

Hermann Ravensperger

Ai translation by Confetti

On the Justification of Man before God

Concerning the justification of man, which we intend to set forth in a simple and brief summary, we most humbly pray God, the Best and Greatest, that He may will and command that we be allowed to use and enjoy His Holy Spirit, the sole guide into truth; Sacred Scripture, the most certain indicator of truth; and a good conscience, a witness of the truth worthy of faith; so that in this way our labor may be glorious to the divine Majesty and salutary for us. AMEN.

THESIS I.:

We judge that we shall do something truly worthwhile if we speak in an orderly manner:

1. concerning terms;
 2. concerning phrases;
 3. concerning the things themselves,
- which pertain most especially to the doctrine of justification.

2. The term whose meaning must first of all be established in this doctrine is this: *Ius* (Right or Law), which seems to be derived either from *iubendo* (commanding) or from *iussus* (a command). Thus Rudolph Agricola, *De Inventione*, book I. In this sense the ancients called *iura* “commands,” as Festus bears witness.

3. But since various things are commanded, it is also appropriate that this term *ius* be used in various ways. By jurists it is understood in a threefold manner: 1. as natural law, which is born together with us; 2. as positive law; 3. as Roman law. See Wesembecius, *Digest, De Iustitia et Iure*. Here, however, the term *ius* signifies everything that is commanded and sanctioned

by laws laid down by God. Piscator, volume III, *Disputationes Theologicae*, locus 26, thesis 9.

4. From the term *ius* descends the term *iustitia* (justice), and therefore it is prior to it, whether you consider etymology or the very nature of things themselves. For justice is a habit of the will, inclining it to do that which reason of the mind has already beforehand shown to be right (*ius*).

5. Nor, indeed, when we say this do we find fault with Ulpian for deriving the name *ius* from *iustitia* (*Institutes* I, *Digest De Iustitia et Iure*). For he does not speak of law as it is situated and born in the mind—which without doubt is prior to justice—but of the study of law, which is a certain art of justice and follows it. Wesembecius, in the same place.

6. Justice in this our doctrine is *ἐννομία* or *ἐννομόν τι* (that is, something that may be called conformity with the law of God), just as sin is *ἀνομία* or *ἀνομόν τι* (that is, something which deviates from the law of God). This consideration has moved some to derive the word *iustitia* from the particle *juxta* (“according to” or “alongside”), because it proceeds according to the rule and prescription of the law.

7. Hence it is evident what the difference is between justice and justification. Justice, as has been said, is conformity with the law of God, or the thing itself by which men are just before the tribunal of the divine Majesty. Justification, however, is the very act of justifying, or the application of justice. See below §§ 20, 35, and following.

8. Moreover, there is a twofold use of this term: one legal, the other evangelical.

9. When taken in a legal sense, it signifies that justice which a person has acquired for himself from the performance of perfectly good works, or from

the perfect observance of the divine law. Luke 10, verse 25 and following; Romans 10, verse 5.

10. When taken in an evangelical sense, it signifies the fulfillment of the law, not performed by ourselves, but accomplished by Christ, and granted and imputed to us by God—indeed, out of pure grace, reckoned as ours for our benefit and salvation.

11. Moreover, from the fact that justice is derived from law (*ius*), it also follows that he is called just who observes the precepts of law or of the divine law, or who satisfies them.

12. This term likewise has not a single use, but a threefold one. For it now designates one who is just by nature, now one who is just by voluntary and perfect obedience, and now one who is just by grace.

13. Again, one who is just by nature is such either by his own essence, from himself and through himself—as God alone, who in this same sense alone is called good (Matthew 19, verse 17)—or by the benefit of another, namely, either made or created by God in such a way as Adam, the stock and root of the entire human race, or born as that one and only Savior of ours, Jesus Christ, according to human nature.

14. By voluntary and perfect obedience, no human being (with the exception of Jesus Christ according to the flesh) can profess himself to be just in this life after the Fall; after this life, however, all the elect will be just also with respect to this justice.

15. Nor does it stand in the way that in the Sacred Scriptures some are judged to be just because they walked in all the ways and justifications of the Lord. For whatever is said of these is said not of universal justice and of the person, but of particular justice and of a cause. And since even this is still

defective, whatever is said of them is spoken not with respect to complete existence and strict examination, but with respect to sincere zeal and effort.

16. A sinful man is said to be just by grace: through Christ, having been predestined to the adoption of sons, and, on account of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, freed from the guilt of sin. See below § 37.

17. But enough has now been said concerning the term *justice*. I shall proceed briefly to speak about the verb *to justify* (*iustificare*), which indeed is used in various ways in the Scriptures, and sometimes signifies to give glory to God and to confess openly and freely (Luke 7); sometimes to defend oneself, to purge oneself, and to present oneself as just (Luke 16); sometimes to instruct in righteousness (Daniel 12, verse 3); sometimes to persevere in righteousness (Revelation 22, verse 11).

18. In the present doctrine, however, this verb *to justify* is forensic, that is, taken from the law court, and signifies to pronounce just one who has been accused and is already being summoned to punishment—that is, to free him from penalty and to declare him absolved.

19. Moreover, in the Sacred Scriptures this verb *to justify* is opposed to the verb *to do evil* or *to render impious*, that is, to pronounce someone impious and liable to punishment, and therefore to hand him over to penalty. Deuteronomy 25; Proverbs 17, verse 15; Isaiah 5. Bullinger.

20. From the verb *to justify* is derived the noun *justification*, which itself is used juridically, and is elsewhere called reconciliation with God (Romans 5, verse 10); imputation of righteousness (Romans 4, verse 6); remission of iniquities and non-imputation of sins (Romans 4, verses 7–8; 2 Corinthians 5, verse 19); imputation of faith (Romans 4, verse 5); redemption through blood (Ephesians 1, verse 7; Colossians 1, verse 14). Pareus.

21. Thus far concerning terms; now the principal phrases which occur in this doctrine of justification must be explained.

22. First of all there occurs that phrase by which it is asked what it is to be justified by works. For the Apostle James, chapter 2, says: “You see that a man is justified by works.”

23. This phrase belongs to Scripture in this sense: *Man is justified by works*, that is, he is declared to be justified. It is not a phrase of Scripture, but of carnal prudence, in this sense: *Man is justified by works*, that is, in the life of a man there is found such purity and holiness as deserves a testimony of righteousness before the throne of God.

24. Next there presents itself that phrase by which it is asked what it is to be justified by faith. To be justified by faith is to be absolved from sins on account of Christ apprehended by faith. For faith is not that by which we are justified, but only an instrument, and as it were a hand, by which the righteousness of Christ offered through the Gospel is received. The righteousness of Christ, therefore, is that precious garment with which a sinful man, being clothed, appears in the sight of God no longer as a sinner, but as righteous. Faith no more merits righteousness than the hand of a leper merits the garment extended to him by a pious man.

25. Similarly, when it is said that faith justifies, or that righteousness is from faith or through faith, etc., it must be understood in an organic sense: that faith is the spiritual hand receiving and applying the righteousness that has been given.

26. Furthermore, there is the customary phrase that we are justified by faith alone. This phrase indeed is not found in Scripture if you look at letters and syllables, but it is found if you consider the sense and usage. For the Apostle says in Romans 3:28 and chapter 4, 5, 6, *χωρὶς ἔργων* (without works), that a

man is justified; and in Galatians 2, verse 16, ἐκ ἔργων ... ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως (not from works, unless through faith).

27. By this same phrase, however, the remaining causes of justification are not excluded, but our works and their merits, and faith itself insofar as it is a habit; and at the same time the apprehensive act of Christ's righteousness is assigned to faith alone as its proper role. That is, it is taught that there is no other instrument by which we can apprehend the obedience and satisfaction of Christ unto righteousness and apply them to ourselves than faith alone, and that we are not justified partly by faith and partly by works.

28. This phrase, however, *Faith justifies without works*, is ambiguous. For it is taken either in this sense: *Faith without works*, that is, destitute of good works or bearing no fruits, justifies—and then it is alien to the Sacred Scriptures; or it is taken in a sense consonant with Scripture, namely: *Faith* (that is, true faith, which works through love) *justifies without works*, that is, without the assistance and concurrence of good works in the apprehensive act of the righteousness of Jesus Christ.

29. Frequent also in this matter of salvation is that phrase by which we are said to be justified freely; that is, by the gratuitous favor of God alone, with all our merits excluded. This gracious favor of God, however, by which we are justified as by the first principle of our salvation, and which excludes our works, does not exclude the merit of Jesus Christ, but is grounded in it as its foundation. Galatians 2, verse 16.

30. Finally, we shall explain that prophetic phrase by which Jehovah, that is, Christ, is called *our righteousness* (Jeremiah 23, verse 6).

31. First, indeed, Christ, the eternal Son of God—indeed, together with the Father and the Holy Spirit that one and true God of Israel—is essentially eternal righteousness itself. But in this manner and sense Christ is not called

our righteousness. For if He were to deal with us according to the rigor of His essential righteousness, He would adjudge us to eternal condemnation.

Secondly, Christ the Son of God, by the operation of the Holy Spirit born of the Virgin as man, was made under the Law, and by living holily fulfilled it most perfectly; and in His most ignominious and most painful passion and death He was made a curse for us, so that He might satisfy for our sins and redeem us from the curse of the Law, and finally present us to His Father as righteous and cleansed from sin, without wrinkle or blemish. And in this manner and sense Christ is our righteousness, insofar, namely, as He Himself fulfilled the Law most fully for us and gave Himself for us as an ἀντίλυτρον (a ransom in place of others), 1 Timothy 2, verse 6.

33. Thirdly, Christ dwelling in our hearts by faith is not idle, but effective by the power of His Spirit; He makes us conformed to His death and resurrection, so that, the old man being crucified and the body of sin abolished, we may thereafter serve righteousness (Romans 6, verse 5). Yet neither in this manner nor in this sense does Christ seem to be called *our righteousness* by the Prophet. For in this way righteousness or new obedience is indeed begun in us in this life, but it is not perfected, since throughout this whole life there remain in us remnants of sin, which will at last be utterly removed from our nature only by death.

34. Thus far also concerning phrases; it remains that we explain the thing itself, which we think may suitably be done by rehearsing and illustrating the definition and distribution of justification. Let the definition be this. Justification is an act of God as Judge, at once just and gracious, by which He indeed considers sinful men, elected in Christ and set before the tribunal above, as liable to accusation and the curse of the Law on account of its transgression; yet nevertheless, out of mere mercy, for the sake of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, He accepts them and, by the imputation of His

righteousness, judges them righteous, to the praise of His name and their salvation.

36. This definition is legitimate, because it consists of genus and specific difference. The genus is *an act of God*. For God is He who justifies (Romans 3, verse 30; chapter 4, verses 1 and 5; and chapter 8, verse 33). It is called an act of a Judge, because Scripture presents God as Judge, before whose face the mountains melt, from whose presence a devouring fire flashes forth, in whose sight the guilty is not innocent (Psalm 5, verse 5 and following; Romans 3, verse 28), where the expressions “before the eyes of the Lord” and “before” or “in the presence of the Lord” clearly denote judicial cognition. This act of God is said to be at once just and gracious. For although we are justified freely—that is, we who by nature are children of wrath (Ephesians 2, verse 3), children of death (Psalm 102, verse 21), liable to the curse (Deuteronomy 27, verse 27)—when we stand before the throne of God, we are freed from all guilt and punishment without any merit of our own, whether of condignity or of congruity, as the Sophists speak; nevertheless, this liberation takes place on account of Jesus Christ, whom God set forth as a demonstration of His righteousness, that He might be a propitiation in His blood, because of the passing over of sins previously committed, God bearing with them (Romans 3, verse 24).

37. The first specific difference is taken from the object. This is sinful man. For God justifies the ungodly, existing as such by nature, though not remaining such through grace (Romans 4, verse 5). Yet He does not justify just any ungodly person, but only that one whom He has elected unto eternal life, according to that saying: “Whom He predestined, those He also justified” (Romans 8, verse 30).

38. The second difference is taken from the antecedent impulsive cause. This is the gratuitous mercy of God (Romans 3, verse 24; Titus 3, verses 5 and 7).

39. The third is taken from the impulsive procatartic or meritorious cause, which some call the material cause. This is the satisfaction of Jesus Christ for us (Romans 3, verse 24). By the satisfaction of Christ is meant His death together with the whole obedience of His antecedent humiliation, from the beginning of the assumed form of a servant even unto the death of the cross (Romans 5, verse 19; Philippians 2, verse 8).

40. The fourth is taken from the form. This is the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or the non-imputation, that is, the remission of sins (Romans 4, verses 6, 7, and 8), which Philipp Melanchthon calls acceptance on account of the Son of God, in the locus *On Justification*.

41. The last is taken from the end. This is twofold, one aiming at the glory of God, the other at the salvation of men (1 Corinthians 1, verses 29 and 31; Ephesians 2, verse 9; Romans 4, verse 16).

42. Thus we have also explained the doctrine of justification from its definition, which we proposed and expounded. It remains to consider the distribution of justification, which is chiefly threefold.

43. The first is the distribution of the genus into species. One justification is legal, another evangelical. The former is that by which someone is justified on account of legal righteousness, that is, perfect obedience rendered to the Law; the latter is that by which someone is justified on account of evangelical righteousness, that is, the obedience of Jesus Christ apprehended by true faith.

44. It must be known, however, that this distribution applies to justification only by hypothesis, namely, on the assumption that some fulfill the Law of God perfectly. If this were so, then justification would be from the Law. But since this is not so, the justification of the Christian man before God is rightly said to be one only, namely, the absolution of a sinner believing in Christ the θεάνθρωπος (God-man).

45. The second distribution is of the whole into parts. Justification is only one benefit, but it has two parts, indivisibly joined together: the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. By the former our unrighteousness is taken away; by the latter an alien righteousness—namely, that of Christ—is conferred upon us. Polanus, *Partitiones Theologicae*.

46. It must further be known that these parts are so called analogically, not according to the thing itself as constituting an integral whole, but according to reason, as distinguishing one act of justifying with respect to diverse termini (Romans 4, verse 7; Galatians 3, verse 27; 2 Corinthians 5, verse 3). Pareus.

47. The third distribution is taken from adjuncts. God pronounces a man righteous either in this age or in the future one.

48. In this age, and indeed in each person being justified individually and secretly, insofar as He renders to their mind, through the Holy Spirit, by means of the ministry of the Gospel, a testimony of the imputed righteousness, and consequently of adoption, on account of the satisfaction of the Mediator (Romans 8, verse 16; verse 38; Galatians 2, verse 20).

49. In the future age, Christ, having been appointed by the Father as Judge of all, will openly pronounce the righteous with His own mouth before all angels and men, and will bestow upon them the reward of righteousness, namely eternal life—all those, that is, who in this life have previously been justified.

50. These things the Lord has granted at present which seemed fit to be brought forward concerning the principal article of the Christian faith. We shall conclude this our compendium with that notable paradigm of the most learned Bullinger concerning justification.

1. Imagine God, the most just Judge of all, seated before the tribunal.

2. Imagine all men standing before the Judge and being grievously accused of impiety, unbelief, and every kind of wickedness, and both convicted of these charges and therefore having the sentence of condemnation demanded against them.

3. Imagine, moreover, that men have nothing to say on their own behalf, nor does anything now remain except that they all be dragged away to punishment and eternal death.

4. But, in this extreme danger, imagine that a great hope has shone forth upon the most wretched race of mortals: namely, the eternal Son of God Himself, who, in order to interpose Himself as a mediator between God and men, and to deliver those condemned to death from destruction, was incarnated and made man—so that He might truly be afflicted, suffer, and die—who took our sins upon Himself, and by His undeserved death abolished the death deserved by us, and washed us from sins by His blood, and appointed us heirs of eternal life.

FINIS.

Theological Theses On Free Will

THESIS I.

Free will is considered either as it was in the state of integrity, or as it is in the state of corruption.

2. Free will in the state of integrity is the faculty in a free creature of willing or not willing that which the intellect dictates as to be chosen or rejected. It is called *arbitrium* (choice) with respect to the mind, which sets before the will its object; and it is called *free* with respect to the will, which by its own motion follows the mind and inclines itself either to good or to evil (according to the rational object which the mind presents and either approves or disapproves). Thus the free creature is free from compulsion, from the servitude of sin, and from misery.

3. Choice (*arbitrium*) is also attributed to the Creator, but indeed only with respect to the good, which is true liberty (2 Corinthians 3:17).

4. We, however, are here speaking of the choice of the creature, which is directed both to good and to evil (Sirach 15:9, 14; Ecclesiastes 7:29–30).

5. Hence that well-known saying: Adam had the power (*posse*)—if he had willed—to persevere in the good, but he did not have a will (*velle*) that could not fail; for if he had possessed such a will, he would certainly have persevered.

6. Nevertheless, from this creaturely choice the decree of the Creator is not excluded; rather, free will is so established that it nevertheless depends upon the decree, to such an extent that the creature wills nothing except what accords with, and not against, the decree of God.

7. From this it follows that the Fall occurred both voluntarily and necessarily.

8. Voluntarily, with respect to the freedom of the creature's choice; necessarily, with respect to the divine decree.

Corollary

9. In the state of corruption, free will is the faculty in a creature that is in bondage, of willing and not willing that which the mind and intellect propose.

10. This choice (*arbitrium*) belongs to the creature after the fall of Adam, whether of angels or of human beings.

11. In the case of angels, it is either that of the good angels or of the evil angels.

12. The choice of the good angels, before the fall, was indeed flexible toward either object; but now it is immutable and unmoved toward the good alone. The reason is that their intellect, now confirmed in integrity, presents the good object to the will, and the will wills nothing other than what the intellect approves (1 Timothy 5:9, 21).

13. The choice of the evil angels is toward evil alone. Hence they can do nothing but sin, and they have been sinning from the beginning (Job 8; John 5:43–44; 1 John 3:5, 8).

14. Our intention, however, is to speak in the course of this disputation about the choice of human beings in the state of corruption, which is considered either as it is in the present age or as it is in the future age.

15. In the present age, it is one way in the unregenerate, and another way in the regenerate.

16. In the unregenerate, it is directed only toward evil. For their mind, through original sin and the corruption that followed upon it, has been deprived of the light of understanding and plunged into the deepest abyss of ignorance (Ephesians 4:6, 18). The will also is turned away from righteousness to unrighteousness through the hardening of the heart (Romans 2, verse 21), and is deprived of the faculty of choosing the good—indeed, it has been made a slave of sin (Romans 7:6, 14; John 8:34).

17. And to such an extent that it cannot by its own powers turn itself to God (Jeremiah 3; 1 Corinthians 2:12), where it is said that it cannot discern spiritual things.

18. In the regenerate, free will is partly toward good and partly toward evil.

19. Toward good, by the benefit of the Holy Spirit; that is, as He renews human nature, kindles in the mind a new light and knowledge of God, and excites in the will new inclinations and new movements in the heart.

20. Toward evil, because in this life regeneration is only begun, not perfected; for there still remain remnants of corruption, as is evident from that saying in Romans 7:18: “I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwells no good.” At times they are abandoned for a while, yet they are recalled to repentance lest they perish; thus Peter, denying Christ, was forsaken for a short time.

Corollaries

1. In the regenerate, in this life, they cannot perfectly fulfill the Law of God.

2. Perseverance is not from ourselves, but from God.

3. The regenerate cannot totally fall away from the grace of God, according to the words of Scripture: “*No one will snatch my sheep out of my hand*”

(John 10:28), and “*He loved those who were in the world to the very end*” (John 13:1, 21).

4. In the future age, free will is different for the blessed and for the damned.

5. That of the former is directed only toward good, because their regeneration is complete. They will be like the angels of God (Matthew 22:30).

6. That of the latter is directed only toward evil, because they are deprived of the grace of the Holy Spirit, left to their own desires, and are governed and impelled by the Devil.

FINIS.

**Of the most illustrious, most learned, and most eminent
man,**

**Hugo Grotius “A Defense of the Catholic Faith
Concerning the Satisfaction of Christ” against Faustus
Socinus of Sienna.**

Judgment of Hermann Ravensperger

Judgment

The book of **Dn. Hugo Grotius**, a most illustrious, most learned, and most eminent man, which he published under the title *Defensio fidei catholicae adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem* for public use, at the request and encouragement of several friends and supporters, I take up, as they say, “under the law” at the end. The style of the work is florid, polished, and disciplined, indeed so august that it hardly calls me to censure it.

Yet I shall briefly lay open my mind and judgment, not unduly, nor beyond what is due, but as an example and out of the desire for good: that the author, so that he may not take it in a harsh or unfair spirit, I also beseech and entreat, and I hope that the spirit of the Prophets may be granted to him, as the Apostle teaches, so that prophets be subject to the spirit (1 Corinthians 14). And I trust that **Dn. Grotius** will receive this favorably, if indeed he testifies to the truth of the Gospel in his own presentation. If anything is less correct or justly disputed, he may take this as intended for the instruction and judgment of the pious, in the most gracious spirit.

Indeed, the foremost theologian has taken up the task of handling and defending the place against the subtle, crafty, and malicious antagonist (through whom Satan devised marvelous schemes, so that with the

stronghold of our only Savior undermined, we might be left exposed). Yet he treated and defended it so well that, unless one considers the supreme authority of the author—both in human letters and in the learning esteemed across all disciplines and faculties—one would hardly think he erred in inscribing the *interpretation of the Danielic word TEKEL* in that treatise of defense.

The use and meaning of certain words and phrases, as accepted among the Icti (likely a scholarly reference), he pursues diligently and elegantly. By this same method, he also annotates the illusions of Socinus regarding these very words and phrases in the theological matter of satisfaction; yet he touches the knot of the matter only rarely and lightly, far from tearing it apart or dissecting it.

He indeed leaves aside many matters of great importance in this doctrine of satisfaction. Nor does this excuse the author of the preface insufficiently (otherwise clear and most elegant) to those devoted to the study of truth, when he writes of **Dn. Hugo Grotius**, leaving aside other questions of merit, that he undertook the matter of satisfaction to be treated.

For if in this doctrine **Dn. Grotius** so carefully distinguishes between satisfaction and merit, why does he himself discuss reconciliation and redemption through the death of Christ, partially by way of explanation? By providing satisfaction, that is, paying the deserved punishment for our sins and enduring death, He acquired for us reconciliation with God and redemption.

But let the excuse for what has been passed over stand as far as possible:
Now we shall note certain things in **Dn. Grotius** which appear worthy of attention.

Where the Catholic sentence is laid down, the words are read as follows
(Page 2):

"God ordained that Christ should endure punishment for our sins, so that, by the demonstration of divine justice, we, through true faith as an intercessor, might be delivered from the punishment of eternal death."

The words are indeed clear, rounded, and free from ambiguities, even portentous; yet some of Socinus' followers might see them as not entirely opposed to their view. For, Socinus does not deny that Christ endured punishment, or that this endurance in some way benefits us, so that we might be delivered from the punishment of eternal death. Yet the heretic denies two essential points:

1. That Christ endured eternal punishments (whether in duration, which is confessed on both sides, or in intention).
2. That by this punishment, or endurance of divine justice on our behalf, He satisfied for the penalties that we owed.

Neither of these does **Dn. Grotius** affirm, although both ought clearly to have been affirmed, since the Catholic sentence against the blasphemous **Socinus' PLACITUM** (I retain the term used by **Dn. Grotius**, though it may seem overly Lenish) demands it.

2. Socinus recognizes two kinds of divine justice: one perpetual, by which God continually exercises punishment upon the wicked, contumacious, and utterly despairing humans, punishing and exterminating them; the other non-perpetual, by which sinners who are not contumacious, nor entirely despairing, may sometimes be punished without awaiting their repentance, or even when they have repented, provided that the promise of mercy is excluded.

Socinus asserts that it is not the first, but the second kind of justice by which God punishes for our sins. To this, the words of **Dn. Grotius** do not contradict, provided the demonstration of divine justice is preserved; indeed, they agree well and exactly with this. No Socinian will deny that God established that Christ should endure punishment for our sins, so that, by a demonstration of divine justice (not perpetual, but acting either in punishment or indulgence as He pleases), we might be delivered.

However, this commentary of Socinus, which is the root, source, and seedbed of many of his errors concerning the matter of satisfaction, was clearly to be opposed by **Dn. Grotius**, who places the Catholic consensus against the destructive **Socinus' PLACITUM** at this point.

3. Socinus binds our security to the strictness of divine justice or to the condition of faith in Christ; that is, he teaches that divine justice is satisfied in Christ and that repentance is not to be mediated by any other means. To this commentary of Socinus—which is also the source of many of his errors—the words of **Dn. Grotius** do not contradict when he adds “intercedente verâ fide” (through true faith as intermediary), but rather respond appropriately to it.

No Socinian will ever deny that God established that Christ should endure punishment for our sins, so that through true faith in Christ (which for Socinus is not historical) we might be delivered.

Yet, in regard to this clear commentary, **Dn. Grotius** ought to oppose it explicitly, which he does when he sets forth the Catholic sentence against the perverse **Socinus' PLACITUM**. On the same page, the words are read as follows.

The second cause which moves God is the sins deserving of punishment. And on page s, at the beginning, it says this. The impulsive cause, however,

can be understood in a manifold way; here it is to be taken as meritorious. For the matter concerns punishment. Sins are the cause of punishment not otherwise than through their due merit.

I have not only once but repeatedly examined this passage, carefully gathering the points as they seemed fit to be addressed; and indeed, though not fully in accordance with the dignity of **Dn. Grotius**, a man otherwise of evident ingenuity, the treatment of the causes of the matter in question seemed to me adequate.

The matter under discussion is satisfaction, as is apparent even from the title of the book itself. Therefore, he thought it necessary to explain its causes immediately at the outset. And most appropriately he says: the efficient cause of the matter under discussion is, first, God.

Most correctly also: the cause which moves God is, first, mercy or *φιλανθρωπία* (philanthropy, or “love of humanity”). But this is not fully correct: the second cause which moves God is the sins deserving of punishment. For the matter under discussion is satisfaction, as has been said. Its efficient or principal cause is God. The moving or impulsive causes are twofold: the first is called the **proëgumenon**, and the second is called **procatactic** in logic. The distinction between them is this: the first is always within the efficient cause itself, the second, however, is outside the efficient cause.

The **proëgumenon** of the cause of Satisfaction is mercy, or *φιλανθρωπία*: for this moves God internally, to send His beloved Son to satisfy for the human race. In this point, so far, there is agreement with **Dn. Grotius**.

However, I cannot agree with him that sins deserving of punishment constitute the **procatactic** cause of satisfaction. For since a procatactic cause presupposes the **proëgumenon**, it must be said that sins deserving punishment are that by which God is moved externally and provoked to

send His merciful Son to satisfy for us. Whether this is appropriate to say, let the judgment of **Dn. Grotius** stand.

Sins are those that provoke God to wrath, as the entire sacred page proclaims, and make humans liable to eternal damnation. Therefore, when **Dn. Grotius** said that mercy is the internal or primary impulsive cause of satisfaction, and the external impulsive cause is that which irritates the internal cause, he should have said that it is not sins, but the misery of fallen humans—and the sins of those perishing in them—that provoke God, without which there would be no satisfaction itself. This is the faith of the Church; without this, it is lacking.

God thought of me in eternity,

My misery beyond measure;

He considered His mercy,

He wished to let me be helped.

And here is first the error of Mr. Grotius; the second is indeed subtler, but more dangerous. Dr. Grotius rightly says, according to the testimony above, that the cause which moved God is primarily mercy.

But when that moving cause in God is considered, it is twofold: mercy, namely, and justice. And indeed, in order of nature, justice is prior. What would prudent men of understanding think he silently overlooked in this respect? Justice of God demands that the penalty due for sins be inflicted on man; mercy of God wishes that man—most noble and fortunate, created before the fall—be freed from the misery into which he had fallen by sin.

Therefore, justice first and immutably demanded satisfaction; mercy afterward procured that satisfaction in this way, namely through Christ.

Thus, in the way we conceive and distinguish these things, they are separate; in God, however, they are not distinguished as they are in us.

Hence, Mr. Grotius can excuse himself by making the cause of satisfaction “procatarctic” (preparatory) be the sins that merit punishment, and yet not make justice the impulsive cause. If he had done so, it would have been first to be said. For when the justice of God is said to be the cause impelling God to demand satisfaction for sins, the sins themselves can indeed be said to be the external cause provoking God’s justice to require it.

And here lies the distinction between: (a) the postulate of God the Judge, which immutably urges us to provide satisfaction, and (b) the moderation of God the Father, whereby it is made that one, namely Jesus Christ, satisfies on our behalf for all.

The preliminary cause of that [satisfaction] is the justice of God and, externally, the sin provoking it; the preliminary cause of this [satisfaction] is the mercy of God and, externally, the misery of man provoking it.

And here is another error of Mr. Grotius; the third follows. When he made sins the impulsive cause of satisfaction, which should instead correspond to the first impulsive cause, namely mercy, he wrote on page five that sins are the merit-causing impulsive cause.

It seems that Mr. Grotius wished to say that sins are the cause of punishment only in the way of merit. But this is irrelevant to the present question. For what is being asked is not about the meritorious preparatory cause of punishment, but about the **meritorious preparatory cause of satisfaction**.

Those are the sins; this, however, is the precious blood of Christ, poured out for us, for which satisfaction is merited or accomplished. Nor should those arguments be listened to that dispute otherwise.

For an external illness compels the physician to apply a remedy, and a debtor compels the surety to intervene in good faith and provide the payment.

Therefore, sin, which is compared to a disease or debt, moves the mercy of God externally to procure satisfaction. For similar cases are not asserted demonstratively, but declaratively.

And although learned and orthodox men would think that nothing absurd follows if it is said that a disease compels the physician to heal a field, which afterward becomes the object of the healer's care, I, however, do not understand, perhaps due to the slowness of my intellect, how he relies on this assertion as a foundation. Certainly, I have struggled with it a bit. Let the expression be granted: "*a disease compels the physician to apply a remedy.*"

For if a disease, in the sense of an external disease, compels, why should it not equally compel the physician whether it afflicts a brute animal or a rational human being?

Therefore, the physician is compelled externally by the dignity of the creature made in the image of God, or by the misery of that most noble and fortunate creature into which it has fallen through disease, so that, through this misery, he may strive with all diligence, according to his office, to rescue it and restore it to health, even though it is done by the benefit of God.

It seems to me similar to the expression, "*a debt compels the surety to promise.*" If a debt, in the sense of a debt, compels, why should it not prompt the surety to promise for a friend, a stranger, or a relative?

Nor does it matter here if someone says that the debt, limited to the person of a friend, is the cause that compels the surety externally. For this proposition belongs to that class of propositions called *accommodated*,

because they do not assert an absolute limitation, nor can they be admitted or tolerated without such a restriction.

And, to excuse this proposition, it remains, in my judgment, firm that it is not the debt *qua* debt itself, but rather the friendship and proximity of the person, insofar as they exist, that move the surety to promise and respond to the need of the friend or relative. If you prefer, one may say: it is not the debt *qua* debt, but the misery of the friend or relative into which the debt has thrown them, that moves the surety to promise.

But this holds abundantly for anyone who understands it rightly, provided he recognizes that it is not a perfect and absolute consequence. Sin is thus compared to disease and debt: just as a disease moves the physician to provide care, and a debt moves the surety to make a promise, so sin moves God to act through mercy to procure satisfaction.

These words are read: “*When it is said that Christ suffered or died for sins, the final cause (as Socinus wishes) is understood; the thing itself does not suffer.*” And on page 6, it says this:

It therefore remains unquestioned that the phrase “*because of sins*” denotes an impulsive cause, and indeed a meritorious one.

Dn. Grotius does not rely on a solid foundation for this assertion.

It is indeed false that the particles *pro* or *propter* ever signify an impulsive cause, as Socinus claims, according to Dn. Grotius; yet I would not dare to assert that Dn. Grotius affirms (pp. 2 and 3) that these phrases, “*for sins*” and “*because of sins*,” whenever they are joined to sufferings or adherent, do not receive the sense of an impulsive cause. From many passages which Dn. Grotius cites, it can reasonably be gathered that an eminent theologian, writing against Socinus, understands these phrases, “*for us*” and “*because of*

us,” to signify *for our benefit*, but “*for sins*” and “*because of sins*” do not indicate *for our benefit*.

Concerning that place of Paul: “*If righteousness comes through the law; therefore Christ died δωρεάν (freely).*” (Galatians 2:21) Dn. Grotius reads the words there. Where the word δωρεάν (freely) is acknowledged by Socinus, it signifies a final cause; yet it should have added an antecedent final cause. And on page 7, in this same place, Paul, with whom we are dealing, does not understand anything other than the antecedent cause.

Nor does Dn. Grotius’ interpretation appear genuine, nor, except cautiously and conveniently, orthodox to me.

It is not genuine because it weakens the apostolic argument, which is as follows:

“If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died in vain.”

But Christ did not die in vain.

Therefore, righteousness is not through the law.

The consequence here is weak if it is said that Christ died *in vain*, as if there were no antecedent cause. For although righteousness would result from the law and its observance, there could still be another antecedent cause of Christ’s death; and if we believe Socinus, this would confirm nothing regarding the way of salvation through His death, nor how we ourselves should place our faith in Jesus Christ.

Faith, as the Polish Catechism (cap. 9) explains, has two parts: the first is that one must have faith not only in God, but also in Jesus Christ; the second is that one must obey God not only in those things commanded in the law and fulfilled through Christ, but also in all those things which Christ added to the law.

Nor is this interpretation sufficiently orthodox unless it is explained very cautiously and conveniently. Christ died *δωρεάν* (freely), that is, without an antecedent cause. Indeed, the error of Socinus is closely connected here: he held that the fathers in the Old Testament were justified not by faith in Christ, but by faith in God.

To clarify: Socinians say that, under the old Mosaic covenant, men were justified in a faith directed only toward God, not faith in Christ the Son; but through Christ alone and by confirmed faith in Him, men are justified in the sense of faith in Christ. They accommodate this to Peter's words, Acts 4:14: *"There is no other name under heaven given to men by which they must be saved but the name of Jesus."*

According to this understanding, the entire disputation between law and faith in Paul is interpreted as a division between God and Christ.

Now observe how well Dn. Grotius' interpretation supports this commentary. If, according to the law that God gave through Moses, righteousness exists, then Christ died in vain—i.e., without an antecedent impulsive cause. For if only the faith under the legal covenant, which was directed toward God, should justify us, what then moved Christ to endure death? If, I say, His death did not secure that faith would also be directed toward Him, then I fear that the Socinians might claim that Dn. Grotius, in his discussion of the meaning of the word *δωρεάν* (freely), inadvertently strengthened Socinus' dogma, which he intended to refute.

Yet if Dn. Grotius explains himself skillfully and acts sincerely with us, and regarding that rigor allows that Paul could intend some other cause than an antecedent one, we acquiesce. Certainly, the word *δωρεάν* (freely) sometimes denotes an antecedent cause, as in John 15:25: *"They hated me δωρεάν (freely), without cause"*—that is, without any fault of mine, or when I had offered them no cause for hatred.

However, with Paul, we judge that *δωρεάν* does not signify an impulsive cause, but a final cause. Erasmus translates it as *frustrà* (in vain) or *sine fructu* (without effect), or logically, *without an accepted end*. For the purpose of Christ's death was that the remission of sins might be merited for us, and that we might be justified through the justice imputed to us from His death; which certainly could not have been achieved if our righteousness depended on the law.

The example of sanctity Christ displayed through His entire life provides evidence, rather than the death itself, which, in a brief moment, accomplishes these things.

It is certain that the example of sanctity was exhibited by Christ throughout His entire life. Indeed, whether His life provided more than His death, I would not rashly decide. Certainly, the greater the sufferings of Christ, the greater and more evident was the demonstration of patience, fortitude, charity, and benevolence, and thereby, in every way, an example of sanctity.

Now, whether the theologian's phrase that Christ's death was accomplished in a brief moment is correct, Dn. Grotius, after having considered the matter more carefully in the fear of the Lord, judges it so. Christ's death is not defined by the single moment in which His soul departed, committed into the hands of the heavenly Father just a little before, but rather by the time from when His soul was in the garden, sorrowful, up to the final end of His life.

Socinus himself recognizes this, when he asserts that the end of Christ's death is to be taken from the Old Testament example of imitation. Yet Peter there does not speak of death as a mere term, but of the deadly passion, which theologians call the extreme and solemn part—lasting not only by the hour, but by night and day.

When, however, Dn. Grotius says that the moment of Christ's death is brief, he thus refutes Socinus in order that the value of Christ's death might not seem diminished.

Dn. Grotius contends against Socinus that ἀνενεγκεῖν (to bear) and ἀναφέρειν (to offer, present) do not mean the same thing as “to endure” or “to remove.” He seeks to demonstrate this from the context of Peter, who speaks not of any arbitrary benefit of Christ, but of the totality of His patience, which is manifested not in removing, but in enduring.

This refutation of Socinus is extremely perfunctory. Socinus confuses Peter (1 Peter 2:23–24), asserting that no commendation of satisfaction was offered through Christ's passion; rather, he interprets it as a commendation of Christ's virtues, and particularly of His patience, from which he takes occasion to encourage humans to mortification for sins and to lead a life in righteousness.

From this, Socinus concludes that Christ died in order to leave an example for imitation, not in order to provide satisfaction for us. Dn. Grotius initially concedes this to Socinus; however, he observes that Socinus, in opposing the Catholic sentiment which he himself seeks to defend, adds nothing further. Indeed, this is a perfunctory refutation.

He should have responded that **two effects of the same reality can coexist without one removing the other**. Christ Himself declares that the end of His death is the **price of redemption** (Matthew 20:28). Paul teaches that it is a **sacrificial expiation** (Hebrews 9:26–28; 10:10, 14). Likewise, Peter presents it as an **example for imitation**, as cited above.

What, then, does Dn. Grotius assert? The **patience of Christ**, in the way Peter speaks, is demonstrated supremely **not by removing, but by enduring**. Therefore, ἀναφέρειν (to offer, present) and ἀνενεγκεῖν (to bear) signify “to endure,” not “to remove.”

From this, what follows? That Christ indeed bore our sins, but did not remove them—this, Grotius asserts, is **false**. For Christ **removed and cast away our sins** insofar as He took them into Himself, carried them, and bore them. If He had not received our sins into Himself, He could have neither borne nor carried them, and in no way could He have removed or taken them away.

Thus, although Peter, with respect to the effect, uses the words “remove” or “take away,” Socinus cannot use this to produce a demonstration against us. For in a constituted effect, no cause is negated; it is, rather, necessarily understood.

Grotius also notes that **penalties are generally imposed even on beasts** (Lev. 16). But what follows from this? Socinus therefore rightly writes that one cannot in any way say that a goat offered as an expiatory sacrifice bore the penalties for the sins of the people.

Isaiah 53:7 says, “The iniquity is laid upon Him” (**Exigitur peccatum & ipse affigitur**). From this, theologians conclude: Therefore, Christ bore the penalties for our sins.

Socinus objects using Leviticus 16:21–22, where the sins of the people are said to be laid upon the expiatory goat, which is then sent into the wilderness, arguing that no conclusion can be drawn from this. Therefore, Socinus claims, the goat bore penalties for the sins of the people.

Dn. Grotius responds: it **can** be said that the goat bore the penalties, for penalties are generally imposed even on animals. This, however, is of **no real moment**. If penalties are generally imposed even on animals, then the expiatory goat truly bore the sins of the people of Israel. It can indeed be said that the goat bore the sins of the people—that is, the penalties of sin—but it should **not** be said for this reason alone, as Grotius cautions, because the penalty fell upon an animal.

Rather, it should be said because the goat was a **type and figure of Christ**, who alone bore the penalties of our sins in His body, removed them, and received the full effect of punishment for us.

Later, on page 150, Dn. Grotius repeats this argument and concludes similarly on page 151. From these explanations, it is already evident how the victims for sin in the Old Covenant **expiated sins**: namely, **by moving God to remit the carnal punishment**, which constitutes a sort of **satisfaction**. Whatever the types prefigured in a carnal manner, Christ fulfills spiritually.

What do I hear? That the **victims of the Old Covenant expiated sins carnally, not spiritually**, and indeed by some sort of **satisfaction**, that is, they moved God to remit the carnal punishment? This is a **double error**:

First, the victims **did not provide any true satisfaction**, by which God, moved by sin, would remit punishment. Rather, they **only prefigured the full satisfaction of Christ** as types.

Second, when the victims are said to expiate sins **as types**, they did not move God to remit merely carnal punishment; nor did they indicate a **temporal liberation**. As Dn. Grotius states at the end of the same chapter, they prefigured a **spiritual remission**, what he calls *αἰώνιον λύτρωσιν* (eternal redemption).

Dn. Grotius, in all of chapter 2, discusses **how God is to be considered in the matter of satisfaction**, and concludes that God is to be regarded as **Rector or supreme principal**, which Socinus also asserts (pp. 40–41). However, Grotius does **not** consider God as **Creditor**, which is contrary to Socinus, nor as **Judge**, which Socinus denies.

Yet Grotius removes **too freely** the consideration of God as Creditor and Judge from this matter. God is to be considered in **three ways**, because Scripture attributes a **triplex χέσιν** (triple role) to God in this act: namely, as

Rector, as **Creditor**, and as **Judge**. Regarding God as **Rector**, the matter is clear and confessed on both sides.

Regarding God as **Creditor**, Grotius, willingly or unwillingly, concedes (p. 48) that **God, remitting the punishment of sinners, may be compared, in some places, to a Creditor yielding his right**, as in Matthew 18. He also concedes (p. 49) that the **act of God as Creditor coincides** not only in the moving cause, which is **benevolence**, and in the effect, which is **liberation from misery or harm**, but also because in both cases some **preceding right exists**: in God to punish, in the Creditor to exact the debt. And in both, a **dissolution occurs of a previously existing obligation**.

That Dn. Grotius would concede this, I marvel at the strategy and foundation, yet deny that God is to be considered as **Creditor in the business of satisfaction**. Is it because the **similarity between God and Rector** is more suitable for the business of satisfaction, whereas another **similarity between God and Creditor** exists in another sense or parabola? This seems to be what his **three assertions imply**.

1. **Punishing is not an act proper to the offended party qua such.** (p. 42)
2. **Naturally, the offended party qua such has no right in punishment.** (p. 45)
3. **The right to punish in the Rector is neither the right of absolute dominion nor the right of a Creditor.**

Here we wish to **amicably warn Dn. Grotius**:

1. It is not good to claim that the parable by which God is compared with a Creditor is **more instructive or more suitable for the**

business of satisfaction, or more analogous to all circumstances, than that by which He is compared with a Creditor. God is to be considered as **Creditor**, but also as **Rector in the business of satisfaction**.

Dn. Grotius believed that he would treat the matter appropriately in a Christian manner, if he were to extract from the rights demanded by law the weapons of the Catholic faith to oppose the adversary. Indeed, as previously observed, he acts **for the zeal of evangelical truth**. Therefore, in this matter of defending the Catholic faith, Dn. Grotius is to be regarded as a **strong and courageous soldier**. And rightly, the analogy to military service is well suited: one may consider Dn. Grotius conveniently as an **Advocate**, if he defends the cause of the Catholic faith against Socinus.

Furthermore, if Jesus Christ is rightly called the **Sponsor of the superior covenant in the matter of satisfaction** (Hebrews 7:22), it follows **infallibly** that God is called the **Creditor in this same business of satisfaction**, and we are the debtors. There is a perpetual relationship (χέσις) between Creditor, Sponsor, and Debtor.

Nor can a more suitable analogy be devised in these terms than that between **Creditor and Debtor**, and among those intervening as Sponsor.

Nor does it prevent this consideration that Dn. Grotius asserts that **one must never yield by law to justice in the matter of the right of a Creditor** (p. 50). This is partly irrelevant here, partly false. I demonstrate this:

Even if the matter were as Dn. Grotius wishes, it **would not follow that God cannot in any way be considered as Creditor**. I prove this: a debt either **injures the honor of the Creditor or does not**. If the debt does not injure the honor of the Creditor, certainly it **does not conflict with justice**,

and may be remitted **without any compensation**. For example, when a King remits a debt of several thousand florins owed by his servant: this debt, because it did not injure royal majesty, could be remitted **without prejudice to majesty**.

However, if the debt **does injure the honor of the Creditor**, and thus **offends the nature and glory of the one wronged**, it cannot be remitted by the satisfaction of the Creditor by free will. In the ultimate sense, **every sin is such a debt**. Therefore, God cannot yield by law as Creditor in the matter of satisfaction.

2. Without harming the Catholic faith, we may take Dn. Grotius' reasoning for **equivalents** concerning the **right of the offended party, the right of the Creditor, and the right of Dominion**:
3. Even if punishing is **not an act proper to the offended party qua such**, it may still be **proper to act against the Contrasted Creditor qua such**.
4. Even if naturally the offended party qua such **has no right in punishment**, the Creditor qua such **may have a right**, and indeed the Lord qua such **has it in reality**.
5. Even if the right to punish in the Rector is **not the right of a Creditor or of Dominion**, the **right to punish in the absolute Lord is the right of absolute Lordship**.

Thus far, we have shown that **God may be considered as Creditor in the business of satisfaction**. It remains to show that He is to be considered as **Judge**.

Regarding this, Socinus writes as follows: **God is not to be considered as a judge, who acts under another's law, and from whose prescribed law He may not depart; rather, He is to be considered as the Prince and Lord, whose will alone is the law of all things and the most perfect standard.**

What does Dn. Grotius say? But to the matter at hand:

1. It is certain that **God in the business of satisfaction is to be considered as Prince and Lord**, to whom no law is laid down, but whose will is law for Him. From this, however, it **does not correctly follow** that God is not to be considered as Judge. One of these aspects does not nullify or destroy the other.
2. It is also certain that **God is frequently compared in Scripture to a judge**, who judges the world in justice, who judges the living and the dead, who judges each individual according to persuasion. Therefore, **God is rightly considered in punishing and remitting offenses as a Judge.**
3. Finally, it is certain that there exists another judge **subdelegated**, who acts under a superior right and may not depart from the law prescribed: but the supreme judge, who is subject to no foreign law or statutes, **judges freely in whatever manner and whenever He wills**, and never unjustly, whether He punishes the sinner Himself, or absolves him by the satisfaction provided by a third party. **God is not subdelegated, but the supreme Judge.**

Chapter 3. Dn. Grotius disputes the nature of God's act in the business of satisfaction, and responds that in general it is **punishment united with impunity for the other party** (p. 56).

He continues as follows:

- It is **not the execution of the law.**
- It is **not the abrogation of the law.**
- It is **not the interpretation of the law** (και' ἐπιείκεια, “and equity”).
- Nor is it a **relaxation or dispensation of the law.**

Here is the subtlety: **God's action in the postulation of satisfaction** is almost the **imposition of the deserved punishment on the sins**. When considered impersonally, it explains **why the sinner is to be punished**; the end of this is the **demonstration of divine justice**. But when considered personally—why Christ is punished—the end is that **through Christ's punishment we may obtain impunity**.

This **personal imposition of the punishment deserved for our sins** is rightly called **the relaxation or dispensation of the law**. For the law's essence was this: **Every man, sinning, should bear the punishment of eternal death**.

Dn. Grotius says (p. 56): In the business of satisfaction, **God relaxes this law or dispenses with it in such a way**: “Every man sinning shall bear the punishment of eternal death, either by himself or by another.”

It is therefore **in vain** that Dn. Grotius asserts that this act of God is **not the execution of the law, nor its abrogation, nor its interpretation, but rather a relaxation or dispensation of the law**. This is indeed subtle. For what is such a dispensation if not the **execution of the law with leniency from strict justice**? Not noticing this, Dn. Grotius, when he denied that this act is the execution of the law, immediately added: for if God were to

execute the law entirely, etc. But **there is a difference between executing the law fully, that is, by the rigor of strict justice, and executing it with some dispensation.** This latter, not the former, God performs.

Is that dispensation of the law really an abrogation of the law?

Dn. Grotius denies this, because **a law abrogated has no binding force.** Yet the unbelievers were still subject to the same law. Hence it is written that **God's wrath remains upon the disobedient** (John 3:36, etc., p. 57).

What follows from this? If the law is not abrogated for the unbelievers, if God's wrath remains over the unbelievers, and if the wrath of God affects the unbelievers to the end: **does it follow that the law is not abrogated for the faithful, and that God's wrath affects the faithful to the end?** No.

The law, in regard to its rigor and its damning sentence or curse, is **not abrogated**, as the Apostle speaks. It is, however, **imposed on the contemptuous and those who do not know submission**, on the impious, sinners, profane individuals, patricides and matricides, murderers, adulterers, male concubitors, kidnappers, liars, perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to sound doctrine (1 Tim. 1:9–10).

That dispensation **cannot properly be called the interpretation** (καὶ ἐπιείκεια, “and equity”). This is how Dn. Grotius wishes it: for such an interpretation shows that **no act or person was ever comprehended under the obligation of the law** (p. 57).

What is the subtlety here? An interpretation by *Epiikeia* does not necessarily show that any act or person was ever under the obligation of the law, but it **shows that the obligation of the law, which was a death sentence, was transferred from all men, God's adopted children, to one person, namely the Only Begotten Son, Jesus Christ.**

Therefore it is as follows: the interpretation by *Epiikeia* shows that **no person was ever comprehended under the obligation of the law**, and by this very fact, Dn. Grotius' assertion fails.

He shows that the **divine dispensation regarded the person of Jesus Christ, who was not comprehended under the obligation of the law to death or punishment**, because He did not transgress the law. Our case, however, **who were under the obligation of the law, became liable**, so that He might redeem us, as I say, **we who were liable to the law** might receive adoption (Gal. 4:4–5).

Finally, what is this dispensation of the law, if not the **proper, careful interpretation, abrogation, and execution of the law**? Dn. Grotius treats this question.

Is penal law **relaxable**? And he definitively concludes (p. 61) that **the positive and penal law appears to have been dispensible**.

1. Penal law is **indeed dispensible and relaxable**, as far as it concerns that act of God discussed earlier, whereby the punishment deserved by us was transferred to Christ, our sponsor; but it is **not relaxable in such a way that a transgression of moral law could remain entirely unpunished**.
2. It is false to say that **penal law is the same as positive law**. It is true, Dn. Grotius asserts, that **all positive laws are absolutely relaxable** (p. 58). But penal law is **not absolutely relaxable**: it **does not so absolutely depend on God's free will** (Dn. Grotius, p. 59) that He could either punish or release the guilty without satisfaction.

Here, if my conjecture is not mistaken, **Dn. Grotius incurs serious criticism among good theologians**, because he, the great advocate of the

Catholic faith, **grants his adversary Socinus what no other sincere theologian had ever granted.** Dn. Grotius is **liberal toward his adversaries in temporal causes; in theological matters he is liberal beyond what is just and right,** for the sake of the cause of truth.

He examines and develops the writings of many theologians, but finds **none in his commentary favoring Socinus,** except for **Wolfgang Musculus,** a man of great authority and learning, who writes in common places that:

“God, if He acts voluntarily and according to His own pleasure, can remit sins without satisfaction to anyone, **having less right or liberty than any creditor, who may freely remit a debt to anyone according to his will with minimal satisfaction.**”

By the authority of the same Musculus, D. Conrad Vorstius, a remarkable admirer of Socinus, is supported, **whose entire theology is almost nothing but play and jest,** and from whom I desire nothing further, so that he might anathematize himself insofar as he cannot, with a good conscience, glory in truth and sincerity with David (Psalm 17).

Nevertheless, D. Vorstius in this matter seems **more lenient—or rather, more slow—toward Dn. Grotius.** For he declares that the necessity of Christ’s satisfaction is **hypothetical,** that is, dependent on God’s free will, **not on the essential nature of His justice,** so that God could have simply remitted sins without satisfaction, although He willed this intervention for His own pleasure.

Dn. Grotius, however, when he says that it is **irrelaxable,** either absolutely or hypothetically, asserts that **in no way can penal law be called relaxable:** therefore, he does not wish to make the satisfaction of Christ necessary by divine will in order that **the penal law be relaxed or the punishments of sins be remitted.**

Not only this, but he also declares that **penal law is positive and absolutely relaxable**. Here I wish to note: what else is this, except what Gittichius, a disciple of Socinus, writes, namely that **satisfaction for our sins through the payment of penalties derived in themselves was impossible in respect to God**? Certainly, it would have been impossible if **penal law were absolutely, as Dn. Grotius says, relaxable**.

Let pious and learned men consider this, and judge **how well Dn. Grotius disputed against Socinus**, who contended that God is not to be considered as **Creditor in the business of satisfaction**, which is the principal foundation and scope from which Socinus asserts that God should be compared to a creditor. Dn. Grotius himself does not admit this, but asserts it **through reasonings collected here and there**.

Nevertheless, I will leave aside this controversy: **whether God could have pardoned our sins without any satisfaction**, for which Dn. Grotius asks whether **penal law was relaxable**—where the slight dissent of Musculus will be mentioned.

Musculus was indeed a great man, yet, like other pious men, he was not free from error. He believed **the necessity of Christ's satisfaction for our sins**, but he held that it **did not depend on God absolutely, but on His free decree**, which is a tolerable error. In peace with such a great theologian, I wish that what Musculus has clearly said and taught be **kept in mind by all**.

If God had **less liberty in remitting sins than a creditor has in remitting a debt**, because He cannot forgive sins without justice and their due offense, then surely He would be less free, who, being good and true, cannot, by any means, be evil or deceitful without violating His own nature.

Disputation
ON THE PERSON AND OFFICE OF CHRIST,
UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF GOD.

THESIS 1.

That in Christ all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden is not unlikely, as we shall see. Let us establish piously, by faith, a proper **discussion** (συζήτησιν).

II.

Knowledge of Christ principally comprises two heads: namely, **His person** and **His office**.

III.

Concerning His person, Christ is **truly and eternally God**, and **truly and perfectly a just man**, united in one and the same person, namely the **second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity**, which He manifested in the flesh at the proper time.

IV.

This description consists of three principal members, of which the **first concerns the divinity of Christ**, the **second concerns His union (with humanity)**.

V.

That the divinity of Christ is true and eternal is demonstrated by the clear testimonies of the Holy Scriptures, in which Christ is called God—not merely nominally, but truly and by nature.

VI.

Next, this divinity is proven by the divine properties of Christ, of which the principal are: **Eternity, Immensity, Omniscience, Omnipotence**—all of which are attributed to Christ in the Word of God.

VII.

Having discussed the divinity, the **humanity of Christ** follows. Its truth and perfection are abundantly shown first by the titles properly ascribed to a human being, and then by those passages in which Christ is clearly attributed not only a human body and rational soul, but also the natural properties proper to that humanity.

VIII.

From what has been said, the complete constitution of the person can be sufficiently understood, which indeed consists entirely in the **personal union of the two natures**.

IX.

And this is sufficient regarding the **person of Christ**; now **His salvific office** follows.

X.

The office of the incarnate Son of God is to serve as **mediator between God and men**, appeasing the wrath of God and restoring those in the disfavor of God, by **interceding and making satisfaction for their sins**.

XI.

The office of Christ is **threefold: Prophetic, Priestly, and Royal**.

XII.

The **Prophetic office** is that by which Christ revealed the secret counsel of God concerning the redemption of humanity and reconciliation with God

to the human race, and particularly, in His own person, to the **Jewish people**, knowingly and willingly teaching them.

XIII.

The **Priestly office** is the personal work of the God-man (θεανθρώπε, "God-man") by which He is ordained to make **satisfaction to God on behalf of men**.

XIV.

The **Royal office** is that by which Christ governs the kingdom obtained through redemption and preserves it.

FINIS.

Theological Disputation on the Antichrist

What and Who He Is

First Thesis

We impose upon ourselves a brief treatment of the Antichrist, sufficient for the matter at hand. First, we will discuss *What* he is, and then *Who* the Antichrist is. **Psalm 105**

2. The name "Antichrist" is received in the Scriptures in a twofold sense, just as the name of Christ is. Sometimes, indeed, the name of Christ is taken *κατὰ τι* (according to a certain respect), for those who symbolize Christ by a sign of union and typology of his office; other times, it refers to a single person, namely the Messiah Jesus of Nazareth. Similarly, the name of the Antichrist is sometimes taken commonly, and then denotes any heretical and false teacher who, in any way, opposes the doctrine of Christ — in this sense, John affirms that many Antichrists existed in his age — while at other times it designates a distinguished individual who opposes Christ, who in Scripture is otherwise called man of sin, king of locusts, beast, harlot, Abaddon, Apollyon, dragon, pseudo-prophet, apostate, etc.

3. The Antichrist, strictly speaking, does not denote a single and individual person, but a society and series of many men, succeeding in order within one and the same kingdom.

4. The reason for this assertion is drawn from the testimony of the Apostles Paul and John, who testify that the Antichrist had already come in their

time, and is not to be completely abolished until the very last day of judgment — a period which cannot be assigned to the lifespan of a single man; the matter itself declares this.

5. Moreover, it is impossible that the events which Scripture predicts concerning the Antichrist and the kings derived from him could be accomplished within the age of a single man, let alone within the very short span of three years and six months, as the pontifical writers contend.

6. It is of no importance that some object that the article α in the Greek context, both Pauline and Johannine, is *added* (additum), and therefore denotes a single person and individual, that which is called the Antichrist; for the article indeed denotes an individual, yet it is rather $\alpha\delta\eta\lambda\omicron\nu$ (indefinite) and common, than $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\tau\iota$ (specific) or singular.

7. It is of greater importance that the Antichrist is not opposed to Christ as a person in the sense of substance, but rather in terms of quality and office. Just as it is proper to Christ to preserve his people and to grant them eternal life freed from sins, so the roles of the Antichrist are to destroy his followers and to drive those enslaved to sin to ruin and death, which is the wages of sin.

8. Christ can be only one in number, on account of both the dignity of his person, which is $\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ (God-man), and of his office, which admits no colleague or successor. Antichrist, however, being a mortal man, can neither weave the web of his mystery without helpers nor extend it without successors. Hence it follows that the singularity of the Antichrist, as deduced

from the singularity of the person of Christ, is absurdly asserted.

9. Properly, the Antichrist may be considered in various states:

- as *rising*, as he was from the time of the Apostles, when the mystery of iniquity was active;
- as *reigning*, as he was while drunk with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus;
- as *revealed*, as he now is and will be until the second coming of Christ;
- finally, as *destroyed*, as he will be under that glorious advent of Christ, when he will be entirely and finally abolished.

10. The chief author of the Antichrist is Satan himself, or the Dragon, who gave great strength and power to the beast. From this, the coming of the Antichrist is said to proceed, according to 2 Thessalonians 2, through the efficacy of Satan with all power, signs, and lying wonders. The teaching which that impostor spirit asserts is called the doctrine of demons.

11. But having sufficiently explained *What* the Antichrist is, we now clarify *Who* the Antichrist is.

12. If the term "Antichrist" is taken commonly, then any heretic is an Antichrist who, with a hardened mind, upholds a perverse doctrine.

13. The term *heresy* seems to have been coined by the Apostle in reference to doctrines of the faith, and it is a term most commonly used by ecclesiastical writers (1 Corinthians 11:17).

14. Before one is called by the infamous term of heresy or Antichristianism, it must first be understood that such a person partly engages in error due to an ignorance or deviation from the received Evangelical faith; partly, he labors in stubbornness, that is, by obstinately retaining his willful opposition to the truth and striving to resist the light of demonstrated truth.

15. Heretics may be called those who, through rebellion of the will combined with blindness of the mind, either err in the foundation itself—i.e., they directly and manifestly disturb it. Such are the heresies of the Samaritans, and all who openly deny the divine nature of Christ; likewise Marcion and all who transform the human nature of Christ into a mere appearance.

Alternatively, they err around the foundation—i.e., they undermine it obliquely, as it were through tunnels—by teaching, as if by subtleties, doctrines which, being posited, pervert some head of faith by necessary consequence, assigning to human free will such powers that they obscurely pervert the entire article of the grace of God (cf. Galatians 5; Titus 3:10; 1 Timothy 1).

16. Errors beyond the foundation—i.e., curious and subtle questions aimed more at the display of ingenuity than at the edification of the Church—are not heresies, but we rightly call them vain and empty controversies, falsely

named in public clamor and opposition to knowledge (1 Timothy 1).

17. But this is sufficient concerning heretics who may be considered as the “lesser nations” of the Antichrist and his forerunners; the great and more complete Antichrist is yet to be discussed.

18. Who the great Antichrist is remains to be said; in this matter, the Fathers have labored long and with much perplexity.

19. Our contemporary orthodox theologians, although some extend the kingdom of the Antichrist more broadly and others restrict it to the Roman Pontiff, nonetheless, as far as we know, no one has yet identified with certainty who this Antichrist will be.

20. Some, such as Zanchius, interpret that the Antichrist, about whom Daniel and the Apostle speak, cannot be the Roman Pontiff. Yet Zanchius does not deny that the kingdom of the Pope is the kingdom of the Antichrist, although he teaches that not only the kingdom of the Pope is the kingdom of the Antichrist, but also that of Mohammed.

21. Egidius Hunnius, among many commonly mentioned Antichrists, affirms that two are named in Scripture as primary or great: Gog, that is, Mohammed (whom he also believes to be called Magog), who attacks the Church of Christ partly with armed force and partly with false and blasphemous religion, and the head and bridegroom of the Babylonian harlot, that is, the Roman Pontiff.

22. What the Prophet Daniel, in the foreshadowing of the fourth monarchy, calls Gog a “horn,” which rises from small beginnings to that power through the progression of time, so that it uproots the three former horns, namely the flourishing Eastern kingdoms, from the fourth monarchy: similarly, it is said to effect a change of laws and times, and to open its mouth against the Holy of Holies and speak great things; and finally, that it will make war against the saints of the Most High and obtain victories—Hunnius asserts that all of this falls upon Mohammedanism, or is fulfilled in the barbaric empire of the Turks.

23. The humble and ignoble beginnings of Mohammed’s kingdom are clearly and plainly despised, when a lowly merchant, by virtue of his trading, was made a powerful prince, formidable even to neighboring peoples, as history recounts.

24. This kingdom, begun under humble auspices, gradually added strength until it became the power we see it endowed with today, growing under Mohammed’s successors.

25. Mohammed undertook to change laws and times when he conflated various religions—Christian, Arian, and Jewish—into a certain mixed form.

26. That his mouth speaks great things against the Most High is evident from the Qur’an, full of diabolical blasphemies, particularly where he attacks the worshipable mystery of the most glorious Trinity and does not shrink from lacerating with abuse the eternal divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ.

27. By how many bloody and horrible wars he shakes the Christian world and encircles the beloved city of God and the camps of the faithful, and wages war against the holy people of the Most High, and wins victories over them—this has been taught abundantly by the experience of many centuries. These are the sum of what Hunnius reports concerning the Antichrist as Mohammed.

28. He considers Antichristianism to be comprehended under this heading, that is, both Mohammedanism and Papism, as does Antonius Fayus; although subsequently he deviates somewhat in distinguishing the one from the other.

29. At the same time, the defection of the Asians arose, whereby the dominion of the Roman Pontiffs, idolatry, and other corruptions in doctrine and life appeared. And what open impiety Mohammed practiced, the same was accomplished almost entirely by all the hypocrisy and idolatry of the papal system, yet with God in the midst of His enemies, recognizing and preserving those who were His.

30. Therefore, these two kingdoms—Mohammedan and Papal—constitute one kingdom of the Antichrist, and they are the dragon who raised up the Antichrist to oppose the true doctrine of Christ by various deceptions, like two horns.

31. For this reason, Scripture calls the Antichrist “Gog and Magog,” that is, as interpreted by the ordinary interlinear gloss, hidden and revealed enemies. For Satan raised up the Mohammedans as open enemies of Christ; hidden, however, and born in the very dwelling of the Church, and secretly arising as

enemies, is the Pope with his satellite followers.

32. And although the previously mentioned marks of the Antichrist do not seem to fit all equally to Mohammed and the Pontiff, it is sufficient that they fit both in many respects, varying only in the manner of application.

33. It is notable that what John predicted about the seat of the Antichrist—namely that the Antichrist would sit on high mountains—equally corresponds to two cities: Constantinople, where Mohammed sits, and Rome, where the Roman Pontiff sits. In both, seven mountains rise, and in both, the precursor of the Antichrist has long ago been seated. These two, the Constantinopolitan and Roman bishops, translated to themselves the name ἐπισκόπε (episkope, “bishopric”), which Gregory called “Antichristian,” and wished to be called and regarded as such.

34. But enough has been said about the Antichrist according to the judgment of Dn. Fayus; it remains to propose briefly what we think concerning the great Antichrist.

35. First, we consider it necessary to explain our position, whether Mohammed should be placed together with the Roman Pontiff in rank, that is, as a half or partner, or whether he should constitute another part of the Antichristian society; or whether he is an ally, kinsman of the Pontiff, in Antichristianism. This is admitted; the learned Povelus denies this concerning the Antichrist.

36. Next, in a way we cannot easily deny, Mohammed is the other horn of the dragon, which Scripture calls Magog; certainly we believe the Roman

Pontiff to be the first horn, and the other, more dangerous, is that which Scripture calls Gog.

37. This we also most certainly believe, until it be solidly responded to by a syllogism.

In which note: the great Antichrist, truly and properly designated in Scripture beforehand, must be regarded as the great Antichrist without doubt;

and the Roman Pontiff truly and properly corresponds to the mark previously designated in Scripture.

Therefore, the Roman Pontiff must be regarded without doubt as the great Antichrist.

38. The major proposition is clear in its own light. The minor proposition, which requires proof, will be demonstrated in the course of this disputation, should anyone oppose it, especially against the sophistries of the Jesuits, as is usually done; we will vindicate it.

FINIS.

Theological Disputation

ON GOOD WORKS

Thesis I.

Under the name of good works, sometimes is understood the entire divine worship, whose scope not only includes external and internal actions conforming to the divine law, but also the very dispositions of the mind, through which actions become good. Strictly speaking, it is understood and defined in this way: A good work is an action, whether internal or external, which proceeds from true faith, is done according to the law of God, and is referred to His glory alone.

(Romans 14:23; Hebrews 11:6; Psalm 119 [entire chapter]).

2. In this discussion, we will consider the causes, effects, adjuncts, and distribution of good works.

3. Of the efficient causes, one is principal, the others instrumental.

4. The principal and proper efficient cause of good works is the Holy Spirit, illuminating our mind, which is averse from God, and directing our will so that it may conform to the will of God. He effects in us both to will and to perform (Philippians 2:13), and hence these works are called “works of God” (John 6:29).

5. The instrumental causes are two: one external, the other internal. The external is the Word of God, by which He Himself sets His will before us and enjoins the zeal for good works.

(1 Thessalonians 4; Titus 2:11–12, regarding this matter.)

This external preaching of the Word, by which we are exhorted in the name of God to live temperately, justly, and piously, renouncing impiety and worldly desires, does not reach all individual humans. Nevertheless, God allowed the nations to walk in their own ways (Acts 14:16), and at that time, many were without Christ, alienated from the civil state of Israel, and without God in the world (Ephesians 2:12).

6. The internal instrumental cause is faith, from which, as from a source, good works flow.

7. The matter (or material) of good works is whatever is prescribed by the law of God. For, if any work is to be truly good, it necessarily requires that it be commanded by God, since no created work can have the power to define itself as good. (Deuteronomy 12:8: “Let no one do anything just because it seems right in his eyes, but what I command.”; Matthew 15:9: “They honor me in vain, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men.”)

CONS. I. Hence, first, the papal traditions concerning morals, which are imposed for divine worship, as well as the observance of things prescribed for external rites, cannot be called good works, since these are not commanded by God.

2. Works of good intention are also rejected when they are not commanded by God; although their intention may be good, they are not properly called good works.

8. The form of good works is conformity with the law of God. Namely, that conformity which is examined according to the ἀκρίβεια (exactness or rigor) of divine law; if this does not shine forth in our works, they are imperfectly good. For any truly perfect good work requires not only that it be done in faith, but also that the principles of the work—the intellect, the will, and the affections—be perfectly obedient to the Holy Spirit, which is granted to no

mortal, except Christ as a human being. Our flesh always resists the Spirit, as long as we bear this body. (Romans 7:23)

9. Even if our works are imperfectly good, they nevertheless do not enjoy the prerogative of original works of righteousness (as Augustine testifies), which excel in sins forgiven. Since the divine law especially requires the sincerity of the heart (Matthew 22:37) and regard for divine glory, no work of the unregenerate, however specious it may appear, can be simply and properly called a good work.

10. The good works of the regenerated, even if imperfect, nevertheless please God.

Although what is done is only partially good and does not fully satisfy the law of God, and therefore does not please God insofar as it contains even the smallest imperfection, good works nevertheless please God—not because of the inherent worthiness of the works themselves, but because they proceed from faith. Their defects are covered by Christ as Mediator; the faithful, because they believe in Christ, give thanks to God, and their works, for the same Christ, please God.

11. The final cause (ultimate purpose) of good works can be considered under three distinctions: some respect God, some ourselves, and some our neighbor.

12. With respect to God, the first end of good works is that the glory of God be manifested (Matthew 5:16; 1 Peter 2:12); the second is that the duty owed to Him by us be performed, a duty consisting of both obedience (Psalm 119:4) and gratitude (Romans 12:1-2).

13. With respect to ourselves, the end is that good works serve as testimony of our faith, both of that faith existing in us and that increasing, of our justification and election (Acts 10:35; 2 Peter 1:10, etc.).

14. With respect to our neighbor, the end is not only that we do no harm to him, but also that we benefit him and profit with him.

15. The effects of good works are: 1. the glorification of God, or the sanctification of the divine name (1 Corinthians 6:20; 1 Peter 2:9; Matthew 5:16); 2. innumerable goods, which return both to the doer and to others.

16. The goods returning to the doer include the confirmation of election, vocation, justification, etc. The goods returning to others include: 1. invitation to true zeal for piety (2 Corinthians 8:1 and following); 2. turning them away from punishment, since God, on account of a few righteous, spares entire cities (Genesis 18:23; Jeremiah 5:1, 18).

17. The adjuncts or consequences of works in general are merit and recompense.

18. **Meritum ingentum** (intrinsic merit) is the adjunct of a work that regards the reward of good or the punishment of evil.

19. There is therefore a twofold merit: **penal** (pæne), which is commonly called reatus, and **præmium** (reward), which is properly called merit. The latter is an undue duty or benefit rendered to someone, which regards a worthy recompense.

20. Here the question arises: Are our works meritorious before God? The answer: if they are divine works, it is certain we say they are meritorious (Romans 6:23). If they are human works, we deny that any work of any man, even the most holy, deserves anything from God. We prove this with the following reasons.

1. Because our works are imperfect (Galatians 5:17). Being imperfect, they not only merit nothing but are even condemned (Deuteronomy 27:26).

2. Because if we perform any good works, they are not truly ours, but the works of the Holy Spirit operating in us (Philippians 2:13; 1 Corinthians 4:7).

3. Because merit requires three conditions:

1. That the work, when performed, be **undue**, i.e., that it be our owed duty. But our works are debts (Luke 17:10), and who has given anything to the Lord first, that it may be recompensed to him? (Romans 11:35).
2. That the work confer a benefit to the one who merits it. Yet no action of ours confers benefit on God (Psalm 16:2-3).
3. That the work be offered in proportion and equality to the reward or price it deserves. But between our works and salvation, there is no proportion (Romans 8:18).

4. Because the elect and the just exist before they perform good works (Romans 9:11-13). Therefore, those performing good works are not justified by them; rather, they perform good works as justified by faith.

5. Because otherwise Christ's death would have been in vain.

6. Because Christ would not have been a perfect Savior.

22. Since eternal life is called a reward, it should be noted that this term is taken not relatively but absolutely, inasmuch as it designates the end of a certain thing.

23. Compensation is the fruit that is given to the worker on account of the work.

24. The distribution of good works is as follows: some regard duties to be rendered immediately to God, hence immediate worship; others regard duties directed mediately toward God.

25. Works of immediate worship are commonly called acts of piety and religion. They may be internal only, or both internal and external simultaneously.

26. Internal acts include: 1. Faith, by which we believe the promises of the Gospel; 2. Knowledge of God; 3. Trust and hope in God; 4. Charity toward God, filial fear of God, and patience.

27. Internal and external simultaneously include the obedience of both mind and body. These are: the invocation of God and acts of thanksgiving; the confession of truth; and the observance of ecclesiastical rites.

28. Works of mediate worship are those prescribed in the second table of the Decalogue and are encompassed under the name of moral virtue. These are treated not only by the theologian but also by the ethicist.

Theological Disputation on the Mediatorial Office of Christ

1. Christ Jesus, the eternal Son of the eternal God, by that holy and most wise dispensation of God the Father, was ordained as mediator and fulfilled in its entirety the office of His mediation. And He did this with the purpose of accomplishing for us the work of redemption according to the promises of God and the prophecies of the holy prophets.

2. Christ accomplished this both through His person and through His mediatorial office; for both were necessary for the completion of the mediation. Certainly, just as our reconciliation with God could not exist unless such a mediator were established, so too it was necessary that He possess the essence and properties of our nature. For satisfaction requires the identity of essence between the one for whom satisfaction is made and the one who makes it; thus, we could not receive grace from God nor be completely freed from our evil unless the Person, by means of a voluntary economy, truly and actually administered that mediatorial office. That is, unless He, infused by God the Father, carried out that office on His own.

3. The office of Christ (about which we now intend to call a few points for public disputation) is the function of Christ the Mediator, imposed and entrusted to Him by the Father, voluntarily undertaken by Christ the Son, and perfectly administered in both natures, for the purpose that, through the reconciliation of our nature with God, He might unite us to God and restore eternal life to us.

4. This office of Christ is to be considered both in general and, by contrast, according to its species. The office of Christ is thus definitively defined, and to its explanation the following theorems are noted.

-1. This mediatorial office is Christ's not as simply God, nor as simply man, but as a Person existing in the hypostatic union of both, that is, as a θεάνθρωπος (God-man). Indeed, what was required from the mediator for our redemption and full liberation demanded, in part, divine power, and in part, human affection. For just as He could not absorb death in victory, abolish sin, and restore life unless He were God, so too He could not take upon Himself our sin, endure the punishment deserved for our sin, and ultimately suffer death on our behalf unless He were truly and fully man.

-2. And thus this mediatorial office is the office of the whole Person, consisting equally of divine and human nature, and accordingly all the effects (ἀποτελέσματα) of this mediatorial function pertain to the whole Person. Nevertheless, the operations of each nature are distinct. Here we distinguish **one** not only as the mediatorial office itself, but also as **one effect** (ἀποτελέσματα). I say **one**, because by unity of the supposit (Person), the entire action proceeds through it.

-3. The supposit (Person) is the proper agent of the action; the individual effects are produced by the distinct natures, so that some acts are divine, others human. Just as in a human work, the soul and body act together—the soul acts, and the body acts through the soul—so too in Christ, the divine and human natures act together.

5. But it must not be thought that this concurrence of the divine and human natures constitutes subordination, such as a universal cause combined with a particular effect, or a mere coordination, such as multiple causes producing one effect by conspiracy. For although in this concurrence of both natures of Christ there is a great connection in producing a single effect, it does not agree in all respects: for coordinated causes do not constitute a single effect as distinct natures, nor as distinct supposita (Persons).

6. From this office, two names are derived. One, because of the administration of this very office, is the name **Son of God**, and it is also the name **Christ**. The other, on account of its complement, effect, and fruit, is the name **Jesus**, that is, one name with another cognomen.

7. The name **Jesus** was first attributed to Christ in the New Testament by the Angel (Matthew 1:21). Nevertheless, it is equivalent in meaning to the Old Testament designation (Isaiah 7:14) *Immanuel* (which means “God with us”). Properly in Hebrew, the name sounds *Yeshua*, which means “Savior,” because He became the mediator, who liberates His people from their sins, as the Holy Spirit interprets in Matthew 1.

The name **Christ** is derived from the Greek *ἀπὸ τὰ χρίσιν* (from “to anoint”), whence *χριστός* (“anointed”), in Hebrew *Messias* (Messiah), because He is anointed with the oil of gladness (Psalm 45:7). This is to be joined to the office of mediation between God and men. It is necessary to note that this twofold anointing of Christ completes:

1. His ordination to the mediatorial office.
2. The bestowal of gifts necessary for its execution.

As regards the first, it pertains to Christ according to both natures, since the Mediator had to be God and man; with respect to the second, it pertains to Christ according to human nature.

9. The office of Christ, however, is threefold: **Prophetic, Priestly, and Royal**.

The necessity of this threefold mediatorial office is proven by the threefold evil in which we were involved, and from which we therefore needed to be freed. For, since we were enveloped in the densest darkness of ignorance, it

was necessary that we be delivered by external doctrine, i.e., by the announcement of the Word, and by internal instruction of the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, since sin and all disorder of our nature had established dominion in us through transgression, it was necessary that the kingdom of righteousness and holiness be restored in us; therefore Christ had to exercise the royal office as well.

10. Finally, since we were constrained by guilt and the debt of sin, it was necessary that our mediator, through the administration of His **Priestly office**, remove the penalty of sin, namely, **eternal death**, and bestow restored life. This was accomplished by the incarnate Son of God through the preaching of the Word and the institution and administration of the Sacraments of the New Testament, namely, **Baptism** and the **Lord's Supper** (Matthew 4:17; John 4; Matthew 28:19; Mark 14:22).

The **Prophetic office** of Christ is the function of the Person of the mediator, by which He teaches and instructs His Church. He is proven to be a prophet (Deuteronomy 18:18), and Christ is called a prophet among His brethren (cf. Isaiah; John 4:42).

11. The parts of this office are twofold:

1. **Manifestation and preaching of doctrine externally.**
2. **Internal illumination**, by which the mind is enlightened.

External manifestation consists in the announcement of counsel and the will of God.

12. This announcement of God's counsel and will, even if extended and propagated in the New Testament to all nations, tribes, and peoples, does not, however, reach each individual human being personally. Hence the

Apostles are said to have begun the propagation of the evangelical doctrine, preaching to both Jews and Gentiles. Yet, when some refused to embrace the truth, they are said to have “shaken off the dust from their feet,” thus indicating the unworthiness of those to whom the doctrine of the Gospel was proposed.

13. The internal illumination was that by which Christ, while preaching both the Law and the Gospel, taught and enlightened the hearts of the Elect through the Holy Spirit, so that they might recognize their misery and rightly understand the mystery of their salvation (John 5:25; John 6:68; Matthew 16:16; John 4:42).

This internal illumination is not always conjoined with the external preaching of the Word, nor is it always separated from it.

To some, the announcement of the Gospel is like the scent of death leading to death, whereas to others it is the scent of life leading to life.

Here, a corollary arises: Was Christ a prophet before He was born of Mary? The answer is: Yes.

14. The priestly office of Christ is that by which He alone serves as mediator (1 Timothy 2:5) between those who are divided, namely between God and selected humans, satisfying for the sins of the latter, and reconciling them to Him.

15. The acts of this office are divided into two parts: one is the fulfillment of the law, the other is the payment of punishment.

It should be noted that, for our justification and total liberation, it was necessary not only that the law be satisfied through the compensation of punishment, thereby freeing us from the power of Satan and of death, but also that it be satisfied through perfect obedience to the primary command

of the law: “*Do this and live.*” Thus, through perfect obedience, eternal life promised to us, indeed adjudicated to us, could be recovered.

16. The fulfillment of the law is that by which Christ freely and perfectly provided all righteousness to which we were bound, both by the perfect conformity of intellect and will to that law, and by works congruent and perfect with that law, both internal and external. (Romans 8:4; John 17:19; Matthew 3:15)

17. The payment of punishments is Christ’s voluntary offering, by which He gave Himself to God the Father as the price of redemption for our sins. The blood of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, purges us from all sin. (John 1:7; 2:1; Acts 20:28; John 1:29; Revelation 13:1)

A question arises: Was Christ properly called a priest? The answer: Yes.

Was He a priest while on this earth? Yes.

18. The kingly office of Christ is that by which He administers and guards the kingdom purchased in redemption.

Here, the question is asked: Was Christ before His resurrection and ascension properly and perfectly called king? The answer: Yes.

Theological Disputation

On the Lord's Prayer

THESIS

1. As in all methodical treatments, following the guidance of the Logicians, we ought to begin with a definition before discussing the Lord's Prayer. Therefore, before examining its parts, we will first see what prayer is.
2. Prayer is the expression of a afflicted heart, a sigh or groan (*gemitus*) by which divine help is earnestly sought, either with words or without words, or even with groans and sighs alone.
3. Prayer is of two kinds, according to circumstances: public and private. Public, which is also called solemn, is that which is made in public or ecclesiastical gatherings, and is most often vocal. Private prayer is that which each person uses privately, either at home or in the innermost recesses of the heart. (1 Kings 8:14; Ezra 7:27; Mark 6:46; Acts 10:9)
4. Both forms of prayer, that solemn formula of petition composed with divine artifice, which our Lord Jesus Christ Himself taught us, are to be used.
5. Its parts are four: **Exordium** (Introduction), **Propositio** (Statement of Petition), **Confirmatio** (Confirmation), and **Epilogus** (Conclusion).

6. The **Exordium** is contained in the words: “*Our Father, who art in heaven.*”
7. The Exordium has two parts: first, the addressing of the true God; second, the description of Him.
8. The addressing teaches whom we ought to invoke, namely, “Our Father” (1 Corinthians 2:19). We call God “our Father” for two reasons:
 - First, with respect to Christ, because He begot a Son from eternity, namely, Jesus Christ.
 - Second, with respect to us, because He adopted us as sons for Christ’s sake. (Ephesians 1:4, 5:9)

We therefore reject the opinion of the Papists that angels, the dead, or others should be invoked. (Matthew 4; Psalm 50:10)

9. This concludes the first part of the Exordium. The second part follows, namely, the description of God.

II. The Description of God

The description is indicated by the words: “*Who art in heaven.*” That God is “in heaven” signifies that He is supremely exalted and omnipotent, the ruler of the universe, who can grant to us what we ask of Him.

God is indeed everywhere (Jeremiah 22:23-24; Isaiah 66:1; Psalm 115:16; Job 14:2), yet Christ says that He is “in heaven”:

- First, to show the contrast with earthly fathers.
- Second, to indicate that He reigns with celestial glory and majesty, presiding over all things, governing the universe by His providence.
- Third, to show that He is free from all corruption and change.
- Fourth, that there He especially reveals Himself before the angels, showing what kind of Father He is, how good, powerful, and active.

This concludes the Exordium of the Lord’s Prayer. What follows is the second part, containing the petitions, namely, the **Propositio** of petitions.

Of these petitions, the first three pertain immediately to the glory of God (according to Matthew 6:33), while the last three pertain to our own necessity.

The first among the former is: “*Hallowed be Thy name.*” Here it is necessary to see:

What is meant by the name of God.

What it means to sanctify.

The name of God signifies:

- First, God Himself (Psalm 5:12; Psalm 7; 118).
- Second, the attributes and works of God (1 Kings 8:5).
- Third, the command of God, that is, His will and divine authority (Exodus 15:3).
- Fourth, the worship, trust, celebration, and profession of God (Matthew 29:19).

To sanctify is used in three ways:

To make pure from what is impure.

To celebrate what is holy.

To dedicate to holy use that which is indifferent (*in δε ἀδιάφορον*).

The first and second meanings pertain here: we ask that God may be celebrated as holy by us, and that by knowledge of His holiness He may make the impure pure and constitute us holy.

God sanctifies Himself in the manifestation of His being, and in the issuance of His works: wisdom, goodness, mercy, clemency, justice, truth, and power, shine forth in all His works. (John 12:18; Psalm 115:1; Ezekiel 36:23; Exodus 9:16)

The second petition is: “*Thy kingdom come.*” Here we ask for the advent of the kingdom of God, and, conversely, the destruction and abolition of the kingdom of Satan, of sin, of the Antichrist, and finally of death.

The kingdom of God is that in which God alone reigns and exercises dominion over all creatures.

This kingdom is indeed one reality (*res ipsa*), but it differs in mode of administration. For it is administered differently in this life and differently in heaven. It is commonly distinguished into the universal and the special kingdom.

The universal kingdom of God is that which God exercises in the entire world over all creatures, declaring His power in moving and restraining all things.

The special kingdom of God is that which God exercises in His Church over rational creatures, namely, angels and men.

This kingdom is distinguished into the kingdom of Grace and the kingdom of Glory.

The kingdom of Grace is that which God exercises on earth in this life, using means appointed by the Father.

The kingdom of Glory is that which God will exercise after this life in heaven, manifestly showing His glory to the elect, and the glory of Christ which He has given. (1 Corinthians 13:10; 15:28; Revelation 21:22–23 and following)

The kingdom of Grace and the kingdom of Glory is indeed one reality, yet they differ in mode and time. (Luke 1:33; Hebrews 12:28)

Up to this point the distinction of the kingdom of God has been explained. What follows now is the coming of the kingdom of God.

The coming of the kingdom of God is the continual manifestation of divine governance, which God exercises throughout the whole world with omnipotent power, and especially in the Church, both in grace in this life and in glory in the life to come.

Therefore, the coming of God is twofold:

Of the universal kingdom.

Of the particular kingdom.

The coming of the universal kingdom of God is when God daily makes Himself known to the whole world and governs the entire universe by His power. (Daniel 4:17)

The coming of the particular kingdom of God is when God the Father manifests Christ as King in heaven and on earth, both in the kingdom of grace and in the kingdom of glory.

The coming of the kingdom of grace is when God the Father gives Christ for the redemption of the elect, the kingdom of Satan, sin, and death having been destroyed; and thus the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit come to us and establish a dwelling among us. (John 14:23; Romans 8:9,11; John 6:44)

This kingdom is therefore twofold:

- To individual elect persons,
- To the whole Church.

The coming of the kingdom of grace to the whole Church is when God gathers the Church to Himself throughout the world and protects it wherever it exists.

This occurs in two ways:

- By establishing churches where none existed,
- By preserving and increasing them, and by maintaining the ecclesiastical ministry. (Psalm 67: whole; Psalm 3:9)

Additionally, it involves building up the kingdom against sin and the devil, removing obstructions and scandals from among His people. (Psalm 78:7)

The coming of the kingdom of grace to individual elect persons is when God not only joins each of the elect to the visible Church by external vocation, but also makes them a member of the invisible Catholic Church through internal vocation, justifying and regenerating them by the gift of faith for salvation.

The coming of the kingdom of glory is the manifestation of Christ the Lord in glory.

This is likewise twofold:

- To individual faithful,
- To the whole Church

To individual faithful, the coming of the kingdom of glory is when it comes to each faithful person individually, to transfer their soul into heavenly

glory. As Paul expresses his longing: *“I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.”*

To the whole Church, it will be when Christ, in the glory of the Father, returns in the clouds to judge all the living and the dead, resurrected from the dust of the earth, and will take us up into heaven so that we may see His glory and participate in it eternally.

The third petition is: *“Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven.”* In this, we ask that the grace be given to us to obey all divine will, and that we may wholly dedicate ourselves to serving God. Once the first three petitions have been explained, the three subsequent petitions follow, which pertain to our necessity.

The first of the subsequent petitions is: *“Give us this day our daily bread.”*

The daily bread that Christ commanded us to ask from the Father in heaven is all that is necessary for the sustenance of the whole man.

According to the judgment of D. Polanus, it is twofold: spiritual and corporal.

The spiritual bread is that by which we are nourished unto eternal life.

It is also twofold: the bread of the Word of God, and that living bread which came down from heaven.

The bread of the Word of God is spiritual food, continually necessary, through which we daily receive the true knowledge of God and virtue, and thereby grow internally in God until we attain maturity as men, and to the measure of the fullness of Christ Jesus. (Proverbs 9:15; Isaiah 15:2; Jeremiah 15:16; Psalm 65:2,5)

The living bread which came down from heaven is Christ the Lord, manifested in the flesh. (John 6:32-33,36,48-51,53-58,74)

The corporal daily bread is that which is required for the sustenance of our bodies. (Psalm 132:15)

Therefore, according to Polanus, the sense of the fourth petition is this: *“Generous Father, give us daily whatever is necessary for our sustenance.”* But above all, feed our souls with the nourishment of Your spiritual Word, and with that living bread which, moved by love for us, You have given, so that everyone who believes in Him may not perish but have eternal life.

The second of the subsequent petitions, which is in order the fifth, is contained in these words: *“And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.”*

This petition has two parts: 1. The request for the remission of sins; 2. The declaration of our gratitude to God for the granted remission of sins.

The request for the remission of sins is a petition for absolution, both from guilt and from the punishment of sins, by the satisfaction and righteousness of our Mediator Christ, applied by faith, through which we are made worthy

of eternal life.

The declaration of gratitude to God, due for the remission obtained from Him, is the directing of all our actions and knowledge to the praise of God.

The third petition, in order the sixth, is: “*And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.*” In this, we ask for the grace of continual regeneration and sanctification, established in the mortification of the old man and the vivification of the new. We ask God for the mortification of the old man when we pray not to be led into temptation.

There are, however, two kinds of temptation: one is from God; the other is from the Devil.

The temptation from God, or whereby God tests, is the examination of our faith, piety, penitence, and obedience for salvation, whether through all evils, the Devil, the flesh, desires, the world, afflictions, calamities, and so forth. Through this, may He grant to us and our household patience, hope, constancy, etc. (Genesis 22:1; Psalm 133:2; 50:1)

The temptation from the Devil is that whereby the Devil, either through evil spirits or the flesh, attempts to cast us into hell. (Job 1; Matthew 4)

The third part of the Lord’s Prayer is the *Confirmation*, which Luke omitted because it was deemed that the Holy Spirit alone should describe the petitions, especially as they pertain to the substance of prayer per person. Matthew, however, expresses it (Matt. 6:13), though in some texts this clause

seems inserted later. The Greeks even today say that only a priest may pronounce these words, which is why no ancient Latin interpreter mentions this clause. Yet in Greek manuscripts it is found and is explained by Chrysostom in *Homily 20 on Matthew*.

This confirmation contains three arguments by which our faith is strengthened.

First, because our Father in heaven has a kingdom; that is, He is King, ruling over all. Second, because He has power; that is, He is able to give us whatever we ask. (Psalm 115:3) Third, for the sake of being heard, because His glory lasts forever, so that He may be praised and celebrated in every age, for He is God and the most gracious Father. (Psalm 25:11)

The Epilogue of the Lord's Prayer consists of one word: *AMEN*, which is at once a vow that what we ask may be confirmed, and a sign of confidence, indicating that we are persuaded that God has indeed heard our prayers.

Theological Disputation

On Penitence

THESIS I

The term *penitence* seems to be derived from punishment (*poena*), not, however, that which a sinner undertakes for himself after the sacred confessional act, nor that which a priest imposes at his discretion; rather, it is that which a man, whose conscience has been wounded by the law, sustains, being aroused by the recognition of sin and the consideration of divine wrath. In Greek, it is called *μετάνοια* (*metanoia*) and *μεταμέλεια* (*metameleia*), that is, repentance and remorse, as some translators render it.

II. Some hold that *metameleia* signifies a still raw, incomplete, and incipient repentance; whereas *metanoia* signifies true, saving, and complete penitence. Even if etymology does not contradict this, theology certainly does, since true and full penitence signifies both, and assigns both terms. (Matthew 3:2, 8; Matthew 21:29, 32)

III. The Hebrew term *Thešubach* denotes conversion or turning back, or the *στροφή* (reversion) by which a penitent man, turning from sin, returns to God from whom he had been alienated through sin; that is, he turns away from apparent and mutable good and turns toward true and immutable good.

IV. Therefore, penitence is the turning of man toward God, in which he, being pierced in heart, grieves seriously over sins recognized by the law, and flees to Christ, preached in the Gospel, in true faith, recovering peace and joy of conscience.

V. Some distinguish penitence from renovation, in that the latter follows the former, as justification does; this distinction is subtle. Eckhardus, *Disputationes*, vol. 3, sec. on Keckermann, lib. 3, *Systema Theologiae*, cap. 8. Others, after the shipwreck of souls, define it obscurely, enveloping the matter in metaphor. Cajetan in the *Catechism*, c. 4. Those who call it a sacrament err greatly: for it lacks an external and visible element instituted by God. It cannot be complete without faith, which, however, does not constitute the sacrament. (Augustine, *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, l. 3, c. 14)

VI. There are two parts of penitence: Contrition and Faith. The former approaches the end, namely, sins; the latter approaches the end, namely, God. The former pertains to the law, the latter to the operation of the Gospel, which includes mortification of the flesh and vivification of the spirit (*δωρεάν* – as a gift). Those who only retain contrition, faith, and new obedience hold tolerable opinions. Yet, those who demand contrition, confession, and satisfaction deserve serious censure, since they omit the chief part of penitence, which is faith, and transfer confession and satisfaction, which are applied in the public exercise of penitence according to the ecclesiastical forum, to penitence directed toward God.

VII. Contrition is the compunction of the soul, accompanied by tears, arising from the recollection of sin and fear of judgment. (Isidore, *Etymologiae*, lib. 2, de Summo Bono, c. 12)

VIII. The degrees of contrition are:

1. Recollection of sins in the mind.
2. Consideration of divine offense.

3. Hatred of sins voluntarily acknowledged.
4. Fear of divine vengeance and future judgment in the heart.
5. In conscience, the terror, sting, horror, and pain produced by the law.
The first two degrees are more προκαταρκτικῶς (preliminary) to contrition, while the last three are proper to contrition itself.

IX. Those who demand full and sufficient contrition for justification burden consciences in vain. Justification is obtained not by the law or by our own contrition's efficiency or sufficiency, but by the Gospel, through Christ, who is perfectly contrite for us. (Isaiah 53)

X. Faith, which we have defined as the second part of penitence, is evangelical and rests not merely on God's promise in Christ the Redeemer. It is the firm trust that, through the free propitiation accomplished, a man asserts that it belongs to him and confidently relies on it.

XI. This alone properly distinguishes true and saving penitence from hypocritical and Iscariotian penitence: through it, we receive the remission of sins, apprehend salvation, return to God from whom we had been alienated through sin, and adhere to Him with holy union.

XII. If this is removed, all distrust and doubt will prevail. Therefore, the Fathers of the Council of Trent rightly decreed, defining faith as we have: *If anyone says that justifying faith is not trust in divine mercy, forgiving sins for Christ's sake, let him be anathema.* (Session 6, c. 12)

FINIS

Theological Disputation

On the True Invocation of God

THESIS I

The term “**invocation**” is homonymous, much like the verb *invocare* (to call upon). In its broad sense, it denotes any calling for help; in this sense, even the invocation of human aid by those living on this earth may be lawfully understood as a request for assistance (Luke 5:70). Strictly speaking, however, it denotes a **religious worship owed solely to God**, which is the sense in which we take it here.

II

Yet, even in this strict sense, the term admits a further distinction. Invocation may refer **generally** to the entire worship of God; or more **specifically**, to a religious prayer, whether it be an act of thanksgiving, petition, or celebration (Genesis 4:20; Psalm 14:4). In the first, general sense, it is common to acts of prayer, thanksgiving, vows, and oaths; in the second, most specific sense, it refers to the supplication of divine aid, as presented in the Scriptures (Psalm 116).

III

We do not at all disapprove of the precision of those who, under the title of **Invocation**, include religious prayer and acts of thanksgiving. They comprehend neither more nor less than what is included here. Although, to others, it may appear that the invocation of God and acts of thanksgiving are distinct parts or forms of prayer or supplication.

IV

Furthermore, the term **invocation** carries ambiguity from the Hebrew word *qara*, which, in the commonly used translation without distinction, renders it as *to call upon* (*invocare*). At times it signifies **simply the naming of a thing**, while at other times it signifies **the supplication of divine aid** (Romans 10:13).

V

This latter meaning appears throughout the sacred Scriptures. However, it must be observed especially in passages where Scripture speaks of the **city of God, the people of God, or the temple of God** (2 Samuel 17; Nehemiah 9; Jeremiah 14; 2 Chronicles 8; Deuteronomy 9:18). In these cases, the sense is: the city is called by a certain name, the people are named, the temple is denominated according to God. That is, the city is so called, the people so designated, the temple is esteemed as the temple of God.

VI

This observation removes all difficulty that seems to appear in the words of the patriarch Jacob: *“Let my name be invoked upon these children; and the name of my fathers Abraham and Isaac”* (Genesis 48:16). That is, they should be **cognominated by the name**, being called the sons of Jacob, the grandchildren of Isaac, and the great-grandchildren of Abraham.

VII

For in these words of Jacob there is the same Hebraism as in the previously recited passages, which the Holy Patriarch intended to signify: that he **adopts Joseph’s sons, Ephraim and Manasseh, his grandchildren, into his family**, and includes them in the number of his own sons. That is, they are called not as Joseph’s sons or Jacob’s grandchildren, or as Abraham’s great-grandchildren, but as **Jacob’s sons** (just as if they were his own, and not Joseph’s), and therefore they are counted as **two tribes in the people of God**, receiving a portion of inheritance equal to that of Jacob’s other sons.

VIII

This interpretation of Jacob's words is **made clear not only from the surrounding context of the sacred text, and the purpose and intention of the holy Patriarch, but also from the explicit words of the prophet**, who introduces them as follows: "*We shall eat our bread, and clothe ourselves with our garments*" (Isaiah 48), provided only that the names of the ancestors are invoked.

IX

Yet some widows have wanted these words to mean that they should be invoked **toward their husbands**, or alternatively, some have drawn from this phrase of Jacob an **invocation of the holy Patriarchs**, since in both cases the formula and manner of speech are the same.

X

What precisely those widows intended is made clear from the surrounding context. Namely, the prophet foretells **so great a disaster, and consequently a scarcity and fewness of men**, that there will be **seven men to one woman**—that is, several women (a certain number is put for an uncertain number) will be litigants, and their husbands will be scarce, so that only a few wives are called, and only from them will children be born. For **sterility and perpetual virginity were regarded as reproachful** in the Israelite people.

XI

To this point, regarding the **voice and symbol of the matter**, which leads us into its understanding: the thing itself is explained in part as it pertains to its **foreknowledge**, and in part as it pertains to its **knowledge** (γνώσις) of the same.

XII

Regarding the **foreknowledge** (πρόγνωσις) of the matter that we have at

hand, that is, the invocation of God, this pertains both to its **definition** and to its **distribution**.

XIII

The **invocation of God** is a religious prayer, by which we approach **the one true God alone**, who has revealed Himself through His sent Son, **our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ**, in **spirit and truth**—that is, in the **name of our same Savior**, in the name of necessity. Through this invocation, we ask that **evil be driven away from us**, and that **goods necessary for both soul and body** be granted to us by God.

XIV

The **distribution of the invocation of God** is considered **in parts** and **in species**.

XV

The **parts of invocation** are two: **petition** and **assent**.

XVI

Petition is that by which, according to the will of God, we implore His help for the things necessary for us, which we lack.

XVII

In every expression of petition, two things are to be expressed: our **sense of need**, and our **desire for God's grace** to supply that need.

XVIII

Assent is that by which we believe that God will grant the petitions already made, and we testify this belief before the same God.

XIX

Species of the invocation of God are variously enumerated by theologians.

XX

First, invocation is either: **absolute to the Deity (λατρεία)**, or **proper to the Mediator Christ**. The former is **adoration directed properly to the Deity**; the latter is **adoration given to Christ the Mediator, as God-Man**, both according to His person and His office, such that just as the Lord and our King is entirely so according to each nature, so also He is entirely to us, to be worshiped and adored without any separation or distraction of the natures by thought of the mind.

For just as the recognition of Christ consists in the recognition of His **person and office**, so also in invocation both must be considered. And just as our faith in the recognition of Christ discerns the natures, so also in the adoration of Him.

XXI

Second, invocation is either **for our own cause** or **for the cause of others**.

XXII

When it is **for our own cause**, it is either **δέησις (supplication)** or **προσευχή (prayer)**. This is the invocation we make **for ourselves**, that God may send us no evil, but rather may **ward off all present and future evil from us**, and **turn away both guilt and punishment**.

XXIII

This pertains **partly to laments over the severity of afflictions**, and **partly to sighs**, so that if God imposes upon us the punishments we have deserved for our sins, He may **mitigate them with His most merciful clemency**, lest by them we be overthrown and **precipitated into eternal ruin**.

XXIV

Προσευχή (prayer) is the invocation which we make **for ourselves**, that God may **grant what is necessary for our goods**.

XXV

This is further distinguished. **First**, it may be **determinate**, in which a **certain thing is specifically expressed** and requested from God; **second**, it may be **indeterminate**, in which what is requested is **not expressed through words, but felt in the heart**.

XXVI

Invocation which is made **for the cause of others** is either **for their benefit**, or **against them**. In the first case, it is **intercession**; in the second, it is either a **complaint** or an **imprecation**.

XXVII

Intercession, in Greek *ἐντευξις*, is an invocation which the faithful make **for others**, that God may either **grant some good to them** or **take away some evil from them**.

XXVIII

Benediction, in Greek *εὐλογία*, is an invocation by which we **wish goods from God to others**; it may also be called a **salutary blessing** or **farewell blessing**, in which we ask for **health, peace, prosperity, and all good things from God**, not feigned, but from genuine charity. Examples occur frequently in the Old and New Testaments, especially in the **beginnings and endings of the Apostolic Epistles**.

XIX

Both **benediction and invocation** are applied to **friends and to enemies alike**.

XXX

Furthermore, **benediction** may be **spiritual**, in which **spiritual goods** are sought, or **corporal**, in which **bodily goods** are requested, for the **benefit and advantage of our neighbor** before God.

XXXI

Both forms may be **divine**, inspired by the **Spirit of God**, praying prophetically for things to come, as in the case of the holy patriarchs, who foretold shortly before their deaths; or **human**, deriving from human and civil study, praying that **good things may come to others by God's will**.

They may also be **private**, performed by any faithful individual privately—for example, **parents blessing their children**, especially those about to leave this life; or **public**, performed in a public assembly by ministers of God. An example of this is found in **Moses' formula**:

"The Lord bless you and keep you; the Lord make His face shine upon you and be gracious to you; the Lord lift up His countenance upon you and give you peace" (Numbers 6:24–26).

In pronouncing this formula, Germans often neglect the dignity of their language, using plural forms where singular would be appropriate.

XXXII

Complaint (Querimonia) is the invocation of God by the saints **against enemies**, not only to recount the **multitude, malice, injuries, and cruel insults of the enemies**, but also to **complain about the severity and long duration of afflictions, the weakness of mind and body, or desertion by friends**, etc.

Many such complaints occur in **the Lamentations of Jeremiah** and in the **Psalms of David**.

XXXIII

Imprecation (Imprecatio) is the invocation of the saints **against adversaries to God**, by which they contend that God, as the **most just Judge of the world and avenger of the wicked**, may **destroy and punish all His enemies and the enemies of the Church**, who, with implacable hatred, do not cease to **offend God violently** and to **persecute the faithful in a hostile manner**.

XXXIV

This refers to **malediction or execration**, which holy men, inspired by God, have used effectively. For example:

- The Prophet **Elisha** cursed in the name of the Lord the **youths of Bethel**, who mocked him (2 Kings 2:23–25).
- The Apostle **Peter** declared **Simon Magus anathema**, who sought to purchase the power of conferring the Holy Spirit (Acts 8:20).
Similarly, **execrations** are pronounced against those who do not love the Lord Jesus. For instance: *“If anyone does not love the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema; Maranatha”* (1 Corinthians 16:22).

XXXV

It must necessarily be **warned** that imprecations are **lawful only under certain conditions**:

1. They must be directed **against enemies of God and His word**.
2. They must be done **for the cause of God**, not out of private desire for vengeance.
3. They must be applied **only to people who are wholly incorrigible**.
4. They must be intended **not for the destruction of people per se**, but solely for the **vindication of God’s glory and the liberation of the Church**.

XXXVI

Regarding the **prógnōsis (knowledge beforehand)** of the invocation of **God**, whether as a part or as a species (species, as an inseparable adjunct), it

pertains to the **action of grace toward God**, by which, in response to the **benefits or promises bestowed by God**, we render **due praise**, either **in words or speech**, or **in deeds and works**.

XXXVII

The **parts of the action of thanksgiving toward God** are:

1. **Remembrance of God's works and meditation on them.**
2. **Proper estimation of the same works and celebration of God.**

XXXVIII

Concerning the **definition and distribution of divine invocation**, which we said pertains to its **prógnōsis (foreknowledge or pre-understanding)**: It follows that we now pursue what pertains to the **gnōsis (knowledge or comprehension) of the same invocation**.

XXXIX

The **gnōsis of the invocation of God** has **two aspects**: namely,

1. Its **explanation**, and
2. The **refutation of abuses**.

XL

In the genuine use of invocation, **two things are required**:

1. **First**, a correct constitution of the invocation;
2. **Then**, an appropriate disposition for invoking.

XLI

In the **correct constitution of invocation**, again **two considerations** must be made:

1. **First**, to whom it is directed;
2. **Second**, what should be desired through it.

We have thus established: **invocation is to be referred only to the one true God — the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit** (Deuteronomy 6:13; Matthew 4:10).

XLIII

Thus, both in the **Old Testament** and in the **New Testament**, invocation is sometimes directed to **one Person of the Godhead**, and sometimes to **all Persons collectively**. (Daniel 9:19)

XLIV

When directed **to one**, for example:

- **To the Father**: “Lord, hear; Lord, attend and act without delay, for You, O God, in whose name Your city and Your people are called, are present.” (Psalm 4:5,7)
- **To the Son**: “Your Throne, O God, is forever and eternal; Your scepter is the scepter of Your kingdom.”
- **To the Holy Spirit**: “Ananias, why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?” — not lied to men, but to God.

XLV

The **Hymn of Praise (Sanctus)** is directed to **all three Persons of the Godhead**: “Holy, Holy, Holy is the LORD of Hosts” (Isaiah 6:3). There is no doubt it refers to **God the Father**. The hymn referring to the **Son** is clear from John (chapter 12), and to the **Holy Spirit**, it is manifest in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 28).

XLVI

We have accepted to whom the invocation must be referred; now let us consider **what we should desire through invocation**. The Lord Himself taught us, in the most perfect formula of His prayer, briefly: (Matthew 6:9)

XLVII

In all things, namely, those which **serve the glory of God first, and then our own good**, we can and should desire: whether we **ask for good**, or **pray against evil**.

XLVIII

Those things that **serve our good** are **twofold**:

1. **Spiritual goods**, which primarily concern the soul — such as all the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which not only work for our salvation but also for the benefit of others;
2. **Corporal goods**, which are provided for the use of our life in this world, necessary or convenient, either **private** or **public**. All these are sought **for ourselves and for our neighbor**, according to the rule of charity and Christian communion.

XLIX

From this **constitution of invocation**, the **disposition of the one invoking** is considered **in two ways: internal and external**.

L

The **internal disposition** is the condition of the mind of the one invoking, in relation to God who is invoked. In this, we consider two principal things: **awareness of our need**, and **confidence in obtaining what we ask**.

LI

Regarding **awareness of need**, this is primarily the incentive for invocation. Since we are conscious of our own poverty and nakedness, we implore the help of Almighty God. For God certainly hears the invocation, and in His mercy provides what is beneficial to us. (Ephesians 6:18; Matthew 11:28)

LII

Regarding **confidence in obtaining**, according to Scripture, we desire that which cannot be obtained except through faith. We are therefore fully persuaded that God, our Father, who is inclined toward us in His love, will liberally provide all things necessary for both soul and body, as He has graciously promised. (Psalm 143:8; Mark 18:24)

LIII

Just as there are two kinds of things we seek from God in invocation — namely **spiritual** and **corporeal** — so also our **confidence** varies with respect to them. Spiritual things must be sought with **undoubted confidence**, trusting that we shall obtain them. Corporeal things, however, are sought with **confidence limited by condition**, i.e., we shall obtain them when God knows they are necessary and beneficial for us. For He knows our needs and usefulness best, and often exercises us through adverse events, raising us from the security of the old world.

LIV

The **external disposition of the one invoking** consists chiefly in **suitable words** and **composed gestures**.

LV

Words are signs of the mind. Whether public, used by one or many in the name of others, or private, used alone, whether simple or modified by sacred chant, they assume diverse forms — having **something common to all** and **something singular** for particular use.

LVI

The **common** aspect of words for all invoking is this (Matthew 6:7): they should **not be too long**, because:

1. Multiloquy appears as an empty outpouring of words rather than an expression of anxious mind;
2. Expression is less necessary than the awareness of need before God. God knows our need even **before we invoke Him**; the invocation is not for His instruction, but for our diligence in prayer. (Matthew 17)

LVII

The **singular** aspect of words pertains to those who invoke in public worship or privately among many, using a **common formula** understood by the participants. Even when private, if one invokes God in words that express his thoughts clearly, it is lawful; but it is **absurd** to use public words that the listeners do not understand.

LVIII

Regarding **composed gestures**, we require that they express **reverence before God**, as we are always in His sight. The gestures should make the invoker appear **conscious of the divine presence**.

LIX

Such gestures include: bodily posture, uncovering the head, raising or lowering the hands, lifting or lowering the eyes toward heaven or the earth,

striking the chest, tears, a clear voice, and similar signs — avoiding superstitious or idolatrous gestures, as the priests of Baal used in their sacrifices with swords and spears to shed blood.

LX

Thus far we have seen the **true use of prayer**; now let us consider **abuses**. These vary greatly, affecting both **the correct constitution of invocation** and **the appropriate disposition of the invoker**.

LXI

In the **incorrect constitution of prayer**, the Pontiffs (leaving aside Turkish and similar errors) err in two ways: first, by invoking **the saints besides God**, treating them as intermediaries, and giving cultic honor to the dead rather than worship due to God alone.

LXII

Second, Pontiffs err in **the manner of invoking God**, worshipping Him through images and idols. (1 Kings 18; Bellarmine) For God forbade this in the Decalogue, and no one may substitute an image for God.

LXIII

Pontiffs fail to elaborate properly, offering **imperfect and metaphorical figures**, claiming mystical meanings. It is frivolous to say, as Gregory did, that **images are books for the unlearned**, since Scripture opposes this: “Wood of vanity” (Habakkuk 2:18), instructing against false doctrine and lies.

LXIV

The distinction between **δελεία** (deletion or allure) and **λατρεία** (worship), since used indiscriminately in Scripture, must be rejected here. If we examine the proper meaning, **λατρεία** (worship) denotes service rendered to the rightful master (**λατρεύω τῷ μιστῷ δουλεύων**).

LXV

In the **proper disposition of the invoker**, both Papists and Anabaptists err.

LXVI

Papists murmur their prayers **publicly or privately** in a foreign language unknown to listeners, wasting sound and failing to pour out their anxious need before God. (1 Corinthians 14:16)

LXVII

Anabaptists, by contrast, condemn prayers expressed aloud and clearly, whether in public assembly or private spaces, believing **interior intention alone suffices**. We believe, as in all things, so especially in invocation, God is glorified through **both body and spirit** (1 Corinthians 6:20). May God grant that we glorify Him indefinitely in **body and spirit**, now and in the future age. **AMEN**

