seeing some thing immediately through the exterior sense knows it to be, and other contingent truths about it, except because he knows it **immediately in itself**; so, therefore, it would be in the present case if the interior thought were immediately terminated at the thing itself outside.

Objection of the associates

But to this it was said by two bachelor associates that there was another reason, namely because the vision of the exterior sense is **intuitive cognition**, by virtue of which such contingent truths can be known; but the thought of an absent thing is **abstractive cognition**, through which such truths cannot be known.

Solution of the objection of the associates

This is not valid, because I ask what cognition and by what reason you call "intuitive" of some thing. For either you call it that which is **immediately terminated objectively** at that thing—and you call it intuitive because it is so immediately terminated—and then it follows that if the interior thought is immediately terminated at the thing outside, it is an intuitive cognition of it; and further follows the inference. Or you call it intuitive, as some **moderns** [Ockham] say, by which it can be known that a thing is, if it is, or is not, if it is not, and other contingent truths about it; and then to say that this cannot be known through a cognition of this kind because it is not intuitive, and through that one it can be because it is intuitive, is nothing else than to say: "**through this it cannot because it cannot through this, and through that it can because it can through that,**" and it is to solve the question by itself. And similarly another will be able to say that through thought that can be known, and not through exterior vision, for the reason that he will call the former intuitive and the exterior vision abstractive.

Furthermore, I ask why through that which you call intuitive can such truths be known. Nor does it seem that any other reason can be given besides this, namely because it is **immediately terminated objectively** at the thing itself. Therefore, the same will have to be said concerning cognition, if it is immediately terminated at the thing outside, whether you wish afterwards to call it intuitive or abstractive, because there ought to be no care concerning words.

It remains, therefore, that that at which such thought is immediately objectively terminated is not some thing outside.

The antecedent is proved, second

Secondly, I prove the same antecedent, and I suppose two things: One is that whenever someone so thinks of a sensible not present, that very thing is presented immediately to his thought—if some such sensible were actually outside the soul—which would be presented if none such were entirely; and this is clear. For to him who has seen a **rose**, if he thinks of a rose, granted that none is present to him, though many are in the world, nothing else is presented than if none then existed. Otherwise, he could know by the power of thought precisely whether any were in the world or not. Likewise, thinking in summer when

there are many, and in winter when there are none, he would experience or could experience a **diversity of objects** immediately terminating his thoughts; which is against all experience.

Secondly, I suppose that whenever anyone thinks of a sensible not present, that which is immediately presented to him is some **entity or entities actually existing** in the nature of things, whether subjectively in the soul or outside the soul. This is clear, because at a **non-being** no simple cognition of ours naturally held is immediately terminated.

From these I prove the proposition thus: That which is presented to one thinking of a sensible not present, while no such sensible is actually outside the soul, is not some thing outside the soul. Therefore, that which is presented to one thinking of a sensible not present is not some thing outside the soul. The antecedent is proved, because if it were then some thing outside the soul, it would not be except some of such sensibles. For it cannot be said that that which is presented to one thinking of a rose is some thing outside the soul and is not a rose; and thus some such thing would be and no such thing would be, which is not fitting. The consequence is proved, because always that which is presented to one so thinking is some thing, as the second supposition says, and I understand always concerning that which is presented immediately, and consequently that which is immediately presented to one so thinking when no such sensible is outside the soul, is certainly some **thing existing subjectively in the soul**. Therefore, by the first supposition, that which is immediately presented to one thinking of a similar sensible when some such is outside the soul, is also some thing in the soul. Therefore, it is not some thing existing outside the soul.

Response of the associates

To this reason, it was responded by denying the second supposition, and in this negation two bachelor associates agreed.

Proposition against the response of the associates

On account of which I prove, as I also then proved, this universal proposition: Of any simple cognition held by us naturally, the **immediate object is something actually existing** or some entity, as I previously assumed. This is proved first, because if the opposite be given, it follows that we can be naturally certain of the actual existence of no contingent thing. The consequence is proved, since such certainty proceeds first from the simple cognition by which we immediately behold that or another thing immediately in itself. Whereupon, if it be asked of one asserting a whiteness to exist or some other thing, how it is certain to him that it is, he will say: "**because I see it**"; so concerning other insensible things which are within us, such as are the operations of the soul, when interrogated he will not respond otherwise except: "because I see or behold with the mind."

But if that which is immediately beheld through some cognition does not exist, whence will anyone be able naturally to be certain that that which is immediately beheld through another [cognition], whether of the same or of a different nature, exists? It does not appear whence. Nor is it valid to say that the other is intuitive, since if by intuitive is understood a cognition through which it can be known that the object-thing exists, as some describe it, it is equally proved that **none would be intuitive**.

Secondly, I confirm this from the expressed intention of blessed **Augustine** in the 11th book of the *Confessions*, chapters 18 and 19, where he determines that neither can past things be knowingly narrated or known naturally, nor even future things be foreknown or foretold, except from the cognition of some **present things**, and from this foundation precisely as a certain principle for himself: that that which is not, **cannot be seen or discerned immediately by the mind**. Whereupon in chapter 18 he argues that past and future things are [real] from the fact that those are narrated and these are foretold, and through this they are seen. "Moreover, that which is not," he says, "cannot be seen."

And a little after in the following chapter he adds, saying: "Although past things, when they are narrated as true, are brought forth from the memory, not the things themselves which have passed away, but **words conceived from their images**, which they fixed in the mind like footprints by passing through the senses." And he gives an example: "My childhood indeed, which now is not, is in the past time, which now is not; but its **image**, when I recollect and narrate it, I behold in the present time, because it is still in my memory." Behold that through the cognition of an image actually existing in the memory, past things are recollected and known. Then he speaks immediately of future things: "Whether," he says, "there be a similar cause also of foretelling future things, so that of things which are not yet, images already existing are perceived beforehand, I confess, my God, I know not." And after a few words he adds: "In whatever way, therefore, the secret perception of future things may be, **nothing can be seen except what is**. But that which already is, is not future, but present."

And then consequently, examples also having been interposed, he declares and determines that future things cannot be immediately known, but only through the mediation of cognitions of actually existing and present things, namely of their **signs or causes**. And he speaks of the cognition which we have naturally, not however of that of the holy prophets, as is clear there manifest. So therefore that proposition is clear, and consequently the efficacy of the reason made.

(Objections of John Duns Scotus)

Against this proposition, however, one of the associates [Scotus] argues in two ways. **First** as follows: The immediate object of the thought of one who has seen a rose, that rose being now corrupted, is either a rose similar to that corrupted rose which was apprehended by the thinker—and this is not the case, because he thinks only of that specific one which he saw; or it is a **likeness of the corrupted rose**—and this is not the case, because no thought by which an external sensible thing is known (whether it exists or not) is terminated at something existing in the soul as at a known object, as he himself attempted to prove by many reasons to be solved below; or it is that very rose which was apprehended—and thus the intent [of Scotus] is held.

Second as follows: The immediate object of **complacency** (pleasure) is sometimes a non-being; therefore, the immediate object of the thought of a pleasing thing is sometimes a non-being. The consequence is proved because when there are two powers essentially ordered, whatever is the immediate object of the act of one is also the object of the other. But the **will and the intellect** are of this kind, according to a sound understanding, because it is impossible for the will to will or nill anything unless the intellect foreknows it. The antecedent is proved because someone opining the virtue of justice or temperance in someone in whom it is not, takes complacency in a virtue which is a non-being.

(Reply to the objections of John Duns Scotus)

To the first, I respond that the immediate object of that thought is the **likeness of the corrupted rose**, and I deny that proposition assumed to prove his point. To his proofs, however, I shall respond below in the third conclusion of this article.

To the second, I deny the consequence. To the proof "whenever there are two powers, etc.," I deny it; for according to those things which I hold, that proposition has many false singular instances, and he himself does not prove it but posits it absolutely. Furthermore, I say that although it could be conceded in a good sense that everything willed or nilled is known, it must not however be said that whatever is the **immediate object of the act of the will** is the immediate object of the act of the intellect in us, as he speaks concerning us. And it is clear in the example of a **Blessed** [in Heaven] who, by the same cognition by which he sees the Word, sees a creature in the Word, as I think and many doctors think. Granted, then, that some Blessed sees in the Word the sin of some wayfarer; this cognition and no other remaining in him, he will be able to hate the sin of the aforesaid wayfarer. And then that hated sin, although it is also known, is nevertheless the immediate object of hatred—for it is not hated by means of another hated thing—yet it is **not the immediate object of the cognition** of that Blessed, but only the Word is. And the Word itself is so the immediate object of the cognition, but not of the hatred.

(Objection of Francis of Treviso)

Another associate [Francis] also attempted to prove the aforesaid proposition to be false because, even if no elephant existed, he said, a natural philosopher could think about an elephant.

I respond that unless that philosopher then had in his mind a **species or concept of an elephant**, by means of which (being known) he might think about an elephant, he could in no way think about it, as is clear from what has been said, and will appear more fully from what is to be said.

(The antecedent is proved, thirdly)

Thirdly, I prove the same antecedent thus: It happens that to someone thinking of a thing which he never sensed through the exterior sense, there is presented a **likeness** of that which is presented to another who saw it at another time. Whereupon, if someone who saw an elephant should narrate to another who never saw it what kind of figure and arrangement of limbs it has, there would occur to the listener a likeness of that which occurred to the narrator—especially if he narrates distinctly and perfectly, and the listener has strong interior powers—"just as **Aristotle** narrates concerning a certain ancient man who so shaped things conveyed to him through hearing which he never saw, that when those forms were tested, they were found according to their true disposition," as the **Commentator** [Averroes] writes in *On Memory and Reminiscence*. But it is certain that a true elephant outside the soul is not immediately presented to the listener, because it is not a universal (since there is no such thing), nor any or all singulars, as is clear; nor

is there any reason why one singular determinately rather than another, since he never saw any. Therefore, **no true elephant outside** is immediately presented to such a listener, and therefore neither to the narrator. And by this, that which is immediately presented to him thinking of an elephant not present is not some true thing existing outside the soul.

(Responses of the associates)

In responding to this reason, it was said by one [Francis] that an elephant is presented to the listener, not as a universal nor even as every singular, but as some **singular under the aspect of a non-signated** and indeterminate singular, but a "vague" singular in a certain way.

The other [Scotus] indeed said that **every singular elephant** is presented to such a listener, because every one is known indifferently by that cognition, nor is "being presented" anything other than "being known."

(Against the responses of the associates)

To exclude these responses, I premise two suppositions: One is that whenever we think of some external sensible not present, whether we have previously sensed such a thing or not, something is **immediately presented to our cognition** by way of a known object (whatever that may be), just as when we gaze with the external eyes of the body, there is presented to our vision the color which we see. Thus our interior gaze is immediately terminated at that thing, just as the exterior corporal vision is immediately terminated at the color on the wall. And this supposition is clear through the common experience of all, which Augustine also confesses.

The second supposition is that that which is so presented is **not purely nothing**, but is some entity; and this was recently proved. And it is confirmed because we experience sometimes that we look at one such thing, sometimes two, sometimes three, or according to another number at the whim of our will. It is certain that such a multitude can only be of entities.

(The first conclusion against the responses of the associates, first)

These things having been premised, I pose two conclusions against both responses: The first is that that which is the immediate object of the thought of him who never sensed any such thing exteriorly is **not a true thing outside the soul**. I prove this, and I posit as before that someone who never saw an elephant thinks of an elephant at the narration of another. That which is immediately presented to him is some entity or entities.

Suppose there is one, and let it be called **A**, so that **A** stands determinately for that entity; then thus: **A** is not some universal elephant outside the soul, as both concede. Nor is it some true singular elephant,

because there is no reason why it should be said to be this one or that one, whatever true singular elephant is pointed out, since, as is supposed, he never sensed any; therefore it is not any singular elephant.

Nor does the distinction concerning the **vague and signated (or determinate) singular** help, because, whatever may be the case regarding such modes of apprehending "determinately" or "vaguely," in the nature of things there falls no distinction between a determinate and a vague singular—as if there were some true singular determinate elephant outside the soul and another vague one—but every one is a **certain and determinate singular**, distinct from every other. Now, however, there is no reason why A should be one of those rather than another, whether some elephant be said to be presented to the thought vaguely or determinately.

(Response of Francis of Treviso)

To this replication, he himself responded saying that A, thought of and taken under the aspect of a **vague individual**, is not "this one" or "that one," because "this one" or "that one" says a determinate and signated individual; and therefore it does not follow: "A so thought of is not this nor that elephant, therefore it is not some singular elephant."

(Against the response of Francis of Treviso)

Against this: First as follows: Every singular elephant existing outside the soul is "this elephant" or "that one" or "that one," thus pointing out every singular elephant existing outside the soul; but A, thought of under the aspect of a vague individual, is not "this" or "that" pointed-out singular; therefore **A so thought of is not any singular existing outside the soul**. The minor of this reason has now been granted by him, and the major is clear, because it is a universal affirmative whose every singular is true. For whatever singular elephant existing outside the soul is pointed out, it is true to say "this singular elephant existing outside the soul is this elephant"—the same being pointed out in the subject and the predicate—otherwise he would not be himself. And it follows: "this elephant is this elephant; therefore this elephant is this elephant, or that one, or that one," thus pointing out every one.

The conclusion of this reason contradicts what he gave in his first response. For he said that A, which is the object of thought in the given case (of which he also says it is not thought of except under the aspect of a vague individual), is certainly **some one singular elephant existing outside the soul**.

Furthermore, from this conclusion (which is concluded from a true major and a granted minor), the point principally intended follows: namely, that such an immediate object of thought is **not some thing existing outside the soul**. For if it were some thing, it would certainly be some elephant; for it would not be a stag or a horse or anything else other than an elephant.

Secondly, against the same response given, I suppose one certain thing: namely, that it is not from the fact that this person (who never saw an elephant) now thinks of an elephant that some true elephant begins to be in the nature of things; and similarly, if he ceases to think, a true elephant does not therefore cease to

be. Since, therefore, according to the response, **A is some one true singular elephant** existing outside the soul, then before this person thought of an elephant, A was in the nature of things, and after he ceases to think, A will still be in the nature of things. Therefore, out of all true singular elephants existing in the nature of things, one determinate and certain one is the immediate object of the thought of this man who never saw any—say, elephant A. But this is granted irrationally, because, as I have said many times, there is **no stronger reason for A than for B or C** or any other singular elephant.

(Against the response of John Duns Scotus)

Against the response of the second [Scotus], I argue thus: A is not every singular elephant, therefore every singular elephant is not immediately presented to one so thinking. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved: Both because **A is precisely that or those things** which it would be if, while this person were thinking of an elephant, no elephant were in the nature of things. But it is certain that A would not be every elephant—indeed, it would not be any elephant nor any elephants outside the soul—if no elephant existed; otherwise some elephant would be while no elephant existed, which includes contradictories. Therefore, now A is not every elephant.

And by the same [reason], one can also argue against the preceding response of the other [Francis].

Secondly, it is possible that to such a person thinking there is presented, as I said above, one such thing and then two such and three and four at his whim. But such a **multiplication of objects** of this kind would not be possible if every one were "all elephants outside"; just as it is not possible for there to be several multitudes, each of which is "all elephants." Nor can it be said that one of these objects is all elephants, and not by equal reason every one of them.

To this he [Scotus] responds by simply denying the assumption, unless it be understood that the thinker can have two thoughts and three, each of which refers to the object.

Against this: First, unless this man wishes to deny experience, he will not deny that sometimes one so thinking experiences "three certain things" appearing to him. Therefore, those are either **three thoughts** or **three objects of thoughts**.

If the first, then also when he experiences only one such appearing thing, that is a certain one thought; and consequently, to one thinking of an elephant there is immediately presented **his own thought** and not an elephant outside the soul (one or all), the opposite of which he says. Likewise, the object (or what is immediately presented to one so thinking) would never be a non-being, the opposite of which he also frequently said in responding. And the consequence is clear, because every thought of his is a being.

If, however, the second be given, the antecedent previously denied is conceded.

Secondly, if it be said that never are two such or three, etc., presented to the thinker, but it is only true to say that such a person has three thoughts referring to the same object—why with equal facility could it not be said that when I look with my bodily eyes, **three men are not presented to me**, but I have three visions referring to the same object? I think that a sufficient reason cannot be assigned.

(The first conclusion against the responses of the associates, second)

Secondly, I principally prove this conclusion thus: That which is the immediate object of the thought of him who thinks of a **golden mountain** or a **river of milk** or any other such thing as is nothing (nor ever was) in the nature of things outside the soul, is not some true entity of that kind outside the soul (one or several), as is certain. Therefore, neither is that which is the immediate object of the thought of him who thinks of some thing such as he never sensed exteriorly. The consequence is clear because both this person and that one have an altogether **similar experience of the objects** which are immediately presented to them. And therefore, unless one wishes to utter a purely arbitrary opinion, he must judge similarly of both.

(Response of John Duns Scotus)

To this reason, the same bachelor responds by denying the consequence. To the proof, he concedes that they have a similar (that is, proportional) experience—if "experience" ought to be called abstractive cognition; but this, he says, is nothing other than to say that this person and that one have **similar cognitions**. From this, however, it does not follow: "therefore the objects equally exist or do not exist," because a deceived person and one not deceived sometimes have similar judgments and sometimes similar intuitives, and yet their objects do not equally exist or not exist.

(Against the response of John Duns Scotus)

This response is not reasonable because, concerning the existence of things which we cannot judge with certitude except through experience—where altogether similar experiences are had on both sides, nor is a greater or more [experience] had on one side than on the other—if one does not judge similarly of their existence, the judgment is **irrational and purely arbitrary**. Whereupon, if it be asked of the one judging dissimilarly why he judges A to exist and B not to exist, I think he will not be able to respond reasonably if he has an altogether similar experience of both. So, however, it is in the present case, as I was saying and is well known.

As to that which is said concerning the deceived and non-deceived who sometimes have similar intuitives and similar judgments: I say that whoever have similar intuitives (so that whatever one has, the other also has, and vice versa), if they judge reasonably, they will have similar judgments concerning the existence of the objects intuitively known. And furthermore, I say that **neither will be deceived**, since everyone will judge the object intuitively known by him to exist, and the judgment of both will be true; because it is **not naturally possible that a non-existing thing be known by us intuitively**, as I have sufficiently proved (as I think) against this associate in treating a certain other article.

(Second conclusion against the responses of the associates)

The second conclusion against the response given is that that which is the **immediate object of the thought** of him who has previously sensed such a thing is **not a true thing existing outside the soul**.

I prove this first from the preceding [conclusion] thus: The immediate object of the thought of him who never sensed such a thing exteriorly is not a true thing existing outside the soul; therefore, neither is the immediate object of the thought of him who at another time sensed such a thing. The consequence is proved from the fact that, as I said above, it happens sometimes that that which is immediately presented to one is **totally similar** (as to appearance) to that which is presented to the other. Whatever experience one can have concerning the existence of his object, the other can also have concerning the existence of his.

Nor can the one have any experience by which he knows that what is immediately presented to him exists outside the soul any more than the other can. And therefore, it must reasonably be judged similarly that either both or neither is a true thing outside; otherwise, just as one says his object is a true thing outside, so the other will say of his, nor can one be proved more than the other. Since, therefore, it is not to be said that sometimes the object of the one who sensed is a thing outside, and sometimes not, it remains to be said that **never is such an object a thing outside**.

This is confirmed by **Augustine** in the 8th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 5: where, just as he says that what was presented to him while he thought of **Alexandria** (which he had never seen) is its phantasm, so also that which was presented to him when he thought of **Carthage** (which he had seen) he says is the phantasm of Carthage. He does not, however, say that the former is a phantasm while the latter is the thing itself outside (namely, true Carthage).

Secondly as follows: To one who saw the **sun**, sometimes several things are presented at once, each of which is the true sun or something like the true sun. And it is certain that not every one is the true sun, since there is only one sun; therefore, **none of those is the true sun outside**. The consequence is clear because the reason is the same for all. And further: therefore, when only one such thing is presented, that is not the true sun outside. And the judgment is the same for any sensible thing outside which we think of in its absence.

To this reason, the same associate responded by denying the antecedent, unless it be understood (as he said to another response) that he who once saw the sun sometimes has several thoughts by which the same sun seen intuitively appears to him in different positions.

Against this: This response denies experience, because whether those things so appearing to the thinker exist or do not exist, and whether they are thoughts or other things—nevertheless, that **several things appear to him at once** no one can deny who wishes not to deny experience. Furthermore, as I said above, another could similarly say to him that he does not see, when he is in his chair, several men, but one man in several positions, which would be absurd.

Thirdly, the same is proved by the express determination of **Augustine** in *On True Religion*, chapter 60, where he says: "If Rome is one, which some Romulus is said to have founded near the Tiber, **this one is**

false which I fashion in thinking, for it is not the city itself." Where note: "this one is false," and again "for it is not the city itself."

(Response of John Duns Scotus)

But to this, the same associate responded saying that Augustine intends there to distinguish between **intuitive and abstractive cognition**, about which he elsewhere spoke commonly and indistinctly. And the sense of the authority is: One is the cognition by which I intuitively discern Rome, and another by which, being absent, I think of it. And because by means of the first it is known that Rome is, therefore he calls it "true"; but because by means of the second that cannot be known, he calls it "false."

(Against the response of John Duns Scotus)

But this response for certain is not fitting: Both because Augustine does not intend there to distinguish between intuitive and abstractive cognition, as this man says, but intends to show that a **distinction must be made between the thing outside and its phantasm** which we fashion in its absence. Whereupon, after the words alleged, he adds: "If the sun is one, false is that which I fashion in thinking"; and likewise: "If this friend of mine is one, false is this one whom I fashion in thinking." And all these things having been proved, he concludes his intent under the form of a question, saying: "Are these not those things which are accustomed to be called **phantasms**? Whence, then, is my soul filled with illusions, etc.?"

Furthermore, Augustine says "if Rome is one... false is this one which I fashion in thinking"; according to this [Scotus's] response, in the antecedent, by "Rome" one must understand "the intuitive cognition of Rome," and consequently, that the word "which" immediately following stands for such a "cognition," and thus the sense will be that **Romulus founded the intuitive cognition of Rome near the Tiber**. What could be more foolish to say?

Furthermore, how would that consequence hold, "if that one is one, this one is false," if it were understood of cognitions? Certainly in no way, because it does not follow: "if the intuitive cognition of Rome is one, therefore the abstractive cognition of it is false." But if by "Rome" in the antecedent the **thing outside** is understood, and in the consequent the **immediate object of thought** in absence is understood, it follows well; because if that one is only one, since this one which the thinker fashions is not that one—as he himself assumes in the proof of the consequence—it follows that it is its phantasm or image, and consequently is a **false Rome**, just as a painted man or the image of a man is called a "false man."

Furthermore, immediately when Augustine said "for it is not the city itself," he proves it saying: "For what is being done there now, I would surely know"; it is certain, however, that the word "there" in the consequent stands for Rome, not for the cognition of Rome. For when it is said "what is being done there," nothing else is signified than if it were said "what is being done in the city itself," and it is certain that this cannot be understood of the cognition of Rome, but only of **Rome itself**.

To the same [point] is another authority of the same [Augustine] in *Against the Letter of the Foundation*, chapter 11, where he says: By the power by which truth is understood, "it is seen that **one is the true Carthage, another that which the thinker fashions.**"

Likewise, in the 12th book *On Genesis*, chapter 49, speaking directly of the thought of absent sensibles (which he calls "spiritual vision"), he says: "In spiritual vision, that is, in the **likenesses of bodies** which are seen by the spirit, the soul is deceived when it thinks those things which it so sees to be the bodies themselves, etc." It would not be deceived in so thinking if those things which it so sees and are presented to it were the true bodies themselves which are outside the soul. They are, therefore, not things outside the soul.

Likewise the same in the letter *To Paulina On Seeing God*: "The soul entrusts **incorporeal likenesses of bodies** to the memory incorporeally; whence, when it wishes and is able, it judges them as if brought forth from custody and exhibited in the sight of thought; and when it wishes, it even discerns these two: what it left outside in the corporal species, and what it beholds inside as its likeness. And that [one] is discerned to be absent, this [one] present; just as while I am absent, you think of the face of my body, and that image is present to you, but the face (of which it is the image) is absent; and this [face] is a body, but that [image] is an **incorporeal likeness of the body.**" Behold that he clearly discerns the image of the absent thing presented to thought from the thing outside, which is thought of in that [image] or by means of it.

But listen still to what he adds in the same letter: "Behold," he says, "heaven and earth by thinking, just as you are accustomed to discern them by the eyes of the body; and see that those **images of heaven and earth** which have been brought forth before the eyes of thought are likenesses of bodies, **not bodies.**" I know not how he could speak more expressly for this proposition.

By many other authorities to be induced for proving directly the principal conclusion, this very thing will be clearly proved.

From these two conclusions proved against the response given, the **principal conclusion follows**: namely, that in the soul are the species of sensible things, thus: That which one experiences to be immediately presented to him while he thinks of an absent sensible is either the true sensible thing itself outside the soul, or it is something existing in the soul similar to it. This is clear; for it must be some thing existing either in the soul or outside the soul, as was proved above. But it is not the true thing itself outside, as is clear from the two conclusions and their proofs. Therefore, it is **something existing in the soul** similar to it.

This, moreover, I call and the authors call a "**species,**" although it is also named by them by many other words, namely: image, phantasm, phantasy, likeness, form, and others besides these, as is clear to those running through their sayings.

(The first principal conclusion is proved, secondly)

Secondly, I prove the same conclusion thus: If no such species are posited in the soul, it must be conceded that those things which appear to sleepers, and even to frenzied men while awake, are true things existing outside the soul. Consequently, that would be true wine which appears to them while they

dream they are drinking wine, and that would be true fire which appears while they dream they are being burned, so that they would truly taste wine and truly touch fire just as it appears to them. Also, he would be a true man who appears to another in dreams to be disputing with him, and those would be true words which he seems to speak. And consequently, he also truly and really speaks who seems to speak in dreams; and thus it would happen that a peasant or one sleeping would truly dispute with another concerning the most subtle questions without knowing how. But no one except the most foolish would say this.

Whereupon blessed **Augustine**, in the book *On the Care to be Taken for the Dead*, reporting that someone had told him that while he was dreaming, Augustine explained a certain obscure passage of **Cicero** to him, says: "Nay, not I, but my image without my knowing it." And before these words and after, he says that neither to those sleeping nor to the frenzied or mad do the things themselves appear, but the **likenesses of things**.

This conclusion, besides the authorities alleged above in this question and besides those also which were placed in the first book in the question mentioned above, could be confirmed by many others, of which I will nevertheless recite a few.

Blessed **Augustine** indeed, in the 12th book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 10, distinguishes three kinds of visions: namely, **corporal, spiritual, and intellectual**. Giving examples of each, he says concerning the spiritual: "For we think of the heaven itself and the earth and those things which we can see in them, even when situated in darkness; where, seeing nothing with the eyes of the body, we nevertheless behold **corporal images** with the mind, whether true ones as we saw the bodies themselves and retain them in memory, or fashioned ones as thought was able to form."

Nor can it be said that by "image" he understands that spiritual abstractive cognition, nor even a "habit," as other moderns [Ockham] have wished to say (speaking properly of habit), because we behold neither the cognition nor the habit with such thoughts, but the **objects of the thoughts**. Likewise, a "habit" is called neither a likeness nor an image of a thing.

Likewise in chapter 16: "When something is discerned with the eyes, a **continual image of it is made in the spirit**; but it is not discerned as made, except when, having removed the eyes from that which we saw through the eyes, we find its image in the soul." And a little later: "King Belshazzar saw the joints of the hand writing on the wall, and immediately through the sense of the body the image of the thing corporally made was **impressed on his spirit**, and the sight itself having been made and passed away, it remained in his thought: It was seen in the spirit and was not understood, etc." Likewise a little later in the same chapter: "He had seen the sign corporally made, and it having passed, he discerned its **image in the spirit by thinking**." Where some things are also to be noted: namely, that the image of which he speaks "is discerned in the spirit." Likewise, that the image of the thing which "is discerned with the eyes" is made in the spirit, and that [image] remains impressed on the spirit when the thing has passed.

By this is excluded a certain gloss of another [Ockham] saying that the authors understand by "images" the external things themselves; for "image," "phantasm," and similar words signify the external things themselves, connoting the act of phantasying, as he says. This, I say, is excluded because neither is the

thing outside made in or impressed upon the spirit, nor does it remain itself once it has passed away and after it has perished.

More clearly also is this gloss excluded, and the proposition confirmed, by the same [Augustine] below. For he says in chapter 45: "This is a **spiritual nature** in which not bodies but **likenesses of bodies** are expressed, etc." And in the following chapter: "In the same moment," he says, "in which a body is touched by the sense of the body, there is also made in the soul something of such a kind—not that this is that [body], but that it is **something similar**." Behold, not bodies but likenesses of bodies are expressed in the spirit. And again: that expressed thing is not this (namely, the body), but something similar.

Likewise in the 10th book of the *Confessions*, chapter 10, he says that in the memory "there are treasures of **innumerable images** brought in from such things sensed." And below in the same: "Nevertheless, they [the bodies] themselves do not enter into it, but the images of the things sensed are there ready for the thought of the one remembering them." And again: "Nevertheless, I did not absorb those things" (namely, the bodies) "by seeing them when I saw with my eyes; nor are they themselves with me, but their **images**." Likewise in the following chapter: "For these things are not let into it [the memory], but only their images are captured with wonderful speed and replaced in wonderful cells (as it were) and produced wonderfully by remembering." Let these things suffice for this first conclusion.

(The arguments of Ockham against the first principal conclusion)

Nevertheless, a certain doctor [Ockham] in diverse places has seemed much to impugn this; and insofar as it pertains to the proposition of the aforesaid, two reasons from his sayings are gathered against this conclusion.

The first is: If species ought to be posited, this is either on account of **assimilation**, or on account of the **causation of cognition**, or on account of the **representation of the object**, or on account of the **determination of the power**, or on account of the **union of the mover and the moved**. "But on account of none of these is a species necessary. Therefore, it is not to be posited."

Dismissing the proofs of this minor premise regarding the other parts (concerning which I do not care for now), he proves that it is not on account of the causation of cognition. For this would be, as he says according to those positing species, "because the material and corporal cannot act immediately upon the spiritual"; but this is false, because otherwise the object could not cause a species in the intellect.

Likewise, that it is not even on account of the representation of the object, "because **intuitive cognition** does not require any representing thing other than the object and the act; therefore neither the abstractive which immediately follows. The consequence is clear, because just as the object sufficiently represents itself in the intuitive, so it does in that which immediately follows it. Likewise, the represented thing ought to be **previously known**, otherwise the representing thing would not lead into the cognition of the represented. But according to those positing species, the species is **prior to every act** of understanding the object; therefore it cannot be posited on account of representation of the object. Likewise, if it be posited on account of representation, this is not except because the distant cannot act upon the distant. But this is false, otherwise a distant object could not cause a species in the intellect without positing

something else prior to the species by which it would be present to the intellect so that it could cause the species. And similarly before that it would be necessary to posit another prior species, and so into infinity."

Secondly, if such a species be posited, it is either "of the **same nature** as the exterior object, or of a **different** [nature]. If of the same, it follows that there is left in the soul true color," true heat, true flavor, "true sound. This, however, is absurd, because since every active thing of the same nature can increase an effect capable of being augmented in a passive thing of the same nature (previously caused in it by an agent of the same nature), another external hot thing could **increase that heat in the soul**. And thus that power could become very hot and cold, and white and black, from sight alone"; which is absurd.

Nor can it be said that it is of a different nature from the object, "because every power capable of discerning between things less dissimilar can discern between things more dissimilar; but this power can discern between individuals of the same species; therefore it can **more easily discern** between that species and the exterior object of which it is called the species and image. Which is false and against experience."

(Reply to the arguments of Ockham)

To the **first** of these, it must be said first that even if it were not known for what purpose species were opportune to us, nevertheless on account of the **experiences** we have of them, they would have to be posited. For we see many things in ourselves and outside us, concerning which we do not know how to give a reason as to why they are and for what they were made, yet we do not deny that those things are. **Secondly**, I say that a species is required both on account of the **representation of the object** not present in itself, and on account of the **causation of its cognition** when it does not exist as present.

Whereupon, as Augustine says in the 10th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 5, because "the soul cannot bring the bodies themselves with it inwardly into the region of an incorporeal nature (as it were), it involves and seizes their **images**." And in the 11th book, chapter 9: "In order that there may be a vision of the one thinking, therefore there is made in the memory from the vision of the one sensing something similar to which the gaze of the mind may turn itself in thinking, just as the gaze of the eyes turns itself to a body in discerning." Likewise in the 12th book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 29, he says that "when we first see some body which we had not seen before, its image begins to be in our spirit, so that when it is absent, we may remember it."

Likewise the Philosopher in the 3rd book of *On the Soul*: To the intellectual soul, he says, "**phantasms are as sensibles**." And the Commentator in the same place, comment 39, says that the images of sensibles are to the intellect in the place of the sensibles.

Many other testimonies can be brought forth and were brought forth in the first book, distinction 3, by which it appears that species themselves are **naturally made in us** for this reason: that we may be able to know absent things (or those not present) in them or through them. Whereupon our cognition in the absence of the things which they represent is terminated at them just as it is at the things themselves when they exist as present, as was declared there.

Now to the proofs made against this. When it is proved that "it is not on account of the causation of cognition," I say that that is not the cause which he assigns; but the cause is that the cognition of a thing in its absence (or when it is not) cannot naturally be caused in us except by a **species or some representative** which leads into the cognition of it. Whereupon, with such a representative being entirely deleted, **no recollection can naturally occur** in us as experience teaches, unless another representative is first formed in the soul.

To the other points by which it is proved that it is not on account of representation. To the first, I deny the consequence and say that the proof has no appearance [of truth]; for it does not follow that the object in absence (or when it entirely is not) presents itself to the power if, while it is actually present and weakly opposed, it presents itself—or, more properly speaking, is so present that it can be known.

To the second, I concede that the presented thing is previously known, namely through **intuitive cognition**, but a species does not precede that [intuitive cognition] but accompanies it and remains after it, as was declared more diffusely in the first book. And I speak here of the presented thing which is distinctly known.

To the third, I say that whether that assumption be true or not, it is nevertheless not the cause in the present case, but that which has been touched upon: namely, because the thing cannot always be immediately presented to the soul through itself (either because it has entirely ceased or because it is absent), **nature—or rather the founder of nature—comes to the rescue**, so that something similar to the thing might be present in us, through which we could know the thing not present or no longer existing.

To the **second** reason, I say that that species is not of the same but of a **different nature** from the exterior object. And when it is assumed that a power discerning between individuals less dissimilar, etc., I say that **likeness** can be taken in two ways: In one way for **essential agreement** according to genus or species, just as two men and two individuals of the same species are said to be similar; in another way for a certain **accidental agreement**, by which an image is said to be similar to that of which it is an image. And by the opposite, dissimilarity can be taken in two ways.

If the proposition be understood concerning things dissimilar by a dissimilarity opposed to likeness taken in the first way, it is **not universally true**. And an instance is clear; for it is certain that a **wolf and a sheep** are less dissimilar in this way than a wolf and a statue of a wolf, and yet a lamb will distinguish well between a wolf and a sheep—indeed even between its own mother and another sheep (which agree even more essentially)—but **not between a wolf and a statue of a wolf**. For if it saw a very well-perfected statue, it would flee from it just as from a true wolf. Many other instances could be given. And because in this sense, as it seems, the argument proceeds, therefore it does not conclude. If, however, it be understood in the second way, then the minor premise is false.

(Second principal conclusion)

The second principal conclusion of this article, namely that in the soul there are **species of some insensible and purely intelligible things**, although it was proved in the first book, distinction 3, question 2, both by authorities and reasons, can nevertheless still be proved briefly thus: We remember certain

insensible things; therefore we have species of those in us. The antecedent is clear through experience; for we sometimes **remember our thoughts and affections**, both good and bad, and those are certainly insensible. The consequence is proved from the fact that recollection (as was proved in the first book, distinction 3, question 1, both by Augustine and the Philosopher) **does not occur in us without a species reserved in memory**. Nor does it stand in the way if it be said that the Philosopher speaks of the recollection of sensible things, because from that we can and ought to argue that it is also so in others. For if we could remember insensible things without a species, why could we not also remember sensible things?

Both the reason and the conclusion are confirmed from the intention of **Augustine** in the 10th book of the *Confessions*, chapter 15: "Behold," he says, "I produce from memory when I say there are four perturbations: desire, joy, fear, sadness"; and below he proves that such things are not present in themselves to the one remembering, but **according to their species**, saying: "For who would speak such things willingly if, as often as we name sadness or fear, we were forced as many times to grieve or fear? And yet we would not speak those things unless in our memory we found not only the sounds of the names according to the images impressed by the senses of the body, but also the **notions of the things themselves**, which we received by no door of the flesh, but the mind itself sensing them through experience of its own passions committed them to memory, or the memory itself retained these things even if not committed to it. But whether through images or not, who shall easily say? Indeed, I name a stone, I name the sun, when the things themselves are not present to my senses; in my memory, to be sure, their images are ready. I name bodily pain, and it is not present to me while nothing hurts; nevertheless, unless its **image were present in my memory**, I would not know what I was saying, nor in disputing would I discern it from pleasure." Here the determination of the question which he premised is clear: namely, "but whether through images, etc." And he writes many things before and after in the same place confirming the proposition.

He also posits the same thing concerning the act of believing in the 14th book of *The Trinity*, chapters 3 and 9, as is held alleged in the mentioned question.

(Contrary arguments of John Duns Scotus)

Against this which has been said, however—namely that the acts of the soul leave their species in the soul—one of the aforementioned associates [Scotus] argues in two ways: **First** indeed, because it would then follow that if I had the act of something a thousand times in a day, a **thousand species** would be caused in the soul; which seems absurd. **Secondly**, because then also habits would cause their species, and species would also cause other species, and so they would be infinite.

(Reply to the arguments of John Duns Scotus)

To the **first**, I say first that either this one arguing posits that nothing at all is left from an act in the soul (which having been left, the soul is able to remember by its mediation), and then he cannot save how the soul can remember such things or even forget them, both of which nevertheless happen; or he posits that

something is left, and then whatever that may be—whether a species or a habit or something else—I shall make all the same arguments against that which he makes against species, and the application is clear.

Secondly, I respond to the argument by denying the consequence. For if the consequence be understood concerning the species of the thing of which those acts were objectively [acts], it is clear that it is not valid, because when a species of some singular thing is held in memory, a **new species of the same thing is not generated** (totally distinct from the first) from a repeated apprehension of it, but the **prior one is strengthened**.

Again, if the consequence be understood concerning the species of the acts themselves, the consequence is also not valid, because neither an act nor any thing naturally causes in the soul a species of itself except while it is **actually intuitively apprehended**. Now, however, not every act is intuitively apprehended by the soul. I say nevertheless further that if I had a thousand acts in a day and I noticed each one so that I could afterwards remember each one distinctly, certainly a thousand species would be caused in the soul.

To the **second**, I also deny the consequence, just as regarding the species themselves Augustine virtually denies it in the 10th book of the *Confessions*, chapter 16, granting the antecedent and expressly denying the consequence. And I feel the same ought to be said concerning habits; nor has the one arguing proved his consequence.

(Third principal conclusion)

The **third conclusion**, namely that man sometimes knows some things **through species**, is clear from what has been said thus: Man by thinking and remembering knows absent things (or things not present) which he at another time saw with corporal eyes or perceived through other senses of the body; and such thinking or remembering is **immediately terminated objectively** at the species of those things previously sensed. Therefore, man sometimes knows some things through species.

The consequence is evident, since I say that that is known through a species which is known by a **cognition terminated immediately at its species**, insofar as it is its species and image, according to what was declared in the first book, distinction 3, question 1.

The antecedent as to the first part is a doubt to no one; as to the second part, it is clear through experience, since the gaze of anyone thinking or remembering is immediately terminated at something which is that thing outside which he thinks, or **something similar to it which is called its species**. And everyone experiences this. And it was proved in the first conclusion that that thing is not the thing itself outside; wherefore it remains that it is its species.

The same is proved expressly by many authorities of Augustine alleged above: namely, that from the 11th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 8 ("So it happens, etc."); and that from the 11th book of the *Confessions*, chapter 18 ("My childhood indeed, etc."); and that from *On True Religion*, chapter 60 ("If Rome is one, etc."); and that from the letter *To Paulina* ("Behold the heaven, etc."); again that from the 12th book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 10 ("For we think of the heaven itself and the earth, etc.") and

another from chapter 16 ("He had seen the sign corporally made, etc."); also that from the 11th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 9 ("In order that there may be a vision of the one thinking, etc.").

I bring forth, moreover, one other from the same [Augustine] from the 10th book of the *Confessions*, chapter 17. For there he says thus: "When the image of any thing is impressed in the memory, it is first necessary that the **thing itself be present**, whence that image can be impressed. For thus I remember Carthage, thus all the places where I have been, thus the faces of men I have seen, and the reports of the other senses, thus the health or pain of the body itself. When these things were present, the **memory took images from them**, which I might behold as present and retract in my mind when I remembered those absent things." From this authority it is gathered first that the image of which he speaks is not the thing itself outside: both because he says it is the "image of that thing," and because he says the "image is impressed from that" and that the "memory receives the image from that." For the thing itself is not the image of itself, nor does it impress itself in the soul, nor does the memory receive it from itself. Secondly, it is held that the one remembering absent things beholds in the mind and retracts their **present images**. By which two things the proposition is fully proved.

(Contrary arguments of John Duns Scotus)

Against this conclusion, however, both aforementioned bachelor associates argued, wishing to prove that such a recollection or cognition of absent things is not immediately objectively terminated at a species of the thing existing in the soul.

One [Scotus] argues thus **first**: No cognition is terminated immediately at some object which the one having it cannot experience himself to know in such a way that he has an **evident judgment** by which he assents to this: "this is known by me." But one having a cognition of a rose not present cannot experience himself to know the species of a rose; therefore, etc. The minor is clear because no one thinking of a rose reckons himself to have an evident judgment by which he assents to this: "the species of the absent rose is known by me."

Secondly, the love of an absent thing is not terminated immediately at some object which is in the lover himself; therefore neither is the cognition of an absent thing terminated immediately at some object which is in the knower himself. The consequence is clear because there is no greater reason for the cognition than for the love.

Thirdly, the one remembering remembers immediately concerning the **thing outside**, and not concerning the species of the thing. Therefore the cognition of an absent thing is not immediately terminated at its species but at itself. The consequence is clear because recollection is a cognition of an absent thing. The antecedent is clear; for the one remembering remembers concerning the heat of the thing outside, not concerning the species, because it was not previously known.

Fourthly, if the thought is terminated at the species immediately, either the species is known through that thought **abstractively or intuitively**. Not abstractively according to you [Gregory], he says, because the abstractive (according to you) is not terminated immediately at the thing which is abstractively known, but at its representative. Nor intuitively, because then it follows that by virtue of that thought the thinker

could be certain (or at least would opine that he is equally certain) that that **species in the soul exists** in the nature of things and that it exists in the soul and in the intellective or sensitive power, just as one sensing a color on a wall can be certain that the color exists and that it exists in such an object. This, however, is false, as is clear through experience. It is also clear because many deny such species.

Fifthly, that species is either of the **same nature** with the exterior sensible which is the object of thought, or of a **different** [nature]. Not of the same, it is clear; nor of a different, because by a single simple cognition **two objects** of a different and different nature cannot be known, which [cognition] would be proper and distinct to each.

Sixthly, that species, if it be posited, according to you would be similar (at least according to appearance) to the exterior sensible; otherwise it would not lead into the cognition of it. But this is false, because nothing of such a kind can be in the soul, since it is **indivisible**. Moreover, nothing indivisible can be similar in appearance to a thing having quantity and figure. It is confirmed because in one hearing a song proportioned out of several sounds, it does not seem possible for anything to remain similar in appearance to that song which he heard.

Seventhly, by the exterior sensation by which a present sensible thing outside is known, nothing existing in the soul is known, neither intuitively nor abstractively. Therefore neither by the interior cognition. The consequence is proved because there is no greater reason here than there.

Eighthly, then **beasts** by interior imagination would by equal necessity know something existing in the soul, which does not seem to be granted.

Ninthly, then to one thinking of a **shadow**, something existing in the soul would be presented, which does not seem to be granted.

(Reply to the arguments of John Duns Scotus)

To the **first**, I deny the minor, nor is the proof valid, because it does not follow: "I do not evidently assent to this: 'the species of the absent rose is known by me,' therefore I do not assent to this: 'this is known by me'" (pointing through the subject at that which is the species of the absent rose). For it is possible that I do not know that thing to be the species of a rose, while I nevertheless know that I know it; just as someone not knowing the light of the sun to be its accident, seeing it, does not have an evident judgment by which he assents to this: "an accident of the sun is seen by me," and yet he has (or can have, the first not having been held) an evident judgment by which he assents to this: "**this is seen by me**" (pointing at that which is the accident of the sun).

Furthermore, I say that although not by virtue of that thought by which he beholds the species, nevertheless by other simple and complex cognitions concurring, one can have an **evident judgment** of this: "the species of the absent rose is seen by me," as I think has been made sufficiently manifest from things held above. Just as also by some other concurring cognitions, one can have an evident judgment by which he assents to this: "an accident of the sun is seen by me."

To the **second**, I deny the consequence. For since **love and cognition** are acts of different natures, it is not inconvenient for them to differ as to that concerning which it is argued and as to many other things; indeed, so it is according to the truth of the fact. And therefore I also simply deny the [proposition] assumed in the proof of the consequence, nor [is it] proved.

To the **third**, I say that for the one remembering to remember immediately concerning the thing outside can be understood in two ways: In one way **immediately**, because not by means of something else of which he remembers; in another way **immediately**, because not by means of something else which he knows. In the first sense, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence. Nor is the proof valid because, although recollection is a cognition of an absent thing, it is also a **cognition of a present thing**. But it is abstractive and a recollection of the former [the absent thing], while it is an intuition or sense of the latter [the species] according to the Philosopher's way of speaking in *On Memory and Reminiscence*; of the former it is a cognition mediately, and of the latter also immediately, as was declared in the first book. In the second sense, however, I deny the antecedent, nor does the proof proceed toward this sense, as is clear.

To the **fourth**, I say that the species is known **intuitively** through that thought. And then to the consequence which is added, I say that if that whole coupled consequent ought to be inferred, the consequence is not valid. An instance in a similar case: For it is certain that we see intuitively an image in a mirror (or that which is called an image), and yet we are not yet certain by virtue of that intuitive in what it is subjectively. Nay, nor [are we certain] whether it is a thing other than that of which it is called the image. The same is true of a rainbow and of the colors appearing in the neck of a dove. And in the very example of the one arguing, the consequence has an instance; for it is certain that not everyone seeing the color of a crow or a pearl is certain (or opines that he is certain by virtue of that vision) in what subject any of those colors is, since even by virtue of that intuitive he cannot be certain that that color is an accident; nay, for this he needs other cognitions and many argumentations.

If, however, the whole coupled consequent is not inferred, but each part of it by itself, I concede the consequent as to the first part. For I say that by virtue of the intuitive which one has concerning a species existing in the soul, he can be **certain that that species exists in the nature of things**, although perhaps he would not be certain that it is the species of another. Just as also seeing an accident, which is the blackness of a crow, he can be certain that that accident is in the nature of things, although he is not certain that it is an accident. Similarly, one seeing intuitively his own love or thought is certain of those accidents, that they exist, although by virtue of that intuitive precisely he is not certain in what they exist, or even that they themselves are accidents. And he who doubts the existence of such species has similarly to doubt the existence of the acts of his soul and also of the sensible accidents existing outside the soul. Nor is it valid that many deny such species; for also many have denied that bodies are moved, and yet by sense we are certain of the opposite.

To the **fifth**, I say that it is of a **different nature**, and furthermore I say that nothing prohibits the same cognition from being of two objects of different natures, of which one is known by means of the other, as is said concerning the cognition of creatures in the Word. Those things which are said against this—namely that acts are distinguished by objects, and that acts of things diverse in species cannot be distinct only by number, and consequently neither [can there be] one in number—if they be true, have to be understood of **immediate objects**, namely of which one is not known by means of the other. Whether,

however, such a cognition of the species and of the thing outside is proper and distinct to each, or not, I do not now define.

To the **sixth**, I say that the species is **similar in appearance** to the sensible thing itself outside; and I say that nothing prohibits there being in the indivisible soul something indivisible quantitatively according to its essence (or something not having quantity nor extended) which is nevertheless an image of a thing having quantity and extension and is similar to it in appearance, as Augustine beautifully and diffusely shows in *On the Quantity of the Soul* in our present case: namely, concerning memory and the images of bodies stored in it. Whereupon he concludes there that "it does not abhor from the truth that the mind lacks all corporal magnitude... although it can **imagine any magnitudes of bodies**."

To the confirmation, I similarly deny that assumption, since unless something of such a kind (or some such things and images of sounds out of which the song consisted) remained, he would never remember it. And this Augustine expressly wills in the 10th book of the *Confessions*; and in the 12th book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis* he says: "Unless the spirit immediately formed in itself an **image of the voice perceived by the ears** and retained it in memory, it would be unknown whether the second syllable were the second, since the first would already certainly be nothing, having passed by striking the ear; and thus every use of speech, every sweetness of singing, every corporal motion in our acts would finally slide away and perish."

To the **seventh**, I deny the consequence. For thus also it would be proved that we could not understand the acts of our soul nor even know our sensations, since the exterior sense is perceptive of neither of these kinds of entities. And both of the aforesaid according to everyone are false. The proof of the consequence is not valid because it assumes a falsehood and does not prove it.

To the **eighth**, it must be said that as to **beasts remembering**, the consequent is certainly to be granted, and Augustine gives that in the 12th book of *The Trinity*. Nor does this one arguing prove that it is not to be granted.

To the **ninth**, also on account of the things said above, I concede the consequent, which he does not prove to be false.

(Contrary arguments of Francis of Treviso)

Against the same conclusion, the other associate bachelor [Francis] argues triply. **First** thus: That which is elicited as a medium for some operation is not the immediate term of that operation, just as the ax by which a bench is made is not the term of the "bench-making," nor is the heat by which drying is done the term of the drying. But the likeness of a thing, insofar as it is representative, is the medium by which the thing itself is known; therefore [it is not the term], etc.

Secondly, that is the immediate term of abstractive cognition as its object at which the act of memorative cognition is terminated. But such an act is not terminated at the species, which is actually present to the one remembering—since memory is not of the present—but at the absent thing; therefore, etc.

Thirdly, that which is not known by someone as to whether it exists cannot be the immediate object of his certain and determinate cognition. But some unlearned man thinks perfectly well of an absent friend

without any thought being had of the likeness of the friend which is in the memory; indeed, he neither thinks nor knows what such a likeness is. Therefore, it is not the immediate object.

(Reply to the arguments of Francis of Treviso)

To the **first**, if the major premise be taken as universal—as it must be if anything is to be concluded usefully—I deny it in that form. For it is certain that the Divine Word is the medium by which the Blessed see creatures in the "morning" or "daytime" cognition, and yet it [the Word] is the immediate object of such cognition. The Philosopher also wills this in *On Memory and Reminiscence*, as was touched upon above and declared in the first book. The proofs brought forth are impertinent, as is clear, nor can they prove that universal [major].

To the **second**, I deny the minor, and I say that such an act is not the "memory" of the species at which it is immediately terminated, but its **intuition**. It is, however, the memory of the thing outside at which it is terminated only mediately, as was said above.

To the **third**, I say first that with that major premise it can be concluded against the one arguing that such a cognition is not terminated immediately at the thing outside—namely at the friend of the unlearned man—because it is certain that the unlearned man does not know whether his friend is in the nature of things. For perhaps he is then dead.

I respond, however, to the reason: that the unlearned man knows and beholds the likeness of his friend and knows that it is, although he may not know that it is a "likeness" of him; indeed, he may perhaps think that that which he beholds (and which is in truth a likeness of his friend left in the memory) is his friend himself existing outside; and in this, if he so thinks, he is deceived, as Augustine says. Who also, sufficiently for our purpose, says in *On True Religion*: "If that friend of mine is one, this one is false whom I fashion in thinking." And he proves it: "For where that one is, I know not; this one is fashioned there, where I wish."

Other things which could be objected or cause doubt regarding the mode of knowing things through their species can, as I think, be sufficiently dissolved and declared from the things said in the third distinction of the first book in the various questions disputed there.

(Fourth principal conclusion)

The **fourth conclusion**, namely that man sometimes knows some things and **not through a species**, is clear enough by saying that "only that thing is known through a species" which is known by a cognition terminated immediately at its species and mediately at itself, as I assumed above. For when we see with corporal eyes a color existing on a wall, or hear with ears a sound made in the air, or perceive exterior sensibles themselves through our other senses, such cognitions are certainly terminated immediately at the perceived sensibles themselves and not at their species. For by no experience or reason are we forced to

posit any species mediating by way of a known object between exterior cognitions of this kind and the sensed things themselves.

This is clear from the fact that in the first book, distinction 3, it was proved that no distinct cognition of a thing had through a species is the "first" cognition of it, but it is necessary that any such be preceded by another prior [cognition] by which that thing was known immediately in itself. This conclusion is also clear regarding **insensible things** which are known immediately in themselves by us, as was proved in the first book.

ARTICLE 2

Now remains the second article: namely, **whether man knows through species essentially distinct from cognitions**, or whether the species of a thing and the actual cognition of the same thing are essentially distinct things.

(Two conclusions)

And regarding this I pose two conclusions:

1. The first is that the **species of a thing** and the **abstractive cognition** of the same thing (namely, that by which the thing is known in its species) are essentially distinguished.
 2. The second is that the **intuitive cognition** of a thing (that is, by which the thing is known immediately in itself) and the **species** of the same thing are essentially distinguished.
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(The first conclusion is proved by authorities)

I prove the first conclusion first by the authority of **Augustine** in the 11th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 3, where he sententiously posits that just as the species of a sensible body outside and the vision of the exterior sense are essentially distinct (which nevertheless is discerned not by sense but by reason alone), "so," he says, "that **phantasy**—when the mind thinks of the species of a seen body, since it consists of the likeness of the body which the memory holds and that which is formed therefrom in the gaze of the remembering mind—nevertheless appears so one and singular that they are not found to be two things except by the judgment of reason, by which we understand it to be one thing that remains in the memory even when we think of other things, and another thing to come to be when we remember, that is, return to the memory and find the same species there." Thus he says. Where note that he says: "**by reason it is found that the thought and the species are two certain things**" and again that "it is one thing that remains in the memory... and another that comes to be when we remember." From both of which the proposition is clear to one considering well.

And thus is excluded the saying of the other opposite opinion [Aureoli] saying that the same thing which, while we do not actually think, is a species only, becomes the thought and actual cognition when we are actually thinking without the positioning of any new thing in the knowing power; since according to that

saying, they would then not truly be judged to be "two." Likewise, then nothing "other" would come to be from that which was previously in the memory, as he [Augustine] says in the same place and again below in chapter 8, saying that "it is one thing that the memory holds hidden away, and **another that is expressed therefrom** in the thought of the one remembering."

It is confirmed secondly: According to the same [Augustine], the actual cognition **comes to be and is caused** from the species itself; therefore, according to the same, it is essentially distinguished from the species. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved; for in the same book, chapter 7, he says: "Although therefore the form which comes to be in the gaze of the one remembering comes to be from that which is in the memory, nevertheless that gaze itself does not exist therefrom but was before it." And below he says that vision "is made in the gaze of the one thinking from those things which the memory contains."

Likewise below in chapter 9: "From the species of the body which is discerned," he says, "arises that which is made in the sense of the one discerning, and from this that which is made in the memory, and from that [in the memory] that which is made in the **gaze of the one thinking**; wherefore the will couples the parent with the offspring three times." By the "species in the sense of the one discerning" he understands the exterior vision itself; but by the "species in the gaze of the one thinking" he understands the interior vision. Whereupon he immediately adds: "For visions are two: one of the one sensing, the other of the one thinking. In order that there may be a vision of the one thinking, therefore there is made in the memory from the vision of the one sensing something similar, etc.," as was alleged in the preceding article.

Likewise he adds: "Therefore I wished to commend two Trinities in this genus: one when the vision of the one sensing is formed from the body; the other when the **vision of the one thinking is formed from the memory**." Just as, according to him, the sensual species and the corresponding cognition are two distinct things and with the intention of the will constitute a certain trinity, so according to him the intellectual species (that is, which is in the intellectual memory and of an intelligible thing) is distinct from the intellectual vision and its eliciting, and both together with the intention of the will constitute their own certain other trinity, as is clear in the 14th book, chapter 3. And in a like way it is to be understood concerning any other species of the intellect and the corresponding vision.

(The first conclusion is proved by reasons)

Next, I prove the conclusion by reasons, and first by that of Augustine touched upon in the words first alleged, and I suppose—as is known by experience—that not always, while someone has the species of some thing, does he actually understand or consider it. Suppose, therefore, that someone who has had a species for a long time now actually thinks of that thing, whereas he was not thinking of it immediately before, and that after a short time he will cease to think, yet will not cease to have the species (which happens daily in any of us). Then I argue thus: **This cognition now begins to be, while this species does not begin to be**, and afterwards it will cease to be, while the species does not cease to be, and both (namely the species and this cognition) are actually present; therefore they are **plural things and essentially distinct**.

To this reason it will be responded by denying the antecedent. For in the case posed, this cognition does not "now begin to be," but it "begins to be a cognition"; nor will it afterwards "cease to be," but it will "cease to be a cognition." For the very species which was prior was indeed there, but it was not a "cognition"; now, however, it is a "cognition"; likewise afterwards it will be, but it will not be a "cognition."

Although this response is tedious to exclude, it nevertheless does not seem rational. And that it is against the intention of Augustine, where above, there is no doubt. For he says "that **another thing comes to be** when we remember." It is certain, however, that the species does not then come to be.

Likewise in the same chapter he says that "when the gaze of the one thinking has ceased to look upon that which was discerned in the memory, **nothing of the form which was impressed** in that same gaze will remain." Which words for certain cannot be conveniently glossed according to this mode of responding.

Furthermore, if this species which was prior is now a cognition and previously was not a cognition, it is necessary to give some reason why it is now a cognition whereas previously it was not. Nor does any sufficient reason appear possible.

But to this it will be said, according to one doctor [Aureoli], that the reason is that now through it the thing (whose species it is) **appears to the intellect and has objective being**, whereas previously it did not so appear through it.

Against this: Either this species now relates itself in the entirely same way in itself and in comparison to the intellect and to the thing whose species it is, or in some way otherwise. If in the entirely same way, it is not intelligible that through it the thing should appear to the intellect now rather than before, and consequently nor that it should now be a cognition more than before. Nor can it be said that it relates itself otherwise in itself, because [it is not otherwise] either according to its essence or according to anything generated in it or corrupted, as is clear enough. Nor [is it otherwise] in order to the intellect, because this cannot be understood except either according to inherence (as if, for example, it were now in the intellect and previously was not, or vice versa; neither of which is said nor seems able to be said to happen naturally according to congruence). Or it would relate itself otherwise to the intellect according to **efficiency**—either because it is now produced by the intellect and previously was not, or vice versa. And this cannot be said, because it does not happen naturally that one perfect and actually existing thing, remaining for a long time, should thus have or not have an agent "anew," and therefore it would not be possible to understand it naturally. Or secondly, it would relate itself otherwise according to efficiency to the intellect because the intellect would cause something in the species (and it is certain it does not), or conversely, it [the species] would **cause something in the intellect**, and then that such thing ought rather to be called the "cognition" than the species itself, which is the proposition [I maintain].

Nor can it be said that it relates itself otherwise in comparison to the thing outside. For this would be, as it appears, according to efficiency. Which cannot be said, since it does not appear what the thing itself would cause in the species, or conversely. And especially because it happens that the thing then does not exist in the nature of things.

Nor can it even be said that this is on account of the **assistance of the intention of the will**, because never on account of our willing precisely would some thing which is not an intellection become an intellection, any more than whiteness on account of some willing of mine would become an intellection. Nor on account of the intention of the will would anyone understand, except because on account of that [willing] some thing comes to be which otherwise would not come to be.

Secondly, I argue to the conclusion since, when a thing is known abstractively in its species, by the same cognition by which the thing is known abstractively, the **species is known intuitively**, as was declared in the first book and touched upon in some way in the preceding article. But the species is not the cognition by which it itself is known intuitively, as was proved in the preceding question. Therefore, the species is not the cognition by which the thing outside is known abstractively.

(The second conclusion is proved)

The **second conclusion** is proved because after the ceasing of the intuitive cognition, the species itself remains; therefore, etc.

(Contrary reasons of Peter Aureoli)

Against this conclusion it is argued **first** thus: "It is impossible for there to be in the same power, with respect to the same thing, **two likenesses really differing**. But a species is a certain perfect likeness of a thing, and an intellection is likewise." Therefore they are not really differing. The major is proved because either those two would be of the same nature—and then two accidents differing only numerically would be in the same thing—"or they would be of a different and different nature. And if so, **one will be more perfect than the other** and will contain it virtually," as the perfect virtually contains the imperfect. "But it is impossible that two accidents, of which one contains the other in virtue, be in the same subject distinctly, just as lukewarmness and heat in the highest degree [cannot coexist]."

It is confirmed secondly: because otherwise "the intellect would be two powers, since the soul through the intellect would be assimilated twice to the object: once through the species and once through the intellection. But through one power the soul is assimilated to an object in only one way."

It is confirmed again: because a species would be posited superfluously. For it is not posited except "for representing the object and for making it present to the intellect. But this is maximally done through intellection." Therefore a species is not necessary.

It is confirmed furthermore: because according to the Philosopher in the 3rd book of *On the Soul*: "As the soul is all sensible things through the sense, so it is all intelligible things through the intellect." It is certain, however, that "it is not the sensible things really," but "by **assimilation** only, insofar as by the act of sensing it is assimilated to the sensed thing"; therefore it is similarly all intelligible things through the intellect, insofar as by the act of understanding it is assimilated to the thing understood.

A **second reason** for the same is: because if the species were distinct from the intellection, then simultaneously in the intellect there would be **two intellections or cognitions**. The consequent is impossible, because they would be neither of the same nature nor of a different one, as was previously proved concerning species. The consequence is proved: "because a species in the intellect is of no less abstraction than in the sense; but a species in the sense has from its own nature that it be **formally a sensation and cognition**. Therefore this is not to be denied to a species in the intellect." The assumption is clear through the Philosopher and through the Commentator. For the Philosopher says that "the sense is receptive of species without matter." And the Commentator, expounding, says that "therefore in the soul there are **intentions and comprehensions**, and outside the soul there are neither intentions nor comprehensions."

It is confirmed: "because nothing else is required for some form to be a true comprehension except that through it the object be exhibited in **objective being** as present. For to have an object so present is to know it, and conversely. But a species, insofar as it is a likeness of a thing, has from its own condition that it exhibit the thing present in objective being. Therefore from its own condition it has that it be a true comprehension."

This very thing is confirmed because "the act of understanding has it precisely from this that it exhibits the thing present in objective being—because it is a likeness of the thing," and because the species is also a likeness (though not so clear), therefore, etc.

A **third reason** is: "A species is either posited in the intellect as other than the intellection to supply the place of the object in the character of a **terminating** [object], or in the character of a **formal principle eliciting** the act." For by any opinion positing a species distinct from the act, it is posited for one of the aforesaid. But it is not to be posited for the first: "because the act by which I understand a rose is not terminated at the species of the rose; otherwise every intellection which was by means of a species would be **reflexive**; for it would be terminated immediately at something in the intellect. Likewise, there would then be neither cognition nor science concerning things, nor would propositions be verified immediately of things; indeed, this proposition 'a triangle has three [angles]' would be false insofar as it is compared to the intellect enunciating it."

"Furthermore, the sense is terminated immediately at things outside, since it immediately judges the things which are outside; otherwise sensation would be a reflexive act. Therefore much more does the intellect judge concerning the things themselves."

"Furthermore, the intellect in understanding a rose either stops in the species of the rose—and then it follows that the **intellect understands nothing concerning things**; or from the species it proceeds further to the things—and then it follows that every act of the intellect regarding things is **discursive**. Both of which are false."

Nor is a species to be posited for the second [reason], namely that it might relate itself "in the character of an elicitor of the act together with the intellect, because it is impossible for an effect to exceed its equivocal cause in perfection; but an **intellection is more perfect than a species**, therefore it cannot be its equivocal effect. But since it also cannot be its univocal effect, as it is of a different nature," therefore in no way is it its effect.

Addition 37: Furthermore, "this action, insofar as it concerns the intellect, is either of the **possible intellect** itself"—and this is not the case, because it is pure potentiality in the genus of intelligibles; for nothing of such a kind has any actuality, and consequently no activity. "Or it is of the **agent intellect** itself," and if so, "it does not seem that then a species is necessary, because no reason is seen why the agent intellect with the phantasm could not reduce the possible intellect to act with respect to an intellection, just as with respect to a species which you posit in the intellect."

And it is confirmed by the Philosopher, who says that as sensible things relate to the sense, so phantasms relate to the intellect. But according to the same in the same place, the action of the sensible is the passion of the sense itself; for "sounding" is "hearing," and "coloring" is "seeing." Wherefore in the intellect the **first impression from the phantasm will be an intellection.**" The Ordinary Text follows.

The Philosopher seems to be of this intention in the 3rd book of *On the Soul* where he says that "the soul is the **place of species**, not the whole, but the intellect." Likewise there: that "to understand is to undergo [passion]." Which things would not be true if the species were other than the intellection. And what makes much for this, as they say, is because Aristotle would not have been so "diminished" [lacking] that he would have made no mention of the order of the species to the intellection, according to which the species is first impressed and afterwards the intellection.

(Reply to the first reason of Peter Aureoli)

To the **first**, I deny the major. To the proof, I say that they are likenesses of a different and different nature. And when it is inferred "therefore one is more perfect than the other and contains it virtually, etc.," I say first that if this proof were valid, it would conclude many false things, both against this very one arguing and against any other. For by a similar mode it would be proved that in the intellect there cannot simultaneously be an **act of apprehending and an act of assenting**, nor any other two acts of different natures. Likewise neither several habits, nor a habit and an act together, nor several species. So also in the will there could not simultaneously be any two acts, or two habits, or a habit with an act; and universally, no two forms could simultaneously be in the same matter—all of which are absurd. And that it would be so proved is clear to anyone wishing to apply the aforesaid consequence to any such things.

I respond nevertheless to the reason, and first I deny the consequence regarding that part of the consequent by which it is said that "one would contain the other virtually." For not everything more perfect than another contains it virtually, properly speaking; for to contain thus is said only of that which either can produce the other, or which can do all that the other can and something more besides. And it is certain that not all things which are of a different and different nature so relate to each other.

Secondly, I concede that a **species virtually contains the act**, but not as a total cause, although it is not more perfect than the act. And I deny that assumption: "it is impossible for two accidents, of which one contains the other virtually, to be in the same subject"; an instance is clear concerning a **habit and an act**, and concerning light and the species of color in a medium (according to those positing them, among

whose number is this very one arguing). And of many other things in the intellect and will an instance could be made. Nor is the proof valid, because it is particular.

To the first confirmation, when it is said "otherwise the intellect would be two powers," I deny the consequence. To the proof, I say that it is possible for the same power to be assimilated to the same thing in several modes of different natures—whatever may be the case as to several modes of the same nature.

To the second confirmation, I deny that the species is superfluous. To the proof, I say that an object is presented in one way through a species, and in another through an act. For through a species it is represented as **through that in which it is known** and in a quasi-habitual mode. But through an act, as through that by which it is known or which is the actual cognition of it, although the word "representation" is applied to an act quite incongruously. And thus it is clear that the species is not superfluous.

To the third confirmation, I concede the conclusion, but from it is not inferred what he principally intends—namely that there are no species distinct from acts; for even in the sense there are species of this kind, as was proved.

(Reply to the second reason of Peter Aureoli)

To the **second** reason, I say first that it fights manfully against its own maker, if it be understood as it sounds: first indeed from the fact that he says it is impossible for **two cognitions** of the same or different natures to be in the intellect. For below he expressly says the opposite concerning angels, concerning whom nevertheless the proof of the said impossibility would conclude equally, as is clear to one applying it. Secondly, because from the proofs of the consequence it manifestly follows that **every species existing in the intellect is actually a cognition**. And consequently that every man simultaneously actually understands all things of which he simultaneously has species—which is also against him and against the truth. And that it so follows, there is no need to declare, because it is immediately clear to one applying care.

Secondly, I respond to the reason and I deny the consequence. To the proof, I say that that is not a sufficient reason; for not everything just as abstract as a sensation is a cognition. It is clear concerning **volitions**, which are more abstract than sensations themselves, and yet according to common opinion and this very one arguing they are not cognitions. Likewise, intellectual habits are not cognitions, and yet they are no less abstract than sensations. I say therefore that such abstraction and spirituality is indeed required for being a cognition. And this alone do the Philosopher and the Commentator intend there, and it suffices for their purpose. And therefore the Commentator well concludes that forms outside the soul are not comprehensions. Nevertheless, this abstraction alone does not suffice for a thing to be a cognition; whereupon what the Commentator says ("and therefore in the soul there are intentions and comprehensions") ought not to be understood as meaning precisely "therefore," but "therefore other necessary conditions concurring."

To the confirmation, it must be said that not just any exhibition of the presence of an object suffices, but only that by which a thing is placed in the **actual sight of the mind**, according to the sentence and mode

of speaking of Augustine in the 14th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 6. This, however, is not done through the species alone; for through the species the object is present only habitually; otherwise, if it were actually [present], everything whose species was in the intellect would always actually be understood, which is false.

The response is confirmed: For it is certain that a thing outside is not more present to the intellect through the species precisely than is the species itself; and yet it is not always known. And Augustine says the same concerning the mind, which is always present to itself, and yet does not always think of itself.

To the other point, it must be said that not every likeness of a thing is a cognition.

(Reply to the third reason of Peter Aureoli)

To the **third** reason, I say that a species is posited for both [reasons]: with respect however to the abstractive [cognition] only of the thing outside and the intuitive [cognition] of itself, just as the object would relate to its intuitive cognition according to both relationships.

To the first proof, by which it is argued that it is not in the character of a terminating object: I say that if you wish to call every cognition immediately terminated at something existing in the intellect "**reflexive**," the consequent is true, nor is it proved to be false. If however, more strictly and more according to the customary acceptance of the word, only that cognition be called "reflexive" which is a "cognition of a cognition," I deny the consequence, which also is not proved in this sense.

To the other point, when it is said that then there would not be cognition concerning things outside, I deny the consequence. And similarly the other, by which it is inferred that propositions would not be verified immediately "of things," or more properly, "**for things**." And these consequences are not proved by him. And that the opposites of the consequents stand with the antecedents was sufficiently declared in the first book, distinction 3, in the second doubt of that question: "Whether sensible things are naturally understood by us."

For now, however, I show the weakness of these argumentations from one thing which Augustine posits in many places: namely, that **angels see creatures in the Word**, and they know them more perfectly through the cognition which they have of them in the Word itself than through that which they have of them immediately in their own nature. And in this the doctors more commonly agree with Augustine. Suppose, therefore, that an angel has precisely this cognition of creatures in the Word and has none of them immediately in their own genus—shall it be said that they do not have cognition of things? Or that the propositions which they would form concerning things outside would not be truly "for" the things themselves? I think no intelligent person would say this. And from this it appears that in the present case such argumentations are of no force.

To the other point concerning that "stopping" or "not stopping" [in the species], it was responded where above. And what is inferred concerning **discourse** is not a consequent, properly speaking, just as neither is a Blessed one seeing creatures through the Word said to understand them by discourse, nor God even

according to the opinion of many who say that He understands creatures by understanding His own essence.

Next, when it is proved that a species does not relate in the character of an elicitor with respect to the act: to the first, I say that the assumption is false concerning an **equivocal cause that is not total**. An instance is clear: For the vision of whiteness is an equivocal effect of the whiteness existing in the body, and yet it is more perfect than it.

Addition 38: To the second: if the agent intellect is not posited as some power of the soul distinct from the possible intellect—as perhaps it is not necessary to posit—it can be said that the **possible intellect concurs actively** to elicit the act. And what is brought forward concerning its potentiality does not stand in the way, because it is not so in potentiality that it is not some actuality in the nature of things, and even an actuality active of such spiritual effects.

If however an intellect distinct from the possible be posited, it can be said that it also concurs.

And when you say that then a species in the intellect will not be necessary, because the agent intellect with the phantasm suffices, I say that they **do not suffice for every intellection**—because they do not suffice for the intellection of purely intelligible things which were and are not; nor for universal and abstract intellection, of which it was spoken in the preceding article, since phantasms do not represent thus abstractly. Whether, however, they would suffice for a particular or not so common intellection of sensibles, at least for the present state, would be a greater doubt; but whatever may be of this, it is certain that it does not suffice for every state; for in the **separated soul** there are no sensible phantasms.

By these things, moreover, it is clear that a species is not superfluous in the intellect, granted that it is not necessary for every intellection—just as neither is a species in the memory, nor even an intellectual habit, necessary for every cognition, since [they are not necessary] for the intuitive [cognition] of a singular sensible of the intellect or sense.

To the other point, it must be said that from the saying of the Philosopher it is not held that from a phantasm nothing is caused in the intellect except an intellection alone. Indeed, rather from that similarity the opposite is held; for from a sensible is caused in the memory a **species** (whether mediately or immediately) which is neither a thought nor a cognition. I do not deny, however, that some cognition can be caused by a phantasm in the intellect.

Likewise, whether by "phantasms" the Philosopher understands precisely species existing in the sensitive part (which is properly called the phantasy), or universally all representative species (whether they be in the intellect or in the sensitive part), is not clear. It seems rather, however, that this second [view] is held from his sayings, since he posits species, as will appear in some way immediately; but to determine this is not opportune for now. The Ordinary Text follows.

To the other point, when it is said that to understand would not be to "undergo" [passion], I say that it is false; since whatever be posited as the active [cause] of an intellection, yet because the **intellection is received in the intellect**, the intellect "undergoes" by such a passion which is surely the safety and

perfection [of it]; and the "to understand" itself is truly to undergo. Whether, however, the intellect relates passively only, or also actively, with respect to an intellection, will be seen below.

To the last, I say that he sufficiently hints at that order by the fact that he said such **images relate to the intellect just as sensibles to the sense**, which is true of whatever images or species through which (or in which) the intellect understands, whether they be in the intellect or elsewhere. For who would be ignorant that sensibles are the cause of sensations, and not conversely, and by this does he not consequently turn [his attention] to the fact that the **species in the intellect is the cause of the intellection** of which it itself is the object, and not conversely?

ARTICLE 3

(Three conclusions)

Regarding the third article, which concerns the principal question, I pose three conclusions:

1. The first is that **angels know some things through species**.
2. The second is that **they do not know everything they know through species**.
3. The third is that **whatever they know through species, they know through species distinct from acts**, that is, from actual intellections.

(The first conclusion is proved)

I prove the first conclusion thus: Angels naturally know some **past things** which no longer are, and they distinctly remember them. Therefore, they know some things through species. The antecedent is commonly conceded and is also proved from the saying of **Augustine** in the book *On the Divination of Demons*, where he says that "there has come to the demons through so long a time as their life is extended a **far greater experience** of things than can come to men on account of the brevity of life." And he posits the same opinion in the 2nd book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 26. Moreover, it is certain that experience, according to the way he speaks of it now, is acquired from **many memories**, as is clear from the prooemium of the *Metaphysics*: "For many memories of the same thing produce the power of a single experience," as the Philosopher writes there. Furthermore, since man can do this, it is not to be denied to an angel.

The consequence is proved. For **memorative or recollective cognition** is most properly through a species, as the same Philosopher wills in the book *On Memory and Reminiscence* and Augustine in the 11th and 14th books of *The Trinity*, as is proluxly clear from their authorities in the question often alleged, and as the evidence of the matter teaches us.

It is confirmed: For everything that is known by an angel is either known immediately in itself or **mediately in its species**. But past and non-existent things cannot be known by an angel naturally in themselves, just as they cannot by us, as is clear through experience. Nor in this is there a difference between angels and us as to natural knowledge, which Augustine calls "**evening**" [knowledge]; speaking of this regarding angels in the 4th book of *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 35, he says:

"Which knowledge those things that came to be preceded, because whatever can be known precedes the cognition; for **unless that which is known be first, it cannot be known.**" This must be understood concerning priority of nature and causality, but not of time, as he hints below in chapter 38, and is proved from what he writes in the 14th book of *The Trinity*, chapter 10. From this, however, it manifestly follows that **unless something exists, it cannot be known naturally by them in itself.** Therefore they are known in a species, and the intent is held.

(The second conclusion is proved)

I prove the second conclusion **first**, because they **do not know God through a species.** Otherwise they would not see Him intuitively and face-to-face, which is false; or they would see Him simultaneously by a twofold cognition, one intuitive and the other abstractive, which seems superfluous to posit. The consequence is clear, because that is said to be known "through a species" which is known in its species and **not immediately in itself**, nor do I understand anything else by "to be known through a species." Whereupon and for this reason alone is the species itself to be posited.

Secondly, an angel does not understand **himself**, nor those things which are in him, through a species; yet he understands those things. Therefore he does not understand everything he understands through a species. The assumption is proved because we understand such things in ourselves immediately, and **not through a mediating species**, as was proved in the First Book, where it is asked whether insensible things are naturally known by us. And by the same reasons the very same is proved regarding angels.

Thirdly, we through the sense and even through the intellect know certain **singular sensibles intuitively**, and not through a mediating species, as was proved in the question concerning the cognition of sensible things. Therefore the angel knows existing sensibles intuitively, and not through a mediating species. Otherwise he would **not have as perfect a natural knowledge** of them as we do, which is not to be granted.

(The third conclusion is proved)

The third conclusion is proved because by whatever cognition something is known by an angel by means of a species, **the species itself is known.** Therefore whatever the angel knows by means of a species, he knows through a species **distinct from the actual cognition** of it. The consequence is clear, because every cognition by which a species is known is distinct from that species, as is clear from the preceding question immediately before.

To the argument of the question [the opening *Sed contra*], the antecedent must be denied. For although man knows some things through the sense and through the intellect immediately and not through a species, nevertheless he knows **some things through a species** as has been said. And thus in its own way it is also concerning angels.

QUESTION 4 WHETHER we can naturally intuit or intuitively know something non-existent.

Thirdly, because in the third article of the preceding question, in order to prove that an angel knows some things through a species, it was assumed that **non-existents cannot be known naturally either by us or by angels in themselves or intuitively** (which amounts to the same thing for me), and I also held this very thing in the **First [Book] distinction 3 question 1**, but a certain capable bachelor running concurrently with me in the **Lectura** held the opposite, and while conferring on this matter together many things were said here and there which I judged useful to be inserted into this work, therefore I now ask, **whether we can naturally intuit or intuitively know something non-existent.**

And it is argued first that yes: **The intellect naturally knows intuitively everything that appears outwardly to the sense.** But something non-existent appears outwardly to the sense; therefore, etc. The **Major** is evident, because the sense knows intuitively everything that appears outwardly to it. This is proven, because it is certain that it knows everything appearing to it, and not abstractively, because abstractive knowledge does not belong to the exterior sense, therefore intuitively. And if the sense [does], therefore also the intellect, since it is a more perfect power. The **Minor** is proven, because otherwise whatever appears would be true.

The opposite is argued through **Augustine** in **[Book] 4 On Genesis** chapter 35 speaking of visions, as was alleged in the preceding question article 3: **"Unless that which is known exists beforehand, it cannot be known."** Therefore a non-existent cannot be naturally known by us intuitively.

(Opinion of John Duns Scotus) Regarding the question, the aforesaid venerable bachelor held that the **non-existent can be naturally known by us intuitively both through the sense and through the intellect.**

And his **first reason** was that which was made in arguing [at the beginning] of the question. The **second** was this: The sense and also the intellect sometimes has an act concerning a non-existent in all respects such as it would have, if that thing actually existed and actually changed the sense. Therefore it sometimes has an **intuitive cognition of a non-existent**. The consequence is noted, because the cognition which it would have, if that thing actually existed and changed the sense, would certainly be intuitive. The **antecedent** seems known by experience, because, if someone touches two bodies really spherical and afterwards [touches] only one by the **crossing of fingers**, he experiences a **similar knowledge of duality** on both sides. And this appears more [clearly], because the subsequent judgments held by virtue of those knowledges are entirely similar. For such a judgment as one touching two really spherical things would have, such [a judgment] one touching by crossing has in all respects, and unless he were certified from elsewhere, he would assent equally to one judgment as to the other.

It is confirmed thus: Concerning whatever things the intellect has **similar judgments** naturally caused, concerning them it beforehand has naturally **similar apprehensions**. It is evident, because judgments are naturally caused by simple apprehensions and cannot be naturally caused without them. But concerning an existent and a non-existent the intellect sometimes has similar judgments, as an example could be given in many things. But the judgment, by which the intellect judges an existent **to be**, cannot be had naturally unless a simple intuitive apprehension of the existent is had beforehand. Therefore neither can the judgment, by which it judges a non-existent **to be**, be had without an intuitive apprehension of itself or at least of another. But not of another, because by virtue of the intuitive [knowledge] of some thing the intellect does not judge concerning the being of another, as is evident by induction.

(Against this, own opinion) I held the **opposite conclusion** and proved it by two reasons, which are also contained in the **first book distinction 3 question 1**. Now **one** was this: If a man can naturally know intuitively a non-existent sensible, by a greater or equal reason he could naturally know an existent sensible, however remote or hidden it might be. But that this is false is evident by experience. For there is no one who can naturally intuit the **color of a pearl existing in the court of the King of the Tartars or the King of the Indians**, or of another body distant or hidden the most. The consequence is proved, because with nothing existing, something non-existent is not **more knowable**, all other things being equal, at least such [a non-existent] which, if it existed, would be of the same nature and entirely similar with that existent; nor even can any natural thing more cause a knowledge of a non-existent than of an existent similar to it, wherever and however it exists. And these things are clear, as I think, to anyone considering [them].

The **second reason** was this: It is not naturally possible that a man knows simultaneously intuitively any **sensible singular of similar singulars** which have been, or of similar ones which will be, or of similar possible ones which will never be. Therefore it is not possible naturally that a man knows intuitively any non-existent sensible. The **antecedent** is certain. I prove the **consequence**, because, if the opposite is given, let it be posited that someone sees a non-existent sensible, I ask then: Either this person sees a sensible that *was*, and then—since none of the **past similar sensibles** has any causality or any relation whatsoever to this vision more than the others, nor does God even supply the causality of any one of them specially, namely by causing the same knowledge which it itself would cause, if it existed, since such a vision is posited to be caused naturally—it follows that by equal reason, by which he sees one, he sees any of the similar past things; and thus, if he sees a **non-existent and past whiteness**, he simultaneously sees whatever similar ones ever were. In the same way it is proved that he does not see a future whiteness nor a possible non-future one, because then he would see any similar future or possible one.

I adduced for this the authority of **Augustine in 11 On the Trinity chapter 2** saying: "**Nor can there be any vision, if there is no body that can be seen**"; which is to be understood concerning the natural power of the creature.

(To the reasons of **John Duns Scotus**) To his reasons he responded thus: To the **first** he said distinguishing concerning a double appearance namely **simple** and **complex**, which is nothing other than a judgment by which something complexly signifiable is judged. If the major [premise] is understood concerning this **judgmental appearance**, I denied that and similarly the [minor] assumed for its proof. For I say that neither sense nor intellect knows intuitively everything, indeed nor anything, that appears by complex appearance, whether it appears to the intellect or to the sense. And further to the proof, when it is said that the sense knows everything appearing to it, and not abstractively therefore intuitively, I answer that speaking of complex appearance, as before, and of simple cognition the antecedent is false by reason of its first part; but if it is not understood concerning simple cognition, whatever may be of the antecedent, the consequence is not valid; for **intuitive knowledge properly accepted**, as the discussion is now concerning it, is **simple knowledge, not complex**. But if the major is understood concerning **simple appearance**, which certainly in the exterior sense is the simple intuition of the sensed thing, I concede the major of the first syllogism and deny the minor in which it is said that a **non-being appears to the sense**. To the proof, when it is said that otherwise whatever appears would be true, it is evident that it is not to the purpose, because here appearance is taken in the first mode.

To the **second reason** I said that either the **antecedent** is taken precisely indefinitely, just as it is uttered, or it is taken in place of this universal "whatever sort of act the sense would have concerning an existent such [an act] in all respects it sometimes has concerning a non-existent." If in the first mode, I denied the consequence, nor is the proof valid. Example: For it does not follow "snow has such a form as milk has, therefore snow has sweetness"; for the antecedent is true and the consequent false, nor is it valid to prove through this, because milk has sweetness. But if the antecedent is taken in the second mode, I deny it nor is the proof valid, because such a person touching first two and afterwards only one does not have a **similar simple knowledge concerning duality**, because afterwards he does not touch two as before, although perhaps he has a **similar complex judgment**.

And because in his confirmations he strives to prove the proposition from this, I say that that upon which the aforesaid confirmations are sustained, namely that **similar judgments naturally had are always caused from similar simple apprehensions**, if any judgments of the same complex significate are called by this "similar," just as he himself seems to accept, because otherwise he cannot show that one touching before and afterwards in his case have similar judgments concerning the duality of the things touched, taking similar judgments thus I say, I say that **that foundation is false**. Proof: For one touching two spherical things, and not seeing them, has a similar judgment with him who sees them and does not touch, and yet they do not have similar simple apprehensions from which they are caused, because the judgment of the one is caused from vision, and the judgment of the other from touch. Item one judges snow to be cold from recollection and abstractive knowledge, but another touching it first, judges the selfsame thing not from any similar simple knowledge but from actual intuition or exterior sensation immediately terminated at the coldness of the snow. Sometimes also one judges this same thing on account of the narration of another, which another judges from actual experience or from memory left behind in him. And thus in many things it could be shown that not always are similar judgments caused from similar simple apprehensions.

(Response of John Duns Scotus) But to **my reasons** he himself responded thus: To the **first** he said that concerning whatever non-existent sensible he experiences himself to have intuitive knowledge, concerning every similar existent however remote or hidden he could have intuitive [knowledge], if sufficient causes concurred to cause knowledge of the existent or hidden sensible, just as sometimes they concur to cause knowledge of the non-existent.

To the **second** he denied the consequence. To the proof he said that such a person does not see *whatever* non-existent, but only that for the causing of whose vision natural causes present suffice, for example recognizing intuitively the duality of spherical bodies, for example of peas, through the crossing of fingers he knows only the **duality which would be opposed to the unity of the touched pea** and not just any other.

To the authority of **Augustine** he says by expounding "if there is no body which can be seen, or something, supply, or some things which are **equivalent in causing vision**." Now however he says that some things are equivalent in causing vision of it.

(Confutation of the solutions of John Duns Scotus) For the exclusion of these solutions and the confirmation of my conclusion I posited two propositions, of which the **first** was: **No thing outside perceived through the sense can naturally cause in the soul of the perceiver an intuitive knowledge**

of another sensible thing actually existing, not simultaneously partially con-causing. This is evident by experience. For neither does one color, while it is seen, cause in the soul of the one seeing it an intuitive knowledge of another color actually existing, not however moving the same power with it and con-causing vision in it. And much more does it not cause intuitive knowledge of a sound or of another sensible according to species not actually changing the same sense. Unless someone perhaps says that indeed it causes, but we do not perceive [it]. But then equally it could be said that a sound perceived by one born blind causes in his soul an intuitive [knowledge] of color, but he himself does not perceive [it]. Furthermore from one speaking thus it would have to be asked, whence it would be certain to him that one sensible in this way causes knowledge of another, although we do not perceive [it].

Second proposition: No thing outside perceived through the sense naturally causes in the soul of the perceiver an intuitive knowledge of any non-existent sensible, not equally con-causing. This is evident from the first: Both because it seems more or at least not less that it could cause knowledge of an existent than of a non-existent similar to it, or because it would be similar to it, if it existed, because for this "non-being" does not support the former nor does "being" harm the latter. And because if that non-existent sensible, the knowledge of which this thing were said to be able to cause, existed, this thing could not cause intuitive knowledge of that; therefore neither can it, while that does not exist. The **consequence** is evident; the **assumption** is clear, because otherwise in such a case it would have to be doubted, whether the feeler felt some absent sensible existing elsewhere, for example in the example of this fellow, when someone with crossed fingers touches one pea, and it seems to him that he touches two peas, such a one would have to doubt, whether he touches some other pea existing elsewhere. Which doubt however never happens to a man of sound mind.

From these the **conclusion** posited above is confirmed thus: **No sensible thing naturally perceived through the sense can cause intuitive knowledge of a non-existent sensible nor [one] actually con-causing. Therefore no one can naturally intuitively sense a non-existent.** The consequence is clear, since every intuitive sensation, which is naturally caused in us, is caused by some sensible thing actually perceived by us through the sense, as is clear through experience. Whence also in the example of the fellow the intuitive [knowledge] of the one touching the pea with crossed fingers is caused by the touched pea.

From these also the **solution** of the first reason is excluded thus: In no case can anyone naturally know intuitively any absent or hidden sensible; therefore in no case can sufficient causes concur naturally to cause intuitive knowledge of an absent existing or hidden sensible. It is clear from the opposite of the consequent of the response given. And further, therefore in no case can sufficient causes concur naturally to cause intuitive knowledge of a non-existent. This consequence is clear from the second proposition premised. And from this it further follows that in no case does anyone intuitively sense a non-existent.

I confirm, by asking from this venerable fellow, how he himself experiences himself touching a non-existent, when he touches one pea with crossed fingers? Because if, as he says, an absent [thing] can be intuitively known just as a non-existent, if sufficient causes to cause his intuitive [knowledge] concur, and it is not certain to him nor can it be naturally certain, whether those causes suffice to cause intuitive [knowledge] of a non-existent rather than of a remote existent, to which the non-existent would be similar if it existed, he cannot experience or know himself touching a non-existent more than a remote existent. Whence just as he himself says he touches the duality of non-existent peas, so another will say to him that

he himself touches a duality existing elsewhere. And from this it is evident also that no proof of his is efficacious for his intent.

The **solution of the second reason** is also removed both on account of that which has just been said and also because inquire concerning the duality which he says is opposed to the unity of this touched pea, if it were, whether it would be that which would be two peas of which either would be this demonstrated pea, which someone touches, for example A. And since such a duality is impossible, it follows that he touches something impossible, which is absurd. Or [it is] a duality which would be two other peas, or this pea and a certain other; and this not, because no such duality would be opposed to the unity of this pea, since any [such duality] is compossible to it. And again since many such are possible, he would touch any of such, since there is not a more powerful reason for one than for another, unless the opposite is asserted at pleasure. Or lastly that duality would be two which are parts of the touched pea for example C D, from which pea A consists. Which two perhaps therefore would be said to be opposed to the unity of A, because it is not possible, that C and D are two discrete things in act while the actual unity of A itself remains. And if it is said thus, it follows that he does not touch a non-existent duality, as he himself says, but a truly existing one, because C and D truly exist, although not how he judges them to exist namely discrete in act.

The response to the authority of **Augustine** is not suitable to the intention of the same, since there Augustine wishes to show in any exterior vision that a certain trinity of things discrete by nature concur, as is evident there in the beginning of the chapter, of which three one is the thing which is seen. But this would be false, if a non-being were seen.

(Fortification of the solutions of John Duns Scotus) But to sustain the given solutions that venerable fellow strove to falsify the **first proposition** posited against them. And therefore first he posited one such conclusion: **The same sensation in number, which is caused by this sensible A or which could be caused by A, can be caused or could have been caused by another sensible totally distinct from A.**

This is proved thus: This is not **repugnant** in other effects caused naturally, therefore neither in cognition. The consequence is noted, because there is not a greater repugnance here than there, as it seems. But the antecedent is clear, because the same heat in number, which now is produced by this fire in this heatable thing or which could be produced, can be produced by another similar fire or by something equivalent to a similar fire, or could have been produced; otherwise between individuals of the same nature there would be an essential order of dependence.

Second the same antecedent is proved, because according to the **saints**, if Adam had not sinned, only those would have been born who now are saved or to be saved. But now there are many saved, whose fathers are damned; therefore some now saved would have had, that case being given, other fathers.

Secondly to the conclusion thus: The **same sensation in number** which this egg causes now, another egg can naturally conserve or continue. Therefore it can produce or have produced it. The consequence holds, but the antecedent is proved, because, if God placed one other egg totally similar in the same site with this one, by withdrawing the causality of the prior, the prior sensation would still remain. Otherwise the feeler could perceive the difference between the one and the other, which is false.

(Corollary of John Duns Scotus) From this conclusion he infers as a corollary against both propositions assumed by me to exclude his solutions, that **one thing perceived through the sense can naturally cause in the soul of the perceiver an intuitive knowledge of another sensible thing not partially con-causing with it, whether that thing exists actually or not.** This is proved thus: The same sensation in number, which is now caused by this sensible, can be caused or could have been caused by another sensible totally distinct. Therefore one thing perceived through the sense can etc. The consequence holds, because that same sensation, if it had been caused by that other by which it could be caused, would have been an intuitive [knowledge] of that, just as now it is of this. The antecedent is evident from the conclusion now proved.

(Replication against John Duns Scotus) Against these things first I show that that venerable bachelor, with those things granted to him which he assumes, does not prove what he principally intends, although he infers that as a corollary. Secondly, I will confirm my propositions, which he strives to falsify. Thirdly, against the things said now by him I will prove some conclusions.

(First part of the replication of Gregory) First therefore I say that, granting that what he assumes were true, he does not prove what he intends, because granting to him that this same sensation in number, by which I see whiteness A and which whiteness A causes, whiteness B distinct from whiteness A would have caused in me, and A then would not have con-caused, if, as he says, the sensation which now is intuitive of A, would have been then intuitive of B, unless it would have been also intuitive of A or of another thing distinct from B and not con-causing with it, still it would not be had that some thing perceived through the sense causes or caused intuitive knowledge of another not con-causing with it, although it would be had that the knowledge which now is of another thing A, with B not con-causing, then B would cause.

And thus it is evident that from that antecedent of his the **consequent** inferred by him does not follow. For, as is clear, for the truth of the consequent it is necessary that concerning some one demonstrable thing this can be true **"this thing causes intuitive knowledge of another not partially con-causing,"** and this therefore, because the "predicate," as is said in logic, **"appeals to its proper form."**

For I always posited that whole even with this participle "perceived" as part of the predicate, and to the sense which it thus makes I proved [it], if it is advertised well.

(Second part of the replication of Gregory) For the confirmation indeed of my propositions I assume one such proposition: **No sensible thing present to the sense and moving it to the intuition of itself causes in the sensor a knowledge, by which is intuitively known some other sensible thing of the same nature actually existing and not present to the same sense.** And this also is evident through experience. Whence the whiteness of this pearl A, while it moves my sense to the intuition of itself, does not cause in me a knowledge, by which I intuitively know a whiteness similar to pearl B or some other, which is elsewhere nor is present to me. And so it is concerning any other sensible, nor is the opposite possible naturally.

This proposition can also be deduced from other sayings of him against whom I act. First indeed, because he, arguing that the abstractive [knowledge] of a thing outside is not terminated immediately at its species in the soul, assumes this proposition **"no cognition is terminated immediately at any object, which the**

one having [it] cannot naturally experience himself to know," as was recited in the preceding question. But it is certain that no one having an intuition or intuitive knowledge concerning a present sensible can naturally experience himself to know another similar thing not present to him, wherever that exists. Therefore no such person has a knowledge immediately terminated at another similar thing. And consequently neither any intuition, by which he knows that.

Secondly, because of the same sensible thing actually present to the sense for example of whiteness A neither perfectional half or [half] according to intensity causes an intuition, by which the remaining half is known, which is entirely similar and equally present to the same sense. Therefore by the topic from the greater neither does the whole whiteness A cause an intuition, by which is known some other whiteness similar to it existing elsewhere and not present to the same sense.

The **antecedent** is evident also through the adversary; for he posited speaking in another matter that any degree of act or habit is known by a **proper cognition and distinct from the cognition of another**. But reasonably he has to say that same thing consequently concerning any sensible thing intuitively known; therefore by another partial knowledge one half of A is known, and by another the remaining half is known. And because there is no reason, why one should cause the knowledge of the other rather than conversely, he has to say consequently that each causes its own knowledge and neither causes the knowledge of the remainder, although those are parts of one total knowledge, by which the whole whiteness is known, just as he says concerning the partial knowledges of degrees of act and habit.

From this I infer the proposition first posited, namely that **"no thing naturally can perceived through the sense cause in the soul of the perceiver an intuition or—which I accept for the same—an intuitive knowledge of another sensible thing actually existing not simultaneously partially con-causing with it."** Because, if the opposite is given in any thing, it follows, since that is perceived through the sense and causes in it knowledge of another, that it also causes knowledge of itself; and because that other sensible, whose knowledge it causes, does not con-cause with it or move the sense, since however it is born to move it, it follows that that is not present to the sense. And I speak of presence exacted according to the condition of that sense for this that it be able to go out into its act.

And thus ultimately it is concluded that some sensible thing present to the sense and moving it to the intuition of itself causes in the sensor a knowledge, by which is intuitively known another sensible thing not present to the sense. Either therefore that other not present is of the same nature with the present one, which causes its knowledge, and then the direct opposite of the proposition now proved is had. Or it is of another, and the same also is inferred, because, if some sensible thing in such a way, as has been said, can cause knowledge of another sensible dissimilar and of another species, much more knowledge of one similar to it and of the same species.

From this it further appears that he ought not to have denied the aforesaid proposition posited elsewhere, since it is consequent to the second now posited, which, as was clear, is deduced clearly from his sayings.

Furthermore, as I said then, nor is anything responded to it, it is **known by experience**, as I declared above. Therefore that proposition stands, and consequently my first reasons are least solved.

(First conclusion of the third part of Gregory's replication) Now moreover, although it is not opportune on account of some things said by me, yet for the sake of elucidating the truth regarding certain things said now by him, I posit some conclusions.

The **first** is that **no intuition of a present sensible thing and [one] changing the sense to [perceive] it is an intuition of any other similar thing not present.** It is proved first from the mentioned saying of this bachelor, namely that **no intuition of one perfectional part of a present sensible thing is an intuition of any other part of the same** however similar to it, and similarly present. Therefore by the topic from the greater, **no intuition of a present sensible thing etc. is an intuition of any other similar [thing], yet not present.**

It is confirmed, because, if it is given that the intuition of present A is an intuition also of non-present B, let it be posited that B becomes present next to A, it is certain that even then the intuition which was of it, while it was not present, will be of it after it will already be present. And if so, therefore also the intuition of one half of A is also the intuition of the remaining half. The consequence is clear, because it must not be said less that of two similar things existing in the same site there is one intuition than of two similar things existing in diverse sites.

Secondly, by what reason the intuition of one present thing for example A would be an intuition of some similar non-present thing as for instance B, by the same reason **it would be an intuition of any other thing similar to it and not present.** And thus it follows that **one intuiting the whiteness A intuites every other whiteness similar to A itself**, which is absurd to say. The assumption is proved, because that it would be an intuition of non-present B, no other [reason] seems able to be assigned for the cause, unless because B is a quality similar to A itself. For not any causality of it [B] to the intuition of A itself could be assigned for the cause, since **no sensible thing existing absent or not present to the sense can naturally move it to the intuition of itself**, just as is known by experience. But if similarity is the precise cause, therefore it will be an intuition of any [thing] equally similar.

Thirdly, by what reason the intuition of one present thing is an intuition also of another similar non-present thing, by the same reason **distinct abstractive knowledge of one thing sensed elsewhere would be also distinct abstractive knowledge of another thing similar to it yet never sensed.** But this is false according to the sayings of this bachelor, who wishes that **proper abstractive knowledge naturally presupposes intuitive [knowledge] of the same thing.** It is also false according to itself, because otherwise **someone would distinctly remember some sensible which he never sensed.** Which is naturally impossible.

(Corollary against the colleague) From this conclusion I infer against him that, **if the sensation which is the intuition of this sensible A had been caused by another sensible suppose B, it would not have been so much an intuition of that B just as it is now an intuition of A**, the opposite of which this fellow assumed in proving the consequence made to prove his corollary. This is proved, because, if with that posited it had been an intuition of B, therefore now also it is an intuition of B, the opposite of which is proved from the proximate conclusion. The consequence is clear, because, if then it had been and now is not, this is precisely because now it is not caused by that. But he cannot say this, because then by the same reason **no intuition would be of a non-existent**, since none is caused by a non-existent. However he principally holds the opposite.

Furthermore, if therefore precisely now it is not an intuition of B, therefore if the intuition of A were caused by God alone, it then would not be an intuition of A, which is not to be said. Otherwise it would follow that **God could not cause in me a vision, by which I would intuit a present whiteness, with the whiteness itself not con-causing the aforesaid vision.**

Again if that saying were true, since also according to this fellow any intuition causable by A is also causable by B and by any sensible of the same nature, it would follow that **any intuition causable by A indifferently could be an intuition of A and B and of any sensible of the same nature**, and not of one more than of another, and consequently if any such were caused by God alone, it would be an intuition of nothing; which is not to be said.

(Second conclusion of the third part of Gregory's replication) The **second conclusion** is that **no intuition causable by this sensible A is naturally causable by any other sensible totally distinct from A**; which is directly opposite to his conclusion posited above.

It is proved, because, if any were causable by another, either that [intuition], if it were caused by the other, would be an intuition of A only, or of that [other] only by which it were caused, or of both, or of neither. The first cannot be said, because then it would follow that **some sensible moving the sense to the intuition of itself would cause an intuition of another sensible not present**—let it be posited that A were not present—which is against one proposition proved above in this replication. The consequence is clear, because that such sensible would move the sense to the intuition of itself. And by the same it is clear that it would not be an intuition of both, nor of that only by which it were caused, as is clear from the proximate corollary and its proofs. Nor can it be said that of neither, because then it would be caused in vain.

Secondly, if so, it would follow that **the same sensation in number would be caused simultaneously by many sensibles distinct even in site**. For if there are for example many eggs opposite to one sight such that all can be seen simultaneously, if the sensation causable by one suppose A is also causable by any of the others, by which reason it will be caused by one, it will be caused by any, just as is proved from one saying of this fellow, in which he says that **"from natural causes approximated etc. whatever does not proceed, cannot proceed; therefore whatever can proceed, proceeds. But the sensation causable by A, can proceed from any of those, as he says"**; therefore it proceeds. Further according to the sayings of the same [fellow] it will be an intuition of each. And thus **one vision in number will be immediately and simultaneously a vision of many and a distinct [vision] of each**, just as we say that the vision of God is a distinct vision of all things; which does not seem to be conceded.

Further it would follow that with one of those corrupted or removed, still with some other remaining **the same vision will remain**, although perhaps afterwards it will not be a vision of that corrupted or removed one. The consequence is clear, because still its cause sufficient to cause and conserve it will remain.

In a similar way it will be proved that the same vision is first of the whole and of the part. For the vision causable by one half of the whole will be causable by the remaining half of the same, and consequently **the same vision will be caused by both simultaneously**, which will be caused by one of them.

And further it follows according to the principles of this bachelor that **by the same vision first the whole and its part will be seen.** Which however is repugnant to other sayings of his, as is clear from things touched upon above.

Item granting that the object is remitted [decreased in intensity], the vision will not be remitted, because still the whole will be caused by the remaining part. And all these things seem inconveniences, wherefore also the first.

(Corollary) From this I further infer that, if the same judgment is to be had concerning all natural effects, as he wishes, consequently it must be said that **no effect producible by this thing is naturally producible by any other of the same nature totally distinct.** The opposite of which he himself said. And the consequence is clear.

(To the reasons of John Duns Scotus) But if anyone wishes to hold that inference, he can easily respond to his reasons for the opposite.

Whence to the **first** that assumption would be denied "the same heat in number, which is produced now by this fire in this heatable thing or which can be produced, can be produced by another fire." And to the proof, where it is said that "otherwise between individuals of the same nature there would be an order of essential dependence," this proposition could have a multiple understanding according as "**order of essential dependence**" could be accepted broadly. And according to different senses it would have to be responded differently. In the purpose however the sense seems to be, if his inference is efficacious, that of some individuals of the same nature one would depend essentially on another just as on a *per se* cause, yet extrinsic, and in this sense it would not have to be denied.

To the **second proof** of the said antecedent, where it is said that "**if Adam had not sinned etc.,**" it can be responded according to the saying of one **modern doctor** [Adam Wodeham] that the saying of the saints is to be understood as regards the **identity of souls only.** But the soul is not an effect of the father, but of God only. It can also perhaps probably be said that, granting that it were understood as regards the essential identity of the whole man only, still it does not follow that the same effect produced now by one cause, then would have been produced by another. For substantially man does not include except matter and form, which according to the doctrine of the saints, as I think, and will be clear below, is unique namely the intellective soul. But neither matter nor soul is an effect of the father, but both of God alone.

To the **second reason**, whatever may be concerning the consequence, I deny the **antecedent.** To the proof I say that with that case given **the same sensation would not remain.** And of that, which is inferred further, I deny the consequence, because not by whatever possible variation of knowledge posited in the soul from the otherness of objects can a man naturally perceive their otherness and difference, just as in many cases an example could be given.

(First replicative conclusion of John Duns Scotus) Against the sayings of this replication that venerable bachelor said yet other things. Whence for the confirmation of his sayings he posited some conclusions, of which the **first** is: **If two most similar sensibles are objected to the same sense successively, with the same vision remaining, both will be seen by the same vision in number adequate to the vision, by which one of them only was seen.**

It is proved thus first: The similitude or representation of one of the most similar things is the same, which is the similitude or representation of the other, if they behave similarly to the power, with that [similitude] remaining. But vision is a similitude or representation of the visible object. Therefore if two most similar visibles are objected etc., with the same vision remaining, that will be of both.

Secondly thus: By the same appearance, by which one of the most similar things appears, the remainder appears, if it is objected similarly to the power. But vision is the appearance of the visible object. Therefore it is the same of the most similar things, if they behave equally to the power, with that [vision] remaining.

Thirdly thus: When two agents are approximated successively to the same patient, if the first acted its effect according to the ultimate of its power, the second can induce no effect nor intend the effect of the first, with that remaining in its total being; therefore if two most similar sensibles are objected successively to the same power, with the whole vision remaining, by which the first was seen, the second will be able to cause no vision or degree of vision; and yet there is no doubt that it will be seen. Therefore by the vision, by which the first was seen. The antecedent is clear inductively; for if fire heated this water according to the ultimate of its power, a second succeeding with the first removed will cause no degree of heat; so it is clear concerning a luminary with respect to light.

(Second replicative conclusion of John Duns Scotus) His **second conclusion** is: **One and the same vision can remain with two most similar sensibles succeeding or successively approximated to the same sense.**

It is proved thus: It is possible naturally for some vision to be conserved without the presence of any sensible. Therefore it is possible that it remains with two successively approximated. The antecedent is proved, because after a strong impression of some visible with us diverting our eyes or closing [them], or with the visible itself annihilated or transferred, we experience ourselves to see that thing seen before. Therefore the vision remains with the visible thing annihilated or taken away.

This is confirmed through **Aristotle** in *On Sleep and Waking*, who says that after the inspection of snow, with us closing our eyes, we experience ourselves to see the whiteness of snow, indeed for a time after whatever things we intuit they seem white to us.

Secondly the same antecedent is proved because, **with one and the same audition of sound remaining, the sound is successively multiplied**; otherwise audition would succeed in the soul just as sound in the air.

(Three corollaries of John Duns Scotus) From this he infers as a corollary some things: **First** is that exterior sensation is born to remain for some time with the sensible thing receding.

Second is that **intuitive vision can be naturally of a non-existent**, indeed sometimes in fact is. And concerning this is the principal inquisition.

Third, that **some sensible thing present to the sense and moving it to the intuition of itself causes in the sensor a knowledge, by which can be intuitively known another sensible thing of the same nature actually existing and not present to the same sense.** It is proved from the sayings thus: One of

the most similar things present to the sense causes in the sensor a knowledge, with which remaining the same the other can succeed. Therefore some sensible thing present to the sense etc. causes an intuition, by which the other actually existing and not present to the same sense can be intuitively known. The antecedent is clear from the second conclusion; and the consequence is clear from the first.

(Third replicative conclusion of John Duns Scotus) And because this conclusion, since it is concerning the possible, as he says, perhaps would be said not to be directly opposed to my proposition posited above against him, which is merely concerning actual being, therefore he adds a **third conclusion**. Which is, that **with one vision remaining, by which two most similar sensibles successively approximated to the same sense may be seen, that [vision] from this that it begins to be a vision of the second or third, does not cease to be of the first.**

It is proved thus: If it ceased to be of the first, either this would be, because the first sensible ceases to be, or because it ceases to be present, or because one sensation cannot be of two most similar things. Not on account of the first, because vision can be of a non-being, as the corollary of the second conclusion says. Nor on account of the second, because vision is born naturally to remain with the sensible receding, as the first corollary of the same conclusion says. Nor on account of the third, because one can be of two, as the first conclusion says.

(Two corollaries of John Duns Scotus) From these he infers that **some sensible thing present to the sense and moving it to the intuition of itself causes in the sensor a knowledge, by which is intuitively known another sensible thing of the same nature actually existing and not present to the same sense.** It is proved, because this vision, with which remaining two visibles successively approximated to the same sense will be seen, will depend on the last, and consequently will be caused by it; and yet that same vision will be an intuition of another of the same nature actually existing and not present to the same sense. It is clear, because it does not cease to be a vision of the first, therefore etc.

Secondly he infers that **some intuition of a present sensible thing and [one] changing the sense to [perceive] it is an intuition of another similar thing not present.** And it is clear.

Of these two the **first corollary** directly contradicts the proposition assumed above for the confirmation of my first reasons. And the **second** contradicts the first proposition now posited against him.

(Fourth replicative conclusion of John Duns Scotus) The **fourth conclusion** was that **the same effect in number naturally producible by this agent is also producible by another natural agent totally distinct.**

It is proved thus: The same effect in number is corruptible naturally by this agent and by another totally distinct. Therefore also producible. The consequence holds, because there is not a greater reason here than there, or conversely. The antecedent is clear, because the same heat in number, which is corrupted by this water, could just as well be corrupted by other water.

Secondly, **there can be two total effective causes of the same effect** to this sense that either without the other could produce that effect. Therefore the same effect, which is producible by one, is producible by the other. The antecedent is proved, because, if two fires were sufficiently approximated to the same stubble, any of them would sufficiently ignite that without the other. Secondly the same antecedent is

proved, because of the same effect there can be two total ends, therefore two agent causes. The consequence holds, because there is not a greater reason here than there. The antecedent is clear, because someone can do some effect on account of two ends, of which either, if it were *per se*, would sufficiently move the agent to causing that effect.

(Corollary) From this conclusion is inferred the contradictory of my second conclusion proximately posited namely this: **Some intuition causable by this sensible A is naturally causable by another sensible totally distinct.** It is proved, because this is not more repugnant to intuition than to heat or to another natural effect.

(First replicative proposition of Gregory) How however he responds to my reasons for the conclusions posited against him, will be said afterwards. On account of those sayings of his I posit some propositions.

The **first** is that **with two most similar visibles succeeding each other according to presence in the same site and in the same opposition to the same seer, when the first will be totally outside the opposition due to the seer, it will not be seen simultaneously with the second**, nor will the second be seen with the first, before the second itself is in the due opposition to the seer.

This proposition is known by experience. Whence if behind one hole of an interposed body such visibles succeed, for example two most similar eggs A and B, by an eye existing on this side of the hole A will not be seen, when it will have gone out of the opposition of the hole, and B will have succeeded it and will be seen. Similarly neither will B be seen, before it is opposite to the hole, and while A will be there and will be seen.

And this is manifestly clear from this that in such a case he will never experience or judge himself to see those two simultaneously. And yet, if that middle body in which is the hole were taken from the middle, with other things behaving similarly, he would experience and judge himself to see both those simultaneously. And so it would certainly be. From which it is clear that the hidden thing, or that which had gone out of the opposition or that which was not yet opposite, was not seen simultaneously with the remaining.

(Two corollaries of Gregory) From this follows another, namely **with two visibles succeeding each other according to existence**, thus namely that the first is not in the nature of things simultaneously with the second, **both are not seen simultaneously by the same.** This is proved, because if some visible, which had been and was not, were seen simultaneously with that which then was, by the same reason or a greater a visible which had been present and was not present, yet was in the nature of things, wherever it was, all other things being equal would be seen with that which then was present. This is clear, because as to "being seen" actual existence does not derogate from the visible itself, nor is something non-existent more visible than it would be, if it existed, all other things being equal. But the consequent is clear to be false from the proposition posited. Therefore etc.

By the same also it is proved that **another, which is not yet and will succeed it, is not seen simultaneously with that, which actually is.**

From these follows another, namely that whether in the first mode or in the second most similar visibles succeed each other, **the vision of the prior does not remain, when the second is seen**, or at least itself

then does not remain a vision of the prior. It is proved, because otherwise the first would be seen simultaneously with the second.

It follows also that **the vision of the posterior is not, or at least is not a vision of that, while the first is actually seen.** Because otherwise both would be seen simultaneously.

And because it is impossible naturally, that two succeeding each other in the first or second mode be seen simultaneously, it is impossible also naturally, that the vision of the prior remains a vision of it, when the second is seen. And this is directly against the second conclusion of this fellow proximately posited, accepted in that sense in which he posits it.

And I confirm that also otherwise thus: If the vision of the prior remains, therefore also the complex knowledge following, for example by which it was known to be, also remains. It is clear according to his sayings, because of such complex knowledge either simple intuition alone is the immediate effective cause—not excluding however the first cause which is God—and since that remains, as is posited, itself also will remain; or also the object of the vision is a con-cause, and the same follows, because according to the fellow every thing causable by one of the most similar things is causable by the remainder, and so the visible second succeeding will supply the causality of the first and will conserve that complex knowledge. But the consequent is impossible, because such complex knowledge would be false, and thus knowledge would be error or converted into error; which naturally cannot be.

(To the reason of John Duns Scotus for his second conclusion) But to his reason for that second conclusion of his I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof I say that one closing eyes or diverting neither experiences himself to see nor sees the thing seen before, but **sees a certain quality or passion made in the exterior parts of the eye by the thing seen before.**

To the confirmation I say that saving the reverence of the allegor I do not find **Aristotle** to speak thus, as he alleges, nor to posit such a sentence there. But wishing to prove that passions are made in the senses by sensibles he adduces examples concerning those beholding one color for much time, to whom diverting their eyes something such appears. Whence his letter is: **"Of the same mode it is seen."** He does not say that is seen which was seen before. And the same afterwards he says concerning those beholding the sun. And he gives experience, because "it happens, he says, for the sight to see first indeed a color of this mode until it is changed into bright red, then into purple, until it comes into black and vanishes." From which it is manifestly clear that such thing then appearing is not that thing which was seen before, but some passion made in the organ of the sense. For it is such [a thing] which is thus remitted little by little and finally vanishes, and not the thing itself which was seen before and remains integral in its being.

And similar to this **Augustine in 11 On the Trinity chapter 2** says in the same experience. Whence he says that "as if certain lucid colors varyingly changing themselves and shining less and less, turn about in the sight, until they wholly cease."

To the second proof of the same antecedent I say that, just as it is another and another sound totally or partially which is heard, so conformably it is **another and another audition.** And if one sound succeeds, changing the hearing or the thing sensed through hearing, to another sound, so also in the soul **audition succeeds audition.** And that is proved from the saying of **Augustine in 14 On the Trinity chapter 10**

saying that "if something sounds, where a hearer is present, simultaneously start and simultaneously cease both the sound and its hearing." But this would not be true, if the audition of the first part of the sound remained simultaneously with the second.

It is proved also by reason, because, if someone utters with me hearing this word "dominus," **the audition of the first syllable is not the audition of the second**, since they are sounds of diverse species as the sound "do" and the sound "mi." But of sensibles diverse in species there is not one audition, neither in number nor in species, just as neither the same vision of whiteness and of blackness. Similarly neither is the audition of the first letter the audition of the second on account of the same cause. And so it is concerning others. And so it is clear that, just as immuting sounds succeed each other, so their auditions succeed each other in the soul.

(Second replicative proposition of Gregory) The **second principal proposition** is that, if two most similar visibles are objected to the same seer successively in the same site, yet so that the first does not cease to be objected when the second is objected, **the second will not be seen by the same vision first and adequately, by which the first was seen.**

It is proved, because, if a remiss [dim] whiteness of such a degree be objected to me now and then it be intended [intensified] to the double, the second half will not be seen by the same vision first and adequately, by which the first half was seen. It is clear according to the sayings of the fellow recited above. It is clear also, because otherwise to the intension of the visible the vision would not be intended, which is against experience, for a more intense visible is seen more clearly and better, all other things being equal; which would not be, unless the vision were more intense. Therefore, if two most similar visibles are objected to the same seer successively in the same site etc. The consequence is clear, because naturally it is not possible otherwise for two most similar things to be objected to the same in the same site in the said mode.

Furthermore, if through divine power two were objected thus otherwise, either they would make one *per se*, just as two perfectional halves constitute one form, or not. If so, the same judgment on both sides. If not, much more, or equally, the second will not be seen by the same vision first and adequately, by which the first was seen. For the distinction of objects demands more the distinction of knowledges, all other things being equal, than unity.

Secondly, if in such a case the second is seen by the same vision adequately, by which the first was seen, therefore the second was seen before it was objected to the seer and was present to him; and if so, therefore also by the same reason any other most similar thing not present, and **so one seeing whiteness A of such a degree sees actually every whiteness existing or possible most similar to A itself**; which is absurd to say. The consequence is proved according to the sayings of the fellow, because, if it were seen when it was present and was not seen before, and yet the vision of it was before, therefore for this that something be seen, it is necessarily required that it be actually present to the seer. But this is repugnant to his sayings, who holds that it is naturally possible for a non-present and even a non-existent to be seen.

Nor can he say that he understood concerning an absent or non-existent which sometimes was present, and not concerning others. For it is certain that the duality of peas touched according to him by the crossing of fingers never was present to the toucher or existing in the nature of things.

(Third replicative proposition of Gregory) The **third principal proposition** is that, **if two most similar visibles are objected successively in the same site to the same seer, yet so that the first is not objected simultaneously afterwards with the second, both will not be seen together afterwards by the same vision first, by which precisely the first was seen before.**

It is proved first, because in such a case the first will not be seen simultaneously with the second, as is clear from the first proposition. Therefore not by the same vision first etc. And the consequence is evident.

Secondly, if they were objected successively in the same site and the first remained present with the second, the second would not be seen by the same vision first, by which the first was seen, as is clear from the second proposition. Therefore if the first ceases to be present, the second will not be seen by the same vision by which [the first] was seen. The consequence is clear, because otherwise the presence of the visible would be a hindrance to this that it be seen, and all other things being equal, the non-present would be seen, but the present by no means; which is absurd.

This is confirmed through one saying of this fellow, which he said in responding to one reason against him, as will be recited below. For he said that **intuition caused by one sensible, which yet was also causable by another, is an intuition of that by which it is caused, and not of another by which it is not caused.** And therefore precisely because it is not caused by that. From which it follows that the vision of the prior visible, with it destroyed or not present, will not be a vision of it, because then it will not be caused by it.

Nor is it valid to say that otherwise it was caused, and this suffices. Because by the same reason it would be said to suffice for this, that the intuition of one be an intuition of another by which it is not caused, that it sometimes will be caused by that.

Item, according to this at least it will be had that actual causation confers more to this, that the thing itself be seen. And consequently, if in the case the first visible remained, it would be seen, because then it would cause the vision itself, the opposite of which is clear from the second proposition now proximately posited.

(Corollary of Gregory) From these follows one other, namely that, **if two most similar sensibles are objected successively to the same, with the same vision remaining, both will not be seen by the same vision adequately, by which the other only was seen.** Which is directly the contradictory of his first [conclusion] recited last above.

It is proved, because either this would be, when what was objected before does not cease to be present and to be objected, when the second is objected; or when the first ceases to be objected or to be present, with the second made present. For it is not otherwise possible. But not in the first mode, as is clear from the second proposition. Nor in the second mode: Both because the same vision cannot naturally remain in that case, as is clear from the second corollary of the first. And because, granting that it remained through whatever power, still by that vision it would not be seen, just as is clear from the proofs of the third.

Continue:

(To the reasons of John Duns Scotus for his first conclusion) But to **his reasons for his first conclusion** I respond. To the **first** I respond by denying the **antecedent** by reason of the first part, if it is understood universally. And it is clear that it is false, even by the sayings of the fellow. For the vision of one perfectional half of a form is a similitude and representation of that [half], and yet is not a similitude and representation of the remaining [half], just as also it is not a vision of it, and yet they are most similar. Other instances also could be given concerning species in the memory, since otherwise a separated soul or an angel could not remember distinctly the other of most similar things. But if the antecedent is taken indefinitely, the consequence is null.

To the **second**, if the speech is concerning intuitive appearance or even concerning distinct abstractive [appearance], the **major** is false, as is clear from things said now. But if the speech is concerning confused abstractive appearance, it is not to the purpose. But if [it is taken] commonly concerning appearance, then either the major is taken indefinitely precisely, and so the discourse is useless, or it is taken universally or in place of this universal "every appearance etc.," and then it is false, as is clear from the sayings.

To the **third**, if the **antecedent** is taken universally, I deny it and say that it is not clear inductively. For the opposite is clear concerning similar sensibles, of which if one is seen first, it causes its species in the memory; with which also removed, if the remainder is seen, it will also cause its species in the memory. Or if species are denied and habits are posited, the same is valid, because the second will cause a distinct habit. Otherwise one could not distinctly remember, nor recall as many of the most similar things as he saw; which is against experience, and against **Augustine in 11 On the Trinity chapter 8**.

Item, if one luminary causes as much light as it can in some part of the medium and a second equal to it supervenes, it will cause equal light, whether that makes one with the prior, or not. If it is said that this is true, supposing that the first luminary remains, but not if it is removed, with the second succeeding, I respond that even if the first is removed, the second will cause a new light, which would be equal to that, which was caused by the first, if that first light were then. That however the medium does not appear more luminous, this is not, because the second does not cause a new light, but because the light caused by the first does not remain. Whence if through divine power it were conserved and the second luminary were approximated, certainly it would cause a new light and the medium would be more luminous. Nor does the fellow prove the opposite, and through this neither is his antecedent clear inductively, as he says.

(One conclusion of Gregory is rediscussed) From the sayings I infer two other conclusions, which I posited above against him. The **first** is: **No intuition of a present sensible thing is an intuition of another similar to it not present**. It is proved from the sayings, because if there is any, either it is an intuition of a non-present sensible which sometimes was present, or of that which never was present. The first cannot be given, as is clear from the third proposition. And from this it follows, by the topic from the greater or from the similar, that neither of that which never was present.

This consequence is confirmed by the response of the fellow given to the third reason, which I made elsewhere for this conclusion, as will be clear immediately.

I argued elsewhere for this conclusion first thus: **No intuition of one perfectional part of a present sensible thing etc.**, as is had above.

To this he responded by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence, saying to the proof that it does not hold by the topic from the greater, as is assumed, by positing on the one hand that both perfectional parts are present, and on the other hand that two distinct sensibles, with the vision remaining, succeed, because in such a case, he says, they will be seen by one vision. And similarly I would say, he says, concerning the perfectional parts of the same form.

This response, as is clear from the sayings, cannot stand: Both because **it has been proved that in no succession of visibles with respect to the same seer can both be seen by the same vision adequately, by which the other only was seen.** And because, if the perfectional parts are posited to have been caused successively in the presence of the seer, with the prior remaining, certainly then there will be a **place from the greater**, because each is present here and the other things are equal. And yet even then he has to concede the antecedent.

To the confirmation made there he says that if B becomes present, yet in another site, it will cause another vision; but if in the same, one inadequate to that, by which the other of the most similar things was precisely seen.

But from this response the proposed is had, because, if B made present in another site next to A will cause another vision from the vision of A, therefore the vision of A will not be a vision of present B, and by the same or greater reason the vision of A is not a vision of B, before it is present. The consequence is clear, because, as I was saying, if non-present B is seen by some vision, it will be seen by the same if it becomes present. For the presence of the object would not derogate from that vision so that it would not be of it, if it was of it while it was not present.

My **second reason** was: **By what reason the intuition of present A would be an intuition of some similar non-present thing as for instance B, by the same reason it would be an intuition of any other similar non-present thing etc.**

Responding he denies this assumption, saying that it will be an intuition only of a similar non-present thing which behaved similarly to that power while that vision stood, just as that which is now seen. To the proof he says that total similarity is not precisely the cause, but with this it is required that the similar non-present whiteness, which is posited to be seen, sometime was present to that power, with that vision remaining.

This response is irrational, as it seems, first because according to it it follows that, if God conserved this same vision in number, by which I see the whiteness A, with the whiteness destroyed I would still see A and this vision even then would be a vision of A, and yet, if God had caused this same vision in me, before the whiteness A was in the nature of things, this vision would not have been then a vision of it, nor would I have seen A. But this, as I think, is said irrationally. For to have been or not to have been present to the power confers or harms nothing for this that something be seen, provided that the thing which is its intentional similitude is posited in the soul, such as knowledge or vision is said to be a similitude of the object.

This is confirmed, because otherwise it would follow that God could not cause in me an intuitive knowledge of any past thing which never was present to me, indeed also neither of any which was present

to me, unless he repairs the same knowledge in number which I had of that, when it was present to me; which I would not willingly concede.

I confirm again through the sayings of the fellow. For he himself among other things treating the **fourth conclusion** recited above posited three propositions. Of which one was that **God can cause a vision of a present sensible, with it not con-causing**. Since therefore the presence of the sensible is not necessary for vision except for causing it, because without it naturally it cannot be caused—as is clear from **2 On the Soul**, where the **Philosopher** inquires, "on account of what do the senses not sense" with absent sensibles—it follows that he could cause a vision of it, granting that neither it is, nor ever was present.

Item this fellow in the same place responding to one reason of mine said that **there is naturally no intuition of a non-existent, which was not caused by it, while it was existing, or by something actually existing which would be something of it, if it were**. I ask therefore concerning the **intuition of the duality of peas**, when one is touched with crossed fingers, by what is it caused, whether by the duality itself not existing, or by something existing which would be something of it, if it were. Not by it, because it never was existing, therefore by something of it etc. But this cannot be assigned other than the pea actually existing which is touched. Therefore it would be something of such duality. And consequently this fellow touches a duality, of which one unity is, namely this existing pea, and the other is not. And this existing pea causes the touch, by which also the non-existent pea is touched. And thus the intuition of this existing pea is also an intuition of a non-existent which never was present, with this touch remaining.

Nevertheless this saying of his now recited does not seem to stand with the response given elsewhere by him and recited above, in which he said that such a one **does not touch a duality except that which "would be opposed to the unity of this touched pea."** For it is certain that no duality, of which this touched pea would be a part, would be opposed to the unity of this pea, and yet he says now such is touched, as is clear from the sayings.

To the **third reason** he said that the similitude would hold, if the intuition of a present thing were an intuition of an absent thing which never was present; which he has not yet said.

Against this argument it has been shown that, by what reason the intuition of a present thing would be an intuition of an absent thing which was present, it would also be an intuition of a similar absent thing which never was present.

(Another conclusion of Gregory is rediscussed) The **second conclusion** which follows from the sayings and which I posited elsewhere is that **"no sensible thing present to the sense and moving it to the intuition of itself causes in the sensor a knowledge, by which is intuitively known some other sensible thing of the same nature actually existing and not present to the same sense."**

It is proved, since, if the opposite is given, either it causes knowledge of an absent thing which was present, or of an absent thing which never was present. The first cannot be given, as is clear both from the first and from the third propositions now proved. And from this it follows that neither can the second be given, since there is not a more powerful reason for an absent thing which never was present, than for that

which was present. Indeed according to the sayings of the fellow a more powerful reason would seem for that which was present, as is clear from the proximately recited.

For this proposition I made elsewhere some reasons, as is clear above. To the **first** of which, which was founded on experience, that venerable fellow responded saying that certainly the whiteness of a present pearl can cause a knowledge, by which is intuitively known the whiteness of another most similar absent one, which yet was present, with the same vision remaining.

This response is reprobated from the already said: Both because it has been proved that **vision cannot naturally remain in the absence of the visible**, so at least that it be a vision of it while it is absent, as is clear from the first proposition and its corollaries. And because, granting that some vision of the absent remained, because yet by it some other present thing similar to the absent would not be seen then, nor by that present would the vision itself be caused then, as is clear from the proofs of the second and third propositions posited proximately above, it would not be had that some sensible thing present to the sense and moving to the intuition of itself would cause a vision of an absent thing which sometime was present.

To the **second** he said that "no cognition is terminated etc. which the one having [it] does not experience," he says, or did experience. Now however if two visibles succeed, with the same vision remaining, the seer did experience sometime himself to see that, which is now absent. This solution also does not stand on account of the **false foundation concerning the remaining of the vision with the visible absent**.

To the **third** he denied the consequence and said it not to hold by the topic from the greater, just as he said to another reason made for the first conclusion in the same replication then posited by me, and it has been recited now in the first corollary conclusion of these last two, which were posited elsewhere. But that cannot stand, as is sufficiently shown in the same place. Because indeed from this last corollary conclusion, as was shown above, the principal conclusion, concerning which it is acted, was deduced, namely that **it is not naturally possible for us to intuitively know a non-existent**, it is clear that that conclusion and its proofs persist in their solidity.

Which conclusion also I confirm from the now said, since, if it be possible naturally that a non-existent be known by us intuitively, either this is true of a non-existent which sometime was present, or of a non-existent which never was present. But neither of this nor of that, as is clear from the sayings. Therefore etc.

(Fourth replicative proposition of Gregory) The **fourth principal proposition** is: **No intuition causable naturally by this sensible is naturally causable by another sensible**. It is proved: **No evident complex knowledge causable immediately by this sensible and this simple intuitive knowledge of the same is naturally causable by another sensible**, however similar to it, and intuitive knowledge of itself. Therefore no intuition causable etc.

The consequence is clear through the fellow, who wishes as to this the same judgment to be had concerning whatever natural effects. The antecedent is proved, because, if the complex knowledge, by which for example I evidently know the whiteness A to exist, were causable naturally by the whiteness B and the intuitive knowledge of B itself, it would follow that **one seeing precisely the whiteness B would**

evidently know the whiteness A to exist; and so one seeing precisely one determined singular would know, that another similar to it, which yet he did not see, exists. But this is against common experience.

Secondly, **no evident and distinct memorative knowledge concerning some certain sensible, causable by the species of that or the habit existing in the memory, is causable by any other species or habit similar to it**. Therefore no intuition etc. The consequence is clear as before through the sayings of the fellow. The antecedent seems clear enough. For otherwise by a unique species or habit in the memory someone could evidently and distinctly remember any singular similar to that by which that species was caused. And further it follows that **he could never forget one, without simultaneously having forgotten any [similar one]**; which is against experience. And this last consequence is clear, because as long as he has the species, by which he can remember concerning some, he has not forgotten that. If therefore by one species he can remember concerning any, as long as he will have any such species, he will have forgotten concerning none. Therefore if he forgets some, he will then have no such species. And if he will have none, he will be able to remember none. Therefore, if before he could, he will have forgotten all.

For this same conclusion I made elsewhere, as is clear above, two reasons. To the **first** of which he responded saying that, if such knowledge is caused first by one and afterwards, with it remaining, another succeeds, it will be an intuition of both. But if it is caused by the other only, it will be an intuition of that, by which it will be caused suppose B, and not of the other as for instance A.

But of this response the first member is certain to be false from the proximately said. But against the second I argued then from the proofs of the preceding corollary.

To the **first** of which he responded that therefore precisely such intuition is not of that, by which it is not caused, **because it is not caused by it**.

And because against this I further inferred that **no intuition would be of a non-existent, because none is caused by a non-existent**, he responded that there is no intuition of a non-existent which was not caused by it or by something actually existing which would be something of it, if it were.

But this, as appears, does not stand with his first sayings. For the touch of a non-existent duality, which he says is touched by him who touches one pea with crossed fingers, was not caused by an existing duality, nor by something existing which would be a part of it, if it existed, as is proved above.

To the **second proof** against the same member he said first that to that I have to respond just as he, because I say that the intuition of A is so an intuition of it that it cannot be an intuition of another. Then he asks, whence is this? I cannot, as he says, assign another cause, unless because it is caused by A, and not by another.

Secondly he responded to the reason that an intuition causable by two is not of that by which it could be caused and is not caused, therefore because it is not caused by it, nor by God himself present. For whichever of these were given, it would be an intuition of it.

Whence he says, without assertion he posits **three propositions**: **First**, that God can cause an intuition of a present sensible, with it not con-causing. **Second**, that he can conserve an intuition of a present, with it absent. **Third**, that in a power, to which no sensible is present nor was before, God cannot cause an

intuition which be an intuition of this sensible suppose A and be not of any other similar to it entirely according to nature, because **by every appearance, by which one of the most similar things appears or could appear, another appears, if they behave similarly to the power**, therefore etc.

Concerning the **first saying** I expedite myself briefly saying that that is not the cause, but the cause is, because **it from its own nature is an intentional similitude of this namely A precisely**, whether it is caused by it or by God. And if through the impossible it were caused by B or some other sensible, still it would not be an intuition except of A itself; just as also the proper species of A itself existing in the memory and caused by A when it was sensed, if the same had been infused by God and not caused by A, nevertheless would be a representative similitude and medium of remembering with respect to A itself, and not with respect to any other. Whence as to this it is accidental to the knowledge and species by what they are caused, provided that they the same and not others are caused.

But against his response I argue doubly: **First**, because he before conceded that therefore precisely the intuition causable by A and by B, if it were caused by B alone, would not be an intuition of A itself, because it would not be caused by A. But with the precise cause posited, that is posited with respect to which it is called a cause. But if the intuition of present A itself were caused by God only, that intuition would not be caused by A, as is clear. Therefore however much A were present, still that would not be an intuition of A itself. The opposite of which he himself says now in the first proposition of those three of his.

Second, because the **third proposition** of the same does not seem to be given, otherwise it would follow that in me, who never saw Moses nor David, God could cause in me a distinct knowledge of neither, and so concerning other similar past things. In the same way it follows that concerning no future could he give distinct knowledge, which I do not think is to be conceded.

And this consequence is confirmed by the sayings of the fellow: "Because by every appearance, by which appears or could appear etc."

To the **second reason** for the same conclusion made above he responds by denying the consequence, in the given case. To the proof he concedes his saying and the consequent inferred, namely that "**whatever can proceed from natural causes, proceeds.**" And when I say "this knowledge is causable by any," he says that it is true "by any apart or if they were successively approximated." If however simultaneously in diverse sites, they are not born to cause one knowledge but two.

This response, as it seems, does not solve the reason. For with such many sensibles posited in diverse sites simultaneously opposite to the same power, of which one be A, the other B, and the causable vision be called C, I ask, **whether C is causable by A, or not**. If so, therefore it is caused by A, because by the conceded "whatever can proceed from a natural cause, proceeds." Then I ask, **whether C can proceed from B, or not**. If so, therefore it proceeds from B and consequently in fact C proceeds both from A and from B; which is to be proved. If not, therefore C is not causable by B, and further, therefore not any knowledge causable by one sensible is causable by another similar to it. The opposite of which this venerable bachelor holds.

Continue:

(Incidental conclusion against John Duns Scotus) From that **fourth proposition** and a certain other saying of this fellow, namely that **"the same judgment as to this is to be had concerning all natural effects,"** it follows that **no effect naturally producible by this agent is naturally producible by another natural agent totally distinct.** Which directly contradicts his fourth conclusion recited above.

But because he proved that [conclusion] by some reasons, therefore I respond to them. To the **first** I deny the consequence, and similarly the proposition assumed for its proof, in which namely it is said that **"there is not a greater reason here than there,"** which he did not prove. However similarly I could prove that by many [agents] and diverse according to species **a horse and an ox are naturally producible** and so of other species of perfect animals—which however is certain to be false—for a horse is corruptible by water and by fire and by a falling stone and by many others even differing in species.

To the **second**, if the antecedent is understood concerning the **same effect according to number**, just as it must be understood, if the consequent ought to be inferred to the purpose, I deny it. To the **first proof** I say that it does not prove the antecedent. For, although either [fire] would ignite by itself, yet neither would cause the **form of fire causable by the other**. Whence that proves nothing except that an effect the same in species is producible by both. To the **second proof**, whatever may be of the antecedent, understood concerning an end voluntarily pre-established by the agent, concerning which sort its proof proceeds, I deny the consequence. To the proof **"there is not a greater repugnance here than there,"** because this is only assumed and not proved, there is no proof but rather a manifestation of the deficiency of proving what is to be proved by the arguer.

Whence to such argumentation it suffices to insist, by arguing similarly concerning any natural effect, that it could be produced naturally by natural agents differing in species.

For this same conclusion this fellow elsewhere, as was recited above, made among others one reason by deducing to this that **"between individuals of the same nature there would be an order of essential dependence,"** and because I conceded this to this understanding, namely that one individual would depend on another of the same species as on a *per se* extrinsic cause, against this in his last replication he argues thus: **In essentially ordered things there is no process into infinity**, however they be essentially ordered; therefore between individuals of the same nature there is not such an order of essential dependence. The consequence is clear, because in those [individuals] there is a **process into infinity**. But the antecedent is clear from **2 Metaphysics**.

I respond. The antecedent can be understood doubly: **In one mode** that with respect to the same effect there are not infinite causes essentially ordered, and the **Philosopher in 2 Metaphysics** has this sense, and I concede [it]. And thus I deny the consequence, accepting the consequent, as I gave [it], namely that **one individual is the *per se* cause of another individual of the same species.** For this is by no means repugnant to the antecedent. **In another mode** the antecedent can be understood thus, namely that it is not possible that on something as on a *per se* cause another depends, as on A depends B so that B cannot naturally be produced except by A; and again in the same mode on B depends C and on C depends D and so into infinity, and in this sense I deny the antecedent. Nor does the Philosopher speak in this sense. For thus one effect in number is not posited to depend on infinite causes essentially ordered. For **causes essentially ordered all cause simultaneously.** Which in the proposed [case] does not happen. And therefore they are not such causes essentially ordered in causing.

To the **principal reason** of the question response was made above.

QUESTION 5 WHETHER an angel receives the species and intellections, by which it naturally understands other things, from the things themselves understood.

Fourthly I ask, **whether an angel receives the species and intellections, by which it naturally understands other things, from the things themselves understood.**

And it seems that **not, first indeed concerning species**, because "from an extreme to an extreme one does not arrive except through a medium. But the being of a form in the imagination, which is without matter, yet not without material conditions, is a medium between the being of a form which is in matter and the being of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and material conditions." Therefore the angelic intellect cannot reduce material forms to intelligible being unless it first reduces them to imaginable being. But this is impossible for it, since it lacks imagination, which is a sensitive power; therefore etc.

Second, the same is argued **concerning intellection**, since, if its intellection were caused by things, the angel would understand through discourse. But this is against **Dionysius in The Divine Names chapter 7**, where he says that "angels do not gather divine cognition from diffuse sermons, nor are they driven from some common thing to these special things simultaneously." The consequence is proved, because, just as some cause precedes the effect even in time, so it would cause knowledge of itself in the angel earlier in time than the effect. And so the angel would understand the cause earlier than the effect.

To the opposite it is argued thus: An angel cannot naturally understand determinately some thing, before it is; and it can understand some thing while it is after it was not, and also while it is not after it was. Therefore the angel receives both the species and the intellection from things. The antecedent as to the first part is clear through **Augustine in 4 On Genesis chapter 35** in that authority alleged in the third article of the preceding question: "Which knowledge the things which were made preceded etc." The second part is not doubtful; and the third is proved, because an angel can remember past things, as was proved in the same article.

Here there will be **two articles**: First it will be seen concerning the question; second, **whether it understands by discursive reasoning**, which is implied in one argument.

ARTICLE 1

For the first I premise that in us certain intellection is **complex**, certain **incomplex**; and certain incomplex [intellection] is **intuitive**, certain indeed **abstractive**. Item of species certain are **singular** and received from things, certain indeed **universal** and fictive by the intellect. All these, and their difference are clear in the **first book distinction 3**.

With these premised I posit **five conclusions**.

(First conclusion) The **first conclusion** is that **the intuitive knowledge, which an angel naturally has concerning another thing, it receives from the thing intuitively known by that.**

This is proved thus: Of any intuitive knowledge in an angel the immediate effective cause, although partial, is the thing itself intuitively known. Therefore any such [knowledge] it receives from the thing intuitively known. The consequence is noted. The **antecedent** is proved. For that it is an effective cause, I prove, because, if it is not so, therefore besides it there is some other sufficient active total [principle] of the knowledge itself, or some other many which simultaneously can sufficiently produce that; and since it itself is not a passive or receptive total or partial principle of this intellection or a disposition of that, nor even is it an effect naturally consequent to the intellection itself, as is certain, it follows that it will be possible for such knowledge to be caused in an angel naturally, with such a thing not existing. The consequent is false; the consequence is proved, because with sufficient active and passive [principles] posited in opportune dispositions the effect is posited, if it is a natural active [principle]; or at least it can be posited, if it is free, just as is clear from **9 Metaphysics** and from the difference of each genus of active principle.

But that it is **immediate**, is proved, because, if it were a mediate cause only, therefore it would be a cause of something which immediately would be a cause of the knowledge. And that would not seem to be except a **species**, or some **habit**, or some **other knowledge**. It cannot be said that another knowledge, because not abstractive; for any distinct abstractive knowledge of a thing and naturally had presupposes the intuition of the same. And then concerning that prior [knowledge] it would have to be asked, whether it was immediately caused by the thing—and if so, by the same reason also any [knowledge]—or mediate, and so into infinity on the part of the before, which is impossible. Nor can it be said that a habit, because any habit naturally acquired presupposes causally an act. Nor a species, which perhaps could seem more possible, because a species is not opportune except in the absence of the object, as was said in the preceding question. And consequently it is not *per se* required for intuitive knowledge, and by this is not a *per se* cause of it.

I confirm, because, if the angelic intellect through the possible or impossible were a power capable only of intuiting present things and not remembering past or absent things, in it no species other than the intuitive knowledge itself would be caused, just as neither in the exterior sense in us is it caused, as was had in the preceding question. Therefore the species, which is caused in the angelic intellect, is not a cause of intuitive knowledge.

Furthermore, an angel cannot naturally know distinctly intuitively any **future thing**, and it can a present one. Therefore it itself is in some way a *per se* cause of its intuitive knowledge. And it is certain that not material or formal or final, therefore efficient. The consequence is clear, because otherwise, while the thing was still future, all causes required for its knowledge would exist, and consequently it could be posited in effect. The **antecedent** is clear, since it is proper to God naturally to intuit futures distinctly. And it is proved also through the authority of **Damascene in book 2 chapter 4** saying: "Futures indeed neither angels nor demons knew"—supply "naturally"—and through the authority of **Augustine in 4 On Genesis chapter 35** pre-alleged in the proximate question. And another similar one in the same place **chapter 34**, where he wishes that, although through knowledge in the Word, which certainly can be had only supernaturally, things were known by the blessed angels before they were in the nature of things, yet through **evening knowledge**, which according to him is that by which things are known in themselves and naturally, they could not be known unless they first were at least causally, as was said.

This conclusion is confirmed through the authority of the same **in 12 On the Trinity chapter 7**. For he says: "God does not see in time nor does anything new happen in his vision and science, when something is done temporally and transitorily, just as thence are affected the carnal senses of animals and men or even the celestial [senses] of angels." Where it is clear according to him that, when something happens temporally, thence are affected the senses, that is the intellects of angels and something new happens in them, conversely concerning God.

(Second conclusion) The **second conclusion** is that **distinct abstractive knowledge concerning another thing an angel receives from the thing abstractively known mediately**, to this sense: Because namely it receives it immediately from some other thing, which it receives or received immediately from that, which actually through the knowledge of this it knows abstractively.

This is proved, for such knowledge it receives immediately from a **species** distinctly representing that thing; and that species it received immediately from that thing, therefore etc. The consequence is noted. And the first part of the antecedent is proved, since distinct abstractive knowledge concerning a thing and in singular is had concerning the thing through its species distinctly and singularly representing it known in itself intuitively, as is clear from things often said elsewhere. And consequently it is immediately caused by that species. But that an angel has such knowledge naturally, is clear from the **third article of the proximate question**.

But the second part of the antecedent will be clear from the fourth conclusion following.

(Third conclusion) The **third conclusion** is that **an angel receives some complex knowledge naturally from the thing understood**.

It is proved, because an angel naturally has evident knowledge of some true contingent enuntiable affirmatively and concerning the present. For it knows evidently that now I speak these things. Therefore etc. The consequence is clear, for such knowledge it cannot have except mediating intuitive knowledge or intuitive knowledges, by which actually it knows both me and my words. But intuitive knowledge of this it receives from the thing itself, as has been proved. Therefore etc.

(Fourth conclusion) The **fourth conclusion** is that **in an angel there are singular species**, that is singularly representative, **accepted from the things themselves**, of which they are representative.

The first part is proved, because otherwise it could not have distinct remembrance of them, the opposite of which was proved in the proximate question. The consequence is proved, just as concerning us was proved in the **First [Book] distinction 3 question concerning the knowledge of sensible things in the third doubt** of the said question.

The second part of the conclusion is proved, because, if they were not accepted from things, either all would be concreated to it simultaneously from the beginning, and then through them it could know distinctly futures just as well as past things, which is false; or whenever an angel apprehends some singular anew, God infuses in it the species of that, which, although it is possible, yet it is not likely to happen so, because naturally and by proper power tribute to it by God, and with him co-acting with it according to common influence only, our soul both conjunct and separated can acquire such species. But

it is certain that an angel is not less perfect according to nature than our soul. But this is certainly of perfection. For thus knowledge can be had concerning non-existents.

(Fifth conclusion) The **fifth conclusion**, that **in an angel there are or can naturally be universal species or fictive ones from species received from things.**

This is proved, since this is of perfection in our intellect on account of having abstract proper, definitive and scientific knowledges of quiddities, as was touched in the **proximate question article one**, and in that question frequently remembered. Therefore it ought not to be denied to an angel to be able to be in [it] naturally.

(Contrary opinion of Thomas) Against these is a **common enough opinion** which holds that **angels receive no new species, but have all concreated to them from the beginning.**

And this besides the reason first made to the question has others. Since **such as is the distinction and order of supreme bodies to the lowest, such is of supreme spiritual substances to the lowest.** Now "however supreme bodies," namely celestial, "have a power totally perfect in its nature through form. But in inferior bodies the power of matter is not totally perfected through form, but now it receives one, now another from some agent. Therefore similarly inferior intellectual substances, namely human souls, have an intellectual power not complete naturally, but it is completed in them successively through this that they receive intelligible species from things. But the intellectual power in superior spiritual substances, that is angels, is naturally complete through intelligible species" naturally had "for understanding all things, which they can naturally know."

Second, human souls, because they are forms of bodies, therefore "from bodies and through bodies attain their intelligible perfection; otherwise they would be united to bodies in vain. Therefore superior substances, that is angels, since they are totally absolved from bodies immaterially and subsisting in intelligible being, attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible efflux, by which they received from God species of known things simultaneously with intellectual nature."

Third the same is proved by the authority of **Augustine 2 On Genesis literally chapter 13** speaking of small things that "the rest below the angels are so created, that first they are made in the cognition of the rational creature and then in their own genus."

Fourth to this can be argued from another authority of the same in the same place **book 12 chapter 29** concerning small things. For he says: "Nor indeed is it to be thought that a body makes anything in a spirit, as if the spirit were subjected to the body making in place of matter. For in every mode he who makes is more excellent, than that thing concerning which he makes something etc." And therefore he concludes that the image of a body in our spirit, "by which when it was absent we remember, not the body itself in the spirit, but the spirit itself makes in itself." From the middle of which reason it can be manifestly concluded that **corporeal things and certainly also spiritual ones inferior to angels cannot cause any species or knowledges.**

Fifth it can be argued, because either things causing such species in the intellect of an angel first necessarily cause those species or others in the medium, or immediately cause them in the intellect of an angel. The first cannot be said, because then it follows that, if there were a **vacuum** between that thing

and the angel, the angel could not understand that. Item it could not understand color in the night just as neither we bodily see, because color existing in darkness causes no species in the medium. But these are absurd. Therefore that cannot be said truly. Nor also the second, since then an angel could be impeded by no distance from the knowledge of a thing, and so the **devil existing in a corner of the east could know that which is done in the west**, which does not seem said conveniently.

(To the reasons for the opinion of Thomas) To the **first** I say that it fails manifoldly: First indeed, because according to him it would follow that never would an angel be perfected through new intellection and actual consideration, but always would consider all things simultaneously in act which it can know by natural cognition, the opposite of which this doctor himself says below **question 58 article 1**.

Secondly, because he assumes false by saying that **celestial bodies are totally perfect**, if it is understood that they receive no substantial or accidental perfection. For it is certain that the moon and other celestial bodies are illuminated by the sun. But if it is understood concerning substantial perfection only, nothing to the purpose, since those species in angels are not substantial forms.

Thirdly, because either that **major** is taken universally, and so it is false, since celestial bodies so behave to the lowest that they generate them, and yet angels do not generate human souls or create [them]. Or it is taken particularly or indefinitely, and then the form of arguing is useless and concludes nothing.

To the **second** I say that not therefore do they attain intelligible perfection from bodies objectively, because they are forms of bodies, nay rather, even when they are separated from them, they receive such perfections. But whether therefore through the body or senses of the body they attain such perfection, because they are forms of bodies, I do not care. For although it were so, it does not make to the purpose, because I do not say that angels receive through bodies such perfections, but I say that from bodies as from objects and partial efficient [causes] of their knowledge.

To the **third** it must be said that, just as is clear there clearly and similarly in **book 4** in many places, **Augustine** speaks there concerning the knowledge, by which creatures are known by angels in the Word, which certainly is supernatural and beatific. But concerning natural knowledge, which he calls "**evening**," he does not say that but the opposite, as was recited above.

To the **fourth** I say first that, if we follow the sound of these words, it would be proved that an inanimate body could not act on the sense, which however is expressly against the **Philosopher in 2 On the Soul**, who wishes that exterior sensibles be active of sensations, or according to others, of species in the sense. And similarly **Augustine in 11 On the Trinity chapter 2**.

Item according to this phantasms would cause neither species nor intellection in the intellect, which is against the Philosopher also; nor would the aforesaid doctor say this.

Furthermore, it would be against the same **Augustine**, who, as is clear in the preceding questions, wishes that "every thing whatever we know, congenerates in us knowledge of itself." And in **14 On the Trinity chapter 10** he says that "certain knowables precede knowledge by an interposition of time, just as are those sensible things which already were in temporal things, before they were known. But certain begin to be simultaneously, just as if some visible, which was not at all, should arise before our eyes, certainly does not precede our knowledge." And soon he adds: "Nevertheless whether preceding in time or

beginning to be simultaneously knowables beget knowledge, are not begotten by knowledge." And it is clear here that he speaks of sensibles. Therefore he does not wish to deny simply that a body acts on a spirit, but only intends that it does not act as a total agent of the effect received in the spirit, but as a partial [agent] he does not deny it to act; otherwise he would contradict himself, as is clear from the sayings, which is not to be thought.

To the **fifth** it must be said that just as well it would conclude by positing innate species that an angel would be impeded by no distance from knowing any thing. Whence also doctors concede this consequent, whose reasons are solved.

However to me it seems it must be responded otherwise to the argument. And I say that it is not necessary that the thing to be known by an angel cause its species in the medium. For one separated soul knows naturally another even distant, just as is clear concerning the **soul of the rich feaster [Dives]** which knew the soul of Lazarus and similarly the soul of Abraham, from each of which it was distant in place, just as is clear from the words of the evangelist saying that that rich man, that is the soul which was of that rich man, "saw Abraham from afar"; and similarly from the response of Abraham saying "a great chaos is established between us and you." But it is certain that neither the soul of Abraham nor the soul of Lazarus caused their species in the medium, since the medium is not susceptible of species of spiritual things.

And when it is inferred that then by no distance would the knowledge of an angel be impeded, I deny the consequence. For notwithstanding what has been said concerning the separated soul, still on account of distance it is impeded, just as **Augustine** expressly wishes in the book *On the Care to be had for the Dead*. For it is his sentence that souls existing in hell can know nothing namely naturally concerning these things which actually are done in the world unless they learn by the relation of those, who descend from here to there. And through this mode he says Abraham knew of what sort in the world had been that rich man and Lazarus. And therefore **Augustine** says: "Accordingly it must be confessed that the dead indeed do not know what is done here, namely while it is done here. But afterwards they hear from those who proceed from here to them by dying." But this they could not, unless approaching there they saw [them], whom however existing here they did not know.

ARTICLE 2 As to the **second article**, I premise one distinction concerning "**understanding by discursive reasoning.**" For it can be accepted triply, as much as suffices for the purpose:

1. **In one mode**, so that it is the same as "**to understand one thing after another.**"
2. **Second**, so that it is the same as "**to understand one thing through another.**"
3. **Third**, so that it is the same as "**to understand one thing after another and through another,**" or, which comes to the same, to know something previously unknown through another previously known. And in this mode "**to understand through discourse**" is taken more strictly and more properly. And in this sense those who deny it deny that an angel understands by discursive reasoning. And properly also such discourse is accepted among knowledges of complexes.

With these premised I posit **three affirmative conclusions** according to the three aforesaid acceptations.

(First conclusion) The **first** therefore is that **an angel naturally understands by discursive reasoning according to the first sense.**

This is proved. For an angel distinctly knows some thing beginning to be, and similarly some contingent truths concerning it, which [thing] and which [truths] sometimes it did not know, when yet it knew other things and other truths. Therefore an angel knows by discursive reasoning, to that sense. The consequence is noted. The antecedent is proved from things said in the first article. For an angel does not know a future thing distinctly, and consequently neither its singular contingent truths. Nor is it doubtful that now, while that is future, it knows other things and truths; and when that thing will be present, then it will know that just as those which are now.

(Second conclusion) The **second conclusion** is that **an angel understands by discursive reasoning in the second mode**. And lest there be calumny in the word, whenever I say "understands," I accept for the same as for "it happens to understand." And I always speak concerning knowledge naturally had by itself as possible.

I prove this conclusion thus: An angel knows some **non-immediate truth**. Therefore it knows one through another and consequently discourses in the second mode. The consequence is proved, because every truth known not through another or through the knowledge of another truth is an **immediate truth**, at least to him, to whom it is thus known, as is clear from the definition of an immediate proposition **1 Posterior Analytics**, namely "**prior to which there is no other**," supply "by which itself is known," as is commonly expounded. And in the same mode I take immediate truth.

I declare the **antecedent**. I take for example this truth "**the sun will be eclipsed at such a time**" or this conditional "**if the world and the course of the stars will endure up to such a time according to the disposition such as is now, on such a day the sun will be eclipsed**." It is not doubtful that this truth is known to an angel, since it is known or can be even to a human astronomer. And it is not known to it *per se* or from terms, as is clear, because even to any of us, who certainly know the terms, it would be known. Item it is not known to it from some one or many intuitive knowledges, but because it knows, when the sun and moon will be in such points. Therefore it is not immediate to it.

The same could be proved concerning the truths of many natural effects, which as futures the angel foreknows, and not except through the knowledge of their causes. Whence **Augustine in *On the Divination of Demons*** says that "a demon in the affection and inordination of the air, known to him, unknown to us, foresees future tempests," that is through the knowledge, by which he knows the air to be so affected and inordered, he knows that a tempest will be.

(Third conclusion) The **third conclusion** is that **an angel can understand by discursive reasoning in the third mode**.

I prove this, because, if the opposite is given, it follows that any devil simultaneously actually knows distinctly **infinite truths differing in species**; and further also, that he has simultaneously in act **infinite specifically distinct knowledges** or one equivalent to infinite specifically distinct ones. I think neither consequent is to be given. I declare the consequence in the example just taken concerning the sun. For it is certain that, if the world and the course of the stars were perpetuated uniformly by God, infinitely many times the sun would be eclipsed. Since therefore the devil can know any future eclipse, or at whatever time the sun is to be eclipsed, if he cannot know through discourse in this mode, therefore he simultaneously knows, whenever it will be eclipsed, and consequently he simultaneously knows **infinite**

such truths: "If the world and the course of the stars will be perpetuated uniformly, in time A the sun will be eclipsed; if the world etc., in time B the sun will be eclipsed," and so of other times.

The same is clear in another example. For it is certain that angular figures are multiplicable into infinity through the addition of angles. For example a **triangular figure** is possible, also some **quadrangular** is possible, and item some **pentangular**, and so into infinity, supposing that the continuum is infinitely divisible. But concerning any species of figures some proper passion is knowable, it is certain. Therefore according to the aforesaid the devil simultaneously knows **infinite conclusions and specifically distinct truths**.

Furthermore, to me it seems a very marvelous saying that the devil ignores **no necessary truth naturally knowable**. And yet it would be necessary to say this according to that way. For if he ignores some, either that is mediate or immediate. If mediate, therefore knowable through a prior. And consequently some unknown can be known by him through another previously known, and by this "through discourse" taken in this third mode, the opposite of which is posited. But if that unknown is immediate, therefore by the place from the lesser it follows that some mediate is unknown to him, and consequently as before some is knowable by him through discourse.

For the opposite opinion the opiners do not adduce another reason than that persuasion concerning the **comparison of supreme bodies to the lowest**, which was solved in the preceding article, and the authority of **Dionysius** alleged in the second argument made to the question.

(To the principal reasons) To the **first argument** therefore, when it is said that "**from an extreme to an extreme one does not arrive except through a medium etc.,**" it can be said first that although that proposition has truth in **local motion**, when some body is moved by a finite power, yet it does not have truth universally in other motions. For it is certain that **black hairs become white**, and yet they do not first become green or blue, which colors are media between whiteness and blackness.

Going however more to the intention of the arguer the proposition can be conceded, where it is to give a *per se* medium and *per se* extremes. And it is clear that otherwise it is not true. Now however so something is a medium between some things, that between certain other things it is not a medium, for example according to the matter, concerning which is the speech, **intentional being in the medium** is a *per se* medium between the material being of color and its intentional being in the organ of sight, whence a visible immediately superposed on the organ does not cause a species in it; and yet such intentional being in the medium is not a *per se* medium between the material being of a tangible and its intentional being in the organ of touch. So also intentional being in the sense or in the imagination is a medium between material being and pure intellectual being in a **conjunct soul**, and yet not in a **separated soul**. And so I say that **imaginable being is not a medium between material being and intellectual being with respect to the angelic intellect**.

Whence just as it would not be well argued that a tangible cannot act on the organ of touch unless it acts on an extrinsic medium, because a visible cannot act on the organ of sight unless it acts on an extrinsic medium, so it is not well argued that a material thing cannot act immediately on the angelic intellect, because it cannot also immediately act on the human intellect conjunct. Which however whether universally it be true in any action of the intellect, for now I do not affirm nor deny.

To the **second**, whatever may be of the consequence, concede however the consequent. And to the authority of **Dionysius** I say that he does not speak concerning angels according to the **state merely natural** but according to the **beatific state**; nor concerning any knowledge of theirs but concerning that by which they know God. And that is clear: Both from this that without medium in the same place precedes; for he says thus: "From itself," namely divine wisdom, "the intelligible and intellectual powers of angelic minds have simple and blessed intellects." Behold that he speaks specially concerning the blessed. Which is also confirmed, because soon after he speaks specially concerning human souls, and afterwards concerning demons specially. Both because he says: "**Not gathering divine cognition from diffuse sermons**"—he does not say absolutely "cognition" but determined saying "**divine**"—and also afterwards immediately follows: "They understand the intelligibles of divine things uniformly." By which things it is clear that he speaks concerning the knowledge, by which they see God beatifically. And certainly that they "do not gather from diffuse sermons" nor acquire through discourse. But in the proposed [case] the speech is not concerning such knowledge nor concerning them according to the beatific state, but according to the natural, that is if they were in their state purely natural. And in such a scrutiny the truth can be seen better from the sayings of the saints, when they speak concerning demons than when concerning blessed angels. For they say many things concerning them according to that state fitting to them, which ought not to be understood to fit them naturally. Which [things] those who do not distinguish, err concerning their intellect.

ADDITIONAL QUESTION 5 WHETHER the species, which an angel receives from things, are causes of the intellections by which it understands the things themselves, or conversely the intellections themselves are causes of the species.

Addition 39: Fourthly I ask, **whether the species, which an angel receives from things, are causes of the intellections by which it understands the things themselves, or conversely the intellections themselves are causes of the species.**

And I argue **first** that species are causes of intellections, because either species are causes of intellections or conversely. This is clear, because otherwise an angel could acquire species of things, with them not understood, and understand them, by not acquiring species. And both are false. But intellections are not causes of species, since species themselves are not posited except on account of the generation of intellections. But an effect is not posited, so that its cause be generated; therefore etc. It remains therefore that species are causes of intellections.

But that **conversely** intellections are causes of species is proved, retaining the major of the first argument. But species are not causes of intellections. Proof, because either they would be causes acting naturally, or freely. Not freely, because the effect does not necessarily follow a free cause; and consequently species could be caused in an angel, with intellections not caused. From which further it follows that an angel could have abstractive knowledges concerning things, with no intuitive ones previously had; the opposite of which was proved in the **First [Book] distinction 3**. Nor also are intellections causes acting naturally, because, if so, it would follow that always, while an angel had the species of a thing, simultaneously also it would have actual intellection of it; and consequently that it would always actually understand as many things and have as many distinct intellections, as it had species; which seems to exceed the powers of created nature.

It remains therefore that the species themselves are not causes of intellections, but conversely intellections causes of species.

In this question there will be **two articles**: For first it will be seen concerning the question. Second, whether angels simultaneously actually understand all things of which they have species, to which as to an inconvenience the second argument deduces.

ARTICLE

As to the **first** I say that the question can be understood both concerning **abstractive intellection**, by which an angel through a species as through a known medium understands the thing of which it is a species, and concerning **intuitive intellection**, by which immediately in itself it apprehends the thing, if it be understood.

(Four conclusions) And according to this I posit **four conclusions**: **First** is that the intuitive knowledge, which an angel has concerning a thing, is a cause namely partial of the species of the same thing. **Second**, that the knowledge itself is a cause of the species naturally active, so that in acting the species, it does not depend on the will except for how much it depends in being; but that, with the knowledge standing, it cause or not cause the species, is not in the power of the will. **Third conclusion**, that the species in the mind of an angel is an active cause of the abstractive intellection by which the angel understands the thing, of which that is the species. **Fourth**, that in causing such intellection the species itself in some way depends on the will.

(First conclusion is proved) I declare the **first conclusion** from those things which we comprehend in us, since neither otherwise can we surmise anything concerning angels through reason, because we have no experience concerning them.

I argue therefore thus: **Sensual vision is a cause of a species in the memory. Therefore intellectual vision or intuitive intellection is a cause of a species in the intellect.** The antecedent is clear through **Augustine 11 On the Trinity chapter 9**, where he says that "from the species of the body, which is seen, arises the species which is made in the sense of the seer, and from this, that which is made in the memory." But the species in the sense of the seer is according to him, as is clear from the immediately following, the vision itself, just as also the species in the gaze of the thinker is the vision of the thinker or the thought. And therefore he adds: "So that the vision of the thinker can be, therefore is made in the memory from the vision of the feeler something similar etc.," as in the superior questions has been alleged. The consequence is clear for so much, because so behaves intellectual vision to constituting intellectual memory, just as sensual vision to constituting sensual memory. But intellectual memory is nothing other than the intellect informed by a species.

Nor does it obstruct, if it is posited that memory is a power realiter distinct from vision, since, even if it were not distinct but the same, just as many opine—although they concede organs to be diverse—nevertheless still the species would be caused by vision, and not conversely.

And similarly it will be in the intellect, which simultaneously is an apprehensive and memorative power, and by this conservative of the species; which most of all ought to be certain concerning angels in whom no corporeal force exists. **The Ordinary Text follows.**

DISTINCTION 9 AND 10

QUESTION 1 WHETHER one angel can naturally of itself know distinctly and intuitively the thoughts of other angels and also ours.

Regarding distinction 9 and 10, in which the **Master** deals with the distinction and preeminence of the **orders of angels**, and how the superiors announce divine precepts to the minor ones through the intermediates, such that what they themselves have known they manifest to others as if speaking, I ask first, whether one angel **naturally** of itself can know **distinctly** and **intuitively** the cognitions of other angels and also ours.

And it is argued that yes: Because any angel can naturally know **distinctly** and **intuitively** the **essence**, **intellect**, and **will** of any other angel and also of a man; therefore anyone can also naturally know in this way the **thoughts** and **volitions** of any angel or man. The consequence seems clear, because **thought** and **volition** are of themselves no less actually intelligible than the **intellect** and the **will**. Indeed, more so; for we come into the knowledge of the powers through operations of this kind, as into things less known through things better known. The antecedent is proved. For any angel knows his own essence **intuitively**, therefore any superior one also knows the essence of an inferior **intuitively**. The consequence is evident, because everything knowable by an inferior can be knowable by a superior equally perfectly or more perfectly. And it is proved in a similar way concerning the **will** and the **intellect**. So also concerning man, since a man also knows the essence of his own soul **intuitively**, as was proved in the **First Book**, distinction 3.

The **opposite** is argued, because it is proper to **God** to know the **thoughts of hearts** according to that of **Jeremiah 17**: "The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable, and who shall know it?" And immediately He answers: "I the **Lord** searching the hearts," supply: and no other.

(Opinion of Scotus)

Here is the opinion of a **certain doctor**, as is gathered from these points by which he reprobates the opinion of **Saint Thomas**, that any angel **naturally** can **intuitively** and **distinctly** know the **thoughts** of others, and in this does not depend on the **will** of the thinker. Whence, a **thought** or **volition** being posited, it is not in the power of the thinking or willing angel to hide it from another angel, such that he could not **distinctly** know it.

This opinion is proved **first** thus: "Every **intelligible in act** present to a perfect intellect not depending on a phantasm and proportioned to it can be understood by it. And 'not depending on a phantasm' is added, because our **intellect** for this state does not understand anything except through comparison to **phantasms**, however much it may be present to it. But a **thought** or **concept** in one angel, however much it may be closed off by the **will**, is **intelligible in act** and proportioned to the intellect of another angel. Therefore it can be known by him."

Secondly, if an angel could hide his **thought** from another, by the same reason he could hide his **essence** from him, lest it be seen by him. The consequent is false; the consequence is proved, because the **essence** of an angel is more intimate to himself than his own **thought**.

Thirdly, "the **action of a natural agent** approximated to a patient is not subject to the command of a created **will**, just as that fire should not heat wood is not subject to the command of a created **will**. But **intellection** in an angel is **naturally intelligible** and motive of the intellect of another angel. Therefore the **will** of one angel cannot hide his **concept** lest it be understood by another angel."

Fourthly, "if the **will** of one angel can close his **concept**, lest it be seen by another more perfect angel, he can by the same reason hide his own **concept**, lest it be known by his own **intellect**; which is false. The consequence is proved, because the **will** can less impede a more perfect and more disposed **intellect** from being moved by an **intelligible** present to it than impede a more imperfect **intellect** and one which is not so disposed, that it be moved by that **intelligible**. But the **intellect** of a superior angel is more perfect than the **intellect** of that one thus hiding, and also more disposed, that it may suffer from that **intelligible**, because the **intellect**, perfectly understanding some object, cannot perfectly at the same time understand the **intellection** of that object, because it does not understand the **intellection** except through a **reflex act**. And consequently it does not understand perfectly that **intellection**, while it is, because then it would have simultaneously two perfect acts of understanding. But another angel can understand that perfectly by a **direct act** of understanding."

Fifthly, "an act of **will** is not less hideable than an act of **intellect**, indeed more so. But an act of **will** cannot be hidden from the intellect of another angel; therefore neither can an act of **intellect**. The minor is proved, because, if he closes or hides a **volition**, either [he does so] through itself or through another **volition**. Not through itself, because it, placed in being, is multiplicative of itself and motive of a power proportioned to itself, because this is also of the nature of less perfect things. Therefore through another **volition**, and concerning that one I ask, if it is hidden, or not. If yes, therefore through another, and so **into infinity**. Therefore one must come to one which is manifest. And consequently an **intellection** or **concept** cannot be hidden through a **volition**."

But to that word of the **Apostle** in **1 Corinthians 2**: "For who of men knows the things which are of a man, except the spirit of man, which is in him," which another opinion adduces for itself, he answers "that this is understood concerning the **heart** of man, which is the **will**, according to that: 'Son, give me thy heart', that is **love**, which is an act of the **will**, and God alone is said to know this act of the **will**, not because it is not **naturally intelligible** by another angel. Whence one angel cannot close his **volition** so that it is not **intelligible** by another. But **God alone** is said to know **volitions**, because he does not co-act with **volitions**, that they may act upon the **intellect** of another. And this justly, because **volitions** are ordered to **reward** and **punishment**, which belong to **God alone**, according to that: 'Vengeance is mine and I will repay'. And therefore he reserved the knowledge of those to himself. But that reason does not conclude thus concerning **intellections**, because they are not thus ordered to **reward** and **punishment**. Whence they are not **meritorious**, except as they fall under an act of the **will** and insofar as they are commanded by the **will**."

(Opinion of Ockham)

With this doctor **another one** agrees enough, saying that "an angel left to his own nature can see **intuitively** the **thoughts** and **affections** in another angel, and in us similarly." Which he proves **first**, "because as the **visible** to **sight**, so the **intelligible** to the **intellect**. But every **visible** thing can be seen by

a perfect visual power, if it is approximated in a due manner. Therefore every **intelligible** can be seen by the **angelic intellect**, which is a perfect intellective power."

Secondly, "every **total or partial active** [agent] regarding one **passive** [recipient] can be a **partial cause** regarding any **passive** [recipient] of the same nature," and of any effect of the same nature. "But one **intellection** of an angel can be a **partial cause** regarding a **reflex act** in the same angel; for he can understand himself understanding. Therefore that **intellection** can be a **partial cause** regarding another angel, if it is approximated in a due manner. And it is the same way concerning our **intellection**, and also concerning **affection**. However, concerning the **matter of fact**, perhaps it is different, because an angel cannot understand except with **God concurring** as a **partial cause**. And because concerning the **matter of fact** perhaps He does not co-act with the **angelic intellect** to understand our **thoughts** or those of another angel, therefore perhaps he does not understand them."

Secondly this doctor says that, "supposing that an angel sees **thoughts** and **affections intuitively**," nevertheless "he does not see the **object terminating the act** except in a **universal** and **common concept** to himself and others, because, posited that I love **Socrates**, the angel can **intuitively** see my **love**, if it is approximated to him; and he sees that I love a man, but he does not see that I love **Socrates**. In the same way in the proposition, if I understand **Socrates**, he can see my **intellection intuitively**, and can see that I understand a man, but not that I understand this one or that one. And the whole cause is, because the **object of the act** cannot be known by the power knowing the act except through **discourse** and **argumentatively**. For otherwise, if one seeing the act **intuitively** always saw the **object of that act intuitively**, since an angel, and our intellect for this state, can know **abstractive cognition intuitively**, it follows that then he sees the **object of that act intuitively**. Which is false, because I can understand **abstractively** an object which is nothing in effect [actuality]. Therefore he knows the **object of the act argumentatively** only and through **discourse**. But in this mode he does not know any determined singular but only in a **common concept**, because that cognition is assimilated equally to all individuals of the same nature, especially if those individuals are very similar. And consequently through such, the knowledge of one cannot be had **determinately** more than of another."

(Against the opinion of Scotus and Ockham)

This opinion does not seem true to me. To show which, and for a response to the question, **Additio 40**: I premise that for an angel to be able **naturally** of itself to understand the **thought** of another can be understood in two ways: In one way, that thus of itself, that left to his **naturals**, with the **thought** in the intellect of the other angel posited in due approximation and **God** not withdrawing his common influence, it is in his power to understand that **distinctly** and **intuitively**, such that he cannot be impeded even by the thinking angel lest he understand it. In another way, that he is able thus of itself, because with the **thought** posited in the other angel etc., as has been said, he can, with the other thinking angel co-acting and as if showing his **thought**, know it. In this second sense the question is not turned for now, but will be discussed in the following question according to that sense. Now however it must be treated according to the first sense, in which sense also, as is evident, the recited opinion speaks.

This being premised, **The Ordinary Text follows**: I posit three conclusions.

(Three conclusions)

The **first** is that **de facto** no creature knows **distinctly** and **intuitively** human **thoughts** or **affections**. **Second**, that none can **naturally** know such **thoughts** or **affections** thus. **Third**, specially against the second doctor, that if an angel **intuitively** knew the **thought** of another, by which the other **distinctly** and **determinately** knows some singular, and through this knew its object, he would certainly know that **distinctly** and **determinately**.

(First conclusion is proved)

I could prove the **first conclusion** by many authorities of **Scripture**, by which it is asserted to belong to **God** to know the **hearts** of men. But, because some interpret [gloss] at their pleasure sometimes saying that from such authorities creatures are not excluded from knowledge of this kind, therefore I adduce a single one, which utterly repels a gloss of this kind. For we have written in **2 Chronicles 6** chapter, said by God through **Solomon**: "Thou **only** knowest the hearts of the children of men." If **only**, therefore no creature.

You will say, by 'hearts' he understands **affections** only, not **thoughts**, on account of the cause assigned above by the first doctor.

Contra. Then the **devil** would know at least **thoughts**, but this is false, as is proved through that **ecclesiastical dogma** written in the book **On Ecclesiastical Dogmas** chapter 49: "We are certain that the **devil** does not see the internal **thoughts** of the soul." And lest, because he names the **devil** specially, you suspect him alone, not other angels, not to have this knowledge, listen to what is added: "But the **secrets of the heart** he alone knows to whom it is said 'Thou **only** knowest the hearts of the children of men'."

Furthermore, it would be too dangerous, if the **devil** knew **distinctly**, what man **determinately** thinks.

Furthermore this is reprobated from the intention of **Jerome** upon that of **Matthew 9**: "When Jesus had seen their thoughts etc." For he himself says, that from this it is proved that he himself was **God**. But certainly that would not be true, if even the **devil**, left to his **naturals**, could know this. Otherwise it would follow equally well that the **devil** was **God**. And if the preceding words of the **Gospel** are attended to, it is clearly evident that he speaks properly concerning **thoughts**, as they pertain to the **intellect**. For the **Evangelist** premises: "And behold certain of the scribes said within themselves: This man blasphemes," and immediately follows: "Therefore when Jesus had seen their **thoughts**"; **thoughts**, by which they said within themselves, he does not say **affections**, by which they desired or willed.

Item, that there by '**thoughts**' are signified **intellections**, is evident through **Augustine** in **15 On the Trinity** chapter 10, where he expounds the aforesaid word to this understanding.

It is not necessary to bring other authorities, because these are so express, that no **Christian** can licitly doubt concerning this conclusion.

Whence I wonder much concerning the **second doctor** also, who with a note of doubt says angels **de facto** do not know the **thoughts** of men, although nevertheless **Scripture** determines that assertively so expressly.

Furthermore, the cause which that doctor assigns, on account of what **affections** alone lie hidden from angels, is not sufficient. Both because, although it befits **God alone** to reward and punish, why on account of this was it necessary that he **alone** should know the **volitions** themselves? If others knew them, would they therefore be less to be **rewarded** or **punished**? Or would this befit him alone less? It is well evident, that no.

(Second conclusion is proved)

Additio 41: I prove the **second conclusion** thus: **Thought** and **affection** per se depend in moving the **intellect** to knowledge of themselves, or what is (the same) in causing an **intellection** concerning themselves, on the **will** itself of him whose they are. Therefore not **any angel** can naturally of itself **distinctly** and **intuitively** see them. The consequence is known, because, since neither **thought** nor **affection** can be **intuitively** known **naturally** by any created intellect, unless they **partially cause** their own notices, as also both aforesaid doctors concede, it is impossible **naturally** for any created intellect to know them **intuitively**, if they do not **con-cause** their notices. But if in **con-causing** they depend on the **will** of the thinker himself, it follows that with the **will** of the thinker not concurring to a motion of the **intellect** of this kind and the causation of the **intellection**, it will not be possible for them to be understood.

But I prove the antecedent **first** thus: A **thought** or **affection** of someone is not less subject to the command of the **will** for moving the **intellect** of another to an **intellection** of itself than it is subject for moving the **intellect** in which it is. This is evident, both because it is not less knowable by him in whom it is, than less near to him for causing an **intellection** in him; indeed, as it seems, more. For nothing is so easy for us to know as that we **Understand**, and **will**, and similar things, which as soon as we will, we experience in us.

This also seems to be proved from the sayings of each opiner. Since each wishes that the **thought** itself be compared uniformly to any **angelic intellect** [outside] as to that in which it is, as to the power to cause an **intellection** of itself in that, as is evident in their recited reasons. But in moving the **intellect** in which it is, it is certainly subject to the command of the **will**. Otherwise it would **naturally** cause an **intellection** of itself, and that [intellection] another, and so **actually infinite intellections** reflected upon themselves would be simultaneous.

Secondly, **affection** and **thought** are not less subject to the command of the **will** as to this, which has been said, than the **species** themselves existing in the **sensitive** or **intellective memory** are subject to the command of the **will** for moving the **intellect**, in which they are, to a knowledge of themselves. It is evident. But these cannot move except according to the determination of the **will**, which uses them at its pleasure. **The Ordinary Text Follows.**

I prove the **second conclusion** thus: No **genus of beings** is deprived **universally**, or for the most part according to individuals and times, of an operation competent to it **naturally** or born to be competent. But the **genus of angels** for always or for the most part according to individuals and times is deprived of **distinct knowledge** of the **thoughts** of man, as is evident from the preceding conclusion. Therefore they are not **naturally apt** for such an **Operation**. The consequence is clear. The first part of the antecedent is proved by the authority of **Augustine** saying in **7 City of God** chapter 30: "God thus administers all

things which he created, that he allows them to exercise and act their own **motions**." And in book 5 **Against Julian** he says: "For neither does God so create natures, that he takes away the laws, which he gave to the **motions** of each nature."

And in both places he takes 'motion' for **operation**. And each saying is to be understood 'as for the most part'; for sometimes through a **miracle** he suspends some creatures from their operations, which nevertheless happens very rarely, just as happened in the **furnace of fire** of the three children.

It is confirmed, because otherwise it could be said that **whiteness** can **naturally** produce **whiteness** just as **heat heat**; but that this does not happen, is because **God** suspends it from such an action, by not co-acting with it. Which nevertheless no one would say.

Secondly, God deprives no **species** of corporeal things **for the most part** according to individuals and times of any operation, to which it is **naturally apt** born. Therefore neither does he deprive **spiritual substances** and the noblest of creatures **for the most part** etc. The consequence is very probable; nor does the opposite of the consequent seem reasonably to stand with the antecedent, and the antecedent is clear.

Furthermore no reasonable cause seems able to be assigned, on account of which **God** would thus always suspend angels at least good ones from knowledge of this kind, since he does not suspend them from the knowledge of less perfect things, nor also of more perfect things, namely **substances** both corporeal and spiritual. For they **naturally** know each other and these inferior things.

Additio 42: Fourthly it can be argued thus: Some **thought** cannot be **distinctly** and **intuitively** known by the thinking angel himself. Therefore one angel cannot **naturally intuitively** see the **thoughts** of another. The consequence seems evident enough; the antecedent is proved. For if an angel sees some **thought** of his, either a **thought** of that **thought** can be seen, and simultaneously also a **thought** of the second **thought** and so into **infinity**, and so it follows that simultaneously there are **infinite thoughts** in him. Or one comes to some one which he cannot see, and the proposition is held.

(Third conclusion is proved)

Additio 42a: I prove the **third conclusion** thus: The **intellection**, by which one **determinately** understands some **singular**, is from its nature so **determinately** a **notice** of that [singular], that it is not a **notice** of any other no matter how similar to it. Therefore, if some **intellect** understands through that [intellection] something else, it **determinately** understands that of which it itself is the **notice**.

The antecedent is certain through **experience**; otherwise an **individual** would never be known **distinctly** and **determinately**, without all other things similar to it being known. It is evident also through the **same one**, against whose saying this **conclusion** is posited. For he says in his **Second Book** in that question 'Whether an angel understands things other than himself through his essence, or through species', in solving a certain doubt moved by him, thus: "Although an **intellection** or **species**, if it were posited, is equally assimilated to many **individuals**, nevertheless from its **nature** it determines for itself that it leads the **intellect** into the knowledge of that **object** from which it is **partially caused**, because it so determines for itself to be caused by that **object**, that it cannot be caused by another. And therefore it so leads into the

knowledge of it, that it does not lead into the knowledge of another." These are his words. **The Ordinary Text Follows.**

I prove the **third conclusion** thus: If someone understands through a **species** representing some **Individual singularly** and **determinately**, he **determinately** understands that **Individual**, which that [species] **determinately** represents. Therefore, if someone understands through some **notice** representing some **Individual determinately**, he understands that **Individual determinately**.

The **consequence** is evident: Both because the reason is the same on both sides, nor does anything seem to obviate the consequent more than the antecedent. Which is evident. For if anything were to obviate the consequent, this would be, as it seems, according to him, because the **notice** is equally similar to other **individuals** of the same nature, as is evident through him above, who assigns precisely this cause. But so also the **species** is equally similar. And because just as, if someone understands through some **species** or some **concept common** and **universal**, he understands all things represented or signified **naturally** by it **confusedly** and **indistinctly**, so, if someone were to understand through some **notice universal** and **common**, he would understand **indistinctly** and **confusedly** all things signified and represented through it. So also if understanding through a **species** representing **singularly** etc.

The antecedent is evident, because otherwise it would be impossible to record [remember] **determinately** and **distinctly** any **individual**. For, as is evident above and also in the **First Book**, it is impossible that there be **recordation naturally** except through a **species**, and it is established that through a **universal species** there cannot be a **recordation** of any **individual determinately** and **distinctly**. If therefore neither through a **singular** [species] or one representing **singularly**, then in no way.

Furthermore, according to this no **species** would represent **singularly**, the opposite of which is assumed in the antecedent.

It is confirmed through the **same doctor** who in his **Second Book** in that question 'Whether an angel understands things other than himself through his essence, or through species', solving a certain doubt moved by himself, says thus: "Although an **intellection** or **species**, if it were posited, is equally assimilated to many **individuals**, nevertheless from its **nature** it determines for itself that it leads the **intellect** into the knowledge of that **object** from which it is **partially caused**, because it so determines for itself to be caused by this **object**, that it cannot be caused by another. And therefore it so leads into the knowledge of it, that it does not lead into the knowledge of another." From which is evident both the antecedent itself as well as that the cause which he assigns above for his saying, namely concerning **assimilation**, is null.

(For the solution of the reasons of Scotus and Ockham)

For the solution of the reasons I premise that, just as for some **sensible** thing to be **naturally sensed** by someone, it does not suffice that he is **sensitive** and that is **sensible**, but it is required that the **sensible** be compared to the **sensitive** according to a **due comparison** in propinquity and distance and other certain conditions, different nevertheless according to the diversity of senses and sensibles, as is evident, because a **visible** thing must be opposite according to a **straight line** to the organ of **sight**, which is not required between an **audible** thing and the **auditive** power, and if there were some **sight** to which the **visible** could

not be thus opposed directly, it could not see it, so for something to be able to be **naturally understood intuitively** by someone, it does not suffice that it be **intelligible** and the other be **intellective**, but it is necessary that, if that **intelligible** determines for itself to relate in some way to the **intellect**, in order that it be understood, it should relate to it in such a way; because, if it is impossible **naturally** for it to relate to that in such a way, it is also impossible **naturally** for it to be understood by it thus. For a thing is capable which "has the **power of doing**, and as it is a **power of doing**; however not entirely [so], but of those having [it] in a certain mode," as is said in **Metaphysics 9**.

Now however although a **thought** is **intelligible** both **intuitively** and **distinctly**, nevertheless for this, that it be possible for it to be understood by a created **intellect**, it from its **nature** determines for itself a certain **mode** of relating to it, such that, if it did not relate to it in such a way, it would not be possible for it to be understood by it.

This **mode** however is, as I think, that it **inform** that [intellect] and be **subjectively** in it. Which can be declared from this, that if through the **power of God** two men were in the **same prime place**, still the **thought** of one would not be **intuitively understood** by the other, notwithstanding that the **intellect** of that one was of the same nature, and otherwise perhaps better disposed, and it was just as near to the **intellect** of the other as to him in whom it is. Nor does it appear on account of what it could **con-cause** an **intellection** of itself in one and not in the other, except because it is in one **subjectively** and not in the other.

Also with another possible case given for the sake of example it is declared. For if one **angel** good or bad were in the **same prime place** with a man, such that the whole **angel** coexists with the whole body of the man and any part of it just as the **rational soul** of that man coexists, except this that the latter **informs** the body, but the **angel** does not, as implies perhaps happens many times, the **thought** of such an **angel** was just as thoroughly present to the **soul** of that man as his own **thought**, and nevertheless it will not be known by him **distinctly**.

Nor does it seem that another cause can be assigned besides this, because that [thought] will not be in his **soul** as a **form in matter**. **Additio 43**: Or if there is any other, this one nevertheless concurs. **The Ordinary Text Follows**.

Since therefore no **thought** relates in this mode to any other **intellect** from that of which it is, or can **naturally** so relate, it follows that it can be **intuitively** known by no other. Nevertheless it is not necessary that everything which ought to be known **intuitively** by it relates to the **intellect** in this mode, just as neither is it necessary that everything, which can be sensed, be directly opposite, but it is necessary that it be **visible** for this that it be seen.

Additio 43a: And that seems able to be confirmed from another point. For a **thought** does not seem to be known by a man except through a certain **experience**, by which he experiences that he understands or wills this or that, and so concerning other acts which he experiences in himself, which all are comprehended for now under the word '**thought**'. But he could not **experience** this unless acts of this kind **informed** his powers, just as neither otherwise would he understand or will through them, as was said above.

Whence if that (**thought**) were preserved thus **per se** by **God**, such that it did not **inform** the **intellect**, just as through it then the **intellect** would not understand, so neither would it understand it [the thought], although it were equally near or undistant to it as before. Nor can another reason for this be given except because such is the **condition** of itself and of the **intellect**. **The Ordinary Text Follows.**

And on account of this which has now been said it seems able to be proved that one **angel** cannot **naturally** understand the **thought** of another. Which concede. And although I have not found this expressed in **Scripture**, as concerning the **thoughts** of men, nevertheless the opposite is not held, rather this can be drawn more from the sayings of the **saints**. And the older **doctors** hold this.

(To the reasons of Scotus)

Now to the **reasons** of the other opinion, insofar as they touch this **conclusion**, I answer.

To the **first** it can be conceded **first** the conclusion, which is there directly concluded, namely that a **thought** can be known by an **angel**, but it does not follow 'it can be known by an **angel**, therefore **distinctly** and **intuitively**', but it is a **fallacy of the consequent**. But if in the major '**intuitively**' is added by saying 'every **intelligible in act** present etc. can be understood by him **intuitively**', it must be said that the proposition is true, if it is understood to be present to him in such a way, as that thing requires from its **nature** in order that it be understood thus. And then it is evident that the minor is false, from those things which have been premised.

To the **second**, although it goes more directly against that **opinion** which he reprobates there, I say, if it were drawn against the sayings, that it is not from the command of the **will** that the **thought** lies hidden, and not the **essence**, but because the **thought** does not have that **comparison** to the **intellect** of the **angel**, such as it requires, that it be understood **intuitively**. But the **essence** is in a comparison sufficient to it according to its exigency.

To the **third** it must be said that an **intellection** in an **angel** is not sufficiently **motive** of the **intellect** of another **angel** to an **intuition** of itself on account of the said cause.

To the **fourth** also through the same it is evident that it can immute its **own intellect** to an **intuition** of itself, and not another. And that suffices for the reason, although also some other things are assumed in it sufficiently doubtful and perhaps not true.

To the **fifth** it must be said that also an act of the **will** is hideable, indeed **naturally hidden**, that is unknowable by another **angel**. Nor do I say that it is hidden through that mode, by which that **opinion** perhaps held, if it had that sense, in which that **doctor** disproves it.

(To the reasons of Ockham)

To the **first** of the other **doctor**, although that similitude cannot be understood **universally** as to all things, but **particularly** only, concede nevertheless that a **thought** is **intelligible** by an **angel**. But it does not follow 'therefore **intuitively**'. Just as also certain things are **intelligible** by us, yet not **intuitively naturally**, as for instance **infused habits**, and according to this **doctor** himself also **acquired habits**, and **material substances**, which, although they are **intelligible** in their **simple common concepts**, or also in

composite common ones, and perhaps **proper** ones, nevertheless in themselves and **intuitively** they cannot be **naturally** understood by us. So I say also that our **thought** or that of an **angel** is certainly **intelligible naturally** by another **angel** in some **common concept**, nevertheless in itself and immediately by no means.

And if the similitude from the **visible** to **sight** were taken with this determination '**intuitively** and in respect to any **intellect**' by saying 'just as the **visible** relates to **sight** etc; but every **visible** thing can be seen **naturally** by any **sight intuitively**', whatever may be concerning the minor, for perhaps it is false, nevertheless the major is to be denied simply.

Furthermore, that similitude ought to be understood thus that the **intelligible** relates to the **intellect** according to its exigency, so that it be seen **intuitively**, just as the **visible** to **sight**, and then nothing is concluded against [us], because a **thought** does not relate thus to the **intellect** of another, as has been said above. And that that similitude ought to be accepted thus, is evident, because otherwise it would be proved that a **visible** thing not opposite directly to **sight** could be seen, by arguing thus: As the **audible** relates to **hearing**, so the **visible** to **sight**; but the **audible** not opposite, yet approximated, can be heard, therefore also the **visible** not directly opposite, yet approximated, can be seen. And it is evident to the sense that the **conclusion** is false.

To the **second reason first** it could be said that it does not conclude that our **thought** is **intelligible** by an **angel**, supposing that the **intellect** of that one is of another nature from ours, just as that same **doctor** has to hold, since he posits the **intellect** of an **angel** to be his substance, and similarly the **essence** of the **soul** to be the **intellect**.

Item if there were not many **angels** of the same **species**, as the **great ones** say, the reason would prove nothing. And if some are of the same **species**, yet not all, it would not prove then concerning all, as nevertheless he intends.

I answer nevertheless by conceding that that **intellection** could be a **partial cause** of an **intellection** in the **intellect** of an **angel**, if it were approximated to it in a **due mode**; but the **due mode**, by which an **intellection** ought to be approximated to an **intellect**, so that it **con-causes** an **intellection** of itself, is, that it **inform** that **intellect**. Which does not happen **naturally** in the proposition.

To the proof of that other saying of his, namely that granted that an **angel** sees **intuitively** the **intellection**, by which I understand **Socrates** etc., I say that, although through that he would see **distinctly** and **determinately**, nevertheless it does not follow that [he sees] **intuitively**.

The instance is: For through some **recordation** some **singular** which was and is not is understood **distinctly**, not however **intuitively**. Whether however its **object** can be seen through an **act** just as its **represented** [object] is seen through a **species**, is doubtful. If nevertheless it were said that yes, then the other saying assumed there would be false, namely that the **object** could not be understood through the **act** except through **discourse**. For what is understood through a **species**, is not understood through **discourse**, as was said above.

Furthermore, still it does not follow 'it is understood through **discourse**, therefore it is not understood **distinctly** and **determinately**'. For we understand **God** in the way [in this life] through **discourse**, and

nevertheless **distinctly**, although not **intuitively**, but **abstractively** in some **composite concept proper** to him, as was declared in the **First Book** distinction 3. And therefore this **doctor** is deceived in this, that from this that something is not understood **intuitively**, he infers that it is not understood **distinctly** and **determinately**. Which inference is null.

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To the **principal reason** I answer, by denying the **consequence**, nor is the proof valid on account of the cause **pre-assigned**.

QUESTION 2 WHETHER one angel can naturally speak to another angel with intellectual speech.

Secondly I ask, whether one angel can **naturally** speak to another angel with **intellectual speech**.

And it is argued that no. No angel can naturally hear another speaking **intellectually** with **intellectual hearing**. Therefore no angel can **naturally** speak to another with **intellectual speech**. The consequence is evident, because otherwise such speech would be **in vain**, just as one speaks **in vain** to a deaf person. Which is not to be posited in angels. The antecedent is proved, because according to **Augustine** in **15 On the Trinity** chapter 10, to hear and to see, although they are diverse in the senses, nevertheless are not so in the **intellect**, but there to hear is the same as to see or to **understand**. Similarly, to speak is the same as to form a **word**, which is nothing other than to think; and consequently to hear another speaking **intellectually** is the same as to see his **thoughts**. But no angel can naturally do this, as was proved in the **preceding question**. Therefore etc.

To the **opposite** it is argued. A **separated soul** can speak **intellectually** to another soul, therefore much more so an angel to an angel. The antecedent is proved from that which is held in the **Gospel** concerning the soul of that rich feaster, which spoke to the soul of **Abraham**.

(Response to the question)

I answer. That angels speak to one another, we have through the **Scripture** of **Zechariah 2**, where it is read: "Behold the angel, who spoke in me, went out and another angel went out to meet him and said to him: Run, speak to this boy etc." Here it is held that an angel spoke to an angel.

Item **1 Corinthians 13**: "If I speak," he says, "with the tongues of men and of **angels**"; where one **gloss** says that "superior angels signify to the minor ones what they sense concerning the **will of God**; which is done by certain **nods** or **signs**."

To this it can also be argued, because angels can speak to the **souls of the dead**, therefore also to other angels. The consequence is clear enough. The antecedent is proved through that of **Augustine** in **On Care for the Dead**: "The dead can also hear something from angels, who are present to the things which are done here; that each one of them ought to hear, He judges to whom 'all things are subject'."

Also in the book **On the Divination of Demons** he says that demons "hear" certain things from holy angels, "that they may announce them." If therefore they hear, therefore others speak. From these points it is well held that angels speak.

Whether however **naturally**, or by a **special divine power**, is not held expressly. It is commonly held however that yes [naturally]. Therefore the **mode** must be seen.

(On the mode of speech of angels)

For understanding which, first it must be seen, what it is to speak **intellectually**, and what to hear; secondly, how an angel speaks to another and the other hears him.

Concerning the **first** it must be said that, just as to speak with **vocal speech** is nothing other than to proffer **vocal words**, so that someone hears with **bodily hearing** and understands that which is signified through the voices, so to speak **intellectually** is nothing other than to form an **intellectual word**, so that someone hears with **intellectual hearing** and understands that which is signified through the **word**. But an **intellectual word**, just as **Augustine** says in **15 On the Trinity** chapter 10, is "a **thought** formed from that thing which we know, which is neither **Greek** nor **Latin** nor of any other language." And therefore to speak **intellectually** is to think in the **intellect**. On account of which in the same place: "Certain thoughts," he says, "are speeches of the heart." And many other things to the purpose.

But to hear through the **intellect** is nothing other than to **understand** the **thought** of another, just as to hear through the sense is nothing other than to perceive **proffered voices**. Whence in the same place **Augustine**: "Hearing," he says, "and vision are two certain things distant among themselves in the senses of the body, but in the mind to see and to hear is not one thing and another thing." Which consequently he declares through the words of the **Savior**. See there. These things concerning the first.

(Opinion of Ockham)

Concerning the **second**, namely concerning the **mode** of speaking and hearing of angels to one another, a **certain doctor** says that it is such: For an angel causes in himself a **thought** concerning something so that another angel may hear; which being caused, he causes **effectively** a **thought** of that **thought** in the other, and so from the consequent he causes in some way in the other a **thought** of the **object** of the first **thought**. And as he says elsewhere, namely in his **Second Book**, he causes such a **thought** in the other precisely "by the **mode of an object**". But the other, in whom a **thought** of the **thought** of the other is caused of this kind, hears the other speaking through that; nor does he who speaks do anything else. And in this mode he says that one angel speaks **naturally** to another.

(Against Ockham)

This **mode of speaking** does not please me. The reason is, because according to him it follows that any angel **naturally** sees or understands **intuitively** the **thoughts** of another. The opposite of which was proved in the **proximate question**. And the consequence is evident. For from the fact that he himself through his **thought** causes precisely by the **mode of an object** a **thought** of his **thought** in another, so the other can **naturally** understand a **thought** of this kind just as the very **essence** of the angel, whose **thought** that is, or any other thing which causes a notice of itself in him **naturally** and precisely by the **mode of an object**.

Whence he himself also concedes this consequence implicitly enough just as also the consequent expressly. Which nevertheless I repute to be false.

(Opinion of Scotus)

Another **mode of speaking** is that one angel speaks to another by causing in him an **intellection** of the same **object** which he himself understands. Where it is to be adverted that according to this **doctor** besides the vision, by which an angel sees in the **Word** some object, for example A, he can see the same A in four other ways, "namely **intuitively** in itself A, and again **intuitively** in the **intellect** of another angel knowing, and also **abstractively** through a **habitual species** concreated or acquired. And none of these intellections is hearing, because none is **per se expressed** by the understander insofar as he is understanding. Indeed it is accidental to it that the object is understanding; for it would remain equally, if it were not understanding. And in all these, if some **intellect** causes, it is the **intellect** of the understander himself, and not of another; and the object itself concurs there with the **intellect** as a **partial cause**. In the **fourth way** this one can know A, such that the **intellection** is made in him through another **intellect expressing**, and the **intellect** of this one has no causality regarding the act, but is only passive. And this sole cognition is hearing and is **expressed** by the understander insofar as he is understanding," such that "only the **intellect** of the speaker or things which are in him as in him, or present to him as to him, are active regarding hearing. And this not as **proximate effects**; for those presences to the speaker first cause an actual **intellection** in the speaker before they cause that hearing in the hearer." Nevertheless the **intellection** of the speaker itself "is not in the speaker a **ratio** of acting insofar as he speaks, but something pertaining to the **memory** of the speaker."

That however an angel can thus cause an **intellection** of A itself in another angel, is proved because, "what is sufficiently in **first act** regarding some effect, can cause that in whatever is **receptive** of that effect. But an angel having actual notice of some object, for example A, is sufficiently in **first act** for causing an actual **intellection** of A itself. Therefore he can cause that in whatever is **receptive** of it. But the **intellect** of another angel is **receptive** of it," since it is of the same nature with that **intellect**. Therefore etc. "Proof of the major, because the **first extremes** of the proportion of active and passive are most universal abstracts from whatever active and passive; because that proportion is in particulars through a **common ratio**, and therefore in the extremes." The minor is proved, "because the angel has in himself an act of knowing A and the **species**, whatever is posited necessary for cognition. And through that, which he has, he can make his own **intellect** in **second act**, by causing in himself an **intellection** of A as an effect."

(Against Scotus)

Contra these things, because they contain some false things. The **first** is that one angel can see **intuitively** A in the **intellect** of another angel knowing A. For if this were true, this would be, because by seeing the cognition of the other angel knowing A, through that he would see A **intuitively**. It is evident, because he cannot see A in the **intellect** of another angel except either by seeing through the **species** which the other angel has of A, or by seeing **formally** through the same cognition by which the other angel sees A, or by seeing the cognition itself by which the other sees A, and through that thus seen seeing A. The first cannot be said, because cognition through a **species** according to him is **abstractive**. Nor less that which would be through a **species** existing in another **intellect** than that which is through one existing in his own. Nor can the second be said, because it is not possible **naturally** that two understand **formally** by the same cognition in number, just as it is impossible **naturally** that one

cognition in number informs two **intellects** simultaneously. Therefore the third remains, and so the consequence is evident.

But that the consequent is false, is proved: Both because it would follow that an angel seeing his own vision, by which he sees **God intuitively**, would also see by that **reflex vision God intuitively**, and consequently some vision concerning a creature, or having a creature for an object immediately and firstly, would be **beatific**. And because two **beatific visions** would be in him. And thirdly because according to his sayings that angel could cause in the **devil** a vision of his aforesaid first vision, since he is sufficiently in **first act** for causing in himself a vision of the aforesaid vision. And also because the vision of **God** itself simultaneously with the **intellect** of the seer can cause in the said **intellect** a **reflex vision** of itself. Therefore the same will be able [to happen] with the **intellect** of the **devil** in the very **intellect** of the **devil**. And each consequence is evident through his reason. With that posited however the **devil** will see **God intuitively**. And all these things are false. Therefore etc.

Furthermore, it was proved in the **First Book** distinction 3 that no notice had concerning a thing through some medium known is **intuitive**.

Secondly, against that which he posits that an angel can thus cause a **notice** in another, because it follows according to this that also in himself he will be able to cause such a hearing concerning A, since his **intellect** is, according to him, of the same nature with the **intellect** of the other, in whom he can cause a hearing concerning A. And so simultaneously and at once he will have two **notices** concerning A: One which is not hearing through which he himself understands A, when he causes hearing in another, which, according to him in the same place, is a prior effect, without which hearing cannot be caused; and another which is hearing.

But this is against him: First, because according to him the **intellect** of the hearer relates purely **passively** regarding hearing. Therefore this one would relate purely **passively** to that. And since hearing, according to him, is effected by the speaker, he would not relate purely **passively** to it, which contradicts what was just said.

Then because, as is evident in the **fourth reason** of his recited in the **preceding question** against the other opinion, it is impossible according to him for there to be two perfect acts simultaneously in the **intellect**; but let it be posited that that hearing is as perfect as he could cause in another, which must be said to be possible by his reason, the proposition follows.

Thirdly it follows that someone will be able to have a **distinct notice** in particular and **determinately** concerning something not existing, given that he has no proper **species** of it or has never known it **intuitively**, which does not seem **naturally** possible.

Furthermore, what kind of **notice** would that be? Not **abstractive**, because such is by means of a **species**, even according to him; nor **intuitive**, because that is not of a non-existent thing. The consequence is proved. For let it be posited that a certain angel has not known some **singular past** thing, which nevertheless another knows and has a **species** of it, and can **determinately** and **distinctly** record [remember] concerning it, this one who can thus record, and is sufficiently in **first act** for making himself in **second act** of recordation, will be able to cause in that other also a similar recordation according to

these sayings, and so also someone will record that which he never knew; which seems to include a **repugnancy**.

Furthermore, if one angel had **science** of one conclusion, which cannot be known except through other prior ones, just as is possible, as was shown in a **question above**, and were sufficiently in **first act** regarding the actual consideration and **science** of the aforesaid conclusion, he will be able to cause a **notice** of this kind in another, who never knew the prior conclusions, posited that it was so, just as is possible, as can be evident from the sayings in the same question. And so someone will know **scientifically** some conclusion, who nevertheless will know neither in act nor in habit the principles of it; which is also not possible.

Furthermore, according to this way, it seems that one creature could have **science** through **infusion** from another creature and **naturally**; which I would not willingly concede.

Thirdly against the **mode of speaking** in itself. For through this **mode of locution**, if in a gathering of many angels one spoke **specially** to one, the hearer could not know who it was who spoke to him, supposing that that speech was concerning a thing actually known to the others. This is declared according to the sayings of these men. For they wish that it is in the power and will of an angel actually knowing something to cause a hearing of that **object** in another. Whence he can speak so to one that not to another, and speak and not speak, just as it pleases him. Therefore the angel receiving hearing in himself, seeing other angels and notices and **species** and other things through which they are in **first act** regarding hearing, if there are any others, any of whom can cause a hearing of such a kind, cannot **determinately** know who caused it and through this neither who spoke to him.

Furthermore, this way does not give a **mode** by which one angel can speak to an angel of another **species**, or also to a human **soul separated**. But it is established that angels speak to angels of another **species**, and to demons and to souls.

The **reason** of the opinion is not efficacious. For the major thus taken absolutely is false and has many instances, just as can be seen from the sayings.

And furthermore in us it has instances. For one man is sufficiently in **first act** for causing in his own **intellect** an **intellection** according to some **habit** which he has, nor nevertheless can he cause a similar one in the **intellect** of another man. Item he can cause a **volition** in his own **will**, and not in the **will** of another. Which is also true concerning angels. So it can be instanced concerning other interior powers of man. It would behoove therefore that that major be understood concerning those **receptives**, which with this that they are of the same nature, also are compared or relate in the same **mode** to that, which is in **first act** regarding that effect. And according to that understanding the minor will patently be false. For the **intellect** of another angel does not relate in the same **mode** to the angel having actual **notice** and a **species** of some object as his own **intellect**, it is evident. Nor even does it relate in the same **mode** to a **notice** and **species** of this kind; for this one is **informed** by them, that one not.

Furthermore, just as was touched upon, not all angels are of the same **species**, and therefore the minor, if it ought to be universal, would also be defective.

(Own opinion)

I say therefore that, since an angel does not see the **thoughts** of another, nor does it appear able to be well said that he causes immediately a cognition in the mind of another not by the **mode of an object**, but by the **mode of an extrinsic agent** and a **free effective cause**, since both the first and the second seem to be proper to **God**, therefore they speak to one another neither according to the first opinion nor according to the second. Nevertheless they speak according to what we are certain through **Scripture**; but how, is unknown to us.

Nevertheless it can be said that just as, because a man cannot see the **thoughts** of another man immediately in themselves, he forms exteriorly **voices** or **nods** or **writings** and if there are any other **signs** by which, what one thinks in the heart, he deduces into the **notice** of another, so the angels themselves, wishing to manifest to one another what they conceive in secret **thoughts**, form in themselves certain **intellectual signs** and **spiritual**, so to speak, **sermons** and **speeches**, through which being **spiritually heard** by others it is known what they think; such that just as in us there is a duplex **speech** - one which is the **first sign** of the thing immediately, and this is of no language of those, which are distinguished according to the diversity of human nations, according to the sentence of **Augustine** touched above, and **God alone** hears this speech; another, which is a **secondary sign** and subordinated to the prior in signifying the same thing and from this in a certain way a **sign** of the prior also, and others also hear this - so in the minds of angels there is a duplex **speech**: First which is the **first** and **immediate sign** of the thing, and this is the **thought** known only to **God** and to himself; another is a **sign secondary** and subordinated to that in signifying which other **spiritual creatures** hear intelligibly and through it conceive what is said through the first, and this I think the **Apostle** called the **tongue of angels** in **1 Corinthians 13**. And for this makes the **gloss** alleged above which says that "superior angels signify to the minor ones by certain **nods** or **signs**."

According to this **mode** an angel can direct his **sermon determinately** to one and in every **mode** in which we do, and far more perfectly distinct and varied speak, as it pleases him. And the other can **determinately** know, who speaks; for it is he namely, in whom he intuitively **signs** of this kind. For in them to hear is to **understand**.

If it is asked, whether someone can speak thus to one that another, to whom he does not speak, does not hear, it must be said that no, if the other is in due propinquity for hearing, and is attentive to this, unless **God** for then prohibits him from hearing, by not co-acting to the hearing. And it is similar, just as when someone of us constituted among many cannot speak **vocally** to one, without being heard by the others.

But against this **mode** it will be said that, by what reason one angel can see **signs** of this kind in the mind of another angel, by the same reason it seems that he could see the **thoughts** of the same existing in the same mind and equally near to him, and consequently **signs** of this kind are posited superfluously.

I answer that equal propinquity and unity of the subject does nothing to this. For notwithstanding these things one is **intuitively intelligible** by others and the other not. Example: It is established that in the same **matter** is the **substantial form** of the colored thing and the **color** of the same, and each is equally near to the seer, for there is not there any order or any situational mediation; and nevertheless we so sense the **color** and through the **intellect** we understand it **intuitively**, whereas we neither sense nor understand **intuitively** the **substantial form** nor also the **matter**, although we can understand them in another **mode**.

In the mind also one has simultaneously an **infused habit** and an **actual intellection**, and he understands this **intuitively**, that not.

So therefore I say concerning the **mode of angelic speech**. Whether however it is so, I am ignorant. Nevertheless it appears to me to be possible so, since we also mentally can form such **locutions** similar to **vocal locutions**, just as anyone can advert in himself.

To the argument of the **question** I answer, by denying the antecedent. To the proof it must be said that **thoughts** are not heard **intellectually** or seen immediately in themselves, but mediating **intellectual signs** immediately seen, just as has been said.

DISTINCTION 11

QUESTION 1 WHETHER an angel can naturally understand at once actually and distinctly all things of which he has species or can have at once.

Regarding distinction 11, in which the **progress of angelic knowledge** is touched upon, I ask, whether an angel can naturally understand **at once actually** and **distinctly** all things of which he has **species** or can have at once.

And I argue **first** that no, because, if it were so, it would follow that he could not understand so many things but that he could understand more. The consequence is evident, because an angel cannot have so many **species** but that, if one **Individual** be generated or created in proportionate proximity to him, he could receive a **species** from it; and since there are not so many **individuals** but that more could be made thus, it would not be possible to give a maximum multitude of **species** possible to be had by him, and consequently not so many but that he could understand more **actually** and **distinctly**. But this consequent is false, because from it it follows that an angel is of **infinite intellectivity** or of **infinite power intensively** for understanding; which is proper to **God alone**. The consequence is declared from this that the power of an angel according to this would not have a limit in capability nor would be terminated by a maximum; but since every finite power is terminated by a maximum which it can do, as is evident in **1 On the Heavens** through the **Philosopher**, it follows that the power of an angel is **infinite**.

Secondly, if that were possible, by the same reason or greater he could **at once distinctly** understand all things present to him immediately through themselves; for a **species** is not posited except to supply the place of an absent object. And consequently he could **at once distinctly** know all proportional parts of one continuum present to him, and since those are **infinite**, it follows that he could **at once distinctly** comprehend **infinities**, and through this his science would be **intensively infinite**.

To the **opposite** I argue and prove that not only can he do thus, but rather that he cannot do the **opposite**. For if he could not understand **actually** and **distinctly** all things of which he has **species**, he could understand some things with others not understood. Posited therefore this in being, I ask, either he can understand something of the others, or not. If not, therefore he is not in **accidental potency** regarding the others of which he has **species**, and consequently he does not have **species** of those, which implies opposites. The consequence is evident, because so through a **species** the intellect is constituted in **first act**

and in **accidental potency** regarding incomplex knowledge of its object, just as through a **scientific habit** regarding actual consideration of the object of that habit.

Furthermore, by what reason he can understand through one **species**, by the same he can through any, at least **dividedly**.

If it be said that he can understand something else, **contra**: Every **actual intellection** must be preceded by an **actual intention** of the **will** copulating the power with the object. This is evident, because even **sensual** and first vision in us is necessarily preceded by an **intention** of the **will**, according to **Augustine's** determination in **11 On the Trinity** chapter 5, where he says that the **will** which conjoins the sense to the visible body, from which it is formed, does not proceed from the vision which is made in the sense. And his proof is: "For before," he says, "vision was made, the **will** was already there, which moved the sense to be formed to the body." Therefore if an angel understood anew some **species** of his, he would first will to understand that. But according to the **same** in **10 On the Trinity** chapter 1 and 2 the **will** cannot will something unknown. Therefore a cognition of that **species** would precede that **volition**, and so **volition** would presuppose cognition and cognition **volition**. Either therefore the same would presuppose that by which it is presupposed and so the same would be prior to itself, or it would presuppose another, and by another be presupposed, and so there would be an **actual infinity** of cognitions and **volitions** presupposing each other mutually. Both of which is impossible.

If it be said that not from this that the **will** cannot will an unknown, does it follow that cognition of the willed precedes **volition**, but it suffices that it be simultaneous with it, **contra**: From this the inferred impossible is not avoided. For, as is evident from the alleged authority, **volition** necessarily precedes cognition. Let therefore that cognition be A, and the **volition** preceding it be B. Either therefore in that prior in which B was before A, there was some cognition, or not. If not, therefore B was a **volition** of an unknown. If yes, either A or another cognition. If A, therefore A was before it was. If another, let that be C. Therefore before C was a **volition** conjoining the power to the object. Either therefore B, or another. And whether this or that be given, either one proceeds into **infinity** or it will be given that some **volition** will be terminated at an unknown.

Secondly, if an angel could not use actually some **species** of his, by the same reason also any other which he has, and so an angel could **naturally**, if he wished, suspend himself from every **intellection** of those things, of which he has **species**, and understand **actually** none of them through his **species**. Which seems absurd.

(Two conclusions)

I answer. Understanding the question concerning good angels, in whom no **natural power** is vitiated, I posit **conclusions**: **First**, that an angel can **at once distinctly** understand all things, of which **at once** he has **distinct species** and ones representing **distinctly**. **Second**, that he can also not understand **at once distinctly** all such things.

(First conclusion is proved)

I prove the **first conclusion first** from the authority of blessed **Augustine** in **4 On Genesis** chapter 34 concerning small things, where he says that the spiritual power of the "**angelic mind** comprehends all things which it will **at once** with easiest knowledge."

From this I argue thus: It is not less easy for an angel to understand **at once** according to all **species** than according to some of them. Therefore he can understand **at once** according to all. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved from the aforesaid authority, since, if it were less easy to understand **at once** according to all than according to some, then he would not comprehend all things which he would will **at once** most easily, rather he would comprehend two less easily than one, and three than two, and by how many more by so much less easily.

It is confirmed by another authority of the **same** in the same place chapter 36, where he says that "the **angelic mind** can do all things **at once**, which speech distinguishes singly through the order of connected causes." Where he wishes that all things, which were created in the beginning and are narrated to be made **distinctly** in a certain order, the **angelic mind** comprehends **at once**. Nor is there doubt that not only is this true concerning **supernatural knowledge** which he has in the **Word**, but also concerning **natural** which he has concerning things in their own genus and which **Augustine** calls '**evening**', as is evident there immediately and in the two preceding chapters.

Nor can it be said that he speaks concerning **confused** cognition, not concerning **distinct**; for he would not attribute this to the power of the **angelic mind**, since we also here in the way can understand all things **confusedly at once** in some **common concept**, and nevertheless there in such simultaneous and easiest comprehension of many things he gives a difference between the power of the **human** and **angelic mind**.

Secondly, if an angel could not do this, either this would happen, because he could not receive so many **intellections at once**, or because he could not produce so many **at once**. This is evident, because, if he is sufficient for acting so many **at once** and for receiving - since with active and passive sufficient things posited action can be posited and also actions, provided they do not have mutual repugnancy, as is in the proposition - all such will be able to be posited **at once**. But it cannot be said that he could not receive so many **at once**, because he is not less powerful for receiving **intellections** than **habits** or **species**, nor is his receptivity more limited to a certain multitude of **intellections** than of **species** or **habits**. Indeed in truth of the matter he is determined to neither, but with equal facility can receive many and few as much as is of himself, as was said above in the **first question** concerning the knowledge of angels near the end in solving a certain reason.

Nor also therefore can he not, because he cannot produce so many **at once**, as if his activity were limited to a certain possible multitude of **intellections** producible **at once**. For supposing that the **intellect** is an active principle of **intellection**, it is nevertheless not total, but partial concurring with the **species** to the production of **intellection**, such that with one **species** it co-acts one **intellection**, and with another **species** another. Now however whenever something is only a **partial agent** and acts another and another **Operation** with another and another **partial co-active principle**, as much as is of itself, so it can do in more operations **at once** with more such co-active principles as in fewer with fewer, unless perhaps it be debilitated in operating or **per se** in some way depend on something, which is debilitated from the multiplication of such operations.

Example: For light existing in a medium is a **partial** and **co-active cause at once** with the color of the **species** of color in the medium, as the **Commentator** wishes in **3 On the Soul** comment 36, and with another and another color it co-effects another and another **species**. And however many colors would concur with it, so many **species** it would congenerate, nor is greater power argued in the light from this that with many it can do many than from this that with one it can do one, rather if there were there with it **infinite distinct colors** in such a disposition that any could **con-cause** a **species**, and there were a sufficient **susceptive** nor did anything else prohibit, it with those would co-effect **at once infinite species**.

Since therefore an angel is not debilitated from **intellection** - since his reception is not a corruptive passion, but perfective, nor also does he depend in understanding on anything debilitatable, as abstracted from a body nor needing any **sensitive power** or **bodily organ** - with that facility, by which with one **species** he can co-effect one **intellection**, he can with many co-effect many, nor so many with so many but that with more he could do more.

But concerning our **intellect** in the present state it is not so, and this on account of its dependence in operating on the **phantastic power** and **bodily senses**, to which debility and fatigue happens not only from continuation of operation, but also from multiplication, as **experience** shows.

Whence **Augustine** in **4 On Genesis** chapter 35 soon after the alleged words, that 'the power of the **angelic mind** comprehends all things which it will **at once** most easily', says that "on account of the **corruptible body**, 'which weighs down the soul'", the **human mind** even with 'most fervent study' pursues knowledge of things, and acts only with 'slowness and difficulty' of time.

And he renders the same cause in **15 On the Trinity** chapter 24, which he says has come to us from the disease of sin. And in the preceding chapter, namely 23, he says that the parts of the **image** of our soul - namely **memory**, **intelligence** and **will** - will be equal, when "they shall have been healed from all languor". Therefore we will be able to understand **actually at once** so many, as to remember, and consequently as many as we will have **species** of things.

Through which it is clearly seen that man in the state of innocence and **natural integrity** could have used **actually at once** all **species** of things, which he would have had. What wonder therefore, if an angel can do this, not vitiated by sin in his **natural powers**? And this can be **per se** a confirmation of the proposed conclusion.

(Objections)

Contra this conclusion it is argued and besides some means, which are solved in the **First Book** distinction 1 question 1 article 3, where it is shown that in the **intellect** there can be many acts **at once**, it can now be argued by other means. For **actual intellection** cannot be without **actual attention**, nor can **actual attention** be had to however many indifferently according to that "the sense intent on many fails as to singulars"; and this we experience. Therefore etc.

Secondly, because, if an angel understood all things **actually at once**, he would now be equaled to **God** in **intellectivity**; which is not to be said.

Thirdly, because it follows that an angel is of **infinite intellectivity** or power for understanding; which is false. The consequence is proved. For to be able to understand some one **intelligible distinctly** is of some power; and to be able to understand two **intelligibles at once distinctly** is of greater power **in double**; and to be able to understand three **at once distinctly** is of greater power **in triple** and so always according to the multiplication of **intelligibles** greater **intellectivity** is argued. Therefore to be able to understand **infinities at once distinctly** is of **infinite intellectivity**, or argues **infinite intellectivity** in him who can do so. But if an angel could **at once distinctly** understand all things, of which he has or can have **species**, an angel could, as much as is of himself, understand **at once infinities distinctly**. For he could not so many but that more, just as he can not so many but that receive more **species**. The consequence is evident, since on account of the **species** the power of the angel does not become greater, but it is as great now as it would be, however many **species** he had, even if he had **actually infinities**. But if he had **infinities**, he could understand **at once infinities distinctly**. Therefore also now, as much as is of himself, he can understand **infinities at once distinctly**.

It is confirmed, because there is no doubt that the **intellect** of an angel is more perfect in itself, because with more **species** he can **at once** understand more things **distinctly**, than if he could not **at once** with more **species** do so more things but one only **actually**, and also than if he could do two only, and again also than if he could do three only; and so proceeding into **infinity** according to some finite multitude always. And so also he is more perfect than another **intellect** would be to whom he could do only one, and than another who could do two only, and so into **infinity**, if there were **infinite** such mutually exceeding each other in this, any of whom could understand **at once** finite things only. Therefore since to be able to understand only one would be of some perfection, and an **intellect**, which had such power, would be of some determined perfection, if some such were, it follows that to be able **infinities**, or not in so many but that more, is of **infinite perfection**, and that an **intellect**, which can do so, is **infinitely perfect** or **infinite perfection intensively**.

Fourthly, if an angel could **at once** all things etc, he could **at once** understand all **species** which he had, because things are not understood otherwise through **species**, of which they are **species**, as is evident from the things said above and also in the **first book**. But by what reason he could **at once** understand all **species**, by the same he could **at once** understand all **intellections** of those **species**, since they are equally present to him, and similarly **intellections** of those **intellections** and so into **infinity**, and consequently he could have **at once infinite intellections** in himself, and **at once** understand them, and I speak always concerning **distinct intellection**. But each is impossible. Therefore etc.

Fifthly, if he understood **at once** all **species**, since those **intellections**, while they are, cause also their own **species** or **notations** or, by whatever other name you wish to call, some **similitudes** of themselves, through which an angel could afterwards record that he had understood **species** of things - just as also through such **similitudes** left from acts of **intellect** and **affections** of **will** we record them, as **Augustine** posits sententially in **10 Confessions** chapters 14 and 18, and similarly in **14 On the Trinity** chapters 8 and 9 -, therefore **at once** an angel understands also all **species** of his **first intellections**. And item those other **intellections** cause their own **species** and consequently he understands those also and through other **intellections**, and so beyond. From which it follows that there are **at once** in the **intellect** of an angel **infinite species**; which is impossible, at least **naturally**.

(To the objections)

To the **first** it must be said that, although in us in the present state **actual attention** does not extend itself to many but to few, in angels nevertheless, who have a more excellent nature and that vitiated by no sin or debilitated by punishment of sin, **actual attention** can extend itself to so many, to as many also **intellection**; and that to so many, as many **species** he has. But that common word is to be understood in us for this state, concerning which sort it is written in **Wisdom 9**: "The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul and the earthly habitation depresses the sense thinking many things."

To the **second** the consequence is to be denied. For with that given, still **angelic intellectivity** is incomparably surpassed by the excellence of **divine intellectivity**. **First** indeed, because **God** is his own **intellection** by which he understands universal things, but the **intellection** of an angel is not the angel but an **accidental perfection** of him. And **Augustine** renders this reason sufficiently to the purpose in a similar case in **15 On the Trinity** chapter 16, where when he had said that in the fatherland "perhaps our **thoughts** will not be voluble going from others into others and returning, but we shall see all our science in one **simultaneous conspectus**" - which words also favor much the proposed conclusion - he immediately adds: "Nevertheless when this shall be, if this also shall be, the creature will have been formed which was formable, so that nothing is now lacking to its form, to which it ought to arrive; but nevertheless it will not be to be co-equalled to that **simplicity**, where not something formable is formed or reformed, but is form. Neither unformed nor formed is that there eternal and immutable substance."

Secondly, because not only does an angel understand by an **intellection** which is not himself but an accident to him, but also not by himself precisely but with another principle co-acting with him, indeed with many perfecting him, namely **species**, does he understand those things, but **God** by himself only, needing no other.

Item even if an angel could understand all things of which he possessed **species**, nevertheless he cannot understand future things nor secret **thoughts**, and perhaps many other things which are not sufficiently present to him, and similarly very many past things of which he has not received **species**. But **God** comprehends all things universally.

To the **third** I deny the **consequence**. To the proof concede that to be able to understand one **distinctly** argues some power. And when it is said that to be able to understand two **at once distinctly** argues greater power **in double**, I concede, if other things are entirely equal, namely both on the part of **intelligibles** and of **intellections** and of other things **per se** concurring to understanding. But if other things are not equal, the proposition is not universally true.

The instance is evident in a similar case. For it is of some power to be able by oneself alone to carry so much weight, and nevertheless it is not of **double** greater perfection to be able **at once** with another carrying to carry two weights **at once** of which each is so much. Rather neither is it in any way of greater power.

Similarly it is of some activity and power to be able with one color to **partially** cause in one part of a medium one **species**, and nevertheless it is not of **double** greater, but not even of greater activity or power with two colors to be able to **partially** cause **at once** in the same part of the medium two **species**; nor do I distinguish, whether they are of the same nature or of another. For the same light in number not increased or intense, which with one color can cause only one **species** in one part of the medium, **at once** with two

can cause two, and **at once** with **infinities**, if **infinities** were posited in due disposition to act on that part of the medium, it could **at once** cause **infinite species**.

So in the proposition I say that to be able to understand two **at once distinctly** with two **species** co-acting does not argue greater **intellectivity** in an angel than to be able to understand only one with a unique **species** co-acting with him argues; nor to understand a thousand with a thousand **species** co-acting with him argues greater power or **intellectivity** than to be able only one with one.

To the confirmation I say that, if there were **infinite intellects** of whom one neither through few nor through many **species** could understand **at once** more than one, but another could two nor more through some **species**, and another three only, and so beyond into **infinity**, any angel, who now **de facto** is, would be more perfect than any of them. Nor nevertheless from this does it follow that now he is or that then he would be of **infinite perfection**, and the reason is, because any of those **intellects** would be of another nature from this angel. Nor otherwise would it be possible. And therefore that first comparison, by which it is said 'an angel is more perfect than he would be, if with more **species** he could not understand more things', implies an impossible. For now he would not be the same angel who now is nor of the same nature, but some other of another nature. But from such an excess of those, who are not of the same nature, it does not follow that the exceeding one is of **infinite perfection**.

Example: For it is evident that one substance, for example an angel, is more perfect than this **blackness**; and item he is more perfect than one other **blackness in double** more perfect than the first, and similarly than one other quality of another nature more perfect than the **blackness** itself, and so, if there were **infinite qualities** of the same or another nature which always exceeded each other, the angel would be more perfect than any of them. Nor nevertheless would he be of **infinite perfection** just as neither now is he.

It can also be instanced in such a mode of arguing from that which has been said concerning light. For it with two colors can cause two **species**, and with three three, and so into **infinity**, nor nevertheless is it of **infinite perfection**. And nonetheless it is more perfect than a certain other light which with however many could cause only one **species at once**, and more perfect than another which with however many could only two. And if there were **infinite** ones thus gradually exceeding themselves, that one, which now is, would be more perfect than any of them. So many other instances could be given.

To the **fourth** I say **first** that this argument can equally be made against any opinion. For according to any an angel can **Understand** his own **intellection**, and then it is argued that he can **Understand** the **intellection** of his own **intellection**, and similarly another, and so into **infinity**.

I answer nevertheless and **first** it can probably be said that he can understand **at once distinctly** both all his **species** and all **intellections**, nevertheless he himself cannot understand all his **intellections**. Nor does this second follow from the first, just as also it does not follow: He can understand every **intellection** of his, therefore he can understand every **intellection** of his **intellection**. For from the antecedent it does not follow that he can have **at once infinite intellections**, which nevertheless follows from the consequent.

Or **secondly** according to others it can be responded to the argument, by conceding the first consequence and further that he can understand the **intellections** of those **species**, nevertheless this process does not go

into **infinity** but is terminated soon enough. For always the posterior regularly are more remiss and less perceptible than the prior. And therefore soon one would come to some so remiss, that they could not congregate actual notice of themselves, given also that in such reflection always the posterior would be nobler according to species, as some wish, when the object of the first **intellection** in that order, which namely is direct, is less noble than the notice of it; this, I say, notwithstanding still some such on account of its remission could not move the **intellect** to notice of itself, such that, although it were nobler according to species, nevertheless it would not be more active.

To the **fifth** I say that, just as a thing outside causes no **species** of itself in the soul unless it be known, just as was held above and also in the **First Book**, so neither a **species** nor an **intellection** or anything else existing in the **intellect** causes a **species** of itself unless it be **actually perceived** and understood by the **intellect**. And because not every **intellection** is **actually** understood, as has just been said, therefore neither does every one cause a proper **species**. And so an **infinite multitude of species** does not arise.

(Second conclusion is proved)

I prove the **second conclusion first** thus: It is not less in the power of an angel not to use some of his **species** than it is in the power of man not to use his. This is evident, because **angelic species** do not move **naturally** more nor are they and the **intellect** also less in the power of the **angelic will** as to their uses than **human species** move **naturally** and are in the power of man. Therefore also an angel can not use some of his **species**. This consequence is proved, because just as we experience for our pleasure, when we have **species** of many things sufficiently firm and intense, now we use one now another. Whence **Augustine** in **11 On the Trinity** chapter 10 says that the **will** "leads the line of the thinker to be formed through the things stored in memory, as it pleases."

Secondly, the use of his **species** is not less in the power of an angel than the use of his **habits** is in the power of man, and than also it would be in an angel, if he had some **habits** distinct from **species**. This is evident, because a **species** does not move more **naturally** than a **habit** just as **experience** proves in us. But a man can not use a **habit** which he has, as is evident concerning one skilled in many doctrines, who does not always consider according to any of them. Nor does this come from a defect of nature but from free power. For although he cannot use all **at once**, if they are many, nevertheless that he uses this one and not that one, and that he continues his act, by which he uses, for some time greater or less, unless an impediment comes from elsewhere, consists in his power, just as **experience** proves.

And therefore both in **8 Physics**, and in **2 and 3 On the Soul** it is frequently held that we use **habits**, when we will. From which also it is evident that so it would happen in an angel, if he had **habits**.

(Objections)

Contra. First, because a **species** is a **natural agent** regarding the **intellection** of its object, and the **intellect** is **naturally passive**. Whence according to the sentence of **Augustine** in **3 On Free Choice** chapter 53, it is not in our power what comes into our mind. Therefore, any [species] always causes an **intellection** of itself, if an impediment is not present. The consequence is evident from the condition of a **natural agent**, posited in **9 Metaphysics**. But in an angel there is absolutely no impediment, as is evident. Therefore etc.

Secondly, because, since in an angel all **species** are sufficiently intense and able to move the **intellect**, and equally present, if an angel used some and did not use others, this would seem to be only because the angel would **determinately** will not to use those which he did not use, and to use **determinately** those which he did use. But it is impossible that he **determinately** wills not to use some one, without **determinately** understanding it, just as it is impossible that he **determinately** wills to use some one, without **determinately** apprehending it. Therefore if he could not use some one, he could simultaneously understand it and not understand it; which is false.

(To the objections)

To the **first** of these it must be said that, although a **species** is a **natural agent**, and posited that the **intellect** is **naturally passive** regarding **intellection**, nevertheless each as to this depends on the **will** as to the production of the act and continuation or at least as to continuation.

Which I say on account of **first** and sudden **intellections**, which are not in our power as to the first production of them, according to **Augustine**, and I say this, in us in the way. Nevertheless even those are in our power as to the **continuation** of them. Whence we can also freely desist from them, although sometimes with difficulty, which does not have a place in good angels. And this suffices for this that with some **species** had, an angel can not always use it **actually**.

And the response can be confirmed. For also **intellectual habits** in us are **naturally motive** just as **species**, and similarly **motive virtues** in the members, and nevertheless it is in our power not always to use such things.

To the **second** I say that that consequence is not good. For in order that the **intellect** not understand some **species determinately**, it is not necessary that it wills **determinately** not to understand it, but it suffices that it does not will to understand it and that it does not detain the **intellect** in the **intellection** of it, and does not copulate the **memory** to the **gaze** [of the mind] according to the mode of speaking of **Augustine**. And this is well intimated by him in **11 On the Trinity** chapter 8 at the end, where he says: "Now further to will to avert the **gaze of the mind** from that, which is in the **memory**, is nothing other than not to think from there." Such that then the **will** is said to will to avert, when spontaneously it does not make the **gaze** think.

(To the principal arguments)

To the **principal arguments**. To the **first** I concede the first consequent and deny the second consequence, by which it is inferred that an angel would be of **infinite intellectivity**. To the proof I say that the **intellective power** of an angel taken precisely according to itself certainly has a limit, and a maximum which it can do; but taken with other **co-agents** or it and others taken simultaneously capable, they do not have a limit. This however does not prove it to be **infinite**, just as neither is light proved to be **infinite** from the fact that with more and more colors co-acting beyond any determined multitude of **species** it could [produce more], as has been said, but it proves an **infinite possibility** of **infinite possible agents**, which ought not to be denied.

To the **second**, when it is said that, if he could understand **at once distinctly** all things, of which he has **species**, by the same reason he could understand **at once distinctly** all things present to him immediately

through themselves, I say that it is true concerning those things which cause **distinct species** in the **intellect**, and concerning which in their absence the angel would have **distinct species** supplying their places, and concerning such proceeds the proof of the consequence. But parts of a continuum are not of this kind. For not any part has a **distinct proper species**, but **at once** all generate one **species** in the angel himself, just as also in us.

(To the first argument to the opposite)

To the **argument to the opposite**, which is against the **second conclusion**, I answer and concede the first consequent which is inferred; and further I say that, posited that an angel understands some things and not others, still he can understand something of those which he does not understand.

And when it is argued **contra**, because **actual intention** of the **will** necessarily precedes every **intellection**, if by **actual intention** is understood some **elicited volition**, I deny the proposition. And similarly I say that not every **sensation** nor every **vision** is preceded by **volition**, although it precedes some and this happens often, just as when someone electively opens his eyes or turns to see something **determinately**.

That however **volition** does not precede every **sensation**, is evident in sudden **sensations**, as for example when someone much intent in some consideration is suddenly moved by a vehement **sensible** like fire, or something strongly pricking. Since indeed a **volition** or **intention** of the **will** did not precede such a perception of the **sensible**. Further still it is evident in **violent passions**, which no **volition** prevents nor accompanies, just as when someone is detained in fire or another much disjointed and harmful thing, in which case it is established that such a one neither antecedently nor concomitantly wills such a **sensation**, nor copulates or conjoins the sense to the **sensible**. Rather he strives, as much as he is able, to avert the sense and flees and hates such a **sensation**.

And therefore to the authority of **Augustine** it must be said that **Augustine** does not give that as universal but **indefinite** only, which certainly has truth in many things. Just as, when someone willing to see something opens his eyes so that he may see it, or while he **actually** sees, he keeps the eye open and in due opposition willing to continue the aforesaid vision, and so in many other cases. And this suffices for the intention of **Augustine** in the same place, as is evident to one adverting diligently.

(Instance)

If it be said that at least **volition** precedes any **notice** had freely - whatever may be concerning sudden and violent ones, of which the causes are extrinsic or at least some of those causes - and this suffices for the proposed argument, because in angels regarding at least their own **species** no **notices** can be caused suddenly or violently.

To that it seems to me must be said that an **elicited volition** does not necessarily precede every **notice** even freely elicited. Which can also be declared in us evidently enough; for it is established through **experience** that one having an **actual notice** concerning some object, does not always have **at once** a **notice** concerning the **notice** of that object. Otherwise he would have **at once infinite notices**; and nevertheless it is in his power that he have a **notice** of that.

Let it be posited therefore that someone, after he has had a **notice** concerning A for some time while he did not have a **notice** of that **notice**, begins to have a **notice** of his own **notice** concerning A: Either some **elicited volition** regarding itself did not precede this second **notice**, and the proposition is held; or some did precede, and then it follows that either it was willed before it was known, by a **simple** and **incomplex notice** I say, which is impossible **naturally**, or he had a **notice** of the second **notice** before he had the second **notice**, which is also impossible: Both because, either the **notice** of the second **notice** was willed before it was had, and consequently a **notice** of it was had before it, and so it proceeds into **infinity** in past **notices**, and it follows that a **reflex notice** always preceded a **direct** one; which are impossible. Or there was some **notice** which was not willed before, and the proposition is held; and with this, by the same reason it was to be stood in the first. And also because, by what reason a **notice** of the first **notice** was known before it was had, by the same reason the first **notice** itself, which is concerning A immediately, was known before had; which is not intelligible.

I say therefore that it is possible both in us and in angels to have some **notice** freely and spontaneously elicited which an **elicited volition** regarding it does not precede. Whence just as blessed **Augustine** says in **2 On Free Choice** chapter 36: "We use the others," namely virtues and powers of which he speaks there, "through the **free will**, also we can use the **free will** itself through itself, so that in a certain way the **will** which uses the others uses itself."

But to use virtues or powers is nothing other than to make them operate or to apply them to their own acts. Whence then the **will** uses the **intellect** or a **habit** of the **intellect**, or rather man through the **will** - just as **Augustine** corrects this locution there - uses such things, when he understands spontaneously and voluntarily according to a **habit**. But then the **will** uses itself, when it elicits its own operation in itself. And just as he says concerning virtues and powers, so it is to be understood concerning other **habits** and **species** and acts, the use of which is in our free power.

And the uses of these can be so separated that a man can sometimes freely use the **intellect** and a **habit** or **species** or also an act, given that then he does not use the **will** with its own use namely by eliciting a **volition**; and consequently have some **intellection** freely, given that regarding that he does not have an **elicited volition**. And perhaps **Augustine** understands such a use, when he says the **will** copulates and conjoins other powers to their acts, such that for the **will** to copulate sight to vision or to the visible is nothing other, says **Augustine**, than to use sight **actually** for seeing. And in the same way concerning the **gaze** of the thinker and others, of which he speaks most often.

To the proposition therefore I say that, notwithstanding that many **species** not understood are in an angel or in a man equally powerful to **con-cause** a **notice** of themselves in the **intellect**, an angel can freely use one **species** with the **intellect** for causing a **notice** of that **species**, by not using another **species** equally powerful and present. Nor is it necessary that first he wills to understand that **species determinately** or to congenerate that **notice** of itself. Just as one habituated with many sciences can operate **determinately** according to some one of them, given that he does not first will to operate **determinately** according to that one; and just as also concerning two proposed things equally useful and judged equally useful for some intended end someone can **determinately** will one of them, given that he does not first will that willing of his or first will that he wills that. Otherwise he could never have any new willing.

(To the second argument to the opposite)

To the **second argument** for the same part I answer and concede the consequent, supposing that an angel were left to his **naturals**. Nor nevertheless from this would it follow that he would lack **intellection** universally. For he could still understand himself and other beings present **intuitively**. Whether however he could also simply deprive himself of every **intellection** through his freedom is another doubt, concerning which nothing for the present.

DISTINCTION 12

QUESTION 1 WHETHER the matter of a corporal substance is an entity actually distinct from its form.

Concerning the 12th distinction, in which the **Master** treats of the matter of corporal creatures, I ask: whether the matter of a corporal substance is an entity **actually distinct** from its form.

And I argue that it is not: Because matter is not any **actual being**, therefore it is not an actual being distinct from form. The consequence is well-known. The antecedent is proved, first from the authority of the **Philosopher** saying in the 7th of the *Metaphysics*: "I call matter that which according to itself is neither called a what, nor a quantity, nor any other thing by which being is determined," that is, divided. But if matter is not any of those things by which being is divided, therefore it is not a being. Secondly, from another saying of the same in the 5th of the *Physics*. For, wishing to prove that generation is not **motion**, he argues thus: That which is moved, is; that which is generated, is not. Therefore, generation is not motion. Now it is clear that just as in the first [proposition] the subject stands for the subject of motion, so in the second it stands for the subject of generation. But **matter** is the subject of generation, as is evident in the same place. Therefore, it is not—supply "actually"—as is that which is the subject of motion.

Secondly and principally: a corporal substance is **one entity** per se in act; therefore its matter is not an entity actually distinct from its form. The antecedent is certain; and the consequence is proved from the saying of the **Philosopher** in the 7th of the *Metaphysics*. For he says that "it is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances existing in it in such a way as to be in act; for two things thus in act are never **one in act**. But if they are two in potentiality, they will be one." And soon after he adds the proof, saying: "For the **act separates**."

To the contrary, it is argued: A corporal substance is a being in act; therefore its matter and its form are in act. But it follows: Matter is in act and form is in act, and matter is not form; therefore matter is **actually distinct** from form.

I respond. Here I will first say what is seen concerning the question; secondly, I will object against these statements through the reasons of a certain opinion-holder and respond to the objections.

ARTICLE (Two preliminary distinctions)

As to the first, I will first set forth some distinctions, then the conclusions regarding the proposal.

The **first distinction** is concerning being in act and being in potentiality. For **being in act** can be taken in two ways: In one way, generally for everything of which it happens to be truly enunciated that it *is* through a proposition of inherence and of the present, for example, by saying "this is." And by opposition, that is called **being in potentiality** of which it does not happen to be enunciated that it *is* through such a proposition, but only through one of possibility, such as by saying "this can be." And the appropriateness of this distinction is clear because, as **Augustine** says in the 5th book *On the Trinity*, chapter 2: "Essence is so named from that which is 'to be' (*esse*).\" And according to the **Commentator** on the 7th of the *Metaphysics*, comment 15: "To say that each of the categories is a being is derived from 'to be'." Therefore, according as something is said "to be," so also it is called a "being" or "essence," which signify the same thing.

In another way, **being in act** can be taken specially for that which is a being in act in the first way, and is an essence complete and **perfect in species**, or the perfection of another constituting with it a perfect essence in a determinate species. And by opposition, **being in potentiality** can be called that which, even if it is a being in act in the first way, is nevertheless a certain partial and incomplete essence, capable of being perfected and, as it were, complemented by another so that it may be a whole and perfect essence in species.

And this distinction is also taken from that which is called "to be," but otherwise than the preceding. For there it is taken from "to be" according as it is predicated **absolutely** without the addition of another predicated term, so that everything that exists is called in that way a being in act. And in this way, of each of us, both the soul and the body is a being in act, because the soul of each is, and also the body is. But the soul which will belong to the **Antichrist** is a being in potentiality, because it is not and it can be. Here, however, it is taken according as "is" is predicated not absolutely, but with the addition of another term. For example, some things can be called a **bed in act** and some a **bed in potentiality**; for woods composed and joined together in the due manner are a bed in act, that is, a whole and perfect bed; but woods not cut and not joined are a bed in potentiality. And of the first, "to be a bed" is predicated; of the second, however, although "to be" is predicated (and consequently they are a being or beings in act in the first way), nevertheless "to be a bed" is not predicated of them, but "to be able to be a bed." And therefore they are said to be a bed in potentiality, that is, imperfect and able to be perfected so as to be a bed.

And if this indeed be possible through local transmutation alone and the segregation of some parts and the conjunction of others without the **generation** of a new form, as some maintain regarding all artificial things, then it can well be said that such woods *can be* a bed. But if artificial forms are certain entities distinct from those matters and informing them, as others think, then such woods are said to be a bed in potentiality in this sense: because, namely, they can receive into themselves a form with which they may simultaneously be a bed.

This distinction can, however, be briefly formed according to common words: so that it may be said that something can be called a **being in act** in two ways: either by the **actuality of presence**, as to the first mode; or by the **actuality of perfection**, as to the second. And by opposition to both, something can also be called a being in potentiality in two ways.

The **other distinction** is that for some things to be actually distinct from one another can be taken in two ways: In one way, by the **actuality of division** and mutual negation, according to the Philosopher's

manner of speaking in the 6th of the *Metaphysics*, where he says that "truth has affirmation in the composite, and negation in the disjunct"; where the **Commentator** in comment 8 explains: "That is, a true affirmative signifies composition in beings, and a true negative signifies division." And according to this mode, of whatever beings it is truly said "this is not that," those things are said to be **actually distinct** or divided or diverse.

In another way, some things are actually distinct by the **actuality of separation** and discretion. And thus, whatever things are distinct in the first way, and with this are so discrete and separated that they do not constitute—or being taken together are not—one **this something** per se, are called actually distinct. Just as the **Philosopher** assumes in the 7th of the *Metaphysics*, where he says that "the act separates." And for this reason he says that two halves of a magnitude are not two in act, but in potentiality only. The true sense of which was set down in the *First Book*, distinction 24, question 1.

(Four conclusions)

These things having been premised, I pose four conclusions: The **first** is that matter is a being in act in the first way. The **second**, that it is not a being in act in the second way, but a being in potentiality only. The **third**, that matter is an entity **actually distinct** from form, speaking of distinction in the first way. The **fourth**, that it is not an entity actually distinct from form in the second way.

(The first conclusion is proved)

I prove the first conclusion thus: A **corporal substance** subsisting per se is naturally generated; therefore matter is, and consequently it is a being in act in the first way. The antecedent is known by sense; for we see fire naturally generated, and plants and animals and many other things. I prove the consequence: because every such naturally generated substance has some **essential part** which preceded its generation, and such a thing we call matter. Since, therefore, it is impossible for the whole to be unless its part is, it follows that matter is. I prove the assumption and take for the sake of example some naturally generated fire: either some part of it preceded its generation and some did not, or the whole preceded, or nothing of it preceded at all.

The second cannot be given, since then it would have been before its own generation and thus would not be generated, contrary to the premise. Nor can the third be given, because it follows that it would have been naturally generated just as it was, even if no other substance had been **corrupted**. But that consequent is against experience. For we see that whenever any fire is generated, some other substance is corrupted, such as wood or smoke or something else. Nor do we ever see it generated without some substance being corrupted. And so it is for all things that are naturally generated.

But the consequence is proved: because if nothing of it preceded, then it is totally—or according to every part of itself—produced by its natural generator, with the action of the universal and **first agent** concurring. And that was a sufficient productive [cause] of it. Therefore, even if the wood that was corrupted when that fire was generated had not been there, it would still have been sufficient to produce that fire. For it is clear that that wood was not the **efficient cause**, neither total nor partial, of this fire; and since its generator was active naturally, it follows that it would have produced it in fact.

And this is confirmed: because once all the **per se causes** of some producible effect are placed, all others being circumscribed, the effect can be placed; indeed, if the efficient cause acts naturally and there is no impediment at all and all things are in the due disposition, the effect itself is placed in fact. Now, however, given this [the third option], all the causes of fire would have been there in the due manner, even if that wood had not been there.

It is confirmed from a similar case. For since **God** is a sufficient productive [cause] of fire according to the whole or according to every part of itself, therefore without the presence of wood or anything else He can produce it. And if He acted by the necessity of nature, He would also produce it without the concurrence of anything else.

Furthermore: to what purpose would it be necessary for one substance to be corrupted so that another might be generated, if neither it nor anything of it enters the substance of the generated thing? Also, why would a **natural agent** require matter or a patient upon which to act? Certainly no necessity appears.

This is confirmed: because otherwise that which is to be corrupted would only serve as an **impediment** to the agent, namely so that it either would not act or would act more slowly. And consequently, if it were not placed, the agent would more easily perform its effect. Therefore, that third option cannot be given.

There remains, therefore, the first: namely that some part of it preceded in the corrupted thing, and that we call **matter**; and some part did not precede, which we call **form**.

Secondly, it can be argued by authority, both theologically and philosophically.

For according to **theology**, matter was created and was not co-eternal with God. Therefore, matter is not a being only in potentiality. The consequence is evident: because otherwise it would not be a being in any other way than it was before creation. For even before it was created, it was in potentiality to be, and it could be through the power of the Creator alone. And so also now, if it were only in potentiality, it could not be except through the power of the Creator. The antecedent is evident through **Augustine** in the book *On Faith and the Creed*, chapter 1: "By no means," he says, "is it to be believed that that very matter from which the world was made could have been through itself as if co-eternal and co-eval with God." And below: "It is most rightly believed that God made all things from **nothing**, because even if the world was made from some matter, that same matter was made from nothing." **Augustine** puts forth the same sentence in the 12th of the *Confessions*. And this all theologians commonly hold.

According to **philosophy** also, the same is evident, although in the opposite way. For the philosophers posit it as ungenerable and incorruptible; and if so, therefore it not only can be, but **is**. The consequence is evident: because if it were not but only could be, and according to philosophy it could not be through creation, therefore it would be through generation, and consequently it would not be ungenerable. Likewise, the **Commentator** on the 4th of the *Metaphysics*, comment 15: "That which is not," he says, "in act, is non-being." But matter is not non-being, therefore it is in act. Likewise, according to this, there would be no **intrinsic causes**, and consequently there would not be four genera of causes. And many other things would follow against philosophical truths.

(The second conclusion is proved)

The **second conclusion** is that matter is not a being in act in the second way, that is, a certain simple or composite essence, whole and perfect in some species, but a certain **partial entity**, receptive of a certain other partial entity, and with which together it constitutes one whole and perfect entity in some species of generable and corruptible substances. And this other partial entity is called **substantial form**, which so differs from matter that, even if it is also a partial entity just as matter is, it is nevertheless of itself constitutive (together with matter) of a perfect essence according to some determinate species; so that, whatever matter it informed, it would not constitute an essence of another species, but only of the same. Matter, however, is not thus determined to any species, but is utterly **indeterminate** to all; so that with one form it constitutes fire and with another water, and so of the other substantial forms. Whence, as the **Philosopher** teaches in the 1st of the *Physics*, if we wish to understand what the nature of **prime matter** is (of which we are speaking), it is necessary to consider it through analogy and proportionality to other matters.

For example, I take the example set down above of the **bed**, and let it be supposed for now—whether it be true or not—that artificial things have forms distinct from natural substances and forms, so that a bed is something composed of woods and its own artificial form. I say, therefore, that just as the woods of a bed are not a bed, nor a bench, nor a chest, nor anything else at all perfect in some species of artificial things, nor even are they the form of a bed nor the form of a bench nor any other artificial [form], but are of themselves **indifferent** and able to receive separately any of such forms and with any of them to constitute some perfect artifact according to some species of artificial things; so **prime matter** of a corporal substance—for example, fire—is not fire, nor water, nor stone, nor iron, nor any thing at all simple or composite perfect in any species of natural things, nor even is it any of the natural forms, but it is **formable** and perfectible through them, and capable of constituting a perfect essence in species with one [form] as one thing, and with another as another, according to the determinate nature of the form.

But it differs from the matter of artificial things in this: that although the latter is not a perfect entity in the species of artifacts, it is nevertheless a certain perfect entity in the **species of natural things**. Whence the woods of a bed truly are woods, and the specific definition of wood fits them; but this matter is a perfect entity in no species at all of natural or artificial things, or of any other simple or composite beings. As perhaps some might think that, although it is not a perfect entity in any species of composite substances, it is nevertheless a **simple entity** perfect in its own species; just as we also say that an angel is a perfect entity in its species, notwithstanding its essential simplicity. It is not so with matter.

On account of these things, therefore—namely on account of its **imperfection and partiality** by which it differs from a composite substance, and on account of its **indifference and specific indetermination** by which it differs from form—I say that matter is being in **pure potentiality**. And thus I understand the sayings of the saints and philosophers speaking on this subject.

That matter is such an entity, I prove first by the clear authority of the **Commentator** on the 1st of the *Physics*, comment 69, saying thus: "And this nature, which is prime matter, is one common principle to all transmutable beings which are altered into one another; but it is not one in itself, so that it would be a **simple substance** existing in act, nor so that it would be some composite of matter and form. For if it had its own form, it would receive no other while that remained, etc." Here notice that he denies matter to be a substance existing in act, whether simple or composite, through some form proper to itself.

Likewise, in both ways he denies it to be a being in act in the first chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*. Whence he says that "the transmutation of individuals in their substances is found to compel the subject **not to be a being in act** and not to have a form by which it is substantialized. For if it had a form, it would receive no other, etc." And it follows: "And if it were a simple substance existing in act, then it would be impassible and not receptive"—supply "of such substantial forms." And from this he concludes: "Whence the nature of this subject receiving substantial forms, namely of prime matter, must be the nature of **potentiality**, namely that potentiality is its substantial difference. And therefore it has no form of its own and no nature existing in act, but its substance is in power."

From these things it is clear that he not only denies matter to be a being in act through some proper distinct form always informing it (as some have thought, and as some moderns sometimes explain the **Commentator**), but he also denies it to be a simple substance which is any being in act.

So also on the 4th of the *Physics*, comment 59, in both ways he denies it to be in act: "When we say," he says, "that in matter nothing is demonstrated in act, we do not mean that it can be denuded of things demonstrated in act, but we intend that in its **essence** there is nothing demonstrated, nor is it in itself anything demonstrated; since, if it were so, it would not receive demonstrated things."

Secondly, I prove the same by the reason of the same **Commentator**, which in this proposal brings conviction to me. And it is the reason already touched upon in some way in the second authority cited; and he sets it down in the same place, and also in the 1st of the *Physics* mentioned above. I argue therefore thus: If matter were an entity in act in this second way, it would follow that there would be no **generation or corruption** of natural substances properly so called. The consequent is false. Proof of the consequence: because generation properly so called differs from other transmutations in this: that in other transmutations something one remains under both terms, retaining the same name and the same **specific definition**, so that if, having pointed it out, it is asked "What is this?", the same name and same specific definition will be answered. In generation and corruption, however, not at all.

But if matter were a perfect being in species, it would already have its own **quiddity** and could have its own name and its own specific definition, just like an angel or whiteness or another essence complete in its species. And since it is the same in the generated thing, it would follow that the subject of generation would retain the same name and the same definition. Nor does it matter whether matter is posited as being in act through an informing form (as if it were a certain substantial composite, as we say of fire), or is posited as being some **simple substance** in act; since in that way no transmutation of an angel is generation simply, according to whatever forms occur, just as neither is the transmutation of water when it becomes hot or cold. And the reason for both is the same, namely because the **subject** remains the same according to essence and definition.

(Instantia)

But it will be said that the reason why one transmutation is **generation** simply, while another is not but rather *secundum quid* (in a certain respect) and **alteration**, is because one occurs according to **substantial forms**, and the other according to **accidental forms**. And because an angel is not transmuted from one substantial form into another, therefore its transmutation is not generation simply. When, however, fire is

generated from water, matter is transmuted from one substantial form into another, and therefore that transmutation is called generation simply.

This does not avail, because the fact that some forms are substantial and others accidental is not known otherwise than from this: that when there is a transmutation according to those we call **substantial**, that which is transmuted and remains under both terms changes its **name and definition**; but when there is a transmutation according to others which are called **accidental**, it retains the same name and the same definition. And this is what the **Commentator** says on the 1st of the *Physics*, comment 63: "Two transmutations," he says, "namely that which is in the accidents of a thing and that which is in the substance, agree in this: that they are the alteration of the same thing from one quality into another and from one disposition into another. But because they saw that, when a thing is transmuted in certain of its dispositions, immediately its **name and definition** are transmuted, and in certain others they are not, they called the first mode transmutation in substance and substantial alteration, and they called those dispositions substantial. But the second transmutation, in which neither the name of the thing nor its definition is transmuted, they called accidental alteration." Thus the **Commentator**.

From these things it is clear that, just as it is concluded that no transmutation of matter will be generation simply if matter itself were some being in act, so also it is concluded that no form of it would be **substantial**, but every form would be **accidental**, just like every form of an angel. And therefore the **Commentator**, in the same place (1st of the *Physics*, comment 69), infers both inconveniences together, saying: "And if matter were something existing in act—that is, having a form—then generation in substance would be **alteration**, and forms would be **accidents**." And granted that he infers these inconveniences in these words specifically against the first mode of speaking (namely, that matter is a being in act through some form), nevertheless he concludes equally against the other mode: namely, if it be said that matter is a **simple substance** in act. And this is on account of the reason assigned.

Whence, just as you would say that, notwithstanding that matter is a simple substance in act, it still has some substantial forms, and when it is transmuted according to them, that transmutation is generation simply; so I shall say to you that, even if it were to have some substantial form proper to itself and **co-eternal**, it still has other substantial forms, according to which the transmutation is generation simply.

(The third conclusion is proved)

I prove the **third conclusion** thus: The matter of a corporal substance is, and the form of the same substance is, and matter is not form, nor is form matter. Therefore, the matter of a corporal substance is an **entity distinct** from its form; and I am speaking of distinction in the first way. And the consequence is evident. The antecedent also, as to every part of it, is certain.

Furthermore, I take one composite substance whose matter is **A** and whose form is **B**. It is clear that both A is some entity and B likewise, because no substance is composed of **non-entity**. This being supposed, I argue thus: A is not B; therefore it is not numerically the same as B. And further, therefore it is **other** than B; and still further, therefore it is **diverse** from B. All these consequences are evident from the meanings of the terms. And they are also proved from the saying of the **Philosopher** in the 10th of the *Metaphysics*,

where he says that "the same and the other are said oppositely; and because of this, everything in relation to everything else is either **the same or other**." And again: "Therefore, everything in relation to everything is called either diverse or the same, whatever things are called both one and being."

From which the two last consequences are clear. The first, moreover, is clear because "a true negative signifies **division** in beings," as the Commentator says; and according to the Philosopher, "truth has negation in the disjunct."

(Dubium)

But here a doubt arises: since, if matter is an entity distinct from form and it remains the same in the generated and corrupted thing according to the whole of what it essentially is, it will also retain the same name and the same definition—namely, such as is appropriate to itself. And consequently no transmutation of it will be **generation simply**; or the reason made for the preceding conclusion is not sufficient.

I respond that the consequence does not hold. For matter—granted that it is a distinct entity from form in this sense, and consequently can have some sort of proper definition, as the **Commentator** speaks in the 1st of the *Physics*, comment 65, when he says: "For you can dissolve the account (*ratio*) of matter and form and distinguish them according to definition, although not in being, etc."—nevertheless, because it is not an entity of any one **determinate species**, neither as a perfect essence in species, nor as a perfection constituting a determinate specific being, therefore no specific definition fits it of itself. On account of which, when there is such a transmutation of it that no form constitutive and completive of a **specific essence** remains with both terms, that is generation simply or corruption.

(The fourth conclusion is proved)

The **fourth conclusion** is easily proved, since, if matter were actually distinguished in the second sense from form, no substance composed of matter and form would be **per se one "this something"**. But this is false, as is certain.

ARTICLE 2

(The opinion of Peter Aureoli)

Although the **third conclusion** ought not to be doubtful to any intelligent person, nevertheless the opinion of a certain **Doctor** [Aureoli] seems to be against it, as appears to those looking at his reasons and words, although in certain other words he seems to favor it.

His opinion, so far as it pertains to the proposal, is this: that a **composite substance** has in itself two realities that are incomplete and, as it were, truncated. One of these is in potentiality and confusedly the reality of every generable and corruptible thing, and the **inchoative** or inchoation of each; and this is called **matter**. The other is the **actuation** of this and the complement of one whole and perfect nature, which is the composite substance itself. And this composite, he says, "is a thing and a determinate account (*ratio*) demonstrated in act completely. But the other two are only **un-precised realities** of it, one as an inchoation, the other as a complement."

And again, in another part of the question, responding to a certain doubt, he says that "although matter is an **undivided** thing in itself, and form likewise, and they do not found the same **absolute indivision**, they nevertheless found an all-encompassing **relative indivision** in act, not in potentiality." By "absolute indivision," as is clear elsewhere from the sayings of the same thinker, he understands the indivision of a thing in itself. By "relative," however, he understands indivision from another.

From which it is clear, as far as it pertains to the proposal, that this opinion maintains that matter and form in a composite are **not two entities** distinct from one another, nor is matter actually distinct from form, nor vice-versa.

(The first reason of Peter Aureoli)

He proves this in many ways: First, he supposes "that **form gives being** (*esse*) to matter and is participated in by matter." Then he asks: is this "being and this participation of form by matter the form itself, or something left behind and **impressed** by the form in the matter? It cannot be said to be the second," as he proves in many ways. Therefore, the first remains. From which it follows that form is the **being and entification** of the matter itself, and consequently is not distinct from it.

This reason, as they say, is from the **Philosopher** in the 12th of the *Metaphysics*, where he says that "matter is not a 'this' except according to what is seen, since that which is according to contact and not according to order is matter and subject." Which the **Commentator** explains in comment 14, saying that the essence of matter is only from its **continuation** with form and that it may be perfected through it. And below: Matter is not a being "through a nature understood of it," but through continuation with form. Nor does the Commentator take—as they say—a quantitative continuation, but an **entitative** one, which is nothing other than mutual relative indivision.

(The second reason of Peter Aureoli)

Secondly, "if form were to signify a proper account and a certain determinate nature, it follows that **ignentity** (the nature of fire) will not import one nature. Similarly, this demonstrated fire will not be one entity." The consequent is false as to both parts.

The consequence of the first part is proved by the **Philosopher** in the 7th of the *Metaphysics*, where, assigning the reason why "composites of accidents do not have an account and definition signifying a

proper quiddity," whereas composites of substances do, he says the reason is because the quiddity and definition of a composite substance "does not include two things, of which either one has an account," as happens in composites of accidents. And the **Commentator** there, in comment 11, says that "a perfect definition is a speech which, when it is completed, there will not remain in it any **being in act** about which it is asked 'what is it?', since in it the quiddity is given which is the being of that thing, and there is not in it a being added to its being. And this is the difference," says the Commentator, "between the definitions of substances and the definitions of accidents." But "these things would be false if ignnity did not signify one **simple account**, but there were in it matter and form, each of which had its own nature."

As to the second part of the consequent, the consequence is also proved, because "if form signified some entity and determinate nature, and matter likewise, the **cause of unity** of the individual composed of them would have to be sought."

If you say "that the cause is not to be sought, since one is in act and the other in potentiality," as the **Philosopher** says in the 8th of the *Metaphysics*, I argue to the contrary: First, this is not according to the mind of the Philosopher. For he says that from matter and form **one thing** is made, because this is in potentiality and that in act; "and this is because that which was in potentiality becomes in act. Where the **Commentator** says," in comment 15, that "the cause of this unity is that that which is in potentiality is transmuted until it becomes in act by the **agent**—namely, by the one drawing it out from potentiality into act. There is therefore here something one, which first is in potentiality and afterwards is transferred from potentiality to act. For its translation does not bestow upon it **multitude**, but perfection in being and in the whole. For this is **one in act**; and this is what Aristotle intended when he said 'since there is not another caused thing, etc.', that is, for there is not here another thing caused by the agent than that upon which it acts."

"Likewise in the same place, comment 16: 'Everyone,' he says, 'who posits that the **soul and the body** are two diverse things, it happens to him to say what the cause of the **bond** of the soul with the body is. But he who says that the soul is the perfection of the body and that the body does not exist without the soul, there are not for him two diverse things, nor does this question happen to him.' And below he says that 'the soul with the body are one, just as we say that **matter and form are one**'."

Likewise the **Philosopher** in the 2nd *On the Soul*: "It is not necessary," he says, "to ask if the soul and the body are one." Where the **Commentator**, in comment 7: "Matter," he says, "is not a 'this' except through form. And if matter and form were existing in the composite **in act**, then the composite would not be called one, except as it is said of things that are one according to **touch and bond**. But now, because matter does not differ from form in the composite except by potentiality, and the composite is not a being in act except through form, then the composite will not be called one, except because its **form is one**."

"Likewise on the 3rd *On the Heavens*, comment 20, he says that 'to be in potentiality is to be in another **not distinct** from it. And this we intend when we say of prime matter that it is not a being in act and is a being in a being in act not distinct from it. And this is the intention of my speech, that it is in it in potentiality'."

"From all these things it is clear," says the opinion-holder [Aureoli], "that the **potentiality** which is in matter so as to make one with form is nothing other than **indistinction** and the inability to be precised from one another. Therefore they could not constitute one thing if they signified **precised and determinate accounts**, however much one were potentiality and the other act; rather, both would be act, although matter would be an **imperfect act**."

(The third reason of Peter Aureoli)

Thirdly thus: Form is not **created** in matter. Therefore "form does not signify a proper and determinate or determinable and signifiable account. The antecedent is clear. The consequence is proved thus: Every form produced anew, of which no part at all preceded, is rightly said to be created. But a thing which thus signifies a **determinate precised account** is so anew that no part of it preceded, because I presuppose that its reality is precised from every other reality. Therefore every such thing, if it goes out into being anew, is of necessity **created**."

This, they say, is the reason of the **Philosopher** in the 7th of the *Metaphysics* and of the **Commentator** also in the same place, as well as in the 12th, comment 18, where "these are his words against **Themistius**: 'And it appears well that he does not understand how generation occurs. For when he understands that the generated thing is made anew from a suitable thing—that is, because it **creates its form** and places it in matter, as if it were another thing in the matter—it was necessary for him [to conclude] that in natural things there are things creating animals, etc.'." From which it is clear, according to the Commentator, that creation cannot be avoided "except because form, although it is other than matter, is nevertheless **not something precised** from it."

Likewise, "in the 7th of the *Metaphysics*, comment 27, he says: 'And since it has been declared that from a simple form there is no generation, nor does matter have generation, it is necessary that every generated thing be **divisible into two parts** in account—not in act—namely, matter and form'."

"Clearly," he says, "the Commentator says that matter and form are two parts not having **realities in act**—that is, precised—for **act distinguishes** and separates."

(The fourth reason of Peter Aureoli)

Fourthly, if matter and form are two divided things, and one is not the termination and **entification** of the other, it follows necessarily that "either **one quantity** will be in two subjects" (namely, matter and form), "or if each has its own proper quantity, one and the same composite will be **two quanta and two bodies**. Nor does it avail to say that form intimately flows into matter. For a **glorious body** flows into another glorious or non-glorious one," and yet they are diverse bodies.

These are the reasons of that opinion; from which, when diligently inspected, it appears most certainly that this opinion intends—or at least its reasons and the words induced above draw it to this—that matter and form in a composite are **not two distinct entities**, not only in the sense of two things each of which is

per se one "this something" and neither is the perfection of the other (which all grant to him), but even that they are **not two entities precisèd** and distinct from each other in any way, and that according to its manner of speaking they found an all-encompassing **relative indivision**. And this opinion, thus understood, as it seems to me, not only speaks falsely (as is proved by the reasons of the **third conclusion**), but also speaks **impossibilities**.

(Against the opinion of Peter Aureoli)

Whence I argue thus against it: Matter and form are two entities; therefore they are **multiple entities**, and further, therefore matter and form are **divided** from each other. The first antecedent is given by the opinion; and the first consequence is clear, because **duality** is a species of number, and consequently is a certain multitude. The second consequence is proved because, if they are not divided from each other, they are therefore **undivided**; and if undivided, therefore **one**. This is clear through the account of "the one" in the 5th and 10th of the *Metaphysics*. If, however, they are one, therefore not multiple. This is clear in the same place and by reason, because **one and multitude** are opposed, as divided and undivided.

Furthermore, this **Doctor** [Aureoli] in his *First Book*, distinction 8, question 3, article 5, against the second mode of speaking, assumes in his third reason this major premise: "**Wherever there is multitude, there is distinction**." But wherever there is duality, there is multitude. This is clear. Therefore, wherever there is duality, there is distinction. But matter and form are **truly two** according to him, as was said; indeed, earlier in another part of the same question he proves this by the fact that "otherwise there would not be **two principles**," and he says that, to prove that they are two entities, "**it is not necessary to labor**," thinking this to be certain.

Furthermore, all his reasons just recited proceed equally against the **duality** of matter and form as they do against their mutual distinction, as is sufficiently clear to anyone, and will appear in the solving. Either, therefore, they disprove the duality which they grant, or they do not disprove the distinction which they intend to disprove, and consequently they are **not sufficient**; which certainly is true.

(Against the first reason of Peter Aureoli)

Whence to the **first reason** I say that form does not give to matter any being distinct from itself. And when it is concluded that "form is the being and entification of matter," I say that this can be understood in two ways: In one way, according to an **intransitive construction**, so that the sense is: Form is the being of matter—that is, the being which is matter; and in this sense that proposition is **false**, nor does it follow from the data, since it does not follow: Form does not give to matter any being distinct from itself (namely, the form), therefore form is matter. Furthermore, in this sense the aforesaid proposition is **against the arguer**, because it follows: Form is matter, therefore matter and form are not two entities.

In another way, it can be understood according to a **transitive construction**; and then it is true. For form is indeed the **being of matter**, just as the act and perfection is [the being] of its perfectible [subject]. From

this sense, however, it does not follow that it is indistinct from matter, but the **opposite**; for every perfection is distinguished from its perfectible [subject].

The authority of the **Commentator** is also against the one citing it: both because everything that is **continued** to something is distinguished from it (whence neither is matter continued to itself, nor is form continued to itself); and because, where that man in citing it places this term "**form**," the Commentator places "**another**," which is a relative of diversity. Because he stands there for form—as they well understood—it follows from the words of the Commentator that **form is diverse from matter**. Moreover, the **Commentator** says that matter is a being "through continuation with another" (namely, with form) for this reason: because it cannot, according to him, exist without form; **not because it is indistinct from form**, as they say. Otherwise, also, the Commentator explains "through continuation," that is, "through comparison." And according to that explanation also, the **entitative distinction** of form from matter is argued. See there.

(Contra secundam rationem Petri Aureoli)

To the **second reason**, I say that "for form to signify a proper account and a determinate nature" can be understood in two ways: In one way, that it signifies or is a determinate nature, whole and perfect; and this is **false**, as was said above. In another way, that it is a certain partial nature, proper and determinate and precised from matter; and this is **true**. And if the antecedent is taken in this way, I deny the consequence.

Nor does the proof of the first part avail. For it is expressly clear that it proceeds as if form were a certain complete and perfect specific nature, having a perfect definition, and matter were a certain being **extrinsic** to that specific nature. This I do not grant. Nor does it follow: Form is not a whole and perfect nature distinct from matter, therefore it is not a **partial nature** distinct from matter. Furthermore, who does not see that through those words "and there is not in it a being added to its being," it could no less be inferred that matter is not other than form, and that it and form are not two entities—both of which he nevertheless grants—than it could be inferred that they are not distinct from one another. Neither, however, according to the intention of the **Commentator**, and as it is denied here, can be inferred.

To the proof of the consequence for the other part, I say as was said there by the **Philosopher**. To the first authority to the contrary, I say first that it can be drawn just as well against the one inducing it. For the Commentator says that translation does not bestow **multitude**, and if so, therefore not duality either. And consequently matter and form are not two entities. I respond, however, for him and for myself, that the Commentator says "it does not bestow multitude" because matter and form are not two things in act in the **second way**, namely that each is per se some one "this something," and neither is the perfection of the other and the other conversely potentiality perfectible through the first. For **matter**, as was said above—and this authority confirms that saying—is an **imperfect and incomplete entity**, perfectible through form and constituting with it a whole and perfect nature, and consequently the whole, because "the whole and the perfect are the same" in the 3rd of the *Physics*. And this is what the Commentator wants to say when he says that "it bestows perfection" upon matter—which is the form and its perfection as to perfect and whole being. And this is declared by what immediately follows: "For this is **one in act**"—this, I say, the whole which arises from matter and from form.

To the other authority, when he says "everyone who posits that the soul and the body are two diverse things, etc.", I say that he understands two diverse things in act in the **second way**, namely those of which each is per se a "this something" and neither is the perfection of the other. And that he understands it thus is clear from what follows immediately: "But he who says that the soul is the **perfection of the body**, and that the body does not exist without the soul, there are not for him two diverse things"—namely, in that manner premised, according to which it is necessary to give a cause for their bond. Now, however, I say that the soul and the body are **two**, but in such a way that the soul is the perfection of the body. And therefore that question does not remain for me.

But does it follow: The soul is the perfection of the body, therefore the soul is not distinct from the body? I think that anyone having a right judgment would say no, but that the **opposite** follows. As for what is added, that "the soul and the body are one just as matter and form are one"—namely, the composite—I grant it. Nor does this infer that they are not distinct from one another in the aforesaid manner. Through the same, the answer is clear to the other point from the 2nd *On the Soul*, and to that from the 3rd *On the Heavens*, the sense of which was also shown in the *First Book*, distinction 24, question 1. And it is clear there that the **Commentator** speaks directly according to the understanding given above.

And as to what this Doctor [Aureoli] adds, that if matter and form signified precised and determinate accounts, each would be an **act**, I say that it is not true if they signified—as they do signify—**partial natures**, perfectible and perfective, as was said.

(Contra tertiam rationem Petri Aureoli)

To the **third reason**, I say first that it manifestly compels its maker to say that through generation **no new form** or new reality at all is made in matter of which no part preceded; and consequently that no reality at all, small or great, is according to its whole self, or according to any part or degree of it, newly in matter. Otherwise, some new reality would be given of which no part at all preceded. And consequently, according to them, it would be **created**; which they strive to avoid. But that no reality at all is in matter through generation which was not there before is both false in itself and against this very Doctor.

Furthermore, just as he strives to prove by this reason that form is not an entity distinct and precised from matter, so it would be proved that form is **no reality or entity** other than matter, and that it and matter are not two. For if they are two, the form itself, which is not matter nor includes matter, will certainly be created according to him, since "no part of it preceded" and it went from non-being into being. And yet he grants that matter and form are **two entities**, and that form is other than matter.

And if you say that he says "it is other, but not precised from it," he either understands that it is not precised from it in such a way that it is not an entity which is so much that which it is that it is not also matter (and then **impossibilities** are implied by saying "it is other" and "not precised," for it amounts to saying it is other and not other). Or he says it is not precised because it is not something per se a "this something," as if subsisting per se and not perfecting matter and constituting with it something per se one "this something"; and then he labors in vain, since the opposite is not granted by anyone. For it still stands

that form is an **entity distinct from matter**, perfecting it and constituting with it one per se composite substance.

To his reason, however, I respond that if by "**to be created**" is understood precisely the same as "to be made with no intrinsic part presupposed," and everything is said to "be made" which goes from non-being to being (whether it receives being per se like per se subsisting substances, or in another like accidents and substantial forms, as he seems to use these terms in the proposal), I grant him that form is "created." But the saints and philosophers did not so accept "to be created" when they denied that anything can be **created by a creature**. How they understood it will be clear in the fourth book.

The authority of the **Commentator** does not pertain to the proposal, because the Commentator there accepts "creation" commonly for "**action**," not specially as it is distinguished against generation and other natural actions. And this is clear because neither did **Themistius**, in the generations of those animals of which he speaks, posit that anything is properly "created"; nor does the Commentator infer this against him, nor does he impose upon him that he felt this; indeed, soon after he numbers the opinion of Themistius among those which did not posit creation properly so called. How Themistius erred in that saying of his and why the Commentator disproves him is not necessary to discuss for the present difficulty.

The other authority also does not help him, because the Commentator understands that "they are two parts, **not in act**" in the second way set down above; which I grant.

(Contra quartam rationem Petri Aureoli)

Regarding the **fourth reason**, I marvel much if this Doctor did not notice that it militates on one side against the **duality** which he grants; and that he did not see that, if they are two entities and the proof is sufficient, it is necessarily argued that **one accident** is in two subjects. I respond, therefore, for him and for me, by denying the consequence. For I say that **matter alone** is the first and adequate subject of quantity, as will be proved below. Therefore it does not follow that the quantity itself is in two subjects, although many also do not hold it as an inconvenience that it be in two partial subjects that are not distant and that constitute something per se one, as are matter and form—but not two **glorious** or non-glorious bodies.

(Ad rationes principales)

To the **first reason** made at the beginning of the question, I respond by denying the antecedent, taking "being in act" in the **first way**. Taking it in the second way, I grant it. And in this second way the first proof proceeds. For the **Philosopher** intends that matter per se is not some perfect individual in some species of which some category is predicated per se, because it is an **incomplete and potential entity**, according to the manner explained above.

To the other proof, it must be said that the Philosopher does not use this term "subject" but says: "For it is impossible for that which is not to be moved"; and afterwards he adds: "For that which is not is generated." And therefore when Doctors say "the subject of motion **is**," and "the subject of generation **is not**," if such propositions are to be taken according to the understanding of the Philosopher, it is necessary to understand by "subject" not that which is really the subject of the thing which is motion or the thing which is generation, but that which is denominated "**to be moved**" and that which is said "**to be generated**." And the truth of the Philosopher's words is clear; for whatever is said to be moved (speaking properly of being moved) truly *is* while it is being moved. Whence that which is altered or augmented or carried, certainly is and exists. But that which is said "to be made" or "**to be generated**" is not while it is being generated or made, although then the matter exists which will be it; but the matter itself, although it is the subject which is really the subject of the making and generation, is nevertheless not that which is generated and made. And thus it is clear that the word of the Philosopher does not avail against the proposal.

To the **second reason**, it must be said that if "entity in act" is taken in the first way in the consequent, the consequence does not hold. If however in the second way, I grant the consequent itself. And in the second sense of speaking of "being in act" the proof of the consequence proceeds. For the **Philosopher** accepts it so expressly; for he premises there: "It is clear," he says, "that none of the things predicated commonly signifies a **this something**, but such; but if it signifies a this something, many other things also happen"—namely, impossibilities—"and the **third man**." And this is the first impossibility that happens. And immediately he adds another proof: "Further," he says, "it is also thus manifest," namely what was said. "For it is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances existing in it in such a way as to be in act; for two things thus in act are never one in act." Where that determination "**thus**" is to be noted, because he does not say absolutely "existing in act" nor "two things in act," but in both places adds "thus," so as to denote that manner of "existing in act" about which he premised—namely, as a certain **this something per se**. For things which are *thus* two in act are not one in act. But matter and form are not *thus* two in act, as was said in the **fourth conclusion**.

QUESTION 2 WHETHER the matter of a generable and corruptible substance is naturally separable from any form informing it.

Secondly, I ask: whether the matter of a generable and corruptible substance is **naturally separable** from any form informing it.

And I argue that it is not, first thus: The **indeterminate dimension** of matter is not naturally corruptible; therefore matter is not naturally separable from its indeterminate dimension. The consequence is clear, because matter is not separated from the form it had otherwise than through the corruption of that form. Otherwise, either that form would pass from one matter into another, or it would remain per se not informing any matter; both of which are **naturally impossible**. The antecedent is clear through the **Commentator** in the first chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*.

Secondly, if matter could be naturally separated from any form informing it, it would follow that by the **power of God** matter could exist entirely without form. This consequent is false. For **Hugh** [of St. Victor]

says in *On the Sacraments*, Book 1, Part 1, Chapter 4: "Certainly I do not think that that first matter of all things was so formless as to have had no form at all, because neither would I believe that anything of the sort could exist at all that might have some being and not some **form**." The consequence is proved, because if matter is separable from any form separately through a finite power, it seems follows sufficiently that it would be separable from any [all] through an infinite power, so that it would have **none at all**.

To the opposite part, I argue thus: From any substantial form, the matter of a generable substance is **naturally separable**; therefore from any form, etc. The antecedent is certain, because every such form is naturally corruptible, except for the **intellectual** [soul]. Matter, however, is naturally incorruptible, and consequently separable from any. For even from the intellectual form matter is separable, as is clear in the **death of a human**. The consequence is clear, because the substantial form is the partial subject of every other form [accidents] besides itself, according to that in the 1st of the *Physics*: "Matter with form is the cause of all accidents **like a mother**," and consequently like a material and subjective cause. When the subject is corrupted, however, every accident existing in it is **corrupted**.

In this question there will be three articles according to the three things implied in the arguments: The **first** will be concerning the dimension or **quantity of matter** itself, about which there is singular doubt and on account of which the question was principally moved—namely, whether it is naturally corruptible, so that just as matter loses one **substantial form** and acquires another, and similarly loses one quality and acquires another, so it also loses one quantity and acquires another; or whether the **numerically same quantity** according to essence is always in matter, co-eval with it and not naturally corruptible. The **second** will be whether of every form, substantial or accidental, matter alone is the **immediate and first receptive [subject]**. The **third**, whether through divine power it is possible for matter to exist **without form**, so that it has none, substantial or accidental.

ARTICLE 1

The first article is to be treated by supposing the more common opinion concerning **quantity**, namely that it is a certain third thing, other than substance and quality, informing the matter itself; otherwise this investigation would be superfluous. Then as to this article, I say together with the **Commentator** and many others that the quantity of matter adheres to it **co-evally**, nor in the same matter does quantity ever succeed quantity.

To the declaration of which, it must be considered that if such a **succession of quantities** in matter were to happen naturally, this would only be when matter is transmuted according to **rarefaction or density**, or when it is transmuted according to substantial generation and corruption, or when a thing is increased by **augmentation** properly so called, which happens through the addition of quantity to quantity, as is treated in the 1st of *On Generation*. For it does not appear when else quantity might be corrupted. For neither in **local motion**, nor in other alteration which substantial generation or corruption does not accompany, nor in rarefaction or condensation [does it appear]. In none of the aforesaid, however, does such corruption of quantity happen, as it appears to me.

(Three conclusions)

I pose therefore three conclusions: The **first** is that neither in rarefaction nor in condensation is the quantity of matter **corrupted**, nor is a new one acquired by it. The **second conclusion** is that neither when one thing is corrupted and another generated is any new quantity generated or an old one corrupted, but the **precisely numerically same one** which preceded in the corrupted thing is afterwards in the generated thing. The **third** is that neither in augmentation or decrement is any quantity totally generated anew, or the whole that preceded corrupted.

(The first conclusion is proved)

I prove the first conclusion, and first concerning **rarefaction**. And I pose for the sake of example that some portion of air of **two-foot quantity** should be rarefied by continuous motion until it becomes four-foot, and that the whole be rarefied first—that is, that it not be first according to one part and later according to another, but simultaneously and at the same time as one part of it is rarefied, the others are also rarefied. And I speak of parts according to **extension**. And all of this is possible and frequently happens.

This being supposed, I show first that in such rarefaction its **prior quantity** is not corrupted. First indeed, because if it were corrupted, it would be corrupted either all at once and in an **instant**, or partly and in **time**. Not in the first way: both because either in that instant a new quantity would be generated in the same matter, or not. If not, then in that instant matter would be **indivisible and unextended**; which is not to be said. Also because, since its substantial form and proper qualities necessarily naturally require **extended matter**, then in $\sqsubset$ instant its substantial form would be corrupted, and thus air would never be rarefied without being corrupted. Also because it would have to be asked where that air would be in that instant; for it could not be except in a **punctual place**; and it would not happen to be said in which [point] rather than another. Also because either then the place which it occupied before will be **void**, or in that instant the sides of the container would meet; which are not to be said.

If it be said that in the same instant a **new quantity** is generated, it is either generated as a quantity greater than two-foot—and then, since it cannot be precisely greater through an indivisible (both because an indivisible does not yield anything greater, and because there are no such indivisibles, as was proved above)—it will be greater according to some **divisible excess**, and consequently the air itself in that instant will occupy a greater place according to a divisible excess. And thus follows a **local motion** of the container of the air in an instant, and also of the air itself, speaking of such local motion by which we say that is moved which occupies a greater place than before. Or then a quantity **equal** to the prior is generated; which cannot be said, because the prior would be corrupted in vain. Or a **smaller** one would be generated. Which can even less be said: both because there would be a local motion in an instant of both the container and the given air; and because that air would be **condensed**, not rarefied, for its parts would lie closer together and they would occupy a smaller place. It cannot therefore be given that that quantity is corrupted in an instant and all at once.

But neither can it be said that it is **partibly in time**, because either first it would be corrupted and afterwards a new one generated (as happens when something is transmuted from one quality into another contrary one); or simultaneously while it was being corrupted another would be generated (as those say who think that **contraries** are simultaneously in remiss being, and simultaneously while one is corrupted the other is generated).

Not in the first way, because then it would follow that in all that time the given air would be **condensed** and become of smaller extension, and thus whenever something ought to be naturally rarefied, it would be necessary for it first to be condensed; which is clearly false.

Furthermore, either it would be corrupted partibly according to **intensional parts**. And this not, because no quantity has such; otherwise one two-foot thing could be **more two-foot** than another, and the same thing now more and now less two-foot, and so according to other quantities of certain measure; which is not intelligible. Or according to **extensive parts**, namely so that first the part of the quantity informing one part of the matter would be corrupted before the part informing another. And this cannot be said, because then either the part of the matter first **destitute** of its quantity would remain without quantity at all, or it would be informed by a portion of quantity which before informed another portion of matter and still informs it; and both are absurd—it is certain to those speculating physically.

Nor in the second way, because if it were corrupted partibly according to **intensional parts** and another were simultaneously generated partibly according to such parts, it would follow, as was said, that quantity would receive **more and less**. And beyond this it would follow that **two quantities** are in the same part of matter first—namely, the part remaining from the prior and the part generated anew.

Likewise, either that remaining part is of equal extension as before, or greater. If equal, one of two things follows: either that the matter will not be **more extended** than before, and yet it will be rarer; or some portion of it will go out from under the prior quantity and be informed by the new, the one that previously informed it nevertheless remaining in the nature of things. If of greater extension, by the same reason the whole corrupted quantity could be more extended without the corruption of any of its parts. And thus nature corrupts it **in vain**. In vain also was the new quantity generated, because it is not on account of it that the matter is of greater extension than it is on account of the part alone which remained from the first. But all these things are utterly discordant.

Or it will be corrupted partibly according to **extensive parts**, namely perhaps first the quantity in the extremity of the air toward the rarefying body will be corrupted, and as the prior is continuously corrupted, so a new one will be generated. But neither can this be said. For it is clear that not immediately will those parts of the air be in their **highest rarity**, but first the same part will be rarer according to a smaller excess and afterwards according to a greater, and so until the rarefaction is finished.

Either therefore in any instant of the time measuring the whole rarefaction there will be a **totally new quantity** in that part of the matter, and none will last through time. And this is impossible, as was proved in the *First Book*, when treating of the **intension of corporal forms**.

Or the part first generated will remain with the following ones, as in truth happens in the **intension of qualities**. And if so, the prior quantity which was there before the matter began to be rarefied is posited as

corrupted in vain. For with that remaining the matter could be rarefied, just as it can with that which is posited as newly generated; and especially because the latter is of no other **account** than the former was.

It is also confirmed: because if some hot thing becomes more hot, according to this way the **prior heat** is not corrupted, but remains and a new one is generated. Again, because any part of that portion of matter will be informed by some part of the quantity previously generated (since none will go out from its part of quantity, as was just said), it follows necessarily that either the whole or some part of it will be informed **simultaneously by two quantities**.

And furthermore, either the first generated will be of equal extension with the later generated, or greater. And then in either way a similar inconvenience follows, as was just deduced.

It is clear therefore from these things that quantity is **not corrupted in rarefaction**.

That indeed none is generated anew is also clear from what has been said. For either it would be generated while the whole prior remained, or while it ceased. Not in the second way, as has already been proved. Nor in the first, because either the prior always informs the whole matter, and then it follows that **two quantities simultaneously** inform the same matter; and again it follows that the same prior quantity will be of greater extension than before. And consequently it is posited in vain that on account of such rarefaction another quantity is generated.

Or while the prior ceased to inform some part and informed another, and then it follows that an **accident is separated** from its subject remaining naturally in the nature of things, and that it passes from subject to subject. For the part of the quantity which informed that part of the matter which is afterwards posited as not informed by the prior, afterwards informs another part of the matter which it did not inform before. From which also follows further that **two parts of quantity** inform the same part of matter first. All of which things are naturally impossible.

Secondly, because since in any instant of the time measuring the rarefaction the quantity of matter is greater, either the prior remains with the posterior, or not, etc.; follow this out, as was just said.

From the same motives deduced conversely, it can be proved that in **condensation** the prior quantity is not corrupted nor is a new one generated, as is easily clear to one inspecting; and therefore I omit for now to apply the aforesaid means to this.

(Secunda conclusio probatur, primo)

I prove the **second conclusion**, and let it be posed for the sake of example that fire is generated from some demonstrated air. If, therefore, the quantity of the air is corrupted, it is corrupted either partly in **time**, or all at once in an **instant**. Not in the first way, as is proved from the things said regarding the **first conclusion**. Nor in the second way, because it would be corrupted either all at once in the instant of the corruption of the substantial form of the air and the generation of the form of fire, or before that instant. Not before, because either the air would remain afterwards without quantity, or if a new one were generated, either it would remain until the instant of corruption—and since air always becomes rarer and its quantity is increased until $\sqsupset$ instant, that quantity would become greater than it was when it was first generated, and it would remain through the whole time of its rarefaction. And thus the first one which is

posited as corrupted could have remained; indeed, this is much more reasonably granted of it. Or it will not remain until that instant, but will be corrupted and a new one generated. Indeed, certainly in any instant it would be necessary to grant that a new quantity is generated. And then follow all the inconveniences which were deduced against a similar imagination concerning the **intension of forms** in the *First Book*.

Nor can it be said that through the whole preceding time the same quantity of air lasts, and in the instant of the corruption of the substantial form the whole is corrupted at once. **Proof:** Because in that instant the **rarity** of the air is not corrupted, therefore neither is the quantity.

The consequence is clear, because either rarity is not another thing from quantity, or if it be another, it is no less possible that the same quantity which is in the thing being corrupted should remain after its corruption in the generated thing, than that the same **quality** should remain. It is certain.

I prove the antecedent and suppose one thing demonstrated in the 6th of the *Physics*, namely that "everything that has changed, when it is first changed, is in that to which it has changed." This is generally true in any genus of motion or mutation. And I suppose also that the matter of the air is rarefied continuously without interruption until it comes to the **maximum rarity** it will have in such a generation. And this supposition is necessary, supposing that the active [agent] which rarefies and ought to generate fire is always present.

Either, therefore, the matter of the air will be first changed to the highest rarity it will have in the instant of generation, or in another instant following, or in the preceding. It cannot be said to be in the preceding, because the matter does not cease to be rarefied until a rarity incompatible with the form of air is obtained; and similarly, because by the same reason the other transmutations of the air by which it is disposed to the form of fire could be terminated. And thus the following generation would not be the term of the preceding transmutation. And again, through the whole following time the active [agent] would be sufficiently close to the passive [patient] and in due dispositions for acting, even without impediment, and yet it would not act; which is against nature.

If the matter will be first changed to that rarity in the **instant of generation**, therefore it will then be in it or have it; which is the point proposed. And the same follows if in the following instant, since even if it will not be changed to the highest [rarity] in that instant, nevertheless because the rarefaction lasts continuously (as was supposed), then it will first be changed to some [degree] short of the highest, and then it will have that, and also afterwards in the following time. For I suppose from the things proved in the *First Book* that in intension the **prior part remains** with the following.

If anyone, however, should wish to say that rarefaction does not last until the instant of corruption, but some other alteration (like heating or drying) does last, although such a person would speak irrationally, the proposal is nevertheless not hindered, because the same is argued concerning any other quality. And whatever is posited to remain in the generated thing, this is much more reasonably posited concerning **quantity**.

(Instantia)

Perhaps it will be responded that although where there is simply an intension of form without another annexed transmutation, the preceding part remains with the following ones, nevertheless where another transmutation concurs, the opposite happens sometimes (though by accident)—for example, if the **corruption of the subject** of the form which is being intended intervenes. But it is thus in the proposal; for the partial subject of quantity and of all qualities is the **substantial form**. And therefore, because it is corrupted in that instant, simultaneously both the quantity and every quality of it are also corrupted; and just as then another form is induced (namely of fire, in the example given), so also the congruous and convenient quantity and qualities are induced. In that instant, therefore, the matter is indeed changed to some quality, as is argued, but to a **totally new** one. And thus of quantity and of any quality it will be said [that it is new], nor will it be held that the same quantity or quality which was in the corrupted thing remains in the generated thing.

To the contrary: The substantial form of the thing to be corrupted is not corrupted before **incompatible dispositions** for it are induced in its matter, on account of whose presence it is corrupted, nor even after they are induced, but then first. Therefore, in the instant of its corruption, there are in the matter the **quantity and qualities** which preceded.

The antecedent is evident of itself. The consequence is proved from the fact that the dispositions which are induced as sequels of the generated form (if there be any such) are not the cause of the corruption of the other substantial form. Indeed, it is corrupted earlier by nature or cause than these are induced. Whence also the very corruption of the preceding form is a disposition in a certain way to the following form—that is, the matter, by the fact that it is deprived of the prior form, is **disposed** to the following one. Indeed, the induction of a new substantial form is prior (at least causally) to the induction of the accidents following it. Therefore, such following dispositions are not those on account of which the form is corrupted, but the **preceding ones**, which then first are in a degree incompatible with the form itself.

The foundation of the response—namely, that the substantial form is the partial subject of accidents—is certainly **false**, as will be shown in the second article.

(Secunda conclusio probatur, secundo)

Secondly, I argue to the conclusion thus: A natural generative agent of some substance **pre-disposes** the matter for generation to the form with dispositions convenient to the form in its being. Therefore, the pre-induced dispositions remain with the form itself. Therefore also the **quantity** [remains]; for it is one of the natural dispositions of natural forms.

The antecedent is evident to the senses. The consequence is proved: First, because there is no agent that would corrupt them, since the generator itself overcomes the action of any contrary and makes these very [dispositions].

Secondly, because they would be destroyed **in vain**, since similar ones would have to be caused again. This is confirmed: because no craftsman or agent according to art ever destroys the **artificial dispositions** he makes, nor even those he finds previously made in his matter by another craftsman (if he finds any), or even by nature, provided they are convenient to the form of the artifact he intends. If anyone did this, he

would not act craftily but foolishly and superfluously; and he would be said to act not according to art but rather against it. It is clear, however, that **nature** in its operations flees superfluities no less than art does.

Thirdly, because if such dispositions did not remain in the reception of the form by the matter, no generator would dispose the matter by **inducing convenient dispositions**, but only by corrupting contrary and inconvenient ones. We see the opposite of this by sense; for fire not only corrupts the coldness of dry wood, but increases and intends its dryness, and any element acting upon another increases its own **symbolic quality** in that.

Fourthly, because it would follow that the matter of itself would be precisely and sufficiently disposed to receive **immediately** any form indifferently; so that if by the power of God it were separated per se and had no accidental or substantial form, it would immediately receive any substantial form without any preceding disposition, if a close agent capable of inducing the form were present. From which it also follows that now in fact it is of itself **proximate matter**, and the proper receptive of all forms, and not remote only. But this is against the **Philosopher** in the 8th and 9th of the *Metaphysics*, and against the **Commentator** in the 2nd of the *Metaphysics*, comment 33, and in the 12th, comment 11 and comment 22, and many other places where they distinguish proximate matter from remote, and the proper matter of one genus of forms from the proper matter of another genus. And they maintain that naturally matter does not receive certain forms except by **means** of certain others. And where they never said it, we see it thus to the senses.

Fifthly, because if such preceding dispositions do not remain in the instant of the generation of the form, it follows that, while there exists some matter highly disposed to one form (for example, of earth), another totally disparate form requiring contrary dispositions (for example, the form of fire) could be naturally introduced. But no one speaking physically would say this, as I think. The consequence is declared: Let it be posed that some piece of wood is disposed to the form of earth, and let there be some fire distant which is moved continuously toward this wood and is moved thus: that in the same instant in which the substantial form of the wood is corrupted, it [the fire] is first at a **due distance** for acting upon that matter; and I wish that this fire be more powerful than the agent which disposes to the form of earth. The whole case, as is clear, is possible. This being posed, it is clear that some substantial form will be induced in that matter, both because matter cannot naturally exist without a substantial form, and because there is there a natural agent sufficient for acting and it is a sufficient receptive of form and at a due distance to the agent. But the form of earth will not be induced. **Proof:** since in that instant of the corruption of the substantial form of the wood, according to you, there is **no disposition** to the form of earth in that matter, although many preceded. And consequently it is not then more disposed to the form of earth than to the form of fire, although previously it was more disposed to the form of earth. Since, therefore, the fire is equally sufficiently proximate and more powerful for acting, given equal disposition of the matter, it follows that it will induce the **form of fire** in the matter.

(Secunda conclusio probatur, tertio)

Thirdly, no quality of the thing to be corrupted that is convenient to the form to be induced is **naturally corrupted** when that form ought to be induced. Therefore, no quantity of the thing to be corrupted is corrupted when another is naturally generated from it.

The consequence is proved: First, because all who posit that the numerically same quality remains in the generated thing which was in the corrupted thing, also posit that the **numerically same quantity** according to essence remains, although sometimes it is greater or smaller. Not all, however, who posit that the same quantity remains, posit thus of quality. Whence this seems more to be posited of quantity than of quality. Secondly, because the cause is the same in both cases: namely, **convenience** to the form to be generated. For there is no substantial form which does not naturally require **quantified matter**.

The antecedent is proved by the authority of the **Philosopher** in the 2nd *On Generation*, chapter 2, where he maintains that in elements having a **symbol** [shared quality], generation of one from another is easier. And he assigns the cause: "because it is easier," he says, "to transmute one than many; for example, from fire there will be air, one thing being transmuted"—namely, the humidity [moistness]. And there by a long process he maintains that only the **contrary quality** is corrupted, and the symbol [shared quality] which is convenient and common remains.

In the same place also the **Commentator**: "The generation," he says, "of these things which are contraries according to one difference will be through the corruption of one contrariety; for example, fire becomes air, the dryness being corrupted and the heat remaining; and this is an **easier generation**." The same **Commentator** makes this whole reason in virtue in the 1st chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*, where he says: "Simple dimensions, which are called the **simple body**, are not denuded from prime matter, just as neither are other accidents common to all contrary bodies or to two of them or more—for example, **diaphaneity** [transparency] in which fire and air and water communicate." And a little before he premises that "since Aristotle found all forms to communicate in **unterminated dimensions**, he knew that prime matter is never denuded from untermiated dimensions." And through the whole chapter he holds this conclusion. And similarly in the 1st of the *Physics*, comment 63, and many other places. Nor can it be doubtful to anyone who has seen his sayings concerning this, but that he was of this opinion.

(Tertia conclusio probatur)

I prove the **third conclusion**. For neither the quantity of the increased thing nor the quantity of the **nourishment** is corrupted; therefore none. The consequence is clear, because there is nothing else whose quantity could be corrupted in such a transmutation.

The antecedent is proved, because if any of the aforesaid were corrupted, this would be either in the **widening of the pores** of the thing to be increased, or in the rarefaction either of its parts or of the nourishment itself, or in the **digestion** or some previous alteration of the nourishment, or in its division and the distribution of its parts to the parts of the thing nourished, or in their conversion into the substance of the thing nourished. This is clear, because in augmentation other transmutations do not concur, as is clear to one considering, and also sufficiently through the **Commentator** in the 1st *On Generation*.

But in rarefaction quantity is not corrupted, as is clear from the **first conclusion**; nor in conversion, as can be clear from the **second**; and by the same reason neither in digestion or any other preceding alteration, nor even in division. For although through division the **total quantity** is corrupted as to the being of the whole (for the fact that after division the parts, which were continuous and simultaneously one total quantity, are after division discrete and not one as before), nevertheless **no part of the matter** is deprived of the part of quantity which it previously had. And by this, no quantity is corrupted in the sense in which the present difficulty is treated.

In the widening of the pores also of that which is to be increased, it is well clear that no quantity is corrupted. If, however, no quantity is corrupted in such augmentation, it is also clear that none is generated **anew**—namely, in such a way that some part of matter is informed by some part of quantity by which it was not informed before. Otherwise it would be informed **simultaneously by two quantities**, which is not naturally possible.

It can, however, be said that a **new total quantity** is generated, for the fact that a new one total quantity results from the continuation of the added part (by which the nourished thing is said to be increased) to the parts of the nourished thing itself; and it is such a quantity as previously was not, although its parts were. Whether, however, such a total quantity is properly said to be **generated** or not, I do not care for now, because it does not pertain to the proposal, for I am not speaking of generation in such a sense now.

By a similar manner it can be proved that in **decrement** no quantity is corrupted or generated.

(Obiectiones)

Against the aforesaid it can be argued **first** thus: When the subject is corrupted, every accident of it is naturally corrupted. Otherwise, either the accident would remain per se **without a subject**, or it would migrate from subject to subject. Both of these are naturally impossible. But the **subject of quantity** is the composite in the genus of substance. Therefore, when the composite is corrupted, the quantity is corrupted. And similarly it is argued concerning other accidents.

The assumption is proved first by the authority of the **Commentator** in the 1st chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*, saying that Aristotle "found that the subjects of all accidents are **individuals of substance** which are in act, about which it was declared by him that they are composed of forms and a subject which is in potentiality." And immediately after he says that "the subject receiving accidents is not a **simple [thing] in act**" but a composite. This is a very express authority.

Likewise in the 2nd *On the Soul*, comment 4: "The subject," he says, "of an accident is a **composite of matter and form**, and is something existing in act, and does not need the accident in its being. The subject of form, however, does not have being in act according as it is a subject except through the form, and it needs form so that it may be in act." Where the same thing as before is clear.

It is also proved thirdly by reason: because the same is the **subject of quantity** and of motion toward quantity. It is clear, because motion toward quantity is the quantity itself, just as other motions are the

very things which are acquired. But the subject of such motion, as of the others, is the **whole composite** and being in act, not matter alone. Therefore, etc.

Secondly, if the quantity of the corrupted thing remained, it would therefore precede in the matter the **substantial form** of the generated thing itself. From which it further follows that it would have "being and act *secundum quid*" [in a certain respect] before having "being simply and **act simply**." This, however, is false, since that which is simply is prior to that which is *secundum quid* only. The consequence is clear, because quantity is an accident and gives being *secundum quid* only, whereas substantial form gives **being simply**. Whence it gives specific being, and name, and definition.

Thirdly, it would follow that the introduction of a substantial form would be **alteration**, because its subject would be a being in act, at least *secundum quid*.

Fourthly, because then the substantial form is not the **cause of quantity** in matter, nor is the diversity of forms the cause of the diversity of quantities in matters—against the **Commentator** in the 1st *On the Heavens*, comment 75, saying that "diversity of forms is the cause of diversity of quantities and magnitudes receiving the forms." The same maintains in the 1st *On the Soul*, comment 53.

Fifthly, it would follow that there would be no **true mixture** nor augmentation, or that many bodies would be in the same first place. Both are false. The consequence is proved: for in true mixture every part of the mixed thing is mixed; and similarly where there is true augmentation, every part of the increased thing is increased. If, therefore, the quantities of the **miscibles** remain, it follows that in any part of the mixture there will be as many quantities as there are miscibles. And similarly it would be of any part of the increased thing.

To the same there seems to be one authority of the **Commentator** in the 1st chapter of *On the Substance of the Orb*: "We see," he says, "that when the form of heat acts upon water, the water begins to increase and grow into the **dimensions of air**. Since therefore it arrives at the maximum quantity of water, then the subject will be **denuded** of the form of water and of the quantity of dimensions proper to water, and will receive the form of air and the quantity of dimensions proper to the form of air." Where, as it seems, he maintains that the matter of water is denuded of the **prior dimensions** and receives new dimensions simultaneously with the form of air.

(Ad obiectiones)

To the **first [objection]**, I grant the major premise concerning that which is the *first* subject, or its part insofar as it is such; and then I deny the minor. For substantial form is not the first subject, nor a part of that which is the first subject of quantity, because matter alone is its first subject. But concerning that which is a subject not primarily but through its part, I deny the major if it is taken universally, and I grant the minor. To the induced proofs, response will be made in the following article.

To the **second**, speaking of precedence according to time, I grant that quantity preceded in the same matter any form that is newly induced in matter, and also that a *secundum quid* [relative] act preceded both this and that *simpliciter* [absolute] act which is newly caused in matter. Nor is this an inconvenience. Nevertheless, by precedence of perfection, substantial form precedes quantity, and the *simpliciter* act precedes the *secundum quid* act.

To the **third**, I deny the consequence. Nor is the proof sufficient, since for the introduction of a form to be an alteration, it is necessary that the subject be in act through a form giving name and definition—which quantity is not, nor any accidental form. Otherwise, it would not retain the same name and the same definition under both terms of the transmutation, by which alteration differs from generation, as was said in the preceding question.

To the **fourth**, it must be said that substantial form being the cause of quantity in matter can be understood in two ways: In one way, that it is the cause of it as to its being *absolutely*; in another way, that it is its cause as to its termination or as to its being *this much* or *that much*. Or, in plainer words, in one way it can be called the cause of quantity in matter—that is, the cause by means of which or on account of which matter is quantified; in another way, that it is the cause through which matter is quantified with *this much* or *that much* extension, and its quantity is of *this much* or *that much* extension. Here it must be known that the same demonstrated essence of quantity can be greater and smaller, and more and less extended, or have its extreme parts more or less distant. And similarly, precisely the same matter can be of greater and smaller extension, so that neither matter of itself nor its quantity of itself is determined to a certain and fixed degree of extension—as if it were two-cubit or three-cubit, or of some other certain measure. Rather, such termination proceeds from the substantial form.

In the first way, therefore, substantial form is not the cause of quantity in matter. Whence matter does not have it from the substantial form itself that it is quantified; indeed, quantity is a property (*passio*) following matter per se. But in the second way, form is the cause of quantity, since according to the requirement and condition of the substantial form existing in matter, the quantity of the matter—just like the matter itself—is of *this much* or *that much* extension.

And this is what the Commentator means to say in the words alleged. There is, therefore, in one portion of matter always the numerically same portion of quantity. But existing under the substantial form of **earth**, it is of a certain extension—for example, one palm; existing under the form of **water**, it is of 10 palms; under the form of **air**, 100; and under the form of **fire**, 1000. And of this sort of diversity of quantities and magnitudes—or that matter and its quantity are this much or that much—the cause is the diversity of the substantial forms. For both the matter itself and the quantity itself are of themselves indeterminate and indifferent to such degrees, and in potentiality to any one of them. And for this reason, the Commentator sometimes calls the dimensions of matter "dimensions in potentiality."

To the **fifth**, I deny the consequence. As for the proof, when it is said that "in a true mixture every part of the mixture is mixed," it must be answered according to the distinction of the Philosopher and the Commentator in the 1st of *On Generation* regarding parts. For certain things are called **material parts**, or parts of the *quantum* according as it is a *quantum*. And thus everything from which a *quantum* is composed is a part. But certain things are called **formal parts**, or parts of the *quantum* according as it is a *quantum* having a form. And such are all those, and only those, in any of which—when separated per se from the other parts—its specific form could be naturally preserved.

Everything that is a part in the second way is a part in the first way. But not everything that is a part in the first way is a part in the second way; indeed, any part taken in the second way contains infinite parts, none of which is a part in the second way. And the reason is that in every species of natural things having parts according to magnitude, there is a **minimum** according to extension in which its form can be naturally

preserved. Or if such a minimum is not given, it is necessary to give, beneath the quantity in which it can be preserved, a **maximum** in which it cannot; as was said more at length in the *First Book*, distinction 17. But in every such minimum (or maximum in which it cannot), there are infinite parts called parts in the first way. For every such thing is a *quantum*, and infinite parts of the same account exist within it. Whence in any part of fire there are infinite parts, each of which is fire, and so of the others.

Now to the point: it must be said, according to the Commentator in the 1st of *On Generation* against Alexander, that neither natural and true mixture nor augmentation occurs according to parts called in the first way, but according to parts taken in the second way. For the miscibles are divided into such, and they are juxtaposed, one of one [substance] next to one of the other. Similarly, the division of nourishment occurs into such parts, and to such parts of the nourished thing occurs their distribution and juxtaposition. Then follows mutual action, and there mixture, here augmentation—their proper quantities always remaining to those parts, just as the parts of matter which they inform also remain. And just as their matters are not in the same first place but juxtaposed, so neither are the quantities themselves.

As for the authority of the Commentator which is adduced last, it must be known that some have thought the Commentator posited a **double genus of dimensions**: of which some he called "unterminated dimensions" and "simple dimensions," and also sometimes "dimensions in potentiality"; and these were inseparable from matter and common to the generated and corrupted. But certain others he called "terminated dimensions" and "dimensions in act"; and these indeed were in matter simultaneously with the others and really distinct from them, and separable from matter, nor common to the generated and corrupted, but each had its own proper terminated dimension. And concerning these, according to that imagination, the alleged authority would be understood—not concerning the unterminated ones.

But I do not think this imagination was the Commentator's and, granted that it were, I do not think it is true: First, indeed, because a double dimension in matter is posited superfluously. For through one, all things can be sufficiently preserved which in truth can be preserved through two.

Secondly, because it is posited impossibly according to nature, because two quantities are posited in the same first place and penetrating each other. For both this one and that one are long, wide, and deep, and both inform the whole same matter first according to that way.

Thirdly, because when matter is rarefied continuously before the substantial generation follows, either in any instant a new terminated dimension is generated—and then it would be necessary to grant that none lasts longer than an instant (which is naturally impossible), or if it lasts through time, there will be simultaneously in the same matter **infinite terminated dimensions**, each of which will inform the whole matter. And again, since matter always becomes more extended, any of the aforesaid dimensions will also become more extended, and thus the same terminated dimension will be now greater, now smaller, nor more of itself terminated to a certain measure than that which they call unterminated; and by the same reason by which the first unterminated ones give one terminated one, there will also be given to this one another terminated one, and to that other another, unto infinity. Or each such will be generated in time and partibly; and this is impossible, as is clear from the proofs of the **first conclusion**. Or none before the substantial generation will be generated, but the same one will successively become greater and more extended; and the same follows which was just said.

I say, therefore, that there is not a double quantity in matter, but **one only**, which can be terminated by a greater and smaller extension or can be more and less extended, and rarer and less rare, just like the matter it informs. Nor is there need for this that any new quantity or part of quantity be added or subtracted, just as it is not for the matter. And it, taken according to itself absolutely as indifferent to this and that extension, is called "unterminated" and "simple dimension" and "in potentiality"; but as it is of such an extension and measure, or such, it is called "terminated." And according to this, forms are said to differ, as was said above.

The true sense of the alleged authority is therefore that then matter will be "denuded of the quantity of dimensions proper to water and receive the quantity of dimensions proper to the form of air"—that is, then the matter and also its dimension will cease to be of such an extension as the form of water appropriates to itself, and will become of such an extension as the form of air requires. This, however, happens without the corruption of any prior quantity and without the generation of a new quantity according to essence.

ARTICLE 2

(Three opinions)

As to the second article—namely, whether of every form only matter is the **immediate and first receptive [subject]**—there is doubt, since it seems to some that the composite of matter and substantial form is the first subject of accidents. And some also wish that quantity be the subject of corporal qualities. Others, however, grant indeed that the composite of matter and substantial form is surely the subject of accidents, but not primarily, because not according to any or through any part of itself—since not through the form but through matter alone. They say also that no accident in itself subjectively receives another, although through one the subject is disposed to receive another; and thus, according to them, every form of corporal matter is received immediately in **matter alone**, and consequently of every one, matter alone is the first and immediate subject.

(The third opinion is proved)

Their statement pleases me more. And therefore I prove it first thus: A composite is the subject of a form (whether substantial or accidental) only through that part through which alone it—before it had the form—was in receptive potentiality to it. This is clear, because whose the potentiality is, whose also is the act. But the composite was in receptive potentiality to every corporal form it has through **matter alone**. Therefore, etc.

I prove the minor in many ways: First, indeed, by the authority of the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 1, where he says that the subject of transmutation is not "a simple substance in act," because "then it would be impassible and impossible"—that is, lacking potentiality—"and not receptive." And below he says that Aristotle "found that the subjects of all accidents are individuals of substance which are in act. Concerning which it was declared by him that they are composed of forms and a subject

which is in potentiality. And he also took a sign from this, that the subject receives contingent accidents in that it is not simple"—that is, the sign by which Aristotle knew the subject of accidents (namely of such corporal ones) not to be simple in act, is because it receives contingent accidents. Whence he adds: "Since, if it were simple in act, it could not receive accidents; for to suffer (*pati*) is contrary to act itself." Thus the Commentator. From this, notice that Aristotle, from the fact that he saw substances existing in act receive contingent accidents, knew them not to be simple and to be composed of a subject in potentiality. And the reason is because **to suffer is repugnant to act**. Therefore, it is not according to form (which is act) that the composite itself is in potentiality to accidents. And by the same reason, neither to another form, the reception of which is "suffering" properly so called. This I say to the difference of spiritual forms.

Secondly, the minor is proved, because otherwise it would follow that form would be the principle of suffering and of being transmuted by another, and through this a passive potentiality. Which is not fittingly granted.

Thirdly, because then transmutation would no more make us know matter than form, if form were the subject of transmutation just like matter.

This reason does not prove concerning quantity, since it is not received anew in matter. But that its subject is matter alone is proved by the fact that otherwise it would migrate from subject to subject. This is clear, because if not only matter but also form were the subject of quantity, since no form is eternal in matter but one succeeds another, quantity would be subjectively now in one form and now in another.

Secondly thus: In **man**, matter alone is the subject of all corporal forms. Therefore, in all corporal things, matter alone is the first subject of such forms. The consequence is evident, since matter does not suffice less in others for receiving than in man. The antecedent is proved, because the substantial form of man is not the subject of corporal accidents, since it is **spiritual**, and no other substantial form is in him, as I suppose for now. Nor indeed is any accident the subject of another accident, as is clear through the Philosopher in the 4th of the *Metaphysics*, in that part "They utterly destroy substance," where he maintains that one accident does not happen to another, unless they be said to happen to each other only insofar as both happen to a third thing—namely, the subject. Whence these are his words: "For an accident will not happen to an accident, unless because both happen to the same thing." And shortly after he proves this by the fact that there is no reason why one should happen to the other rather than vice versa. Whence he says: "Nor thus is anything an accident to 'white' as 'musical'; for the one happens no more to it than it to the other."

It is clear, therefore, that in man, matter alone is the subject of accidental forms. But that it alone is the subject of substantial form is clear from the fact that in him there is only one substantial form, as I suppose. Therefore, no substantial form is the subject of that one. And it is certain that no accidental form is its subject either. Therefore, matter alone.

(To the arguments of the first objection in the preceding article)

Now I answer to those things which were argued against this in the first objection of the preceding article. To the authority of the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Orb*, I say that the Commentator intends that the composite is the subject of an accident per se, yet not primarily, because only through its part—namely, matter. And he shows this manifestly by what follows: namely, that from this Aristotle knew the subject itself to be a composite of a subject in potentiality—that is, matter. And again, that to suffer is repugnant to act and that, if it were simple in act, it would not be receptive.

To the other from the 2nd *On the Soul*, it must be said in the same way: namely, that the composite of matter and substantial form is per se the subject of an accident, yet not the first or not primarily. And notice the difference between the **subject of form** and the **subject of accident** according to the Commentator. For the subject of an accident is something composite existing in act *simpliciter* through another form than the accident itself, so that for its *simpliciter* being it does not need the accident of which it is the subject. But the subject of substantial form is not such a composite thing having *simpliciter* being through another form than itself; rather, it has *simpliciter* being through the very form of which it is the subject. And therefore it needs it in its *simpliciter* being. Whence also the matter alone is the subject of form and accident in different ways. For of an accident it is the subject as "actuated *simpliciter*," or having *simpliciter* being through another form than that accident.

With which agrees another saying of the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Orb*, chapter 1, where he says that this is the disposition in all accidents existing in prime matter: namely, that they are not found in it except insofar as it has a form existing in act. But of **form** (namely substantial, which he understands here by the name of "form"), the subject is matter not having *simpliciter* being through another form, but through that very one.

Nor does it follow: Matter having a substantial form (or actuated through a substantial form) is the subject of an accident, therefore the substantial form is the subject of the accident. Just as it does not follow: Matter quantified is the subject of a **rational soul** (or of another substantial form), therefore quantity is the subject of the rational soul. For the antecedent is true, and the consequent false. Nor does it follow: White matter is the subject of sweetness, therefore whiteness is the subject of sweetness. For in milk the antecedent is true, and the consequent false.

To the reason which is adduced to the same, I say that—whatever thing motion according to quantity may be, and in whatever way the occurrence of such motion ought to be understood, which is not to be discussed for now—of every motion which is some thing formally existing in that which is moved, the first subject is **matter alone**, just as it is of substantial generation, but differently: since of generation it is the subject insofar as it does not have *simpliciter* act through another form. And therefore in generation *simpliciter*, nothing demonstrated remains having the same name and definition as before. But in other motions it is the subject insofar as through another form it has *simpliciter* act, which remains in the whole transmutation. And therefore there also remains something demonstrated retaining the same name and the same definition.

And this is entirely the opinion of the Commentator in the 1st of the *Physics*, comment 63, whose words I omit to recite for the sake of brevity.

ARTICLE 3

(Concerning the possibility of matter without form)

As to the third article—namely, whether it is possible through divine power for matter to exist and have no substantial or accidental form in itself—I answer that, supposing God's omnipotence (which we truly confess) and that matter is an essence distinct from the essence of form (as appears from the preceding question and is commonly granted), it does not appear to me that anyone ought to think but that it is possible for God to do this. And the reason, which ought to move anyone, is that **everything possible to be true can be verified through divine power**. Otherwise some "word would be impossible with God." But for matter to be and no form to be, although it is false, is nevertheless possible to be true, since it implies or infers no contradiction. Therefore, etc.

Secondly, if this were not possible for God, it follows that God could not preserve every creature by Himself alone without another extrinsic conserver. This consequence is clear, since the fact that one thing cannot (even naturally) exist without another—essentially distinct from it and not intrinsic to it—is only either because that is its natural effect (as the sun naturally cannot be without light being diffused from it), or because it is a certain proper following property (*passio*) (as we say fire cannot be without heat), or because it is a cause preserving it in being (as light cannot naturally exist without the luminous body by which it is preserved in being).

The proposal is not hindered on account of the first: both because form is not an effect of matter in that way; and because through divine power every such cause can exist without such an effect. This is clear regarding the sun at the time of **Christ's death**, which did not pour forth light in the air. It is also clear regarding the fire in the furnace, which did not heat those **three boys** or otherwise act upon them.

Nor on account of the second, because there is no form so naturally and necessarily following any subject but that without it God could preserve the subject—as can be expressly held from Blessed **Augustine** in the epistle *To Consentius* (which is number 73), where he says: "The divine power is able to take away from this visible and tractable nature of bodies those qualities it wishes, while certain others remain." And when he had said immediately before that God can preserve our flesh perpetually without corruption just as He preserved the boys in the furnace without harm, he posed a certain response by which it could be said "not that incorruption had been added to the flesh of those men against the fire, but that the faculty of corrupting had been taken away from the fire itself." These are his words.

He did not say this was impossible, but he said this was even more wonderful than the previously mentioned thing, because simultaneously the fire was burning the wood and not burning their bodies. And shortly after follow the alleged words, so that it is not doubtful to anyone diligently considering but that Augustine wishes to assert there that God can, if He wished, make **fire without heat**, and any thing without its proper quality and any naturally following property.

It remains, therefore, that if He could not make matter without every form, this would be because through form matter is preserved in being. And thus the consequence is clear. But the falsity of the consequent, as it appears to me, ought to be certain to every Catholic: because God can preserve every thing without another extrinsic conserver no less than He can produce it without another efficient cause. For as all

things are from Him, so also through Him are all things, "and all things consist in Him," according to the **Apostle**.

It is confirmed: because otherwise God would need a creature and would be helped by it in preserving another creature; which seems to derogate from God's omnipotence. Whence just as **Augustine** says in the 1st of *On Free Choice*, chapter 2, that he does not believe in God the Omnipotent who believes He was aided by nature in creating any thing, as if He did not suffice for Himself; so certainly it seems that He is not fully believed to be omnipotent if He cannot preserve any one creature without the aid of another.

To this it adds that, as it is commonly argued, this is no less possible for God than for an accident to be without a subject—which nevertheless happens by divine power in the **Sacrament**. Many other wonders also and things above nature we read to have been done divinely; from the consideration and belief of which no one ought to doubt that God can do this. And therefore Augustine, in the alleged epistle, when he had brought forward the miracle concerning the fire in the furnace, says: "Those who do not believe these things trust too little in the divine power, nor is our speech now with them or to them. But let those who believe these things gather from them also those other things, in whatever way, which they faithfully seek."

(Opinio Thomae)

Against this conclusion is the opinion of one **Doctor** [Thomas Aquinas], whose reason is this: because if matter were without form, matter would be "in act without act; which implies a contradiction." The consequence is clear, because "that which is act, is form." And this reason is taken from the **Commentator** on the 2nd of the *Physics*, comment 12; whose authorities for this are also in the same place at comment 30, and in the first book, comment 70.

Secondly, it is argued to the same point thus: Insofar as certain things make a truer unity, they are to that extent less separable from each other. But matter makes a truer unity with form than a proper property (*passio*) does with its subject, because matter with form makes a unity **per se**, while a property with a subject makes a unity **per accidens**; and yet a property cannot be separated from its subject.

Thirdly: "All being (*esse*) is from form," according to **Boethius**. If therefore matter were without form, it would have being and would not have being; which is impossible.

Fourthly: if so, it would follow that in matter the **privations** of opposite forms would exist simultaneously, for it is simultaneously deprived of opposite forms. But the consequent is impossible, because matter cannot have the privation of one opposite form unless it is under another opposite form.

(Ad rationes pro opinione Thomae)

These reasons avail little. Whence, to the **first**, it must be said: if it is understood that matter would be in act in the **first way** set down above, and by "act" form is understood, the consequent is not impossible nor does it imply any contradiction. If, however, it is understood that it would be in act in the **second way**, the

consequence does not hold, since it would not be in act in that way. The authority of the **Commentator**, however, where the power of God is concerned, ought not to be accepted.

To the **second**: if proper property is taken for a proper accident really informing the subject (as the argument seems to take it), it must be said that any such can also be separated from the subject, as can also appear from the authority of **Augustine**.

To the **third**, it must be said that **Boethius** understands this concerning the specific, perfect being of a composite in the genus of substance. And thus it is not to the point.

To the **fourth**, I grant the consequent. When it is proved to be impossible, it must be said that the assumption is true concerning **immediate opposite forms** regarding a subject and those necessarily succeeding one another. But such succession is not necessary with respect to the power of God, but only according to the course of nature. And therefore it does not follow that matter cannot be without form through the power of God, but only that it cannot be so naturally; which I grant.

To the **first [argument]** to the contrary, the consequent is to be granted. To the **second**, it must be said that **Hugh** speaks of natural power, not however of the absolute power of God. The answer to the argument for the opposite part is clear from the things said.

DISTINCTION 15

QUESTION 1

WHETHER in mixed bodies generated from elements, the essences of those elements remain.

Regarding Distinction 15, in which the **Master** treats the production of mixed bodies from elements—such as fish and birds from water, and reptiles from earth—I ask, as is customary to ask here: whether in mixed bodies generated from elements, the essences of those elements remain.

And it is argued first that they **do**, because if they did not remain, there would now be no **mixed body**; but we suppose that mixed bodies exist. The consequence is evident, because nothing is mixed unless something is mixed with another; and things that **do not exist** cannot be mixed.

This is confirmed, because "mixture is the union of altered miscible things," according to **1 On Generation**. From this, it is argued in two ways: First, because it is impossible for things that do not exist to be **united**. Second, because things that are merely **altered** are not corrupted; but miscible things are only altered in mixture, otherwise he should have said "the union of **corrupted** things." Furthermore, the **Philosopher** says there: "for these," namely the miscible things, "are not necessarily corrupted when they are mixed."

Second, suppose that the elements concur toward the generation of a mixed body: either in such generation **all** are corrupted, or **some** are and some are not, or **none**. The **first** cannot be said, because then there would be no agent generating the mixed body. For the elements themselves would not generate it, since in the instant of generation they **do not exist**, and consequently they cannot act then. Nor can any

other agent be assigned, unless perhaps it is said that the universal agent—namely the **heaven**—then generates the mixed body. But this is not sufficient, because besides the universal agent, it is necessary to have a **particular agent** proximate to the matter of the thing generated, since a natural agent does not act immediately at a distance. Furthermore, what corrupts them? For no other extrinsic corrupting agent appears. But if they corrupt each other mutually, it is necessary for some to **overcome** others, and consequently for some to **remain**. Therefore, not all are corrupted.

Nor can it be said that **some** are corrupted and some are not, because then that which is corrupted would be converted into the nature of the one remaining, and there would then be no mixture—just as when a drop of water is added to a jar of wine and is converted into wine, as the **Philosopher** says. Furthermore, then that corrupted thing would not be united to the remaining one, because it would not exist, and consequently the mixed body would not be "mixed" from that corrupted thing.

There remains therefore the third option: namely, that **none** are corrupted, which is the proposed point.

On the contrary, it is argued from the intention of the **Philosopher** in **1 On Generation**, who proves that habits and passions are not mixed with subjects because such things are **preserved** in their own nature. Therefore, if elements are truly mixed with each other, they are **not preserved**. They are therefore corrupted, and consequently their essences do not remain in the mixed body.

This is confirmed by what the **Philosopher** adds: "It is manifest," he says, "that one ought not to say things are mixed because they are preserved according to **small parts**; for that would be **composition** and not mixture."

THE FOUR OPINIONS

Regarding this question, there is a fourfold opinion:

One was that of **Avicenna**, as is clear in **1 of the Sufficientia**, chapter 11, and which the **Commentator** recites in **1 On Generation** and **3 On the Heavens**, comment 67: that in a mixed body the elements remain **intact and fixed** according to their proper essences, but their **qualities** are corrupted, and from them a certain complexional and intermediate quality is generated.

Another opinion was that of the **Commentator** [Averroes], as is clear in the same place in **3 On the Heavens**: namely, that the substantial forms of the elements are not corrupted according to the **whole**, but are diminished and corrupted according to a **part**. And "from the collection of them" thus diminished, "another form" arises, "just as when whiteness and blackness are mixed together, many colors are made from them," as he says. From this he also consequently grants that such "substantial forms receive **more and less**" [intensity]; which he says does not contradict them because of their **imperfection**, for "their being is a **medium** between perfect forms and accidents."

He therefore proves two things: The **first** is that they are not totally corrupted because, he says, "if they were corrupted according to the whole, then **prime matter** would receive all forms primarily and essentially, and would not receive the forms of composites by the mediation of these bodies." The **second**

is that they do not remain complete and in their perfection: first, because if they remained so, "it would be necessary that no being be generated from them diverse in **substantial form**, but only in accidents." Second, because then the "composite" from elements "will not have **one substantial form**," and consequently it will not be one in act. The proof of this is that it is not possible for the unity of a composite to be a unity of **contact** only or of **continuation**. It is therefore one through one form. And it is certain that it is not through an accidental form, therefore through a substantial one. And it follows also, as he says, that one of the elementary forms will be "distinct from another." From which it can be inferred that the composite will not be one, but **many essentially**. Third, because if such forms remain intact, or even if their qualities remain perfect, then it follows that "in the composite there would be **fire in act** with heat and dryness in the highest degree." Or they are remitted according to a part, and then it follows that "it will be possible for their forms to be **stripped** of these qualities according to the whole; for a part and the whole have the same judgment. And all this," he says, "is impossible."

The **third opinion**, the most recent of all, is that the substantial forms of the elements do not remain according to their **whole essence**, nor according to any **large or small part** which retains the name and definition of the whole form, but according to some **part of itself** to which the definition of that form does not belong *per se*. Hence they imagine in every miscible form, whether substantial or accidental, a certain genus of **parts**—not indeed quantitative, but **essential** parts—not of the same nature among themselves or with the total form, but of different natures, from which the substantial form itself is integrated. They say, therefore, that in mixture some of those [parts] are corrupted and another remains the same as it was before. And from such **partial and incomplete realities** of the elements, the form of the mixed body is fashioned and results; so that the form of the mixed body is not some simple form newly induced in the matter, but a certain thing **fashioned** from the pre-existing parts of diverse forms.

The reasons for this opinion will be recited in the second article.

The **fourth opinion**, which is now also more commonly held, is that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body neither according to their **wholes** nor according to any of their **parts**.

Now it remains to see which of these opinions is true. I prove, therefore, **first**, certain conclusions. And **secondly**, I will object against them and respond to the objections.

ARTICLE 1

(Four Conclusions)

For the first part, I premise—as I also touched upon in the **First Book**, Distinction 17, where it was asked whether the intensification of a form occurs through purification from its contrary—that the forms of miscible things can be considered in two ways:

1. In comparison to some **aggregate** of them, before the substantial generation of any substance of a different species from them follows (which substance we call a **mixed body**, such as a stone or iron or something of this sort).

2. In comparison to some such **substance** generated from their mixture.

And speaking of the mixed body in this second sense, as the aforementioned opinions have spoken:

- The **first conclusion** to be proved is that the substantial forms of the elements **do not remain** perfectly and intactly in the mixed body itself.
 - The **second**, that they do not remain **remitted and fractured**, as the second opinion imagines.
 - The **third**, that they do not remain according to any of their **essential parts** according to the imagination of the third opinion.
 - The **fourth** (absolute), that such forms are **not actually** according to themselves in such a mixed body as has been described; however, in what manner and how [they are there], shall be said.
-

(The First Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the first conclusion first thus: And I take for the sake of example a single **stone**. Either in that stone there is some particle in which there is only the substantial form of **one element**—and I speak of parts according to **dimensive quantity**—or there is none at all, however small, in which the forms of several elements are not present.

If the **first** is said, then not every part of that stone is mixed, nor is every part a stone; for a single simple element is not a stone. But the consequent is false according to the truth and according to the concession of all, since every part of a stone—and similarly the part of any part even unto infinity, taking a smaller one—is **truly a stone**. And so it is in any **homogeneous** thing, because every quantitative part of it is of the same nature as the whole. And the **Philosopher** also expressly says this in that chapter "On Mixture."

If the **second** is said, since a substantial form does not desert its own matter to pass to another (just as an accident does not migrate from one subject to another), it follows that together with that form will be **its matter**, which it also previously informed, and also **its quantity**. And thus in the same primary location there will be **several bodies at once**; which is naturally impossible.

Second: either the form of one element (for example, fire) existing in the mixed body informs **precisely the same portion of matter** which it informed before the mixture, and similarly the form of every other element informs precisely its prior matter; or it informs not only its own matter, but also informs the matter which the form of another element previously informed.

This **second** option is not naturally possible. Nor can the **first** be said, because either **no new substantial form** has been produced, and consequently those things will not be one substance in number but four aggregated ones, nor will the mixed body be a stone, but it will be fire and air, water and earth. Or a **new substantial form** will have been induced, and then, since the remaining matters of the elements do not penetrate each other in the same location, one will be **situally outside** the other.

And from this it follows that one part of the mixed body would be informed by the form of the mixed body and the form of fire only, and another would be informed by the form of the mixed body and the

form of air only, and so of the others. And consequently no mixed body will be **homogeneous**, and no part will be mixed, or one element alone will be mixed; which is not to be said.

Third, I posit that from one mixed body another mixed body is generated. Either, therefore, in the generated mixed body there are the substantial forms of the **first elements**, or not. If not, then it is not necessary for such forms to be in a mixed body, and consequently they are posited to be in other mixed bodies **in vain**. If so, since in the generation of this thing no new aggregation and mixture of elements was made, the forms of the elements in this generated thing are no other than those which were in the corrupted one. And then certain inconveniences follow.

One is that here there would be no **true generation**, for the reason that something would remain numerically the same, retaining the same name and the same definition, because the same **specific substantial form** would remain—indeed, several in several matters. Likewise, those who defend the opposite opinion say that generation differs from mixture in this: that in generation, that from which another thing is generated is **totally corrupted**, but in mixture it is not. Therefore, there is no true generation here.

Another thing that follows is that the same **measures and proportions** of the elements are in the generated mixed body as were in the corrupted one. And thus, however many mixed bodies are ever successively generated, in all of them there will be an **equal proportion** of elements; and the element which predominates in the first mixed body generated immediately from elements will predominate in **every succeeding one**; which is absurd to say.

Fourth, as a certain doctor [Adam Wodeham] argues: either the matter of one element is in the **same primary location** with the matter of another, or in another. If in another, so also are the forms, and then mixture is nothing but **juxtaposition**.

If in the same, either they and it constitute **one essence**—just as two parts of whiteness or of another form existing in the same primary subject constitute one form in number. And then it follows that **matter** would admit of "more and less" [intensity], and could naturally be intensified and remitted; which has never been heard of. The consequence is evident, because for an essence to be intensified is nothing else than for a **total essence** to be made from something arriving and existing naturally in the same place with another of the same nature. Hence a thing is said to be intense which is greater **intensively**; and so it would be in the case proposed.

Or those matters do not constitute one essence in number but remain **numerically distinct**. And if so, if each retains its own substantial form, it follows that in the same primary location there will be **distinct corporeal substances**, composite and naturally subsisting per se, nor will mixture be anything other than an **aggregation of bodies** penetrating each other. Which things are naturally impossible.

To this also applies the reason of the **Commentator** made above regarding the **unity of the composite** against Avicenna.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved)

The **second conclusion**, which is specifically against the **Commentator** [Averroes], is proved evidently by any of the aforesaid reasons, as is clear to one applying them and arguing about those **remaining parts of forms** just as was argued about the forms themselves if they were posited to remain intact.

But specifically he fails in this: that he grants that the **substantial forms** of the elements are intensified and remitted. For thus, not only in mixture but even outside of it, a single element existing by itself could be **substantially remitted** by the action of another. And thus the same fire in number would now be "less fire" than before, just as it can be less hot or rare than before. And again, by the action of a more intense fire, it could be intensified and become "more fire." Which is a great **physical inconvenience**.

Furthermore, since not only those four elements are miscible, but many mixed bodies are also miscible (so that from them another mixed body is generated, as is clear in electuaries and many other things), it follows that those **substantial forms of the miscible mixed bodies** would also be essentially intensifiable and remissible—and consequently not only the forms of the elements, on account of their (as he says) "imperfection and diminution from perfect forms," can be thus remitted.

Furthermore, in a **natural intermediate color**, such as the greenness of fennel or the redness of a rose, or another essentially generated from mixed extremes—which I say to distinguish it from an intermediate color according to **appearance only** (of which it was spoken in the First [Book] where cited above)—the essences of the extreme colors are **not present**, neither fractured nor intact. Therefore, neither are the forms of the elements in a mixed body. The consequence is evident through him, because he says similarly that elements are in the mixed body as extreme colors are in intermediate ones, as was recited. But the antecedent has been sufficiently proved, as I judge, where cited above.

(The Third Conclusion is Proved)

The **third conclusion** is also proved from the reasons of the first conclusion. For if such parts of elementary forms remain, either in some particle of the mixed body there is only a part of the form of **one element**—and then not every part is **homogeneous** to the whole and to the other parts—or in every particle there is not only a part of one form but of **several at once**. And it follows that several matters and substantial composites and bodies naturally subsisting *per se* are at once in the **same primary place**, just as was deduced in the first reason.

Furthermore, since according to this opinion the **form of the mixed body** is not a new form distinct in essence from the miscible forms or from the remaining particles of them, and since none of those particles can naturally desert its own matter while remaining in the nature of things, nor can it together with that matter inform another matter anew—certainly much less than a total and perfect form of its species can, concerning which there is no doubt to anyone, since no one of sound mind would grant that the substantial form of **this fire** demonstrated here could naturally, being the same itself, primarily inform another matter anew—it is necessary that those partial substantial composites, as regards the forms of diverse elements, do not constitute any substance **one per se** except according to continuation or a certain congregation in the same place.

Furthermore, the **third reason** is also evidently applied against this opinion, and all the more evidently because this opinion posits **no other form** in the mixed body. Similarly, the argument of the **Commentator** against Avicenna concerning the **unity of the composite** applies, since this [opinion] can assign no one form to the composite except the unity of contact.

Furthermore, it can be argued specifically against this way concerning those **partial realities** of the elementary form. For either one is the **act** of the other, and thus the substantial form will be essentially composed of its own act and its own potentiality; which this doctor does not wish to grant. And furthermore, it will be a certain substantial composite generable and corruptible *per se*—corruptible indeed when it comes to mixture, but generable when that mixed body is dissolved into elements. For then the reality which was in the mixed body receives its actuality, and then it is a true and **intact fire in act**, and the form of fire is then in act, of which only a part was present before; which is very absurd. Or neither is the act of the other, and then, since they are not of the same nature but **opposite**, and are in the same primary subject, they will not constitute **one form** any more than grammar and music do in the soul, or whiteness and sweetness in milk.

Furthermore, if neither is the act of the other, therefore each immediately informs the matter and constitutes with it a composite one *per se*. And thus from matter and one of those realities results **one composite per se**, and from the same matter and the other reality results a composite of another nature, other at least partially from the first.

This is confirmed because, if by the **power of God** one of those realities informed one portion of matter and the other informed another portion distinct and discrete from the other, there is no doubt that from them and their matters **two composites** of diverse natures would be constituted. And thus it follows that fire and any element is not **one thing**, except by accident, on account of the unity of matter, just as "the musical" and "the grammatical" are one on account of the unity of the subject of music and grammar.

(On the Form of the Mixed Body)

Furthermore, what the opinion says concerning the **form of the mixed body**—namely that it is not other than those parts of the elementary forms but **conflated** from them—is false.

Which is proved **first** by the **Commentator** in **1 On the Soul**, comment 77. For there the **Philosopher** argues against those who posited that the soul is composed of all elements so that it might know all things; among other things, [he argues] that even if it were composed of all elements, it still would not know all things, because it would not know the **composite** made from elements. And the Commentator, declaring this, says: "It happens to them that it does not know the universal **composition of the thing** and that it does not perceive its form; for the form is **over and above** the elements in the composite. It happens therefore that it does not know God or man nor flesh nor bone. For the element is not the essence," that is the form, "nor is it from elements. And this is necessary in all composites." And it follows further: "It is necessary that the essences and forms of things be **superadded** to the elements."

More express words could not be said for the proposed point. Nor do the words alone compel one to intend this, but his proof does, since he infers that "it will not know the universal composition of the thing, etc."

Item, in **Metaphysics 7** at the end, the **Philosopher**, solving the question moved in the third book—namely, whether in the individual substance there is any cause **besides matter** (since, as the Commentator says there in **Metaphysics 3**, comment 2: "The formal cause was known by him alone among the ancients")—solving this, I say, at the end of the seventh in that part "Since indeed the composite is made from something so that the whole is one, but not like a heap, etc.," because those men, positing no **form distinct from matter**, said that these bodies were nothing other than the elements themselves gathered together and proportioned in diverse ways, therefore the Philosopher proves first that besides such elements there is **something else** in the composite, then that that "something else" is not some element, nor something composed of elements. And finally, determining, he concludes: "It will seem, however, that this is something, and an element and a cause of being, this indeed flesh, that indeed a syllable. But similarly in others. The substance, however, of each thing is this; for this is the **primary cause of being**." Where the **Commentator** in the last comment says expressly that in these things there is "something added to the elements" and "that that is not some element," because, as the Philosopher says, besides that and the other elements there would be another element added to them, and one would proceed into infinity; nor even is that added thing "from elements," because also besides those elements from which it is, it would be necessary by the same reason for there to be another added thing. And the Commentator says that "if that were an element, it happens that the other elements have something added, and it is **form**; and if not, nothing would be made here." And it is the same reason as that which he makes against Avicenna, as was had above.

Then expounding the pre-alleged words of the Philosopher "It will seem however etc.," where the conclusion of the determination is: "By this investigation," he says, "it will appear that here is **another substance** from the material elements, which is also an element," that is a part of the composite, "and that it is the first cause, and that it is the cause which is form, and that of one thing it is flesh and of another bone, and of another a syllable, and similarly it must be said in all things of diverse substances, since this is the **first cause of substance**, that is since this substance is the cause which is the **first quiddity**."

From these things it is clearly evident that the Philosopher and Commentator intend that in mixed bodies there is some **substantial form**, which is neither an element nor composed of elements, and it is the form which is a part of the composite. And not as some say "the form of the whole." And this is the **formal cause**, through which the composite itself is this or that, according to species and quiddity.

But against this sense of the authority that doctor argues, because according to this the form of the mixed body will be an **element**, because it itself with the elements will enter the constitution of the composite, and then by the same reason, besides it and the other parts of the composite, it is necessary to posit another element into infinity.

To this it must be said that "element" is taken in **two ways**: In one way commonly for every **intrinsic principle** of a thing; in another way specially for the **intrinsic material principle** or that which is like matter.

In the second way, the Philosopher denies that the added thing is an element, and in the first way he affirms it. Hence he states immediately: "This is not an element, but a **principle**. But an element is that into which a thing existing as matter is divided." And the Commentator, expounding this and at the same time solving the premise objection, says: "For an element is that into which a thing is resolved, and is in

the thing like matter. This, however," namely the form, "is an element and, when the thing is resolved, it is **not resolved into it.**" By which he means that "it is an element but not material." This is also evident from the pre-alleged texts. For the Commentator says: "It will appear that here is another substance from the **material elements,**" he does not say absolutely "from the elements." Item, when he said that "it itself is an element," he expounded "that is, a **part of the composite.**"

Furthermore, if the form of the mixed body were not **other**, as has been said, it follows that **all mixed bodies** would be of the same species and would have operations of the same species; which is manifestly false. The consequence is evident; for they would all have the same intrinsic principles and there would be no difference except in the **proportion and quantity** of the elements themselves, namely because in one mixed body fire would superabound, in another air, and so of the others according to another and another proportion to each other.

And this that doctor also grants. But from it necessarily follows the inferred inconvenience. For, as the **Commentator** says in **3 On the Heavens**, comment 72: "The rule is that from causes whose nature is the same, and which do not differ except according to **more and less**, nothing follows except one nature diverse according to more and less." And again he adds that "causes diverse in quantity have effects diverse in quantity and each is of the same species." And from this he argues against those who said that elements differ from each other on account of proper figures: "Their speech, however," he says, "if it were true, from the diversity of causes according to more and less, namely of causes agreeing in form and essence and diverse according to more and less, a **diversity of effects according to forms** would follow; which is impossible." These are the words of the Commentator.

Unless therefore there is in the mixed body **another substantial form** besides those forms or parts of forms, however you wish to call them, since such things are of the same nature in all mixed bodies, notwithstanding their diverse proportions, **all mixed bodies** from similar elements will be of the same nature.

(The Fourth Conclusion is Proved)

The **fourth conclusion** is proved from the three preceding ones, since, if the forms of the elements do not remain according to the whole nor according to a part, it follows that they are **not in the mixed body according to themselves actually.**

Nevertheless, one reason can be added. I suppose that from **one element precisely** some mixed body can be generated, according to which we call "mixed" any bodies whatsoever besides those first four which are customarily called elements—for example, a **fish from water alone.** And this supposition is evident through **Augustine** in **3 On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis**, chapter 15, regarding small animals, where he says that "it has been observed that certain animals are so born from waters or earth, that they have no sex, and therefore their seed is not in them but in the elements from which they arise."

I take therefore one fish generated, not by propagation but immediately from **water alone.** It is certain that in this there is not the substance of earth or air or fire, neither according to the whole nor according to a part, since none of such things was in the place of the generation of this fish. I ask therefore, whether in it is the **substantial form of water**, or not. If not, then I have some mixed body in which the substantial

form of **no element** is found according to itself or according to any part of itself. And since no experience or reason is had that such elements are in the bodies of other fish or terrestrial animals more than can be had concerning this one, it is not to be said that such elements are in others.

Nor can it be said that the substantial form of water is in it, first indeed, because according to this the water from which it was generated would not be **corrupted**, but would still remain. And if so, the production of this fish was not generation but **alteration only**. For in a similar way the **Philosopher** in **2 On Generation** in that chapter "But nevertheless still and thus we will inspect" proves that none of the elements is the **materia of generable things**. "For if," he says, "it will be air, if indeed it remains, it will be alteration and not generation."

Second, because then that fish will be **water** just as a statue made from wood is wood, because the substance of wood remains. Hence the **Commentator** in the same place: "If" that one element "remains, it happens that that subject thing is in act. If therefore air, all things will be air; if water, all things will be water."

Third, because then there will be generation of some substance *per se* without the **corruption** of another substance; which is not naturally possible.

ARTICLE 2

(Objections of Peter Aureoli)

Now it remains to object against what has been said and to posit reasons for the opposite part.

And **first** indeed it seems that, if the elements are totally corrupted, then **mixture** does not differ from **generation**, contrary to the **Philosopher** in **1 On Generation** saying: "It is manifest however that it ought to differ," namely mixture from generation, "if mixture exists."

Second, it is argued from the definition of an element in **Metaphysics 5**, which is such according to the letter of the comment: "An element is called that from which a thing is composed first and is in it"; where the **Commentator** in comment 4 says: "By this," he says, "that [the Philosopher] said 'and is in it,' that element is excluded which is transmuted when something is generated from it, just as when flesh is generated from blood, then blood will not remain a part of the flesh."

Third thus: "A mixed body according to any **minimal and assignable part** of itself is resolved into four elements, therefore the forms of the elements are in the mixed body. The antecedent is evident; for while wood is burned, it is evident to the sense that it is resolved into certain **fiery** parts, certain **smoky** ones, some indeed **watery**, and some also **ashy**."

Fourth, things are nourished and exist from the same things, and mixed bodies are nourished from all four elements; therefore they are also **from the elements**.

Fifth, "mixture is not **corruption simply** of the miscible things themselves," as is clear in **1 On Generation**. But if the forms of the miscible things remained neither according to the whole nor according to a part "in the mixed body, mixture would be corruption simply of the miscible things; therefore etc." This is confirmed by the **Philosopher** who says that "a drop of wine is not mixed with ten thousand amphoras of water; for the species is dissolved." Behold that the reason why it is not mixed is because it is **corrupted**. From which it follows that things which are mixed are not corrupted.

Besides these reasons, the third opinion holder adduces one other more appropriated to his way of speaking, and says it is of the **Philosopher** in **Metaphysics 7** at the end. He argues however thus: "Just as **A and B** relate to this syllable **BA**, so do the elements to the form of the mixed body, for instance to the form of flesh." But B and A so relate to that syllable BA that the sound of neither is **perfectly preserved** in that syllable, nor even any particle retaining the proper nature of its sound. And yet some **particle of each** is preserved in it, as is evident to the sense, therefore etc. And these are taken precisely as they are spoken, not written. The major is proved: "Because that sound BA is **one quality**," since it is one syllable, just as the form of a mixed body, as for example of a stone, is one form.

(Reply to the Objections of Peter Aureoli)

I Respond. To the **first** I say that **mixture** can be taken in three ways, and similarly the mixed body. For to the generation of some mixed body many transmutations concur, since first the miscible things are **divided** into parts, and those are gathered together and juxtaposed. Then they are mutually **altered** and made continuous. Finally they are **corrupted**, and a new substance is generated. Therefore mixture can be taken in the **first way** for the congregation and juxtaposition of the miscible parts precisely, and such mixture is not generation. **Second** for the alteration of the miscible things and their union and continuation, and neither is this generation simply, properly speaking. In the **third way** it can be taken for the **generation following** the aforesaid mixtures. And thus it is properly generation, yet it differs from generation in common, because not every generation presupposes such prior mixtures; and therefore not every generation is mixture, but every mixture so called is generation.

To the **second** I say that neither fire nor any of the other three bodies is an element of any substance which is one *per se*, according to that **definition of element**. But thus only the **intrinsic causes** of a thing, namely matter and form, are its elements. And if it is contracted even further to that into which a thing is also resolved, only the **matter** of the thing is an element to it. And these things are evident through the **Commentator** in the same place.

And if it is asked, why therefore are those **four first bodies** called elements with respect to others, I say that it is because either from them, previously altered and mixed and finally corrupted, others are **immediately generated**, or from those things which are immediately generated from them, although not all other bodies thus generated are from them. And therefore not of all things are they truly called elements even in this sense, but of many.

To the **third** I deny the antecedent. To the proof I say that neither are those **watery** parts water which is called elementary, nor are those **ashes** earth, nor are those **fumes** air. And therefore it is resolved into none of the three elements. Nor is it even resolved into fire, but fire is **generated** from it. How, however, fire can generate ashes or smoke from wood is another question, not pertaining to the proposed point.

To the **fourth** I say first that **not all mixed bodies** are nourished. This is evident concerning stones and metals. Item, not all things which are nourished are nourished from fire, earth and air and water, but certain ones from other bodies, certain ones from some one or several of these. Second I say that it is not to be understood that those things which are nourished are **from those things** from which they are nourished, as if those things from which they are nourished entered the constitution of the nourished things according to their **forms**. Otherwise men would consist essentially of wine and bread and herbs and innumerable other things which they assume for food, but because those things are **converted** into the substances of the nourished things, and from similar things, yet with many intervening transmutations, they were generated. Hence it is clear that the argument is of no efficacy.

To the **fifth** it must be said that neither in mixture taken in the **first way** nor even in that taken in the **second way** are the miscible things corrupted simply, but they are essentially in such a mixed body or aggregate. But the question does not turn on the mixed body in this way, but on the mixed body by the **third mixture**. And in such, certainly, the miscible things are **corrupted simply**.

But if they are said not to be corrupted or to remain, it is said improperly, yet truly according to the sense of the **Philosopher**, who therefore says they are not corrupted totally because that which is generated from them and remains is a **medium** between them, not by participation but by agreement. For it agrees in proper qualities with the miscible things themselves more than they do among themselves, and consequently also in the form which such qualities follow.

Similarly also in the operations arising from those qualities. And because it can through its qualities [act] in operations similar in some way, therefore it is said to **contain them in power**, and also in this their power is said to be preserved. And this is the intention of the Philosopher, as is clear through his own exposition. For he says: "They do not remain therefore in act like a white body, nor are they corrupted, neither one nor both." And in what sense he says they are not corrupted he immediately shows, saying: "For their **power is preserved**." Behold that therefore they are said not to be corrupted because their power is preserved, not because **they themselves** are preserved. Otherwise he would contradict the first part of the authority.

To the confirmation it must be said that not therefore precisely is that drop not mixed with the water because it is corrupted, but because it is also **converted into water**. For in true mixture none of the miscible things remains nor is one converted into another, but all are corrupted and converted into a certain **common medium**. And this is clear from the text, if the authority is alleged completely. For he says: "For the species is dissolved and is transmuted into all water." And again it follows immediately to the purpose: "When however they are equal in powers, then each is transmuted into the dominant one from its own nature, but neither of them is generated, but a **medium**."

To the **last** I say first that the Philosopher does not posit that major premise neither in one translation nor in another; hence it is falsely alleged. Second I say that it, taken universally, or even as regards the proposed point, is **false**; and the proof is invalid since it is from two affirmatives and in the second figure. Third I say that the Philosopher there does not discuss whether the elements are in the mixed body or not, nor from his principal intention does he treat specifically there of the form of the mixed body, but as is clear through the **Commentator** near the beginning of the comment, and as was said above, the Philosopher principally intends to prove that in things there is, besides matter, **another cause** which is

form. For the sake of example, however, he speaks specially of the form of the mixed body which the ancients did not posit to be distinct from the elements themselves, and he proves that it is indeed **something other** from them, nor composed from them, as is clear above.

On account of which the Philosopher is wholly opposed to the intention of this opiner, nor is he contrary to the premised conclusions, because he does not say nor intend that the elements are in the mixed body, but only that, **even if they were**, still besides them it would be necessary to posit the form of the mixed body. And according to this his reason there concerning dissolution proceeds directly.

Although, however, that major premise cannot be had in that place from the Philosopher, yet it seems to be posited by the **Commentator**. But it is not a wonder, since he expressly posits that the elements remain in the mixed body, as is clear above. And in this **he errs**, nevertheless however even he is against the intention of the opiner, as is clear from what has been said.

(Reply to the Reasons of the Commentator)

Now it must be responded to one reason of the **Commentator** made above, namely that by which he infers that, if **substantial forms** were corrupted, **matter** would immediately receive all forms. It must be said to this that, if that **immediation** is understood in **perfecting** and in **being**, matter receives every substantial form immediately, and not one by means of another. Otherwise the second would not be substantial nor would the transmutation terminated at it be generation but **accidental alteration**, as is evident through his other reason, which he makes there and was recited above.

But if it is understood concerning **immediation** in **transmuting**, thus it is true that matter existing under one form is not transmuted into any whatsoever immediately, nor however is it always transmuted first into the form of some of those **four bodies**, just as if bread is converted into flesh, its matter is not first transmuted into fire or water or another of the remaining two, but into **food moisture**, and afterwards into flesh. Nor does the opposite of this follow from the fact that elements are **substantially corrupted**.

To his other reasons it is not necessary to respond, because they conclude the truth, although the third [does so] by an **invalid means**. For according to that it would follow that the **proper quality** of none of the first bodies, and certainly also of others, could be remitted in any way, without the **substantial form** being remitted at the same time; which is manifestly false.

Nor is his proof valid, since the judgment of the **whole and the part** is not always the same as regards all things. For it is not the case that if remaining water or air can be deprived of some part of its **diaphaneity**, it can similarly lack diaphaneity totally. Nor if it is possible for one part of the earth to be corrupted, is it possible that the whole be corrupted at once naturally. And so it could be verified of many others, that the judgment of the whole and the part is not always the same, and especially in respect to a **third thing**.

To the **first reason** of the question it must be said that, if we speak of a mixed body **truly generated**, that ought not to be understood to be mixed through **essence** but through **agreement** and **equivalence** or **virtual continence**, as was said above.

To that **definition** it could be said that it is understood concerning mixture of the **second mode**, but not of the third. It can also, as **one doctor** says, be taken as said of the third [mode], and then "mixture is the

union of altered miscible things" ought to be expounded: **Union**, I say, in one **common intermediate and agreeing effect**. But also otherwise and not less well, as I think, it must be said that it is called union because it **presupposes** such a union, so that that predication is not understood to be through essence, but **concomitance**.

However, it must be noted that not everything which we call mixed presupposes such a mixture, as is evident above. And therefore not every mixed body is called mixed on account of such mixture, but on account of its **agreement and equivalence**, as has been said.

To the **second reason** it must be said that **all [elements] are corrupted** and that besides them there is another **extrinsic [agent]** corrupting and inducing the form of the mixed body, whether it be some power existing in the container or some heat or something else. And this is sufficiently evident in the mixture of **theriac** and other electuaries. For besides all those miscible things, the action of **fire** or of the immediately hot container is necessary.

DISTINCTION 16 and 17

QUESTION 1

WHETHER it can be evidently proved that the soul according to which man is to the image of God, that is, the intellectual soul, is the substantial form of man.

Regarding Distinctions 16 and 17 following, in which the **Master** treats of the creation of man regarding the soul (according to which he says he was made to the image of God) and regarding the body, I ask first: whether it can be evidently proved that the soul according to which man is to the image of God, that is, the **intellectual soul**, is the **substantial form** of man.

And it is argued that **no**: Because the intellectual soul is not the substantial form of man, therefore it cannot be evidently proved, etc. The antecedent is proved, since **no form separated** from matter is the substantial form of man. The intellectual soul is of this kind, therefore etc. The major is evident, because man is something one *per se*, therefore the substantial form of man is the **act of matter**, which is the other part of him. For this is the whole cause why some composite is one *per se*, namely because this indeed is its **potentiality**, and that is the **act** of this potentiality, as can be had from **Metaphysics 8**. The minor is evident through the **Philosopher** in **3 On the Soul** saying that "the rationale is that the intellect is not mixed with the body," or according to another letter, "so that it is not mixed with the body."

Second, the same antecedent is proved thus: The **intellect** is **one in number** for all men. Therefore the intellectual soul is not the substantial form of man. The antecedent is evident through **Averroes**, who attempts to show this by many reasons in **3 On the Soul**. The consequence is proved. For either the intellect is nothing other than the intellectual soul itself, or it is an accident of it; and whichever is granted, there cannot be one intellect for all unless there is also **one soul for all**. But it is impossible that one soul in number be the substantial form of all men, because then there would not be **many men essentially**, just as [there are not] two other individual substances of the same species which are distinguished by both forms and matters.

On the contrary, it is argued thus: It can be evidently proved that the **proper and ultimate end** of man is the operation of the intellectual soul. Therefore it can be evidently proved that the intellectual soul is the **substantial form** of man. The antecedent is evident enough from **Ethics 1 and 10**. The consequence is proved, since it is evident that the diversity of proper ends in things is from the diversity of their **specific and substantial forms**.

I Respond. Here there will be two articles: In the **first**, it will be inquired whether it can be evidently proved that the intellectual soul is the substantial form of man. In the **second**, whether the intellect is the same in number for all men, or whether for each one there is some **proper intellect**.

ARTICLE 1

As to the first, I premise that by the **substantial form of man** I understand the **intrinsic principle** distinct from matter, by which man is man, just as by substantial form generally we understand that part of the composite according to which it is "this something," as the **Philosopher** says in **2 On the Soul** at the beginning. By the **intellectual soul**, however, I understand that by which man **primarily understands**.

(The Error of Averroes) These things being premised, it must be known that here was the error of **Averroes the Commentator**, who, as is clear in **3 On the Soul**, opined that the intellect is a certain substance **abstract per se**, which is not united to man from the beginning of his being (or when he is first a man), but when he is in the **years of discretion**. For then in a certain way it is coupled to him and made continuous, so that through it he can understand. And therefore in **3 On the Soul**, comment 5, he says that for a boy the **material intellect** is continuous in potentiality only. And below in comment 36, after he posited the mode in which he opined the intellect is coupled to man, he says: "Now therefore we have found the mode according to which it is possible that this intellect be **continued with us** in the end, and the cause why it is not coupled with us in the beginning." And below: "It is manifest," he says, "from this why we are not continued with this intellect in the beginning, but in the end: Because, while it is in potentiality in us, it will be continued with us in **potentiality**; and it is impossible that we understand anything through it unless when it is made a **form in us in act**, and this will be upon its continuation in act."

Since, therefore, a boy is truly a man and of the same nature as an adult, and the same adult is the selfsame in number and species who was the boy, if the boy is not a man **through the intellect**, it follows that **no man** is a man through the intellect, and consequently that the intellect or that substance through which he understands is not the **substantial form** of man, as we speak of form in the proposed matter. But, if it be called a form, it will be called so **equivocally**, namely not taking form for a **constitutive principle**, but for an **operative principle** only. And therefore certain men following the Commentator say that the intellect is a form not indeed giving being and constituting in the first act, but **giving operation**. And on account of this the Commentator himself in **2 On the Soul**, comment 7, and in book 3, comment 5, says that **perfection** and **act** are said of the rational soul or intellect and the other parts of the soul in an **equivocal mode**.

Regarding the mode, however, of the "continuation of the intellect with man" according to the Commentator, it must be known that, just as the **possible intellect** (which he calls "material") is a certain abstract substance, pure potentiality in the genus of intelligibles and which is "to become all things," so there is a certain other abstract substance which is "powerful to make all things" in the genus of intelligibles, that is, to reduce the possible intellect to act with respect to whatever it is in potentiality to. And this he calls the **agent intellect**. To this agent, however, man is continued when, through **imagined intentions**, he concurs with the agent intellect to cause an **intention** in the possible intellect. Therefore, the agent intellect causes such an intention and the possible receives it. And such "causing" of the agent intellect the Commentator calls **abstracting** and causing things understood in act. The "receiving" of the possible intellect he calls **understanding**. All these things can be had in **3 On the Soul**, comments 18 and 36.

(Against Averroes by a Triple Way) This opinion, in my judgment, is a **great error** not only in theology, but also in philosophy. And because the Commentator implies in diverse places that the **Philosopher** was of the same sentence, therefore **first** I will show the opposite from the sayings of the Philosopher; **secondly** I will prove this same thing by **evident reason**; and **thirdly** I will argue specially against the Commentator's way of speaking concerning the **continuation** of the intellect with us.

(Against Averroes from the Sayings of Aristotle, First) That the **Philosopher** felt the intellective soul to be the **substantial form** of man is evident first, because according to him the intellective soul is a **substance** and is an **act**, or according to another letter, a "perfection of the body." Therefore it is the substantial form of some composite which through it is "this or that" according to species. And further: Therefore it is the substantial form through which man is man.

The antecedent is evident according to the **Philosopher** in **2 On the Soul** at the beginning, where he proposes that he wishes to give a **most common definition** concerning the soul. And immediately, supposing from a common conception that the soul is a **substance** (because we all opine substance to be nobler than an accident, and the soul [nobler] than all accidents, as the **Commentator** says there in comment 2), he posits a distinction of substance into matter and form and composite. And **form** he calls "according to which it is now **this something**." And afterwards he adds: "Matter indeed is potentiality, but species is **entelechy**," that is, act. And a little later, taking act in this way, he concludes the definition of the soul, that it "is the **act of a body** etc." From these things it is clear that he speaks properly of form and act, namely **constitutively** and that which is a principle of being and not of operating only. And because according to him this definition is common to **every soul**, therefore the intellective [soul] according to him is truly the form of the body.

The consequence is evident, both from the definition of the "nominal meaning" of form which he premised, and from the difference between substantial and accidental forms. For through a **substantial** [form] the composite is "this or that" according to species, and therefore it gives the **name and definition**; not so the accidental. It is evident, since the composite of the intellective soul and the body is that which we call **man**.

(Response of the Commentator) To this reason the **Commentator** responds in **2 On the Soul**, comment 7, saying that Aristotle does not assert this definition to be common to every soul, but speaks **conditionally**: that *if* any is common, this is it, in which it is said that it is the act of a body etc. Hence the words of the **Philosopher** are: "If, however, it is necessary to say something common in every soul, it will be the **first act of a physical organic body**."

This is confirmed more evidently. For afterwards, definitions having been given of the soul in common, the **Philosopher** says in chapter 2: "Concerning the **intellect** and the perspective power nothing is yet manifest, but it seems to be **another genus** of soul." From which words it is clear that the **Philosopher** does not intend that common definition to be [applied] also to the intellect; indeed he implies the opposite by this that he adds: "But it seems to be another genus of soul." "And therefore," the **Commentator** says there in comment 21, "from the aforesaid speech it was not manifest whether the intellect is a **perfection** or not." And below he says that "if the intellect is called a soul, this will be according to **equivocation**." And in book 3, comment 5, from these words of the **Philosopher** he concludes that according to the **Philosopher** the intellect is not the perfection of the body; or if it is, it is in **another mode** than the other powers of the soul and equivocally to them.

(Against the Response of the Commentator) These things do not remove the aforesaid reason. Not indeed the **first**, since, although the **Philosopher** speaks conditionally there, nevertheless the antecedent of that conditional he himself asserted in the beginning of the chapter, as was said above. Again, a little after those words "If however something common etc.," he adds: "**Universally** indeed, therefore, it has been said what the soul is"; and another letter has: "Now therefore we have said what the soul is universally."

Furthermore, the **Philosopher** in the following chapter proves that the soul is the act of the body and a form, because it is "that by which we live, sense, move and **understand primarily**." And it is not "that by which we live or sense etc." as matter, therefore as **form**. And thus he speaks of the intellective [soul], as is evident, just as of the others, since among other actions proper to animate things he posits **understanding** also many times in that chapter.

Item, in the following chapter, namely "Of the Powers of the Soul," he wills that, just as for figures there is one common definition suitable to every species of figure and proper to none, so also for the soul there ought to be one **common definition** suitable to each of its parts—among which he expressly names the **intellect**—which definition is proper to none of them [individually]. And he says that such a common definition is that which he gave, namely that it "is the act of a body etc." And, as he himself says and the **Commentator** himself also in comment 30 [agrees], one wishing to give a common definition of the soul and dismissing the aforesaid would be **derided**.

From all these things it is manifestly clear that the **Philosopher** willed that definition to belong to the **intellective soul** just as to the others.

The second saying also does not remove the aforesaid reason, since the **Philosopher**, when he says that "concerning the intellect nothing is yet manifest," refers his word to one doubt which he immediately premised, namely **whether each of the parts of the soul is separable**. Which doubt—concerning whatever separation it is understood according to the diverse expositions given of this—had not yet been declared by the **Philosopher** concerning the intellect, whether it was separable. Concerning certain other

parts of the soul, however, he says that "it is manifest that they are **not separable**," as he immediately adds and also declared before.

Therefore, from that definition which the Philosopher wills to be common to every soul, it is held that the **intellect is the act of the body**, although it had not yet been declared whether it was a **separable act**.

(Against Averroes from the Sayings of Aristotle, Second) Second, the same is proved principally from the difference which the **Philosopher** himself gives in **Metaphysics 12** between **agent** and **formal** causes. For he says that the agent cause precedes that of which it is the cause; but no **formal cause** precedes the thing of which it is the formal cause, but is **simultaneous** with it. "For when," he says, "a man is healed, then there is health; and the figure of a bronze sphere is simultaneous with the bronze sphere." And the **Commentator** also there in comment 16 expounding: "The agent cause," he says, "differs from the formal, because the agent and mover precedes that which is acted upon and moved by it; but the **formal and material** is with the generation."

But there is a doubt according to the Philosopher, whether any such cause, namely formal, remains **after the corruption** of the composite. "If however," says the **Philosopher**, "something also remains afterwards, it must be investigated. For in certain things nothing prohibits that if the soul is such," namely remaining afterwards, "not all but the **intellect**. For [to say] all is perhaps impossible."

From these things it is clear that the Philosopher opined the **intellective soul** to be the **formal cause** of something. Otherwise there would be no doubt whether any formal cause remains afterwards. But if it is a formal cause, it follows that it is a **form giving being**; for thus he accepts the formal cause there.

This is also confirmed from the exposition of the comment. For where our letter has "those however as reason, are simultaneous," the letter of the comment has "those however which are **universals**, are simultaneous." And the **Commentator** expounds: That is, "the causes through which a thing becomes 'all' and 'one'"—or as some books have "through which it becomes 'being' and 'one'"—"are with that, which becomes a whole through them, simultaneously, since they have such a disposition in the aggregate as **parts in the whole**."

Thus therefore the intellect is the **formal cause** of some composite which through it as through a form is "this or that." Such a composite, however, is what is called **man**, therefore etc.

(Against Averroes by Reason) Now **secondly** I prove by reason that the **intellective soul** is the **substantial form** of man. And it is a common argument which is taken from the **Philosopher** in **2 On the Soul**. I argue thus: Man **understands**, and not by himself primarily, nor through his **matter** primarily; therefore through his **form** primarily he understands. And further, therefore the intellective soul is the form of man. But not accidental, therefore **substantial**.

The **first part** of the antecedent is known by experience. For any man experiences himself to understand. The **second part** and the **third** also are clear, since matter of the same nature is also in things lacking cognition naturally.

The **first consequence** is also evident, because every operation belonging to any composite belongs to it either precisely through its matter or through its form precisely, or through both, since besides this there is

nothing of it. Otherwise it belongs to it no more than to any other. The **second consequence** is known from the "nominal meaning" of the intellective soul premised above. The **minor** of the prosyllogism is proved, because the form through which man primarily understands is not in man accidentally; otherwise he would be powerful to understand not *per se*, but accidentally. Nor even is it an accident following him *per se*, because every such thing follows him by reason of something which is of the **essence of man**. If therefore that by which man primarily understands were an accident of man, it would not now be that by which he **primarily** understands, but that [essence] by reason of which it belongs to man. Hence, whether the immediate principle of understanding is a substance or an accident, the **first and principal** [principle] is a substance.

(Response on Behalf of Averroes)

To this reason it is said by the defenders of the **Commentator Averroes** that form is twofold: One kind **giving being and operation**, another **giving operation only**.

Secondly, they distinguish concerning **man**. For in one way man is taken for some **essence one *per se***, and thus he is a certain essence composed of the body as matter, and the **cogitative soul** as his specific form—which also sometimes, as they say, is called by Aristotle **intellect** and **reason**, and some doctors also call it **particular reason**, because it, as the **Commentator** says, receives particular intentions only and discourses in them. In another way man is taken for a certain **aggregate** of man taken in the first way and the **intellective soul** or intellect conjoined to him. And thus he is not one *per se*, although he is in some way one more than by aggregation simply speaking, on account of the natural union and inclination which his parts have to each other.

Thirdly, they distinguish concerning **understanding**. For there is a certain understanding **particular**, and that is the operation of the cogitative [soul]; and there is a certain understanding **universal**, and that is the proper operation of the **intellective soul** or intellect properly taken.

From these distinctions, the form of the reason can be answered. For when it is said that man understands, if "understanding" is taken in the **second way** [universally], it is true of man taken in the **second way** [as an aggregate], but not of man taken in the first way. And further it is granted that he understands through his form appropriated and **giving operation only**, but not through any form giving him being, because neither is man thus taken something one *per se*. If, however, "understanding" is taken in the **first way** (namely particularly), it is true of man taken in the **first way** [as a *per se* unity]. And further it is granted that he understands through his form, which certainly is the **cogitative soul**.

(Against the Response on Behalf of Averroes)

This response fails, **first** in this: that it posits some form to **give operation** which **does not give being**. For it is not possible that any thing operate through something as through a principle of operating, without having being through it in some way. Just as it is impossible that something heat through some heat, unless it is **hot** through it. Hence if some heat were separated nor inhered in anything, however proximate it might be to something or undistand, nevertheless that thing would not heat through that heat, even if that heat heated something else—as would happen if it had a proximate heatable object, as the **Commentator** also grants in **1 On Generation**.

And thus generally, through no form can something act unless it **has being** through it. Otherwise in a similar way it could be said that a garment senses because the clothed animal senses, and that the body in which an angel is located understands because the angel understands. Which is nothing.

This is confirmed from the intention of the **Philosopher** in **2 On the Soul**, where he says that the **first act** is prior to the second act, and that the second is in something because the first is in it. Hence he says: "For in **existing** is the soul, and sleep and waking [are in it]."

Second, if this were true, it would follow that through no operation of any animal could it be convinced that its soul was a form giving it being. For the adversary will always say that that soul gives it **operation only**, and gives no being nor constitutes it in specific being.

Furthermore, let such defenders of Averroes tell me how the master of their master, namely the **Philosopher**, proves that the soul is the **act of the body**, if it can give operation without giving being. For just as you say that the intellective soul gives operation only and is not the act of the body, so I will say to you that the **sensitive soul of a lion** and even the motive [soul] gives it operation only, nor is it its act. For I am certain that the opposite of this is no more evident than that of the other, and thus, as was touched upon before, concerning **no soul** will it be sufficiently proved that it is the act of the body informing and giving being to the composite.

Thirdly, the solution fails in what it consequently posits concerning that "man aggregate" etc., first indeed because it follows that **not the same man** himself who understands particularly understands universally, nor conversely. The consequence is evident, because no aggregate is its own part. But the man understanding particularly according to this solution is a **part** of the aggregate man who understands universally. But the consequent is contrary to manifest experience. For I experience that **I myself**, who understand particularly, understand universally. And so I think that Averroes himself experienced, and anyone can experience who knows how to discern between understanding universally and understanding particularly.

You will say that I, experiencing myself to understand both universally and particularly, am the **aggregate man**; and through one part of me, namely through the man one *per se*, I experience myself to understand particularly, and through another part, namely the **intellect**, I experience myself to understand universally.

Against this. First, because that some **aggregate** experiences itself to operate something is most improperly said. Otherwise it could be said that an assembly or people experiences itself to operate what one of the assembly or people operates, and that the Universe or world experiences itself to know future things because God knows future things; which no one would say.

Second, some man **one per se** in the human species can understand particularly through a form giving him being, as the solution grants; therefore some man one *per se* through a form giving him being can understand universally. The consequence is evident, since whoever understands universally so experiences himself to understand when he understands, and so [experiences] to have such operation in his power, just as someone experiencing himself to understand particularly experiences himself to understand thus, and to have such operation in his own power. And consequently this operation is thus from a form **giving being** to the understander and thus **intimate** to him just as is the form from which that

[particular understanding] is; and thus that understander is **one *per se* man**, just as this one is. Or if it is contentiously denied of this one, it can equally be denied of that one and said that neither does the **cogitative soul** constitute anything one *per se*, just as neither the intellective. Nor will the opposite ever be proved unless it be proved equally strongly or stronger of the intellective, since this intellection appears more proper to man or at least not less.

(Against Averroes, On the Continuation of the Possible Intellect)

Consequently I argue against the **Commentator's** way of speaking concerning the **continuation of the intellect**; and first concerning the continuation of the **possible intellect**. For he says that it is continued to us through **suffering or receiving**, namely because it receives an **intention** from the imaginative species which is in man.

If indeed it were continued to man precisely in such a way, it would follow that neither man taken in the first way nor man taken in the second way (namely for the aggregate) would understand; the opposite of which he strives to save through such continuation. The consequence is declared, because if he understood precisely through such continuation, by the same reason a **colored wall** or an aggregate of the wall and sight would see; which no one would say unless he wholly lacked the sight of the mind. The consequence is evident, because the color existing in the wall causes vision in the sight, and the sight receives from it.

Furthermore, prior in time or nature or cause the operator has the **principle of operating** than he operates through it. For "we receive the powers first, then we render the operations," as is said in **Ethics 2**. Therefore in some way man has the intellect **before** he understands through it, therefore also before the intellect receives the intellection. And consequently before that reception the intellect is in some way **united** to man. Or if not, it follows that man does not understand through it.

Furthermore, if some boy were carried outside the company of men to an uninhabited and very distant place, it is certain that coming to perfect age he would understand something and naturally know some truths which cannot be apprehended except through the intellect. Therefore according to this way his **imaginative species** would cause an intention in the possible intellect. And because no natural power can act on a non-existent or indefinitely distant thing by true action whether corporeal or spiritual, it follows that either then a new intellect is **created** there—which even the Commentator would not grant—or that that intellect previously existing approaches there from elsewhere—which appears said without reason—or that it was **previously there**. And this either spontaneously only; which is not to be said, otherwise it could have been absent and not arrived, and consequently it was in his power that that boy never understand. Or it was naturally **present and proximate** to that boy; and then concerning such natural conjunction it must be asked, of what kind it is. Nor does another appear than the conjunction of **form to matter**.

Nor is it valid to say that a **spiritual substance** is locally near or distant to none, since, although it is not circumscriptively or dimensionally anywhere, nevertheless neither the **Philosopher** nor the **Commentator** denies that it is definitively somewhere so that it is not everywhere. Hence they say the celestial mover is **determinately** in the circumference of the sphere at the eastern part.

Furthermore, upon that word of the **Philosopher** in **3 On the Soul** "He however who is in potentiality, is prior in time in one" or according to another letter "is in the individual," the **Commentator** says expounding in comment 20: "For according to our opinion and that of **Themistius**, the intellect which is in potentiality is continued to us **sooner** than the agent intellect."

And it is necessary that he understand concerning priority even of **time**, otherwise he would not expound the text. Therefore he must say that the possible intellect is continued to this demonstrated man **sooner** than it receives anything from his phantasm. And consequently the Commentator must assign another **prior continuation**.

The first consequence is proved, because the possible intellect does not receive sooner than the agent abstracts. Indeed he himself says in comment 18 that "the intellect which is to abstract the intellect [concept] and create it, is necessary to **precede** in us the intellect which is to receive it." And in comment 36: "This action," he says, "namely to create things understood and make them, is **prior in us** than the action which is to understand." Therefore the agent intellect is continued to man sooner (at least causally) than the possible receives anything from his phantasm. And consequently the possible itself is continued **sooner** than it receives.

(Against Averroes, On the Continuation of the Agent Intellect)

Secondly I argue against the continuation of the **agent intellect** with man. For either it must be understood precisely according to **contact or local simultaneity**, or according to **virtual contact** which is through the action of one on the other, or through a certain **concurrence** in causing the same common effect, or through **true information**. For no other mode naturally possible appears by which a spiritual substance can be conceived to be continued with man.

But the **first** cannot be said, as was said above concerning the possible intellect. Nor the **second**, because according to the Commentator neither does the phantasm act anything on the agent intellect (since it is not in potentiality), nor conversely does the agent intellect act anything on the phantasm, as is evident through the same in **3 On the Soul** comment 5 against **Avempace**. Nor the **third**, which nevertheless could be drawn more from his sayings, because then the agent intellect would be united to man no more than **light** existing in a medium [is united] to a colored body; for they concur simultaneously and undividedly to causing vision just as the phantasm with the agent intellect to causing the species or intellection. Furthermore, if two partial agents con-cause, not from this is one thus called the **form** of the other, or of the aggregate of them; nor is the aggregate or the other part called to act through the other, just as through its form, and yet man is said to act through the agent intellect just as through a **proper form** according to the **Commentator** in **3 On the Soul**, comment 36.

Thus therefore it is clear that such a mode of continuation or union of the intellect with man **does not suffice** to save that man can understand just as he experiences himself to understand, and it is necessary to posit, as far as from those things which we naturally comprehend, that the **intellective soul** is truly the **form** through which man is man.

Nor does it stand in the way what certain theologians bring up concerning **Christ**, who certainly through the **Deity** understands and knows all things, and yet the Deity is not a form informing Christ's humanity;

because, although the Deity does not thus inform the humanity, nevertheless, although in a mode incomprehensible to us, with the humanity itself it constitutes **one suppositum** as one *per se* as any created suppositum, and thus truly that blessed constituted [being], which is called Christ, is **God** through the Deity, just as some animal is truly an animal through its soul. But in the proposed case according to the way of the Commentator it cannot be saved that man is thus one, or that he is man through the intellective soul, nor through any other way naturally comprehensible to us, unless it be posited that the **intellective soul informs the human body**, although in many conditions differently from other forms.

(Objections)

Against this conclusion it is argued in many ways, **first** thus: "Every receiver must be **denuded** of the specific nature of the received." But our intellect is receptive of all material forms; therefore it is denuded of the nature of every material form, and further, therefore it is **not a material form**. The major is evident: Both because otherwise the same would be receptive of itself and would be mover and moved; and through induction, for sight receiving color must lack color, and hearing receiving sound must lack sound. The **Philosopher** implies this reason in **3 On the Soul** when he says: "It is necessary therefore, since it understands all things, to be **unmixed**." And thus the **Commentator** forms it there in comments 4 and 19.

Second, if the intellect were the form of the body, it would follow that it would be a **complexional form** or added to the complexion, and consequently an **organic power**. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved, since, as the **Commentator** says, "every power in a composite body either is attributed to the first qualities, namely to the form of the complexion, or will be a power existing in the complexional form, and thus necessarily the soul will be organic." The **Philosopher** also implies this in that part "Hence neither is it mixed" and the **Commentator** there in comment 6.

Third, then the intellect would be **transmuted** by its object, and consequently in understanding it would be weakened, and similarly by an excellent object it would be **corrupted**; which is false. The consequence is proved, because every power received in a body is transmuted, according as its receiver, namely the body, is transmuted. And he posits this in comment 7.

Fourth, no power judging **infinite** and also universal things is the form of a body. The intellect is of this kind; for "we judge through it," as the **Commentator** says, "infinite things in a universal proposition." Therefore etc. The major is evident, because every mixed power judges individually and finite things only, as is evident inductively. And he posits this in comment 19.

Fifth, by others it is argued thus: Every form of a body is **extended** with the extension of the body; the intellect is not extended, therefore etc. The major is proved first, because perfection and perfectible are **correlatives**; but one of the correlatives being multiplied, the remainder is multiplied. Therefore if the perfectible has parts, the perfection also will have corresponding parts. Second, because everything which belongs to the whole *per se*, necessarily belongs to every part at least secondarily; but being extended belongs *per se* to man just as to every other animal, therefore etc. Third from the intention of the **Philosopher** in **Physics 8**; for there he proves that the first mover is not a power in a magnitude, because then a part of the power would move a part of the mobile in finite time etc., where he supposes as a necessary consequence that it would have part and part according to extension. And the **Commentator**

will be the same there in comment 78. Hence he derides those who reprove Aristotle in this that he takes a part of the power in arguing, since that is indivisible. For, as he says, "**divisibility** belongs to every form in a body"; wherefore that power, if it will be in matter, will be divisible.

This is confirmed. For either the soul would come to matter by means of **quantity**, and then necessarily it would be extended because it would be received in a quantum; and "everything which is received, is received according to the mode of the receiver." Or it would come immediately to matter, and then it follows that quantity comes to the **total composite** of matter and intellective soul; and then more strongly the same follows, because everything informed by quantity must be a quantum, and consequently extended.

Sixth, every form which is the perfection of matter is **educed from the potency of matter**; the intellective soul is not educed from the potency of matter, because according to theologians it is **created** and according to philosophers it comes to the body from outside. The major is proved, because to be educed from the potency of matter is nothing else than for the imperfect to be led to perfect being, and the perfectible to act.

Seventh, every form of a body is **corruptible** at the corruption of the composite. The intellective soul is not corruptible, therefore etc. The major is proved, because at the corruption of the composite it is necessary that some **intrinsic principle** of it cease to be; otherwise, if every intrinsic principle remained, its total essence would remain and through this it itself [would remain], and thus it would not be corrupted. But it is certain that the matter of man is not corrupted, therefore the form [is].

Eighth, every form of a body communicates to the body its **formal effect**. For vision, because it is the perfection of the eye, communicates to it its formal effect, and therefore this is true "the eye sees." And whiteness communicates to the body to be white, and so it is evident in all things inductively. But the intellect **does not communicate** to the body its formal effect. For this is not true "the body understands"; therefore etc.

This is confirmed, because that whose **operation** is abstract and divided from the body, is not the form of the body. But "to understand" is abstract from the body; for the body does not understand, therefore etc. The major is proved, because an accident cannot be **more abstract** than its subject. Hence the **Philosopher in Physics 3** against the ancients positing the infinite separated from the senses argues this to be impossible by this, since a passion and accident is not more separated than its subject. But the subject of the infinite is number or magnitude which are not separated. The **Commentator** [says] the same there in comment 36.

(To the Objections)

To the **first**, "every receiver etc.," I say that that proposition can have a **double sense** according as "received" can be taken in two ways, namely for that which is **formally** received in another as in a subject, in another way for that received **objectively** just as a power is said to receive its object.

If in the **first way**, still "the receiver to be denuded of the nature of the species of the received itself" can be understood in two ways: In one way, that the receiver itself be not of the **same specific nature** with the

received itself; and in this sense the proposition can be granted, and the minor is to be denied; for the intellect does not formally receive in itself every material form. In another way, that the receiver itself not have in itself **anything** of the same species with the received; and thus the proposition is **false**. The instance is clear in a **medium** which indeed having in itself one species of color, can still with that receive another of the same nature.

But if it is understood concerning the received **objectively**, as the **Commentator** seems more to understand (through the proof which he adds deducing to this that the same will be mover and moved), I also **deny** the proposition. For not only the same in species, but the **same in number** can move itself and act on itself, as is evident concerning the intellect when it understands itself, and a heavy thing moving itself; and below concerning others it will be shown.

For the intention, however, of the **Philosopher** saying the intellect is **unmixed** and separated and abstract from the body, and similar words, it must be said that for some form to be mixed with matter can be taken in two ways: In one way **commonly**, so that namely every form conjoined to matter and informing it is called a **material form** and mixed with matter. In another way **specially**, so that that only is called material and mixed which, besides the fact that it informs matter, is subject also to the **laws and conditions of matter**, such as because it is extended according to the extension of matter, and through its natural transmutation is educed from potency to act. And in this second way properly we are accustomed to call some forms **material**, distinguishing against immaterial and spiritual forms.

When the Philosopher therefore says the intellect is unmixed and separated, he understands in the **second way** and not in the first. Or perhaps he denies it to be mixed from diverse miscible things just as some ancients thought the soul to be mixed from all things so that it might know all things; and this seems [likely].

To the **second reason** the consequence is to be denied and it must be said that the proof is not valid concerning form universally, but if it is true, it has truth concerning a form which is **educed** through natural transmutation of matter.

To the **third** also the consequence is to be denied, and to the proof it must be said that the assumed proposition is not true concerning a form **not extended nor organic** nor educed through natural transmutation of matter, such as is the intellective soul.

To the **fourth** the major is to be denied, speaking universally concerning form; nor is that induction valid, since it is made only in powers mixed in the second way.

To the **fifth** also I deny the major, and to the first proof it must be said that it is invalid. For it is certain that creator and creature are said relatively, and yet the creator is **not multiplied** to the multiplication of the creature. So also of many servants there is one lord and of many sons there is one father, and yet these are correlatives. And so in many others that proposition takes an instance.

To the **second proof** where it is said that "everything which belongs to the whole *per se*, necessarily belongs to every part," it must be said that the proposition is **false**. For to a lion and a horse, and so of other species of animal, it belongs *per se* to be **corruptible**, which nevertheless does not belong to its

matter. Item, it belongs to be an animal and animate, and yet its soul is neither an animal nor animate. And so in many others an instance could be given.

To the **third proof** it must be said that that reason of the Philosopher does not need that sense concerning the whole and part, but it suffices for it that by "part of the power" be understood another **lesser power**, and by "part of the mobile" another lesser mobile. And thus that reason proceeds better and more clearly to concluding the omnimodous abstraction of the mover from magnitude, just as he intends to conclude. Whether, however, this concludes efficaciously or not, is doubtful.

Of the saying of the **Commentator**, however, there is no care in this. For certainly he himself did not think that anything could be the act or form of matter without being extended with its extension; and in this **he is deceived**.

To the **confirmation** it must be said that both the soul and quantity, supposing that quantity is another thing from matter, **immediately** inform matter. I say, nevertheless, that the soul truly informs **quantified matter** nor however is it itself quantified. When against this it is assumed that "everything which is received in another, is received according to the mode of the receiver," it must be said that that proposition (which is assumed by many as a maxim), if it ought to have truth, is to be understood thus: "Everything which is received, is received etc.," that is according as the receiver is **apt to receive**, but not that it be such as the receiver is at least according to **all conditions** of the receiver, for it would have innumerable instances. For it is certain that in incorruptible matter a corruptible form is received, and in a dense, cold and dry vase rare, hot and humid air is received. And therefore although in certain things certain received things are conformed to the receivers (just as water and other fluids are configured according to the figures of the receivers), nevertheless **not all**. Nor are those even conformed in all receivers.

To the **sixth** I deny the major. To the proof it must be said that not everything which is actually in matter, after it was in it only in potentiality, is said to be **educted from the potency of matter** according to the sense which is accustomed to be had in such a saying, but that only which through **natural transmutations** of matter by a natural agent goes out to act; which does not happen to the intellective soul.

To the **seventh** also the major is to be denied. To the proof it must be said that it is possible for a composite to be truly **corrupted**, even if no part of it is corrupted, and this through the sole **dissolution** of it and separation of part from part. Hence if some continuous body (for example a piece of wood A) be cut into two parts or more, even if all remain in the nature of things, nevertheless **A does not remain**, because not however-existing but continuous are those parts A; so in the proposed case, not however-existing are the soul and body man, but the soul **informing** the body and actuating [it] and the body informed and actuated by the soul are man.

To the **eighth**, that if by the **formal effect** of a form some thing ought to be understood, none can congruously be understood other than the matter or the composite; and whether this or that, it is clear what should be said in the proposed case. But if by formal effect is understood the **denomination** taken from the form, as the argument seems to accept and many use this term in such a sense, it must be said that properly speaking the major is not true except concerning **accidental forms**, nor however concerning

all perhaps. The reason is because substantial forms give "to be this or that" or through them something is "this or that," as was touched upon above. But that which through a form is "this or that" (for example fire or water, lion or stag or any of the others) is not the matter of that form but the **composite** from both. And therefore according to that mode of speaking the substantial form gives its formal effect **not to the matter but to the composite**. But accidental forms, because they give "to be such or such" (as white or hot and such which truly belongs to the subject of the form), therefore it ought to be said that they give their formal effect to the subject.

To the **confirmation**, when it is said "whose operation is abstract etc.," it must be said that for an operation to be **abstract from the body** can be understood in two ways: In one way so that neither the "principle *which*" (susceptive or elicitive of it) is the body, nor even the principle *which* is *per se* constituted from the body. And in this way I grant the major and I say that the understanding of man or of the intellective soul conjoined is **not thus abstract**, since the "principle *which*" of such an operation is **man himself**, whose *per se* part is the body. Indeed perhaps not properly the conjoined soul but **man only** is said to understand, according to that of the **Philosopher** in **1 On the Soul**: "To say the soul is angry is similar as if someone should say it weaves or builds. But it is better perhaps not to say the soul pities or learns or understands, but **man through the soul**." And there is no doubt that he accepts "understanding" according as it is the operation of the intellect properly called, as is evident from the sequence of the text. **Augustine** implies a similar sentence in **2 On Free Will** chapter 36, where he says: "Memory remembers not only others but also itself, or rather **we** remember others and also it through it."

In another way "operation to be abstract from the body" can be understood precisely because the body is not its "**principle by which**" (susceptive or elicitive). And in this sense I say the major is **false**; nor is it inconvenient for someone's operation and accident to be more abstract than it in this mode, namely that it informs the body and its accident informs it and not the body. And so I say of **understanding**. And what is more, some also say the same of every sensation of man. And according to that opinion which says every sensitive soul (even in others than man) is unextended and whole in every part, the same would have to be said of its sensations as others say of the sensations of man, and I of understanding—for now not defining concerning others. But it would be inconvenient to say that an accident is more abstract from its subject than its subject from *its* subject, or that an accident would be *per se* subsisting or more apt to subsist *per se* than its subject. But neither do I say in the proposed case. And to a similar sense proceeds somewhat the intention of the **Philosopher** where he is alleged; for principally he intends to prove that the **infinite** is not a substance *per se* existing, as is clearly evident from the text and comment.

ARTICLE 2

(The Opinion of Averroes)

As to the second article, it is the opinion of **Averroes** that the **intellect** is one in number for **all men**, and there is not one for one man and another for another. He proves this in **3 On the Soul**, comment 5, thus:

First, because if the opposite is granted, it follows that the "intellect is **this particular thing**," that is, some singular thing demonstrated beneath a species and not a nature simply; and according to this "it will be an **intention understood in potentiality**" and consequently "it will be moving," or able to move, "the

intellect" to the intention understood in act or to intellection. And thus it follows that the intellect "will receive" and will move **"itself"**; which is impossible.

Second, if it were thus singular and individual, it would not receive **universal intentions**, but singular ones only. But this is false, because then the intellect would be a **sense**. The consequence is proved, because if the receiver is singular, the thing received is also singular. Otherwise, it could be said that the sense receives universal intentions.

Third, it follows that "the **thing understood** in me and in you would be **one in species** and **two in individual**; and thus the thing understood will have a thing understood, and so it proceeds into **infinity**." These are his words. And I think that by "thing understood" he understands the **concept** of the thing existing in the intellect, so that the reasoning is this: It follows that the concept of some thing (for example, of a rose) existing in my intellect and the concept of a rose existing in your intellect will be one specifically and two numerically. And since from any things of the same species one **common concept** can be abstracted, I will be able to abstract another concept from them, and you similarly; and again that second concept in me is other than yours, and yet of the same species, and consequently from them another can again be abstracted, and so into infinity.

The first consequence is proved from the fact that it is impossible for **one concept in number** to be simultaneously in diverse intellects subjectively.

Fourth, it follows that a **disciple** could not learn anything from a **master**; which is contrary to experience. The consequence is proved, because either he would learn by acquiring the **same knowledge** in number which the master has, or by acquiring **another** caused by the knowledge of the master. Not in the first way, because it is not possible that the same knowledge be in two men unless there is the **same subject** of knowledge in them; which, given the hypothesis of the diversity of intellects, is not in the proposed case. Nor in the second way, because then the knowledge of the master would be a "power **generating and creating** knowledge in the disciple after the manner in which this fire generates another fire similar to itself in species; which is impossible."

Fifth, it can be argued according to the principles of the **Philosopher** and **Commentator**. For it is certain that the **intellect is incorruptible**; and infinite men (according to their opinion) have existed. If therefore there were not one intellect for all, but for each there were a proper intellect, there would be **infinite intellects in act**. And although according to the truth it is false that infinite men have existed, nevertheless it was **possible** for it to have been so, as was proved in the **first distinction**. But if infinite men had already existed, there would already be **infinite souls**; which is impossible.

(Against the Opinion of Averroes)

That this opinion is **false** is established not only from the truth of our faith but also from **evident reason**.

And **first** indeed through the reason of **Augustine** in **2 On Free Will**, chapter 12, where first he proves that each man has a **proper exterior sense**, and it is not one for many. Then he proves this same thing

concerning the **interior sense** by which one perceives oneself to see or otherwise sense. Finally, he proves this also concerning the **intellect and reason** itself. Hence from his words a double reason can be formed.

The **first** is such: It is possible for **me** to understand something, while **you** are not understanding that thing. Therefore my intellect is not your intellect. The antecedent is known from experience. The consequence is proved, because if my intellect is your intellect, therefore every **intellection** of mine is an intellection of yours. And further, therefore everything that I understand, you understand. For to understand some thing is, for a man, to have its intellection in himself **subjectively**.

Second, I can **know** that I understand something, while you are **not able** naturally to know that I understand that thing. Therefore my intellect is not your intellect. The antecedent is also known by experience; for no one can naturally know the **thoughts** of another or what another is thinking. The consequence is proved just as the prior one, because if my intellect is yours, therefore my cognition, by which I know myself to understand, is also yours. For it is therefore mine and I know through it, because it is in **my intellect**. If therefore it is also in your intellect, the consequence is that you also know through it that I understand, just as I know.

These reasons **Augustine** touches upon simultaneously in these words (briefly, without proof of the consequences because they can occur immediately): "Does not each one of us have his **own reason**? Since indeed it can happen that I understand something, when you do not understand it"; this is the first, and he immediately adds the second: "Nor can you know whether I understand, but I know," and then responding in the person of the student: "It is manifest," he says, "that individual rational minds have **individual** [reasons]."

(Response of the Commentator)

But the **Commentator** strives to avoid this consequence where cited above, and his sentence is that, notwithstanding the **unity of the intellect** in me and in you, I can understand something which you do not understand, because neither I nor you understand through any intellection except insofar as it is coupled to me or to you through a **phantasm** or imagined intention which is in you or in me; it is coupled, however, through such a species, because it **moves the intellect** to the intellection itself. And because it is possible for my phantasm to move [the intellect] to an intellection, while yours is not moving [it] to that, it is possible for me to understand something while you are not understanding it.

And through this it could be responded to the form of the reason made, by denying that it follows that "if my intellect is yours, every intellection of mine is an intellection of yours," because my intellection is **mine** because **my phantasm** moves to it, which is mine in such a way that it is not yours. And similarly your intellection is yours, because your phantasm moves to it. And because my phantasm moves to some [intellection] while yours does not move to it, some intellection is **my intellection** and I understand through it, which is not your intellection nor do you understand through it.

Otherwise, according to the sentence of the same man, some seem to respond: namely that, although my intellect is your intellect, nevertheless it is not mine and yours **in the same mode**, because it is not

coupled to you and to me **equally perfectly**. And therefore it is not necessary that everything you understand through it, I understand, nor conversely.

(Against the Response of Averroes)

Neither response is sufficient.

And concerning the **first** it is evident: First, because it would follow according to it that, if you understand some thing which I do not understand, I cannot understand that thing **while you persevere** in the intellection of it; the opposite of which experience teaches. I declare the consequence, because if the opposite is given, therefore **my phantasm** will move the intellect to an intellection. Therefore, either to the **same** one to which yours moves, or to **another**. Not to the same one, because it cannot make what is already in act by another to be in act. Nor to another, because either to another not composing with the first, or composing and consequently constituting a more intense and perfect intention. The **second** cannot be given, because then it would follow that from the fact that I understood that thing, you would understand **more perfectly** what you were understanding before. For you would understand by a more perfect intellection, unless it be said that you would not understand by the whole intellection but by a part of it only; which is absurd. Nor can the **first** be given according to the Commentator, because then in you and in me there could be diverse intellections and concepts according to number and of the same species; [which is] against that which the Commentator himself strives for in his **third reason** posited above.

Nor can it be said that my phantasm moves to the same intellection, not indeed by producing it or making it be (after it was not), but by making it be **my intellection** (after it was not mine), because if it were so, it would follow that neither my phantasm itself nor the **agent intellect** concurring simultaneously with it would be a **true agent**, but each would be called an agent according to **metaphor** only and similitude; the opposite of which he himself wills in the same comment, and below in comment 20 he deduces this against **Themistius** as an inconvenience.

Furthermore, posited that I understand through the **same intellection** through which you also were understanding before, either I will not be able to persevere in the same intellection if you cease to understand that thing through that intellection—which is contrary to experience—or if so, by the same reason another after me, and so into eternity that thing would be understood through the **same intellection in number** by any men whatsoever, and consequently also all who understand that thing understand [it] simultaneously through the same [intellection], and whoever understood [it] understood [it]. And thus not only the agent and possible intellect are eternal according to him, but also the **intellection itself**, and consequently also the **speculative intellect**, and nothing is truly made there; the opposite of which he strives to defend from intention in the pre-alleged comments.

Furthermore, I ask: **in what mode** does that intellection become mine? For either it becomes mine as of an **agent**, and it is evident by the response that [it does] not; or as of a **recipient**, and neither can this be said, because I do not receive it except through the intellect, and it was previously in the intellect. Therefore **in no way** does it become mine, and consequently neither do I understand through it. Nor can it be said that it becomes mine because the intellect is coupled to me anew **more or in another mode**,

because then the question returns: how is the intellect coupled anew, if nothing new is made in it nor in the phantasm, since nevertheless that coupling according to the Commentator is understood through the precise action of the **phantasm** on the intellect?

Second, that solution is not valid, since according to it it would follow that we could understand nothing unless the **phantasm** caused its intellection; which is manifestly false by experience. For we understand our **intellections** and **affections** both past and present, of which nevertheless there is **no sensible phantasm at all**, concerning which sort of phantasm only is the speech now.

Item, the **first propositions**, which come to our mind naturally (as the **Commentator** himself says in **3 On the Soul**, comment 36, for example "anything either is or is not"), we understand, and yet no phantasms cause their intellections. Therefore we do not understand through some intellection because our phantasm moves to it, but because it is in our intellect and informs it. Hence, this precisely being posited, we understand through it.

Furthermore, the **principal reason** itself can be formed specifically concerning the intellection of such **spiritual things** not having sensible phantasms, and similarly of **complex truths**, the notice of which we do not receive from a phantasm. For even regarding some of these, while you are not understanding, I understand, and conversely.

Furthermore, posited that we understand a rose simultaneously, it is possible that **I understand that I understand** the rose, while you do not understand that I understand the rose. And the phantasm of the rose does not cause this **reflexive intellection**, but the **direct cognition** of the rose itself [causes it]. If therefore both my cognition of the rose and the reflexive cognition of the same is in you or in your intellect, why therefore do **you not understand** that I understand the rose just as I do?

The **second solution** also is not valid. For posited that according to that fictitious fiction the intellect is coupled to you **much more perfectly** than to me, it is still possible that I understand something while you do not understand it.

Third, I argue principally against that conclusion, since, if there were one intellect for all men, it would follow that in the **same primary subject** there would be **contraries** in act simultaneously. This however is false in itself and according to the Philosopher and Commentator also. The consequence is declared. For simultaneously in the intellect of one man there is an intense **assent** to one conclusion, and in the intellect of another man there is an intense **dissent** to the same and an assent to the contradictory; which assents and estimations certainly are truly **contraries**, as is evident from **2 On Interpretation**.

Nor is the refuge to **phantasms** valid for this: Both because such assents and dissents can be about **un-phantasms** [things without phantasms]. And because neither does the **diversity of agents** make it so that contraries can be simultaneously in one subject. Otherwise the same subject could be hot with heat caused by fire and cold with coldness caused by water; which is false.

(To the Reasons of the Commentator)

Now I respond to the **reasons of the Commentator**.

To the **first** I say first that it can be adduced against him, because he himself would not deny that the intellect can **understand itself**, and then it would follow that it acts on itself and moves itself. Or if this does not follow, but is avoided through some way, so I will say to you. I, however, grant that ultimate consequent, namely that the **intellect can move itself**.

To the **second** I deny the consequence, if it is understood concerning intentions universal by **universality of representation**, in which mode it must be understood that some intentions are universal. Nor is the proof valid, because notwithstanding the **singularity of the receiver**, the received intention can still represent universally, just as the **Commentator** himself is forced to confess. For even according to him the intellect is truly **some singular thing** (although there are not many of the same nature), and yet the intention existing in it is **universal by representation**. And when it is said that it could thus be said of the sense, I say that I will say so against him, nor will he be able to assign any sufficient reason without me assigning the same in the proposed case, because **im-plurifiability** in the same species does not impede true singularity.

A reason is rendered, however, by some, because the intellect is a power **unextended** and not organic, while the sense is **extended**. And therefore a species in the intellect can represent universally, but not in the sense. Whether however this is the cause or not, I do not define. I say nevertheless that that is not the cause which he assigns, nor does he prove the opposite, nor do I think that he can prove it.

To the **third** I grant that the **concept** of a rose existing in my intellect is other in number from the concept of a rose existing in your intellect, and that those concepts are of the same nature and from them **another concept** can be abstracted, which will thus be a concept of those concepts, just as those first ones are concepts of roses. And no one ought to deny such a possible **process into infinity**. But if by "thing understood" the Commentator did not understand the concept of the thing itself or the intellection, but the **thing outside** understood, it must be said that the **same thing in number** can be understood by you and by me, notwithstanding the diversity of my intellect from yours, just as the same sun is seen by you and by me and yet your sight and mine are not the same.

To the **fourth** I deny the consequence; to the proof I say that the **disciple** learns by acquiring **another knowledge**, not however caused by the knowledge of the master, but by **his own** notices and intellections, to which he is moved through the words and speeches of the master.

To the **fifth** I say that it is certainly held expressed by the **Philosopher** that the intellective soul is the **act and form of the body**. Whether, however, there is **one soul** for many or all men, or **individual ones** for individuals, and if so, whether one informed many bodies neither simultaneously nor successively, or whether there is naturally a **return of souls** to bodies so that there is a certain and finite number of souls, by which the bodies of all past men were informed successively (as many philosophers posited), is not found expressed.

I nevertheless grant that it was possible for the world to have been **from eternity** and for **infinite men** to have preceded and also for **infinite souls** to be simultaneously; nor is such an infinity impossible to God, as was proved in the **First [Book]**.

To the **principal reasons** of the question, the response is evident from what has been said.

QUESTION 2

WHETHER besides the intellective soul there is any other substantial form in man.

Second I ask, whether besides the intellective soul there is any other substantial form in man.

And it seems that **yes: First**, because man is not only man, but also an **animal** and an **animate body**, and a body and a substance. Therefore not only in him is the form by which he is man (namely the rational soul), but also the form by which he is an animal (and this is the **sensitive soul**), and the form by which he is an animate body (which is the **vegetative soul**), and similarly the **form of corporeity** by which he is a body, and the form by which he is a substance. And through this, besides the intellective soul, there are many other substantial forms in man. The antecedent is known; the consequence is proved from the fact that it is impossible for something to have a **formal effect** without a form. But just as "to be a man" is the formal effect of the rational soul, so "to be an animal" is the formal effect of the **sensitive soul**, and so of others.

Second, in man there are **vital operations** of diverse natures, such as to vegetate, sense, and understand. Therefore also in him there are diverse souls which are the **first principles** of such operations. The consequence is evident, because diversity of operations proceeds from diversity of forms.

Third, no thing is a body through a form **merely spiritual**. Therefore in man there is another substantial form besides the intellective soul. The antecedent is known. The consequence is proved, because man is both a body according as body is a genus, and is composed of a body as body denotes the other part of the composite; or at least one of the aforesaid is granted. But neither man nor any part of him is a body through any **accidental form**, therefore through a substantial one. But not through the intellective [form], since that is merely spiritual, therefore through another. And thus at least one other substantial form is in man, namely the **form of corporeity**.

Fourth, if there were not any other substantial form in man, it would follow that **flesh and bones**, nerves and blood, and other such organic parts of man would not differ substantially by a specific difference. The consequence is evident. But what follows is false. For such parts have proper accidents and proper operations specifically differing; such diversity of accidents and operations necessarily argues a **specific diversity** of substantial forms. Otherwise it could never be argued that some things differ in species in the genus of substance; which is inconvenient to say.

On the contrary. Man is one *per se* "this something" in the genus of substance; therefore his substantial form is **one only**. The consequence is evident, because just as through a substantial form a thing has being, so also [it has] **one being**. Therefore besides the intellective soul there is no other substantial form in man.

I Respond. Regarding the plurality of forms in man there are various ways of speaking:

- **Some** say there are as many substantial forms as there are **essential predicates** which are said of him "in what" (*in quid*), and thus in every substantial composite they posit a **multitude of forms** according to the degrees of the predicate or predicates "in what" concerning him.
 - **Others** posit such a plurality according to the **plurality of vital operations**, and say there are three souls in man: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective.
 - **Others** posit **two only**, namely sensitive and intellective.
 - **Others** also two only, yet not two souls but the **form of corporeity** and the **intellective soul**.
 - **Certain ones** indeed posit as many as there are **heterogeneous parts** in the body.
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ARTICLE 1

(Four Conclusions)

And because none of the aforesaid opinions seems true to me, therefore concerning this I posit **four conclusions**:

1. **First**, that there are not to be posited in man as many substantial forms as there are **predicates** which are said of him "in what."
 2. **Second**, that there are not to be posited as many as man has **vital operations**.
 3. **Third**, that not as many as he has **heterogeneous parts**.
 4. **Fourth**, that there is not to be posited any substantial form in man besides the **intellective soul**.
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(The First Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the **first conclusion** thus: If in man there are "as many substantial forms as there are predicates etc.," by the same reason also in an **angel** and in every **accidental form** there will be as many distinct entities as predicates are said of them "in what" according to the degrees of the predicate. The consequent is false, since then in Michael there would be one entity by which he is a substance, and another by which he is a spirit, and another by which he is Michael, and thus he would be substantially composed of **three substances**; which no one says. Similarly in whiteness there would be an entity by which it is a quality, and another by which it is color, and another by which it is whiteness; which is also commonly denied. The consequence is evident, because if the opposite is given (namely that by the same entity Michael is Michael and Spirit and substance, and similarly whiteness by the same is whiteness, color and quality), it does not appear why a horse would not be by the **same form** horse, animal, and so of others.

This is confirmed, because man is no less by the same substantial form man and animal than he is by the same accidental form white and colored. This is evident, because animal is predicated "in what" of man no less essentially than colored of white, or even color of whiteness.

Second, if so, I take the composite of matter and the **form of substantiality** of fire itself, or that by which fire is a substance precisely: Either this composite thus precisely accepted is a **corporeal substance** or incorporeal, or neither corporeal nor incorporeal.

If **corporeal**, therefore either it is a body or a part of it is a body; for otherwise it cannot be understood that it is a corporeal substance. If it is a body, since every body is a substance and not every substance is a body, there is another form in that composite by which it is a substance, and another by which it is a body. And the same follows if it be said that it is therefore a corporeal substance because its part is a body, for also that part which is a body is a substance; and then it follows that that composite is not precisely from matter and the form of substantiality, **contrary to the position**. Item, it follows that in fire there are several **forms of corporeity**. Furthermore, let that other form of corporeity be prescinded according to the intellect, and let the matter and form of its substantiality be taken precisely, and let the argument be made as before.

If it be said that it is an **incorporeal substance**, since the angel Michael is also an incorporeal substance and of another nature from this one, some species of incorporeal substance will be predicated "in what" of such a composite, which species will be a predicate inferior to substance, and consequently still in this composite besides the form of substantiality there is **another form**, contrary to the position.

If it be said that it is **neither** a corporeal substance nor an incorporeal substance, therefore it is of another nature from corporeal substance and from incorporeal, and consequently still some **species of substance** will be predicated "in what" of such a composite, from which as before it follows that besides the form of substantiality there is **another form** in it, contrary to the position.

Nor can it be said that it is something **common** to corporeal substance and incorporeal substance, and consequently neither is it of the same nature or species with this or that; nor even of another species (just as neither does a genus differ in species from its species), nor even is it of the same species with that, as is said in **Metaphysics 10**. This, I say, cannot be said: Both because such a composite, if such be given, is a certain substance truly singular, just as this matter of this demonstrated fire and every form of it is truly singular. And because if it is thus common, it will be predicated of corporeal substance, and consequently by conversion it itself is a corporeal substance, and the inconvenience inferred before returns. And thirdly, because outside the soul there is no **universal**, as I suppose.

The reason can be confirmed theologically by positing that God preserves the **matter** of this fire and the **form of substantiality** which is in it, the other forms being annihilated; which certainly could well be done, supposing the distinction of such forms.

Third, it follows that it is possible for something to be **fire** and not be a **body** or a **substance**, and for something to be a man or a horse and not be an animal; which no one would grant, since every superior is predicated in the first mode of its inferiors. The consequence is proved, because God could preserve the matter of fire with the **form of igneity** alone, the **form of corporeity** and the **form of substantiality** also being destroyed; and similarly preserve the matter of man with the **form of humanity** or with the rational soul, the **form of animality** being destroyed, if they are distinct, as is said.

Fourth, according to the **Philosopher** in **Metaphysics 7**, in a definition it suffices to put the **first genus** with the **final difference**; but this would be false if there were a multitude of substantial forms according to the multitude of predicates "in what." For then by such a definition some of the forms imported by the **intermediate differences** between the first genus and the final difference would not be explicated.

Fifth, if so, it follows that no superior would be predicated "in what" of its *per se* inferior; which is manifestly false according to all, and specially repugnant to this opinion also. For this being granted, it follows that there is no multitude of predicates "in what," which nevertheless they suppose. The consequence is proved; for according to this every superior will signify only a **part** of that which is signified by the inferior (for example, animal will signify according to this way the composite of matter and sensitive soul, but man the composite of matter and sensitive soul and also of rational soul); and then the proposed is had, because the name of the part is **not predicated "in what"** of the name of the whole, as is certain, since part and whole are really distinguished. Or the superior signifies the composite of matter and one form only (for example, animal signifies precisely the composite of matter and sensitive soul, but the inferior signifies precisely matter and another form, as man matter and rational soul); and then the same follows, because both this composite and that would be **really distinct**, although one part of one would be a part of the other, namely matter.

Sixth, there are not in man several souls, therefore not according to the multitude of predicates etc. The antecedent will be proved in the following conclusion. The consequence is evident, because if there are not several souls in man, therefore by the **same soul** man is man and is animal; and consequently, by the same form.

(Objections Against the First Conclusion)

Against this conclusion there are some reasons of those holding the opposite.

First is such: If by the same form man is man and animal, everything which is in man through the form by which man is man, is in him through the form by which man is animal. But everything which is in man through the form by which he is animal, is in him **insofar as he is an animal**. Therefore, if by the same form etc., everything which is in man through the form by which he is man, is in him insofar as he is an animal, and consequently by virtue of reduplication is in **every animal**. But to be **risible** is in man through the form by which he is man, therefore to be risible is in every animal; which is false. That however everything which is in man through the form by which he is animal, is in him insofar as he is an animal, is proved, because every such thing is in him either according as he is man, or according as he is animal. Not according as he is man, because to sense is due to Socrates through the form by which he is animal, and yet it is not in him according as he is man, therefore according as he is animal.

Second, the form of the **genus** can remain when the form of the **species** is corrupted, therefore they are really distinct. The antecedent is proved, because many accidents the same in number remain in the generated and corrupted, whose subject is the composite of matter and form. Therefore the **same substantial form** remains, and that is not the form of the species.

Third, just as the **Philosopher** says in **Metaphysics 7**, a definition is a speech having parts and the parts of the thing correspond to the parts of the definition; therefore to the **genus** corresponds another part of the defined thing from that which corresponds to the **difference**. But matter alone does not correspond to the genus, because the genus denotes a form intermediate between potentiality and act, as the **Commentator** says in **Metaphysics 2**, comment 33. Therefore to it corresponds either a form only, or matter with a form other than that form which corresponds to the difference.

Fourth, the **Philosopher** in **Metaphysics 2**, wishing to prove that there is not a process into infinity in formal causes, proves there is not a process into infinity in predicates "in what." Therefore he seems to will that according to the diversity of such predicates forms are diversified in the same individual. To this seems to be the authority of the **Commentator** in **Metaphysics 2**, comment 33, where he says that "matter first receives **universal forms** and by means of them other forms even unto individual ones." But such forms, of which one is received by means of another, differ from each other, since nothing is a means of receiving itself; therefore etc.

(To the Objections)

To the **first** I grant the consequence, and when it is assumed further that "everything which is in man through the form by which he is animal, is in him insofar as animal," it must be said that this is **false**, taking "insofar as" reduplicatively, as the argument takes it in the further deduction. It has a multiple instance; for something two-cubits-long is by the same form two-cubits-long and a quantum, and consequently by the form by which it is a quantum it is two-cubits-long, nor however is it two-cubits-long insofar as quantum, because **not every quantum** is two-cubits-long. Similarly something white is white by the form by which it is a "such" [quality], nor is it however white insofar as "such." Nor is the proof valid. For whether that assumed proposition be disjunctive or of a disjoined predicate, it is false. And it can have an instance in a similar way in the examples proposed, if one adverts, and in many others.

To the **second** I deny the antecedent. Nor is the proof valid, because it is founded on a **falsehood**, namely that the first subject of accidents is the composite of matter and form; the opposite of which was had above.

To the **third** it must be said that that saying of the **Philosopher** accepted according to the force of the word ought to be understood of a definition given through **oblique terms**; for example if it be said that man is composed of body and rational soul, for the parts of such a definition certainly signify parts of the thing, one matter, the other form, nor from this is it concluded that there are several substantial forms in the thing defined.

But of a definition which is given through **recto terms**, genus and difference, that saying cannot properly be understood, since, as was shown in the **First [Book]**, Distinction 8, Question 3, even according to the mind of the **Philosopher** the **genus** does not signify a part but the **whole**. Otherwise it would be predicated "in what" no more than the difference. It can nevertheless improperly be said to signify a part for the reason that it signifies the thing imperfectly and confusedly, and through this quasi-partially, and similarly the difference. But the **total definition** signifies explicitly and perfectly.

And **Avicenna** teaches this well in **Metaphysics 5**, chapter 5, where moving the question how parts of the thing are said to correspond to parts of the definition and speaking of such a definition, he says such a multitude is not in the thing according to being, but according to the **intellect**, insofar as the thing is conceived as not terminated in a common concept and also as terminated, which termination and indetermination is not in the thing but in the concept. And therefore he says that "when we define man saying that he is a rational animal, we do not intend that he is a composite of animal and rational, but that he is an **animal which is rational**," so that first man is signified as a certain common and unterminated thing, then through the difference he is quasi-terminated.

To the **fourth** the consequence is to be denied, since not therefore does the **Philosopher** (wishing to prove that) prove there is not a process into infinity in predicates "in what" or rather in definitions and their parts, because according to the multitude of such predicates there is a multitude of forms, but (as the **Commentator** also implies in comment 10) therefore, because if there were infinite forms in a thing, the definitions or parts of the definition would be infinite; which is false. But with this it stands well that there are not several forms in the thing which is defined.

The authority of the **Commentator** is not against [this], because however that universality of forms ought to be understood, the Commentator does not say that those forms are **simultaneously** in matter, but that it receives one by means of another, because namely first one, then another.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the **second conclusion** first thus: There are many more **genera of vital operations** which belong to man than there are genera of souls. Therefore there are not as many souls in man as he has vital operations. The assumption is proved; for to be nourished, to grow, to generate, to sense, to dream, to remember, to desire, to progress, to understand and many other genera of vital operations [exist]. For certain of the aforesaid contain under themselves several genera, as is at least evident concerning understanding and desiring; and the operations of all these genera belong to man. But it is certain that there are **not as many genera of souls**, from **2 On the Soul**; nor does anyone posit so many. Therefore etc.

Second thus: In man there are not several souls, therefore not as many as etc. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved, first indeed from the fact that in **On Ecclesiastical Dogmas**, chapter 15, it is thus written: "Neither do we say **two souls** in one man, as **James** and others of the Syrians write."

(Instance of Ockham)

To this a certain **modern doctor [Ockham]** responds saying that here are not condemned simply two souls in man, but two **intellective souls**, of which one is from God, the other from the devil; and this, as he says, is evident to one inspecting the letter there.

(To the Instance)

But I wonder much at this exposition, and more at this that he says this is evident from the letter. For the letter lies thus: "Neither do we say two souls in one man, as James and others of the Syrians write, one **animal** by which the body is animated, and is mixed with the blood, and the other **spiritual** which ministers reason, but we say one and the same soul is in man, which both vivifies the body by its society and disposes itself by its reason, having in itself liberty of choice, so that in its substance it chooses by thought what it wills." Here it is evident that neither did those men posit two intellective [souls] in man, but one **animal** and the other **spiritual**, nor did they say any of them was created by the devil. Hence this is another error from that which that doctor says. Indeed of that one neither there nor in that whole book is any mention made. Furthermore, from the determination which he adds saying "but we say etc." it is evident that the intention of the writer is that **no soul besides the intellective** is in man; for in vain would it be posited "since it by itself vivifies the body." And consequently it is the principle of vital operations.

This is confirmed from the intention of **Augustine** in **10 On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis**, chapter 12, regarding small [animals], where he says that "the rational soul not only provides **animal life** to the flesh, but also according to the flesh itself desires something etc." If it provides animal life, therefore besides it another **sensitive or animal soul** is posited superfluously; and by the same reason a **vegetative** one, because the vegetative according to what the **Philosopher** says in **2 On the Soul** is contained virtually in the sensitive, so that it can do all things which the vegetative can, and consequently that which contains the sensitive, contains also the vegetative. And this is expressly proved also by **Damascene** in book 2, chapter 13, who says that the rational soul "uses an organic body and is tributary of life and growth and sense and generation to it." And **Augustine** posits the wholly same sentence in **On the Quantity of the Soul**, chapter 65.

Hence from this it can also be argued to the principal point, since a plurality is **not to be posited** to which experience, reason or authority (which it is not permitted to contradict) does not compel. But neither does experience compel to posit in man several souls (it is evident), nor even any such authority, nor reason, since if any ought to compel to this, it would seem [to be] that one which would argue a multitude of souls on account of the **multitude of vital operations**. For from such operations alone we come naturally into the knowledge of the soul. But this does not compel, since **one soul** can be the first principle of many operations, indeed of all which belong to man, as is evident from what has been said; therefore etc.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved, Repeatedly)

Third, Augustine in the book **On Faith and the Creed**, chapter 3: "Man," he says, "except for the form of the members which is attributed diverse to diverse genera of animals, does not differ from a beast except by the **rational spirit** which is also named mind." And he understands concerning a specific difference, because even by matter he differs numerically from a beast.

From this I argue. If in man there is a sensitive soul distinct from the intellective, that is of the **same nature** with the soul of a beast; otherwise he would not differ from a beast by the rational spirit alone, as Augustine says. If it is of the same nature, therefore man or a part of man is a **beast**; for every substantial form constitutes in its specific being. And thus it follows that man or a part of him is a donkey or an ox or something such of the same species with some of the brutes; which certainly he who would grant, would be computed not among men, but among brutes.

This is confirmed, because if such a soul informed matter without a rational soul, the resulting composite would certainly be a certain **beast**. Therefore also now it is so in fact, since that [soul] is not changed from its species by the arrival of the intellective one. The assumption is proved by **Augustine** in **83 Questions**, question 80, against the **Apollinarians**, where he says that against **Apollinaris** (positing first that Christ did not have a human mind, "that is a rational soul, by which man differs from beasts according to the soul"—his words are), it follows that the Word took up "a certain **beast** with the figure of a human body." And from this he says that he changed his error and secondly posited that the Word assumed flesh alone without a soul. From which it is clear that Apollinaris first posited the Word to have assumed flesh with some sensitive soul, and to this according to Augustine it followed that he had assumed a certain beast. Therefore, if there were any such composite, that certainly would be a certain beast and animal.

Fourth, the same **Augustine** where cited above in **On Faith and the Creed** says: "If anyone holds the catholic faith, so that he believes the **whole man** to be taken up by the Word of God, that is body, soul, spirit, he is sufficiently fortified against those," namely heretics. But in the book **On Ecclesiastical Dogmas** he says—if the book be his, as is more commonly believed and the rubrics of ancient volumes testify, or if it be not his but **Gennadius's**, as the **Master** seems to will in **2 Sentences**, Distinction 8 near the end, nevertheless it is an authentic book among all theologians and in it the rules of our faith are contained—in that book, I say, chapter 20, it is thus written: "There is not a third in the substance of man, the Spirit, as **Didymus** contends, but the spirit is the **soul itself** called spirit for its spiritual nature or for that which it breathes in the body. But it is called soul from that which animates the body to living or to vivifying." From which it is clear that in the first authority, when he says "soul, spirit," the construction is appositive, and the sense is "soul spirit," that is the soul which is spirit. Therefore according to these authorities there is nothing of the substance of man besides the body and the soul which is spirit, that is the **rational soul**.

Fifth, if in man there were several souls, for example sensitive and intellective, then it follows that man will be composed of an **animal**, and consequently will not be an animal. The second consequence is evident; the first is proved, because a certain part of man will be a certain thing constituted from the body and the sensitive soul, but every such thing is an animal.

This is confirmed, because if such a constituted thing remained, the rational soul departing, certainly it would live and sense, and consequently would be an animal.

Thus therefore I say that not only are there not as many souls in man as he has vital operations, but neither is any soul in him **distinct from the intellective**.

(Ockham's Objections)

Against these things, however, is the opinion of certain even modern [thinkers] holding that there is in man a sensitive soul distinct from the intellectual soul. They prove this first as follows: "It is impossible that contraries exist in the same subject at the same instant. But the act of desiring something and the act of rejecting the same thing are contraries. Therefore, if they exist simultaneously in the nature of things, they are not in the same subject. But it is manifest that they are simultaneous in man, because that very thing which a man desires through the **sensitive appetite**, he rejects through the **intellectual appetite**."

It is confirmed "by the Philosopher in 3 *De Anima*, who says that in the same [being] there are **contrary appetites**; that is, they would be contraries if they were naturally suited to be received in the same subject."

Second, "the same **substantial form** cannot at one and the same time have two acts of desiring with respect to the same object. But frequently in man there are simultaneously an act of willing some object and an act of desiring the same thing by the **sensitive appetite**. Therefore, those acts are not in the same subject."

Third, "the same form in number does not elicit simultaneously an act of desiring something **naturally** and another **freely**. But the will wills something freely, and the sensitive appetite desires naturally. Therefore, etc."

Fourth, "**sensations** are subjectively in the soul mediately or immediately, and they are not subjectively in the intellectual soul; therefore, the sensitive soul is distinguished. The major premise is clear, because nothing else can be assigned as the subject of sensations except the soul or a power; and if the power be an accident of the soul, it will be subjectively in the soul. The minor is proved, because otherwise every apprehension of the sensitive soul would be an **intellection**, because it would be subjectively in the intellectual soul. Likewise, then the separated soul could feel, because since sensation would be subjectively in the intellectual soul and God can preserve every accident in its subject without any other thing, He could preserve sensation in the separated intellectual soul; which is absurd."

Fifth, "the same form in number is not **extended** and **non-extended**, **material** and **immaterial**; but the sensitive soul in man is extended and material, whereas the intellectual soul is not, because it is whole in the whole [body], and whole in every part. Therefore, etc."

(The Irishman's Objection)

Sixth, it is argued by another doctor thus: "**Man in generating man produces a sensitive soul**"; but the intellectual soul is created. Therefore, in man there is a sensitive soul distinct from the intellectual soul. The antecedent is proved; because, unless it be so, it follows that "**man is of a more ignoble condition of himself as regarding the act of generating and continuing his species than other animals**." Which does not seem reasonable: both because "nature does not fail in necessary things," and especially in perfect things according to the Philosopher in 3 *De Anima* and the Commentator in comment 45; and because the nutritive power is more noble in man than in other animals. Therefore, the generative power in him is more perfect. Therefore, it can produce an effect as noble as the generative power of a brute can. But that [power of a brute] can produce a sensitive soul; therefore, the generative power of man can produce a sensitive soul. Suppose, then, that in the generation of man God does not create an intellectual soul; it follows that man would still generate a true animal. Therefore, he does so when God creates the intellectual soul, since that creation does not hinder the action of the man. Furthermore, the **complexion** of man is more noble than the complexion of other animals. Therefore, his complexional form is more noble than that of the others. Since, therefore, in the others it is a soul, it follows that in man such a form is a soul.

(Response to Ockham's Objections)

Addition 44: To the first, I say that, just as regarding the will we are accustomed to distinguish between **absolute willing** and **conditional willing** (which is usually called a *velleity* rather than a *volition*), so regarding the appetite in general we can distinguish between absolute and conditional appetite. When, therefore, it is said that "the act of desiring something and the act of rejecting the same are contraries," I say that, even if this were granted if both were absolute acts, it is nonetheless not true if one is absolute and the other conditional—supposing also that such a conditional act is an elicited act, which is perhaps false. Hence, a **volition** of an act and a **noIition** (vailing-not) of it are not contrary nor are they impossible, not only in the same man, but not even in the same power; as is clear regarding one throwing merchandise into the sea, who **absolutely wills** to throw it and **conditionally would not will it**, namely, if he could escape otherwise. And in this way are to be understood the authorities saying that contrary appetites are in the same [being].

But speaking of appetites in the first way—namely, both absolutely—perhaps it could be said that they are simultaneous neither in the same power nor in the same man. Hence, no one ever simultaneously absolutely wills or desires something, and absolutely does not will or rejects that same thing. It happens, however, that the opposite seems to be the case to someone because of an almost **imperceptible succession** of contrary appetites in the same man, who, according to succeeding judgments arising from different causes, now desires something and presently rejects that same thing. The Ordinary Text follows.

To the first, I say that because of that reasoning the Manichaeans were moved to posit **two souls** in man, "who," as Augustine says in *10 Super Genesim*, "when they saw that the flesh could not lust without a soul, thought that their flesh had another certain soul from another nature contrary to God, whence it 'lusts against the spirit'." But, as he shows in chapter 12, it is not necessary because of such repugnance of the flesh and the spirit and of contrary lusts to posit diverse souls.

Similarly, in *83 Questions*, question 40: "From diverse things seen," he says, "there is a diverse appetite of souls, etc." And he adds: "Thus it is not to be thought for this reason that there are diverse natures of souls because there are diverse wills; since even the will of a single soul is varied according to the diversity of times, etc." And that whole question pertains to the proposal.

Likewise, in *Against Julian*, book 6: "By its own motions," he says, "which the soul has according to the spirit, it opposes its other motions which it has according to the flesh. Again, by its motions which it has according to the flesh, it opposes its other motions which it has according to the spirit. And therefore it is said 'the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh'." From which it is also clear that such motions opposing one another belong to one and the same soul.

Something regarding this will also be said in the following question. But as much as must be said for now to the argument: the act of desiring something and the act of rejecting that same thing, if both be **rational** or both **sensual** or **natural**, are certainly contraries. Nor are they ever simultaneously in the same man. But a **rational act of desiring** is not formally contrary to a **sensual act of rejecting** even of the same object, although they are virtually contrary. And this is clear, since to a rational appetite, a rational rejection of the same object is contrary; and that rational rejection is of a different kind from a sensual rejection of the same object. And because "to one thing only one is contrary" (*10 Metaphysics*), it follows

that this sensual [rejection] is not formally contrary to $\neg$ rational appetite, though virtually so, inasmuch as they incline toward contrary effects.

To the second and third together, I say first that there appears no impossibility that the same soul should have concerning the same object one act **merely naturally** received by means of the sensation of that object and the change of some corporeal organ, and another **spontaneous and free** act caused by previous deliberation.

To the fourth, I deny the minor premise. It will be responded to the proofs in the following question. I say, however, for now that the second proof is also turned back against the arguer, since he himself would not deny that God could separate that sensitive soul from the body, and consequently, according to his reasoning, sensation could be preserved in it.

To the fifth, I say that the sensitive soul in man is **neither extended nor material**, just as the intellectual is not, since the very same [soul] that is intellectual is sensitive.

(Response to the Irishman's Objection)

To the sixth, I say first that by the same [logic] it could be argued that man in generating would produce an intellectual soul, because otherwise, regarding the continuation of his species, he would be of a more ignoble condition than other animals. For the **intellectual soul** is the specific form of man, nor does the production of any other form suffice for the continuation of the human species.

However, I respond to the argument: First, I grant that man in the generation of man produces a certain sensitive soul, as many and great [doctors] grant, but from this it does not follow that there are in man two distinct souls, one sensitive and the other intellectual. For the sensitive is introduced first, and then, after a further disposition for the intellectual [soul] has been made, the sensitive is simultaneously corrupted and the **intellectual is infused**, just as must be said of other substantial forms which precede the intellectual soul, and similarly the sensitive and vegetative in the matter which is disposed for the intellectual. For simultaneously as the latter is generated, the former is corrupted.

Addition 45: Second, if anyone wished to hold that no sensitive soul distinct from the intellectual is produced before the intellectual, nor even simultaneously with the intellectual in the generation of man, it can be said that, if nobility of condition in generating is considered precisely according to the form which the generator produces, in this respect man is more ignoble than others, because others produce a more perfect form from themselves; yet **simply speaking**, man is more noble than they. Nor is this inconvenient, since not only animals, but even fire itself is in this way more perfect than an angel; for it can produce a substantial form from itself, but an angel cannot; and yet simply speaking, an angel is more perfect than they.

Nor is the first proof to prove this false valid: Because, just as it is not to be said that nature fails man in necessary things because it did not give him the power of producing an intellectual soul through which man is man, so neither because it did not give him the power to produce some sensitive soul. And the

reason for both is that neither this nor that was necessary for him, because God, the author of nature, so administers human nature in its natural course and appropriately bestows such a form upon the body, so that the human species does not fail in its necessary things.

To the other proof, it can be granted that the **generative power** in man is more perfect as to its essence than the generative power in others, but not as to its effect. Or, according to the way of speaking of some moderns, the power itself is a more perfect essence, but not a more perfect power; nor is this inconvenient. In one way, however, it could even be called a more perfect power, because it perfectly and ultimately disposes for a more perfect effect.

To the other concerning the **nobility of complexion**, I say that it does not follow from this that any complexional form, properly speaking (that is, which is generated from the complexion by the power of a natural agent), is more noble in man than in others; but it suffices that a body so complexioned be perfected by a more noble form. And so it is; for a body so nobly complexioned is perfected by the most noble form, namely, the **intellectual soul**. The Ordinary Text follows.

(The Third Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the **third conclusion** from a certain mean touched upon above, since **plurality is not to be posited** where experience, reason, or sacred authority does not compel its positioning; but as to positing a plurality of substantial forms according to the plurality of organic and heterogeneous parts of man, sacred authority does not compel it, as is known, nor does experience, as is also clear, nor reason. Proof: Because one and the same substantial form requires all such diversity of accidents in the human body, and it informs all parts so differing in accidents; for the same intellectual soul is the **form of the whole human body**. Therefore, we cannot argue for a diversity of substantial forms because of the diversity of accidents which we see in the parts of the body.

Likewise, neither [can we argue] because of the diversity of operations, since the same form in diverse parts and even in the same parts of the body can be the first principle of various operations, as is clear above. Since, therefore, there are no other [grounds] from which such a diversity of substantial forms could be argued, it is not to be posited.

Furthermore, neither in plants nor in other animals is there a diversity of substantial forms according to the diversity of such parts; therefore, neither in man. The consequence is clear. I prove the antecedent, because the **organization of the body** and the distinction of such parts in some way precedes the generation of the soul; therefore, according to this, such substantial forms precede the soul itself in the parts of the body. Either, then, they are corrupted in the generation of the soul, or they remain. If they are corrupted, either others like them are introduced—and this is not to be said, because then they would be corrupted in vain—or others are not introduced, and then it follows that in such a living being there is not this kind of diversity of substantial forms, which is the proposition. If, however, they remain, then it follows that there will be a true **substantial generation** of something without the substantial corruption of anything; which is repugnant to all physics.

It is confirmed by the Commentator in *1 Physics*, comment 69, where he says that "if matter had its own form, it would receive no other while that one remained, but [the first] would immediately be corrupted as soon as another form was generated."

Nor can it be said that some one form of the whole body is corrupted: both because it does not appear that any one form informs the body of a plant before its soul [does]; and because by whatever reason those partial forms would remain, so would that total one.

Furthermore, if they remain, it follows that that production will not be a true generation simply speaking, but only an **alteration**. For the subject undergoing the change will retain the same name and the same definition under both terms, since any substantial form constitutes [a thing] in its specific being. Nor does it matter in this regard whether that form be perfect or imperfect, because any [substantial form] constitutes "this something" as one according to species, and consequently, while the same form remains, it will be the same thing, unvaried according to its substance, and by this, any supervening change will be only accidental.

This is confirmed by the Commentator where [cited] above, who by this proves that matter is not "something existing in act" having its own substantial form, since "then generation in substance would be alteration, and the received forms would be accidents." And this is another inconvenience which also follows in the proposal, namely, that the **intellectual soul will be an accident**. And I am certain that these inconveniences follow no less in the proposal than in that against which the Commentator argues, as is clear to anyone willing to pay attention.

And by this is also excluded one solution which is usually given by some, namely, that notwithstanding that the same substantial form remains, there will still be true generation if the received form be substantial. For by this it is also proved, as was declared more at length above in *distinction 12, question 1*, that no supervening form will be substantial.

These inconveniences also clearly follow according to the Philosopher in *2 De Generatione*, as is proved above in *distinction 15* in the fourth conclusion of the question.

If it be said that there will still be generation because a new substance will be generated, namely, a composite of the preceding [substance] which undergoes the change and the new form which is acquired—then I say to you that when wood is heated, there is a true generation, because a new substance is generated, namely, a composite of wood and the form of heat. Nor could it be proved that the form of heat is not substantial, or that this composite is not a substance, except from the fact that the wood is numerically the same in act according to the species of wood as it was before the change; and the same applies in the proposal.

(The Fourth Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the **fourth conclusion** first thus: Every substance which is in man is either soul or body, and there are not several souls in man; therefore, in man there is no substantial form other than the intellectual. The

consequence is clear, because the intellectual soul is in man, as is clear from the preceding question. The antecedent as to the second part is proved from the second conclusion; as to the first part, however, by the express authority found in *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, chapter 19. For it is written there: "**Man consists of two substances, soul only and body.**" From this it clearly follows that every substance of which man consists is either soul or body.

Second: If there were another substantial form in man other than the intellectual, it would either be the form of an element, or the form of a mixture (which some call the **form of corporeity**), or another soul. Not the form of an element, because no such thing remains essentially in a mixture, as was proved in *distinction 15*.

Nor any other soul, as is clear from the second conclusion of this question. Likewise, if it were some other soul, either vegetative or sensitive, one or the other certainly preceded the intellectual soul in that matter. For, as is commonly said, the embryo lives a **vegetative and sensitive life** before the rational soul is infused; and because nature does not corrupt one form so that another entirely similar one may be introduced (because its action would be superfluous), it follows that if any such soul is in man, it is that very same one which preceded the intellectual in the body. And if so, it follows that a new substance is generated, namely man, without the corruption of any substance, and thus it was inferred in the third conclusion.

Nor can it be said that it is a form of corporeity or mixture, since the same inconvenience just inferred follows.

Furthermore, it is no more inconvenient that a man or some part of him should be a beast or cattle than that he should be a stone or wood or something pertaining to some species of inanimate body, since there is less suitability between the rational soul and such forms than between it and other souls. But the first is not to be posited, therefore neither the second. But that follows if any such form be posited in man; for any such form constitutes an individual of its species.

Nor is the refuge to the distinction between **imperfect and perfect forms** valid, since there is absolutely no substantial form outside the soul which is not individual and singular and of a determined species, and consequently constitutes a singular of a determined species.

(Objections)

Against this conclusion it can be argued, specifically proving that besides the intellectual soul there is another substantial form in man, namely, the **form of corporeity**: First, because man truly is a body, and not through the intellectual soul, since that is a spiritual form. Therefore, [he is a body] through another substantial form.

Second, man is composed of a rational soul and a body, as all grant. Therefore, the body of which he is composed is either matter alone, or matter with some accident, or matter with the intellectual soul, or matter with some other substantial form. Not matter alone, because then even fire and every element, and

similarly every mixed body, would be composed of body and form; which no one says. For only animals are said to be **composed of body and form**. Nor is it matter with an accident, because no accident is of the essence of man. Nor is it matter with the intellectual soul, because the intellectual soul is the other part of man, co-distinguished from the body. Therefore, it is matter with another substantial form; and the proposal is held.

Third, when any animal dies, the matter for no instant is without a form of corporeity. Therefore, either that [form] preceded in the animal while it lived (and the proposal is held), or it is newly introduced. And this cannot reasonably be said, since no single effect according to species is produced indifferently by anything and by one or more according to species; nor even indifferently through any previous change, but by a determined cause and a determined previous change. Now, however, we see that if an ox or another animal is killed by a sword or a club, or is suffocated, or drowned, or dies in any other way, its **corpse** is always of the same nature, and consequently the form of that corpse is of the same nature. Therefore, it is not produced then anew, but preceded in the living being, produced by a determined and proper generator of its species. And so it can also be proved regarding man.

Fourth, "when an animal dies, the same **accidents in number** remain as were there before. Therefore, they have the same subject in number, because an accident does not naturally migrate from subject to subject. Now, however, their subject is not prime matter, because that does not immediately receive absolute accidents. Therefore, there remains some preceding form, and not a sensitive one, therefore [a form] of corporeity."

Fifth, this is specifically proved regarding man, "because if corporeity is not distinguished from the intellectual [soul], it would follow that the **body of Christ in the sepulcher** would never have been an essential part of the human nature in Christ, nor would it have been the same body living and dead, nor would the deity have been united to that body except by a new assumption; which seems absurd. Similarly, the bodies of the saints would not be the same living and dead, and consequently they would not be to be adored as the bodies of the saints, because they never had those bodies. Therefore, it accords more with the faith of the church to posit a distinction between the forms themselves than a unity."

Several other reasons are adduced to the same [point], but these are the stronger ones, and once these are solved, the rest are easily solved.

(Solution to the Objections)

To the first, it must be said that this name "**body**" is understood equivocally. For sometimes it signifies quantity itself or dimensions, as in the Commentator in *De Substantia Orbis*, chapter 1, and *1 Physics*, comment 63. At other times, however, it signifies every nature or quantitative substance, as in Augustine, *7 Super Genesim*, chapter 17, where he says: "We call 'body' any nature occupying a space of place by length, width, and height." And in this way man is a body, and even his matter is a body.

Modern doctors distinguish "body" into **body in the genus of quantity** (and that is the triple dimension) and **body in the genus of substance**. And this they subdivide into body which is a **genus**—and thus it is said of every substance composed of matter and substantial form—and into body which signifies **one part of the composite** as distinct from the form.

In the first way, I grant that man is a body. It should be known, however, that just as "animal" (even though it signifies the whole composite) is said to be an animal principally through the soul because its constitutive difference signifies the form (namely, the soul) determinately—so also, although "body" as a genus signifies the composite substance and is predicated of that alone according to this mode of understanding, it is nevertheless said to be a body **principally through matter**, because its constitutive difference signifies matter determinately. For it is defined as a "material substance." And so I say that man is a body through matter—that is, because he is composed of matter—and he is not a body through any other form apart from the intellectual soul.

To the second, it must be said that "body" as the other part of the composite is **matter alone**. Nevertheless, this can be understood in two ways:

- **Commonly:** and thus every matter is a body. In this way the Commentator also understands it in *I Physics*, comment 63, where, having posited the distinction of a twofold alteration (namely, substantial and accidental), he says: "And when they have considered that which undergoes both changes, they find it to be the same in number, and it is the 'demonstrated body.' For we see the same body in the same place transformed from the nature of flesh into the nature of earth, and from the nature of earth into the nature of vegetation, etc."
- **Specifically:** for **organized matter**, and in this way only animate things are usually said to be "composed of body."

It is certain that this [the Commentator's view] cannot be understood except of matter alone, not of a composite of matter and some substantial form: both because in none of the elements is there more than one substantial form; and because matter alone, according to him, is the subject of generation.

To the third, I say that the **form of the corpse** is introduced anew, yet it is not always of the same nature, as the argument assumes. Just as the harmony [of the body] is not always dissolved in the same way, nor is the complexion of an animal corrupted in the same way—sometimes by a superabundance of one humor, sometimes by a superabundance of the contrary, and sometimes by an excess of one quality and sometimes by an excess of the contrary—so various and diverse complexions are generated, which different specific forms of the corpse follow. This often appears sensibly from the diversity of the accidents of the corpses themselves. Nor do I deny that sometimes from different causes a form of a corpse of the same nature can follow; this is not inconvenient, for we see this in many natural effects (e.g., the sun and fire cause the same specific heat).

To the fourth, I grant that frequently many accidents remain the same in number and in the same subject, and I say that **matter alone is their subject**, as has frequently been said. Furthermore, if the arguer intends that the substantial form alone is the subject of such corporeal accidents, this is dissonant with physical teaching and truth; or if he intends the composite of matter and form to be their subject, then he contradicts himself. For he holds elsewhere that no accident is simpler than its subject, and thus sensation is not subjectively in the composite.

To the fifth, I deny all those consequences if "body" is taken for the other part of the composite. For just as that very same matter existing in the sepulcher had been an essential part of the human nature in Christ, so also the same body existing in the sepulcher had been a part of the human nature in Christ; and what

was then dead had previously been alive. For such a body was nothing else intrinsically than **matter itself**. Again, that [matter] was united to the Word without the assumption of a new thing.

I say the same of the bodies of the saints. Nevertheless, new substantial forms were introduced into them; which I think no one ought to deny, otherwise the dust and ashes into which the bodies of many saints have been resolved would have been essential parts of those saints while they lived—which is absurd. Therefore, one must grant that we venerate such relics not because they were themselves parts of the saints, but because a part of them [the matter] was a part of the saints.

(To the Principal Arguments)

To the arguments of the question: To the first, I grant that in man there is an intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative soul, because it is the **same soul** which is the principle of living, sensing, and understanding. It is also a substance, and through it man is formally a substance, so that it is not necessary to posit a multitude of forms.

Regarding the **form of corporeity**: if "body" is taken as the other part [of the composite], no form of corporeity is to be given. If it is taken as a genus, we either understand by it the form of that which is a body (and thus the intellectual soul is the form of corporeity), or we understand a form by which it is first a body in the way we say a man is a man through a rational soul—and in this way I deny such a form of corporeity in man and in every composite. For a material substance is a body **principally through matter**, not through form.

To the second and third, it is clear from what has been said.

To the fourth, I grant the consequent and say that such diversity of accidents and operations does not arise from a diversity of substantial forms, but from the condition of one form (the soul), which requires its proper and due **susceptive [subject]** to be so organized and disposed. The soul itself, in these diverse organs and parts, is the first principle of diverse operations. One does not need to "feign" other substantial forms in those parts.

As to the claim that "one could never argue that things differ in species in the genus of substance" [without multiple forms]: I say on the contrary. For although one cannot argue for a diversity of forms from the diversity in parts of one total perfectible whole, when such diversity of accidents and operations is found in **distinct proper susceptible subjects**, one rightly argues for a specific substantial diversity. Hence, because in the body of a **deer** (the whole of which is compared to its soul as its proper perfectible) and in the body of a **lion** (likewise a proper perfectible) we see such diversity of accidents, we rightly argue for a specific diversity of their souls. Yet we do not say that specifically diverse souls exist in the different parts of the same body, despite the diversity of accidents there, because none of those parts is *per se* the proper susceptible subject of the soul.

QUESTION 3: Whether the sensitive or intellectual power in man is really distinct from his soul.

I ask thirdly whether in man the sensitive or intellectual power is really distinct from his soul. And I argue first that it is so regarding the **sensitive power**. For sensitive powers are many in man, but the soul is only one. Therefore, some sensitive power of man is distinguished from the soul, and by the same reasoning, every one of them is. The consequence is clear, because if every one were the same as the soul, they would all be the same as each other, and consequently, they would not be many, but only one. The antecedent is well known.

Second, the same is proved regarding the **intellectual powers**, and by the same means, thus: Memory, intellect, and will in man are three distinct things; therefore each is a thing other than the soul. The consequence is proved like the preceding one. I prove the antecedent by the authority of Augustine in *4 De Trinitate*, saying: "When I name my memory, intellect, and will, the individual names refer to individual things, yet they are made by all three together. For there is none of these three names that my memory, intellect, and will have not operated upon simultaneously." Where it is clear that according to him those three names stand for (**supponunt**) three distinct things which are in him.

To the contrary, it is argued by the authority of [the author] of *De Spiritu et Anima*, who says: "The soul shall be a rational and intellectual spirit." And it follows immediately: "According to the office of its work it is called by various names; for it is called **soul** while it vegetates, **spirit** while it contemplates, **sense** while it feels, **animus** while it knows, **mind** while it understands, **reason** while it discerns, **memory** while it remembers, **will** while it wills or consents. These things, however, do not differ in substance as they do in names, since all these are one soul, and the properties are indeed diverse, but the essence is one."

ARTICLE 1: (The Opinion of Thomas [Aquinas])

Regarding the first, there is a threefold solemn opinion. For one posits that the sensitive power of the soul is a certain quality essentially distinct from the soul and the body, existing subjectively not in the body alone, nor in the soul alone, but in the **composite (coniuncto)**. They prove that every power of the soul is an accident distinct from the soul in two ways:

1. "First, because since **potency and act** divide being and every genus of being, it is necessary that potency and act refer to the same genus of being. Therefore, if the act is not in the genus of substance, the potency which is referred to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. But the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance (except in God). Therefore, the power for the operation of the soul is not a substance."
2. "Second, the soul according to its essence is an act. If, therefore, the essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, one having a soul would always actually have the works of life, just as one having a soul is always actually alive." But this is false.
3. Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus* that celestial spirits are divided into **essence, virtue (power), and operation**. Much more so in the soul is the essence one thing and the power another.

That this accident is subjectively in the composite is proved because "to that thing belongs the power as to a subject, to which belongs the operation," as the Philosopher says. But the operations of the sensitive powers belong not to the soul alone, but to the whole composite, since they are exercised through corporeal organs.

(Against the Opinion of Thomas)

This opinion does not please me because it posits a **plurality of things**, which neither experience, nor reason taken from experience, nor any sacred authority compels us to posit. That experience does not, is clear; for no one experiences the soul and its power as two distinct things. That reason does not, will be clear in the solving. That sacred authority does not, is clear because this is nowhere held in the sacred canon.

I argue otherwise against it: Everything by which a sensing thing primarily senses is a sensitive power. The soul is such a thing (*2 De Anima*); therefore, etc.

To this they respond "that an accidental form has this very thing—that it is a principle of action—from the **substantial form**. Thus the substantial form is the first principle of operation, but not the proximate one."

Against this: If the soul is not the immediate principle of sensing, it will be possible for something **inanimate** to truly sense. For God could cause a power in a body, or preserve a caused one, without causing a soul. This being supposed, that thing would certainly sense. But this does not seem grantable. For in that case, such a body would not be alive, and consequently would not have the operations of life.

Furthermore, if this could be done for one operation, it could be done for any; and thus a thing lacking a soul could grieve, fear, hunger, and thirst. This is against the intention of **Augustine** in *83 Questions*, where against Apollinaris (who denied Christ had a soul) he proves He truly had a soul because He truly grieved and hungered. He says that just as the accounts of the Evangelists testify He had a body, so the affections—which cannot exist except in a soul—indicate He had a soul: Jesus marveled, was angry, was saddened.

I respond that such qualities, which are grief or hunger, could indeed be made without a soul [by God's power], but then they would not be *grief* or *hunger*, nor would anyone grieve or hunger through them. That anyone should grieve or hunger **without a soul** is utterly impossible.

(The Opinion of Scotus)

Others, holding the sensitive power not to be an accident, said that it is a certain **composite** of the body so mixed and the soul proportionally perfecting it for an act corresponding to such a composite. Thus, according to them, the soul is not the sensitive power (speaking of the total power), but a part of this power.

This seems provable from Augustine in *11 De Trinitate*: Everything in which sensation is received subjectively belongs essentially to the sensitive power. But sensation is received both in the soul and in the body. Therefore, etc. Augustine says vision is so pertained to as to be made "both in the body and through the body in the soul."

(The Opinion of Adam [Wodeham])

Another opinion is that the **soul alone** is the sensitive power, and in it alone is sensation received subjectively. This is proved because "no simple form is received primarily and immediately in an essentially composite thing," but is received either in one part only, or in one immediately and the other mediately. "Sensation is a **simple form**," therefore, etc.

This seems to be the intention of the **Commentator** [Averroes] in *2 De Anima*, who says that "senses move the virtues (powers) just as the sensibles which are outside the soul move the senses." In which it is clear he distinguishes the powers from the organs.

(Adam's Opinion Confirmed by Authorities and Reason)

Although the first of these opinions seems very probable to me, this second one [Adam's] pleases me more.

Authority: Augustine says in *12 Super Genesim*: "**The body does not sense, but the soul through the body**, which it uses as a messenger to form in itself what is announced from without." If the body received the sensation together with the soul, it would sense just as the soul does.

Reason: The human soul is **sensitive memory**; therefore it is every sensitive power of the man. The antecedent is proved by Augustine in *10 Confessions*: "The **animus** is the memory itself." And it is certain he speaks of sensitive memory by which species of sensed things are retained.

Furthermore, the species of sensibles are subjectively in the **intellectual soul** and remain in it after it is separated from the body. Otherwise, it would not have a distinct memory of individual sensibles, which is against the Saints. If, therefore, the soul itself is the power conserving such species, it is the memory. It would be superfluous to say some species are in the soul and others in the body.

(Response to the Objections for Scotus's Opinion)

To the authorities of Augustine: Vision is said to be made in the body only **mediately**, since it is made immediately in the soul informing it. It is made *through* the body because it is caused in the soul by a species caused in the organ.

Regarding the "sense" not being without a body:

1. "Sense" can be taken for the **sensitive power** itself, which is nothing other than the soul informing such a part of the body. Because of this connotation, it is said sense is not without a body. But the separated soul can still be called a sensitive power absolutely.
2. "Sense" can be taken for the **instrument** (the organ) through which the soul senses. Thus an eye is an eye only equivocally when dead, because it lacks the informing soul.

To the Philosopher: He says sensing is not proper to the soul alone not because sensation is subjectively in something other than the soul, but because sensation does not happen in the soul except **through the body**.

To the fifth [objection]: I grant the consequent, namely that God could preserve sensation in a **separated soul**; and I grant further that if other requirements concurred, the separated soul would sense. Nor do I see why this should be marvelous to any theologian.

(Objections)

But against this conclusion, it can be objected in itself: First, because it follows that **every sensation of man is an intellection**, since every sensation is in the intellect. Likewise, that **sense is intellect**, and conversely; the opposite of which the Philosopher proves in *2 De Anima*.

Third, it follows that there is only **one sense** in man, just as there is only one soul in him, contrary to Augustine in *2 De Libero Arbitrio*, chapters 6 and 7, positing five exterior senses, and besides those, a certain interior sense; which number of senses is also most common among all philosophers.

Fourth, then the same power would be the **sensitive and intellectual appetite**; which is impossible, since they are very often opposed to each other in their desires according to the saints.

Fifth, a most absurd thing follows, namely that **vision would be in the ear** and **hearing in the eye** and tasting in the foot; and consequently that man would see through the ear, hear through the eye, and taste through the foot, and universally perceive any sensibles through any part of the body. And the consequence is clear, because the soul, in which these sensations are said to be subjectively, is in every part of the body.

(Solution to the Objections)

To the first, I say that by **intellection** we can understand in one way **every knowledge formally existing in the intellect**; and thus I grant that, although not every sensation is an intellection (because the sensation of a brute is not), nevertheless **every sensation of man is an intellection**. In another way, by intellection we can understand only the knowledge of the intellect to which a corporeal organ or some form existing in it does not immediately move [the soul] *per se*; and then it is false that sensation is intellection.

Augustine distinguishes this double genus of knowledge in the soul itself in 7 *Super Genesim*, chapter 10: "By these senses," he says, "as if by messengers, the soul accepts whatever of corporeal things is not hidden from it." And a little later he adds that "the soul is not aided by the light which shines from the eyes except for sensing corporeal forms and colors." And he adds: "It has innumerable things far dissimilar to the whole genus of bodies which it beholds only by **intellect and reason**, to which no sense of the flesh aspires."

To the second, it must be said that, as was said above, "sense" is taken in two ways: In one way for the **corporeal instrument** by which the sensor senses; and thus no sense is intellect. In another way, "sense" is taken for the **force or power** by which it senses; and thus, although not every sense is intellect, nevertheless **human sense is intellect**, because it is the rational soul itself which is certainly the intellect, although it is called sense and intellect by different reasons. And this is expressly clear through the author of *De Spiritu et Anima*, as was alleged in the beginning of the question.

To the Philosopher, however, it must be said that he does not prove nor intend to prove that in man the sense and intellect are distinguished **powers**, but he well intends and proves that **to understand and to sense are not the same convertibly and definitively**, as the ancients opined. Hence he first proves that not every sensing is understanding, then that not every understanding is sensing, as is clear to one attending [to the text].

To the third, if "sense" is taken for the **organ**, I deny the consequence; if for the **power**, I grant the consequent, namely that there is only **one sense in man**, although because of diverse exercises it is called by various names and is sometimes said to be several senses, though improperly. This is also clear through the author of the book *De Spiritu et Anima*, who says in chapter 3: "**Sense is one in the soul and the same as it**; and although it is not a body, it is called corporeal." And "although within there is only one sense, nevertheless because of various exercises it is variously named. For the sense is called imagination, reason, intellect, or intelligence. And all these in the soul are nothing other than itself, distinct properties among themselves because of various exercises, but one rational essence and one soul." Augustine, however, understands the **organs of sensing**, as is clear in 11 *De Trinitate*, chapter 2, and 7 *Super Genesim*, chapters 10 and several following.

To the fourth, it must be said that the **sensitive and intellectual appetite** are not in name two essentially distinct powers, but the same soul itself. Insofar as it is moved or is mobile according to a sensual motion to appetition, it is called sensitive appetite; but insofar as [it is moved] according to an intellectual apprehension, it is called intellectual appetite. But that contrariety is not to be taken as of diverse souls or powers, but only of **diverse delights or concupiscences** of the same soul moved in one way and another, according to Augustine in 10 *Super Genesim*, chapter 12. The Commentator also in 3 *De Anima*, comment 50, holds that the **will and the appetite are the same power**. But, as he says, "if it desires through cogitation, it will be called will; if it is without cogitation, it will be called appetite." See that comment, because there are many things there pertaining to the proposal.

To the fifth, I grant that, just as intellection is immediately in the soul and mediately in every part of the body, so also vision and any sensation. Yet not every part of the body hears or sees, just as not every part understands; nor does man hear through the eye but **through the ear**, because **hearing is caused in his soul through the ear** and not through the eye.

ARTICLE 2

(Arguments for the Proper Opinion)

Regarding the second article, I say consequently that the **rational soul itself is the intellect and the will**, so that neither the intellect is a thing distinct from the essence of the soul nor is the will. This is the intention of Augustine in the sermon *De Imagine*, where he says: "The soul is intellect, the soul is memory, the soul is will." Likewise in *10 De Trinitate*, chapter 11, he says that "**these three, memory, intelligence, will, are not three lives, but one life; not three minds, but one mind**. Consequently not three substances, but one substance." And at the end of the chapter he says: "These three are one, one mind, one essence."

Other authorities could be adduced, but I do not care, because these suffice.

The reason touched upon in the preceding article moves me most to this, because **plurality of things is not to be posited** to which neither experience, nor reason proceeding from experience, nor sacred authority compels; for otherwise it seems to be posited in vain. None of the aforesaid compels it. Regarding authority and experience it is clear; regarding reason taken from experience I will prove it. For if there were any, it would be taken either from the fact that we experience in ourselves **diverse genera of operations** of the soul, or because we experience in ourselves **diverse modes of operating**, namely freely and naturally.

But from the first, a real distinction of powers cannot be sufficiently argued. Otherwise, it would be necessary to posit in one man several intellectual powers and several volitional ones, since we experience several genera of intellectual acts and similarly of voluntary ones.

Nor from the second, since according even to the contrary opinion the same will with respect to certain objects elicits certain acts **naturally**, and with respect to others elicits certain acts **freely**. From which it is clear that because of such a diverse mode of operating it is not necessary to posit powers distinct really. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore, it was proved in the preceding article that the soul itself is the **sensitive power**, therefore the human or rational soul is its **intellectual power**.

(Five Contrary Authorities)

Against this, however, there seem to be some authorities: One is of Augustine in *15 De Trinitate*, chapter 7, where he says that "if, the body being removed, the soul alone is thought of, something of it is the **mind**, as if its head or eye or face. But these are not to be thought of as bodies. Therefore not the soul, but **what excels in the soul**, is called mind."

Second, if these were not distinguished from each other nor from the soul, it would follow that, just as we understand through the intellect, so **we would understand through the will**; and just as we love through

the will, so **we would love through the intellect**. But this is false according to Augustine in the same place. For showing the dissimilarity of the trinity found in our soul to the Uncreated Trinity, he says thus: "And likewise in this there is a great distance, that whether we call it mind in man and its knowledge and love, or memory, intelligence, and will, we remember nothing of the mind except through memory, nor do we understand except through intelligence, nor do we love except through the will. But indeed in that Trinity who would dare to say that the Father understands neither Himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit, etc."

Third, below in chapter 17 he holds that each of the Divine Persons is memory, intelligence, and will; "nor do these differ in them. In us, however, **memory is one thing, intelligence another, love or charity another**." Furthermore, Augustine frequently speaks of them as if of several and distinct things. Hence, as is held above, speaking of them he says: "These three, etc."

Fourth, Anselm in *De Concordia*, chapter 29: "Just as we have in the body members and five senses, individual ones suited to their uses, which we use as if instruments, etc., so the **soul has in itself certain forces**, which it uses as instruments for congruous uses. For there is reason in the soul, which it uses as its instrument for reasoning, and will, which it uses for willing. For reason or will is not the whole soul, but each is **something in the soul**." These are his words.

Fifth, the Master of the Sentences in *Book 1, distinction 3*, expressly says that "those three are natural properties or forces of the mind itself and **differ from each other**, because memory is not intelligence or will, nor intelligence will or love." And before this he premised that the saying of Augustine, in which he says that they are 'one mind and one essence,' is not "true according to the **propriety of speech**."

(Solution of the Aforesaid Authorities)

For the solution of the aforesaid, it must be known that, since the soul is the power and principle of many operations in man, it receives, as was said above, diverse names, some of which signify the essence of the soul itself by **co-signifying determinately certain operations** of which it is capable; for example, "intellect" signifies the essence of the soul by connoting determinately the operation which is intellection; hence this name "intellect" signifies the same thing as this phrase "soul capable of understanding." Another name signifies that same essence by connoting another operation of it, which is to will, as is this name "will." And so it is of many others.

And because such names thus partially express it not by intrinsic partiality—for any of them signifies the whole [soul] and stands for the whole—but by a **quasi-extrinsic partiality**, because it does not give one to understand all things of which it is capable, but some of them determinately: therefore it is sometimes said that intellect and will and the like are **parts of the soul**, and they are even called powers plurally, so that insofar as it can do these things, it is called one power, but insofar as [it can do] those, it is called another power. And therefore the author of *De Spiritu et Anima* says in chapter 8: "**The whole essence of the soul consists in its powers nor is it divided by parts**, since it is simple and undivided. And if sometimes it is said to have parts, it is to be understood by reason of similitude rather than by the truth of composition. The soul is a simple substance, nor anything else; nor is reason in the substance less than the soul, but one and the same substance according to diverse powers," that is, according as it can do diverse things, "receives diverse names."

Augustine teaches the same in *12 De Trinitate*, chapter 3: "One nature of the mind," he says, "embraces our intellect and action, or counsel and execution, or reason and rational appetite, or if they can be called more significantly in any other way." And immediately it follows in chapter 4: "When therefore we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss **one certain thing**, nor do we double it into these two which I have mentioned except through offices."

From these things it is clear that reason and appetite are not two parts of the mind nor two things, but one only, distinctly signified according to **diverse offices**. By which also the present conclusion is principally confirmed.

From these things, to the **first authority** of Augustine, it must be said that he does not intend that the mind is a certain noble part of the soul in the way that the head or eye is a part in the body. But since the human soul is for man the principle of vegetating and sensing and desiring and understanding and willing, and of many operations, and it is not called mind insofar as it is vegetative or sensitive, but insofar as it is **intellective and intellectually volitive**, for that reason the mind is called as if a certain part of the soul; and because those acts, regarding which the soul is called mind, are more noble than the rest of which it is capable, therefore the mind is called something more noble or a more noble part of the soul. This, then, is the sense of "therefore not the soul, but what excels in the soul, is called mind," that is: therefore the soul is not called mind absolutely, but considered according to its excellence it is called mind.

To the **second**, it must be said that these names "intellect" and "will" are sometimes taken to signify the **operations** which are to understand and to will, sometimes however to signify the **power** intellective and volitive. If they are taken in the first way, it does not argue to the proposal. If in the second way, then I say that, if we attend precisely to the **truth of the saying**, it must be granted that we understand through the will and will through the intellect. Hence the Commentator in *3 De Anima*, comment 49, virtually grants this, saying: "**The desired moves the intellect, and then the intellect will desire**; and when it has desired, then the man is moved by the desiderative virtue, which is the intellect or imagination." Behold that "the intellect desires" and "is a desiderative virtue," and consequently man desires through the intellect.

If, however, we attend not only to the **truth of the saying**, but to the **"per se nature" (perseitatem)** and consequently the **"technical correctness" (artificiositatem)**—since, as the Philosopher says in *1 Physics*, "we say most properly that a doctor does or suffers something, if he suffers or does these things *according to that which is a doctor*," and the Commentator there in comment 74 says that "passion or action is not attributed to a thing *per se* except according to that which is that to which it is attributed, and the intention is predication which is *per se*"—if, I say, we attend to this, it is not to be granted that man understands through the will or that the intellect wills, because due to the difference of the connoted things, these are not *per se* to the premised understanding, because neither the intellect *insofar as it is intellect* wills, nor does man *insofar as he understands* will. And for this cause authorities are to be understood to deny such locutions, not because they are false, but because they are not locutions by the mode of art and science.

To the **authority** of Augustine, I say that he uses those terms "memory, intelligence, and will" for **acts**, and according to this the difference which he intends is most clear, since every Divine Person is His memory and intelligence and will, and [His] memory is intelligence or intellection and volition, but in us

it is not so. Or it can be said that, if he takes them for the power, he posits those negatives, avoiding the opposite affirmatives, not as false but as **unartful (inartificiales)**. However, the first solution pleases me more, because it is fully clear from the text.

To the **third**, I say similarly that he takes those for **acts**. And this is clear enough, because that word "charity" is never accustomed to be placed for any power of the soul, but only for an act or a habit. To that which is added concerning plural speech, it must be said that the speech is certainly improper, yet it is used to explain distinctly the many things of which it is capable; or that it is many powers by **equivalence**. Similarly Augustine in *9 Super Genesim*, chapter 26, speaks plurally saying that "the causes of certain made things were hidden" in God, although His most simple will is the unique first cause of all things; but "because of His diverse effects he calls the causes plural," as the Master teaches in *distinction 18* of this Second Book. And according to this sense I speak, if I happen to speak thus about this matter.

What Augustine says, "these three," ought not to move [one]. For in *15 De Trinitate*, chapter 17, speaking of intelligence, memory, and will in God, he says that "**all and singular persons have all these three, nor do they differ in them**"; so that he says "those three" and with this says "that they are not distinguished," just as it is true.

To **Anselm and the Master** together, although some attempt to expound them, I say nevertheless that it appears to me that they were of that opinion [of distinction] just as many other solemn doctors. However, because Augustine seems to me contrary to them, nor do I see a necessity for positing a distinction of this kind, therefore I hold the opposite, always saving the reverence of others.

To the **first argument** of the question, the response is clear in the preceding article. To the **second**, I say that Augustine takes those for **acts**, not powers, and others are also compelled to grant this, since they themselves do not posit that memory and intellect are two really distinct powers.

DISTINCTION 18

QUESTION 1

WHETHER the body of Eve was formed from the rib of Adam without the addition of other matter.

Regarding Distinction 18, in which the Master treats the formation of the woman from the rib of the man, I ask whether the body of Eve was formed from that rib without the addition of other matter.

It is argued that it was so, first by the authority of the Master in the present distinction, who says: "From the substance of the rib alone, without any external addition, the body of the woman was made, having been multiplied by divine power."

To the contrary, it is argued that if it had been so, it would follow that the body of the first woman would have been much more rare (less dense) than the bodies of others; which is not to be believed. The consequence is demonstrated: for as much as there is less matter in the same extension, so much more rare it is. Therefore, if the body of Eve was formed from the matter of the rib alone, it would have been as

much rarer than the body of the man as there were more portions of matter equal to the portion of matter in that rib in a quantity of the man's body as large as the woman's entire stature. But it is certain there were many more such portions, since a man does not exceed a woman excessively in bodily stature. It is also certain that the bodies of other women, granted they may be rarer than the bodies of men, are nonetheless not so by such a great excess. Therefore, Eve's body would have been much rarer than the bodies of other women are.

The Opinion of Lombard and Hugh

Here is the opinion of the Master and also of **Hugh [of St. Victor]** in *The Sacraments*, Book 1, Part 6, the last and penultimate chapters, in favor of the affirmative side. The reason for both is that if God had added other matter to complete the woman's body, that addition would have been greater than the rib, and consequently the woman's body should have been said to be made from that addition rather than from the rib. However, Scripture in Genesis 2 says: "The Lord God built the rib, which He had taken from Adam, into a woman"; nor does it make mention of other matter. They prove the possibility of this from that miracle of Christ, by which five thousand men were satisfied by five loaves multiplied by His blessing. For just as it was possible for God to multiply those loaves into so many more without any other addition, so it was possible to draw that rib to a greater magnitude, as great as He willed, without any addition.

For the declaration of this position, **Hugh** distinguishes six "works" by which, as he says, whatever is made is made:

1. **The work of creation:** when something is made from nothing.
2. **The work of multiplication:** by which "from something, things are made greater according to substance and quantity," or when from something, something larger is made.
3. **The work of diminution:** as when "from some things, something is made smaller," or that which was made great becomes smaller.
4. **The work of division:** by which "from something, things are made, yet not greater according to substance and quantity," but smaller, "as when a whole is divided into parts."
5. **The work of composition or conjunction:** when "from some things, something is made, yet not smaller according to substance and quantity," but larger, as "when parts are united into a whole."
6. **The work of annihilation:** when something is reduced to nothing.

Of these six, he says four are proper to divine power, namely the first three and the last; but the fourth and fifth he says belong to the creature. "Whose work," he says, "is rightly called 'nothing' for this reason: because through its work, nothing is taken away or conferred upon the essences of things, whether divided things are joined or joined things are divided."

In declaring further the work of multiplication, he says that "when more of something is made, something is made, because unless something were made in that which is already something, that which is more afterward would not be there." And he adds concerning the work of diminution: "Again, when something smaller is made from some things, something is made, because unless that which was previously more there were made into something in that which is now less, it would not be at all."

Four Conclusions

I do not grasp this opinion. Therefore, against it I prove four conclusions:

- **First:** That the work of multiplication, understood as he posits it, is impossible.
 - **Second:** That such a work of diminution is also impossible.
 - **Third:** That a creature can perform some work besides those two which he attributes to it.
 - **Fourth:** That the body of Eve was not formed from the rib of Adam without the addition of matter.
-

Proof of the First Conclusion

I prove the first conclusion thus: Let **A** be the name of some portion of matter which ought to be multiplied and made greater according to substance and quantity, and let **B** be the name of the larger portion of matter in which the portion **A** has been multiplied. Then thus: Either in **B** there is something which neither is nor was **A** nor a part of it, or there is nothing in **B** which is not or was not **A** or a part of it.

If the first is granted, then **A** is not made larger without the addition of another; for that which neither is nor was **A**, nor a part of it, has been added. Furthermore, either that added thing was something, or nothing. If it was something, and was not **A** nor a part of it, then **B** is made by the composition of that thing to that which is or was **A**; and thus this work is not a work of multiplication, "by which from something things are made," but rather it is the fifth work (composition), "by which from some things something larger is made," which according to opinion and truth belongs also to the creature. If, however, it was nothing, then it is itself something made from nothing, since according to him in the same place: "Something is made from nothing, when that which previously was nothing, was made so that it might be something." And this, as he adds, "is the work of creation."

If, however, there is nothing in **B** which is not or was not **A** or a part of it, then in it there is nothing more than was in **A**. Consequently, no multiplication has been made, nor is **B** greater according to substance than **A** was.

Secondly, either **A** in this work entirely ceased to be, and then it follows that it has been annihilated, and we have the sixth work posited above; and again it follows that **B** is made from nothing, as before. Thus such a multiplication will be nothing other than the annihilation of one thing and the creation of another. Or it did not entirely cease to be, and then either it or something of it remained; and then that which remained is either **B** itself or a part of it. If it is **B**, then by this work nothing has been made which was not there before. If, however, it is a part of **B**, then there is something else in **B** which was not made from **A**, and consequently "things were not made from something," but "from some things something was made."

Proof of the Second Conclusion

The second conclusion is proved by almost the same motives, only in reverse. Hence, if from **B**, which was a large portion of matter, a smaller portion **A** is posited to have been made, I ask: Was there something in **B** which is not **A** nor a part of **A**? This is against the statement of the opinion last cited; and furthermore, it follows that such a work of diminution is nothing other than a certain partial annihilation or destruction of that which is said to be made smaller. Or, was there nothing in **B** which is not **A** or a part of **A**, and then it follows that **A** is in no way smaller according to substance than **B** was—the opposite of which is posited. But if it is smaller, it is smaller according to quantity only, in the way that when something is condensed, it becomes of smaller quantity. And certainly, to make a small thing from a large one in this way is a work even of the creature.

Secondly, either in such a work **A** entirely began to be, so that neither it nor anything of it was there before; and then it follows that it is made from nothing, and consequently created, and **B** itself is annihilated, and such a work of diminution is nothing other than to annihilate one large thing and create one smaller thing. Or it, or something of it, was there before; and if **A** itself was there before, then it was not made by such a work. If, however, not itself but something of it was there, then that which was there before was either **B** itself or a part of **B**. If it was **B**, then in **A** itself there is more than **B**, and consequently something smaller according to substance has not been made from a large thing, but a large thing from a small one; nor something from some things, but rather things from something; the opposite of which is said.

Thirdly, I argue generally for both conclusions. For whether from **A** comes **B** through multiplication or conversely from **B** comes **A** through diminution, I ask: Does the matter from which it is made cease to be? If so, then the matter which is made is made from nothing and is created. Or it does not cease to be. And since in neither mode of making, according to this position, is any portion of matter created or annihilated, it follows that the very same matter is first that which is made and that from which it is made; which is impossible.

Response According to Hugh

To this, it can be answered according to him that it is not said that "from this" "that" is made because "this" *becomes* "that"; and then this indeed ceases to be what it is, but nonetheless does not cease to be, because it begins to be that which is certainly something. And therefore it is not annihilated, nor is that which is made made from nothing, because before it was made it was something, but it was not that which it becomes; nor is it made from something, because it ceases to be what it was before. And this solution could be sufficiently applied even to the preceding arguments.

This solution is drawn from his words, which are these: "Since there are two things, one becomes the other and passes into it so that it may be it, and it indeed ceases to be what it is; and yet it does not cease to be, because it begins to be what it is not. And when that which begins to be is made, something is made, because that which begins to be and which is made is something; and yet that which is made is not made from nothing, because before this was made, it was something. Nor again is it made from

something, because it ceases to be what it was before, when that which previously was not begins to be." Thus he says.

Against the Response

First, against that saying "it ceases to be what it is, and yet it does not cease to be": for this is unintelligible to me. For although some thing can cease to be *of such a kind* or *of such a size* as it is (granted that it does not simultaneously cease to be altogether—for example, a white and two-cubit-long body can cease to be white and two-cubits, and so with other things predicated of it accidentally and contingently), it is nonetheless impossible that it should cease to be **that which it is**, and yet not cease to be. For it is nothing other than itself. Since, therefore, it is impossible for it to be not-itself, it is impossible for it to cease to be itself without it ceasing to be. And so it is universally in all things, since there is no entity except itself—as Socrates is nothing but Socrates, and matter is nothing but matter, and so for individuals. It is therefore impossible for Socrates to cease to be Socrates without Socrates ceasing to be. And so it is impossible for this matter to cease to be this matter and that which it is, without it ceasing to be.

Furthermore, let that very thing be pointed out precisely which is this matter **A**; either this ceases to be, and the proposition is held, or if it does not cease to be, then this will exist after this instant. And then it follows that, having pointed out the very same thing entirely, it will be true to say after this instant "this is"; because if not, but it will be true to say "this is" only of something else from this, it follows that it is not now truly said of it "this will be," because it is truly said of nothing that it "will be" precisely, because something other than it will be. Otherwise, even of that which is now being annihilated (suppose that something is now annihilated never to be recreated again), it would be true to say that it will be and that it will not cease to be, for something else will be; which no one would say.

But if, pointing out the very same thing entirely, it will be truly said "this is," then also it will be truly said "this is this," pointing out the very same thing entirely through the predicate that is pointed out through the subject. Otherwise, it would be other than this, and thus would be other than itself. But if this will be true "this is this," then this is now true "this will be this," and consequently, from the first to the last, if this does not cease to be this, it does not cease to be this, from which it further follows also that it does not begin to be something else. Otherwise, it will be simultaneously this and something other than this; which does not happen.

Secondly, against the other saying, namely that "those things which are made, before they were made, were something": for if it was something, and it is certain that it was not other than **A** (supposing that **B** is that which is made), therefore **B** was previously **A**; therefore **B**, before it was made, existed; which is false.

Likewise, if **B** was previously **A**, then **A** was previously **B**; for it is impossible in purely absolute and non-connotative terms (such as these are supposed to be) to block such a consequence. But if **A** was previously **B**, then it does not now "become" **B** or "pass" into **B**. And furthermore, if **A** was previously **B**, by the same reason **A** is now **B**, and **B** is not other than **A**.

Furthermore, if **B** was **A**, or that which is **B** was **A**—which I say because some following the aforementioned opinion give this second [statement] and not the first—then that very thing which was **A** is **B**; and they even grant this. But if so, then it is impossible for God to restore the numerically same **A** without destroying **B**. The consequent is false. I prove the consequence: because if God can restore **A** without destroying **B**, this will be precisely by recreating **A**, because it is not by reconversion or transition of **B** into **A**, since then **B** would be destroyed. But that He cannot [do it] through recreation, I prove: because according to the opinion, **A** has not been reduced to nothing; therefore it cannot be recreated just as it cannot be created, unless it is first reduced to nothing. And it cannot be reduced to nothing unless it first has being, or **B** itself is reduced to nothing and consequently destroyed.

Furthermore, if it can be recreated, let it be placed into being. This being posited, it is true to say that that very thing entirely, which was **A**, is now **A**. Otherwise, it would not be the numerically same **A**. But by what was granted, that very same thing which was **A** is now **B**. From which it follows that that demonstrated singular thing is now **A** and is **B**, and consequently **B** is not another essence than **A**. And through this, neither when **A** was becoming **B** was it becoming another essence than it was, and thus it did not cease to be that which it was; contrary to what was given by the opining party.

Again, it is certain that **A** was a certain singular essence, common to nothing really distinct within itself, just as now it is not common to any plurality. Therefore, if it is that very thing which it was, everything which it was has now been made it; and consequently that which is **B** has been made **A**; therefore **B** passed into **A** and is destroyed. That this consequent is false, I think no one would deny.

I prove it nonetheless: for let it be posited that after **A** was made **B**, another portion of matter, namely **C**, is made **B**, and similarly some other portion as **D** is made that very same portion **B**; for all this is possible according to that way. This being posited, if **A** cannot be restored without **B** being destroyed, this will be precisely for this reason: because **A** cannot be restored unless it is made from **B**, or unless **B** (or that which is **B** and was **A**) passes back into **A**. Therefore, this being done, **C** cannot be restored unless **A** is destroyed (into which **B** passed, and consequently that which had been **C**), and consequently it will be impossible for **A** and **C** to be simultaneously in the nature of things. And the judgment is the same for **D** and as many others as might have passed into **B**. But this is entirely absurd, since they have no more impossibility to exist together in the nature of things than they had before their transitions into **B**.

Furthermore, according to the opinion, many things can be made from one through multiplication. Let it be posited, therefore, that from **A** come **B**, **C**, and **D**. This being posited, it is true to say according to the opinion that that very same whole which was **A** is **B**, and by the same reason also that very same whole which was **A** is **C**, and similarly the very same is **D**. Thus the very same thing entirely is **B**, **C**, and **D**; and consequently they are not many things counted together. And this reason specifically works for the first conclusion.

Furthermore, let it be posited conversely that from some distinct things one is made through the work of union, as from **C**, **D**, and **B** comes **A**; it follows that that very thing which is **A** was **B** and was **C** and also **D**, and consequently either **A** is not one such thing but many, or those were not many but one; the opposite of both is posited.

Lastly, the other saying, namely that "that which is made ceases to be what it was before when that which was not before begins to be," seems to be founded upon a false imagination—with all due respect always to him. For he seems to imagine that, just as when something white becomes black there is some common subject there which simultaneously ceases to be white and begins to be black, so in such a transition of essence into essence, or of one matter into another, there is something common which is first this essence and afterward is the other essence. But that imagination is not true, since a thing is not that which it is through something distinct from itself which is in it, in the way that something is white through something which is not itself, existing nonetheless in it.

Furthermore, it could be argued in the same way about that imagined common thing which is first this and afterward that. For since it is no less subject to divine power than this matter or that, so it itself will be able by divine operation to pass into some other thing just as this matter. And then either it also will be resolved into some other common subject, and so to infinity; or by passing into another, just as it ceases to be what it is, so it ceases to be simply.

Proof of the Third Conclusion

The third conclusion is easily proved. For a creature can [perform] the work of generation and the work of alteration, and it is certain that neither generation nor alteration is the division of some whole into parts nor the conjunction of several previously distinct things into one.

And if a challenge were made concerning the composite, saying that it is made through the union of matter and form—although this would not be according to the intention of the opinion—nonetheless this cannot be said of the form itself, and yet a creature makes that, with the action of God concurring, just as someone cannot divide or join things except with God co-acting.

Hence, as it seems, **Hugh** in this part was of that ancient opinion rejected by **the Philosopher**, which posited that generation and corruption do not occur except through the gathering and disjunction of certain smallest bodies, which smallest bodies (called atoms) he himself posits in the same chapter.

Proof of the Fourth Conclusion

I prove the fourth conclusion because either that numerically same matter of the rib was in the body of the woman (or was the body of the woman), or not. It cannot be said that it was not, because then God would not have built into a woman the rib itself which He had taken from Adam, as Scripture says, but some other matter.

Furthermore, from this it would rather be held that the woman had not been formed from that [rib] precisely without addition. If, however, the numerically same matter was in the body (or was the body) of the woman, either it was the whole matter of the woman, and then it follows that every part of the woman's body was a part of that matter of the rib, and consequently nothing more of matter according to

substance was in the body of the woman than in the rib. From which it further follows that it was drawn to such a great magnitude by rarefaction alone, as is clear from Book 4 of the *Physics*.

To this agrees the saying of **Augustine** in *On Genesis Literal*, Book 10, the last chapter, where against Tertullian he says: "What is more absurd than to think there is any body which, while its nature's quantity remains, grows on all sides unless it becomes rare?" And if it had been so, it follows that the body of the woman would have been much rarer than the body of the man and than the bodies of other women are; which is false. Or, it was not the whole matter of the woman; and the proposition is held.

I say, therefore, that from that matter of the rib, and also other matter either newly created or pre-existing in other things, as it pleased God, the body of the woman was formed; nonetheless, because of such an addition of matter, the body of the woman ought not to have been said not to be made from it, since even notwithstanding that a plant is not generated from the matter of the seed alone cast into the earth, we still say that the plant is generated from the seed.

As to why mention was made of that [rib] rather than another, the same reason can be given as why He willed to take that rib from the man so that He might partially form the woman from it. And there is a manifold mystical significance which the Master posits in the text. And so also **Augustine** hints in *On Genesis Literal*, Book 9, chapter 19, concerning small things.

And by this the solution to the reason for the position is clear. Regarding that about the Gospel loaves, I also say, as other Doctors say, that that multiplication of loaves was not made without the addition of other matter.

The authority of the Master and Hugh in this part is commonly not received, just as another saying of theirs similar to this is not—which Hugh posits in the same place and the Master in Distinction 30 of this Second Book—namely, that that alone of the paternal substance which is cut off in generation, without the addition of other substance, is multiplied in itself and grows to the perfect quantity of the son, so that not even any of the food is converted into his substance. For the Doctors commonly hold the opposite of this.

DISTINCTION 24 AND 25

QUESTION 1 WHETHER the will of man is the immediate productive cause of the acts of free choice.

Regarding Distinction 24 and 25, in which the **Master** treats of the **free choice** of man, I ask first, whether the **will** of man is the **immediate productive cause** of the acts of free choice. And it seems that it is not, because, if it were such a cause, it would be the cause either of acts **commanded** by free choice or of acts **elicited**. It is not the cause of **commanded** acts, because the will is not the principle of such acts except by means of its own **elicited** act, which is to will or to nill; and consequently, it does not principle them immediately. Likewise, it is not the cause of **elicited** acts, since such acts are immediately received in it **subjectively** and inform it; and consequently, if the will immediately produced such acts, it would **move itself** to such a form. However, this is against the **Philosopher**, who everywhere holds that **nothing moves itself primarily**. It is also against **Augustine** in *On Free Choice*, Book 2, chapter 30, saying: "No thing can **form itself**." And he proves it: "Because no thing can give to itself what it does not have; and certainly, so that it may have a form, something is formed. Wherefore, if any thing has a form, it does not need to receive what it has; but if it does not have a form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have. Therefore, no thing, as we said, can form itself." Thus he speaks.

But in the opposite is what he himself says in *The City of God*, Book 5, chapter 10: "**Our wills**," he says, "do whatever we do by willing. Which would not happen if we were unwilling." But we do every act of free choice by willing, and none would occur if we were unwilling. Therefore, our wills do every such act. But they do not do an **elicited act** mediately; otherwise, acts of this kind would presuppose themselves **infinitely**, and there would be no first and immediately elicited act. Therefore, such an act is produced **immediately** by the will.

This question presupposes that man performs certain actions through **free choice**. Which indeed, since it is known through **experience**, cannot be demonstrated by anything more evident. However, it is proved against those denying it by leading them to certain consequences which are judged false and inconvenient by all who have the use of reason: namely, because if man does nothing by free choice, all **human counsel** will be in vain, as **Damascene** deduces in Book 2, chapter 26; no one would merit **punishment or reward** for his acts, as **Augustine** shows in *On Free Choice*, Book 2, chapter 2; and many other absurdities follow. Furthermore, as the same author says in *On Grace and Free Choice*, around the beginning: "**Divine precepts** would not profit man unless he had free choice of will, by which, doing them, he might reach the promised rewards." Finally, this is repugnant to innumerable authorities of **Sacred Scripture**, as **Augustine** declares in the same place. And therefore, he himself says in the *Hypognosticon*, Response 3: "We believe with certain faith and preach without doubt that **free choice** exists in men."

This being presupposed, it remains to see about the question, namely whether the will is the **immediate productive cause** of the acts of free choice. And the question is to be understood not concerning acts **commanded** by the will, since it is certain that it is not the cause of such acts except by the means of a command which is its elicited act, but concerning acts **freely elicited**. Regarding which, having

understood the question, I posit **three conclusions**: The **first** is that of such acts the will is the **immediate productive cause**. The **second**, that the will alone is not the immediate productive cause of them, but with it the **knowledge of the object** causes them. The **third**, that the **object** of such acts of the will is not, insofar as it is an object, the immediate productive cause.

I prove the **first conclusion** thus: Such acts are **immediately in the power of the will**; therefore, the will is their **immediate productive cause**. The antecedent is proved. For that they are in the power of the will is clear: Both because, if it is not so, it follows that **no act** is in its power, and consequently **free choice perishes**. The consequence is clear, since any other act existing in our power is said to be in our power precisely because it follows our will, according to that of **Augustine**, *Retractations* Book 1, chapter 22: "That is in our power which, when we will, we do"; and again: "It is not in our power, except what follows our will." Therefore, if the **will itself** or the **volition** is not in our power, neither will the act consequent to it be in our power. This is confirmed, since the volition itself is not a **free cause**, but a merely **natural** one of the other act. Hence, once it is posited with the other requisites, the act necessarily follows—for example, if there is sufficient motive power and it is not impeded, and the other requisites are posited, if there is an effective volition to move, the movement necessarily follows; nor is it in our power that, these things standing, it does not follow. If therefore volition is not in our power, neither will the other act be in our power. Also by an argument from the greater, since, as **Augustine** says in the same place nearby: "**Nothing is so much in our power as the will itself.**" And below in Book 2, chapter 1: "We do not say," he says, "that anything is in our power, except what is done when we will; where first and most of all is the willing itself. For without any interval of time the will itself is present when we will." Therefore, if **volition** is not in our power, much more so neither is anything else. It is clear therefore that such acts are in the power of the will. That they are so **immediately** is clear, since there is not any other prior act or anything else by means of which the will has its act in its power, as is known. And it is confirmed from what has been said, because otherwise that would be more in our power than the volition itself, the opposite of which is clear from what has been said.

The consequence is proved, because if they are immediately in the power of the will, therefore the will is their **immediate cause**. But not only a **material** or **receptive** one: Both because then something else would be the immediate and total **active cause** of the volition, and, since no act is more in the power of the patient precisely than of the agent but conversely, it follows that the act of the will would be more in the power of **another created principle** than of the will itself; which is absurd. And also because, if it were merely passive, the **goodness or malice** of the act would be justly imputed to no man, **Augustine** saying in *83 Questions*, question 24: "Neither sin nor right action can be justly imputed to anyone who did nothing by his own will." This however would not be, unless because then that act would not be in his power; and consequently, if it were merely receptive of it, it would not be in its power; which is repugnant to the antecedent. Hence it appears entirely irrationally said that any act is in the full power of a **passive principle**, which is precisely passive with respect to it. If it is said that the will, although it does not immediately produce its own act, is nevertheless not precisely passive with respect to it, since it moves other powers to their proper acts or causes the acts of those in them, from which or from whose acts its own act is caused in it, and thus **mediately** it is the cause of its own act, this is not valid, because then the acts of **other powers** would be more in the power of the will than the willing itself; against **Augustine**, as is held above.

Secondly, the same conclusion is proved from the intention of **Augustine** in *On Free Choice*, Book 3, chapter 1. For he premises there that the **culpable movement** of the will is in it, and soon inquires whose it is. Hence in the person of the master: "Whose," he says, "is this movement, which you certainly concede is to be blamed?" And he answers in the person of the disciple: "I see it is in the mind, but whose it is, I do not know." Therefore he does not inquire whose it is as a subject and thing moved, but whose as an **active principle** or mover. And finally he determines that it belongs to the **will itself**. Therefore, in such a movement the will moves itself and consequently is the **efficient cause** of its own volition. This is confirmed by the **similitude** which he adduces. For he says that just as the movement by which a stone descends to the depths "is properly of the stone, so that movement is of the mind; nevertheless it is dissimilar in this, that the stone does not have it in its power to check the movement by which it is borne downwards, but the mind, while it does not will, is not so moved." But that such a downward movement belongs to the stone, not only as moved but as **moving actively**, is clear according to him in the same place, who explains that he is speaking of the movement by which it is moved **naturally** downwards, and not of that by which it is violently thrown upwards. And yet it is certain that even that violent movement belongs to it as a thing moved; and by this, if he did not intend that the natural movement belonged to it otherwise than as to a thing moved, it was not necessary to exclude the violent one.

Thirdly, I argue for the same point from another determination of the same author in *83 Questions*, question 8, where he says: "He feels that the soul is **moved by itself**, who feels that the will is in him. For if we will, no other wills concerning us; and this movement of the soul is **spontaneous**." In which words it is clear he means that the soul in willing **moves itself**, and he seems to found his saying on this, because a movement of this kind is spontaneous and in our power. Also in *On the Perfection of Justice*, around the middle: "**Divine precepts**," he says, "would not be commanded to be done, if our will did nothing there." Since therefore we are commanded to love God and neighbor, in this love our will **acts**. And it is clear that it does no less in its other spontaneous acts. Also below in the same place: "The will does not fulfill what it acts, unless it is divinely helped"; where he also implies that the will acts. And what will it act, unless it acts its **proper act**?

Furthermore, if it ought to be denied that the will is the **immediate productive cause** of its own act, this would seem to be for this reason, lest it be posited that something acts **immediately upon itself**. For those who posit the will as merely passive lean most upon this foundation. But on account of this it ought not to be denied, since, when the mind **loves itself**, according to **Augustine** in *On the Trinity*, Book 9, the last chapter, it is the principle from which its love proceeds, and consequently it effects its love in itself and **acts upon itself**. Therefore it is not impossible for the will to act upon itself and thus to **move itself**. **Anselm** also agrees with this in *On Concord*, chapter 32, where he says "the will is an instrument **moving itself** and doing all voluntary movements."

Against this conclusion it can be argued: **First**, from the definition of **active power** posited in *Metaphysics* 5, where it is said that it is a principle of transmuting **another**. Therefore neither the will nor anything else is a principle of acting upon itself. **Second**, because **matter and the efficient cause** do not coincide, *Physics* 2. But this would follow according to this conclusion; for the same will would be the efficient cause and the matter of volition. **Third**, **opposite relations** cannot be founded in the same thing at the same time. But the relations of agent and patient and of mover and moved are opposite. Therefore neither can be founded in the same thing, and consequently neither can the same thing act upon itself or move itself. **Fourth**, the aforesaid relations are **real** on the part of both extremes, since they are of the

second mode of relatives. But of the same thing to itself there is no real relation. This is clear in *Metaphysics* 5. **Fifth**, if the conclusion is true, it follows that the productive principle will be a **part** of that which is per se produced by it. For, since the form does not come to be per se, but the composite, as is clear in *Metaphysics* 7, the product per se in the proposed case will be the **composite** of will and volition, and the will which is a part of it will be the productive principle. But the consequent is false: Both because then something would be the cause of its own being; against **Augustine** in *On the Trinity*, Book 1. And because, since an equivocal producer is **nobler** than the product, it would follow that the will precisely which is the producer would be nobler than that composite or the willing will; which is clearly false. **Sixth**, the **Philosopher** in *On the Soul* 3 says that in the local movement of an animal there is "something moving which is immobile," namely the "**actual good**," and "a mover which is moved," namely the "**appetitive**. For that which desires," he says, "is moved insofar as it desires, and appetite," that is appetite or desiring, "is a certain act or movement." It is therefore the intention of the **Philosopher** that the actual good moves the appetite to its act and causes it in it. But the appetite itself, insofar as it desires, is moved, and consequently it does not cause its own appetite in itself. **Seventh**, the **Commentator** on *Physics* 2, comment 48, says that "**contingent-equally** is not found in powers acting per se but in **passive powers**, and of those, in those whose preparation for the reception of two contraries is equal, whether it be a soul or not a soul." But the will is a power contingent-equal with respect to such acts of its own, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 9 and sufficiently from what has been said. Therefore it is not an active power, but merely **passive** with respect to them. This is confirmed by the reason of the same author in the same place, since from that which is contingent-equally, one of the actions cannot proceed determinately, since neither is worthier than the other as to this.

To the **first** it can be said, first, according to the intention of the **Commentator** on *Metaphysics* 9, comment 2, where the **Philosopher** posits the same definition of power, that the **Philosopher** does not define **active power** universally, but that which is merely **transmutative**. Hence he himself says that the **Philosopher** "described active power which is a form and passive power which is through matter." And of such it is true that it is a principle of transmuting **another**, since it is a principle of transmuting matter and never is a principle of transmuting itself, although both principles, active namely and passive, sometimes concur in the same composite, as is clear concerning **heated water**, which per se without an extrinsic agent returns to coldness, of which coldness the active principle *quo* is the form of the water and the passive principle is its matter. And the **Commentator** also hints at this in the same comment, saying: "For in certain things active power will be in the thing passively, and in certain things in another." And according to this it is clear that that assumption does not work for the proposed point, since the will is not active in such a way. Secondly, even if it were granted that the **Philosopher** defines active power universally there, still it is not against this. For he speaks thus: "Power is called a principle of movement or change either in **another** or insofar as it is **other**," *Metaphysics* 5; by which disjunction he openly demonstrates that nothing prohibits the same thing from being transmutative of itself, although in different respects. Thus the will, insofar as it **virtually** contains its own act, transmutes itself insofar as it is **formally receptive** of it.

To the **second** I say first that, although many allege the **Philosopher** thus, nevertheless the **Philosopher** does not say this, nor even the **Commentator**, as is clear to one looking into both in that place.

To the **third** it must be said that, if any mutual relations are called **opposite relations**, nothing prohibits some opposite relations from being founded in the same thing, speaking according to a good

understanding of the foundation of a relation. This is clear through **Augustine** as to the relations which are treated; for when the mind **loves itself** or **understands itself**, it is active and passive, moving and moved. Furthermore, no one can deny that the same thing can be understanding and understood, loving and loved with respect to the same, and yet all these are said relatively and are referred **really**, as is clear from what was said in Distinction 30 of the First Book. If however those only are more properly called opposite relations which are **impossible** concerning the same thing, I deny that the aforesaid relations are opposite.

To the **fourth** I say that of the same thing to itself there can be a **real relation**, nor does the **Philosopher** say the opposite anywhere. For, where he is alleged, he speaks precisely of **identity** and not universally of the relation of the same thing to itself. And furthermore he does not say that it is not real, as was shown in the First Book, in the distinction previously alleged.

To the **fifth**, if such a composite is called produced per se, about which I do not care at present, I concede the consequent and deny the first inference by which it is proved to be false; for the will is not that composite. To the second proof I say that not every **equivocal producer** is nobler than the product; nay rather it has many instances. For **color** existing in a wall or a species in an organ is productive of vision in the soul, and according to that imagination it produces the composite of soul and vision, than which composite it is not nobler. The same is true of species existing in the soul, from which notices are produced. And many other instances could be given speaking generally of a producer as much total as partial.

To the **sixth** I say first that, granted that the **actual good** causes appetite in the appetitive efficiently, which nevertheless is not to be understood of **immediate** causation but mediate only, as for instance because it effects a knowledge of itself which partially effects the appetite. And the **Philosopher** seems to hint at this in the same place, when he says that "the appetible moves, when it is not moved, because it becomes understood or imagined," hinting by this that it moves the appetite by means of its **apprehension**. Which the **Commentator** also hints at in comment 54 explaining that "Appetite is a certain movement": "Appetite," he says, "is a movement, because it is from a thing desired through the intellect in act," that is through intellection. And in comment 49 he says that "the desired moves the intellect, and then the intellect will desire, and when it has desired, then the man is moved"; and again: "The intellect, when it has comprehended something, will desire through science and will move through desire," so that according to him science is the cause of desire and desire the cause of movement. However, the cause of science is the desired good itself, although not just any desired and apprehended good is the cause of its own apprehension. From this however it does not follow that the appetitive virtue itself is not also **productive** of its own appetite. Secondly it can be said according to some that the **Philosopher** holds there that the actual good moves the appetitive **metaphorically** only and by way of an **end**, just as can be had from the intention of the **Commentator** on *Metaphysics* 12, comment 35. And if it is argued against this, as some argue, that then the **Philosopher** would equivocate concerning the mover, when he says that there is a certain mover immobile and a certain mover moved, because the mover moved—suppose the appetitive itself—would move the moved body actively and not by way of an end, the inference can be conceded. Nor does any evil follow concerning that purpose of the **Philosopher**, as is clear to one diligently considering what the **Philosopher** intends there. Furthermore, everyone must concede this. For it is certain that the appetitive moves the body locally; but no one would say that the

actual good moves the appetite locally by an active motion. And thus both are not said to move univocally.

To the **seventh** I say first that the **Commentator** speaks of powers acting **naturally** insofar as they are such, not however of **free** powers insofar as they are free or with respect to those things of which they are free. Which I say on account of the **rational soul**, which with respect to certain operations is a merely natural principle, but with respect to certain ones is a free principle contingently. Also he speaks of **total powers** not partial, whether a unique one or several partial ones are taken for one total. The first of these is clear through the words which he premises, already alleged. For he says: "Let us say therefore that prime matter is prepared to receive two contraries equally, and therefore the reception of both contraries is natural to it. And similarly it appears concerning the **concupiscible soul**, namely that it is prepared for contrary actions equally. For that contingent does not have causes acting contraries equally in all time, namely that which is natural." Thus the Commentator. Where note that he speaks of a natural principle and again of the concupiscible soul, such as is the brutal soul or even the human insofar as it is sensuality, but not as it is **rational**, according to which mode it is free and relating equally to opposites, as is clear also from his intention and the **Philosopher's** in *Metaphysics* 9, comment 10. The second is clear through other words of the same author in the same place, namely *Physics* 2. For he says: "Therefore it is impossible for one of two diverse actions to be found from an equal contingent unless from another cause conjoined with it, since neither action is worthier so that it be the other." He holds therefore that there is no **total cause** naturally active of contraries. However, that something be a **partial** productive principle of contraries and merely naturally, of which contraries another partial productive principle is a **free principle**, is not against him. For then from the **liberty** of the free principle one of the actions will be determinately posited by both. From these things it is clear that the saying of the Commentator is not against the premised conclusion: Both because it is not their **total** productive principle, as will appear in the following conclusion; and because the will with respect to such acts is a **free principle**.

Proof of the Second Conclusion

The **second conclusion** is that the **will alone** is not the **immediate productive cause** of free volition. I prove this by the common reason of those holding this view, which concludes the proposed point with sufficient probability, as it appears to me. I argue, therefore, thus: If the **will alone** were the immediate productive cause of free volition, it would follow that the will could naturally will the **unknown**. The consequent is against **experience** and **Augustine** in *On the Trinity*, Books 8 and 10 in many parts, and in *On Free Choice*, Book 3, chapters 53 and 54. I prove the consequence, because every thing without which another thing cannot naturally be produced is either a **per se cause**, or a **necessary disposition** of the cause, or a **cause of that cause**, or an **effect** naturally following it. I think that an instance against this cannot be found. But, if the will alone is the immediate productive cause of free volition, the **knowledge of the willed thing** is not the cause of the volition, because it is not the final, nor formal, nor material cause (this is clear), nor efficient by hypothesis. Likewise, it is not a **necessary disposition** of that cause, since the will of itself is sufficiently apt to receive the volition, and by hypothesis is the sufficient productive principle of the same. It is also clear that it is not a **cause of the cause** [of the will]. Likewise, it is not an **effect** necessarily following it, since it is naturally prior to it. For a thing can be known, granted that it is not loved, but not conversely. This seems to be of the intention of **Augustine**, *On the Trinity* Book 15, chapter 23, where he holds that **love proceeds from knowledge**; and in chapter 26 he says that "love proceeds from the begetting mind and the begotten notion as from a parent and offspring."

Also *To Simplicianus*, Book 1, question 2, he says that "calling," which is certainly **knowledge**, "is the effector of the **good will**." Also the **Commentator** on *On the Soul* 3, as was alleged in the solution of the sixth argument against the preceding conclusion, holds that **science** is the cause of **desire**, and in comment 56 of his third book he says that "every appetite comes from imagination." Also in *Metaphysics* 12, comment 35, he says that if "the form of the bath, which is in the soul, is the agent of desire," and that "on account of it," namely as an **efficient cause**, "we desire the form which is outside the soul." And below: "Desire," he says, "is on account of the estimation of that which is to be some good." Also in comment 34 he says that "comprehension is the cause of pleasure." From all these authorities this conclusion is clear.

Objections against the Second Conclusion

But against this it can be argued: **First** thus, because it follows that some cause would be successively productive merely naturally of **contraries** in a patient disposed in the same way. This however is false, since every **natural agent** is determined to one, and only a **free agent** can act toward opposites. The consequence is proved, because while the **same knowledge** of some thing stands, we can at our pleasure first will it and afterwards nill it, and conversely. Therefore that knowledge will be the cause of both of those acts, which are truly contrary. And it is certain that it is merely natural and not free, just as neither the volition itself (concerning which it would seem more likely) is a free principle of anything, but merely natural, as was said above. **Second**, it would follow that whoever knew a thing **more perfectly** would love or hate it **more intensely**, since from a more intense cause, other things being equal, a more intense effect is produced. But the consequent is clearly false to many. **Third**, it frequently happens that **volition precedes knowledge**, as when we will to know what we do not know, and therefore **Augustine** says in *On the Trinity*, Book 9, the last chapter, that "a certain appetite precedes the birth of the mind, by which that which we will to know is born through seeking and finding, the offspring itself being knowledge"; and in the same place he says that this appetite is a certain will, "because everyone who seeks wills to find." From this two things follow against what was said: One is that the knowledge itself is not the productive cause of every freely elicited volition, because it is not the cause of that which was mentioned, and consequently neither of any other. The second is that some volition is about the **unknown**, since we only seek to know the unknown. **Fourth**, and to the same point, the will can will the intellect to have **no knowledge**, and consequently it can have a volition without any knowledge, and by this some volition will be of the unknown. The consequence is proved, because the intellect as to the exercise of its act is under the **empire of the will**, and consequently it will not have an act when the will wills that it not have one. **Fifth**, it is not necessary that an effect freely produced by the will be **foreknown**; otherwise there would be a process into **infinity** on the part of the anterior in acts elicited by the will. Therefore neither is it necessary for its **object** to be foreknown.

Replies to Objections

To the **first** it must be said that the inference is not inconvenient concerning a **partial cause**, with which another **free partial cause** concurs, which of itself has power toward contrary effects. Example: While the same apprehension precisely stands of some complex thing proposed to me and evident—for example, that the King is now in Paris—I can believe and assent, and finally, if I will, I can dissent; and yet both to the production of the assent and of the dissent the **apprehension** of that which is assented to concurs partially. To the **second** the consequence is to be denied on account of the concurrence of the **free cause**,

which even with a more intense knowledge can elicit a more remiss act. But that proof would be valid where all concurring causes acted merely naturally. To the **third**, concede that **volition** precedes *some* knowledge; nonetheless, however, *some* knowledge of the same thing of which the volition is, precedes *every* volition, at least causally. Hence, when someone wills to know the **unknown**, although that volition precedes the knowledge which is desired concerning it, it nevertheless does not precede that knowledge by which that **desired knowledge** is known. And from this it is also clear that such a person does not will the unknown, but wills **to know the unknown**, which "to know" nevertheless is not unknown to him. And this is what **Augustine** teaches in *On the Trinity*, Book 10, chapter 1, where he solves this doubt: "It must be understood," he says, "that it is not said to be the same thing when it is said 'he loves to know the unknown,' as if it were said 'he loves the unknown.' For the former can happen, that someone loves to know the unknown; but that he loves the unknown, is not possible. For 'to know' is not placed there in vain, since he who loves to know the unknown loves not the unknown things themselves, but the very '**to know**'; which unless he had it known, he could neither confidently say he knew anything nor that he did not know."

To the **fourth** I deny the first consequence. For, when the will might will the intellect to have no intellection, it would know that which it wills, namely **that the intellect have no intellection**. And when it is proved "because the intellect is under the empire of the will etc.," I say that this is true. But for the intellect to obey it in this, it will be necessary that the will also obey itself, namely that it suspend itself from every volition; nor is the opposite possible naturally. Whether however the will can thus freely deprive itself of every volition and intellection, I do not assert for now nor deny. To the **fifth** I deny the consequence, because it is not necessary for everything that is **produced** to be foreknown, but everything that is **loved**. And because it does not will every act which it produces, therefore it does not know every one, although it knows that which it wills through it; and, if it willed it, it would also know it.

Proof of the Third Conclusion

I prove the **third conclusion**: Because it happens that the **object** of the act is not in the nature of things, as for instance when one desires some **future** thing; therefore the object of such an act is not the **efficient cause**. Furthermore, an act can be freely elicited concerning some **volible complex** or something only **complexly significant**, as is clear when someone wills "not to dine" or "to lead a wife." Since therefore such things which are only complexly significant are not any **entities**, as was proved in the first book, it follows that they cannot be the **effective causes** of any act. To this also is the intention of the **Commentator** in *Metaphysics* 12, comment 35, where he holds that the **form of the bath** existing in the soul "is the agent of desire and movement." But the bath outside the soul, which we desire on account of its form which is in the soul, "is the **end** of the movement." **Augustine** also does not seem to attribute any causality to the object of volition with respect to the act other than that of an **end**. Hence in *On the Trinity*, Book 11, chapter 6, he always calls the object of the will its end. Also in *83 Questions*, question 35: "Since love," he says, "is a certain movement, and there is no movement except toward something, when we ask what is to be loved, we ask what is that toward which it is necessary to be moved." Where also he posits the loved thing only as the **end of love**. Thus therefore I say that the **object** of the act of the will is not immediately effective of the act, unless perhaps when the will **loves itself**. But then it is not the efficient cause of love insofar as it is an object, or loved, but insofar as it is **loving**, so that it, with the knowledge of itself, effects the love of itself. But where the object is distinguished from the will, it is in no way the **immediate effective cause** of the act. Sometimes however it is a **mediate** one, as when we

love a thing seen intuitively, for then the loved thing is the cause of the **knowledge**, which is the immediate cause of the love.

Objections against the Third Conclusion

Against this conclusion a **certain doctor** [Scotus] argues, **first** thus: If the object is not an effective cause, at least partial, with respect to the volition, it follows that "volitions would not take their **formal distinction** from objects, and then, since a habit is generated from acts naturally, habits of diverse objects would not be formally diverse; which is false." **Second**, if so, "then neither the habit nor the act of one object would be **nobler** than that which is of another, but greater and lesser perfection would be only according to the intensity in the effort of the willing agent. Therefore neither is the volition by which the will loves **God** nobler than that by which it loves a **fly**, supposing that it loves the fly as intensely as God; and consequently there will not be more beatitude in God than in a fly. And if it loved the fly more intensely than God, it would be more blessed with natural beatitude in the fly than in God, because natural beatitude is in the natural perfection of volition." **Third**, "the stone does not have a relation to the will because it is willed, but conversely the will according to the act of willing the stone **depends** on the stone. Therefore the will seems to have an **essential order** to the volible, and not conversely, and to relate to it as the **measured to the measure**. Since therefore the dependence of the measured on the measure is essential, it follows that the act of willing essentially depends on the volible object. But every dependence is of a caused thing on a cause, or of a posterior caused thing on a prior caused thing, as when from some one cause there are many effects according to an order, although the first effect is not the cause of the posterior effect. But the act of willing does not depend on the object as a posterior effect on a prior effect of the same cause; therefore as on a **cause**." **Fourth**, "we experience that we can love a good more when it is **present** than when it is absent. Therefore the known object, which through its cognition is present to the intellect, does something **per se** toward the act." He also makes other reasons, but those prove only this negative, namely that the will is not the **total cause** of volition, which I also concede. Therefore it is not necessary to respond to them. Against the same conclusion the authority of **Augustine** can be adduced in *83 Questions*, question 40, where he says that "from diverse things seen there is a diverse appetite of souls." But the seen and the willed are the same, and consequently the appetite or volition in the soul is from the **willed object**.

Solution of Objections

To the **first**, when it is inferred that "volitions do not take their formal distinction from objects," a double sense can be had: One, that is, volitions of objects distinct in species are not **formally distinct**; and in this sense I deny the consequence. Another sense can be that, although volitions of distinct objects are formally distinct, nevertheless they do not take this distinction **effectively** from the object; and in this sense I concede the consequent, since, just as volitions are not effected by objects or at least not immediately, so neither are their distinctions, which are not other things than themselves. To the **second** I deny the first consequence; and, because it is not proved, it is not necessary to answer further. To the **third** it must be said that no act of willing a stone depends **essentially** on the stone immediately. And certain ones depend neither mediately nor immediately, such as that which is of a stone **not existing** or only abstractively apprehended; but certain ones depend mediately only, such as that which is of a stone **intuitively** apprehended, since such a volition depends on knowledge, and knowledge on the stone. And what is assumed that "of the measured to the measure there is an essential dependence," is not universally

true, properly speaking of dependence, since of a non-existing thing an **abstractive knowledge** can be had, which is referred to it as to a measure. To the **fourth** it must be said that, if a good can be loved more **present** than absent, this is because it is apprehended **more perfectly** while it is present, and thus only **mediately** does it contribute to the act, namely by causing the **knowledge** which is the cause of the love. To the authority of **Augustine** it must be said that from diverse things seen there are diverse appetites by the means of the **visions** of those seen things.

To the Principal Reasons

To the **first principal argument** it must be said that the will is the **immediate productive cause**, yet **partial**, of elicited acts. To the **first proof** the answer is clear above in **Distinction 6**, question 1, article 3, in the solution of the fifth argument against the sixth conclusion of that article. And for now I recall that it is alleged there from comment 40 of the eighth book of the *Physics*. For the **Commentator** says that according to the **Philosopher** "it is not impossible" for something to **move itself**, "except in motors which are bodies or virtues in bodies"; but virtues in bodies certainly according to him are and are called virtues extended by the extension of the bodies which they perfect. The **will** however is neither a body nor a virtue in a body, according to the said understanding. To the **other proof** from the saying of **Augustine** it must be said that Augustine does not take **form** as it is taken here in the proposal, namely for an entity perfecting and informing another, but for **nature and essence**; and thus to form something is nothing other than to effect it and give it being in act in its proper nature, in the manner it is taken in Genesis 2, when it is said: "God **formed** man from the slime of the earth." Thus however neither the will nor another thing can **form itself**. For everything is formed through the unchangeable form, by which all things subsist, which is **God**, as **Augustine** says there and in the following chapter nearby. If anyone however wished to take form as it ought to be taken here, and to form for "to cause a form in itself"—which however would not be to the mind of Augustine in that place, nay rather he would even contradict himself in the things alleged above for the first conclusion—he could answer that Augustine intends that no thing can form itself as a **total active cause** of its own form, since besides any created cause the first form itself, which is God, is required for causing. And thus one would still come to the intention of Augustine, namely that through the **eternal and unchangeable form** all things are formed; nor from this is anything held against the aforesaid.

DISTINCTIONS 26-28

ADDITIONAL QUESTION 1 WHETHER man, according to the present state, with the general influence of God remaining, can perform any morally good act through free choice and his natural powers without the special help of God.

[Addition 46]: Concerning Distinction 26 and the two following, in which the **Master** treats of **operating and cooperating grace**, by which man's free choice is helped to work well and to avoid evil, I ask first: whether man, according to the present state, with the general influence of God remaining, can perform any **morally good act** through free choice and his natural powers without the special help of God.

And it is argued that he **can**: **First**, because man naturally can fulfill the precepts of the written law; therefore he can naturally do a morally good work. The antecedent is clear through the **Apostle** in

Romans 2: "For when the Gentiles," he says, "who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these... are a law to themselves, etc." The consequence is proved, since such a law commands only good works, the Apostle saying below in chapter 7: "The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy and good and just." **Confirmation** through that of **Jerome** in the letter *To Demetrias the Virgin*: "For how many philosophers have we heard and read of and seen ourselves who are chaste, patient, modest, liberal, abstinent, benign, and lovers of justice no less than of wisdom. Whence, I ask, are these things that please God in men alien from God? Whence these good things to them unless from the good of nature?" Thus he speaks.

Second, as is clear from **Sacred Scripture**, man is commanded and persuaded by God to do virtuous works; therefore he can do such works. The consequence is clear, because otherwise such precepts and exhortations would be given in vain. **Confirmation** through that of **Jerome** in the *Exposition of the Catholic Faith*: "We execrate also the blasphemy of those who say that something impossible is commanded to man by God, and that the commandments of God cannot be kept by individuals but by all [collectively]."

Third, if man could not do such good things, no one would sin by not doing them. For as **Augustine** says in the book *On Two Souls*, beyond the middle: "To say that anyone is held guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do, is of the highest iniquity and insanity." But this [consequent] is erroneous, because according to it no one would sin by not fulfilling the divine precepts.

To the contrary is what **Augustine** says in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, near the beginning: "No one," he says, "is sufficient to himself for beginning or perfecting any good work, but in every good work, both in beginning and in perfecting, 'our sufficiency is from God'."

Here there will be two articles: First, I will speak to the question; second, arguments will be made against what was said and replies given to the arguments.

ARTICLE 1

As to the first, because it is the **opinion of many moderns** [Scotus, Ockham, Adam Wodeham] that man through his natural powers alone with the common influence of God, both in the present state and that of fallen nature, can elicit a **morally good act**—that is, one conformable to right reason according to all circumstances required for the act to be virtuous and morally good (for example, to love God above all things, to grieve for and detest a sin committed and whatever is offensive to God, and so of others)—whose principal motive is that the will can conform itself to any right dictate of practical reason (and it comes to the same thing, because concerning an apprehended object the will can go out into an act and not necessarily a defective one), from which, as is clear, it follows that man naturally can perform not only *some* morally good act, but can elicit a good act according to *any* species of moral good—which opinion, as it appears to me, saving the due reverence of those opining, falls most directly into the **error of Pelagius**, nay rather deviates more unbridledly from Catholic doctrine—therefore: **First**, I will show what has been said; **Then**, against the opinion in itself I will posit **three conclusions**:

1. **First:** That in this state man can perform **no morally good act** of himself or through natural powers alone with only the common influence of God, but for performing any such act he needs the **special help of God**.
2. **Second:** That man according to this state, of himself without the special help of God, cannot have any **right practical dictate** or know what is to be willed or nilled, done or avoided; and I speak always of those things which pertain to the morally good or bad life of man.
3. **Third:** That, supposing man has true knowledge of what is to be done, still without the special help of God he cannot **will conformably** and operate conformably.

Concerning the Pelagian Error of the Moderns

For the evidence of the first, it must be known that **Pelagius**, distinguishing between *posse* (to be able), *velle* (to will), and *agere* (to do), said that only *posse* is to us from God. And therefore according to him it is not in our power that we are able to will or do well or ill. But it is in our power to will well and ill, and to do well and ill. Nor for these do we need divine help.

Hence, according to what **Blessed Augustine** recites in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 4—which book is clear to have been Augustine's from *Retractations* 2, chapter 50—**Pelagius** himself in his third book *Pro libero arbitrio* speaks thus: "We thus distinguish these three and divide them arranged as if in a certain order. In the first place we establish *posse*, in the second *velle*, in the third *esse* (to be/do): we locate *posse* in nature, *velle* in the will, *esse* in effect. That first one, that is *posse*, belongs properly to **God** who conferred it on His creature. But the other two, that is *velle* and *esse*, are to be referred to **man**, because they descend from the fountain of the will. Therefore in the good will and work is the praise of man, or rather of man and of God who gave the possibility of the will and work itself, and who always helps that possibility with the help of His grace. But that man can will and perfect the good is of God alone. Therefore that one can exist, even if these two were not; but these cannot exist without that. Therefore it is free to me neither to have a good will nor action; but in no way can I not have the possibility of good. It is in me, even if I should be unwilling; nor does nature ever admit idleness of itself in this. Let some examples make this sense clearer to us. That we can see with eyes is not ours; but that we see well or badly is ours. And, to embrace everything generally, that we can do, say, think every good is of Him who gave this power, who helps this power. But that we do or speak or think well, is ours, because we can also turn all these things to evil." All these are the words of **Pelagius**.

However, it is clear that the **premised opinion** does not disagree with this sentence, since it says we can do good through natural powers alone. And because it could be answered that Pelagius did not err in this, although he erred in other things, behold what **Augustine** says immediately in chapter 6, explaining why Pelagius in the premised words interposed "and who always helps that possibility etc.": "But lest he should seem to have said nothing of grace, he added: 'and who always helps that possibility with the help of His grace'; he does not say 'the will itself,' or 'the operation itself,' which if he said, he would not seem to abhor from apostolic doctrine." From which it is manifestly given to be understood that, because he did not say that, he abhorred from apostolic doctrine.

Furthermore, the same **Augustine** in the *Hypognosticon*, near the beginning, placing the articles of this dogma: "Of this dogma," he says, "these are the unspeakable blasphemies: 'Adam,' they say, 'etc.'"; and it

follows: "That man can fulfill what he wills through free choice as if sufficient to himself through himself." Here he calls that saying of theirs **blasphemy**.

Furthermore, in the book *On Heresies*, the penultimate chapter: "The **Pelagian heresy** etc."; it follows: "These are enemies of the grace of God to such an extent that they believe man can perform all divine commandments without it; whereas, if this were true, the Lord would seem to have said in vain 'Without me you can do nothing'." Through which words of the Lord it is shown that without His grace we can do not only not *all* His commandments, but not even *any*.

Also in the letter of a certain **Council of Carthage To Pope Innocent I**, celebrated under Aurelius bishop of Carthage, it is held thus: "We perceive **Pelagius and Coelestius** to be authors of an entirely nefarious error which must be anathematized by us all"; and it follows: "They assert that the grace of God is to be deputed in this, that He instituted and created such a nature of man, which through its own will could fulfill the law of God, whether written naturally in the heart or given in letters."

In the rescript of the aforesaid **Innocent** to the aforementioned council, as to this article, the Pope concludes thus: "Whoever therefore seems to assent to this opinion, that he says we have no need of divine help, professes himself an **enemy of the Catholic faith** and ungrateful for the benefit of God."

Also in the **Council of Milevis**, celebrated in the time of the Emperors Arcadius and Honorius and the aforesaid Pope Innocent under the same Bishop Aurelius, it is held thus in chapter 5: "Item, if anyone shall say that the same grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord helps us not to sin for this reason only, because through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed to us, so that we may know what we ought to desire, what to avoid, but that through it it is not granted to us that what we have known is to be done, we also **love and are able to do**, let him be **anathema**." Who however does not see that they say this, who assert that from pure natural powers we can **love God above all things**—in which according to the sentence of the Savior "the whole law depends"—and that we can conform the will to any right dictate of reason without the special help of God? Nay, they show themselves not to need the grace of God all the more, in that they say we do not need divine help even to know what is to be done or avoided by us, but can do it through our natural powers alone.

Also the same **Aurelius** bishop in the letter which he wrote "to all bishops constituted throughout the Byzantine and Arziguitan province concerning the condemnation of the heretics Pelagius and Coelestius," first posits the dogma of Pelagius saying: When "he said," namely Pelagius, "Adam was made mortal etc."; it follows: "And that the grace of God and help is not given for singular acts, but is in free choice or in the law and doctrine"; and below: "All these things Pelagius anathematized etc." Then positing the Catholic dogma, to the singular articles of Pelagius he opposes the articles of the Catholics and against him, which was just recited of Pelagius, he says thus: "That he confess the grace of God and help is given even for **singular acts** etc."

But if these [moderns] consent to this, either therefore we could do those same things without such help, although perhaps not so easily or more difficultly; and then consent is given to **Pelagius** who, as **Augustine** says in *On Heresies* where above, "rebuked by the brethren because he attributed nothing to the help of the grace of God for doing His commandments, yielded to their correction thus far, that he did not place it before free choice, but with unfaithful cunning placed it under, saying: 'For this it is given to

men, that what they are commanded to do through free will, they may vary **more easily** fulfill through grace.' Saying certainly 'that they may be able more easily' he wished it to be believed that, even if more difficultly, men can nevertheless perform divine commands **without the grace of God**; but that grace, without which we can do nothing well, they say is only in free choice, which our nature received from Him with no preceding merits of its own." And this certainly was also condemned in the pre-alleged council.

Or without such help we can by no means do them; and then it follows that we cannot do those things from **pure natural powers**.

(The Ordinary Text follows)

QUESTION 1

WHETHER man, according to the present state, with the general influence of God remaining, can perform any morally good act through free choice and his natural powers without the special help of God.

Concerning Distinction 26 and the two following, in which the **Master** treats of operating and cooperating grace, by which man's free choice is helped to work well and to avoid evil, I ask first, whether man according to the present state, with the general influence of God remaining, can perform any **morally good act** through free choice and his natural powers without the special help of God.

And it is argued that he **can**: **First**, because man can naturally fulfill the precepts of the written law; therefore he can naturally do a morally good work. The antecedent is clear through the **Apostle** in *Romans* 2: "For when the Gentiles," he says, "who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law, these... are a law to themselves, etc." The consequence is proved, since such a law commands only good works, the same saying below in chapter 7: "The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy and good and just." **Confirmation** through that of **Jerome** in the letter *To Demetrias the Virgin*: "For how many philosophers have we heard and read of and seen ourselves who are chaste, patient, modest, liberal, abstinent, benign, lovers of justice no less than of wisdom. Whence, I ask, are these things that please God in men alien from God? Whence these good things to them unless from the good of nature?" Thus he speaks.

Second, man is commanded by God to do these good works, as is clear through all of **Sacred Scripture**; therefore it is possible for man to do such works. Otherwise God would have commanded impossibilities to man; which surely is impious and blasphemous to say, **Jerome** saying in the *Exposition of the Catholic Faith*: "We execrate the blasphemy of those who say that something impossible is commanded to man by God, and that the commandments of God cannot be kept by individuals but by all [collectively]."

Third, if man could not do such good works, no one would sin by not doing them. For as **Augustine** says in the book *On Two Souls*, beyond the middle: "To say that anyone is held guilty of sin because he did not do what he could not do, is of the highest iniquity and insanity." But that consequent is erroneous, because according to it no one would sin by not fulfilling divine precepts.

To the contrary is what **Augustine** says in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, around the beginning: "No one," he says, "is sufficient to himself for beginning or perfecting any good work. But in every good work, both in beginning and in perfecting, 'our sufficiency is from God'."

Because **many moderns** hold the affirmative part of the proposed question, in which, as it seems to me, saving their due reverence and better judgment, they dissonate very much from the doctrine of the saints and from ecclesiastical definitions and favor a certain **condemned error of Pelagius**, therefore I will proceed thus: **First**, I will prove the opposite part by reasons and authorities; **Second**, I will show the other part to have been of the **condemned articles of Pelagius**, or, if it disagrees in anything, it deviates more from Catholic truth than the saying of Pelagius, and on account of this it is not to be sustained by any Catholic; **Third**, I will argue for that part and reply to its proofs.

ARTICLE 1

(Acceptation of the Morally Good Act)

As to the first article I premise that I, just as those of the opposite part and doctors commonly, understand by a **morally good act** nothing other than a moral act conformable to right reason according to all circumstances required for the act to be truly virtuous.

(Three Conclusions)

This being premised, I wish to prove **three conclusions**:

1. **First:** That no man in the present state, even with the general influence of God remaining, can without His **special help** perform any morally good act.
2. **Second:** That no man etc. can without the special help of God sufficiently know in those things which pertain to moral life what is **to be willed or nilled**, done or avoided.
3. **Third:** That no man etc., having even sufficient knowledge concerning something to be willed or nilled, done or avoided from those things which pertain to moral life, can without special help **will or act conformably**.

(Suppositions for the Proof of the First Conclusion)

To prove the first conclusion, I will premise some suppositions to be simply confessed by any Catholic without any hesitation.

First: That **no culpable act is morally good**. This is clear, because no morally good act is in any way difforn to right reason or lacking any circumstance due to be present according to right reason, as was said. But every culpable act is difforn to right reason in some way. Therefore etc. The minor is proved, because if any act were entirely conformable and in no way difforn to right reason, it would be such as it ought to be; otherwise the reason to which it conforms is not right but erring. But if it is such as it ought to be, it is not culpable.

Second: That no one tempted to any vice or any morally bad act can overcome such a **temptation without the help of God**. This is clear, since when in the Palestinian episcopal judgment it was objected to **Pelagius** among other things "that he said 'the victory over temptations is not to us from the help of God but from free choice'," he was compelled to anathematize this as manifestly contrary to Catholic truth. Otherwise he would have gone out only anathematized, as **Augustine** relates in the letter *To Paulinus* Bishop of Nola: "Whence," as he writes there, "it follows that whoever follows the authority of that episcopal judgment and the confession of Pelagius himself, ought to hold these things which the Catholic Church has always held." And among those enumerating what makes for the purpose, "that he confess," he says, "when we fight against temptations and illicit concupiscences, although even there we have our own will, yet our victory comes not from that but from the **help of God**." And this whole thing is also held in the letter of **Aurelius** Bishop of Carthage which he destined to the fellow provincial bishops concerning the condemnation of Pelagius and Coelestius.

Also **Augustine** a little after in the same place in his own person and that of other Catholics: "Without the grace of God," he says, "we say that the choice of the will is valid for nothing towards not sinning." Therefore neither towards overcoming evil temptations nor towards resisting, so that we do not offer consent to them.

Also Pope **Innocent** writing back to the bishops who were present at the Council of Carthage: "Equal," he says, "to resisting," namely temptations, "not free choice, but the **help of God alone** can make us."

Still many authorities of Sacred Scripture and of the saints could be adduced, but it is not expedient. For it is certain that the opposite is erroneous, as is clear from the letters of the bishops who were present at the Councils of Carthage and Milevis destined to Pope Innocent and from his rescripts to the same.

Third: That both for avoiding vicious acts and for doing virtuous ones the faithful by praying **implore divine help** and, when they have avoided the former and done the latter, they **render thanks to God**; nor are their prayers nor thanksgivings superfluous or feigned.

The first part of this supposition is clear and evident by daily experience; the second truly ought to be doubtful to no faithful person, since to say the opposite is to condemn the whole rite of the Christian religion and to infame basely and impiously of fiction **Christ and the apostles** and other holy fathers, who taught the Church to act thus both in words and deeds. Hence the condemners of the Pelagian heresies deduced his dogma to this as to a pernicious error and condemned it on account of that as erroneous, as is clear in the pre-alleged letters.

Fourth: That every man in the present state is **infirm and impotent** toward any good act falling under divine precept, so that not only for doing better or more easily, but simply for doing he needs the **special help of the grace of God** on account of his infirmity, to such an extent that he can perform no such act unaided. This is proved, since **Pelagius** was compelled in the Palestinian judgment to confess that the grace of God and help is given for **singular acts** and to revoke the opposite of this as erroneous under anathema, as **Augustine** recites in the pre-alleged letter *To Paulinus*, similarly also **Aurelius** in his. And that this is to be understood of the **special help of grace**, is clear through Augustine who, reciting the same rule of faith among the twelve which he takes for foundations against the heretic Vitalis in the letter to the same, speaks thus: "Since by the propitious Christ we are Catholic Christians, we know that not yet

born etc."; and it follows: "We know that the grace of God is given neither to little ones nor to greater ones according to our merits, we know it is given to greater ones for **singular acts**, we know it is not given to all men." If not to all, therefore it is a **special help**; and if for singular acts, therefore for those which fall under precept.

But that man needs such help not only for doing more easily but simply for doing, as was said, is clear, because since **Pelagius**—as Augustine recites in the same place—after that judgment opening the sense of his aforesaid confession in certain of his books said "therefore the grace of God is given to men, that what they are commanded to do through free choice, they may **more easily** fulfill through grace"—hinting by this that, although not so easily, they could nevertheless without grace perform such acts—the **Council of Milevis** celebrated in the time of the Emperors Honorius and Arcadius and Pope Innocent I afterwards condemned this sense as erroneous. Hence in the same place, chapter 6, it is written thus: "Whoever shall say that the grace of justification is given to us for this reason, that what we are commanded to do through free choice, we may more easily fulfill through grace, as if grace were not given, not indeed easily, but nevertheless we could even without it fulfill divine commands, let him be **anathema**. For the Lord was speaking of the fruits of the commandments, where He did not say: Without me you can do more difficultly, but He said: '**Without me you can do nothing**!'." From which determination it is manifestly clear that the grace of God is bestowed as a help to human infirmity for doing such acts and that without such help it could by no means do so.

This is confirmed, since in the letter of the Council of Carthage to Pope **Innocent**, in which also, as is clear in that letter, the errors of **Pelagius** were condemned, the fathers of the council write thus among other things, speaking of Pelagius and Coelestius: "They do not cease to persuade that human nature alone can suffice to itself for working and perfecting justice and fulfilling God's commands, not attending to what is written '**The Spirit helpeth our infirmity** etc.'." Where it is clear they understand that for fulfilling commands, on account of our infirmity which of itself is impotent to that, the help of God is given to us. And this also **Augustine** expressly posits or hints at wherever he speaks of this help of grace.

Fifth: That man for doing morally good acts even **not meritorious of eternal life** needs to be helped by God in such a way as he does not need to be helped for doing morally bad acts. This is clear, since such acts are attributed by the saints to God as author in such a way as our bad acts are not attributed, but rather are denied to be from Him.

Hence **Augustine** in *On the Predestination of the Saints* says that "whatever **Cornelius** did well, both before he believed in Christ and when he had believed, is all to be given to God, lest perhaps anyone be extolled." It is certain however that Cornelius, before he believed in Christ, did nothing well meritoriously in that sense, but only well morally. Also in Book 1 *To Simplicianus*, in the solution of question 2 around the beginning, he says that nothing of good is done by **catechumens** without the help of the grace of God, and yet their works are not meritorious of eternal life. Hence also in the same place he says that "the grace of God in them is so great as does not suffice for obtaining the kingdom of heaven." From these things it is clear that acts good precisely morally are attributed to God as author.

But that bad acts are not attributed to Him in the same way, is clear through the same author in Book 2 of *On the Merit and Remission of Sins and the Baptism of Little Ones* to Marcellinus, where he says: "We certainly do not have a **bad will** from God." Also below: "To be extolled into pride is of men's own will,

not of God's work; for neither does God compel or help them to this." And there also he holds that every **good will** in us is from God; otherwise that word of the **Apostle** "What do you have that you have not received?" cannot be saved according to him. Which is to be understood also of the will good morally only, as will appear somewhat from what has been said and more fully below. Also in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 9: "Confess," he says, "that you have from God whatever you have of good; from yourself, whatever of evil."

[Addition 47]: **Sixth**: That man in the present state is not of himself more sufficient for having a good will than the **devil**. This is clear through **Augustine** [Fulgentius] *On Faith to Peter*, chapter 3, where he speaks thus: "If it were possible that human nature, after it turned away from God and lost the goodness of will, could have had it again of itself, much more possibly would the **angelic nature** have had this, which by as much as it is less burdened by the weight of an earthly body, by so much more would have been endowed with this faculty." Which saying would not be true, if man were more sufficient or powerful of himself for having a good will than the devil.

(The Ordinary Text follows)

(First Conclusion is Proved, First)

From these things I prove the conclusion **first** thus: Man cannot without the special help of God perform any moral act **not culpable**; therefore man cannot without the special help of God perform any **morally good act**. The consequence is proved, because otherwise some culpable act would be morally good, against the **first supposition**. I prove the antecedent by authority and reason.

For **Augustine** says in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 11: "Free choice suffices for **evil**, but for **good** it is little, unless it be helped by the **Omnipotent Good**."

Also in the letter *To Hilary* of Syracuse, around the beginning: "Therefore free choice is valid for good works, if it be divinely helped; but deserted by divine help, however much it may excel in knowledge of the law, it will by no means have the solidity of justice, but the inflation of impious pride and a deadly swelling."

Also in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 12: "Absolutely if the help of God be lacking, you will be able to do **nothing of good**. You act indeed, with Him not helping, by free will, but badly. For this your will is suitable, which is called free, and by acting badly it becomes a damnable servant. When I say to you 'Without the help of God you do nothing,' I say **nothing of good**. For to do badly you have a free will without the help of God."

Also in the book *On Divine Predestination*: "Free choice which we have from God flows with a prone lapse to wickedness and, since it can do nothing toward the character of virtue with God's help deserting, it subsists suitable for every kind of sin supported by its own 'virtue'."

And in all the aforesaid it is clear that help is taken not for general influence but for **special help**, since without general influence free choice can perform no evil, and yet the aforesaid authorities say it suffices without God's help for acting badly.

I also prove it by **reason** thus: Man cannot without the special help of God in act or habit love God **for His own sake**, that is on account of God Himself; therefore he cannot love or will anything ultimately on account of God; therefore he cannot have any moral act **not culpable**.

The antecedent is clear through **Augustine** in Book 5 *Against Julian*, chapter 3, where he speaks thus: "When by God's gift one lives from true faith, God Himself is present both for enlightening the mind and overcoming concupiscence and bearing trouble. For all this is done rightly, when it is done on account of Him, that is when **He Himself is loved freely**, which love cannot be to us except from Him." Here you have that the love by which God is loved freely, which certainly is only that by which God is loved for His own sake, cannot be in us unless it be from Him.

Also in the letter *To Vitalis*: "We lost," he says, "free choice for **loving God** by the greatness of the first sin." He means to say that free choice by the merit of the first sin became impotent for loving God; and he speaks of the love by which He is loved for His own sake, for then only is He to be said to be loved. For as **Bernard** says in *On Loving God*, "whatever you seem to love on account of another thing, you clearly love that to which the end of love tends, not that through which it tends." And the same **Augustine** in *On True Innocence*, proposition 19, says: "He who worships God so that he may merit something else more than Him, does not worship God, but that which he desires to attain." But thus he worships God, who loves God not for Himself but on account of another.

Also *City of God* 21, chapter 16: "Then therefore vices are to be reckoned conquered, when they are conquered by the **love of God**, which no one gives but God Himself."

Also **Bernard** in *On Loving God*: "It is difficult," he says, "nay impossible for anyone by his own powers or those of free choice, once liberty has been received from God, to convert the will **wholly to God** and not rather to twist it back to his own purpose, as it is written: 'All seek the things that are their own'."

Also **Anselm** in *On Concord*, the antepenultimate chapter, says that "the will after justice was deserted became the servant of its own affection which is for **advantage**."

From all which it is clear that man in the present state cannot of himself alone will or love anything except in relation to himself, and consequently cannot love God for the sake of God. The antecedent is therefore clear.

The **first consequence** is also clear from the same authority of **Augustine**. For by that exposition "that is when God is loved freely" it is given to be understood that then only is something done on account of God, when "God is loved freely," that is for His own sake. It is also clear by reason, since for something to be loved on account of God is nothing other than to be loved because God is loved. Thus therefore to will or do anything on account of God ultimately is to will that very thing because one loves God for His own sake. Therefore, if one does not love God for His own sake, he does or wills nothing on account of God ultimately.

The **second consequence** is also proved from the same authority, if one goes to the mind of **Augustine** in what he says: "All this is done rightly etc.," where there is no doubt he intends that then only is it done rightly, "when it is done on account of God." It is also clear by reason, since no moral act not ordered to God finally or not done on account of God is done on account of that on account of which it ought to be

done, and consequently is to be deemed vituperable and culpable. The assumption is proved by **Augustine** in *On the Morals of the Church*, chapter 8, where he inquires purposely what ought to be the end of all our acts, saying: "Let us hear therefore what end of goods Christ prescribes to us. Nor is there doubt that that will be the end, to which He commands us to tend with supreme love: **'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God'**." And he adds: "Thither must we tend entirely, to that must our counsels be referred. God is the **summum bonum** to us. Neither must we remain below us nor seek beyond, for the one is dangerous, the other is nothing."

Also chapter 15: "I do not think, when there is a question of morals and life, that it is to be inquired further what is man's **summum bonum**, to which all things are to be referred. For it was clear that it is, both by reason as much as we wish and by divine authority which excels our reason, nothing other than God Himself."

This is the reason of the same author *Against Julian*, Book 4, chapter 3, where he says: "You should know therefore that virtues are to be discerned from vices not by **offices** [actions] but by **ends**. For the office is what is to be done, but the end is that on account of which it is to be done. Therefore when a man does something where he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it on account of this on account of which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning." And consequently showing what ought to be the end of our acts: "Far be it," he says, "that true virtues should serve anyone except Him or on account of Him to whom we say: 'God of virtues convert us.' Therefore virtues which serve carnal delectations or any temporal advantages and emoluments, can by no means be true. But those which wish to serve no thing, are not themselves true either. For true virtues serve God in men, serve God in angels, from whom they are given to men and angels. But whatever of good is done by man and is not done on account of this, on account of which true wisdom commands it to be done, although by office it seems good, by the **end not being right it is a sin**." From these things it is clear that whatever man does ultimately on account of another than on account of God, he sins, and by this his act is not inculpable.

To this also agrees what the same author says in *City of God* 19, chapter 25: "Virtues, which the mind seems to itself to have, through which it commands the body and vices for obtaining or holding anything, if it has not referred them to **God**, are themselves vices rather than virtues. For, although by some they are then thought true and honest, when they are referred to themselves, and are not sought on account of another, even then they are inflated and proud. And therefore they are to be judged not virtues but **vices**."

(Corollary)

From these things I infer as a corollary that **no one can merit the first grace** *de condigno* (condignly) nor even *de congruo* (congruously), against the opinion of some **moderns** [Scotus, Holcot]. By the name of grace I signify not only **sanctifying grace** (grace making pleasing) but also **gratuitous grace** (grace freely given), and universally whatever **special help of God** for working well, whether He helps by infusing some created gift or immediately by Himself moving the will to will well or in whatever other special way He helps man.

This conclusion thus understood is proved thus: No one can have before the first grace any act of free choice **not culpable**; therefore no one can merit the first grace *de condigno* or *de congruo*.

The consequence is clear, because no one merits except through acts of free choice, and it is certain that one does not merit grace through any culpable act, but rather punishment.

The antecedent is proved, because if anyone could before the first grace have an act of free choice not culpable, then someone could without special help have such an act, the opposite of which has been proved. It is proved also by **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon*, response 4, saying: "We condemn by divine authority the works of free choice which are placed before grace." Therefore such works preventing grace are culpable.

This conclusion is confirmed in itself by another authority of the same author. For he himself says *To Paulinus* Bishop of Nola: "If he wished to seek what he merited before grace so that he might receive it, man will be able to find his evil deeds, not good ones." And he adds: "Which if debt followed, what would be rendered to his merit except punishment?"

It is confirmed, for as he adds, "even the merit of man itself is a **free gift**; nor does anyone merit to receive anything of good 'from the Father of lights', from whom descends 'every best gift', except by receiving what he does not merit." Therefore the first merit of man is grace or a free gift of God; therefore he does not merit the first grace. Otherwise before the first grace there would be a prior [grace] and before the first merit there would be another prior merit.

It is confirmed also by the authority of the **Apostle** in *Romans* 11 saying: "Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?"—as if he said "no one." Which would not be true if anyone merited the first grace; for then he would have given a merit which he would not have had from God and for it would have received grace. And therefore **Augustine** on these words in sermon 10 *On the Words of the Apostle*: "'Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?' Who first gave, when he received all freely? 'Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?' If the Lord wished to recompense, He would have recompensed nothing but due punishment. 'Who hath first given to him', who has prevented the grace which is given freely? If anything of merits prevents grace, it is no longer given freely but rendered from debt. But if it is not given freely, why is it called grace?" In which words he himself also proves the aforesaid conclusion.

(First Conclusion is Proved, Repeatedly)

Second, I argue to the principal conclusion thus: If man could without the special help of God perform a morally good act, he, tempted to a vicious act, could without the special help of God overcome that temptation. The consequent is false, as is clear from the **second supposition**. The consequence is proved, since he, tempted, could elicit an opposite morally good act, and thus not elicit the vicious act to which he is tempted, and by this he would conquer and not be conquered. Hence, if the antecedent be true, one tempted for example concerning concupiscence could will to contain on account of God, but with such a volition it is not compossible that he covets, and thus he will not covet and will overcome.

Third thus: If man can etc., therefore foolishly and superfluously by praying does he implore the help of God that he may not consent to temptation or that he may not be angry with his neighbor or work other evil; foolishly also does he give thanks to God when he has obtained these things. The consequent is clear to be false from the **third supposition**. The consequence is proved, since if he can, not helped by God,

perform a good act, he can, not helped, avoid the opposite bad act. And if so, he superfluously implores help.

And this last consequence holds by entirely the same reason by which holds the consequence of the **Council of Carthage** against Pelagius and Coelestius; nay rather in reality it is the same in sentence to that one. Hence in the pre-alleged letter of the said council to Pope Innocent it is argued thus: "It necessarily follows from the sacrilegious disputations of these men that neither ought we to pray that we enter not into temptation, which the Lord even warned the disciples and placed in the prayer which He taught; nor that our faith fail not, which He testified He had asked for the apostle Peter." And that this would follow, they prove thus: "For if these things are constituted in our power by the possibility of nature and the choice of the will, who would not see that they are vainly asked of the Lord and deceptively prayed for, when things are asked by praying which are obtained by the sufficient powers of our nature already so created?" Here it is clear that this is the sentential consequence of the council: If by his own powers man can not fall into temptation or not fail from faith, vainly and deceptively does he ask these things of the Lord.

Augustine uses a similar consequence in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 10, against **Coelestius**: "God's precepts," he says, "would not be commanded to be done if our will did nothing there; nor would it be prayed for if it alone sufficed." Of which authority the last part proves the proposed point. Also against **Pelagius** in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 18, the same consequence virtually premised: "What," he says, "is more foolish than to pray that you may do what you have in your power?" Also against the heretic **Vitalis** in the letter to the same: "Absolutely," he says, "we do not pray to God, but we feign that we pray, if we believe ourselves, not Him, to do what we pray. Absolutely we do not give thanks to God, but we feign that we give thanks, if whence we give thanks to Him, we do not think He does it." He posits the same sentence entirely in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, around the beginning. And in reality anyone attending adverts it to be true what is said.

From the same foundation it can be argued further to the purpose, since if man of himself, God not helping, can perform good moral acts, irrationally and vainly does he ask that God grant to him to live or act continently or temperately or justly or liberally or meekly or other acts of moral virtues; derisively also does he give thanks to God when he has performed any such act; which is against the **aforsaid supposition**.

Perhaps someone would say that one ought not to give thanks for such acts good precisely morally or concerning such, but for acts meritorious of eternal life. But this cannot stand; otherwise no **catechumen** or one existing in **mortal sin** ought to render thanks to God concerning such acts however good, since it is certain no act of his is for then meritorious of eternal life. Which consequent nevertheless is not to be granted.

Fourth thus: If man etc., it follows that he would not need to be helped by the grace of God to *whatever* acts falling under precept on account of his infirmity, so that not helped he could not perform them. The consequent is against the **fourth supposition**. And the consequence is clear, because if the opposite is given, namely that he needs to be helped to acts falling under precept, therefore also he needs to be helped to those which fall under **counsel** only, since they exceed his impotence still more on account of their arduousness. Hence concerning such the Savior said: "He who can take, let him take." And consequently

to *any* morally good act he needs to be helped, and to none does he suffice of himself; which is the opposite of the antecedent.

Perhaps it would be said that man does not need to be helped to perform such good acts absolutely, but he needs to be helped to perform them **meritoriously**; and for this grace helps, since with it informing the soul such acts are accepted by God for the reward of eternal life, which otherwise would not be so accepted.

But this answer plainly concedes the inconvenience which is inferred, namely that man does not need grace on account of his **impotence and infirmity**, nor is grace given to him by God for the help of his infirmity, although perhaps for the ornament of the soul and the acceptance of it. Just as, if a lord gives a beautiful garment to a servant in which he wishes to be served by him, accepting for a certain reward services exhibited by the servant clothed in that garment, but others by no means, no one would say that the servant on account of his impotence needs to be helped by such a garment to perform the services of the lord or that that garment is given to him for the help of his impotence, although it is given for ornament and beauty, and consequently for acceptance to the reward ordained by the lord.

Fifth thus: If man without the special help of God, with the general influence alone remaining, can perform morally good acts, it follows that man would not need to be helped otherwise by God for performing such good acts than he needs to be helped for performing opposite vicious acts. The consequent is against the **fifth supposition**. The consequence is sufficiently certain, since even for vicious acts he needs the general influence of God, which withdrawn from him he could by no means act.

From this foundation **Augustine** reprobates the answer of **Pelagius**, by which—when it was argued against him that if by the power of free choice we can act well, we would not have all our good things from God, the opposite of which Scripture says—he answered that "therefore we have such works from God, because from Him we have the **possibility** of working well." This, I say, he reprobates, because we also have the possibility of working badly from God, and yet Scripture not only does not say but rather denies that we have our bad works from God. Hence in Book 1 *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 25: "Let **Pelagius** therefore cease," he says, "to deceive himself and others by disputing against the grace of God. Not on account of one of those three, that is on account of the possibility of the good will and work, but also on account of the **will and good operation** itself towards us is the grace of God to be preached. For he defines that possibility to be valid for both," that is for good and for evil, "and yet our sins are not therefore to be attributed to God, just as he wishes to attribute our good works on account of the same possibility."

In a similar way he reprobates the solution of certain others of the same sect—saying that therefore the good will of man is attributed to God as author because man is from Him, without whom there cannot be a good will of this kind—in Book 2 *On the Baptism of Little Ones* to Marcellinus, not much after the middle, since, as he says, in the same way the **bad will** would be to be attributed to God as author; "which," as he adds, "is **nefas** (impious) to say." It is necessary therefore according to Catholic truth to confess that we need to be helped by the **special grace and influence of God** to perform good works, so that thus our good things are attributed to the help of God in a way that bad ones are not attributed.

[Addition 48]: **Sixth**, if man etc., it follows that man in this state is of himself more powerful for having a good will than the **devil**. The consequent is against the **sixth supposition**. The consequence is proved, since the devil cannot of himself have any morally good will, as **Augustine** [Fulgentius] expressly says in *On Faith to Peter*, chapter 3. Hence—what is well to be pondered—in the same place from this medium he wishes to prove that man cannot of himself have any **good thought or good will**; which now principally is also inquired. For he speaks thus: "That the beginning of a good will and thought is not born to man from himself, but is both prepared and given divinely, God evidently shows in this that neither the **devil** nor any of his angels, from the time by the merit of that ruin they were thrust down into this lower darkness, could or will be able to resume a good will. But if it were possible etc.," as was recited in proving the supposition.

Also in the letter *To Vitalis* he says: "Neither does the devil himself have free choice for doing well, but is hardened in the greatest malevolence by the punishment of his crime." From which authority it is clear he denies to the devil the possibility not only of a meritorious will, as perhaps someone [Scotus] would wish to gloss, but also of a **morally good will**, since he says he is hardened in malevolence, which is nothing other than a bad volition.

(The Ordinary Text follows)

(First Conclusion is Proved from Scripture)

By authorities of **Sacred Scripture** the same conclusion is evidently proved, such as that of the **Wise Man**: "I cannot be continent unless God gives it," *Wisdom* 8; and that of **Christ**: "Without me you can do nothing," *John* 15; and that of the **Apostle**: "It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that showeth mercy," *Romans* 9, and *Ephesians* 2: "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus," "that is through Christ," "in good works," and *Philippians* 2: "It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will," and *1 Corinthians* 4: "For what hast thou that thou hast not received?" And innumerable others could be adduced, by which it is shown indubitably that we can perform no good without the help of God. But let these suffice.

(Double Instance)

But to all the aforesaid and other similar ones perhaps someone will say that they do not force one to say that another help of God is necessary to us than the **general influence**; for all are saved if it is said that we cannot do anything unless God helping through His general influence.

Or perhaps it will be said that such authorities are not to be understood of whatever good acts possible to be done by man, but of **meritorious goods** only. And in this solution the moderns defending the opposite conclusion are more sustained; yet neither of them is sufficient.

(Against the Double Instance)

Hence the **first** is excluded:

- First by what was said in the **fourth supposition**;

- Second by what was said in the **fifth reason** to the conclusion. For neither can we perform **bad acts** with the general influence of God withdrawn, and yet Scripture does not say we need to be helped by God for bad acts as for good ones. Otherwise just as the **Wise Man** said: "I cannot be continent unless God gives it," so he or another could have said: I cannot covet or be an adulterer unless God gives it. And just as the **Apostle** says: "We are his workmanship, created in Christ in good works," so we could say: We are his workmanship, created in Christ in bad works; and just as he says: "It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good will," so it would have to be said that He works to will and to accomplish according to a bad will. Which words every ear of the faithful shudders at as full of **blasphemy**.

It is confirmed, since, as was alleged above through the council, and the series also of the preceding text shows, when **Christ** says: "Without me you can do nothing," He speaks specially of the **fruits of the commandments**. And, as **Augustine** says in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 12, as was alleged above, when it is said to you "Without the help of God you can do nothing," understand nothing **of good**; for with Him not helping you certainly act badly. Therefore besides general influence God helps us specially to act well, without which special help we could do nothing well.

The **second answer** also is not valid, and first indeed is evidently excluded by the last alleged authority of the **Apostle** [1 Cor 4:7], if it be taken according to the intention of the Apostle, as **Augustine** has shown excellently in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, not much after the beginning. For, as he proves prolixly, the whole intention of the Apostle tends to showing that no one can be extolled against another, either concerning anything over another in himself or in another man, but only to glory in the Lord. Hence the Apostle: "These things," he says, "I have in a figure transferred to myself and to Apollo, that in us you may learn, that one be not puffed up against the other for another, above that which is written. For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it," namely "from God"? It is necessary therefore to understand the saying of the Apostle universally of **any good**, by which man can be distinguished from man and extolled against another. Therefore not only of **meritorious** ones, but also of **moral goods** yet not meritorious. Otherwise some **catechumen** or even Christian existing in mortal sin, performing some acts morally good and extolling himself from them against another, could answer the Apostle asking: My meekness distinguishes me, my justice, and so of others, and this I did not receive but had from myself.

And therefore **Augustine** adds in the same place, as I alleged above, that "whatever **Cornelius** did well, both before he believed in Christ and when he had believed, is all to be given to God, lest perhaps anyone be extolled." But it is certain that the goods which Cornelius performed before he believed in Christ were not meritorious, meritorious I say of eternal life, as those solving thus speak of meritorious goods and as they are accustomed to be distinguished from moral goods.

This same thing is expressly clear through the same author in Book 1 *To Simplicianus*, in the response to the second question: "Man begins," he says, "to receive grace from the time he begins to believe God, moved to faith by either internal or external admonition." And he adds: "But in some the grace of faith is such as does not suffice for obtaining the kingdom of heaven, as in **catechumens**, as in **Cornelius** himself before he was incorporated into the Church by participation of the sacraments. But in others the grace is such that they are already deputed to the body of Christ and the holy temple of God." And it follows: "Therefore certain inchoations of faith are made similar to conceptions; yet it is necessary not only to be

conceived but also to be born, that one may arrive at eternal life. Yet none of these things is without the **grace of the mercy of God**, because even works, if any are good, follow—as was said—that grace, do not precede it." Thus he speaks.

Hence it appears manifestly that not only works meritorious of eternal life, such as are only of those who by participation of the sacraments are incorporated into the Church and made the temple of God, but also other good works **not meritorious of eternal life**, such as are in catechumens, are not done without the grace of God.

He says the same also concerning the good works of **heretics and schismatics** in the sermon *On Patience*, according to what is clear in the authority which is to be alleged from that sermon a little after.

Furthermore, against this answer seems to be the process of **Augustine** *Against Julian*, Book 4 from chapter 7 up to 19. For **Julian**, wishing to prove that we by our own powers without the special grace of God can act rightly, took for an argument that true virtues were in **infidels**, as is clear there in chapter 7. And with this he held that through them or their works they did not merit eternal life; hence he said they were **steriley good**, and so of all others who do not perform such works on account of God, as is clear from chapters 12 and 19. And against this saying of Julian, Augustine proceeds prolixly, proving from intention that in infidels there was no true virtue—although there were "vices bordering and close to virtues," and "similar by a certain deceiving appearance"—and that they performed nothing well, but **badly and culpably**, even where they performed things good in kind or office. Therefore it was not the intention of Augustine to prove against him that infidels or any others cannot act well without God's help *only for this reason*, because they cannot act meritoriously or works by which they merit eternal life (because Julian conceded this to him), but also that they cannot act **virtuously and well morally** or works virtuous and truly good morally; the opposite of which Julian affirmed.

(The first conclusion is proved by the authorities of the Saints and Doctors)

The Catholic and holy Doctors of the Church have taught this opinion. Whence **Saint Cyprian** the martyr, as **Augustine** cites him in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, says: "**We must glory in nothing, since nothing is our own.**" To which he applied the Apostle as a witness, saying: "**But what do you have that you did not receive?**" And it is clear that he speaks universally concerning any good acts whatsoever; otherwise, he would not show that "**we must glory in nothing**," as was deduced above.

Likewise **Ambrose** in Book 2 *On Luke*, whom **Augustine** also cites in Book 1 *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 44: "**You see**," he says, "**therefore, that everywhere the power of the Lord cooperates with human efforts, so that no one can build without the Lord, no one can guard without the Lord, no one can begin anything without the Lord.**" Now, how does the power of the Lord cooperate everywhere with human efforts if it does not cooperate with some virtuous acts of men? Or how can a man begin nothing without the Lord if he can even perfect a virtuous act without Him?

Likewise **Jerome** in the *Exposition of the Catholic Faith to Pope Damasus* says: "**We confess free will in such a way that we say we always stand in need of the help of God.**" The same in his letter *To*

Ctesiphon: "Whence do you dare to utter with a rash tongue that everyone is ruled by his own will? If he is ruled by his own will, where is the help of God? And if he does not need Christ as a ruler, how does Jeremiah write: 'The way of man is not in himself,' and 'The steps of a man are directed by the Lord'?" From which it is clearly gathered that the principle not only of true acts but also of **good thoughts** is from God, who inspires in us both the beginnings of a holy will and grants the strength and opportunity to perform those things which we rightly desire. For **"Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights."** He who both begins those things which are good, and carries them out, and perfects them in us.

The second is held in the same place, chapter 8, as follows: **"He,"** namely God, **"when He sees in us a certain origin of a good will, immediately illuminates and strengthens and incites it toward salvation, granting increase to that which He Himself either planted or saw emerge from our effort."** Prosper rebukes this on account of the last clause, saying that **"here now"** Cassian **"departs from the premised definition, and what had been given entirely to grace is partially assigned to free will,"** namely when he says some good will emerged from our effort.

The third is held in the same place, chapter 9, as follows: **"Except that in all these things both the grace of God and the liberty of our will are declared; and because sometimes man can be extended toward the appetite for virtues by his own movements, yet he always stands in need of being helped by the Lord."** Prosper rebukes this on account of that phrase **"and because sometimes by his own movements etc."** saying: **"As if our Physician does not grant even this to the sick, that they might desire true health."**

The fourth is held there in chapter 10, as follows: **"But so that it may appear more evidently that even through the good of nature, which was granted by the benefit of the Creator, the beginnings of good wills sometimes proceed—which nevertheless, unless they are directed by the Lord, cannot arrive at the consummation of virtues—the Apostle is a witness, saying: 'For to will is present with me, but to perform that which is good I find not'."** Prosper rebukes this, saying: **"As if the Apostle has a good will from a natural affection and not from the gift of grace, he who professes that his sufficiency even for thinking is from God."**

I pass over the following three, in which the proposition is also sufficiently confirmed. I come to the eighth, which is written in chapter 12 thus: **"Whence we must beware lest we so refer all the merits of the saints to God that we ascribe nothing to human nature except that which is evil and perverse."** Prosper rebukes this, saying: **"As if nature before grace were not in condemnation, were not in blindness, were not in a wound; or as if they were not justified freely, who are thereafter whence righteousness comes."**

I omit the remaining ones, because they do not pertain so directly to the proposition. But from these it is evidently clear that it must be held catholically, according to the doctrine of this saint, that in this state of weak and wounded nature **man cannot have any good volition without the help of the grace of God,** but of himself is sufficient only for evil; also according to the doctrine of **Augustine**, which is somewhat clear from the things cited in the first reason made above for the conclusion. And what sufficiently confirms the proposition is that in almost all books the aforesaid *Conference* of **Cassian** is found with the corrections of the blessed **Prosper** appended, which I think was begun by the earlier fathers and drawn

into custom by the Church, so that from that *Conference* the true things might be approved and the false rejected, nor the false received for the true.

Likewise blessed **Gregory** in the 22nd book of the *Morals* upon that passage of Job 31, "**If I kissed my hand with my mouth,**" says thus: "**Holy men know that they are changed unto better vows or works not by their own power but by prevenient heavenly grace; and whatever evil they recognize to be in themselves, they perceive as the merit of their mortal stock; but whatever good they behold in themselves, they recognize as the gift of immortal grace, and they become debtors for the received gift to Him who, by prevenience, gave them the good will which they did not want, and by subsequence, granted the good power for what they do want.**" Behold here expressly that "**whatever evil they behold in themselves, the saints recognize comes from their mortal stock, but whatever good, they recognize to be the gift of immortal grace.**" I ask, therefore, concerning a **morally good act**, whether according to this division of blessed **Gregory** it is to be counted in the number of evils coming from the mortal stock, or not. I think that no Catholic will say that it is. Therefore, it is to be counted in the number of those things which are called **the goods of immortal grace**.

Likewise the same in *On Ezekiel*, homily 9, upon that passage of Ezekiel 2, "**I heard the voice of one speaking, and he said to me: Son of man, stand upon your feet etc.**": "**Behold,**" he says, "**the divine voice commanded the prostrate prophet to rise. But he could not rise at all unless the spirit of the Almighty God had entered into him, because by the grace of Almighty God we can indeed strive toward good works, but we cannot fulfill them if He who commands does not help.**" Then—proving that by the authorities of the Apostle: "**It is God who works in you both to will and to perform,**" and of Christ: "**Without me you can do nothing**"—he adds below: "**But it must be known that our evils are ours alone, but our goods are both the Almighty God's and ours, because He prevents us by inspiring so that we may will, and follows by helping, lest we will in vain, but may be able to fulfill what we will.**" Here also the proposition appears, unless someone wishes to count **virtuous acts** among our evil works; which no one but a fool would say. Likewise, it must be noted that he attributes even the **effort** toward a good work to the grace of God. Now, who does not see from this that much more strongly does he attribute to it an act **perfectly virtuous** or **morally good**?

Likewise **Isidore** in the *Book of Differences*, chapter 30: "**The good that we do,**" he says, "**is God's on account of prevenient and subsequent grace; but it is ours on account of the subsequent will of free choice. For, if it is not God's, why do we give Him thanks?**" Which proof, if considered attentively, shows that **whatever right acts**, whether meritorious of eternal life or not, **we have through the grace and help of God**. For no Christian will deny that for all such things we give thanks to God, and indeed that we ought to give them.

The same, moreover, below in chapter 46: "**Let the defenders of free choice know,**" he says, "**that their own power can prevail nothing unto good unless they are sustained by the aid of divine grace.**"

Likewise blessed **Bernard** in sermon 13 *On the Canticles*: "**The origin,**" he says, "**of all fountains and rivers is the sea; the Lord of virtues and sciences is Christ. For who is the 'Lord of virtues' except 'He is the King of Glory'? And 'the Lord is a God of sciences.'** Continence of the flesh, industry of the heart, rectitude of the will flow from that fountain." And below: "**What? Chaste counsels, just judgments, holy desires, are they not the streams of that fountain?**" He yet adds: "**Whatever of**

wisdom, whatever of virtue you trust you have, reckon it to Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." How could he more expressly say that every moral virtue and act of virtue is derived from Christ in us as from a fountain?

Likewise the same in the book *On Grace and Free Choice*, chapter 40, says: "**The efforts of free choice toward good are both empty if they are not helped by grace, and non-existent if they are not excited. Otherwise, as the Scripture says, the senses and thoughts of man are prone to evil.**" From this authority it is clear that without the help of God exciting it, free choice cannot even **strive** toward the good. Much less, therefore, can it perform a virtuous act.

Likewise in the same place, chapter 44: The Apostle "**attributes everything that can be of good—that is, to think and to will and to perform according to a good will—to God, not to his own choice. If therefore God works these three in us—that is, to think, to will, to perform the good—He performs the first indeed without us, the second with us, and the third through us.**" And in the following chapter: "**Thus,**" he says, "**He works these things with free choice, that in the first He prevents it, in the others He accompanies it, to this end surely preventing it that they may now thereafter cooperate with Him; yet in such a way that what was begun by grace alone is performed by both together, so that they work mixedly, not individually; together, not in turns, through each progress. Not partly grace and partly free choice, but each performs the whole by an individual work; the latter indeed the whole, and the former the whole, but as the whole is in the latter, so the whole is from the former.**"

From these things the proposition is clearly open, since **every morally good act**, whether meritorious or not, co-requires—indeed, by the order of nature, even necessarily pre-requires—**thinking the good**, which, if it cannot be in man except from grace, it necessarily follows that without it no morally good act can be done by him.

Likewise among the letters of **Bernard** is contained one, which is 193, of several bishops writing the errors of Peter Abelard to Pope Innocent, among which the sixth is in these words: "**That free choice is sufficient by itself for some good.**" And in the rescript of Innocent to them, that point, along with his other dogmas noted there and previously refuted in the Council of Reims by blessed **Bernard**, is condemned as heretical; and it is letter 194.

Likewise **Anselm** in *On the Harmony of Grace and Free Choice*, chapter 19, says: "**Certainly no one keeps this received rectitude except by willing. But no one is able to will it except by having it, and he is by no means able to have it except through grace. Therefore, just as no one received it except by prevenient grace, so no one keeps it except by the same subsequent grace.**" From these the proposition is evidently clear, because, if no one can have or receive rectitude of the will except through grace, it follows that **no one can conform his will to right reason without the help of grace**. For the will is then always right when it is conformed to right reason.

Likewise **Hugh** in *On the Sacraments*, Book 1, Part 7, Chapter 35, as is clear from his authority to be brought forward for the second conclusion.

Likewise the **Master** in the 2nd *Sentences*, distinction 25, penultimate chapter, says thus: **"Free choice, therefore, since it is always free in each case, is nevertheless not equally free in good and evil men—and toward good and evil works. For it is freer in the good, where it has been set free, than in the evil, where it has not been set free. And it is freer toward evil, which it can do by itself, than toward good, which it cannot do unless it is set free and helped by grace."** Here it is expressly held that by itself it can do evil, but not good, unless it is helped by grace. Likewise in distinction 26, at the end of the first chapter, he says: **"By these testimonies it is openly suggested that the will of man is prevented and prepared by the grace of God so that it may become good, not so that it may become a will; because even before grace it was a will, but it was not a good and right will."** From which it is clear that without the help of grace the will can neither be virtuous nor right, and therefore not morally good.

Likewise **Saint Thomas** expressly puts forward this opinion in the *Prima Secundae*, question 109, article 2; also article 3, also article 4, also article 6. I do not write his words here for the sake of brevity.

Likewise **Grosseteste** in his sermon *On the Advent*, the beginning of which is **"There shall be signs in the sun and the moon etc.,"** says thus: **"In the moral doctrine of the philosophers also, and in the conversation of many gentiles such as the Scipios and Africans, the splendid stars of the virtues seemed to shine; but now it is truly manifest that without the faith of Christ there is no true virtue in anyone's doctrine or conversation."** He asserts this very thing and says it was the intention of blessed **Augustine** in his *Enchiridion*, chapter 37, where, treating of the four cardinal virtues and asking whether Cato and the Scipios had virtues of this kind, he says thus: **"We grant with Augustine that without the faith of Jesus Christ no one ever had or could have virtues."** And he proves it immediately thus: **"For there cannot be ordered love where that which is most to be loved is despised or not loved. Since, however, nothing is loved except what is known or believed, it is clear that he who does not know or does not believe in the Lord Jesus Christ does not love or despises what is most to be loved. Wherefore, in such a one there is no virtue. Which Augustine also proves by such arguments, saying thus: 'Far be it that there should be true virtue in anyone unless he be just etc.'"** From these the proposition is clear, since, if without special help from God true moral virtue cannot be had—as he evidently perceived—therefore neither can a morally good act be performed. Likewise, if without the help of God there cannot be ordered love, as he maintains, then neither can there be a morally good act, since every virtuous act is an ordered love or necessarily presupposes it.

Likewise **Bede** against Julian the heretic, chapter 18, responding to a certain argument of his, says thus: **"He who says the Lord, who is just, has not commanded anything impossible, certainly speaks the truth if he looks to His help, to which the Catholic voice supplicates, saying: 'Lead me in the path of your commandments.' But if he trusts in the powers of his own mind, he refutes the truthful sentence of the same Just One, where He says: 'Without me you can do nothing'."**

From which it is clear, according to him, that he who says someone can fulfill some commandment of God by his own powers alone contradicts Christ. Which also follows for one who says that someone by his own powers alone can perform a **morally good act**. For by any such act some commandment or counsel is fulfilled; but he who fulfills a counsel, which is more, can also fulfill a commandment.

(Other Authorities of Augustine)

No one who has seen his books, letters, and sermons written against the errors of Pelagius is permitted to be ignorant that this was the opinion of **Blessed Augustine**, just as it already appears sufficiently from his authorities cited above. Beyond those, I shall bring forward some that are very open and expressly prove the aforesaid opinion.

For writing to **Juliana**, the mother of the virgin **Demetrias**—to whom **Pelagius** had written, commending her for her moral virtues (which he calls spiritual riches), using these words: **"You have, therefore, even here that by which you may be deservedly preferred to others, or rather, more so from this. For bodily nobility and opulence are understood to belong to your kin, not to you. But spiritual riches no one can confer upon you except yourself. In these, therefore, you are rightly to be praised; in these you are deservedly to be preferred above the rest—things which cannot exist except from you and in you"**—all these are the words of Pelagius—writing, I say, Augustine, moved by these words, says to the mother of that virgin: **"Truly, the error of those is not small who think that we have from ourselves whatever of justice, continence, piety, or chastity is in us, on the ground that God so created us that beyond the fact that He reveals knowledge to us, He helps us in nothing further so that those things which we know by learning must be done, we might also do by loving."** Here he appears manifestly to speak of **moral goods**, such as we call moral virtues and their acts; and he says that those err who say we have any such thing from ourselves without the help of God.

Furthermore, immediately after the recitation of the aforementioned words of Pelagius, he says: **"You perceive surely how much destruction is to be guarded against in these words. For indeed, that which was said, 'those goods cannot be except in you,' was said excellently and most truly; that is clearly good. But that which he says, 'not except from you,' this is entirely poison."** And he adds: **"These are the gifts of God, and they are indeed ours, but not from us. For you have 'this treasure' in earthly and still fragile bodies as if 'in earthen vessels, so that the excellence of the power may be of God and not from us'"**; and these are the words of the Apostle speaking in the first person in 2 Corinthians 4. And below: **"We do not wish, therefore, that the holy virgin, when she hears of 'spiritual riches etc., which cannot be except from you and in you,' should so glory as if she had not received them."** And he adds the reason, saying: **"Because, although they are also from her on account of her own choice—without which we do not work good—nevertheless it is not as that man said, 'not except from her.' For one's own choice, unless it be helped by the grace of God, cannot even itself be a good will in a man. 'For it is God,' says the Apostle, 'who works in us both to will and to work according to a good will.'"**

As far as it appears to me, he could not speak more expressly for the aforesaid opinion. Nor can that evasion of the distinction concerning acts that are good **meritoriously** versus only **morally** be conveniently applied to these words, since he himself speaks expressly of moral virtues and their acts and denies they can be in us without the help of God. This is confirmed by what he writes in the same place: **"Or,"** he says, **"when a man hears the Apostle saying, 'For who distinguishes you?' is he going to answer, 'My good will, my faith, my justice,' and not immediately hear what follows: 'For what do you have that you did not receive?'"** For as was said above, if he had a **morally good will** and justice or another virtue from himself without the help of God, he could certainly answer, **"I have these and I did**

not receive them," and through this he could deservedly glory in himself, contrary to what the Apostle intends.

Likewise in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, near the beginning: **"Those,"** he says, **"must be resisted most sharply and vehemently who think that without the help of God, the power of the human will can by itself either perfect justice or profit by tending toward it."** Now it is certain that those say this who assert that without special help from God we can act justly and virtuously. For that Augustine himself understands this not of the help of general influence, but of the **special grace of God**, appears because immediately, having recited how the Pelagians confessed we are helped by God toward virtuous works, he adds his own and the Catholic opinion, saying: **"But we say that the human will is so divinely helped toward doing justice that, besides being created with free choice and besides the doctrine by which he is commanded how he ought to live, he receives the Holy Spirit, by which there is created in his soul a delight and love for that highest and unchangeable good which is God, even now while one still walks by faith and not yet by sight; so that, having been given this as a pledge of a free gift, he may burn to adhere to the Creator and be inflamed to approach the participation of that true light, so that it may be well with him from Him from whom he has his being. For neither is free choice avail for anything except for sinning if the way of truth is hidden; and when that which must be done and toward which one must strive begins to be not hidden, unless it also delights, it is not undertaken, and one does not live well. But so that it may be loved, 'the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts,' not by the free choice which rises from us, but 'by the Holy Spirit who is given to us.'"** From these things it appears that beyond the powers of free choice and even the special help of God's doctrine, he says the help of the **Holy Spirit** is necessary for us, by which we may love God—namely for His own sake, for only such a love of God is called **charity**—and from which love we may work. For whatever a man does, if he does it not from the love of God, he does it neither rightly nor virtuously nor morally well, because he does it not for God's sake, and through this not for that for which he ought to act, and therefore he sins, according to what was proved above from his own words. Such a love of God, however, is not had by the power of free choice, as he says, but from the grace of God.

From this reason he himself also, on the letter *To the Galatians*—where the Apostle says: **"For you, brethren, have been called unto liberty etc."**—in chapter 5 says that the Jews belonging to the Old Testament **"fulfilled certain works of the law which are in the sacraments; but those things which pertain to good morals, they were entirely unable to do. For nothing fulfills them except charity."**

Likewise upon that verse of Psalm 58, **"His mercy shall prevent me":** **"When,"** he says, **"will you understand that you have been prevented, unless you understand what the Apostle says: 'For what do you have that you did not receive?'** This is **'His mercy shall prevent me.'** Finally, observing all goods whatsoever we can have, whether in nature, or in training, or in conversation itself, in faith, in hope, in charity, in good morals, in justice, in the fear of God—that the whole is nothing but from His gifts, he thus concluded: **"My God, my mercy."**

Likewise *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 4: **"The grace of God is to be understood as that by which alone men are set free from evil and without which they do no good whatsoever, whether in thinking, or in willing and loving, or in acting; not only so that, by its showing, they may know what must be done, but also so that, by its granting, they may do with love what they know."**

Finally, he himself in the sermon *On Patience* moves and solves one question, where he evidently determines the aforesaid opinion, saying thus: **"But it may rightly be asked whether even that patience is a gift of God, or whether it is to be attributed to the powers of the human will, by which someone separated from the Church—not for the error which separated him, but for the truth of the sacrament or the word which remained with him—suffers temporal punishments for fear of eternal punishments. For we must beware lest perhaps, if we call that patience a gift of God, those in whom it is might be believed to belong also to the kingdom of God. But if we deny that it is a gift of God, we are compelled to confess that without the help and gift of God there can be something of good in the will of man. For this is not 'not a good,' that a man should believe he is to be punished with eternal torment if he denies Christ, and for that faith should endure and despise any human punishment."** Having proposed this question and made the aforesaid arguments for both sides, with nothing interposed he determines it thus: **"Therefore, just as it must not be denied that this is a gift of God, so it must be understood that some gifts belong to the children of that Jerusalem 'which is above and is our free mother'; for these are in a sense hereditary, in which we are 'heirs, and joint-heirs with Christ.'** But there are other gifts which even the children of concubines can receive, to whom carnal Jews and schismatics or heretics are compared. For although it is written: 'Cast out the bondwoman and her son; for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with my son Isaac,' and God said to Abraham: 'In Isaac shall your seed be called'—which the Apostle so interpreted as to say: 'That is, they who are the children of the flesh are not the children of God, but the children of the promise are counted for the seed'—so that we might understand the seed of Abraham according to Isaac to pertain, on account of Christ, to the children of God, who are the body of Christ and the members, that is, the one, true, genuine, Catholic Church of God, holding the pious faith, not that which works through pride or fear, but that 'which works through love'—nevertheless, even to the children of the concubines, when Abraham sent them away from his son Isaac, he bestowed some gifts upon them, lest they should be left entirely empty, not so that they should be held as heirs. For so we read: 'And Abraham gave all his substance to Isaac his son; and to the sons of the concubines Abraham gave gifts.' If therefore we are children of the free Jerusalem, let us understand that some gifts are of the disinherited, others of the heirs."

From these things the proposition is manifestly clear, since the **patience of heretics or schismatics**, by which they endure death for Christ, is certainly not a meritorious act, and yet he says it is a gift of God; and this is to be felt concerning the act of any other virtue and universally concerning any **morally good act**, even though it is not meritorious. This he also hints at by arguing for the second part of the question when he says: **"Lest we be compelled to confess that without the help and gift of God there can be something of good in the will of man."** And he affirms the same in determining the question, and later in following up and solving the argument for the first part of the question by that distinction of the gifts of God. From which it is also clear that that distinction concerning acts that are **good only morally** and those that are **good meritoriously**, made above, helps the opposite side not at all in this matter.

(Recapitulation of Authorities)

Let these authorities suffice for now, since from them and several others cited above and to be cited below, I think the proposition can be clearly open to anyone.

Moreover, **Pope Innocent**, writing back to the fathers who were present at the Council of Milevis and condemned the heresies of Pelagius: **"In all the divine pages,"** he says, **"we read that the help of God must be joined to the free will, and that it can do nothing if destitute of heavenly protections."**

Likewise the council of African bishops writing to **Pope Zosimus**, the final condemner of the Pelagian heresies, speaks thus, as Saint **Prosper** recites in the aforementioned book against Cassian, chapter 8: **"'The will is prepared by the Lord' and, so that they may do something of good, He Himself touches the hearts of His children with paternal inspirations—for 'as many as are led by the spirit of God, these are the sons of God'—so that we may neither feel our own choice to be lacking and in each individual movement of the human will unto good, we may not doubt that His help prevails more."** Now who would say that **morally good or virtuous volitions** are not included in that expression **"in each individual movement of the human will unto good"**? **"For we have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God, so that we may know the things that are given to us by God"**; and these are the words of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 2. But if the diminishing of ignorance is not from us but from God, it follows by the argument from the greater that the consumption or expulsion [of ignorance] is not from us.

Likewise the same in Book 2 *On the Baptism of Infants* to Marcellinus: **"Men,"** he says, **"do not want to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it be just, or because it does not delight them."** And he adds: **"Ignorance, therefore, and weakness are vices which hinder the will, lest it be moved to perform a good work or to abstain from an evil work. But so that what was hidden may become known and what did not delight may become sweet, it is the grace of God which helps the wills of men."**

Likewise **Hugh** in Book 1 *On the Sacraments*, Part 7, Chapter 25: **"The rational soul,"** he says, **"infused into the human body, unless it be helped by grace, can neither perceive the knowledge of truth nor resist the concupiscence of its flesh."** And he speaks of the knowledge of truth pertaining to salvation, as he himself explains in Part 6, Chapter 29. Now it is not doubtful that the knowledge of those things which must be done or avoided, willed or not willed, pertains to our salvation.

Secondly, the saints prayed to God for having such knowledge; therefore they could not have such knowledge of themselves without the help of God. The consequence is clear, because otherwise it would follow that their prayer would have been superfluous and feigned; which is not to be said. The consequence is clear by the force of the consequences made by the Council and Augustine against Pelagius and Caelestius, as was recited above. The antecedent is clear in several places of Scripture, such as: **"Make known to me the way in which I should walk"**; and: **"Direct my steps according to your word, and let no injustice have dominion over me"**; and innumerable such things.

Thirdly, man cannot have any **good thought** without the help of God; therefore he cannot know etc. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved by the authority of the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 3, saying: **"We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."** Which authority Augustine uses as a most powerful argument for the same proposition against Pelagius in Book 1 *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 25. Likewise in *On True Innocence*: **"It is of the divine gift,"** he says, **"when we both think right things and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice."** Likewise in the *Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, chapter 50: **"Good thoughts are always from**

God." Also, writing to Paulinus, the Bishop of Nola, Augustine—speaking of the prodigal son, who, having returned to himself, said: "**I will arise and go to my father**"—says: "**When would he have had that good thought, unless the most merciful Father had inspired it in him in secret?**"—manifestly demonstrating that we cannot have any good thought unless God inspires it.

Fourthly, this conclusion is proved by the express authority of Augustine in his letter to the priest **Sixtus**, saying thus: "**No one is rightly wise, rightly understands, rightly prevails in counsel and fortitude; no one is knowingly pious or piously knowing; no one fears with the chaste fear of the Lord, unless he has received 'the spirit of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and fortitude, of knowledge and piety, and of the fear of the Lord.'**" And he adds: "**Not because there are so many spirits, but 'all these things one and the same Spirit works, dividing' His own to each one 'as He wills,' because 'the Spirit breathes where He wills.'**" Where the proposition is manifestly clear, because it is certain that he who is not rightly wise, nor rightly understands, nor rightly prevails in counsel, does not know what must be done or what must be avoided in those things which regard the moral life.

Finally, for the same point there is the express determination of the aforementioned council; for there it is written thus: "**Both are a gift of God: both to know what we ought to do, and to love so that we may do it.**"

Several authorities also to be brought forward for the third conclusion prove also this second one, as is clear to one who looks.

(The Third Conclusion is Proved)

I prove the **third conclusion** first as follows: If, having sufficient knowledge of what should be willed or not willed, done or not done, a man could—without special help—conformably will or not will, act or not act, it follows that either grace and the special aid of God are not given for every single act, or, if they are given, they are given **superfluously**. The consequence is evident; but the consequent is erroneous, as is clear from the fourth supposition placed above to prove the first conclusion.

Secondly, if having [knowledge], etc., then one knowing that he ought to will or do something would have no need to ask God to grant that he so will or act. Similarly, for others knowing what they ought to do, there would be no need to pray that they be converted to the good if they are evil, or persevere if they are just. The consequence is clear, because they could have those things for which prayer would be made from themselves. But the consequent is manifestly erroneous and contrary to the pious rite of the faithful. Similarly, it would suffice for the Church to preach the Gospel to infidels and the virtue of baptism to catechumens, without praying for the former to believe or the latter to desire baptism. Consequently, the Church would pray superfluously for both; which is not to be said. **Augustine** argues with similar reasons in principle against the heretic **Vitalis** in his letter to him.

Thirdly, if having [knowledge], etc., it follows that for the fulfillment of the law or for doing those things which the law commands, the law itself and the knowledge of it would suffice for man, nor would he further need the aid of the grace of God. But this is expressly against the **Apostle** in many places. And **Augustine** also places this reason in principle against Pelagius in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and*

Original Sin, chapter 8; and similarly in the letter to **Asellicus**, where he says that such people "**Judaize not in name, but in error.**"

Fourthly, it would follow that the good will itself and even the good work would not be, in themselves, **gifts of God**, contrary to the Apostle saying in Philippians 2: "**It is God who works in us both to will and to perform**" or "to work," as Augustine says is found in the Greek codices in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 5, where he notes against Pelagius that the Apostle "**did not say 'It is God who works in us the power (posse),'**" as if they already had both the willing and the working by themselves nor needed His aid in these two, '**but to will, he says, 'and to work.'**" And therefore below in chapter 25, as was cited above: "**Not only,**" he says, "**did God grant and help our power, but He even works the willing and the working in us.**"

Fifthly, this conclusion is proved by the express determination of the **Council of Milevis**, in which it is written thus in chapter 5: "**If anyone should say that the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord helps us only to avoid sinning because through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed to us, so that we may know what we ought to desire and what to avoid, but that it is not granted to us through grace that we should also love and be able to do what we have recognized must be done, let him be anathema.**" And it adds: "**Both are the gift of God: to know what we must do, and to love so that we may do it.**" Therefore, beyond the knowledge of things to be willed or done, man needs the aid of the grace of God to act or will those things which he himself recognizes ought to be willed or done.

This is confirmed by the **Parisian Article 128**, which condemns the opposite and testifies that it was an error of Pelagius. Wherefore the article lies thus: "**That if the reason is right, the will is right: an error, because it is against the gloss of Augustine** upon that verse 'My soul has longed to desire, etc.,' and according to this, grace is not necessary for the rectitude of the will, but knowledge only; which was an error of Pelagius." All these are the words of the article. According to this article, as is clear, the consequent inferred in its final part—namely, that "**grace is not necessary for the rectitude of the will, but knowledge alone suffices**"—was an error of Pelagius. But it is certain that if, having sufficient knowledge of acting or willing without other grace, the will can conformably will—since by willing conformably to right reason the will is right—it follows that grace is not necessary for its rectitude, but knowledge suffices.

It is confirmed again—and this moves me much—since, notwithstanding that Pelagius posited that we are helped by God to will and act well insofar as He helped the possibility of nature by giving doctrine and knowledge of things to be willed and done—whence, as **Augustine** recites in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 7, these were the words of Pelagius: "**For God helps us through His doctrine and revelation, while He opens the eyes of our heart, while He demonstrates future things to us lest we be occupied with the present, while He unfolds the snares of the devil, while He illuminates us with the multiform and ineffable gift of heavenly grace**"—because nevertheless beyond this he did not posit that we have the good will itself and the good work from the grace of God, but from ourselves through our free choice, Augustine says he erred. Wherefore in the same place, chapter 10, he recites that Pelagius explained the authority of the Apostle "**vehemently contrary to his dogma**"—where it says that "**God works in us to will and to perform according to a good will**"—thus: "**He works in us to will what is good, what is holy, while He inflames us, who are given over to**

earthly desires, with the magnitude of future glory and the promise of rewards; while He rouses the stupefied will into the desire for God by the revelation of wisdom; while He persuades us of everything that is good.'" And then follow the words of Augustine: "What is more manifest than that he calls grace, by which God works in us to will what is good, nothing other than the law and doctrine?" And he adds: "But we want them to finally confess that grace by which the magnitude of future glory is not only promised, but even believed and hoped for; by which wisdom is not only revealed, but also loved; nor only is everything that is good suggested, but even persuaded." And it follows: "Pelagius ought to confess this grace if he wishes not only to be called, but even to be, a Christian."

Likewise in chapter 12: "By this grace it is brought about not only that we know what is to be done, but even that we do what is known; nor only that we believe what is to be loved, but even that we love what is believed." Likewise in chapter 14 upon that word of the Savior in John 6, "Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me": "Who," he says, "would not see that someone both comes and does not come by the choice of the will? But this choice can be alone if he does not come; however, it cannot be unless it is helped if he comes; and so helped, that he not only knows what is to be done, but also does what he has known."

From these things it is clear that in this was the error of Pelagius of which we treat: that he posited that a man—having sufficient notice and knowledge through the doctrine of Christ or revelation or inspiration of those things which are to be willed and done—could will and act upon those things he recognized ought to be willed and acted upon without other aid of grace, so that for such acts he does not need to be helped, as if made sufficiently powerful through the knowledge given to natural possibility. This is declared yet more manifestly from the words of Augustine in the same book, chapter 47; for he says: "As pertains to this question concerning divine grace and aid, attend to those three things which Pelagius most openly says: to be able, to will, to be; that is, possibility, will, action. If therefore he should agree with us that not only the possibility in man... but also the will and action themselves—that is, that we will well and act well, which are not in man except when he wills well and acts well—are divinely helped, so that without that aid we will and act nothing well, and that this is the grace of God through Jesus Christ, then no controversy concerning the aid of the grace of God, as I judge, will be left between us."

Behold that the whole controversy between Catholic doctrine and the error of Pelagius as pertains to this article is because Catholics say that beyond the **possibility** of willing well and acting well—which possibility both they and Pelagius confess to be in us from God who grants sufficient knowledge—there is still necessary for us the aid of the grace of God for the **act** itself of willing well and working well. Pelagius, however, denied this, asserting that after having such knowledge, no other aid is necessary for us, but we are already sufficient to conformably will well and work well. From which it is clear that the opinion of Catholics is this which this **third conclusion** signifies, and its opposite was the error of Pelagius.

And therefore I wonder greatly that any **Catholic doctor** should say that a man, having sufficient knowledge of something to be willed or not willed, done or avoided, can conformably will or not will, act or not act without the aid of divine grace. And it is even more to be wondered at that some pronounce absolutely that a man from **pure naturals**—that is, alone without special aid from God—can will well

and act well, since saying so they exclude even the necessity of the aid of God which is through doctrine and science, and through this they attribute less to the grace of God than Pelagius himself attributed. Let these things suffice regarding the first article of the question.

ARTICLE 2

(Concerning the Pelagian Error of the Moderns)

Now, secondly, it must be shown principally that the affirmative part of the question—namely, that a man can from his own natural powers without the special aid of God perform a **virtuous act** or, what is the same, a **morally good act**—was one of the condemned errors of Pelagius; or, if it differs in anything, in that it deviates more from the truth than his statement, and through this it will be concluded that it ought to be sustained by no Catholic.

Now these things are already sufficiently clear from what has just been said, since, as has been shown, Pelagius posited that a man, having sufficient knowledge through doctrine or the revelation of God concerning those things which are to be willed and done, can without other aid will and act upon what he knows should be willed and done. It is clear, however, that this is nothing other than saying that he can will and act conformably to **right reason**, which is the same as to will rightly or morally well and to act morally well. That that statement of Pelagius was condemned as erroneous is sufficiently clear from the things brought forward in the proof of the third conclusion of the preceding article.

Again, it is clear that those holding that affirmative part of the question differ in nothing as pertains to this, except perhaps that they say absolutely that a man can, without the aid of God, rightly will and act, not positing that he needs to be helped to have knowledge of the things to be willed and done; Pelagius, however, posits that man needs such aid from God. But in this, they deviate **more from Catholic truth**, as is manifestly clear from the proofs of the second conclusion and several things brought forward for the third conclusion. Therefore, much less should or can that conclusion be sustained than that condemned one of Pelagius.

Secondly, I show the same through the express words of Pelagius which Augustine recites in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 4—which book is clear to have been Augustine's from the second book of the *Retractations*, chapter 50—for Pelagius, distinguishing between **power, will, and acting**, spoke thus: "**We so distinguish these three and partition them into a certain ordered arrangement. In the first place we set power (posse), in the second will (velle), in the third being/acting (esse); we place power in nature, will in choice, being in effect. That first one, that is, power, pertains to God who conferred it upon His creature. But the remaining two, that is, will and being, are to be referred to man, because they descend from the fountain of choice. Therefore, in the will and the good work is the praise of man—or rather, of man and of God, who gave the possibility of the will and work itself and who always helps that very possibility with the aid of His grace. That a man can will the good and perform it is of God alone. It is possible, therefore, for that one thing to be, even if these two are not; but these cannot be without that. Therefore, I am free either not to**

have a good will or not to have an action; but in no way can I not have the possibility of good. For it is in me, even if I should not want it; nor does nature ever receive rest from itself in this. Let some examples make this sense clearer to us. That we can see with our eyes is not ours; but that we see well or ill, this is ours. And, to embrace all things generally, that we can do, say, or think every good is His who gave this power, who helps this power. But that we either act or speak or think well is ours, because we can also turn all these into evil.'" All these are the words of Pelagius. Their meaning, as is clear, consists in this: that from ourselves we do not have the **power** to act well, but from God who gave the power and helps it. Therefore, having been made powerful by God, we have the **willing well and acting well** from ourselves nor do we need other aid for them, just as we have the power to see from God, but the seeing [itself] from ourselves.

Certainly, those do not differ from this who say that through free choice or natural powers (which it is certain we have from God) we are sufficient without other aid to rightly will and act, except perhaps in this: that they do not say our powers are helped by the aid of grace, which Pelagius said. And in this, they err **worse** than he did.

And lest perhaps someone should say that the aforesaid opinion of Pelagius was not erroneous, although he erred in many other things, behold what Augustine says in the same place, chapter 6. For explaining why Pelagius interposed in the aforesaid words that clause "**and who always helps that very possibility with the aid of His grace,**" he says thus: "**But lest he should seem to have said nothing of grace, he added 'and who always helps that very possibility with the aid of His grace'; he did not say 'that very will or that very operation'; for if he said that, he would not seem to abhor apostolic doctrine.**" From which it is given to be understood that, because he did not say that, he therefore **abhorred apostolic doctrine**.

(The Triple Response of Adam [Goddam])

To this perhaps someone will say, as a certain modern says. For he says that the error of Pelagius was because he posited "**that from pure naturals we can merit.**" This, however, the opinion holding that affirmative part does not say; for, although it grants we can elicit morally good acts from pure naturals, "**nevertheless it is not in our power that God accept those unto eternal life, because this is always of His mere grace. On account of which Christ said in the Gospel: 'When you have done all things well, say: We are unprofitable servants'; hinting through this that our works are not meritorious of eternal life from themselves, but from 'divine gracious acceptance alone.'**"

Secondly, it is said that Pelagius wanted us to be able to fulfill divine precepts from pure naturals; this, however, is an error because it is not in our power to do anything regarding such precepts, since it is not in our power that those be precepts.

Thirdly, it could be said that, although we can do morally good acts without the aid of God, we cannot do **meritoriously good acts**. For meritorious ones are of another nature from those, and we cannot perform meritorious ones unless **sanctifying grace** concurs; Pelagius, however, understood that from ourselves we can perform meritorious acts.

(Against the First Response of Adam)

None of these responses removes the proposition. Not the first, certainly, since, granted that what he ascribes to Pelagius was his error, it is not thereby removed that this [error] of which we treat was also his error. For he did not err in one thing only, as is clear in diverse places of Blessed Augustine and especially in his letter to **Paulinus the Bishop of Nola**, cited above, and also in the letter of **Aurelius the Bishop of Carthage**, which he sent to the provincial bishops after receiving the rescripts of the Pope and the Emperors concerning the condemnation of Pelagius and Caelestius. For in each, a good **twelve distinct errors** are noted as condemned against Pelagius. He, therefore, who wished to evade what has been proved, ought to show that [this point] was not among his errors; which the response does not do, nor can anyone do, since the opposite has been evidently proved.

It is confirmed, because as is clear in the aforementioned letters, two points are placed distinctly as **distinct articles and errors**: one of which is because he said the grace of God and aid are not given for single acts, but consist in free choice or in the law and doctrine; the other is where he said the grace of God is given according to our **merits**. From which, as I judge, the doctors wish to conclude that he felt we can merit from pure naturals. For I do not find that statement in its own form imputed to him among his other statements.

Although those holding that way do not agree with Pelagius in this second statement, they entirely agree in the first; and that is the one touched upon. For because he posited that we do not need the help of God to will well and act well—although he posited we are helped to know what we ought to will and do, which is provided through the law of God and doctrine—therefore he is said to have posited that the grace of God and aid are not given for single acts, etc. And certainly those who say we can will well and act well without the help of God posit this, nor do they seem to differ in anything else except that they make no mention of the aid of God to have knowledge of those things we ought to will and do; which, if they also grant we know these things without God's aid, they err worse than Pelagius himself, as was said above.

If it be said that they do not deny the grace of God is given for single acts in fact, although they say that even without it a man could perform some good acts, then one returns to that other condemned opinion of **Pelagius**, where he said grace was given to us so that we might **more easily** do what we are commanded to do by free choice—without which, however, although not so easily, we could do them—unless they wished to differ in this, to say that we could do them **equally easily** and even without grace; which is worse than his statement, and both have been manifestly reproved by the determination of the council, as is clear in what was cited above.

Secondly, the response is not valid, because according to it one would have to say that whatever good **Adam** could have done before the Fall without sanctifying grace, **we now after the Fall can do without special aid from God**. It is clear, because although he could have performed morally good acts, it would not nevertheless have been in his power that God accept those unto eternal life. Indeed, certainly, even if we act with grace or if he had performed his acts, it is still neither in our power nor would it have been in his that God accept them unto eternal life. Wherefore such acceptance of our acts, even those elicited in

sanctifying grace, is **purely gratuitous and free**, as was proved in the *First [Sentences]*, distinction 17, question 1. From which it also follows that whatever good we can do with grace, we can do without grace. And certainly the first consequent is not Catholic; for then ignorance of things to be done and concupiscence for harmful things would not be in us as the punishment of the first sin, nor would man have been **wounded in his naturals**, as the doctrine of the saints hands down. The second consequent is truly not Catholic, because then grace would not be an aid for us in our weakness and impotence, as Catholic doctrine hands down.

Addition 49: Thirdly, although it does not follow that a man can from pure naturals merit eternal life in that sense which the response gives, it nevertheless follows that a man can from pure naturals do those things for which he will have eternal life as a reward; which is certainly false. And I say that this follows if the statement of the opinion is held with its foundations. For from those it is equally concluded concerning **every act falling under a divine precept**; and so that [opinion] has to posit—and thus those holding it commonly posit—that a man from pure naturals can fulfill all **moral precepts** as to the substance of the works, or, what is the same, do whatever things are commanded to be done and avoid what are commanded to be avoided.

That this follows is clear expressly through the consequence of **Augustine** against Pelagius in *On Nature and Grace*, near the beginning, where he argues thus: "**The nature of the human race, procreated from the flesh of that one transgressor—if it can be sufficient for itself for fulfilling the law and perfecting justice—ought to be secure of the reward, that is, of eternal life, even if in some nation or some earlier time the faith of the blood of Christ was hidden from it. For God is not unjust, that He should defraud the just of the reward of justice.**" Behold the consequence clearly placed, which can be confirmed by the word of Christ in Matthew 19: "**If you will enter into life, keep the commandments**"; and in Proverbs 7 it is written: "**Keep my commandments, and you shall live.**"

That the consequent is false, he proves immediately, adding: "**But if this could be done or can be done, then I also say what the Apostle said of the law: 'Christ died in vain.'** For if he said this of the law which one nation of the Jews received, how much more justly is it said of the law of nature which the whole human race received? If justice is through nature, 'then Christ died in vain.'" The Ordinary Text follows.

(Against the Second and Third Responses of Adam)

The **second response** also does not avoid the proposition. For that error of Pelagius concerning the fulfillment of the commandments was not because he said it is in our power that those be precepts for us—for nowhere can such a sense be had from his statements recited by councils or by other saints, and certainly it is not likely that he felt that—but in this was the error: because he wanted [to claim] that we are able to fulfill the given precepts **by our own power without the aid of grace**. And certainly this opinion must grant this very thing, since it says we can perform good acts without aid. And, if their foundations are weighed, they have to say this indifferently of any morally good act, and through this of those things which fall under a precept.

Furthermore, if it is not otherwise denied that it is possible for us to fulfill divine mandates, then it would not be otherwise denied of us than of Adam before his sin, because it was not in his power either that a precept be given to him.

Furthermore, granted that such works as are commanded of us had never been commanded, still according to the intention of the Church and the saints we could not do them without the aid of God.

The **third response** also does not escape: First, because the error of which principal mention was made was in this: that Pelagius said that those things which we know should be willed or done by us, we can will or do without the aid of God. This the response grants when it says we can do morally good acts without God's aid. Whether those be meritorious or not is nothing to the proposition of this article.

Second, because it was sufficiently proved above that not only meritorious acts but **no other morally good acts whatsoever** can we perform without the aid of God.

Third, because it does not seem true that meritorious acts are of a different nature from acts similar in object and circumstances which are not meritorious, of which the response must be understood. This is proved from the fact that the **numerically same act** can successively be meritorious and non-meritorious, speaking of "meritorious" in the sense placed above. For the act of believing which a catechumen has before baptism is not meritorious; if nevertheless that act be continued until the reception of the sacrament or until the infusion of sanctifying grace and beyond, it will certainly be meritorious. Similarly, the sorrow by which a sinner grieves for God's sake that he has sinned is not meritorious before the reception of sanctifying grace; if nevertheless it be continued beyond the infusion of such grace, it will be meritorious. Conversely, some good act elicited by means of grace is meritorious and, if it be continued until after the privation of grace, it will be non-meritorious. And the case is quite possible. For it is possible that someone in grace prays or meditates on the law of the Lord, and persists in such an act so long that he knowingly omits something he is then bound to do, so that that omission is a mortal sin.

From these things, as I judge, it evidently appears that that affirmative conclusion was one of the errors or condemned articles of Pelagius. From which it follows that it ought to be sustained by no Catholic.

ARTICLE 3

The third article remains, in which it is to be argued against what has been said and for the opposite side. And first I shall bring forward the reasons of the doctors holding the opposite part; then I shall add certain other reasons and also authorities of the saints, by which the aforesaid part might perhaps seem to someone to be confirmed.

(Reasons of Scotus, Ockham, and Adam)

One doctor argues thus: A sinner existing in sin can, from pure naturals, have **attrition** for sin, circumstantiated by all due circumstances and through this **morally good**; therefore, etc. The assumption is proved, because otherwise **"it would be necessary to say that a sinner is justified without any**

previous sufficient disposition of congruity on his part" toward justification; and it would be difficult to save the idea that God is not an acceptor of persons, when He justifies one through the infusion of grace and not another. Or it would be necessary to say that some attrition that is not morally good was a sufficient disposition of congruity for justification; which does not seem fitting nor true.

Secondly, another argues thus: Man from pure naturals can have a **right dictate** concerning loving something—for example, concerning loving God above all things—and the will can conform itself to such a dictate. Therefore, from pure naturals, he can love God above all things, and through this perform something morally good.

Thirdly, the same [doctor] thus: **"Every free power can have some act concerning an object shown to it, therefore the will [can]; but not necessarily a disordered one, therefore it can have an ordered one from pure naturals,"** and consequently a morally good one.

Fourthly, the same [doctor] elsewhere thus: **"Everything that can of itself be sufficient for a demeritorious act can also of itself be sufficient for a meritorious act.** This is clear because, since a meritorious and demeritorious act are contraries, there is no greater repugnance of a meritorious act to a nature constituted in its sole naturals than there is of a demeritorious act to the same. But the will can of itself perform a demeritorious act, therefore of itself it can perform a meritorious one. However, that act will not be meritorious from pure naturals," but from divine acceptance. It will, however, be ordered and good; and this suffices for the proposition. Whence it could otherwise be argued thus: The will can of itself perform a vicious act, therefore also a virtuous act.

Fifthly, another argues thus: The same act according to species can be elicited by a will that is habituated and by a will not habituated. And this seems much more true of **infused habits** than of acquired ones, which fall less under our experience. But the will, by means of charity, can perform an act good in its kind (because it is meritorious)—for example, the love of God for His own sake—therefore, existing in pure naturals without charity, it can perform an act of the same species.

Sixthly, the same argues thus: In the will, from the frequency of good acts elicited by means of charity, **"one habit naturally inclinatory toward similar acts can be generated; and thus, if infused charity were withdrawn,"** the will could still, by means of the acquired habit, elicit acts similar to the previous ones, and consequently morally good ones.

These are the reasons of those writing for the opposite side. Now I bring forward others.

(Proprietary Reasons for the Opposite Side)

Seventhly, thus: From pure naturals, man can—with the general influence of God remaining—honor parents, help the needy, fight bravely and constantly for the fatherland, and do many other things according to the judgment of right reason. In which things no one would say he sins or acts badly, but well and laudably. Therefore, he can act morally well without special help from God. The assumption is

clear, since we read of many infidels also that they frequently performed such things, and for these they are praised and not blamed.

Eighthly: From pure naturals, someone can perform an act worthy of remuneration or reward—if not eternal, at least temporal; therefore also a morally good act. The consequence is evident, because no act is worthy of any reward unless it be right and morally good. The assumption is proved both by what is held in Exodus 1 concerning the Egyptian midwives who, fearing God, saved the Hebrew boys against the command of Pharaoh. And in the same place it is said: **"God therefore dealt well with the midwives"**; and again: **"Because the midwives feared God, He built them houses."** Now God would not have rewarded them even with that reward unless that act were so to be rewarded, or if it had been vicious or morally evil (which one would have to say if it is said it was not morally good), since it was an act freely and deliberately elicited. The same is also clear concerning the ancient memorable Romans, who by their strenuous acts merited the glory of the empire. Whence Augustine says of them in the 5th book of *The City of God*, chapter 15: **"To those, therefore, to whom God was not going to give eternal life with His holy angels—if He did not even grant them this earthly glory of a most excellent empire, the reward would not be rendered for their good arts, that is, the virtues by which they strove to arrive at such glory."** And a little after he adds: **"They have no cause to complain of the justice of the highest and true God: They have received their reward."** Where he manifestly hints that for their laudable acts that temporal reward was justly rendered by God; and, what is more, he even says "for their virtues and good acts," from which he asserts they exercised virtuous acts and morally good ones.

Ninthly: If without special grace [a man could not act well], it follows that any infidel—indeed even a believer existing in mortal sin—would sin in any act of his done deliberately; which seems too harsh. For thus it follows that in giving alms, and praying to God, and testifying to the truth, and defending the unjustly oppressed, and doing many other things of the kind of goods which sinful men work daily, he would sin; which does not seem well said nor Catholic, since the prelates and preachers of the Church daily exhort them to such works. Whence it also follows from this that it would not even be necessary to preach to infidels to be converted to the faith or to exercise justice or exhibit any work of mercy or piety; and similarly not to Christian sinners who are not in charity, because no one is to be persuaded to do something which he, in doing, would sin. And the consequence of all this is clear, because any such person lacks the grace of God.

Tenthly, according to this it would follow that man could not use his will and free choice except evilly, contrary to **Augustine** in the 2nd book of *On Free Choice*, chapter 35, where among the middle goods (which man can use well and evilly) he counts the will.

Eleventhly, man constituted in his sole naturals is bound to will well; therefore he can will well from sole naturals. The antecedent is clear, because otherwise he would not sin by never willing well; which is not to be said. The consequence is proved, because in no state is anyone bound to something that is for that time impossible for him.

Twelfthly, I ask concerning this special mode of helping toward a good act. For either God helps by causing some habitual gift or sanctifying grace or grace freely given, which can exist even in one not actually operating and not actually willing. And then it follows that only on account of **power** (*posse*) does man need this special aid; the opposite of which has been said many times above. Or He helps by

immediately effecting the act of willing itself. And if so, either God alone effects the act itself, and the will only receives it (and then it follows that the act is not in the power of man nor to be imputed to him for reward or punishment, nor meritorious nor demeritorious; which is not to be said). Or God alone does not cause it, but He Himself together with the will, so that God is only a partial efficient cause; and since in this way He also co-causes every effect of any created agent (whether natural or free) and every act (whether it be morally good or evil)—and this is called the **general influence of God**—it follows that beyond the general influence of God, he does not need special aid from God to will well; the opposite of which is principally intended.

(Scriptural Authorities for the Opposite Side)

That part can also be confirmed by authorities: And **first** by the authority of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 7, saying: "**He who has stood fast in his heart, having no necessity, but having power over his own will, and has judged this in his heart, to keep his virginity, does well.**" Here the Apostle says that the will to keep virginity is in the power of man, and thus willing, he does well.

Second, in Ecclesiasticus 15 it is written: "**If you will keep the commandments, they shall preserve you**"; and it follows: "**He has set water and fire before you; stretch forth your hand to whichever you will; before man is life and death, good and evil, what shall please him shall be given to him.**"

In many parts of Scripture also the will of man is addressed, saying: "**Do not do this' and 'Do not do that,' and**"—certainly according to what Augustine says in *On Grace and Free Choice*, near the beginning—"where in divine admonitions the work of the will is required for doing or not doing something, free choice is sufficiently demonstrated." And consequently such things are in the power of man.

(Authorities of Augustine for the Opposite Side)

The same is proved also by authorities of **Augustine**: First, indeed, he himself in *On the Spirit and the Letter*, upon that word of the Apostle in Romans 2, "**For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things which are of the law,**" says that from those infidels "**we understand or know or have heard certain deeds which, according to the rule of justice, we not only cannot blame, but even deservedly and rightly praise.**" And a little after: "**Just as,**" he says, "**certain venial sins (without which this life is not led) do not hinder a just man from eternal life, so certain good works (without which the life of any worst man is very difficult to find) do not profit an impious man for eternal salvation.**"

From which it is clear that according to him, certain good works are done by the impious or infidels that are rightly laudable according to the rule of justice, and consequently morally good works, even though those are not meritorious of eternal life. And concerning such goods (namely meritorious ones) Augustine understands wherever he says that without grace we cannot do good.

This seems evidently proved from the fact that in the fourth book of *Against Julian*, chapter 19, after a long disputation by which he strove to prove to infidels that they have no good works, explaining himself he says thus: **"Know that we say that good of men, that good will, that good work, can be conferred upon no one without the grace of God which is given through the one mediator of God and men; by which alone man can be led to the eternal gift and kingdom of God. Let all other things, therefore, which seem among men to have something of praise, seem to you true virtues, seem to you good works. What does it pertain to me?"**—as if to say: my discourse is not concerned with goods other than meritorious ones.

Second, the same [Augustine] in *On Two Souls*, near the end, says: **"For we sin by loving corporeal things for this reason, because we are commanded by justice and are able by nature to love spiritual things, and then we are the best and most blessed in our kind."** Here note that he says we are **able by nature** to love spiritual things, by which love we are best.

Third, *Against Adimantus*, chapter 26: **"Unless someone has changed his will, he cannot work good; which the Lord teaches in another place to be set in our power, where He says: 'Either make the tree good, etc.'"**

Fourth, *Against Fortunatus*: **"Hence,"** he says, **"is the reward, because we do right things by our own will."** And below: **"If therefore it is commanded of us that we make the tree either good or evil, it is ours to choose what we will."**

Fifth, *Against Felix the Manichaeian*, book 2, a little after the beginning: **"Each one,"** says Augustine, **"has it in his will either to choose those things which are good and be a good tree, or to choose those things which are evil and be an evil tree."**

Sixth, the same in *To Simplicianus*, book 2, question 1: **"Although it is in the power of anyone what he wills, it is not nevertheless in the power of anyone what he is able either to do to anyone or suffer from anyone."**

In many places also of the books *On Free Choice* and the *Retractations* he says that nothing is so much in our power as the willing itself. But it is not to be said that only willing evil is in our power, otherwise the liberty of choice would seem to have been given to us only for evil; which is not to be said. Therefore, willing good is also in our power, and consequently from ourselves we can will well.

(Authority of Lombard for the Opposite Side)

Finally, the **Master of the Sentences** expressly determines the opposite of all the aforesaid, holding the opposite part of the question. Whence in the 2nd book, distinction 26, he says thus: **"Before prevenient and operating grace, by which the good will is prepared in man, there precede certain goods from the grace of God and free choice, and certain [goods] even from sole free choice, by which nevertheless he does not merit life, nor the grace by which he is justified."** And afterward he adds: **"Nevertheless we do not deny that many goods are done by man through free choice before this**

grace and without this grace, as Augustine says in the *Responses Against the Pelagians*, where he says that men through free choice cultivate fields, build houses, and do many other goods without operating grace."

(To the Reason of Scotus)

To the first I respond by simply denying the antecedent as expressly contrary to the doctrine of the saints. For Augustine says in the *Hypognosticon*, response 3: **"Unless the Lord had looked upon Peter, he would never, moved by repentance, have wept bitterly"**; and a little after: **"There is therefore,"** he says, **"free choice, which no one would deny to be"** [but should confess] **"he who has confessed that without God a good work—that is, that which pertains to His holy purpose—he can neither begin nor perfect, is a Catholic."** Where he hints that he who says the opposite is not a Catholic. Now it is certain that such attrition so perfectly circumstantiated pertains to the holy purpose of man as at least a certain beginning.

Likewise Ambrose in the 9th book *On Luke*, speaking also of the weeping of Peter: **"Good,"** he says, **"are the tears which wash away the fault; finally, those whom Jesus looks upon, weep. Peter denied first and did not weep; he denied a second time and did not weep, because the Lord had not yet looked upon him; he denied a third time, Jesus looked upon him, and he wept most bitterly."** And as Augustine proves in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 45, where he cites these words, **"it cannot be said that the Lord looked upon him with corporeal eyes by visibly admonishing him. And therefore what is written there, 'The Lord looked upon him,' was done within, was done in the mind, was done in the will. The Lord helped with mercy secretly, He touched the heart, He recalled the memory, He visited Peter with His interior grace, He moved and led the affection of the interior man even unto exterior tears."**

From which it appears, according to these two saints, that Peter could never have been sufficiently attrite or sorry for his sin unless God had helped him with special grace. And just as of him, so also of the rest must it be faithfully confessed.

Wherefore in *On the Faith to Peter*, chapter 31, Augustine says: **"Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that no man can do penance here unless God has illuminated him and converted him by gratuitous commiseration. For the Apostle says: 'Lest perhaps He give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth and they recover themselves from the snares of the devil.'"** Likewise in *On Grace and Free Choice*: **"Unless the conversion itself were a gift of God, it would not be said to Him: 'O God of hosts, convert us.'"** Likewise in Book 5 *Against Julian*, chapter 9: **"However much patience God provides,"** namely by waiting for and sustaining sinners, **"unless He Himself has given it, who does penance?"**—as if to say "no one." And this he proves immediately by the already cited words of the Apostle. It is clear, therefore, that that antecedent is false.

To the proof, it must be granted what is first inferred, namely that without a previous disposition on the part of the sinner—on his part, I say, only, so that namely it is not from God preveniently—the sinner is justified. Wherefore **"he is justified freely by His grace,"** as the Apostle says. And when it is inferred

that "it would be difficult to save that God was not an acceptor of persons," it must be said that, if the discourse is about the acceptance of persons as it sounds in sin (as in James 2, when he says: "If you have respect to persons, you work sin"; and as it is taken in Romans 2, when he says: "There is no acceptance of persons with God"), it is in no way difficult to save that God, by thus freely justifying one and not another, is not an acceptor of persons; indeed, it is very easy to see that. For only he is called an acceptor of persons who, in giving gifts or rewards, attends to race or nation, state or condition, or some personal prerogative by which one person excels another beyond the dignity of merits. Wherefore the word of James was said against those who, in view of riches, prefer the rich to the poor, as is clear in the beginning of said chapter, and through Augustine in the letter to Jerome concerning the words of James: "He who shall keep the whole law, yet offend in one point, is become guilty of all." The word of Paul also was said to teach that God in judging does not attend to nation or race, but renders to both Gentile and Jew according to merits.

Similarly also Peter in Acts 10 says there is no acceptance of persons with God, because He does not accept persons in view of race or nation, **"but,"** as he says, **"in every nation, he who fears God and works justice is accepted by Him."** Now, however, it is clear that God, while precisely freely and from His mere liberty gives grace to this one and does not give it to that one, calls this one and does not call that one, does not attend to any such personal prerogative in them; and therefore He can in no way be called an acceptor of persons, in that sense.

If however the acceptance of persons were taken simply for **predilection**, by which He prefers one to another in every way similar and bestows upon him graces and gifts which He denies to the other, we ought not to strive to exclude this from God, but simply to confess with the Apostle that **"He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens."** And to this point many things said concerning the eternal predestination of God in the 1st book, distinction 40, are valid.

(To the Reasons of Ockham and Adam)

To the second, it must be said that the first part of the antecedent—taking "right dictate" for the dictate by which it is dictated what and in what manner (namely according to all due circumstances) something is to be loved or willed—is simply false, as is clear from the things said in the second conclusion. Also the second part is false, if it be understood that the will of itself can conform itself to such a right dictate, as must be understood for the consequence to be valid; and the falsity is clear from the things said in the third conclusion.

To the third, it must be said that the will, concerning no object shown to it, can of itself alone have a morally good act. Whence, if it should have one not divinely aided, it will necessarily be disordered on account of the lack of some due circumstance.

To the fourth, I simply deny the minor, just as Augustine denies it entirely, as is clear from several authorities brought forward to the proof of the first conclusion from the first supposition, and from another of the same [Augustine] in *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 14, cited in proving the third conclusion. And certainly it does not seem to me that it sounds well in the ears of any believer,

since it entirely excludes the necessity of divine aid for every good act. For it is certain that we can perform any evil act of ourselves, nor does God help us specially toward any such act.

If however whoever can of himself perform an evil act can of himself perform the opposite good act, it follows that we can perform any good act of ourselves without special help from God. The proof is nil, because although contraries are susceptible in the same [subject] and neither is repugnant to the subject, and consequently both a good act and the evil one opposite to it can be received in the will (which is all that is proved by that assumption), it does not nevertheless follow that if the will can effect an evil act in itself, it can also [effect] a good one; just as neither if a man can of himself have an error concerning some truth, can he also of himself have the knowledge of it. Otherwise man could naturally of himself know every truth believed concerning the Trinity and any other revealed to us, and know determinately how many stars are in the heaven, and so of many truths which we naturally cannot know of ourselves; for concerning any of those we can err of ourselves.

To the fifth and sixth together it must be said that, granted that that assumption were conceded, the proposition is nevertheless not proved, because beyond any habit it is necessary for us toward willing well that God specially move our will, as will be declared in the solution of the twelfth argument.

(To the Proprietary Reasons for the Opposite Side)

To the **seventh** [reason], it must be said that although man constituted in his sole naturals can, without special help from God, honor parents, help the needy, and do many other things of the kind of goods, he can nevertheless do **none of these for the sake of which he ought and in the manner he ought** according to all the circumstances required for the moral goodness of the act; for at least the circumstance of the ultimate due end, which is God, will be lacking, as is clear above. And through this he cannot perform any **morally good act**, as the discourse is held concerning it in this proposition.

And therefore concerning Gentiles and the simply unfaithful who are said to have exercised such things, it must be said that although they did things which were good **by office** or **in their kind** (according to the manner of speaking of Augustine), they nevertheless did not do them **ultimately for the sake of God**, and through this not for that end finally for which they ought, and therefore not virtuously but badly and viciously; wherefore neither were their acts morally good. And this whole solution is held virtually by **Augustine** in Book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 18.

To the **eighth**, I deny the antecedent. To the first proof, which is about the midwives, it must be said that that fear of God, for which it is said God built them houses, they did not have from themselves alone, but from God mercifully inspiring. And it is sufficiently probable, as a certain doctor says, that those midwives were converted to the worship of the true God by the information of the Hebrews, although perhaps not by a perfect conversion. Whence they already had the fear of the true God, as Scripture says. However that may have been, it must be said that neither did they fear God nor save the boys by His fear unless God specially helped.

And the same would have to be said of the Romans, concerning whom it is argued, if it were conceded that they had any truly virtuous acts; and so also generally concerning others who might have operated

anything virtuously, as is clear from the authority of **Augustine** cited in the first article from his sermon *On Patience*; and similarly from his Book 4 *Against Julian*, where in chapter 8, reciting a similar argument of Julian against himself, he says: "**But you, most bitter enemies of this grace, oppose to us the examples of the impious, whom you say abound in virtues foreign to the faith, in which without the help of grace there is only the good of nature (albeit enslaved to superstitions), who by the powers of innate liberty alone are found frequently merciful, and modest, and chaste, and sober, etc.**" And against this argument, as if answering immediately in the following chapter: "**How much more tolerable,**" he says, "**would it be if you attributed those virtues, which you say are in the impious, to the divine gift rather than to their will only—even if they themselves do not know this, until, if they are of that number of the predestined, they receive the Spirit who is of God, that they may know the things that are given to them by God?**"

But because, as is clear through the same **Augustine** in *The City of God*, Book 5, chapter 12 and several following, those Romans concerning whom it is argued exercised those acts (which are thought to be virtuous) ultimately and finally for obtaining **worldly glory**, it must be said that they by no means exercised acts truly virtuous or morally good, nor even worthy of any eternal or temporal reward, but rather worthy of punishment and torment.

But as to what Augustine says, that "**reward was rendered to them for their good arts, that is, virtues,**" it must be said—as I said more broadly in the *First [Sentences]*, distinction 1, question 3, article 2—that that reward is not said to be rendered to them because God conferred it upon them as a reward for their acts, but because they performed their acts **to obtain that [reward]**. And therefore in chapter 8 Augustine says that the reward which they sought was rendered to their intention, just as the Savior says of the hypocrites: "**They have received their reward,**" that is, what they seek. Whose acts, nevertheless, it is certain are vicious and worthy of no remuneration except penal.

Also, their "arts" are not called good or virtues except according to **similitude** and the estimation of men. Whence in chapter 12: "**That greed for praise,**" says Augustine, "**and desire for glory did many other wonderful things, laudable namely and glorious according to the estimation of men.**" And in chapter 19: "**Wherefore,**" he says, "**although I have sufficiently explained, as I could, for what cause the one true and just God helped the Romans (good according to a certain form of the earthly city) to obtain the glory of so great an empire, there can nevertheless be another more latent cause on account of diverse merits of the human race, known more to God than to us; provided it be established among all the truly pious that no one without true piety—that is, the true worship of the true God—can have true virtue, nor is it true when it serves human glory.**" And the same in Book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 11 and the two following.

Also, what Augustine says—"They have no cause to complain of the justice of the highest and true God: '**They have received their reward**'"—is not said as if, had they not received it, God would have dealt unjustly with them (namely by not conferring upon them what the justice of those works demanded), but it is said to exclude the complaint which—although not according to truth, yet according to the false estimation of men who thought such acts virtuous and thereby worthy of reward—could have been made against God if He had not rendered the reward to them. For that having been rendered to them, every complaint whatsoever (even according to false opinion otherwise possible against God's justice) is excluded.

To the **ninth**, the consequence is to be denied. Nor is the proof valid, because although any such person lacks sanctifying grace or charity which is an infused habit, he does not nevertheless lack every grace of God freely given and therefore the **gratuitous motion of God** to a good act; nay rather, God specially helps many such persons to act well. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that many men sin in performing acts good **by office** or **in their kind**; for they sin when they do not act for that [end] and in that [manner] for which and in which they ought to act, whether they are infidels or Christians.

Nor do preachers sin by admonishing them to exercise those acts rightly and with the due end, if they themselves exercise the act of their preaching as and with what end they ought. Whence, as Augustine says in Book 1 *Against Cresconius*, near the beginning: "**Just as the malignant persuader of sin, even if he does not persuade, deservedly incurs the punishment of a deceiver, so the faithful preacher of justice, even if he be rejected by men—far be it that he should be defrauded of the reward of his office with God.**" If therefore someone preaches to others that they do such acts for God's sake—whether they do not do them, or do them not for God's sake or with the omission of another due circumstance—not only does he not sin, but he even merits, provided he exercises the office of preaching, as I said, as he ought.

To the **tenth**, it must be said that by ourselves we can use the will evilly, but well **by no means unless divinely helped**. And therefore Augustine himself in the 1st book of the *Retractations*, chapter 9, where he reviews this opinion, says that "**even the good use of the free will is from God**" and that unless the will be divinely helped, one cannot live rightly by mortals.

To the **eleventh**, the consequence is to be denied. To the proof, it must be said that it is certainly true that "**for no state is anyone bound to something that is for that time impossible for him,**" and it is also true that for this state it is not impossible for man to act well (for he can act well with the help of grace); but it is indeed impossible for him **to act well from himself alone**, and certainly man for this state is bound to something which by himself alone he cannot do. This response is confirmed by the response of **Augustine** given to the argument of **Caelestius** in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 6. For that man argued: "**Man ought to be without sin, and it is certain he ought not do other than he can,' therefore man can be without sin.**" To which Augustine: "**It is answered,**" he says, "**by the same similitude by which we answered above. For when we see a lame man who can be healed, we say rightly: 'This man ought to be without limping'; and if he ought, he can. Yet not immediately when he wills can he, but when he shall be healed by the applied cure and medicine has helped the will. This happens in the interior man, as pertains to sin as his limping, through the grace of Him who came not 'to call the just but sinners,' because 'they that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.'**"

From these things it is gathered that certainly man for this state ought and is bound to be without sin, nor nevertheless can he be without sin **by himself alone without the help of divine grace**. So it must be said in the proposition. It could also be said that although man constituted in sole naturals for this state is bound to act well, he is not nevertheless bound to act well **from sole naturals**. And therefore it does not follow that he can act well from sole naturals.

To the **twelfth**, it must be said that although God frequently helps man to act well through some **habitual gift** which He causes in the soul, He nevertheless does not only help thus, but also helps by **immediately causing the act itself** and immediately moving the power to it. Whence a man having even sanctifying

grace, and any other habitual gift of God whatsoever, still needs another **special aid of God** to operate well, according to the doctrine of Blessed Augustine in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 26, saying thus: **"The supernal Physician heals our evils not only so that they may no longer be, but so that henceforth we may be able to walk rightly, which indeed even when healed we will not be able to do unless He helps."** And below: **"Just as,"** he says, **"the eye of the body, even most fully healthy, cannot see unless helped by the brightness of light, so also man, even most fully justified, cannot live rightly unless he be divinely helped by the eternal light of justice."** Now it is certain that no one not having sanctifying grace is "most fully justified." So therefore to the argument I say that God helps us by immediately effecting the act itself and that He does not effect the act alone, but the will also co-effects it. But, as I have already touched upon, God helps toward willing well not only by partially co-effecting (which is the common mode by which He concurs with every effect of any created agent, as was said in the argument), but also by a certain other **special mode**, namely by making the will itself partially co-cause, so that the will itself partially co-causes when applied and moved as if **instrumentally** by God to thus partially cause; in which motion, however, it is not necessitated but, existing as a free instrument in whose power it is to follow the motion of the first agent, it is helped so that it acts; which, not so helped, could by no means have acted. But for the production of an evil act God concurs only in the first mode, because He does not make the will perform an evil act, as He makes it perform a good act. And this is that **special aid of God**, without which I say we will or do nothing well.

Blessed **Augustine** clearly teaches these things in *On Grace and Free Choice*, past the middle, saying thus: **"It is certain that we will when we will, but He makes us will the good, of whom it is said that 'The will is prepared by the Lord,' and of whom it is said: 'It is God who works in us to will.' It is certain that we act when we act, but He makes us act by supplying most effective powers to the will, who said: 'I will make you walk in my justifications and keep my judgments and do them.'"** Likewise a little after: **"He operates that we may will, by beginning; who cooperates with us willing, by perfecting; on account of which the Apostle says: 'I am confident that He who has begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ.' Therefore, that we may will, He operates without us; but when we will, and so will that we may act, He operates with us. Nevertheless without Him, either operating that we may will or cooperating when we will, we are capable of nothing toward the good works of piety."** Thus he.

If these words are well considered, it is clear he distinguishes a double mode of God's operating concerning our good willing: One is proper to Him in which our will does not cooperate, namely **to make us will**. Therefore he says **"Therefore, that we may will, He operates without us"**—without us, I say, operating that we may will, because although the will wills and causes the volition, it does not nevertheless make itself will or cause the volition; nor nevertheless because God makes it, therefore it does not cause, but rather therefore it causes. And therefore to exclude that [misunderstanding], Augustine in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 7, concerning the sons of God (of whom the Apostle says that "they are led by the Spirit of God"), says: **"For they are led so that they may act, not so that they themselves do nothing."** The other mode is common to Him and to the will, namely **to cause the volition**. Therefore he says: **"When we will, He operates with us."** And because both are necessary for us, nor does only the other suffice for willing well, therefore he adds: **"Nevertheless without Him, either operating that we may will etc."**

Likewise in *On True Innocence*: "**As often,**" he says, "**as we do good deeds, God operates in us and with us, that we may work.**" Likewise in the same place: "**God does many good things in man which man does not do; but man does no [good things] which God does not make man do.**"

(To the Scriptural Authorities for the Opposite Side)

To the authority of the **Apostle**, it must be said that such a one certainly has the power of his own will, not indeed so that he can of himself so will without the aid of Him who said: "**Without me you can do nothing,**" but so that with Him helping he can both will and perfect, concerning whom it is said: "**It is God who works in us both to will and to perfect according to a good will.**" And according to this sense are the other similar authorities to be understood. Which the same Apostle teaches well in Philippians 4, when he says: "**I can do all things in Him**" (that is, through Him) "**who strengthens me**" (that is, "**who grants me the possibility,**" as the **Gloss** explains).

So also **Augustine** teaches in *On the Perfection of Justice*, and in *On Grace and Free Choice*, and in the book of *Retractations* in very many places.

To the other from the book of **Ecclesiasticus** and all similar ones, it must be said that through them it is certainly demonstrated that there is free choice in us both to voluntarily keep the commandments and to work well, not however from ourselves only, but **with God helping and granting** us to so will and fulfill what we will. Whence Augustine in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 31, says that there is not "**a voluntary good, unless when 'God works in us both to will and to work according to a good will,'**"—although that from **Ecclesiasticus** is to be understood for the state of man before sin, as will appear in distinction 29.

(To the Authorities of Augustine for the Opposite Side)

To the **first** authority of Augustine, it must be said that of works which are called good, certain ones are called good because they are good **by office** or **in their kind** only, but not from circumstances. Thus Augustine in the fourth book *Against Julian*, chapter 13, says: "**Some good things can be done by those not doing well, by whom they are done. For it is good that help be given to a man in danger, especially an innocent one; but he who does this, if he does it by loving the glory of men more than of God, does not do the good well.**" And similarly below in chapter 18, he says "**that the good works themselves which infidels do are not theirs, but His who uses evils well; but their sins are theirs, by which they do even good things badly.**" Now it is certain that such things which are not done well and are sins for those doing them, even if they are good by office and in their kind, are nevertheless not **morally good**, in the sense in which the present question turns.

But certain ones are called good because they are good by office (or according to the manner of speaking of the moderns, **good in their kind**) and also **good from circumstances**, which namely are done for that [end] and in that [manner] they ought to be done. And such I call in the proposition "**morally good.**"

Similarly certain ones are called right and laudable because they are good in the first mode; certain ones because they are good also in the second mode.

Conversely also certain ones are called blameworthy because they are not good even in the first mode; certain ones because they are not good in the second mode, even if they are good in the first mode.

Now to the proposition I say that Augustine understands that the life of any man, even the worst, is led with very much difficulty without good and rightly done and laudable deeds **accepted in the first mode**. For it would be very difficult to find a man who never venerated his parents, nor ever pitied his relatives, nor ever spoke the truth, and so of others which are good in their kind. But it would not be very difficult to find many who **never** did any of such things for that ultimate end for which they ought, namely for God. Indeed, among infidels scarcely anyone would be found who did any of such things with that end with which he ought. Wherefore Augustine, immediately after the first part of the cited authority, arguing adds: "**Although if it be discussed with what end they are done, scarcely are they found to merit the praise or defense due to justice.**" And therefore, when Augustine says infidels do some good or laudable things, he understands it of goods in the first mode only.

Which is also manifestly clear from the fact that in Book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 15, concerning infidels (who seemed singularly among the rest to have true virtues), he says that "**they do by nature those things which are of the law, having the work of the law written in their hearts** to this extent, that they did not do to others what they would not want to suffer; sinning in this, however, that men without faith did not refer those works to that end to which they ought to have referred them. For **Fabricius** will be punished less than **Catiline**, not because the former is good, but because the latter is more evil; and Fabricius is less impious than Catiline, not by having true virtues, but by not deviating very much from true virtues." If nevertheless anything done in such a way—namely with the due end and other due circumstances—be found among infidels, it must be said that they did it **not without the special aid of God**. Nor does Augustine say the opposite, indeed rather the proposition in the same place. Whence he immediately adds: "**Just as the image of God is renewed in the heart of believers through the New Testament, which impiety had not wholly abolished (for there remained that which the soul of man cannot be unless it is rational), so also there,**" namely in the heart of non-believers, "**the law of God not cast down from every part by injustice is certainly written, renewed by grace.**" From which it is clear that that authority of Augustine is in no way against [us].

Nor even does what is further said prove such a gloss concerning the intention of Augustine. Which is clear: First, because since frequently in the immediately preceding chapters Augustine said such works of infidels (which seem virtuous and laudable) are truly **sins and punishable**, no doubt can exist that he understood them not to be morally good, but to be vicious and morally evil. If, however, where he is cited, he wished to concede that they are morally good (although not meritorious), he would patently contradict himself; which no one of sound mind would concede.

Second, because if the words cited for the opposite part be considered subtly, the proposition is more confirmed than weakened. For he himself says he speaks of that good "**by which man can be led to the eternal gift and kingdom of God**" or, what is worth the same, the good which is rewardable by God with the reward of eternal life. Now it is certain that such is every good that is **truly morally good** (as I accept in the proposition), namely which is good in its kind and from all circumstances required for the act to be

truly virtuous. For any such act, if it were done by a man having sanctifying grace and dying in such grace afterwards, would certainly be rewarded with the reward of eternal life. Therefore any [such act] is rewardable with such a reward, although, when it is done by one not having the aforesaid grace, it is by no means accepted for such a reward. Since therefore Augustine says such a good is not done by an infidel nor can be done without the special aid of God (although other goods in their kind only can be done), our proposition is manifestly confirmed from that statement of his.

To the **second** authority of the same [Augustine], it must be answered according to the response which he himself gives in the 1st [book] of the *Retractations*, chapter 15. For reviewing the aforesaid words he says: "**It can be asked why I said we 'can' by 'nature,' and not by grace; but the question was being turned against the Manichaeans concerning nature. And certainly grace does this: that healed nature may be able to do what vitiated nature cannot, through Him who 'came to seek and to save that which was lost.'**" From which it appears that he certainly understands what we can do by nature, but **not by nature alone.**

To the **third**, it must be said also according to the exposition of the same [Augustine] in Book 1 of the *Retractations*, chapter 22: "**It is in the power of man,**" he says, "**to change his will, but that power is null unless it be given by God, of whom it is said: 'He gave them power to become the sons of God.'** For since this is in our power which we do when we will, nothing is so much in our power as the will itself; but 'the will is prepared by the Lord.' In that way therefore He gives the power." Thus Augustine.

By the same [logic] it must be answered to the other *Against Fortunatus*, and to the other *Against Felix*, and similarly to the last from the book *To Simplicianus*, whose sense he himself explains by the same words in Book 2 of the *Retractations*, chapter 1.

To that which is argued from the fact that Augustine frequently says "**nothing is so much in our power as to will etc.,**" it must be said that not only willing evilly is in our power but also willing well, but **differently**. For without the special aid of God we can will evilly, but we cannot will well unless He specially helps, as is clear through Augustine in *On Correction and Grace* and in *On the Words of the Apostle* and in *On Divine Predestination*, as was cited above in the first reason for the first conclusion. Nor nevertheless, because through free choice alone we can only will evilly, therefore was it given to us that we might will evilly; but rather, because with God helping we can through free choice will well, it was given to us that with Him granting we might will well and might implore His aid, without which we can will nothing well.

(To the Authority of Lombard for the Opposite Side)

To that which is adduced for the intention of the **Master**, it must be said that of the good works of man, certain ones pertain to the goodness of the **moral life**, but certain ones to the goodness of the **natural life**, by which even many vicious and morally depraved men live well. When therefore the Master says certain goods are done by man through free choice alone and before grace and without grace, he by no means understands it of goods pertaining to the goodness of the moral life, but of those pertaining to the

goodness of the natural life. And this is certainly manifest from the proof which he adduces, namely from the authority of **Augustine** in the *Hypognosticon*, response 3; which, that it may appear more clearly, I recite the words of Augustine as they lie in the same place: "**There is,**" he says, "**we confess, free choice in all men having indeed the judgment of reason, not by which it is suitable to either begin or certainly perfect those things which pertain to God without God, but only in the works of the present life, both good as well as evil.**" And he explains himself concerning which goods he speaks: "**I say goods which arise from the good of nature, that is, to want to work in the field, to want to drink, to want to eat etc.**"; and embracing universally he adds: "**Or whatever good pertains to the present life; all of which do not subsist without the divine governance, indeed they are or began to be from Him and through Him.**" Then he gives examples of evils saying: "**I say evils such as to want to worship an idol, to blaspheme, to want to live shamefully etc.**"; and he adds: "**To want whatever it is not lawful or not expedient to do.**"

From these things it is clear first that free choice is not of itself suitable to begin or perfect goods **which pertain to God**. Now it is certain that all **morally good or truly virtuous works** are of such a kind, even if they are not accepted by God for the reward of eternal life. Otherwise such works in catechumens or Christians existing in mortal sin (whose works it is certain are not accepted for the reward of eternal life) would not pertain to God nor be said to proceed from the grace of God; the opposite of which was proved through Augustine in the book *To Simplicianus* in the declaration of the 1st conclusion of article 1.

And so it is clear that free choice cannot perform goods pertaining to **living virtuously** or to the goodness of the **moral life** without the help of God. And it must be understood of **special aid** and not of general influence only, because not even without that general [influence] does it suffice for evil works or even for other goods of the natural life, as is clear, and he himself even hints through that clause "**all of which do not subsist without the divine governance etc.**"; and yet giving the difference in this he says "**but only in the works of the present life etc.**" (supply: is it suitable without God). He means therefore that free choice can do **these** things without God helping specially, but not **those**. Which also that exclusive word "**only**" confirms.

It is also clear that those goods which he says free choice can do of itself are goods pertaining to the goodness of the **natural life** and insofar namely as they pertain to such a life. For it is certain that one is not called morally good from the fact that he cultivates a field well or builds a house, or drinks and eats according to what the sustentation of his body requires (and so of others which he enumerates). Indeed, sometimes he who is more morally vicious cultivates a field better and exercises the other aforesaid works perfectly, according to what is required for their natural perfection.

From which it is evidently gathered that the intention of the **Master** there is not against the statements [of this text].

(To the Principal Reasons)

To the **first principal** reason of the question, when it is assumed that "**man can naturally fulfill the precepts of the written law,**" it must be said that one can be said to fulfill such precepts in two ways: In one way, because he does that which the law commands to be done or abstains from that which the law

commands not to be done, and in this sense, the antecedent being accepted, the consequence is not valid. For one can do what the law commands (for example, honor parents) and yet not act morally well, as if he honors parents not from the love of God or for God's sake, but for fear of punishment or desire for human glory or temporal advantage or any other inordinate intention.

In another way, one can be said to fulfill the law if he does what the law commands **for that [end] and in that [manner]** it is to be done and the law teaches it is to be done. And in this way only is one rightly said to fulfill the precept of the law. Whence Augustine, upon the letter to the Galatians, says that the precepts of the law **"nothing fulfills except charity; because even if someone does not kill a man for this reason—lest he himself be killed—he does not fulfill the precept of justice."** With the antecedent thus taken, I say that man fulfilling the precept naturally can be understood in two ways: In one way "naturally," that is, by the powers of nature precisely **without other special aid** from God, and so it is **false**. In another way "naturally," that is, by the powers of nature **helped nevertheless by the special aid of God**, and so I concede it; and I deny the consequence if the consequent be understood with the exclusion of special aid, as it must be understood to be against the statements [of this text].

To the proof, it must be said that the statement of the **Apostle** is to be understood in the **second sense** and not in the first, as is expressly clear in the same place through the **Gloss** (and it is taken from the book of **Augustine On the Spirit and the Letter**). For he says thus: **"Nor let it move you that he said they do by nature those things which are of the law—not by the Spirit of God, not by faith, not by grace. For the Spirit of grace does this, that He may restore in us the image in which we were naturally made. For vice is contrary to nature, which indeed grace heals."** And he adds: **"Therefore, the vice having been healed by grace, those things which are of the law are done naturally; not that grace is denied by the name of nature, but rather nature is repaired by grace."**

Furthermore, the Apostle does not say "For when the Gentiles who **do not have grace**," but "who **do not have the law**," understanding by this the Gentiles converted to the faith of Christ who had not received the law of Moses, yet they did not lack the grace of God, through which they fulfilled the precepts of the law.

And this solution and the preceding one **Augustine** gives together to **Julian** the heretic (alleging the said authority for himself) in Book 4 against the same, chapter 15, saying: **"Therefore they are said to do naturally those things which are of the law without the law, because from the Gentiles they came to the Gospel, not from the circumcision to which the law was given. And therefore 'naturally,' because nature itself has been corrected in them by the grace of God so that they might believe."**

To the confirmation, I say that neither those words nor the letter in which they are contained were Jerome's, but **Pelagius's**, as is clearly evident from the book of **Augustine On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin**, chapters 37 and 38, in which the words of Pelagius from the letter which he commemorates having written to the virgin Demetrias are recited, which are close to the cited ones. The same is clear from the letter of Augustine *To Juliana*, the mother of the aforesaid virgin Demetrias, in which he also recites the words of Pelagius contained in the same letter. Now the beginning of that letter of Pelagius is **"If relying on the highest genius and equal knowledge etc.,"** and the end **"no labor is hard, no time long by which the glory of eternity is acquired."**

Secondly I say that if there are or were any moral virtues or their good operations in Gentile infidels, certainly they had those **not from their own natural powers, but with the special aid of God**, as was said in responding to the eighth argument.

To the **second**, I concede that man certainly can perform such virtuous works, but **not unless he is helped by the special aid of God**, as Augustine says sententiously in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 22 (responding to the argument of **Caelestius**) and similarly in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 44 (responding to the argument of Pelagius); similarly also *Against Julian*, Book 5, chapter 46, to the same arguing thus: **"If you faithfully invite men to the study of continence, you confess therefore that the virtue of chastity can be kept by those willing, so that whoever wills may be holy in body and spirit"**; to whom Augustine: **"I respond,"** he says, **"that I confess it, but not as you do. For you attribute this to the powers of the mind itself; I to the will helped by the grace of God."**

Concede therefore that consequent first inferred thus simply placed, but this is not against me, because from it it does not follow that man can do such works by his own powers without the special aid of God.

But if the consequent be accepted with the aforesaid addition, namely **"without the special aid of God,"** I deny the consequence. And to the proof, when it is said **"Otherwise God would have commanded impossibilities to man,"** it must be said that if the sense is that He would have commanded things which are impossible to man **with the aid of God**, that does not follow, as is clear; but if the sense is that He would have commanded things which are impossible to man **without the aid of God**, it must be conceded what is inferred, as is taught here by Augustine and above also by Bede responding to Julian to be conceded.

From which also it can well be further inferred that God does not command man that he do such works **without His aid**. Which I also say must be conceded, **Augustine** teaching this very thing in the sermon *On Many Martyrs*, when he says: **"To live justly and chastely and to keep charity with all is commanded to all with the help of God."** Likewise upon Psalm 118: **"Thus, O Lord, thus,"** he says, **"do, O merciful Lord. Command what cannot be fulfilled—nay, command what cannot be fulfilled except through Your grace."**

In the first sense of the consequent the statement of **Jerome** is to be understood, not in the second. Which is confirmed, because he himself a little after says: **"We confess free will in such a way that we say we always stand in need of the help of God"**; by which words, as the Master says in Book 2, distinction 28, he crushes the error of Pelagius.

By this it is clear what must be said to the **third**. For it must be conceded that man can do such goods, but **not without the help of God**.

But against this it can be argued, because, since it is not in man's power that God help him (for He freely and contingently helps whomever He helps), if man cannot do good not helped, it follows that **it is not in man's power to do good**, from which it follows (as was inferred in arguing before) that in not doing good, he does not sin.

I respond first that a similar argument can be made generally against all. For all Catholics confess that for every voluntary act of man the **aid of the general influence of God** is necessary, and it is certain that it is

no more in the power of the creature that God help it in that general mode than it is in its power that He help it in that special mode by which He helps to act well. Just as therefore from the need of the aid of general influence it cannot be inferred that the voluntary act is not in the power of man, so neither from the need of special aid; wherefore that first consequence is to be denied.

But the difficulty of the argument seems still to remain. For at least according to the statements [here] one must concede that it is not in the power of man to do good without that special aid, just as neither without the aid of general influence. Therefore if God did not help some man in that special mode to act well, he could not act well and consequently such a one **in not acting well would not sin**, just as also if God did not co-act toward some act of his or help through general influence, he would perform no act, nor in not acting in such a case would he sin. But the first consequent is not to be granted; wherefore etc.

I respond that **not every inability to act well excuses a man from sin**, if he does not act well, because not that which is the **punishment of sin** (just as neither ignorance, which is the punishment of sin) excuses a man from sin if he does not do what he ought or does what he ought not. Now, however, according to the present state every man is unable to act well of himself on account of **original fault**; for unless that had been, there would have been conferred on everyone the aid by which he could act well without other special aid, just as the first man could before sin. But that he cannot now nor has such aid is the **punishment of sin**. And therefore, if God should not help someone in that special mode to act well, he is not on that account excused from sin while he does not do what he ought to do. But it would have been otherwise if such aid had been lacking to the first man before he had sinned. Whence **Augustine** in *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 49, speaking of the first grace and gift of God or aid conferred on angel and man when they were first made, says: "**If this aid had been lacking either to angel or man when they were first made, since their nature was not made such that it could remain if it willed without divine aid, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault; for the aid would have been lacking without which they could not remain. But now to whom such aid is lacking, it is already the punishment of sin.**" Where he hints that now the defect of that aid and consequently the inability to act well does not excuse from fault, since it is the punishment of sin. This solution, however, will appear more fully from certain things to be said in the following [questions].

From these things it is clear that in responding to the form of the objection made, the **first consequence is to be conceded and the second denied**.

QUESTION 2

WHETHER man in the present state can from his own natural powers without the special aid of God avoid every sin.

Secondly I ask **whether man in the present state can from his own natural powers without the special aid of God avoid every sin.**

And it seems that **yes**, because if he could not, it would follow that sometimes he **would sin by not sinning**. But this implies impossibles. The consequence is proved by that of **Augustine** in Book 3 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 38: "**For who sins in that which can in no way be avoided?**"

Secondly, if he could not, it would follow that **not every sin of man will be voluntary**, and consequently it would not be a sin; which is a contradiction. The second consequence is proved by that of **Augustine** in *On True Religion*, chapter 24: "**Sin is so much a voluntary evil that in no way is it a sin if it is not voluntary. And this indeed is so manifest that no paucity of the learned, no crowd of the unlearned dissents from this.**" But the first consequence is clear for the reason that if man cannot avoid some sin, he will commit that [sin] of necessity, and not freely, and through this not voluntarily. This whole reason is confirmed by the consequence of **Augustine** in *On True Religion*, chapter 26. For he says: "**But that which is said to be persuaded to man by the perverse angel, even to this he consented by will. For if he had done it by necessity, he would be held by no crime of sin.**"

To the **opposite** is that of **Augustine** in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 4: "**To a vitiated nature the choice of the will is insufficient for not sinning, unless it be healed by the helped grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.**"

This question is to be understood of **actual sin**, not of original; for concerning original sin there will be a special question below. There will be two articles of this question: For first it will be seen concerning the thing asked principally; secondly it will be inquired whether man, having habitual sanctifying grace beyond natural goods, can without other special aid avoid every sin.

ARTICLE [1]

(Two Conclusions)

Concerning the first article, because **certain ones** have said that man through free choice without other special aid of God can avoid every sin (in this sense namely, that he has it in his power to preserve himself from every sin and commit absolutely none), but **others** have said that it is not in the power of man that he commit some sin nor can he without the special grace and aid of God keep himself immune from every sin or avoid **all** sins collectively, yet he can avoid **any** sin [taken individually] according to itself through his free choice without other special aid of God besides general influence—therefore in this article I place **two conclusions**: The **first** is that **it is not possible for man in the present state without the special aid of God to avoid every sin**, against the first opinion. The **second**, that **not any sin of his [taken individually] can any man in the present state or could he by his own power without the special aid of God avoid**. And in both conclusions I speak of man not-God and able to sin by his own will.

(The First Conclusion is Proved, First)

I prove the **first conclusion** first thus: No one can, without the special aid of God, **avoid every harmful temptation** or resist everything by which he is tempted; therefore it is not possible for man without the special aid of God to avoid every sin.

The consequence is plain, because everyone not resisting a harmful temptation certainly sins.

The first part of the antecedent is known to everyone by the experience which he has of himself; for "**the world, the flesh, the demons move diverse battles.**" And who is there who has it in his power that none of the aforesaid should move a battle against him? For who has it in his power by what sights or other sensations he is touched, what thoughts enter his mind? Or even who can avoid the inordinate motions of the *fomes*? It is clear that no one.

But the **second part** of the antecedent is proved first from the fact that when **Pelagius** had dogmatized that the victory of temptations is ours from free choice, not from divine aid, he was compelled to anathematize this as erroneous and contrary to the truth of the Catholic faith. "**Whence,**" as Augustine says in the letter *To Paulinus the Bishop of Nola* (and it was cited in the preceding question in the proof of the third supposition for the first conclusion of the first article there to be proved), "**it follows that whoever follows the authority of that episcopal judgment and the confession of Pelagius himself, ought to hold these things which the Catholic Church has always held.**" Then enumerating those things, as much as makes for the proposition, he adds among other things: That "**he should confess that when we fight against temptations and illicit concupiscences, although there too we have our own will, nevertheless our victory does not come from it but from the aid of God.**"

(Instance)

But to this perhaps it will be said according to the gloss of certain ones that it is one thing **to conquer** a temptation, another **to resist** a temptation. For everyone who does not consent to a temptation resists it. But he only conquers who so overcomes it that he obtains that for the loss of which the temptation was inclining; but he is the one who from his victory merits the eternal good; for the temptation was inclining toward the loss of such a good. From which it follows that **not everyone who resists a temptation conquers it**, but only he who resists **meritoriously**. Although therefore no one by his own power can conquer temptations, as the cited words testify, it is not concluded nevertheless that he cannot **resist**.

(To the Instance)

This gloss for certain is **not to the mind of the fathers** who, condemning the error of Pelagius, decreed that the aforesaid Catholic truth must be confessed without ambiguities. This is manifestly clear first from the words of **Pope Innocent** writing back to the fathers who were present at the Council of Carthage, where the Pelagian errors were condemned. For inveighing as to this article against Pelagius and Caelestius he says: "**Not knowing that unless the grace of God implored by great prayers descends upon us, we can by no means attempt to conquer the errors of the earthly stain and the mundane**

body, since not free choice but the aid of God alone can make us equal to resisting." And again below: **"It is necessary,"** he says, **"that with Him helping we conquer, with Him not helping we be conquered again."**

From these things let the touched-upon glossators advert that the Catholic fathers in the aforesaid words understood him to have victory over temptation who resists temptation and is not conquered by it—namely neither by another. For if someone overcome by another stronger temptation does not yield to a lesser one (just as when someone abstains from fornication by a greater desire for human praise), he is by no means said to conquer the fornicatory temptation, but pulsated by two temptations, he is conquered either by both or by the greater, and one temptation conquers the other.

Likewise the same **Innocent** writing back to the fathers of the Council of Milevis against Pelagius and Caelestius, condemned also in the same place, speaks thus: **"Denying therefore the aid of God, they say man can be sufficient for himself nor does he need this divine grace, deprived of which it is necessary that he fall, ensnared by the snares of the devil."** And a little after: **"Indeed neither can we avoid other machinations of the devil unless with the same [grace] helping."**

Let them advert here that **without grace man cannot avoid the temptations of the devil**, but it is necessary that he fall ensnared; therefore he cannot by himself resist. This intention is confirmed, because it is certain that the aforesaid fathers condemning the aforesaid error wished to condemn it according to that sense in which Pelagius spoke and in which they recognized him to err. But such is the sense if the **victory** of temptation be taken for **resistance**, as is clear through **Augustine** in Book 1 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 27, where speaking of Pelagius: **"In the book,"** he says, **"to the holy virgin, when he says 'Let us merit divine grace and more easily resist the evil spirit with the aid of the Holy Spirit,' he signifies indeed what he savors. For why did he interpose this word, that is 'more easily'? Or was the sense not complete that 'we resist the evil spirit with the aid of the Holy Spirit'—easier and not only complete, but even a sound sense?"** From which it is clear that the apposition of that word **"more easily"** hints at an unsound sense. Which Augustine also noted before, when he says **"But how much detriment he did with this addition etc."** And therefore consequently in chapter 30 he says: **"Let him amend all these things, lest if human infirmity has erred in the profundity of great things, even diabolical fallaciousness or animosity should accede to this error, either by denying what he felt or by defending what he felt wrongly."**

Therefore the condemners of his errors wished it to be confessed that we can **neither easily nor with difficulty** resist temptation without the aid of God, since they decreed it must be confessed simply and without ambiguities that **"when we fight against temptations and illicit concupiscences, although there too we have our own will, nevertheless our victory does not come from it but from the aid of God."**

Furthermore, a man having grace and resisting a temptation resists meritoriously and conquers the temptation, and **he could resist the same temptation even without grace and any other special aid** (as the response says); therefore grace helps not so much **to resist or conquer** temptation, although it makes his resistance be accepted by God for obtaining a reward. And it is similar as if a king wished to reward some soldier resisting and fighting bravely against an enemy in the vestment or robe of the king with some reward, with which nevertheless he would not want to reward him if he had fought against the same

[enemy] without the robe of the king and had resisted similarly. For that vestment would by no means have helped the soldier to fight, although without it his fight would not be meritorious with the king.

But Catholic confession says the tempted one is **helped by God**, and similarly the whole doctrine of the saints wills that man on account of his infirmity and impotence needs divine aid against temptations; wherefore etc.

Nor can it be said that he needs to be helped so that he may resist "**more easily**," but not simply so that he may be able [to resist], because then one falls into the touched-upon **condemned response of Pelagius**.

Furthermore, the resistance by which a heretic or schismatic or catechumen resists some temptation for God's sake is certainly not meritorious of eternal life. If therefore such a one resists thus without the special aid of God, since to resist thus is some good (although not meritorious), it follows that **there is some good in the will of man without the aid and gift of God**; the opposite of which was shown at length in the preceding question, and especially from the determination of **Augustine** in the sermon *On Patience* cited to prove the first conclusion of the first article.

(The Proof of the First Conclusion Continues)

The same part of the antecedent is proved secondly thus: If man could resist temptations without the help of God, God would not have to be asked nor His help implored by which we might be able to resist them.

This consequence is clear in the third reason made to prove the first conclusion of the first article of the preceding question. But the consequent is clearly false from the fact that the Church prays daily for this, just as Christ the Head of the Church taught to pray when He says in the Lord's Prayer: "**Lead us not into temptation**," that is, do not permit us to fail in temptation, according to the exposition of **Augustine** in his letter (and of four other bishops) to Pope Innocent against Pelagius.

You will say it does not follow from this that one should not pray for such help, because although without it we could resist, nevertheless not so well and easily. Therefore, so that we may resist better and **more easily**, one must pray.

This response can by no means stand: First, because it expressly contradicts the **Council** and **Augustine** saying that it follows we ought not pray. Second, because it openly gives that condemned and reprobated opinion which **Pelagius** hinted at by saying: "**And more easily resist the evil spirit etc.**" This reason (and for the same proposition) the same **Augustine** makes against Pelagius in Book 2 of *On the Baptism of Infants* to Marcellinus, near the beginning saying thus: "**For there are certain ones so presuming on the free choice of the human will that they opine we do not even need to be divinely helped not to sin, once the choice of free will has been granted to our nature itself.**" And soon against them: "**Whence it becomes consequent**," he says, "**that we ought not even pray 'that we enter not into temptation,' that is, that we be not conquered by temptation, either when it deceives and preoccupies the unknowing, or when it presses and urges the weak.**" And then he says that that inference is "**pernicious and contrary to the religion with which we are imbued**" and an adversary "**to the piety with which we worship God.**"

(The First Conclusion is Proved, Again)

Secondly, the **principal conclusion** is proved from the foundation already touched upon concerning prayer, because the Church prays daily for avoiding or not committing sins, saying: **"Save us today by Your power, that on this day we may decline to no sin."** And similarly for the same [end] she pours out daily many other prayers to God. Similarly the Apostle in 2 Corinthians, last chapter: **"We pray,"** he says, **"to God that you do no evil."** From which word, according to what **Augustine** says in the immediately cited letter *To Innocent*, **"it sufficiently appears that for not sinning, that is for not doing evil, although it is not doubted that there is a choice of will, nevertheless its power does not suffice unless infirmity be helped. Therefore prayer itself is the clearest testimony"** (namely of our infirmity and the necessity of divine aid).

Thirdly thus: If it were possible for man without the aid of God to avoid **every sin** by his own power, it would be possible for him by his own power without other special aid of God to fulfill **all divine commandments**.

The consequence is clear, because whatever commandment man does not fulfill, he sins. But the consequent is false, since it was one error of the condemned Pelagians, **Augustine** saying of the Pelagians and Caelestians in the book *On Heresies*, penultimate chapter: **"These are enemies of the grace of God to such an extent that they believe man can without it do all divine commandments; whereas if this were true, the Lord would seem to have said in vain: 'Without me you can do nothing.'"** Likewise the same [Augustine] in the letter *To Hilary of Syracuse*, near the beginning: **"That statement,"** he says, **"which they say—that free choice suffices for man to fulfill the Lord's commandments, even if he be not helped to good works by the grace of God and the gift of the Holy Spirit—is to be anathematized in every way and detested with all execrations."**

This very thing was also condemned in the **Council of Milevis**, as was cited in the proof of the fourth supposition made to prove the first conclusion of the first article of the preceding question.

Fourthly, the conclusion is proved by the express determination of the **Council of Milevis**, in which it is held thus: **"Whoever shall say that the grace of God, by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, avails only for the remission of sins which have already been committed, not also for aid that they may not be committed, let him be anathema."**

Likewise **Augustine** in *On the Perfection of Justice*, last chapter: **"Whoever denies that we ought to pray that we enter not into temptation (but he denies this who contends that the aid of the grace of God is not necessary for man not to sin, but that the human will suffices with the law alone accepted), I do not doubt that he ought to be removed from the ears of all and anathematized by the mouth of all."**

Another chapter of the previously cited **council** posits the same opinion, as is clear in the proof of the third conclusion of the first article of the preceding question.

Nor can it be said that grace is necessary for man not **simply** to avoid, but to avoid sins **easily**, as if without it man could avoid them (although with difficulty or not so easily). For this was the perverse and condemned exposition of **Pelagius**, as was proved by the words of **Augustine** in *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, chapter 27, cited a little before. Which is also refuted by another chapter of the previously cited **council** recited in the proof of the fourth supposition made to prove the first conclusion of the first article of the preceding question.

(The First Conclusion is Proved by Sacred Scripture)

The aforesaid conclusion could be proved by many authorities of Sacred Scripture, but let it suffice to commemorate a few. For the **Psalmist** says: "**Unless the Lord keep the city, he watches in vain that keeps it.**" And therefore he himself prayed, saying: "**May he not give**" (that is, may he not permit to be given) "**thy foot to be moved: neither let him slumber that keeps thee.**"

Likewise the **Wise Man** in Wisdom 8: "**As I knew that I could not otherwise be continent unless God gave it, and this also was a point of wisdom, to know whose gift it was: I went to the Lord, and besought him etc.**" And it follows in his prayer: "**Give me wisdom that sits by thy throne**"; and below: "**For she knows all things and understands and shall lead me soberly in my works, and shall preserve me by her power.**" Behold he confesses he cannot be continent unless God gives it, and therefore he prays that the uncreated wisdom of God be given to him, which may lead him soberly and by her powerful virtue keep him from incontinence and intemperance, namely, and other sins.

Many others could be brought forward, but let these suffice.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved, First)

I prove the **second conclusion** first thus: Someone sins by **not loving God for His own sake ultimately** and by **loving a creature not for God's sake finally**; therefore there is some sin of his which man cannot avoid without the special aid of God.

The antecedent is certain. The consequence is proved, because such a sin cannot be avoided unless God be loved for His own sake. But no one in the present state can so love God without His special aid, as was proved in the preceding question, first reason of the first conclusion of the first article.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved, Second)

Secondly, if man can or could avoid any sin of his [taken individually] without special aid, therefore hearing the faith of Christ preached to him, he can without other aid **believe** those things which are proposed to him to be believed.

The consequence is clear, because such a one, if he does not believe, certainly sins. For **"He that believes not shall be condemned,"** Mark, last chapter; and in John 16 the Savior says: **"When He is come, He will convince the world of sin and of justice and of judgment; of sin indeed, because they have not believed in me."** Augustine also *To Vitalis* in the letter against him: **"For neither are you going to say,"** he says, **"that he does no evil who does not believe in Christ, or who deserts the faith of Christ."** But the consequent is erroneous, Augustine testifying that he himself once erred in this and therefore retracted it in *On the Predestination of the Saints*, near the beginning, where he speaks thus: **"For I did not think that faith was prevented by the grace of God so that by it there might be given to us what we might profitably ask, except because we could not believe if the proclamation of the truth did not precede; but that we should consent to the Gospel preached to us, I thought was our own and was in us from ourselves. Which error of mine several of my small works sufficiently indicate, written before my episcopate."** And then he commemorates that he revoked this in the book of his *Retractations*, because faith is numbered among the divine gifts by the Apostle; and so it is, as is clear in the first book, chapter 23. And that he erred in this (where his words were just recited), he says he was convicted by that apostolic testimony: **"For who distinguishes you? What have you that you did not receive?" "Which testimony,"** as he adds not much after, **"does not allow any of the faithful to say: I have faith which I did not receive. For the whole elation of this answer is entirely repressed by these apostolic words. But not even this can be said: Although I have not perfect faith, I have nevertheless its beginning, by which I first believed in Christ. For here also it is answered: 'But what have you that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?'"** And below concluding: **"Therefore,"** he says, **"to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men; but to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful."** And he says many other things in the same place reproving a certain error of that time of those saying that the beginning of faith was in us from ourselves.

Likewise this was the error of **Vitalis**, as the same Augustine recites in the letter to him, saying to him near the beginning of the letter: **"How do you say—because I hear you say—'That we rightly believe in God and consent to the Gospel is not a gift of God, but this is in us from ourselves, that is from our own will which He did not work in us in our heart (God works in us to will) through His law, through His scriptures by which we either read or hear that God works that we may will; but to consent or not consent to Him is so ours that if we will, it happens; but if we will not, we make the operation of God in us to avail nothing'?"** Here it is clear that that Vitalis opined that man, the Gospel of Christ having been preached to him, could from his own liberty without other aid of God consent by believing, as the inferred consequent signifies. But this **Augustine** consequently reproves as erroneous by three reasons.

Of which the **first** is because then it would follow that one should not pray for infidels that they believe, but only that the Gospel be preached to them. Whence he says: **"If you say these things, you certainly contradict our prayers. Say therefore most openly that we ought not to pray for those to whom we preach the Gospel that they may believe, but only preach to them."** And then he shows this is against the pious custom of the Church and apostolic doctrine and that of Blessed **Cyprian**.

The **second** reason is because then we ought not give thanks to God from the fact that some consent to such preaching by believing, because thus we would act feignedly and not truly; which is not to be said, since the pious rite of the Church holds this. Whence he says below: **"Vainly and perfunctorily rather**

than truly do we give great thanks to God with exultation when some of the infidels believe, if He Himself does not do this in them." And he adds: "We do not give thanks to God at all, but feign that we give thanks, if we do not think He does that for which we give Him thanks."

His **third** reason is since, as he says, this falls into the condemned opinion of **Pelagius**, by which he said the grace of God is not given for single acts. And the consequence is clear, because according to this statement it would not be given for such an act of believing. Whence he adds: "**This is that sentence of the Pelagians, badly defamed and deservedly reprov'd and condemned in the judgment of the Eastern bishops by Pelagius himself fearing to be condemned, by which they say 'the grace of God is not given for single acts, but consists in free choice or in the law and doctrine.'**"

And each of the aforesaid reasons he pursues very diffusely, concluding finally that **to believe the Gospel is not a work of nature or doctrine, but of divine grace.**

Also in the letter *To Paulinus the Bishop of Nola*: "**Because,**" he says, "**the will is not sufficient for itself to be moved toward believing true things unless God helps through grace, the Lord Himself saying when He spoke of non-believers: 'No one comes to me unless it has been given to him by the Father'; on account of this also the Apostle, although he preached the Gospel instantly, nevertheless believed it to be little unless he also prayed for them that they might believe.**"

Bede also upon that [verse] of Luke 5, "**Master, we have labored all the night and have taken nothing: but at thy word I will let down the net**": "**Unless,**" he says, "**the instruments of disputations be let down in the word of supernal grace, in vain does the preacher send the dart of his voice, because the faith of the peoples comes forth not in the wisdom of the composed word, but by the gift of divine vocation.**"

(Instance)

But to this reason perhaps it will be said, just as I heard a certain one saying, that these things are to be understood of **believing meritoriously**; for one hearing the Gospel cannot believe it meritoriously without the aid of divine grace, but he can nevertheless **believe simply** and assent to those things which are said without other special aid from his own liberty; and the recited statements of the saints would be said to be understood of the first mode of believing, not of the second.

(To the Instance)

But if what has been said be considered diligently, this response is refuted from the same sources. First, from the first motive of **Augustine** touched upon above, because according to this the faith of those not having charity would not be counted among the gifts of the Holy Spirit; which is against the opinion of the **Apostle** in 1 Corinthians 12 and 13. Also the conversion of catechumens, when they begin to believe, would not be a work of the grace of God, against **Augustine** in Book 1 *To Simplicianus* in the response to

the second question, and his words were cited in the preceding question, article 1, in the treatment of the first conclusion. The consequence is clear, because such persons do not believe meritoriously in the sense which is now commonly held of that term.

It is also refuted from the **second** foundation, since one believing from his own power, although not meritoriously, could truly extol himself over another not believing and glory in himself, and to the Apostle asking "**For who distinguishes you? What have you that you did not receive?**" he will be able to answer: "My faith by which I believe the Gospel of Christ distinguishes me; I have this and I did not receive it." For there is no doubt that, other things being equal, one thus believing would excel one not believing, so that the whole effort of the **Apostle** in that part would be frustrated, by which he wishes to show that man cannot glory in himself concerning any good whatsoever and extol himself over another, as **Augustine** declares at length in *On the Predestination of the Saints* (cited above). And therefore it must be concluded with Augustine that to have such faith is also a gift of God just as to have charity.

It is also refuted from the **third** foundation, since then one should not pray that someone believe the Gospel preached to him, but only that God accept his believing for the reward of eternal life and that his faith be meritorious to him, or that He inspire charity in him by which his believing would be meritorious to him. The consequence is clear, because according to the response that person can without inspiration or other divine operation believe what is proposed to him; and through this the aid of God would be asked superfluously for this, as was declared many times above. But the **rite of the Church** holds the opposite.

It is also reprov'd from the **fourth**, since it follows that for the newly believing not baptized (as catechumens) thanks should not be rendered to God for their faith. The consequence is clear, because they do not believe meritoriously.

It is also removed from the **fifth**, because according to this the grace of God would not be given for **single good acts**, because [it would] not [be given] for that believing, which is certainly right and good, although not meritorious of eternal life. For it is possible that someone not existing in the state of meriting believes as integrally and rightly as some other existing in the state of meriting.

But if anyone wishes to evade these things otherwise—saying namely that to one believing in such a way grace is indeed given in fact for that act, or that God helps with special aid by which he believes **more easily or more promptly**, but he could nevertheless even without such aid believe (though not so easily and promptly)—let him advert that this response coincides with that **condemned response of Pelagius**, by which he said "**grace is given to us for this reason, that what we are commanded to do by free choice, we may be able to fulfill more easily through grace.**" For there is no doubt to anyone that, the Gospel of Christ having been preached, we are commanded to believe.

(The Second Conclusion is Proved, Third)

Thirdly to the conclusion thus: If [man can avoid] any sin [without special aid], therefore by whatever and however great a harmful **temptation** anyone is tempted, he can by his own power without other special aid of God **resist** that temptation.

The consequence is clear, because everyone not resisting such temptations sins. But the consequent cannot be given catholically, as is clear from the things said to prove the first conclusion and from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, such as that: "**Being pushed I was overturned that I might fall: but the Lord supported me; the Lord is my strength and my praise**"; and that: "**In thee I shall be delivered from temptation**" ("in thee," the **Gloss** says "that is, through thee"). The Apostle also, great temptations having been mentioned (by which nevertheless the saints cannot be separated from the charity of Christ), says in Romans 8: "**In all these things we overcome because of Him that hath loved us.**" And the letter of **Augustine** has "**through Him that hath loved us,**" upon which word he himself says in *On Grace and Free Choice*: "**Therefore not through us but 'through Him that hath loved us.'**"

Why should I bring forward more, when it ought to suffice for any Christian that the whole Church of God, instructed by Christ the Head, prays **that it be not led into temptation** (that is, that it fail not in temptation), and all the saints refer thanks to God as the author for the overcoming of temptations? And also that it condemns the opposite as erroneous, professing simply that "**when we fight against temptations and illicit concupiscences, although there too we have our own will, nevertheless our victory does not come from it but from the aid of God,**" as was cited above. Through which confession indeed it evidently appears to those intending piously that not only great temptations but **not even small ones**, against which we fight, can we overcome by our own power.

With which **Gregory** agrees in the 9th book of the *Morals* upon that of Job 10 "**And thou shalt bring me into dust,**" saying: "**He is aptly said to be brought into dust, because left to himself he is carried away by the wind of any temptation whatsoever.**"

It is confirmed, because then **Job** could have by his own power without the special aid of God patiently borne the tortures of the body inflicted on him and evinced such a temptation of the devil to impatience by the purpose of a good will; whoever says which, **Blessed Prosper** testifying in his book *For the Preachers of Grace*, chapter 20, "**runs down into the Pelagian precipices.**" Whence later in chapter 25, the tenth definition of Cassian against him having been recited, he says: "**If God knew only what Job could do, but did not also grant that he could, He was the witness of his patience, not the helper. And in what will the aid of grace be necessary, if so great a victory is acquired for him by human powers alone?**"

Lastly the same is proved by the **council** previously cited in which he is anathematized who says that grace does not avail for aid **that sins be not committed**. For either it must be understood that that is said only because no one can avoid **all** sins (so that he commits absolutely none) without the aid of grace, as some wish to explain; or because man can avoid **no** sin [individually] without the aid of grace. The first cannot be said, because then it would follow that the grace of God avails **for no man** for avoiding sins [perfectly]; the opposite of which the council proclaims. The consequence is clear, because no one [even with grace] is powerful to sin [so little] that he commits absolutely no sin, as is evidently proved from the seventh chapter of the said council. The second therefore remains, and the proposition is held.

ARTICLE 2

(First Conclusion)

As regards the second article, I posit two similar conclusions. The first is that **no just person** or one having **habitual grace** making one pleasing [to God] is able, without **another special aid of God**, to avoid **every sin**.

This is proved thus: No one, even existing in grace, is able without **another special aid of God** to avoid every harmful temptation or to resist every harmful temptation; therefore, no such person is able without the **special aid of God** to avoid **every sin**. The first part of the antecedent is clear and the prophetic and apostolic voices confess it. The second is also evident, because otherwise there would be no need for holy men to pray for that which Christ taught them to pray, namely: "Lead us not into temptation." Whosoever denies this, says **Augustine** in *On the Perfection of Justice*, as was alleged before, "I do not doubt must be removed from the ears of all and anathematized by the mouths of all." Furthermore, if this were not necessary, why did **Saint David** plead with such insistence: "Be Thou my helper; forsake me not, nor despise me, O God my Savior," and why do other saints and the whole Church of the just daily pour out suppliant prayers to God for the same thing?

The consequence is evident through that saying of **Augustine** against **Pelagius** in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 18: "What is more foolish than to pray that you might do what you have in your power?" And through the determination of the **Council of Carthage** and other proofs made for a similar consequence in the preceding question in the third reason made for the first conclusion.

Secondly, it is argued thus: The just and those existing in grace still need the **help of God** so that they may **persevere** in the good and not fail; therefore, they need help so that they do not sin. The consequence is evident through that saying of **Augustine** in *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 7: "For he does not do no evil who deserts the good, and who is inclined into evil from which he ought not to decline, not persevering in the good." Where he implies that the very failure to persevere is a sin. Furthermore, if one existing in grace were not to sin further, he would surely persevere in the good.

The daily prayer of the just shows the antecedent to be true, in which they say: "Hallowed be Thy name." By which words, according to the exposition of the blessed martyr **Cyprian**, as **Augustine** alleges in *On Rebuke and Grace*, where cited above, and in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, around the beginning, we "ask and plead of God that we, who have been sanctified in baptism, may **persevere** in that which we have begun to be." And **Cyprian** adds: "We make this prayer with continuous supplications, we ask this day and night, that sanctification and vivification, which is received from the grace of God, may be preserved by **His protection**."

Did not also **Saint David** pray, and do not all saints living in the present life still pray: "Preserve me, O Lord, for I have put my trust in Thee"? Did not the same man pray for the people devoted to God in 1 Chronicles, the last chapter, saying: "O Lord God, keep forever this will of their heart, and let this mind remain always in the worship of Thee"? Did not also the **Savior** pray for His people to the Father, John 17: "Holy Father, keep them whom Thou hast given me"? And it follows: "Those whom Thou gavest me have I kept; and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition." From which it is evident that the other apostles were in grace. Which is also confirmed, because He had foretold to them: "Now you are clean," chapter 15.

It is also evident that He was speaking of **spiritual custody**, by which they were kept from **sin**; for Judas had not perished except spiritually. And He adds: "I do not ask that Thou take them out of the world, but that Thou **keep them from evil**." And it is certain that He was not speaking of the evil of punishment or of the adversity of this world, since in the same sermon He had foretold to them: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God"; and again: "In the world you shall have distress, but have confidence, for I have overcome the world." But surely He was speaking of the **evil of fault** [sin]. Furthermore, blessed **Gregory** in Book 9 of the *Morals* upon that verse of Job 10, "Thy visitation hath preserved my spirit," says: "Supernal visitation preserves the human spirit, when it does not cease to pierce with love or strike with a scourge the one enriched with virtues. For if He bestows gifts, but does not lift him up by continually restoring him, the good which is not preserved by the bestower is quickly lost." And it is evident also that he speaks of just men.

Item, in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, chapter 21, it is written: "That we do not slip from the good, whether of nature or of merit, belongs to our solicitude and equally to the **celestial help**; but that we slip, belongs to our power and laziness."

This conclusion is proved by the authority of **Augustine** in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 26, saying: "The Supernal Physician heals our evils not only for this, that they may no longer exist, but that for the future we may be able to walk rightly; which indeed, even when healthy, we shall not be able to do unless **He helps us**. For a human physician, etc.," as is held below in responding to the objection made against the conclusions of the second article.

(Second Conclusion)

The second conclusion is that a man existing in **grace** cannot avoid **any [given] sin** without **another special aid of God**.

It is proved, because he cannot overcome **any temptation** without **special aid**, therefore, etc.

The assumption is proved because, if he could overcome any temptation, then just men placed in no temptation, however great, would need to implore help, nor ought they to recognize themselves as obliged to God for the victory of any temptation more than before, nor to give thanks to Him as if for a new gift. The consequence is evident from what was said above.

But the falsity of the consequent as to the first part is evident in that, as was alleged before from the rescript of **Innocent** to the Council of Carthage, "it is necessary that with Him helping we conquer, lest with Him not helping we be conquered." And by this, even after past victories of the just, they have to implore His help again concerning sins and oncoming temptations. Thus did **Saint David** do, saying: "Be Thou my helper; forsake me not, nor despise me, O God my Savior." The pious custom of the universal Church shows that this must be done; nor do I judge that this is to be denied by any true Christian.

As to the second part also, anyone, as I think, will confess it to be false. For who among the just, having been delivered from the peril of a great temptation, does not consider that he has received a **great benefit of God** in this, and that he is all the more obliged to give thanks, and pays vows of confession or praise as if for a new gift? Whence blessed **John** in Apocalypse 4 says that the "ancients," by whom surely holy men are figured, "adored Him that liveth for ever and ever, casting their **crowns** before the throne."

Expounding upon these words in Book 22 of the *Morals*, **Gregory** says: "To cast their crowns before the throne is to attribute the victories of their struggles not to themselves, but to the Author, so that they refer the glory of praise to Him from whom they know they have received the strength for the struggle."

This antecedent is also evident by the authority of the same **Gregory** in Book 28 of the *Morals* upon that verse of Job 38, "Who shut up the sea with doors, etc.," where, speaking of the victory over temptations which man suffers in carnal thoughts, he says thus: "Let no one attribute the victory of thoughts to himself, since the Truth says: 'Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing out of the womb?' Because unless **divine grace** retained the waves of the heart from the very beginning of thought, the sea," that is the human heart, "raging with the storms of temptations, would undoubtedly have overwhelmed the land of the human mind, so that, flooded with salty waves, it would dry up, that is, it would perish delighted by the pernicious pleasures of the flesh. Therefore, the Lord alone shuts up the sea with doors, because He opposes the bars of **inspired strength** against the depraved motions of the heart."

Item, at the end of the said book upon the words of the same Job, he says thus: "Therefore let blessed Job, lest he attribute to himself that he stands strongly against the storms of the heart, hear the divine voice: 'Who shut up the sea with doors, etc.?' As if it were openly said: In vain do you weigh yourself externally in good works, if you do not consider Me internally, who curb the waves of temptation in you. For that you are able to bear the waves in deed, belongs to **My power**, who break the waves of temptation in the heart."

From these things it is manifestly clear that no one, even just and constituted in grace, as Job surely was, can resist the temptation of a harmful thought by his **own power** without **divine assistance**.

Secondly, if a man existing in grace can avoid **any [given] sin** without the **special aid of God**, therefore either grace and the help of God are not given for singular acts, or they are given for some in vain and inappropriately. The first part of the consequent was one error of the condemned **Pelagians**, as is evident above and also in the preceding question. But the second part is a certain blasphemy. The first consequence is clear enough, since the help of God would not be given for that willing or nilling by which one resists temptation, or, if it were given, it would be given superfluously, since without such help he could prevail. If it is said that it is not given superfluously because he resists temptation **more easily** through that help, one approaches that condemned response of **Pelagius**, "That they might more easily fulfill through grace, etc.," as was said above.

Thirdly, if this is so, then God does not cause man to do **every good act** which is done by man, or God does not move the will of man to every good act of man, making it will that which it wills. The consequence is evident regarding the act by which one wills to resist a depraved temptation, which is surely good, and indeed meritorious in one having grace. For if man resists or wills not to consent through the **habit of grace** and **free will**, since the habit does not move the power, although it helps by co-acting, it cannot be said that God moves the will to act, unless He concurs in **another special way** freely and mercifully, as was said in the preceding question in the response to the twelfth objection. However, the consequent is shown to be false through many authorities adduced in the same place.

From these things, I think it is sufficiently clear that even just men and those existing in grace, in order to resist temptations strongly and not fall into sin, still need the **special aid of God**, and without it they

would not be able to persist without falling into sin. And therefore, whatever just men stand firm against strong temptations, they say with humble and truthful confession with the Prophet: "Our soul waiteth for the Lord, for He is our helper and protector"; and again with the same: "O Lord God, the strength of my salvation, Thou hast overshadowed my head in the day of battle." Who also says elsewhere: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord, and He is their protector in the time of trouble." Many other testimonies of the Holy Scriptures could be adduced, but let these suffice.

(Objections)

Against all the aforesaid, it can be argued through the arguments of **Coelestius** and **Pelagius**, holding that man, through the freedom of **free will**, having the knowledge of the law by which it is known what is to be done and what is to be avoided, can avoid **every sin**.

And although Coelestius made many arguments, as is evident in **Augustine's** book *On the Perfection of Justice*, where he repeats and solves them one by one, nevertheless all of them are sustained in a few roots. And therefore, it suffices here to recite some, by the solutions of which the rest may be solved similarly.

He argues first thus: Sin is either of **will** or of **necessity**; "if of necessity, it is not sin; if of will, therefore it can be avoided."

Secondly, man **ought** to be without sin, therefore he **can** be without sin. The consequence is proved, because "man ought not do other than what he can do."

Thirdly, it is **commanded** to man to be without sin, therefore he can be without sin; for "that which could not be done at all would not be commanded."

Fourthly, it is necessary to confess that man is able to avoid all things that are prohibited as well as to fulfill all things that are commanded. Therefore, it is **possible** for man to be without sin. The consequence is evident, because one does not sin unless "those things are done which are prohibited or those things are not done which are commanded."

Fifthly, "if man cannot be without sin, it must be asked **whose fault** this is, namely, whether it is his or another's." It stands that it is not another's, nor even his. For how is it his fault, "if he is not what he cannot be?"

Sixthly, "God imputes every sin to man, because whatever will not be imputed as sin is not sin." Therefore, man can avoid every sin; otherwise, God would impute it to him unjustly.

Seventhly, "the **nature of man** is good, for no one but **Marcion** or **Manichaeus** will dare to deny this"; therefore, it is possible for him to lack evil and consequently sin.

It is also argued by authorities. For certain authorities exhort men to perfection, like that of the **Savior** in Matthew 5: "Be ye perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect," and many others similar in Scripture. Now, he is not perfect who is not without sin, nor is an exhortation made toward the impossible.

Item, whoever is without spot is surely without sin, since the soul is stained by every sin. But many are without spot. Whence **David** says of such: "Blessed are the undefiled in the way"; and again: "I will be undefiled with him, and I will keep myself from my iniquity." The **Apostle** also in Ephesians 1: "He chose us," he says, "before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted." And many similar authorities could be adduced. These are taken from the sayings of **Coelestius** recited in the book *On the Perfection of Justice*.

But besides these, **Pelagius** adduces, as **Augustine** recites in *On Nature and Grace*, also the authorities of other Catholic doctors. Of which one is of **Hilary**, saying: "For not unless perfect in spirit and changed by immortality, which is appointed only to the clean of heart, shall we discern that which is immortal in God."

Another is of **Jerome** upon that verse "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God": "Whom," says Jerome, "does no conscience of sin accuse?" And he adds: "The clean one is gazed upon by a clean heart, the temple of God cannot be polluted."

Again **Jerome**: "God created us with **free will**; we are drawn neither to virtue nor to vices by necessity; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is no crown."

Another is of **Augustine** in Book 3 of *On Free Will*, chapter 18, saying: "For who sins in that which can in no way be avoided? But sin is committed; therefore, it can be avoided."

By certain of the aforesaid, as is evident, it is argued against the **first conclusion** of the first article, and by certain ones against the **other**; and all the aforesaid arguments are similarly against the two other conclusions of the **second article**. Against which, however, it seems possible to argue specifically that it follows that **habitual grace** is given by God to men uselessly and superfluously; which is not to be said. The consequence is proved, since grace of this kind is not given except for this, that through it man may be powerful to do those things which are to be done and to avoid those things which are to be avoided. But according to the things said, man is powerful for neither through it; nay rather, he needs to be helped by **another aid of God** or in another way by God. Therefore, etc.

(Solution to Objections)

To the **first**, it must be conceded according to the opinion of **Augustine** in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 2, that sin is of the will and also that sin can be avoided; but it does not follow: "Therefore it can be avoided without the **help of God**." With the help of God, indeed, man can avoid sin. Whence **Augustine** in the same place: "We answer," he says, "that sin can be avoided, if **corrupted nature** is healed by the **grace of God** through Jesus Christ our Lord. For to the extent that it is not healthy, to that extent it either does not see what is to be done through blindness, or does not fulfill it through infirmity." And in *On the Merit of Sins and Remission* to Marcellinus, book 2, around the beginning: "If it is asked of me," he says, "whether man can be without sin in this life, I will confess that he can through the **grace of God** and his **free will**." And below: "Man can," he says, "if he wishes, be without sin, **assisted by God**."

It could also be said to one sense that sin is of **necessity**, namely, that man of himself without divine assistance cannot avoid sin, but it is necessary that he, not assisted, sin. And speaking with this intention, the **Prophet** cries to the Lord: "Deliver me from my necessities."

To the **second**, it must be said in the same way that man surely **ought** and **can** also be without sin, but with the **assistance of God**, and not otherwise. And **Augustine** declares this beautifully in *On the Perfection of Justice*, chapter 6, by an example, saying: "When we see a lame man who can be healed, we rightly say: 'This man ought to be without lameness.' And, if he ought, he can; yet not immediately when he wishes can he, but when he shall have been healed by the applied cure and medicine has assisted his will. This happens in the interior man as pertains to sin as his lameness, through the grace of Him 'who came not to call the just, but sinners,' because 'they that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill.'"

To the **third**, it must be said in the same way that man can be without sin, but not without the **assistance of God**. To whom also it is not commanded that he be without sin without assistance, just as neither is it commanded that he live well without the assistance of God, as was said in the preceding question. Therefore, man can be without sin, but with the **assistance of God**. And therefore **Augustine** adds in chapter 7: "Most advisedly is it commanded to man that he walk with straight steps, so that, when he shall have perceived that he cannot" (namely, of himself), "he may seek the medicine, which in the interior man for healing the lameness of sin is the **grace of God** through Jesus Christ our Lord."

To the **fourth**, it must be said that it is surely necessary to confess that man can fulfill all things that are commanded and avoid all things that are prohibited, but with the **assistance of divine grace**, and not otherwise, just as we are taught by the definitions of councils and sacred authorities, as is evident in this and the preceding question. And so that **Augustine** might confirm this by the authority of the sacred canon, responding to that argument to **Coelestius** where cited above, chapter 12, he premises that every divine command is generally contained in that one command, by which it is said: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, etc."; and every prohibition is comprehended in that one, by which it is said: "Thou shalt not covet." And having declared these things through Scripture, he adds: "But neither can anyone 'be continent,'" which pertains to not coveting, "unless God gives it," and 'charity is poured forth in our hearts' not through ourselves, but 'by the Holy Spirit who is given to us.'"

To the **fifth**, it must be said that for man not to be able to be without sin is not a fault, but is a **punishment** which he has from the fault of the **first parent**, who through free will and the **help of grace**, which he had received—such as any other would also have received if he himself had not sinned—was able to be without sin. And because this punishment is the punishment of that fault, in which not only he but also all future men from him sinned according to the **Apostle**, therefore anyone sins when he is not without sin, that is, when he does not avoid but commits sin. And therefore **Augustine**, where cited above, chapter 14, responding to this argument: "We answer," he says, "that it is therefore man's fault that he is not without sin, because by man's sole will it was brought about that he should come to this **necessity**, which man's sole will is not able to overcome." And before, in chapter 10, he says: "By the freedom of the will it was brought about that man should be with sin, but now the **penal viciousness** that followed from liberty has made a **necessity**. Whence faith cries to God: 'Deliver me from my necessities'"; and a little later he adds that that "liberty would not have perished if the will had remained good. But because the will sinned, the hard **necessity** of having sin followed the sinner."

To the **sixth**, the answer is as above.

To the **seventh**, it must be conceded that human nature can lack evil. And therefore, according to what **Augustine** says where cited above, chapter 15, we cry to God: "'Deliver us from evil'; which is not perfected as long as 'the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul.'"

To the **authorities** of the canon, it must be said that man can be perfect and without sin and without spot, but through the **grace of God**; which the alleged authority of the **Apostle** also manifestly implies: "He chose us, that we should be holy and unspotted." For he speaks of the election of **predestination**, the effect of which is our sanctity and purity.

To the authority of **Hilary**, **Augustine** responds in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 62, and well, that it is not against the posited opinion, since he testifies nothing other than "that man can be clean of heart," which is conceded, "but by the **grace of God** through Jesus Christ."

And in the same way is the first authority of **Jerome** to be understood, as **Augustine** teaches in the same chapter 66.

But to the other of the same [Jerome], it must be said according to **Augustine** in the same place that it is not contrary, because he speaks of **nature** such as it was first created, in which there was then no **necessity of sinning**. But as he adds: "That there is a certain necessity of sinning from the vices of nature, not from the condition of nature, let man hear, and that the same necessity may not exist, let him learn to say to God: 'Deliver me from my necessities'; because even in prayer of this kind there is a struggle against the tempter fighting against us concerning that very necessity."

To the authority of **Augustine**, it will be responded when the first principal argument of the question is solved.

To that which is argued against the conclusions of the **second article**, it must be said that it does not follow that grace is given uselessly or superfluously, just as an infirm eye is healed neither superfluously nor uselessly, although even when healthy it cannot see without the **assistance of light**. Nor does it follow even that in habitual graces there is a process into infinity, as perhaps one might wish to argue, since such assistance, which I say is necessary beyond the habit of grace, is not some **habitual gift created** in the soul, but a certain **special assistance of God**, or God Himself specially assisting and freely helping to act well and to will and not to sin, whether by not permitting us to be tempted beyond the power bestowed on us by Him, or by making us fight strongly and rightly against temptation, or by helping in another way known to Him, unknown to us.

And if it is said that it was held above through **Augustine** that man can avoid sin if **corrupted nature** is healed through the **grace of God**, from which it seems that another assistance is not necessary, it must be said that by that saying **Augustine** does not exclude the opportunity of **another assistance** or mode of helping, nay rather he expressly posits it elsewhere, namely in *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 26, as will be evident immediately.

It can also be said that by the **grace** by which **corrupted nature** is healed, is understood not only the **habit of grace** healing as a medicine of the soul, but God Himself also freely assisting and healing as a **Physician**; and in this behaving dissimilarly to a corporal physician, because as **Augustine** says where I just commemorated: "The human physician, when he has healed a man, now leaves him to be sustained

by bodily elements and aliments, so that the same health may convalesce and persist by suitable subsidy, to God; who provides these things to those living in the flesh, whose were also those things which he applied while he was curing. But God Himself," as he adds, "when He spiritually heals the sick or vivifies the dead, that is, justifies the impious, through the Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, and when He has led him to perfect health, that is, to perfect life and justice, does not desert him if He is not deserted, so that he may always live piously and justly. For just as the eye of the body, even most fully healthy, unless it is assisted by the brightness of light, cannot discern, so also man, even most perfectly justified, unless he is assisted **divinely** by the **eternal light of justice**, cannot live rightly. Therefore God heals not only that He may delete what we have sinned, but that He may grant also that we do not sin."

And from this authority it is evident that even one having that **habitual grace** still needs **divine assistance**, so that he may not sin and may live rightly. For no one is perfectly justified not having such a habit of grace; and he says that such a one still needs **divine help**.

(To the Principal Arguments of the Question)

To the **first principal argument** of the question, I respond by denying the consequence. Nor is the proof valid, since it does not follow: "Sin can be avoided, therefore it can be avoided without the **special aid of God**"; just as it also does not follow: "Man can merit and be beatified, therefore he can merit and be beatified without the **special aid of God**." For the antecedent is true and the consequent is doubly false and erroneous. But **Augustine** in those words understands that sin can be avoided with God helping so that it may be avoided. Whence in *On Nature and Grace* 67, responding to **Pelagius** alleging the aforesaid authority of **Augustine** in favor of his error: "Sin," he says, "can be avoided, but with Him helping who cannot be deceived." And therefore, as he premised, "in this we ask for help saying: 'Lead us not into temptation'; and a little below: "In two ways," he says, "is the evil of disease avoided even in the body, both that it happen not, and that, if it happen, it be quickly healed. That it happen not, let us beware by saying: 'Lead us not into temptation'; that it be quickly healed, let us beware by saying: 'Forgive us our debts'."

To the **second** also the consequence must be denied. Nor is the proof valid, since I do not say that man cannot avoid sin, just as that proof assumes as a foundation, but I say that he cannot without the **help of God**, but he can with it. And therefore he sins not by **necessity**, speaking simply, but by **will** when he sins.

But, that we may step further inside, suppose that to some man beyond his **natural goods** and the **general influence** of God no aid is conferred by God for acting well or for not sinning. Will this man be able to fulfill the precept and resist the harmful temptation rising up against him, or will he **necessarily consent** to the temptation and transgress the precept? If the first is said, one recedes from the opinion posited above. If the second, then he will not transgress the precept and consent to the temptation freely but **of necessity**, and consequently he will not sin, because every sin is voluntary, as was argued before.

I answer that it must be said, according to the sayings of **Augustine** cited above in the response to the fifth objection and many others in the same place and elsewhere against the **Pelagians** in many places and also in Book 1 of the *Retractions*, that he so constituted will surely transgress the precept **of necessity** and succumb to temptation; nor however will such **necessity**, since it is the **punishment** of that fault in

which we all sinned and are guilty, for which also we justly pay penalties, excuse him from sin, just as was also said in the solution of the third principal argument of the preceding question.

This is confirmed by that of **Augustine** in *On the Perfection of Justice* chapter 16: "It is sin, when either charity is not [present] which ought to be, or is less than it ought to be, whether this can be avoided by the will, or cannot. Because, if it can, the **present will** does this; but if it cannot, the **past will** did this," namely of the **first man**. "And yet it can be avoided, not when the proud will is praised, but when the humble [will] is assisted."

And further it must be said that on account of **necessity** of this kind it does not come about that that sin is not **voluntary**, since it is still committed by one knowing and not coerced; which suffice for the nature of the voluntary, as **Augustine** implies in Book 1 of the *Retractations* chapter 13. Or otherwise according to the same in the same place chapter 15 it must be said that sin is called **voluntary** "either in work or in origin." In this second mode at least the sins of that one would still be voluntary. For the **first man** sinned voluntarily, whose sin was the beginning and origin of others following in us the punishments of that one.

If it is said that to be voluntary thus does not suffice for the nature of sin, but beyond this it is required that it be voluntary such that it can be avoided, according to what is proved from the definition of sin which **Augustine** posits in *On Two Souls* saying: "Sin is the will of retaining or obtaining what justice forbids and whence it is free to abstain," it must be answered according to the same in Book 1 of the *Retractations* chapter 15 that there "was defined sin which is **only sin**, not that which is also the **punishment of sin**." And of such sin also, which namely is not the punishment of sin, he says in the same place chapter 13 that his saying in *On True Religion* alleged to the contrary is to be understood. But now such things are also the **punishment of sin**, namely of that sin of the **first man** in whose sin we all sinned.

To the **confirmation** it must be said that those words are true, but do not help the proposal, since in the **first man** before the first sin, if there had been such necessity, because that would not have been the **punishment of sin**, surely it would have excused him from sin; but in us it does not excuse, because it is a punishment arising from sin, as has often been said above.

DISTINCTION 29

QUESTION 1

WHETHER man before sin, by free will and the powers of his nature **precisely** without **another aid of God**, was sufficient to perform any act **morally good** or truly right or virtuous.

Regarding distinction 29, in which the **Master** inquires "whether man before sin needed grace operating and cooperating," I ask: whether man before sin, by **free will** and the powers of his nature **precisely** without **another aid of God**, was sufficient to perform any act **morally good** or truly right or virtuous.

And I argue **first** that yes, by the authority of the scripture of **Ecclesiasticus 15** saying: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel, he added his commandments and

precepts, etc." "But what is it," as **Augustine** says in *Hypognosticon*, response 3, "'He left him in the hand of his own counsel,' unless He dismissed him into the power of his own free will? For by 'hand' **possibility** is understood." But he would not be said to be left in the power of his own will to perform, namely, God's commandments, unless of himself without the aid of God he was **sufficient** to fulfill them, and consequently to perform works morally right and virtuous.

To the **opposite** it is argued thus from the authority of the **Master** here saying: "Man therefore needed grace, not to free his will which had not been a slave of sin, but to **prepare** it to will effectively the good which **by itself** it could not do."

From these things the proposal is evident, since, if **by itself** it could not effectively will the good, therefore it did not suffice **by itself** to perform any **morally good act**, since every such act is a volition of the good or proceeding from it.

In this question there will be **two articles**: In the first, according to the title of the question, inquiry will be made concerning the power of the **first man** before his fall toward doing good. In the second, inquiry will be made concerning the power of the same toward good **after the fall**; and similarly concerning the power of other men naturally descending from him, and this on account of certain things said by a certain **venerable master** against some things posited by me above in the first question upon the 26th distinction of this Second Book.

ARTICLE 1

(On the Acceptation of the Aid of God)

As to the first article, I premise according to the common saying that the **aid of God** can be taken in two ways: In one way for the aid of **general influence**, by which namely He is said to aid generally every created agent in its every action. In another way for the aid of **assistance** or **special influence**, by which He specially aids some agents and not all, and toward some actions and not all; which also is accustomed to be called the aid of **grace**, extending the name of grace to all His gratuitous and **special help**, whether He helps immediately through Himself or through the mediation of some gift of His to act.

(First Conclusion)

This being premised, I posit three conclusions: The **first** is that the **first man**, that is **Adam**, before his fall was not sufficient by his powers without the aid of the **general influence of God** to perform any **good act**.

This conclusion is commonly conceded by Catholic doctors, and therefore for its proof let the authority of the **Apostle** in Acts 17 suffice for now, saying: "In Him," namely God, "we live, and move, and are," through which we are taught that we are not able to live without Him, that is to exercise the operations of life, nor to be moved nor even to be, but for any of these His **influence** is necessary to us. Wherefore if He did not influence our being, we would not be; and if He influenced being and not operating, we would surely exist such that we would operate nothing, as happened concerning the fire in respect to the **three children** existing in the furnace of fire, as is read in Daniel 3.

This is confirmed by the authority of **Augustine** in Book 4 *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, chapter 14 concerning the small, expounding the aforesaid words of the Apostle thus: "For since we are other than He, not for any other reason are we in Him, except because He operates this, and this is His work by which 'He containeth all things' and by which His wisdom reaches 'from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly,' through which disposition 'in Him we live, move, and are.' Whence it is gathered that, if He were to withdraw this work of His from things, we should neither live nor move nor be. It is clear therefore that God has not ceased, indeed not for one day, from the work of ruling what He created, lest they should immediately lose their **natural motions**, by which they are driven and vegetated so that they may be natures at all and remain in that which they are according to their kind, and should cease to be anything at all, if that **motion of the wisdom of God** were withdrawn from them by which 'He ordereth all things sweetly.'"

Now this work and this motion is what we call **general influence**, which being withdrawn, surely, as he says, other things would lose their motions. Nor can it be said that this saying had truth only after the fall of man, since he says the same even concerning the **holy angels**, who never sinned nor are bound by the guilt of any other sin, below in Book 9, chapter 23. Many sayings in the **First Book**, distinction 45, also make for this.

(Second Conclusion)

The **second conclusion** is that **Adam** before the fall was not sufficient by his **natural powers precisely**, even with the **general influence** of God, to perform any act **morally good** or truly virtuous; nay rather, beyond the aforesaid, **another special aid of God** was necessary to him.

I prove this first from one authority of **Augustine** in *On Rebuke and Grace*, chapter 47, saying thus: "The first man did not have that grace by which he would never wish to be evil, but he surely had [grace] in which, if he wished to remain, he would never be evil, and without which even with **free will** he could not be good, but nevertheless he could desert it through free will. Therefore God did not wish him to be without His grace, which He left in his free will, because **free will suffices for evil, but is too little for good**, unless it is aided by the **Omnipotent Good**. Which aid if that man had not deserted through free will, he would always have been good; but he deserted and was deserted."

From this authority the proposal is proved first thus: **Adam** could not without the **grace** which he had received, even with free will, be good; therefore he could not by his **natural powers** without the **special aid of God** be virtuous; therefore neither could he perform an act virtuous or morally good. The antecedent is given by **Augustine** in the aforesaid authority. The consequence is proved, because that **grace**, which he had received, was surely a **special aid distinct** from his natural powers. Which is evident: Both because his free will and other natural powers could exist without it, as **Augustine** implies when he says "without which even with free will etc."; and because in fact he lost it, as **Augustine** signals when he says "but he deserted and was deserted." Nor however did he lose any **natural power**, although he was wounded in naturals.

Secondly thus: "Free will suffices for evil, but is **too little** for good, unless it is aided by the **Omnipotent Good**," as **Augustine** says; and there he speaks of free will such as it was in the first man before sin, as is clear. Therefore the free will of Adam needed such aid to do good, of the kind it did not need to do evil.

Therefore it needed some **special aid** to do good; and I speak always of virtuous good. The consequence is evident, since even to do evil it would not have sufficed without **general influence**.

But against this, that it is said that that aid given to the first man was something **distinct** from his free will and natural powers, seems to be the intention of the **Master** in Book 2, distinction 24, saying thus: "Here it must be considered what was that aid given to man in creation, by which he could remain, if he wished," and he answers: "That surely was the **liberty of choice**, immune from all stain and corruption, and the **rectitude of the will** and the sincerity and vivacity of all the natural powers of the soul." From which words it seems to be held that that aid was not any thing superadded to free will, but was **free will itself**, not yet corrupted or vitiated, and the other natural powers unharmed and sound; and by this, if through free will with such aid Adam could act well, it follows that by his **natural powers precisely** without **another special aid** he could perform an act morally good.

To this it must be said that that saying of the **Master** thus understood does not agree with the saying of **Augustine** already alleged. Which is evident: Both because speaking of the free will of the first man before sin, which surely stands to have been then uncorrupted and not vitiated, he says "that is **too little** for good, unless it is aided by the **Omnipotent Good**." Therefore beyond the unharmed and unvitiated will he had an aid, which indeed was not free will itself; otherwise free will alone, which he had, was not "too little for good," but sufficient without the indigence of aid; the opposite of which **Augustine** says. And because, if that aid is nothing but uncorrupted free will itself, since such was indeed the free will of Adam before sin, it follows that just as by itself it sufficed for man for evil, so by itself it sufficed for good; for surely with that aid it sufficed for good. Whence **Augustine** says: "Which aid if he had not deserted, he would always have been good"; and a little later he adds: "For such was the aid which he might desert when he wished, and in which he might remain if he wished." But this contradicts **Augustine** saying of the free will of Adam: "Free will suffices for evil, but is **too little** for good etc."

Nor can it be said that **Augustine** speaks of the free will of Adam **after sin**, which then surely was damaged and corrupted. For he wishes to prove that that aid was necessary to the first man so that he could **persevere** in the good will in which he was created. Whence a little later he adds: "Therefore God had then given to man a good will, for in that He had made him, who had made him right; He had given an **aid** without which he could not remain in it [the good will], if he wished." To prove this he assumes that "free will suffices for evil, but is **too little** for good unless it is helped"; which indeed would serve the proposal not at all, unless it were understood of free will uncorrupted and not vitiated, such as **Adam** had before sin.

Therefore either the saying of the **Master** is not to be assented to in this part—which indeed certain ones openly affirm—or it must be understood in those recited words of the **Master** that it is not his complete response, but still depends on the letter immediately following, which is such: "Free will is a faculty of reason and will, by which good is chosen with **grace assisting**, or evil with the same desisting"; and after a few things: "Which good," he says, "it does not choose unless with **grace added**; but it chooses evil by itself."

And then his opinion is consonant with the words of **Augustine** previously alleged and others to be alleged next, and it is conceded that **Adam** had an aid **besides** his natural unharmed and uncorrupted free will. This also agrees with the opinion of the **Master** himself appearing a little before in the same place.

Whence at the end of the first chapter of the same distinction he says: "By these testimonies it is evidently shown that man received **rectitude** and a **good will** in creation and an **help** by which he could stand; otherwise he would not have fallen by his own fault." In which it appears sufficiently that he asserts that in creation, beyond that **natural rectitude**, an **aid** was given to man by which he could stand.

Secondly to the conclusion I argue principally thus: If **Adam** before sin could have performed an act morally good by his **natural powers precisely**, he could have made himself good from not good—positing that at some time he was without every act of will—with only his naturals, or from good **better**, with God not helping him **specially**.

The consequence is evident, since, whenever anyone performs an act morally good, if he was not good or bad, he becomes good, and if he was good, he becomes better. But the consequent is false, because, if **Adam** could have done this, the **good angels** also could have done it; which is against **Augustine** in Book 12 of the *City of God*, chapter 8, where he says thus: "If the good angels were first without a good will and produced it in themselves without God operating, therefore were they made **better** by themselves than by Him? God forbid." It follows: "Or, if they could not make themselves better than He had made them, than whom no one makes anything better, surely they could not have the good will, by which they would be better, unless with the **aid of the Creator operating**." From which words also the consequence itself made is proved.

Nor can it be said that **Augustine** understands this of the aid of **general influence** only, since similarly then it would have to be said that the angels could not make a bad will in themselves with God not operating, or become bad by themselves; which no usage of the saints admits.

Furthermore, the Church teaches that it cannot be said similarly in the *Extra, On the Supreme Trinity and Catholic Faith*, [chapter] "Firmiter," saying: "The Devil and other demons were indeed created good by nature by God, but they became bad **by themselves**."

Thirdly, if **Adam** could etc., therefore he could by his **sole natural powers** keep the divine command and resist the temptation of the devil and remain in the **rectitude of justice** in which he was made.

It is evident, because with the devil tempting he could will not to eat on account of God, and thus against any given temptation he could have a morally good act and by this remain in his rectitude and not fall.

But the consequent is expressly against **Augustine** saying in *On Rebuke and Grace* 47 that his free will was helped by **grace** given to him first, so that without this aid he would not remain in the good, and again that God had given an **aid** without which even with free will he could not be good nor remain in a good will, as is alleged nearby, though sparsely.

And moreover in chapter 49 he says: "If this aid had been lacking either to angel or to man when they were first made, since the nature was not made such that it could remain without **divine aid** if it wished, surely they would not have fallen by their own fault; for the aid would have been lacking, without which they could not remain. But now to those to whom such aid is lacking, it is already the **punishment of sin**. But to those to whom it is given, it is given according to **grace**, not according to **debt**." The authority is express, nor does it need to be explained or applied.

Item, in the *Enchiridion* 116, speaking of the state of man before sin, he says: "Although sin was constituted in free will alone, nevertheless **free will** did not suffice for retaining justice, unless by participation in the Immutable Good **divine aid** were offered. For just as to die is in the power of man when he wishes, and there is no one who cannot kill himself, to say nothing else, even by not eating, but to maintain life the will is not enough if **aids** either of foods or of any other protections are lacking, so man in paradise was suitable to kill himself by abandoning justice through the will, but that the **life of justice** be held by him, to will was **too little**, unless He who had made him helped him."

Item, in Book 14 of the *City of God*, chapter 27, he says: "Why would God not permit that man, who had been created right, that is of a good will, be tempted by him," namely the evil angel? "Since indeed he was so instituted that, if he **trusted** in the **aid of God**, a good man, he would conquer the evil angel; but if he deserted the Creator and Helper God by proudly pleasing himself, he would be conquered; having good merit in a will **divinely aided**, but evil in a perverted will deserting God. Because even to trust in the **aid of God** itself he could not indeed do without the **aid of God**, nor yet therefore did he not have it in his power to withdraw from these benefits of divine grace by pleasing himself." From these things it is held expressly that **Adam** surely trusting in the aid of God could conquer the tempter, and by this it is implied that he could not otherwise; but he could not trust without the aid of God and consequently neither conquer without His aid. Again he immediately subjoins: "For just as to live in this flesh without the **aids of aliments** is not in our power, but not to live in it is in our power—which those do who kill themselves—so to live well without the **aid of God** even in paradise was not in our power, but to live badly was in our power."

From these authorities I think it is clearly evident that that consequent is false as to its singular parts and the conclusion itself is true. Nor can the flight concerning the aid of **general influence** avail here, since it stands that man could not even live badly without such aid. Therefore he speaks of **special aid**.

(Incidental Conclusion)

From this conclusion I infer a conclusion posited by me elsewhere, also above in distinction 26, namely that **man in the present state**, even with the general influence of God standing, cannot without the **special aid of God** perform any act **morally good**, speaking of a morally good act as it was expounded then.

It is proved thus: **Adam** before his sin could not from his **natural powers** without **another aid of God** beyond His general influence perform any act morally good; therefore neither can man for the present state etc. The antecedent has been proved. The consequence is evident from this, that the **free will** of man now is not more powerful for acting well, nor even any other human natural power, than it was in **Adam** before sin, but **less**, since on account of his sin the free will of anyone naturally descending from him is wounded and infirm, as the **Savior** declared to us in the parable of the wounded man, and the whole doctrine of the saints commonly confesses.

(Incidental Conclusion Confirmed from One Foundation)

I wish to confirm this conclusion in itself, although I have also proved it then in many ways, for the greater declaration of the truth, from certain other **Catholic foundations**.

And **first** indeed from certain rules formed about this matter by **Pope Coelestine I** from the determinations of the Supreme Pontiffs his predecessors and of the **African Councils**—as he himself testifies—and proposed to all the faithful, so that from them as from principles in those things which pertain to this matter they might be consistently and healthily regulated in what is to be said.

He indeed, according to what is evident from the book of councils of the church recollected by blessed **Isidore** in his Decretal Epistle—which, on account of some who after the condemnation of **Pelagius** and **Coelestius** and the death of most blessed **Augustine** presumed in the parts of Gaul to favor in some way the Pelagian errors and to detract from Augustine as if he had exceeded the necessary measure in disproving them, as the aforesaid Pope had received by the relation of holy **Prosper** and **Hilary** Bishop of Arles, he destined to all the bishops of Gaul—premising first a rebuke of the bishops who did not resist the disputations of such men, and a marvelous commendation of most blessed **Augustine** concerning the universal and always continued sincerity of the Catholic faith and excellence of wisdom and sanctity of life, among other things which follow, says thus: "Therefore, that those who doubt in anything may be more fully instructed, let us manifest the constitutions of the holy fathers in a compendious **Indiculus**. Which, if anyone is not too contentious, let him recognize that the connection of all disputations hangs from this brevity of the subjoined authorities and that no reason of contradiction remains for him, if with Catholics he believes and says that in the prevarication of **Adam** all men lost **natural possibility** and innocence and that no one from the depth of that ruin can rise through **free will**, unless the grace of the merciful God erect him."

This is the **first rule** which he draws, as he soon shows, from the epistle of **Innocent I** to the Council of Carthage.

From this rule I conclude the proposal thus: If in this state men can from their natural powers without the **special aid of God** do good morally, not all men lost in the prevarication of **Adam** the **natural possibility** of doing well; the opposite of which the aforesaid canon hands down, which anyone not too contentious will immediately confess ought to be understood of the natural possibility for doing well. The consequence is proved from this, that given the antecedent it cannot be assigned what natural possibility men lost in Adam's prevarication. For it cannot be said that [they lost] the natural possibility for doing well **meritoriously**, since neither Adam himself according to the common concession of all doctors could from his natural powers without the aid of **grace** do anything meritoriously; and consequently neither did we lose such natural possibility by his sin, because neither would we have had such, if he had not sinned, just as he also did not have it.

But perhaps from the same authority someone may urge a difficulty against me and ask what **natural possibility** I say men lost in Adam's prevarication, who say that he could do nothing well morally without the **special aid of God**.

I answer that the **natural possibility** of Adam for doing well was such before sin that he through **free will** and his **natural powers** with the aid of **habitual grace** added to his naturals sufficed without **another special aid of God** to do well morally, as will be evident in the following conclusion; and, supposing that he had grace making pleasing [sanctifying grace], he could also act meritoriously.

But now on account of his prevarication, with the natural powers of man infirm and free will wounded, no one through his powers, even with habitual gifts similar to the gifts given to Adam, suffices without the **special aid of God** to do anything well morally, but **another special aid** is still necessary to him, namely that God move his will by making it will well and commonly operate well and perfect what it has willed well, as I said elsewhere in distinction 26. From which indeed it is evident that we lost the **natural possibility** which Adam himself had, and which, if he had not sinned, we also would have had.

He subjoins **another rule** in chapter 7 thus: "That no one except through Christ uses free will well." And he takes it from the epistle of the memorable Pope **Innocent** to the Milevitan Council.

From this thus: No one without the **special aid of God** uses free will well, therefore no one without the **special aid of God** acts well morally. The consequence is evident; for to act well morally, as I take it in the proposal and posited elsewhere, is to act conformably to **right reason** according to all circumstances required for this that the act be truly virtuous; but no one would say that one acting thus does not use free will well. The antecedent is evident; for, when the Pope says "except through Christ," there is no doubt that he wishes to signify His **special aid** and not only the **general influence**, by which He commonly offers aid to the faithful and infidels, good and bad, men and beasts and insensate trees.

The **third** is such, chapter 9: "That God so operates in the hearts of men and in free will itself that a **holy thought**, a **pious counsel**, and **every motion of a good will** is from God, because through Him we can do **something of good** without whom we can do **nothing**." Which he confirms by the authority of another Pope, namely **Zosimus**, "who," as he adds, "when he spoke to the bishops of the whole world concerning the help of divine grace: 'What time therefore,' he says, 'intervenes in which we do not need His aid? In **all acts, causes, thoughts, motions**, therefore, the Helper and Protector is to be prayed to. For it is proud that human nature presume anything for itself.'"

And to fortify this opinion he adds many authorities of the **Apostle**, among which are these: "By the grace of God I am what I am" and "I have labored more than all, not I but the grace of God with me"—through which and through that which he interposed, namely "when he spoke concerning the help of divine grace," it is evident to those knowing the custom of the scriptures and interpreting them not contentiously that they speak of **special aid** and not only of **general influence**. But if without the **special aid of God** some act well morally or virtuously, not "every motion of a good will is from God," nor "in all acts, causes, thoughts, motions is He to be prayed to as Helper," the opinion of the **Council of Carthage** attesting, alleged by me elsewhere, saying: "Who does not see that it is asked of the Lord in vain and prayed for deceitfully, when those things are demanded by praying which are obtained by the sufficient powers of our nature already so created?" Also human nature presumes not only anything but **much** for itself, when it presumes that it can perform a truly virtuous work without aid.

Nor is it valid to be said that here these holy pontiffs speak of **meritorious acts** only, because he says "as a holy thought"; nay rather that they intend concerning **all good acts universally** appears more from this, because, after he said "holy thought, pious counsel," so that they might comprehend all universally, he added "and **every motion of a good will**" and again "because," he says, "through Him we can do **something of good** without whom we can do **nothing**" namely of good, according to the doctrine of **Augustine** in *On the Words of the Apostle*, sermon 12, saying: "When I say to you 'without aid you do nothing' I say nothing **good**, for to do evil you have free will without the aid of God." Where it appears

that he accepts "good" universally distinctly against evil and says that we have free will without the aid of God only for evil. No one however of sound mind would say that acts morally good and truly virtuous and by this rightly laudable are imported by the name of **evils**.

The aforesaid Pope posits many other things in that epistle strengthening this opinion. All of which being posited, he concludes the epistle thus: "We believe that whatever the writings of the **Apostolic See** have taught us according to the aforesaid rules suffices enough, so that we do not at all opine as Catholic what shall appear to be contrary to the prefixed sentences."

Then I confirm the same conclusion by the authority of another Pope, namely **Innocent II**, who, as is evident in the book of epistles of blessed **Bernard**, epistle 194, condemned the errors of **Peter Abelard** and imposed silence on him as a heretic. Among those errors indeed, as is evident in the epistle immediately preceding directed to the same Pope, the sixth is noted in these words: "That free will **by itself** suffices for some good." From which the consequent is that it must be confessed catholically that free will by itself suffices for **no good**; and if for none, therefore not for any act truly virtuous or morally good.

With which opinion the authority of **Augustine** in the book *On Divine Predestination* agrees, saying thus: "Free will indeed which we have from God flows with a slide prone to wickedness. And since it can do **nothing toward the character of virtue** with the aid of God deserting, it subsists supported by suitable power for **every kind of sin**." How can it be said, without contradicting his intention completely, that we can perform any act truly virtuous without the **aid of God**, when he expressly says that our free will "can do **nothing toward the character of virtue** with the aid of God deserting, supported by suitable power for **every kind of sin**" and consequently for all evil volitions, for none of which however could it [do anything] with the **general influence of God** removed?

(Incidental Conclusion Confirmed from Another Foundation)

Addition 50: Moreover from another foundation I confirm the same conclusion.

Indeed Saint **Prosper** in his book *For the Preachers of Grace*, which he made against one Conference of **Cassian** entitled *On the Protection of God*, and is 13 in the total number of Conferences and 3 in the number of Conferences of the second part, in which Conference Cassian speaks many things concerning the grace of God and the power of free will, notes twelve opinions of Cassian about the said matter, which he calls **Definitions**. And the first only he praises and approves as Catholic, but the others he condemns and rejects as repugnant to Catholic truth. Hence lest those reading that Conference should fall into error, by the pious diligence of the fathers, as I estimate, it was done that those definitions in the aforesaid Conference should be noted and to each singly the correction and reprobation of blessed Prosper briefly excerpted from his forenamed book should be joined, lest **falsity** be received for truth. And in such manner the said Conference is found corrected in almost all books.

But omitting the others for now on account of brevity, by which nevertheless the present proposal is confirmed, I mention only three: Namely the **third**, and it is written there in chapter 9, in which **Cassian** says thus: "Except that in all these things both the grace of God and the liberty of our will is declared, and because sometimes man can be extended to the appetites of virtues even by his **own motions**, but always

needs to be helped by the Lord." This Saint **Prosper** reprehends on account of that "and because sometimes even by his own motions etc." saying: "As if our Physician does not give even this to the sick, that they desire true health."

Item the **fourth**, which is written there in chapter 10 in these words: "But that it may be more evidently clear even through the good of nature which is granted by the benefit of the Creator, that sometimes the **beginnings of good wills** come forth, which nevertheless, unless they are directed by the Lord, cannot arrive at the consummation of virtues, the Apostle is witness saying: 'For to will is present with me, but to accomplish that which is good I find not.'" This, I say, Saint **Prosper** thus rejects saying: "As if the Apostle has a **good will** from natural affection and not from the gift of grace, who professes that sufficiency even to think is to him from God."

I come to the **eighth**, which is written in chapter 12 of that Conference thus: "Whence we must beware, lest we so refer all the merits of the saints to God, that we ascribe nothing to **human nature** except that which is evil and perverse." Against this **Prosper** says thus: "As if nature before grace is not in condemnation, is not in blindness, is not in a wound."

From these things it is evidently gathered that **Cassian** is reprehended and disapproved in this that he said man can be extended to the appetite of virtue sometimes from his **own motions** without the grace of God. From which it follows that it must be said, if the reprehension is just, that man is not sufficient of himself even for the act of **desiring virtue**.

He is also reprehended in this that he willed: "Sometimes in us the **beginnings of good wills** come forth from our **free will** without the aid of grace, although they cannot arrive at the perfection of virtues without the aid of God." From which it follows that it must be confessed that we are able to have **no good will**, even not wholly perfect, from ourselves without the aid of God.

He is also reprehended in this that he says nothing is to be ascribed to **human nature** before the aid of grace except only that which is evil and perverse. From which it follows that it must be said that man not yet helped by the grace of God has **no act morally good** or virtuous at all, but only vicious and evil, since our nature before grace is in condemnation, in blindness, that is ignorance, and in a wound, that is wounded and infirm.

The opinion of blessed **Bernard** favors this, asserting that we can have **no attempts** even toward good, with God not exciting us to them; toward evil surely we can. From which it is evident that he speaks of **another aid** from general influence, since without that no one can attempt toward good or toward evil or think anything. Now these are the words of blessed **Bernard**, which he writes in the book *On Grace and Free Will* chapter 14, according to the quotation of the book which I saw: "The attempts of free will toward good are both void, if they are not helped by grace, and **null**, if they are not excited. But toward evil, the scripture saying, the senses and thoughts of man are prone."

From these things however that it follows that without the **special aid of God** man cannot perform any act **morally good** or truly virtuous, there is no one who does not see. For how can he act virtuously of himself who of himself cannot by reason attempt toward good or desire virtue? Nor does he suffice for himself except for that which is evil and perverse. The Ordinary Text follows.

And this is confirmed, since, when **Cassian** in Conference 13 chapter 12 had said: "We must beware, lest we so refer all the merits of the saints to God, that we ascribe nothing to **human nature** except that which is evil and perverse," Saint **Prosper**, who edited a book entitled *For the Preachers of Grace* against that Conference, approving the things well said and condemning the things badly said, rejected this saying as not Catholic saying: "As if nature before grace is not in condemnation, is not in blindness, is not in a wound." From which it is evidently clear that according to the intention of Saint **Prosper** it must be confessed catholically that without grace man cannot act except **badly** and **perversely**.

Addition 51: And that in this he rightly reprehended **Cassian** is evident testimony, because in almost all books that Conference of Cassian is found written with the corrections of Saint **Prosper** joined to the reprehended clauses, which Prosper calls **Definitions**. This, as I estimate, the pious solicitude of the fathers providing, lest anyone should slide incautiously into error through those things which are badly inserted therein. The Ordinary Text follows.

Item when blessed **Augustine** was defamed by the Pelagians concerning some things as repugnant to Catholic doctrine and among other things it was objected that he said "that God fashions such a will in men as is of demons, which by its own motion can or wills nothing other except **evil**"—as is evident in his little book which is called *Catholic Confutation of the Chapters Falsely Imputed to Him* chapter 6—he responding in the same place by no means denied the said objection, but as to the similitude posited only assigned a difference saying: "But this differs between **evil men** and **demons**, that to men even very evil there remains, if God has mercy, **reconciliation**; but to demons no conversion is preserved." But that of himself man can do nothing except **evil**, not only by not denying did he imply, but even by confessing sufficiently he expressed saying: "'The whole world,' as the apostle John says, 'is set in **wickedness**'; and the malice of many is such as is also of demons." In this however he subjoined the difference, which has already been posited. In the preceding chapter also he does not deny, but insinuates that he concedes that man by **natural motion** can do nothing except **sin**.

And with these his other more express authorities recited above are consonant, namely *On Rebuke and Grace* 47 and *On the Words of the Apostle* sermon 12 and that which was recited next from the book of the same *On Divine Predestination*.

From these things however it is gathered that it must be said catholically that man cannot through **free will** without the **aid of God** will or do anything except **badly** and **culpably**; and it must be understood of **another aid** besides **general influence**, since without that it stands that he cannot will or do anything, not only well but neither badly, since nevertheless in the aforesaid authorities it is affirmed that man without the aid of God can will badly and do badly.

From which foundation it is evidently concluded that man cannot do anything **well morally** or virtuously, whether meritoriously or not meritoriously, without the **special aid of God**, since no virtuous act is evil or culpable, as is clear.

(Third Conclusion)

The third conclusion is that **Adam** before sin, by free will and his natural powers and the aid of **superadded grace**, which he had together with the **general influence of God**, could without **another special aid of God** perform an act **morally good**.

It is proved first by the authority of **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon* response 3 in the beginning, where reciting one error of **Pelagius** he says: "Again they say that man can by free will sufficient to himself by himself fulfill what he wills"; and afterwards against this he says thus: "We answer: We rightly say that no one can suffice to himself by himself, that is by free will, to fulfill what he wills, except that the **first formed man alone** could, when the will of free will was sound to him before the fault." And a little later proving this by the authority of scripture he says: "For, that you may understand more clearly that Adam was made with free will with the **good of possibility**, which would be strong enough to fulfill what he wished, hear what holy scripture says in the book of **Ecclesiasticus**: 'God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel, he added his commandments and precepts etc.' But what is 'He left him in the hand of his own counsel,' unless He dismissed him in the **possibility of his own will**? For by 'hand' possibility is understood. That is the **first grace**, by which the first man could have stood, if he had wished to keep the Lord's commandments." Thus Augustine.

From these words it is evident according to **Augustine** that **Adam** by free will endowed as he had it before the fault, namely with the **good of possibility** or that **first grace**, sufficed to himself to fulfill what he wished; but of the rest no one suffices to himself. By which it is evident that he speaks of sufficiency for **good**; for even others suffice to themselves for evil. This is also evident from this that he says Adam by free will with the good of possibility could have stood, if he had wished to keep the commandments. By which also it is implied that he could have kept the commandments. Therefore he could perform an act **morally good**. If indeed he sufficed to himself for this, therefore he did not need **another special aid**. Otherwise the rest could be said to suffice to themselves even for good, because it stands that they by free will with the **special aid of God** can do good and all God's commandments completely; and yet concerning the rest he denies that.

Secondly, either **Adam** by free will with the aid of **added grace** could, with general influence standing, without **another special aid** keep the commandment of God, or not. If yes, therefore he could perform an act **morally good**. If not, therefore by not keeping it he did not sin; which is not to be said. The consequence is proved, because he who does not do what he could not do, if the impotence of doing it did not proceed to him from sin, by no means sins. For sin which is not the punishment of sin is most truly defined by **Augustine** in *On Two Souls*: "Sin is the will of retaining or obtaining what justice forbids, and whence it is free to abstain," as the same says in Book 1 of the *Retractations* chapter 15. But the **first sin** of Adam was not the punishment of sin, nor would that impotence, if it had existed, have proceeded to him from any sin; wherefore etc. **Augustine** implies this reason sufficiently in *On Rebuke and Grace* 49, as is evident in the authority alleged in the third reason for the second conclusion.

Against this however argues **one doctor** holding the opposite part. Since, if **Adam** with accepted grace could keep the commandment without **another aid**, therefore he could also without **another special aid** "overcome temptation and beware of any [given] sin. And, since now after the fall" the free will of man "is not infinitely weaker, because thus it would have lost its whole strength entirely, he could even now with as much grace as he had then overcome **some temptation**, namely a temptation weaker by as much as the free will itself is weaker now than then." Or let it be posited that "by as much as free will is

weakened, by so much let him have **amplified grace**." But this consequent is false, as he says, and I also say, as was evident in the preceding question.

I answer and concede the first consequence, but the **second** I deny. Nor is the proof valid, as is evident in a similar case. For it is certain that a healthy eye with the **general influence of God** standing with the aid of light can see some color at a certain distance without **another special aid of God**, and yet it can be so infirm that neither with so much light nor with however much greater or lesser will it be able to see that color or another at that or another distance, unless first it is **healed**. So it is in the proposal, because free will surely by the sin of the **first man** was weakened and vitiated by vices, which anyone contracts from origin, because not only was it deprived of gratuitous gifts, but also wounded in naturals. And because the weakening of free will was not precisely by the subtraction of aid, but also by the access of **infirmity** and **vice**, such as was none before in it, therefore by no application of **habitual helping grace** can its power be supplied, unless with this it be perfectly healed from infirmity, which happens to no one in this life by the common law.

Thirdly, the conclusion can be confirmed by another authority of **Augustine** in *On the Gift of Perseverance*, not much after the beginning, saying that "not to be led into temptation and not to depart from God is not entirely in the powers of free will, such as they are now; but it had been in man before he fell." But if not to depart from God and not to fall into temptation was entirely in the powers of the free will of man before he fell, therefore he did not need **another special aid** for not departing; otherwise it would not have been entirely, but only in some way and partially in his powers. By his powers however we ought to accept not only free will itself, but also the **power** and **aid** conferred upon him, as the authorities adduced above attest.

This **third conclusion** surely seems to me more consonant with the sayings of the saints. Without assertion however and without prejudice of better deliberation let it be posited. And this as to the first article.

ARTICLE 2

(Principal Conclusion)

As to the second article I posit principally **one conclusion** only, namely that **Adam** after his fall could not by his **natural powers** without the **special aid of God** perform any act **morally good**.

It is proved thus: **Adam** from his sin incurred **ignorance** of things to be done pertaining to the moral life, so that afterwards he could not without the **special aid of God** sufficiently know concerning any thing to be done or avoided that it was to be done and **why** and **how** it was to be done, nor concerning any thing to be avoided could he sufficiently know whether and **how** it was to be avoided. He also incurred **infirmity** and impotence as to the will, so that afterwards he could will nothing to be willed **why** and **how** it was to be willed, nor nill anything to be nilled **why** and as it was to be nilled. And by these circumlocutions "why" and "how" I understand all circumstances required for this that any act be **morally good** or truly virtuous. Therefore **Adam** could not after the fall without **special aid** perform any act **morally good**. The consequence is evident.

And I prove the **first part** of the antecedent first by the authority of **Augustine** in Book 3 of *On Free Will* chapter 18 saying that Adam and Eve, "when they had sinned, were precipitated both into **error** and into **misery** and into death." And in the chapter next preceding: "That," he says, "is the most just punishment of sin that everyone lose what he would not use well, when he could without any difficulty, if he wished; that is that he who knowing does not do rightly, lose **knowing** what is right, and he who when he could do rightly would not, lose **being able** when he wills." Also in the *Enchiridion* chapter 28 speaking of the first sinners, namely angel and man, he says that "to them unwilling entered **ignorance** of things to be done and **concupiscence** of harmful things." From which it is evident that **Adam** in the condemnation of his sin incurred **ignorance** of things to be done pertaining to the moral life.

Item **Hugh** [of Saint Victor] in *On the Sacraments* book 1 part 6 chapter 13, and the **Master** in Book 2 distinction 23 say that **Adam** by sinning lost the **knowledge of the soul**, which according to them was that by which he previously knew what he ought to do and what to beware.

Moreover blessed **Prosper** in his book *For the Preachers of Grace* against **Cassian** reprehends him, because in chapter 12 of his Conference *On the Protection of God* he said: "Therefore Adam conceived after the prevarication, which he had not had, the knowledge of evil; but the knowledge of good, which he had received, he did not lose"; saying that both are false. Therefore **Adam** lost the **knowledge of good** and consequently of doing well. Therefore afterwards he could not of himself without mercy and the **special aid of God** know sufficiently what he ought to do or what to avoid. The consequence is evident, because from the punishment and condemnation of his sin divinely inflicted he could not free himself.

I prove the **second part** of the antecedent first thus: **Adam** could not after his fall without the **special aid of God** love God rightly; therefore he could not without the **special aid of God** will anything well. The antecedent is evident through **Augustine** [Fulgentius] in *On the Faith to Peter* chapter 3 saying: "God indeed bestowed the faculty of knowing and loving Himself only on angels and men. To whom on account of the liberty of choice, which ought most of all to be conferred on the intellectual creature by the benignity of the Creator, He so gave the faculty and will of knowing and loving Himself, that everyone could both have it and lose it. If anyone however should lose it voluntarily, he would not be able to resume it by his own will thereafter." It stands however that **Adam** voluntarily lost such a will.

The **first consequence** is clear. I prove the **second** thus: **Adam** without the **special aid of God** could not will anything for the sake of God **ultimately**, therefore he could not without the **special aid of God** will anything for the sake of that ultimately, for the sake of which he ought to will ultimately, and by this neither will well morally, since for moral goodness the intention of the **due end** is required. The consequence is proved from this that, as was proved above in distinction 26 question 1, God ought to be the **ultimate end** of our every will and action. Which now I also confirm, because whoever wills anything, either wills God or other than God. If God, and not for His own sake but for the sake of another, he **uses** things to be enjoyed, which act is **culpable** and consequently not morally good. If he wills other than God and not for the sake of God ultimately, that act is ultimately for the sake of other than God, and consequently he wills something other than God for its own sake and thus **enjoys** other than God, and consequently his act is **culpable** nor morally good. From which it follows that every volition, which is not of God for His own sake or of other than God for the sake of God ultimately, is **culpable** and **vicious**.

Secondly thus: The **angel** after his fall could not without the **special aid of God** have a good will; therefore neither **Adam** after his. **Augustine** [Fulgentius] posits the antecedent and the consequence in *On the Faith to Peter* chapter 3 saying: "If it were possible that human nature, after it lost the goodness of will having turned away from God, could have it again of itself, much more possibly would the **angelic nature** have this, which by how much less it is burdened by the weight of an earthly body, by so much more would it be endowed with this faculty. But God shows whence a **good will** is given to men, which the angels so lost, when they had it, that they could not recover it lost thereafter."

Thirdly, the same is proved by the authority of **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon* response 3, where speaking of **Adam** he says that "using free will badly, incautious, while voluntarily offering consent to the persuading serpent he passed over the commandment of the Lord, the **good of possibility** being lost, he possessed a will alone for willing, wounded." And a little later: "Man could make a fall by himself, because he willed; but not, just as he fell by himself, could he rise by himself, that is by his own will, unless he had been erected by the most merciful **hand of the Lord**, when it pleased His piety." And below: "For not by another did he contract the offense, except by that which he could, lest he should fail, resist the persuader. Therefore by willing evil he lost the **power for good**, who by the power for good could conquer the will for evil."

Here it is to be noted that he says "the **good of possibility** being lost," by which he understands the gift or gifts added to the free will of Adam, by which with free will he could have a good will. Item that he says that afterwards he "possessed **alone**," that is naked will, "and **wounded**" and that by that "he could not rise," namely to willing good, "unless he had been erected by the most merciful **hand of the Lord**," by which I think that anyone not contentious will concede plainly that the **special aid of God** ought to be understood and not His general influence only.

(First Collative Conclusion)

From this conclusion I infer two others on account of a collation had with a certain **venerable master**. Of which the **first** is that from the sin of the **first parent** every man born by natural usage contracts **ignorance** of things to be done, so that no one without the **special aid of God** can in those things which pertain to the **moral life** sufficiently know what is to be willed or nilled. But I say that he knows "sufficiently" who not only knows something is to be done or nilled, but also knows **why** and **how** it is to be done or nilled according to all circumstances required for this that the act be **morally good** and truly virtuous, and of such sufficiency of knowledge I have spoken always in the above concerning this matter.

(First Part of the Collative Conclusion Proved)

And because the aforesaid **master**, responding to the reason which I made above to prove the second conclusion of article 1 of question 1 of distinction 26, conceded that man from the sin of Adam incurs ignorance of things to be done pertaining to **faith** and the sacraments of faith, but not ignorance of things to be done pertaining to the **moral life** as it is moral precisely, therefore I prove this conclusion thus posited and opposite to him thus:

Adam from his sin incurred **ignorance** of things to be done pertaining to the **moral life**, therefore also every man naturally born from him. The consequence is evident; for the **punishments**, which he incurred,

we also incur, and not lesser ones, otherwise he would have begotten better than himself, against **Augustine** in Book 3 of *On Free Will* chapter 20. The antecedent is proved just as the **first part** of the antecedent of the reason made for the preceding conclusion.

Secondly thus, and I ponder this reason well: It stands that according to the common course every man, when he first comes to the years of discretion, has **ignorance** of those things to be done which pertain to the **moral life** as it is moral, judging frequently that is to be done which is to be avoided, and conversely, and that something is to be done or avoided in such a way as it is not. And **experience** manifests this.

Now I ask whether to be ignorant and to err thus happens to man from his **nature** according to itself, or from some **vice** or evil of nature. The first cannot be said: Both because, if this were true, it would follow that, even if the first man had not sinned, sons being born, when they had come to the years of discretion, would have had ignorance and errors similarly concerning moral matters; which cannot be said catholically. And because according to this saying such error would not then be blameworthy in man, nor by doing something through such ignorance against those things which are to be done according to the law of God would he sin, and especially, if he had never accepted the law; which also is not to be said, since according to the **Apostle**: "Those who have sinned without the law, shall perish without the law."

But this consequence and the falsity also of the consequent is evident through **Augustine** in Book 3 of *On Free Will* chapter 18: "For if that is not," he says, "the **punishment** of man, but nature, those are no sins"; and he proves it: "For if it is not departed from that mode in which he was naturally made, so that he cannot be better, he does those things which he ought, when he does these things." And before in chapter 13 he says that "of no thing is the **vice** blamed except the vice; but every vice is **against nature** whose vice it is." From which it follows that nothing existing according to human nature, namely such as it was instituted, ought to be blamed in man, and consequently neither would such error be blameworthy. And this approaches, nay perhaps enters the error of **Julian** who said that **concupiscence** and **ignorance**, which everyone has in himself, are not any evils nor any blameworthy things.

If it is said that to err thus happens to man from **vice** or some evil, either vice of this kind is in nature according to itself and from its first institution, or not. It cannot be said that it is, lest we fall into the error of the **Manichaeans**. Therefore it must be said that it is not in nature from its first institution. Since therefore it is a certain evil and **penal** to nature, it is necessary to say that it proceeds from some **fault**. And it stands that it is not from the actual personal and proper fault of the man thus erring, since no other fault of his preceded. Therefore from the fault of some other, of which he is deservedly guilty. Nor does it appear from whose fault except of the **first man**; and thus Catholic doctrine preaches.

Therefore the proposal is evident, namely that every man naturally begotten contracts from the sin of the **first parent** ignorance of things to be done pertaining to the **moral life**.

Furthermore, the aforesaid **venerable master** concedes that man for the condemnation of the **first fault** incurs ignorance of things to be done pertaining to **faith** and the sacraments of faith. Either he includes or wishes to be understood as included among things pertaining to faith the **moral works**, which the Catholic faith commands to be done; and then the proposal is had, for Christian faith teaches every work of virtue. Or he does not include those, but wishes that man incur from the sin of the first parent ignorance of those things precisely which pertain to the **articles of faith** and its sacraments. And if so, since in a

gentile there is not less vice of nature from which proceeds erring concerning **morals**, as for example to think fornication or something such to be licit, than that from which proceeds error concerning the **articles of faith**, which he never heard, or concerning baptism as perhaps if he thinks it is not necessary to be baptized, and similarly concerning other sacraments of Christians, whatever may be of the proportion of sins, on this side and that it is necessary to give whence human nature contracts this defect of **ignorance concerning morals** no less than to assign whence it contracts ignorance concerning **ecclesiastical sacraments**. Nor does it appear what is given except the **fault of the first parent**.

But whether man contracts ignorance of things to be done pertaining thus to **faith** and ecclesiastical sacraments from the **first sin**, as this **venerable master** says, or not, for now I do not approve nor reprove. Undoubtedly however it seems to me that the sayings of the saints—saying that **ignorance** and **difficulty** are not the nature of instituted man but the **punishment of the condemned**, and that human nature conceived two vices from its first corruption, which are **ignorance of good** and **concupiscence of evil**—and similar sayings, in which mention is made of original **ignorance of good**, ought to be understood of ignorance of things pertaining to the **moral life**, whether they ought to be understood of others also or ought not.

Therefore the **first part** of the premised conclusion is evident.

(Second Part of the Collative Conclusion Proved)

The **second** part, namely that no one can without the **special aid of God** conquer ignorance of this kind or sufficiently know what is to be done, is proved by the authorities of **Augustine** and **Hugh** alleged in the first reason of the aforesaid conclusion.

Addition 52: But I confirm it by another authority of the same **Augustine** *Against Julian* book 6 chapter 26 speaking of ignorance and concupiscence contracted originally: "Therefore they are remitted in the reborn, diminished in the proficient; ignorance is diminished with truth shining more and more, concupiscence is diminished with charity burning more and more. **Nothing good** of these two is from us. For 'we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God, that we may **know** the things that are given us from God'" ; and they are the words of the **Apostle** in 1 Corinthians 2. Behold that not only the consumption or expulsion of ignorance is not from us, but neither the diminution; nay rather it is the **gift of God**.

Item, **Hugh** in *On the Sacraments* book 1 part 7 chapter 35: "The rational soul infused into the human body, unless it is helped by **grace**, can neither perceive the **knowledge of truth** nor resist the concupiscence of its flesh"; and he speaks of truth of which man originally contracts ignorance. The Ordinary Text follows.

Nor can these be glossed concerning the grace or aid of **general influence**, lest we concede that man is freed from the punishments contracted for the first sin of himself with the general influence of God, and thus it be concluded that Christ died for us in vain.

From these things it appears that that first reason proving the aforesaid conclusion is efficacious. And the solution given is not valid, **Addition 53:** (namely) that for the present state with the **general influence of God** standing man can without the **special aid of God** know what is to be done or avoided in those things

which pertain to the moral life. (The reason) is efficacious and, saving the reverence of my venerable master, unsolved.

For I argued thus: If man can without the **special aid of God** etc., either he for the condemnation of the first fault did not incur **ignorance** of things to be done, or from such punishment he suffices to free himself without the **grace of God**. Each part of which consequent I proved to be false from the authority of **Augustine** in Book 1 of the *Retractations* chapter 9.

Responding to this the **venerable master** distinguished concerning things to be done pertaining to **faith** and the sacraments of faith, and concerning those pertaining to the **moral life** as it is moral.

Of the first he said there is no sermon to the proposal; but of the second he conceded the consequent as to the first part, saying that man does not incur for that condemnation ignorance of things to be done pertaining to the **moral life** as it is moral.

But that this is not to be conceded has now been proved. It is true that he added one word namely "**omnimodous**" [of every kind], whence he says that man does not incur "**omnimodous**" ignorance of things to be done; by which what he wishes to understand, let him see himself. For it suffices for me, as I said above, that concerning no thing to be done or avoided does he have **sufficient knowledge**. For whether he has none or some yet not sufficient, he will not be able to have according to it an act **morally good**, as I accepted above, and truly virtuous. The Ordinary Text follows.

(Arguments of Master Albert Adduced and Solved)

Nevertheless this **master** proved that man does not incur ignorance of things to be done, of which it has been said, from many things.

And first from the authority of **Augustine** in *Questions on the Gospels* saying upon that "They went away leaving him half-dead": Man the sinner is left half-dead, "because on the part by which he can know and understand God, he is alive; but on the part by which he wastes away in sins, he is dead."

To this authority I say first that it, as it seems, makes **for me**. For by the very fact that he says he wastes away in sins and is dead, he asserts that he **does not suffice**, although, insofar as he is still in potency and apt born to know God, he is said to be alive. Secondly I say that, granted that it were had from this authority that man can know God, it does not follow: Therefore he can sufficiently know concerning anything that it is to be done or not to be done. For not every knowledge of God is such.

Secondly he argues from another authority of the same, which is written in Book 1 of *On Free Will* chapter 6: "That briefly," he says, "insofar as I can explain in words, the notion of the **eternal law**, which is impressed on us, is that by which it is just that all things be most ordered." Which law, says this master, could not do this unless it handed down the knowledge of things to be done morally.

How from this authority the venerable master proves his intent, I do not see. For these stand well together, namely that the **eternal law** is "that by which it is just that all things be most ordered" or which decrees that all things ought to be most ordered, which is the same to say, and that man concerning no thing to be

done of the moral life without the **special aid of God** has knowledge by which he knows to do it most orderedly. Whence I deny that consequence of his to him.

Another is of the same in the same book chapter 9: "Do you think that lust is more powerful than that mind, to which we know the reign over lusts has been granted by the **eternal law**?" Here **Augustine** says that we know by the eternal law that the reign over lusts has been granted to the mind.

Another is also a certain **gloss** upon that in Romans 2 "The gentiles do by nature those things that are of the law" saying: "Although the gentile does not have the written law, nevertheless he has the **natural**, by which he understands and is conscious to himself what is good and what evil. For the **natural law** is to do injury to no one, to seize nothing of another's, to abstain from fraud and perjury."

To these I say first that it does not follow: "We know that the reign over lusts has been granted to the mind," therefore we know this without the **special aid of God**; just as it does not follow: The blessed knows God to be three and one, therefore he knows this without **special aid**. Nor does it follow: "The gentile naturally or by natural law knows what is good etc.," therefore without the **special aid of God**; just as it also does not follow: Man naturally does those things which the law of God commands, therefore man without the **special aid of God** does what the law commands. For the antecedent is true, as is evident through the **Apostle** where it is alleged, and yet the consequent is not true.

And therefore I say for all authorities of the saints asserting that we naturally know or do such things that their intention is that we know or do through the **principles** or powers of our nature, yet they do not intend to exclude the **special aid of God**. Nor have I ever found or heard from anyone any authentic authority which said this explicitly or implicitly. Whence from no authority speaking in the aforesaid mode ought such an exclusive [implication] be inferred.

And the **gloss** immediately following the words of the gloss alleged by the venerable master teaches this expressly: "Let it not move you," it says, "that he said 'naturally' they do the things that are of the law, not by the Spirit of God, not by faith, not by grace. For the **Spirit of grace** does this, that he may restore in us the **image of God**, in which we were naturally made. For vice is indeed against nature, which surely **grace** heals." And it adds: "Therefore, vice being healed by **grace**, naturally are done those things that are of the law, not that by the name of nature grace is denied, but rather by **grace** nature is repaired, by which grace, the inner man being renewed, the law of justice is written, which **fault** had blotted out. For that is written there by renovation which had been blotted out by oldness." And a little later thus it expounds the words of the **Apostle**: "'They do naturally those things that are of the law,' that is by natural reason illuminated by **grace** they discern things to be done and avoided; which the law would do." **Augustine** speaks in the same way entirely in *On True Innocence*.

Secondly I say that those words of the alleged gloss are to be understood of the gentile not faithful but **converted** to the faith of Christ, just as also the words of the **Apostle** which it expounds, according to **Augustine** in Book 4 *Against Julian* chapter 15, where he responds to the argument which **Julian** made against him from this authority of the Apostle.

Thirdly I say that, granted that I conceded the infidel gentile or some other man naturally and without the special aid of God to know that no one is to be injured, nothing of another's is to be seized, and similar

truths which are **principles** and rules of the moral life, even that he would know what is good from its kind and what evil from its kind—than which nothing more could be extorted from the words of that gloss—still nothing would be had against me. For no such knowledge is **sufficient** for performing an act **morally good** as it is accepted, namely conformable to **right reason** according to all circumstances required for this that the act be truly virtuous. Whence, granted that someone for example knows it is good to succor the indigent and not to injure the neighbor nor seize another's, unless he knows with this **why** and **how** it is to be succored and abstained from injury and rapine, he does not have **sufficient** knowledge for the moral goodness of the act, of which we speak. Which is evident, because, if someone succors the indigent and not for the **due end**, he does not act well morally. If someone also abstains from injury or rapine, unless he abstains for the **due end**, he does not abstain virtuously or morally well.

(Authority of Augustine Discussed)

I proved the same conclusion also among other things by the authority of **Augustine** in the epistle *To Sixtus* saying: "No one savors rightly, no one understands rightly, no one prevails by counsel or fortitude" etc., "unless he has received the 'spirit of **wisdom** and **understanding**, the spirit of **counsel** and **fortitude**.'" It stands however, as I said, that he who does not savor rightly nor understands rightly nor prevails by counsel, does not sufficiently know what is to be done or avoided in those things which pertain to the **moral life**.

To this this master said two things: First, that, if this authority is taken as I take it, it is concluded that no one lacking **grace making pleasing** [sanctifying grace] can perform an act **morally good**; which is against my other sayings in the proof of my first conclusion, which I posited there. But that that follows is evident, because no one lacking **grace making pleasing** has the spirit of wisdom and counsel, since those are **gifts of the Holy Spirit**, which are not had without **grace making pleasing**, as doctors say and sacred scripture Wisdom 1: "The holy spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful."

Secondly he responds to the authority saying that, when it is said "No one savors rightly etc.," it is to be understood of the rectitude which is in the act from the attainment of the end simply **ultimate**, which cannot be except by the Holy Spirit infusing **grace** and making together with such charity in the act an immediate order to the end simply **ultimate**. But **Augustine** does not speak of the rectitude which can be in the act from the attainment of a **proximate** and immediate end, just as it is to fight rightly "to war down the proud" and "to pacify the subject," which can be in man not having the gifts of the Holy Spirit, as is evident concerning **Nebuchadnezzar** warring down Tyre.

As to the **first** saying of the venerable master I say that from that authority, just as I accept it and just as **Augustine** himself accepts it, does not follow what he infers.

And when he proves by this "that no one lacking **grace making pleasing** has the spirit of wisdom and counsel etc.," I say that this is against the intention of **Augustine** in the same place. Whence he immediately subjoins: "Not because there are so many spirits, but 'one and the same Spirit worketh all these things, dividing to every one according as He will,' because 'the Spirit breatheth where He will,' but what must be confessed, He helps otherwise **not yet inhabiting**, otherwise **inhabiting**. For not yet inhabiting He helps that they may be faithful; inhabiting He helps the already faithful." From this it is evident that the Spirit breathes His gifts, of which he speaks, sometimes also in those whom He does not

inhabit. But in whom there is **grace making pleasing**, the Holy Spirit inhabits them. Whence they are also called the **temple of God** according to that in 1 Corinthians 4: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Where the **gloss** of **Augustine** says: "God dwells in no one whom the Holy Spirit does not first sanctify and purge." But sanctification and purgation is not without **grace making pleasing**, as is clear. Therefore according to **Augustine** in the same place such gifts of the Holy Spirit are also sometimes in one not having **grace making pleasing**.

Furthermore, according to **Augustine** in the same place, **faith** is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Whence he says that "just as no one savors rightly" etc., "so without the **spirit of faith** no one is about to believe rightly." And before the words previously alleged he also says: "Just as man would not have wisdom, understanding, counsel" etc., "unless he had received 'the spirit of wisdom and understanding and counsel'" etc., "so he would not have faith unless he had received the **spirit of faith**, of which the **Apostle** says: 'Having the same spirit of faith etc.'" Where it is evident that faith is a gift of the Holy Spirit according to the intention in which **Augustine** speaks there of gifts, and so say the words of the **Apostle** which he alleges. Similarly in 1 Corinthians 12 among the gifts of the Spirit he numbers **faith** and **prophecy**; and yet it stands that both are frequently in one not having **charity** and **grace making pleasing**, as is expressly evident through the same **Apostle** and glosses in the same place chapter 12. And therefore, saving his reverence, this saying does not seem consonant with the sayings of the **Apostle** and the saints.

The authority of scripture, which he alleges, is not to be understood as if in the **deceitful** there are never any gifts of the Holy Spirit, but because the Holy Spirit does not **inhabit** nor approve the deceitful, therefore He is said to flee him.

The **second** response, which the venerable master gives, saving reverence does not seem to be valid, since according to **Augustine**, as is evident from the things said above in the first proof of the 1st conclusion of question 1 of distinction 26, and by the reason made for this in the proof of the conclusion of this article, never is an act **morally right** unless immediately or mediately it be ordered **ultimately** to God. Whence to fight for the sake of the peace of subjects or the warring down of the proud ultimately, so that an act of this kind neither actually nor habitually is referred to God, is **culpable**. If therefore an act cannot be ordered to God ultimately without the **special aid** of the Holy Spirit, as the reverend master seems to concede, it follows that one cannot exercise an act **morally right** without the **special aid of God**; which is the proposal.

(Determination of the Council of Milevum Discussed)

For the prefaced conclusion I adduced the determination of the **Council of Milevum** saying: "Both are the gift of God, both to **know** what we ought to do, and to **love** that we do it."

To this the reverend master said that that saying is directly against **Pelagius** who posited that right and good knowledge of the intellect was well from the **grace of God**, which he called the doctrine of the law, but to **will** the good was not from God except insofar as He gave the will, and therefore the council says that **both** are the gift of God. And this he says that he and others, against whom I argue, also posit. For speaking of a good act of intellect and will **meritorious**, each is from God with the **special aid of God**. But speaking of **moral good precisely** each is also from God, but it is not necessary that it be with **special**

aid but only with the **general influence of God**. Whence by saying "both are the gift of God, therefore from the special aid of God" is a fallacy of the consequent.

This response, as it seems, does not save the intention of the council. For whatever was the position of **Pelagius**, of which it will be seen in the following, nevertheless this determination of the council is against anyone positing that without the **special gift and aid of God** we "know what we ought to do."

And that the sense of the council is concerning **special gift and aid**, and not concerning **general influence**, is proved evidently: For it is certain that general influence, which commonly is both in respect of evil actions as well as good, and as well of natural as of rational ones, is not called according to the usage of Catholic scriptures "**the grace of God through Jesus Christ**," and by this the aid of the grace of God through Jesus Christ ought not to be understood as the aid of general influence, but **special aid**. And this will be more fully evident below.

But now in the proposal the council speaks of the aid of **such grace**. Whence that chapter lies thus: "If anyone shall say that the **grace of God through Jesus Christ** our Lord helps us only for this not to sin, because through it is revealed to us the intelligence of the commandments, so that we know what to desire, what to avoid, but that through it is not afforded to us, that what we have known is to be done, we also love and are able to do, let him be **anathema**. For since the **Apostle** says: 'Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth,' it is very impious that we should believe that we have the grace of Christ for that which puffs up and not have it for that which edifies, since **both** are the gift of God, both to **know** what we ought to do, and to **love** that we do it, so that with charity edifying knowledge may not puff up. For just as of God it is written: 'He that teacheth man knowledge,' so also it is written: 'Charity is of God.'" Therefore "both to **know** what we ought to do, and to **love** that we do it" according to this determination of the council is in us from the **special grace and aid of God**. And since to know in him who does not love to do is not **meritorious**, and yet something of this kind even in him in whom it is, is according to the council and the **Apostle** from the **grace of God or special aid**, it follows that such **knowledge even not meritorious** is a **special gift of God**.

Furthermore, if this response is sufficient, by which by the name of gift or grace of God is understood general influence, never from any text of scripture will it be able to be proved that for any act whether of intellect or of will, whether **meritorious** or **not meritorious**, we need the **special aid of God**. For nowhere in scripture is found this locution "**special aid**," but only "gift" and "grace" and "aid" or "help" without the addition of specialty or anything equivalent. But that is not to be said.

Item let there be two, one not baptized, the other baptized, arriving at the years of discretion, and let natural talent and other things be equal in them: According to this response the not baptized with the aid of **general influence alone** will be able sufficiently to know something pertaining to the moral life, as it is moral, to be done or avoided; therefore the baptized also similarly will be able to know with such aid precisely, and yet his knowledge will be **meritorious**, supposing that it is not in any way culpable. From which it follows that even a **meritorious** act of intellect is had without **special aid**. Nor is it valid to say that in the baptized is special aid, namely **grace making pleasing** infused in baptism, because, if the not baptized not having such grace knows just as he who has grace, it is clear that that grace in nothing helps him for **knowing**. And therefore, although his knowledge from the assistance of grace is accepted by God for eternal life, and thus meritorious, nevertheless he cannot be said to be helped in **knowing** from it nor

can it be said to be an aid with respect to that by which he is helped to know what he ought to do; against the intention of the council and the concession of this same venerable doctor who says that for a **meritorious** act of intellect we need **special aid**. Thus therefore it is evident that that conclusion is true, and the proofs of the same efficacious.

(First Collative Conclusion Confirmed)

But I confirm it also now thus: If man for this state can without the **special aid of God** know what is to be done in those things which pertain to the **moral life**, it follows that he needs no other aid for this than he would need, if no one had ever sinned.

The consequence is evident, because, even if no man had ever sinned, he would still need the aid of **general influence**, just as even Adam himself, before he sinned, could not perform any act without such aid, as is evident from the first conclusion of the preceding article. But that consequent is false, as the **Lord** declared in the parable of the wounded man. Whence as the **Master** says in the *Second Book of Sentences* distinction 25, and all Catholic doctors commonly agree, the human race was both despoiled of **gratuitous gifts** and wounded in **natural goods**. Whence "natural goods—that is talent, memory, intellect—are **corrupted**," although not subtracted, as the Master says.

Furthermore, it follows that the doctrine of the **Old and New Testament** was not necessary to man as to knowing what and how is to be done in those things which pertain to **morals**, since it is a certain **special aid of God**. And thus a great part of scripture is asserted to be superfluous for the cure of the human race, the opposite of which nevertheless the same parable shows in the two pennies, which the **Samaritan** handed to the innkeeper, that he might take care of the wounded man, as is evident through **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon* against the Pelagians—or in *Responses*—response 3, and through other expositors commonly.

Item, if man can without the **special aid of God** etc., much more will he be able without the **special aid of God**, by reading the moral doctrine of sacred scripture, to understand the sense of it and conceive and will to do those things, which it teaches are to be done. The consequence is clear, but the consequent is manifestly against **Augustine** [Fulgentius] in *On the Faith to Peter* chapter 32 instructing our faith thus: "Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that man, whom neither ignorance of letters nor any imbecility or adversity prohibits, can indeed read the words of the holy law and the gospel or hear them from the mouth of any preacher; but that no one can **obey** the divine commandments unless God prevent him by His **grace**, so that what he hears with the body he may perceive with the heart and, a good will and power being accepted divinely, he may **will** and **be able** to do the commandments of God. 'For neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase.'" And this proof is the word of the **Apostle** in 1 Corinthians 3. Behold that here he says no one can perceive with the heart, that is **understand**, or will to do those things, unless he be prevented by the **grace of God**. Either therefore he speaks of some **special grace**, and the proposal is had; or of **general influence** only, and this cannot be said, because neither without such can anyone even healthy and strong in body read or hear from the mouth of a preacher. And therefore the **grace of God** would be as necessary to him for reading or hearing the law of God as for understanding; the opposite of which he evidently intends.

Item, the saints prayed to God for having the **knowledge** of things to be done of the **moral life**; therefore they could not have it of themselves without the **special aid of God**. The antecedent is evident there: "Make the way known to me, wherein I should walk"; and there: "Teach me to do Thy justifications" and: "Direct my steps according to Thy word"; and innumerable such are had in scripture. The consequence is proved, since for those things, for which the saints needed only **general influence**, they are never found to have prayed, nor does any prudent man ever pray for such things. For who prays to God that fire may warm him, when he is sufficiently near to the fire, or, if he is distant from the fire a little, prays that he may be able to approach it, and so of other things, which are in his power? And for them **special aid** is not necessary; and yet in all motions and actions, whether voluntary or merely natural, the **general influence of God** is necessary to every created agent according to the common doctrine of all.

Nor is it repugnant to this that the **Church** asks God, "that He deign to preserve us" and "to give and also preserve the fruits of the earth," since, because all these things can be harmed in very many ways even with **general influence** standing, she supplicates for aid and **special influence**, by which things about to harm may be avoided and things about to profit may be mercifully and graciously afforded.

It is confirmed, because every argumentation of the councils and saints against **Pelagius**—besides the authorities of scripture for proving that for avoiding sins or perfecting the commandments of God or believing what Christ ordered to be believed or working any other things the aid of the **grace of God** is necessary to us—is founded upon this, that the saints **prayed** for such things. But if it is said that from this the necessity of **special aid** is not proved, it follows that they never proved sufficiently against him that some **special grace** or aid of God was necessary to us for any of the aforesaid things. Which nevertheless that they intended is not doubtful to any Catholic doctor.

Furthermore, it is certain that God subtracts His **general influence** from no creature unless very rarely, and this is then reputed to a **miracle**, as happened concerning the fire not burning the children in the furnace. Just as also it would be a miracle, if with healthy and open eyes I did not see a colored thing present in light with no impediment existing. But for such things, which man cannot [do] except by a miracle, no one is solicitous or doubtful, so that he pours out prayer to God for that, nay rather he would be reputed a mocker or fool, who did this.

(Arguments of Albert and Responses of Gregory)

But against the aforesaid conclusion the said **venerable doctor** argues in many ways. First thus: Either man from his naturals with the **general influence of God** alone concurring can know that God is to be **supremely honored**; or not, but beyond this a certain **special aid of God** is required. If the first is given, the proposal is had, because that is a certain **moral good**. If the second, it follows that man constituted in his naturals and with the general influence of God concurring will have **invincible ignorance** of this moral good, which is that God is to be supremely honored; and further it follows that the omission of this act, namely not honoring God supremely, will not be imputed to him as to **punishment** or even as to **fault**, since according to all doctors those things are not imputed which are committed from simply invincible ignorance. But each of these consequents seems to be false and against the **Apostle** in Romans 1, where it is said that the gentiles had knowledge that God is to be supremely honored, "because that which is known of God is manifest in them." And that an act of this kind is imputed to them to punishment, is evident there: "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and

injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice," and as to fault: "so that they are inexcusable"; and he adds the cause immediately: "Because that, when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God."

I answer. I say that man cannot know that without **special aid**. And when it is inferred that then "he will have invincible ignorance of this moral good," if it is understood that ignorance is invincible without the **special aid of God**, I concede that part of the consequent. And when it is inferred further that then "the omission of that act will not be imputed to him," I deny the consequence. To the proof "according to all doctors those things are not imputed to man which are committed from simply invincible ignorance," I say that that is to be understood of ignorance which is not a **sin** nor the **punishment of sin**, of which he is or was guilty. For ignorance which proceeds to man from sin, of which he himself was guilty, excuses him by no means, at least from the whole, as is evident concerning him who from ignorance contracted on account of **culpable drunkenness** kills a man. For such a one according to the more common doctrine and according to the **Philosopher** also in Book 3 of the *Ethics* does not excuse him from homicide, neither as to fault nor as to punishment.

But now this ignorance concerning this, that God is to be supremely honored, is surely the **punishment of the sin of the first man**, in which sin "all have sinned," as the **Apostle** says. For, if he had not sinned and others also had not sinned by that sin, no one would have had this ignorance, and therefore it excuses no one from such omission.

This response is the express opinion of blessed **Augustine** in the epistle *To Sixtus* upon those words of the Apostle alleged "so that they are inexcusable" saying thus: "And although they seem to excuse themselves, He does not admit this excuse, who knows that He made man right and gave him the precept of obedience, nor except from him, whose free will he used badly, even that sin flowed which would pass into posterity. For neither are they condemned who have not sinned, since indeed that passed from one into all, in whom before proper sins in each single one all sinned commonly. And by this every sinner is **inexcusable**, either by the guilt of origin or by the addition also of proper will, whether who knows or who is ignorant, whether who judges or who does not judge. Because even **ignorance itself** in those who would not understand is without doubt a **sin**; but in those who could not is the **punishment of sin**. Therefore in both there is not a just excuse, but a **just condemnation**."

To the other proof of the falsity of this part of the conceded consequent I say that the gentiles did not have such knowledge without the **special aid of God**. I say however that that special aid can be taken in two ways: In one way that it was such to which the creatures themselves did not co-help or cooperate, which are the effects of God or the knowledge of them, just as is the aid by which **future things** are known, or other things which other holy men knew only by inspiration or **divine revelation strictly taken**, in the way the mysteries of the Incarnation and our redemption are known by us.

In another way that to such aid concurred also the **knowledge of creatures**, which knowledge nevertheless together even with the aid of general influence did not suffice for them to know that God is to be supremely honored, but **another special aid** and influence was surely necessary, just as also together with vocal doctrine proffered exteriorly and with the general influence of God the **special aid of God** is necessary to us, that we may understand with the heart and consent to the **faith of Christ** which is preached to us.

Now to the proposal I say that those gentiles, of whom the Apostle speaks, did not have special aid in the first way but in the **second**. Nor does any gloss alleged by this master against me say the opposite of this. But surely one **gloss** there seems to say the proposal expressly. Whence upon that word "For God hath manifested it unto them" the **Gloss** says: "He says this, lest **nature alone** should seem to suffice."

Therefore, if they are said to have known naturally or by natural reason, it does not follow: Therefore from **naturals alone** and without the **special aid of God**.

And this is confirmed, because according to **Augustine** in *On Seeing God to Paulina* it is impossible for any man to know without the **special aid of God** that God is some such thing as the **philosophers**, of whom is the sermon, knew God to be, and consequently it is also impossible that He be known to be supremely honorable, unless He **specialy helps** to this knowledge. The assumption is evident, because these are his words: "For who without the **aid of the Holy Spirit** can think that something is and is more than all things which are sensed through the body, which neither is seen in place nor is to be sought by eyes nor is heard by speech nor held by touch nor sensed by approach, yet is seen but by a clean heart?" As if he says "no one." And yet those philosophers thought God to be some such thing. But by the **aid of the Holy Spirit** cannot be understood general influence only in the proposal, since without that we cannot even think anything to be which is seen by sight or sensed by another sense, as is certain. And thus **Augustine** would say no more of God than of the sky that He cannot be thought to be without the aid of the Holy Spirit; which is ridiculous to feel.

Item in Book 2 of the *City of God* chapter 7 he says thus: "The **philosophers** endowed with most acute talents tried in whatever way by reasoning to investigate what lay hidden in the nature of things, what was to be desired and fled in morals, what in the very rules of reasoning was drawn by certain connection, or what was not consequent or was even repugnant. And certain of them found certain **great things**, insofar as they were **divinely helped**; but insofar as they were humanly hindered, they erred." But I think that among those great things which they found is to be computed that of which it is acted, namely that God is to be **supremely honored**. Nor do I believe that this reverend master would say the opposite. Therefore they knew this through the **aid of God**, nor can it be understood through the aid of general influence only, since also for finding small things and even in their errors they had such aid, and by this similarly it would be well said "insofar as they were **divinely helped**, they erred"; which I do not think anyone will concede. Nor can this be expounded of the **meritorious knowledge** of eternal life, since they were infidels and idolaters.

Haymo also in the same place upon that "Their foolish heart was darkened" says: "Their heart which was illuminated through natural talent and through the **grace of God**, after they began to adore idols, was darkened through ignorance." And he adds after a few things: "For what **divine grace** conferred on them freely [gratis], surely it took away while they were ungrateful." Behold that he says their heart was illuminated through natural talent and through the **grace of God**; and again that that knowledge, which they had of God, **divine grace** conferred on them freely [gratis]. But I think it is not usual with scripture, nay nowhere do I find those things, which we have from ourselves, with only general influence concurring, to be said to be conferred on us by **divine grace freely** [gratis], just as neither anywhere is it said nor would any wise man say that fire warms from the **grace of God** or that any man blasphemes God or hates his neighbor from the **grace of God** or that the grace of God confers these things on such agents, since nevertheless none of these happens without the concurrence of general influence.

Secondly this master argues thus: If man from his naturals with the general influence of God alone concurring cannot know what is to be done etc., he will not have of himself whence he may be **counseling** [capable of taking counsel] or be able to be. It is evident, since counsel is not of those things which cannot be known. But that consequent is against sacred scripture saying Ecclesiasticus 15: "He left man in the hand of his own counsel."

I answer. When it is inferred that "of himself he will not have whence he may be counseling," that consequent seems to be simply to be **conceded** according to the property of speech, because man not of himself but from God has the soul and other things through which he can take counsel. But nevertheless going more to the mind of the arguer who, as I think, wishes to say that then he will not have in himself whence he may be counseling, I say that that can be taken in two ways: In one way thus simply as it is proffered, and then I deny the consequence. Instance in a similar case according to the concession of this doctor and of all other Catholics: Man cannot with the general influence of God alone perform a **meritorious** act nor even be beatified, and yet from this it does not follow that man in himself does not have whence he can merit and whence he can be beatified, since this consequent according to all is false; for he has intellect and will, by which he can merit and be beatified. In another way the consequent can be taken with a subunderstood determination thus: In himself he will not have whence he may be or through what or through which things he may be **rightly counseling** without the **special aid of God**, and then I concede that consequent.

And to the scripture, which is alleged against, I say that that is not to the proposal, since it does not speak according to the **present state**, but according to the state in which he was **first created**. Which is evidently clear from the same place. Whence thus lies the text: "God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel." It is evident also through **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon* response 3 evidently.

Thirdly he argues thus: Either the **Samaritan** seeing that man left half-dead could know from his naturals with the general influence of God alone what was morally to be done concerning him, and the proposal is had; or he could not, and then it follows that the nature of this man is worse in order to the consort of his nature than the nature of a **pig**, because hearing another pig being tortured it immediately leaps upon the torturer. And this seems to favor much the error of the **Manichaeans** saying nature is simply evil.

I answer that, if by the **Samaritan** we understand **Christ**, just as Christ understood when He posited that parable, surely He could know and knew what and how was to be done towards that wounded man, namely the **human race**. But that is nothing to the proposal, because in our question Christ is not included. But if by the Samaritan is understood some **pure man** in the present state and by the wounded another, it is worth as much as if concerning some other man for example concerning **Peter** it is asked, whether seeing another for example **Paul** wounded he could know what is to be done morally concerning him without the **special aid of God**. And I say that, although he could know what is to be done, namely because he ought to compassionate him and help, nevertheless he cannot know **why** and **how** according to all circumstances required for the moral goodness of the act he ought to do those acts. And therefore he cannot sufficiently know what is morally to be done concerning him.

And what is inferred then concerning **pigs**, is evident not to be valid, unless my reverend master wishes to say that a pig knows what and how according to all circumstances required for the moral goodness of the act is to be done concerning another pig which is tortured; which I do not think he wishes to say.

And when he says that this seems to favor much the error of the **Manichaeans** who said nature is simply evil, I answer that **Manichaeus** meant human nature in its first condition from a commixed substance of evil to be evil; which I do not say, but I say it was created good and pure but from voluntary **sin**, which surely the first man committed and could avoid, it was vitiated and with vice transfused by propagation into other descendants. And he who asserts the opposite of this pertinaciously, exists as a **Pelagian heretic**. Whence **Augustine** excludes a similar invective made against himself in *Responses against the Pelagians* response 3, for speaking of Adam he says: "By willing evil he lost the **power for good**, who by the power for good could conquer the will for evil, whom God justly dismissed now captive to a depraved will by the offense." And he adds: "Therefore he had an evil will not from the condition of his good nature as from a congenital evil, as **Manichaeus** believed, but conceived from an accessing depraved desire; which every human progeny risen from him contracted from a vitiated root without **Christ alone**."

To the **gloss** of **Gregory** saying that "our mind from the consideration of itself understands what it should do to another and brings forth the germ of a right work," I say that it makes nothing for him, because Gregory does not say that from the consideration of itself, which it has of itself with general influence alone or without special aid, it understands what it should do to another. But I say that, when "our mind from the consideration of itself understands what it should do to another and brings forth the germ of a right work," it has such consideration from the **special grace of God** and without that it does not suffice. And the **Apostle** also says this with me, when he says that "we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."

(Second Collative Conclusion)

The **second conclusion**, which I infer from the aforesaid principal conclusion of this article, is that from the sin of the **first parents** every man conceived by natural usage contracts **impotence** of willing well and acting well morally, namely to this sense that he cannot without the **special aid of God** will or do anything well morally, even if he sufficiently knows what and how something is to be done or willed.

I prove this thus: **Adam** from his sin incurred **impotence** of willing and acting well morally; therefore every man conceived by natural usage incurs similar impotence. The antecedent is evident above. The consequence is proved through **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon*—or according to another intitulation in *Responses against the Pelagians*—response 3, where, when he had said that Adam, while he passed over the commandment of God, "the **good of possibility** being lost, possessed a will alone for willing, wounded," inferring immediately he joins: "Therefore by this wound we all limp with free will nor does the power for good naturally suffice for us to fulfill, because from nature vitiated by sin, that is from the **first formed men**, of whom we are and are nature itself, in whom liberty is vitiated, a man of sound will, namely with perfect choice of liberty by which he suffices to himself, cannot arise." Therefore the **impotence**, which he incurred, we also incur.

Secondly, I prove the same conclusion against the man thus: **Adam** before sin could with the general influence of God alone will and do well morally, and no man in the present state even having sufficient

knowledge concerning doing or willing can with general influence alone will anything or do well morally. Therefore every man conceived by natural usage incurs from the sin of the **first parents** impotence of willing well and acting well morally. The consequence is clear, because since **Adam** did not have such impotence before sin it is evident that we do not have it from our nature according to itself; therefore from the **vice of nature**. But it is not vitiated except on account of sin; and it cannot be said on account of other than on account of the sin of the first parents, as is sufficiently clear from the doctrine of the saints.

The **first part** of the antecedent, whether it be true or false, the **reverend master**, against whom I argue, has to concede, since he, which is more, concedes that we in the present state, when our nature is infirm and vitiated, can with general influence alone act and will well morally.

The **second part** was proved above; for it is the third conclusion proved in the first article of question 1 of distinction 26. Nevertheless I confirm it also now through **Augustine** who to Simplician book 1 and question 1 says: "Furthermore all who received the law prevaricate it, unless through **grace** they obtain the power to do what it commands." But through the law sufficient knowledge is had concerning moral things to be done.

Item the same in the epistle *To Juliana* says thus: "God helps us not only that we may **know** what is to be done, but also that by loving we may **do** what by learning we already know. Therefore no one can be not only knowing, but even continent, unless God gives it"; and it is the word of the Wise Man, Wisdom 8. And from this authority is confirmed as well the preceding as this conclusion. For he speaks expressly of an act of **moral virtue**, as is evident through that whole epistle. Nor can that word be expounded of the giving of **general influence** only, because even then it would be said equally well: I cannot be an adulterer, unless God gives it. And just as the Wise Man says continence is the gift of God, so we ought to say that **adultery** was the gift of God; which pious ears could not sustain.

(Additional Proof of the Second Collative Conclusion)

Addition 54: The second part was proved above by the authority of **Augustine** upon the epistle to the Galatians, where the **Apostle** says: "For you, brethren, have been called unto liberty"; and it is in the 5th chapter. For he says there that the Jews pertaining to the **Old Testament** "fulfilled certain works of the law which are in the sacraments," namely ceremonial ones, "but those which pertain to **good morals** they could not at all." It is not however to be understood that they could not have with the **special aid of God**, if God had wished to confer sufficient aid. For **David** also pertaining to the New Testament from the gift of faith of the future Christ surely fulfilled concerning Saul the commandment of love of neighbor, which is surely moral, according to what **Augustine** subjoins there sententiously. And so others could have, if God had helped. Nor can it be said that therefore they could not, because they needed general influence. For they needed that also for doing ceremonial things, and yet he says that they did those. Therefore it is necessary to understand that things pertaining to **good morals** they could not without the **special aid of God**. Further, since they had sufficient knowledge of moral things from the law, it is evident that beyond sufficient knowledge of things to be done morally **another special aid of God** was necessary to them.

Item, the same to Simplician book 1 question 1 says: "Furthermore all who received the law prevaricate it, unless through **grace** they obtain the **power** to do what it commands." Nor here by grace can be accepted **general influence**, since neither without that is there prevarication of the law, at least as to negative

precepts. Therefore beyond knowledge of things to be done morally, which surely is had sufficiently through the law, **another special aid of God** is necessary for doing what the law commands.

Addition 55: This part of the antecedent, which is my third conclusion, where it is said, I proved by some reasons, which the aforesaid **reverend master** undertook to solve, nevertheless in my judgment they are not sufficiently solved.

(Reasons of Gregory Discussed)

For the **first reason** was this: If having sufficient knowledge concerning something to be willed or nilled, done or not done, man can without the **special aid of God** conformably will or nill, do or not do, it follows that either **grace** and the **special aid of God** is not given for singular acts or, if it is given, it is given superfluously. The consequence is evident; and the consequent is false, as is evident from the fourth supposition, which I made then to prove the first conclusion.

To this reason the reverend master said many things: One was that the **grace**, which is said to be given for singular acts, is **grace making pleasing** [sanctifying grace]; and this he tried to prove in many ways. Secondly he says that in us there are two genera of acts, namely to **understand** and to **will**. And each can be taken in two ways, namely as they have an immediate order to **angelic civility** according to that "You are fellow citizens with the saints," and as they have an immediate order to **human civility** or human moral regimen. Item, when it is said the grace of God is given for singular acts, he says that a **distribution** can be made there for the singulars of genera and for the genera of singulars.

Now to the reason he says that, if those acts "to understand" and "to will" be accepted as they have order to **angelic civility**, thus that special aid is necessary for singular acts, if the distribution be made for the genera of singulars, because not only is such special aid necessary for understanding, but (also) for willing; which is against **Pelagius**.

But if these acts be accepted as they have order to **human civility** precisely, thus such special aid is not necessary for singular acts, if the distribution be made for the singulars of genera, because under "to understand" and "to will" it is to accept some good acts even according to me, as he says, to which such special aid, namely of **grace making pleasing**, does not concur; nevertheless it is not to accept any act in us according to this order, for which the **aid of God** is not necessary. But such aid is not special aid, as I accept it, but is aid through **general influence**. And this also is against **Pelagius**, who posited right understanding to be from God, but not willing, except insofar as He had given the will.

Briefly this response consists in this, because, since in that confession of **Pelagius**, by which the consequent is proved to be false, it is said the grace of God and aid is given for singular acts, the distribution is not made for the singulars of genera but for the genera of singulars, and it is understood of acts having immediate order to **angelic civility**, and by the name of grace specially **grace making pleasing** is to be accepted.

Against this response I show first that there the distribution is made for the **singulars of genera**, and this in two ways. First by arguing from the data thus: That confession of **Pelagius** according to this venerable master is understood of acts having immediate order to **angelic civility**. Either by "acts having order to angelic civility" this master understands acts which are done from the **love of God**, and by "having order

to human civility" he understands acts done from the **love of the world**, according to the distinction of the **Gloss** there, where the word alleged by him is written, namely "You are fellow citizens with the saints," which according to two loves, namely of God and of the world, distinguishes **two cities**; and then it follows that those acts, which are said to have order to human civility, are not morally good but **vicious** and culpable, because according to the **Gloss** there "love of the world makes the **Babylonian city**." But this is against him, who says they are good and right.

Or by "having order to angelic civility" he understands acts **meritorious** of eternal life, by which already man is in a certain way a citizen of the celestial Jerusalem, but by "others" he understands acts **not meritorious** of eternal life but only **morally good**, by which man is a citizen of the mundane city morally right well; and then it follows that some singular meritorious acts are done by man without the **special aid of grace** and with only the aid of **general influence**. Which does not seem consonant with the common doctrine of the saints and other doctors. The consequence is evident, because, if there were none of this kind, already the grace of God, of which is the sermon in that confession of Pelagius, would be given for singular acts, the distribution being understood for the singulars of genera; the opposite of which he says.

Secondly I prove that same thing absolutely. And first from the confession of **Pelagius**, repeated elsewhere by him, as **Augustine** recites in Book 1 *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* chapter 2, speaking to Albina, Pinianus and Melania, to whom he writes that book. For he says thus: "You wrote to me that you had dealt with Pelagius, that whatever things were said against him, he should condemn in writing, and that he said hearing you: 'I anathematize him who either feels or says that the **grace of God**, by which "Christ came into this world to save sinners," is not necessary not only through **singular hours** or through **singular moments**, but even through **singular acts of ours**; and those who try to take this away, let them suffer eternal punishments.'" But I think that no one would say that that term repeated three times, another here and another there, but similar in all parts of the authority makes a **distribution**. And it is certain that, when it is said "through singular hours" or "through singular moments" the distribution is made on both sides for singular hours and moments, in which man operates, so that in none can he operate well without grace. And consequently similarly the distribution is made for **singular acts**, when it is said "for singular acts," so that it is understood none can be done well without grace, and by this it is a distribution for the **singulars of genera**.

Secondly, the same is proved from the proof cogently forcing **Pelagius** to making that confession. For **Augustine** relates in the epistle *To Paulinus* Bishop of Nola that two words of the **Apostle** among others were objected to Pelagius, namely that "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy" and that "Not I, but the grace of God with me." And **Augustine** says this was said not "because there is no will and course of man, but because he can **nothing**, unless He has mercy; nor did the Apostle say 'And I,' but he said 'Not I but the grace of God with me,' not because he did nothing of good, but because he would do **nothing**, if it did not help."

Therefore the subsequent confession of **Pelagius** according to the intention of that episcopal judgment was such, that it should be understood that we do **no good act at all** without the aid of grace; which is not signified by those words, unless the distribution be made for the singulars of genera.

Secondly I prove that that confession is to be understood universally of **all acts morally good**, whether they be meritorious or not, or to whatever civility they pertain. For if the opposite is given, it follows that

man without the **special aid of God** with His **general influence** alone will be able to fulfill all the commandments of the law, at least as to the substance of works. Which is not true, as I suppose for now; and is expressly against the determination of Saint **Thomas** *First of the Second* question 109 article 4, which now suffices for me against this venerable master.

And the consequence appears, because according to this master for any act **morally good** precisely the aid of **general influence** suffices for man.

Since therefore in that confession the distribution is made for the **singulars of genera** and it is understood generally of **all acts morally good**, as has been proved, and there "aid of grace" is taken for **special aid**—even according to this venerable master, who says that there by the name of grace **grace making pleasing** is signified—it follows that for any singular good act the **special aid of God** is necessary to us; from which follows the intent.

But then that is reduced against me, since I have posited that some not having **grace making pleasing** do some acts **morally good**, therefore grace of which is that confession of Pelagius is not given for singular acts; for, as the said venerable master says, that is "**grace making pleasing**."

I say here that there that name "grace" does not stand only for "**grace making pleasing**."

He proved the opposite of this in four ways: First, from the epistle of **five bishops** to Pope **Innocent**, from which it is held that that grace, concerning which the question against Pelagius was turned, is not that "by which we are created," but "by which we are **justified** from iniquity" and "by which predestined we are called, justified and glorified." But such is **grace making pleasing**.

Secondly, from the word of **Augustine** in the epistle *To Vitalis*: "Let us not therefore call grace doctrine, but let us acknowledge **grace**, which makes doctrine profit, without which we see doctrine even harms." Behold that he speaks of **grace making pleasing**.

Thirdly, from the words which I myself alleged in that **fourth supposition**. For he speaks there, as this master says, of grace which is **common** to greater ones and little ones. But that is **grace making pleasing**.

Fourthly, because in the same place it is said: "We know **grace** is not given to all." Either therefore it is understood of **grace making pleasing**, and the proposal is had; or of moving to a good act, and this is false, because such is given to **all men** even according to me, as he says, and according to the authority of the **Decree On Penitence** distinction 4, and is of **Chrysostom**: "Let no one seeing the bad have prosperity be troubled, because the bad cannot be bad in all things, but has **some goods**, nor the good be good in all things, but has some evils."

To these I answer. To the **first** I say that by the name of "**grace by which we are justified**" not only **grace making pleasing**—which is a certain infused habit, which whoever has is just—is understood, but also other **graces freely given**, preventing or accompanying it in the soul, and any gratuitous divine motions and inspirations and interior or exterior vocations, concurring or disposing to the **justification** of the sinner.

And this is evident even by the words alleged by him "By which, he says, predestined we are called, justified etc." It is certain that **vocation** is not **grace making pleasing**. It is evident also, because it stands that the **faith of Christ** or to believe in Christ is included under the name of special grace, of which the saints speak against Pelagius and Vitalis especially; and yet **faith** pertains to the grace of justification, since "without it it is impossible to please God" or to be just.

It is evident also from the authority of **Augustine** book 1 *To Simplician* question 2, which I alleged in my Vespers, which if the reverend master had considered well, perhaps he would not have spoken thus. For **Augustine** says: "Man begins to receive **grace**, from the time he begins to believe God, moved to faith by either internal or external admonition." And he adds: "But in certain ones there is so much **grace of faith** as does not suffice for obtaining the kingdom of heaven, just as in catechumens, just as in **Cornelius** himself, before he was incorporated into the church by the participation of the sacraments." And afterwards: "Certain inchoations of faith happen, he says, similar to conceptions; yet it is not only necessary to be conceived, but also to be born, that one may arrive at eternal life. Yet none of these is without the **grace of the mercy of God**, because works also, if any are good, follow, as has been said, that grace, do not precede. Wishing to persuade which thing the Apostle just as in another place says: 'For by the **grace of God** we are saved, and not of ourselves etc.'" Behold that all such inchoations and conceptions are closed under the name of "**grace by which we are saved**," and yet some such are in those not having **grace making pleasing**.

To the **second** it must be said that even gratuitous **motion**, by which God makes the mind assent to doctrine, is called grace "which makes doctrine profit." Whence he himself adds immediately: "For we do not pray for infidels that their nature may be made, that is that they may be men, or that doctrine may be preached to them which they hear to their own evil, if they do not believe, but we pray that the will be corrected, consent be given to doctrine, nature be healed." But not everyone, who consents to doctrine by believing, has **grace making pleasing**.

To the **third** I say first that in that whole authority it is not said that that grace is "common to greater ones and lesser ones," but it is said: "We know grace is given neither to greater ones nor to lesser ones according to our merits." Secondly I say that to greater ones and lesser ones there is some common grace, which is not **grace making pleasing**, such as **infused faith**. But it does not follow: "The grace of which he speaks is common to greater ones and little ones," **grace making pleasing** is common to greater ones and little ones, therefore **grace making pleasing** is that of which he speaks there.

To the **fourth** I say first that that major disjunctive is not sufficient. For, as I have already said, special grace is manifold other than **grace making pleasing** and than freely moving to act. Secondly I say that that grace, which is given for singular good acts, is **gracious motion** by which God makes man will well or do well, as I declared in my first reading. And I say that this is not **common to all men**, nor have I ever said the opposite. Whence I do not know, how he says that according to me this is common to all.

Nor does the authority of the **Decree** prove his proposal; for although in any man there are some goods freely given, as goods of nature and goods of fortune, according to which one is said to have prosperity, of which that authority speaks, it does not follow from this that God makes any man will or do well morally.

My **second reason** for the conclusion was this: If having sufficient knowledge the will can without **special aid** conformably will, it follows that for fulfilling the law or for doing what the law commands the law itself and the knowledge of it would suffice for man, nor would he need further **another aid of God**; which is against the **Apostle** in many places, and similarly against **Augustine** in the epistle *To Asselicus*, who says that those saying this "not in name, but yet in error judaize."

To this he responds that for fulfilling the law as to the substance of commandments and as to the attainment of the **ultimate end** knowledge of the law does not suffice without **grace making pleasing**, but it well suffices as to the substance of commandments and the attainment of the **immediate end of human natural regimen** without **special aid**, yet not without **general influence**.

But this response concedes, as it seems, the proposal. Because, since to fulfill the commandments with the attainment or reaching of the **ultimate end** is nothing other than to do the works commanded us for the sake of God, because neither otherwise can it be understood that the wayfarer attains the ultimate end, if thus he cannot fulfill them without **special grace**, it follows that he cannot act well morally without **special grace**, because, as was proved above in the fourth conclusion of the first article, no act is **morally good**, unless it be done ultimately for the sake of God.

And what is said concerning that **end of natural regimen**, seems to be a saying at pleasure, because there is no due end of human regimen except God Himself, and whoever rules himself to another or according to another end, **enjoys the creature** and lives erroneously.

Thirdly I proved that conclusion by the determination of the **Council of Milevum**: "If anyone shall say that the grace of God through Jesus Christ etc.," as above. "For **both** are the gift of God, both to **know** what we ought to do, and to **love** that we do it."

He responds that **both** are the gift of God, because He acts for both according to **general influence**.

But this response has been excluded in the preceding conclusion.

I confirmed by the **Parisian article**, which says it was the error of **Pelagius** that for the rectitude of the will knowledge suffices.

He responds saying there is a triple rectitude: One which excludes all **infirmity** both according to act and according to habit; and to say that for this particular agile knowledge suffices is the error of Pelagius. Another which is in the right order of work immediately attaining the **ultimate end simply**, such as is a meritorious work; and concerning this also it is an error to say that agile knowledge suffices. The third which consists in the right order of work attaining the **end of human natural regimen** morally; and concerning such rectitude it is not erroneous to say that knowledge with **general influence** suffices.

But this response is excluded by that which was said next, namely that a work is never right unless it be done ultimately, namely actually or habitually for the sake of the **ultimate end** which is God.

Fourthly I proved the conclusion and I said that this moved me much; for, notwithstanding that **Pelagius** posited that we are helped by God to will and do well, insofar as He helped the possibility of nature by giving doctrine and knowledge of things to be done, because nevertheless beyond this he did not posit that

we have even the **good will** itself and the good work from the **grace of God**, but from ourselves through free will, **Augustine** says that he erred. And I declared this by many authorities of Augustine, which the reverend master did not care to recite.

To this the venerable master said that the error of **Pelagius** (was) in this that, since there are in us two genera of acts, namely to understand and to will, Pelagius posited one namely to **understand** to be the work of God, but the other namely to **will** he said was the work of the **will alone**. But if he had posited even to will itself to be the work of God moving according to **general influence**, he would not have erred nor would there have been any controversy between him and Catholics.

But this response, saving reverence, is not valid, first indeed, because it is false what he says, namely that **Pelagius** posited "to **will** itself to be the work of the **will alone**," namely such that the **general influence of God** is not required for it. And this is evident first from the saying of **Coelestius** who in all things so followed Pelagius, as **Augustine** says in the book *On Heresies* the penultimate chapter, that "their followers are also called Coelestians." For he indeed, as **Augustine** recites in *On the Perfection of Justice* chapter 5, said it was impious to induce another author of any thing except **God**. Therefore he wished that God be the author of the act of the will itself. Which would not be true, if neither the **general influence of God** were necessary for it. Secondly, the same is gathered from the proper saying of **Pelagius**. For, as **Augustine** recites in the first book *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* chapter 4, and I alleged in my Vespers, **Pelagius** in his 3rd book *For Free Will* said that the **possibility** of good in us is from God, but the **operation** itself is from us. And declaring by an example he said: "That we can see with eyes, is not ours; but that we see either well or badly, this is ours. And that I may embrace universals generally, that we can do, say, think every good, is of Him who gave this power, who helps this power. But that we either do or speak or think well, is ours, because we can also turn all these things into evil."

From which it is evident that **Pelagius** said so to **will evil** and evil work to be ours, and not God's, just as to **will good** and good work. But if he had understood that each was ours so, that the **general influence of God** concurred for neither, he would have erred so in denying evil work and evil will to be from God, just as in denying that good will and good work is from Him. And the saints would have reproved him so in that as in this. But in that he is nowhere found reproved, nay rather all saints say that same thing. Therefore he did not deny the **general influence of God** from a good act, but a certain **special one**, which is so in respect of a good act, that it is not in respect of an evil one.

Secondly the response fails, because whatever Pelagius intended, nevertheless the councils and saints wished to assert a certain **special influence** or **special aid** in respect of an act of will conformable to knowledge had of things to be done to be necessary to man beyond general influence.

And this is evident first, because it is certain that by "**the grace of God through Jesus Christ**" the saints do not understand general influence. Whence no one would ever say that we cannot desire or commit adultery unless helped by "**the grace of God which is through Jesus Christ our Lord**," since yet we can do neither not helped by general influence. But the **Council** says that for **both**, namely for knowing what is to be done and for loving that we do it, the **grace of God through Jesus Christ** helps us.

Augustine also showing the controversy of Pelagius and Catholics, as I recited in my Vespers, says in Book 1 *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* chapter 47: "If **Pelagius** will agree with us that even the

will itself and action are helped **divinely**, so that without that aid we will and do nothing well, and that that is the **grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord**, in which He makes us just by His justice not ours, so that that is our true justice which is to us from Him, nothing concerning the aid of the grace of God, as I think, of controversy will be left between us." Behold that the controversy is not concerning general influence, but concerning the **grace of God through Jesus Christ**.

Item, in the epistle *To Hilary of Syracuse* reproving the error of **Pelagius** from the proposal: "Free will, he says, is valid for **good works**, if it be **divinely helped**; but deserted by the **aid of God**, however much it excels in the knowledge of the law, in no way will it have the solidity of justice, but the inflation of impious **pride** and deadly tumor." Here it is evident that that aid is necessary for **good works**, without which it can [do] only evils. But it is certain that without general influence it cannot [do] evil works. Therefore it is **another aid** which is required for good ones, and precisely morally good ones, because without that "it will have the inflation of impious **pride** and deadly tumor," which surely are not morally good but **vicious**.

Furthermore, as I touched above, if for **moral goods** not meritorious general influence sufficed for us, since even for such **general influence** would have been necessary to man before sin, in what would free will be weakened in us? For it stands according to the doctrine of the saints that he without **grace making pleasing** could not have acted meritoriously, and consequently with only **general influence** and other gratuitous gifts commonly superadded he could not [attain] to a greater good than to moral not meritorious. How therefore can we say that for such things **general influence** suffices for us? The Ordinary Text follows.

(Objections of Albert and Solutions of Gregory)

Against this conclusion this **venerable master** argues first thus: Having in the present state knowledge that God is to be loved above all things, either man from his naturals with only general influence can elicit concerning God an act of love **morally good**, or not. If yes, the proposal is had. If not, it follows that an act of love morally good elicited concerning God is **above the faculty of human nature**; which seems to be against the authority of scripture in **Deuteronomy** 30 saying: "The commandment that I command thee this day is not above thee nor far off, but the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayst do it."

From which authority the said master takes that not only is it not above our faculty to love God, but that this is **connatural**, because it is not less connatural to man to love God than to know God is to be loved or to form a word of heart or mouth concerning loving God. But it is connatural to man to know God is to be loved above all things and concerning God thus known to form a word of heart and mouth. Therefore etc.

Here I say first that the conclusion which this doctor concludes, namely that in the present state we can from naturals alone with the general influence of God **love God above all things**, does not seem consonant with the sayings of the saints, as I proved by authorities of **Augustine** and **Bernard** and **Anselm** in my Vespers, to which he has said nothing yet.

And now I prove it also by the authority of scripture saying 1 John 4: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He **first loved us**." Upon which word **Augustine** in Book 1 *On the Grace of Christ and*

Original Sin chapter 26: "Most excellently," he says, "altogether and most truly is it said; for we would not have whence we might love Him unless we received this from Him, when He first loved us." From these things it appears manifestly that for loving God it is necessary to us, that we take this from the **grace and love of God**.

I prove this same thing evidently, against him at least, because he will not deny the doctrine of **Saint Thomas**. For he in the *First of the Second* question 109 article 3 inquires: "Whether man can love God above all things from **naturals alone** without grace." And he determines that man in the state of **integral nature** could, in the state of **corrupt nature** he cannot. Whence his proof being premised he concludes in these words: "And therefore it must be said that man in the state of integral nature did not need the gift of grace superadded to natural goods for loving God naturally above all things, although he needed the aid of God moving him to this. But in the state of **corrupt nature** man needs also for this the aid of **grace healing nature**."

Nor can that saying be glossed by saying that he speaks of **meritorious** love. For he expresses determinately concerning **natural love**, by which love he says man in the state of integral nature could without the gift of grace superadded to natural goods love God above all things; which surely would be false concerning meritorious love. And afterwards he says that for this, namely for loving God with natural love above all things, he needs in the present state "the aid of **grace healing nature**." It is certain that that is not general influence.

To the reason I answer that having such knowledge man cannot in the present state without the **special aid of God** love God above all things, and consequently neither well morally. And when it is inferred that such love "would be **above the faculty of human nature**," if the sense of such saying is that for loving thus the faculty of human nature of itself would not suffice, I concede such consequent.

And to the authority of scripture which is adduced I say first that, as is evident from the series of the text, that word is not only accepted for the commandment of the love of God, but commonly for **all His commandments**. Whence there is premised: "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God and keep His commandments and ceremonies, which are written in this law etc."; and immediately follows: "The commandment that I command thee this day etc.," as has been alleged. But it is marvelous that this **reverend master** says the observation of the commandments of God is not only possible but **so easy** to man in the state of corrupt nature not helped by the special grace of God as it is easy to him to say with the mouth that God is to be loved above all things, since nevertheless the **Prophet** says: "For the sake of the words of thy lips I have kept hard ways," and the **Apostle**: "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin," and therefore he exclaims: "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" and responding he does not say: "My free will with general influence," but "The **grace of God** by Jesus Christ our Lord."

And certainly, if this reverend master feels it is so easy for him to observe God's commandments, let him give thanks not to himself but to God.

But I answer to that authority just as **Augustine** answers **Coelestius** in *On the Perfection of Justice* chapters 21 and 22, and also **Pelagius** in *On Nature and Grace* the last chapter, who alleged the aforesaid authority for themselves, and that also of 1 John 5 "His commandments are not heavy." And I say

according to his opinion that this is to be understood of him who is converted to God from the whole heart through **love**, just as in the same place in the text is premised. For to such a one loving thus the commandments of God are called easy in that sense, in which it is accustomed to be said that to a lover nothing is difficult. But I say such love cannot be in man from proper powers precisely, but from the **grace of the Holy Spirit**. Whence in *On Nature and Grace* the last chapter: "For all things are easy to **charity**. According to this it is said: 'And His commandments are not heavy,' so that to whom they are heavy, let him consider that it could not be said divinely 'they are not heavy,' unless because there can be an affection of the heart to which they are not heavy, and let him ask what is wanting, that he may fulfill what is commanded. And what is said to Israel in Deuteronomy, if piously, if holily, if spiritually it be understood, signifies this same thing." And he adds: "Therefore everyone converted, just as is commanded there, to the Lord his God from his whole heart and from his whole soul, will not hold the commandment of God heavy. For how is it heavy, since it is the commandment of **love**? For either everyone does not love, and therefore it is heavy; or he loves, and it cannot be heavy. But he loves, if what is admonished there to Israel, he shall have been converted to the Lord from his whole heart and from his whole soul." And in *On the Perfection of Justice* chapter 22: "They ought," he says, "surely to be reminded that the commandment of God is not heavy to the **charity of God**, which is poured forth in our hearts only through the **Holy Spirit**, not through the choice of human will."

He adduced one authority of **Basil** fairly long, by which it is said to be **connatural** to us to love God even more than benefactors.

To which I say, just as was said above to that of the **Apostle** "The gentiles naturally do the things which are of the law," for therefore he says that it is **natural** to us to love God, because from the principle of nature implanted we are apt and inclined to His love. But nevertheless that aptitude or inclination still does not suffice, but needs to be helped by Him; which the authority itself expresses, where it says: "But a certain **seminal reason** is implanted in us having causes intrinsically, that it may adhere to God. Which reason the receiving doctrine of divine precepts to cultivate diligently and cherish cautiously is accustomed to lead to the **perfection of divine grace**." Behold that that seminal reason implanted in us is cultivated and cherished by the doctrine of divine precepts, that it may be led to the perfection of divine grace, that is to which the grace of God leads; but that perfection is that God be loved **above all things**.

The **second reason** of the aforesaid master is this: Either, having sufficient knowledge that God is to be supremely loved, the will from its naturals will elicit an act **morally good**, and the proposal is had; or **evil**, and then against, because for every time, in which the exercise of any act is evil morally and culpably, the **omission** of that act is good morally and laudably. But according to you, says this master, for every time, in which man stands under general influence alone, the exercise of divine love is evil morally and culpably. Therefore for that time the omission of it is good morally and laudably. But this is evident to be false, because according to the **Apostle** it was culpable to the philosophers that they omitted to glorify, and consequently to love God.

I answer that, if the will shall elicit any act of love concerning God not helped by the **special aid of God**, it will elicit an act **evil morally** and culpable, because namely it will not love Him for the sake of God or above all things, but for the sake of **itself**.

And when it is argued against, proving that then the **omission** of divine love for that time will be good, it is evident that the argumentation is frivolous. For similarly I will argue in another matter: For every time, in which the exercise of any act is culpable, the omission of it is laudable; but, when someone gives alms to the indigent for the sake of **vain glory**, the exercise of that act is culpable; therefore then the omission is laudable, and thus it is laudable **not to give** alms to the indigent.

His **third reason** is: Either, having sufficient knowledge concerning good and evil morally to be chosen or refused, the will for the present state with general influence alone is **indifferent** to both, and the proposal is had; or not, and this is against scripture: "Before man is life and death, good and evil," to whichever he shall will he shall stretch forth his hand, Ecclesiasticus 15.

Item, if it be not indifferent to both, but determined to one, either it is determined to the **evil act**, and this is near to the error of **Manichaeus**, or it is determined to the **good act**, and then near to the error of **Jovinian**.

From which further this venerable doctor says, since concerning the nature of man for the present state there were the aforesaid two opposite errors—for **Manichaeus** posited that human nature could not do good, but **Jovinian** that it could not do evil—these both errors cannot be avoided except by positing a medium, namely that human nature from its naturals can do **good** and **evil**, and this mode the church holds and the **Holy Doctor** in the *Second* and in *Disputed Questions*.

To this reason I say first that, if I concede that it is **indifferent** to choosing good and refusing evil, he does not from this precisely have the proposal, because it can sometimes choose good, and yet not **well**, and such choice will not be morally good.

But, if he understands concerning indifference to an act **morally good** by which namely good is chosen **well** and to evil by which it is not chosen well, I say that for the present state it is not indifferent understanding thus that it can without the **special aid of God** have a good act.

And when first the opposite is proved through scripture, it is evident from the things said above that it is not to the proposal, since that authority is concerning man for the state of his **first condition** and before the fall, not for this state.

To the second proof I say that under the given understanding it is determined to the **evil act**, namely that, if without the special aid of God it shall elicit an act, surely it will elicit an evil one. And when it is said that this is near to the error of **Manichaeus**, here I say that, saving his reverence, this in nothing participates in the error of Manichaeus, nay rather differs most widely. For **Manichaeus** wished that for its every state, after human nature was created, it was always determined to evil, so that it could not avoid sin. And this indeed was in it not from vice contracted from some fault voluntarily committed, but from nature itself and a certain **substance of evil**, from which he said human nature was essentially composed. Nor did he say we contract ignorance and difficulty of good from **original sin**, since they deny that, as is evident through **Augustine** in Book 1 of the *Retractations* chapter 9.

But I say that human nature was created good and without vice and such that it could sin and could not sin, and by the sin of the **first man**, in whom according to apostolic doctrine all we sinned, we are born with **vices**, on account of which, unless we are helped by the grace of God, we cannot act virtuously. To

say this is not to err with **Manichaeus**, but is to consent faithfully and catholically to the ecclesiastical council alleged above and to the destroyer of Manichaeans and all heretics **Augustine**.

But that he says further that by that middle way of his one must walk between the errors of **Manichaeus** and **Jovinian**, I do not approve. For that way seems to have been of **Pelagius**. But another is, by which the church and **Augustine** teaches to walk, namely that we confess man can sin, against **Jovinian**, and man's nature was created not evil nor commixed from the substance of evil, from which he is necessarily drawn to sin, against **Manichaeus**, but nevertheless by the voluntarily committed sin of the **first parents**, when previously it was good and without vice, vitiated and such propagated into others and cannot act virtuously unless helped by Him, to whom daily we say: "Help us, O God, our Savior"; and this is against **Pelagius**. This is the mode which the church holds, and far be it that I ascribe the opposite to the church or to **Saint Thomas**. But let the reverend master himself see what he says Saint Thomas taught.

Addition 56: His **fourth reason** is: If man for the present state standing under general influence alone, having sufficient knowledge what morally is to be done concerning him, could not conformably will or act, it would follow that **Christ** had said in vain: "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," Matthew 7. For in this precept, which is of the natural law, all moral precepts of the law are comprised.

Here I say first that, if this reason be efficacious, similarly it will be concluded that man in the state of corrupt nature can with the general influence of God alone **fulfill all moral commandments** of the law at least as to the substance of the work. The opposite of which, as I said above, **Saint Thomas** determines from intention *First of the Second* question 109 article 4; which suffices for me against him. The consequence is evident: Both because God commanded every such thing to man, and according to his argumentation He would have commanded in vain if man could not fulfill it; and because the **Apostle** says: "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the law."

Secondly, I deny the consequence. And to the proof I say that it is not vain, although we cannot fulfill it of ourselves; nay rather it is useful, that we attempting and failing may learn to recognize our **impotence** and seek the aid of the physician and helper God. Whence **Augustine** in *On Nature and Grace* chapter 50 says: "God commands some things which we cannot do, that we may know what we ought to ask of Him. For it is faith itself which by prayer obtains what the law commands." And in *On Rebuke and Grace* chapter 43: "Who will say," he says, "that God does not command to those who He knows will not do what He commands? But He commands for this, that we may be humbled in our infirmity and ask: 'Give what Thou commandest,' or if anyone has already received, he may give thanks to the Lord, not to himself, for his own peace, lest he be exalted. For who will say that those things are not commanded to us, that we do not 'receive the grace of God in vain,' or that we be not 'found reprobate'? And whatever things of this kind are commanded, they show that there is place for **rebuke**, which even concerning the predestined is done usefully, that 'peradventure God may give them repentance etc.'" The Ordinary Text follows.

Let these things suffice for now as to the sayings of this master.

To the authority adduced, arguing to the first part of the question, it must be said that the **first man** ought not be understood left in the hand of his own counsel or the power of his will, as if he had been left in his

natural powers alone and could have fulfilled the commandments by them alone, but it must be understood that he was left with free will such as he had, namely informed by **superadded grace**, so that through his free will thus endowed by the grace of God, with the general influence of God standing, without **another special aid** he could complete the commandments of God. And this is clearly evident through the authority of **Augustine** in *On Rebuke and Grace* 47, alleged in the first reason for conclusion 2 of the first article, in which it is to be noted that he says: "Therefore God did not wish him to be without His **grace** which He left in his free will, because free will suffices for evil etc.

DISTINCTION 30-33

QUESTION 1

WHETHER original sin is **punishment** or **fault**.

Concerning distinction 30 and three others following, in which the **Master** treats of original sin, I ask first: whether original sin is **punishment** or **fault** [guilt].

And I argue **first** that it is not fault, because every fault is **voluntary**. Original sin is not voluntary, but **natural**; therefore etc. The major is evident, because nothing is blameworthy or worthy of punishment, unless it be voluntary. For no one reproaches a blind man by nature, as the **Philosopher** says in Book 3 of the *Ethics*. But every fault is blameworthy and merits punishment. The minor is evident; for original sin is contracted before every use of free will and act of will, namely when first the soul is joined to the body.

Secondly, I prove that original sin is not punishment, because either it would be punishment inflicted for the sin or fault of the one born, and this not, because in him no fault preceded; or for the fault of the first parent or of other following progenitors, which also cannot be said, since for the fault of one man punishment is not inflicted on another, the Lord saying in Ezekiel 18: "The soul that sinneth, the same shall die: the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, and the father shall not bear the iniquity of the son: the justice of the just shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."

To the **opposite** I argue from the word of the **Master** in distinction 32 saying that before baptism **concupiscence** is punishment and fault, and that surely according to him is original sin.

Secondly, I prove the same by **Augustine** *Against Julian* book 5 chapter 5 saying that "just as blindness of heart, which God the illuminator alone removes, is both **sin**, by which God is not believed in, and **punishment of sin**, by which the proud heart is punished with worthy retribution, and **cause of sin**, when something of evil is committed by the error of a blind heart, so **concupiscence of the flesh**, against which the good spirit lusts, is both **sin**, because disobedience against the dominion of the mind is in it, and **punishment of sin**, because it was rendered to the merits of a disobedient mind, and **cause of sin** by the defection of the consenting or the contagion of the one born." And all these things are to be understood to belong to it before baptism, although some things are in it even afterwards. But it according to Augustine is original sin, therefore etc.

This question supposes that men contract **original sin**, then asks whether it is fault or punishment.

Concerning the supposition it is not to be doubted, **Augustine** saying in *On the Faith to Peter* chapter 26: "Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that every man, who is conceived by the intercourse of man and woman, is born with **original sin** subject to impiety, subject to death and on account of this by nature a **child of wrath**, of which the Apostle says: 'For we were also by nature children of wrath.'"

Item the **Apostle** in Romans 5: "By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned"; which words can only be truly understood of **original sin**.

Of this also is the determination of the **Council of Milevum** alleged above, in whose third chapter it is written thus: "Whoever denies that **little children** fresh from the wombs of mothers are to be baptized, or says that they are indeed baptized unto the remission of sins, but that they draw nothing of **original sin** from Adam which is expiated by the laver of regeneration, whence it follows that in them the form of baptism 'unto the remission of sins' is understood not true but false, let him be **anathema**. For that which the Apostle says is not to be understood otherwise: 'By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned,' except as the Catholic Church diffused everywhere has always understood. For on account of this rule of faith even little children, who could not yet commit any sins of themselves, are therefore truly baptized unto the **remission of sins**, so that in them by regeneration may be cleansed what they drew by generation."

This therefore being supposed for certain, we must descend to the proposed question, and there will be **four articles**: In the first it will be seen concerning what is asked. Secondly it will be inquired what is called original sin. Thirdly, whether in one man there is one original sin only or many. Fourthly, whether it is taken away in baptism.

ARTICLE 1

(On the Question, Three Conclusions)

As to the first I posit three conclusions: The **first** is that original sin is **fault** [guilt]. The **second**, that it is the **punishment of fault**. The **third**, that it is also the **cause of fault**.

(First Conclusion Proved)

The first conclusion is posited by the **Master** in distinction 30, and is proved by many authorities of the saints. And besides them another of **Augustine** can be adduced who in *Hypognosticon* response 2 says: "The sin of Adam harmed not only himself, but every human genus, since we receive his condemnation at the same time as his **fault**."

It is proved also by reason thus: **Just punishment** is attributed to man for original sin; therefore original sin is **fault**. The consequence is evident, because punishment is owed only to fault. And therefore **Augustine** says in Book 3 of *On Free Will* chapter 18: "Every punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of sin and is named supplication"; and there he posits sin properly for fault. The antecedent is proved by the **Apostle** in the words alleged above: "By one man," he says, "sin entered into the world, and by sin death"; and he speaks of original sin. Where it is evident that death is the **punishment** of original sin.

Item **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon* response 5: "Tell me," he says, "if the little child born attracted no sin carnally, why is he bound by the lot of death brief of days? Because where sin is not, surely death ought not to be. For it is said: 'By sin death.' And by this according to your error God is unjust, that He suffers a little child to die not having sin, by which he can be deprived of life." And below: "This is our faith. We confess unhesitatingly that sin in little children and by sin death passed through; to whom while it happens to die, on account of **sin**, which passed into them not by action but by uterine conception, they die. For they would not die, unless they were killed by the filth of sin." Here it is manifestly evident that on account of sin, which the little child has "not by action but by conception," which indeed we call original, he receives the **punishment of death**.

Item the same is proved by that of Job 13: "Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries"; and it follows: "And dost Thou think it meet to open Thy eyes upon such an one, and to bring him into judgment with Thee?" And according to **Augustine** where above he renders the cause why he is brought into judgment, when he says: "Who," he says, "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed?" Where he manifestly implies that on account of the **uncleanness** of original sin the little child is led to judgment. And therefore **Augustine**, these words being expounded to the aforesaid intention, concludes thus in the same place: "Therefore on account of this sole **filth of sin**, which he drew not from the good of marriage but from the evil of lust, the little child of brief life is full of wrath. He falls also as a flower and flees as a shadow, nor remains, and shall come into judgment before the Lord to be judged, whom unless the grace of baptism through Christ succor, he shall perish from the Christian people." From these things it is evident that the little child incurs both present evils and the **judgment of damnation** on account of original sin, unless it be remitted through baptism.

Item in Book 2 of *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* chapter 38 he says that "the vice of origin makes the offspring **guilty**, even if in the parent the guilt of the same vice is washed away by the remission of sins." But it is certain that **fault** alone makes a man guilty; therefore the vice of origin is **fault**.

This conclusion is also proved by **Anselm** in *On the Virgin Conception* chapter 26 saying: "When an infant is condemned for original sin, he is not condemned for the sin of Adam but for **his own**. For, if he did not have his own sin, he would not be condemned." But it is certain that no one is condemned except on account of fault. Therefore since the infant is condemned on account of his own proper sin, which is nothing but original, surely he is condemned on account of **proper fault**. From which it follows that original sin is the **fault of nature**.

Augustine posits a similar opinion in the epistle *To Marcellinus* responding to a certain argument of **Pelagius** saying: "'By no reason,' they say, 'is it conceded that God, who remits proper sins, imputes alien ones.'" And Augustine responds: "He remits, but to those regenerated by the Spirit, not to those generated by the flesh. But He imputes not now alien, but **proper**; they were indeed alien, when those who should bear them propagated were not yet. But now by carnal generation they are already **theirs**, to whom they have not yet been dismissed by spiritual regeneration." Since therefore it is imputed to no one except fault, these **proper sins** of those born are surely their **faults**.

(Opinion of the Hibernian)

From these things it is evident that the mode of speaking of a certain **modern doctor**, which nevertheless he himself does not assert but posits only probably, cannot be sustained. For he says that sin and fault can be taken in two ways: "In one way properly for **commission** or **omission** to which some punishment of sense is to be recompensed, namely for a blameworthy act" merely voluntary or a blameworthy voluntary omission. "In another way commonly for the **effect of sin**, just as for ignorance or difficulty which are punishments, and universally for whatever punishment following sin whether positive or privative."

"In the first way original sin is not **fault** nor sin, because it is not committed by one knowing nor by free will. But in the second way it is **fault**. Whence it is fault such that for it some punishment is not retributed by way of recompense, but **privation of justice** and following **damnation** in infants not baptized and ignorance and difficulty in other men are in them as **effects** of the first sin of Adam, not as any things recompensed for original sins. Whence," he says, "men err thinking that those punishments, which we suffer, are in us for redeeming our original sin. For they are not in us for that reason, but are in us as **natural effects** of corrupt nature, which follow naturally from the fault of the first parent."

He confirms this by **Augustine** in Book 3 of *On Free Will* chapter 20, where he asks, "why we are born with ignorance and difficulties and torments of the body on account of the sin of Adam and Eve; and he answers that 'from the **punishment** of him condemned we are born both mortal and ignorant and subject to the flesh.'" And he adds in another chapter that "'that he should beget better than he himself was, was not of equity etc.'" From which he shows that such things in us are not sins but **punishments** of the sin of Adam as effects naturally following his punishment.

He confirms also, because in the same place chapter 21 "he says that, if human souls are made individually in each one of men, 'ignorance and difficulty will not be for the souls born a punishment of sin, but an admonition of profiting and a beginning of perfection.'"

(Against the Hibernian)

This mode of speaking, although it be true as to this that he says original sin is not fault in the **first way**, as he expounds, namely accepting fault for voluntary commission or omission, since thus there is no fault except actual sin, nevertheless in that he says original sin is precisely the **effect** or **punishment** following the sin of the first parent and is not **fault**, to which punishment is retributed recompensatively, does not contain the truth, as the things adduced above sufficiently prove.

Furthermore **Augustine** *Upon Psalm 50*, as the **Master** alleges in distinction 30, says that "no one is born except drawing punishment and the **merit of punishment**." But it is certain that the merit of punishment is surely **fault**, to which punishment is owed. And from this the Master concludes in the same place that original sin is **fault**.

Augustine says a similar thing in Book 3 *Against Julian* chapter 6, where he says that "the evils, which infants suffer in this transitory life, would not be inflicted under a just and omnipotent God, if no **evil merits** were drawn from parents." And below chapter 7 he says that "the human race from the beginning, in which it deserted God, draws the **guilt** of a condemned origin most worthy of all these punishments, except where the inscrutable wisdom of the Creator spares by reason of hidden disposition." From which also the proposal is evident. For what is **guilt** most worthy of punishments, except **fault** to which

punishments are justly owed? Nor is the intention of **Augustine** against this, where he is alleged by that doctor, since even original sin, which the little child contracts, is surely the **punishment** of the sin of Adam, as is evident through Augustine in Book 5 *Against Julian*, and was touched in some way in the authority alleged to the opposite of the question, and therefore the punishments, which follow original fault, consequently are also punishments of the sin of Adam. Wherefore it is not concluded from this that original sin properly accepted is not **fault** to which punishment is owed.

To the other it must be said, just as he himself declares in Book 1 of the *Retractations* chapter 9 at the end, that those words were said against the **Manichaeans** who deny **original sin**, which being denied the aforesaid things would not be the punishment of sin, and yet neither thus would God be to be blamed but praised. And this he intends to conclude there.

But to his reason which he implies it must be said that it does not follow that original sin is not **fault**, although it is not fault such as he describes, namely actual commission or omission. For there is also a certain **habitual fault** or quasi-habitual vice, namely inclining to actual fault, and such is original sin. Which by a double reason can be called **fault**: One is, because it is **inclinative to fault**, and **Augustine** touches this in the authority alleged to the opposite of the question, when he says that "concupiscence is sin, because disobedience against the dominion of the mind is in it." For it is the principle of desires opposing spiritual desires. Another reason is, because it is a **stain** and vice dishonoring nature; whence, just as actual fault of commission deforms the mind so that on account of it punishment is justly owed to the deformed soul, so also vice of this kind dishonors and pollutes the mind on account of which it justly merits punishment and thus that is truly called **fault**. And **Augustine** briefly implies this reason in Book 2 *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin* chapter 39, where he says that "God damns man on account of the **vice** by which nature is dishonored, not on account of nature which is not taken away by vice."

If you say that by the same reason other **vicious habits**, which are acquired in men from depraved acts, would be faults, it can be responded probably that even those are surely faults, before their guilt is dismissed through penitence, just as original vice is also fault before its guilt is taken away through baptism, as will be evident from the following. For as well through penitence as through baptism the soul is absolved from guilt and decorated with **grace**, through which also against vicious inclination, God helping, it is made strong, so that vice does not dominate in it. And therefore neither that after baptism nor these after penitence are **faults**. Nevertheless let these things be said saving more diligent deliberation.

(Second Conclusion Proved)

The **second conclusion**, namely that original sin is the **punishment of fault**, namely of the actual fault of the first parent, is expressly evident through that of the **Apostle** in Romans 5: "By the disobedience of one," "namely Adam," "many were made sinners," "that is all his own," as the **Gloss** says. But this cannot be understood except of original sin, since not all descending from Adam are sinners by another sin than original, because not little children. Therefore his disobedience was the **merit of original sin** in his own and that is the **punishment** of his disobedience.

Augustine also wishes this in Book 2 *On the Merit of Sins and Remission* to Marcellinus, where he says that sin dwelling in our members is so sin that it is the **punishment of sin**. He also wishes the same in Book 5 *Against Julian*. The **Master** also says the same in distinction 32.

(Third Conclusion Proved)

The **third conclusion**, namely that original sin is the **cause of fault**, is proved by the authority of **Augustine** in *Hypognosticon* response 2 saying: "From the sinner Adam, his begetter, Cain the first attracted sin in the womb of his mother, and the third man was born a sinner from her womb. The internal mind was already captivated by the devil by the first sin, thence he was imbued into zeal, thence he had envy and malice, thence not by imitation of morals, but precipitated by will he committed homicide."

Hence it is held that from the **first sin** originally drawn from the womb both zeal and envy and finally homicide proceeded, and that word "thence" indicates this well, which is surely a note of causality.

Item below in response 5 he says that the adultery and homicide of **David** proceeded from original sin. Whence when weeping for those things David said: "Behold I was conceived in iniquities," **Augustine** expounding says in the person of David: "Therefore I took the vice of sin sown and conceived from parents, through which I committed adultery and homicide, my **proper sins**."

To the same is a **Gloss** very express expounding that "I am a carnal man sold under sin"; Gloss: "that is subjected to sin, that is to concupiscence, by the price of the evil will of Adam. For by the name of sin he calls this whence all sins arise, that is from carnal concupiscence. For whatever of sins is in sayings, in deeds, in thoughts, does not arise except from **evil concupiscence** which was made by sin, and if by consenting it has drawn and enticed, it conceives and brings forth sin. Therefore from sin is sin, unless it be curbed, generated." This the Gloss.

The authority of the **Apostle** in the same place confirms this saying: "Sin taking occasion"; Gloss: "that is the fuel [fomes] of sin, namely the **vice of concupiscence**"—which is also called carnality, and this according to Augustine is original sin—"by the commandment wrought in me all concupiscence," Gloss: "that is **every sin**."

ARTICLE 2

What is Called Original Sin

Concerning the second article, namely, what that thing is which is called **original sin**, there is a diversity of opinions.

For the venerable **Anselm**, in *De Conceptu Virginali*, maintains that **original sin** is nothing other than the **lack of original justice** along with the obligation to possess it; many doctors, both ancient and modern, follow him.

Blessed **Augustine**, however, in various books—wherever he speaks of this matter—understands by **original sin carnal concupiscence** itself, or the *fomes* (tinder), or the vice of concupiscibility, through which man is inclined toward **actual concupiscence**. Hence, in Book 1 of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* addressed to Valerius, he says that "concupiscence is forgiven in baptism, not so that it does not exist, but so that it is **not imputed as sin**," and later he says that the "**vice of the first birth** was original sin"; where the proposition is expressly clear.

Likewise, in Book 6, Chapter 28 of *Contra Julianum*, he says: "I say that a **vice** is inborn in man from a corrupted origin, like a bad state of health, by which **the flesh lusts against the spirit**." Shortly after, he adds concerning the same: "From this evil of man, and with this evil, man is born—an evil which in itself is so great and holds such an obligation to man's damnation and separation from the kingdom of God that, even if he be drawn from regenerated parents, it is not loosed except as it was in them by **regeneration alone**, and by this one remedy the **master of death** is driven from the offspring." From this also, the proposition is most clearly evident.

Likewise, in Book 1 of the *Retractationum*, Chapter 15: "The **guilt of concupiscence** is loosed in baptism, but the **infirmity remains**." Now, it is certain that one is guilty only through sin; therefore, before baptism, concupiscence is sin. And for this reason, the **Gloss** on Romans 4, regarding the text "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven," says that "**concupiscence** or concupiscibility, which is called the *fomes* of sin, is **fault and punishment** before baptism, but after baptism it is **punishment and not fault**." And in the same place, it is also expressly stated that "**concupiscence is original sin**." Thus, it is not to be doubted that it was the intention of **Augustine** (with whom the glosses on the Epistle to the Romans in several chapters also agree) that the **vice drawn from one's origin** is that which is called original sin.

The **Master** [Peter Lombard] followed this opinion, as is clear in this distinction and the following ones where he treats this matter, and many doctors, both ancient and modern, follow him as well.

And I—although at times, where this matter was not directly discussed, I may have said certain things by assuming the opposite opinion (which is also common enough)—nevertheless follow this same judgment, both because of the **authority of Augustine** and because it seems more in harmony with the words of the **Apostle**. For when he said in Romans 5: "**Through one man sin entered into the world**"—words which clearly refer to original sin, both through the expositions of the saints and the determination of the Council recited above—and then added many other things about the same, he says in Chapter 6: "For we who are **dead to sin**"—the Gloss says: "in baptism"—"how shall we live in it? Or do you not know, brethren, that all we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized into his death?" And it follows: "So do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God, in Christ Jesus our Lord. Let not **sin therefore reign** in your mortal body, so as to obey its concupiscences."

From the series of these words, it is implied that when he concludes "Let not sin therefore reign," he is speaking of **original sin**, just as it is certain he had been speaking in the preceding words. And when he adds "so as to obey its concupiscences," he manifestly signifies that he denotes that **vice**, which inclines man toward concupiscence, by the name of "**sin**." From this, as it seems, it appears sufficiently clear that the Apostle understands **concupiscence itself** to be original sin—not indeed understanding the **act** of lusting by concupiscence, but the **vice** which is also called **carnality**, and **languor**, and the **fomes**, and the **law of the members**, which "makes the infant **apt for concupiscence**, but renders the adult **lusting**," as **Ambrose** says, and is placed in the Gloss on Romans mentioned above and recited by the Master in the text of Distinction 30.

Yet I do not deny that man also lacks **original justice**, to which he is a debtor, before baptism. But I do not say that a lack of this kind is original sin, but rather the **effect of original sin**; just as the privation of grace is the effect of **actual mortal sin**—that is, because of mortal sin man is deprived of grace—so because of original sin, God does not infuse **original justice** into the soul.

Doubt

But now a doubt remains: namely, what kind of thing is this concupiscence or *fomes*? Is it a **substance**—either of the flesh or the soul—or is it some **accident**? And if it is an accident, is it an accident existing in the flesh, or existing in the soul? Also, whatever it may be, it is doubted by what it is caused.

Solution of the Doubt

To the solution of this, according to the doctrine of **Augustine**, it seems first must be said that this concupiscence or *fomes* is **not a substance** of the body or the soul, but is a certain **quality**.

This is clear, first, through the same author in Book 1 of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, where, speaking of this concupiscence, he says: "For it does not remain **substantially** like some body or spirit, but it is a certain **affection of an evil quality**, like a languor." Likewise, in Book 6 of *Contra Julianum*, he says the same several times, utterly denying it to be a substance.

It is also proved by **reason**: because if it were a substance, it would be either the body, or the soul, or the man himself composed of both. None of these can be granted: first because, since the body of the first man, when it was first formed, was of the same nature and species as the body of any other man—and similarly his soul with the soul of another, and the man himself with other men—it would follow that he, just like us, would have had **original sin**, which is erroneous; and similarly the same would follow concerning the man **Christ**, which is also erroneous. Secondly, because since any of the aforementioned has God as its author, such a sin in us would be from **God**; which is not to be said.

Secondly, it must be said, according to the same author, that it is a **quality existing in the soul**. Hence, in the same *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 28: "Certain philosophers," he says, "said that lust is a **vicious part of the mind**, and certainly a part of the mind is a substance, because the mind itself is a substance. But I call the **vice itself**, by which the mind or any part of it is vicious in this way, **lust**, so that when every vice is healed, the whole substance remains safe. Because those philosophers, by a tropical [metaphorical] expression, seem to me to have called the vicious part of the mind 'lust,' in which part there is the vice called lust, just as a house is called for those who are in the house."

Likewise, in Book 5 against the same, Chapter 11, he says that "the whole man fulfilled the **first sin**," and immediately adds: "Therefore, so that both the soul and the flesh may be punished equally—unless that which is born is cleansed by being born again—surely either both are drawn **vitiating from man**, or one is **corrupted in the other** as if in a vitiated vessel, where it is included by the hidden judgment of the divine law." Here he asserts the **soul is vitiated**, and it is certain that he speaks of the original vice from which it

is cleansed through baptism, although he leaves it under doubt whether it is vitiated by the body or whether it is transmitted vitiated from the vitiated soul of the father.

By **reason** also this same thing is proved, because the **soul alone** is the subject of fault; since therefore original sin is a **fault**, as has been proved, it follows that it is in the soul as in a subject. The Master also holds this in Distinction 31.

Thirdly, it must be said that such a vice is caused in the soul from a **vice of the flesh** or from a certain **morbid quality**, which the flesh of the offspring contracts while it is conceived from the **libidinous concupiscence** of the parents coming together; and the Master expressly posits this in Distinction 31. It is also proved by the authority of **Ambrose**, which he alleges and is also placed in the Gloss on Romans 7: "Behold," he says, "the body of the first man was **corrupted through sin**, and that corruption remains in the body through the condition of the offense, holding the strength of the divine sentence given in Adam, by whose fellowship the **soul is defiled by sin**." Likewise, he alleges **Augustine** in *De Verbis Apostoli* saying: "The vice of concupiscence is what the soul **contracted from the flesh**."

By **reason** also it is proved, because either such a quality is **co-created** in the soul by God, or it is **acquired** by it from its own acts, or it is **caused** in it from the flesh to which it is joined. The first cannot be said, because God does not create a **vicious soul**; nor the second, because no act is in the soul before that vice or original sin is in it. Therefore, the third remains, since it does not appear what else could reasonably be assigned as the cause of that quality.

First Series of Objections

Against these things, it can be argued: and first, it is argued that concupiscence of this kind or the *fomes* is **not some quality caused in the soul**. First, through the authority of the **Apostle** in Romans 7, where he says this concupiscence is **in the members**: "I see," he says, "another law in my members, etc." And a little later: "I know," he says, "that in me—that is, in my **flesh**—good does not dwell"; which was said because of the word he had sent before: "But sin that dwells in me." Since therefore, explaining how it dwells in him, he says "that is, in my flesh," it is manifestly clear that he does not posit it to be in the soul.

Secondly, a plurality of things is not to be posited without necessity. But there is no necessity for positing it [this quality], because every effect which we experience in ourselves, we can save [explain] without it. For we see a **proneness and inclination** toward carnal desires even in **beasts**, in whom nevertheless we do not say there is a *fomes*, or a quality informing the soul, from which they are inclined. Likewise, we can explain the **rebellion of the appetites** without it. For it is natural for the **sensitive appetite** to be carried toward what is sensually delightful, but for the **rational appetite** not to be, but rather it has to delight in the honest good and according to reason. And therefore, without any superadded quality, appetite would rebel against appetite. Moreover, we experience nothing else for which such a quality must be posited; therefore, etc.

This is **confirmed** because none of the **philosophers** posited that man was born with any such vicious quality that would inform the soul. Rather, they said that vices and virtues are generated in men from **works and habituation**, and yet whatever we experience, they themselves also experienced.

Thirdly, given only the **absence of original justice** and grace without any other vicious quality informing the soul, man would be driven into evil desires, as is clear through **Anselm** in *De Conceptu Virginali*, Chapter 5, where he gives the example of an **untamed wild beast** which rages when its chains are broken, and a **ship** which is tossed into every danger when the rudder is let go. Therefore, the necessity of positing such a quality does not appear because of this.

Fourthly, one **doctor** argues because no form existing immediately in the soul can be naturally increased or diminished without a **vital act of the soul**; but the *fomes* is increased and diminished by **bodily nourishments** and certain medicines, by which one becomes more prone to carnal concupiscences, even without a vital act of the soul, as experience teaches; therefore, etc.

Fifthly, the same argues thus: According to the **Philosopher** [Aristotle] in Book 2 of the *Ethics*, all things that are in the soul are **passions, powers, or habits**. But the *fomes* is not a **power**, because then it would have been in the state of innocence. Nor is it an **act or passion**, because then when the act ceased, the *fomes* would also cease. Nor is it a **habit**: because it is not **infused**, since God does not infuse a vicious habit; nor is it an **acquired habit**, because that presupposes the acts from which it is acquired, but the *fomes* is in man before any act of his own.

Sixthly, the **bad disposition of the flesh alone**, without a quality received in the soul, can render a man prone to evil and inept for good, as was said concerning foods provoking lust, through which man would certainly become more prone to concupiscences and more inept for continence. Likewise, it appears in an **example**: for if a soul were united to a flesh previously wounded, it would soon feel pain according to the requirement of the wound, although previously there had been no pain. Another example is of a soul united to a body **disposed in such a way** as it is disposed in phrenetics and the mad; although no phrensy or madness had been in the soul, it would immediately rave and be prone to phrenetic acts.

Second Series of Objections

Secondly, it can be argued against the other point, namely, that such a quality is caused in the soul **from the flesh**:

First, because the **body cannot act upon the spirit** unless the sense co-operates, or at least it cannot cause a spiritual form other than an act of knowing or desiring. Such, however, is not the *fomes*.

Second, because if it were caused by a form existing in the flesh, it would also increase as that increased and diminish as it diminished, and thus the *fomes* could be **totally removed** in man naturally, or even through the art of medicine; which is not to be said.

Third, either such a **quality of the flesh** infecting the soul was in the **first man** before sin—and this is not to be said, because then it would follow that his soul was infected before sin, which is false. Or it was

in him **only after sin**, and then it must be asked what was its cause. For not God, since He does not immediately cause vice in the soul nor anything necessarily and naturally causative of vice. Nor the **evil will of the man sinning**, which would seem more likely, because by the same reasoning any other man by his own evil act of will could infect his own flesh by causing some similar quality; which does not seem to be said.

Fourth, either such a quality is caused in the **flesh of the offspring** from a similar quality existing in the flesh of the mother; or from a quality existing in the **seed** of one or both parents. The first cannot be said, because it would follow that a child conceived by a **miracle** without the union of male and female would contract original sin; the opposite of which all the saints seem to say. Nor the second, because even granted that some such quality were in the seed, it is nevertheless changed by so many **transmutations** before the body of the offspring is formed that no such quality seems able to remain in the body of the offspring.

To the Objections of the First Series

To the **first**, it must be said according to **Augustine** in Book 1 of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* that the Apostle "called **flesh**" that nature of the soul "where there is a certain **morbid affection of the flesh**, not the conformation of the body itself." And in Book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 20, he says that "the soul's desires are called **of the flesh** for this reason: because the soul lusts according to the flesh when it lusts in such a way that the **Spirit**—that is, its better and superior part—ought to resist it."

To the **second**, it must be said that the minor premise is false. And what is said concerning the **proneness of beasts** is not valid, because in a similar way it could be said that **vicious habits** are not acquired in the soul, by which man becomes prone to vicious acts; which according to everyone is false. And the assumption is clear, because we see even some beasts are prone to luxury, some to anger, some to deception and craftiness, and some to gluttony, and so on for other acts similar to these, toward which **habitually vicious men** are inclined. And yet, in beasts, such habits are not posited in the soul. It must be said, therefore, that just as such pronenesses are in other animals **by nature**, but in men through **vices depraving nature**, so also such carnal proneness inborn in man does not belong to him by nature but **by vice**; so that even in regard to this, it is understood that "man is compared to beasts and made like to them" not by nature, but **by vice**. This is expressly confirmed by **Augustine** in Book 2 of *De Gratia Christi et Peccato Originali*, the penultimate chapter, where he says: "If man, being in honor and not understanding, is compared to the beasts and becomes like them, yet he does not become so to the point that he is a beast. For he is compared **through vice, not through nature**—not the vice of a beast, but of nature. For man is of such great excellence in comparison to a beast that the **vice of man is the nature of a beast**."

To what is added concerning the **rebellion of the appetites**, it must be said that without a superadded quality there would not be rebellion such as we experience—namely, with **proneness** toward what is delightful according to the sense and **difficulty** toward the opposite.

To the **confirmation**, it must be said that the **philosophers** certainly experienced this proneness and confessed it was inborn in us, as **Augustine** proves in the fourth book of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 36, from the sayings of **Plato** and also **Tully** [Cicero] in *De Republica*, where in Book 3 he says that man is "brought forth with a mind prone to lusts"; but, as Augustine adds, this Tully "**saw the thing, but knew not the cause.**" For it was hidden from him why there was a "heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam," because not being instructed in the **sacred scriptures**, he was ignorant of **original sin**. And below in Chapter 47, the same is said of all philosophers generally: "What," he says, "had they learned and what had they spoken concerning the **first man Adam** and his wife, concerning their first prevarication, etc.?" And it follows: "Being devoid of these writings and of this truth, what could they know of this matter?" Hence I say that because they did not know that any man had ever been without such carnal lust and proneness, they did not recognize that such a proneness was in the minds of men from some **vicious accident**.

To the **third**, it must be said that although a man lacking grace and original justice without another vicious quality would fall into evil desires, it is nevertheless probable that **not all** would be so universally and determinately inclined to the passions of concupiscence from their origin unless some **special vice** were inborn in each one, inciting toward such desires. Furthermore, that such a vice is inborn beyond the lack of original justice is sufficiently indicated by that **parable of the wounded man** [the Good Samaritan], who was not only "stripped of gratuitous gifts" but also "**wounded in his natural gifts** by the blows inflicted"; which does not seem able to be well understood unless we take the "blow" to be a **vice infecting nature**.

To the **fourth**, whatever may be the case regarding the major premise, the minor can be denied. And as for what is said about man becoming more prone from certain medicines and foods, it must be said that this is not because the *fomes* is **immediately intensified** by them, but because other **corporeal qualities** are caused or intensified by them, with which—also aiding—the soul is drawn toward similar passions; just as through an increase of bile or choler, an angry man is more easily and vehemently incited to anger, and yet the **habit of anger** is not immediately increased through such corporeal qualities or their extrinsic causes without a vital act of the soul. And from this the defect of the argument is also clear, because in a similar way it would be proved that there is no habit of anger or luxury or sloth or any other habit inclining toward passions in the soul—passions toward which we experience ourselves to be more disposed through corporeal nourishments; which nevertheless is false according to everyone.

To the **fifth**, it must be said that it is a **habit not infused by God**, nor acquired from the works of the soul in which it exists, but **generated from the foul quality of the flesh**; and the **Philosopher** did not know such a habit. Therefore, his authority in this part is not to be weighed heavily, as was also touched upon regarding other things above. And **Augustine** speaks beautifully of this in Book 4 of *Contra Julianum*.

To the **sixth**, it must be said that whatever may be the case concerning other evil pronenesses of man, and whatever also would be possible through the power of God concerning this one, in fact such a proneness is **not from the bad disposition of the flesh alone**, nor from any disposition of the flesh possible to arise naturally from foods or other altering things, by which the dispositions and complexions of bodies are commonly varied in men. And an evident proof of this is that this proneness stands with **any corporeal dispositions whatsoever** and however diverse or contrary. Hence, everyone naturally conceived is born

with such a proneness, and it is consumed in no one—as long as he lives in a mortal body—except through a **gratuitous and singular benefit of God**, if indeed it be consumed in anyone.

To the Objections of the Second Series

To the other arguments, by which it is argued that such a quality is not caused in the soul from the flesh:

To the **first**, when it is said that "the body cannot act upon the spirit without the sense co-operating," it must be said that this is **false** if understood simply of any action whatsoever, although it may be difficult—and perhaps impossible—to provide a specific instance in every case. Nevertheless, this is not to be denied, since both the saints assert it and the opposite cannot be sufficiently proved.

To the **second**, without making a rash assertion, I say that the quality of the flesh from which the *fomes* is caused in the soul is **neither increased nor diminished essentially** in man. For, just as it is not generable from any corporeal qualities except those caused in the seed by the fervor of coitus and ardent lust, so it is not increased by others nor diminished by their contraries. Secondly, I say that whatever the case may be regarding that [corporeal quality], the *fomes* which is in the soul is **not diminished** by the action of any corporeal qualities whatsoever. Hence, **Augustine**, speaking of this in Book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 20, says: "There are some qualities of corporeal things which are tempered by their contraries, and there are other **desires of the soul**, which are called 'of the flesh' because the soul lusts according to the flesh, etc.," as was alleged above; and he follows: "Finally, these vices seek no physicians of bodies, but are cured by the **medicinal grace of Christ**, first so that they may not hold one by guilt, etc." From this, it is clearly evident that he is speaking of original vices.

To the **third**, it must be said that such a quality was **not in man before sin**, but after.

When it is asked by what it was caused, a certain doctor [Adam Wodeham] responds that it was from the **forbidden food** which they ate; for it altered and, as it were, intoxicated their flesh toward the wretched corruption which we now feel.

This response **cannot stand**; for it is expressly against **Augustine** in Book 4 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 37, who says to Julian (arguing that "if this lust was in the fruit of that tree," it would be shown to be made by God and thus defended as good): "But it is answered to you: **lust was not in the fruit of the tree**." And he adds: "Far be it from God to confer such a 'benefit' from a good tree upon those men at any time, that they should have in their members an **adversary** against which chastity would have to fight."

I respond, therefore, according to his judgment in the *Hypognosticon*, Response 4, that from the **breath of that venomous serpent** in which the devil tempted them—while God, because of their disobedience or sin, turned away from their custody or did not preserve them (whereas if they had not sinned, He would have preserved them)—their flesh was **infected by such an evil quality**. Nor is it a marvel, since even from the hissing of certain serpents, as Augustine says there, men are sometimes suddenly killed by their breath, or sometimes gravely driven toward death. And therefore, this judgment having been sufficiently declared by him, Augustine adds below: "After the sin, however, as was already disputed above, their bodies conceived this **restless and deadly pestilence** from the hissing of the venomous serpent, by whose

clever flatteries they were deceived; and through legitimate use [of marriage], after they were cast out of paradise, they **transmitted it to their posterity.**"

To the **fourth**, it must be said that it is from the quality existing in the **seed**, according to that word of Job: "Who can make a clean thing conceived from unclean seed?" Nor is the argument valid concerning the manifold transmutation of the seed, since by no natural transmutation is that quality removed, as can sufficiently appear from what was said above.

ARTICLE 3

Whether in One Man There is Only One Original Sin

Concerning the third article, namely, whether in one man there is only one original sin: although it was the opinion of great doctors, namely **Praepositinus** and **William of Auxerre**, that there are not only one but several original sins in one man, I nevertheless hold with the **Master** [Peter Lombard] in Distinction 33, who expressly says that "infants are bound by **one only** and not by several sins," and other doctors commonly follow him.

Augustine also seems to be expressly for this side in the *Enchiridion*, Chapters 48 and 51. It can also be proved by **reason**. For, as is clear from what has been said, original sin is nothing other than that **carnal concupiscence** which the child's soul contracts when it is joined to the infected flesh. But there are not several such concupiscences in the same person. Therefore, there are not several original sins.

And if it be said that "concupiscence" is a general name containing under itself several species of vices and desires, such as "the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life," it must be said that although this is so, nevertheless **not every concupiscence**, but the **concupiscence of the flesh alone**—which is also appropriately called **lust** (*libido*) by another name—is that vice which is called original sin, since that alone is common to everyone born through it. For no other vice is contracted from conception by every man. From this one, however, no one conceived concupiscentially comes immune.

This is also favored by the fact that wherever **Augustine** disputes against the Pelagians concerning original sin, he manifestly implies that it is this **carnal concupiscence** which he calls original sin.

It is also attested by the fact that in those members [the genitals] singularly, after the transgression of the first parents, an **indecent movement** appeared, through which carnal lust especially goes out into its act.

Objections

But against this it can be argued: first, because it was said in the third conclusion of the first article (through a gloss alleged there) that from the concupiscence which is original sin, **all other sins** of man

proceed. This would not be true if concupiscence were taken so determinately, because not every evil act is generated from such a vice.

Second, through the reasons of those holding that original sins are several: one is from the authority of the **Psalmist** saying in the plural: "Behold, I was conceived in **iniquities**, and in **sins** did my mother conceive me."

Another is from a certain gloss on Numbers, which says that "**there are seven fomites**," where it speaks of seven carnal vices toward which "man is **prone from his youth**."

To the Objections

To the **first**, it must be said that it is not to be understood that every sin is born **immediately** from the original vice, but either mediately or immediately. For, as was said above, because of this vice which the soul contracts, it is deprived of both **grace and original justice**; being deprived of these, it is not strong enough to resist the temptations of sins.

To the **second**, the Master responds from the saying of **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, 48, that there the Psalmist uses the **plural number for the singular**, just as it is written in Exodus: "They made to themselves gods of gold," when they made only one calf. This solution is also favored by the **Gloss on Romans 4**, which explains the text "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven" in the singular—that is, "**original sin**."

To the **third**, it must be said that **not every fomes** is original sin, just as not every *fomes* is drawn from one's origin. For I do not think that every man has every vice when he is born, nor does that gloss say the opposite.

ARTICLE 4

Whether Original Sin is Taken Away in Baptism

Concerning the fourth article, whether original sin is taken away in baptism: it is already clear in some way from certain things said in the second article that it is **taken away in one way** and **remains in another** after baptism. For it is taken away as to **guilt** (*reatus*), but it is not taken away as to **essence**; that is, that vice or quality which is called concupiscibility and is original sin before baptism remains indeed according to its essence even after baptism, but it **does not remain as to guilt**. That is, through it, man after baptism is not guilty of eternal damnation as he was before baptism.

And therefore **Augustine** says in Book 2 of *De Gratia Christi et Peccato Originali*, Chapter 38: "This carnal concupiscence would be harmful even merely by being present, unless the remission of sins were so beneficial that what is in them—both the born and the reborn—might be present and harmful to the

born, but in the reborn it might be **present indeed but not harmful**. For it is so harmful to the born that, unless they are born again, it can profit them nothing if they are born of the reborn. For the vice of origin remains in the offspring so as to **make it guilty**, even if the guilt of that same vice in the parent has been washed away by the remission of sins."

Likewise, in Book 1 of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, as was alleged above: "Concupiscence," he says, "is forgiven in baptism, **not so that it does not exist**, but so that it is **not imputed as sin**." Therefore, original concupiscence or the *fomes* is in the baptized, but it itself is **not sin in him**; and through this, speaking properly of sin (namely, as fault), the baptized person himself does not have original sin. "For this is 'not to have sin': **not to be guilty of sin**," as Augustine says in the same place.

This is also confirmed by the same author in Book 2 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 7, where he says that "in baptism the **remission of all sins** occurs, and with the baptized a kind of **civil war** of interior vices remains. For they are not such vices," he says, "as should now [after baptism] be called sins, if concupiscence does not draw the spirit toward illicit works." Before baptism, therefore, the original vice **was sin**; after baptism, however, although it exists, it is nevertheless **not sin**, taking "sin" properly (namely, for fault). And this also agrees with the gloss alleged above in the second article.

Augustine and the **Master** also say frequently that original sin in baptism "**passes away in guilt and remains in act**." Now, how "passing away in guilt" is to be understood is clear from what has been said. But how it is said to "remain in act," Augustine himself explains in Book 6 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 31, saying: "It remains in act, not indeed by drawing away and enticing the mind and—by its consent—conceiving and bringing forth sins, but by moving **evil desires** which the mind must resist. For that very movement is its **act**, even though, the mind not consenting, the effect is absent. For evil is in man even apart from that act—that is, apart from this movement from which this movement arises—which movement we call 'desire.' For there is not always desire against which we fight. But if it is not there when that which is lusted after does not occur (either to the mind of the one thinking or to the senses of the body), it can happen that the **evil quality is present**, but it is moved by no temptation; just as timidity is in a timid man even when he does not fear."

It should also be noted that even as to **essence**, such a quality does not remain entire; rather, its essence is **somewhat diminished** in baptism, as the Master proves in Distinction 32 by the authority of Augustine in Book 1 of *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*. And therefore, when I say that it is not taken away as to essence, I mean that it is **not totally taken away**, but a part of it remains, of the same kind (*unigenea*) as the whole and the part which is taken away through the grace of baptism.

The solution of this article set forth above—namely, how original sin is taken away through baptism—is drawn from that word of the **Apostle** in Romans 8: "There is therefore **now no damnation** to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh"; where the **Gloss** says: "Even if the law in their members fights against the law of the mind, nevertheless there is no damnation, because through the **grace of baptism** and the laver of regeneration, the **guilt itself** with which you were born is loosed, and whatever you previously consented to of evil concupiscence, whether in thought, word, or deed."

With these things the **Master** also agrees, as does **Hugh of Saint Victor** in *De Sacramentis*, Book 1, Part 7, Chapter 37.

To the Principal Arguments

To the argument of the question, when it is first proved that original sin is not a fault "because every fault is voluntary," it must be said according to **Augustine** in Book 1 of the *Retractationum*, Chapter 13, that this is true of that fault which is a fault in such a way that it is **not also a punishment for fault**. And he posits the same judgment in Chapter 15. Now, however, original sin is certainly also a **punishment for fault**, as was said above.

Alternatively, according to the same author in those same chapters, it can be answered that every fault is **voluntary either in itself or in its cause**. Original sin, although it is not voluntary in itself, was nevertheless **voluntary in its cause**—namely, the **actual sin of Adam**.

To the other point, by which it is proved "that it is not a punishment, because it would either be inflicted for one's own fault or for the fault of the first parent," I say it is for the **fault of the first parent**. And when it is said that a punishment is not inflicted on any man for the fault of another, it must be said that this is **false**, as **Augustine** well proves from Sacred Scripture in Book 6 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 45. As for the authority of the prophet, it must be said that, as Augustine says and beautifully proves in the same place, "that promise is to be understood as being of the **New Testament** and the spiritual inheritance belonging to the other world." Hence, he who before baptism (when he still belongs to the Old Testament) carries the iniquity of the father so that he is guilty of eternal damnation, being **regenerated in Christ** through baptism and numbered among the children of grace and of the New Testament, is made **free from that guilt**. Therefore, Augustine says: "Carnal generation, even of the people of God belonging to the Old Testament—which generates in servitude—**binds children to the sins of their parents**. Spiritual generation, however, has changed the threats and promises of punishments and rewards just as it has changed the inheritance." And a little later on the same: "In this New Testament, therefore, through the blood of the Mediator, the **paternal debt-record** (*chirographo*) having been deleted, man begins by being born again not to be liable for paternal debts, to which he had been bound by being born."

QUESTION 2 WHETHER the glorious Virgin Mother of God was conceived with original sin.

Secondly, concerning the same matter of **original sin**, because it is commonly held that it is transmitted to **all human beings** of both sexes born from the commingling of parents, and there is no doubt among the doctors concerning anyone—as to whether they are exempt from this law—except for the **glorious Virgin Mother of God**, I therefore ask: **Whether she was conceived with original sin**.

And I argue that she was **not**, first from the authority of **Augustine** in *De Natura et Gratia*, who says: "When we treat of **sins**, I wish to have **no question** concerning her." And he is speaking of the **Mother of the Lord**; now he said this for no other reason than that he firmly held there was **no sin at all** in her.

Secondly, from the authority of **Anselm** in *De Conceptu Virginali*, Chapter 18, saying: "Surely it was fitting that that **Virgin** should shine with a **purity** than which a greater cannot be understood under God." But it is certain that if she had contracted **original sin**, a greater purity under God than hers could not only be understood but could actually exist—namely, a purity from both original sin and all others.

Thirdly, if she had been conceived in **original sin**, a **feast of her conception** could not lawfully be celebrated in the Church. This is not to be said, since many churches, by long-standing custom, celebrate it with the highest veneration. The consequence is clear, since a feast is to be celebrated for **no sinner** for the time in which they are a sinner; but the **Blessed Virgin** would then have been a sinner by original sin.

To the contrary, in **Romans 5**: "Through one man sin entered, in whom **all have sinned**." And **Pope Leo**, in a sermon on the Nativity of the Lord, says of Him that "just as He found no one free from **guilt**, so He came for the salvation of all." Now, guilt presupposes **sin**, and every other sin of a human being descending from the first parents presupposes—for the present or the past—**original sin** in that person.

In this question there will be three articles: First, whether the **Blessed Virgin** was conceived with original sin; second, whether she was **born** with original sin; third, whether at any time in this life the *fomes* of original sin was totally extinguished in her.

ARTICLE 1 (Opinion of Gregory on the Question)

Concerning the first, because we are not asking whether it was **possible** for her to be conceived without such sin, but whether **in fact** she was conceived without it—and since certainty on this point cannot be had through human reason—it seems to me that in this matter, that view should be held which is more in harmony with **Sacred Scripture** and the sayings of the **saints**. Therefore, without prejudice to a better judgment and always saving all reverence for the Mother of God, it seems to me it must be said that she was **conceived with original sin**.

I am moved to this first because **Scripture**, wherever it speaks of this, utters a **universal judgment** concerning all without exception, and it is understood by all expositors to apply universally to all born in the natural way. From this it seems to follow that to except anyone from it is to **contradict Sacred Scripture**.

This is confirmed by **Augustine** in *De Perfectione Iustitiae*, near the end, saying thus: "Whosoever therefore thinks there was or is any human being in this life—excepting the one **Mediator of God and men**—for whom the **remission of sins** was not necessary, is contrary to the divine Scripture, where the **Apostle** says: 'Through one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so it passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.'" It is certain, moreover, that these words of the Apostle are to be understood by everyone as referring to **original sin**. But remission of sin presupposes **sin**. Therefore, if remission of original sin was necessary for everyone, everyone contracted it.

Secondly, I am moved by the sayings of other saints, who expressly said things from which this follows by necessity. Hence, as **Augustine** recites in Book 2 of *De Gratia Christi et Peccato Originali*, Chapter 39, **Blessed Ambrose** on Luke says: "For the **Lord Jesus alone**, among those born of woman, was **holy through all things**, who by the novelty of His immaculate birth did not feel the contagion of earthly corruption." If, however, He **alone**, then no one else; and consequently not His blessed Mother.

Likewise, the same author on Isaiah, as **Augustine** also recites in the same place, speaking of **Christ**: "Born of the Holy Spirit," he says, "He abstained from sin. For 'every man is a liar,' and no one is without sin except the one God. It is reserved, therefore, that from man and woman—that is, through that commingling of bodies—**no one is seen to be free of fault**. But he who is free of fault is also free of a

conception of this kind." From the first part of the authority, when he says "No one is without sin except the one God," the proposition is manifestly inferred; and similarly from the second, since it is certain that the **Blessed Virgin** was not free of a conception which is through the commingling of woman and man.

Furthermore, **Augustine** in Book 1 of *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* says that **Christ** did not wish to be born from sexual union for this reason: "so that from this He might teach that **everyone who is born from union is flesh of sin**, since only that flesh which was not born from it was not flesh of sin."

Further, in Book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 36, he says to one denying that infants contract **original sin**: "If beyond doubt the flesh of Christ is not flesh of sin, but like unto the flesh of sin, what remains for us to understand except that, with Him excepted, **all remaining human flesh is flesh of sin**?" And a little later he adds: "But whoever denies that the body of Christ was called 'in the likeness of the flesh of sin' because **all other human flesh is flesh of sin**, and so compares the flesh of Christ to the flesh of other newborns as to assert that both are of **equal purity**, is found to be a **detestable heretic**." Nor does it seem possible to say that he understands this only of one who asserts that the flesh of *all* other men is of equal purity with the flesh of Christ; but, as is clear from the premises—namely, that "with Him alone excepted, all remaining human flesh is flesh of sin"—it is manifestly gathered that he understands this of anyone who asserts that **any other human flesh** is of equal purity with the flesh of Christ, and he speaks determinately of purity from **original sin**.

And this is evidently confirmed by the same author in Book 10 of *De Genesi ad Litteram*, Chapter 23, speaking of little ones thus: "Accordingly, the body of Christ, although assumed from the flesh of a woman who had been **conceived from that propagation of the flesh of sin**, yet because it was not conceived in her as she had been conceived, it was not flesh of sin but the **likeness of the flesh of sin**." Where it clearly appears he felt the flesh of the **Blessed Virgin** was flesh of sin; and through this, according to him, he who asserts the opposite is found to be a **heretic**.

Item, in *De Fide ad Petrum*, Chapter 2: "Because," he says, "there is no union of parents without **lust**, for this reason the conception of children born of their flesh **cannot be without sin**." But it is certain that neither the **Blessed Virgin** nor any other human being except Christ was conceived without the union of parents. Therefore, according to **Augustine**, both she and everyone else other than Christ was conceived with **original sin**; and therefore, below in Chapter 32, handing this down as a certain **rule of faith**, he says: "Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that every human being who is conceived through the union of man and woman is born subject to the impiety of **original sin**, subject to death, and because of this is born by nature a 'child of wrath.'"

And this same thing is proved by **reason**, yet founded on authorities: because, if the **Blessed Virgin** was not conceived with original sin, then **Christ did not die for her**.

This consequence is proved first by the authority of **Augustine** in Book 6, Chapter 4 of *Contra Julianum*, where, speaking to Julian, he says: "You say Christ died also for those who were not sinners; I say He **died only for sinners**." Now it is certain that no one descending from Adam was a sinner who was not first a sinner by **original sin**. Therefore, if the **Blessed Virgin** did not have original sin, she was not of the number of sinners, and through this not of the number of those for whom **Christ died**.

Secondly, it is proved by the authority of the **Apostle in 2 Corinthians 5**, just as **Augustine** proves his own saying posited above. For the Apostle says: "Because if one died for all, then **all were dead**; and Christ died for all." Now from this consequence of the Apostle it follows, by arguing from the opposite of the consequent, that if **not all** were dead, Christ did not die for all; and similarly that if this or that person is not dead, **Christ did not die for him**. And it is certain that the Apostle is speaking of death not indeed of the body, but **spiritual death** which is **sin**, as Augustine well shows there. And therefore Augustine says: "See, because the Apostle wished it to be consequent that all be understood as **dead**, if Christ died for all." And a little later: "Wherefore, if infants contract no sin, they are not dead; if they are not dead, He did not die for them, who died only for the dead." The consequence can be made exactly similar concerning the **Blessed Virgin** herself. Therefore the consequence is clear.

But I prove the consequent is false, first through the other part of the authority of the Apostle. For he says, affirming the antecedent: "**And Christ died for all**," therefore also for the Blessed Virgin; which is the opposite of the consequent. And from this the principal conclusion is also inferred by arguing according to the Apostle: If Christ died for the Virgin, therefore she also was **dead**. But He died for her; therefore she was dead.

It must be noted, however, that those expressions concerning the present according to the voice are not to be understood for all as concerning the present. For neither the **Blessed Virgin** nor any blessed person nor anyone redeemed and regenerated in Christ is **dead to sin**. Indeed, certainly no one, if the speech is about the death of **original sin**, although everyone of them *was* dead in that way; and therefore, when it is said "they were dead," it is to be understood commonly also for "they have been."

Secondly, it is clear the consequent is false, because if Christ did not die for her, therefore neither was she **redeemed** by the death of Christ. How then was she saved and beatified with **Christ as Mediator**, when the Apostle says in **Hebrews 9** that "Christ through His own blood entered once into the holy place, having found **eternal redemption**?" And again: "Therefore He is the mediator of the new testament, that by means of His death for the redemption of those transgressions which were under the former testament, they that are called may receive the **promise of eternal inheritance**"; where he manifestly demonstrates that all who receive the promise of the eternal inheritance receive it through the **intervening death of Christ**.

To this conclusion is the authority of **Anselm** in *Cur Deus Homo*, Book 2, Chapter 16, where the disciple asks how God assumed a man without sin from a **sinful mass**. "For although," he says, "the conception of that same man [Christ] was clean and without the sin of carnal delectation, yet the Virgin herself from whom He was assumed was **conceived in iniquities**, and in sins did her mother conceive her, and she was **born with original sin**, since she also sinned in Adam, 'in whom all have sinned.'" **Anselm** does not deny or reprove this opinion, but rather approves it at the end of the chapter, saying in his own person: "But that Virgin from whom that man of whom we speak was assumed was of those who **before His birth were cleansed from sins by Him**, and in her very cleanness He was assumed from her." But if she was **cleansed**, therefore she had previously been **stained**.

Moreover, the **Master of the Sentences** in Book 3, Distinction 3, in the beginning: "It is asked," he says, "also concerning the flesh of the Word, whether before it was conceived it was **obliged to sin**, and whether such was assumed by the Word"; and he responds: "It can surely be said and must be believed,

according to the agreement of the attestation of the saints, that it was previously **liable to sin**, just like the rest of the Virgin's flesh, but was **cleansed** by the operation of the Holy Spirit, so that it might be united to the Word immune from all contagion." Behold that according to the Master it must be believed, according to the agreement of the attestation of the saints, that the flesh of the Virgin was entirely **flesh of sin**.

Therefore the Virgin herself was conceived with **original sin**. And it is necessary to hold this conclusion for certain, as the Master says, if we wish to conform ourselves to the judgments of the saints.

(Opposite Opinion)

The opposite, however, is defended by **some doctors**, moved by certain reasons. Of which the **first** is: "A **most perfect mediator** has the most perfect act of mediation possible with respect to any person for whom he mediates. Christ, therefore, had this with respect to someone," and it is certain that "with respect to no one did He have it more excellently than with respect to **Mary**; therefore" with respect to her He had such a perfect act of mediation. But this would not be true if He had not **preserved** her from **original sin**. This is clear: First, because He would not have most perfectly **placated the Trinity** unless He had prevented every new offense. For the offended one is more perfectly placated if every other offense is prevented than if He is offended again and afterwards placated for the whole. But it is certain that God is offended in the **original guilt** which the soul contracts.

Second, because "a **most perfect mediator** merits the removal of all punishment from him whom he reconciles. But **original guilt** is a great punishment, indeed greater," as he says, "than the lack of the divine vision. Therefore, etc."

Third, because "Christ was more immediately the **repairer from original sin** than from actual sin, because the necessity of the Incarnation of Christ is commonly assigned from original sin. But it is commonly supposed that He was so perfect a mediator with respect to Mary that He preserved her from every **actual sin**. Therefore, etc."

Fourth, because "a reconciled person is not **maximally obliged** to a mediator unless he has from him the **highest good** which he can have through a mediator. But this innocence, namely preservation from contracted or contractible guilt, can be had through a mediator. Therefore no person will be maximally bound to Christ as mediator if He preserved no one from **original sin**."

The **second reason** is made by others as follows: Whatever is of honor possible and fitting for the **dignity of the mother of Christ** ought to be attributed to her or estimated to be granted, if the opposite is not had from Scripture. This is clear, because few things are written in the canon concerning the Mother of God herself; and therefore, according to a certain rule accepted from **Blessed Augustine**, it seems fitting that whatever pertains to her dignity be attributed to her. Hence Augustine proves her body was not incinerated because it was not fitting. But it is to her honor that she was **immune from original guilt**. And this was certainly possible and surely fitting, and more so, as it seems, than that her body was not incinerated; nor is there doubt that she would rejoice more in this. Therefore it is to be believed that this was granted to her.

Other reasons are not adduced which do not virtually coincide with these and those which were made for the **first part of the question**.

(Against the Opposite Opinion)

To the first I say first that that antecedent has no greater evidence than if it were said: A **most perfect mediator** has, with respect to *every* person for whom he mediates, a most perfect act of mediation, as is clear. And thus, according to that mode of arguing, it would be proved that Christ preserves **all others** also from **original sin**; which is not to be said.

Furthermore, according to the second probation, it would be deduced that the **Blessed Virgin** was also preserved from all **temporal punishment** of body and soul, and even from **bodily death** itself; which is certainly false. And that it would be so deduced is clear.

Item, according to the third, it would be proved that He preserved many others from **original guilt**; which nevertheless is not said by any doctor. The deduction is clear; for Christ, as he says, was a repairer more immediately with respect to original than with respect to actual sin, and consequently than with respect to actual mortal sin. But it is commonly enough believed that He preserved many others from every **actual mortal sin**, such as **John the Baptist** and **Jeremiah**, who were sanctified in the womb. Therefore, etc.

Further, according to the fourth, it would be proved first that the **Blessed Virgin** was blessed in the **first instant of her conception**, since she could have had such a good through Christ the Mediator, and similarly that she was glorified in the body; which are false.

Secondly, it must be asked how he takes "**to be maximally held**" or "**obliged to a mediator**." For either it is such that he alone is said to be maximally obliged than whom it is not possible to be more obliged; and thus it is certain the Blessed Virgin was not maximally obliged to Christ, even given that she was preserved from original sin. For Christ could have conferred upon her then the beatitude which she has now, and even much greater, and at the same time the perfect glory of the body, on account of which she would have been more amply obliged—taking obligation always according to the proportion to the **benefits received**, as the argument takes it. Or he takes "**to be maximally obliged to a mediator**" such that he is said to be maximally obliged to him because he is obliged to no other so much or can be, or because through everything he has he is obliged to him; and thus **every other person** besides the Virgin is maximally obliged; and yet not every other person was preserved from **original sin**.

From which it is clear that that reason is not valid. Rather, it proves the **opposite** of what he intends. For **placating mediation**, such as was the mediation of Christ reconciling us to God—just as he assumes in arguing—surely supposes an **offense**. And therefore, if He mediated between the Virgin and God, it follows that the Virgin offended through **sin**. And if not through actual, therefore through original. Hence, conversely, if she had no sin, she needed no reconciling mediator.

To the reason itself, however, I respond that for an act of mediation to be the **most perfect possible** can be said in a double sense: One is that none could be more **convenient and fitting**; and thus I concede the antecedent and I say that not only with respect to some person but even with respect to everyone for whom Christ mediated, He had the most perfect act of mediation. Nor then is the further deduction valid; for that act of mediation which the arguer accepts, even if it had been, would not have been more fitting or reasonable than that which was in fact. The other sense is because through no other mode of mediation could the reconciled person become **more pleasing to God** or more immune from fault and more secure

from punishment; and then I say that, just as with respect to others Christ the most perfect Mediator did not have such a most perfect act of mediation, so neither did He with respect to the Virgin. And therefore I deny the antecedent in this sense.

To the Other Proof, when it is assumed that "a **most perfect mediator** merits the removal of all punishment," it is clear this is false in the proposed case; for the **Blessed Virgin** had many punishments in this life.

To the Third Proof—the strength of which lies in this consequence: "**Christ preserved the Virgin from every actual sin, therefore from original**"—although this consequence, taken simply, could be denied (for God preserves baptized children dying in childhood from every actual sin, but not from original), nevertheless if it be taken determinately of those who have possessed the use of discretion and free will, it seems it should be conceded according to **Augustine** in Book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, Chapter 39. There, to Julian—saying "it must be noted" from the words of **Blessed Peter** speaking of Christ: "Who did no sin," "that the Apostle judged this sufficient to show there was no sin in Christ, 'because he who did no sin, could not have had [original sin]'"—Augustine responds: "**It is altogether most true.** For surely He would have committed even greater sin if He had had it as a little one. For the reason there is no man except Him who has not committed sin at the approach of greater age is because there is no man except Him who has not had sin at the rising of infantile age."

From these words it is clear that **Augustine** infers concerning Christ that if He had had **original sin**, He would also have committed **actual sin**; and conversely he wishes it to follow: He did not commit actual sin, therefore He did not have original. And therefore, as it seems according to the aforesaid—since, as was proved above and also follows from the second part of the alleged authority, the **Blessed Virgin** according to the attestation of the saints had **original sin**—it would seem consequently to be conceded that she also at some time had some **actual sin**, although none mortal. And thus that antecedent would have to be denied. This, however, I would say **doubtfully**, without assertion and without injury to her reverence.

To the Second Reason, whatever may be the case regarding the major premise, I say to the minor that the opposite is had from **Scripture** in its antecedent and in the sayings of other **saints**, as was proved above.

ARTICLE 2 (Whether Mary was Born with Original Sin)

Concerning the second article, namely whether she was **born with original sin**, it must be said that she was **not**, taking it as it is a fault (*culpa*).

Sufficient proof of this kind is that the **universal Church** celebrates her **nativity**; which it would not do if she had been born with sin.

Furthermore, **Bernard** in his Epistle to the Canons of Lyon says: "Beyond doubt the Mother of God was **holy before she was born**; nor is holy Church mistaken at all in reputed the very day of her nativity holy and receiving it every year with votive celebration by the exultation of the whole earth." Which he himself also proved by reason immediately before. For establishing first that **Blessed John the Baptist** was sanctified in the womb, he soon argues thus: "What therefore is certain to have been conferred on

even a few mortals, it is certainly not right to suspect was denied to such a Virgin, through whom all mortality emerged into life." This also the **doctors commonly hold**.

(Objections)

Against this, however, seems to be the authority of **Augustine** in *De Praesentia Dei ad Dardanum*, beyond the middle, where he says: "That **sanctification**, by which we are made individually temples of God and all together one temple of God, belongs only to the **reborn**; which men cannot be unless they are **born**." Since therefore through the sanctification of the soul anyone becomes a temple of God, it follows that **no one is sanctified before he is born**, and through this neither is he cleansed from original sin, since that is not taken away without the infusion of grace.

Secondly, the **Gloss** on that text of Romans 8, "That He might be the firstborn among many brethren," says of Christ that He is the "first born without sin." But it is certain that the **Blessed Virgin** was born before Christ was born of her. Therefore she was **not born without sin**.

Thirdly, **Anselm** in *Cur Deus Homo*, Book 2, as was alleged in the first article, says that she was "**born with original sin**."

(To the Objections)

To the first, it must be said that **Augustine** speaks of sanctification which happens according to the **common law of God**. For such is through **baptismal regeneration**, which he who is not yet born from the womb cannot attain. He does not speak, however, of sanctification which happens in some according to a **special and privileged concession**, such as was the sanctification of the **Virgin existing in the womb**. And that he speaks of the first kind is clear because he says "by which we are made individually temples of God." Which is also confirmed by what immediately precedes. For he says that whatever opinion we may have as to whether those existing in wombs can "be gifted with some mode of sanctification, either on account of **John** or on account of **Jeremiah**, to whom it was said: 'Before you came forth out of the womb, I sanctified you,' since that sanctification etc."; where it is manifestly clear he is not speaking of sanctification made in some by **special grace**.

To the second, it must be said that the **Gloss** is to be understood concerning **nativity in the womb** when the soul is joined to the body, according to that of Matthew 1: "That which is born in her is of the Holy Spirit."

In the same way it must be said to the **third**.

ARTICLE 3 (Whether the *Fomes* of Original Sin was Ever Totally Extinguished in Mary)

Concerning the third article, namely whether the *fomes* of original sin was ever totally extinguished in her in this life, it must be said according to the doctors commonly that in her **second sanctification**, namely when the **Holy Spirit overshadowed her** that she might become the Mother of God, the *fomes* in her was either **totally extinguished** or at least so weakened or bound by the superabundance of grace that afterwards it was the occasion of **no sin** for her. And so the **Master** says in Book 3, Distinction 3.

And I think it is said with sufficient probability that then that **morbid quality of the flesh**, from which the *fomes* is caused in the soul when it is first joined to the flesh, was **totally consumed** and the whole flesh of the Virgin was thoroughly purged from it. And this is proved by the **Master** in the same place, who from the authority of **Damascene**—saying in Book 3, Chapter 2: "After the consent of the holy Virgin, the Holy Spirit came upon her, according to the word of the Lord which the angel said, **purging her**, etc."—concludes thus: "From these things it becomes clear that the flesh of the Word was simultaneously conceived and assumed, and the same—indeed the **whole Virgin**—was **made chaste from all stain of sin** by the prevenient Holy Spirit." Thus according to the Master, not only that portion from which the body of Christ was formed, but also the **whole flesh of the Virgin** was cleansed from all stain of sin, such as is that morbid quality.

And similarly I think it can be probably said that her **soul** was totally purged from the *fomes*, so that absolutely nothing of that quality or vice was in it thereafter, so that she was not purer in flesh than in mind, but in both she was **most clean from all filth**.

(To the Principal Arguments of the Question)

To the first argument of the question, it must be said that **Augustine** speaks there of **actual sins** only; nor is it proved from that authority that she was totally without actual sin except **after she was made the Mother of God**. And the **Master** also implies this in the place cited above, when he says: "But that **from then on**"—namely, from the conception of the Son of God—"she existed immune from all sin, **Augustine** evidently shows in the book *De Natura et Gratia*, saying: 'Except the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, on account of the honor of the Lord, I wish to have absolutely **no question** when we treat of sins. For from this we know that **more grace was conferred upon her to conquer sin on every side**, because she merited to conceive and bear Him whom it is certain had no sin.'"

For from the fact that he says "more grace was conferred upon her **to conquer sin**," it is clear he is speaking of **actual sin**, because no one has to fight against original sin through grace conferred upon him, since it is excluded from everyone having grace. And from the fact that he says "more," it is sufficiently drawn that she also did not have **venial sin** afterwards, since it is believed of some others also that they never sinned mortally, such as those **sanctified in the womb**. But that this is to be understood of her **after the second sanctification**, those words imply sufficiently: "because she merited to conceive and bear, etc."

However, I do not affirm that she **never sinned venially**, because the doctors more commonly feel the opposite; and **Bernard** in the Epistle to the Canons of Lyon says: "I think," he says, "that a more copious sanctification of blessing descended into her, which not only sanctified her birth but also kept her life **immune from all sin** thereafter; which is believed to be given to **no other** among those born of women."

And according to this, it would have to be said to the consequence of **Augustine** in Book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, alleged in the solution of the third reason of the other opinion, that it is to be understood according to the **common law**, where the consequent is not prevented by **special grace**; but in the Virgin it was prevented by **special privilege**. Otherwise it would be necessary to reject the authority of either him or **Bernard** in this part.

To the second, it must be said that "God" is put for Christ, so that the sense is "**under God**," that is, under Christ. For she ought not to be of **equal purity with Christ**. Which one authority of **Augustine** in Book 5 of *Contra Julianum*, alleged above, also proves. And according to this, the authority of **Anselm** is for the conclusion which I hold, because unless she had had original sin, she would have been, as it seems, of **equal purity with Christ**.

To the third, it must be said, as is commonly and well said, that that feast can lawfully be celebrated having regard **not to her conception**, but to her **sanctification** which was proximate to her conception. For it is to be believed that **very quickly**, after the soul was united to the body, she was sanctified and cleansed from all guilt of sin.

QUESTION 3 WHETHER those dying with original sin alone are punished with some punishment of sense.

Thirdly, I ask: **Whether those dying with original sin alone are punished with some punishment of sense.**

And I argue that they are **not**, because such persons experienced no pleasure of **actual fault**; therefore, they ought to suffer no sadness of **punishment**. The antecedent is certain. The consequent is proved because, as it is written in the *Extra, De Baptismo et eius effectu*, chapter "Maiores": "**The punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna.**" Therefore, it is not due to those who have not actually sinned.

This is confirmed by that of **Apocalypse 18**: "**As much as she hath glorified herself in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her**"; where, according to the proportion of actual inordinate pleasure, he shows there is a proportion of torment and **sensual punishment** to be inflicted. Therefore, where no actual evil pleasure preceded, no **sensual punishment** will follow.

To the contrary: Such persons will have **passible bodies**, because although all will rise again—both saved and damned—nevertheless not all will be changed [to glory] according to the **Apostle**, but only the elect. Now those dying in original sin will not be of the number of the elect, but of the **damned**. Therefore their bodies will not be changed for the better so as to become impassible. Therefore, they will suffer from the **fire of hell**, and consequently they will suffer a **sensual punishment**.

(Opinion of the Master and Moderns)

I respond. The opinion of the **Master of the Sentences** is for the negative part. Hence in Distinction 33 of this Second Book, he says: "For original sin, which is drawn from parents, little ones will be damned, feeling for it **no other punishment** of material fire or worm of conscience, except that they will **lack the vision of God forever**." Here it is manifestly clear that he asserts they are punished only with the **punishment of loss** (*poena damni*), but by no means with the **punishment of sense** (*poena sensus*). And as to this, all the **modern doctors** whose writings I have read on this matter agree with him, although some concede that besides the aforesaid punishment of loss, they suffer a **punishment of sadness**, which is caused in them from the fact that they consider they will lack the vision of God forever.

That first saying, in which they agree, is proved by the reason made for the first part of the question.

It is also argued from the authority of **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, Chapter 101, saying: "**Indeed, the mildest of all punishments** will be theirs who, besides the original sin they contracted, have added no other." This would not be true, as it is said, if they also suffered sensible punishment.

Thirdly, for the same point seems to be a certain Decretal in the *Extra, De Baptismo et eius effectu*, chapter "Maiores," in which it is written thus: "**The punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God; but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna.**" Since therefore he assigns here to each kind of sin its own proper punishment, it seems that the torment of Gehenna, which is called sensible punishment, is **not the punishment of original sin**.

These are the points on which the aforesaid opinion is sustained.

(Opinion of Augustine is Shown, First)

To me, however—saving always a better judgment—it appears that **Blessed Augustine felt the opposite**.

This is clear **first** from that authority of his, commonly alleged for this, in *De Fide ad Petrum*: "Hold most firmly and doubt in no way that not only men already using reason, but also **little ones** who—whether they begin to live in their mothers' wombs and die there, or are already born of mothers—pass from this world without the sacrament of holy baptism... are to be punished with the **supplicium of eternal fire**. Because although they had no sin of proper action, nevertheless they drew the **damnation of original sin** by carnal conception." Now it is certain that the *supplicium* of eternal fire is that punishment of hell which is called **punishment of sense**, and about which the present question asks.

(Responses of Moderns Adduced and Solved)

It is responded to this authority in two ways: **First**, that Augustine spoke here **excessively** (*excessive*), in order to distance himself most from the opinion of the heretics, who denied all guilt in little ones and consequently all punishment. Therefore, they say, much attention must be paid to whom the saints are speaking against, in order to have their intention.

But this response can in no way stand:

- **First indeed**, because since **falsehood ought not be excluded by falsehood**, nor—where the true faith is defended—should an error be said or a false opinion asserted, it is not to be thought that **Augustine**, that excellent extirpator of errors and truthful defender of the faith, would have said for the sake of excluding any error whatsoever that it must be believed "firmly" that children are punished with the **supplicium of fire**, if he had esteemed this false or not consonant with right faith.
- **Second**, because in that book Augustine speaks against no error specifically, but commonly hands down the **canons of the whole Catholic faith**, prefacing each with "Hold firmly and doubt in no way." And about all of them in the last chapter of the said book he says: "These forty chapters pertaining most firmly to the **rule of the true faith**, believe faithfully, hold bravely, and defend truthfully and patiently. And if you know anyone to dogmatize contrary to these, flee him as a pestilence and reject him as a heretic... For these things which we have posited so agree with the Catholic faith that if anyone wishes to contradict... he appears as a **heretic** and enemy of the

Christian faith and from this to be anathematized by all Catholics." These are Augustine's words. Now it ought not fall into the mind of any theologian that among such rules of faith Augustine would have posited something **false** according to the signification which he makes commonly first among all, as would follow in the proposed case if the given response were true.

This is confirmed because, since the opposite of this rule is found nowhere determined by the Church nor preached in Sacred Scripture, by what power do you say that he spoke here not properly and truly, but **excessively**? Another will say similarly in other rules posited by him in the same place that he spoke excessively and not as they sound to be held. But by saying so, there is no doubt to one looking diligently that one would fall into **many errors**.

Therefore **secondly** and more commonly it is responded otherwise: namely, that Augustine there by the name of "fire" signified generally **all punishment**. Hence by "supplicium of eternal fire" he understands eternal punishment, but punishment not of sense but of **loss**.

But this response also does not seem able to stand:

- **First**, because it is not likely that he would have handed down rules of faith under **metaphors**, and especially not one alone; but every other one handed down there would seem to be taken properly.
- **Second**, because in the same book, Chapter 3, he expresses together and similarly the punishment of such children and of demons and of adult damned dying in crimes. Hence he says: "The quality of an evil life begins from infidelity, which takes its beginning from the guilt of **original sin**. In which whoever begins to live so that he ends his life before he is loosed from its obligation... it is necessary that that soul with the same body sustain the **interminable supplices of Gehenna**, where the devil with his angels is **to burn forever**." And it follows: "Where with him also fornicators, those serving idols, etc.... will be burned with eternal fires." Since therefore no one commonly understands by the "supplices of Gehenna" where the devil is to burn, or by the "fires" with which other damned will be burned, any punishment whatsoever, but determinately the **sensible punishment of infernal fire**, it does not seem to proceed according to the mind of Augustine if by the "supplices of Gehenna" to be inflicted on such children only the punishment of loss is understood.

This is confirmed, because equally another could say that from those words it could not be had that the **devil or others** suffer the punishment of sense; which no one would say. And the assumption is clear, because Augustine speaks similarly of all.

(Opinion of Augustine is Shown, Second)

Secondly, it is shown principally that Augustine was of the aforesaid opinion from the fact that in the *Hypognosticon*, Response 5—against **Pelagius** saying that infants dying without the sacrament of baptism do not enter the kingdom of heaven, but nevertheless have eternal life without any punishment, this alone excepted that they are not in the fatherland—he proves from the text of the **Gospel** that if such do not obtain the kingdom of heaven (as Pelagius confessed, and is true), the consequence is that they are sent to be **tortured in eternal fire**.

Hence he says thus: "The first place the faith of Catholics believes to be the **kingdom of heaven**... The second, **Gehenna**, where every apostate or one alien from the faith of Christ will experience **eternal supplices**. A third we are utterly ignorant of, indeed we will find it is not in the Sacred Scriptures. Feign, Pelagian, a place from the workshop of your perverse dogma where infants alien from the grace of Christ can possess a life of rest and glory. The right hand and the left hand of the just Judge sitting is the kingdom and Gehenna... On the right therefore are constituted the just... in the kingdom the rest of the baptized; in Gehenna the **punishment of unbelievers**... Just as the just in the kingdom of the Father together with Christ, the unjust in **eternal fire** prepared for the devil and his angels." And he immediately adds that these things do not signify divisions of many places, but of **two only**: namely the Kingdom of Heaven... and Gehenna... "where," he says, "death which is called the second will be not ending but durable with **torture**." And then he argues: "He therefore who is not baptized cannot be found in those things which are of the kingdom of heaven. And if not there, because truly not there, do you think, Pelagian, you now sense **where**?" As if he says: You ought to see openly that he is found in **Gehenna**.

From these things the proposition is manifestly clear:

- First, because he says that one alien from the faith of Christ will experience eternal *supplices*; now experience of *supplicium* is not understood without **torture and punishment of sense**.
- Second, because everyone according to him is either in the kingdom of heaven or in Gehenna, through which the second death is always durable with **torture**, and where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth; where he concludes **unbaptized infants** are.

(Opinion of Augustine is Shown, Third)

Thirdly, in the sermon *De Baptismo Parvulorum* against the Pelagians (and it is sermon 14 *De Verbis Apostoli*), from the same premise he concludes the same: "The Lord is to come," he says, "and judge the living and the dead... He is to make **two parts**, the right and the left. To those on the left He will say: 'Go into **eternal fire**...'; to those on the right He will say: 'Come, ye blessed... receive the **kingdom**...' Here He names the kingdom, here damnation with the devil. There is left **no middle place** where you can put infants." And he adds: "If therefore there will be a right and a left, and we know no middle place in the Gospel, he who is not on the right is without doubt on the left. Therefore he who is not in the kingdom is without doubt in **eternal fire**."

If it be said that infants of this kind will indeed be *in* hell fire, but will not suffer *from* it, he seems to exclude this in the following words from the word of Christ, by which He declared what He understands by the kingdom and what by eternal fire. Hence Augustine adds concerning Christ Himself: "The extreme sentence, that He might teach what is the kingdom and what is eternal fire: 'Then,' He says, 'these shall go into **eternal burning**; but the just into eternal life.'" From this it is clear that those to whom it will be said "Go into eternal fire" will suffer the **burning of eternal fire**.

And this seems able to be confirmed by **reason**, since by one and the same sentence all the damned will be judged to eternal fire, among whom infants of this kind will be included. Nor do we read of another special sentence to be given concerning them. But it is certain that the rest—whether men or angels—damned are understood from that sentence to be judged to that fire not only because they are to

be contained in it locally, but because they are to be **truly tortured** by it. Therefore it seems one must feel the same concerning the aforesaid sentence as to **damned infants**.

For this also makes what the same **Augustine** writes to Consentius in that epistle "Quantum ad oculos": "Those," he says, "who are to rise again to judgment will not be changed into that incorruption which cannot suffer the corruption of pain... but these [the damned] will be tortured with **perpetual corruption**, because 'their fire shall not be extinguished and their worm shall not die.'" Now it is certain that such infants are of the number of those who are **to rise again to judgment**.

Furthermore, just as you would understand that word of Christ concerning them only as to **local inclusion**, so another might perhaps expound it concerning the rest of the damned. Nor from Scripture, as it seems, could his saying be reproved more than yours.

From these things, as it seems, it is clear that Augustine felt and proved intentionally against the Pelagians that infants of this kind suffer the **punishment of fire and torture**, and not only the punishment of loss which is the lack of the divine vision. Indeed, he seems to attribute such an opinion [punishment of loss only] to **Pelagius** in the pre-alleged sermon... "For you seem to yourself merciful," he says, "because... you do not strike him, but send him into exile... This is their only punishment: **not to be in the fatherland**."

And furthermore, I have never read anywhere **Augustine** saying that they do not suffer the punishment of fire or punishment of sense or that they are punished only with that punishment of loss. Nor have I seen it alleged by anyone that he said any such opinion anywhere. Hence it seems sufficiently to me that he was of the **other opinion**.

(Mind of Gregory the Great)

With him in this also **Blessed Gregory** seems to me to agree in Book 9 of the *Moralia* on that word of Job 9, "He hath multiplied my wounds even without cause," saying: "For some are withdrawn from the present light before they come to produce good or evil merits of active life. Whom, because the sacraments of salvation do not liberate from the **guilt of origin**... they arrive there at **torments**." Now "torment" is properly called torture and **sensible punishment**.

Item, immediately: "...For perpetual **torments** do they perceive, who sinned nothing by their own will."

Hence a sufficiently strong reason could also be formed for the proposition, as it seems: since if infants of this kind suffered **no other punishment than precisely that of loss** after death, it follows that it would be **much better for them after death**—and even after their final damnation—than it was in this life. This is clear, because in this life they suffer many **sensible punishments and tortures** and with this they lack the divine vision; but after their damnation they would feel no punishment, but only lack the divine vision. But the consequent seems false; for the condition of **all the damned** seems to be worse after the final judgment. And the alleged text according to Gregory's exposition also seems to prove this in particular as to the proposition, when it is said "He hath multiplied my wounds." For they would not be multiplied, but rather **diminished**, if they had no punishment except that lack of the divine vision.

(To the Reasons of the Moderns)

He who would wish to hold this way could respond to the proofs of the opposite part.

Hence to the **reason** made for the question, it would be said that the consequence is not valid, because the sadness of sensible punishment is due not only to actual guilt, but also to **original guilt**. And **Augustine** notes this in the authority *De Fide ad Petrum* alleged above... And **Blessed Gregory** also notes this immediately after those pre-alleged words... "Wounding," however, as is clear, is taken for **sensible punishment**. And although according to human estimation it would not be due to him who had no sin of proper action, nevertheless according to **God's hidden justice** it is due to him who contracted **original guilt**.

The authority of the **Decretal** does not prove the consequence, because it does not say that the punishment of *actual guilt alone* is the torment of Gehenna.

And by the same, the answer is clear to the authority of the **Apocalypse**, because with that sentence it stands that to others also, who have not glorified themselves in delicacies, **torment and sorrow** may be given.

To the **second**, which is from **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, it must be said that it does not conclude the proposition, because it stands very well together that they suffer **sensible punishment** and that their sensible punishment is **mildest** with respect to the punishments of those who sinned actually. And for certain, if the intention of Augustine is inspected diligently there, it seems to be **opposite** to what is intended by the argument... Hence in the beginning of the immediately preceding chapter Augustine says: "...Whosoever are not liberated from that mass of perdition... will rise again indeed... but so that they may be **punished with the devil** and his angels." And a little later: "...Where unhappy dying is not allowed... and where **perpetual pain** does not kill but afflicts..."

From these things it is clear he wishes that everyone not liberated from the mass of perdition (such as infants of whom is the speech) will rise again with his flesh so that he may suffer **pains** in it, and consequently everyone such will have **sensible punishment**. Among these, however, he says the punishment of those who had only original sin will be the **mildest**.

To the **third**, it must be said that neither from that **Decretal** is the intent proved. For the Decretal does not say that *only* the lack of divine vision is the punishment of original sin. Nor, as I said above, does it say that the torment of Gehenna is the punishment of *actual sin alone*. Both of which or either would have to be said for it to suffice to prove that.

Item, that such exclusives are not to be understood from that Decretal is clear:

- Both from the **gloss** there which says: "Little ones who die without baptism... are punished with **eternal fire**... distinction 'Firmissime'," and it is the authority of Augustine alleged above. Behold that besides darkness he posits the **punishment of fire**.
- And because for the proposition which the Decretal wishes to conclude, neither of those exclusives is opportune. For it wishes to prove that sin is not forgiven to a sleeper or a madman through baptism as it is forgiven to little ones; and it supposes that in such there is also **actual sin**. Now it proves this because "the punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna. Hence, if the first were forgiven to

someone, the other not being forgiven, such a one would not lack the vision of God on account of forgiven original sin and would be tortured in Gehenna perpetually on account of the guilt of actual crime. But these do not suffer themselves as if impossible, indeed they are mutually adverse." This is the Decretal.

It is clear also that this whole argumentation stands even if besides the lack of divine vision there is **another punishment** of original sin. For still, when original sin is forgiven, he would be exempt from the punishment of such lack.

Furthermore, it is certain that not only the torment of Gehenna is the punishment of actual sin, but also the **lack of divine vision**. Hence a Christian who has no original sin, if he dies with the guilt of actual mortal sin, will forever lack the vision of God. Just as therefore from the fact that the Decretal says "the punishment of actual sin is the torment of Gehenna," it is not removed that its punishment is *also* the lack of divine vision, so neither from the fact that it says "the punishment of original sin is the lack of divine vision" is it excluded that its punishment is *also* the **torment of Gehenna**.

(Ambiguous Solution of the Question)

He who would hold this way would indeed **deny the authority of the Master** [Peter Lombard], nor would he weigh it above the **authorities of Augustine and Gregory**.

However, because I have **not seen any part** of this question **expressly determined by the Church**, and it seems to me a **fearful thing to deny the authority of the saints**, and on the other hand it is also **not safe** to go against the **common opinion and consent of our masters**, therefore, preferring neither part to the other, I **leave the judgment of them to the reader**.

DISTINCTION 34-37

QUESTION 1

Whether God is the immediate efficient cause of actual sin.

Regarding Distinction 34 and the three others following, in which the **Master** inquires concerning the quiddity and cause of actual sin, I ask whether God is the **immediate efficient cause** of actual sin.

I argue that He is not, first as follows: Of **evil** there is no efficient cause; therefore, neither is there one for **sin**. The consequence is evident, because every sin is an evil. The antecedent is proved, because whatever has an efficient cause is some **entity** or **essence**. For no cause effects "nothing" or a "non-being." But evil is not any entity, because according to **Augustine** in *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 21: "**Evil is nothing other than the privation of good**"; and in the *83 Questions*, question 6, he says that "**this whole name of evil was found for the privation of species**." Now, a **privation** is no entity; therefore, etc.

Secondly, according to **Augustine** in the *City of God*, book 12, chapter 7, a **bad will** does not have an **efficient cause** but a **deficient cause**. Moreover, a bad will is certainly a sin; therefore, sin does not have an efficient cause. And if it does not, then God is not the efficient cause of sin.

On the contrary. God is the immediate efficient cause, at least a partial one, of **every entity**; therefore, he is also the cause of actual sin. The antecedent is evident through that saying of **Augustine** in 83 *Questions*, question 16: "**God is the cause of all things that exist.**" And in **John 1**: "**All things were made through Him.**" The consequence is proved from the definition of sin given by the same author in the book *On the Two Souls*, where he says that "**sin is the will of retaining or pursuing what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain**"; and it is established that he defines actual sin there. Now, any **will** is some entity; therefore, sin is an entity. From which the consequence is evident.

ARTICLE 1: On the Acceptance of Evil

In the resolution of this question there will be three articles: For **first**, it will be seen whether evil is any entity and whether there is any efficient cause of evil. **Second**, it will be seen whether sin is any entity and how sin is an evil. **Third**, that which is principally asked will be seen.

Regarding the first article, I premise that **evil** can be taken in two ways: In one way, for that which is **denominated** evil, just as we call a man "evil" and an angel "evil" and gold "bad," and so of others; in another way, for that **from which** something is first denominated or is evil in the first sense. In the first way, when we speak of evil, this name "evil" is used **adjectivally**. When, however, we speak in the second way, it is used **substantively** and is a synonym for this name "**malice**," which more evidently retains the form of abstract and principal names, from which concrete terms (which are called derivatives) are derived.

Likewise, some things are denominated evil in different ways according to the different **analogy** they have to evil accepted in the second way; just as, also, according to a different analogy to **health**, some things are denominated "healthy" with different meanings, as is declared in *Metaphysics* IV, and similarly regarding those things which are called "infirm" or "sick." For some are so denominated because they are **subjects** of sickness (to a sound understanding, by which we assign subjects to privations); some because they are **causes** of sickness, some in one way, and some in another. So it is also with evils, as will be clear in what follows, from which also the aforesaid distinction will be clarified.

Three Conclusions

Having premised this, I lay down conclusions for this article: The **first** of which is that **malice** or **evil**, from which something is first denominated evil—which can be called "evil in itself" or, according to **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, can be called "**evil simply**" or "**simple evil**"—is not any entity, but a **pure privation** or **defect of a due good**.

The **second conclusion** is that, taking "evil" in the same way, although evil is not an entity, **every evil is nevertheless in some entity**.

The **third conclusion** concerns evil accepted in the first way, namely for that which is denominated evil—which according to **Anselm** is called "**not simply evil, but something evil**"—that **some evil is an entity**, yet not every evil is. From which it will consequently be clear that of **some evil** there is some **per se efficient cause**, and of some there is not.

Proof of the First Conclusion

I prove the first conclusion first by **authorities**. For **Ambrose** says in the book *On Isaac and the Soul* (and **Augustine** also alleges him in book 1 of *Against Julian* at the end): "**What is malice except a lack of good?**"

Likewise, **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, 12: "**What else is that which is called evil except a privation of good?**" And the same in *De Fide ad Petrum*, as was alleged in the first argument of the question.

Likewise, in *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, near the beginning, he says: "**No nature is an evil**"; and he takes "nature" there universally for **entity**. Whence a little later he adds: "For even nature itself is nothing other than that which is understood to be something in its own **genus**; thus, just as we now call it **essence** by a new name from 'that which is to be' (*esse*), which we also frequently call **substance**. So the ancients, who did not have these names, called 'nature' that which stands for essence and substance." And not long after he says that evil "**is most rightly said not according to essence but according to privation.**"

Likewise, in *The Nature of the Good*, near the beginning: "**Evil is nothing other than the corruption of either mode, or species, or natural order.**" And in *Against the Fundamental Epistle*, chapter 22: "Who," he says, "would doubt that all that which is called evil is nothing other than **corruption**? Indeed, different evils can be named by various and different words, but what is the evil of all things, in which something of evil can be observed, is corruption." And this having been made clear through many examples, he adds: "But if evil is not found in things except as corruption, it is not a nature. Therefore, **no nature is an evil**"; and he takes "nature" universally for entity as above, as is clear to one inspecting diligently.

Likewise, in *On Genesis according to the Letter*, book 8, chapter 22: "For neither is there any **nature of evil**, but the **loss of good** has received this name." And he writes the same words in the *City of God*, book 11, chapter 9 at the end; and he sets forth precisely the same opinion below in chapter 22.

Likewise, **Pope Leo** in the epistle *To Turribius, Bishop of Astorga*, against the errors of Priscillian, chapter 6: "The true faith," he says, "which is Catholic, confesses the **substance of all creatures**, whether spiritual or corporal, to be **good**, and that there is **no nature of evil.**"

Likewise, **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 5: "**Evil**," he says, "is nothing other than **non-good**, or the **absence of good** where good ought to be or is advantageous to be. Moreover, that which is nothing other than the absence of that which is something, is certainly not something." And he says a similar thing in *On the Virgin Conception*, chapter 5.

Many other authorities could be adduced. But let these suffice.

Secondly, I declare the conclusion by **reason**, and I suppose one thing which is evident: namely, that everything which is denominated evil is either denominated evil **in itself** or **absolutely**—just as gold is called "bad" and wine is called "bad," and so of others—or it is denominated evil **in relation to another**, namely that which is said to be evil **for something**, as poison is said to be evil for a man or another animal.

In both, the proposition is proved. And regarding the first: Any thing, if it lacks some **good due to it**, is called evil, whatever else it may have or not have. And if it does not lack any such good, whatever else it may have or not have, it is not called evil. Therefore, any thing is called evil primarily from the **lack of some due good**. From which follows the proposition, as is clear.

The consequence is evident. And the first part of the antecedent is clear; for any thing, by the very fact that it lacks some **perfection due to it**, is imperfect and **vitiated**, and through this is judged evil. Whence, as **Augustine** says in *On Free Will*, book 3, chapter 33: "**As much is added to the malice of vices as is diminished from the integrity of natures**"; and therefore a little later he adds: "That which you perceive to be lacking to the perfection of a nature, that you call a **vice**"; and at the beginning of the following chapter he says that you rightly blame that "**which is not as it ought to be**."

The second part of the antecedent is also clear. For, if a thing does not lack some good or perfection due to it, it already exists as **integral and perfect** in its genus, and through this is neither deficient nor vitiated nor evil. Whence, if gold has every perfection due to its nature—regarding species and mode, or degree and measure, or proportion in the species, and regarding order and relation to another—certainly, whatever else not due to its perfection it might lack, or whatever else it might have (provided that because of it it does not lack anything due to it), it will be called **perfect and good gold**. Whence whether it be heated or cooled, or receive some other quality, as long as it is deprived of no good of its own, it always remains good and not vitiated. And therefore **Ambrose** says above that there are no evils except those which are **deprived of goods**. And **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, 12: "Just as," he says, "in the bodies of animals, to be affected by diseases and wounds is nothing other than to be **deprived of health** etc., so," he adds, "even whatever **vices of souls** exist are **privations of natural goods**," wishing by this to hold that things are precisely evil or vitiated insofar as they are deprived of some good of their own.

Which is also confirmed by **Anselm** in *On the Virgin Conception*, chapter 5. For he says: "To no essence is being evil anything other than the **lack of the good** which it ought to have; but for a good that ought to be present to be lacking is not 'to be something.' Therefore, for any essence, to be evil is not 'to be something'." And by this, he wishes to hold that **evil is not any essence**.

Regarding those things also which are called evil in respect to others, the conclusion is proved. Because whatever things are evil for some others are precisely evil for them because they **harm** them; and they precisely harm them because they **deprive them of some good**, that is, because on account of them those things are deprived of some good. Therefore, whatever things are so called or are evil, they are evil primarily from the **lack of some good**.

The consequence is evident; and the antecedent could be declared by running through individual cases. For if the **poison of a serpent** did not deprive a man of some good of his own any more than it deprives the serpent, it would be no more an evil to the man than it is to the serpent. Similarly, if bread did not

harm a hawk more than a man, it would be no more "bad" for it than for a man; and conversely, if it killed a man just as it kills a hawk, it would be as bad for the man as it is for the hawk. And so in all things what has been said is clear.

This is confirmed by **Augustine** in *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, where he shows that any such things are not evil to anyone insofar as they are such natures or entities, but only insofar as they are **inconvenient** for someone, that is, **disagreeable**. Whence also in all such cases he says and shows that **inconvenience alone is the evil**, that is, that those things are evil to another insofar as they are inconvenient; but insofar as they are inconvenient, they **harm**. Whence he says: Who "could bring it about that inconvenient things would not harm him?" But further, as he says nearer to the beginning of the book, "**whatever harms, deprives of some good that thing which it harms**; for, if it takes away no good, it harms nothing at all." And a little later he says that "**to harm is to deprive of good**." From all of which the whole antecedent has been declared.

Proof of the Second Conclusion

The **second conclusion** is that, taking "evil" in the same way, although evil is not an entity, **every evil is nevertheless in some entity**, speaking in that sense by which we say **blindness** is in the eye and **darkness** is in the air, and universally **privations are in their subjects**.

I prove this conclusion first by **authorities**. For **Augustine** says in the *Enchiridion*, 16: "**Evils can by no means exist without goods, nor except in goods**, although goods can exist without evils." And it is certain, as is clear from the preceding, that he is speaking of evils as "evil" is taken in this context, and of goods which are entities or natures, as is clear from the examples he immediately introduces. "For," he says, "a man or an angel can be **not unjust**; but an unjust one cannot exist except as a **man or an angel**, and what is a man is a good, and what is an angel is a good; what is unjust is an evil."

Likewise in chapter 13 at the end: "Nature," he says, "if it is consumed by **corruption**, then neither will the corruption itself remain, with no nature subsisting where it could be." And immediately in the following chapter, he infers: "And through this, there is **nothing that is called evil if there is no good**." Where Augustine implies two consequences: One is, if there is no good, there is no nature in which there is corruption; the other is, if there is no nature in which there is corruption, there is no evil. And from this, the proposition is clear.

Likewise, in *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, not far from the beginning: "I shall ask," he says, "thirdly, what is evil? You will perhaps respond: **Corruption**. Who would deny this also, that it is a general evil?" And he adds: "But **corruption is not in itself**, but in some **substance** which it corrupts."

This is also clear from the authorities adduced for the first conclusion, by which it is held that evil is nothing but the **privation of good**. Moreover, every privation, speaking properly of privation, is **subjectively in some entity**, to a sound understanding.

This is confirmed, as is also the principal conclusion itself, by **reason**, because, as has been proved, a thing which is called "evil" absolutely is precisely called evil because it **lacks a good due to it**. Therefore, the absolute negation of good is not evil or malice, but the **negation of good in a thing to which that good is due**.

Furthermore, if every evil were not in some entity, the **absolute negation of good** would be an evil, as before. But this is false, because according to this it follows that the negation of another world than this one which exists—or **another world not existing**—is a certain evil; and similarly, the negation of any possible good is a certain evil; which no one would say.

Likewise, it would follow that before God created any thing, there were many evils, indeed infinite ones, for no created good existed; indeed, it would follow that there had been and also were **far more evils** when He first created entities—"and all were very good"—than there were goods, just as more goods could have been which were not than those which He created. But all these are absurd; therefore, etc.

Furthermore, if the negation of good which we call evil were an **absolute negation**, then either from the negation of no good would any thing be called evil, or, if from the negation of some good some thing were called evil, from the same or a similar negation any other thing would be called evil. This is clear, because there would be no more powerful reason for one thing than for another. But the consequent is clearly false. For from a **lack of justice** a man is called evil; and from a **lack of sight** or of an eye or of bodily strength a horse is called and is "bad." And an example could be set concerning many other things; and yet gold is called or is "bad" neither from a lack of justice nor of sight.

Proof of the Third Conclusion

The **third conclusion** concerns evil spoken of **denominatively**, and it is that **some evil is an entity** and some is not. This is clear enough regarding the first part, both concerning those evils denominated as such by **active denomination**—namely, because they deprive another of good or because on account of them another is deprived of a due good, for it is established that **poison**, which is an evil to man, is an entity, and **bread**, which is an evil to a hawk, is an entity, and so of many others—as well as concerning those denominated evil by **passive denomination** and as a subject, namely those things which are deprived of some good of their own. For it is established that **bad gold**, **bad wine**, a **bad man**, and a **bad angel** are all entities. Hence **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, 15: "**What is a 'bad man' but a bad nature, because a man is a nature?**"

Regarding the second part, namely that **not everything** denominated evil is an entity, it is also clear. For **abstaining entirely** from food and drink is an evil to an animal, and yet it is not an entity. Similarly, **limping** is an evil to a man, yet it is not an entity, although the limping man himself, the man's foot, and the space through which he limps are entities. Therefore, **Augustine** says in *On the Perfection of Justice*, near the beginning, that "**limping is an act, not a thing**"; and he says the same of **robbery**, which we also call evil. The same must be said of any other thing signifiable only as a **complex** [proposition] which we say is evil. For no such thing is properly called a thing or entity, as was declared in the first book.

From these points, it is clear how there is an **efficient cause** of "taken" evil and how there is not. For of **malice**, or evil *per se*, since it is no entity, there is properly speaking no efficient cause. For every

efficient cause makes something to be and makes some entity; nor is that which is "nothing" properly said to be "made." Hence in *Metaphysics* VII, the **Philosopher** says that **"all things which are made, are made by something, from something, and are [made] something"**; and his saying is certainly true regarding the first and last parts. Likewise, in *Physics* V, he maintains that every **generation** is from non-being into being. From which it follows that everything generated receives being and consequently becomes some entity. And universally, the same judgment applies to anything which, properly speaking, is said to "become."

This is confirmed by **Augustine** in the *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, saying: **"It was not said that God made darkness"**—namely in that scripture of Genesis where the first creation of all things is related—"because," he says, **"God made the species themselves, not the privations** which belong to nothing, from which [species] all things were made by God the craftsman." And a little later he says: **"God both makes and orders the species and natures themselves; but the privations of species and defects of natures He does not make, but only orders."**

Likewise, in the *Hypognosticon*, response 1, near the middle: **"Death,"** it says, **"is the privation of life, having only a name, not an essence; and therefore God cannot be said to be its author.** For whatever we say God has made has an essence, that is, it is a species. For 'essence' is named from that which 'is' (*esse*), etc." By these same points, it is clear that of evil accepted denominatively—which is nevertheless in itself no entity—there is no efficient cause. Of evil taken denominatively which **is** some entity, however, there is truly some efficient cause, just as there is of any creature.

Objections against the First Conclusion

One may argue against the aforesaid; and first against the **first conclusion**, which states that evil taken in the second way, or malice itself, is not an entity. The opposite is proved first from what was alleged for the **second conclusion**. For it is said there that **"evils are in goods,"** and similarly that **"corruption,** which is called evil, is in some substance." But that which is no entity cannot be in any entity. Hence, no one would say that "pure nothing" is in something.

Secondly, according to **Anselm** in *On the Virgin Conception*, chapter 5, although evil **"which is injustice is always nothing,"** nevertheless **incommodity** (or "hardship"), which is an evil from which uncomfortable things are called evil, **"is sometimes nothing, like blindness and deafness, and sometimes seems to be something, like pain and sorrow."** Therefore, some evil is an entity. Nor can it be said that pain and sorrow are called evil only denominatively—namely, precisely because they deprive the one in whom they are of some due good—since, even if absolutely no absence of any good followed from them, they would still be in themselves certain evils for the one possessing them, and to him they would be an evil because he would suffer and be sorrowful.

This is confirmed because **punishment** (*poena*), insofar as it is punishment, is a certain evil. Whence evil is commonly divided into the **evil of fault** (*culpae*) and of **punishment** (*poenae*). Now, **sorrow** is in itself a punishment, and similarly **pain**. Therefore, each is in itself a certain evil.

Thirdly, if **sorrow** were not in itself an evil, but precisely because it deprives the sorrowful person of some good, it would follow that if someone were deprived of that good but did not have sorrow, as is

quite possible at least by divine power, he would suffer just as much evil and it would be just as bad for him as it would be if, along with being deprived of that good, he also actually had great sorrow; which seems absurd to grant.

Fourthly, according to this, every punishment would be a **punishment of loss** (*poena damni*) and there would be no **punishment of sense** (*poena sensus*), contrary to the common distinction of the doctors.

Fifthly, if evil in itself is nothing but the pure **privation** of a due good, then **every such privation is a certain evil**. The consequence is clear, but the consequent is false: First, because in the things created by God when they were first created, there was no evil. Whence according to **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, 11, individual things were good, "**but together all were very good**," and yet there were then many privations in created things. For "**darkness was over the face of the abyss**," and "**the earth was void and empty**" or unformed and unordered, which are certainly denominations of privations.

Furthermore, if before Adam had sinned, God had **annihilated** his virtues and other accidental perfections while preserving his substance, as He well could have by His absolute power, Adam would certainly have lacked some good due to him, and yet there would have been no evil in him. This is proved: for according to **Augustine** in the *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, near the beginning, "**everything that is called evil is either sin or the punishment of sin**." But in him there would have been no sin, and consequently no punishment of sin.

Sixthly, if an angel were created with only **natural goods** which did not have an incompatibility with the act of sin, and he subsequently sinned, he would become evil through sin, as is certain, and yet he would not be deprived of any due good more than before. Similarly, if one existing in mortal sin sins anew, he certainly becomes worse than he was before, and yet he is deprived of no good more than before, because he was already deprived of everything with which sin is incompatible. Therefore, not every evil is a privation of a due good.

Objections against the Second Conclusion

One can also argue against the **second conclusion**. First, because the **total negation** of the being of some substance—such as would be the negation of the angel **Michael** if he were totally annihilated—would not be in any entity, and yet it would be an evil, indeed a certain great evil. Therefore, not every evil is in some entity. The consequence is clear, for the same judgment applies to the total negation of the being of something "creatable" before it is created as would apply to the total negation of something annihilated. But there are in fact many "creatables" which are simply nothing. The antecedent is proved as to its second part, because the negation of a greater good is a greater evil; but the substance of an angel is a greater good than any of its accidental perfections; therefore its negation is a greater evil.

Furthermore, to be deprived of some good is an evil; and to be deprived of that and some other good is worse, just as it is worse for a man to be deprived of wisdom and justice together than to be deprived only of wisdom. Similarly, it is worse to be deprived of hands and feet than only of feet. Therefore, to be deprived of **all goods simultaneously** is much worse; indeed, as it seems, it is the worst or the **supreme evil**.

Secondly, because **simply not being** is more to be fled from than to lack a certain accidental good due to oneself; therefore it is a greater evil. The antecedent is well known. The consequence is proved, because just as nothing is to be desired except the good, so nothing is to be fled from except the evil.

Thirdly, because the **positing** of any good is good, therefore the removal of any good is evil. Or thus: Every entity is good, therefore the negation of every entity is evil. But the negation of every entity is not in some entity. This is clear regarding the negation of substance; therefore, etc.

Reply to the Objections against the First Conclusion

To the **first**, it must be said that those expressions, and universally all others of the authors signifying that certain privations are "in" any things, are not to be taken in their strict sense, but according to the meaning the authors had, who did not intend to signify that certain entities are in certain other entities, but rather that those goods which **ought to be present are not present**. Therefore, when some evil is said to be "in" a thing, nothing else is signified except that the thing **does not have some good** which it ought to have. **Augustine** teaches this in the *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, on the verse "And darkness was over the face of the abyss," saying: "In truth, he who diligently considers what **darkness** is finds nothing other than the **absence of light**. Thus it was said, 'Darkness was over the abyss,' as if it were said, '**Light was not over the abyss**.'" And just as he teaches this concerning the verb "to be," so also concerning the verb "to have" in the book *On the Blessed Life*, chapter 3, where he says that "for some place to 'have' darkness is nothing other than to **not have light**," and to have "folly" or "poverty" is nothing other than to **not have wisdom**. "Wherefore," he says, "to explain what I wish as best I can, it is said: 'He has poverty,' as if it were said: '**He has a "not-having"**.'" From these points it is clear that from such expressions it cannot be concluded that evils or any privations are any entities. **Anselm** maintains entirely the same in meaning in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 41, and *On the Virgin Conception*, chapter 5.

To the **second**, it must be said that both **pain** and **sorrow** and whatever other entities are called "incommodities", and through this "evils", are not **malices** or evils in the second way, but only in the first way—namely, denominatively—from the privation of some good which is in itself an evil. And this is clear, because nothing is called "commodious" or "incommodious" except in relation to another. Whence what is a convenience for one is a hardship for another. Moreover, whatever is a hardship for someone is a hardship precisely because it **harms**, and it harms because it **deprives of some good**, as was deduced above from the opinion of Augustine.

When it is argued against this—first, that where absolutely no privation of good followed, pain and sorrow would still be in themselves certain evils for the possessor, and through them it would be bad for him—I deny it; rather, I say that if he were deprived of no good of his own by them, it would be no less "well" with him with them than without them. This is clear, because they would in no way harm him. But the reason it is "bad" for him is because they **harm** him, namely by depriving him of some good of his own, at least of that **delight** naturally following upon the soul, or some degree of it, in which the soul rests and delights in itself as long as it feels nothing adverse. And this is that delight from which it arises that one naturally avoids adverse things even if unexperienced, according to the opinion of **Augustine** in *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, book 8, chapter 25, concerning small children.

And if it is said against this that many things suffer pain and sorrow which do not so delight in themselves—namely irrational animals, for the souls of such are not cognitive of themselves and through this cannot delight in themselves or concerning themselves—it must be said that the assumption, namely that they do not know themselves, is false and expressly against the determination of **Augustine** in the same place, where he evidently shows the opposite, and similarly in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 8, as can be clear to one willing to examine the aforesaid places.

To the **confirmation**, when it is said that "**punishment insofar as it is punishment is an evil**," if "evil" is taken strictly in the second way only, the proposition is false. If, however, it is taken commonly for the first and second way, even if it were true, and similarly the minor premise taken under it, it does not conclude against the proposition, because it does not follow: "Every punishment is an evil, therefore every punishment is an evil in the second way."

To the **third**, grant that if someone were deprived of that good and did not have sorrow, he would have no less an evil nor would it be any less "bad" for him than if he had great sorrow along with that privation, provided that by that sorrow he were deprived of no other good or degree of good. And this is because the sorrow would harm him no further, and thus would not make him any worse.

To the **fourth**, it must be said that the expression "**punishment of loss**" (*poena damni*) can be **intransitive**, so that the sense is: "The punishment which IS a loss." And thus the doctors speak when they distinguish between the punishment of loss and of sense, understanding by "punishment of loss" the loss itself or the privation of some good, but by "punishment of sense" some **harmful sensible thing**. In another way, that expression can be **transitive**, so that "punishment of loss" is called the punishment **causing** or bringing about loss, or which loss follows. Therefore, that consequent can be taken in three ways: taking "punishment of loss" determinately in the first way only; taking it determinately in the second way only; or taking it commonly for the first and second way. If taken in the first way, the consequence is to be denied; and similarly if taken in the second way. If, however, it is taken in the third way, assuming that every punishment is an evil, the consequent must be granted as to the part "every punishment is a punishment of loss." But for the other part, where it is said that "there is no punishment of sense," the consequence is to be denied; for the punishment of sense is also a punishment of loss, i.e., one which loss follows or accompanies.

To the **fifth**, it must be said that when evil is said to be the privation of a due good, it is to be understood: **when it ought to be present and as it ought to be**. And taking the consequent thus, grant it. Regarding that by which it is first proved to be false—assuming that the earth was earlier in time "void and unformed," and not only earlier by nature or cause, for then the argument would have no place—I say that such privations were not privations of any good **due to be present at that time**, and consequently they were not any evils. Whence, just as according to **Hugh** in *On the Sacraments*, book 1, and also the **Master** in book 2, distinction 20, if Adam had fathered sons before sin, they would have been born small in body, not yet able to speak or walk, even without knowledge and cognition of the truth, and consequently with the lack of many goods which they would have acquired later by the onset of age, and yet such lacks of goods would not have been vices or any evils in them, because those goods were not due to them at that time; so I say that those privations concerning the earth were not any evils, because the opposite goods were not due to be present at that time.

To the **second proof** of the falsity of that consequent, I say that in that case given, there would have been some evil in Adam, but nevertheless **not of fault nor of punishment** properly speaking of punishment according to which *poena* is named from *pendo* ("to weigh/pay") and whence "punish" (*punio*) is derived. Whence he who brings about a punishment is said to "punish." And although in fact and according to divine ordination "**every evil is sin or the punishment of sin**", namely actual or original, as Augustine says, it is nevertheless **not impossible** for there to be some evil which is neither sin nor the punishment of sin; nor does Augustine say the opposite. So it would be in the case given.

To the **sixth**, it must be said that both that angel and also the man would be deprived of some good. For to both, as to every rational creature, it is a good to be **naturally apt** for the good of virtue; and to be more apt is a greater good. Now, this good is diminished in anyone sinning through sin; for through sin one becomes **more apt for vice and less apt for good**. And this "aptitude," according to some, is that "good of order" or that "natural order" whose corruption **Augustine** says is evil in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, when he says: "Evil is nothing other than the corruption of either mode, or species, or natural order."

To the point, I say that both that angel and the man would be deprived of a good of this kind of order or natural aptitude—not because they would not be apt afterward, but because they would be **less apt** than before. Furthermore, it can be said that both would be deprived of the good of natural order, taking such order according to the opinion of **Augustine** in *Against Faustus*, 22. For he maintains that the order which naturally ought to be in man is that the **body be subject to the soul**, the inferior part to the superior—namely **sensuality to reason**—and again the "action of reason to contemplation," whether working through faith, as long as we are "pilgrims from the Lord," or through sight, when we shall be "equal to the angels of God." Now this **order** can be considered according to **act** and according to **aptitude**, and in both ways it is a certain good. For if it is a good that a man be so ordered, it is also a good to be apt to be so ordered. Moreover, this aptitude is diminished in anyone sinning; for every man by sin is rendered less apt for this: that reason should dominate over sensuality within him, and contemplation over action. Similarly, an angel is rendered less apt for this: that his action or active life be subject to contemplation, and thus the good is diminished in him.

Reply to Objections against the Second Conclusion

To the arguments against the second conclusion, I respond. To the first, I deny the antecedent regarding the second part. To the first proof, I say that not every **negation of a greater good is a greater evil**—indeed, some is not an evil, as is clear from what has been said—but rather the negation of a greater good **due to be present**, assuming the existence of the subject. Just as not every negation of a greater good is a greater vice or a greater deformity (namely, that which does not presuppose the existence of a subject owing to have such a good), indeed such is neither a vice nor a deformity; although the negation of a lesser good in a subject in which it ought to exist is both a vice and a deformity. To the second proof, I deny the consequence. And if in the consequent "to be deprived" is taken properly, it is clear that it implies impossibilities; for, since **privation properly accepted** presupposes the existence of the subject, it is impossible for something to be deprived unless it exists, and consequently has or is some good. If, however, it is accepted improperly, such that the significance of the subject of the consequent itself is the same as "to have no good" or "to be nothing," the consequence still does not hold for the stated reason: namely, because "to be evil" and similarly "to be worse" or "worst" presupposes the **existence of the**

subject. Whence, just as it does not follow—as **Augustine** implies in *On the Nature of the Good*—that although that which moves less in the same time is slow, and that which moves still less is slower, it nevertheless does not follow that that which does not move at all is the "slowest" or "most slow." And similarly, if some luminous thing is deprived of some degree of its light, it becomes obscure. And if it is deprived of another such degree, it becomes more obscure. If, however, it is deprived of every degree of light, it does not become "most obscure," indeed it is not even obscure, but **dark**. And this is because slowness exists only in that which moves, and obscurity only in that which has some light; and so in the proposition, because **evil or malice exists only in an existing thing**.

To the second argument, I concede the antecedent, and I deny the consequence. To the proof, I say that what is assumed is false; for even something **not evil is to be fled from**, namely that whose opposite is to be desired. But "to be" is certainly to be desired. To the third argument, one must also respond by denying the consequence.

ARTICLE 2: On the Acceptance of Actual Sin

Regarding the second article, I say that **actual sin** can be taken in two ways: In one way **properly**, namely for that from which one is first denominated as **sinning**. In another way **improperly** or at least less properly, namely for something implied in that from which one is first denominated as sinning, such as for some entity which, by doing, one sins, or for the negation or non-being of some entity which, by not doing, one sins.

First Conclusion Explained

Taking sin in the first way, I will say first **what sin is** and from its description I will infer some corollaries. Second, I will inquire whether sin accepted in this way is any **entity**. Third, it will be seen how sin is an **evil** and whether it is called evil and sin by the same reason, or by different ones.

Regarding the first point, asserting nothing however but speaking only probably, it seems to me that it can be said that **actual sin is nothing other than voluntarily to commit or omit something against right reason**. And for the sake of brevity—since it is sufficiently in use that we say both he who sins by omitting (or not doing what he ought to do) and he who sins by doing what he ought not, "do badly," although he who omits, properly speaking, does nothing insofar as he is such—I say thus, using the word commonly and broadly, that **sin is nothing other than voluntarily to act against right reason** or against that which ought to be done according to right reason.

I declare this as follows: Everyone who is truly said to sin or is denominated a sinner is said to sin primarily and precisely from this: because he **voluntarily acts against right reason** (and I use the verb "to act" according to the common, though improper, acceptance premised above); therefore, sin is voluntarily to act against right reason.

The consequence is clear; for by the name of sin we signify nothing other than that from which one is first denominated as sinning, as has been said. The antecedent is clear, because this alone being posited, one is said to sin, and this alone being removed, by no means. For if one acts according to what right reason judges ought to be done by him, he acts as he ought to act; and if so, he does not sin. For to say the opposite is a crime according to **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 3, chapter 37.

This is confirmed: Both because, since everyone who sins insofar as he is such is rightly blamed, it would follow that he who acted as he ought to act would be rightly blamed; which, as **Augustine** says in the same place, chapter 35, is "**execrable insanity**" and a "**most miserable error**." Again, if one voluntarily acts against that which right reason judges ought to be done by him, he acts against that which he ought, and through this is rightly blamed. However, he would not be rightly blamed if he lacked fault and did not sin, as is clear, and **Augustine** also posits in the same book, chapter 1. Therefore, primarily and precisely from this does one sin or is a sinner, speaking thus of sin, because he **voluntarily acts against right reason**.

To this description is convertible and consonant the description of **Augustine**, who in *Against Faustus*, 22, defining sin, says: "**Sin is a deed or word or desire against the eternal law**." And soon explaining what he understands by eternal law, he adds: "**But the eternal law is the divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed**." Therefore, it is valid to say "against the eternal law" as much as if it were said "against **divine reason**, etc." Since therefore divine reason is certainly always most right, everything which is against the eternal law is against right reason. And whatever is against *some* right reason is also against *any* right reason regarding the same matter, for concerning the same thing any right reason is consonant with any right reason and none is adverse to any, just as neither is truth to truth. It follows that whatever is against right reason is against the eternal law, and through this, according to Augustine, it is rightly said that sin is a deed or word or desire against right reason, that is, as will appear later, to do or say or desire (all of which are comprehended under the word "**to act**") against right reason.

If it is asked why I say absolutely "**against right reason**" rather than restrictedly "against divine reason," I answer: Lest it be thought that sin is precisely against divine reason and not against any right reason regarding the same thing; or lest it be estimated that something is a sin not because it is against divine reason insofar as it is right, but because it is against it insofar as it is divine. For, if by impossibility divine reason or God Himself did not exist, or if that reason were erring, still, if someone acted against right angelic or human reason or any other, if there were any, he would sin. And if there were absolutely no right reason, still, if someone acted against that which some right reason would dictate ought to be done, if there were any, he would sin. And therefore in positing the conclusion I said "**sin is to act against right reason**" or "against that which ought to be done according to right reason."

First Corollary

From what has been said, three corollaries follow. One is that, speaking properly of sin as above, **sin is not something incomplexly signifiable, but only complexly**. This is proved: For that someone acts against right reason can only be signified through a sentence or something equivalent to a sentence in signifying.

This is confirmed: For in prohibitions or negative precepts, those things which are prohibited are properly called sins, and in affirmative ones, the opposites of those things which are commanded. But in both cases, only **complexly signifiable** things are of this kind. Therefore, only such things are properly called sins; and so it is of the rest, if there are any not prohibited. The assumption is clear by running through examples. For when it is said "**You shall not commit adultery**," neither the man nor the woman nor

anything incomplexly signifiable is prohibited, but it is prohibited that someone be joined to one not his own. The same is clear concerning the others to one considering it.

Objections against the First Corollary

But against this, first, seems to be the authority of **Augustine** in *Against Faustus* previously alleged; for he says sin is "**a word or deed or desire** against the eternal law." Now it is established that any of the aforesaid is **incomplexly signifiable**; whence even he signifies them through simple terms.

Second, to the same point is another definition given by the same author regarding sin in the book *On the Two Souls*. For he says: "**Sin is the will of retaining or pursuing what justice forbids.**" Now it is established that "will" or "volition" is something incomplexly signifiable. This is confirmed, because in many places **Augustine** and other saints call the bad movement of the will or a bad volition a sin; and it is established that that is incomplexly signifiable, just as well as knowledge, color, or the heavens. Therefore sin is something incomplexly signifiable.

Reply to Objections against the First Corollary

To the **first**, I say that, as I touched upon above, those simple terms "**word, deed, desire**" are placed in the stead of their **infinitives** standing verbally with the implication of their subjects, and through this they have equivalently the signification of complex terms. And the sense is: Sin is **to say** or **to do** something, etc. And that this is so, is clear: For if "desire" had there properly an incomplex signification, it would certainly stand for the thing desired and it would be denoted that that thing was a sin; which is false. For it is certain that if someone desires the wife of a neighbor or his possession, neither his wife nor the possession is a sin. The same is clear regarding that term "**deed**." For if someone commits adultery by actually joining himself to an adulteress, nothing **incomplexly signifiable** is the "deed" that is his sin. For neither he nor the adulteress is the sin; nor does anything else appear "done" there, unless perhaps some offspring is generated, but neither is that the sin. Therefore "**that he is joined to another**" is what Augustine calls the "deed" and that is his sin.

If it is said that there is something "done" there, namely the act of adulterating or **adultery** itself, it is not valid, because one cannot feign what entity or what incomplexly signifiable thing distinct from the adulterer and adulteress is the "act of adulterating" or "adultery"; but these are said of such a **complexly signifiable** thing as is signified when it is said of someone that he commits adultery or is joined to the wife of another. And such words are imposed in this way for the brevity of speech.

Nor can it even be said that that "deed," which is called sin, is the **concupiscence** itself or the will of joining himself to the wife of another. For there Augustine posits those three words "word, deed, desire" so that he might comprehend three genera of sins which are commonly distinguished, namely of **heart, mouth, and work**; where by "**desire**" he signifies the sin which one commits by thinking, but by "**deed**" he signifies the sin which one commits externally by executing what he had thought. Therefore Augustine does not understand by "deed" that concupiscence.

To the **second**, it can be said that that name "**will**" is placed in the stead of this infinitive "**to will**" standing verbally, and that definition is equivalent to this: "**Sin is to will to retain or pursue what justice forbids**"; and thus the whole intention of Augustine is saved and the proposition is sustained. In another

way, it can be said that Augustine does not accept sin there strictly and properly, but improperly, namely for the **bad act** which someone sins by doing. For such an act is frequently called sin by him and by others, although not the act itself, but **to do it against right reason** is properly called sin. And through this the confirmation is also answered.

Second Corollary

The **second corollary** is that **many things are sins of themselves** and not precisely because they are prohibited. Indeed, assuming that they were not prohibited, one acting in such a way would still sin. And I speak here of prohibition strictly, namely imperative, by which a superior commands an inferior not to do this or that.

This corollary is clear from what has been said: Because in many things one could act against right reason, even if he had received no precept concerning not acting; therefore, etc.

The assumption is clear, because, even if no precept had been given or were to be given to man, still, with God helping, he could know and judge that **God is not to be hated but loved above all things**, as the highest good and the author of all our goods. He could also know that parents, and especially virtuous ones and right emulators of their children, are to be honored by children, that a virtuous man insofar as he is such is not to be hated, that no one is to be injured, and many other **practical truths**, which even the philosophers of the world, having no precepts or prohibiting law, knew; and yet with all these, he could hate God or not love Him as he ought, dishonor parents, envy the virtue of a neighbor and inflict injuries on him no less than he can now, having precepts to the opposites of the aforesaid.

The consequence is clear: Both because this is to sin, which is **voluntarily to act against right reason**, as is clear from what has been said; and because one acting in such a way would disturb the **natural order**, which the eternal law commands to be preserved, and thus he would sin according to **Augustine** in *Against Faustus*. The assumption is clear from the fact that the natural order is that all morals and actions of man be subject to reason. Whence, as **Augustine** says in *On Free Will*, book 1, chapter 7: "**When reason dominates the morals of the soul, a man is to be called ordered. For it is not a right order, or to be called order at all, where better things are subjected to worse ones**"; and a little later: "**Therefore when reason rules the irrational motions of the mind, then that rules in man to which domination is due by the law which we have found to be eternal.**" And this opinion is posited by the same author in *Against Faustus*, 22, as was touched upon above.

This is confirmed from the intention of **Augustine** in the epistle *To Hilary of Syracuse*, where distinguishing between the **natural law** and the written law, he says: "**That law being transgressed, which is in the use of reason of a rational soul in the age of a man already using reason, 'all the sinners of the earth become transgressors.'** But that law also being transgressed which was given through Moses, the offense abounds much more." From which words it is clear that if someone acted against the natural law alone or against the right judgment of reason, he would certainly sin, although, if he had a superadded precept with this, he would sin more. And this is confirmed by that saying of the **Apostle** in Romans 5: "**The law entered in, that the offense might abound**"; which according to Augustine in the immediate context is to be accepted not concerning original but actual offense. For the offense would not abound for the working man regarding the same work by the entry of the law, as

according to **Augustine** the Apostle intends, unless man before the entry of the law had an offense by doing that very thing. But it is established that he would not have had it, if nothing were a sin except because it was prohibited.

This corollary is also proved in itself, because if there were no sins except because they were prohibited, it would follow that if men had received no precepts, whatever they did, they would not sin. This is clear; but the consequent is false and expressly against **Augustine** in the epistle *To Asellicus*, where concerning those thinking they could fulfill that law or commandment by their own powers, in which it is said "**You shall not covet**," he says: "**And through this they become not only sinners, which they would be even if they had not received the law, but also transgressors, which they would not be unless they had received the law.**" Furthermore, it is established that the **gentile philosophers**, who did not receive the law, sinned in many things, as the **Apostle** also testifies in Romans 1.

Second, it would be possible for man, with no precept made to him, neglecting eternal and spiritual goods, to turn to temporal and corporal goods; therefore also to sin. The antecedent is clear, because he can do this even having a precept to the contrary. The consequence is clear: Both through **Augustine**, *On Free Will*, book 1, last chapter—for according to him in the same place this is to sin—and because thus the **natural order** would be disturbed, which the eternal law commands to be preserved and forbids to be disturbed, as was alleged above. For as **Augustine** says there, namely in *On Free Will*: "**It belongs to a perverse and disordered mind to be subjected to following those things, to the guiding of which by its own command it is placed over by divine order and right.**"

Third, we do not read that any precept was given to the **angel**, and it is certain that it was possible for it to be so; and yet, if he had had no precept and had desired equality with God, just as he desired, he would certainly have sinned.

Fourth, if nothing were a sin except what is prohibited, since it is possible for nothing to be prohibited, it would be possible that to hate God and to envy a good man and to lie **would not be a sin**. And if so, as it seems, it would be possible for **God to lie**, the opposite of which was sufficiently proved in the first book. The consequence is clear, because this does not seem repugnant to God from any other source, except because to lie is to do badly and is a sin. It would also be possible for God to hate Himself and to envy a good man; which is absurd to say. The consequence is clear, because this does not seem repugnant to Him, except because they are depraved and sins.

This corollary is also clear by authorities. For **Augustine** says in *On Free Will*, book 1, chapter 3: "**Adultery is not evil because it is forbidden by law, but therefore it is forbidden by law because it is evil.**" The same author in the *Gloss* on that of Leviticus 19, "**You shall not lie**"—determining earlier that a lie, even by which no one is harmed and which is done for safety, is illicit and prohibited by divine law—consequently asks: "Whether," he says, "from the time it was said in the law 'You shall not lie,' was it not lawful to lie in such a case or cause?" And he answers saying: "**But rather, because the lie was unjust, therefore it was prohibited; not because it was prohibited, was it therefore unjust.**"

To this the opinion of the **Philosopher** accords entirely, saying in *Ethics* II, chapter 5: "**Not every operation nor every passion of the soul admits of a mean. For some have been named immediately**

as involved with malice, such as joy at evil, shamelessness, and envy, and in operations adultery, theft, homicide. For all these and those which are called such are said to be evil in themselves."

Objections against the Second Corollary

But against this corollary conclusion seems to be **Augustine** in the book *On the Baptism of Infants*, 2, to Marcellinus, saying: "**For neither will it be a sin, if there is one, unless it is divinely commanded not to be.**" Likewise in the same place below: "How," he says, "**is it not forbidden by God's justice, if it is a sin?**"

Likewise in the book *On the Two Souls*: "**No one,**" he says, "**is worthy of blame or condemnation, either doing nothing against a prohibition or not doing what he cannot do; but every sin is either to be blamed or condemned.**" From this it follows that every sin is prohibited; whence also there defining sin he says that "**it is the will of retaining or pursuing what justice forbids.**"

Furthermore, to the same point is valid what he says in *Against Faustus*, defining sin to be **against the eternal law**: "**But the eternal law is the divine reason or the will of God commanding the natural order to be preserved, forbidding it to be disturbed.**" From which also it follows that every sin is forbidden by the eternal law.

This is confirmed by the authority of the **Psalmist** saying: "**I have accounted all the sinners of the earth as transgressors.**" But not all would be transgressors unless every sin were prohibited by precept or law; for, as the **Apostle** says in Romans 4, "**where there is no law, neither is there transgression.**"

Likewise **Ambrose** in the book *On Paradise*, and it is alleged by the **Master** in book 2, distinction 35, chapter 1: "**What is sin,**" he says, "**except the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience of the heavenly precepts? Therefore, in the transgressor there is sin, but in the commander there is no fault. For sin would not exist if there had been no interdiction.**" Thus Ambrose. From these it seems to be concluded universally that **all sins are prohibited by God**, nor are any sins except because they are prohibited.

Reply to Objections against the Second Corollary

To these I respond that **prohibition** can be taken in two ways, and similarly **precept** and **law**:

In one way **commonly**, as it is said of both **indicative** and **imperative** [prohibition].

Indicative prohibition is that by which it is only signified that something is **not to be done** or something else from which it follows that it is not to be done; as when it is signified that something is unjust or depraved or worthy of blame or punishment. Such are those words of the **Apostle** in Romans 1: "**Those who do such things are worthy of death**" and in Ephesians 5: "**Every fornicator or unclean person or covetous one**" etc. "**has no inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and God,**" and those of the **Psalmist**: "**The Lord will abhor the man of blood and deceit,**" and many other words from which it is gathered that certain things are illicit and ought not to be done, and so consequently are said in some way to be prohibited. And similarly, when it is enunciated that some things are **to be done** or something else from which it follows that they are to be done—as because they are said to be just or acceptable to God or

worthy of retribution or praise or glory—such things are said to be commanded by an **indicative precept**. Now I call it indicative because it is expressed vocally through a verb of the indicative mood. That the names of prohibition and precept are sometimes accepted thus by the doctors is clear through **Hugh** in *On the Sacraments*, book 1, part 6, chapter 6, where in the premised distinction concerning the precepts of nature and discipline: "**In the precept of nature,**" he says, "**there are three things: command, prohibition, and concession. But by the precept of nature we understand nothing other than natural discretion itself, which is inspired intrinsically so that through it man might be instructed concerning those things which were either to be sought or fled by him; for to give a certain precept was to inspire discretion and the intelligence of acting into the heart of man. What therefore was the knowledge of things to be done except a certain command made to the heart of man? And what again was the knowledge of things to be avoided except a certain prohibition? And what indeed was the knowledge of those things which were intermediate to be esteemed except a certain concession, etc.?**"

From these points it is clear that every knowledge which man has concerning things to be done or avoided is called in a certain way **command** or **prohibition**, and consequently indicative or enunciative knowledge.

I call **imperative prohibition** that by which someone is commanded to do or not do something; and this is expressed through a verb of the imperative mood or another taken in its place and for signifying similarly, as when the **Psalmist** says: "**Do not speak iniquity against God,**" or when the Lord says: "**You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal, etc.**" And if these are taken strictly and properly, only that is called imperative by which an inferior is imperatively prohibited something by his superior.

In a **second way**, prohibition can be accepted specially and strictly, namely for the **imperative only**, such as is now described.

Now to the point, I say that **every sin**, speaking of prohibition in the **first way**, is **prohibited by God**. And if something were not prohibited—the divine law standing, which is God—it would not be a sin. For the eternal law judges at least indicatively that every sin is **not to be done**; and if it did not judge so concerning something, that thing would not be against right reason, and consequently not a sin. I say also that it is impossible for some sins **not to be prohibited** by God, speaking thus of prohibition. For concerning some things it is impossible that they not be against the eternal law, such as to hate God, to injure another, etc., which are **evil in themselves**. For just as it is impossible for it not to be true that God is not to be hated and no one is to be injured, so it is impossible that the highest truth, the eternal law, not judge that God is not to be hated and that no one is to be injured, and through this it is impossible that to hate God or to injure a neighbor not be prohibited by the eternal law; and the same judgment applies to the others which are unjust in themselves.

But if one speaks of prohibition in the **second way**: whether every sin is prohibited (as seems to some) or not every sin but only some (as others would say, because concerning this I define nothing at present), I say that **not all are necessarily prohibited by God**, indeed none. For it is and was possible for God to make no such **imperative command** to anyone, as is certain; yet, even if none were or had been prohibited in this way, still, if someone hated God and the other things which have been mentioned, he

would act and certainly sin. In this **second way**, as I said above, I accept prohibition in the aforesaid corollary; and so it is accepted by the doctors when such a question is disputed.

The **authorities** indeed of both Augustine and Ambrose accept law and precept and prohibition in the **first way**, therefore they are not against me.

To the authority of the **Psalmist**, I say that **transgression** (*praevaricatio*) is also accepted in two ways: Namely **commonly**, in which way anyone is called a transgressor who acts against the law, speaking commonly of law; and **specially**, as namely he only is called a transgressor who acts against the law taken specially and in the second way. The saying of the **Psalmist** is to be understood in the first way and not the second, as is expressly clear through **Augustine** in the previously alleged epistle *To Hilary*.

Third Corollary

The **third corollary** is that **man can do many things which God cannot command him to do**. I do not accept here "to do" properly, as namely it is the same as to produce some entity, but improperly, just as we say someone can "do" something from the fact that he can fornicate or can abstain from fornication or do some other thing **complexly signifiable** by means of the infinitive of some verb, although none of such things can properly be said to "become." Yet such is the custom of speaking, that we comprehend all such things in this one general word.

Understanding this corollary thus, it is proved, first as follows: **Man can do many things which he can never do well**; therefore man can do many things which God cannot command him to do.

The consequence is proved, because whatever things man can do, if God could command him to do them, man could do them **from a divine precept**. But whatever things man can do from a divine precept, he can certainly do well. For whatever man does by fulfilling God's precept, he does well, just as whatever he does by transgressing a mandate, he does badly. If therefore whatever man can do, God can command him to do, whatever man can do, he can do well. But this is repugnant to the antecedent; therefore the consequence is good.

The antecedent is proved, because, as is clear from the **second corollary**, there are many things which are **evil in themselves** which man can do. But such things he can never do well. Otherwise by doing badly he would do well, and to do badly would be to do well; which implies a repugnance. The consequence is clear, because any of those things which are evil in themselves is a certain "doing badly." Second, because man can do many things which can never be judged by right reason as **to be done**, and consequently which he can never do well; for it never happens that one does something well unless that thing is "to be done" according to right reason. The assumption is proved, because there are many things for which "they are not to be done" is a **necessary truth**, and consequently "they are to be done" is a **false impossibility**, and through this they can never be judged by true or right reason as to be done; and yet man can do them, for example: that no one is to be injured, evil is not to be rendered to anyone for good, no one is to be envied, and many others which concerning **agibles** (actable things) are first principles and self-evidently true, just as that if "**equals are [added] to equals, they are mutually equal,**" and "**if equals are added to equals, the results are equal,**" or any other first principles in **speculables** (speculative matters). And therefore **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 18, concerning such first known truths about agibles

(which he calls lights of virtues and rules of wisdom because, as he says, "**the more one leans on them for conducting life, the more wisely he lives**"), says that "**they are as true and unchangeable as the rules of numbers are true and unchangeable**," although he posits other examples than I have posited above; which however does not vary the proposition.

Second, the same antecedent is proved by the authority of the **Philosopher** in *Ethics* II, after the words alleged above ("For all these and those which are called such are said to be evil in themselves") adding without a medium: "**But not the excesses of them nor the defects. Therefore it is never possible to direct [oneself] concerning these**" (that is, to act rightly), "**but always to sin. Nor is there 'well' and 'not well' concerning such things, in that [one acts] as one ought and when and how—for instance to commit adultery—but simply to do any of these is a sin.**" The text is clear. **Augustine** also in the *Gloss* on Leviticus alleged above says that "**idolatry or adultery and theft cannot be just**," therefore neither can they be done well.

Second principally thus: It is **not possible for God to do anything against right reason**; therefore man can do many things which God cannot command him to do.

The antecedent is proved, because it is not possible for God to sin, therefore neither is it possible for Him to do anything against right reason. The consequence is clear, because if God did anything against right reason, He would certainly sin, since **to sin is nothing other than to act against right reason**, nor is one said to sin from any other source, as is clear above.

The first consequence is proved, because man can do many things which, **if God commanded man to do**, God would certainly act against right reason; for example, man can injure another, envy a neighbor, hate God, and such sins in themselves; whatever of such things God commanded, He would act against right reason. For it is no less right (and right reason judges it is not to be commanded to man that he hate God or do injury to a neighbor or envy) than it judges that God is not to be hated or a neighbor injured or envied.

This is confirmed from the words of **Augustine** saying in *83 Questions*, question 4, that **a depraved man cannot not be a persuader of evils**; which if true, it is clear by the topic *a maiori* that a depraved man cannot not be a **commander or preceptor of evils**. Indeed, it seems much worse to command evils than merely to persuade them. Therefore, if God commanded such things, He would be depraved; which is impossible.

Third to the same point thus: No one can become **worse** by God commanding it; therefore man can do many things which God etc.

The consequence is clear, because man can do many things which he cannot do without becoming worse by doing them, namely those which are unjust in themselves and sins.

I prove the antecedent, just as **Augustine** proves in *83 Questions*, question 3, that **man cannot become worse with God as author**. For he argues thus: "**By no wise man does a man become worse; for that fault is not small, indeed it is so great that it cannot fall upon a wise man, although a man. But God is more excellent than every wise man; much less therefore does a man become worse with God as author, for the will of God is much more excellent than that of a wise man.**" In a similar way I argue:

By no wise man commanding does a man become worse; for the fault is so great that it cannot fall upon a wise man, as is clear etc.

Objections against the Third Corollary

Against this it can be argued, first thus: All things which **man** can command man to do, **God** can also; but whatever man can do, man can command man to do; therefore etc.

Second, every effect possible to be done by a creature, God can do by Himself; this is clear from what was said in the first book, distinction 42, question 1. But the **precept** by which man would be commanded to hate God or any other evil in itself is possible to be done by a creature, for instance by a man or a devil. Therefore God can also make such a precept by Himself, and thus whatever man can do, God can command him to do.

Third, concerning no possible thing done by man, if it be posited as commanded by God, is any contradiction implied or inferred; therefore whatever is possible to be done by man, God can command him to do.

Fourth, if He could not [command] some things, this would seem to be concerning those which were said above to be **evil in themselves**. But this is not true. For in fact we read that He commanded the sons of Israel to **lie** to the Egyptians in asking for a loan of their vessels and furniture, in which He also seems to have commanded them **theft or robbery**.

Likewise He seems to have commanded **Samson** homicide both of himself and of others; otherwise he does not seem able to be excused from the crime of his own death and through this for it to be sustained that he was not damned, which however is unhesitatingly to be held, since the **Apostle** places him in the catalog of saints in Hebrews 11.

Likewise in **Hosea** 1 it is read that God commanded the prophet to commit adultery. For it is written that the Lord said to him: "**Go, take to yourself a wife of harlotry and make for yourself children of harlotry**"; and according to **Jerome** he calls a "wife of harlotry" a harlot of hired body, whence he speaks of carnal fornication. But he would not make "children of harlotry" unless he fornicated with her.

Reply to Objections against the Third Corollary

To the **first** of these, I respond by denying the major premise understood absolutely as it is posited. Whence, just as man can sin and do something against right reason which God cannot, so he can **command something badly** to another, which God cannot. But if the major were understood of **just power**, it would be conceded; for whatever man can justly command man, God can [also], and many more things; but then the minor premise duly assumed will be false.

To the **second**, I concede that every precept factible by man God can make by Himself alone. But from this it does not follow what is further inferred, namely that "**whatever man can do, God can command him to do.**" For some precept of man—for example, by which he commands another to kill someone else—God could make by causing, namely, that entity which is the precept, but nevertheless **He would**

command nothing to anyone by it, and it would not then be a precept [in the sense of a binding command], as was declared in the first book, distinction 42, question 1.

To the **third**, I deny the antecedent. For, as was proved above, there are some things which, if God commanded them, **He would sin**; from which it follows that He would not be God. And on the other hand, if God commanded, He would be God; and if He were, He would be God. And thus, if He commanded those things, God would be God and God would not be God; which are contradictories.

To the **fourth**, I deny the minor. To the first proof concerning the precept made to the sons of Israel about the lie, it must be said that God did not command them to lie nor to say anything false with the intention of deceiving the Egyptians, as was well declared in the previously alleged distinction of the first book, question 2. Concerning **theft and robbery**, it is clear that they were not commanded by God, indeed they committed neither robbery nor theft. For, since God is the Lord of all things and judge of all men, certainly He could by right of dominion deprive the Egyptian sinners of that which they held in the things they possessed and transfer it to the sons of Israel. And so the sons of Israel, taking away those things by the command of the Lord, committed neither theft nor robbery, just as they did not take away what belonged to another.

To that concerning **Samson**, it must be said that by killing himself and others by the command of the Lord, he **neither sinned nor committed homicide**, according to which homicide is a sin prohibited in the law. Where it should be known that not everyone killing a man is called a homicide or said to commit homicide. Otherwise a minister of justice killing a malefactor would act against God's precept and sin; which is false, as is clear through **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 1, chapter 3. But, as the same author says in the epistle *To Dulcitius*, "**he who kills a man without any authority of legitimate power is a homicide.**" Now, however, Samson was not such, since God could legitimately inflict death on both him and the others on account of their past crimes, either by Himself or by another whom He wished to choose for this ministry; wherefore Samson, killing himself and others by God's precept as God's minister with respect to his own and others' death, was not a homicide.

To that concerning **Hosea**, it must be said that, as is clear from the glosses, it is not to be understood that she was a harlot after she was taken by the prophet, but **before**, and that she had generated children of harlotry *before*. God commanded the prophet to make her his wife and to adopt the children of harlotry previously generated for himself and to love them as if generated by himself. Whence **Jerome** in the *Gloss*: "**Neither did the Lord command a base thing, nor did the prophet sin by obeying, but rather he recalled a harlot to chastity and remaining in his own goodness made a good woman from a bad one.**" And another *Gloss* says: "**He orders to assume a harlot and to take her children, so that those whom she had generated from fornication, he**"—supply 'formerly'—"might generate as free children [from a harlot]." And therefore **Jerome** in the original seems to wish that in the text there ought not to be that "make for yourself" but "**take to yourself a wife of harlotry and children of harlotry.**" To which the text of the Septuagint accords which, as is held in the *Gloss*, is such: "**Take to yourself a wife of fornication and children of fornication.**" This is also sufficiently implied in the text when it is said "**take to yourself a wife.**" For if she became a wife to him, by knowing her legitimately he did not fornicate.

Proof of the Second Conclusion

The **second conclusion**, namely that **no actual sin**—speaking properly of such sin as above—is **any entity**, is proved first from what has been said, since **nothing signifiable only complexly or equivalently is any entity**. This was proved in the first book, distinction 28, question 1. But every actual sin is of this kind, as is clear from the first corollary of the preceding conclusion; therefore etc.

This conclusion is also proved in itself, and first by **authorities**. For as **Augustine** recites in *On Nature and Grace*, well before the middle, **Pelagius**, wishing to prove that human nature was not debilitated nor changed by sin, said thus: **"Before all things I think it must be asked what sin is: a substance, or a name entirely lacking substance, by which not a thing, not an existence, not some body, but a wrongly done act is expressed."** Then he adds: **"I believe it is so; and if it is so,"** he says, **"how could that which lacks substance debilitate or change human nature?"** From this argumentation it is clear that here Pelagius accepts **substance** commonly for **entity or essence**, not restrictedly as substance is distinguished against accidental forms. For if he accepted it thus, the argument would be of no appearance. For who does not see that human nature can be debilitated and changed by many accidents, both spiritual (like errors and depraved affections by which it is rendered weaker for knowing the true and choosing the good) and corporal (by which it is rendered weaker even according to the body)? But if he accepts substance universally for entity, the argument appears [to have weight] in some way. For it can appear sufficient to someone that that which is no entity can change no nature. But **Augustine** responds to this argumentation in the same place by conceding the assumption, namely that **sin is not a substance**: **"It is so,"** he says, **"as you say; sin is not any substance, but only a wrongly done act is expressed by this name."** And a little later: **"We have learned,"** he says, **"that sin is not a substance."** Then he denies the consequence by which it is inferred that it could not debilitate nature, or he responds to Pelagius' question (which virtually carries such a consequence) by showing that even from the fact that it is absolutely no entity, nature can be debilitated, saying: **"Is it not attended to, to omit other things, that even 'not to eat' is not a substance? Indeed, one recedes from substance, since food is a substance. But to abstain from food is not a substance, and yet the substance of the body, if one abstains entirely from food, languishes."** For it is established that "not to eat" is absolutely no entity, neither a substance specially taken nor an accident. From which example also it is sufficiently clear that he wished to say that sin is absolutely no entity, and yet human nature could be debilitated by it. Thus therefore it is clear from this place that Augustine wished that **sin is not any entity**.

Likewise the same author in *On the Perfection of Justice*, near the beginning, recites an argument of **Celestius**, by which he strove to prove that man can avoid sin. For he argued thus: **"It must be asked, what is sin: an act or a thing? If it is a thing, it is necessary that it have an author. And if it is said to have an author, already another besides God will seem to be introduced as the author of some thing. Or if it is impious to say this, it is necessary to confess that every sin is an act, not a thing. If therefore it is an act, indeed because it is truly an act, it can be avoided."** Here it is clear that this one also accepts **"thing"** universally for entity, since otherwise God would not be the author of some entity, just as [He is not] of sin; which he reputes false, and truly, as will be clear in the following article. Therefore this one concludes first that **sin is not an entity but an act**, and then infers that it can be avoided. To this argument **Augustine** speaks thus in the same place: **"We answer that sin is indeed said to be and is an act, not a thing."** Now he does not accept "thing" most commonly for every complexly or incompletely signifiable thing. For in this way sin and act or any "doing" can be called a "thing," just as he accepts "thing" below, when according to the authority of Job—according to another letter saying: **"There was a man dwelling etc."** and it follows: **"abstaining himself from every evil thing"**—he says that sin,

"although it be an act, can be called a thing." But he accepts "thing" for **essence or entity**; for thus every thing other than God has God as author. And accepting it thus he says **"sin is an act, not a thing"**; from which the proposition is clear. And he immediately responds to the consequence of Celestius saying: **"But also in the body limping is by the same reason an act, not a thing; since the thing is the foot itself or the body or the man who limps with a vitiated foot, and yet he cannot avoid the limping unless he has a healed foot."** From which example also the proposition is declared. For one cannot feign what thing or entity is **"limping"** or **"to limp"** (which is the same), assuming as constant from what was said above that **motion is not a thing in itself distinct from permanent things**.

Likewise, in Homily 1 on John—expounding that verse of John 1, **"All things were made through Him, and without Him was made nothing"**—he says: **"Sin indeed was not made through Him; and it is manifest, because sin is nothing."** And below on the same words: **"Every creature,"** he says, **"great or small, was made through Him: things above and below, spiritual and corporal, were made through Him. For no form, no structure, no harmony of parts, no substance of any kind which can have weight, number, and measure exists, except through that Word and by that Creator Word, to whom it is said: 'You have disposed all things in measure and number and weight.'"** Thus he speaks. Where for the proof of the proposition he first makes use of what he says, **"sin is nothing,"** therefore it is not any entity; second, because, as is clear from the second part of the authority, when the Evangelist says **"all things were made through Him,"** by the term **"all things"** every entity small and great is generally signified, so that that saying is as valid as if it were said **"every entity was made through Him."** But in the first part he says **"sin was not made through Him."** From which it is necessarily and evidently concluded: **"therefore sin is not an entity,"** in which way also **Augustine** seems to have concluded that **"sin is nothing"** in the first part of the authority.

This conclusion is also proved by **reasons**; and first indeed because, if sin is some entity, we must either say that God is not the maker of some entity which is not God, or confess that God is the author of sin. But neither seems capable of being said catholically, as **Augustine** says in *On Free Will*, book 1, chapter 2: **"We believe that all things that exist are from one God, and yet that He is not the author of sins."** Likewise in *83 Questions*, question 21, he says of God that He is not the author of evil, **"who is the author of all things that exist,"** where, as the **Master** says in book 2, distinction 37 at the end (and proves by the saying of the same **Augustine** in *Retractations* 1, chapter 26), **"by the name of evil sins are understood."** In the same place also the **Master** says that **"all catholic treatisers agree that God is not the author of evils,"** that is, of sins. Now it is established that every entity is of the number of those things "that exist."

Furthermore, this is clear concerning certain ones in particular. For neither is **adultery** any entity, because neither the adulterer nor the adulteress nor any other entity can be feigned which is adultery, as was said above. Similarly neither is **homicide**. For what entity would it be, since neither the killer nor the killed nor the instrument of killing nor absolutely any entity appears to concur there which is this sin that we name homicide? So it is concerning **theft** and other sins by which men sin in external operation. And just as such things are not any entities, but only certain **complexly signifiable** things, so also it seems one must think concerning other sins.

Objections against the Second Conclusion

But against these things it can be argued, and first from the **authorities** previously alleged proving the conclusion. For in both **Augustine** says that "**sin is an act.**" But every act is an entity, as is established; therefore etc. And from this it is clear that when **Augustine** says "**sin is not a thing,**" he does not take "thing" as every thing is called an entity, but specially for that entity which has an act, such as is properly a **substance** capable of acting per se. For such a thing is not sin, but is the act of some such thing. And with this it stands well that sin is a certain entity in itself.

This is confirmed by **Augustine** himself in the *Hypognosticon*, response 1 at the end, when he says: "**The evil works of the devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things which are said to do something as if per se.**" Where it appears what entities he calls "things," namely those which are said to do something per se. And so he shows he should be understood elsewhere, where he distinguishes act against thing.

Second, if sin is not any entity, there is no **author of sin**; for, as was said in the first article, there is an efficient cause only of an entity. But this consequent is false and expressly against the same author in book 1 of *On Free Will*, chapter 1, where, having distinguished between the evil of fault and of punishment and having said that God is in no way the author of evils of the first kind, to the disciple asking whether there is any author of such evil, he answers: "**There certainly is; for it could not be done with no author.**" And a little later he adds that "**everyone evil is the author of his own misdeed.**"

Third, it is established that every **act of the will**, whether good or bad, is a certain entity. But a bad act of the will is sin, as is clear through **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 39, where asking from whom is the movement of the will when it turns away from God, he says that "**such a movement is without doubt sin.**" And from this he concludes it is not from God. Now such a movement is certainly the act of the will itself.

Fourth, if sin is not an entity, therefore neither is **merit** an entity; for similarly it seems both must be said. But the consequent does not seem to be granted, since all confess that the **ordered love of God** is merit, and so of other good acts of the will.

Fifth, the **Master** in *Sentences*, book 2, distinction 35, says that "**it must be freely handed down that sin is a bad act, interior and exterior, namely bad thought, speech, and operation.**" But who would doubt that **thought** is a true entity, and similarly **speech**?

This is confirmed, because no one would ever deny that **hatred of God or neighbor** is a sin, nor would anyone say that hatred of this kind is not an entity.

Reply to Objections against the Second Conclusion

To the **first**, it must be said that, generally speaking of act, **not every act is an entity**. For everything with respect to which some power is said [to exist] or something is said to be in potency, is called an act, as is sufficiently clear from *Metaphysics* IX. Now, however, many **complexly signifiable** things are of this kind. For powers are spoken of with respect to **limping** and **stealing** and **robbing**; for we say someone *can* limp, steal, and rob, and so of many other complexly signifiable things. But none of such things is an entity, as was said above. Indeed, we even say someone *can* destroy some thing and even annihilate it—for example, that God *can* annihilate every creature—and according to the custom of speech of disputants it would have to be said that such a power would be reduced to **act** if God annihilated all

things. Therefore "God annihilating every creature" would be the act of such a power, and yet it is established that it would not be any entity.

To that which is added concerning the acceptation of this term "**thing**" when act is said not to be a thing, it must be said that from such a saying of **Augustine** it by no means appears that, where he says act is not a thing, he accepts "thing" only for an entity which can act per se; indeed rather from that determination "**which are said to do something as if per se**" it is implied that certain others, namely those which cannot act per se, are called and are "things." Likewise, although here he does not absolutely deny that act is a thing, nevertheless in the places previously alleged he denies it absolutely and, as has been shown, accepts "thing" commonly for **entity** in the same place.

To the **second**, it must be said that for someone to be the **author of sin** can be understood in two ways: In one way, that is, the maker or efficient cause of that which is sin; in another way, that is, the maker of something which, by doing, he sins. And these senses are certainly diverse. For that which one sins by doing is not the sin, but **for him to do that** (or that he does that) is the sin. In the first sense, grant the consequent; and in the second, I deny the consequence. The words of **Augustine** proceed in the second sense; which is clear, because distinguishing there concerning evil he says it is accustomed to be accepted in two ways: "**One**," he says, "**when we say someone has done badly; another when [we say] he has suffered something bad.**" And a little later: "**But if you know or believe God is good, for it is not right otherwise, He does not do badly.**" And from this he concludes He is not the author of sin, for "to do badly" and "to sin" are the same. Therefore, from the fact that God does not sin by doing anything whatever He might do, he concludes He is not the author of sin. But because everyone doing badly sins by doing that thing, everyone such can be called the author of sin and of his own misdeed, if the term "**misdeed**" is a word [noun]; for thus the "misdeed" is called sin. But if it is a sentence, still even in the first sense he can be called the author of his own misdeed, that is, of that which is done badly by him. Now that which is thus done badly by him is not sin, but **that he does that badly** is certainly sin for him, as was stated immediately.

To the **third**, the minor is to be denied, accepting sin properly, as is clear from what has been said. To the proof, it must be said that **Augustine** does not accept there the movement of the will for that entity or affection by which one turns to a creature, which is now usually called the act of the will, as the argument pretends. And this is clear; for it is established that such an entity is from some efficient cause, and yet **Augustine** wishes there that that movement is **not from any cause**. For having concluded that such a movement is not from God, he asks: "**From where therefore will it be?**" And he answers: "**If I answer you asking thus that I do not know, perhaps you will be sadder. But nevertheless I would answer true things. For that which is nothing cannot be known.**" He wishes to say that, because it is not true that it is from someone, therefore it cannot be known from whom it is. Therefore he does not accept movement thus, but for that **complexly signifiable** thing which we signify when we say "**the will is turned away from God and turned to a creature**," concerning which to ask "from where it is" is nothing other than to ask: What is the cause for the will that it turns away from God? And certainly God is not such a cause for it, as **Augustine** says; otherwise He would be a cause of sinning for it. And certainly neither is anything else such a cause for it, but it is moved thus **spontaneously**, as **Augustine** determines the same in the first and second chapters of the following book. Thus he accepts the movement of the will when he says it is sin; for **that the will is moved thus** is certainly sin, and this is absolutely no entity.

To the **fourth**, whatever may be of the consequence, the consequent can be conceded. When it is proved that "it is not to be granted, since all concede that the ordered love of God is merit," it must be said that those understanding rightly do not intend that that entity which is called love is merit, but they understand that **for someone to love God is merit**. But "for someone to love God" is not love, nor any entity of the world, just as neither are other **complexly signifiable** things.

To the **fifth**, it must be said that this name "**act**" can have a double signification: Namely **merely simple and incomplex**; and thus the saying of the **Master** is not to be understood, if the speech is about sin, accepting sin properly. And it can have a **complex signification equivalently**, according to which mode some **complexly signifiable** things are called acts; whence **to steal** and **to commit adultery** are called certain bad acts, and yet they are not signifiable except complexly or equivalently. And when such things are called bad acts, nothing else is given to be understood except that he who commits adultery or steals, **acts badly**. And so the alleged saying of the **Master** is to be understood. And just as has been said of this name "act," so it must be said of these others: "**thought**," "**speech**," "**operation**." For the sense is that **to think badly** and **to speak badly** and **to operate badly** is sin. In which expressions those infinitives ought to stand verbally.

To the **confirmation**, it must be said in the same way that when it is said "**hatred of God is sin**," the true sense is that **for someone to hate God is sin**, so that that name "**hatred**" is taken to signify all that which that complex phrase "**for someone to hate God**" signifies; and this is done for the sake of briefer speech. But the sense is not that that entity or affection of the will is sin, unless perhaps sin is accepted **improperly**, namely for the act which someone sins by doing, as was said above.

Proof of the Third Conclusion

The **third conclusion**—namely that **every sin is an evil** accepting evil in the first way of the distinction posited in the preceding article, and **some is an evil** also accepting evil in the second way, yet **every one is called evil by one reason and sin by another**—is proved as to the first part thus:

Every sin corrupts or diminishes some good of the sinner; therefore every sin is an evil in the first way. The consequence is clear from what was said in the first article. The antecedent is declared; for every sin diminishes the **good of natural order** of the sinner himself, as was declared above. And this is universally true. Sometimes however with this it corrupts or diminishes a pre-existing good habit and sometimes grace and other gifts; and thus it deprives the sinner of many goods, as the **Master** also declares in book 2, distinction 35 near the end. This is confirmed by **Augustine** in the *Enchiridion*, 19, saying that "**every sin harms the doer more than the sufferer**." Which saying would not be true, unless every sin harmed the sinner.

As to the second part, the conclusion is clear concerning the **sin of omission** of him who omits to have a good will, when he ought to have it.

As to the third part, it is proved. For every sin is an evil insofar as it is a **privation of good** or insofar as it deprives the sinner of a good; but it is a sin insofar as it is **against right reason**. Therefore it is called evil by one reason, and sin by another.

Corollary

From this conclusion and its proofs it follows that **no sin of man remains entirely unpunished in this life**, but he who sins bears a punishment for every sin. It is proved: Because every sin harms the sinner by corrupting or diminishing his good, as was said; therefore from every sin the sinner suffers a loss and consequently a punishment.

This corollary is confirmed by **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 3, chapter 35, where he says: "**For because no one overcomes the laws of the omnipotent Creator, the soul is not permitted not to pay its debt. For either it pays by using well what it received, or it pays by losing what it did not wish to use well. Therefore, if it does not pay by doing justice, it will pay by suffering misery.**" And a little later: "**If it will not pay by doing what it ought, it will pay by suffering what it ought. Moreover, these are divided by no interval of time, so that as if at one time it does not do what it ought and at another suffers what it ought, lest the beauty of the universe be defiled even for a point of time, so that the disgrace of sin should exist in it without the grace of vengeance; but whatever is now avenged most secretly is kept for the future judgment for manifestation and the most bitter sense of misery.**" Thus Augustine.

ARTICLE 3

On the Question, the Affirmative Conclusion is Held

The **third article**, namely whether God is the **immediate efficient cause** of actual sin, as is clear from what has been said, has no doubt if "**sin**" is taken properly and similarly "**efficient cause**"; for it is clear that He is not. But if the name of sin is taken improperly, namely for the **bad act** or that which someone sins by doing—for example, for a bad volition or some other interior or exterior act which the sinner does—then it is doubtful. And concerning it there are solemn contrary opinions, neither of which I rashly affirm, but for now I hold the **affirmative conclusion** as more probable and, as it seems to me, more consonant with the sayings of the saints, just as it is also more commonly held by modern doctors.

First Proof of the Conclusion

The conclusion therefore to be proved is that **of the bad act which the sinner effects, God is the immediate cause, yet partial, co-effecting the same act**. I prove this first thus: Every bad act already made, as long as it exists, is immediately conserved by God; therefore every bad act, while it is being made, is immediately made by God.

The antecedent is proved, because if some bad act is not immediately conserved by God, therefore it does not depend immediately on God in its existing. Therefore either it depends immediately on no thing (and consequently neither does it depend mediately on any, and through this is simply independent) or it depends immediately on a creature alone, one or many simultaneously.

The **first** cannot be given: Both because by a stronger reason it would have to be said that the will itself and the substance of the soul would be simply independent, since it is a thing in itself much more perfect than its act which is its accident, and so consequently it would have to be said of angels and other substances; which no catholic or even true philosopher is ignorant to be most false. And because according to this it would follow that this alone being posited—namely that God conserved no thing and withdrew from all things that intimate operation by which according to the saints He contains all

things—that bad act would still exist, and because it is established that then no soul would exist, it would certainly exist by itself and without a subject; which is too absurd to say. And because according to this it would not be true what the **Apostle** says of Christ in Colossians 1, when he says: "**And all things consist in Him**" (Gloss: "**who infused in all things according to divinity sustains all things**"), and what he says in Hebrews 1 speaking of God the Father: "**Bearing all things by the word of His power**" (where the Gloss: "**Just as all things were created by Him, so they are conserved by Him immutable**").

Nor can the **second** be said, namely that it depends immediately on a **creature alone**, for example on the will itself, concerning which it would seem more likely; since, if this were true, it would follow that God could not annihilate that act while the will itself remained and willed to conserve that act, and thus "**the effect of the will of the omnipotent will would be impeded by the creature**," which, as is true, **Augustine** says is erroneous in the *Enchiridion*, 104. The consequence is clear, since God annihilates or makes a thing not to be in no other way than by **not making it to be**, according to **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1. Nor does it obviate [the argument] if it is said that besides the will there is another partial cause, for example the **knowledge of the object**, because that causes naturally, and so with that standing and the will willing to conserve the act, God will not be able to annihilate it; and so the same inconvenience follows. Therefore the antecedent is clear.

The consequence is proved first, because if no created cause suffices without God to **conserve** some such act after it has being (as is clear from what has been said), the consequent is that none suffices without God to **produce** it anew after it immediately did not have being. For "to be able [to do] the second" seems to be greater, or at least not less, than "to be able [to do] the first."

Second, because if this should be denied of God, it should not be for another reason, as it seems, except because **effecting a bad act** would be repugnant to divine goodness. But, if this were repugnant to Him, it would also be repugnant to Him to **conserve** a bad act after it has been produced, since man not only sins when he first effects a bad act, but also when he afterwards freely continues it, and through this, if God does not effect the bad act, He does not even conserve it; which is repugnant to the antecedent.

Third, the consequence is clear from the authority of the **Wise Man** saying in Wisdom 11 speaking to God: "**How could anything remain, unless You willed it? Or be conserved, which was not called by You?**" From the last part of which the Wise Man teaches that nothing can be conserved unless it is "called" by God, that is, brought to being by Him saying or making. According to which sense it is said of Him in the Psalm "**He called a famine upon the land**" according to the Gloss, and similarly that of Haggai 1 "**I called a drought**," that is a burning wind, "**upon the land**."

Second Proof of the Conclusion

Second I prove the conclusion and I suppose that in no species of bad act is there only one act numerically producible by the will, indeed many are producible entirely similar and of the same nature, whether several of them can be simultaneously in the will or not. I suppose also that no such act is of itself more producible at one time than another, nor even in any given time is any one more producible than another. These are proved in the First [Book], distinction 35, and also sufficiently commonly conceded, although perhaps the opposite might be said by some.

These being supposed, I prove the proposition thus: When the will effects some bad act, **not every possible similar one comes to be**, this is clear; therefore that one does not come to be by the **will alone**. The consequence is clear, because, since no such act is for that time more possible than another, and the created will itself holds itself **indifferently** to any of them and distinctly knows none before it actually exists (and through this cannot will to produce distinctly any of them determinately), unless some cause naturally determined to the production of one determinately concurs only—which is established to be false—or some free cause which distinctly knows them and wills to co-produce one determinately, it will never produce any, because by the reason it would produce one, by the same [it would produce] any. But such a **free cause distinctly knowing them** can be no other than **God**, as is certain. Wherefore etc.

Third Proof of the Conclusion

Third, if God were not the immediate efficient cause of the bad act, God would not be the **maker of all entities**. But the consequent is false, as contrary to the article of faith by which we confess "**God the maker of all things visible and invisible**." For what is "maker of all etc." except of all essences or entities and things? Whence **Augustine** understanding thus the profession of our faith against the Manichaeans in the book *On Their Morals* says that "**in the Catholic Church God is said to be the author of all natures and substances**." And that he accepts nature and substance universally for **entity**, is clear through the words which he immediately premises. For he says thus: "**Nature itself is nothing other than that which is understood to be something in its own genus; thus, just as we now call it essence by a new name from 'that which is to be' (esse), which we also frequently call substance, so the ancients, who did not have these names, called 'nature' that which stands for essence and substance. That itself therefore is evil, if you wish to attend without stubbornness: to fall from essence and to tend toward this, that it be nothing. Therefore when in the Catholic [Church] God is said to be the author of all natures and substances, it is simultaneously understood by those who can understand this that God is not the author of evil.**"

From these points it appears that when he says "**God is the author of all natures and substances**," by the name of nature he signifies everything which is something in its own genus and everything which has being or everything which exists. And it is certain that we also call any such thing and no other an **entity or essence**.

This is confirmed from another point. For from the fact that God is the author of all natures and yet is not the author of evil, he wishes to conclude there that **evil is nothing**, as is clear to one looking closely. Which he would not conclude, unless by the name of nature universally every entity and everything which is not nothing, but something in its own genus, were understood.

From these points it is also clear that the response and gloss which those holding the opposite part of the question give to the authorities of Augustine (which assert that every nature and substance which is not God is made by God and that He is the cause of all things that exist)—saying that by nature and substance he does not signify every essence or entity universally, but only those which **subsist per se** and can act or suffer per se, and are called by the proper name of substance according as we distinguish substances against accidents—is **not according to his mind**.

Which is also clear through his authority on that verse "**All things were made through Him**," alleged above.

Through the authority of the Gospel also touched upon, the consequent inferred above is proved to be false. For it says: "**All things were made through Him and without Him was made nothing**," that is, as **Augustine** expounds in *On the Nature of the Good*, "**without Him not anything was made**." Therefore every made entity was made through Him.

The consequence is proved, because if God is not the immediate efficient cause of the bad act, either He is simply not the efficient cause of it, and consequently is not the factor of every entity (since the bad act is certainly some entity), or He is the mediate cause only, namely moving the will itself to effect the bad act. But this cannot be said, because then it would follow that **with God as author man becomes worse** and so God would make us do evils, just as it was said in the 26th distinction, question 1, that He makes us do goods; which is blasphemous and impious to think. Whence **Augustine** on Psalm 104: "**Is it to be understood or believed that God turns the heart of men to do sins? Who would say this?**"

Perhaps it will be said that in neither way is God the factor of the bad act, but only by causing and conserving the **will** and other immediate causes, if several concur, which effect the bad act; "**for whatever is the cause of the cause, is the cause of the caused**."

But this cannot stand, because these do not suffice for God to be called truly and properly the **maker of all things**. Otherwise it could be said that the fruits of the earth and other things which are naturally generated in the world, God neither effects immediately nor makes their causes to effect, but only made and conserves those things which of themselves alone afterwards effect such effects.

But **Augustine** recites this saying to have been of the opinion of certain ones in *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, book 5, chapter 21, concerning small things, and in the same place reprobrates it as contrary to divine scripture, which says God makes these things, as was recited in the First [Book], distinction 45.

Furthermore, notwithstanding that the earth generates and conserves certain herbs, no one however says the earth makes the passions in the senses or any other qualities which are caused by those herbs. Similarly neither is a natural place said to do the actions which are effected by the located thing which it conserves. Whence air is not said to cause the coldness caused in someone by the water which it contains. And so concerning many other things it could be argued against such a response. On account of which it is also clear that never is "**that which is the cause of the cause also the cause of the caused**," unless it is a cause *that the other cause be a cause*, that is that the other cause cause, or (what is the same) unless it makes the other cause to cause or moves it to causing, just as in movers **essentially ordered** according to the doctrine of the **Philosopher** in *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* II the first mover moves the second and is the cause for it that it move another. From which places I think that magisterial proposition is taken.

Fourth Proof of the Conclusion

Fourth thus: **Every good which is not God is from God effecting it**, and I speak not only of the good of morals but also of nature; therefore every bad act is from God effecting it.

The antecedent is clear through that of **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 39: "**Hold unshaken piety**" (that is faith) "**so that no good either to one sensing or understanding or thinking in any way occurs to you which is not from God. For thus no nature occurs which is not from God.**" And through this last part of the authority it is clear he speaks universally also of the **good of nature**. Which sense is also confirmed from the following words; for he adds: "**Every good completely subtracted, not indeed 'not-nothing', but absolutely nothing will remain. Moreover every good is from God. Therefore there is no nature which is not from God.**" Thus he speaks. Therefore every "**not-nothing**" according to him is a good, and every good is from God.

The consequence is clear: Both because an act is **not nothing but a certain entity**, and consequently a certain good, as has already been touched upon; and **Augustine** also frequently says that everything which is, insofar as it is, is good. And because every act of the will, however bad, is a **more perfect entity** and nobler than any corporal accident; therefore every one is a certain good. The consequence is clear, since there are many corporal accidents, any of which is a great good, and there is none which is not some good, as can also be known from the utilities proceeding [from them]. The assumption is proved from the fact that every such act is a **vital and spiritual act**. This is confirmed by **Augustine** in *On the Trinity*, book 9, chapter 10, who proves the species of a thing existing in the soul to be better than the corporal species outside (of which it is the likeness) by this: that it is in a **better nature**. Whence he says: "**Nevertheless the imagination of a body in the mind is better than that species of the body, insofar as this is in a better nature, that is in a vital substance, such as is the mind.**" It is confirmed again, because just as every human soul, however depraved, is better and nobler according to nature than every body, as the same **Augustine** wishes in *On Free Will*, book 3, chapter 11 and several following, so every **accident of the soul** is nobler than any accident of the body.

This whole reason is confirmed together with the principal conclusion from the argumentation of **Augustine** in *On True Religion*, chapter 34, by which he proves all things are made by God. For he says thus: "**To be, however little, is itself good, because the highest good is to be highly**"; and he adds: "**Since the highest species is the highest good, the minimal species is the minimal good. Moreover every good is either God or from God. Therefore even the minimal species is from God. Indeed what is said of species, this also can be said of form.**"

Since therefore the bad act is a certain good—which is also proved from the alleged [texts]: Both because it is some being, and Augustine says that "**to be, however little, is good**"; and because it is some species, that is essence, since as he says in the same place "**whatever is, however little it may be in species, is necessary**"; and because it is a certain form, and "**what is said of species, in the proposition can also be said of form,**" as he says—it follows necessarily, if his argumentation is valid, that **the bad act itself is certainly from God**.

Fifth Proof of the Conclusion

Fifth to the same point it can be argued from another consequence which **Augustine** makes in the same place. For he says there that "**that which in comparison to perfect things is called unformed, is not nothing**"; and immediately he infers thus: "**And through this that also, insofar as it is, is not except from God.**" Similarly in the proposition it can be argued: The bad act is not nothing, therefore it is from God. Which consequence is confirmed also from the saying of the same author in *The City of God*, book

12, chapter 5, where he says thus: **"God is highly and on account of this every essence which is not highly was made by Him, because neither ought it to be equal to Him, which was made from nothing, nor could it be in any way, if it were not made by Him."** Therefore the essence which is the bad act, since it is not the highest essence, could in no way be, unless it were made by God.

This also seems to be the intention of **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, where to the disciple—saying: **"That indeed God makes the natures of all things, must be confessed. But that He makes individual actions of perverse wills like the depraved movement itself of the will, by which the evil will moves itself, who would concede?"**—he answers: **"What wonder, if we say God makes individual actions which are done by an evil will, since we confess He makes the substances which are made by an unjust will?"**

(Proof of the Conclusion, from the Addition)

Addition 57: **Augustine** in the book *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, near the beginning, says that **"in the Catholic [Church] God is said to be the author of all natures and substances."** Now by the names of nature and substance he comprehends universally every essence and entity. Which is clear through the letter immediately preceding, in which he expounds what those names signify according to him. For he says: **"Nature itself is nothing other than that which is understood to be something in its own genus, so that just as we now call it essence by a new name from 'that which is to be' (*esse*), which we also frequently call substance, so the ancients, who did not have these names, called 'nature' that which stands for essence and substance. That itself therefore is evil, if you wish to attend without stubbornness: to fail from essence and to tend toward this, that it be nothing. Therefore when in the Catholic [Church] God is said to be the author of all natures and substances, it is simultaneously understood by those who can understand this that God is not the author of evil."**

Here it is clearly evident that he calls **"nature"** here everything which is something in its own genus and everything which has being or every essence, and consequently every **entity without any exception**, since any [entity] is and is something in its own genus. The words which follow immediately after those recited confirm this intention: **"How,"** he says, **"can He who is the cause of all things that exist that they be, be again the cause that they not be etc.?"** Since therefore every entity *is*, of every one according to the opinion of Augustine God is the cause *that it be*; and it is certain that he is speaking of the **efficient cause**.

From these sayings it is clear that the response and gloss which those holding the opposite conclusion give to the authorities of Augustine—in which he frequently says that every nature and substance which is not God is made by God and that God is the cause of all things that exist—saying that by nature and substance he does not signify every essence and entity universally, but only those which **subsist per se** and can act or suffer per se, and are called by the proper name of substance, as we distinguish substance against accident—is **not to the mind of Augustine**.

This is also confirmed by that which he writes in *On the Nature of the Good*, near the beginning. For speaking of species, mode, and order, which he says are **"common goods in things made by God,"** he says: **"These three, where they are great, are great natures; where they are small, are small natures; where they are none, there is no nature."** Now it is established that these three are in every essence, as

can be clear in the same place also from the following words; therefore Augustine calls **every essence** a "nature."

The same antecedent is proved by the authority of the same author in Homily 1 *On John*, where he says that every creature, small and great etc., and again: "**No form etc.**," as was alleged above.

Likewise *The City of God*, book 12, chapter 5: "**God**," he says, "**is highly and on account of this every essence which is not highly was made by Him, because neither ought it to be equal to Him, which was made from nothing, nor could it be in any way, if it were not made by Him.**" What can be said more expressly? For what is entity other than essence, or conversely?

Likewise *De Fide ad Petrum*, chapter 8: "**Firmly**," he says, "**hold and by no means doubt that the Holy Trinity, the only true God, is the creator of all things visible and invisible etc.**" But every entity is a visible or invisible thing.

This is confirmed by the **Evangelist** saying: "**All things were made through Him and without Him was made nothing**," that is, as **Augustine** expounds in *On the Nature of the Good*, "**without Him not anything was made.**" Therefore no entity was made without Him. Therefore every made [entity] was made by Him.

Many other authorities could be adduced to the same point, but I think these suffice. Therefore the antecedent is clear.

The consequence is proved, because if God is the author of every entity which is made, therefore **He is the author of the entity which is the bad act**: Either therefore immediately effecting it or mediately only, namely moving to act that which immediately effects it. This second cannot be said, because then **with God as author man would become worse** and so also God would make us do evils, just as was said in the 26th distinction that He makes us do goods; (which) is blasphemous and heretical to think. The first therefore remains, which is the intent.

Nor is it valid to say that He is a mediate cause only insofar as He was the cause of the immediate cause, namely of the will itself, assuming that He does not move the will to effect the bad act itself. It is not valid, I say, because then He would be called its cause neither truly nor properly, just as neither is the father of Socrates truly called the begetter or cause of Plato begotten by Socrates.

Second thus: **Every good which is not God is from God effecting it**, and I accept good not only for the good of morals, but also for the **good of nature**; therefore bad acts etc.

The antecedent is clear through that of **Augustine** in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 39: "**Hold unshaken piety, so that no good either to one sensing or understanding or thinking in any way occurs to you which is not from God. For thus no nature occurs which is not from God.**" By this last clause it is clear he speaks universally also of the **good of nature**. Which sense is also confirmed from the following words; for he adds: "**Every good completely subtracted, not indeed 'not-nothing', but absolutely nothing will remain. Moreover every good is from God. Therefore there is no nature which is not from God.**" He posits the same opinion in many places.

The consequence is proved: Both because such an act is a certain entity and **every entity is a certain good**, the same Augustine saying many times that everything which is, insofar as it is, is good; and in the authority now alleged he says that "**every good completely subtracted, absolutely nothing will remain.**"

And because every act of the will, however bad, is a **more perfect entity** than any corporal accident; therefore every such act is a certain good. The consequence holds from the fact that there are many corporal accidents, any of which is a great good, and there is none which is not some good, as can be known from the utilities proceeding [from them]. The antecedent is clear, because every such act is a **vital and spiritual act**, and consequently nobler than any corporal [act]. It is confirmed by **Augustine** in *On the Trinity*, book 9, chapter 10, who proves the species of a thing existing in the soul to be nobler than the corporal species outside (of which it is the likeness) by this: that it is in a **better nature**. Whence he says: "**Nevertheless the imagination of a body in the mind is better than that species of the body, insofar as this is in a better nature, that is in a vital substance, such as is the mind.**" It is confirmed again, because just as every soul, however depraved, is better and nobler according to nature than every body, as **Augustine** wishes in *On Free Will*, book 3, chapter 5 and several others of the same book, so **every accident of the soul is nobler than any accident of the body.**

This reason and also the conclusion is confirmed by the argumentation by which **Augustine** proves in *On True Religion*, chapter 34, that all things are made by God. "**To be,**" he says, "**however little, is itself good, because the highest good is to be highly**"; and he adds: "**Since the highest species is the highest good, the minimal species is the minimal good. Moreover every good is either God or from God. Therefore even the minimal species is from God. Indeed what is said of species, this also can be said of form.**" Likewise in chapter 35 he proves matter to be made by God, saying in conclusion: "**Therefore there is some good even in the capacity for form; and therefore the author of all goods, who bestowed form, Himself also made the possibility of being formed,**" that is, that which can be formed.

Since therefore the bad act is a certain good—which is also proved from the sayings: Both because it is some being and, as Augustine says, "**to be, however little, is good**"; and because it is some species (that is) essence, since as the same author says in the same place, namely chapter 34, "**whatever is, however little it may be in species, is necessary**"—if Augustine's argumentation is valid, it is certainly concluded that **the act itself is from God.**

Third, I argue to the conclusion thus: **The bad act is not nothing**; therefore it is made by God. The antecedent is certain. And the consequence holds from a certain consequence which **Augustine** makes in the same place, chapter 34. For after he concluded that all things were made by God, he asks: "**Is that therefore [something], from which God made all things?**" And he answers "**that which has no species and no form; which is nothing other than nothing. For that which in comparison to perfect things is called unformed, if it has something of form, however meager, however inchoate, is not yet nothing, and through this that also, insofar as it is, is not except from God.**"

Here finally, as is clear, he makes such a consequence: **The unformed is not nothing; therefore it, insofar as it is, is not except from God.** From which it follows: therefore it is from God. Which consequence if it is efficacious, certainly this one is also efficacious: **The bad act is not nothing; therefore, insofar as it is, it is from God.** And further: therefore it is from God. Nor let that exclusive

expression "**except from God**" move you; for Augustine does not intend to exclude another partial cause from which also that unformed and imperfect thing is. For indeed many such things are from creatures also co-causing. But because they cannot be unless they are made by God, therefore he says "**except from God**," that is "except made by God," so that that is not an exclusion of another co-acting cause, but of another mode of being than through perfection from God.

Fourth thus: The bad act already made is conserved by God; therefore the bad act, while it is being made, is made by God.

The consequence is proved efficaciously by Sacred Scripture. For the **Wise Man** says in Wisdom 11 speaking to God: "**How could anything remain, unless You willed it? Or be conserved, which was not called by You?**" Now what is "to be called by God" other than "to be made by God"? Therefore the Wise Man wishes it to be impossible for anything to be conserved unless it is made by God. From which the premised consequence is clearly evident.

Second the consequence is clear, because, since **Sacred Scripture** frequently says all things are made by God, if from such a universal expression it were to be understood that bad acts were excepted—as defenders of the contrary conclusion might perhaps say—this would not seem necessary for another reason, except because it would seem to be repugnant to the goodness of God to effect a vicious or bad act in any way. But this estimation is immediately excluded, if it is attended to that the bad act, as long as it exists, is **conserved and continued in being by God Himself**, as all must concede, as is clear from the proofs of the third conclusion of the disputed question on the 45th distinction of the first book, and as suffices here for now also from the first part of the authority of the Wise Man now alleged. For it cannot seem more repugnant to God's goodness to **partially effect** a bad act than to **conserve** it made, since man not only sins when he first effects the said act, but also while, after it is made, he freely continues it. Therefore, because it is not repugnant to God's goodness to conserve such an act, the consequent is that neither is it repugnant to Him to effect it.

It is confirmed further, because since **to conserve is to make a thing to be which immediately before was**—as was said above in distinction 1 and can also be held from **Augustine** in *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, book 9, chapter 22, concerning small things, and from **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1—neither ought it to be judged more unworthy of God that He make something which immediately before was not, than that He make that same thing after it was; nor is it rather to be denied that He makes the bad act when it first comes to be, than that it is to be denied that God makes it after it was. But the second cannot be denied catholically; therefore neither ought the first to be denied.

For this conclusion make many other things which were said in proving the second conclusion of the disputed question on the 45th distinction of the First [Book]. Require there and apply to the proposition.

The authority of **Anselm** also makes for this in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, where he says expressly that God "**makes all natures substantial and accidental, universal and individual.**" And still more specially he says: And "**the depraved movement itself of the will**" and "**individual depraved actions which are done by a perverse will,**" God makes. The Ordinary Text follows.

Objections against the Conclusion

Against this conclusion it can be argued, first thus: If God makes the same bad act which man makes, just as man sins by making it, so also **God sins**; which is impossible. This is clear, because man sins for no other reason except because he makes a bad act.

Addition 57a: Against this conclusion it can be argued first, because if God makes the same bad act which man makes, just as man by making it sins, so **God would sin**; which is impossible. The consequence is clear, because man sins for no other reason except because he does that bad act.

This is confirmed, because according to this it follows that God envies another, deceives and lies, steals, and is said to commit other similar things which cannot be done except badly; and consequently **He would sin**. This consequence is declared. For accepting "to steal" for the exterior act, one is said to steal precisely because he does such an act. Similarly one saying something false to another is precisely said to be a falsifier because he causes a false speech; and if he knows it to be false, he certainly lies. An envious man also or one envying is not so called except because he elicits an act of envy. Therefore, if God also makes any such acts, He also will be similarly denominated and called a thief, deceiver and liar and envious; and similarly of other sins which man commits by heart, mouth or work. The Ordinary Text follows.

Second, if God makes the bad act, God is the **author of evils**, the opposite of which **Augustine** says in the authority alleged above from the book *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, in the first reason made to prove the conclusion; and in innumerable other places. The consequence is clear, because to be the author of evil is nothing other than to make a bad act.

Third, then "**with God as author man would become worse**," against the same **Augustine** in 83 *Questions*, question 3. The consequence is proved, because he who causes the act by which man is worse, with him as author that man becomes worse. But if the conclusion is true, God causes the act by which man is worse. Therefore etc.

Fourth, God is the **avenger of the bad act**, therefore He is not its author. The antecedent is certain by faith. The consequence is proved by the authority of **Fulgentius** saying that "**God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author**." Likewise **Augustine** in the booklet called *Catholic Confutation* of certain things falsely imputed to him, chapter 3, says that "**whatever is to be condemned in anyone is entirely alien to the author of nature**."

Fifth, if God is the partial cause of the bad act, He could be the **total cause** of the same act, so that He alone would cause that act. The consequent is false, because then He could cause the act of hating God, and a lie, and through this lie; the opposite of which was proved in the first book. The consequence is clear, because whatever effect God can make with a second cause concurring, He can make without it; otherwise He Himself would not suffice for every effect of His, but for causing some He would need the help of a creature. But this is false, **Augustine** saying in *On Free Will*, book 1, chapter 2, that no one thinks best of God "**who does not believe Him to have been helped by no nature in creating, as if He did not suffice for Himself**."

Sixth, if God makes this bad act which this man also makes, God **wills this act to be**. Therefore He wills this man to make this bad act; and further, therefore this man by making this bad act, does that which God

wills him to do, and consequently **does not sin**. And so it follows from the conclusion that whatever act man does, he never sins. For it can be argued thus concerning any act.

(Arguments of Peter Aureoli against the Conclusion)

Seventh, a certain doctor argues to the same point thus: If God caused the bad act, He would necessarily cause its **deformity**; "**the opposite of which the saints say**." The consequence is proved, because there are certain acts from which deformity is inseparable, for example to hate God and many others, which have malice involved nor can be done well.

Eighth, the same one thus: "**If God co-acts with the will in its act, either this is because He follows the determination of the will in that act so that the will first by nature determines itself and from this God co-acts with it, or conversely God first determines Himself to acting and our will follows His determination, or they come to this action**" equally. The first cannot be given, "**because then God would voluntarily co-act to sin; and also the proposition would be had, because in that [act] determinately God would not co-act with it, and thus He would not be the cause of every positive act**." Nor the second, "**because then the will would be determined by God to sin**"; and thus it would not sin, because of itself it would not have whence it would be the cause of sin, because [it would be] not free, for it would be determined from outside." Nor the third, "**both because such a concurrence would be accidental, and because God would voluntarily co-act to sin**."

Ninth, and it is a reason of the same one: "**The will is of no less power with respect to its act than natural agents with respect to their proper acts. But natural agents so elicit their acts per se, that God does not cooperate actively except through conservation. Therefore etc.**"

The minor is proved by authorities and reason. The first authority is of **Augustine** in *The City of God*, book 7, chapter 30, saying: "**God so administers all things which He created, that He allows them to exercise and do their own proper movements**." Another is of Ecclesiasticus 15: "**God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hands of his own counsel**." Another is of the **Commentator** on *Metaphysics* XII, who derides the Saracens because they deny things to have proper operations.

By reason also the said minor is proved, "**because it does not appear why God cannot communicate to a creature an action which is not creation but extraction of the perfectible to completion**," since that does not require infinite power in the agent.

Second, because either in the eduction of a form from matter, if God co-acts with the natural agent, **both make the same thing totally**; or God makes one part and the natural agent another. The first cannot be said, "**because it is impossible for the same thing to be simultaneously from two total causes in the same genus of cause**." Nor the second, both because sometimes that form is simple lacking parts, and because then it would follow that to the part which the natural agent makes, God does not co-act; which is the proposition.

(Authorities of Augustine against the Conclusion)

There also seem to be several **authorities** against the aforesaid conclusion. For **Augustine** says in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 39: "**That movement of aversion, which we confess to be sin, since it is a defective movement, see where it pertains, and doubt not that it does not pertain to God.**" And he answers the disciple asking whence is the movement of the will by which it is turned away from God; by which response it is expressly clear that Augustine wishes that that movement is **not from God**.

Likewise the same author in the booklet previously alleged above, which is called *Catholic Confutation*, says in chapter 10: "**It is a detestable and abominable opinion which believes God to be the author of anyone's bad will or bad action.**"

Likewise in *On the Nature of the Good*, before the middle of the book: "**When we hear,**" he says, "**'all things from Him and through Him and in Him,' we ought to understand all natures which exist naturally. For sins are not from Him, which do not preserve nature but vitiate it; which sins Holy Scripture testifies in many ways to be from the will of sinners.**" And that by the name of sins he understands **bad acts**, is clear from the fact that he says "**those are from the will of sinners**"; for only acts of the will elicited or commanded are from the will of sinners.

Several other authorities also sound the same.

Reply to Objections against the Conclusion

I respond. To the **first**, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that one does not sin precisely because he does a bad act, calling "bad act" that entity which is now called "bad act" by the moderns—which I say to exclude the acceptance of this name "act" as it is said of certain **complexly signifiable** things, in which way act is denied to be properly a thing, that is an entity, as was said in the second article—but therefore he sins, because he does it **badly**, that is **against right reason**. And because that act, which man does against right reason and therefore badly, God does according to right reason and through this well, therefore **man sins by doing it, not God**.

This is declared proximately. For the same bad act, which man freely continues and conserves after it is made, **God also continues and conserves**, and yet man by so continuing sins, but God does not. Similarly the same man whom man also generates by committing adultery, **God produces and forms in the womb**, and yet God does not sin, but man. Similarly, as the **Master** says in *Sentences*, book 3, distinction 20, the betrayal of Christ was done by God, Judas and the Jews; and yet **God did not sin**, but they sinned. And so examples could be given concerning many exterior works to which also diverse men concur; and yet one sins while the other does not sin, because one does it according to right reason and well, but the other against right reason and badly.

You will say that at least in those things which are **evil in themselves** nor can be done well, it will have to be conceded that they are not done by God, because then He would not only do evils, but also **do them badly** and against right reason and thus He would sin.

It must be said that there is no entity or can be, which cannot be **done well**, although not by anyone. But those things which are evil in themselves and are said not to be able to be done well, are not some existing or possible-to-exist entities, but are certain **complexly signifiable** things, as was said in the preceding [sections], which also are properly called sins. And such things are **never done by God**, even according

to that mode of speaking by which they are said to be done by man. For example, **to envy** is said to be evil in itself and is said to be done by man in this sense, namely because we say that man envies. But God, although He causes simultaneously with man that act or that entity which we name envy and by which man is said to envy, nevertheless He Himself **does not envy**; just as neither does the knowledge of the envier (causing envy partially with the will of man) envy anyone, but only the soul itself which is affected by that entity. So it must be said of others, as **to steal**, **to commit adultery** and the like. For God can do none of such things. For although God also simultaneously does and moves every entity which a liar or thief does or moves, nevertheless He **neither steals nor lies**. For any of such things, beyond the simple making or motion of such or such a thing, connotes certain things on the part of him who is so denominated, which do not befit God; just as **to steal**, beyond the simple translation of a thing from place to place, connotes that that thing **does not belong** to the translator; **to lie** also, beyond the formation of a false voice, connotes that he who is said to lie **will signify the false** by it and to deceive another. And because God, assuming that He simultaneously partially transfers that thing, does not transfer a thing not His own (because all things are His), and although He forms that voice simultaneously with the liar, nevertheless He does not intend to signify the false by it or to deceive anyone, therefore neither is He said to steal or be a thief truly, nor a liar or to lie.

You will say, although God does not envy or lie and so of others, nevertheless according to you He causes **envy** in the soul of the envier and similarly also causes that voice which is called a **lie**. But to cause such things seems to be against right reason, just as to envy and to lie; for doing such things He makes in a certain way or at least helps another to envy and lie, which right reason dictates is not to be done. Therefore God acts badly and sins, as was inferred before.

I respond that, just as God does not act against right reason by making a **man** who can do a bad act (since He does not compel or induce him to do it), so He does not act against right reason by **not subtracting** from him that without which he cannot do the bad act, nor however by exciting or making man to do such an act. But that without which man cannot do a bad act is the **co-efficiency of God**, which is necessary to any creature for producing its effects, since none suffices of itself alone to cause any essence, as appears from several authorities adduced above.

This response is confirmed, since it is certain that God does not sin nor act against right reason from the fact that He partially **continues and conserves** a bad act. Nor is He thus said to make or help man to sin by the continuation of the bad act.

To the **second**, I deny the consequence, accepting the consequent in the sense in which it is denied by the saints. For when it is said by them that God is not the author of evils, this name "**evil**" either is a substantive noun and stands for that which is per se evil or **evil simply** (according to the distinction given concerning evil in the first article), just as it is taken in the authority of **Augustine** in *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, and in many other places; or it is an adjective, but substantivized as the grammarians say, and then it stands for those things which are denominated evil, yet not universally for all. For it is certain that God is the author of **evil men** and similarly of **evil angels**, although He is not the author or cause for them *that they be evil*. And similarly He is the cause of every essence which is denominated evil, and consequently in this sense it can be truly said that **God is the author of evil**, just as **Augustine** well implies responding to Julian the heretic in book 3 against him, chapter 10, thus: "**But that which you add and say 'God cannot be the author of an evil thing', how do you say that? For He knows how to**

speak better than you, who says through the prophet that He creates evils." Behold that he reprobates him because he said that "God is not the author of an evil thing," and he accepts "**thing**" strictly for entity, as is clear to one looking at the question which turns between them. Therefore the opposite must be said, and similarly from the reprobated saying it appears that "**evils**" in the authority of the prophet is taken denominatively.

Therefore, when the name of evil is taken thus by the saints and it is said "**God is not the author of evils**," the name of evil does not stand for all things generally which are denominated evil, but stands restrictedly for those evils which are **sins**, as is clear above through the **Master**. Now however the **bad act**, accepting this name "act" as it has an incomplex signification (that is, that entity which is called a bad act), although it is bad, is not "evil" [in the substantive sense] nor even is it a **sin**, although man doing it sins.

And from this further to the proof of the consequence it must be said that it is not the same according to the intention of the saints "**to be the author of evil**" and "**to make a bad act**." Whether however and in what sense it is to be granted or denied that "**God is the author of bad acts**" accepting act thus, will be said in the response to the second authority alleged against [this].

To the **third**, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that not "**whoever causes an act etc., with him as author man becomes worse**," speaking of "to cause" generally according as even a partial cause is said to cause. For if several men concur to the same bad work, from this neither is said to sin or become worse with the other as author, even if one principally, the other instrumentally or secondarily; the one [acting] principally is never said to sin with the remaining one as author. When therefore is one said to become better or worse with another as author? It can be said that then, when the other is a **cause for him that he do** that which doing he is better or worse. And because God is a cause for everyone doing well *that he do* that which he does well—for not only does He partially co-cause the good act of man, but also He moves his will and **makes it do** the same act—but for no one doing badly is He a cause *that he do badly* that which he does badly—although He also co-causes that act, as was held above in distinction 26, question 1—therefore everyone can be truly said to become better with God as author, but no one **worse with God as author**.

But can it be said truly in this sense that in some way with another as author one becomes worse? It must be said that just as one can be said to be a cause for another *that he do badly*, so it can be said that with him as author the other becomes worse. Now no one can be for another an **immediate cause moving his will** and making it do a bad act, just as God makes it do a good act, and therefore no one becomes worse with another as author in the way one becomes better with God as author. But one can, although improperly, be said to be an immediate cause to another in some way, for example **inducing or persuading** to do badly, like the devil to the man whom he tempts. And in this sense one can be said to become worse with another as author.

Second it can be said to the argument according to the exposition of **Augustine** himself, namely denying the same consequence. For what it is "**to become worse with someone as author**" Augustine expounds in the same place saying: "**When it is said 'with him as author,' it is said 'with him willing'.**" Therefore to become worse with someone as author is according to Augustine to become worse **with him willing**

that he become worse. And because God does not will anyone to be worse, although He co-causes the bad act by which one is worse, therefore no one becomes worse with Him as author.

To the **fourth**, it can be responded in two ways: In one way, that if "**act**" in the antecedent has a **complex signification**, the antecedent is true, and similarly the consequent in the same sense; but if it has a **simple signification**, the antecedent is false. For God does not punish man for that **entity** which he makes and which we call an act, but because he does it **badly**. And because to do that badly is also called a bad act, as act has a complex signification, therefore in such a sense it must be granted that "**God is the avenger of the bad act and is not its actor**," just as it is granted that He is the avenger of sin and not its actor. And because sin and the act thus taken is also sometimes called a **thing**, as was said above, therefore also "**He is said to be the avenger of that thing of which He is not the actor**." And so it must be said to the authority of **Fulgentius**. To the authority of **Augustine** in the same way; for nothing is to be condemned in anyone except **sin**, and God is not the actor of sin. In another way it can be said, according to what **Altissiodorensis** says, that the sense of the authority is that "**God is not the actor and avenger of the same thing and according to the same**," but He is its actor insofar as it is a certain **entity**, but its avenger insofar as it is **bad**. Now it is bad insofar as it is done badly; and therefore He punishes for it him by whom it is done badly. The first solution pleases more.

To the **fifth**, grant that "**God alone can cause that act**" and "**the act of hating**" (that is, which is hatred of God), "**and can also cause a lie**"; nevertheless He cannot cause the act of **hating God** or the hatred of God nor can He cause a lie or **to lie** nor can He cause a **bad act**. Wherefore whatever act He alone caused, although that [act] now is hatred of God or a lie or some bad act, yet if God alone caused it, just as He can cause it alone, it would not be a bad act nor hatred of God or a lie. And this solution is clear from what was said in the first disputed question on the 42nd distinction of the first book. Therefore I do not insist on its declaration.

To the **sixth**, grant that "**God wills this [act] to be**," but I deny that "**He wills this man to do this act**"; just as according to the **Master** in the last distinction of the First [Book], the whole Trinity willed the passion of Christ to be and the killing, "**nor however did It will that the Jews kill**" Christ. Therefore I deny that consequence.

Fifth Proof of the Conclusion

Fifth to the same point it can be argued from another consequence which **Augustine** makes in the same place. For he says there that "**that which in comparison to perfect things is called unformed, is not nothing**"; and immediately he infers thus: "**And through this that also, insofar as it is, is not except from God**." Similarly in the proposition it can be argued: The bad act is not nothing, therefore it is from God. Which consequence is confirmed also from the saying of the same author in *The City of God*, book 12, chapter 5, where he says thus: "**God is highly and on account of this every essence which is not highly was made by Him, because neither ought it to be equal to Him, which was made from nothing, nor could it be in any way, if it were not made by Him**." Therefore the essence which is the bad act, since it is not the highest essence, could in no way be, unless it were made by God.

This also seems to be the intention of **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, where to the disciple—saying: "**That indeed God makes the natures of all things, must be confessed. But that He**

makes individual actions of perverse wills like the depraved movement itself of the will, by which the evil will moves itself, who would concede?"—he answers: "What wonder, if we say God makes individual actions which are done by an evil will, since we confess He makes the substances which are made by an unjust will?"

Proof of the Conclusion, from the Addition

Addition 57: Augustine in the book *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, near the beginning, says that "**in the Catholic [Church] God is said to be the author of all natures and substances.**" Now by the names of nature and substance he comprehends universally every essence and entity. Which is clear through the letter immediately preceding, in which he expounds what those names signify according to him. For he says: "**Nature itself is nothing other than that which is understood to be something in its own genus, so that just as we now call it essence by a new name from 'that which is to be' (*esse*), which we also frequently call substance, so the ancients, who did not have these names, called 'nature' that which stands for essence and substance. That itself therefore is evil, if you wish to attend without stubbornness: to fail from essence and to tend toward this, that it be nothing. Therefore when in the Catholic [Church] God is said to be the author of all natures and substances, it is simultaneously understood by those who can understand this that God is not the author of evil.**"

Here it is clearly evident that he calls "**nature**" here everything which is something in its own genus and everything which has being or every essence, and consequently every **entity without any exception**, since any [entity] is and is something in its own genus. The words which follow immediately after those recited confirm this intention: "**How,**" he says, "**can He who is the cause of all things that exist that they be, be again the cause that they not be etc.?**" Since therefore every entity *is*, of every one according to the opinion of Augustine God is the cause *that it be*; and it is certain that he is speaking of the **efficient cause**.

From these sayings it is clear that the response and gloss which those holding the opposite conclusion give to the authorities of Augustine—in which he frequently says that every nature and substance which is not God is made by God and that God is the cause of all things that exist—saying that by nature and substance he does not signify every essence and entity universally, but only those which **subsist per se** and can act or suffer per se, and are called by the proper name of substance, as we distinguish substance against accident—is **not to the mind of Augustine**.

This is also confirmed by that which he writes in *On the Nature of the Good*, near the beginning. For speaking of species, mode, and order, which he says are "**common goods in things made by God,**" he says: "**These three, where they are great, are great natures; where they are small, are small natures; where they are none, there is no nature.**" Now it is established that these three are in every essence, as can be clear in the same place also from the following words; therefore Augustine calls **every essence** a "nature." The same antecedent is proved by the authority of the same author in Homily 1 *On John*, where he says that every creature, small and great etc., and again: "**No form etc.,**" as was alleged above. Likewise *The City of God*, book 12, chapter 5: "**God,**" he says, "**is highly and on account of this every essence which is not highly was made by Him, because neither ought it to be equal to Him, which was made from nothing, nor could it be in any way, if it were not made by Him.**" What can be said more expressly? For what is entity other than essence, or conversely? Likewise *De Fide ad Petrum*,

chapter 8: **"Firmly,"** he says, **"hold and by no means doubt that the Holy Trinity, the only true God, is the creator of all things visible and invisible etc."** But every entity is a visible or invisible thing. This is confirmed by the Evangelist saying: **"All things were made through Him and without Him was made nothing,"** that is, as Augustine expounds in *On the Nature of the Good*, **"without Him not anything was made."** Therefore no entity was made without Him. Therefore every made [entity] was made by Him. Many other authorities could be adduced to the same point, but I think these suffice. Therefore the antecedent is clear.

The consequence is proved, because if God is the author of every entity which is made, therefore **He is the author of the entity which is the bad act:** Either therefore immediately effecting it or mediately only, namely moving to act that which immediately effects it. This second cannot be said, because then **with God as author man would become worse** and so also God would make us do evils, just as was said in the 26th distinction that He makes us do goods; (which) is blasphemous and heretical to think. The first therefore remains, which is the intent. Nor is it valid to say that He is a mediate cause only insofar as He was the cause of the immediate cause, namely of the will itself, assuming that He does not move the will to effect the bad act itself. It is not valid, I say, because then He would be called its cause neither truly nor properly, just as neither is the father of Socrates truly called the begetter or cause of Plato begotten by Socrates.

Second thus: **Every good which is not God is from God effecting it,** and I accept good not only for the good of morals, but also for the **good of nature;** therefore bad acts etc. The antecedent is clear through that of Augustine in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 39: **"Hold unshaken piety, so that no good either to one sensing or understanding or thinking in any way occurs to you which is not from God. For thus no nature occurs which is not from God."** By this last clause it is clear he speaks universally also of the **good of nature.** Which sense is also confirmed from the following words; for he adds: **"Every good completely subtracted, not indeed 'not-nothing', but absolutely nothing will remain. Moreover every good is from God. Therefore there is no nature which is not from God."** He posits the same opinion in many places.

The consequence is proved: Both because such an act is a certain entity and **every entity is a certain good,** the same Augustine saying many times that everything which is, insofar as it is, is good; and in the authority now alleged he says that **"every good completely subtracted, absolutely nothing will remain."** And because every act of the will, however bad, is a **more perfect entity** than any corporal accident; therefore every such act is a certain good. The consequence holds from the fact that there are many corporal accidents, any of which is a great good, and there is none which is not some good, as can be known from the utilities proceeding [from them]. The antecedent is clear, because every such act is a **vital and spiritual act,** and consequently nobler than any corporal [act]. It is confirmed by Augustine in *On the Trinity*, book 9, chapter 10, who proves the species of a thing existing in the soul to be nobler than the corporal species outside (of which it is the likeness) by this: that it is in a **better nature.** Whence he says: **"Nevertheless the imagination of a body in the mind is better than that species of the body, insofar as this is in a better nature, that is in a vital substance, such as is the mind."** It is confirmed again, because just as every soul, however depraved, is better and nobler according to nature than every body, as Augustine wishes in *On Free Will*, book 3, chapter 5 and several others of the same book, so **every accident of the soul is nobler than any accident of the body.**

This reason and also the conclusion is confirmed by the argumentation by which **Augustine** proves in *On True Religion*, chapter 34, that all things are made by God. **"To be,"** he says, **"however little, is itself good, because the highest good is to be highly";** and he adds: **"Since the highest species is the highest good, the minimal species is the minimal good. Moreover every good is either God or from God. Therefore even the minimal species is from God. Indeed what is said of species, this also can be said of form."** Likewise in chapter 35 he proves matter to be made by God, saying in conclusion: **"Therefore there is some good even in the capacity for form; and therefore the author of all goods, who bestowed form, Himself also made the possibility of being formed,"** that is, that which can be formed.

Since therefore the bad act is a certain good—which is also proved from the sayings: Both because it is some being and, as Augustine says, **"to be, however little, is good";** and because it is some species (that is) essence, since as the same author says in the same place, namely chapter 34, **"whatever is, however little it may be in species, is necessary"**—if Augustine's argumentation is valid, it is certainly concluded that **the act itself is from God.**

Third, I argue to the conclusion thus: **The bad act is not nothing;** therefore it is made by God. The antecedent is certain. And the consequence holds from a certain consequence which **Augustine** makes in the same place, chapter 34. For after he concluded that all things were made by God, he asks: **"Is that therefore [something], from which God made all things?"** And he answers **"that which has no species and no form; which is nothing other than nothing. For that which in comparison to perfect things is called unformed, if it has something of form, however meager, however inchoate, is not yet nothing, and through this that also, insofar as it is, is not except from God."** Here finally, as is clear, he makes such a consequence: **The unformed is not nothing; therefore it, insofar as it is, is not except from God.** From which it follows: therefore it is from God. Which consequence if it is efficacious, certainly this one is also efficacious: **The bad act is not nothing; therefore, insofar as it is, it is from God.** And further: therefore it is from God. Nor let that exclusive expression **"except from God"** move you; for Augustine does not intend to exclude another partial cause from which also that unformed and imperfect thing is. For indeed many such things are from creatures also co-causing. But because they cannot be unless they are made by God, therefore he says **"except from God,"** that is **"except made by God,"** so that that is not an exclusion of another co-acting cause, but of another mode of being than through perfection from God.

Fourth thus: **The bad act already made is conserved by God; therefore the bad act, while it is being made, is made by God.** The consequence is proved efficaciously by Sacred Scripture. For the **Wise Man** says in Wisdom 11 speaking to God: **"How could anything remain, unless You willed it? Or be conserved, which was not called by You?"** Now what is **"to be called by God"** other than **"to be made by God"**? Therefore the Wise Man wishes it to be impossible for anything to be conserved unless it is made by God. From which the premised consequence is clearly evident.

Second the consequence is clear, because, since **Sacred Scripture** frequently says all things are made by God, if from such a universal expression it were to be understood that bad acts were excepted—as defenders of the contrary conclusion might perhaps say—this would not seem necessary for another reason, except because it would seem to be repugnant to the goodness of God to effect a vicious or bad act in any way. But this estimation is immediately excluded, if it is attended to that the bad act, as long as it exists, is **conserved and continued in being by God Himself,** as all must concede, as is clear from the

proofs of the third conclusion of the disputed question on the 45th distinction of the first book, and as suffices here for now also from the first part of the authority of the Wise Man now alleged. For it cannot seem more repugnant to God's goodness to **partially effect** a bad act than to **conserve** it made, since man not only sins when he first effects the said act, but also while, after it is made, he freely continues it. Therefore, because it is not repugnant to God's goodness to conserve such an act, the consequent is that neither is it repugnant to Him to effect it. It is confirmed further, because since **to conserve is to make a thing to be which immediately before was**—as was said above in distinction 1 and can also be held from **Augustine** in *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, book 9, chapter 22, concerning small things, and from **Anselm** in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 1—neither ought it to be judged more unworthy of God that He make something which immediately before was not, than that He make that same thing after it was; nor is it rather to be denied that He makes the bad act when it first comes to be, than that it is to be denied that God makes it after it was. But the second cannot be denied catholically; therefore neither ought the first to be denied.

For this conclusion make many other things which were said in proving the second conclusion of the disputed question on the 45th distinction of the First [Book]. Require there and apply to the proposition. The authority of **Anselm** also makes for this in *The Fall of the Devil*, chapter 20, where he says expressly that God "**makes all natures substantial and accidental, universal and individual.**" And still more specially he says: And "**the depraved movement itself of the will**" and "**individual depraved actions which are done by a perverse will,**" God makes. The Ordinary Text follows.

Objections against the Conclusion

Against this conclusion it can be argued, first thus: If God makes the same bad act which man makes, just as man sins by making it, so also **God sins**; which is impossible. This is clear, because man sins for no other reason except because he makes a bad act.

Addition 57a: Against this conclusion it can be argued first, because if God makes the same bad act which man makes, just as man by making it sins, so **God would sin**; which is impossible. The consequence is clear, because man sins for no other reason except because he does that bad act. This is confirmed, because according to this it follows that God envies another, deceives and lies, steals, and is said to commit other similar things which cannot be done except badly; and consequently **He would sin**. This consequence is declared. For accepting "to steal" for the exterior act, one is said to steal precisely because he does such an act. Similarly one saying something false to another is precisely said to be a falsifier because he causes a false speech; and if he knows it to be false, he certainly lies. An envious man also or one envying is not so called except because he elicits an act of envy. Therefore, if God also makes any such acts, He also will be similarly denominated and called a thief, deceiver and liar and envious; and similarly of other sins which man commits by heart, mouth or work. The Ordinary Text follows.

Second, if God makes the bad act, God is the **author of evils**, the opposite of which **Augustine** says in the authority alleged above from the book *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, in the first reason made to prove the conclusion; and in innumerable other places. The consequence is clear, because to be the author of evil is nothing other than to make a bad act. **Third**, then "**with God as author man would become worse,**" against the same **Augustine** in *83 Questions*, question 3. The consequence is proved, because he who causes the act by which man is worse, with him as author that man becomes worse. But if the

conclusion is true, God causes the act by which man is worse. Therefore etc. **Fourth**, God is the **avenger of the bad act**, therefore He is not its author. The antecedent is certain by faith. The consequence is proved by the authority of **Fulgentius** saying that "**God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author.**" Likewise **Augustine** in the booklet called *Catholic Confutation* of certain things falsely imputed to him, chapter 3, says that "**whatever is to be condemned in anyone is entirely alien to the author of nature.**" **Fifth**, if God is the partial cause of the bad act, He could be the **total cause** of the same act, so that He alone would cause that act. The consequent is false, because then He could cause the act of hating God, and a lie, and through this lie; the opposite of which was proved in the first book. The consequence is clear, because whatever effect God can make with a second cause concurring, He can make without it; otherwise He Himself would not suffice for every effect of His, but for causing some He would need the help of a creature. But this is false, **Augustine** saying in *On Free Will*, book 1, chapter 2, that no one thinks best of God "**who does not believe Him to have been helped by no nature in creating, as if He did not suffice for Himself.**" **Sixth**, if God makes this bad act which this man also makes, God **wills this act to be**. Therefore He wills this man to make this bad act; and further, therefore this man by making this bad act, does that which God wills him to do, and consequently **does not sin**. And so it follows from the conclusion that whatever act man does, he never sins. For it can be argued thus concerning any act.

Arguments of Peter Aureoli against the Conclusion

Seventh, a certain doctor argues to the same point thus: If God caused the bad act, He would necessarily cause its **deformity**; "**the opposite of which the saints say.**" The consequence is proved, because there are certain acts from which deformity is inseparable, for example to hate God and many others, which have malice involved nor can be done well. **Eighth**, the same one thus: "**If God co-acts with the will in its act, either this is because He follows the determination of the will in that act so that the will first by nature determines itself and from this God co-acts with it, or conversely God first determines Himself to acting and our will follows His determination, or they come to this action**" equally. The first cannot be given, "**because then God would voluntarily co-act to sin; and also the proposition would be had, because in that [act] determinately God would not co-act with it, and thus He would not be the cause of every positive act.**" Nor the second, "**because then the will would be determined by God to sin**"; and thus it would not sin, because of itself it would not have whence it would be the cause of sin, because [it would be] not free, for it would be determined from outside." Nor the third, "**both because such a concurrence would be accidental, and because God would voluntarily co-act to sin.**" **Ninth**, and it is a reason of the same one: "**The will is of no less power with respect to its act than natural agents with respect to their proper acts. But natural agents so elicit their acts per se, that God does not cooperate actively except through conservation. Therefore etc.**"

The minor is proved by authorities and reason. The first authority is of **Augustine** in *The City of God*, book 7, chapter 30, saying: "**God so administers all things which He created, that He allows them to exercise and do their own proper movements.**" Another is of Ecclesiasticus 15: "**God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hands of his own counsel.**" Another is of the **Commentator** on *Metaphysics* XII, who derides the Saracens because they deny things to have proper operations. By reason also the said minor is proved, "**because it does not appear why God cannot communicate to a creature an action which is not creation but extraction of the perfectible to completion,**" since that does not require infinite power in the agent. Second, because either in the

education of a form from matter, if God co-acts with the natural agent, **both make the same thing totally**; or God makes one part and the natural agent another. The first cannot be said, "**because it is impossible for the same thing to be simultaneously from two total causes in the same genus of cause.**" Nor the second, both because sometimes that form is simple lacking parts, and because then it would follow that to the part which the natural agent makes, God does not co-act; which is the proposition.

Authorities of Augustine against the Conclusion

There also seem to be several **authorities** against the aforesaid conclusion. For **Augustine** says in *On Free Will*, book 2, chapter 39: "**That movement of aversion, which we confess to be sin, since it is a defective movement, see where it pertains, and doubt not that it does not pertain to God.**" And he answers the disciple asking whence is the movement of the will by which it is turned away from God; by which response it is expressly clear that Augustine wishes that that movement is **not from God**. Likewise the same author in the booklet previously alleged above, which is called *Catholic Confutation*, says in chapter 10: "**It is a detestable and abominable opinion which believes God to be the author of anyone's bad will or bad action.**" Likewise in *On the Nature of the Good*, before the middle of the book: "**When we hear,**" he says, "**'all things from Him and through Him and in Him,' we ought to understand all natures which exist naturally. For sins are not from Him, which do not preserve nature but vitiate it; which sins Holy Scripture testifies in many ways to be from the will of sinners.**" And that by the name of sins he understands **bad acts**, is clear from the fact that he says "**those are from the will of sinners**"; for only acts of the will elicited or commanded are from the will of sinners. Several other authorities also sound the same.

Reply to Objections against the Conclusion

I respond. To the **first**, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that one does not sin precisely because he does a bad act, calling "bad act" that entity which is now called "bad act" by the moderns—which I say to exclude the acceptation of this name "act" as it is said of certain **complexly signifiable** things, in which way act is denied to be properly a thing, that is an entity, as was said in the second article—but therefore he sins, because he does it **badly**, that is **against right reason**. And because that act, which man does against right reason and therefore badly, God does according to right reason and through this well, therefore **man sins by doing it, not God**. This is declared proximately. For the same bad act, which man freely continues and conserves after it is made, **God also continues and conserves**, and yet man by so continuing sins, but God does not. Similarly the same man whom man also generates by committing adultery, **God produces and forms in the womb**, and yet God does not sin, but man. Similarly, as the **Master** says in *Sentences*, book 3, distinction 20, the betrayal of Christ was done by God, Judas and the Jews; and yet **God did not sin**, but they sinned. And so examples could be given concerning many exterior works to which also diverse men concur; and yet one sins while the other does not sin, because one does it according to right reason and well, but the other against right reason and badly.

You will say that at least in those things which are **evil in themselves** nor can be done well, it will have to be conceded that they are not done by God, because then He would not only do evils, but also **do them badly** and against right reason and thus He would sin. It must be said that there is no entity or can be, which cannot be **done well**, although not by anyone. But those things which are evil in themselves and are said not to be able to be done well, are not some existing or possible-to-exist entities, but are certain

complexly signifiable things, as was said in the preceding [sections], which also are properly called sins. And such things are **never done by God**, even according to that mode of speaking by which they are said to be done by man. For example, **to envy** is said to be evil in itself and is said to be done by man in this sense, namely because we say that man envies. But God, although He causes simultaneously with man that act or that entity which we name envy and by which man is said to envy, nevertheless He Himself **does not envy**; just as neither does the knowledge of the envier (causing envy partially with the will of man) envy anyone, but only the soul itself which is affected by that entity. So it must be said of others, as **to steal**, **to commit adultery** and the like. For God can do none of such things. For although God also simultaneously does and moves every entity which a liar or thief does or moves, nevertheless He **neither steals nor lies**. For any of such things, beyond the simple making or motion of such or such a thing, connotes certain things on the part of him who is so denominated, which do not befit God; just as **to steal**, beyond the simple translation of a thing from place to place, connotes that that thing **does not belong** to the translator; **to lie** also, beyond the formation of a false voice, connotes that he who is said to lie **wills to signify the false** by it and to deceive another. And because God, assuming that He simultaneously partially transfers that thing, does not transfer a thing not His own (because all things are His), and although He forms that voice simultaneously with the liar, nevertheless He does not intend to signify the false by it or to deceive anyone, therefore neither is He said to steal or be a thief truly, nor a liar or to lie.

You will say, although God does not envy or lie and so of others, nevertheless according to you He causes **envy** in the soul of the envier and similarly also causes that voice which is called a **lie**. But to cause such things seems to be against right reason, just as to envy and to lie; for doing such things He makes in a certain way or at least helps another to envy and lie, which right reason dictates is not to be done. Therefore God acts badly and sins, as was inferred before. I respond that, just as God does not act against right reason by making a **man** who can do a bad act (since He does not compel or induce him to do it), so He does not act against right reason by **not subtracting** from him that without which he cannot do the bad act, nor however by exciting or making man to do such an act. But that without which man cannot do a bad act is the **co-efficiency of God**, which is necessary to any creature for producing its effects, since none suffices of itself alone to cause any essence, as appears from several authorities adduced above. This response is confirmed, since it is certain that God does not sin nor act against right reason from the fact that He partially **continues and conserves** a bad act. Nor is He thus said to make or help man to sin by the continuation of the bad act.

To the **second**, I deny the consequence, accepting the consequent in the sense in which it is denied by the saints. For when it is said by them that God is not the author of evils, this name "**evil**" either is a substantive noun and stands for that which is per se evil or **evil simply** (according to the distinction given concerning evil in the first article), just as it is taken in the authority of **Augustine** in *On the Morals of the Manichaeans*, and in many other places; or it is an adjective, but substantivized as the grammarians say, and then it stands for those things which are denominated evil, yet not universally for all. For it is certain that God is the author of **evil men** and similarly of **evil angels**, although He is not the author or cause for them *that they be evil*. And similarly He is the cause of every essence which is denominated evil, and consequently in this sense it can be truly said that **God is the author of evil**, just as **Augustine** well implies responding to Julian the heretic in book 3 against him, chapter 10, thus: "**But that which you add and say 'God cannot be the author of an evil thing', how do you say that? For He knows how to speak better than you, who says through the prophet that He creates evils.**" Behold that he reprobates him because he said that "God is not the author of an evil thing," and he accepts "**thing**" strictly for entity,

as is clear to one looking at the question which turns between them. Therefore the opposite must be said, and similarly from the reprobated saying it appears that "**evils**" in the authority of the prophet is taken denominatively.

Therefore, when the name of evil is taken thus by the saints and it is said "**God is not the author of evils**," the name of evil does not stand for all things generally which are denominated evil, but stands restrictedly for those evils which are **sins**, as is clear above through the **Master**. Now however the **bad act**, accepting this name "act" as it has an incomplex signification (that is, that entity which is called a bad act), although it is bad, is not "evil" [in the substantive sense] nor even is it a **sin**, although man doing it sins. And from this further to the proof of the consequence it must be said that it is not the same according to the intention of the saints "**to be the author of evil**" and "**to make a bad act**." Whether however and in what sense it is to be granted or denied that "**God is the author of bad acts**" accepting act thus, will be said in the response to the second authority alleged against [this].

To the **third**, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that not "**whoever causes an act etc., with him as author man becomes worse**," speaking of "to cause" generally according as even a partial cause is said to cause. For if several men concur to the same bad work, from this neither is said to sin or become worse with the other as author, even if one principally, the other instrumentally or secondarily; the one [acting] principally is never said to sin with the remaining one as author. When therefore is one said to become better or worse with another as author? It can be said that then, when the other is a **cause for him that he do** that which doing he is better or worse. And because God is a cause for everyone doing well *that he do* that which he does well—for not only does He partially co-cause the good act of man, but also He moves his will and **makes it do** the same act—but for no one doing badly is He a cause *that he do badly* that which he does badly—although He also co-causes that act, as was held above in distinction 26, question 1—therefore everyone can be truly said to become better with God as author, but no one **worse with God as author**.

But can it be said truly in this sense that in some way with another as author one becomes worse? It must be said that just as one can be said to be a cause for another *that he do badly*, so it can be said that with him as author the other becomes worse. Now no one can be for another an **immediate cause moving his will** and making it do a bad act, just as God makes it do a good act, and therefore no one becomes worse with another as author in the way one becomes better with God as author. But one can, although improperly, be said to be an immediate cause to another in some way, for example **inducing or persuading** to do badly, like the devil to the man whom he tempts. And in this sense one can be said to become worse with another as author. Second it can be said to the argument according to the exposition of **Augustine** himself, namely denying the same consequence. For what it is "**to become worse with someone as author**" Augustine expounds in the same place saying: "**When it is said 'with him as author,' it is said 'with him willing'**." Therefore to become worse with someone as author is according to Augustine to become worse **with him willing** that he become worse. And because God does not will anyone to be worse, although He co-causes the bad act by which one is worse, therefore no one becomes worse with Him as author.

To the **fourth**, it can be responded in two ways: In one way, that if "act" in the antecedent has a **complex signification**, the antecedent is true, and similarly the consequent in the same sense; but if it has a **simple signification**, the antecedent is false. For God does not punish man for that **entity** which he makes and

which we call an act, but because he does it **badly**. And because to do that badly is also called a bad act, as act has a complex signification, therefore in such a sense it must be granted that **"God is the avenger of the bad act and is not its actor,"** just as it is granted that He is the avenger of sin and not its actor. And because sin and the act thus taken is also sometimes called a **thing**, as was said above, therefore also **"He is said to be the avenger of that thing of which He is not the actor."** And so it must be said to the authority of **Fulgentius**. To the authority of **Augustine** in the same way; for nothing is to be condemned in anyone except **sin**, and God is not the actor of sin. In another way it can be said, according to what **Altissiodorensis** says, that the sense of the authority is that **"God is not the actor and avenger of the same thing and according to the same,"** but He is its actor insofar as it is a certain **entity**, but its avenger insofar as it is **bad**. Now it is bad insofar as it is done badly; and therefore He punishes for it him by whom it is done badly. The first solution pleases more.

To the **fifth**, grant that **"God alone can cause that act"** and **"the act of hating"** (that is, which is hatred of God), **"and can also cause a lie"**; nevertheless He cannot cause the act of **hating God** or the hatred of God nor can He cause a lie or **to lie** nor can He cause a **bad act**. Wherefore whatever act He alone caused, although that [act] now is hatred of God or a lie or some bad act, yet if God alone caused it, just as He can cause it alone, it would not be a bad act nor hatred of God or a lie. And this solution is clear from what was said in the first disputed question on the 42nd distinction of the first book. Therefore I do not insist on its declaration.

To the **sixth**, grant that **"God wills this [act] to be,"** but I deny that **"He wills this man to do this act"**; just as according to the **Master** in the last distinction of the First [Book], the whole Trinity willed the passion of Christ to be and the killing, **"nor however did It will that the Jews kill"** Christ. Therefore I deny that consequence.

Reply to the Arguments of Peter Aureoli against the Conclusion

Regarding the **seventh** argument, I say that if by "deformity" any entity whatsoever and wherever it may be is understood, God co-acts it; nor do I know the opposite to be said by the saints nor does that doctor show it. However, some modern doctors certainly say that although the deformed act is from God, the deformity itself is not from God. Which saying can have a good understanding, not indeed by conceiving that the deformity is some entity distinct from the act which is not caused by God, but by understanding that although the deformed act is from God, nevertheless **insofar as it is deformed it is not from God**. For it is not deformed except insofar as it is done against right reason. Moreover, insofar as it is done against right reason, it is done by man, but not by God, who does nothing against that which right reason judges ought to be done by Him. And to this accords what others understanding rightly intend to signify when they say that **God is the cause of the bad act but not as it is bad**, because namely that [act] is not from God as it is bad, nor even as it is from God is it bad.

To the **eighth** argument I say, according to the mode of speaking of the arguer, that **"God follows the determination of the will,"** not because the determination of the will is some entity distinct from the will and its act which is first made by the will (as the argument seems to imagine), nor even understanding that **"first by nature the will"** does that act before God (properly speaking of "prior by nature," since then it would follow that it could do it without God co-acting, as is clear from the definition of prior according to nature); but I say God follows the determination of the will in this sense: because **therefore God does**

that act because the will does it, and not therefore because God does it, therefore the will does it.

And therefore it is more properly said that God co-acts with the will in such an act by causing than that the will is said to co-act with God. And when it is argued against this, inferring that "**God would voluntarily co-act to sin,**" if sin is accepted properly, the consequence is to be denied, because that act is not sin; but if improperly, namely for the bad act, the consequent is to be conceded. What is added further has already been excluded.

To the **ninth** argument it must be said that the minor is false, as was sufficiently proved in the first book, distinction 45. To the proof which is by authority, it must be said that those authorities are in no way to the purpose, because it is not held from them that God does not co-act with natural agents, but only that **natural agents do their own actions**. Which I certainly concede; nevertheless I say that **with them God also acts**. To the first proof by reason, I say that it also does not prove what it ought to prove; because, granted that God could communicate to a creature that it alone could [do] such an action, it does not follow that He has communicated [it]. Whether however He could or not, can be discussed elsewhere. To the second proof, I say that **the same thing totally is made by both**. And when it is said that "**it is impossible for the same thing to be simultaneously from two total causes,**" it must be said that a cause can be called "total" in two ways: In one way, total by a totality related to the **cause**, that is sufficient to cause the effect without the concurrence of another cause, precisely by causing as it causes; and thus that consequence is to be denied, since neither God nor the creature is thus the total cause of the bad act. For never would such an act be made if God did not cause it; nor even if the creature did not cause it and God did not cause it otherwise than He now in fact causes by concurring with the creature. In another way, total by a totality related to the **effect**, that is causing the whole effect; and thus of the same thing there can be several total causes. For of the same volition according to the whole, the **knowledge** is a cause and also the **will**; many other examples can be given. Furthermore, it is no less possible for the same thing according to the whole to be produced by two than for the same thing according to the whole, already produced, to be **conserved by two**. Now however the same act of the will, whether bad, is conserved immediately by God, even according to this doctor, nor is there doubt that it is also conserved by the will itself. And thus it is clear that the premised reasons are not efficacious against the aforesaid conclusion.

It should be noted however that all [reasons] can be made equally to prove that such an act is not immediately conserved by God; which however, as I predicted, is entirely false. And in this he also agrees, whose are the last reasons. For it can be argued thus: That God by continuing the bad act **sins** just as man simultaneously continuing the same; item, that then God would be the **author of evils**, since by conserving the act He does it; furthermore, it can appear no less absurd that God **continue** bad acts than that He produce [them]; item, that then "**with God as author man would become worse,**" since it is certain that man is rendered worse from the free continuation of the bad act; item, it is established that God punishes man for the free continuation of the bad act, therefore such an act will not be continued by God; item, that then God could be the **total conservator**, and further, as there; item, if He continues, therefore He wills it to be, and further, therefore He wills this man to continue this act etc.; item, then He would continue the **deformity**, which can seem equally inconvenient as that He would do [it]; item, it would have to be asked whether in such continuation He follows the determination of the will etc., as is argued concerning action; item, it appears no less [valid] to be said that natural agents continue proper actions than that they do them.

Reply to the Authorities of Augustine against the Conclusion

To the authorities I respond indeed. To the **first**, the response is clear from the response to the third reason made against the second conclusion of the preceding article, since, as was said there, by the "movement of aversion" Augustine does not understand that entity which is called volition, but that **complexly signifiable** thing which is signified when we say the will is turned away from God.

To the **second**, it must be said that the name of "**author**" as to the proposition can be accepted in two ways: In one way **commonly** for the total or partial agent; and thus it is accepted when it is said that "**God is the author of all natures and of all things that exist.**" In another way **specially** for the total agent or the partial principal one in acting; and in this way also it is accepted when it is said that "**God is the author of all our goods,**" that is of good thoughts and volitions and operations. For of such things either He is the author and total efficient cause or the partial principal one moving another partial cause (namely our will) to do such acts or making it to act thus. To the point, when God is denied to be the author of the bad will or operation, the name of author is accepted in the **second way**, not the first, since, although He causes such a volition, nevertheless not as its total cause but as partial, nor however in acting thus is He principal, so that He moves our will to act and makes it do such a volition, or in any way persuades or excites; for to opine this is a detestable and abominable opinion. That Augustine had spoken in this sense in the same place is evidently clear from the objection to which he responds. For it was objected to him that he said or from his sayings it followed that "**adulteries and corruptions of sacred virgins happen therefore because God predestined them to this, that they might fall.**" To this he responds thus: "**Detestable and abominable is the opinion which believes God to be the author of anyone's bad will or bad action, whose predestination is never outside justice.**" From these points it is clear that he wishes to deny that God predestined anyone to bad works, by denying Him to be the author of such. Whence, if author is accepted in the **second way**, the intent follows best, since to whatever and what kind of works God predestined anyone, He moves him to do them and **makes him do them**, the Apostle saying in Ephesians 2: "**We are His**" (namely God's) "**workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works which God prepared**" (that is predestined) "**that we should walk in them.**" For we are said to be created through Christ in good works, because He makes us do them, nevertheless also doing them with us. Such an intention of Augustine is also clear from what follows. For he says after a few things which also help the proposition: "**Therefore neither the fall of those rushing [to ruin], nor the malignity of the iniquitous nor the cupidities of sinners did the predestination of God either excite or persuade or impel.**" Therefore he denies Him to be the author according as he is called author who moves or persuades etc. to act; and the proposition is clear. The **other authority** is not against [this], since it speaks of sins which certainly are not bad acts, as the speech is now concerning acts. Moreover sins are said to be from the will of sinners, because sinners by will do those things which for them to do is a sin. And so also are to be understood other authorities sounding that **men do sins**, not that those entities which are done by them are sins, although sometimes "to do a sin" is put for "to sin," so that the sense is "**he does a sin, that is he sins**"; by which also the proposition is saved.

Reply to the Principal Arguments of the Question

From what has been said it is clear how one must respond to the principal arguments. For accepting sin **properly**, the conclusion of the first argument is to be conceded, although it is concluded by an invalid medium. But accepting sin **improperly**, namely for the bad act, the consequence is to be denied. For the antecedent is not universally true except speaking of per se evil. But the bad act is not an evil accepting evil in this way. To the **second** argument it must be said that, although the conclusion is also true

accepting sin properly, nevertheless the proof assumes a falsehood when it says that the **bad will is sin**. But if sin is accepted for the **bad act**, then it must be said that of the sin and the bad act there is certainly some **efficient cause**. Nor is it to be thought that Augustine or any learned man felt the opposite, and therefore it must be said that Augustine does not understand by "bad will" the bad volition, but the **bad soul or volitive power itself**, and he speaks specially of the **first bad will** and intends that such a bad will did not have an efficient cause, because there was no thing which by doing something made it bad, but it itself **by ceasing from a good volition**, in which it had been made, became bad; and it is similar as if it were said that of dark air there is not any efficient cause, because nothing makes the air dark by doing something in it, but from the fact that light ceases to be in it, it becomes dark. And this is evidently clear to one looking diligently at that whole chapter and also the following. Therefore the saying of Augustine is not valid for that argument. To the argument in the opposite [direction], the consequence is to be denied if sin is taken properly. To the authority of Augustine it can be said, just as was said in responding to the second objection against the first corollary of the first conclusion of the 2nd article of the question, that there that name "**will**" is placed in the stead of this infinitive "**to will**" standing verbally, or, if it stands purely nominally, then sin is accepted by him **improperly**, namely for the bad act, and accepting sin thus God is certainly its efficient cause in the mode posited above.

DISTINCTIO 38-41

QUESTION 1

WHETHER goodness or malice exists in a work according to the goodness or malice of the intention of the doer.

Concerning distinction 38 and the three following, in which **The Master** [Peter Lombard] inquires about the goodness and malice of wills and intentions, and how goodness or malice is to be judged in exterior actions based on them, I ask: **whether goodness or malice exists in a work according to the goodness or malice of the intention of the doer.**

And it is argued that it does, through the authority of **Ambrose**, whom **The Master** alleges in distinction 40, saying: "Your affect imposes the name on your work." **Augustine** also says, as is alleged in the same place: "Intention makes the work good." And similarly, it seems it must be said that intention makes a work bad. Therefore, the work that is committed is good or bad according to the goodness or malice of the affect or intention.

To the **opposite** it is argued: If it is according to the goodness or malice etc., it follows that every action of an infidel is bad and vicious. But this does not seem right to say, since we read that many **moral virtues** flourished in many of them in times past; and the same should still be believed regarding many. The consequence is proved, because according to **Augustine**, immediately after his words just recited, "faith directs intention." Therefore, where there is no faith, there is no **right intention**; thus in infidels there is no right intention, and through this, neither is it good, but only bad. Therefore, if the malice of the exterior action is according to the malice of the intention, every action of theirs will be bad.

In this question there will be two articles: In the first, it will be inquired which intention is to be deemed good and which bad; in the second, inquiry will be made regarding the proposition.

ARTICLE 1 (On the acceptation of intention)

As to the first, I premise that this name "**intention**" is equivocal regarding many things. However, in the proposed matter, I accept it according to that which signifies the **volition of the end**; and it is accepted thus by those discussing the present question.

However, the **End** can be accepted in a threefold manner, namely: commonly, properly, and more properly. Accepting the name of end **commonly**, any willed object or object of volition is called an end. Thus **Augustine** accepts it in book 11 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, when he says that "the will of seeing has no end but vision, whether it refers that to something else or does not refer it, and the will of seeing a window has the vision of the window as its end." And he says similar things many times in that place. However, an end is called **properly** not just any willed thing, but a willed thing for the sake of which another thing is willed. The end is accepted thus when it is said to be that "for the sake of which." **The Master** distinguishes these two modes in this distinction 38, when he says: "The end of the will is either that which we will, through which the will itself is fulfilled, or rather the other thing for the sake of which we will that thing." But accepting the end **more properly**, that alone is called the end for the sake of which another thing is willed, and it itself is willed only for its own sake. Thus **Avicenna** accepts the end in book 1 of the *Sufficientia*, chapter 15, when he says: "The true end is that which is intended for itself and for the sake of which other things are desired." With whom **The Philosopher** [Aristotle] also agrees in book 2 of the *Metaphysics*, saying: "The end is that for which another is not the cause, but it is the cause of the other." And the **Commentator** [Averroes] says there in comment 8 that "the description of a final cause is that it is not for the sake of another cause."

Conformably, **intention** can be accepted thus: Commonly, and thus every volition is an intention. Properly, and thus the volition of that for the sake of which something else is willed is called intention. But **more properly**, the volition of that which is willed for itself, and another for its sake, is called intention. And it is accepted in this third mode in the proposition.

Secondly, I premise that the goodness and malice of intention, just as the goodness and malice of **election** and the following operation, is attended to according to conformity and difformity to **right reason**, such that, just as an operation is then called morally good or right and virtuous when that is done, and done in such a manner, as **right reason** judges that it ought to be done—by comprehending under "in such a manner" and "how" all circumstances which are commonly attended to in a virtuous operation—however, when one does not act thus conformably to right reason, the operation is called vicious and morally bad; so then the intention of the doer is called good and right when it is conformable to **right reason**—that is, when the doer intends or wills that ultimately and for itself which right reason judges ought to be willed so—and it is depraved and not right when his intention does not conform to right reason in such a way, and universally according to every due circumstance according to the judgment of right reason.

(Opinion of Master Francis of Treviso)

However, against that which has been assumed—namely that when a moral operation is not conformable to right reason according to **all circumstances** required for it to be virtuous, it is vicious and morally bad—there is the opinion of a certain reverend **modern doctor**, who recently, among his other sayings in his Vespers, posited that a moral act lacking some due circumstance, even if it is the **circumstance of the end** (which according to him is the principal one among all), yet without the position of an opposite and bad circumstance of its own nature or from the intention of the doer, is **not morally bad nor vicious nor a sin**, but is truly morally good and virtuous, yet **incompletely** on account of the defect of a due circumstance. Whence, neither simply nor by a determining or diminishing modification ought it be called good by a doctor of theology. According to him, such is every moral act that is done for such an end that is not opposed to the ultimate end, but can concur with it and be an end under the ultimate end. And he understands, as I think, a moral act which is not bad *from its genus*. But a bad moral act according to him is only that which, with the defect of some good and due circumstance, has a bad and opposite circumstance of itself or from the intention of the doer.

(Three sayings against Francis of Treviso)

But this opinion does not contain the truth. Whence I wish to prove three things against this position: The **first** is that no moral act lacking any due circumstance is in truth virtuous or, which I accept for the same thing, morally good. The **second**, that any such act is vicious or morally bad and a sin. The **third**, that for a moral act to be bad, the lack of the circumstance of a due end suffices, nor is the position of an opposite circumstance or an opposite or bad end opportune for this, in the sense in which he speaks.

(The first saying is proved)

I prove the **first** by showing that the opposite implies a contradiction. And I argue first thus: If any moral act lacks any circumstance with which it ought to be done, it is not as it ought to be. Therefore, it is worthy of vituperation, **Augustine** saying in book 3 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 34: You rightly blame "that which is not as it ought to have been"; indeed, as he says in the following chapter, "whatever is rightly blamed, is rightly blamed for this, because it is not as it ought to have been." However, if any act is truly virtuous, whatever that may be, it is not worthy of vituperation but rather of praise and honor, as is clear from book 4 of the *Ethics*, in the chapter *On Magnanimity*. Therefore, if any act lacking any due circumstance is **truly virtuous**, some act is worthy of vituperation and is not worthy of vituperation; which consequent includes contradictories.

Furthermore, those circumstances are commonly called "due" which are required for an act to be truly virtuous; and thus I accepted it when I said elsewhere that by a morally good act I understood a moral act conformable to **right reason** according to **all circumstances** required for the act to be truly virtuous. And because he wished to disprove this saying through that conclusion of his which he posited—as if that description did not befit every morally good act—it is clear that he also accepts "due circumstances" similarly. And from this it is immediately clear that his proposition implies a contradiction: Because, if without some circumstance an act is truly virtuous, therefore that circumstance is not required for it to be virtuous; but if that is a **due circumstance**, therefore that is required so that it may be virtuous; therefore, if any act lacking a due circumstance is virtuous, truly some circumstance is required and is not required for it to be virtuous.

Furthermore, if any act is **truly virtuous**, it is conformable to **right reason** according to all circumstances due to it according to the judgment of right reason. And if so, therefore it does not lack any circumstance due to it. Therefore, if anyone lacking a circumstance due to him is truly virtuous, he lacks and does not lack a circumstance due to him, and is and is not truly virtuous.

The first consequence is proved. For **The Philosopher** says in *Ethics* book 2, chapter 2, that "it is common to every virtue to operate according to right reason"; and afterwards in chapter 6, defining virtue, he says that "it is an elective habit existing immediately as regards us determined by right reason and as a wise man would determine." Item, in book 6, chapter 1, he says that it is necessary to choose the mean; "but the mean is as right reason says." From these things it is clear, according to the sentence of **The Philosopher**, that every virtuous act is conformable or is done conformably to right reason.

With which the sentence of others also agrees, who, as **Augustine** recites and approves in book 4 of *Against Julian*, chapter 11, defining virtue, said that "it is a habit of the mind agreeable to the mode of nature and to reason." But that this conformity is necessary according to **all circumstances** is clear from the fact that in *Ethics* book 2, chapter 5, **The Philosopher** says that "it happens that one sins in many ways, but to direct," that is to act rightly, "in one way"; and from this he immediately infers: "Therefore this indeed is easy," namely to sin, "but this is difficult." And he proves it saying: "It is easy indeed not to touch the sign [mark], but difficult to touch it." From which proof it appears that, whenever the sign is not touched—namely that mean which right reason has established—one sins. This, however, happens whenever the act fails in any due circumstance from those with which right reason judges it ought to be done. And only then is the sign touched, and through this one acts virtuously, when **nothing is lacking** from such circumstances; and therefore it is "difficult" and "in one way" only, as he says, that one acts rightly.

If, however, an act could be **truly virtuous** with the defect of some due circumstance, it would happen that one acts rightly in many ways and easily. For whenever anyone might do something which is to be done, he would act well and rightly, even if he did not act *where* or *when* or *how* or *for whose sake* it is to be done. Which even this doctor is compelled to concede, since he concedes that with the defect of the circumstance of the **due end**, which he says is the principal of all, it happens that one acts rightly; for much more does it follow that with the defect of any other. Indeed, according to his saying, by which he says an act lacking the due circumstance of the end is truly virtuous, though not perfectly or fully, it will have to be said that, if anyone does that which truly is to be done, and yet **no due circumstance** is in such an act, still that act will be truly virtuous, though not fully. And he alone will have to be said to act viciously who does what is not to be done. And through this, the distinction of virtues and vices will be taken not from the circumstances of acts, but precisely from the acts themselves and the **offices** [duties], just as **Julian the Pelagian** opined. This, however, is against the doctrine of the saints and philosophers commonly.

Whence **Augustine**, in the aforesaid book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 13: "You should know," he says, "that virtues are to be discerned from vices not by **offices** but by **ends**; office, however, is what is to be done, but the end is that for the sake of which it is to be done. Therefore, when a man does something where he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for this, for the sake of which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning." Item, a little after: "Whatever good is done by a man and is not done for this, for the sake of which true wisdom commands it to be done, although by the office it seems good, by the wrong end itself

it is a sin." From which it is clear according to Augustine that even the sole **lack of the circumstance of the due end** impedes the act from being virtuous and renders it vicious, even such that it makes it to be a sin.

Item, **Seneca**, epistle 95 *To Lucilius*: "Precepts," he says, "will perhaps provide for you so that you do what you ought, and will not provide for *how* you ought; and if they do not provide this, they do not lead to virtue. He will do what he ought when admonished, I concede; but that is too little, since indeed praise is not in the deed, but in *how* it is done."

That this is also against **The Philosopher** is clearly evident from what has already been alleged. But he delivers this even more clearly in *Ethics* book 3, chapter 9, where he asserts that regarding the matter of **fortitude**, one sins from the defect of any circumstance according to itself. Whence he says: "Thus however of sins, this indeed because it is not what one ought, this however because it is not *as* one ought, this truly because not *when*, or something of such things." How could he speak the proposition more expressly? And immediately showing who acts rightly, he says that "he therefore who sustains and fears what one ought and for the sake of whom, and as one ought, and when, and similarly dares, is brave," understand *he is*. Where he also openly teaches that for an act of fortitude, **all due circumstances** are required simultaneously and copulatively; and the judgment is the same regarding the acts of all virtues generally.

From these things it is concluded indubitably that **no act lacking any due circumstance**—and much more strongly if that is the circumstance of the due end, since it is one of the more powerful ones (Philosopher, *Ethics* 3, chapter 3, saying that the most principal circumstances are *for whose sake* it is done and *what* it is that is done; and according to this doctor himself and **Saint Thomas** in the same place, whom he shows he wishes to follow in all things, the circumstance of the end is still generally the most principal of all)—no such act, I say, is **truly virtuous**; and I say this speaking univocally of virtue, according to how the saints and philosophers have spoken, not applying the vocabulary of virtue to anything at will and abusing it irrationally.

Perhaps it will be said that the aforesaid things are true of a virtuous and morally good act **fully and completely**, but not of a good and virtuous act **incompletely only** and not fully; such, however, is the act lacking the circumstance of the due end, about which it is agitated.

Against this. Either you say such an act is **incompletely virtuous** or morally good because, namely, something pertaining to the definition of virtue is lacking to it, on account of which defect it does not pertain to the species of virtue; and then by affirming it to be virtuous, indeed even **truly virtuous**, just as this doctor affirms, and adding this distracting diction "incompletely" in the premised sense, you openly include contradictories, just as if you were to affirm of something that it is a **dead man** or an incomplete man, that is, one to whom a soul or something pertaining to the specific nature of man is lacking.

Or you call it good **incompletely**, because, namely, although it is good, yet it is not the best in that species, just as a **remiss whiteness** would be called incomplete because it is not the most intense nor supreme; and then by saying that such an act lacks the circumstance of the due end and yet is truly virtuous, you also speak contradictories, because, as has been proved, without such circumstances the nature of virtue is not saved in the act, nor is the definition of virtue verified of the act lacking them.

Furthermore, according to this, what prohibits such an act from being called good absolutely and without a diminishing modification, just as absolutely and simply we say that which is remissly white is white? You, however, do not concede that this can be called good **simply**, but only with a determination.

(The second saying is proved)

From this, however, follows the **second** [point], namely that any such act is **morally bad and a sin**.

"Bad," I say, because it lacks the good due to it, namely the circumstance due to it so that it may be good and conformable to **right reason**. However, malice is nothing but the lack of a due good according to the doctrine of the saints, as was shown above in distinction 34.

Item, since goodness and malice are privatively opposed concerning a due subject, such as there is no doubt a moral act is, it necessarily follows: "It is not good, therefore it is bad," since of such an opposition there is no medium [middle ground] in a subject apt by nature. And because in the proposed matter to be good is nothing other than to be **virtuous**, nor to be bad other than to be **vicious**, it is clear from these things that any such act is vicious.

That any such act is also a **sin** is proved from the fact that any such act is voluntary, and difform [non-conforming] to **right reason** on account of the lack of a due circumstance; however, sin is nothing other than to act voluntarily against right reason, as was shown in the pre-alleged distinction. This is clear from the authorities of **The Philosopher** and **Augustine** already alleged, in which they say any such act is a sin.

Addition 58: This is also confirmed by the authority of **Augustine** in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 13, saying: "Therefore when a man does something where he does not seem to sin, if he does not do it for this, for the sake of which he ought to do it, he is convicted of sinning"; and again a little after: "Whatever good," he says, "is done by a man and is not done for this, for the sake of which true wisdom commands it to be done, although by the **office** [duty] it seems good, by the wrong end itself it is a sin." Behold how expressly he determines that whatever of the genus of good or whatever good from **office**—that is, whatever of those things which a man ought to do—a man may do, if his action lacks the circumstance of the **due end**, that is, to use his words, "if he does not do it for the sake of which he ought to do it," he is convicted of sinning, and his act is a **sin**. The Ordinary Text follows.

Nor can it be glossed, as this doctor intimated in general, saying that where such acts are called sins by Augustine, he does not speak properly of **sin**, but improperly, accepting, namely, sin not for a fault but for a less good act, which, although not absolutely and properly, yet comparatively regarding the good is called a sin, albeit improperly, just as a white garment in comparison to snow is called black. This, I say, cannot be said according to the intention of Augustine. For it is certain that for no act truly good, even if it is not supremely good, but less good than some other good regarding which it could be improperly called bad, is a man to be punished by God, since punishment is justly due to no such person. Otherwise, punishment would be due to many meritorious and well-remunerable acts; which must not be said. Therefore, only to those which are called sins and are culpable is punishment due. But to the acts which Augustine says are sins from the fact that they are not done for the **due end**, punishment is justly due

according to him. For he says that for them men are to be punished by God in the future. Therefore, according to him, such things are **truly sins**, speaking properly of sin.

The assumption is declared. For consequently in the fifteenth chapter, responding to the argument of Julian—proving that the Gentiles had true virtues, because according to the word of the Apostle "they naturally did those things which are of the law"—among other things he responds that, even if that word of the Apostle were accepted as said of Gentiles not believing, yet from this it is not convicted that they had true virtues, since even in doing those things which are of the law **they sinned**, because they did not do them for the **due end**. Whence he says: "Sinning, however, in this, that men without faith did not refer those works to that end to which they ought to have referred them." And with nothing interposed he adds: "For **Fabricius** will be punished less than **Catiline**, not because the former is good, but because the latter is more bad; and Fabricius is less impious than Catiline, not by having true virtues, but by not deviating very much from true virtues." He puts Fabricius here for those who did the works of the law, but Catiline for those who did things contrary to the law. And the proposition is clearly evident. It is also evident that acts done without the circumstance of the **due end** are not to be called, as this doctor says, virtuous or good, albeit less, but **sins and bad**, albeit they are less bad. Whence he calls both Fabricius and Catiline bad and to be punished; and he denies Fabricius is good, but says he is less bad, but the other more bad, and that neither had true virtues, but one deviated less from true virtues.

(The third saying is proved)

From these follows the **third** [point], which was proposed to be proved against this opinion, namely that for an act to be **morally bad**, the **lack of the circumstance of the due end** suffices, nor is the position of an opposite end required in the sense in which he speaks.

For it has been proved that, whatever due circumstance an act lacks, it is bad. **Augustine** also, in the premises, assumes for inferring the malice of an act, as an antecedent and cause, the sole negation or lack of the **due end**; which proof would be nothing, unless such a negation sufficed for the act to be bad.

Moreover, however, I prove this by evident reason. For, if the opposite is given, it follows that whoever does some good from genus or office, that is something which is to be done, and does this for the sake of having a **good name** or fame in the people, or for the sake of honor or riches, ultimately fixing the step of his intention there nor referring those things further into any other end either in act or habit, **acts virtuously**, and not badly nor culpably. But this is most certainly opposite to the common doctrine of the saints, as is clear, and not only to their doctrine, but even to that of the philosophers.

Whence **Aristotle** expressly determines in *Ethics* book 3, chapter 10, that citizens who sustain dangers in defense of the state for the sake of acquiring honor or fleeing disgrace are not **truly brave**, although they are more simulated [to bravery] than those who act similarly for other less good ends; of which he distinguishes several kinds in the same place.

Item, in *Ethics* book 4, chapter 2, he says that the liberal man does not honor, that is love, riches "for the sake of riches themselves, but for the sake of giving." And a little before he says that he "will give where it is good," upon which **Eustratius** says that he who gives for the sake of honor or glory or the hunting of greater profit is not liberal.

Seneca also in epistle 95 *To Lucilius* reproaches such men, who do something that is to be done for the sake of riches, saying: "Someone sits by a sick friend, we approve; but he does this for the sake of an inheritance: if he is a vulture, he awaits a corpse."

But the consequence is evident; for none of such things is opposite to the **first end**, nay rather any of them is a certain good which can be rationally desired and be an end under the true and due end, as is certain. Whence, to act for a **good reputation**, though not ultimately, scripture admonishes saying in *Ecclesiasticus* 41: "Have care for a good name." Indeed, according to **Augustine** in the epistle *To Albina*, a prelate ought to prefer a good reputation even to corporeal life on account of those for whom he ought to be an example. **Honors** also can be rationally desired by the greater ones, to whom it befits others to be subject. And according to **Aristotle**, the magnanimous man "is moderately delighted in great and studious honors"; and he says that honor is the greatest of exterior goods. That **riches** also are not bad but good, the same man posits in *Ethics* book 4, chapter 1; and concerning them he says there is the virtue of liberality. According to theologians also this has no doubt, otherwise no one could licitly possess them; which is erroneous, verging into one of the errors condemned against Pelagius.

Perhaps it would be said that those acting thus act badly because they act for a **bad end**, namely for **vain glory** or ambition or avarice, all of which are bad.

But this is not valid, because, although he who from his act ultimately seeks fame sins by the sin which is called **vain glory**, yet he does not finally intend that, but fame itself, which is not vain glory—speaking thus of vain glory which is called a sin and would more properly be called the love of empty or vain glory for its own sake—but is its object, although in another sense it could be called vain glory, because namely it is unstable and transitory. For he who seeks honor does not have **ambition** for an end, but rather such an appetite is ambition. Nor does he who seeks riches have **avarice** for an end, but his acquisition or desire is avarice.

Whence in no case of the aforesaid can the circumstance of any **bad end** be assigned, in the sense in which this doctor speaks of a bad end, namely one which is opposed to the first end nor possible to be sought rationally for the sake of that, so that it may be an end under the true end. However, it can well be said that there is the circumstance of a **bad end**, in this sense namely, because that is sought finally for its own sake which ought to be sought not for its own sake but for the sake of another; and therefore it is called bad precisely because it is not ordered into another, as it ought. Whence, this alone being posited, that it be ordered into God and sought for His sake, that act would not be bad nor would it be said to have a bad end. But this confirms the proposition, because according to this, **every act not referred ultimately into the due end**, whatever end it may have, will be with the circumstance of a bad end, and through this bad and not virtuous.

Therefore it is clear that it was well said that an operation is then only **virtuous** or **morally good** when it is conformable to **right reason** according to **all due circumstances**; and every moral operation not thus conformable is certainly bad and vicious. And it must be said regarding intention itself in its own way.

(First Conclusion)

Having premised these things, I posit three conclusions: The **first** is that that intention alone is right or morally good, by which is intended or loved for itself that which is **to be loved or willed for itself**. For I use now the word "love" generally, according to which every volition is called love. However, any intention by which either that is loved which is not to be loved, or that is loved for itself which is not to be loved for itself, is **bad**. This is clear, because any such intention is deformed and deviating from **right reason**. For right reason says that what is not to be loved is not to be loved, and that what is to be loved yet not for itself but for the sake of another, is to be loved not for itself but for the sake of another; otherwise it itself would not be right, but erring. Therefore, since by every intention something is loved for itself, as is clear from the description of the name premised, every intention by which something is loved that is **not to be loved for itself** is discordant from right reason and through this bad and vicious.

Addition 59: From these things it evidently follows that that intention alone is right and morally good, by which is intended or loved for itself that which is **to be loved or willed for itself**. For I use now the word "love" in its general signification, just as every volition is called love. However, any intention by which either that is loved which is not to be loved, or that is loved for itself which is **not to be loved for itself**, is vicious and bad. For any such is difform to **right reason**. For right reason judges that what is not to be loved is not to be loved, and that what is to be loved yet not for itself but for the sake of another, is also to be loved not for itself but for the sake of another; otherwise it itself would not be right but erring. The Ordinary Text follows.

(Second Conclusion)

The **second conclusion** is that every intention of a doer, by which something **other than God** is intended, that is, loved for itself and not for another, is bad and vicious.

Addition 59a: Having premised these things, I posit two conclusions: The **first** is that every intention of a doer, by which some volible or lovable thing **other than God** is intended or loved for itself, that is not for the sake of another, is bad and vicious.

It is proved: Whence in *Ethics* book 2, chapter 2, **The Philosopher** says that "it is common to every virtue to operate according to right reason." And in chapter 6, defining virtue, he says that "it is an elective habit existing immediately as regards us determined by reason and as a wise man would determine." And in book 6, chapter 1, he says that it is necessary to choose the mean; "but the mean is as right reason says." And a little after he posits sentiently that **right reason** is like "a certain sign, to which looking, the one having reason intends and remits" his work. From which things it is clear that every election or virtuous operation insofar as it is such is conformable to **right reason**, and consequently every moral election or operation not conformable to right reason is certainly vicious and morally bad, since goodness and malice of this kind are privatively opposed and born to exist in a moral operation and election. For malice is only a privation, as was declared in distinction 34.

And this is also confirmed from the intention of **The Philosopher**, who in *Ethics* book 2, chapter 5, says that "to sin is easy," but "to direct," that is to act rightly, is "difficult." And he proves this saying: "It is easy indeed not to touch the sign, but difficult to touch it." From which proof it is clear that whenever in acting one does not touch the sign—which according to him, as was premised, is **right reason**—that is whenever one acts and not according to right reason, one sins and acts badly. And from this he concludes

that men "become good simply," that is in one way, "but bad multifariously," because namely in all ways by which one acts by not touching the sign. The Ordinary Text follows.

I prove it thus: Every lovable thing other than God is **not to be loved for itself**; therefore every intention of a doer, by which something other than God is intended, is bad. The consequence is clear, because, if every lovable thing other than God is not to be loved for itself—whether it itself is to be loved or is not to be loved, such as are many lovable things, for not every lovable thing is to be loved—by every intention by which something other than God is intended, something not to be loved for itself is loved for itself; therefore every such intention is **bad**. And this consequence is clear from the first conclusion. The antecedent is proved thus: No lovable thing other than God is **supremely to be loved**; therefore every lovable thing other than God is not to be loved for itself. The antecedent is clear, because than any other lovable thing, God is more to be loved according to the common and catholic doctrine of the saints.

But I prove the consequence: For if some lovable thing other than God is not *not to be loved for itself*, therefore something **not supremely to be loved** can rationally be loved for itself. Which if it is true, this is true of those lovable things which are good and lovable according to themselves, and precisely therefore, because they are such. Therefore a man can also rationally love any of such things for itself; therefore a man can also rationally love something else for that thing ultimately. From which it follows that a man will be able to rationally do something and will it for the sake of his **fame** or **honor** or **riches** ultimately; nor will he sin by acting and willing thus. This, however, stands as much against theological doctrine as against philosophical, as was said above.

You will say perhaps that certainly some of those things which are good and to be loved according to themselves, yet not supremely, can be rationally loved for themselves and something else also for their sake ultimately, but not *any* of such things can be rationally loved thus, but that only which is more excellent among them and more to be loved than the rest, for example a **virtuous act** or virtuous operation; and moral philosophers would concede thus.

Against this. First, if the rest of such things cannot be rationally loved for themselves, but only that which is better and more to be loved, this is precisely, as it seems, because they are **less to be loved** than that; for, if they were equally to be loved, they would not be more to be loved for the sake of that than conversely. Therefore, since whatever is to be loved, yet not supremely, is **less to be loved** than that which is supremely to be loved, it follows that nothing not supremely to be loved can rationally be loved for itself.

It is confirmed, because, if some to-be-loved thing, notwithstanding that it is less to be loved than some other, can be rationally loved for itself, it does not appear why some other to-be-loved thing, although it is less to be loved than it, cannot rationally be loved for itself. For example, if notwithstanding that B, which is to be loved, is less to be loved than A, it can be rationally loved for itself, and C, which is to be loved, notwithstanding that it is less to be loved than B, can still be rationally loved for itself; and so it will have to be said of D and universally of whatever is to be loved. And therefore, if anyone concedes that a **virtuous operation** or anything else not supremely to be loved can be rationally loved for itself, he will never be able to rationally deny that **good fame** and **honor** can be rationally loved for themselves, although they cannot rationally be equally loved with a virtuous operation. Just as, although a virtuous

operation cannot rationally be equally loved to the supreme to-be-loved itself, it is nevertheless conceded by the one speaking thus that it can be rationally loved for itself.

It is confirmed, because it is certain that not all virtuous operations are equally to be loved, just as neither are they equally perfect, but some among them is more perfect according to its species, namely the **beatific** one. Either therefore others can be rationally loved for themselves, notwithstanding that they are less to be loved; and then by equal reason other things to be loved, which are less good and less to be loved than virtuous operations, even notwithstanding this will be able to be rationally loved for themselves. Or they cannot be rationally loved for themselves, but only for the sake of the beatific, and this because they are less to be loved; and then by the same reason neither can the **beatific** be rationally loved for itself, since it is less to be loved than that which is **supremely to be loved**, namely **God Himself**.

Whence it appears that, for something to-be-loved not to be able to be rationally loved for itself, no cause seems able to be rendered except this: because it is **not supremely to be loved**. Therefore nothing not supremely to be loved can be rationally loved for itself.

Secondly, the authority of **Augustine** in book 19 of *The City of God*, chapter 25, tends directly against this, saying: "Although by some they are then thought to be true and honest virtues, when they are referred to themselves nor are desired for the sake of another, even then they are inflated and proud, and therefore are to be judged **not virtues but vices**." Who, however, would doubt that, if habits or acts which are thought virtuous are truly vicious if they are not referred into another, it would also be vicious to love such acts for themselves by not referring them into another?

Secondly I argue for the conclusion thus: Every to-be-loved thing other than God is to be loved finally **for the sake of God**; therefore every intention by which some lovable thing other than God is loved for itself is vicious.

The antecedent is proved, because man and every rational creature ought, so that it may be rightly ordered and perfectly disposed, to order **all its acts** ultimately to one end, which is certain cannot be other than that which is best and supremely to be loved; that, however, is nothing but **God**.

This is also clear through **Augustine** in *On the Morals of the Church*, chapter 15, concluding from preceding things thus: "I do not think, when there is a question of morals and life, that it is to be required further what is man's **supreme good**, to which all things are to be referred. For it has been evident both by reason, as much as we have been able, and by that authority which excels our reason, the divine, that it is nothing other than **God Himself**." Also in book 1 of *On Christian Doctrine*, chapters 27 and 37, and in 83 *Questions*, question 30, he wills that others other than God are **to be used** into God; which was sufficiently declared in book 1, distinction 1, question 3.

The consequence is clear, because with an intention by which another other than God is loved for itself, either something is loved which is not to be loved, and thus there is no doubt it is vicious, or something is loved which is to be loved for the sake of another and yet is not loved for the sake of that, and through this it lacks the circumstance of the **due end**; from which also it is concluded to be vicious.

Thirdly, this conclusion is proved by the authority of **Augustine** in book 9 *On the Trinity*, chapter 8, saying: "Not that the creature is not to be loved, but if that love is referred to the Creator, it will not now be **cupidity** but **charity**. For then it is cupidity when the creature is loved for itself; then it does not help the one using, but corrupts the one enjoying." It is not doubtful, however, that such cupidity corrupting the enjoyer is vicious. That indeed he accepts "for itself" here, not "for the sake of another," appears through that "but if it is referred to the Creator etc."

(Third Conclusion)

The **third conclusion** is that there is no **right intention** of any doer except the **love of God for His own sake**. This is already clear from what has been said. For every intention is the love of something for itself; and if it is of something that is not God, it is vicious, as appears from the preceding conclusion. Therefore, if it is not vicious but right, it is the love of God for His own sake.

ARTICLE 2

(First Conclusion)

Now to the question I posit two conclusions: The **first** is that the goodness of **election** or the goodness of the exterior **operation** is not always according to the goodness of the **intention**, but rather sometimes the intention is good, and yet both the accompanying election and the following exterior operation are depraved.

It is proved thus: It happens that someone with a **good intention** chooses and operates things which according to **right reason** he ought to reject and avoid; therefore the goodness of election or exterior operation does not always accompany the goodness of intention. The consequence is clear, since in such a case he acts and chooses against **right reason**, and through this both his election and action are bad.

The antecedent is clear concerning him who for the **safety of an innocent neighbor**, whom he loves for the sake of God, offers **false testimony** and kills the one iniquitously accusing or unjustly prosecuting him without the intervening power of legitimate authority, and concerning him who, willing for the sake of God to help a needy neighbor, commits **theft**; and many other similar things could be deduced as examples, which sometimes happen. However, it is certain that one offering **false testimony** or killing a man without the authority of legitimate power or committing **theft** or anything else from these which are bad and sins according to themselves—of which kind many were proved to be in the preceding question—acts certainly and chooses those things which according to **right reason** he ought to avoid. And yet in the aforesaid cases the **intention** of the doer is right.

It is confirmed from the intention of **Gregory** in *Morals* book 3, upon that verse of Job 2 "And they sat with him on the ground for seven days," where he expressly posits that the friends of Job reproved Job with a **right and good intention**, and yet in that reproof they sinned.

This is the determination of **Augustine** in the book *Against Lying*, chapter 19, and it is alleged by **The Master** here in distinction 40: "There is a great difference," he says, "by what cause, by what end, by what intention something is done. But those things which are known to be sins, are to be done under no pretext of a good cause, for no quasi-good end, with no as-it-were good intention. For those works of

men, if they have good or bad causes, are now good, now bad, which are not **sins in themselves**." And he gives examples of many, as is clear in the letter. Then he adds: "When truly the works themselves are sins, like **thefts**, **whoredoms**, **blasphemies**, or other such things, who would say that they are to be done for good causes, so that either they are not sins or, which is more absurd, that they are **just sins**? Who is he who says: That we may have something to give to the poor, let us commit **thefts** against the rich?" And he posits many other examples and adds: "For why should those evils not be done for these goods, if for the sake of these goods neither are those things evil?" And below: "Who would say these things, except one who tries to subvert human affairs and all morals and laws?" From which words the determination of the aforesaid sentence is clearly evident.

But still perhaps it would be said, just as **The Master** reports some to have said, that the **intention** of those doing such things is not right, since to will to save an innocent person through **false testimony** or **homicide** is not a right intention, similarly neither to will to help the needy through **theft**; and therefore those who do such things, do not act with a good intention.

This is not valid, since, although such a willing is not right, it is not taken away by this that the intention of the one operating thus, as I premised, is not right; for here "to will" is not the intention of the one operating thus. Whence in one operating thus several acts of the will are to be distinguished: One indeed, by which he loves God; another, by which he wills to help his neighbor for the sake of God; another, by which he wills to steal so that he may help his needy neighbor; and the exterior operation itself, which is theft. Among all these, however, only the **first** is the **intention** of such a doer, since it alone is the volition of the ultimate end and that which is loved for itself, and this certainly is right and good. Similarly, the second, which however is not intention but election, is also good. But the third, which also is not intention but **election**, is certainly bad. And similarly the fourth, namely the exterior act. Whence it is clear that one operating thus operates with a **right intention**, although he operates with a bad volition, which is not of the end itself, and through this not an intention, but of that which is ordered to the end although badly, but is a **bad election**.

(Objection from Augustine)

Against this however and against the conclusion in itself seems to be the authority of **Augustine** in book 11 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, saying: "Right wills are all bound to one another, if that one is good to which all are referred. But if it is depraved, all are depraved."

(Objection of Bradwardine)

Against this also and against that which was assumed in the proof, namely that some things are **sins according to themselves** [*secundum se*], it can be argued through the reasons of a certain **modern doctor** [Thomas Bradwardine], first thus: If some things were bad or sins *per se*, any such thing, and in whomever it was, would be a sin. But this is false. It is clear, because "**homicide and adultery**" and other similar things, which would seem more to have to be called bad according to themselves, are not bad "in boys and **fools**, those sleeping or the furious, since they lack the **free judgment** of the will." Similarly, if anyone "from **inculpable ignorance** knows another's wife believing her to be his own wife," he does not sin. If anyone also "kills an innocent person placed in prison in the place of a guilty one justly condemned and weakly guarded, he does not sin."

It is confirmed, because, if they were "**bad according to themselves**, since similar acts according to essence are in the married and the non-married, in the innocent and those guilty of death," the intercourse of the married would be a sin, and similarly homicide would be a sin; which is false.

Secondly, the same is proved regarding **interior acts** and regarding these specially, of which it would seem more [likely], namely regarding the **hatred of God and blasphemy**. For someone without his preceding fault can be so deceived by the devil, "that it seems to him entirely that unless he blasphemes God or hates Him, he will necessarily sin more. That man then, according to the judgment of the most right reason, is held to **blaspheme God or hate** Him, lest otherwise he fall into a greater sin, since according to the common conception of the mind **of two evils the less evil is to be chosen**. The cause of which is, because in goods it is the contrary, namely that the greater is more to be chosen."

This is confirmed by the authority of **Gregory** in *Morals* book 32 "upon that verse of Job 40 'The nerves of his testicles are intertwined' saying: 'The nerves of his testicles are intertwined, because the arguments of his suggestions are bound by complicated inventions, so that they make many sin in such a way, that, if perhaps they desire to flee sin, they do not evade this without another snare of sin and they commit a fault while they avoid one, and by no means can they loose themselves from one, unless they consent to be bound in another.'" And he posits many examples in the same place, one of which is concerning him who "swore to conceal the secrets of another, who after the oath indicates to him" that he wishes to commit homicide, "which he who is sworn is not able to impede except by betraying the secret." Here he is so **perplexed** that "unless he betrays, he seems guilty of homicide; if he betrays, of perjury." Another is concerning someone who has promised obedience to some prelate who afterwards commands him to do what is not licit. Here also he is so perplexed that, if he does what is ordered, he sins; if he does not do it, he seems to incur disobedience.

And according to this case let it be posited that that prelate commands him "that he **blaspheme or hate God**, and that man judges that such an act against God is a **lesser evil**, because there is only one sin there and against God only and much excused on account of the command of the prelate, and he believes that not to obey the prelate is a greater evil, because it is against his prelate and against God, whose place he bears, and that it is to violate an oath and apostatize from a vow." In this case it seems that he will have to blaspheme, and consequently **he will not sin**. Whence **Gregory** after the alleged words, teaching what is to be done in such cases, says: "There is however that which may usefully be done to destroy his wiles, that when the mind is constrained between lesser and greatest sins, if absolutely no approach of evading without sin lies open, **the lesser are always to be chosen**, because even he who is shut in on all sides by the ambit of walls lest he flee, precipitates himself into flight there, where the wall is found shorter."

To this also is in the *Decretum* distinction 13 that chapter "Two evils" taken from the eighth council of Toledo: "To which also makes that which is premised in the head of that distinction, namely that 'against **natural law** no dispensation is admitted, unless perhaps **two evils so urge**, that it is necessary that one of them be chosen.'"

Nor is it valid, if it is said that in such a case he also sins, "because he commits a lesser sin, just as the alleged authorities also say," because "no one sins by doing what he ought; but such a one does what he ought. Also no one sins by doing according to the most right judgment of the saints, the canon, and the general council. This man acts thus."

"This also seems against blessed **Gregory** where earlier he says: 'When we are constrained in doubtful things, we are usefully subject in the least things, lest in great things we sin without pardon.'"

"**Augustine** also in the book *Against Lying* seems to feel the same; whence after a long disputation" he says in chapter 18: "Thus therefore it is to be concluded, that whatever alien sins, excepting those which make unclean him against whom they are committed, no one avoids by his own sins, neither for himself nor for anyone, but he should rather suffer them, strongly and patiently. But those which are so committed against a man that they make him unclean, we ought to avoid even by our own sins; and through this **they are not to be called sins**, which are done for this reason, that that uncleanness may be avoided. For whatever is done so that, unless it were done, it would be justly reprehended, is not a sin; and it would be a great sin, whatever had been done for avoiding such things. For the sake of avoiding these therefore whoever has lied, **does not sin**." Item below in chapter 37 he says that "sometimes by lying that is to be done which you hate, so that what is more to be detested is avoided." And in the following chapter he says: "Those things which are kept for the cause of sanctity and religion, when they wish to violate these, are to be redeemed **even by lesser sins**, not only by the injuries of others, if the condition is proposed and the faculty given; and then **they now cease to be sins**, which are undertaken for avoiding graver things."

Item **Bede**, as is alleged in the *Decretum* 22, question 4, "Si aliquid," says: "If it happens that we have sworn something rather incautiously which observed would verge into a worse outcome, we should know that it is to be changed freely by salubrious counsel and we must repent more for the instant necessity than divert into another graver crime for avoiding perjury."

This is also proved by reason. "For whoever chooses the less evil, so that thus he may flee the greater evil, does not will to do the less evil but **to flee the greater evil**," just as **Anselm** says in *On the Fall of the Devil* chapter 13 that "he who wills something for the sake of beatitude, wills nothing other than beatitude." Wherefore such a one incurs no sin.

(To the objection from Augustine)

To the **first** of these it must be said that, just as another authority of the same man alleged from the book *Against Lying* declares, that saying of **Augustine** is to be understood of those wills whose objects are not **sins per se**. Therefore it is not against [the thesis].

(To the first reason of Bradwardine)

To the **first** reason of that doctor the consequent can be conceded. And to that by which it is proved to be false, it must be said that, just as the name of **sin** not only signifies the act or operation which is done against reason, but also connotes that that action is done voluntarily—whence in the preceding question I said that sin is to act voluntarily against that which is to be done etc.—so these names "**homicide**," "**adultery**" and other special names of sins not only signify such acts, but also connote that they are exercised voluntarily and by **free judgment**. And therefore just as if some beast kills a man or copulates with some married woman, it is not said to commit homicide or adultery because it does not act by free judgment, so neither are boys or **fools** or others naturally lacking the use of free judgment, if they do such acts, rightly said to commit adultery or homicide, according to how we use these names to signify sins

and say that they are **bad according to themselves**. Whence given that the acts of such are not sins, it does not follow that some adultery or homicide is not a sin.

By the same [reasoning] the answer is clear to that which is said concerning him who knows another's wife believing her to be his own, and also what is added regarding homicide. For such **ignorance** in both, just as it excuses from sin, so it makes that act not be voluntary, as is commonly said. And consequently that act also is not properly called adultery, nor the other homicide.

To the confirmation it must be said that, notwithstanding the similitude of those acts, namely the motions of intercourse, yet when it is with another woman it is **adultery** and with one's own by no means. Similarly the killing of a guilty person with legitimate authority intervening is not homicide, but of an innocent person is homicide. However, it is not said that intercourse and the killing of a man are **bad according to themselves** or sins, but that **adultery** and **homicide** are. Whence it does not follow that intercourse with one's own [wife] is a sin, nor also the killing of a guilty person.

(Propositions for the solution of the second reason of Bradwardine)

For the solution truly of the **other reason**, which includes many doubts, I posit some propositions.

The **first** is that in no case ought anyone erroneously judging something is to be done or not done by him **conform himself** to such a judgment.

Proof: Since if he ought, therefore he ought to do that very thing and he ought not to do it, or he ought not to do it and he ought not not to do it; which are contradictories. The consequence is clear, because, if the judgment, by which it is judged that something is to be done by someone, is erring, therefore he **ought not** to do that; otherwise such a judgment would not be erroneous but true. And if he ought to conform himself to such a judgment, he ought to do that; for to conform oneself to such a judgment is nothing other than to do that which is judged by it to be done.

Secondly, if he ought to conform himself, therefore by conforming himself he does what he ought and consequently **does not sin**. And thus he to whom his **erroneous conscience** or reason dictates that he ought to kill another, if he kills, does not sin. And through this the Jews and pagans killing Christ, the disciples, and other martyrs did not sin, since conscience dictated this to them according to that of the Savior in John 16: "The hour comes in which everyone who kills you, will think he offers a service to God." Also according to this all infidels, heretics and any sinners thinking they ought to believe and do what they believe and do, would act well nor would be damned; which is not to be said. To this makes also that among the articles condemned by the church against **Peter Abelard** the tenth is such: "That they did not sin, who crucified Christ being ignorant, and that whatever is done through **ignorance** is not to be ascribed to fault." Which there is no doubt follows, if it is given that man ought to conform himself to his ignorance or deception.

The **second proposition** is also negative, that no one ought to act **against** his erroneous reason or such a conscience.

It is proved thus: No one ought to sin, therefore etc. The consequence is proved first, because he acting against his erroneous judgment acts against that which he estimates is to be done by him, and through

this, although he does what is good, yet he acts badly by intending an undue end and deserting the due end out of contempt, not less than if he acted against his true estimation. Secondly it is proved through the gloss of **Ambrosiaster** upon that of the Apostle to the Romans 14 "Everything that is not from faith, is sin" saying: "Everything that pertains to conscience, if it is done otherwise, he says," namely the Apostle, "is sin. For although even that is done which is good, if however it is believed not to be done or to be done thus as it is done, it is sin."

The **third proposition** is affirmative, namely that everyone ought **not to act against** his erroneous conscience or reason.

It is proved, because everyone ought to not sin by any sin, therefore he ought not to act against conscience etc. The consequence is clear, because to act against conscience is a sin, as is clear from the preceding conclusion.

The **fourth** also is affirmative, that everyone ought **not to act according to** his erroneous conscience or reason.

It is clear from the same, because everyone ought not to sin. However by acting according to an erroneous conscience a man sins, because he does that which he ought not to do; otherwise that conscience would not be erroneous but true and right.

Nor does it follow from these two propositions that a man is bound to the **impossible**, because neither is it impossible not to act against such a conscience nor is it impossible also not to act according to it, nor are these mutually impossible. Which is clear, because **that conscience being deposited** [set aside], just as is possible, he acting will not act against it nor according to it.

(To the second reason of Bradwardine, first)

Having premised these things I respond to **that reason**. And first indeed I say that, if such a case is given, that he is **by no means bound to blaspheme God** or hate Him, as is clear from the first proposition, nay rather he is bound not to blaspheme, as is clear from the fourth and its proof.

Which is confirmed, because before that error he was bound not to blaspheme. It is absurd however to say that on account of the sole accession of this error he is absolved from the prior obligation and what was priorly illicit becomes licit to him, and especially if such **ignorance** is a sin or the punishment of sin, as perhaps it must be said, as I will touch upon later. For ignorance, which is from fault, harms according to the Gloss where above, and through this he would sin more than if he had blasphemed without erring.

To the proof, when it is said "according to the common conception of the mind **of two evils the less evil is to be chosen**," I say that, if that proposition is taken in its propriety, not only is it not a common conception of the mind, but it is a proposition simply false, speaking always of the **evil of fault**, since of two evils neither is to be chosen, because both are evil, and consequently neither is the less evil more to be chosen. But it is well true that of two evils the less evil is **less to be fled** and the greater evil more to be fled. And the former use this proposition in this sense or place, who understand rightly, specifically improperly saying that the less [evil] is "to be chosen" in comparison to the worse more to be fled, just as

also frequently what is less evil is said to be "good" and "better" regarding a greater evil; which there is no doubt is said falsely, if speech is taken in its propriety.

Augustine teaches that it must be responded thus in the book *Against Lying*, chapter 17, where having premised the case that someone were constituted in such necessity that it behooved him either to sacrifice to an idol or suffer whoredom [rape], he asks thus: "Ought he therefore, says someone, rather suffer whoredom than burn incense?" And he answers: "If you ask, what he ought, he **ought neither**. For if I say he ought to have done one of these, I will approve one of these, while I disapprove both. But if it is asked, which of these he ought rather to avoid, who could not avoid both, but could one, I will answer, **his own sin rather than another's**, and rather the lighter which is his own than the graver which is another's."

The proof which is added, or that rendering of the cause by which it is said "because in goods it is the contrary, namely that the greater good is more to be chosen," is nothing, because it does not follow: The more good is more to be chosen, therefore the less evil is more to be chosen, but it follows well: Therefore the less good is less to be chosen, and similarly it follows: The greater evil is more to be fled, therefore the less evil is less to be fled.

If it is said against this: This man ought not to blaspheme, as you concede, therefore he ought to act against his conscience; this however is false and repugnant to the **second proposition** posited above. The consequence is proved, because it follows: This man does not blaspheme, therefore this man acts against conscience.

I respond by denying the first consequence, because from that conceded [point] it does not follow "Therefore he ought to act against conscience," because he ought not to have such a conscience. If however he *ought* to have it, certainly he would be bound to act against conscience. Nor is the proof valid, because that consequence is not a simple consequence, but only **as of now**; and of such things it is not universally true that he who owes the antecedent, owes the consequent. For example, if a prelate commands a subject to steal or commit another sin, still the prelate himself ought not to steal and it follows: This prelate does not steal, therefore he acts against this which he himself commands to the other. And yet it would not be truly said that he ought to act against that which he commands the other, because he ought not to make such a command to the other, although it is true that the opposite of that, which he commands, he ought to do himself. And so it must be said also in the proposed matter that the opposite of that, which his conscience dictates to this man, he ought to do. Not however is it true nor does it follow that he ought to act **against his conscience**.

The authority of **Gregory**, just as is clear to one considering well, is to the **opposite** of that which this doctor intends to conclude. Which is clear from the fact that he says: "They make many sin in such a way, that, if perhaps they desire to flee sin, they do not evade this without another snare of sin and they **commit a fault** while they avoid one." From which it is clear that even one so **perplexed**, if he blasphemes, will sin. Nor is the counsel, which he gives, against this, because not only is it usefully counseled to a man that he do good and avoid evil, but also that, if he cannot avoid [both] and it behooves him to fall into one of two sins, he avoid that which is the **greater evil**. And this in a certain mode is called choosing the less evil, and he does this, just as is clear, because he says: "If absolutely no approach of evading without sin lies open, the lesser are always to be chosen." From which also the proposition is

confirmed, because, if that case being posited that man did not sin, he would now avoid sin without sin, the opposite of which is supposed.

And it must be said similarly regarding the alleged council. To the other, which is alleged regarding the dispensation of **natural law**, it must be said that that saying, which is certainly **Gratian's**, is false on account of that exception; nor is he to be followed in this but reprehended, just as his glossator reprehends him in the same place, and well, saying he excepted the case of perplexity badly.

When it is proved further that the blasphemer in such a case does not sin, because he **does what he ought**, it must be said that it is false, nay rather he does that which not only he ought not to do, but which also he ought **not to do**, as is clear enough from the sayings. When it is added to the same "no one sins by doing according to the most right judgment of the saints, the canon and the council," it must be said this is true of a judgment by which they judge absolutely that that is to be done, however it is not universally true of a judgment judging conditionally. For it is certain that all saints and generally prudent men would judge and counsel that, if anyone could not or would not avoid both of two unequal sins, but from malice or infirmity were going to fall into one, he should fall into that which is the **lesser sin**; and yet it is certain that he by doing that lesser sin would sin. Now however it is certain that to such a man so perplexed no saint, indeed nor anyone unless wicked and impious or foolish, would counsel that he **blaspheme or hate God**, but would counsel that he deposit and cast away such an **erroneous estimation**. Which if he either could not or would not, then he would judge it a lesser evil for him, that he act the lesser sin than that he act the greater. And this is what **Gregory** says in the other authority alleged from the same place: "When we are constrained in doubtful things, we are usefully subject in the least things, lest in great things we sin without pardon." For who doubts it is more useful in the abovesaid sense, that is less bad or noxious, to sin **venially** than **mortally**? But even who will deny that he sins who sins venially?

This solution is confirmed evidently by the words of **Gregory** immediately preceding these and immediately following those which were alleged above for the sentence of this doctor. For willing to show his true sentence in that which he had said "if no approach of evading without sin lies open, the lesser are always to be chosen" he added: "Just as **Paul**, when he beheld certain incontinent ones in the church, conceded the least things, so that he might decline the greater, saying: 'But on account of fornication let each one have his own wife.' And because then only are spouses without fault in admixture, when they mix not for explaining [satisfying] lust, but for receiving offspring, so that he might show that even what he had conceded was not without fault, although minimal, he immediately joined: 'However I say this according to indulgence, not according to command.' For that is not without vice which is ignored [forgiven] and not commanded; indeed he saw the sin, which he foresaw he could indulge. But when we are constrained in doubtful things etc." Hence the proposition is clear. For the **incontinent**, if he approaches his wife for the sake of explaining lust, acts according to that counsel of Paul, and **yet he sins**.

Furthermore, given that it were granted to this doctor that in such a case of **perplexity** one ought to do what is less bad and that doing so he does not sin, I do not see by what pact it follows that he ought to **blaspheme God**. For this does not follow, unless to blaspheme God is a **lesser sin** than to not blaspheme God against conscience. Which neither would I wish to say nor did he prove that, and yet he ought to have, since it is of his proposition to prove that to blaspheme or hate God is not bad *per se* and that sometimes it can be done rightly.

(To the second reason of Bradwardine, second)

Secondly, I say to the reason that the case posited assumes one thing which seems **false**, namely that into such an error, by which it is estimated that God is to be hated or blasphemed, someone having the use of free judgment and able to sin—such as he would be who is so perplexed—could fall **without fault**, since the error itself, about which it is agitated, would certainly be a certain **fault**. For if it were not a fault, what error would be said to be a fault? Certainly it does not appear. And thus it would seem that it must be conceded that **no error is a fault**; which is against the doctrine of the saints. For **Augustine** in *Against Julian* book 5, chapter 5, expressly wills that the blindness and obscuration of the mind of the philosophers—concerning whom *Romans* 1 says: "Their foolish heart was darkened"—was not only the punishment of sin, but also a **sin**; the same also in *On Nature and Grace* chapter 22. **Jerome** also in the *Dialogue of Atticus and Critobulus against Pelagius* book 1 feels this same thing.

Furthermore, the common doctrine is that the act of infidelity is a **sin** and that also the **ignorance** of those things which one is bound to know is a sin. Whence there is no doubt that the error of such persons is a sin, and I speak always of actual error. And who would say that he who estimates that God is to be blasphemed does not err regarding those things which he is **bound to know**?

Furthermore, if no error were a sin, no ignorance would be a sin; and further, therefore for no ignorance would a man be damned. And yet the **Apostle** says in 1 Corinthians 14: "If anyone ignores, he will be ignored"; Gloss: "that is, **he will be reprobated**."

If you say that in the case it is not said simply "without his fault" but "without his **preceding** fault," this does not help the proposition. For an error which is a fault excuses no more than one which is only the punishment of a fault. Item, that that [error] would not be in some way from a **preceding original fault**, which even when dismissed leaves behind many of its punishments, perhaps should not be said.

To the alleged authority of **Augustine**, it must be said that Augustine does not write those words as bringing forth his own sentence and opinion, but as pursuing disputatively only one opinion of others which he reported there. Which is clear, because being about to treat this question, namely whether sometimes one is to lie with an **officious lie**, having proposed these things in the beginning of the book, he immediately says: "Which question we shall treat so solicitously, that we seek with the seekers. Whether however we find anything, with us affirming nothing rashly, the treatment itself will sufficiently indicate to the reader attending well"; and "at the extreme [end] however a more certain investigation comprehends our sentence." And because throughout the whole he proceeds **disputatively** affirming nothing until the extreme part of the book, in which he concludes the investigated truth, therefore lest what he was going to say in the prior parts by disputing should be taken as his assertion—which could easily happen to those intending less diligently on account of the obscurity and implication of that book, which is great, just as he himself confesses there and in *Retractations* book 1, last chapter—he soon premonished the reader adding: "Indeed whoever you are who reads, reprehend nothing, unless when you have read through the whole, and so perhaps you will reprehend less." Now however in the extreme part of the book, namely in the chapter before the penultimate, from the premised disputation he expressly concludes that **one is not to lie** for avoiding corporal unchastity, which is of those things which committed against a man make him unclean; the opposite of which sentence the words alleged by this doctor contain, as is clear. And generally he immediately concludes that **in no case is one to lie** with any

kind of lie, saying: "It shines forth therefore, all things discussed, that those testimonies of the scriptures advise nothing else except that one is **never to lie at all**." And consequently by recapitulating the causes treated in disputing and discerning through all kinds of lies, he determines conclusively that one is to lie with **no kind of lie ever**. From which it is clear that in those alleged words he does not bring forth his intention or sentence. Whence neither are they to be alleged as his authority.

To the saying of **Bede**, it must be said that in nothing is it against [the thesis], because by not observing that upon which such an oath was given, **perjury is not committed**, just as the Gloss of the *Decretum* says in the pre-alleged distinction, and **Saint Thomas** in the *Second of the Second*, question 98, article 2; indeed according to him in the same place, the perjury was when it was sworn incautiously.

To the proof which is added lastly, that "whoever chooses the **less evil** so that thus he may flee the greater evil, does not will to do the less but to flee the greater" and therefore "incurs no sin," here I say first that, if this deduction were ratified, it would be necessary to concede that **no one sins**, whatever he did for the sake of avoiding a greater evil. Which is in no way to be said, just as from the words of **Augustine** alleged for the conclusion and other connected ones, which I have not alleged, is well clear. And in the same book, namely *Against Lying*, chapter 37, he says that such an opinion subverts the universal probity of life. It would also be necessary to concede that sometimes "evils are to be done, so that goods may come"; for the intention of him who intends the outcome of good does not seem to be less good than of him who intends the flight of evil. And yet this is against the sentence of the **Apostle** to the Romans 3 and of **Augustine** *Against Lying*, chapter 2.

When it is said that such a one "does not will to do the less evil," if the word "wills" is taken in its general signification according to which universally a motion of the volitive power, which is not volition [strictly], is called volition, it is clear that that saying implies a **contradiction**. But if it is accepted not for any such motion, but for that by which something is desired **for itself as an end**—which also appropriately according to the usage of many authors and **Anselm**, where he is alleged, is called **will**—but that by which something is desired for the sake of another is usually called **election**, the saying can be conceded, but it does not help the arguer, because, given that such a one does not *will* to do the less evil in the aforesaid sense, because not finally and for itself, yet he **chooses** to do the less evil, which election is depraved; and through this he also incurs sin. For not only does he act against right reason who finally intends evil, but also he who intending good **operates or chooses evil**, or what he ought not to operate and not to choose. For for the goodness of an operation it does not suffice to operate for the sake of what is to be operated, but it is also required that **that be done which is to be done**.

(Second Conclusion)

The **second conclusion**, that the **malice of the election** and operation always accompanies the malice of the intention of the doer, so that never is the election or operation of someone doing something with a bad intention morally good or virtuous, but bad and vicious, is proved. Every election or operation done for the sake of that, for the sake of which it **ought not to be done**, is vicious. It is clear, because such is against right reason. But every election or operation of an agent with a bad intention is of this kind, as is clear; wherefore etc.

This is the sentence of **Augustine** clearly *Upon Psalm 31*, where he says that "intention makes the work good," namely partially together with other requisites; which would not be true, if without a good intention the work were good. Item in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 18 and also 19. This is also the common sentence of other saints.

It is also the sentence of the philosophers. Whence **The Philosopher** in *Ethics* book 6, chapter 15, says that "the work is perfected according to prudence and moral virtue"; and he renders the cause saying: "For virtue indeed makes the intention right, but prudence those things which are towards this." Item in *Politics* 7, chapter 18: "There are two things," he says, "in which it is well for all. Of these however one indeed is in this, that the intention and end of actions be placed rightly; but one to find the actions bearing to the end." From which it is clearly evident according to his sentence that for a virtuous operation it is necessary that the intention of the doer be right.

From these things it is clear that for operating virtuously and laudably it does not suffice to do **what** one ought to do, but beyond this it is necessary to do **how** one ought, namely **when** and **how much** and **for whose sake** one ought and with other circumstances which **The Philosopher** posits in *Ethics* 2, chapter 5; nor is there doubt that the circumstance of the **due end** is the most powerful.

From this conclusion and the conclusions of the preceding article follow some corollaries.

(Three Corollaries)

One is that nothing is ever done by man virtuously or morally well, unless it be done from the **actual or habitual love of God**, infused or acquired. It is proved, because nothing, which is done otherwise, is done with a right intention; therefore etc. The assumption is proved, because, as is clear from the preceding article, there is **no right intention except the love of God for His own sake**.

This corollary is confirmed according to itself by **Augustine** *Upon Psalm 67* saying: "For those alone are to be called good works, which are done through the **love of God**"; and in *On the Spirit and the Letter*: "There is no good fruit," he says, "which does not rise from the **root of charity**." What however is charity except the love of God for His own sake or the love of neighbor for the sake of God, which certainly proceeds from the charity of God?

Another corollary is that no act of man is morally good, unless it **tends immediately into God** or into another for the sake of God ultimately, and this by act or habit, just as I also said in distinction 26. Which is proved, because no other is a right intention or done with a right intention, as is sufficiently clear from the sayings.

Which is also confirmed according to itself from the authority of **Augustine** who writes in book 1 of *On Marriage and Concupiscence* and recounts in book 4 *Against Julian*, chapter 7, that "he is not truthfully called chaste, who does not keep the true faith of marriage to his wife **for the sake of God**." Who also, as is clear from his authorities alleged in distinction 26 in the prosecution of the first reason to the first conclusion of the first article, and *Against Julian* book 4 and *The City of God* book 19 chapter 25, expressly says that true virtues are none, if they are not referred finally **into God**, nay rather to whatever else, or if not to another than to themselves they are referred, they are **vices**.

Item in *On the Morals of the Church*, when he had concluded that God is He to whom "all things are to be referred"—just as was alleged in the first article—in the following chapter defining those moral virtues, he says: "Let us say that **temperance** is love keeping itself whole and incorrupt for God; **fortitude**, love bearing all things easily for the sake of God; **justice**, love serving God alone and on account of this ruling well the rest which are subject to man; **prudence**, love discerning well those things, by which one is helped into God, from those by which one can be impeded."

From which things it is clearly evident that there is no virtue, whose act is not finally done **for the sake of God**, according to the sentence of Augustine, and through this neither is any act not done for the sake of God ultimately virtuous.

The **third** corollary, and this pertains specially to distinction 41, is that **no act of men simply infidel is morally good**. I say however "simply infidel" to exclude schismatics, heretics, catechumens and the rest who in some way believe and with some faith know God.

It is clear, because none [of their acts] is done from the love of God or for the sake of God ultimately, since they do not know that He is to be loved for Himself and other things for His sake. Therefore none is done with a **right intention** and through this neither virtuously or morally well.

This reason almost total is posited by **Augustine** *Upon Psalm 67* saying: "For those alone are to be called good works which are done through the love of God. However it is necessary that **faith** precede this, so that that [love] may begin from this [faith], not this from that, since no one operates through the love of God, unless he first believes in God." Item *Upon Psalm 31*: "Let no one," he says, "compute his good [works] before faith; where **faith** was not, good work was not. For **intention** makes the work good, but **faith** directs the intention."

It is confirmed, because, if the acts of infidels were truly virtuous, certainly there would be **true virtues** in them; for from virtuous acts habits of virtues are generated. But the consequent is false according to the intention of blessed **Augustine** in book 4 *Against Julian*, where through many chapters he proves the opposite.

In *The City of God* also book 5, chapter 19, he says that "it ought to be established among all truthfully pious men that no one without true piety, that is the true worship of the true God, can have **true virtue**." And in book 19, chapter 4: "**True virtues** cannot be except in those, in whom is true piety."

Furthermore in the book *On Continence* near the end he says: "For are we going to say that continence, which we most truly call a gift of God, is a sin? Far be from our hearts such detestable madness. However the blessed Apostle says: 'Everything that is not from faith, is sin.' Therefore that which does not have faith **is not even to be named continence**." And just as here concerning continence specially, so concerning any moral virtue generally it can be proved.

Again in the book *On True Innocence*: "Every life of infidels," he says, "**is sin** and nothing is good without the supreme good. For where the acknowledgment of the eternal and immutable truth is lacking, **virtue is false** even in the best morals," that is those which seem best.

Finally, which urges more strongly, since in the book *On Order* he had insinuated the opposite in some way, afterwards in *Retractations* 1, chapter 3, revoking that he says: "It displeases me that I said philosophers not endowed with true piety 'shone with the **light of virtue**.'"

Bede imitated his sentence saying against Julian, chapter 13: "It is certain that whichever of the philosophers did not know Christ the virtue of God and the wisdom of God, these could by no reason have any **true virtue** just as neither true wisdom."

Lincolniensis [Robert Grosseteste] expressly held the same and affirmed it to be the intention of Augustine, just as was alleged above in distinction 26, article 1 of question 1.

(Instance)

But against this seems to be what **Augustine** writes in the epistle *To Marcellinus* saying: "The Romans constituted and increased the republic by **virtues**, although not having true piety toward the true God, which could lead them even into the eternal city by salubrious religion, yet keeping a **certain probity of its kind**, which could suffice for constituting, increasing and preserving the earthly city. For God thus showed in the most opulent and illustrious empire of the Romans, how much **civil virtues** even without true religion were valid, so that it might be understood that with this added men become citizens of another city, whose king is truth, whose law charity, whose measure is eternity." Here Augustine openly asserts that in those Romans were moral political or civil virtues.

(Against the instance)

I respond that here **Augustine** does not use the word "virtue" strictly and properly, so that he calls only that virtue which is **truly virtue**, that is a habit which is a principle of acting *what* and *for the sake of what* and *how* it is to be done, just as virtue is taken in the proposed matter.

And this is clear, since in *The City of God* 5 from chapter 12 up to 20 inclusive, discussing many things concerning this matter from the proposition, he says many times that those Romans, who seemed more laudable, did all their works, which seemed laudable and glorious to men and from which they are still praised, finally for **vain glory of the world**. From which it is certain that their affections and habits, by which they did this, were by no means **true virtues**. And he himself did not be silent about this in the same place, chapter 19, saying: "While that is established among all truthfully pious men that no one without true piety, that is the true worship of the true God, can have true virtue." And he adds what makes to the proposition: "Nor is it true, when it serves **human glory**." And in the following chapter—approving the sentence of those philosophers, who said they are not true virtues which are referred to pleasure, according to the opinion of the Epicureans, painting Pleasure as if a queen in a royal chair, whom virtues as handmaids might serve—he adds: "But I do not think the picture is of sufficient due decorum, if even such is feigned, where virtues serve **human glory**"; willing through this that, just as those are not true virtues whose end is pleasure, so neither are those whose end is the glory of the world. Which also he immediately shows explicitly. But **Augustine** uses the word "**virtue**" **improperly**, extending it to those habits, by which certainly those things which are to be done are done and those to be avoided are avoided, although not for the sake of that end for the sake of which both the former are to be done and the latter to be avoided; which [habits], although according to the truth they are **neither virtues nor laudable**, yet to

men who look only at that which is done and not for the sake of what it is done—whether they be ignorant for the sake of what they ought to be done, or not ignorant but yet not able to discern the intentions of the doers—are estimated **virtues** and **laudable habits**.

And he also expresses this sufficiently in chapter 12 saying: "Therefore that greed for praise and **desire for glory** did those many wondrous things, laudable namely and glorious **according to the estimation of men**." Therefore he does not attribute to them true moral virtues, but putative only and dissimilar to true virtue by a smaller distance than those habits by which things to be avoided are done and things to be done are avoided, just as also *Against Julian*, as is alleged above, he said: "Not by having **true virtues**, but by **not deviating very much** from true virtues"; after which words he soon subjects that they "by civil virtue, not true but similar to the true, served demons or human glory." And that he did not intend to ascribe to them true virtues, even civil ones, he insinuated sufficiently even in the words alleged in objecting, when he says: "Keeping however a **certain probity of its kind**, which could suffice for constituting, increasing, and preserving the earthly city." For by such a mode of speaking, by which he says not simply "probity" but with an addition "a certain probity which etc.," he insinuates sufficiently that they did not have **true probity** and perfect according to its nature, but a certain **imperfect disposition**, which however would be valid for the constitution, increase and temporal conservation of the city, and therefore he calls them also "civil" virtues. Nor however did he add "true" nor did I ever find where he said that they had true ones. Which however if he had said, he would be to be estimated to have **retracted** on account of that which is alleged from the book of *Retractations*, and because so many times, and especially where he discussed this matter from the proposition, he openly said the **opposite**.

To the **principal reason** of the question the response is clear from the sayings, namely that those authorities speak of works which can be done well and badly. For such things, if they are done with a **bad intention**, are bad; but if with a **good [intention]** with other due circumstances concurring, they are good. But in others it is not so, as was clear.

DISTINCTION 42-44

QUESTION 1

WHETHER a man sins more by a bad will and the accompanying exterior operation together than by the bad will itself only.

As to distinction 42 and the two remaining ones, I ask together: **whether a man sins more by a bad will and the accompanying exterior operation together than by the bad will itself only.**

And it seems first that he does not, thus: **No exterior operation is of itself a sin**, neither morally good nor bad; therefore a man does not sin more through it than he would sin by the bad will alone without it. The consequence is plain enough. The antecedent is proved: For that none is a sin, is proved, because the definition of sin is not verified of it. For sin is defined by **Augustine** in *On Two Souls* thus: "Sin is the will of retaining or pursuing what justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain"; and he approves this definition also in *Retractations* book 1, chapter 15. However, **no exterior action is a will**. That also none is good or bad of itself, is clear, because any can be done indifferently well and badly. For **homicide**,

concerning which it would seem less [neutral], is done well by a minister of justice; that it is also done badly sometimes, there is no doubt.

To the **opposite** it is argued thus: A man sins more sinning by two sins together than sinning by one of them only; therefore etc. The antecedent is known. The consequence is proved, because the **bad will** and the **bad exterior operation** accompanying it are two sins, since they are two distinct acts and each according to itself is a sin, **The Master** saying in distinction 35 of this Second [Book], chapter 3: "Indeed it can be said and ought to be freely delivered that sin is a bad act **interior and exterior**, namely bad thought, speech, and operation; chiefly however sin consists in the will, from which as from a bad tree proceed bad works as bad fruits."

I respond. Assuming the true sense of the speech, which ought to be held when we say some act or operation is bad or an evil or a sin according to those things which were said above in distinction 34, and speaking in this whole question concerning **moral goodness and malice**, I posit some conclusions.

(Conclusions 1-4)

The **first** is that **some exterior operation is a sin**. It is proved: Every **lie** is a sin, but some exterior operation is a lie, therefore etc.

The major is clear through that of **Augustine** in *Enchiridion* 20: "It seems to me indeed that **every lie is a sin**." And he says and proves the same in the same place, chapter 25. Item in *On Lying*, the last chapter: "Whoever thinks there is some kind of lie which is not a sin, deceives himself foully." And in *Against Lying*, chapter 5: "There are many kinds of lies," he says, "all of which indeed we ought to hate universally. For there is no lie which is not contrary to the truth." From which it follows well that there is **no lie which is not a sin**.

The minor is clear through the same author in *On Lying*, chapter 6, saying: "No one doubts that he lies, who willing enunciates a falsehood for the cause of deceiving. Wherefore it is manifest that a false enunciation brought forth with the will to deceive is a **lie**." However, it is certain that a false enunciation brought forth is an **exterior operation**. This same thing is clear from the definition of sin given by **Augustine** in 22 *Against Faustus*: "Sin is a deed or word or desire against the eternal law." Through which disjunctive speech it appears that not only to will but also to say something and to operate something extrinsic is a **sin**. Furthermore, who would deny that **thefts, adulteries, homicides** and many other exterior works prohibited by divine law are sins?

The **second conclusion**, that **every exterior moral operation arising from a bad will is morally bad and a sin**, is proved, because every such is a voluntary operation difform [non-conforming] to right reason or done difformly. However, it was shown in distinction 34 that sin is nothing other than **to act voluntarily against right reason**.

The **third conclusion**, that **every exterior moral operation is good or bad morally and none is entirely neutral**, is proved, because every exterior moral operation either is conformable to right reason or is not conformable. If conformable, it is morally good; if not conformable, it is morally bad.

The **fourth conclusion**, that **no exterior moral operation is [both] good and bad morally**, is proved, because from the opposite it follows that some singular demonstrable operation is conformable to right reason according to all circumstances due to be in it and is not thus conformable; which implies a **contradiction**.

(Corollary)

From this is inferred that **first supposition**, which I posited in distinction 26, question 1, article 1, for proving the first conclusion, namely that **no culpable act is morally good**. And the inference is clear, since every culpable act is morally bad. It is clear, because every culpable act is difform to right reason; otherwise it would not be culpable but laudable. Therefore, if some culpable act is morally good, some morally bad act is morally good.

(Response of William of Bellomonte)

However, a **certain modern doctor** [William of Bellomonte] denied that supposition. For distinguishing concerning a threefold fault, namely **original, actual mortal, actual venial**, he said that, if that proposition is understood of an act culpable by **original fault**, it is false, because infidels had many morally good acts. If also it is understood of an act culpable by **actual venial fault**, it is also false. Which is proved thus: A **meritorious act** is morally good, but an act of **venial sin** is sometimes meritorious, therefore etc. The major is clear, because meritorious goodness supposes moral goodness. The minor is proved, because **to resist temptation, to render the debt to a wife, to lie for saving the life of an innocent** are meritorious acts; and yet they are **venial sins**. If an act culpable in the second mode is accepted, namely from **actual mortal fault**, this can be accepted in two ways: Namely positively contrarily culpable, that is **demeritoriously**, and thus the proposition is true; in another way privatively culpable, that is **non-meritorious**, and thus the proposition is false, because, as he says he has posited, many acts, which are not meritorious, are morally good.

To the proof of that supposition then made—which was "No morally good act is in any way difform to right reason, but every culpable act is in some way difform to right reason, therefore etc."—he says to the major that it is true of that which is difform contrarily and to natural right reason; but to the minor, that it is true of an act culpable by **actual mortal fault** and of difformity taken contrarily, but not of culpable taken in the two other modes.

(Against the response of William of Bellomonte)

In this response are contained many things **false in my judgment**: One is that **some actual sin is a morally good act**; for this manifestly includes a contradiction. Which is proved, because, if some act is morally good, it is conformable to **right reason** according to all circumstances required for the act to be truly virtuous. But it is certain that no sin is thus conformable according to all circumstances to right reason; otherwise it would not be a sin, but done entirely rightly and altogether in such a manner as it ought to be done.

Furthermore, **every sin is rightly blamed**, accepting sin for a fault as in the proposed matter; however no truly virtuous act is rightly blamed, because, as **Augustine** says in book 3 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 35, "whatever is rightly blamed, is blamed for this, because it is not so as it ought to have been." However, a

virtuous act is not called virtuous from elsewhere, unless because it is as it ought to be. For to act virtuously is nothing other than to act **what** one ought and **for the sake of what** and **how** one ought etc., as right reason dictates. If therefore some sin is a morally good act or, which is the same, truly virtuous, some act is rightly blamed and is not rightly blamed.

Again, the authority and reason of **Augustine** in *Against Lying*, chapter 38, directly impugn this, where he proves that **no lie is just** by this, that otherwise some sin would be just; which he says and proves to be most absurd. Whence he speaks thus: "But is he to be judged to say nothing, who says **some lies are just**, unless that some sins are just, and through this that some things are just which are unjust? Than which what can be said more absurd? For whence is it a sin, unless because it is contrary to justice? Let it be said therefore that some sins are great, some small, because it is true; nor must we listen to the Stoics, who contend all are equal. But to say certain sins are unjust, certain **just**, what else is it than to say certain iniquities are unjust, certain **just**, when the apostle John says: 'Everyone who commits sin, is iniquitous'?" These are his words. Since therefore we call those things just, which are done rightly or virtuously, and all the aforesaid denominations are of the same signification entirely—the word justice being accepted generally as here, according to what is clear Augustine accepts—it is clear that that whole deduction of Augustine directly impugns the aforesaid saying.

Another false thing contained in that response is that **some sin is meritorious**. For if this is true, therefore a man is to be remunerated by God for some sin of his and to receive a reward, and through this the consequent is that God approves and accepts some sins of ours and takes pleasure in them. But who would dare to say this, when it would be nefas [wickedness] to think this even of a just man? For who would not cry out that a man, who approved the sin of another or took pleasure in it and gave gifts for it, was corrupt in mind and vicious and depraved?

It is confirmed, since, because it seemed to some that sometimes one is to lie, on account of the fact that it is read that God did well to the **midwives** who nevertheless had lied, as is held in Exodus 1, the saints expressly say God did not do well to them for that lie, lest it be thought God rewards any sin. Whence **Augustine** in *Against Lying*, chapter 40: "But that which is written," he says, "that God did well to the Hebrew midwives and to Rahab the harlot of Jericho, was not done therefore because they lied, but because they were merciful toward the men of God. Therefore not **fallacy** was remunerated in them, but **benevolence**; the benignity of the mind, not the iniquity of the lying."

Furthermore, if some sin is a meritorious act, either some meritorious act is not a **special gift of God** nor arising from the grace of God, or some sin is a gift of God and proceeding from His grace. The first is not to be given, lest it be conceded that a man can do a meritorious act **without the grace of God**; which this same doctor tries well and catholically to avoid. However, it would be necessary to concede that, since **no sin is a work of the grace of God** and for any sin free will is supported by suitable power, as **Augustine** says in *On Divine Predestination*, just as was alleged in the question of distinction 26 and also 29. However, the second is too absurd, as is clear from the words of **Augustine** in the book *On Continence* alleged in the preceding question: "For are we going to say," he says, "that continence, which we most truly call a **gift of God**, is a sin? Far be from our hearts such detestable madness." For he wills it to be a necessary consequence that continence is not a sin, if it is, just as it truly is, a gift of God; and from this he further concludes it not to be in infidels, because in them it would be a sin. However, that consequence is founded upon this, that **no gift of God is a sin**, as is clear.

Furthermore, if some sin is a meritorious act, **not every sin is to be avoided**. For who ought to avoid what is meritorious for him with God? And if not every sin is to be avoided, how does the universal church of the faithful pray daily to God saying: "Save us today by Your power, that on this day **we may decline to no sin**"? For it is clear that he wills to avoid not only some but any [sin], who prays thus, if he prays so in heart as in mouth.

Furthermore, no one, from the fact that he does not do what he ought to do, or from the fact that he does what he ought not to do, merits any reward with God; therefore **no sin is meritorious with God**. The antecedent is evident. For since any such person is worthy of vituperation and punishment, indeed nor does anyone otherwise deserve to be blamed or punished, how can it be said that from this or that anyone merits a reward? The consequence is evident, because one sins actually by no one but one of those modes.

Furthermore, **every sin is demeritorious** or punishable and worthy of punishment; therefore none is meritorious. The antecedent is commonly conceded by catholic doctors, teaching that to any mortal [sin], if it is not remitted, is due eternal punishment according to the divine statute, but to any venial [sin] temporal punishment. The consequence is clear, because by no one act does anyone simultaneously merit and demerit.

Item what he says that **to resist temptation** is a venial sin, does not seem to be able to be said safely. For how does the whole doctrine of Christ persuade that we resist temptations, and commend those resisting, but rebuke those consenting and deter with the threat of punishments?

Again, how is "**to render the debt to a wife**" called by this doctor a sin, when the **Apostle** commands this saying in 1 Corinthians 7: "Let the husband render the debt to the wife, similarly the wife to the husband," and a little after prohibits the opposite saying: "Do not therefore defraud one another," Gloss: "that is subtract the debt"? Furthermore, if to render the debt to a wife is a sin, much more does it seem it must be said that **to ask** is a sin; and thus conjugal intercourse—whether it be done by asking or by rendering—will be a sin, and through this illicit. But to say this is to condemn marriage; which was the error of the **Tatianists**, just as **Augustine** recites in the 25th chapter of *On Heresies*.

And if it is said that this doctor does not understand that *every* "resisting temptation" or *every* "rendering the debt to a wife" is a sin, but to render badly and to resist badly, it avails him nothing to his proposition, because neither to resist badly nor to render badly is meritorious to the one resisting or rendering, but certainly **demeritorious**. Since therefore he wishes to prove that minor of his, namely that an act of venial sin is meritorious through this, because to render the debt is meritorious, it behooves him to assume universally: Either that **every** rendering the debt is meritorious, and thus also every rendering badly is meritorious—which is in no way to be said—or that **every** rendering the debt is a sin; against which it has already been argued.

Moreover what he says: "**To lie for saving the life of an innocent** is a meritorious act," is also not well said, because, if that were true, it follows that it is not to be denied that one is to lie for saving the life of an innocent. For how is it to be denied that that is to be done through which a man merits with God? But the saints commonly teach that one is **not to lie** even thus and for such a cause, as is clear through **Augustine** in the book *Against Lying*, in which from the proposition he disputes and determines that **in no case ever is one to lie**, just as appears sufficiently in chapter 5, as was pre-alleged; and the same in the

Enchiridion in many chapters, and similarly in the book *On Lying*. Blessed **Gregory** also teaches the same writing in *Morals* 18 about the beginning thus: "For a **lie** is to be beware of with the greatest effort, although sometimes there may be some kind of lie of lighter fault, if anyone lies by helping. But, because it is written: 'The mouth that lies kills the soul' and: 'You will destroy all who speak a lie,' perfect men flee this kind of lie also with the greatest effort, so that neither is the life of anyone defended by their fallacy, **lest they harm their own soul**, while they strive to help the flesh of another."

Furthermore, since **every lie is a sin**, as he says in the same place and **Augustine** also in the pre-alleged [places], nor would this doctor deny this, if it is conceded that for saving the life of an innocent or doing any other good whatsoever one is to lie, certainly against the doctrine of the **Apostle** it is conceded that "evils are to be done so that goods may come."

Item what he says concerning **mortal fault**, does not seem well said, because there is **no mortal fault** which is not demeritorious positively, and not only non-meritorious. Which is clear, because there is none, to which eternal punishment is not due; and yet from the distinction, which this doctor posits, it is clear he wills some mortal fault not to be demeritorious positively. And from the same he wills that some mortal fault is a **truly virtuous and right act**; which also is not well said.

The **response** finally given to the reason proving that supposition is **not sufficient**. For what he says to the major concerning contrarious difformity and concerning natural reason helps him in nothing, since by whatever difformity an act be difform to right reason, it is certain it is not conformable to it according to **all circumstances** dictated by it. Therefore no act in any way difform to right reason is conformable to it according to all circumstances dictated by it. However, every **morally good act** is conformable to right reason according to all circumstances dictated by it, as has frequently been premised. Therefore no morally good act is in any way difform to right reason; and this is the major then assumed.

What is added concerning **natural reason** helps nothing also. For however "**natural reason**" is taken, provided it is right reason, whatever is conformable to it, is conformable to any right reason concerning the same, and whatever is conformable to any right reason, whether natural or not natural, is conformable to it and to any right reason about the same object. For all true and right reasons concerning the same signify similarly; otherwise some would not be true and right, but false and erroneous.

What is also said to the minor is not valid, since universally of every fault, whether venial or another, the proposition is true, because, if there is any culpable act in no way difform to right reason, that will be entirely conformable to right reason, and consequently will be such as it ought to be. From which it follows that someone by doing what he ought sins, and by sinning does what he ought; which, as **Augustine** says in book 3 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 37, "is a crime to say."

It is necessary therefore to say that **every culpable act**, by whatever fault it is truly called culpable, is in some way discordant and difform to right reason. From which things the aforesaid supposition is efficaciously concluded.

(Conclusions 5-7)

The **fifth conclusion** is that a man **sins more extensively**, that is, he sins by more sins, by sinning with a bad will and a bad accompanying exterior operation together than by a bad will alone. This is proved,

because such an exterior operation is a **sin**, as is clear from the **second conclusion**; and that sin is not the bad will which it accompanies, just as to speak a falsehood with the intention of deceiving is not to will to speak a falsehood with the intention of deceiving, nor is to handle another's thing against the will of the owner to will to handle another's thing etc., and so it is clear regarding others. And it is certain that such and such a willing are sins; therefore to will that which is a sin and to do that which accompanies it are **several sins**. And consequently he who sins with a bad will and a bad accompanying exterior operation sins by **more sins**.

The **sixth conclusion**, that a man does not sin **more intensively**, that is not by a more intense sin, by a bad will and a bad operation accompanying it outwardly together than by one of them only, is clear, because those two sins do not constitute any **one sin**. Therefore there is not any sin of that man more intense than the bad will and than the following operation.

The **seventh conclusion** is that a man does **not demerit more** with God through a bad will and a following operation together than through a bad will only, **supposing the equality of the will**. Which I understand thus, namely that a man willing to do something, for example to kill, and with this also killing, is not worthy of greater punishment nor is deputed to greater punishment by God than if he only willed to kill and did not kill, supposing that he had an equally full and in all things similar **will of killing**. And I say this regarding diverse men, of whom one might will to kill someone and actually kill, but the other might will to kill, yet not kill, because he could not: If the will were **equally full** in both and other things are equal in them except the killing and not killing, he who does not kill does not demerit less with God nor is he worthy of greater punishment according to the truth than he who kills, nor conversely does the latter demerit more. And I speak similarly regarding other acts.

This conclusion is clear first by the express authority of **Augustine** in book 1 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 3, saying thus: "If the faculty of lying with another's wife does not happen to someone, but it is plain in some way that he desires it and, if the power were given, he would do it, he is **no less guilty** than if he were caught in the deed itself." What is "he is no less guilty" except that he does not demerit less or is not worthy of less punishment?

Secondly thus: The measure of punishments is attended to according to the **measure of the wills** of those who sin; therefore in whomever there is an equal or equally bad will, they merit **equal punishment**, and consequently in the proposed case one is not worthy of greater punishment than the other.

The assumption is proved through **Augustine To Deogratias**, chapter 4, where expounding that verse of Matthew 7 "In what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you again," he says that "the **appetite of the will** is the measure of all human deeds"; and he adds: "For from the qualities of wills, not from the spaces of times, do we measure whether things are rightly done or sins. Otherwise it would be held a greater sin to fell a tree than to kill a man; for the former is done with a long delay by many blows, the latter by one briefest blow of time." And therefore Augustine concludes there a little after that "the punishments of the damned will be equally long, but some milder than others, so that for those for whom the time is equal, the harshness is not equal, on account of the **measure of sins** not in the production of times, but in the **will** of those sinning." In which words he also offers us the motive of a good argument for the principal proposition, because, if on account of the exterior work one demerited more, other things being equal, therefore on account of a **greater exterior work**, if each operates outwardly, yet with other

things being equal, he whose work was greater would merit greater punishment. And thus, he who suffocated or otherwise killed a man with a longer delay would merit greater punishment than he who did so with a shorter one, supposing that both acted with an **equal will** and all other things were equal and similar except this only, that the one, because stronger in powers kills more quickly, but the other, because weaker, applies a longer delay. This however no one would say; wherefore etc.

Furthermore, a man does not merit a **greater reward** on account of the will and work than another on account of an equal will only without the work, where other things are equal; therefore neither through a bad will and work etc. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved, because otherwise a man could **unwillingly** be made of greater or lesser merit with God through another man and be defrauded of a reward and burdened with punishment; which does not seem to be granted. The consequence is plain, since in an exterior act a man can be impeded even unwillingly, just as is clear in many things.

The antecedent is also proved through the **Gloss** on 2 Corinthians 8 upon that verse "He who had much did not abound and he who had little did not have less," which says: "He who gives much as a rich man and he who gives little as a poor man, if the **will is equal**, will have an **equal reward**." And certainly it seems it must be said thus of him who gives nothing, because he has nothing which he can give, if an equal will is present.

Which is confirmed through **Hugo of Saint Victor** in *On the Sacraments*, book 2, part 14, chapter 6, saying: "If therefore where more is given and where less there is not a different merit, if an **equal will** is had, therefore where something is given and where nothing is given there cannot be a different merit, if an equal will is had on both sides."

Furthermore in the same place he determines this conclusion from the proposition. Whence he says: "Therefore **the whole merit is in the will**. As much as you will, so much you merit." Which is not to be understood as if it were said "As much as you will to merit, so much you merit," but how great is the will by which you merit, so great is the merit proportionally, namely that of a greater will there is greater merit and of a lesser less and of an equal equal. And then he argues against himself thus: "But you say to me: If the whole merit is in the will, there is **nothing more from the work**, and when the work itself is with the will; why therefore is the work required, if for the work nothing is added or taken away from the merit of man?" And he answers: "Hear why. Therefore after the will the work is also required, so that by the work itself **the will may be increased**. Such is the heart of man, that for his work he burns more, whether toward loving goodness if it is right, or toward malice if it is depraved"; and he adds: "And if perhaps it happens that there is **as great a will** in him who does not operate, as is in him who exercises the work, where the will is the same, the merit cannot be dissimilar." And whatever things he says in that chapter, which is prolix enough, go to this intention.

(Objections against the seventh conclusion)

But against this conclusion seems to be first the **Gloss of the Decretum** *De poenitentia*, distinction 1, "Si cui." For there the glossator glossing the pre-alleged word of **Augustine** *On Free Choice* "He is no less guilty" says: "In truth **he is more guilty**, if the work is applied, but accept this as to the sufficiency of eternal destruction: Or 'no less,' that is nevertheless he is guilty, not but that he sins more, if the work follows. Which he proves from this that it is prohibited that a bad will proceed into work."

Secondly, against this seems to be the determination of the church condemning the errors of **Peter Abelard**. For among his condemned articles one is said to be, by which he spoke thus: "We say indeed that the **will alone** is remunerated by God eternally, whether for good or for evil, nor is a man made worse or better on account of works, unless perhaps, while he operates, his will is augmented in something." From the condemnation of which sentence it seems to be held that the will alone is not remunerated and that a man is **better or worse through exterior works**.

Thirdly, it can be argued by reason, because, if the conclusion is true, he will not merit more with God willing to sustain **martyrdom** for Christ and actually sustaining it than another willing to sustain it with an equal will, yet not actually sustaining it. Which does not seem true, because for the act of martyrdom an **aureole** [halo] is given according to the doctors. Item to will to be **baptized**, or to receive another sacrament, would be equally good and useful to a man as to will and also with this to be baptized. Item he who would will to strike or kill a **cleric**, would sin as much as another who not only willed but also killed. Which is false: Both because the one killing is truly a homicide, but the other not; and because this one incurs **excommunication and irregularity**, which punishments the other does not incur, and whatever other punishments the one incurs or merits for the will of killing, this one incurs and merits. However, this would not be just, unless he sinned more and was worthy of greater punishment.

Fourthly, it follows that, if two men willing to kill someone were to shoot arrows in some street of a city, with **equal caution applied or equal neglected** on this side and that concerning harming anyone, and one killed a person coming upon the scene, the other no one, because no one met him, he who harmed no one would sin as much as he who killed the man coming upon the scene; which does not seem to be granted.

Fifthly, because to every sin punishment is due, therefore to **two sins greater punishment is due** than to one only of them. For from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent seems to follow clearly; therefore for both, namely the will and the following act, since they are two distinct sins, as was said in the fifth conclusion, greater punishment is due to the sinner, and through this he demerits more.

(To the objections against the seventh conclusion)

To the **first** of these it can be said first, just as many theological doctors say, that that **gloss** seems to contradict the text directly, therefore one is not to stand by the gloss. Or, if we wish to receive the gloss, it can be said secondly that he is more guilty **extensively**, because he sins by more sins; and the proof which is added concerning the prohibition of the exterior act seems to insinuate this intention. Or it can also be understood **intensively** on account of a more intense will. For he is more intense who exits into work than he not exiting, where each could exit; in which case perhaps the gloss speaks only. But where the will is **equally intense**, if the exterior act does not follow on account of a positive or negative impediment or howsoever, just as must be taken in the proposed matter, he will not be less guilty in the premised sense than if, with no impediment intervening, the act had followed outwardly.

To the **second** I say that I do not think all those words thus posited, as they were recited in arguing, were of **Peter Abelard**; and the cause is, because in no book of the epistles of blessed **Bernard** have I yet found such a text of words, where the articles collected from his sayings are recited, but in many books and all, which I have read up to here by myself or another, it is held precisely thus: "That on account of works a man is made **neither better nor worse**"; and it is the 13th of his articles. However, who would

not see that this article accepted thus is deservedly to be condemned? For these words alleged thus give to understand that whether a man steals or commits adultery, he is not worse from that than if he did not commit these things, and, if he honors God and helps his neighbor for the sake of God, or exercises any other good things commanded to us by God, he is not therefore better than if he did not do them. Which sense is certainly **false and erroneous**; for according to this it follows that neither from an exterior work nor from a will or another interior act is a man better or worse than he would be without it, and that through none does he merit or demerit, and so there is **no sin or merit** of man. And that such was his sense, another article of his opens sufficiently, which is the 19th and last and posited with this tenor: "That neither the work nor the will nor the concupiscence nor the delight, which moves it, is a sin, nor ought we to will it to be extinguished." From which things it is clear that the determination of the church condemning him is in nothing contrary to the sayings above.

To the **third**, as to that which is said concerning **martyrdom**, it seems it must be said that, where the case were such that the interior act were **equally intense** and equally well circumstanced and generally equally good intensively and extensively without the exterior act, just as it would be if the exterior act accompanied it, one does not merit less from such a will precisely than if with it he actually suffered the punishment of martyrdom. It would be difficult however to find such a case. For, as was touched upon by **Hugo**, the will is increased from its act and greater fervor seems to be required and to concur in the **actual experience** and sustenance of punishment actually inflicted than of that imagined or conceived only. However, where the case is given, as was premised, it seems it must be said, as was said. To which makes that which the church sings concerning **blessed Martin**: "O most holy soul, whom although the sword of the persecutor did not take away, yet **he did not lose the palm of martyrdom**."

As to the second part concerning the **sacraments**, the consequence is to be denied, because, although he does not merit more from the exterior act, yet from the *thing operated* [ex re operata], namely the sacrament, grace is conferred upon him, and consequently it is better for him; just as also for a boy receiving a sacrament, although he does no meritorious act, it is good to receive the sacrament on account of the efficacy of the sacrament itself in him. Similarly also it is said that he actually sustaining martyrdom, even if he does not merit more on account of the exterior work, yet receives the **aureole**, and through this it is better and more useful for him to will and sustain than it would be to will precisely.

As to the third part the consequent is to be conceded. And to the first proof of falsity it must be said that each is a homicide by the **homicide of the will**, although only one is a homicide by the homicide of the exterior act, according to the distinction of the **Gloss** upon that of Romans 1 "Filled with all iniquity" and it follows "with homicides, contention etc." And although one is a homicide by actual homicide, it does not follow however that he demerits more than the rest, if other things are equal; nor is the opposite proved. However, what is added concerning **excommunication** and other punishments does not argue the intent, because frequently such punishments are inflicted for lesser sins and not for greater, as is clear, because he beating a cleric incurs excommunication and yet he killing a thousand lay men is not therefore excommunicated, although there is doubt to no one that he sins and demerits much more and more gravely with God. Whence from such punishments, which are inflicted on sinners by ecclesiastical or even secular judgment, greater demerit of a man with God cannot be argued. Nor however are they inflicted unjustly, since he certainly is worthy of such punishments, indeed even of greater ones which are reserved to divine judgment, just as also the punishments of other crimes, which are not punished judicially here.

To the **fourth** the consequent is to be conceded. However, it must be said that neither does he actually killing sin as much, as if he had *wished* to kill [only]; nor less also than if no one had arrived whom he might kill, and consequently the killing of anyone had not followed, with other things however holding themselves similarly. Furthermore, the argument does not seem fully to the proposition. For each shooter has not only an interior act, but also an exterior one; nor does one have properly any act to which the rest does not have a similar one. Whence if both died before the arrow arrived at anyone whom it might wound, it would not be said that one acted dissimilarly from the other, although the **event** was dissimilar.

To the **fifth** I deny the consequence speaking universally of sin. For since, just as **Augustine** says in book 1 of *On Free Choice*, chapter 14, "it is one thing to will well or badly, another to merit something through a good or bad will," so I say that it is one thing to act well or badly, or to act rightly or iniquitously, or not rightly which is called sinning, another to **merit or demerit** through one's act. However, a man acts well or badly both by an exterior act and by an interior act or will; but nevertheless he does not merit or demerit except precisely through the **act of the will**, and consequently he does not demerit more through the act of the will and the exterior act than through the act of the will alone. And through this not by any two sins does he demerit more than by one of them only.

(To the principal arguments of the question)

To the **principal argument** of the question, when it is assumed that **no exterior operation is of itself bad** or a sin, this can have a double sense: One is, by which it is understood that no exterior operation is any evil or sin distinct from the sin or evil which is the interior act of the will; and in this sense I deny the assumption.

To the first proof from the authority of **Augustine**, it must be said that there Augustine does not define sin universally but only the **sin of the will**, to which certainly the nature of sin agrees first and principally; and this suffices for his proposition there. And this is clear, because in 22 *Against Faustus* defining sin he says that "it is a word or deed or desire against the eternal law." From which definition it is clear that not only the interior act of the will but also some **exterior operation is a sin**.

To the second proof it must be said that it does not proceed to the given sense of the antecedent, since it does not follow: Every exterior operation can be done well; therefore when it is done badly, it is not a distinct evil or **distinct sin** from the sin which is the interior act.

Another sense of that can be, by which it is understood that no exterior operation is **per se a sin**, so that this name "sin" per se in the first or second mode is predicated of the name signifying such an operation; to which sense the second proof goes. And whatever may be of the truth of it in this sense, because that can be clear from the two questions immediately preceding, the consequence is to be denied, if in the consequent the word "**more**" is taken **extensively**, just as it is taken above in the fifth conclusion. For given that some exterior operation is not *per se* a sin, still it can be a **distinct sin** from the interior, and consequently he sinning by the interior act and such an exterior operation sins by **more sins**. But if the word "more" in the consequent were taken **intensively**, whatever might be of his proofs, it would not be against the sayings, but for the **sixth conclusion**.

And through this the answer is clear also to the argument in the **opposite**. However, it is to be noted that, when I say an interior or exterior act is a sin, I speak according to that sense which I gave above in distinction 34, where it was inquired **what is sin**.

From which may He preserve us immune by His grace, in whom there was absolutely no sin and who, that He might take away sin, came into the world, the Son of God **Jesus Christ** blessed unto ages of ages. Amen.

Here ends the Second [Book] of the Sentences of brother **Gregory of Rimini**, master of the sacred page, of the order of the hermit brothers of Saint Augustine.