

On the Justification of the Sinful Human Before God, a Disputation Höpfner, Heinrich¹

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WITH GOD! PROEM.

1. Since that intricate controversy—whether one who is justified can be divinely and infallibly certain about his faith and his justification and God's grace toward him—has been brought to an end, an approach should now be made to the antithesis of the seventh proof, consisting in an induction from those who are justified before God by faith alone, as held in Disputation I, chapter 2, member 6.

2. However, because the Papists bring forward counterexamples based on a diversity of justification and a different right of obtaining salvation, a discussion of their doctrine must first be set forth.

3. But so that we may approach this without confusion, we will set forth the Papist aphorisms under two chapters. First, we will examine the dogma concerning first and second justification by means of Holy Scripture as the test of divine truth—carefully weighing and rejecting the reasons they offer. In the second part, we will explain how they attempt to prove that some obtain salvation by one title only—namely, as an inheritance—while others obtain it by a twofold right, that is, as an inheritance and at the same time as a reward properly so called. Above all, however, it is necessary to lay out clearly the state of the controversy.

4. For Bellarmine (Book 4, **On Justification**, Chapter 1, and in his **Judgment on the Book of Concord**, Lie 1), Mayer (in the Preface, 8 Controversies, Part 4, and in Controversy 1, Chapter 4, page 44), Thomas Bozius (**On the Signs of the Church**, Book 8, Chapter 5), and Pazmann (Book 3, **Hodegetica**) do not hesitate to write that our churches teach that someone can be saved even if they perform no good works or are not inherently righteous, but remain in mortal sins—that is, in sins that bring about and reign with spiritual death. For this reason, Lessius (**Consultations**, page 18) calls us "work-killers." But they contradict this most shameless calumny themselves when they say that we teach that good works are necessary as good fruits of faith and that true faith cannot exist without works (Bellarmine, Book 1, **On Justification**, Chapter 3, § "First therefore," and Chapter 10, § "Add"; also Book 4, **On Justification**,

Chapter 7, § 2; Toletus, **Commentary on John**, Chapter 13, Annotation 6; Vega, Book 9, **On Justification**, Chapter 7; Maldonatus on John 3:15).

5. Indeed, we most willingly concede that those justified before God through the imputation of Christ's righteousness are at the same time also righteous by a righteousness inherent in them through grace. But we say that this inherent righteousness belongs to them not insofar as they are justified, but insofar as they are renewed.

6. Therefore, the true state of the controversy is this: Is a reborn person justified before God by the inherent righteousness with which he is endowed—whether habitual or even actual?

We deny it; the Roman Catholics affirm it. But Estius objects that inherent righteousness also avails before God, and he proves this from Luke 1:6, where the Evangelist attributes this commendation to the parents of John the Baptist: that they were both righteous before God.

7. I reply: Many more passages can be cited in which the phrase "before God," "in the sight of God," or "in the presence of God" is used, signifying the approval and acceptance of inherent righteousness—for example: Deuteronomy 6:2; Luke 1:71; Acts 10:4; Acts 23:1; Romans 12:17; 2 Corinthians 8:21; 1 John 3:22.

8. But just as the righteousness by which we are justified differs greatly from the inherent righteousness by which we are renewed, so also the acceptance of inherent righteousness or good works differs greatly from the acceptance of the person when Christ's righteousness is imputed to him through faith.

9. Both indeed belong to God as Judge: He regards with favor the person who does well and approves his conduct and actions. For not only are good works accepted (Romans 12:1; Philippians 4:18; Colossians 3:20; Hebrews 13:16), but persons already justified are said to be accepted on account of those works (Romans 12:18; 1 Corinthians 7:32; Colossians 1:10; 1 Thessalonians 4:7; 2 Timothy 2:4; Hebrews 12:28). Therefore, the distinction between the acceptance of the person and the acceptance of

works must be taken with a grain of salt regarding the person insofar as Christ's righteousness is imputed to him.

10. They differ greatly with respect to different acts and efficient causes. For in the first mode of acceptance, the person is pleasing before God as a Judge strictly judging according to the rigor of the Law, which demands universal and perfectly complete righteousness from the one who must be justified. To this extent, indeed, the rigor of the Law is mitigated by God's clemency and leniency, so that the right to demand from the sinner his own obedience is relaxed, and another's righteousness—namely, Christ's—is admitted. Christ fulfilled the Law for us both by paying the penalties due for transgression of the Law and by rendering perfect holiness, so that the right of the Law might be fulfilled in us (Romans 8:4). Nevertheless, in another respect of dispensation, the rigor and strict right of the Law does not admit the matter but demands from the Mediator universal and exact obedience on behalf of the sinner—obedience which the sinner, taught by the word of the Gospel through faith, apprehends as imputable to himself and sets against the accusation of the Law. He demands that the condemning sentence of the Law be retracted and obtains that Christ's obedience be imputed to him by faith. Hence he is absolved from his guilt and receives the sentence by which the right to salvation is conferred upon him.

But the acceptance of works and of the person working after justification takes place before God as a benevolent Father, passing judgment according to the gentleness of the Gospel, approving and regarding with favor the newness of life in the children of light (Ephesians 5:9) and obedience (1 Peter 1:14).

11. They differ in order: for those performing good works cannot be pleasing before God unless they are first accepted through reconciliation. For only when the person is reconciled does the work and all inherent righteousness please (Ephesians 1:6): "He has graced us"—that is, He has loved us freely—"in the Beloved," in whom we have redemption through His blood according to the riches of His grace.

12. III. They differ in the inequality of their objects: for the imputed righteousness, which is apprehended by faith in the justification of a sinner and accepted, is universal and in every way perfect, so that it satisfies the Law. But the righteousness of works, which is accepted by God in the unregenerate who perform them, is in itself imperfect and cannot withstand the judgment of God, as in Psalm 143:2: "Enter not into judgment with your servant, O Lord (so that you judge him in the court of justification according to inherent righteousness), for no one living is justified before you."

13. Indeed, even the saints appeal to the judgment of God and ask to be judged according to their inherent righteousness. However, that judgment is not one of justification, but of general providence outside the act of justification, which punishes the wicked and rewards the good. And that righteousness, according to which they ask to be judged by God, is either not universal but particular in a certain deed or case—as when David, in the matter of treason of which he was accused by Saul's courtiers, against the slanders of Shimei and also the rebellion of Absalom, repeatedly asserts his righteousness and innocence in Psalm 7:8, 18:24, and others—or it is indeed universal but not perfect, such as the Law demands from one who wishes to be justified by inherent righteousness. The goodness itself of good works is the fruit of the Spirit, and on account of it the works themselves are done from God and in God, John 3:11. Nevertheless, to this goodness evil is also attached, Romans 7:21, which evil is sin, v. 13, and it is εὐπρεπίστατον, that is, what clings tenaciously not to one part but to all powers, Hebrews 12:1. Hence Augustine writes to Caelestius: "The perfection of the Law consists in the first and last commandments; if anything is lacking in either of these, although something may have been performed in other respects, there is not perfect obedience, nor does it deserve the title of righteousness," namely, that which justifies a person before God, as it is said in Exodus 34:7: "With you there is no one innocent." And Paul, citing the righteousness of a good conscience which he has before God, 2 Corinthians 4:2; 5:21; Acts 23:1, nevertheless denies that he is justified by this. But when such righteousness is sometimes called perfect by the Holy Spirit, then this is done comparatively and by comparison with the works of the wicked or even hypocrites, so that this perfection only denotes seriousness and sincerity in

the pursuit of good works, whence it cannot endure God's examination according to the strictest measure of the Law, Psalm 130:3; or imputatively, insofar as this inherent righteousness is compelled to receive from elsewhere and as it were to beg in order to please God and be acceptable, namely on account of Christ apprehended by faith; because without faith it is impossible to please God, Hebrews 11:6.

14. Faith imputed so pleases God that it avails for justification and adoption unto salvation; hence Luther renders the righteousness of God in the act of justification: "The righteousness that avails before God." But inherent righteousness does not avail before God for obtaining this; it only pleases insofar as it partly agrees with the norm of living prescribed by God, namely the Law of God, Deuteronomy 21:25, and as it is the fruit of the Spirit; then also insofar as it is in a believing person previously reconciled and made pleasing to God through justification. Hence Luther translates the righteousness of the regenerate that is before God: "The righteousness that is pleasing to God," Luke 1:75. Therefore it serves for the demonstration of justification and is not infrequently used for the description of the saved subject made a posteriori; because it is an undoubted mark from which a believer can be certain of his faith and of God's grace toward him, 1 John 5:19, and of the hearing of prayers for salvation by one who calls upon him, 1 John 3:22; Acts 10:4.

15. With these premises laid down, the state of the present question can be more narrowly limited against every evasion: Are the regenerate justified before God the judge strictly judging according to the rigor of the Law on account of inherent righteousness, and do they obtain salvation? We defend the negative; our adversaries uphold the affirmative, set forth in the following aphorisms, which we will refute in order, by the grace of the divine Spirit, which we devoutly implore to assist us and supply sufficient strength.

CHAPTER I

PAPAL APHORISM I: Of those who are righteous through inherent righteousness, there are two kinds: some are justified only by the first

justification, but others are justified by both the first and second together.

1. Thus Bellarminus, book 4, chapter 18, § "We say": he distinguishes between the first justification, by which one becomes righteous from being unrighteous, and the second, by which one becomes more righteous from being righteous. The same is defended by Becanus in **Differentia de Justitia Catholica**, chapter 1, thesis 2; Costerus in **Enchiridion**, chapter 8.

2. If no inherent righteousness contributes to the justification of man before God, then neither first nor second justification is granted; because this fictitious distinction of justification is constructed from the diversity of inherent righteousness. But no inherent righteousness contributes to the justification of man before God. Therefore, neither first nor second justification is granted through inherent righteousness.

3. The truth of the minor proposition is established by the following prosyllogisms, the first of which is deduced from the nature of habitual and inherent righteousness. That righteousness which the Law of God condemns in the judgment of God on account of imperfection—as a norm of divine righteousness—does not contribute to the justification of man. But inherent righteousness is condemned by the Law of God, as a norm of divine righteousness, in the strict judgment of God on account of imperfection (2 Cor. 4:4), because such righteousness is not entirely spiritual due to indwelling sin (Rom. 7:21; Isa. 64:6). However, the Law is entirely spiritual (Rom. 11:12) and demands such a dignity of righteousness that it has nothing carnal in any powers of man justified by the law. See Disputations 3 and 4 on Justification. Therefore, inherent righteousness does not contribute to the justification of man.

4. The latter prosyllogism is drawn from opposites: By that righteousness to which all causes of justification are diametrically opposed, no one of the reborn was, is, or will be righteous before the tribunal of God. But inherent righteousness in the reborn is such that all causes of justification before God are diametrically opposed to it, which we demonstrated in Disputation 1,

Chapter 2, Sections 1 and 2. Therefore, by inherent righteousness, no one of the reborn was, is, or will be righteous before the tribunal of God.

5. We add another principal argument taken from the distinct benefits of God: That which is from sanctification or renewal cannot be the proper effect of justification. But inherent righteousness is from sanctification or renewal. Therefore, inherent righteousness cannot be the proper effect of justification. The minor is conceded by all Papists. The major, however, is established from the testimonies of Scripture: 1 Cor. 1:30, "He became for us wisdom from God and righteousness and sanctification and redemption." 1 Cor. 6:11, "And such were some of you (so that some of you were polluted by these, others by those mortal sins. The Syriac: And these were in a man from among you, i.e., in each one of you, who individually were held by some of these vices): But you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified." Rev. 22:11, "Let the one who is righteous still be justified, and let the one who is holy still be sanctified."

6. Bellarmine objects against these statements in various ways. First, regarding the passage 1 Cor. 1:30, he responds in Book 2 on Justification, Chapter 10, Section 4: Christ is our righteousness, that is, the cause of justification in two ways: both with respect to inherent righteousness and with respect to the righteousness of satisfaction, from which comes the remission of sins. First, with respect to inherent righteousness, because He effects it in us, so that through it we are formally justified or absolutely perfect, to whom by the just judgment of God is owed not punishment but glory; and he wishes to prove this by such a means: Christ is said to be our righteousness, just as He is said to be our wisdom and our redemption; which titles of Christ in the same text by Paul are joined to that title by which He is called our righteousness. But Christ is not our wisdom and redemption imputatively. Therefore, neither is He our righteousness imputatively. Second, with respect to the righteousness of satisfaction, which He so gives and communicates to us when He justifies us that the satisfaction of Christ can be called our satisfaction, no differently than if we ourselves had satisfied God. The words of the Jesuit are worthy of note, which you have in Section 4, Chapter 10, Book 2 on Justification. For Bellarmine also...

Although through inherent righteousness we are truly called and are just, yet we do not satisfy God for our faults and eternal punishment through it. Rather, that inherent righteousness, together with the remission of fault and eternal punishment, is the effect of the satisfaction of Christ, which (as the Council of Trent teaches in Session 6, Chapter 7) is conferred and applied to us in justification. And in this way it would not be absurd if someone were to say that the righteousness and merits of Christ are imputed to us when they are given and applied to us, as if we ourselves had satisfied God—provided it is not denied that there is in us besides an inherent righteousness, and that this is a true and absolute righteousness, to which by the just judgment of God punishment is not due, but glory.

And soon after, in §6: Therefore, indeed, God does not reckon our trespasses against us because Christ satisfied for us, and God, appeased by that satisfaction, reconciled us to Himself and made us friends from enemies. Therefore, he concludes that our righteousness, by which we are justified before God, is not that righteousness which is in Christ, imputed to us; but it is inherent in us by the grace of God. However, the righteousness of Christ's satisfaction is at the same time imputed for the remission of sins, of which the imputation of satisfaction is the effect; and thus justification consists of the remission of sins and the infusion of inherent righteousness.

7. I reply: To say that inherent righteousness in this life is absolute and justifies a person before God is blasphemous against God and falsely contradicts the assertion of all the saints seeking pardon from Psalm 32:7, and those who clearly profess that they could not withstand God's judgment if He were to mark iniquities (Psalm 130:1), because no one living is justified in His sight (Psalm 143:2) before the tribunal of the Law (Deuteronomy 27:28; James 2:10). How then could a reward be due to this righteousness by the just judgment of God?

8. Moreover, we concede Bellarmine's reasoning in a certain respect. Christ is our righteousness in the same way that He is our wisdom and sanctification and redemption—but in a general, not a special sense. For the general mode of effecting is common to all these titles and consists in this: that Christ is the meritorious cause of our wisdom, justice, and

sanctification. Yet it does not follow from this that these titles apply in a special manner. For Christ is the cause of our wisdom so that wisdom inheres in us; similarly sanctification—that is, the infusion of holiness—and also redemption—that is, liberation from all inherent sin and universal misery to come in heaven—also require a subject capable of receiving them. The wisdom that Christ works in us is a virtue; sanctification and redemption are receptions of God's action. But our righteousness is Christ in such a way that His righteousness is indeed communicated to us, yet does not inhere in us but is imputed (Romans 4:6; 5:19). And on account of that righteousness of Christ, apprehended by faith, we are reckoned as just and worthy of eternal life.

Therefore, from the very text we argue from dissimilar cases:

By that which Christ was made for us justification, by that He was not made for us righteousness.

But by the giving of inherent righteousness Christ was made our sanctification.

Therefore, by the conferring of inherent righteousness He was not made for us righteousness.

But if by the conferring of inherent righteousness—by which He was made our sanctification—He was not made our righteousness, it follows that Christ is called our righteousness and our sanctification in different special ways.

Alternatively:

Either inherent righteousness is imputed to us by faith in justification, or the righteousness of Christ apprehended by faith is imputed.

But inherent righteousness is not imputed.

Therefore, the righteousness or obedience of Christ rendered to the Law on our behalf, apprehended by faith, is imputed to us.

The minor premise is proved from the nature of inherent righteousness:

Whatever in the divine promises is not offered as an alien merit to be apprehended by faith, nor on account of its imperfection is imputable as perfect righteousness—that also is not imputed by God in justification.

But inherent righteousness is not offered as an alien merit to be apprehended by faith, nor on account of its imperfection is it imputable as perfect righteousness.

Therefore, inherent righteousness is not imputed by God in justification.

Finally, if the righteousness inhering in us from renewal...

Faith, even considered in itself, is imputed for righteousness, because according to the hypothesis of the Pontificians, it is viewed in three ways: either as a work disposing to righteousness, or as a certain habitual part of righteousness, or as an actual work of righteousness. But faith justifies in none of these ways, because we are justified by law apart from works of the law, without the works of the law (Rom. 3:28; Eph. 2:8–10; Titus 3:5), but organically, as by the hand of the beneficiary, insofar as it apprehends and receives the thing offered by the donor. See Disputation 1, Chapter 2, Section 1, Aphorism 8.

Nor does the phrase of the Apostle in Romans 4, often saying that faith is imputed for righteousness, present an obstacle. For there faith signifies not only the instrument of apprehension, nor by metonymy only the thing imputable, but comprehensively and as a complex term it signifies the righteousness of Christ, insofar as it is apprehended by true trust. Therefore Paul says that faith is imputed to the one believing for righteousness, but not to the one working. But if faith were indeed imputed as an infused quality or a work, it would be imputed to a man as working, not as believing. Therefore the righteous requirement of the law is said to be fulfilled not by us, but in us when we are justified (Rom. 8:4).

In the other part of the exception, the Jesuit argues in vain when he concedes indeed that the satisfaction of Christ is imputed to us, but denies that His active obedience, as they call it, apprehended by faith, is our righteousness. For the Apostle by that statement, in which he says Christ has been made

righteousness for us, includes the whole obedience of Christ, namely both the righteousness of satisfaction, as Bellarmine calls it, and His holiness by which He fulfilled the law of God for us. And so the righteousness of Christ is ours, both as meritorious for salvation and as satisfactory for our sins.

This becomes clear if we consider:

I. The essence of imputed righteousness, which is the most perfect fulfillment of the law. But that the law might be fulfilled by Christ in our place and for our good, His whole obedience is required, both active and passive, so that from this the whole obedience which the law demanded from us is constituted. Indeed, the objects of this whole obedience are diverse, yet it does not follow that the essence of obedience, which consists in the fulfillment of the law, is diverse, nor does a double species of obedience arise from this. Otherwise it would follow that the damned in hell obey the law while they pay the due penalties for their sins.

II. The same is evident from the end of obedience, which is not only satisfaction for sin but also merit of life. Otherwise, if it were not so, it would follow that the damned by paying penalty would merit reward. Indeed, there would properly be no satisfaction, even if penalties were paid eternally, unless the person paying the penalty fulfills the law also by performing what the law commands, even if he suffers for another while being innocent himself: because then at last the justice of God is satisfied if someone pays the penalty by its payment and after payment of penalties does not sin, so that the law of God cannot further punish or aggravate penalties already deserved before.

III. Moreover, this is most clearly proven by the mediatorial office of Christ, which is to fulfill the law of God for us, and not only to suffer and die for our sins so that we might not die, but also to do for us those things which the law requires to be done so that we might live. But if He had rendered only passive obedience for us, He would have partly satisfied the law, because that passive obedience would be only partial, since the law not only demands penalties from transgressors but also and indeed primarily commands observance of its precepts. Hence it is that Scripture in the passion of the

Lord sets before us an example (1 Peter 2:21) of various virtues, such as obedience, humility, charity, meekness, etc. In short: The whole righteousness of the law is from Christ, who fulfilled and rendered the law for us. Whence with respect to Christ, the righteousness of the law and of Christ do not differ but are in reality the same (Gal. 4:4; Rom. 10:3), although with respect to us, to whom the righteousness of Christ is imputable and is imputed through faith, it is evangelical and truly differs from legal righteousness (Phil. 3:9).

IV. Another invincible argument is supplied by the apostolic statement concerning the obedience of Christ; that which is its imputation through faith. For whatever Christ rendered according to the law, He rendered for us, not for Himself, so that He might impute all His righteousness to us who believe. But Christ rendered according to the law His whole obedience, both active and passive. Therefore He rendered His whole obedience to the law not for Himself but for us.

14. The major premise is proven by Galatians 4:4, 1 Timothy 1:18, Matthew 20:28, Romans 5:19, 21, and in this very saying in 1 Corinthians 1:30, the Apostle says: Christ has become righteousness for us, and indeed so fulfilled the Law for us that in no way did He fulfill it for Himself, as shown in Matthew 20:28 and Hebrews 10:5–6. This is first proven from the testimonies of Scripture.

15. There follow the strongest reasons by which this is established:

I. From firm reasons:

1. The Law obliges neither in regard to punishment nor obedience one who is not bound by it for himself; therefore, such a one is not subject to the Law for himself. But the Law obliges Christ neither in regard to punishment nor obedience. Therefore, Christ is not subject to the Law for Himself. The minor premise is proven because no law is imposed upon an infinite person. But Christ is an infinite person. For Christ is not a person having a human hypostasis, but a divine one, into which His human nature was assumed. Therefore, no law is imposed upon Christ.

2. The Lord of the Law is not, for Himself, a servant of the Law, or subject to the Law. But Christ is the Lord of the Law, Matthew 12:8. Therefore, He is not subject to the Law for Himself.

3. Because He denies that He is obligated by the fourth commandment and bound to give tribute to Caesar, Matthew 17, on the grounds that He is the Son of the heavenly King, while Caesar is a minister; and a king's minister does not usually exact tribute from the sons of kings, because they are free, vv. 25–26.

4. If He were subject to the Law for Himself, He would have sinned in Adam and violated the Law given to Adam. For all to whom the Law was given in Adam sinned when Adam violated it. But the consequent is false. For He is holy and just, Acts 3:14; indeed, holy, Luke 1:35; and separated from sinners, Hebrews 7:26. Although Christ was in the loins of Adam, since He was the fruit of David's loins according to the flesh, Acts 2:30, yet not as a mere man, but as one who, when He existed, was to have His subsistence in the infinite person of the Son of God. Therefore, the antecedent is also false.

16. We conclude, therefore, that the Apostle speaks of Christ's righteousness or obedience, both active and passive, which is imputable to us for righteousness and is imputed through faith in the very act.

17. Moreover, against Bellarmine—who concedes that indeed Christ's satisfaction is imputed to us, but not the righteousness of Christ's holiness—we also press this point: from David's Psalm 32, Paul proclaims blessed the one whose sins are forgiven. No one is blessed unless God imputes righteousness apart from works, Romans 4:6. But everyone whose sins are forgiven is righteous by imputed righteousness apart from works, Romans 4:7–8. Therefore, everyone whose sins are forgiven is blessed.

18. From this we further argue thus: If the one whose sins are forgiven is blessed on account of Christ, it follows that the cause of the forgiveness of sins is not only Christ's passion and death but also the imputation of His active obedience; because Christ's passion frees from the guilt of death not only as paying penalties but also as being holy and innocent, meriting life for us—which the Law promises only with the clause: "Do this." But everyone whose sins are forgiven is blessed. Therefore, the cause of the forgiveness of sins is not only Christ's passion and death but also His holiness, and thus the imputation through faith of Christ's entire obedience rendered to God's Law on our behalf.

19. Therefore, we who are justified by faith are said not to make void the Law but to establish it, Romans 3:31—that is, to fulfill it through faith in the act of justification abstracted from works or inherent righteousness. But if we are justified by faith alone, excluding works and inherent righteousness, and yet for justification and blessedness there is required not only satisfaction for sin through suffering but also righteousness and merit of blessedness, then certainly we are justified and saved through the righteousness of Christ imputed by faith. Thus the conclusion stands: Justification before God does not signify simultaneously the remission of sins and the infusion of habitual righteousness, but only the former; and indeed—

But it is closely connected with the imputation of righteousness. And so far for the exception against the first statement.

20. Next follows Bellarmine's second exception, taken from 1 Corinthians 6:11, drawn from the order of benefits: because Paul, by the very fact that he places justification after the washing and sanctification of the Corinthians, intends to teach that justification is a certain whole, consisting of washing and sanctification, or of its parts.

21. And although the explanations of this saying are diverse, yet they all agree in this truth: that justification is a benefit distinct from sanctification and differing from it in its whole essence.

22. Chrysostom and Oecumenius hold that there is a gradation in the enumeration of these benefits. For thus stands the commentary of Oecumenius: “These things that have been said are of grace: but Christ made them clean—and not only this, but also sanctified them—and not only this, but also justified them.”

23. Chrysostom, in the same sense, in his 16th Homily on the Epistle to the Corinthians, paraphrases the Apostle’s words according to the version of Gratian Hervetus Aurelius: “Consider from how many evils the Lord has delivered you, how great an experience and demonstration of His philanthropy, kindness, and mercy He has shown you; and He did not reward you only with deliverance from evils, but He carried forward His beneficence far more. For He made you clean. But is this only? Not at all; but He also sanctified you—but not even this only; indeed He also justified you. Now to be freed from sins is a great gift; but now He has also filled you with innumerable gifts.”

24. Without doubt, according to these Fathers, the Apostle celebrates both the privative (as they call them) and the positive benefits of God; as if he were saying: “He did not consider it enough to free you from sin with respect to its slavery and guilt; but He also worked holiness in you—indeed, and by the imputed perfect obedience of Christ, He reckoned you righteous before His tribunal and received you into grace.”

25. There are also interpreters who take “washing” to refer to the general benefit of God, which is opposed to sin and guilt and dominion; and they teach that Paul divides this into two special benefits: sanctification and justification. As if to say: “Before, you Corinthians were defiled with various filths of vices to which you were given over—fornication, greed, injustice, drunkenness, etc.; but now, renewed by the power of the Holy Spirit, you strive for holiness. Before, you were liable to divine wrath and eternal damnation; now you have been freed from just guilt, are in God’s grace, and have obtained the right of sons of God.” This sense is shown by the antithesis. For he considered fornication, greed, rapacity, idolatry, and other vices which he implies, as being opposed to holiness and as the old leaven, the leaven of malice and wickedness (1 Corinthians 5:8); then

insofar as they are causes of disinheritance from the kingdom of Christ (chapter 6:9). Therefore, having been cleansed from this contamination of vices, he then attributes both sanctification and justification.

26. Not far from this exposition is a third, which understands “washing” as referring to the instrument of washing—namely, Baptism. “You were washed,” that is, “you were baptized with the washing of water by the word” (Ephesians 5), “the washing of regeneration and renewal” (Titus 3:5). But it takes “sanctification” and “justification” as referring to the effects of Baptism.

27. And Benedictus Justinianus, as well as Cornelius à Lapide in their commentaries, refer these words to this Sacrament: “In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God.” For Baptism is administered in the name—that is, by the authority and command, merit and efficacy—of Christ; and the Holy Spirit is poured out upon those who are baptized (Titus 3:5).

28. But if we hold to the former interpretations, nevertheless these words rightly cohere with what precedes and show: first, the meritorious cause of these benefits. For the name of Jesus Christ is His merit, by which He acquired for us both sanctification and justification. But if the name of Christ is everything...

Wherever Christ may be named and celebrated, and for whatever reason He may be invoked, certainly both His merit and His name are present, Acts 10:43.

2. The applicatory cause: For the Spirit of our God, through the Word and Sacraments, offers Christ—both insofar as He works faith and new obedience in us by His merit and because of it, and insofar as His righteousness, apprehended by faith, can be imputed to believers for righteousness.

Argument 29.

Therefore, Bellarmine’s argument drawn from the order in which these benefits are named is very weak. For justification is placed last, not because

it is some whole consisting of washing and sanctification, but because justification is, according to the first interpretation, the chief benefit, so that in the listing of these things Paul ascends as if by steps from the lower to the highest. This gradation, which some call an increase, is also affirmed by Estius on this passage: “For liberation from misery is not as great a benefit as the bestowal of a blessed state; and the renewal of inherent righteousness—imperfect as it is in this life—is a lesser benefit than the imputation of Christ’s most perfect righteousness and the reception of the believer into grace for the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom.”

30. But if anyone follows the second or third interpretation, a reply is readily available: one may say that Paul, in naming these benefits, follows not the order of nature but of teaching; not the order of being, but of knowing. The different order in recounting these benefits has a different rationale.

31. For in the order of nature, justification precedes sanctification—a point most clearly taught by the way Paul treats the doctrine of justification and sanctification in Romans and Galatians. For he deals separately and first with justification (Romans 3–5; Galatians 1–4), and later with sanctification (Romans 6–7; Galatians 5–6). For no one can be endowed with true inherent holiness unless first reconciled to God and righteous before God through the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. And in this respect Paul in 1 Corinthians 6:11 places justification (Romans 3–4) before sanctification (Romans 6–7) in naming these benefits.

32. But when Paul mentions sanctification before justification, he follows the order of knowing, because newness of life, though posterior by nature to justification, is nevertheless better known and prior to us in our confused manner of knowing, since through this benefit, as a sign, the other becomes known as the thing signified. And let this suffice as a rebuttal to the second assertion.

33. Next comes an objection against the third statement: Revelation 22:11—“He who is righteous, let him be righteous still; he who is holy, let him be holy still.” Papist commentators such as Cornelius à Lapide, Ribera, and Essius in his annotations on key Scripture passages (on Revelation 22), as

well as Bellarmine in his work **On Justification** (Book 4, Chapter 10, penultimate section), say this refers to an increase in inherent righteousness and press the antithesis: “He who does wrong, let him do wrong still; he who is filthy, let him be filthy still.” From this Bellarmine infers: “Certainly those who become more filthy do so through evil works and new sins; therefore those who are more justified are justified through good works and new obedience.”

34. Reply: Even if in this passage the term “justification” were to be taken as referring to the perfection of inherent righteousness—set in contrast to the tyranny and injustice of Antichrist and the enemies of the Church, and distinguished from the filth of Epicureanism—still it could not be demonstrated from this that the justification of a sinner before God’s decisive judgment occurs through infused renewal. For Paul teaches far differently about that when he deals expressly with justification. Augustine indeed suggests this antithesis between injustice (as it harms others) and righteousness in his **Letter 137** to the people of Hippo, where he explains righteousness as an increase in inherent righteousness and so cites this text: “Let the righteous become more righteous; and let the filthy be filthy still.”

Likewise, Luther also responds: “Whoever is pious, let him always be pious.” This explanation is supported by the example of the King, which for the word δικαιοσύνη has δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω, “let him do justice.” However, if the common reading is preserved, the text does not compel that this saying must be explained only in terms of inherent righteousness. For the meaning is entirely consistent if these words are understood concerning perseverance: “He who does harm,” or as in the Greek, “acts unjustly, let him do harm,” or “let him proceed to act unjustly,” or “let him continue in the guilt of injustice.”

Although the continuation of sanctification is followed by an increase of it, it cannot immediately be inferred that this is connoted by the term ἔτι if the discussion is about justification before God. For the nature of justification before God is opposed to this, since it consists in the total remission of all sins and the entire obedience of Christ, apprehended by faith through an instantaneous imputation. Indeed, remission can be renewed daily because of

the Lord's new mercies every morning (Lamentations 3:23), but it cannot be increased or made greater.

Therefore, this little word will hold the meaning common to both benefits and will have the same force as ὡροφώτιζον, "further" or "more," as it is used in chapter 13:12, chapter 10:6, and in this very chapter 22:3. Nor does the scope of Revelation contradict this, which addresses a tacit objection against the publication of this prophecy: "You see that the prophecy ought not to be sealed but made known to all." But many will abuse this knowledge? The angel first responds with a concessive threat: "Let it be that many will abuse this prophecy for perseverance in the guilt of injustice and the continuation of carnal lust; nevertheless, they will do so to their own great harm." Then he teaches that some will nevertheless put it to good use, whom he stirs with a grave admonition: "He who is righteous, let him be righteous still; he who is holy, let him be holy still."

Thus, the antithesis is to be considered differently: namely, with respect to the diverse effects of righteousness and justice, of which the one is guilt and the other is blessedness. So that the justified—that is, those continuing their justification through persevering faith—are set in opposition as blessed to those persevering in the guilt of injustice. Then also in a signifying respect, insofar as the perseverance of justification and faith is declared through the perseverance of sanctification (which the other member addresses), just as perseverance in guilt is shown through perseverance in iniquity.

38. For they preserve justification not through the continuation of sanctification but by faith, by which they live (Romans 1:17), being kept by the power of God for salvation, as Peter says (1 Peter 1:5), lest they fall against conscience and fall away from the grace of justification. And so they continue justification and show faith and justification through good works, just as evil works demonstrate unbelief and guilt.

39. And with the words of Revelation understood in this sense, the prophecy of Daniel 12:10 agrees when it says concerning the last times: "They shall be purified" (certainly they will recognize and trust that they are cleansed from the guilt of sin), "and made white" (or shall whiten themselves, having

apprehended the purity of Christ, whiter than snow; they will recognize themselves as righteous before God), "and tried" (as gold through fire, that they may be truly faithful. Luther: "And they shall be proved."). And the wicked shall do wickedly. Luther elegantly: "And the godless shall lead a godless life." And in the marginal gloss: "The godless proceed and remain as they are and care nothing for it; but let no one be offended by this."

40. Moreover, from the coherence of the following words, the interpretation flows very well. For then both the threat and the promise placed in verse 11 are confirmed by the Lord from the righteousness of His judgment now at hand. Verse 12: "Behold, I come quickly, and my reward is with me, to give every man according as his work shall be" (both to the unjust and filthy, as well as to the just and to him who continues and shows his justification, and to the holy and further devoted to holiness). To this also pertains that in verse 14 He calls blessed those who keep the commandments through the continuation of sanctification and says that they will have right to the tree of life, with respect to the enjoyment of life to be received from Christ, that tree of life, and shall enter in through the gates into the city—that is, they shall be inhabitants of the heavenly mansions. But right and likewise possession of heavenly life is obtained through justification. Finally, to these blessed ones in verse 15 He opposes all wrongdoers and other impious persons (Revelation 21:8), as being harmful and defiled, and says that they are without—that is, damned (Revelation 21:27). But condemnation is opposed not to sanctification but to justification.

PAPAL APHORISM II: By the first justification those are justified to whom grace is infused—that is, habitual righteousness or charity.

1. Among the Pontiffs themselves, there is no certain doctrine of faith, as the Conclusion of Medina in the first part of the second part, question 110, article 2, holds, that grace is an infused habit inhering in the soul. The same article 4 writes: Certainly, according to the opinion of all theologians, God can most rightly justify a man without infused habits.

2. But whatever there is of novelty or inherent sanctity, which God works in the reborn, whether a disposition or a habit: we, taught by the magisterium

of the Holy Spirit from the sacred scriptures, consistently assert that this does not enter into the act of justification before God, for the very strong reasons adduced a little before, and especially because Scripture distinguishes sanctification from justification as a distinct benefit. Therefore, justification cannot be a certain whole consisting of the remission of sins and sanctification with some comparisons, as Bellarmine contends throughout book 2 on Justification; but he abuses the testimonies of Scripture against the truth.

3. For the passage Romans 3:24, "We are justified by grace," etc., does not deal with grace as an inherent gift, but with the principal cause of justification, which is the mercy of God. The term "grace of God" (χάρις Θεοῦ) must always be understood in this sense whenever Scripture speaks about the justification of man before God.

4. Nor is it the case, as the Jesuit objects, that mercy is signified by adding the word "freely" (δωρεάν). Response: For "grace" signifies the cause of the benefit; but the adverb "freely" denotes the manner in which we obtain the benefit. Just as in Romans 5:15, the imputed righteousness itself is called "a gift in grace" (δῶρημα ἐν χάριτι), that is, a gift through grace; likewise "the gift of righteousness" (δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης). To this, as to grace itself, is attributed "abundance" (περισσεΐαν) in verse 17, opposed to the multitude, that is, to all offenses. In this way, abundant righteousness cannot be infused charity. Therefore, what is in God, imputing to us the righteousness of Christ, is not a gift inhering in us. But the grace of which the Apostle speaks is in God, imputing to us the righteousness of Christ. Therefore, grace in this place is not a gift inhering in us.

5. Then Bellarmine objects concerning the preposition "PER," which is not suited to the mercy of God. Response: But in Greek it is "by the grace" (τῇ χάριτι) of God, not "through grace," although the sense coincides if the particle "PER" is rightly understood of the efficient cause, as it is usually expressed concerning the mercy of God, Luke 1:78: "through the tender mercy." And likewise in Romans 4, the preposition "EX" is used in the same sense, where a reward from imputed grace is distinguished from a reward from debt, verses 3 and 4.

6. Finally, Bellarmine objects in vain that this grace is given in Ephesians 4:7, received and made in John 1:17. For mercy is also said to be given in 2 Timothy 1:16, and the active love of God is said to be received in 1 John 3:1, and made in Luke 1:72: "to show mercy to our fathers."

7. The examples adduced are not of one kind. For John 1:17 responds concerning grace and truth, that is, true grace, which was formerly prefigured in types and examples; the word ἐγένετο is used not in that signification in which the verb "to become" denotes a change with previous dispositions for the reception of a new form, but it denotes existence: so that the sense is: Grace and truth came into existence through Jesus Christ. In this sense the word ἐγένετο is rendered by the verb "וַיֵּהי." But in Ephesians 4:7, the Greek text indeed has the word χάρις, but takes it metonymically for a gratuitous gift, as the Apostle immediately explains when he says that this grace is given according to the measure of the gift; and it does not signify righteousness freely imputed, which is given in justification, but inherent gifts of sanctifying grace. The inequality and diversity of grace, which is seen in the mystical body of Christ or the Church (Romans 12; 1 Corinthians 12), proves this; but the gift of justifying grace is equally common to all.

8. Finally, he wrongly urges as a parallel the saying in Romans 5:5 about the love of God poured out in our hearts. For with these words the Apostle proclaims God's love toward us, or the primary foundation of Christian hope on the cross. But even if Paul speaks about our love toward God, yet he does not hold it as the formal cause of justification, but as a sign of it, insofar as namely the sense and experience of internal love in our heart assures us of our justification a posteriori. See Disputation 4, Aphorism 4, scholium.

Romans 5:17–19.

9. The Jesuit cites another passage in support of this false doctrine, from the same chapter, verses 17–19. From this passage, he deduces a threefold means of proving justification through habitual righteousness.

First, from the word καθίσταμαι (kathistamai) in verse 19, where Paul says: "Many shall be constituted," that is, "shall be made righteous through the obedience of Christ."

Second, from the terms used for righteousness:

- It is called a “gift by the grace of one man” in verse 15,
- and χάρισμα (charisma), that is, a free gift, in verse 16,
- “the gift of righteousness” in verse 17,
- and δικαίωμα (dikaiōma), meaning a justifying act or passion.

Thus, even habitual newness is called a free gift and a righteousness which is given by renewing grace.

Third, from the comparison between Adam and Christ:

Just as many were constituted sinners through Adam’s disobedience with respect to habitual unrighteousness, so many are constituted righteous through Christ’s obedience as the meritorious cause, with respect to habitual righteousness.

But the first is true because the first sin of Adam was followed by habitual aversion from God.

From this he infers: Therefore, we are justified before God also by habitual righteousness.

10. Reply to the first means by refutation:

To be “constituted righteous” in this passage does not mean to be made righteous by a change from inherent unrighteousness to inherent righteousness, but is a forensic expression, taken from the situation of accused persons who are set before a judge, acquitted, and pronounced innocent and righteous.

This is shown:

- By the accumulation of other judicial terms used in this comparison, such as “guilt” (reatus),
- likewise δικαίωμα (dikaiōma), meaning the merit of reward due for obedience according to the law,

- and its opposite κατάκριμα (katakrima), that is, the merit of condemnation.

In the same place, δικαίωσις καὶ κατάκριμα (dikaiōsis kai katakrima), justification and actual condemnation;

- and by the harmony of the text: because that very righteousness by which believers are constituted righteous before God is contrasted with offense and sin insofar as it is imputed (v. 13), and with disobedience by reason of guilt and insofar as it deserves punishment, which is death (v. 17), contrasted with reward on account of imputed righteousness.

But all these pertain to a judicial process.

Moreover, we are constituted righteous by no other righteousness than that which is said to come from the abundance of grace (which imputes) and to be the overflowing gift of righteousness.

Hence, “to be constituted righteous” here means those who are reckoned righteous by God’s judgment and worthy of the rewards of righteousness on account of Christ.

11. Therefore, the adversary’s objections to this explanation are entirely deserving of rejection.

Namely:

I. That the text speaks of those who are constitutively made righteous not by God but through the obedience of Christ alone;

II. That it is no different from how many were made sinners through Adam’s disobedience and constitutively unrighteous;

III. Moreover, that the Apostle uses the future tense to indicate that it concerns such righteousness by which we shall also be constituted righteous in the next life.

12. But the first objection confuses the argument by opposition, because it contrasts subordinate causes of salvation which nevertheless concur in the act of justification.

For by the obedience of Christ, God the judge is moved to will to justify us, and when He justifies, He imputes that very obedience to us as righteousness.

Just as conversely, Adam's disobedience is meritorious of condemnation, and the same is imputed for condemnation.

Whenever righteousness is contrasted with condemnation, as in verse 18, it is understood in no other way than as absolution from sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

13. The second objection is also unsound.

For the Apostle is not speaking of the righteous as they will be in eternal life through the absolute perfection of inherent righteousness; because justification is an act of this life, in which believers believe and by faith receive the righteousness of Christ which is imputed to them by grace.

The Apostle speaks in the future tense because of the reference to the past imputation of Adamic sin, insofar as all were in Adam's loins when he sinned.

To this imputation of Adamic transgression, which makes all men guilty as soon as they are born, is opposed the imputation of Christ's righteousness, which follows afterward when they become children of God from being children of wrath (Ephesians 2:1).

So also in verse 17 he uses the future tense: "much more those who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness will reign in life through one Christ Jesus."

For this acceptance of Christ's righteousness, like the acceptance of forgiveness of sins, takes place through faith in this world; and "life" here is not considered as the end but as the effect of grace, and "reward" signifies the enjoyment of grace by which believers are received as children of God on account of Christ, as having a right to eternal life; but eternal life itself, the possession, is the end of this reign.

For he speaks of the kingdom of grace, which will cease at the end of this world.

14. Now, suppose the Apostle speaks in the future tense for this reason: either to indicate another response—that we will be constituted righteous by inherent righteousness—or to simultaneously embrace the benefit of both justification and sanctification. Yet from this the Adversary gains nothing. For if he prefers the former, he can deduce nothing else than that we will obtain through Christ in eternal life the absolute perfection of inherent righteousness and newness (1 John 3:2), which we do not oppose—provided that the one who is constituted righteous is understood then not as one justified before God, but as one who is inherently righteous; and provided it is further granted that we now have only the firstfruits of that inherent righteousness and do not attain perfection in this life. Hence it follows that newness or inherent righteousness is not that by which the law of God is satisfied and we are able to stand before the judgment seat of God.

But if he takes the latter position and says that in Christ we are made righteous not only imputatively but also inherently—just as in Adam we were made sinners both in respect to the imputation of guilt and inherent depravity—then the inference against the Papists is ready at hand: Therefore, those who are constituted righteous are nevertheless righteous in one respect by imputed righteousness, and to be constituted righteous will not be the same as to be justified, but partly to be justified perfectly at present, and partly to be renewed or sanctified now indeed in this world inchoately, but finally in eternal life perfectly.

15. The second means of reasoning is similarly slippery and weak: Not every **charisma** (gift), and what God graciously gives, is immediately a gift of renewing grace; but in general it signifies everything that is given to us without any price interposed by us (Romans 8:32). Hence also the remission of sins is said to be given to us as **charis** (grace) and **dōrea** (free gift) (Luke 7:42; Ephesians 4:32; Colossians 2:13). And for this reason also the righteousness of Christ, when it is imputed through faith to believers for righteousness, is a **charisma**.

To this **charisma** and gift of righteousness are attributed **charis** and **dōrea**—abundance and perfection. But inherent righteousness in this life is not perfect (1 Corinthians 13:9). The same **charis** and **dōrea**—the free gift of righteousness—is set in opposition to many things, that is, to all sins that make men guilty (v. 17). But the gifts of inherent righteousness are not opposed to all sins as incurring guilt (James 2:10). Therefore, the gift of inherent righteousness is not the gift of righteousness of which the Apostle speaks.

16. Nor indeed can it be shown without blasphemy that such righteousness is putative and fictitious, or as Cornelius à Lapide calls it on Ephesians 4, "masked."

17. For either the righteousness that is imputed to us, or the imputation itself, will be fictitious. But not the righteousness that is imputed to us, because that was most truly rendered by Christ for us to the divine law—which demanded both penalties for sins and also the most perfect holiness of life. The righteousness of Christ is truly satisfactory and meritorious (Romans 5:6; Isaiah 53:6; John 1:29; Titus 2:14). It is also truly imputable to us because He fulfilled the law not for Himself but for us (Galatians 4:5). Thus He is said to have been made by God righteousness for us (1 Corinthians 1:30), so that we might become the righteousness of God in Him (2 Corinthians 5:21). And Paul in Philippians 3:9 desires to be found in Christ, not having a righteousness of his own.

If a part of Christ's righteousness is truly imputable, then His whole righteousness is also truly imputable to us. But a part of Christ's righteousness—namely, His passive obedience—is truly imputable to us, as we have Bellarmine himself as an agreeing authority (Book 1, Section 6). Therefore His whole righteousness, and thus also His active obedience, is imputable to us.

18. Nor is the righteousness a mere fiction and imaginary construct, into which the obedience of Christ is imputed, and which we obtain by faith in justification as our own—not as if it were performed by ourselves. For the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for righteousness, not as though the

righteousness as it exists in Christ Himself were not most perfect, but so that, when apprehended by faith, it becomes ours through God's gracious reckoning.

Moreover, this is a true righteousness:

I. Because of its true necessity: For it is impossible that we should receive the reward of righteousness and live unless we are perfectly righteous; because the law, which requires perfect righteousness, cannot be relaxed or abolished—indeed, it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for one dot of the Law to perish (Matt. 5:17–19). Therefore, without a righteousness perfectly fulfilling the Law, God wills to regard no one as righteous in His sight, as He sits in the tribunal of justification (Ps. 143:2). But because the fulfillment of the law was impossible for us, there was a transfer of the law (Heb. 7:12) to the Son of God, that He might satisfy it.

II. This righteousness is true because it conforms to the law of God both in satisfaction for sins and in merit of life. Hence Paul says that by faith—considered relatively, without works, insofar as it apprehends the perfect righteousness of Christ—we do not abolish the law but uphold it (Rom. 3:31); and that the righteous requirement of the law, which demands perfect obedience, is fulfilled not by us but in us (Rom. 8:4).

III. Its end is true, namely, our boasting in this righteousness (Rom. 3:27; 5:2; 1 Cor. 1:31).

IV. The effect of this righteousness is true, namely: praise of God arising from it (Eph. 1:6; Rom. 3:4); our impunity and blessedness (Rom. 5:1; 6:22); also joy and peace (Rom. 5:1; Gal. 5:22; 1 Pet. 1:8); certainty of God's grace and salvation (Rom. 4:16; Gal. 2:20).

19. Bellarmine, in Book 2 on Justification, chapter 7, along with other Papist teachers, attacks this imputed righteousness from various angles; but among all their arguments, the following is prominent:

“Christ restored to us what we lost in Adam. We did not lose imputed righteousness in Adam, but inherent righteousness. Therefore, Christ

restored to us not imputed righteousness but inherent righteousness; and consequently we are justified by inherent righteousness, not imputed.”

20. Response: Christ not only restored the goods lost in Adam but also drove away the evils contracted in Adam, and for our liberation from those evils He bestows goods which Adam did not need: Christ’s surety-ship, satisfaction for us sinners, our redemption and reconciliation with God (Rom. 5:10; Gal. 4:5); remission of sins, repentance, faith in the Mediator (Col. 1:12; Acts 5:31; 1 Tim. 1:14). And because two evils were introduced through Adam—guilt and inherent corruption—He frees us from guilt by remission of sins and imputation of Christ’s righteousness; but inherent depravity He removes through sanctification—inchoately in this life as regards its dominion and our consent, and in the next life He will finally abolish it entirely even as to its sense, through glorification.

2. The restoration of goods also admits limitation. For the restoration of inherent righteousness, which occurs through Christ in this life, is joined with conflict between flesh and Spirit—which even the Papists cannot deny—although they falsely deny that concupiscence (while the Spirit resists) is sin, so that they may assert their doctrine of the absolute perfection of habitual righteousness. Adam in the state of innocence was able not to die a temporal death, but in this life we are not freed from the necessity of dying a temporal death. Adam was whole in the earthly paradise and had dominion over all animals; he labored without weariness—all of which are not restored to us with specific identity.

21. Therefore, that restoration must not be understood universally as involving specific identity of those goods, but only of some—some being restored by way of equivalent compensation or even by way of eminence; others as to right and inception in this life, and in the next life as to actuality and completion.

Thus, the major premise of the syllogism is false if understood without exception; because in Christ we receive not only the goods which Adam lost through sin, but also freedom from the evils into which he fell by his lapse—together with the bestowal of goods pertaining to that freedom, which is

imputed righteousness. This is necessary because no finite righteousness suffices to expiate and remove the injury to an infinite object, which is sin.

22. Finally, the imputation itself is not imaginary:

I. Because it has a most firm foundation, both in the intellect of God—which is infallible truth—since on account of Christ’s righteousness, apprehended by faith, He regards the believer as righteous, just as if he himself had fulfilled the law, according to the saying of Paul in 1 Corinthians 4:4: “I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby justified, for it is the Lord who judges me”; and in His will, whose affection and act is grace, according to which this imputation takes place, Romans 4:4–5.

II. The object or matter of imputation is not fictitious, as we said before. For God wills to justify no one unless he has fulfilled the Law by his own obedience or by another’s—which, however, was performed by the satisfier.

III. Moreover, the reward arising from this imputation is true, Romans 4:4.

IV. The same truth of this imputation is taught by the imputation of our sins laid upon Christ, by which He was reckoned among the wicked, Mark 15:28; made sin, 2 Corinthians 5:21; and a curse for us, Galatians 3:13. And yet this imputation of our sins was of such efficacy that He had to endure even the most bitter torments and the horrors of death.

23. There remains the third means of proving righteousness, which is taken from the apostolic comparison of Adam and Christ—indicated both by the particular likeness expressed by “just as” in verses 18–19, and also by that appellation in which Adam is said to have been a type of Christ.

24. Now, there is a threefold comparison between Adam and Christ:

The first, with respect to opposite efficiency: he was the author of sin (v. 12) by his fall (vv. 15–18), transgression (v. 14), and disobedience (v. 19); but Christ is the author of righteousness by His obedience acquired for us.

II. 25. The second, with respect to a common effect—that is, a twofold one:

First indeed is the merit of punishment and reward. For judgment (that is, guilt, Jeremiah 26:16; since according to the law of God sin is imputed, v. 13; Luther: *das Urtheil*) indeed (as the Syriac supplies the ellipsis, or “comes”) from one (that is, from one’s fall and transgression) εἰς κατάκριμα—to the right and merit of condemnation. For the antithesis in this verse teaches that this word should be understood thus; but χάρισμα—that is, what God freely gives (is, or comes) to them—δικαίωμα, to the merit of justification, or has this end: that believers may thereby be rewarded (v. 16).

The other kind of effects is death and life: v. 14, “Death reigned (that is, prevailed, so that no one could free himself from it by his own strength) from Adam”; and v. 17, “Just as through one offense death reigned through one, much more those who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness will reign in life through one, Jesus Christ”; v. 21, “So that just as sin reigned in death, so also grace might reign through righteousness to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.”

III. 26. The third, with respect to the mode of communicating sin, merit, punishment and death itself—and likewise righteousness, merit, reward and life itself. That mode is the imputation of Adam’s sin and of Christ’s righteousness. For indeed, just as through one offense (guilt came) upon all men πρὸς κατάκριμα—to condemnation; so through one δικαίωμα—a righteous satisfaction rendered to the law of God—the grace of God, that δικαίωμα of the one imputing abounded (v. 18) upon all men, so that they might receive this gift of righteousness (v. 17) for justification of life. The Syriac paraphrast, omitting the supplement of the ellipsis, translates thus: “Just as through transgression (there was) condemnation for all the sons of men; so through the righteousness of one there will be justification to life for all the sons of men.”

27. Bellarmine objects that we cannot be formally justified by the righteousness of Christ because it cannot inhere in us (*De Justificatione*, bk. 2, ch. 2). But by sin, as inherent, we are formally unrighteous.

Reply: We indeed concede that original sin can be considered not only in terms of guilt and as deserving punishment, but also as an inherent depravity

and corruption in each one of us who sinned in the loins of Adam against the law of God. But it does not follow from this that the righteousness by which we are justified and are righteous before God—insofar as it is imputed to us—must also inhere in us.

28. Therefore, some theologians deny that the comparison between Adam and Christ should be extended to the mode of communication. And so also Cornelius Musius, Bishop of Bitonto, on Romans chapter 5: “The likeness,” he says, “is with respect to the thing, not with respect to the mode of the thing.”

29. But if we consider the Pauline scope more attentively, it appears that this harmony of opposites must also be understood in terms of a certain mode of communication. For the Apostle is not yet dealing with sanctification, which involves considering sin insofar as it inherently and intrinsically makes us unjust, but is still treating the benefit of justification and amplifying its effect—which is certainty of God’s grace—from the right and power that Christ has through His life to justify us and reconcile us to God (vv. 9–11). Furthermore, he sets up an antithesis between Adam’s sin and Christ’s obedience, and between the resulting guilt and death on both sides (v. 12, 17), as well as merit and life (v. 18), and how Adam’s first sin and the obedience of Christ opposed to it become ours. For he does not regard Adamic sin as an inherent quality and action, but as the meritorious cause of divine punishment, or by reason of guilt—both that which follows the actual Adamic sin and its imputation, and that which inherent original depravity has as its own.

30. Therefore, he also treats Christ’s righteousness as imputed to us through faith; and just as condemnation is not the infusion of unrighteousness, so neither is justification the infusion of righteousness.

31. This is what Augustine observed in Book 1, On the Merit and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 13, where he explains the gift of righteousness in terms of the free remission of sins, not inherent righteousness. And Luther notes in the marginal gloss on Romans 5:19 that this mode of

communication can consist in imputation: “As Adam’s sin has become our own, so Christ’s righteousness has become our own.”

32. Indeed, Bellarmine himself, compelled by truth, asserts the same in Book 5, On the Loss of Grace, chapter 10, when he admits that Adam’s sin is imputed to all his posterity, ordinarily procreated from him, as if all had committed the same sin. And in chapter 17 he says: “Adam’s sin is imputed to us in the way that what is past can be communicated, namely, through imputation.” And in chapter 18 he proves this imputation from Romans 5:19.

33. Hence I infer: To all Adam’s posterity sin has truly been communicated as imputable and meriting death. Therefore, Christ’s righteousness is also communicated to believers through imputation, no differently than if that righteousness of Christ had been performed by the believers themselves.

34. Nor does Bellarmine’s sophistry in Book 2, On Justification, chapter 7, argument 5, avail anything when he denies that Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us exactly as if it were our own intrinsic and formal righteousness. For Christ’s righteousness is not imputed to us so as to inhere in us—since it inheres in Christ alone—but is the object of divine imputation, or that thing which, apprehended by us through faith, is truly imputed to us no differently than if we ourselves had performed it. Thus we are denominated righteous from Christ’s righteousness, not insofar as it is in Christ and imputable to us (as for those for whom it was performed)—for in that way it is the meritorious cause of justification—but insofar as it is apprehended by faith and becomes ours by imputation. Hence we are said to become righteousness not in ourselves but in Christ (2 Corinthians 5:21), that is, most perfectly righteous.

35. The Jesuit objects: “This is against the truth and justice of God, that He should reckon and esteem as righteous one who is unrighteous.”

Reply: In justification, God repute the believing man righteous in the same way that he is righteous. But he is truly righteous with a perfect and God-pleasing righteousness. Therefore, in justification he is truly esteemed righteous by God in that way. Although no one is justified unless at the same time he is also renewed by the Spirit so as to be inherently righteous, yet he

is not justified by that righteousness (1 Corinthians 4:4). Outside the bounds of justifying judgment, this righteousness inheres in the regenerate as a good conscience; although it is imperfect, yet from it—as the stronger quality—denomination is made, and on account of the predominance of inherent righteousness in actions (both properly and interpretatively voluntary), he is rather to be considered righteous than unrighteous, insofar as he is considered apart from comparison to God's justifying tribunal.

36. Moreover, the Apostle—about to supply a fuller understanding of this comparison—inserts some remarks about its quality: that the analogy of Adam as type and Christ as antitype is to be taken in a certain respect, not simply (as being of opposites), and that it holds only in general for certain things, not in all particulars.

37. Then regarding the merit and efficacy of each (v. 15): “But not as the trespass [of Adam], so also the χάρισμα [gift].”

(It pertains to Christ.) Luther: But it does not hold in the same way with the gift as with sin: both in regard to the merit and the outcome, v.16. "And the gift is not like the result of one man's sin" (the ellipsis of this article is to be supplied from the opposite clause). The Syriac renders it thus: "Not as the offense of one, so is the gift." Luther: And the gift is not only over one sin, as through the one sin of the one sinner came all ruin.

38. Hence, he further explains the reason for that likeness, which is a comparison of the lesser and the greater. For he shows the distinction between Adam and Christ:

39. First, in the effectiveness of the meritorious cause, about which Paul speaks in v.15: "For if many died through one man's trespass, much more have the grace of God and the free gift by the grace of that one man Jesus Christ abounded for many." He repeats the same in v.24, as if the Apostle were saying: Far greater is the power and effectiveness (for this he calls abundance in v.15,17) of grace, which forgives sin, and of the gift by grace, that is, righteousness imputed to believers freely, than the fall of Adam, when it is imputed to us through the Law, v.13,20.

40. Second, in the magnitude of effectiveness, Adam and Christ are distinguished both in regard to the merit of condemnation and of life, as the Apostle teaches in v.16: "For the judgment following one trespass brought condemnation, but the free gift following many trespasses brings justification," that is, to a just satisfaction for sins and absolution from their guilt.

41. Augustine in Book 1, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 13, clearly expresses this sense of the words when he says: "For judgment indeed from one offense, if not forgiven—the original one—can lead to condemnation; but grace from many forgiven offenses leads not only from that original one but also from all others to justification." And below: "What else is it that they receive the abundance of grace and righteousness, except that not only for that sin in which all have sinned, but also for those which they have added, the grace of forgiveness is given."

42. Then, in regard to condemnation itself and life, which is the outcome of merit. The former through the imputation of sin, by which many, that is, all (v.14,16), are made sinners, as many as sinned in Adam; the latter through the imputation of Christ's obedience (v.18,19), by which many, that is, all who through faith receive the grace and gift of righteousness (v.17; Acts 20:18), are made righteous.

43. "Sin indeed reigned in death, but grace reigns through righteousness leading to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" (v.21). Death indeed reigns through one (Adam), through that one's fall, so that it makes all slaves of sin; but life also reigns so that it conquers death, so that those who receive the overflowing and superabounding grace and the abundant gift of righteousness through faith may themselves also reign over death in life—both spiritual life and, after resurrection from bodily death, eternal life (v.21). Truly, death reigns over all as slaves; life reigns over all believers so that they themselves are also kings.

44. To these distinctions others may also be added from which this inequality arises. For thirdly: Adam is a mere man; but Christ is not only man but also God, as ought to be gathered from the value of His obedience,

which could atone for the offense against an infinite object—that is, God—and appease God’s wrath and reconcile sinners to Him (v.10). "God blessed forever" (Rom. 9:5) and "Lord" (Rom. 5:21).

45. Fourthly: Adam by his sin incurred guilt and harmed both himself and his posterity; he himself is to be numbered among sinners. But Christ did not render obedience for Himself, nor merit life for Himself, but for us; and as righteous for the unrighteous He satisfied the Law of God to acquire life for human beings—life communicable to many, that is, to all—which is also actually communicated to believers through faith.

PAPAL APHORISM III: By a second justification, those are justified before God who out of a habit of charity perform works of righteousness and through actual righteousness increase and perfect habitual righteousness.

1. Bellarmine addresses this matter in two ways. First, in Book 4, Chapter 18 of **De Justificatione**, he cites Sirach 18:22, James 2:22–24, and other passages—Romans 6:19, 2 Corinthians 7:2, 2 Corinthians 9:11, John 14:23, and Revelation 22:11—to argue that the justified are further justified by works. Second, in Book 2, Chapter 18, he refutes certain doctors under the Pope who claim that people are formally justified before God by actual righteousness. In responding to scriptural objections, he interprets Romans 2:13 and James 2:24 as referring to a second justification, by which righteousness before God is preserved, nourished, increased, and perfected. Consequently, he contends that works justify not formally but only meritoriously. He also takes the words of 1 John 3:7 as a sign of a person who is formally righteous before God.

2. Response: Paul explicitly teaches that good works do not justify in any way (Romans 3:4; Galatians 2–4). Therefore, they do not justify further. This notion is overturned by the equality of justification before God, which we defended in Disputation 1, Chapter 2, Section 5, and Disputation 5, Chapter 2, Aphorisms 1–2. For what cannot be increased or perfected in Christ Himself cannot become greater or more perfect through faith apprehending it. But the righteousness of Christ, which is imputed to us

through faith, cannot be increased or perfected in Christ Himself because it is perfect in every respect and has fulfilled God's Law most exactly. Therefore, when apprehended by faith in us, it cannot become greater or more perfect. If justification cannot be increased through faith, much less can it receive increase through works as merits of such increase. The scriptural testimonies adduced to confirm this fiction are urged against us in vain.

3. Bellarmine cites Sirach 18:22 from the Latin version as follows: "Do not hesitate to be justified until death, for the reward of God remains forever." From this, he concludes: "He who must be justified by continual prayer so as to receive a reward is justified in such a way that he is made more righteous before God as judge." But Sirach intends the one he instructs to be justified by continual prayer so as to receive a reward. Therefore, Sirach intends the one he instructs to be justified in such a way that he is made more righteous before God as judge with respect to inherent righteousness. Bellarmine thinks the major premise is proven from this: because the reward is thus the prize not of the first but of the second justification.

4. Response: Without even mentioning that the book of Sirach itself is apocryphal, we now only point out the distortions of the saying and the faults committed in its citation. For from the old Latin version, a patch is inserted—"for the reward of God remains forever"—which is not found in the Greek text. Therefore, it is vainly inferred from these words that Sirach speaks of a second justification, whose reward is properly called a recompense. Second, "to be justified" in this passage does not mean to be made righteous from unrighteous by inherent righteousness, or to be made more righteous if already righteous; but to be reckoned, held, and pronounced righteous before God. Third, the phrase "until death" is wrongly applied by the Jesuit to the daily continuation of justification, when it signifies the postponement of the end until

of the matter: because they pertain not to the word δικαιοῦν, to justify, but to the expressions and μὴνῃς do not delay. Therefore, the words ought to be arranged thus: do not delay being justified until death. For this reason, some

Roman Catholics also explain it concerning not secondary justification, but primary, when through conversion one becomes just from being ungodly.

5. Now then, it must be seen what kind of righteousness Sirach means, on account of which someone is held and declared righteous by God.

Concerning this matter, there is a twofold interpretation among those who think correctly, according to the different signification of righteousness. One righteousness is in words, and signifies truthfulness, faithfulness, and constancy in keeping promises; the other, however, is in deeds and works.

6. Hence, some interpreters say that to be justified in this place is the same as to be considered righteous, or to prove oneself righteous, that is, faithful in promises, because both in the preceding and following verses the discourse is about a votive promise. For the preceding verses read: Before you fall ill, humble yourself with abstinence, and in the time of sins show ἄμετρον ὕψος, that is, as Luther translates it, repentance; or as Tremellius and Junius, conversion. Do not hinder ἀποδιδόναι εὐχὴν εὐκαιρῶς (the old version conversely has: do not be hindered from praying always), and do not wait until death to be justified. The subsequent verse 23 agrees with this: μὴ ἐξάσθαι, before you vow, prepare yourself, and do not be like a person who tempts God.

7. The sense of this interpretation, therefore, is: Do not delay until death the promise of any thing, to be performed or omitted, made by you to the Lord God. For because God had given a law about keeping vows (Deuteronomy 23:22–23), therefore whoever did not fulfill them was tempting God, that is, sinning against His law. And from this righteousness, which is in words, one is said in this place to be justified who fulfills his vow, that is, to be acknowledged and to prove himself righteous or faithful in his promises and steadfast in his promise. Therefore, the general signification of this word remains: that to be justified is to be esteemed or reputed righteous; nor does to be justified mean to be made more righteous and more pleasing to God; but it is to be reckoned as righteous, that is, truthful and constant in the fulfillment of a votive promise.

8. But what does this contribute to righteousness valid before God as judge? Does he who performs a vow fulfill the whole Law? Or is righteousness in word immediately universal righteousness in deed imputed by God the judge as righteousness?

9. Bellarmine insists that Sirach commands that we be justified without prayer, that is, that we increase and nourish our righteousness. For thus the old Latin translator renders it: do not be hindered from praying always. Likewise: Before prayer, prepare your soul. Reply: Arias Montanus indeed rendered the word εὐξαθαι in verse 23 as "to pray," yet in verse 22 he takes εὐχήν as concerning a vow.

10. But the connection of the words shows that the general signification of the verb εὐξαθαι in verse 23 is the same as that of the noun εὐχή in verse 22. Certainly, the word εὐχή is ambiguous: sometimes it denotes a vow, sometimes also a prayer, as Jerome testifies to Sunia, for example, James 5:15: εὐχή πίστεως, prayer of faith, that is, proceeding from faith toward God. And when it signifies a vow, it is distinguished from prayer, as Gregory of Nyssa teaches in his second homily on the Lord's Prayer: εὐχή μὲν ἔστιν εὐαγγελία τινὸς τῶν κατ' εὐσέβειαν ἐφιμεμένων, a vow is a promise of something which is consecrated in the name of piety; πρὸς εὐχή δὲ αἵτησις ἀγαθῶν μετ' εὐσέβειας προσαγομένη Θεῷ, that is, a petition for good things which is offered to God with supplication. Here, however, that εὐχήν signifies a vow is indicated by the very phrase of Sirach, commanding ἀποδιδόναι εὐχήν, the rendering of a conceived vow. Nor is there in the Greek a word noting continuous time, but εὐκαιρῶς, that is, opportunely.

11. Other interpreters, however, take εὐχήν, that is, a vow, materially concerning a thing religiously promised to God, and specifically understand it as repentance, which is promised to God by a person. This sense also does not remove the general signification of the word to be justified, which signifies to be reputed righteous. For thus the wise man will persuade that a person should not delay doing repentance and see to it that he is justified in the time of grace, namely, not on account of repentance but on account of Christ apprehended by faith, of which repentance is the primary part. For when repentance religiously promised to God is performed by a person in a

timely manner or in the time of grace while it still lasts, he is also justified by God—that is, he receives remission of sins and is held as righteous. For repentance comprises contrition, through which the need for justification is acknowledged; and faith, through which forgiveness of sins is received and the righteousness of Christ, to be imputed to us for righteousness, is apprehended.

12. Therefore, according to this interpretation, the meaning is: Do not delay being justified; do not allow the time of grace to pass by, in which you can receive from God, on account of Christ, forgiveness for your sins—acknowledged with true contrition—and, on account of Christ apprehended by faith, be pronounced righteous before the tribunal of God. And thus the Syriac explains: Do not put off repenting of your sins; remember that death does not delay. And Luther rendered it with an elegant paraphrase: first the former clause in verse 22, “Do not withhold your vow when it is timely. Do not spare your repentance until you become sick, but amend yourself while you can still sin”; then the latter: “Do not delay being justified until death. Do not postpone becoming pious, nor wait with the amendment of your life until death.” And verse 23: “Before you vow, namely, to serve God, prepare yourself.” Thus he translates: “If you will serve God, let it be a serious matter to you.” For he understands that the discovery or acceptance of reconciliation, about which Sirach speaks in verse 20, is not to be delayed until the time of sickness and danger of death, nor is conversion to God to be postponed—both in seeking forgiveness of sins and in amending one’s life. The former is the form of justification; the latter is its inseparable attendant.

13. Therefore, this sense also clearly overturns that fiction. Nor does this allow another meaning of the word “justify”—that it is not the same as making one more just, nourishing, increasing, and perfecting righteousness before God, as strict legal justice would require. For he who is justified—that is, is reckoned righteous by the universal righteousness of Christ, which is an accomplished fact—is not justified by his own righteousness; so far is it from his righteousness becoming greater, larger, or more perfect before the tribunal of God.

14. The remaining sayings of Holy Scripture, which Bellarmine (Book 4, Chapter 19, §1 of this Aphorism) adduces, do indeed speak of the righteousness of the regenerate; however, not of that which avails before God the Judge in the court of justification, but of inherent righteousness, which does not justify but is a consequence of justification and of justifying faith, and pertains to sanctification—as 2 Corinthians 7:1 expressly names it, as do Romans 6:4; 2 Corinthians 9:10; and John 14:23. But the passage in Revelation 22 deals indeed with the continuation of justification, yet not such as admits of increase or greater perfection, but such as is held and endures through the persevering apprehension of Christ’s righteousness.

15. Furthermore, concerning the testimonies from James Chapter 2 explained by him: the first will be vindicated from the perverse gloss of the Jesuit in the following disputation, when we consider the induction of examples of justification before God—of which Abraham’s example, about which James speaks, is the chief. The other, from Romans 2:13—“the doers of the law will be justified”—is expounded in three ways, but partly falsely, partly ineptly.

16. Falsely: when he understands the word “will be justified” as referring to the increase and greater perfection of righteousness, so that the sense is: “They will become more righteous and will merit an increase of righteousness.” Estius himself on this passage disapproves of this explanation as foreign both to Paul’s purpose—distinguishing those who are only hearers of the law from its doers, not habitually righteous from those righteous by actual righteousness—and to the meaning of the word “justify,” which by itself never signifies such a preservation of righteousness as is joined with its increase and greater perfection—as is signified in Revelation 22:11 not by the verb “justify” itself but by the adverb “still.” We add that nowhere in Scripture are works called merits either of an increase of righteousness or of reward itself, as the following will teach.

17. Ineptly: for thus stands Bellarmine’s other interpretation: “The doers of the law will be justified,” that is, those who desire to be doers of the law should take care to be justified; or otherwise they are not doers of the law unless they have been justified. Estius accommodates what Augustine says

in “On the Spirit and the Letter,” Chapter 26: “So that justification does not come to the doers, but that doers of the law are preceded by justification.” But in this way, that saying would signify not the cause of justification (which they defend through inherent righteousness, whether habitual or actual) but a mark of the justified—showing what kind of persons the justified ought to be, namely, doers of the law. But the effectiveness of justification differs greatly from its demonstration.

18. Indeed, Augustine himself deserts this interpretation in that place and substitutes another drawn from the genuine meaning of the word: “The doers of the law will be justified,” that is, they will be held and pronounced righteous by God.

19. This meaning—whether taken in a legal or evangelical sense—in no way helps the cause of the Papists who wish man to be justified by inherent righteousness.

20. Not in the Evangelical sense; because according to the promise, those reborn by grace are justified—not on account of righteousness arising from a good conscience proceeding from sanctification (1 Cor. 4:4)—but on account of the righteousness of Christ, who is the absolutely perfect doer of the Law, apprehended by faith and imputed by God, just as if they themselves had rendered perfect obedience to the Law. This is how the ordinary gloss understands “doers of the Law” as believers in Christ.

21. This explanation, though not strictly literal, is nevertheless analogous to faith and completely overthrows the Papist dogma. For if the alien work—namely, that of Christ, who stood in our place as the doer of the Law—must be imputed to us, then we cannot be justified by any righteousness inherent, infused, or actual within us.

22. In vain, however, does Estius distinguish works of faith from works not proceeding from faith, attributing to the former what Paul denies to the latter in chapters 3 and 4 regarding efficacy for justification. For the preaching of faith, or the Gospel, is not against the Law but establishes it, insofar as it testifies that no one is absolved from the guilt of violating the Law unless full satisfaction has been made to the justice of God—offended by sins and

further demanding due obedience—and that for this reason Christ was made under the Law, so that His righteousness and obedience, apprehended by believers through faith, might be imputed to us and life obtained. But indeed, the inherent righteousness of the regenerate—both habitual and actual—is not without sin still adhering to those born in this life (Rom. 7:18). Therefore, the works of the regenerate, proceeding from faith in Christ, do not justify in the Evangelical sense.

23. Nor in the Legal sense, because the Law indeed promises life, but on the condition of perfect obedience rendered without any sin; such obedience is impossible even for the regenerate in this life. On the other hand, it threatens a curse upon those who fail to render exact obedience (Gal. 3:10), even for a single sin (James 2:10).

24. Therefore, according to the Legal sense of this saying—which is fully genuine and literal—Paul, wishing to demonstrate that both Jews and Gentiles are justified by faith apart from works, uses an argument from the contrary: he denies that any human beings, ordinarily born of Adam, are justified before God because they are sinners—not only Gentiles but also Jews who suppose that knowledge of the whole Law and partial obedience suffice for life—since neither are doers of the whole Law in such a way that they can live by it; and Jews excel Gentiles only in this: that they hear the Law but do not fulfill it.

25. He therefore wishes to convict them by a negative argument: "Doers of the whole Law will be justified before God by the Law. But no one is a doer of the whole Law—that is, without sin and in the manner in which it must be done. Therefore, no one will be justified by the Law before God." This conclusion he expressly states in chapter 3, verse 20, where he condemned the whole world as guilty before God (v. 19).

26. Therefore, this testimony, which the Papists allege as a foundation for justification, completely overthrows the Papist dogma of justification by inherent righteousness; and from the natural conclusion deduced from Paul's purpose and words—that no human being can be justified by habitual righteousness and its works—the assertion of our adversaries stands in

diametrical opposition: that a human being justified by habitual righteousness is made more righteous before God the Judge in the forum of justification by works.

27. The last Scripture passage is 1 John 3:7: "He who does righteousness is righteous, just as Christ is righteous." Bellarmine (Book 2, Chapter 16) takes the name "righteous" to refer to one endowed with habitual righteousness, and such a one is recognized by doing righteousness—that is, when he performs good works—because John does not teach what makes a human being formally righteous, but how it may be recognized whether someone is righteous. "That one," he says, "is righteous who does righteousness, just as that one is living who moves." Doubtless, because in the same chapter he had asserted that actual righteousness justifies not formally but meritoriously. But William Estius contradicts Bellarmine to his face, asserting that a human being is formally righteous even by actual righteousness. For thus he writes in his commentary on James 1: "Just as one is formally said to be walking from the act of walking, so from acts of righteousness which one exercises, one is said to be righteous in act, and consequently from habitual righteousness formally righteous in habit; just as conversely evil works formally constitute a human being a sinner, and the stain from them constitutes a sinner." He brings forth something similar in James 2:21 when Estius writes: "But it must be noted that a human being is justified by works even formally; for just as one is formally righteous in habit through habitual righteousness, so one is formally righteous in act through actual righteousness, which are works of righteousness." Thus, then, do the principal pipers of the Papist chair undermine one another.

28. Response: We agree with Estius thus far, that actual justice is not merely a sign and evidence of habitual justice, as Bellarmine holds, but also has the nature of a formal cause by which one is made just through works. We also grant that John chapter 3, verse 7 speaks of actual justice, not only as it is an effect and sign of habitual justice, but also because it formally makes one just: which is confirmed by the example of Christ proposed by John for the imitation of the reborn: finally, we concede that inherent justice can be increased and more perfected by the pursuit of good works. But nevertheless the most important question remains: whether we are justified before God by

habitual justice; and whether we are more justified by actual justice, which Bellarmine and Estius and the whole Papacy assert; we deny it. For it does not follow: The reborn are just even with inherent justice. Therefore, the reborn are justified on account of that justice, because this justice is an effect of sanctification. Nor indeed is the perfection of those just ones such as is required before the tribunal. And the particle "just as" in the cited saying from 1 John 3:7 does not signify equivalence, but indicates a likeness, and that only a certain one, not an absolute one, just as also in Matthew 5:48. For, as Augustine says in Book 2, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 7: then we have begun to be like, having the first fruits of the Spirit, and yet we are still unlike, through the remnants of the old self.

CHAPTER II.

PAPAL APHORISM I: The effect of both justifications is salvation both spiritual and eternal.

1. Bellarmine in Book 2 on Justification, chapter 10, enumerates four formal, as he calls them, effects of justification: which are to purge sin; to make just; to reconcile to God; to ordain to the kingdom.

2. Response: Purgation of sin, with respect to guilt, and reconciliation do not differ from justification, which indeed is variously denominated by different authors: yet the sense remaining the same. For purgation of sin, with respect to guilt considered, is nothing other than the non-imputation of sin, that is, absolution from sin: because guilt, that is, the worthiness of hatred, is an aversable stain in the eyes of God: And when that guilt is remitted; sin itself, insofar as it is imputable, is said to be purged through the application of the merit of Christ, who purged sins by Himself, Hebrews 1:3, by which He does not impute sin, see Dissertation Five, Part Two, Aphorism 2, Member 1, §§ 7–9.

2. Thus also the same justification is called reconciliation, because through it sin is removed, as it is an offense of God considered from the effect of man offending God. But where the offense of God is removed and taken away, there the cause of enmity is taken away, and so again there is reconciliation likewise through the application of the merit of Christ, as it is imputable

through faith, while He is set forth to us as a propitiation through faith in His blood, Romans 3:25. For Christ by reason of His merit is a propitiation, 1 John 2:2, that is, He has the power and value of appeasing or placating God and reconciling us with Him, and when He is received by faith, He effectively renders God propitious to us.

3. Therefore, purgation from sin with respect to guilt considered and reconciliation is the gracious remission of sins, or the offense of God on our account; those offending Him considered is not an effect of justification, but justification itself, that is, the judicial act of God not imputing sin but remitting it.

4. Indeed purgation of sin generally so called comprehends in itself many benefits on account of the diverse efficacy of sin. For according as sin either makes guilty before God; or dominates the sinner; or at least makes miserable, to the extent that as long as he lives in this mortality he feels the motions of evil concupiscence: so purgation of sin removes sin either with respect to guilt, and this is justification; or with respect to domination, which is sanctification;

Sanctification: Or because of the inherent quality of that which is glorification.

5. However, the Jesuit mixes into one mass, as it were, purification from guilt and purification from the dominion of sin; and under justification he includes not only the remission of sins but also renewal or sanctification.

6. And concerning this very sanctification, he understands that one act is to make a person righteous, so that they will to act justly—that is, promptly and with delight in righteous works. But it is one thing to be justified, another to be made righteous through inherent righteousness. We do not deny that the latter is the immediate effect of sanctification, but we have repeatedly denied that it avails before the tribunal of God for the acceptance of our person.

7. And although our justification before God is not an impelling cause for the pursuit of good works—lest we turn grace into licentiousness, as Jude speaks in his Epistle, verse 4—nevertheless, zeal in piety and holiness

follows justification not immediately, but through the mediation of renewal or sanctification, from which arises that disposition or ability to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit.

8. Thus, there remains only that one formal effect of justification, as Bellarmine calls it, namely, the bestowal of spiritual and eternal life or salvation.

PAPAL APHORISM II: Spiritual salvation or life is received on account of the infused righteousness from the first justification.

1. Thus Bellarmine, in Book 2 on Justification, chapter 16: because God is just and loves righteousness, it cannot be that He who makes a person righteous and good does not also make them pleasing and a friend. And in the same chapter, regarding effects, he says: Infused charity not only makes people just and friends, but also heirs of the kingdom; nor can anyone, according to the ordinary law of God, be accepted for the kingdom of glory who is not adopted as a son through infused grace. This is what Bellarmine intends by citing the saying in Titus 3:5, which he quotes in Book 2 on Justification, chapter 3.

2. Response: Because the distinction between first and second justification is fictitious, and the mode of justification before God through and on account of infused righteousness is false, therefore salvation is not obtained on account of such righteousness.

3. Nor is it true that infused charity makes people friends of God and heirs of the kingdom. For a person not reconciled to God cannot love God. But a person not justified by faith is not reconciled to God. Therefore, a person not justified by faith cannot love God. For by faith God is apprehended as lovable—that is, insofar as He can be good and merciful without compromising His justice. The major premise is proved because one who is not reconciled flees from God and fears His punishment. But such fear is cast out or excluded by charity, as in 1 John 4:18. The minor premise is likewise clear from the nature of justification.

4. As for the saying in Titus 3:5, they wish to conclude from it thus: The action of God that saves also justifies. But regeneration and renewal save; therefore they also justify. Furthermore, they infer thus: Regeneration and renewal justify; the bestowal of inherent gifts is regeneration and renewal; therefore the bestowal of inherent gifts is justification. The major premise of the prosyllogism is constructed from the following words of Bellarmine in Book 2 on Justification, chapter 3: “That being justified through regeneration and renewal we may be made heirs,” etc. He asserts that the minor premise of the prosyllogism is conceded by both sides, because indeed it cannot be understood how someone is regenerated without any change in themselves through God’s benevolence alone; for supernatural powers for believing and living holily are also conferred.

While there are inherent qualities—and the exercise of these qualities, which is performed by the reborn through the Holy Spirit’s grace that both excites and cooperates—such as the trusting apprehension of Christ’s merit, the mortification of the old Adam, and the pursuit of holiness, are inherent acts.

5. Response: The word “to save” generally signifies deliverance from any evil—for example, from the power of enemies (Judges 6:14; Psalm 44:7), from captivity (2 Samuel 10:19), from diseases (Mark 6:56). Likewise, spiritual salvation is liberation from spiritual enemies (Luke 1:71) and from every aspect of sin (Ezekiel 36:29; Matthew 1:21; 1 Timothy 1:15).

6. However, the specific acts of this salvation are distinct:

- One is deliverance from the guilt of sin and the death of the soul—that is, the privation of God’s grace. This deliverance is obtained through justification alone (Ephesians 1:6). Therefore, the Apostle Peter refers to the word “save” in this sense only in relation to the forgiveness of sins (Acts 4:12): “There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved.” In Acts 10:43, he explains it thus: “To him all the prophets bear witness that everyone who believes in him receives forgiveness of sins through his name.” Refer also to Luke 1:77 and Acts 15:1, 11.

- The other specific act of salvation, generally speaking, is deliverance from the dominion of sin (Acts 2:40). This deliverance is obtained through sanctification. Moreover, this combined spiritual salvation includes the consequent conversion of a person to God (Isaiah 41:14; Luke 19:9; Acts 4:12; 1 Corinthians 9:22; 1 Corinthians 10:13; 1 Thessalonians 2:16; 1 Timothy 2:4).

7. With these premises established, I respond to the minor proposition by making a distinction:

- That divine action which saves—namely, by that act of salvation through which we are reconciled to God and obtain His grace and the right of His children—also justifies.

- However, renewal is not an act by which we are freed from guilt and obtain impunity, God's grace, and the right of God's children. Therefore, renewal does not justify.

- Consequently, when God is said to have saved us through Baptism as a washing of regeneration, this must be understood in reference to another special act of salvation that depends on sanctification.

8. Concerning the term “regeneration”:

- (1) In a broad sense, it denotes the whole conversion of a person to God, including justification and finally sanctification as the fruit of justification (1 John 3:9; 1 Peter 1:23; 2 Peter 1:4).

- (2) In a specific sense, it is distinguished from renewal as an opposite species and signifies either the gift of faith in Christ (John 1:12) or the use of this regeneration, evident in justification—that is, the trusting apprehension of Christ's merit, through which justification is obtained, acceptance as children of God, and the right to the heavenly inheritance. As John testifies in John 1:16, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession takes regeneration in this latter sense as equivalent to justification itself.

9. Nevertheless, regeneration taken in the specific sense—as the gift of faith—does not immediately result in the dignity of being a child of God;

rather, justification intervenes. For it is necessary that the reborn first be reconciled to God by grace through faith before they become children of God; then comes adoption, by which we receive the right of God's children (John 1:13). Therefore, God is said to have regenerated us "because he willed" (James 1:18)—that is, entirely freely and out of the pure good pleasure of his will—not on account of supernatural powers for believing or for apprehending Christ's righteousness (by which that apprehension would inhere in us), but solely on account of Christ's merit apprehended by faith, through which we become children of God and have the right to the heavenly inheritance (John 1:12).

10. Indeed, both divine actions—justification and adoption—are accomplished by God's gracious decree. Through justification, God pronounces those who believe in Christ righteous.

He justifies, or reckons as just; by this justification, He accepts them as sons. Galatians 3:29. And so adoption adds only a new degree of dignity and excellence to justification. 1 John 3:1. This is also a gratuitous act and is not done on account of any inherent quality or action: just as Joseph's two sons, Ephraim and Manasseh, were adopted by Jacob out of singular favor and were called by his name so that they were considered his sons, Genesis 48:5. In the same way, all believers in Christ, justified through faith in Him, are called the firstborn of God, Hebrews 12:27.

Therefore, we grant the major premise of the syllogism concerning certain acts—specifically those of regeneration taken as a whole—but not concerning all particular acts. For, as we have just taught, the reception of believers into grace, which is spiritual life as opposed to condemnation, and adoption are not accomplished through any inherent gift, but solely on account of Christ freely imputed through faith. Habakkuk 2:4; Romans 1:17; Hebrews 10:38.

Renewal, as opposed to regeneration, signifies the restoration of corrupt human nature, the mortification of the flesh, the giving of spiritual powers for good works, and the stirring of spiritual motions that follow faith. Ephesians 4:22–23; Colossians 3:9–10, 12.

This very distinction between these terms is clear from the heart of the Pauline text, Titus 3:5. For first, the Apostle contrasts salvation in general with the miserable condition of unconverted people and describes the corruption of human nature after the fall, both in understanding and in will (v. 3), and then also sets forth what is proper to this corruption. Therefore, this salvation includes the conversion of a person—that is, regeneration and renewal—as well as justification and sanctification. For Paul attributes these effects to Baptism, which he makes the instrument used by God for this salvation.

Then, because salvation in general includes within itself distinct particular acts conspicuous in the exercise of regeneration and renewal, he specifically teaches about that act which is liberation from the guilt of sin and the merit of damnation, and the conferral of a right to the heavenly inheritance; and he ascribes the right and confidence of the heavenly inheritance solely to justification as its adequate end (v. 7): “so that being justified by His grace we might be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life.” He does not say that we are made heirs of eternal life through renewal (as the Jesuit would have it), nor even through regeneration as it is the giving of faith as an inherent gift; for in that way faith would save inherently and by reason of its quality. But it is through justification.

Then he excludes from justification and its continuation all inherent righteousness—and thus also faith as it inheres in us and is part of inherent righteousness—when he says that we are justified by His grace, namely, that of the Savior. He calls this the grace of Christ or His merit, freely imputed to us through faith, Romans 3:16; or that very act of mercy by which Christ applies His own righteousness to us and imputes it through faith. This is acknowledged by Thomas Aquinas in his first lecture on chapter 3 of the Epistle to Titus: “When he says, ‘not by works,’ he gives the reason for salvation; and first he excludes the presumed reason, then he shows the true reason. The presumed reason is that we are saved on account of our merits, which he excludes when he says: ‘not by works of righteousness which we have done.’ Deuteronomy 9: ‘Not for your righteousness or the uprightness of your heart are you going in to possess the land.’ But the true reason is the mercy of God.”

Nor is Baptism only God's instrument insofar as it regenerates and renews—that is, effects and excites faith as it is the first door—and offers and applies to us the righteousness of Christ, on account of which we obtain the right to eternal inheritance. See Disputation 3 on Justification, chapter 2, aphorism 6; and Disputation 8, chapter 4, aphorisms 3 and 4. For in this respect also the Holy Spirit is efficacious through Baptism, while through this washing He purifies us from the guilt of sin, so that in the eyes of God we are whiter than snow.

Let us be cleansed from filth. Therefore, justification is attributed not only to God the Father and the Son, but also to the Holy Spirit, as in 1 Corinthians 6:11: “You were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God.”

Accordingly, Paul does not make two parts of justification when he says that the fruit of Baptism is regeneration and renewal. Nor is renewal—indeed, not even regeneration, insofar as it signifies the conversion of a person—justification itself; rather, renewal is a necessary consequence. But regeneration, strictly speaking, and renewal (when not opposed) are the antecedent of justification.

Moreover, the Holy Spirit is compared to water and said to be poured out—that is, given abundantly—not only by reason of cooperating and consequent grace, but also by reason of prevenient grace, as in Isaiah 44:3: “I will pour water on the thirsty land, and streams on the dry ground” (namely, on the Gentiles, who until now have been like a dry land, not watered by the springs of Israel). “I will pour out my Spirit on your offspring.” Therefore, the effects of this outpouring—which are likened to flowing streams—are immediately added in verse 5: “This one will say, ‘I am the Lord’s,’ and that one will call on the name of Jacob” (i.e., a spiritual Jacobite); “another will write with his hand, ‘The Lord’s’” (i.e., he will give his name to the son of God and renounce Satan and all his pomp); “and name himself by the name of Israel” (i.e., he will be a spiritual Israelite). Now, it is justification and adoption that make one a son of God and a spiritual Israelite, not sanctification, which only demonstrates one to be a son of God.

So also in Ezekiel 36:25: “I will sprinkle clean water on you” (i.e., the Holy Spirit with His gifts, v. 27). Among the effects of this outpouring are numbered both conversion to the true God and justification: “And I will cleanse you from all your uncleannesses and from all your idols” (or dung-gods); and also sanctification or renewal: “I will give you a new heart,” etc.

Similarly, Christ extends this metaphor to all the gifts of the Holy Spirit in John 4:14—whatever a thirsty and panting soul may thirst for—and promises that whoever drinks of the water that He will give him will never thirst again, and that the water He will give him will become in him a spring of water welling up to eternal life. For a soul scorched by the heat of wrath especially thirsts for the grace of God that does not impute sins, and Christ, by the application of His righteousness through the Holy Spirit, refreshes such a thirsty soul that comes to Him (John 5:35) and drinks, so that it may live forever.

It is therefore false what [someone] says on Titus 3 concerning the Holy Spirit: that remission of sins is not said to be poured out. On the contrary, the Apostle himself indicates this sufficiently when he says that Baptism—which he calls the washing of regeneration and renewal (not metonymically but organically)—cleanses us from the guilt of sin. What else is this but to remit sins and to impute the righteousness of Christ, apprehended by faith, to believers?

PAPAL APHORISM III: The same spiritual salvation is preserved through works in a second justification.

1. Thus Bellarmine, throughout his books on justification, teaches that charity is preserved and increased by good works. And Osorius, in his sermon for Pentecost (p. 205), says: “The works of the just preserve grace in the soul.”

2. **Reply:** That spiritual salvation can be continued is beyond all doubt. But the Papists differ from us, first, in explaining both the continuation and the cause of continuation. For they define continuation as an increase of salvation—that is, an increase in the degree of renewing grace. But to us, the continuation of salvation is called the preservation of it by the same causes

by which it was first received, so that it does not admit of more or less—as we demonstrated above in refuting the notion of a second justification.

3.11. They teach that the cause of continuation is on our part, namely good works; but we bring forward that it is faith, Romans 5:2: "Through faith we stand in the peace which we have as justified," verse 1; and Romans 11:22: "To those who stand and remain in the goodness (of God)" are opposed οἱ ἐκπεσόντες, those who have fallen. And Galatians 2:20: Paul, when he had already received salvation through faith many years before, says: "I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God." And Romans 4, concerning Abraham as the example of all who are justified, demonstrates that in the midst of his course and pursuit of good works, he was further justified and remained blessed before God μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ, verse 5: "not working," that is, not insofar as he was working, but to him who believes, faith was imputed for righteousness apart from works, that is, without the cooperation of good works, as Luther renders it: "Ohne Zuthun der Wercke" (without the addition of works). Therefore, we also preserve the salvation of grace through faith, so that the promise of salvation may be firm not only to be received but also to be retained, Romans 4:16. But indeed, good works, as they are a sign of salvation, so also the continued pursuit of them is a sign of continued salvation.

4. This Chemnitz diligently inculcates in Part 2 of the Loci, in the eighth form toward the end under the title: "On the Testimonies of Scripture," page 803, where he recounts Gropper's argument, which he calls a deceitfully woven web: "The form is that which, if removed or lost, the thing itself is lost and taken away. But by the loss of new obedience, righteousness before God is lost. For those who walk according to the flesh will die, and those who do such things will not inherit eternal life, etc. Therefore, renewal is our formal righteousness before God." And at the beginning, he quotes Pighius's words: "If we speak formally, we are justified before God neither by faith nor by love, but by the one righteousness of God in Christ, by the one righteousness of Christ communicated to us, by the one mercy of God forgiving us our sins." After this, he adds a distinction by which Gropper's fallacy may be detected: "It is one thing," he says, "when it is said that if the

form is removed, the thing itself is taken away. And when it is said: If the individual effects are removed or cease, the cause in act also ceases and vanishes. For the cause or state does not depend on its effects, but rather the contrary. But when individual effects cease, it is a sign, testimony, and argument that the cause has ceased; otherwise the effects would not cease. Yet it would be foolish to conclude from this: Therefore, the effects are the form of the cause."

5. Indeed, it is worthwhile to trace more broadly the sources of explanations of this argument, since even among the defenders of Evangelical truth there have not been lacking those who have used this proposition: "Works preserve salvation."

6. Although the aforementioned authors do not agree with the Papists in that opinion which states that man is justified before God by infused righteousness, nor do they grant that a second justification is given, nevertheless they cause a loss of truth in this: that they assert the state of grace, received by faith in Christ, is preserved by works.

7. We, with Luther—who everywhere in his writings disapproves of this proposition—and also with the Apology of the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord, hold that this proposition is at least dangerous and scandalous and does not conform to the pattern of sound words, which we must entirely hold to, since (according to Augustine) we must speak according to prescription.

8. Let us review the entire complexity of this question, which we begin from the distinction of the preserving cause. For the preserving cause is said to be either that which continues the essence of a thing and makes it that the thing previously effected continues to exist (on which meaning see Scaliger, Exercitation 31), or it is said to be a preserving cause per accidens, which hinders or removes the corrupting cause of salvation.

9. In neither way can good works be the preserving cause of spiritual salvation. Not in the first way because in that manner Christ preserves salvation, the grace of God, faith in Christ: of which the first two causes

preserve salvation ἐνεργητικῶς (effectively); but the last preserves salvation ληπτικῶς (receptively).

10. For Christ is αἴτιον σωτηρίας (the author of salvation), Hebrews 5:9.

He is able to save to the uttermost those who come to God through Him, since He always lives to intercede for them (Hebrews 7:25). For the Father has given Him all judgment—that is, the entire administration of the kingdom of grace, which includes calling through the Word, enlightenment, conversion, justification, sanctification, governance and protection of believers, preservation and glorification, etc. (John 5:22)—and authority over all flesh, that He might give eternal life to them (John 17:2).

The first man, when he was still upright, was able not to sin and able not to die, and so could have preserved for himself and his posterity the spiritual life and salvation entrusted to him on behalf of the human race. Indeed, he was far more capable of this than of sinning and dying and losing salvation, because the power to sin was at that time only remote, whereas the power not to sin and not to die, and to guard his own salvation, was immediate. Moreover, the image of God in which he was created included within itself a propensity—indeed, a singular readiness—for doing good.

But he proved an unfaithful guardian of this divine deposit; seduced by Satan, he transgressed the divine command, lost salvation, and brought death upon himself and all his descendants. Therefore, God the Father willed no longer to entrust the preservation of human salvation to mere man alone, but committed it to His own Son, placing into His hands all things necessary for our salvation (John 3:35), both as a matter of gracious and free giving and for the sake of infallible safekeeping—which we may expect from Him alone. Hence He is called the author and perfecter of faith (Hebrews 12:2; see Chemnitz, *Harmony of the Gospels*, Book 2, chapters 20 and 59).

Similarly, the grace of God is the preserving cause of salvation. For:

2. According to that grace, God not only calls us (Galatians 1:15; Colossians 1:12; Romans 8:28; 1 Peter 5:10) and offers spiritual salvation through the Word and Sacraments; but also, according to the riches of that same

imputing grace, we have the forgiveness of sins through the merit of Christ (Ephesians 1:7). We are entrusted to this same grace of God to be preserved in salvation and to persevere in faith—as a treasure deposited with a sure and faithful friend. So Paul says to the Ephesian elders: “I commend you to God and to the word of His grace, which is able to build you up and give you an inheritance among all those who are sanctified” (Acts 20:32).

12. Faith preserves salvation unconditionally insofar as it apprehends and holds fast to Christ, from whose fullness we receive grace upon grace (John 1:16), so that we might become the righteousness of God in Him (2 Corinthians 5:21) and be found in Him (Philippians 3:9)—in whom indeed is our righteousness (Isaiah 45:24). For all the fullness that dwells bodily in Christ according to His human nature (Colossians 1:19; 2:9) is channeled and overflows into us through the Word and Sacraments, both as to its sufficiency and its permanence (Romans 5:2). Through faith we stand and rejoice in hope of the glory of the children of God.

13. Good works do not preserve spiritual salvation in this secondary sense either, because they are not the corrupting cause of unbelief—which does destroy spiritual salvation. For just as incompatibility with a thing produced by a cause is indeed a necessary sign of a corrupting cause—though not itself the cause—so also good works cannot coexist with unbelief. Yet this is not because their absence causes loss of salvation; rather, it is because they are the proper fruits and effects of faith, which opposes and conquers unbelief. Their presence only proves by way of sign the absence of unbelief.

Objection 14. But they object: What preserves faith also preserves spiritual salvation. Good works preserve faith. Therefore they also preserve spiritual salvation.

Reply: I distinguish the major premise. The activity of faith is either primary—namely, the fiducial apprehension of Christ’s entire obedience rendered on our behalf to God’s law—or secondary, when it is effective through love (Galatians 5:6).

Galatians 5:6 – In the former sense, salvation is obtained by faith alone when it is received. Faith, as we believe and preserve it (Romans 4:5),

insofar as it apprehends, lays hold of the merit of Christ. Therefore, a greater role is granted to faith in its primary function, but not in its secondary ἐνέργεια (activity). For although that faith which is without good works does not justify and save (James 2:3), yet it is that very faith—and no other—which is made effective through love, that justifies. However, it does not justify insofar as it is made effective through love and exercises itself in the pursuit of good works, because faith justifies apart from our works (Romans 3:28), but rather insofar as it apprehends the meritorious cause of salvation, that is, the obedience of Christ.

15. We simply deny the minor proposition: because good works preserve faith neither in its primary nor in its secondary ἐνέργεια. Good works do not preserve faith.

16. Not in its primary function: for the primary action of faith is to apprehend the obedience of Christ, so that it may be freely imputed to the believer for righteousness. Therefore, by as great an interval as another's work is separated from our own, by so great a distinction must our works be separated from the act of justification and salvation.

17. Indeed, charity also apprehends righteousness and the justification offered—as Bellarmine objects (De Justificatione, Book 1, Chapter 10, “Sed enim”). But in a far different manner: for faith apprehends and holds the obedience of Christ as a moral good, and as the most perfect fulfillment of the Law, and it is set before us by God so that through faith it may be imputed to us for righteousness. Charity, however, apprehends the same righteousness of Christ as a saving and pleasant good.

18. Nor do good works preserve faith with respect to its secondary operation, because good works are the fruit of faith—both with respect to their essence and presence, and with respect to their duration and perseverance. But an effect, as such, cannot produce or preserve its own cause. Good works are only signs by which, as fruits from a tree, believers—and those who have obtained spiritual salvation through faith—may be recognized; but they are not the cause of faith, either by procuring it or by preserving it. Augustine wisely says to Simplician, Bishop of the Church of

Milan, in his work on resolving certain questions from Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Book 1, Question 2: "Therefore, it is the part of grace to call, but good works follow as a consequence—not such as beget grace, but such as are begotten by grace. For fire does not warm in order to be hot, but because it is hot; nor does a wheel run well in order to be round, but because it is round. So no one does good works in order to receive grace, but because he has received grace. For how can one live justly who has not been justified?" etc. The merit of faith for those who persevere continues that imputation, by virtue of which we are said to be kept by God through faith (1 Peter 1:5).

19. They also place no small weight in an argument from the contrary: "Evil works cast out and destroy salvation; therefore good works do not preserve it." The reasoning of the consequence is: because contraries have contrary consequences. Reply: But this is true only if the contraries are equal.

Moreover, it is necessary that these contraries be causes—not effects, signs, or accidents of a cause. For accidents are indeed proper incompatibles—that is, they cannot coexist with the contrary of the thing whose properties they are—and they demonstrate a posteriori the absence not only of the contrary property but also of the contrary thing; however, they are not the corrupting cause of the thing as a contrary cause would be. Thus evil works are never joined with spiritual salvation, because it is certain that those who sin against conscience lose grace and drive out the Holy Spirit—yet not through evil works except consequentially and as a sign; but through unfaithfulness, of which evil works are the effect and sure sign, they lay waste the conscience.

20. Indeed, the sins of the regenerate—through which they fall from God's grace—are called mortal sins, not only because they are deserving of death (for in this respect even those which are called venial with regard to the believing subject—that is, whose pardon is received and held through present active faith by believers—are mortal or damnable, Matthew 5:29ff.), but because they actually bring about spiritual death—not immediately, however, but mediately and through unbelief, insofar as they are imputed to unbelievers and are not forgiven.

21. After the fall, indeed, when the promise of grace had not yet been proclaimed, all sins were immediately deadly, both in terms of the spiritual

death actually inflicted and the necessity of future temporal and eternal death. But after the Protevangelium was set forth, with the Son of God now proposed as the Mediator in the propitiation (Romans 3:25), so that lost life might be restored and made communicable again, no sins, however atrocious, actually bring death and are directly and immediately deadly, nor do they actually deprive one of the grace of salvation—except for unbelief, which causes the remaining sins to be retained and not forgiven (Mark 16:16; John 3:16, 18; John 5:24; John 12:48). For just as a dying person to whom a life-giving and salutary remedy is offered does not die because he lies dangerously ill—indeed, he is near death—but because he refuses to use the means by which he could have been restored, so the unbeliever does not die because he has committed damnable sins, but because he does not believe and rejects the means of salvation (Matthew 23:27; Ezekiel 18:31; John 5:34).

22. Therefore, Augustine, in Tractate 95 on John, commenting on Christ's words, "Concerning sin, because they do not believe in me," says this: "He (Christ) placed this sin as if it were the only one above the others, because while this remains, the others are retained, and when this departs, the others are forgiven."

23. We cannot indeed entirely avoid the tribunal of divine justice, because by it we are accused and convicted of our guilt, and we acknowledge that we have deserved death (Romans 3:19–20). For the Law cannot be destroyed (Matthew 5:18). Yet, though terrified and condemned by the Law, we can be raised up by the promise of the Gospel, which shows us the tempering of justice and mercy in Christ—to whom the Law has been transferred (Hebrews 7:12)—and the tribunal of grace prepared by Christ (Romans 3:25; Hebrews 4:16), where the Son of God Himself is both our surety and sponsor and at the same time our advocate (1 John 2:1) and judge. For the Father judges no one (John 5:22) according to the severity and rigor of divine justice; nor does He wish anyone to perish (2 Peter 3:9). But He has given all judgment to the Son, who in our place underwent that strict judgment of divine justice and earned for us the right to appeal to the tribunal of grace, before which, absolved from all guilt and deserving of death, we are adjudged life and salvation.

24. Thus, having prayed with David (Psalm 143:2) for a definitive sentence from God's strict justice to be averted, we flee from an angry God to the same God appeased in Christ, from the tribunal of rigid divine justice to the tribunal of mercy; and through faith in Christ we obtain freedom from guilt, so that we may live and be rewarded by God. So John Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, in Part 3, folio 77, marginal note 10 of his Works, illustrated this method of seeking absolution from sins and this twofold forum and tribunal of God with a most elegant image under the title: "The Tenor of an Appeal from Divine Justice to Divine Mercy."

25. This privilege of appealing is expressed with great solemnity especially in John 5:24: "Truly, truly, I say to you, whoever hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life; he does not come into condemnation, but has passed from death to life."

26. Therefore, let us make our own the words of Chemnitz (Vol. 3, Loci, p. 57, Frankfurt octavo edition): "It must be known that faith is preserved in Christ through the Word and Sacraments, according to the saying (1 Peter 1:5), 'Who by God's power are guarded through faith for salvation.' Faith, therefore, is conceived through the Word and Sacraments and is retained through them; nor is it handed over to good works as to a guard."

He lays hold of Christ so that he may be more fully laid hold of and known. (1 Cor. 13:12)

It is therefore not without reason that the form of sound words is this: if anyone says, "Faith is retained by good works," even though it may be cast out by evil works. Therefore it is better to say, "lest faith and the Holy Spirit be cast out," because this proposition is less exposed to cavils.

27. They further insist:

What removes faith and drives out the Holy Spirit also loses and removes the salvation of grace.

Evil works remove faith and drive out the Holy Spirit.

Therefore evil works lose and remove salvation.

28. Reply:

Just as faith is considered in two ways—either as it lays hold of and holds fast the merit of Christ, or insofar as it is effective through love—so also unbelief ought to be viewed in two respects:

either as the non-apprehension of the merit of Christ and the rejection of salvation,

or as being active through sins against conscience.

29. In both ways it struggles against faith, destroys it, and lays waste the conscience.

30. In the first way, unbelief destroys faith as a contrary cause, and thereby actually brings death to the soul, and causes mortal sins—for which guilt had been forgiven through faith—to be imputed again, and the wrath of God to remain upon them (1 Pet. 2:25; Col. 3:6).

This same unbelief retains sins so that they are not forgiven, takes away the righteousness previously imputed through faith in Christ, and the peace which it had with God, and spiritual joy, and the sense of God's love previously poured out in their hearts (Rom. 5:5; 1 Cor. 2:12), and drives out the Holy Spirit insofar as He justified (1 Cor. 8:10; 12:3; Gal. 5:17; Rom. 8:15) and through faith reigns in the hearts of the reborn (Rom. 14:17).

31. In the second respect, unbelief destroys faith insofar as it produces fruits contrary to faith—namely, sins against conscience or reigning sins—which cannot coexist with faith, whose fruits are contrary (1 John 3:6), and it devastates the inherent goodness and righteousness begun and promoted by the Holy Spirit, and causes lusts to reign so that the members obey them and offer weapons to sin (Rom. 6:3), and carry them out (Gal. 5:16), and add sin to sin (Ps. 69:28).

And therefore it troubles and grieves, drives out and casts away the Holy Spirit from His temple (1 Cor. 3:16–17; 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16), which He had prepared and renewed to dwell in (Rom. 8:9; 2 Tim. 4:14; Titus 3:5), that He might rest in it (1 Pet. 4:14), and it causes those falling from grace to fall

into the reproach and snare of the devil (1 Tim. 3:7; 6:9), so that they are taken captive to his will until they repent (2 Tim. 2:26).

32. Therefore unbelief is the mother of all evils, such as:

guilt either remaining (John 3:30) or returning (Col. 3:6),

the loss of faith,

the devastation of conscience,

and the rejection given to the Holy Spirit.

And for this reason evil works cannot be compatible with saving faith, because unbelief—whose necessary effects and infallible signs are sins against conscience—is contrary to faith and produces contrary consequences.

33. For where there is no true repentance, there cannot be faith and the Spirit of life. But in those sinning against conscience there is no true repentance, either with respect to contrition or with respect to faith.

34. Not with respect to contrition:

For where there is no detestation but rather delight in sin, there is no contrition.

But in such sinners there is no detestation of sin; therefore there is no true contrition.

Nor with respect to faith:

Because in those in whom there is no desire for the grace of God—who forgives sins and gives the inheritance of the kingdom—in them there cannot be true faith; for its first regard is the desire for grace, the second is apprehension, and the third is rest in that grace of God.

But in those sinning against conscience there is no desire for divine grace; therefore in those sinning against conscience there cannot be true faith.

Now the minor premise is proved by the following prosyllogism:

Those who turn away from God and Christ and seek license and opportunities for sinning do not desire forgiveness of sin and liberation from it.

But those sinning against conscience seek license and opportunities for sinning; therefore they do not desire forgiveness of sin.

35. Thus the principal conclusion stands: that evil works cannot coexist with true faith, because they are effects and infallible signs of unbelief, which as a contrary cause drives out faith.

36. And hence the Holy Spirit is also said to be cast out. For where there is no true faith in Christ, there the Holy Spirit cannot be. For the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of faith, 2 Corinthians 4:13—indeed, of faith both as it enters into the act of justification and salvation and makes the justified certain of it, whence He is called the Spirit of life, Romans 8:6, and of adoption, verses 15–16; and as far as He is effective through love, because the fruit of the Spirit is love, Galatians 5:22, and this same love is a sign of faith insofar as it justifies. For those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God, Romans 8:14. But those who are unwilling to believe—to them the Spirit resists, Acts 7:51. However, in those who sin against conscience there is no true faith, as we have already proven, 1 Timothy 5:8; 1 John 3:1. Therefore, in those who sin against conscience the Holy Spirit cannot be.

37. Moreover, the phrase by which unbelievers are said to resist the Holy Spirit—and when they both reject the merit of Christ and the salvation offered by Him, and by dead works are said to grieve and drive Him away—is not proper, as an expulsion that occurs when a real action is hindered by a contrary action; because no creature has such power that it can oppose and resist God, and it would be exceedingly foolish to maintain that the actions of God could be delayed by man through some equal power or overcome by a greater one.

38. But it is metaphorical—when the purpose of an agent is hindered, which the agent intends by his action. Thus a person is said to resist the Holy Spirit when he neglects what the Spirit intends by His supernatural operations in him and despises the operations of grace, and so the grace of God does not

obtain its effect on account of the intervention of willful malice. Thus the Jews, although the Holy Spirit was acting upon their conscience and convicting them of the truth of those things which were spoken by Stephen under the inspiration of the Spirit of God, Acts 6:10, nevertheless resisted Him, Acts 7:51. Christ wanted to gather them to Himself—that is, to work faith in them and save them, Matthew 23:27—but they themselves were unwilling. And He preached the Gospel to them so that they might be saved, John 5:34, but they themselves were unwilling to come to Him that they might have eternal life, verse 40. Thus the Pharisees are said to have rejected and made void the counsel of God against themselves when they were unwilling to be baptized, Luke 7:30; Matthew 21:22.

39. But faith struggles against that resistance and overcomes unbelief—both because it rejects the merit of Christ and is an obstacle to salvation, and causes evil works, insofar as they are mortal, not to be forgiven but imputed; and because through evil works it is effective and seeks dominion in the hearts of the faithful through enticements to sin, which if not restrained become reigning.

40. Therefore Peter commands in his second epistle, chapter 1, verse 10: "Be diligent to make your calling and election (to spiritual salvation) sure." This statement, in the same sense in which we have thus far spoken of preserving salvation, is explained by the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, where concerning the meaning of Peter in 2 Peter 1:10 it deals thus with these words: Peter speaks of works following the remission of sins and says why they should be done—namely, that your calling may be firm; i.e., lest they fall away from their calling if they sin again. "Do good works," he says, "so that you may persevere in your calling, lest the gifts of calling which previously came to you not on account of subsequent works be lost; but they are now retained by faith, and faith would not remain in those who lose the Holy Spirit and cast away repentance."

41. Moreover, so that what we have thus far presented may be more evident, we illustrate this doctrine concerning the preservation of salvation and faith with an example: The essential power of laughing, counting, and acquiring learning is a proper effect of a rational soul, and a defect of this power

cannot coexist with a rational soul—so that if anyone were to conceive in his mind a man upon whom falls an inability to laugh or count, he would imagine for himself a non-man. Meanwhile, that power does not bring about humanity, nor would an inability (if through an impossibility it were given) destroy humanity; but it would only be an effect of a cause abolishing humanity, whose presence it would indicate.

42. So also the purpose of new obedience and zeal for good works is indeed an inseparable effect of faith—so that it is incompatible with unbelief; and conversely, sins against conscience cannot coexist with saving faith. Meanwhile, this effect of faith does not contribute to bringing about salvation, or increasing it, or preserving it; and reigning sins in those who have fallen from grace are likewise incompatible with faith. Nevertheless, they are not on that account a cause that loses salvation or drives out faith and grace; but they are an effect and sign of that corrupting cause which is unbelief.

43. It is of no importance that Bellarmine, in Book 4 on Justification, chapter 9, section "Neg.," replies by teaching that faith can be separated from good works, and against us who deny this, he uses a hypothetical proposition—that faith at least can be understood without works, and separated from them, if not in reality, at least in thought. His full words are as follows:

"Adversaries cannot deny that faith can be understood without good works and separated from them at least in thought, since they say that faith and works relate as cause and effect, as tree and fruit, as fire and heat. For what can be understood as a cause without its effect, a tree without fruit, the prior without the posterior? Therefore, the proposition of the argument is conditionally true: If faith alone saves, it would accomplish this even if it were empty of good works and joined with every kind of vice."

44. However, the Jesuit confuses true mental separation, which occurs by abstraction, with false mental separation—of which there are two kinds: privative and positive—neither of which applies here. For the former conceives something as if it were not present in thought, while the latter conceives it not only as absent but also as thinking that its contrary is present. For example, one who conceives of risibility in man as though it

were entirely absent—even though it is an affection following from human nature—is employing a privative and false mental separation. Yet far more false is positive mental separation, which thinks not only that the affection is absent from the thing but also conceives something contrary to that affection: for example, that man is incapable of laughter. True mental abstraction, however, abstracts risibility from human nature in such a way that it is understood as a proper affection belonging to the very essence of man, even though it necessarily follows from it.

45. Similarly, the purpose of good works can truly be separated from justifying faith—by which one is justified—because that purpose does not enter into the act of justification, nor is it a co-cause of salvation, but is an effect of faith. Nevertheless, that concept of this purpose and of inner charity is false by which it is thought that this purpose of faith is in no way present or can coexist with its contrary, which are sins against conscience.

PAPAL APHORISM IV: Eternal salvation is received either as a free gift or merely as an inheritance; or as both an inheritance and a reward simultaneously.

1. Thus Bellarmine determines in Book 5 on Justification, chapter 3, section "But if a son," and chapter 17, section "But indeed," and following sections. Likewise in his book on Purgatory, chapter 14, section "Secondly"; and also Christopher Maier in Controversy 1, page 46, in the margin: "To some," he says, "eternal life comes only as an inheritance, but to others as both an inheritance and a crown."

2. Response: The contrary appears (1) from the identity of the causes of justification and spiritual salvation with the cause of eternal salvation. By whatever title spiritual blessedness is received, by that same title and no other is eternal blessedness obtained. But spiritual life or blessedness is received by right of inheritance. Therefore, by that title alone eternal blessedness is also obtained.

3. The major premise is founded on the words of the Apostle, Romans 8:30: "Whom He justified, these He also glorified"; and from this the theological axiom is constructed:

Extracted: The causes of salvation are faith, which is of justification. See also Distinction 1 on Justification, chapter 2, member 1, aphorism 10.

The minor premise is evident from the refutations of the preceding aphorisms, as well as from the removal of good works from all causes of spiritual salvation, as we demonstrated in Distinction 1, chapter 2, member 2, aphorisms 1 and 4.

(2) From the direct opposition between a free gift and a reward properly so called: No reward given freely and ἀντιδιηγημένως (that is, by division of the same genus, opposed to wages) is a reward properly so called, due for works as merits. But eternal life is a reward given freely and ἀντιδιηγημένως opposed to wages. Therefore, eternal life is not a reward properly so called, nor ought it to be attributed to works as causes and merits of salvation.

(5) The genuine meaning of these words clearly confirms the major premise, by which a reward, spoken of generally, is divided into wages and a free gift. For ὀψώνιον is wages, which used to be given to soldiers for the labor of military service (James 3:1; 1 Corinthians 9:7). Indeed, as Athenaeus writes in Book 7, ὀψώνιον properly means all food prepared by fire. Hence from this name and from the verb ὀψωνάω (that is, "I buy") comes ὀψώνιον. But specifically it signifies military pay, because formerly soldiers were given not silver coins but food in place of wages.

(6) And this meaning is that of this passage: because Paul continues the metaphor taken from military service and teaches that he who has served sin as a commander, fighting against the Spirit, and has presented his members as weapons of unrighteousness, will in the end receive from it also the reward, which is death.

(7) The Old Latin rendered it as stipendium, as if stipem, which was weighed out to soldiers. Moreover, stipes denotes money and whatever is usually valued in money, so called because by stamping it is made firm.

(8) The Syriac translates it as נגרא (hire), likewise gain (Acts 16:16), from the root נגר in Pehal, "he hired for wages" (Matthew 20:1–2).

(9) But to this is opposed the word χάρισμα, which signifies a free gift (Romans 11:29), just as it is explained in Romans 5:15, when it is immediately said δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι (a gift by grace). Whence χάρις (grace), "to be given out of grace" (1 Corinthians 2:12).

(10) To the Latin interpreter, χάρισμα is called gratia (grace): not taken formally by the word, but causally, by metonymy of the effect, because a gift of this kind is the effect of grace or divine favor. And Augustine noted this difference well in the Enchiridion, chapter 107: "Stipendium is rendered as due for the work of military service; but grace, unless it is free, is not grace"—a sense he drew from Romans 11:6.

(11) Indeed, when Hilary in Canon Five on Matthew admonishes us to seek the kingdom of God with the stipends of our life, he uses the word stipendium improperly, just as merces (reward) also has this general meaning for any gift; which is clear from the context, because what he calls the stipends of human life he understands as the supports of human life, which are given freely by the Lord to his servants for its sustenance.

(12) Just as the context also clearly confirms this very thing: "Therefore, he requires all our expectation to be placed in faith of the promises and the power of his might, so that, care for things we need being set aside, we may rather seek all things from him from whom we ourselves take our vital beginning, and seek the kingdom of God with the stipends of our life."

(13) But properly taken, the word stipendiis is opposed to gratuitous reward by Ambrose in Epistle 1: "One thing," he says, "is the reward of liberality and grace; another is the stipend of virtue; another is the remuneration of labor."

(14) Now to the minor proposition, which is constructed from the words of Paul directly opposing eternal life to death, or a free gift to wages.

(15) For the Apostle sets forth a general axiom, and thereby delivers the manner in which death and eternal life are the end of sin and righteousness, namely—

Indeed, death is the wages of sin; but eternal life follows good works as a χάρισμα, a free gift. Now if it is given freely, it is not on account of works; if not on account of our works, then it is on account of another's merit, namely Christ's, apprehended by faith.

16. The Apostle therefore intends by these words to indicate that the final end of man is either death or life—yet not in such a way that the ground of each is the same: death is acquired by true merits, that is, by sins; but life is given freely by grace.

17. Since, however, in both clauses the Apostle adds the article to words signifying “reward,” it is not out of place to inquire what the force and meaning of that article is.

18. Not a few hold that by that article the subject of the proposition is indicated, in which it otherwise has its proper place if only one article occurs in a single statement. But this is not always the case, since sometimes it happens that when added to the predicate it denotes the excellence of the thing—as when Aristotle in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics discusses whether pleasure is the good, or the highest good itself—or it determines and restricts a more general predicate, either to a certain species or to a particular individual.

19. Either use of the article can be applied here. For it can signify the eminence, singularity, and greatness of each outcome—as if the Apostle were saying: “τὸ ὀψώνια of sin,” that is, “the greatest rewards of all evils are death.”

20. And so this expression is convertible, and the parts of the statement can be interchanged, so that one may say: “Death is that (most dreadful) wage of sin,” as Luther rendered it: “Der Todt ist der Sünden Sold.” And conversely: “That wage (that is, the most terrible of all) of sin is death.” Likewise: “Eternal life is that (that is, the most excellent) gift given by grace”; and conversely: “The χάρισμα given (the highest) is eternal life,” as Luther rendered it: “Die Gabe Gottes ist das ewige Leben.”

21. Tertullian, in his book *On the Resurrection*, chapter 47, observing that the metaphor from military service continues with “donativum,” pointedly translates with the Roman word *donativum*: “The stipendia of transgression is death, but the donativum of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus.” For a donativum was what was given to a soldier out of generosity, as opposed to a stipendium, that is, the pay owed for military service.

22. Bellarmine, in Book 5 *On Justification*, chapter 5, denies the minor proposition—that is, the explanation of the Apostolic saying brought forward by us—and substitutes others from Augustine.

23. He takes the first from the book *On Grace and Free Will*, chapters 8 and 9: although Augustine could have said—and rightly so—“the wages of righteousness is eternal life,” he preferred to say “the grace of God is eternal life,” so that we might understand from this that God leads us to eternal life not on account of our merits but out of His mercy.

24. Reply: Just as with Hilary above, so also here Augustine takes stipendium generically, for any reward—as shown by the words immediately following, in which God says He leads us to eternal life not on account of our merits (that is, on account of good works) but out of His mercy. For as Bellarmine himself testifies in Book 1 *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 10, Augustine usually calls any good act a “merit” by reason of which we receive something else. Accordingly, it is no wonder that in this passage he calls the reward of a good work catachrestically a stipendium.

25. Yet he soon explains what kind of stipendium he means—namely, one given out of mercy and, as he says in Book 2 *Against the Pelagians*, chapter 24, in every way gratuitous—just as also in Psalm 62 he says: “God gives eternal life to us not on account of our merits but on account of His mercy.”

26. But Augustine describes stipendium quite differently when he speaks properly, as we saw a little earlier from chapter 107 of the *Enchiridion*, where he denies that stipendium is grace and determines each by its proper difference. Let us quote the passage in full from that book:

“Even eternal life itself, which certainly is the reward of good works, the Apostle calls grace: ‘For the wages of sin is death, but the grace of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord.’ A stipendium is paid for military service as something owed, not given as a gift; therefore he said: ‘The wages of sin is death,’ to show that death is inflicted on sin not undeservedly but as something due. But grace—unless it is given freely—is not grace. It must therefore be understood that even man’s good merits (works) are gifts of God; and when life is given in return for them, what is given if not grace for grace?”

27. Therefore, it does not follow: The Apostle could have spoken in such a way that he took ὁψώνιον to mean grace as any reward, even a gratuitous one. Therefore, he could not have used that word in its strict and proper signification, by which it denotes a due wage on account of work previously performed. On the contrary, the Apostle intended it to be taken only in its proper sense, and to call eternal life not a stipend but grace, for the reasons cited by Augustine in the words of the Enchiridion.

28. Vain, then, is Bellarmine’s exclamation that Augustine slays our cause, when in fact he stands most strongly on our side. Let us hear him again from Book 2 against the Pelagians (which is on original sin), Chapter 24, where, speaking of the pious of the Old Testament—that they too were saved through faith in the Messiah, who was at that time still to come—he thus distinguishes concerning the grace of Christ: “For their hearts were cleansed by the same faith in the Mediator, and charity was poured forth in them by the Holy Spirit, who breathes where he wills, not following merits, but even himself making merits. For the grace of God would not be grace in any way unless it were gratuitous in every way.” Here by “merits” Augustine again understands not merits properly so called, as if good works were rewarded with a due recompense, but he indicates that merits are given as a reward to those who work well, as the final words irrefutably prove.

For what is gratuitous in every way cannot be a reward earned and due. But eternal life is a reward gratuitous in every way. Therefore, eternal life is not a reward due. Hence, according to Augustine’s mind, Paul calls eternal life

grace, not because it is more grace than stipend, but because it is grace in every way; for that reason, because it is a gratuitous reward in every way.

29. He brings forward a second Response built from the same Augustine's *Enchiridion*, drawn from the last words of the cited passage: namely, that eternal life is called grace by the Apostle because the good merits for which eternal life is rendered are from grace and are gifts of God. This Response is also used by Bellarmine in *Book 1 on Justification*, Chapter 19, and by Mayer in *Controversy 1*, page 47, Chapter 4.

30. The reply is: This reason is indeed brought forward by Augustine in the cited place; however, (1) it is not drawn from the heart of the text but from the usage of that time, when the word “grace” was frequent in Anti-Pelagian controversies in this signification. For against the Pelagians, who said that good works could be performed by the powers of nature, it was a sufficient proof if it were shown that inherent righteousness, or the pursuit of good works, is χάρισμα, that is, a gift bestowed from grace. But the Pauline context itself sufficiently shows that what is dealt with in this passage is not the effect of renewing grace, but of rewarding grace; because it demonstrates that eternal life is such, and is such a terminus of righteousness, that it is the gratuitous gift of God.

31. (2) This reason is cited by Augustine neither alone nor as the most important, because he soon adds another and urges it more strongly, teaching that eternal life is rendered to good works—or as he himself calls it catachrestically, to merits—as grace, to such an extent that if it is not gratuitous, it is not grace. Now if eternal life, which is the happy terminus of good works in the course of the Christian life, is grace—that is, a gratuitous reward—then eternal life itself is rendered to good works as a gratuitous reward. For this reason, Blessed Augustine names a double grace: one through which the other grace is given; and the other, which prefers the grace of renewal, from which good works come; but through this grace of reward, by which good works are gratuitously remunerated.

32. But if Augustine's mind were truly the same as that of the Jesuits, he would have had to say that eternal life is a stipend for grace, not—as Augustine does say—grace for grace.

33. Therefore, this explanation differs greatly from the Jesuitical evasions, who say that good works, done by the grace of God, are eternal life in the final sense—as Cornelius à Lapide speaks on this passage—because they lead to eternal life as a reward. In this part, Johann Piscator of Herborn vigorously supports the Papist faction, both in his analysis of Romans 6:23 and in his scholia, taking χάρισμα as the divinely granted zeal for inherent holiness and righteousness given by grace. Moreover, he claims this zeal for righteousness and holiness is eternal life—that is, it brings eternal life with it, not indeed by merit, but by God's ordinance. He adds that the phrase is metonymical, like that in Romans 7:7: "Is the law sin?"—that is, "Does the law produce sin?" So also in this place, it is a metonymy of the efficient cause, which ought to be explained thus: τὸ χάρισμα, the free gift of righteousness, is eternal life—that is, it produces eternal life.

34. Reply: But Paul does not consider χάρισμα as an infused gift, but as a gift of rewarding grace—that is, a reward—because Paul considers God as a master rewarding his servants, and sin as a commander paying wages to the ungodly as his servants and soldiers (v. 1). Therefore, the phrase is not metonymical but entirely proper, by which a free reward is called χάρισμα. For every reward freely given is a free gift; yet not every free gift is immediately a reward or a gift given freely after some work.

35. Next, if χάρισμα in this passage did not signify a reward but the gift of righteousness freely infused or actual righteousness arising from grace, it would follow that eternal life is a free gift in one way for infants and adults who do not survive after their conversion, but in another way it is χάρισμα for adults who survive after justification. For the former, it would be purely gratuitous; for the latter, partly gratuitous and partly not gratuitous—yet more gratuitous than not.

36. Third: But this very point completely undermines the Pauline antithesis. For if this explanation were to stand, it would follow that death—the

opposite of eternal life—is likewise a wage, so that sin itself would also be a wage. Just as eternal life is said by the Papists to be grace, so that the inherent righteousness itself, which produces eternal life, is grace. But the Apostle's aim is different; he makes a double opposition: one of sin and righteousness, the other of death and eternal life. And for each opposing member, he states attributes proper to them which do not apply to the other members. Therefore, as in the former member he represented sin as a master inciting evil actions, and righteousness as a master commanding good actions, so in the other member of the antithesis he shows the outcome of each dominion and the manner—not that righteousness is eternal life, but that eternal life is the τέλος—that is, the outcome of righteousness: namely, not in the way death is a wage—that is, properly called the reward of sin—but in the way it is χάρισμα—that is, an unmerited reward.

37. Fourth: If eternal life is grace metonymically because the righteousness of new obedience produces grace, it follows that eternal life is only accidentally grace by reason of renewing grace, but in itself and properly it is a reward—properly so called—no differently than if a soldier's pay were accidentally gratuitous by reason of the arms which he freely receives from the emperor.

38. Fifth: Paul not without cause adds that appendix: "In Christ Jesus"—that is, on account of Christ's merit. For by these words...

This verb means that the righteousness of new obedience is in no way worthy of the title of a wage or reward properly so called, since its pursuit results in eternal life. This is what Cajetan observes when he comments on this passage as follows: "Paul does not say that the wages of righteousness are eternal life, but that the gift of God is eternal life, so that we may understand that we attain eternal life as our end not from our own merits, but by the gratuitous gift of God." For this reason he also adds: "In Christ Jesus—behold the merit; behold the righteousness whose wage is eternal life; but for us it is a gift, on account of Christ Jesus himself."

If, therefore, eternal life is a reward properly so called only insofar as Christ merited it for us by his obedience, and is a gratuitous gift with respect to us,

to whom Christ gives that reward of his, it follows that eternal life cannot be called grace only metonymically.

39. Sixthly and finally, even if χάρισμα in the sacred text were to signify righteousness inherent by the gift of God, yet that righteousness would not produce eternal life, nor would it efficiently precede it, but rather as a medium of order, and as it were a path, the terminus of a journey.

40. Nor does anything lend strength to the confirmation of this foreign explanation from the fact that in the penultimate verse of Romans 6, eternal life is called τέλος, the end of inherent righteousness. For the word τέλος in the sacred text is taken for the outcome with which the pursuit of righteousness is finally terminated, when the Apostle says in verse 22 that the service of righteousness has a twofold fruit: an intermediate one, which is sanctification of spirit; and the other τέλος, that is, the ultimate fruit, namely eternal life.

41. For in whatever sense the word τέλος is taken when death is said to be the τέλος of servitude to sin (v. 21), in the same sense it is also taken in the opposite latter clause (v. 22), when the Apostle says that the end of sanctification is eternal life. But in the first member of the antithesis, the word τέλος does not signify an end or final cause, but the ultimate terminus or outcome. Therefore, in the latter member also it will likewise signify only the outcome or ultimate terminus.

42. The reason for the minor is that not every τέλος or any terminus is an end of intention or causality, which is called divine τέλος and excellence; but some is only an end of termination and extremity. Aristotle calls the same ἔσχατον (Physics, Book 2, Chapter 3, text 31 and 8): "Not every last thing is an end, but that which is good." "The end is the best." And Scaliger expressly argues that an end per se and by its nature is convertible with the good (Exercise 254).

43. Bellarmine himself admits the same (Book 5, On Justification, Chapter 3, § "Quod verò"): "For," he says, "an end and a reward are not the same: for an end has a relation to means, whether they are merits or not. A reward (properly so called) has a relation only to merits."

44. But William Estius, in his commentary on this chapter, urging especially the middle exposition of Augustine, wishes to render it fuller and more absolute by three other reasons on account of which the Apostle prefers to call eternal life grace rather than a reward. The first he draws from the grace of predestination, which is entirely gratuitous and intends eternal life before works, as means by which we merit eternal life. The second he takes from the grace of promise, because God wills to remunerate good works not indeed from their nature, but from his gratuitous good pleasure. The third he deduces from the munificence of the rewarding grace, which not only renders due reward for works, but also adds a gratuitous gift beyond and rewards good works above what is condign.

45. Response: Many false things are contained in these reasons. As regards the first reason: in predestination, eternal life is not only intended by God under the aspect of an end, but is also regarded under the aspect of a reward and fruit. God regards eternal life as an end with respect to his good pleasure, by which he wills to communicate the means of salvation. But he regards it as a reward insofar as he ordains those whom he foresees will believe to eternal salvation as to the reward of faith. For faith alone, as it apprehends the merit of Christ...

On our part, the act of predestination enters in, and truly good works are not necessary means for obtaining salvation, much less do they promote it; but they are only required in a certain order of precedence before salvation, as the way to the destination toward which the journey tends. Nor does inherent righteousness constitute any part of the object about which predestination is concerned, but faith in Christ alone determines that; although sometimes the predestined are designated by holiness as a sign.

46. Similarly, the other argument is not in harmony with the truth. For there is no Gospel promise that pledges a reward properly so called on account of good works. But God wills to remunerate good works freely only to His children—as they are the works of His children, pleasing to Him on account of Christ, and signs of future glory—but not as an assisting, moving, or organic cause, much less as a meritorious cause. And according to the saying of the Apostle in Romans 11:6: “If it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis

of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace. But if it is by works, it is no longer grace; otherwise work would no longer be work.” But if good works are not meritorious of salvation by God’s promise and acceptance, much less will they merit salvation by their own nature.

47. The third argument is entirely foreign to heavenly truth. For God rewards good works out of mere grace, and not partly by grace and partly by the merit of the one working. But if good works, whether by God’s covenant or by their own force, are worthy of rewards, how can it be said that God rewards good works by grace beyond what is worthy and more than they deserve? Surely God accepts good works not on account of their worthiness, but out of mere gratuitous favor by which He accepts the person, and He also accepts the works of the person who is pleasing through Christ, rightly covering the imperfection that adheres to those works through the most perfect holiness of Christ. See Distinction 2, Aphorism 6, in the explanation of the sayings in Luke 20:7; Luke 6:20, 35–36; Luke 31:36; 2 Thessalonians 1:5; Revelation 3:4; Wisdom 3:5.

48. The argument of Estius, which he incidentally inserts in his commentary on this passage, labors under similar falsehood: “Just as a soldier often receives a donative beyond his stipend on account of a successfully accomplished deed, so also the pious receive a gratuitous gift from God beyond the reward due for good works.”

49. Response: We concede that it could happen that a prince, beyond the ordinary pay, might bestow some unowed gift on account of some distinguished deed out of special munificence; yet even then the stipend itself—that is, the ordinary pay for military service—is not the donative, but a different reward bestowed out of the prince’s kindness.

50. Of the same kind is the little reasoning that both Estius and Cornelius à Lapide adduce from the meaning of the Greek word: “The Apostle did not wish to call eternal life *ὁψώνιον* because this word signifies a cheap stipend, whereas eternal life is a most excellent reward.”

51. Response: *ὁψώνιον* denotes not only a cheap stipend but any pay customarily given to soldiers, as appears from Luke 3:14 and 1 Corinthians

9:7. Otherwise it would follow that only lower soldiers were forbidden in Luke 3:14 from extorting or oppressing anyone by false accusation and were commanded to be content with their pay, but that this was not said to the leaders of the army. Second, Paul does not make an antithesis of reward with respect to excellence and degree, but with respect to an essential difference, according to which one is a reward for merit—that is, wages and stipend properly so called—while the other is unmerited—that is, gratuitous. Third, Nazianzen in Oration 23, which is entitled “On His Addresses to Julian, the Tax Collector,” testifies that ὀψώνιον also signifies “the royal provision or the gifts that were bestowed upon dignitaries by law.” Therefore, the opposition between stipend and donative remains unshaken. Hence Chrysostom understands by χάρισμα in this passage a reward that does not admit ὀφειλὴν (debt), ἀμοιβὴν καὶ ἀντίδοσιν (requital and repayment) due from prior merit.

PAPAL APHORISM V: It is received only as a gratuitous gift on account of the merits of CHRIST.

1. This thesis, as far as the words themselves are concerned, contains nothing false; but the meaning which the Papal Church assigns to them is perverse.
2. For it teaches that some receive eternal life solely by the merit of Christ, while others are saved both by Christ’s merits and by their own. Furthermore, it regards the righteousness of Christ only as a merit for eternal life—that is, as something which merits for us that, on account of inherent righteousness, we may possess eternal life. But it denies that the same righteousness of Christ is imputed, by which, when apprehended through faith, believers are justified before God—as Bellarmine contends in Book 2, On Justification, Chapter 2, §8: that we are formally justified on account of a new quality inherent in us, not on account of the merit of Christ, which cannot be inherent in us.
3. Moreover, the Papists assert that eternal life is called a gratuitous gift on account of the infused righteousness, which is a gratuitous gift. But in truth, the question here concerns the reward, which is opposed to punishment, not

the righteousness itself. Now if some were rewarded on account of righteousness, their reward would indeed be gracious—that is, given out of mercy—but it would not be gratuitous, even though the inherent righteousness itself is a gratuitous gift. The reason is that this infused righteousness is ours by inherence in us. For we are justified freely; we are not justified on account of something that is inherently ours, whether by nature or even by grace. A gratuitous reward excludes, on the part of man, all efficient causes, moving causes, assisting causes, and any others that can be conceived as moving God to bestow the reward. For there is no foundation in the recipients for receiving eternal life. Therefore, a gratuitous reward is what we receive on account of another's righteousness—namely, that of Christ—as Bernard teaches in Epistle 190. Our faith, however, insofar as it is held and reckoned by God as ours through faith as the instrument for receiving it.

PAPAL APHORISM VI: In the same sense, eternal salvation is called an inheritance because it is given by the grace of adoption.

1. Again, the Papists use the same words as we do, but they mean something different. For although they too concede that the foundation of adoption is justification, yet because they refer justification to love (charity), they also judge the essence of this adoption by the acceptance of inherent and indwelling charity, as well as by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by which we are made partakers of the divine nature and, as Basil says in his Homily on the Holy Spirit, “we are gods and sons of the Most High.”

2. For this reason, Cornelius à Lapide, commenting on Hosea 1:10–11 and 2 Peter 1:4, writes that the grace by which we are adopted as sons of God is not one simple thing but embraces many: remission of sins, faith, hope, charity, and other gifts, and the Holy Spirit Himself as the author of gifts—and consequently the whole Trinity. On page 71, column 2, and page 72, column 1, he explains that our adoption is indeed one in itself but twofold in virtue. The first, he says, is that by which we are adopted as sons of God through created charity and grace infused into the soul—for this is a participation in the divine nature. The second is that by which through grace we obtain the Holy Spirit Himself. And shortly before these words he states:

“Just as the formal cause of the first adoption through grace is grace itself, so the formal cause of this second adoption—which takes place through the communication of the Holy Spirit—is the Holy Spirit Himself dwelling in the soul of the just; the means, however, is grace itself.”

3. All these things are asserted especially to establish the divine power and precious value of good works—that they are of the highest dignity and fully commensurate and worthy of their reward (namely, heavenly life and glory), seeing that they proceed from God Himself and from the divine Spirit who dwells in us, impels us to them, and cooperates with us in them.

4. The state of the regenerate in this life indeed includes all these benefits, as we have taught in chapter 1; yet it does not follow that they are to be held indiscriminately, or that they are not also distinct and to be differentiated according to their specific essence. Therefore, regeneration, passively understood as the reception of supernatural powers for believing, which are given by the prevenient grace of God, is not itself sonship or adoption; nor is the exercise of those supernatural powers for believing—that is, the fiducial apprehension of Christ, to which likewise prevenient grace stirs a person—itsself the remission of sins or sonship. But both the supernatural faculty for believing and its exercise pertain to the instrument for receiving remission and for obtaining the right to be children of God (John 1:12). Similarly, renewal, insofar as it is distinguished from generation, is a different benefit from justification; and faith, hope, and charity, which are exercises of regeneration and renewal, inhere in us; but the righteousness by which we are justified before God’s justifying tribunal does not inhere in us but is imputed through faith.

5. Next, evangelical adoption is also spoken of in the sacred Scriptures not in one way only but is used either formally and in itself or effectively.

Formally, it is the gracious acceptance of a person justified by faith before God as His son, to inherit spiritual and eternal goods (John 1:12: “To all who received him, he gave the authority to become children of God”; Ephesians 1:5: “He predestined us for adoption to himself as sons through Jesus Christ, according to the good pleasure of his will”; Galatians 3:29: “If you are Christ’s, then you are Abraham’s seed, and heirs according to the promise”).

6. Effectively, however, adoption is spoken of by reason of its privileges and signs, such as the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (Galatians 4:6: “Because you are sons, God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts”; 1 Corinthians 6:19: “Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit?”); that the adopted may be members of God’s household (Ephesians 2:19); and that they may be led by the Spirit (Romans 8:14), imitate the heavenly Father (Matthew 5:44–45, 48), be inflamed in prayer crying, “Abba, Father” (Galatians 4:6), be sealed with the Spirit of God and His grace toward them (Ephesians 1:13–14; 4:30; Galatians 3:14), and be assured by His testimony that they are children of God. Also included are the future incorruption and resurrection of the body to eternal life and the very possession of the heavenly inheritance (Romans 8:17; Revelation 21:7). In this respect we are also said to await adoption (Romans 8:23), and the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of adoption (Romans 8:15–16; Galatians 4:6) from these effects, which for this reason Theophylact aptly calls “indicators and completions,” or effects and outcomes, of divine adoption.

7. Therefore, it is common that the form of adoption and sonship considered in itself consists partly in charity alone or inherent righteousness, and partly in the Holy Spirit Himself, uniquely present and dwelling in the children of God. For both inherent righteousness and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, as well as participation in the divine nature, follow upon adoption: the former indeed because it is the fruit of the indwelling Spirit; the latter because the Holy Spirit gives Himself to

He who is to give to us that we may become partakers of the divine nature does not inhabit a temple unless it pleases him. But the person who is to inhabit cannot do so in reality unless he is first justified before God through faith.

8. Therefore, just as the proper subject of justification is only a person believing in Christ, so the proper subject of divine adoption is a person justified before God and having obtained the life of grace and God’s favor. For this reason, in Hosea 1:10, such a son is called a son of the living God. But when God’s adoption is considered effectively, the sons of God are

named from effects and signs. Such designations and descriptions are improper and are taken a posteriori.

9. Moreover, that sharing in the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4) ought to be rightly understood—not as if we are justified before God by the essential righteousness or holiness of the Holy Spirit dwelling in us, but effectively, because through sanctification, proceeding from the Holy Spirit dwelling in the justified, we begin to be conformed to the divine nature with respect to likeness. For Peter immediately describes those partakers as “those who have escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust.” Hence, N. Flenus, at the beginning of his work on the Epistle to the Harmony, posing the question “What is Christianity?” answers by giving an a posteriori description of Christianity: “It is the imitation of the divine nature,” namely through inherent holiness and on account of that mystical, most intimate, and ineffable union of the Holy Spirit with the justified and those adopted as sons of God—not only by proximity of operation but also of his substance, present in a new way and dwelling in them by his temple (1 Corinthians 6:19; 1 John 4:13).

10. And Basil also means this in his homily on the Holy Spirit when he says that the saints are gods through the indwelling Holy Spirit. And for this purpose, he refers (not literally but accommodatively) to the saying in Psalm 82: “I said, ‘You are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High.’” And from this he proves that the Holy Spirit is God: “For it is not possible,” he says, “for one who is not divine and who is not from God to be the cause of divinity to gods.” But those who sin against conscience by this very act profess by their unbelief—by which they drive out the Holy Spirit and lose that sharing in the divine nature and fellowship with the Father and his Son Jesus Christ (1 John 1:3) which they had.

11. Hence, what Cornelius à Lapidè writes in the same place about the former (which he calls adoption), on page 70, section 2, is worthy of note (marked with an obelisk, not an asterisk): “Note: In this generation and sonship, the Father is God; the seed is prevenient grace; the mother is the consenting and cooperating will; the offspring is the just man; the soul is charity.”

12. For first: God is indeed our Father, but not immediately insofar as he generates—that is, confers supernatural powers for believing—or insofar as he stirs up those gifted with supernatural powers so that we believe; but insofar as he adopts into sons those justified through faith.

Second: The seed by which we are regenerated Scripture says is the Word of God (1 Peter 1:23) and Baptism (John 3:5; Ephesians 5:26), through which instruments God regenerates us by his prevenient grace.

Third: The mother is not the consenting will, because the will, insofar as it receives powers for believing, is merely passive toward grace and suffers it to be given to it. Hence, not only “of bloods”—that is, nobility of nature—but also of the will, whether of flesh or of man (that is, of anyone’s choice or inclination, whether of commoners or nobles), is God opposed, from whom alone we are born. But when the Church is called mother, this is only by reason of the ministry by which it dispenses the Word and Baptism.

Certainly, in the use of supernatural powers for believing, the will—first stirred up and aided by the Holy Spirit—consents so that it may believe; yet a man does not live by that life which is opposed to curse and condemnation—being prevented, stirred up, and aided by God’s grace—through the very act of believing and insofar as he apprehends; but only by reason of the object apprehended.

Fourth: The offspring or son of God is a just man—but not by inherent righteousness, rather by the imputed righteousness of Christ. The reason is what we gave before: because inherent righteousness only makes known one who is born again a posteriori; but imputed righteousness properly and a priori describes a son of God.

Fifth: Faith in Christ is the spiritual soul of one born again, conceived from the Word of God (1 Peter 1:23; Romans 10:17) and from Baptism (Ephesians 5:26).

John 3:5, inasmuch as it lays hold of Christ, who is life, and through him makes man alive and causes him to enjoy the grace of God, Galatians 2:20, Hebrews 2:4, Romans 1:17, Galatians 3:11, Hebrews 10:38. But love is only a movement of this spiritual soul and a sign of the spiritual life. Therefore,

we are said to be children of God not through love, but through faith in Christ, John 1:12 and Galatians 3:26. And John in his entire epistle exhorts to love, not as to a cause, but as to the affection and proper mark of adoption.

13. In vain, however, Maldonatus in chapter 1 of John, column 410, opposes and objects:

1. That ἐξουσίαν in this passage can mean a power or authority remote from the act: as if they had indeed received the power through faith to become children of God, but had not yet become so; because this happens through love, through which they begin, as it were, to have the soul of life by grace and to be children of God.

2. He explains the verb γενέσθαι concerning a successive change, which is begun through faith but perfected through love in this sonship; and he wishes to prove this from Matthew 5:44–45: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, pray for those who persecute and slander you, that you may be children of your Father who is in heaven."

Bellarmino also uses the same ἐξουσία in "On Justification," book 1, chapter 13. Therefore, the first disposition.

14. However, we respond:

1. ἐξουσία does not mean only a faculty for acting remote from the act itself, by which one is merely disposed to that act, but a power joined with authority, or the right of the children of God. Then also the dignity and excellence which comes to those born of God through adoption; which latter sense also pleased the Syriac Paraphrast, rendering the Greek word by **ܐܠܦܝܬܐ**, that is, dignity, excellence. Both meanings are suitable to this passage and can be joined, so that it denotes that ἐξουσία by which one is a child of God is a right, and indeed a most noble one joined with the greatest dignity.

15. II. The second aorist signifies not that something becomes which is not yet, but that it has been made which now is; likewise to be.

Therefore, the words of the Evangelist ought not to be translated concerning a future potential act: "He gave the power that they might become children of God," but not then, when they had received the power, were they immediately so; but concerning the event itself: "He gave the right and authority that they are, or that at that very time when they believe, they have been made children of God," according to the saying of Paul in Galatians 3:26.

16. Nor is the passage in Matthew 5:44 opposed to these things, where the children of God are described from what follows, namely from love: And the particle ὥτως signifies not the cause but the outcome of divine sonship, as it is also taken in Matthew 23:35. Therefore it can be translated: "And you shall be children of God"; as the Lord expresses this sentence and its reason in Luke 6:35. Or the verb γίνεσθαι in this passage denotes not to be or to have been made, but to be acknowledged for what one is, and to be made known as what kind of person one wishes to be; just as the verb γίνεσθαι is so used in John 15:8. And this meaning is proved both from the nature of the children of God, about which we have already said enough, whose effect and sign is love; and from the parallel passage John 13:35, where Christ testifies that his disciples will be recognized by this sign: "By this all will know that you are my disciples."

17. Moreover, so that the hereditary right which believers in Christ have to eternal life from free adoption may be better understood, we will unfold the difference between earthly and heavenly inheritance; and we will examine what forms each adoption has.

I. 18. The first difference arises from the diverse way of receiving inheritance: in earthly inheritance an adoptive son succeeds the adopter; but the inheritance of the heavenly patrimony is such that heirs do not succeed the Father, but approach the heavenly Father and are joined to him, as sharers in the kingdom of glory and eternal blessedness. For he who by his own nature is immortal lives forever; he cannot admit succession. But the heavenly Father by his nature is immortal and lives forever. Therefore he cannot admit succession. The major premise is clear: because where succession takes place, there the death of the father precedes.

In the heavenly inheritance the death of the Father does not precede. Therefore in the heavenly inheritance succession has no place. Indeed Christ, who is the Father of eternity, Isaiah 9:6, has appointed to us a kingdom, Luke 22:29, γινόμενος τῷ θανάτῳ, that is, in such a way that in the assumed flesh he died, and in this he willed his covenantal disposition to be at the same time similar to the disposition of a last will, which receives its validity from the death of the testator, Hebrews 9:17; nevertheless, on the third day he rose from the dead in that same flesh of his, so that he dies no more, Romans 6:9.

19. Another distinction arises from the motive for earthly and heavenly adoption. Earthly inheritance rights are transferred to another through adoption, received as a son, due to the lack of a natural son. However, the right to heavenly inheritance is granted to us through adoption by the Heavenly Father, not because He lacks a natural son—namely Christ—but out of pure mercy, by which He makes us co-heirs with His Son (Romans 8:17, 29; Hebrews 2:12).

20. A third distinction is drawn from the diversity of those adopted. Earthly inheritance through adoption can come even to the unworthy, but heavenly inheritance is conferred by God only upon those who believe in Christ and are first deemed worthy through justification, having been reconciled to Him through faith in Christ (John 1:12; Galatians 4:4–5).

21. Furthermore, earthly and heavenly adoption agree in this: both confer the right of inheritance either under the condition of obedience or some other act to be performed by the adopted, or out of pure grace.

22. For before the fall, in the state of integrity, Adam was a son of God not only by creation but also by a covenantal arrangement, under which he was adopted on the condition of perfect obedience to be rendered to God's law, with the simultaneous addition of a reward promised by legal covenant for that obedience and a penalty threatened if he disobeyed, so that humanity might be more strongly motivated to obey.

23. If Adam had rendered that obedience, he would have obtained the inheritance of eternal life—but in such a way that this inheritance would

have been the proper reward for obedience rendered, or, as Paul calls it in Romans 4, a reward due by debt—that is, on account of works by which he might have fulfilled the law laid down for him—a debt, I say, arising only from covenant and legal promise, not from the force and nature of the works themselves. For only Christ's obedience, by its dignity and power, is meritorious in acquiring salvation for us and is the impulsive cause that moves God to save us. But if unfallen man had obeyed, he would have done what he ought to have done (Luke 17:9–10).

24. After the fall, that conditional adoption on account of works no longer has a place because of our inability to fulfill God's law, introduced through Adam's fall (Romans 8:3). Therefore, the inheritance of eternal life that comes to those who believe in Christ is purely gratuitous; and although it comes after works, it is not conferred because of them.

25. Indeed, even gratuitous adoption is in its own way conditional and takes place through the intervention of a covenantal agreement—if the person who wishes to be adopted believes. Nevertheless, that condition of adoption required of the heir according to the Gospel covenant is very different from the condition of the legal covenant: because faith, through which the right to heavenly inheritance is freely conferred, is not regarded as a work but as the instrument for laying hold of Christ's perfect righteousness. And since the righteousness on account of which we receive the heavenly inheritance is not our own but Christ's—rendered to God's law on our behalf—we are heirs not because of faith, but through faith we merely lay hold of another's merit—that is, Christ's—on account of which we inherit eternal life.

26. Accordingly, eternal life is given to believers only on the basis of gratuitous adoption and therefore is not a reward due by debt but from pure grace (Romans 4:4).

27. Although divine adoption involves either a condition of obedience or is granted freely according to the different state of humanity—and in this it agrees with earthly adoption—nevertheless there are differences by which earthly inheritance, even when gratuitous, differs from the heavenly. For:

1. Earthly inheritance can be given by grace not only on account of another's merit—for example, the deeds of parents—but also by reason of some kinship, even though others may still be closer relatives than the appointed heir.

2. In human adoption, another's merit is considered only insofar as it was beneficial to the adopter. But God freely confers the heavenly inheritance upon us, received as sons by grace; and Christ's merit is regarded not as something beneficial to Himself but as a moral good satisfying divine justice—offended by our sins—so that, with justice appeased, He may impute Christ's merit to us as a saving good.

PAPAL APHORISM VII: Moreover, they hold that eternal life is at once a reward and is given on account of works.

1. Thus Bellarmine (De Iustificatione, Book 5, Chapter 3) says: “Eternal life has the character both of a reward and an inheritance: for it is given by promise to those who labor, and it is given only to sons, which is proper to an inheritance.” Likewise, he held that God willed His sons who have the use of reason to acquire eternal life by their own labors and merits, so that eternal life would be owed to them by a double title—namely, the title of inheritance and the right of reward.

2. It is answered. We have previously shown that inheritance from gratuitous adoption and properly so-called wages (*ἀντιπεπονθός*) are opposed, so that both cannot be predicated of one and the same thing. Nor is the question here about just any sons, but about adoptive sons, and indeed those who are adopted gratuitously, not those adopted under the condition of performing works. For it is impossible that he who has the right of inheritance from gratuitous adoption should also acquire it by the title of wages, properly so-called.

3. Bellarmine replies (lib. 5 de Iustificatione, cap. 17, § Porro): Good works are not required for acquiring eternal life as an inheritance, but they are required so that the son may not fall away from adoption and justly deserve to be disinherited. Therefore, the adoptive son does not merit to acquire

eternal life as an inheritance through good works or by any other pact, but he merits not to lose it.

4. It is answered. Good works are in no way the cause—much less the meritorious cause—of retaining and not losing the right to eternal life; but faith alone in Christ, insofar as it holds fast to what it possesses and has once apprehended the merit of Christ, through which we are kept by the power of God for salvation (1 Pet. 1:5). For the right which someone has and retains, as a friend and son of God through faith, he loses when, faith having been lost, he ceases to be a son. But believers have and retain the right to eternal life as they are friends and sons of God through faith. Therefore, believers lose the right to life when, having lost faith, they cease to be sons of God. Good works, however, do not make, but show, friends and sons of God; and they are only signs and testimonies of the cause preserving the right to eternal life. Therefore, good works are not the cause preserving this right. And here all those things must be repeated by which we decided in the negative the question: Do good works preserve spiritual salvation? For spiritual salvation and the right to eternal life are inseparably connected, as the scholium of the third aphorism in chapter 2 of this disputation extensively declared. The sum is: What is only a sign of the cause preserving the right to eternal life is not itself the preserving cause. Good works are only a sign of the cause preserving the right to eternal life. Therefore, they are not themselves the preserving cause.

5. Indeed, evil works are simultaneously a meritorious cause of not retaining, or of losing, the right to eternal life; yet not immediately, but through the mediation of unbelief, of which evil works are the effects and signs. But the nature of good works is different; since they are imperfectly good, they cannot be the cause of salvation—either mediately or immediately, whether as efficient or preserving.

6. Moreover, Bellarmine, while he wants eternal life to be simultaneously an inheritance and a wage, what else does he say than that it is simultaneously improperly and properly a wage? Surely he makes coordinated or subordinated things out of opposites, which is most absurd. For a son becomes an heir of the Father by right of sonship; therefore he is a partaker

of the inheritance not on account of his obedience and his little work, which he willingly acknowledges is not of such value as to merit those hereditary goods by it; but rather, the more splendid and greater the inheritance is, the more he finds it to be gratuitous. In the same way, eternal life is from gratuitous adoption, and indeed of the best and greatest kind; therefore it can in no way be called a proper wage.

7. But let us examine the Scriptures which Bellarmine wishes to use to prove that eternal life is given to some who are reborn not only as a gratuitous inheritance but also as a wage properly so-called. For this purpose Bellarmine (lib. 5 de Iustificatione, cap. 19) adduces sayings that mention a wage: such as Isaiah 40:10; Jeremiah 31:16; Matthew 5:12; chapter 20:8; 1 Corinthians 3:8; Revelation 22:12. To these also belong those passages he cites in book 5, chapter 8: Colossians 3:24; Hebrews 10:35; chapter 11:6 and 26. The answer, however, is by distinguishing between an unmerited wage and a deserved wage (Luke 10:7). Paul calls the former a wage by grace, but the latter by debt (Romans 4:4). The former coincides with a gratuitous gift or inheritance; just as David in Psalm 127 calls children, whom he called a wage, soon after an inheritance—that is, as Luther translates it, a gift.

8. The question now is, in what sense the word "merit" should be understood when it is spoken of eternal life and heavenly glory? We answer: in the former sense, by which it denotes a gratuitous reward, which Lyra also observed in John chapter 10, at the words: "But the hireling flees," where he teaches that the good shepherd looks to the gratuitous reward of heavenly glory, whereas the hireling looks to the advantage of the present life and temporal things. And he deduces this explanation from the distinction between merit properly so called and that which is broadly called merit. For he says thus: "Heavenly glory is not properly called a merit, but only broadly, inasmuch as everything that is given as a reward for labor is called merit." The reason for this is that inheritance is distinguished from merit properly so called: just as a son, to whom an inheritance is due, is distinguished from a hired worker, to whom a wage is due; but heavenly glory is given to the faithful, as an inheritance to sons: for which reason it does not have the nature of merit.

9. As for the individual passages cited, in none of them does "merit" signify a reward on account of works.

10. For in Isaiah 40:10, the discourse is not about merited rewards, but gratuitous ones; indeed, not only about gratuitous rewards, but about any benefits of the Messiah: such as He would bestow most abundantly in His first advent. Therefore, in verse 2 of that chapter, the Prophet says: The Lord will render to His spiritual Jerusalem, in which consolation is received (Isaiah 66:13), for all our sins, contrary to their merit, taking occasion to do good to us as wretched and in need of help, that He will render double: both forgiveness of sins and impunity, and salvation by grace and glory. For these things are said to be proper to the Gospel, the sum of which He comprehends in those verses of this chapter; and indeed He requires from the spiritual Jerusalem nothing else than that it acknowledge itself in need of salvation and seek and apprehend it outside itself in Christ; and He promises benefits by which He rewards His faithful gratuitously, not by their merit, but by His own, which He merited for them, and after faith imputes to them, and by which He rewards them. Let the parallel passage Isaiah 62:11 be referred to here: "Say to the daughter of Zion: Behold, your Savior comes; behold, His reward is with Him, and His work before Him."

11. Similarly, the saying in Jeremiah 31:16 does not confirm what the Jesuit intends. For neither does "merit" in this place signify a merited reward, but a gratuitous one; much less does it mean that eternal life is a reward due from merit. For God, speaking through the Prophet to His people, understands by "work" opposed to "merit" either serious repentance; or the misery of captives in Babylonian servitude; or the afflictions and martyrdoms of the pious in the New Testament, prefigured by the Babylonian captives. If you understand it as the repentance of captives, that work will not be meritorious of reward: because even according to the doctrine of the Pontificians, condign reward for repentance is not remission of sins: since it is received gratuitously, and therefore this is not merit properly so called for repentance. But if "work" is taken for misery and affliction, likened to the difficult and hard labor of a hireling or soldier—who must not only endure various difficulties and adversities but also daily observe a very image of death—as the Jesuit Sanctius observes this trope; even so it cannot be proven that such

work is that on account of which a reward is given by debt: because the reward said here is liberation from captivity—both Babylonian and spiritual (the former signified by it as a type)—both of which are gratuitous. Hence mention is often made in this very chapter of grace (v. 2–3) and heartfelt mercy (v. 30). Therefore, the merit opposed to work in this place is unmerited and gratuitous; which assertion is also confirmed by verses 9 and 10, where this merit is said to be given to sons; but the merit of sons is not merited merit but gratuitous. Cornelius à Lapide specifically explains these words concerning the infants slain by Herod, to whom Matthew chapter 2 verse 17 refers the preceding verse of this prophecy: whose work was martyrdom; but the merit was the palm of martyrdom. But understood in this way, the merit is gratuitous. For infants cannot merit eternal life, according to Bellarmine's own hypothesis (book 5 on justification, chapter 3, section "but if," and chapter 17, section "furthermore"). And if, according to Cornelius à Lapide's hypothesis, what Baptism is to other infants, martyrdom was to these infants; but to other infants salvation is given gratuitously through Baptism; therefore, according to the Pontifical hypothesis, salvation given to these little ones through martyrdom is gratuitous.

12. In the passage of Matthew 5:12, 1 Corinthians 3:8, and Revelation 22:12, the term "eternal reward" refers not to eternal life itself, but to degrees of glory within eternal life. Therefore, the argument used by some to prove a double title and a double right to obtain eternal life is irrelevant, especially since Bellarmine himself argues that degrees of glory are given only on the basis of the title of reward.

13. Indeed, Bellarmine, in his work "De Justificatione," book 5, chapter 3, seeks to prove from Matthew 5:12, compared with verse 10 of the same chapter, that eternal life itself is called a reward: "Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." But this verse is not parallel; there is only a certain similarity in that both speak of enduring persecution, but there is a difference in the rewards mentioned: in verse 10, the kingdom of heaven is promised to martyrs, while in verse 12, a reward in heaven is promised. The former is given freely and equally

to all for the sake of Christ, apprehended by faith; the latter, however, is unequal, according to different degrees of persecution.

14. Similarly, in 1 Corinthians 3:8, the reward that each laborer in building the house of the Lord receives is his own. But eternal salvation is common to all who build upon the foundation, which is Christ—even to those who suffer loss in their work, having learned by the outcome that they built with straw and stubble, yet retained the foundation.

15. Finally, in Revelation 22:12, there is no mention of eternal life when the Son of God says that His reward is with Him at His second coming, to give to each according to his work—or as the Old Latin version and Luther render it, "according to his works," that is, according to the differences in labor within each one's calling and cross. But eternal life is given equally to all through faith in Christ. Hence, in verse 14, the blessed are described by the general condition of keeping the commandments of Christ—namely, all who have the glory, right, and authority to the tree of life and to enter the city through the gates.

16. The general response to each of these passages is this: The texts that do not deal with eternal life itself cannot use the promised reward to signify eternal life. But these texts do not deal with eternal life itself. Therefore, the reward promised in these texts cannot signify eternal life itself.

17. Finally, in Colossians 3:24, the Apostle does not make eternal life both a free gift and a merited reward, even though he calls it "the reward of the inheritance." For he does not use both words properly: "reward" or "recompense" is taken improperly, while "inheritance" is taken properly. "You will receive the reward of the inheritance"—that is, the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom, which will be like a reward, by a Hebrew figure of speech (hypallage). This is a metaphor: just as a reward is not given to workers until after the work is completed, so the eternal life inheritance is not given until after the labors and hardships of this life. The reason why both words cannot be understood properly is that heirs and sons, by free adoption, merit nothing. But eternal life is given to the sons of God as those having a right of inheritance to the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, eternal

life cannot at the same time be properly called a reward. Nevertheless, the Apostle chose to use this metaphorical expression because this figure was suited to the exhortation directed to servants, whom he commands to serve their masters heartily, as serving the Lord Christ and not men. In this sense, Estius comments on this passage: "Although perhaps little or no reward is to be expected from the men whom you serve—much less an inheritance, which men give only to their sons—you ought nevertheless to be certain that you will receive from Christ the Lord an outstanding reward: namely, the very inheritance of sons." As if to say: He will make you, for the service which He will reckon as rendered to Himself, sons of God from servants, and will admit you to the fellowship of the inheritance of sons. Yet immediately afterward, Estius, as if ignoring the proper sense, presses the proper meaning of the word "antapodosis," which he wants in this place to signify a merited reward.

18. The same metaphor is used in the terms "misthapodotes" (rewarder) in Hebrews 11:6, and "misthapodosia" (recompense) in Hebrews 10:35 and 11:26—because God is said to reward believers, which is done only by grace.

Matthew 20:8, 19. There remains one passage in Matthew 20 which is urged as a principal one, where in the parable the head of the household commands the steward: "Call the laborers and pay them their wages," verse 8.

Reply: Can it therefore be concluded from this that the term "wages" signifies either eternal life or a reward owed on account of works?

20. Neither of these can be inferred from the words spoken. Not the first: For this denarius and this wage is received either in the heavenly Church or in the Church militant. But it is not in the heavenly Church. The proof of the minor proposition is strengthened by the following reasons from the text:

I. The vineyard into which the laborers are called to toil is not heaven or the Church triumphant. But this denarius is paid in the vineyard into which the laborers are called to toil. Therefore, this denarius is not paid and received in heaven. The reason for the major is that in heaven there is no place for

labors, troubles, or heat. In that vineyard there is place for labors, troubles, and the heat of the cross. Therefore, this vineyard is not heaven.

II. Where there are no murmurers against Christ, there this wage is not paid: In the heavenly Church there are no murmurers against God, nor any who have an evil eye—that is, who envy others equality in spiritual salvation. For “evil eye” by metonymy of the sign denotes envy. Hence also foul envy is called ζηλος and συγχεωσύνη, a grim look. Surely the blessed ever praise God, and among them, although distinguished by different degrees of glory (1 Corinthians 15:40–42), there is the highest concord, no rivalry, as Augustine explains in *Enchiridion*, chapter 95. Therefore, in the heavenly Church this wage is not paid.

21. Nor should it be objected from the preceding words, explaining the immediate occasion of the parable (Matthew 19:28), that whatever the Lord lists among the rewards awaiting his disciples ought to be understood by the wage promised to the laborers in the vineyard. For the Lord numbers eternal life among the rewards awaiting his disciples. Therefore, eternal life also ought to be understood by the wage promised to the laborers in the vineyard.

Reply: The Lord indeed expressly names eternal life when he recounts the rewards awaiting his disciples, but he adds “in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory.” This determination does not pertain to the preceding text so that “regeneration” is to be taken metonymically for the preaching of the Gospel carried out by the Apostles, through which the world was as it were reborn and renewed, as Hilary would have it; but it must be referred to the following words and understood concerning the future age and resurrection to life, as is proved by the harmony of parallel passages (Mark 10:30 and Luke 18:30), in which Christ promises eternal life to be given in the future age. Hence also the Syriac version at Matthew 19:28 renders “in the regeneration” as “in the new age.” Therefore, in that verse 28 of chapter 19, by “eternal life” cannot be understood a right to eternal life, but rather the very enjoyment of eternal life itself.

22. From this arises a new means of proving the conclusion that the denarius or wage promised to the laborers does not signify eternal life itself. When the final regeneration has not yet occurred, nor is the new age present but still future, then what is given to Christ's disciples in place of a wage is not eternal life itself, considered with respect to its possession. But when labor occurs in the Lord's vineyard, the final regeneration has not yet occurred, nor is the new age present but still future. Therefore, at that time what is given to Christ's disciples in place of a wage is not eternal life itself, considered with respect to its possession.

23. What then, you will say, ought to be understood by the denarius and wage given to the laborers? Indeed, Cornelius Jansen in *Concordia Evangelica*, chapter 101, denies that the identity of the denarius and equality of wage suits Christ's purpose and what is signified by the parable; he holds that an equal wage given to the first and last is not to be understood in the matter signified by the parable; and therefore he thinks it should be omitted, as suitable only to the human example itself, and that we should not inquire what is meant by

However, among other things, this is also the Lord's purpose: to show that the common rewards given to the Elect are in a certain sense equal, yet sufficient for all, so that they should not seem less to the just, even if compared with those who labored more or achieved greater things, or with those who labored less.

24. Therefore, by the same denarius and the same wage, we understand spiritual salvation and the right to eternal life. For both this and that are received only in this life, where Christ's vineyard exists and labor is performed. The identity of the denarius can be applied to both. Moreover, the occasion of this parable confirms it: first, the more remote occasion, when Christ promises the young man that he will have treasure in heaven if he sells all and follows Him (Matthew 19:21); and second, the nearer occasion, which is the promise of a hundredfold reward (v. 29). For we argue thus:

The good that is promised to the young man who follows Christ in this life corresponds to the denarius in the parable and is treasure in heaven.

The right to eternal life (Matthew 6:20) and hope (v. 21) are treasure in heaven.

Therefore, the right and hope of eternal life are the good promised to the young man who follows Christ and correspond to the denarius in the parable.

The minor premise is proved: What the young man would possess as soon as he sold all, gave to the poor, and followed Christ is treasure in heaven.

But the young man would possess the right and hope of eternal life as soon as he followed Christ. Refer here to Matthew 6:21.

Therefore, the right and hope of eternal life are treasure in heaven.

25. But enough about the first proposition, which was:

In this passage, the wage does not signify eternal life itself, but the right to eternal life together with spiritual salvation.

Now follows the second proposition, which was:

The right to eternal life is not a wage in the proper sense, but a free gift.

26. This is likewise proved by the preceding and following parts of the text in Matthew; also by the occasion and purpose, as well as by the Savior's exclamation and its reason.

27. The first argument is supplied by the identity of the denarius and the inequality of the workers. For although they entered the vineyard at different hours and thus performed unequal labors, nevertheless they receive one denarius equally—even those called at the last hour (v. 9)—because the Lord of the vineyard wishes to give to the last as to the first (v. 14), and He testifies that this is lawful for Him: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own?" (v. 15). That is to say: I am not bound to explain to you the reasons for this free act of mine; let it suffice for you that I will it so; and that I do not will otherwise lies within my freedom. But if the due wage

were to be reckoned by strict right, some ought to have received a quarter of a denarius, others a half, others more than half a denarius.

28. Indeed, Bellarmine (in his books on Justification, ch. 19) and likewise Cajetan on this passage think that the other workers were given the whole denarius beyond what was due. But then it would follow that the first workers were given their wage according to merit—which the Lord of the vineyard expressly denies (v. 15). Secondly, it would follow that the others had merited the denarius not entirely, but in part—the absurdity of which is shown by the following arguments.

29. Maldonatus objects against this argument in another way: that the labors of these workers were indeed unequal in duration, but equal in work. But that this objection has no force is proved by the complaint of the first workers: for they would have had no cause for indignation and murmuring against the master of the house if the labors of the other workers had been equal in work. And the master of the house would not have alleged his goodness as the reason for the unequal distribution, but rather the worthiness of the labor or equality of merit.

30. The second argument is supplied by the impulsive cause of giving an equal reward—or equal denarius—to those who labored unequally. For the Lord says to the envious complainers: “Is your eye evil because I am good?” Now that goodness of God, shadowed forth by this goodness of the master of the household, is not only gracious but also gratuitous; because if He had wished to give a wage on account of labors, the later workers ought to have received less than the earlier ones—indeed, the last would scarcely have received a twelfth part of a denarius.

In this way, Bonus understands the voice of Prosper concerning the calling of the nations, Book 1, Chapter 17, where he applies this parable to the free rewards of God, which are bestowed upon the children of God. God illustrated the variety of His manifold calling, all pertaining to one grace, by that rule of the Gospel comparison, in which He shows the master of a household hiring workers for the vineyard at different times under the agreement of a denarius, by which is signified the equality of eternal life.

Here, without doubt, those brought into the vineyard at the eleventh hour were made equal to the workers of the whole day. These, especially the strong ones of whom we now speak—whom divine indulgence counted in order to commend the excellence of grace, at the failing of the day and the close of life—are not paid a reward for labor, but rather God pours out the riches of His goodness upon those whom He chose without works. This is so that even those who sweated in much labor and received no more than the last might understand that they received the gift of grace, not the wages of works. Therefore, John Ferus, a Minorite, who according to the testimony of Sixtus of Siena in Book 14 of his **Bibliotheca** was a man subtly learned in divine literature and wrote pious and erudite works, not without reason warns in this place: “If, therefore, you wish to preserve the grace and favor of God, make no mention of your merits.”

III. A reason can be drawn from the nature of this reward: That which is given through justification and free adoption—that is, what is purely gratuitous—is not obtained by right of merit. But indeed, this denarius is given through justification and free adoption. Therefore, this denarius is a purely gratuitous reward. The minor premise is established as follows: Spiritual blessedness and the right to eternal life are not given except through justification and free adoption. This denarius is spiritual blessedness and the right to eternal life. Therefore, this denarius is a purely gratuitous reward and, consequently, is not given by right of merit or under the title of earned wages. The major premise of the prosyllogism is conceded even by the Pontificians themselves. For although the Pontificians define justification differently than we do, nevertheless they agree with us in this: that works preceding justification are not meritorious works of condignity. The minor premise, moreover, is clear from what has been said before.

IV. The occasion of the parable provides a reason, both more remote and more proximate. The more remote occasion is the spiritual state of the young Pharisee, arrogating to himself perfect and complete observance of the divine law and, on account of his works, wishing to have eternal life (Matthew 19:16–20). For after he asked the Lord, “What good must I do to have eternal life?” he first received a response fitting to the matter itself—about which the question was asked—and to the hypothesis of one disputing,

wishing to be justified by works: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.” Of these, the Lord enumerates some from the second table of the Decalogue, presupposing the commandments of the first table as the foundation of love for neighbor. Then the young man, with haste according to Pharisaic teaching, replied: “All these I have kept from my youth. What do I still lack?” Then the Lord adds another response, which is *ad hominem* (v. 29). Now it is clear that this response partly consists in a refutation and denial of his audacious and false assertion: “One thing you lack” (Mark 10:21), as Luke recounts (Luke 18:22): “You still lack one thing,” namely, for eternal life. By these words, He argues that he is far from that perfection which he had imagined for himself. Indeed, Mark (10:21) relates that the Lord loved this young man, but from this it ought not be inferred that his boastful response about complete fulfillment of the divine law was not vain and false at that time. For these words are truly to be understood not in a composite sense—as if Christ loved him insofar as he was false and vain—but in a divided sense: that Christ loved him—however false he was—yet as one drawn away from the common error which the Jews held about justification, and as one somehow desirous of learning and concerned about his salvation. Partly, however, it consists in convicting him of his own imperfection by his own experience. For this reason, the Lord says to him: “If you wish to be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven”—that is, the right and hope of a gratuitous reward—“and come, follow me” (Matthew 19:21; Mark 10:21). O who...

He adds: taking up the cross. The author of the unfinished work paraphrases the constancy of Christ’s entire response as follows:

“One thing remains for you”—as if to say: “I know indeed that you have lied; nevertheless, I accept it as if true. If, therefore, you have kept all those things from your youth, in order to become perfect, go and sell, etc.”

33. Christ’s refutation can be framed thus:

If by doing good, or on account of works, you wish to enter the kingdom of heaven, you must be perfect in every way in keeping the Law. For the words

“If you wish to be perfect” (Matthew 19:21) do not indicate a greater perfection or a higher degree of reward to be expected from selling one’s goods, but rather the perfection of obedience—both in its parts and in all degrees owed to the Law—so that the sense is: “If you wish to observe and fulfill the Law of God perfectly.”

But you are not perfect. Therefore, you cannot enter the kingdom of heaven on account of divinely commanded works.

The minor premise the young man immediately recognized from the outcome: when commanded to sell his possessions and give to the poor, he went away sorrowful, unwilling to leave his belongings and follow Christ (Matthew 19:22; Mark 10:22; Luke 18:27). And for this reason, he was in danger concerning his salvation (Matthew 19:23–25; Mark 10:23; Luke 18:24).

34. Hence we argue as follows:

Works that are imperfect cannot bring anyone eternal life.

But all good works are imperfect.

Therefore, eternal life cannot be obtained on account of any good works.

35. We proceed also to an argument that can be drawn from the immediate occasion of this parable, which was the disciples’ questioning of Christ. In their name, Peter protests that they themselves had done what the young man refused to do—they had left everything and followed Christ. Therefore he asks: “What then shall we have?”—as if to say: Is it enough that we should have eternal life, which that young man, by leaving you, did not receive? Or is something more to be expected besides?

Christ therefore answers those who, for the sake of His name (Matthew 19:29), or for His sake and the Gospel’s (Mark 10:29), or as Luke says (Luke 18:29), for the sake of the kingdom of God, had forsaken all things, promising rewards both in the next life and in this one.

In the next life they will receive rewards:

- Accidental rewards, which are special and exalted degrees of heavenly glory and judicial authority (v. 28). Indeed, all the faithful will judge the world—that is, the ungodly (1 Corinthians 6:2)—and will sit on Christ’s throne; yet in this very glory the prophets and apostles will have a prerogative (Daniel 9:24; Revelation 4:8; 20:4; Luke 22:30).

- Essential rewards: “They will inherit eternal life”—they will possess it by right of inheritance (Matthew 19:29).

In this life He promises them hundredfold rewards—that is, various and abundant, as Luke explains—including:

- Temporal rewards, but with the limitation Mark adds: “with persecutions,” or as theological language puts it, “with the exception of the cross.”

- Spiritual rewards: such as salvation, grace, the right to the kingdom of heaven and its continuation, increase of faith and hope and eternal gifts.

And for leaving home, father, mother, wife, children, or fields, He has most generously repaid them: He Himself became their Father; they received the Church as mother in their adoption as sons of God; Christ as brother; and others in Christ as spiritual brothers. And so they possessed God dwelling in them—a wealth that far surpasses all the treasures of this world. They also had full right and title to be content with God alone and His grace, whatever earthly things had to be left behind (Philippians 4:11; 1 Timothy 6:6).

36. From this we draw the following conclusion:

Those to whom eternal life is promised in the age to come—to be given as an inheritance and a free reward after they have forsaken all temporal goods for Christ’s sake—do not receive it as a reward owed on account of works, or as a wage properly so called.

To the apostles, after they forsook all temporal goods for Christ’s sake, eternal life is promised in the age to come as a gift or inheritance...

It is given as an inheritance and a truly gratuitous reward. Therefore, the Apostles do not receive eternal life as a reward owed on account of their works, or as wages properly so called.

37. A minor premise is found in Matthew 19, verse 30. For the word which Mark uses is λαβεῖν, and Luke uses ἀπολαβεῖν, but Matthew employs the verb κληρονομεῖν—to possess an inheritance by right—and thus he more specifically explains the title by which eternal life is promised to be received by them.

38. But if the Apostles did not merit eternal life but received it as a free reward, much more will other believers obtain eternal life gratuitously, because the Apostles labored more than others. Therefore, the Savior's response is suited not only to the Apostles but to all who have forsaken their possessions for the sake of Christ and the Gospel; and it is expressed by a general statement: "everyone who has forsaken," Matthew 19:29; "there is no one who has left," Mark 10:29–30; and Luke in nearly the same way: "There is no one who has left, who will not receive many times more." Likewise, elsewhere the Holy Spirit testifies that eternal life is received by all believers as heirs: Matthew 25:34; Romans 8:17; Hebrews 6:27; 1 Peter 1:4. But if the very possession of eternal life is gratuitous, no less gratuitous will be the reward of spiritual life and the right to eternal life, which believers obtain in this world, and which are the chief rewards among the hundredfold, or, as Luke 18:30 says, the "manifold" benefits with which He freely compensates them for these martyrdoms.

39. Fifth, a principal argument can be drawn from the scope of this parable, which is to confirm the admonition that Christ attaches to the promise made to the disciples against spiritual pride: "But many who are first, who seem to themselves or in the eyes of others to be first, namely in dignity, will be last," that is, they will be held in no account. For what is more abject than one whom God does not receive into His grace? "And the last, that is, the lowest, namely those who in their own eyes or in the eyes of others seem to be such, will be first" in the eyes of God. As the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4:9: "I think that God has exhibited us apostles as last," that is, such as are most abject in the world's sight, so that everyone puffs himself up above us. The Lord repeats this prophetic statement in Matthew 20:16 in the application of the parable, signified by the adverb ἔσχατος ("last") and the causal conjunction γὰρ ("for"), which refers back to verse 1 of chapter 20, where the transference of the similitude begins.

40. Hence arises the following argument: Whoever are like the last workers and are opposed to those who wished to be rewarded above others on account of their labors, they have eternal life gratuitously. But those who are last in their own eyes are like the last workers in the vineyard and are opposed to those who wished to be rewarded above others and on account of their works. Therefore, those who are last in their own eyes have eternal life gratuitously and not from merit.

41. The reason for the major premise is that this parable is brought forward by Christ to confirm by its example the statement which He added as a warning epiphonema to His promise in Matthew 19. Now, the last workers merit nothing because they labor only one hour, and yet they themselves receive the denarius.

42. We illustrate the minor premise in this way: Whoever acknowledge their own unworthiness and that they can merit nothing by their works on account of the imperfection of those works—they seek all salvation and the right to eternal life in the gratuitous good pleasure of God and the merit of Christ. But those who are last in their own eyes acknowledge their unworthiness, etc. Therefore, those who are last in their own eyes seek all salvation not in their own works but in the grace of God. On the other hand, those who presume upon their own works as meritorious of eternal life—these, rejected by God, fall away from the inheritance and are far from the kingdom of heaven, however much for a time they themselves were first, that is, sons and heirs of God, or at least seemed to themselves to be such.

43. Finally, a sixth argument can be drawn from the rationale of Christ's epiphonema: "For many are called, but few are chosen." That for which we are chosen by God from eternity, unto a reward, that alone is gratuitous. We are chosen by God from eternity unto salvation, as unto a reward. Therefore, salvation is solely gratuitous. The major premise is clear from the nature of election, which is solely gratuitous: Romans 11:5–6, 22; Ephesians 1:5–7; 2 Timothy 1:9–10; "not from works," in the same passages and Romans 9:11.

44. From here we proceed by argument: Those who are set forth as an example of free election and receive eternal life freely, through them it is

signified that the right to eternal life is received not by merit, but freely. Now, certain workers in the vineyard are set forth as an example of free election. Therefore, through certain workers in the vineyard it is signified that eternal life is received freely.

45. But against this explanation of the text—by which the reward is said to be understood as a free gift—the Jesuit Maldonatus heaps up a great pile of objections; however, it is not difficult to refute these, both from the parable itself and from its occasion.

Maldonatus's arguments can be reduced to this syllogism:

What someone receives 1) by a definite agreement, 2) as compensation for labor, 3) as his own, and 4) by justice, he has by right of merit and as a reward properly so called.

But the workers in the vineyard receive a reward 1) by a definite agreement, 2) for labor (whence they are called workers, verse 1 and 2; likewise verse 6 says: "Why stand you here all the day idle?"), and indeed as compensation for labor, verse 8: "Give them their reward"; 3) as that which is their own, verse 14: "Take what is yours"; 4) and as due by justice.

We can understand the substance of the agreement with those sent into the vineyard at the first hour from the promise given to those who came into the vineyard at the third hour, verse 4: "I will give you what is just"; and the same happens with those sent at the sixth and ninth hours. Finally, to those hired at the eleventh hour, almost the same clause is repeated (which, however, the old Latin version omits, but the Greek sources and the Syriac paraphrase have it): "What shall be just, you shall receive."

Therefore afterward he says to the first called: "Friend, I do you no wrong." Therefore, the reward which the householder gave, the workers received by right of merit and as a reward properly so called.

47. Reply to the major premise by distinction:

I. Not every agreement is under the condition of merit on account of which the reward is received; but some regard only the condition of an instrument,

or even of a bare antecedent. Thus God in baptism promises us that He will work faith in us through this sacrament, and through faith confer grace. Yet neither the supernatural powers given by God for believing, nor the life and salvation of grace are rewards properly so called; nor is our faith a merit or meritorious cause of salvation, but only an instrument apprehending the meritorious cause of salvation.

II. Compensation is twofold: one follows the thing which is rewarded as a bare antecedent; the other, however, occurs not only after works but also on account of works. Thus the preposition “for,” applied to the thing which is rewarded, does not always mean the same as “on account of,” but sometimes denotes the order of a consequent to its antecedent and means the same as “after,” as when obedient children, dying in the flower of age, are said to receive life for temporal death, eternal rest for sorrow. And so compensation is sometimes merited, sometimes gratuitous.

III. Someone can receive something as his good either from his own merit or from the gratuitous imputation of another’s merit.

IV. The justice from which a reward is given is either rigid or strict, or gracious and tempered with mercy.

48. If therefore Maldonatus understands the reward as given on account of labor and as due by right from Christ’s own merit, we grant the major premise and deny the minor. But if he speaks of a reward given indeed after labor, but freely on account of the imputation of Christ’s merit, according to indulgence and justice tempered with mercy, we deny the major premise and grant the minor—to whose fuller explanation we now proceed.

49. I. This agreement is not legal—which promises spiritual and eternal life on account of perfect obedience rendered to the Law—but evangelical, which promises life by grace to the believer on account of Christ’s merit apprehended by faith and imputed by God. Hence Paul says that one reward is imputed as due on account of works, another by grace. For so far is it from the evangelical agreement to promise a reward on account of works that it does not even do so on account of faith, but destines such a reward to be received through faith in Christ.

50. Nor does it stand against this that this agreement is said to be made with workers. For this word does not signify the cause of the reward but denotes an antecedent sign from which it can be recognized who are those who are to receive this reward: namely, those who not only enter the vineyard and labor but also do not grow proud of their labors, nor wish others to be more worthy, thinking they will receive more; nor do they murmur at the equality of the reward, although they bore the burden and heat of the day; and who finally retain that reward.

51. II. Eternal life is called a reward not properly, but metaphorically, as we have taught above; not because it is given on account of works, but because its granting follows labor. Hence, in Hebrew it is called עֶקֶב (a word related to the name עֶקֶב, which means "heel," as the extreme part of the foot), and also רֵמוֹן, that is, "end," in Proverbs 23:18; and by synecdoche of the species, it denotes the final cause and the fruit arising from the final cause. Also, "reward." Most specifically, however, it denotes a reward that is earned. But in this passage, we have previously shown that "reward" denotes not an earned but a gratuitous reward: because the master of the vineyard does not pay a price for labor, but out of his own abundance and goodness (Matthew 20:15), according to his free good pleasure (v. 15), he makes equal both those who have worked only one hour and those who have borne the burden of the day (v. 12). Moreover, those very ones who receive this reward are in their own eyes last and nothing; as they cannot, so they do not even wish to allege merits on account of which the reward is given to them; but by the grace of God they are first in dignity, which does not befall the self-righteous and hirelings. Finally, they are chosen (v. 16), and these alone are rewarded; and this happens only by grace, because election was not made according to works, but from the pure grace of God.

52. Although even those who murmur are said to have received a reward, nevertheless this is to be understood thus: either because they could indeed have received it, yet were unwilling to accept the equal denarius; or because they received spiritual salvation and the right to eternal life for a time, but afterward, puffed up by their works and trusting in them, they rendered themselves destitute of that gratuitous reward, becoming last before God, that is, rejected and disinherited. Therefore also then, after it is mentioned

that the last have already received the denarius (v. 9), nevertheless the master of the house says that he will give to the last as to the first (v. 14).

53. III. Since therefore the promised reward is gratuitous and founded on the evangelical covenant, it follows also that those who become partakers of this reward receive what is theirs, but by grace; or what belongs to them on account of the merit of Christ, imputed by God through faith, not what is owed to them on account of works. And in this latter way it is truly asserted that this reward is given as unmerited and is not due by reason of works, just as in the midst of the darkness of Papacy, Simon of Cassia (who died in the year of Christ 1348) saw this when, on the words of this parable, "Call the workers and give them their reward" (Matthew 20:8), he commented thus: "The Lord spoke with a moderated word when he does not add 'their own,' because no one merits a reward from works undertaken, nor his own reward. Therefore he does not add 'their own,' but only 'reward,' which from eternity he himself determined to give to just workers."

54. IV. The justice of God, by which he distributes rewards and bestows eternal life, is not only universal justice or rectitude, by which he fittingly and as befits his wisdom carries out all things, but also particular justice, by which to each is rendered what is his. However, this is not to be taken so nakedly and simply of strict and rigid justice, by which he wills to give eternal life to those who render perfect obedience to the Law, but of the justice of God tempered by his mercy. Moreover, the justice of God is shown in the justification of sinful man before God by two evidences: I. That he willed sins to be expiated and men reconciled not except through the blood and merit of his Son. II. That also on account of Christ's merit he wills to receive no one into grace except him who apprehends that merit by faith.

55. By this justice, therefore, which acts not according to rigor but according to the nature of the Gospel, God rewards believers. For since justification is a judicial act of God; therefore the most just God by justice tempered by his mercy adjudges the reward to believers on account of the righteousness of Christ imputed to them by faith, and thus renders to each of the believers what is theirs by imputation.

56. And on account of this tempering of justice and divine mercy, believers are said both to be rewarded gratuitously and by justice (2 Timothy 4:8). Gratuitously, on account of the grace of Christ's merit through imputation by faith. By justice, on account of the most perfect obedience of Christ, which he rendered for us to this end: that by faith it might be imputatively ours and render us worthy of eternal life and other rewards of God. This Bernard also teaches in Sermon 14 on Psalm 92: "You have been saved gratuitously as far as pertains to you, and for nothing; but as regards him (Christ), clearly not gratuitously, not for nothing."

57. When indeed some orthodox theologians call justification...

57. In the Pauline passages concerning the righteousness of those who receive, some theologians understand the righteousness of God in a strict sense—that is, truthfulness, faithfulness, and constancy in promises—but not simultaneously regarding righteousness in deeds. They interpret it as the righteousness by which, according to the rigor of the Law, God would distribute a reward to those who rendered the most perfect obedience to the Law.

58. Therefore, according to this gratuitous mercy by which the righteousness that rewards believers is tempered, God does no injury to any of the faithful from the moment He gives them spiritual and eternal life, no matter how diverse their labors, afflictions, and martyrdoms may have been. For as Johannes Ferus rightly teaches on Matthew 20: where nothing is owed on account of works, but all things are given by grace, there can be no injury, and no one can complain about what has been granted to him.

59. Bellarmine himself acknowledges this in Book 2, On Grace and Free Will, Chapter 3: "If God should wish to give someone a greater reward or a lesser punishment, it is not partiality, even if He does not do so for all, since this is not a matter of justice but of liberality, according to the saying: 'Friend, I do you no wrong.'" The same Jesuit asserts in Book 3, On Justification, Chapter 16: "God does no injury to one to whom He has rendered the due reward, if out of kindness He gives an equal or greater reward to another." And in Book 5, On Justification, Chapter 19: "By the

words ‘I do you no wrong; did you not agree with me for a denarius?’ it is signified that the reward is given not out of justice but out of liberality.” Nevertheless, Bellarmine here attempts to introduce a certain distinction by saying in Book 5, Chapter 18: “God would absolutely do no injury to the just if He deprived them of the reward of justice; yet on the hypothesis that God would do an injury if He had promised eternal life for good works and did not render it according to that agreement.” We reply: It is true that we respond to the Jesuit that there is no promise by which eternal life is promised after the Fall on account of works, since after the Fall such merit through works is impossible (Romans 8:4).

60. The second foundation of proofs by which Maldonatus demonstrates that the reward properly so called is to be understood here is drawn from the occasion of the parable. To the one asking about the way to possess eternal life, a treasure in heaven is promised if he sells all and follows Christ (Matthew 19:21). Likewise, to him who asks what he may expect for forsaking all and following Christ, rewards in this life and the next are promised (verses 25, 29); eternal life is given to him as a reward properly so called. But to the rich young man asking about the way to possess eternal life, a treasure in heaven is promised if he sells all; and to Peter asking what he and the other disciples should expect for forsaking all, a hundredfold reward in this age and in the age to come, eternal life, is promised (Matthew 19:28–29); and to them eternal life is promised not as a gratuitous reward but as one earned.

61. Reply: These arguments have already been abundantly refuted when we examined both the remote and immediate occasion of this parable. Now we only repeat that the phrase by which a reward is said to be given for some deed or work does not signify a causal proportion, such as that of merit to earned reward—especially a special merit—but a proportion of order, by which eternal life is given after works, with only a prerequisite order of sequence.

62. Specifically, in response to the example of the young Pharisee, which is the remote occasion of the parable, we reply: Whoever has not rendered perfect obedience to the Law of God cannot in any way obtain eternal life by

doing good on account of works or by his own merit. But this young man's obedience to the Law of God was not perfect. The minor premise is shown by the text from the method Christ used to convict him of his imperfection.

63. For the Lord acts as a probing disputant with a self-righteous man who thought he had kept the Law of God in all things from his youth. And when he further asked, "What do I still lack?" he did not doubt that he could perform more and greater things.

64. Indeed, by a singular command He ordered him, first, to sell all his possessions and give to the poor; and second, also to follow Christ personally as a disciple—concerning which kind of following we read in Matthew 9:35 and Luke 9:55.

65. By this first personal precept, He willed to lead him to...

He experiences his own imperfection. For whoever loves God with his whole heart also keeps all His commandments—both general and personal—with joy; and whoever loves his neighbor with his whole heart also gives to the poor. But you love neither God nor your neighbor with your whole heart: not God—indeed, prove this love by the simple test of obedience, since I do not command you to lose your life for My sake, nor to endure bodily torment, but only to distribute the proceeds from selling your possessions to the poor. For this discourse of the Lord takes the form of a hypothetical proposition: "If you are perfect and can do all things, sell all that you have and give to the poor." Nor do you love your neighbor, since the poor are also included under that term.

Then, in place of a subsumption—"But you do not sell all, nor give to the poor"—He wishes to teach the young man by his own experience the corruption of his inner disposition and his inability to render obedience to this command. For you go away sorrowful, a sorrow which Mark expresses by the word συλλυπούμενος and Luke by the term ἄθυμῶν. From this outcome, therefore, we have proved the conclusion of the practical syllogism: Therefore, you are not perfect; you have not perfectly kept all the precepts of the divine Law.

66. By the second personal precept, which is the call to follow Christ in ministry, He invites him to understand His teaching concerning the true way of obtaining eternal life.

67. For the refutation of the latter premise, which the Jesuit draws from a nearby occasion in the parable—or even from the single word “lacking” (ἀπολείπω) in Matthew 19:20—a brief note is sufficient. For if eternal life were also a merited reward, Christ would not have promised it to His disciples only as an inheritance. Moreover, if it were in addition a reward in the proper sense, Christ—especially in response to Peter’s question about what reward they would receive for their works—would not have omitted this title as a greater incentive, particularly since, according to Bellarmine (Book 5, On Justification, Chapter 3), it is more honorable to have something by merit than by gift alone.

68. Therefore, our assertion stands firm: that in the parable of Matthew 20, the reward signifies a free gift.

PAPAL APHORISM VIII: Since there are various degrees of eternal life, the first degree is held by both titles—inheritance and reward—simultaneously; but the remaining degrees are held only by right of reward and on account of works or merits.

1. Thus argues Bellarmine in Book 5, On Justification, Chapter 17, in the section “Furthermore,” which we have already cited, and in the section “But although.” Moreover, he says: “Since there are various degrees of eternal life, one is owed to the person by right of adoption without any other covenant; the rest are owed to works by promise or by a covenant concerning reward.”

2. Good works are not meritorious either of eternal life itself—which the Jesuit calls the first degree of glory—or of the rewards in eternal life, which he names the remaining degrees of heavenly glory. A single reason suffices to prove this: No work to which sin still adheres can merit anything by divine promise alone. For no promise—except a legal one—promises eternal life and degrees of glory in it on account of works, and indeed only if they are perfectly good. But to the good works of the reborn, sin still adheres

(Romans 7:21; Hebrews 12:1). Therefore, the good works of the reborn are not meritorious.

3. Hence the Savior calls the reborn—that is, those to whom their Father who is in heaven gives good things to those who ask Him (Matthew 7:11) and the Holy Spirit (Luke 11:13)—nevertheless “evil” in terms of the perfection of righteousness.

4. Therefore, good works are not meritorious of glory in heaven, nor are degrees of glory a reward in the proper sense for good works. But He freely compensates the labors and sufferings of this life out of His gracious promise (1 Timothy 4:8). For God promises these degrees of glory to us not on account of works, but only after works. For this reason, good works are not causal or meritorious conditions, nor do they produce any right to a reward; they are conditions of order.

They grant the right to attain degrees of glory in eternal life, and they indicate the order in which God wills to glorify those doing good and suffering for the glory of Christ.

5. If God owed a reward for works, He would repay them not with glory but with punishments, because due to their imperfection and inherent corruption, they deserve wrath, not a reward. That He accepts them insofar as they are the works of His children and does not impute their imperfection is an act of free grace, received through faith in Christ—2 Timothy 1:18; Jude 21. Therefore, there is no other title for receiving heavenly rewards than the free grace of God.

6. For in the acceptance of good works by faith, there is a twofold operation: one primary, whereby through faith people become children of God before they perform good works, and through that same faith their good works are made pleasing to God—for without faith it is impossible to please God (Hebrews 11:6). Works are not pleasing to God because of any inherent goodness, which is imperfect, but insofar as they are the works of God’s children and by the free imputation of Christ’s perfection. The other operation is secondary, whereby good works are the fruits of faith, and God also accepts them as signs and testimonies of true faith in Christ.

7. It is therefore false that good works are divinely accepted as perfect righteousness worthy of the reward of eternal life—as Bellarmine asserts (Book 5 on Justification, Chapter 17). This opinion is far removed from what Paul teaches us in Romans 8:18: “I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed in us.”

8. The Jesuit indeed objects (Book 5 on Justification, Chapter 3), claiming that Paul speaks only of absolute equality and does not deny a proportional parity between sufferings and glory on account of the dignity of charity from which sufferings arise and as they proceed from the Holy Spirit by grace—as he adds in Chapter 18 of that book.

Response: Nevertheless, Paul utterly denies any equality or proportion between degrees of glory and works—even those proceeding from the Holy Spirit and the grace of God—as Fulgentius explains (Book 1 to Monimus). The dignity of charity, or the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and sanctifying grace, does not confer upon the works of the regenerate the power to merit heavenly rewards, as we have explicitly taught in our discussion on justification (Aphorism 6 and following scholia). There are also many other arguments raised by the Roman Catholics on this subject, which have been more fully treated in our second dissertation on justification (Aphorism 10 and scholia).

9. Here we set the boundary of our disputation and the sum of our desires—sighing to God, the source of all mercy, that we may dwell solely in the wounds of Christ as in the clefts of that spiritual Rock, outside of which we do not wish to be found, whether in life or in death.

THANKS BE TO YOU, LORD JESUS!