Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

Thomistic Manual of Theology 4

A Brief Course of Thomistic Theology

Translated by Osvaldo R.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

FR. JEAN-BAPTISTE GONET, O.P.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

A BRIEF COURSE OF THE WHOLE OF
THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

TOME IV.

I. ON THE INCARNATION. II. ON THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.
III. ON THE SACRAMENTS IN PARTICULAR.

LATIN PRINTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
ASSOCIATES, IN ANTWERP, BELGIUM

1726

This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P., of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose defense this indefatigable Thomist consecrated his labors, that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To Saint Thomas Aquinas
and His School.

August 1, 2026.

Osvaldo A. R. | Gpt 5.6
Translator.

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TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE
FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

APPROBATION

Of the Faculty of Theology of the Academy of Bordeaux.

We, the undersigned Chancellor, Doctors of Theology, and Professors of the Academy of Bordeaux, have diligently examined the book entitled Manuale Thomistarum, published by the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Preachers, Professor and Senior Professor of the same Academy. We have found that it contains absolutely nothing contrary or discordant with orthodox faith and Christian morals. On the contrary, as a genuine offspring most worthy of the genius of its Author, who is always like himself, consistent with himself, and most steadfast in explaining and defending the difficulties of the most sacred and angelic doctrine, we have judged that it should be committed to the press as soon as possible. Given at Bordeaux on 16 May 1678.

JOHN FONTENELLE, Chancellor.
FRANCIS ARNALDUS, Augustinian.
ANGELUS LATRIE, Carmelite.
PETER LAHAYE, Doctor of Theology.

APPROBATION

The Reverend Father Gonet had published the immense Shield of Thomistic Theology against its new assailants. But because those assailants were not men who, experienced in the contests of disputation, hurled dangerous blows or greatly formidable weapons, he reduced the Shield, and in place of the immense Shield recently published by him he now fashions against those same assailants a little shield, and a very brief one. Yet its brevity detracts nothing from it; rather, its power is increased, for it is stronger insofar as the weight of its propositions and the arguments concerning its subject matter cohere more closely, are not separated by longer distances, but are joined at nearer intervals. Thus one may say with Tertullian: As much as it is compressed in words, so much is it expanded in meanings. Let the old proverb, therefore, be dismissed: A good book always makes a bad compendium. For this Compendium involves no loss. It is clear despite its brevity, solid despite its subtlety, most worthy of its Author's reputation, and so complete in every respect that it seems to have nothing of a compendium except the title. Thus I judge at Béziers on 19 December 1679.

JULIAN JOSEPH GOURGAS,
Doctor of Sacred Theology and Canon Law of Paris.

LICENSE

Of the Most Reverend Father General.

We, Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Master General and servant of the entire Order of Friars Preachers: greetings.

By the tenor of these presents and by the authority of our office, we grant you, Reverend Father Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Friars Preachers, former Provincial of the Province of Toulouse and Senior Professor at the Academy of Bordeaux, license and faculty to commit the Manuale Thomistarum to print, provided that the work shall have been approved by three Professors of Theology appointed by the Very Reverend Father Provincial of the Province of Toulouse, and provided that all other requirements of law are observed. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. In testimony of which, etc. Given at Rome on 31 July 1677.

Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Master of the Order. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. ANTONINUS CLOCHE, Master and Associate.

COMMISSION

Of the Very Reverend Father Provincial.

We, Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Prior Provincial and servant of the Province of Toulouse of the Order of Friars Preachers, by the tenor of these presents appoint and establish the Reverend Fathers John Leonard Geay, Prior of Béziers, Louis Bancel, and Jerome de Grasse, Professors of Sacred Theology, as censors of the book entitled Manuale Thomistarum, which the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, formerly public Professor at the University of Bordeaux, intends to publish. Given at Valence on 29 October 1679. In testimony of which, we have signed these presents with our own hand and fortified them with the seal of our office.

Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Provincial as above. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. JOHN LAPEIERE, Associate.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Leonard Geay, Professor of Sacred Theology and Prior of the Convent of Béziers. The Shield of Thomistic Theology shone forth from God, so that all the mountains of the Church might gleam with its extraordinary brilliance. Yet just as the sun, when first rising, illuminates the summits of mountains, and in its progress does not disdain to flood the lowliness of the valleys with the rays of its light, so the Author of the Shield, after illuminating the minds of more eminent Doctors with his solar Shield, now hastens by means of his Theological Manual to enlighten even the weaker scholastics. Indeed, in this Manual all the mysteries of Scholastic Theology are seen reduced, as it were, to a compact whole, but with such order, solidity, brevity, and clarity that one may deservedly say of the Disciple's Manual what is commonly proclaimed of the Master's Summa: The style is brief, the eloquence pleasing, the doctrine lofty, clear, and firm. Let this Theological Manual, therefore, come forth into the light. Let it come forth for the relief of Masters, for the consolation of Disciples, and for the more convenient use of all students. Let this Theological Manual be worn by the hands of all. Just as all the sacred Doctors spoke through the mouth of the one St. Thomas, so now, in this Manual, may all Professors of Sacred Theology explain in the Schools the conclusions of the Summa Theologiae through the mouth of one most wise disciple of St. Thomas. These are my wishes, this my judgment, this the vote that I willingly add to this Manual. Given at Béziers on 20 November 1679.

Fr. JOHN LEONARD GEAY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Prior of the Convent of Béziers of the Order of Friars Preachers.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Bancel, of the Order of Preachers, Aggregate Doctor and Perpetual Professor of Sacred Theology in the School of St. Thomas at the University, Examiner for the Diocese and the entire Legation of Avignon, and also General Definitor of the Province of Toulouse of the same Order.

I have always admired the works of our Very Reverend Father Gonet, a Doctor celebrated everywhere. For he has brought the whole of Theology into the light with such clarity that he seems to have written it with the rays of the sun. With such care and industry has he collected within it the choicer testimonies of the Holy Fathers and the more solid and subtle arguments of the Doctors, which are scattered throughout the books of others, that it may with perfect justice be said: he who knows Gonet knows the whole. Only this could still have been desired: that the Author himself should reduce his works to a compendium for the greater convenience of all students. This he has successfully accomplished in his Manual, in which I do not doubt that nothing will be found contrary to faith or good morals, since it is nothing other than the doctrine itself of his Shield of Thomistic Theology. Let this work, therefore, most complete in every respect, come forth before the public, so that all may

Handle it by night and handle it by day.

At Avignon on 6 December 1679. Fr. LOUIS BANCEL, of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Jerome de Grasse, Professor of Sacred Theology and Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

The Shield of Thomistic Theology, comprised in five volumes, was published some years ago by the Very Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, to the great benefit of the whole theological discipline. This excellent work, in every respect consonant with the holy faith, remarkable for its profound and solid doctrine, and delightful for the most abundant flowers of the Holy Fathers scattered throughout it, has been eagerly embraced and honored not only privately by all sacred Professors, but also by the most celebrated sacred Academies of all Europe. This Theological Manual was forged by the labor of the same Author. Being commanded to judge it by the Very Reverend Father Antoninus Massoulié, Provincial of the Province of Toulouse of the Friars Preachers, I would say nothing other than that this Theological Manual is the true and genuine epitome of the Theological Shield. In it, purity of doctrine, in complete agreement throughout with the faith and oracles of the Holy Apostolic See, choice and elegance of propositions, and the flowers of the Holy Fathers, which shine more diffusely throughout the Theological Shield, shine in the Manual more narrowly and compactly indeed, but also more preciously. Thus I judge at Avignon on 3 December 1679.

Fr. JEROME DE GRASSE, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

EULOGY

Let the most learned men of Europe heap innumerable praises upon GONET. Let the Spaniards proclaim his profundity, the Italians his charm, the Germans admire his labor, and the French his clarity. Let others, finally, extol the various gifts of his genius with various encomiums. For my part, and insofar as a sober man may do so, I shall praise his modesty and reserve. The rarer this virtue is among the more learned, the more praiseworthy it is in this most learned man, in whom it is found in the highest degree. By this principal ornament of the soul, and by his other riches of genius, he is most like the Angelic Thomas. GONET may therefore be called, not inelegantly, the Second Hope of the Great Order of Preachers. It was not enough for him, through his marvelous clarity, to illuminate the minds of all more brightly than the sun; by this Epitome he enables all students to become theologians in a short time. Restrain yourself, Very Reverend Father: you are distinguished by excessive clarity, and labor too much to write Theology in a laconic style. By your lucid discourse you disclose to all the hidden mysteries of this science; by this brevity of speech you open them to all as though in a single glance. You were easy to understand; you will be easier still. Finally, your Manual will be in the hands of all. Yet proceed, I beg you, Reverend Father. The knowledge of God can never become known too much or too quickly. Hail, therefore, new light of Thomistic Theology; hail, Thomas of our Age, most humble son of Dominic and richest heir of his virtue; unconquered Opponent of the Innovators, pillar of the Order, glory of your native land, honor of your people, and glory of the Christian world.

CHARLES LEPUL, Doctor of Both Laws, Royal Counselor,
and Assessor of Annual Taxes.

Table of Contents

Tertia Pars

Treatise I.
On the Incarnation of the Divine Word.

Ch. I.	The Possibility and Fittingness of the Incarnation.	3
§ 1.	The Possibility of the Incarnation.	4
§ 2.	The Fittingness of the Incarnation.	7
Ch. II.	The Necessity of the Incarnation.	12
Ch. III.	The Motive of the Incarnation.	16
Ch. IV.	The Essence of the Incarnation.	26
§ 1.	Whether Christ's Person May Be Called Composed of the Divine and Human Natures.	28
§ 2.	The Term of the Action Uniting Humanity with the Divine Word.	30
Ch. V.	The Meritorious Cause of the Incarnation.	33
§ 1.	Whether Christ Could Merit the Hypostatic Union.	34

§ 2.	The Merits of the Blessed Virgin and the Holy Fathers in Relation to the Incarnation.	39
Ch. VI.	On the Assuming Person.	41
§ 1.	How the Divine Word Immediately Terminated the Human Nature.	41
§ 2.	Metaphysical Difficulties Concerning Possible Hypostatic Unions.	44
Ch. VII.	On the Assumable and Assumed Nature.	50
§ 1.	Whether Angels and Irrational Creatures Are Assumable by God.	50
§ 2.	Whether the Word Immediately Assumed All Parts of Human Nature.	55
Ch. VIII.	On Christ's Substantial Grace.	59
Ch. IX.	On Christ's Accidental or Habitual Grace.	62
Ch. X.	On the Perfection of Christ's Grace.	69
Ch. XI.	Whether All Virtues, Gifts, and Gratuitous Graces Were in Christ.	73
Ch. XII.	On Christ's Capital Grace.	78
§ 1.	Resolution of the First Difficulty.	80
§ 2.	The Second Difficulty Resolved and Those of Whom Christ Is Head Explained.	81
§ 3.	The Grace through Which Christ Is Constituted Head.	84
Ch. XII.	On the Blessed Knowledge of Christ's Soul.	86
Ch. XIII.	On the Infused Knowledge of Christ's Soul.	92
§ 1.	The First Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.	94
§ 2.	The Second Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.	96
§ 3.	The Third Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.	101
§ 4.	The Fourth Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.	103
§ 5.	Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine.	105

Ch. XIV.	On Christ's Acquired Knowledge.	106
Ch. XV.	On Christ's Power to Cause Grace and Work Miracles.	109
Ch. XVI.	On Christ's Impeccability.	111
Ch. XVII.	The Harmony of Christ's Freedom with His Impeccability.	117
Ch. XVIII.	On Christ's Merit.	126
§ 1.	Whether and When Christ Merited.	126
§ 2.	What Christ Merited or Could Have Merited for Himself.	128
§ 3.	What Christ Merited for Men and Angels.	133
§ 4.	By Which Acts Christ Merited.	139
Ch. XIX.	On the Satisfaction of Christ.	142
§ 1.	Christ's Satisfaction Was Condign by Its Intrinsic Value.	143
§ 2.	Christ's Satisfaction Was Exceeding and Superabundant.	144
§ 3.	Christ's Operations Had Infinite Satisfactory and Meritorious Value.	146
§ 4.	Christ's Satisfaction Was According to Strict Justice.	150
§ 5.	Christ's Satisfaction Was an Act of Commutative Justice.	154
Ch. XX.	On Christ's Servitude.	156
Ch. XXI.	On Christ's Adoption.	159
Ch. XXII.	On Christ's Predestination.	162

Treatise II.
On the Sacraments in General.

Ch. I.	The Quiddity or Essence of a Sacrament in General.	166
Ch. II.	The Intrinsic and Essential Parts of the Sacraments.	170
Ch. III.	On the Existence or Necessity of the Sacraments.	174

Ch. IV.	On Sacramental Grace.	180
§ 1.	Two Points Certain among All Catholics.	180
§ 2.	The Physical Causality of the Sacraments of the New Law Established.	182
§ 3.	The Objections Resolved.	186
§ 4.	Whether the Sacraments Cause First or Second Grace.	190
Ch. V.	On the Sacramental Character.	193
§ 1.	St. Thomas's Opinion Preferred.	194
§ 2.	The Objections Resolved.	196
§ 3.	The Immediate Subject of the Sacramental Character.	199
§ 4.	Whether the Character Is Naturally Indelible and Incorruptible.	201
Ch. VI.	On the Institutor of the Sacraments.	202
Ch. VII.	On the Minister of the Sacraments.	205
§ 1.	Resolution of the First Difficulty.	208
§ 2.	Resolution of the Second Difficulty.	211
§ 3.	Resolution of the Third Difficulty.	213

Treatise III.
On Baptism and Confirmation.

Ch. I.	When Baptism Was Instituted by Christ.	216
Ch. II.	When the Obligation of Baptism Began.	218
Ch. III.	The Remote and Proximate Matter of Baptism.	221
Ch. IV.	The Form of Baptism.	223
Ch. V.	The Minister of Baptism.	225
Ch. VI.	The Subject of Baptism.	228
Ch. VII.	The Necessity of Baptism.	234
Ch. VIII.	The Effects of Baptism.	238

Ch. IX.	The Reviviscence of Baptism.	241
Ch. X.	On the Baptism of the Spirit and of Blood.	249
Ch. XI.	On Circumcision, Which Was Succeeded by Baptism.	260
Ch. XII.	On the Sacrament of Confirmation.	265
§ 1.	The Existence and Institution of This Sacrament.	265
§ 2.	The Matter, Form, and Effect of This Sacrament.	268
§ 3.	The Minister of This Sacrament.	275

Treatise IV.
On the Most August Sacrament of the Eucharist.

Ch. I.	On the Existence, Essence, Unity, Necessity, and Institution of This Sacrament.	281
§ 1.	The Existence and Essence of This Sacrament.	281
§ 2.	The Unity of This Sacrament.	288
§ 3.	The Necessity of This Sacrament.	290
§ 4.	The Institution of This Sacrament.	293
Ch. II.	The Matter of This Sacrament.	296
Ch. III.	The Real Presence of Christ's Body and Blood in the Eucharist.	305
Ch. IV.	Eucharistic Transubstantiation.	317
§ 1.	The Bread and Wine Are Wholly Converted into Christ's Body and Blood.	318
§ 2.	Transubstantiation Produces Christ's Body in a Determinate Manner.	324
Ch. V.	The Manner in Which Christ Exists in the Eucharist.	330
§ 1.	What Is Contained by the Words and by Concomitance under Each Species.	330
§ 2.	The Sacramental Presence of Christ's Body in the Eucharist.	333

§ 3.	Whether Christ in the Eucharist Can Move, Act, Suffer, or Be Seen Bodily.	337
Ch. VI.	The Eucharistic Accidents.	340
Ch. VII.	How Something Can Be Generated from the Sacramental Species.	342
Ch. VIII.	The Form of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.	346
Ch. IX.	The Effects of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.	358
Ch. X.	The Obligation to Receive the Eucharist.	366
Ch. XI.	Communion under Both Species.	368
§ 1.	Resolution of the First Difficulty.	369
§ 2.	Resolution of the Second Difficulty.	372
Ch. XII.	On the Sacrifice of the Mass.	377
§ 1.	The Mass Has the True and Proper Character of a Sacrifice.	377
§ 2.	The Essence of the Mass Consists in the Consecration.	381

Treatise V.
On the Sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction.

Ch. I.	On Penance as a Sacrament.	388
§ 1.	The Existence of This Sacrament.	388
§ 2.	The Institution of This Sacrament.	391
§ 3.	The Matter and Form of This Sacrament.	394
Ch. II.	On Penance as a Virtue.	397
Ch. III.	On the Effects of Penance.	404
§ 1.	The First Effect: the Remission of All Mortal Sins.	405
§ 2.	Penance Removes Eternal Punishment, Though Temporal Punishment May Remain.	406
§ 3.	The Remission of Venial Sins as the Third Effect of Penance.	411

§ 4.	The Recovery of Virtues and Revival of Merits.	418
Ch. IV.	On Contrition.	427
§ 1.	Whether Perfect Contrition Justifies Apart from the Sacrament.	428
§ 2.	On the Precept of Contrition.	430
§ 3.	Whether Contrition Differs Essentially from Attrition.	432
§ 4.	Whether Charity Is Required for Penance or Supernatural Attrition Suffices.	435
§ 5.	The Principal Foundation of Our Position Explained.	437
§ 6.	The Objections Resolved.	440
§ 7.	Conditions Required for Attrition to Dispose for Justification.	445
Ch. V.	On Sacramental Confession.	446
§ 1.	The Precept of Sacramental Confession.	447
§ 2.	The Minister of Sacramental Confession.	449
§ 3.	The Quality of Sacramental Confession.	451
§ 4.	The Integrity of Sacramental Confession.	452
§ 5.	The Seal of Confession.	456
Ch. VI.	On Sacramental Absolution.	458
Ch. VII.	On Sacramental Satisfaction.	466
Ch. VIII.	On the Sacrament of Extreme Unction.	470
§ 1.	The Existence and Institution of This Sacrament.	470
§ 2.	The Matter and Form of This Sacrament.	472
§ 3.	The Subject and Minister of This Sacrament.	474
§ 4.	The Effects of This Sacrament.	475
§ 5.	Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine.	479

Treatise VI.
On the Sacrament of Holy Orders.

Ch. I.	Holy Orders in General.	481
Ch. II.	The Individual Orders in Particular.	483
Ch. III.	The Essential Matter and Form of the Priesthood and Diaconate.	487
Ch. IV.	The Minister and Subject of the Sacrament of Holy Orders.	491
Ch. V.	The Episcopate.	495

Treatise VII.
On the Sacrament of Matrimony.

Ch. I.	Betrothals.	499
Ch. II.	Matrimony as an Office of Nature.	505
Ch. III.	Matrimony as Having the Nature of a Sacrament.	508
Ch. IV.	The Consent Required for Matrimony.	515
Ch. V.	The Indissolubility of Matrimony.	521
Ch. VI.	On the Impediments to Marriage.	527
§ 1.	On Prohibitive Impediments.	528
§ 2.	On Diriment Impediments.	530
§ 3.	Other Diriment Impediments Briefly Explained.	535

THIRD PART
OF THE MANUALE THOMISTARUM[1].

— PROOEMIUM —

Having completed the first two parts[2] of this Manual, and having explained what pertains to God as the First Principle and Last End, together with the means that of themselves and by their own nature lead to Him, namely human acts, grace, and both the theological and moral virtues, it remains for us in this third part to undertake an explanation of the external means, that is, those depending solely upon God's institution, and to discuss the Incarnation and the Sacraments both in general and in particular.

Therefore, in the first Treatise we shall consider the great and wondrous Mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine Word, which Dionysius calls the ineffable manifestation of JESUS in the flesh; Cyril of Alexandria, the most sacred enigma; Damascene, the new thing among all new things, and the only new thing under the sun; Leo, the great miracle and summit of all miracles; Gregory, the ineffable secret hidden even from the birds of heaven (that is, the Angels). Finally, the Apostle, 1 Tim. 3, calls it the great Mystery of piety, manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen by Angels, preached among the Gentiles, believed in the world, and taken up in glory.

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[1] On God Incarnate and the Institutor of the Sacraments.

[2] Contained in the first 3 tomes of this edition.

We therefore undertake the explanation of this ineffable mystery and begin to contemplate and explain God in the flesh, the sun in a cloud, honey in wax, the whole in a point, greatness in an atom, the Word inscribed upon the parchment of our humanity, dew (as Clement of Alexandria says) condensing into a pearl, and finally, as the Apostle says, the wisdom of God hidden in the mystery of the Incarnation. We do so together with our Angelic Doctor, whose angelic doctrine the Incarnate Word Himself approved three times in words that easily surpass the commendation and approval of all men and of the blessed spirits: YOU HAVE WRITTEN WELL OF ME, THOMAS. He addressed these words to him on three different occasions under the appearance of the Crucified.

TREATISE I.

ON THE INCARNATION OF THE DIVINE WORD.

By the name "Incarnation" is signified the union of humanity and divinity in the one person of Christ. For although humanity is composed of flesh and spirit, the assumption of humanity by the Word is nevertheless appropriately expressed by the name of flesh. First, because in Scripture the whole man is commonly signified by the name of flesh, the part being taken for the whole, as in Gen. 6: *All flesh had corrupted its way*, that is, every man had become depraved and corrupt in conduct. Second, to demonstrate the truth of the Incarnation against the Manichaeans, who denied that the Divine Word assumed flesh. Third, to manifest God's charity toward men, since He humbled and emptied Himself so greatly as to assume that lowly and abject nature of flesh in order to redeem them.

CHAPTER I.

The Possibility and Fittingness of the Incarnation.

Since the existence of the Incarnation is established from what was said in the Treatise on Faith, where we explained the principal motives of credibility for the mysteries of our faith, here we shall discuss only the possibility and fittingness of this mystery, and in the following chapter its necessity.

§ 1.
The Possibility of the Incarnation.

1. I say, therefore, that the mystery of the Incarnation is possible, but that its possibility cannot be known by the natural light.

The first part is certain by faith, since it is certain that this mystery has actually been accomplished: John 1: *The Word was made flesh*; and in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea: *He was incarnate by the Holy Spirit.* The Archangel Gabriel assigned the reason for its possibility in Luke 1, when, addressing the Blessed Virgin and instructing her concerning the possibility of this mystery, he said: *No word shall be impossible with God*, that is, anything that can be conceived by the intellect as not implying a contradiction. But the mystery of the Incarnation involves no contradiction, as will be evident from the solution of the arguments. Therefore it is possible. I add that, since the divine subsistence is infinite and consequently contains in the most eminent and perfect manner every perfection of created subsistence, it can supply for the latter—since this involves no imperfection, as will appear below—and can thus terminate human nature hypostatically, in which the mystery of the Incarnation consists.

2. The second part is gathered from Scripture and the holy Fathers. In Eph. 1 the Incarnation is called *the mystery hidden from the ages in God*, that is, *in the knowledge of God alone*, as the Gloss explains. In Rev. 5 it is called the book that no one in heaven or on earth could open, and whose seal God alone could loose by His revelation. Likewise Dionysius, ch. 2 of *De divinis nominibus*, says that this mystery is *unknown to every intelligence, even to the highest of the Angels*. Cyril of Alexandria, in his epistle to the Queens, says that it is *the most sacred enigma, which no created mind can understand*. Finally, Gregory, cited above, says that it is *an ineffable secret hidden even from the birds of heaven*—that is, from the Angels. Hence Bernard excellently says: *The Sun of eternity, begotten before the morning star amid the splendors of the saints, was born in shadow and darkness from the womb of the Mother overshadowed by the Holy Spirit.* Therefore the blindness of faith alone sees Him, its darkness alone perceives Him, and, as Dionysius says of God, negation alone manifests Him.

3. Reason also supports this. For since the mystery of the Incarnation is supernatural in its very substance and thus infinitely surpasses everything due to nature and every exigency of natural causes, there is no naturally

knowable being that could lead us to knowledge of it as its cause, effect, or sign.

4. You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: Although the divine subsistence is infinite and eminently contains every perfection of created subsistence, it nevertheless cannot terminate human nature. Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation is impossible. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: first, because there must be some proportion between a term and the thing capable of being terminated. But there can be no proportion between human nature and the divine subsistence, since they are infinitely distant, and there is no proportion between a finite distance and an infinite one. Therefore, although the divine subsistence is infinite, it cannot terminate human nature. Second, because the divine essence eminently contains every perfection of humanity, of the soul, of the intellect, and of the light of glory, yet it cannot on that account supply for these things.

5. I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof, I say that, although there is no arithmetical proportion between the finite and the infinite, there is nevertheless a geometrical proportion, for this requires only that the finite be capable of being perfected by the infinite. To the second, having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. All the things enumerated there involve in their concept the imperfection of potentiality or of informing, from which they cannot be separated either absolutely or precisely. It is otherwise with supplying for created subsistence, for the latter either has the character of a pure term, or, if it is in some manner a form, it is not a physical form, which, because it is essentially a part, is something incomplete and dependent upon the composite whole, but a metaphysical form, which does not properly have the character of a part, but of an act and constitutive principle.

6. You will object, second: It is contradictory for God to be changed intrinsically, since immutability is one of the principal attributes of the divine nature. But through the Incarnation He would be intrinsically changed. Therefore it is impossible for God to become incarnate. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved: to be changed is now to be intrinsically disposed otherwise than before. But if God became incarnate, He would be intrinsically disposed otherwise than before, for He would become intrinsically man, whereas previously He was not intrinsically man. Therefore He would be intrinsically changed.

7. Leaving aside the various solutions that we reported and refuted in our *Clypeus*, I answer by denying the minor premise. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise: to be changed is now to be disposed

otherwise than before by receiving into oneself something distinct through a passive and receptive potency; I grant the major premise. It is merely to terminate some nature; I deny the major premise. For since change is the act of that which exists in potency precisely insofar as it is in potency, for something to be changed intrinsically it must intrinsically receive the term produced by the change. Hence, although through the Incarnation God became intrinsically man, which He was not before the Incarnation, nevertheless, because He did not become man by receiving humanity into Himself through a passive potency, but by terminating it without any potentiality, He was not changed through the Incarnation.

8. You will say: If, per impossibile, the person of an Angel were united to human nature, it would be intrinsically changed, although it would not receive that nature into itself but would only terminate it. Therefore, the fact that through the Incarnation God is man, not by receiving humanity into Himself but by terminating it, does not prevent Him from being intrinsically changed through the Incarnation.

9. I deny the consequence and the parity, for a twofold reason for the difference may be assigned. The first is that created personality, since it is an incomplete and modal entity, is completed and perfected through union with the nature that it terminates. It is otherwise with the divine personality, since this is most perfect and complete. The second is that created subsistence not only terminates a nature but is also received in it; and a form is changed by its reception in a subject. The Divine Word, however, neither receives humanity nor is received in it, but is its pure term, and therefore is not changed through the Incarnation.

10. You will object, third, against the second part of the conclusion, in which we said that the possibility of the Incarnation cannot be known by the natural light: All the arguments of unbelievers against the possibility of the Incarnation can be solved, and in fact are solved, by theologians. Therefore it can be known by the natural light alone that the Incarnation involves no contradiction and consequently is possible.

11. I answer that the arguments of unbelievers against the possibility of the Incarnation can be solved by theologians with negative evidence, but not with positive evidence. That is, although we know, at least with faith presupposed, that the arguments of unbelievers against the possibility of this mystery are not demonstrative, nevertheless from no naturally known principle can we demonstrate their falsity.

12. You will object, fourth: By purely natural knowledge we can know that a created nature is really distinct from, and indeed prior to, its own personality, and therefore that there is no contradiction in its being

separated from that personality by God's absolute power and consequently terminated by the divine subsistence. Therefore, by the natural light alone it can be known that the mystery of the Incarnation is possible.

13. I deny the consequence. From the fact that a created nature is really distinct from and prior to its own personality, it can be inferred only that by God's absolute power it is separable from this or that determinate proper personality, not that it can subsist without every proper personality. Similarly, although prime matter, because of the distinction that it has from form, can by absolute power exist without this or that determinate form, it cannot exist without every form, as our Thomists teach in physics.

14. From these things it follows that not even God, considered as the author of nature, knows the mystery of the Incarnation evidently. For God is called the author of nature or of grace only in relation to a natural or supernatural effect. Since, therefore, the Incarnation cannot be known from any natural effect, it is not known by God considered as the author of nature.

§ 2.
The Fittingness of the Incarnation.

15. I say, first, that the Incarnation is most fitting to God.

This is proved by the two arguments of St. Thomas here, q. 1, a. 1. The first, which is found in the argument *On the contrary*, may be proposed thus: It is most fitting to God that He manifest Himself and His attributes through external works. But through the Incarnation the divine attributes are most clearly manifested. Therefore the Incarnation is most fitting to God. The major premise is clear. The minor is shown by considering each attribute, which may be reduced to five principal ones, namely omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, justice, and mercy.

First, therefore, the divine power shines forth most greatly in the mystery of the Incarnation, since the Incarnation is the greatest and most excellent of God's works ad extra, in which the most widely separated extremes, God and man, are united, and the divine and human natures are joined in so great and wondrous a covenant that the glorification does not consume the lower nature, nor does the assumption diminish the higher, as Pope Leo says in serm. 1, *De nativitate*.

Divine wisdom also shines forth in it in a wondrous manner, since it devised the most fitting means of reconciling divine justice and mercy with one another, and of tempering the splendor of the divinity through the

opacity and obscurity of our nature, so that from this wondrous tempering it might present to us the most illustrious mirror of all virtues, as we have discussed at length in our *Clypeus*.

As regards the divine goodness, it shines forth so greatly in the Incarnation that Paul, speaking of this mystery in Titus 3, says: *The kindness and humanity of God our Savior appeared.* By these words he seems to signify that God's kindness first appeared when He was incarnate—not because it had not previously appeared in the creation of the world, but because it shone far more brightly in the Incarnation than in creation. Hence Christ Himself appears to commend God's charity toward men from this mystery alone when He says in John 3: *God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son.*

Finally, God's justice and mercy shine forth most brightly in the Incarnation. His justice does so because through it Christ offered to the Father a condign and rigorous satisfaction for the sins of men, which no mere man could offer, as will appear below. His mercy does so because through it He raised fallen man by His own power and had compassion upon our evils and miseries, so that it may fittingly be said of Christ's humanity what Queen Dido said of herself in Virgil: *Not unacquainted with misfortune, I learn to aid the wretched*, as we discussed at length in the Treatise on the Will of God when considering the attribute of divine mercy.

16. The second argument, which the Holy Doctor gives in the body of the same article, is proposed in this form: It belongs to the nature of the supreme good to communicate itself in the highest and most perfect manner, since, as Dionysius testifies, *the good is diffusive of itself*. But through the Incarnation God communicates Himself in the highest and most perfect manner. Therefore the Incarnation is fitting to God. The major premise is clear. The minor is shown from the fact that in the mystery of the Incarnation the greatest of all communications was made, both intensively and extensively.

It was the greatest intensively, because that which was communicated to the assumed nature, namely the uncreated subsistence of the Divine Word, is of infinite dignity and perfection and infinitely surpasses all goods and gifts belonging to the orders of nature, grace, and glory. It was the greatest extensively, because it extends in a certain manner not only to man but also to all the creatures of the universe contained in man as in a compendium, as we shall explain more fully below.

17. I say, second, that the Incarnation is fitting, that is, useful and advantageous, to human nature.

This conclusion is evident in itself, for no one is unaware of how useful the Incarnation is to human nature and how many benefits it has conferred upon it.

First, humanity was exalted to the hypostatic union, and man was made substantially God. For this reason the Angel in Rev. 19 did not permit John to adore him, as Gregory the Great expressly explains in homil. 8 on the Gospels: Because the King of heaven assumed the weakness of our earthly flesh, that angelic loftiness no longer despises it. The Angels return to peace with us, laying aside the former discord, and those whom they had formerly despised as weak and abject they now venerate as companions. Hence it is that Lot and Joshua adore Angels and are not forbidden to adore them. John, however, wished to adore an Angel in his Apocalypse, but this same Angel rejected the adoration due to himself, saying: "See that you do not do this, for I am your fellow servant and that of your brethren." Why is it that before the coming of the Redeemer Angels are adored by men and do not greatly refuse to be adored, whereas afterward they avoid it? Is it not because, after recognizing that our nature, which they had formerly despised, was assumed above themselves, they feared to see it prostrate beneath them? Nor did they any longer dare to despise as weak that nature which they venerated above themselves in the King of heaven. Nor do they disdain to have man as their companion, since above themselves they adore the Man-God.

Second, in the order of grace men have in the Incarnate Word a homogeneous head of the same nature, from whom the charisms of every grace flow into the members.

Third, through the Incarnation God gave us a perfect exemplar of every virtue, according to Augustine, serm. 52, De diversis: Man, who could be seen, was not to be followed; God, who could not be seen, was to be followed. Therefore, that there might be presented to man one who could be seen by man and whom man could follow, God was made man.

Fourth, God was made man so that man might have in God that by which he could be made fully blessed: in his soul, by seeing Christ's divinity; in his body, by seeing His humanity; and thus the whole of man's activity would be occupied with Him. Augustine elegantly discusses this argument in *Manuale*, ch. 26, in these words: *God was made man for men, so that both senses of man might be beatified in Him: the eye of the heart might be refreshed in His divinity and the eye of the body in His humanity, so that, whether entering or departing, the human nature created by Him might find pastures in Him.*

Fifth, God, who dwells in inaccessible light, having assumed humanity as a veil casting its shadow, tempered the most radiant splendor of His divinity. Gregory discusses this elegantly in bk. 1, homil. 2 on Ezekiel, where,

explaining the Prophet's words, From its midst, as it were, the appearance of electrum, he says: What is signified by the appearance of electrum except Christ Jesus, the mediator of God and men? For electrum is composed of gold and silver. When gold and silver are mingled in electrum, the silver increases in brightness, while the gold grows pale from its own splendor: the former advances in brightness, while the latter is tempered in brightness. Therefore, because in the only-begotten Son of God the nature of the divinity was united to our nature, humanity grew into the glory of majesty, while the divinity tempered the power of its splendor to human eyes.

Finally, in Christ men have a Mediator and Redeemer, through whose merits they may satisfy God for offenses, obtain whatever they ask, and at last attain eternal glory.

18. I say, third, that the mystery of the Incarnation is fitting to the whole universe.

This conclusion is evident from what has been said above. For since all created things are in some manner contained in human nature, by the very fact that the Divine Word assumed it, He joined all the other creatures of the universe to Himself, raised them in a certain manner to the divine loftiness and existence, and consequently ennobled, adorned, and, so to speak, deified the whole world in a wondrous manner. Hence in John 3 the Incarnation is said to have been accomplished not only from love of man but also from love of the whole world: *God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son.* And in Eph. 1 all things are said to have been restored in Christ because of the new dignity and excellence conferred through the hypostatic union upon all creatures gathered in man as in a compendium of the whole universe.

19. I say, fourth, that it was more fitting for the Son of God to become incarnate than for the Father or the Holy Spirit.

This is proved by three reasons or considerations of fittingness. The first is that, just as man was created through the Word as through his divine exemplar, so it was fitting that fallen man be restored through the Word, for an artisan produces a work and repairs it after its collapse by means of the same idea. The second is that the Incarnation was accomplished to constitute men as adoptive sons of God, which is fittingly done through the natural Son of God. The third is that man sinned through a disordered appetite for knowledge. Therefore he is more fittingly restored through the Word, who is the true Wisdom of God.

20. I say, fifth, that it was more fitting for human nature to be assumed by the Word than angelic nature.

This too is proved by three considerations of fittingness. The first is taken from the weakness of human nature, which ought to have moved the

divine mercy. Gregory suggests this argument in Moralia, bk. 4, ch. 9, in these words: God had created two rational creatures, namely the angelic and the human. Pride struck both, but one possessed the burden of flesh, whereas the other bore nothing weak from flesh. Therefore the Creator in His mercy ought to restore that creature which is known to have possessed some weakness in committing its fault.

The second is that the ruin of the Angels could be repaired through men, by raising men to their seats, which had remained as though vacant; but the fall of man could not be supplied by substituting another nature in place of human nature, since the other purely corporeal natures, which are lower than human nature, are not capable of beatitude.

The third is that all the Angels sinned by their own will, whereas men, with the exception of the first parents, sinned by another's will, namely that of the first parent acting in the place of all. It was more fitting that those who sinned by another's will should also be redeemed by another's will than those who sinned by their own, since the latter are less excusable.

I add that, when man is assumed, the whole universe is ennobled and, as it were, deified, as we explained above. But if the Divine Word had assumed angelic nature, such a union and communication would not have extended to purely corporeal creatures, and consequently not to the whole universe. Therefore, for the completion of the universe and the greater diffusion of the divine goodness, it was more fitting for human nature than angelic nature to be assumed by the Word.

21. I say, sixth, that the Incarnation was fitting by reason of the time at which it was put into execution.

Proof: It was not fitting for the Incarnation to occur at the beginning of the world and immediately after Adam's fall. For since man sinned through pride, before he was delivered from sin he ought to have been humbled, recognized his own weakness and his need of a physician and deliverer, and desired and implored Him. This would not have been accomplished so fittingly if Christ had come immediately after the beginning of sin.

Moreover, it pertained to the dignity of the Incarnate Word that, before assuming flesh, He should be foretold by a long succession of Prophets and Patriarchs, so that He might be awaited more ardently and received more lovingly.

Nor was it fitting that the execution of this mystery be deferred until the end of the world, both because it would then have profited few and because it was not fitting for the Word to become incarnate when the conduct of men had become altogether corrupt, faith in Him had been entirely lost, and

hope concerning Him had been reduced almost to despair, as would have happened if He had delayed His coming until the end of the world.

Therefore Christ ought to come *in the fullness of time*, as the Apostle says, or *in the midst of the years*, as is said in Hab. 3, so that, just as the sun placed in the midst of the planets illuminates those above and below it, so Christ, the true Sun of justice, might illuminate the preceding ages through faith in His future Incarnation and the following ages through the evangelical doctrine proceeding from His mouth.

CHAPTER II.
The Necessity of the Incarnation.

1. It is evident that the Incarnation is not absolutely necessary, since it is a work ad extra, and God's works ad extra are free. Nor is it necessary on the supposition that the universe was created, since it has no necessary connection with the created universe.

It is also certain that the Incarnation was not simply necessary for restoring man from sin, since God could have restored man in other ways, either by remitting the injury inflicted upon Him through sin or by accepting man's unequal and imperfect satisfaction.

Therefore the only difficulty and controversy among theologians is whether, on the supposition that God willed to require a condign satisfaction for man's sin, the mystery of the Incarnation was necessary. The resolution of this difficulty depends upon the decision of another: whether a mere man could offer God a condign satisfaction for his own or another's mortal sin. I say a "mere man" not by excluding grace and supernatural assistance, that is, a man established in pure nature, but by excluding personal union with God, that is, a man who is not God.

2. I say, therefore, that a mere man cannot make condign satisfaction to God for his own or another's mortal sin, and consequently that the mystery of the Incarnation was necessary in order to offer God condign satisfaction for the sins of men.

The conclusion is proved by the fundamental argument: The satisfaction of any mere man is of finite value and dignity, whereas the injury inflicted upon God by mortal sin is infinite in the moral order. But an infinite injury cannot be condignly compensated by finite satisfaction. Therefore a mere man cannot make condign satisfaction for mortal sin.

The major premise, as regards its first part, is clear. For since the value of satisfaction is taken from the dignity of the person satisfying, it is evident

that a mere creature cannot impart infinite value to the acts by which he satisfies God.

As regards its second part, it is proved from three sources from which the infinite malice of mortal sin can be gathered. The first is the infinite dignity of the person offended, for an injury increases according to the dignity of the person upon whom it is inflicted. Hence an injury inflicted upon a soldier is less than one inflicted upon a knight, and the latter less than one inflicted upon a king, because a king exceeds a knight in dignity, and a knight a soldier. But the dignity of the divine person offended by mortal sin is infinitely infinite. Therefore the offense against God is also morally infinite.

3. This is confirmed: The more an excellent person is cast down and dishonored, the more grievous the injury becomes. But through mortal sin God is infinitely cast down and dishonored. Therefore mortal sin contains infinite malice and gravity. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved: The casting down and humiliation of an excellent person is measured from the distance between that person's excellence and the vileness of the thing to which he is subjected. But God is infinitely distant from the creature to which He is subjected through sin. Therefore through mortal sin He is infinitely cast down.

4. This argument is explained and further illustrated. God's highest glory consists in His being the last end of all things. Mortal sin consists in turning man away from God as his last end and in establishing the last end in a creature. From this it follows that God Himself is ordered to a creature as a means to an end, or is subjected to it. In this consists a grave contempt of God, for He is thus judged and esteemed by the sinner as less worthy than the creature. God complains of this in Jer. 2 in these words: *They have forsaken Me, the fountain of living water, and have dug for themselves broken cisterns.*

St. Thomas suggests this argument in De veritate, q. 28, a. 2, where he writes: Whoever places something less worthy before something more worthy does an injury to the latter, and the more so according as the latter is more worthy. But whoever establishes his end in a temporal thing—which every mortal sinner does—by that very fact, as regards his affection, places the creature before the Creator, loving the creature more than the Creator, for the end is that which is loved above all. Since, therefore, God infinitely exceeds the creature, the offense of one who sins against God will be infinite on the part of the dignity of Him upon whom injury is in a certain manner inflicted through sin, insofar as He is despised together with His precepts.

5. The second source from which the infinite malice of mortal sin is gathered a posteriori is the infinite punishment due to it. For, as St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2: *Because you sin against the infinite, an infinite punishment is due to you.* By these words he openly declares that an infinite moral effect, namely the debt of infinite punishment, is contained in mortal sin. This would not be true if mortal sin contained only finite malice in the character of an offense, for a morally infinite effect cannot be contained in a morally finite cause.

6. The third source is suggested by the same Holy Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 65, a. 4, where he teaches that an offense inflicted upon a prince redounds upon the multitude of subjects whose head he is, and receives its gravity from that multitude. But God is the prince and head of infinitely many possible creatures, which are contained in Him as in their cause and head. Hence one who offends God virtually injures them all, just as though they actually existed. Therefore sin actually possesses infinity in the character of an offense.

7. You will object, first: That satisfaction is equal to the offense which restores to the offended person all that had been taken from him. But one who elicits an act of charity restores to God all that he had taken from Him through sin. Therefore he satisfies for it with perfect equality. The major premise appears certain. The minor is shown thus: Through mortal sin man took from God, only as regards his affection, the character of the last end. But one who elicits an act of charity restores to God, as regards his affection, the character of the last end. Therefore he restores to Him all that he had taken away through sin.

8. I answer, first, by absolutely denying the major premise. There is this difference between satisfaction and restitution: for restitution it is enough that the thing taken away, or its equivalent, be simply returned; but for satisfaction it is further required that the thing taken be restored by an act equal to the gravity of the offense, and that as much honor be given to the offended person as had been taken from him by the offense.

Hence, if a commoner took something from a king by robbery and restored the equivalent, he would indeed satisfy for the thing taken, but not for the injury inflicted upon the king. Such an act could be called sufficient restitution, but not sufficient satisfaction, because the commoner's slight subjection and humiliation would not equal the gravity of the injury.

Since, therefore, an act of charity, in the character of satisfaction and homage, does not equal the gravity of the offense inflicted upon God through sin, nor give Him as much honor as was taken from Him by sin, and since it is more grievous and atrocious to subject God to a creature than it is

honorable to God to subject a creature to Him, although such an act restores to God the character of the last end as regards affection, it cannot be called condign satisfaction for sin.

9. I answer, second, by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For charity does not restore to God the character of the last end in the manner in which it was taken away by sin. Sin subjects God to the vilest creature, whereas charity subjects the creature to God. But to subject God to a creature is infinitely greater than to subject a creature to God. Moreover, God is the last end through His own goodness, which charity by no means restores but presupposes.

10. You will object, second: Granted that the injury inflicted upon God through mortal sin is infinite in the moral order, it is nevertheless not infinite simply and intrinsically, but only extrinsically and in a qualified sense, since the person offended has only the character of an object with respect to the injury inflicted upon him. Hence St. Thomas, here, a. 2, ad 2, says that sin possesses *a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty*. But the satisfaction of a mere man possesses the same infinity from the grace and charity from which it proceeds, since an act of charity is extrinsically and objectively infinite. Therefore the satisfaction of a mere man is equal and condign to the offense inflicted upon God through mortal sin.

11. I answer by denying the major premise. As we showed in the Treatise on Sins, mortal sin, in the character of an offense, possesses malice and gravity that are simply infinite in the moral order. This is because the person offended is related to the injury inflicted upon him not only as an object but also as its subject, as is clear from the common manner of speaking. For it is said not that the offender, but that the person offended, suffers and receives the injury; and from the common proverb: *Honor is in the one who honors, but injury is in the person injured.*

Hence, if such a person is of infinite dignity, as is God when offended through mortal sin, he morally imparts to the offense or injury inflicted upon him a gravity and malice simply infinite in the moral order.

Nor is it an objection that St. Thomas says sin possesses *a certain infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty*. He added the expression "a certain" to signify that sin is not physically infinite and infinite in the order of being, but only morally, or in the moral order. Moreover, even in this order it is not infinite under every aspect of morality included in it. For it does not possess infinite malice insofar as it is an evil of man, but only insofar as it is an evil against God and possesses the character of an offense, as we explained in the place cited.

12. From what has been said it follows that a mere man existing in grace can make condign satisfaction for venial sin, because such sin is not infinite in the character of an offense as mortal sin is. For one who sins venially does not place a creature before God, nor establish his last end in it, as does one who sins mortally.

CHAPTER III.
The Motive of the Incarnation.

1. I say briefly that the restoration of the human race was the principal motive of the Incarnation in such a manner that, if man had not sinned, the Incarnation would not have occurred by virtue of the present decree. Thus St. Thomas, here, a. 3, and others more commonly, against Scotus, who thinks that in the stated hypothesis Christ would have come, though not in passible flesh; and against Suárez, Martinon, and others, who judge that the principal end and motive of the Incarnation was the excellence of so great a mystery and the other goods resulting from it independently of sin.

2. The conclusion is proved, first, by the argument of St. Thomas: Concerning those things that depend upon God's free will, we can know or define nothing except what becomes known to us from God's revelation through Scripture, Tradition, and the Fathers. But from these nothing becomes known to us concerning the Incarnation except that it was accomplished as a remedy for sin and for the redemption of the human race. Indeed, the Fathers often teach that it would not have occurred if there had been no sin. Therefore it is asserted without foundation that, if man had not sinned, the Incarnation would have occurred. The major premise is clear.

The minor is proved by producing some testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers, in which it is openly signified that God came into the world through the Incarnation only to save sinners. Matt. 18 and Luke 19: *The Son of Man came to seek and save that which had perished.* John 3: *God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, that everyone who believes in Him might not perish but have eternal life.* 1 Tim. 1: *Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.* Finally, the Church sings in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea: *Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate.*

3. To these are added the testimonies of the holy Fathers. Irenaeus, bk. 5, Adversus haereses, ch. 14: If the flesh had no need to be saved, the Word would by no means have been made flesh. Athanasius, serm. 5 against the Arians: It would never have been decreed that the Word should become man unless man's necessity had demanded it. Ambrose, De incarnatione, ch. 6:

What was the cause of the Incarnation except that the flesh which had sinned might be redeemed? Cyril, dialogue 5, De Trinitate: If we had not sinned, He would not have been made like us. Finally, Augustine, serm. 8, De verbis Apostoli: If man had not perished, the Son of Man would not have come. And in serm. 9: There was no cause for Christ the Lord to come except to save sinners.

4. These texts are not answered by saying that Scripture, the Fathers, and the Councils give only the motive of the Incarnation as regards its manner, or why Christ came in passible flesh, but not the motive of the Incarnation as regards its substance, or why He came simply.

For if this answer were valid, the absolute manner of speaking of the Fathers, who assert that Christ would not have come if Adam had not sinned, would be false. But this must not be said. Therefore neither may the former be said.

The consequence of the major premise is proved: When something can occur in two ways, from the fact that it does not occur in one of them it cannot be said absolutely not to occur, since an absolute negation excludes every manner; for, as is commonly said by logicians, it is of the nature of such a negation to destroy the whole. Therefore, if Christ would have come when Adam had not sinned, although in impassible flesh, the absolute statement of the Fathers asserting that Christ would not have come if Adam had not sinned would be false.

This can be declared and illustrated by these examples. If someone simply and absolutely said that Christ's body is not in heaven or in the Sacrament, he would be judged a heretic, although it is not there in passible flesh. Likewise, if someone asserted that a king would not come to some city, knowing that he would come absolutely, although not with royal pomp but incognito, or not wearing some customary garment or with some other circumstance, he would lie. Therefore the holy Fathers would similarly speak falsely when they simply and absolutely assert that the Incarnation would not have occurred if Adam had not sinned, if it truly would have occurred as regards its substance, although not as regards the manner and circumstance of passible flesh.

5. This answer and the doctrine of Scotus and his disciples can also be refuted by the following argument. By virtue of the present decree Christ was not to come except in passible flesh. But if Adam had not sinned, He was not to come in passible flesh. Therefore, if Adam had not sinned, Christ was in no manner to come by virtue of the present decree.

The major premise is proved: The present decree of God concerning the Incarnation of the Word and the coming of Christ, since it is an act of most

perfect providence, determined all the particular circumstances of the Incarnation without which it would not exist. Therefore it determined either passible or impassible flesh. It did not determine impassible flesh, as is evident, for otherwise the Word would actually have assumed impassible flesh. Therefore it determined only passible flesh.

6. To free themselves from this difficulty, our adversaries distinguish a twofold decree in God: one concerning the substance of the Incarnation, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh; the other concerning the particular circumstance of passible flesh. They add that, just as by virtue of this second decree Christ actually came in passible flesh, so by virtue of the first He would have come in impassible flesh if Adam had not sinned.

7. But against this: Although a conditional and inefficacious decree of God may be terminated at a thing in common, or at its substance while prescinding from particular circumstances, as is evident in God's antecedent will, which wills all men to be saved—for this will regards the salvation of all men considered in itself and prescinded from particular circumstances, as we explained in the Treatise on the Will of God—nevertheless it is contradictory for an efficacious and absolute decree of God, such as the decree concerning the Incarnation of the Word, to be terminated solely at the substance of a thing as prescinded from its circumstances, since the thing cannot be placed in reality unless clothed with all its circumstances.

8. This is confirmed: An efficacious decree of God is regulated by an act of most perfect prudence. But most perfect prudence attends to all the singular circumstances without which its object cannot occur. Therefore an efficacious decree of God is not terminated solely at the substance of a thing while prescinding from particular circumstances.

9. This argument is further confirmed and illustrated from the difference between the human and divine wills. The human will decrees many things without yet considering or willing their particular circumstances. This arises from many imperfections.

First, from ignorance, because not all the circumstances occur to the human mind and memory in the same instant, but gradually and successively.

Second, from impotence, because the human will cannot execute all the particular circumstances without the cooperation of another cause, and is therefore compelled to await the concurrence and consent of that other cause.

Third, from imprudence, because the human will often decrees and proposes something rashly and from a precipitate judgment.

Fourth, from inconstancy, because it frequently changes its counsel and proposes new things.

The divine will, however, is compelled by none of these reasons to suspend its consent and decree concerning particular circumstances. Since all the circumstances occur in the same logical instant as the substance of the object, and since God can execute them independently of the cooperation of any other cause, He would act altogether imprudently if He infallibly and absolutely decreed the future Incarnation without determining the particular circumstance without which it cannot exist.

10. I add that predestination, since it is a part of divine providence, attends to all the singular circumstances of the thing predestined and predetermined. But the decree by which God first willed and preordained the Incarnation was the predestination of Christ the Lord. Therefore it regards all the particular circumstances of the Incarnation and not only its substance.

11. From what has been said, the opinion of Suárez and Martinon may easily be refuted. They judge that the Incarnation was willed by God primarily and principally because of the intrinsic goodness and excellence of this mystery, and secondarily and less principally as a remedy for sin.

First, Scripture and the holy Fathers cited above assign no motive of the Incarnation other than the remedy for sin and the redemption of the human race. Indeed, some expressly assert that there is no other. Augustine, cited above, says: *There was no other cause for Christ the Lord to come except to save sinners.* Chrysostom, homil. 5 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, shortly after the beginning, proves from the words of the Apostle that Christ assumed flesh for no other reason than to free us from sin, and concludes: *There is no other cause of the dispensation than this alone.*

Ambrose reproduces these words of Chrysostom in his commentary on Heb. 2, where he says: Therefore there was no other cause for Him to be made like His brethren in all things except that He might be a faithful High Priest among us and make propitiation for our sins. There is no other cause of this whole wondrous dispensation than this alone. Therefore Suárez and Martinon wrongly assign two causes of the Incarnation, namely the excellence of this mystery and the remedy for sin.

12. Next, if the redemption of men were not the total, or at least the first and principal, motive cause of the Incarnation, but there were another prior and more principal cause, namely the excellence of this mystery, God's statements in Scripture, in which He simply and absolutely asserts that He became incarnate and came for the salvation and redemption of men, would not be true and sincere.

For example, suppose a physician undertook a journey and intended to travel to Rome to transact some business there with a friend. As he was setting out, he was informed that this friend was gravely ill and desired his assistance and care so that he might be freed from his sickness. The physician could not truly and sincerely say to his friend: "For your sake I left my home and undertook a long and dangerous journey." At most he could say: "I had undertaken the journey to transact some serious business with you; but even if this cause had not existed, my concern and love for you, and my desire to assist you, would have moved me to go to Rome and undertake this journey."

Similarly, if the opinion of our adversaries were true, and God had decreed the mystery of the Incarnation because of its excellence as the first and principal motive cause, He ought not simply to have said that He came into the world for the sake of the human race, but rather that, when He was already going to come for another end, mercy toward the human race added a new weight and impulse to His will to execute the Incarnation.

13. Third, if God willed to redeem us for the sake of Christ first intended, Scripture ought not to say: *God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son*, but rather: "God so loved Christ that for His sake He willed to permit us to fall into the misery of sin and to deliver some from it." This is wholly foreign to the manner of speaking of Scripture and the holy Fathers.

14. Finally, if God had principally willed the mystery of the Incarnation because of its excellence and intrinsic goodness, it would follow that the Incarnation would have occurred even if the world had not been created, for it would have been willed independently of the universe. Hence, precisely from that willing of the Incarnation for the sake of its own excellence as the principal end, and independently of the remedy for sin, there would have followed the production of only one individual of human nature in whom the Word would subsist, and of no other man or creature. This appears absurd.

The Principal Objections Are Solved.

15. You will object, first: Christ was willed and predestined by God before the foreknowledge of Adam's sin. Therefore Christ's predestination is independent of that sin and its remedy, and consequently Christ would have come even if Adam had not sinned. The consequence is clear, for what is prior cannot depend upon what is posterior.

The antecedent is shown thus: Christ's predestination was prior to the decree to produce creatures, and consequently to the decree to permit

Adam's sin. Therefore Christ was willed and predestined by God before the permission, and consequently before the foreknowledge, of Adam's sin. The consequence is evident.

The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is proved first from Scripture. Christ is called in Col. 1 *the firstborn of every creature*, not in the order of execution, as is evident, but in the order of intention and the causality of the end. Nor should Paul be thought to speak of Christ according to the divinity, for in that respect He is called only-begotten, not firstborn, as Athanasius and the Fathers of the Council of Ephesus note.

Likewise, in Prov. 8 the incarnate Wisdom of God—as many of the holy Fathers explain—is called *the beginning of the ways of the Lord*, not in the temporal execution of things, since Christ came after many things had already been created, but in the divine intention and predestination. Therefore, from Scripture, Christ's predestination was prior in the divine mind to the decree to produce creatures.

Reason also supports this. Whoever wills in an orderly manner first intends those things that are nobler. But God wills in the most orderly manner, and the Incarnation is the noblest of all things and approaches more nearly to God, who is the last end. Therefore the Incarnation, or Christ's predestination, was willed and intended by God before the production of creatures.

16. Our Thomists answer this argument, which is considered decisive among our adversaries, in three ways.

Some grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For, they say, although Christ's predestination precedes the foreknowledge of Adam's sin and the decree to redeem man, nevertheless, because God willed to execute it in no other manner and through no other means than through the permission of sin, it follows that, if man had not sinned, Christ would not have come.

This is proportionally similar to the fact that, although God's intention to give His glory to the elect is prior to the decree concerning their good works, and therefore precedes the foreknowledge of such works according to the more common and truer opinion, nevertheless, because God decreed to fulfill this will or intention only through the good works of the elect, it is true to say that none of the elect will be saved without good works, as we explained in the Treatise on Providence and Predestination.

17. Others answer that the decree of the Incarnation and Christ's predestination, or Christ as willed and predestined, is indeed prior in the divine mind in the order of final causality. For this reason He is called *the*

firstborn of creation and *the beginning of the ways of the Lord*, and the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 3: *All things are yours, but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.*

By these words, as St. Thomas interprets them, he signifies that, just as all things were created for the predestined, so all created things, and the predestined themselves, exist for Christ as man and as their end; while all these things, and Christ Himself, exist for God as the last end.

Nevertheless, Christ as willed and predestined is posterior to the permission and foreknowledge of original sin in the order of material or occasional causality, because from that sin God took the occasion to will the Incarnation and to predestine Christ as man and Redeemer. Under this aspect Christ cannot be intended unless man is presupposed as the matter to be perfected and sin as the matter to be destroyed.

For, they say, there is no contradiction in that which is prior and independent in one order of causality being posterior and dependent in another, since causes are causes of one another, as philosophers teach and illustrate by various examples.

18. Finally, others distinguish the principal antecedent thus: Christ was willed and predestined by God before the permission and foreknowledge of Adam's sin. If the word "before" denotes priority in every order of causality, they deny the antecedent. If it denotes only priority in the order of the end to be attained, or for the sake of which something is done, they grant the antecedent and deny the consequence.

For nothing prevents Christ, in the order of intention, from having been willed before the remedy for sin or the human race to be redeemed as the end to be attained or for whose sake something is done, while being posterior as regards the beneficiary of the end, because the Incarnation is ordered to the redemption of men and redounds to the good and benefit of human nature.

They explain this by the example of a physician who desires health for a sick man. Health itself is prior to the sick man as the end to be attained or for the sake of which something is done. But the sick man for whom health is desired is prior, in the same order of final causality, as the beneficiary of the end.

19. From this doctrine and distinction another argument of our adversaries is solved. They say that to order a greater good to a lesser is to proceed in a disorderly manner. But Christ, since He is God, is a greater good than the salvation and redemption of men, who are creatures. Therefore, if God ordered Christ, or the mystery of the Incarnation, to the salvation and redemption of men, He would proceed in a disorderly manner.

The answer is clear from what has already been said. The major premise must be distinguished: to order a greater good to a lesser as the end to be attained or for whose sake something is done is to proceed in a disorderly manner; I grant the major premise. To order a greater good to a lesser as the beneficiary of the end; I deny the major premise.

For Angels are said in Scripture to have been produced and sent for the ministry of men, and the salvation of a peasant is called the beneficiary of royal providence because that providence redounds to his good and advantage. Likewise the generation of lower things is said to be the beneficiary of the motion of the heavens, yet it is not therefore more perfect than that motion.

20. You will object, second: If the human race as something to be redeemed were the end and motive for which God intended Christ, it would follow that Christ is less loved by God than the human race. But this cannot be said, since the eternal Father says of Christ in Matthew: *This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.* Therefore neither can the former be said.

The consequence of the major premise is proved: Since a means is loved for the sake of the end, it is loved less than the end itself. Therefore, if the human race as something to be redeemed were the end and motive for which God intended Christ, Christ would be less loved by God than the human race.

21. I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. To its proof, I distinguish the antecedent: a means is loved less than the end when it has the character of a pure means; I grant the antecedent. When it has not only the character of a means but also of an end; I deny the antecedent.

Christ does not have the character of a pure means to the redemption of the human race, since that redemption is referred to the glory and exaltation of Christ Himself as its end, just as Christ's exaltation is ordered to the glory of God as the last end, according to the words of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 3: *All things are yours, but you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.*

22. You will object, third: The mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to Adam in the state of innocence, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 7, and yet he was not conscious or foreknowing of his future sin. Otherwise such knowledge would have caused in him sorrow incompatible with the happiness of that most flourishing state. Therefore the remedy for Adam's sin is not the principal motive of the Incarnation.

23. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. The mystery of the Incarnation could have been revealed to Adam without its principal motive being revealed to him. Since the Incarnation is ordered both to the liberation of man from sin and to the consummation of glory,

although the remedy for sin as its motive was not revealed to Adam, the consummation of glory was revealed, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited. This was sufficient to remove from him the anxiety and sorrow that arise in a man when an effect is known but its cause remains unknown.

24. You will object, fourth: According to Augustine, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, ch. 21, in the state of innocence, and consequently before Adam's sin, the union of man and woman was a sign of Christ's union with the Church. Therefore, even if Adam had not sinned, Christ would have come and united human nature to Himself through the mystery of the Incarnation.

25. I deny the consequence. Augustine intends only that, in the state of innocence and before Adam's sin was actually committed, the union of man and woman was a sign and symbol of Christ's union with the Church. He does not assert, however, that such a signification belonged to matrimony in the state of innocence antecedently to the foreknowledge of Adam's sin and independently of its permission. Consequently, he does not deny that the mystery of the Incarnation depended upon such permission and foreknowledge in the manner explained above.

26. You will ask whether, if only original sin had existed, or if only actual sins without original sin had existed, Christ would have come by virtue of the present decree.

27. I answer affirmatively as regards the first part and negatively as regards the second.

The reason for the first is that God decreed the mystery of the Incarnation in order to restore the whole nature that had perished in Adam. But even if no sin other than original sin had existed, the whole nature would have perished in the same manner and fallen from its right to heavenly glory. For original sin is the sin of the whole nature, infects all men descending from Adam by seminal propagation, and closes to them the gate of the heavenly kingdom. Therefore, even if no sin other than original sin had existed, Christ would have come by virtue of the present decree.

From this the second part remains proved. For actual sin does not infect the whole nature as original sin does, but only the person by whom it is committed. Therefore, if only actual sins had existed, Christ would not have come by virtue of the present decree.

28. This is confirmed: When the principal motive of the present decree is absent, the present decree cannot remain. But the remedy for original sin alone was the primary and essential motive of the Incarnation, whereas the remedy for actual sins was merely secondary and, as it were, incidental, so that the redemption might be complete and perfect.

This is manifestly gathered from the holy Fathers cited above, who teach that the sin of the first man was so the motive of the Incarnation that, if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come. Gregory the Great expressly asserts this in bk. 4 on 1 Kings, ch. 1, where he says: *Indeed, if Adam had not sinned, it would not have been necessary for our Redeemer to assume flesh*. With this agrees what the Church sings on Holy Saturday: O *truly necessary sin of Adam, which was destroyed by the death of Christ.* Therefore, if original sin had not existed, Christ would not have come by virtue of the present decree, even if actual sins had existed.

29. Nor is it an objection that the Apostle says in Gal. 2: *Who loved me and delivered Himself for me.* By these words he does not signify that Christ so came and suffered for the salvation of individuals that, by virtue of the present decree, He would have come and suffered for the salvation of any one particular man. Rather, he signifies that Christ as man, on His own part, underwent death for all with so great a love and readiness that He would willingly have suffered death for only one man if God had so decreed and willed. God, however, did not in fact so will or decree.

In the same sense must be understood the statement of Chrysostom in his homilies on the Acts of the Apostles: *The loss of even one soul is so great that on its account the Son of God would have become man.* Likewise the similar statement of Christ to St. Carpus in Dionysius the Areopagite, epist. 8.

30. At the end of this celebrated question concerning the motive of the Incarnation, it must be carefully observed that when St. Thomas, here, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, says that *predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things*, he is not speaking of the foreknowledge of conditionally future things, which the more recent authors call "middle knowledge," as its defenders commonly contend. Rather, he is speaking of the foreknowledge of absolutely future things, which is called the "knowledge of vision."

For he is speaking there of the predestination of Christ, which, as we showed at length above, presupposes in the order of material or occasional causality the foreknowledge of Adam's sin and of the other actual sins contained in it as in a root.

That celebrated passage is commonly understood and explained in this manner by the disciples of St. Thomas, and even by Francis Suárez, although he was a most vehement defender of middle knowledge. This is evident from bk. 1, *De essentia praedestinationis*, ch. 1, § *At enim*, where he says:

It may be doubted whether the predestination of one thing or effect necessarily presupposes the absolute foreknowledge of another future thing or effect. St. Thomas appears to affirm this in Summa Theologiae III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, where he says that predestination presupposes foreknowledge of

future things. This cannot be understood with respect to the same effect of predestination, as has been proved. Therefore it must at least be understood of the foreknowledge of one thing with respect to the predestination of another. That he is speaking of the absolute foreknowledge of a future thing appears manifest, because from this principle he declares that Christ was predestined after Adam's sin had been foreseen as future.

By these words he candidly admits and leaves as manifest that St. Thomas in the place cited speaks of the absolute foreknowledge of future things, and not of the foreknowledge of conditionally future things.

Why, then, do the other theologians of the Society cite this passage of St. Thomas in favor of middle knowledge, which is the foreknowledge of conditional things, when according to Suárez it is manifest that St. Thomas is there speaking of the foreknowledge of absolute things?

Likewise, why does Suárez himself, forgetful of himself and of what he had written in the aforesaid first book on predestination, later openly depart from the truth that he had called manifest in the cited place on predestination? For in bk. 1 of his tripartite work *De gratia*, prologue 2, ch. 6, explaining the above testimony of St. Thomas, he says:

The same statement of St. Thomas may also be alleged—in favor of middle or conditional knowledge—in the third part, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, where he says that predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things. This is most fittingly understood of this foreknowledge, for the absolute foreknowledge of future things rather follows predestination, especially according to the opinion of the Thomists.

By these words this author openly contradicts his earlier statement and denies the truth that he had called manifest. Certainly, as Father Lemos says in his Treatise on Middle Knowledge, ch. 10: Such are the mysteries of the times and the liberty of doctrine that, even contrary to what appears manifest, it is said that something else can be understood through forced explanations, so that nothing remains firm in doctrine but all things remain uncertain. For because they consider it dishonorable to retract an opinion that they badly held from the beginning, they strive to persist in it even against what appears manifest to themselves.

CHAPTER IV.
The Essence of the Incarnation.

1. Before proposing and briefly resolving the scholastic difficulties that theologians customarily dispute concerning the hypostatic union, or the

essence of the Incarnation, it must be premised that the Catholic truth concerning the Incarnation stands between the two extreme errors of Nestorius and Eutyches.

The first asserted that through the Incarnation Christ's humanity was not personally united to the Word, but only accidentally and extrinsically, namely through indwelling, operation, or affection. Consequently, he asserted that one and the same was not both God and man, but that one was God and another man; that this man Christ was a mere man; and that the Virgin Mary should not be called Mother of God, but Mother of Christ.

The second, turning aside from the precipice of Nestorian impiety, so confused Christ's two natures as to say that they had coalesced into one nature by mutual commingling.

Both errors were condemned by the Church. The first was condemned in the Council of Ephesus, held under Pope Celestine against Nestorius in the year 431, part 1, ch. 4, where it is said: To think that the name "Christ" belongs separately to this one and separately to that one, that is, to the Son of God and the son of the Virgin, as to two persons joined together, is foolish, indeed impious and blasphemous. For there is one Lord Jesus Christ, not divided or cut apart.

And in the Fifth General Synod, final act, can. 4: If anyone says that God and man are one only according to representation, indwelling, honor, operation, or affection, and not according to hypostasis, that is, unity of person, let him be anathema.

The second error is proscribed in the Council of Chalcedon, for its Creed contains the following: We confess that in the last days the only-begotten Son of God is to be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, and without separation, the difference of the natures never being removed because of the union.

Athanasius condemns both errors in his Creed in these words: Although He is God and man, nevertheless there are not two, but one Christ: one altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of person.

The Catholic faith, therefore, acknowledges in Christ both the divine and human natures, intimately joined in the same person of the Divine Word and united by an indissoluble covenant. Hence Pope Leo, serm. 7, De nativitate Domini, says: He is a true worshiper of this mystery who neither thinks anything false concerning the Lord's Incarnation nor anything unworthy concerning His divinity. For the danger is equal if either the truth of our nature or equality with the Father's glory is denied Him.

§ 1.
Whether the Person of Christ May Truly and Properly Be Called Composed of the Divine and Human Natures, and of the Humanity and the Subsistence of the Word.

2. I say, first, that Christ is a person truly and properly composed of the divine and human natures.

This is proved from the Sixth Synod, act 11, in the epistle of Sophronius, where it is expressly stated that *the person of Christ is composed of two natures*. It is also proved from Damascene, bk. 3, *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 7, where he says: *The person of the Word, which was formerly simple, became composed of two natures.*

Reason also supports this. That which truly consists of diverse realities really united is truly and properly composed of them, since composition is the placing together or union of distinct things. But the person of Christ truly consists of the divine and human natures as diverse realities really united. Therefore it is truly and properly composed of the divine and human natures.

This is confirmed: Every union is of its nature ordered to making some one thing from its extremes. It is not one thing simply, as is evident. Therefore it is one by composition. Thus the hypostatic union is ordered to making one composite from the divine and human natures, not in the being of nature, and therefore in the being of person.

3. I say, second, that the person of Christ is composed of human nature and the personality of the Word.

This is clear from what was said in the preceding conclusion, for composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things. But in the person of Christ there is a union of the person of the Word with human nature, which are really distinct. Therefore in Christ there is a composition of the person of the Word and human nature.

This is confirmed: Christ is a person truly and properly composed of the divine and human natures, as we showed in the preceding conclusion. Therefore He is also composed of the subsistence of the Word and humanity.

The consequence is clear. For every composition of the divine and human natures in Christ presupposes, according to our manner of understanding, the composition of the subsistence of the Divine Word and

humanity. Human nature is not immediately united to the divine nature, but to the subsistence of the Divine Word, as will be evident from what is said below.

4. You will object against the preceding conclusions: Every composition is from parts. But neither the divine nature nor the personality of the Word can have the character of a part, since every part is something incomplete and imperfect and is subordinated to the whole as to an end. Therefore the person of Christ is not truly and properly composed of the divine and human natures, nor of human nature and the personality of the Word.

I answer, first, by denying the major premise. The universe is composed in a certain manner of God and creatures, and yet God does not have the character of a part but of a pure extreme. Similarly, subsistence composes the composite together with the nature, and yet is not properly a part but a term. Likewise, from the intellect of the blessed and the essence of God there is constituted one principle of the beatific vision, and yet the divine essence has the character of a pure extreme, without the imperfection of a part.

I answer, second, that, just as generation in creatures has many imperfections annexed to it that are not found in divine generation, because the Father generates the Word from eternity, so that wondrous and ineffable composition which theologians, following the Councils and holy Fathers, acknowledge in the person of Christ is free from the imperfections found in many other compositions.

Hence, granted that in natural and created compositions the extremes always have the character of parts and are something incomplete and imperfect, nevertheless the composition found in the person of Christ abstracts, at least on the part of one extreme, namely the divine nature or the personality of the Word, from that imperfection. Therefore in it neither the divine nature nor the personality of the Word has the character of a part, but only of an extreme, whose nature does not require that it be incomplete and imperfect or of itself ordered to another as to an end.

5. You will say: The personality of the Word, since it is the medium in which the divine and human natures are united in Christ, cannot be an extreme entering into the composition. Therefore the person of Christ cannot be composed of human nature and the personality of the Word.

I answer by denying the antecedent. Just as a point containing parts is not only the medium by which they are united but also in some manner the extreme that is united; and just as quantity is the medium by which whiteness is united to a body and at the same time the extreme united to it; so the personality of the Divine Word is not only the medium joining the

divine nature with the human, but also the extreme joined to human nature through the hypostatic union.

§ 2.
What Is the Term of the Action Uniting Humanity with the Person of the Divine Word?

6. I presuppose, first, that the action uniting humanity with the Word is really distinct from the creation of the soul and the production of Christ's humanity. This is both because that action belongs to a higher order, namely the supernatural and hypostatic order, and because it has a formal term specifically different from theirs.

The formal term of the creation of Christ's soul is the soul itself, which is brought forth from nothing. The formal term of the production or generation of Christ's humanity is humanity itself considered in itself and absolutely. But the formal term of the action uniting humanity with the person of the Word is the subsistence of the Word as communicated to human nature, as will appear below.

I add that the production of humanity is presupposed to its assumption, at least by priority of nature, because assumption is the assumption of something to oneself. Therefore it is really distinct from the assumption.

Nor is it an objection that the holy Fathers sometimes appear to assert that Christ's humanity was produced through assumption. Pope Leo says in epist. 11 to Julian: *Our nature was not assumed in such a way that it was first created and afterward assumed, but so that it was created in the very assumption.* Similarly Fulgentius, *De incarnatione et gratia*, ch. 2, says that *the very acceptance of the flesh was the virginal conception.*

In these passages they intend only that Christ's human nature did not precede the Incarnation in time, but was produced and assumed in the same real instant. Nothing more is required for the Blessed Virgin to be said to have generated the Man-God and consequently to be the Mother of God. For this it is sufficient that her generative action, which united the soul to the body, was terminated at a humanity assumed in the same instant, although perhaps posterior by nature.

7. I presuppose, second, against Suárez and other more recent authors, that for the Divine Word to be united to human nature no created substantial mode is necessary as a medium between the person of the Word and the assumed humanity.

For the Word's being united to humanity is nothing other than His terminating it and rendering it subsistent. But the subsistence and personality of the Word exercise this office immediately through themselves, and do not require the ministry of any created mode for this purpose. For if that intermediate bond could accomplish this, much more can the divine person, who is pure act and admits no potential indifference in Himself. Therefore such a mode is unnecessary.

8. What our adversaries say is entirely without force: namely, that this mode is necessary not because of any defect in the Divine Word, but because of human nature, which of itself is indifferent to being united or not united to the Divine Word.

For this indifference is nothing other than passive obediential potency, or the non-repugnance of human nature to actually subsisting and being terminated by the Divine Word. Therefore it is sufficiently completed by the actualization of the Divine Word Himself, or by His actual termination, just as every potency is completed by the act or form that it receives in itself.

Nor is any mode required for this on the part of human nature. Our adversaries themselves say that, because human nature is not of its nature indifferent to the supposed mode, but is related to it only by obediential potency, it does not require another superadded mode or entity to determine it to receive that mode; rather, the unitive action of God producing it in the humanity is sufficient.

I presuppose, third, from philosophy, that there may be a twofold term of an action: one total and the other formal. For example, in substantial generation the total term is the suppositum, or composite of nature and subsistence, whereas the formal term is the substantial form itself through which the composite has being.

With these things premised, for the resolution of the proposed difficulty:

9. I say, first, that the total term of the action uniting humanity with the person of the Word is Christ, or the person composed of the divine and human natures.

Proof: The total term of an action uniting two extremes is the composite resulting from them, as is evident in the generation of a man. For its total term is the composite resulting from the union of the soul with the body, because this is what is intended in itself by the generator. But Christ, or the person composed of the divine and human natures, is that which is intended in itself in the Incarnation and which results from the action uniting humanity with the person of the Word. Therefore He is the total term of the action uniting humanity with the person of the Word.

10. You will say: The total term of such an action must be something made in time. But Christ cannot be said to have been made in time through such an action. Therefore He is not its total term.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For some composite to be said to be made, it is not necessary that the extremes be produced through the action from which it results; it is sufficient that they be joined to one another. If the rational soul and matter had existed from eternity and were united in time to compose a man, such a man would truly be made in time.

Similarly, although through the union of humanity with the Word neither the Word Himself nor even humanity itself is made, nevertheless Christ, or the composite of the Word and humanity, is made through it. Hence it is said in John 1: *The Word was made flesh*; and the Church says in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea: *Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, and was made man.*

11. I say, second, that the formal term of the action uniting humanity with the person of the Word is the personality or subsistence of the Word itself as communicated to humanity.

Proof: In every unitive action, that has the character of the formal term which has the character of act and perfective principle, not that which has the character of matter and of something perfectible. But in the action uniting humanity with the person of the Word, that which has the character of act and perfective principle is the personality or subsistence of the Word itself as communicated to humanity, whereas humanity itself is related to it as something material and perfectible through it. Therefore the formal term of God's unitive action is not the human nature assumed by the Word, but the personality or subsistence of the Divine Word itself as communicated to humanity.

You will say: The personality of the Word sustains the assumed humanity. Therefore it is related to humanity in the manner of matter and not in the manner of act.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. It sustains humanity passively, in the manner of a receiving subject; I deny the antecedent. It sustains humanity actively, in the manner of a term and act completing and perfecting it and causing it to subsist; I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For that which sustains another in this manner is related to it in the manner of an act and perfective principle, not in the manner of matter and a perfectible potency.

From what has been said, you will understand that, even if some substantial mode of union were admitted by which the assumed humanity

was formally joined to the Divine Word, this mode would not be the formal term of God's unitive action. For the formal term is that through which the total term is constituted. But the total term of God's unitive action would not be constituted through such a mode, but rather through the personality or subsistence of the Word itself as communicated to humanity. Therefore that mode would not be the formal term of the unitive action; rather, the personality or subsistence of the Divine Word itself as communicated to the assumed humanity would be its formal term.

Similarly, even if between matter and form there were a mode of union, which some philosophers admit not improbably, that mode would not be the formal term of generation, but the form itself constituting the total term. For the form would have the character of act and perfective principle, whereas the union would not be a part but the pure bond of the parts.

12. You will ask whether the hypostatic union, considered under the aspect of union, is the greatest of all unions.

I answer with St. Thomas, here, q. 2, a. 9, that the hypostatic union is the least on the part of the things united, but the greatest on the part of that in which they are united.

The first part is clear, for the human and divine natures, which are the extremes of this union, are infinitely distant and are less suited to composition.

The second is evident from the fact that the person of the Divine Word, who is the medium or bond in which the divine and human natures are substantially and hypostatically joined, is something most simple and is really identified with one of the extremes, namely the divine nature.

Hence, under this aspect, the hypostatic union surpasses all other created unions, in which the medium is really distinct from both extremes, and yields only to the uncreated union by which the three persons of the most holy Trinity are joined to one another. Bernard discusses this elegantly in bk. 5, *De consideratione*, ch. 8, in these words: *Among all things that are rightly called one, the unity of the Trinity holds the highest place, by which three persons are one substance. In the second place excels that unity by which, conversely, three substances are one person in Christ.*

CHAPTER V.

The Meritorious Cause of the Incarnation.

1. We are not treating here of the physical cause of the Incarnation, because concerning it there is almost no difficulty or controversy among theologians.

For since the Incarnation is most supernatural, and indeed occupies the highest summit of supernatural reality, no creature can be its principal cause.

Nor was the most Blessed Virgin a physical instrument by means of which God joined human nature to the personality of the Word. Such instrumental concurrence in relation to the hypostatic union is not required for her truly to be and to be called Mother of God. It is sufficient that in the conception of her Son she exercised the same concurrence that other mothers customarily provide in the conception of their children.

Hence, if the holy Fathers sometimes call her an instrument of the Incarnation, they do not take the name "instrument" in the strict signification in which philosophers customarily use it, but in the broader sense in which whatever concurs in any manner toward the production of another thing is commonly called an instrument.

With this premised, certain difficulties customarily disputed by theologians concerning the meritorious cause of the Incarnation must be briefly discussed and resolved here.

§ 1.
Whether Christ Could Merit the Hypostatic Union through Works Preceding or Following the Incarnation.

2. It is certain and undoubted among theologians that Christ did not in fact merit the hypostatic union through works preceding it by priority of time or nature, or through works following it.

That He did not merit it through works prior in time is certain by faith, since it has been defined in various Councils against Photinus that the humanity did not exist for any real instant before the hypostatic union.

That He did not merit it through actions elicited in the first moment of the Incarnation but prior by nature is clear, first, because no operation actually existed in Christ's humanity prior by nature to its being assumed by the Word. In that prior instant it would not subsist, and actions belong to subsisting things or supposita, as philosophers teach.

It is also clear because Augustine manifestly appears to exclude every merit of Christ, even those that might precede the adoption of union only by nature. He says in tract. 82 on John: *No merits of the man preceded that assumption, but all His merits began from that assumption.*

And in De praedestinatione sanctorum, ch. 15: The most illustrious light of predestination and grace is the Savior Himself, Christ Jesus. By what

preceding merits of works or faith did the human nature that is in Him obtain that He should be what He is? What did it do before, what did it believe, what did it ask, that it might attain this ineffable excellence? As though he were saying: nothing.

He teaches the same in *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 11, and bk. 2, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, ch. 17, and in many other places. He assumes this to prove the truth of faith that no merits of the sinner precede the first grace of justification. Hence he says in the cited place of *De praedestinatione sanctorum*: *By the same grace by which a man is made a Christian from the beginning of his faith, that man was made Christ from His beginning.* And a little below: *Whoever finds in our Head preceding merits of that singular generation may seek in us, His members, preceding merits of our manifold regeneration.*

3. Finally, it appears no less certain that Christ did not in fact merit the hypostatic union through works following the Incarnation. For since a principle of merit—such as in Christ the hypostatic union, or the personal being of the Word communicated through that union—cannot fall under merit, at least connaturally and according to the ordinary law, it must not be said without an urgent reason that this actually occurred. No such reason can be offered here. Rather, it must be presumed that in this mystery the most connatural manner of proceeding was observed when the contrary is not otherwise evident.

Therefore the sole difficulty and controversy among theologians is whether Christ could have merited the hypostatic union through works preceding the Incarnation by priority of time or nature, or through merits following it.

4. I say, first, that if Christ's humanity had subsisted in itself with habitual grace for a time before being assumed by the Word, it could not have merited the hypostatic union condignly through preceding works, but could have merited it congruously.

The first part is proved: Only a work of infinite value can be condignly meritorious of the Incarnation, since a condignly meritorious work must have proportion to the reward. But works preceding the union of humanity with the Word would not be of infinite value, since they would not proceed from a divine suppositum, from which alone infinite value can be derived into the works of the humanity, but from the humanity subsisting in a created suppositum. Therefore they could not condignly merit the hypostatic union.

That they could congruously merit it is clear, because equality with the reward is not required for such merit, but friendship with God is sufficient.

Hence, as we shall say below, the holy Fathers who preceded the Incarnation merited it congruously.

5. I say, second, that Christ's humanity, even by absolute power, could not have merited the Incarnation either condignly or congruously through works preceding it by priority of nature.

This conclusion must be understood of Christ's humanity as assumed by the Word. For if it had first been united to another uncreated person or to the absolute subsistence of God, it could without doubt have merited union with the Word, even condignly, because, since its works would have been of infinite value, they would have possessed sufficient proportion and condignity to that union.

6. The conclusion thus explained is proved by the fundamental argument: It is contradictory for Christ's humanity to operate before by nature it was assumed by the Word. Therefore it is also contradictory for it to merit union with the Word through works preceding that union by priority of nature.

The consequence is clear. The antecedent is shown thus: Just as existence is a condition indispensably required on the part of an efficient cause in order to act, so also is subsistence, which is either existence itself or something essentially and necessarily presupposed to existing. Hence there is the familiar axiom: *Actions belong to supposita.* Since this order among operation, existence, and subsistence is intrinsic and essential, it cannot be changed by God.

7. Nor is it valid to say that for Christ's humanity to operate in the prior instant of nature to its union with the Word, it is sufficient for it to be singular and existent.

Apart from the fact that it is false that Christ's humanity existed in a prior instant of nature to its union with the Word, since it exists only through the uncreated existence of the Divine Word, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 17, a. 2, the argument made efficaciously proves that subsistence is of itself required in a nature for it to operate. For an accidental act, such as operation, essentially presupposes in the nature a substantial completion, such as subsistence.

This is especially forceful in the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches that existence is the ultimate actuality of essence and distinct from it. For since it is evident that a nature cannot operate unless it possesses existence, much more will it be impossible for it to act unless it possesses subsistence, which is something necessarily presupposed to existing.

8. You will say: An accident can be preserved without a subject and, when separated from it, can operate, as is evident in the mystery of the

Eucharist. Therefore Christ's humanity could similarly have been first produced and preserved by God without any suppositum, and, thus preserved, could have operated.

I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that the existence of an accident immediately affects its essence, not through the subject, although its existence connaturally depends upon the subject. But the existence of a substance does not affect it immediately, but through subsistence, by which the nature is proximately receptive of existence. Hence, just as no nature can be preserved by God without existence, neither can it be preserved without some suppositum.

9. I say, third, that Christ could not merit the Incarnation, either condignly or congruously, through acts following the hypostatic union and proceeding from the Word as united to the humanity. Thus theologians commonly teach against Suárez and a few others.

This is proved by the fundamental argument: The principle of merit cannot fall under the merit of a work proceeding from it. But the hypostatic union is the principle of every merit of Christ. Therefore it cannot fall under the merit of any work proceeding from it.

The minor premise is certain, both because the principle of Christ's works is not the humanity itself but the suppositum as united to that humanity, and because Christ's works receive from His person their infinite value and condignity for reward.

The major premise, in which the difficulty lies, is proved, first, by the authority of Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, and the other Fathers and Councils against the Pelagians, who teach that first grace does not fall under merit because it precedes every merit as its principle.

Second, it is proved from St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 29, a. 6, where he argues thus: Merit is the cause of reward, not indeed in the manner of a final cause, for in that respect the reward is rather the final cause of merit, but by reduction to an efficient cause, insofar as merit makes one worthy of the reward and thereby disposes one for the reward. But that which is a cause in the manner of an efficient cause can in no manner be temporally posterior to that of which it is the cause. Hence it is impossible for someone to merit what he already possesses.

By these words he manifestly teaches that the principle of merit cannot fall under merit; otherwise merit would be its own cause and at the same time its effect in the same order of meritorious causality.

The same major premise is proved, third: Merit is related to reward as a means to an end, a way to its terminus, a disposition to a form, and an efficient cause to its effect. But it is contradictory for a means to follow the

end, for the way to be posterior to its terminus, for a disposition to be posterior to the form, or for an efficient cause to be posterior to its effect. Therefore it is impossible for merit to be posterior to the reward, and consequently for the principle of merit to fall under merit.

It is proved, fourth: Merit possesses a certain moral power of attracting the reward. But in no manner can the same thing attract itself. Therefore it is impossible for the same thing to be its own merit, and consequently it is also contradictory for it to be the merit of its own principle, from which it has the power of meriting.

10. The conclusion can further be proved by this argument: Granted that an efficient cause of merit can in some manner fall under merit, nevertheless it is contradictory for the formal principle of merit to fall under the merit of that of which it is the formal principle. Otherwise the same thing could merit itself insofar as it is merit and be rewarded by itself, and consequently depend upon itself, which is contradictory.

But the Word as united to humanity is the formal principle of Christ's merit, since Christ's works derive their infinite meritorious value from the personality of the Divine Word as united to the humanity, as will appear below when we treat of Christ's merit and satisfaction. Therefore it is contradictory for the hypostatic union to fall under the merit of works proceeding from it.

11. You will say with Suárez: In human affairs the reward of merit is very often given before the merit itself, by an anticipated payment as compensation and wages for future labor and merit, as when a commander gives a horse or weapons to a soldier in reward for a future battle. Therefore God could similarly have conferred the hypostatic union upon Christ's humanity as a reward for future merits.

I deny the consequence and the parity. First, because the weapons granted to the soldier are not the principle of his merits. Rather, that principle is the prudence, virtue, and vigorous courage of the soldier who uses the weapons bravely. Hence it is not surprising if he merits previously given weapons by his labors. Christ's merits, however, depend upon the hypostatic union both as an efficient and as a formal principle, as is evident from what was said above.

Second, because gifts granted by man can be given imperfectly and by a suspended donation, which becomes null if the condition is not fulfilled. The hypostatic union cannot be so given, for by the very fact that it is given it is granted simply and absolutely.

§ 2.
The Merits of the Blessed Virgin and the Holy Fathers in Relation to the Incarnation.

12. I say, first, that the Blessed Virgin and the ancient Fathers neither merited nor could have merited the Incarnation condignly, as regards either its substance or its intrinsic circumstances. For no merit of a mere creature can be proportionate to so great a reward, which belongs to the highest order and possesses the highest value.

Therefore, just as in the order of nature there is nothing condignly meritorious of a reward belonging to the order of grace, so in the whole order of grace nothing can be condignly meritorious of the hypostatic union, which is farther distant from the order of grace than the order of grace is from the order of nature.

13. You will say: Through their good works the ancient Fathers condignly merited the opening of the heavenly kingdom; otherwise they would not have merited glory. But the kingdom of heaven is opened only through Christ. Therefore they merited Christ's coming.

I answer by denying the major premise. For since the opening of the heavenly kingdom is a common good of the whole human race, it exceeds in value every work proceeding from personal grace and can be equaled only by a work proceeding from the grace of the Head.

14. I say, second, that the Blessed Virgin and the ancient Fathers congruously merited the Incarnation, both as regards its substance and as regards its acceleration and other circumstances.

For the Blessed Virgin and the ancient Fathers, by devout and insistent prayers and most fervent desires, entreated God to send His Son into the world. But these prayers and desires possessed the character of congruous merit in relation to the coming of the Son of God: first, because it was fitting that God should hear His friends who obeyed Him; second, because those devout desires disposed the ancient Fathers to receive Christ.

Therefore the Blessed Virgin and the ancient Fathers congruously merited the Incarnation and consequently its circumstances, since they did not ask for the Incarnation only as regards its substance, but with all its circumstances.

15. You will object, first: In the order of nature there can be no merit, even congruous merit, in relation to grace. Therefore neither can there be

merit in the order of grace in relation to the hypostatic union, which, as we said above, is farther distant from the order of grace than the order of grace is from the order of nature.

I answer by denying the consequence and the parity. The order of nature does not include friendship with God, whereas the order of grace does. Hence, since congruous merit is founded upon friendship with God, although in the order of nature there can be no merit, even congruous merit, in relation to grace, there can nevertheless be congruous merit in the order of grace in relation to the hypostatic union.

16. You will object, second: Neither can a mere man congruously merit for himself the first justifying grace, nor could Christ merit the hypostatic union, because the principle of merit cannot fall under merit, as is evident from what was said above. Therefore, since the Incarnation was the principle of the merit of the ancient Fathers, because all their merit came from grace conferred upon them through Christ's merits, it appears that they could not congruously merit the Incarnation.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that the hypostatic union is not a purely extrinsic and effective principle of Christ's merits, but also an intrinsic and formal principle, since it is the form from which the meritorious value of Christ's works is derived.

Similarly, in a mere man justifying grace is the form constituting merit and is not related to it merely in the manner of an efficient cause.

Christ, however, was not the intrinsic and formal cause of the merit of the ancient Fathers, but only its extrinsic cause. For He caused their grace only in the manner of a final cause or of a moral efficient cause.

Hence, when it is said that the principle of merit cannot fall under merit, even congruous merit, it must be answered that this is indeed true of an intrinsic principle of merit having the character of a formal cause, but not of an extrinsic principle of merit having the character of a final or moral efficient cause.

17. From what has been said, you will infer that the Blessed Virgin neither merited nor could have merited condignly that she should be the Mother of God, but that she did merit it congruously.

The first part is clear. For since such maternity involves the Incarnation and belongs to the hypostatic order, what we have said of the Incarnation must be understood of the maternity of the Blessed Virgin.

The second is likewise evident, for by the holiness of her life and her extraordinary purity, by fervent prayers and devout desires, the Blessed Virgin disposed herself and congruously merited to be chosen as the Mother

of God. Bernard excellently declares this in his sermon De aquaeductu, in these words: But how did this aqueduct of ours reach that fountain so sublime? How do you think, except by the vehemence of desire and the purity of prayer? As it is written: "The prayer of the just penetrates the heavens." And who is just, if not Mary the just, from whom the Sun of justice arose for us? How, therefore, did she reach that inaccessible majesty except by knocking, asking, and seeking?

Likewise Gregory the Great, in bk. 1 on 1 Kings, says: By the name "mountain" is signified the most blessed ever-Virgin Mary, Mother of God. For she was a mountain who, by the dignity of her election, surpassed the height of every chosen creature. Was Mary not a lofty mountain, who, that she might attain to the conception of the eternal Word, raised the summit of her merits above all the choirs of Angels, even to the throne of the divinity?

CHAPTER VI.
On the Assuming Person.

The ineffable mystery of the Incarnation cannot be fully understood unless the two terms of the hypostatic union, namely, the assuming person and the assumed nature, are explained. Therefore, these must be treated briefly here and in the following chapter.

§ 1.
By What Did the Divine Word Immediately Terminate the Human Nature: by the Common and Absolute Subsistence, or by the Personal and Relative Subsistence?

1. Durandus, III, dist. 1, q. 2, posits in Christ two unions with the Word: one primary, with something absolute and common to the three persons, namely, the absolute and essential subsistence; and another secondary, with the personality of the Word. He requires the first so that the humanity may become subsistent, for he judges that in God there is no subsistence except the absolute subsistence common to the three persons; but he requires the latter so that there may be a complete personal union with the person of the Word.

2. This opinion, however, is commonly rejected by theologians. First, because the Word formally and immediately terminates the human nature by that whereby He formally terminates the divine nature, since the two

natures in Christ are united in the same term. But He formally terminates the divine nature by the property, or relative subsistence. Therefore He also terminates the human nature by it. Second, if the formal and proximate reason whereby the Word terminates the humanity were the absolute and common subsistence of God, it would follow that the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnate, which is heretical. The consequence is clear, for whatever belongs to one person of the most holy Trinity by reason of an essential and common attribute belongs to them all.

This is confirmed because the action uniting the Word with the human nature belongs to the divine persons by reason of the nature and omnipotence common to them; hence all the divine persons are properly said to be the principle of the Incarnation. Therefore, if immediately terminating the human nature belonged to the Word by reason of the essential and absolute subsistence common to the three persons, all would properly be said to terminate the human nature, and consequently all would properly be said to be incarnate. Thus the Father could be called incarnate and a man, just as the Son is.

3. Nor is Durandus's claim of any force, namely, that the Father, as God, can be called incarnate and a man, but not as Father, whereas the Son is incarnate and a man even precisely as Son. For, on the contrary, those things which belong to the divine persons by reason of something absolute and common are predicated of them absolutely and without qualification. Creating, conserving, governing, and all operations *ad extra*, because they belong to the divine persons by reason of the nature and omnipotence common to them, are predicated of them simply and without qualification. Therefore, if terminating the human nature belonged to them by reason of the absolute and common subsistence, the Father and the Holy Spirit could absolutely and simply be called incarnate and men, just as the Son is.

4. From these considerations there also stands refuted the opinion of others who teach that the Word primarily and immediately terminates the human nature by the absolute subsistence, not considered precisely and absolutely, but as modified by the relative property of the Son. For according to this opinion, the person of the Word, as distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, could not be said to terminate the humanity, which is erroneous. The consequence is proved because the power of creating is not proper to the Son, but is common to Him with the other persons; therefore, even as appropriated to the Son, or as modified by the relation of filiation, it cannot create anything unless the Father and the Holy Spirit create it together with Him. Therefore, likewise, since the absolute subsistence is something common to the three persons, the Son will not be able through such

subsistence, even as appropriated to Him and modified by the relation of filiation, to terminate the humanity unless the other persons likewise terminate it.

You will object on behalf of Durandus's opinion: The divine nature is communicated to the Son without the paternity being communicated to Him. Therefore, with greater reason, the common and absolute subsistence can be immediately united to the humanity without the personalities of the Father and the Holy Spirit being united to it; and thus the chief foundation of our opinion collapses.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that a relative opposition is found among the divine personalities, by reason of which personalities opposed to one another cannot be communicated to the same person, although the divine nature is communicated to Him. But between the humanity and the personality of the Father or of the Holy Spirit there is no relative opposition preventing the personalities of the Father and the Holy Spirit, which are really identified with the absolute subsistence, from being communicated and united to the humanity, at least mediately and secondarily, once the absolute subsistence has been united and communicated to it.

5. From what has been said you understand, first, that there is a twofold term of the Incarnation, or hypostatic union: one primary and immediate, namely, the subsistence and personality of the Divine Word; the other secondary and mediate, namely, the absolute subsistence common to the three persons. Whether God, as common to the three persons by reason of the absolute subsistence, can assume another nature and be immediately united to it, we shall discuss in the following section.

6. You will understand, second, that although paternity is really identified with the divine nature and with the absolute subsistence, which is the secondary and mediate term of the hypostatic union, nevertheless the eternal Father cannot be called a man or incarnate, even mediately and secondarily. For this would require that paternity be really identified with the primary and immediate term of the Incarnation, namely, filiation. Yet this cannot occur, since paternity is relatively opposed to it.

§ 2.
Certain Metaphysical Difficulties Concerning Possible Hypostatic Unions Are Briefly Proposed and Resolved.

7. You will ask, first, whether God, as common to the three persons by reason of the absolute subsistence, can assume a foreign nature and be immediately united to it.

I answer affirmatively, for that which is the reason for God's subsisting in His proper nature can be the reason for His subsisting in a foreign nature. The relative subsistence of the Word is the reason for His subsisting in a created nature for no other reason than that by reason of it He subsists first through Himself in the infinite divine nature. But the absolute subsistence, which we presuppose from the treatise *De Trinitate* to belong to this God as common to the three persons, is the reason for His subsisting in the divine nature as understood prior to the relations and persons. Therefore, by reason of it He can subsist in a created nature and consequently assume it to Himself and be immediately united to it.

8. This is confirmed. The whole power of terminating which is in the relative subsistences of the divine persons arises radically from the absolute subsistence transcendentally included in them. Therefore, if the relative subsistences can immediately terminate a created nature, with greater reason the absolute subsistence can do so. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. The relative subsistences of the divine persons can terminate a created nature because they are infinite and eminently formally contain the whole perfection of created personality. But this infinite perfection of relative subsistence proceeds as from a root from the simply infinite divine essence itself and from the absolute subsistence, which are transcendentally included in the relative and personal subsistence. Therefore the whole power of terminating also proceeds from them.

9. You will say: It is contradictory for there to exist in reality a man who is not a person. But if the humanity were primarily and immediately terminated by the absolute subsistence, such a man would not be a person, because he would not subsist incommunicably, since the absolute subsistence does not confer incommunicability, but only perseity. Therefore, it is contradictory for the humanity to be terminated first through itself by the absolute subsistence.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor premise. For although incommunicability would not be conferred formally and immediately upon the humanity through its union with the absolute subsistence, it would nevertheless be conferred concomitantly and mediately. For by the very fact that such a nature was primarily and immediately joined to the absolute subsistence, it would secondarily and mediately be united to the relative subsistences of the divine persons, by which it would be rendered incommunicable.

10. You will ask, second, whether the three divine persons could assume the same created nature and unite it hypostatically to themselves.

I answer affirmatively with St. Thomas, here, q. 3, a. 6, against the Scotists. The reason is that this simultaneous termination is repugnant neither on the part of the terminating persons, who do not exclude one another from the character of terminating, as is clear in the divine nature, which all three terminate together; nor on the part of the assumed nature, because this termination does not occur according to the nature's own natural exigency, but by reason of the obediential potency, which is equally receptive of three persons and of one. Hence such a nature existing in several divine persons would not be infinite as the divine nature is, because it would not have existence in them connaturally and intrinsically by reason of its own fecundity, as the divine nature does, but supernaturally, extrinsically, and by reason of the obediential potency. This does not imply infinity in it, but only subjection and obedience.

11. You will say: One and the same thing cannot at once depend adequately upon the same thing and not depend upon it. By this reasoning our Thomists prove in philosophy that it is contradictory for one and the same effect to proceed from several adequate and total causes of the same order. But if the three divine persons assumed the same created nature, it would simultaneously depend adequately in its subsisting upon the same divine person and not depend upon that person. Therefore, it is repugnant for the same created nature to be assumed simultaneously by the three divine persons and hypostatically united to them. The major premise seems evident. The minor is shown as follows. An effect proceeding from several adequate causes would depend upon each one, because it could not exist without it; and it would not depend upon it, because it could exist without it, since it would be caused totally by another. Therefore, similarly, a created nature assumed simultaneously by several divine persons would depend upon each in its subsisting, because it would have subsistence from that person, and it would not depend upon that person, because it would subsist through another without it.

I answer, first, with Capreolus and Cajetan, that although one and the same thing cannot depend adequately upon two by causal dependence, which is dependence in the strict sense, nevertheless one and the same thing can depend adequately upon two by a dependence which is not causal but purely terminative, and thus is not dependence in the strict sense—adequately by intensive adequation, though not by extensive adequation. One white thing is adequately terminated intensively by another white thing through a single relation of likeness, but not adequately extensively; for by virtue of the same relation it can be terminated at several white things and is in fact terminated at all things with which it has likeness in degree and intensity. A father also, by virtue of the same relation whereby he is referred to his first son and is terminated adequately and intensively by him, is referred to a new son if another should be born; and accordingly such a relation is not terminated adequately and extensively by the first. Therefore, since a created nature united to a foreign *suppositum* does not depend upon it by strict and causal dependence, but by a purely terminative and non-causal dependence, although when united to one of the divine persons it is adequately terminated by that person intensively, it is nevertheless not adequately terminated extensively. Therefore, united to one person, it can also be united to the others.

12. Second, an answer can be given by distinguishing the major premise. One and the same thing cannot simultaneously depend upon the same thing and not depend upon it under the same aspect: I grant this. Under diverse aspects: I deny it. I similarly distinguish the minor premise. If the three persons assumed the same nature, it would simultaneously depend and not depend upon the same thing under diverse aspects and with respect to diverse effects: let this pass. Under the same aspect: I deny it. For it would depend upon the person of the Father, for example, so as to subsist incommunicably with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit; but upon the Son so as to subsist incommunicably with respect to the Father and the Holy Spirit; and proportionally the same must be said of the Holy Spirit. By virtue of any one divine person, however, it would be made incommunicable to every created person.

13. You will ask, third, whether, just as the three persons can terminate the same nature, so the same person can terminate several natures.

I answer affirmatively with St. Thomas, in the cited q., a. 7. This is clear from an evident reason, for the divine person is not restricted by one nature, nor is His terminative power exhausted, since He is infinite in terminating and in the character of subsisting *ad extra*. Therefore, from the fact that He terminates one nature, He is not prevented from terminating another. This

is confirmed because the divine person simultaneously terminates two natures in Christ, namely, the divine and the human. Therefore, a plurality of natures does not prevent Him from terminating even several created natures.

14. You will ask, fourth, whether, in the case where several persons assumed the same humanity, or one person assumed two humanities, there would then be one man or several men.

I answer that in either case there would be only one man, as St. Thomas teaches, a. 7, ad 2. The reason is that for the multiplication of a substantive noun, such as "man," the multiplication either of the *suppositum* alone or of the form alone which it signifies does not suffice, but the multiplication of both is required. A man clothed in two garments is not called two clothed men, but one clothed man; and one possessing several arts is not called several craftsmen, but only one craftsman, because of the unity of the *suppositum*. Conversely, the name "God" is not multiplied in the divine persons although the *supposita* are multiplied, because the form which it signifies, namely, the Godhead, is not multiplied. Similarly, the name "spirator" is not multiplied in the Father and the Son because of the unity of the spirative power which it formally implies. Therefore, since in the first case the *supposita* would be multiplied but not the nature, and in the second the natures would indeed be multiplied but not the *supposita*, in neither case could they be called several men. St. Thomas notes, however, a. 6, ad 1, that because a numerical term taken absolutely and without qualification determines the *suppositum*, just as it is not permissible to say of God, "The Father and the Son are one," using the masculine, because the meaning would be that they are one *suppositum*, though it is permissible with the qualification "one God," so several persons united to the same nature would indeed be one man, but not absolutely "one," in the masculine, without qualification.

15. You will ask, fifth, whether it is so proper to the divine person to be united hypostatically to a foreign nature that it is repugnant to every created or creatable personality to terminate a foreign nature.

I answer affirmatively with St. Thomas, here, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2, where he says: *This is proper to the divine person, because of His infinity, that a concurrence of natures should occur in Him, not accidentally, but according to subsistence.* In these words he indicates the fundamental reason for our answer. No subsistence can terminate a foreign nature unless it is infinite. But the divine subsistence alone is infinite, whereas no created or creatable subsistence is infinite. Therefore, only the divine subsistence can terminate a foreign nature. The minor premise is certain, both because every created thing is

finite and because a created subsistence is limited by the nature whose complement and term it is. The major premise, in which the difficulty lies, is proved as follows. A subsistence terminating several natures, since it must supply the function of those subsistences proper to those natures, must contain them eminently and formally. But it cannot contain them in this manner unless it is infinite. Therefore, neither can it terminate several natures unless it possesses infinite perfection. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. A subsistence terminating several natures cannot eminently and formally contain the function of the subsistences proper to those natures unless it contains them insofar as they agree in some one common character, which can be nothing other than the character of being. For proper differences do not agree in anything superior except transcendentally, as imbibed in them. But to contain something under the character of being is to contain it in an unlimited and infinite manner, for the character of being, since it is most universal and transcendent, extends to all things and is in a certain manner infinite and unlimited. Therefore, a subsistence terminating several natures cannot eminently and formally contain the subsistences proper to those natures unless it is infinite.

This is confirmed. A subsistence possessing an infinite terminative power is infinite in the character of subsistence, since subsistence consists in nothing other than the power of terminating a nature. But a subsistence able to terminate several natures possesses an infinite terminative power, because if it can terminate several natures, it can terminate infinitely many. Where plurality makes no difference, neither would infinity make one, if infinity of that kind were possible, as Aristotle says in *Physics* IV, text 76. From this he infers that if two bodies could be simultaneously in the same place, infinitely many bodies could also be there, if they were possible. Therefore, a subsistence able to terminate several natures is infinite in the character of subsistence.

16. You will say, first, that by this reasoning it is indeed proved that a subsistence able by its natural power and according to ordinary power to terminate several natures must be infinite in the character of subsistence, or possess infinite terminative power; but this does not establish the same concerning a subsistence which can terminate several natures only through obediential potency, or by the absolute power of God.

But this answer is easily overturned from the common doctrine of philosophers, who assert that in formal causes the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary power is of no force. The reason is that a formal cause effects nothing except by communicating its own entity, since the formal effect is the form itself as communicated. Hence, however much a

form may be applied by a higher cause, it will effect nothing except by giving itself; nor can its power of causing formally be increased if the same form remains. In this it differs from an efficient cause, whose power can be increased by something superadded because it produces an effect distinct from itself. Therefore, since a created subsistence has the character of a form and substantial act of the nature which it terminates, if by its natural power and according to ordinary power it cannot terminate several natures, neither can it do so through obediential potency and by the absolute power of God.

17. You will say, second: The sun eminently contains the effects of inferior causes and is nevertheless something finite in itself. Therefore, similarly, a created subsistence, although finite, provided that it belongs to a higher order, can eminently contain other created subsistences of an inferior order and consequently supply their function.

This is confirmed. The termination of a foreign nature is not an infinite effect. Therefore, it does not require infinity in the form capable of producing it, and consequently a created subsistence, although finite, can terminate a foreign nature.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. For the sun and other universal causes contain the effects of inferior causes by an imperfect eminence extending only to some common and generic character, such as the character of a living thing or of a corruptible body. But a subsistence terminating several natures must eminently contain their subsistences according to their proper and distinct characters. This cannot belong to any created and finite subsistence, because, since subsistence is the term of a nature, it receives from that nature its determinate species and perfection and therefore cannot be more perfect than it. Hence, just as no created and finite nature contains the specific and individual perfections of other natures, neither can any created and finite subsistence contain the perfection of another subsistence. This is proper and peculiar to the divine and uncreated subsistence, which, because it terminates the divine nature eminently containing the perfections of all natures, eminently contains the perfections of all created and creatable subsistences according to their proper and distinct characters. From this it is rendered capable of terminating every created and creatable nature.

To the confirmation, I distinguish the antecedent. The termination of a foreign nature is not an infinite effect under the character of being: I grant the antecedent. Under the character of a formal effect: I deny the antecedent and the consequence. For in order that the infinity of a cause may be inferred from its effect, it is not required that the effect be infinite

entitatively; it suffices that it be infinite under the character of an effect. This is clear in the term of creation, which is not entitatively infinite but nevertheless demands infinite perfection in the creating cause.

CHAPTER VII.
On the Assumable and Assumed Nature.

Before we discuss the nature assumed by the Word, the assumable nature must be treated, and it must be briefly explained which natures can be assumed by God.

§ 1.
Whether the Angelic Nature and Creatures Devoid of Reason Are Assumable by God.

1. I say, first, that the angelic nature is assumable by God. This is repugnant neither on the part of God, since the divine subsistence has an infinite power of terminating and eminently contains the terminative power of every created subsistence; nor on the part of the angelic nature, which, since it is really distinguished from its subsistence, as I presuppose from *Metaphysica*, can be deprived of it either while possessing it or immediately before possessing it, and can be anticipated by a divine person. Hence the Apostle, in Heb. 2, in order to commend God's charity toward men, says that *nowhere did He take hold of the angels, but He took hold of the seed of Abraham.*

2. You will say: St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 3, and frequently elsewhere, teaches that in separate and simple substances, or substances not composed of matter and form, such as the angels, the *suppositum* is not distinguished from the nature. But it is contradictory for a nature to be assumed together with its proper *suppositum*, as we shall say below. Therefore, the angelic nature is not assumable by God.

I answer that in the cited place St. Thomas is speaking of the *suppositum* considered not formally but radically, that is, of the individual, which in angels is not distinguished from the nature. To understand this better, it must be noted that subsistence arises from the nature, not according to its specific principles, but according to its individuating principles. Since it renders a nature incommunicable, it must be the term of a singular nature. For this reason St. Thomas sometimes takes *suppositum* and subsistence formally, for the term completely terminating a singular nature, and

sometimes radically, for the individual principles themselves from which that term arises. Therefore, when he speaks of the *suppositum* formally, he teaches that it is distinguished from the nature not only in corporeal things but also in angels, as he indicates here, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3, and expressly teaches in *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, a. 4. But when he treats the radical *suppositum*, he says that in immaterial things it is not distinguished from the nature as it is in corporeal things, because in intellectual substances there is not one radical principle from which the specific degree is taken and another from which singularity is taken, as there is in corporeal things, in which the specific character is taken from form and singularity from matter designated by quantity.

3. I say, second, that an irrational nature can, by the absolute power of God, be united hypostatically to God and assumed by Him into the unity of a *suppositum*.

The proof is that this is repugnant neither on the part of the divine person, who has an infinite power of terminating, nor on the part of the irrational nature itself, since it is separable from its proper subsistence no less than the human and angelic natures are.

4. You will say that the repugnance of the assumption of such a nature arises from its unbecomingness. But, on the contrary, although to men who follow the guidance of reason without the rule of faith it appears unbecoming to the divine majesty for the Divine Word to assume our flesh, to be scourged, spat upon, and put to death, this is nevertheless not truly unbecoming or repugnant to the divine majesty. Hence the Apostle, 1 Cor. 1: But we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews indeed a scandal, and to the Gentiles foolishness, but to those who are called, Jews and Greeks alike, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. Therefore, similarly, although it appears unbecoming to us for God to assume an irrational nature, it would not truly be unbecoming if God had decreed to do it. Tertullian explains this excellently in De carne Christi against Marcion, ch. 4, in these words: If He had truly willed to come forth from a she-wolf, a sow, or a cow, and, clothed in the body of a wild animal or beast of burden, to preach the kingdom of heaven, I suppose your judgment would prescribe to Him: "This is shameful for God, unworthy of the Son of God, and therefore foolish; who would believe such a thing?" It is indeed foolish if we judge God by our own understanding. But look around, Marcion, if you have not deleted it: God chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.

This is confirmed. During the three days of death, Christ's body, although inanimate and informed by the form of a corpse, remained hypostatically united to the Divine Word, and nevertheless there was no

unbecomingness in such a union. Therefore, similarly, in the union of a divine person with an irrational nature there would be no unbecomingness repugnant to the majesty of God. Cajetan prudently warns, however, that although God can be hypostatically united even to the vilest creatures without any dishonor to His majesty, we should refrain from descending to particular examples because of the danger arising from our weakness. For the same reason no mention ought to be made of the presence whereby God, through His immensity, is present to the filthiest things. Note also that if a divine person assumed an irrational nature, He would not be united to it under the character of a person, but only under the character of a hypostasis or *suppositum*, because an irrational nature is not receptive of personality, since personality is found only in a rational nature, as is clear from the definition of person: *an individual substance of a rational nature.*

5. You will object, first: St. Thomas, here, q. 4, a. 1, in the body of the article, concludes: *Hence it remains that the human nature alone is assumable.* Therefore, he judges that neither the angelic nor the irrational nature can be assumed by God.

I answer that St. Thomas is there speaking of assumability according to fittingness, as is clear from the text, and intends only that special fitting reasons for assumability are found in the human nature which are not similarly found in the others. On this see above, ch. 1, § 2, concl. 5.

6. You will object, second: An irrational nature cannot be elevated to the vision and enjoyment of God. Therefore, neither can it be assumed to the being of His subsistence. The consequence is proved, both because operation follows being and because that which cannot be elevated to the lesser cannot be elevated to the greater; but to see God is less than to be hypostatically united to Him.

This is confirmed. A subject incapable of the formal effect of a form is also incapable of that form. But an irrational nature is incapable of sanctification, which is the formal effect of the hypostatic union. Therefore, it is also incapable of that union.

To the objection, I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence, whose falsity is evident in Christ's body during the three days of death. It remained united to the Word and nevertheless was incapable of being elevated to see and love God. Hence, to the first proof I say that operation follows the being of essence or formal being as its principle by which, or formal principle. According to the proportion of that being there follows either a natural operation, if the being is natural, or a supernatural operation, if the being is supernatural. But operation does not follow personal being; personal being has only the character of a necessary

condition for operation. To the second proof I say that although a creature cannot be elevated to the greater if it cannot be elevated to the lesser when the greater and lesser belong to the same order, or when the lesser is included in the greater, it can nevertheless be so elevated when they belong to diverse orders and the lesser is not included in the greater. Flying is less than understanding, and nevertheless in man an incapacity for flying stands together with a capacity for understanding. Likewise, although an angel can naturally understand and will, and supernaturally see and enjoy God, he nevertheless cannot by any power laugh, which is something less. Therefore, since the beatific vision and hypostatic union do not belong to the same order, nor is one included in the other, incapacity for the union is not rightly inferred from incapacity for the vision.

To the confirmation, I distinguish the major premise. A subject incapable of the primary formal effect of a form is also incapable of that form: I grant the major premise. Incapable only of a secondary formal effect: I deny the major premise. The soul of Christ is receptive of habitual grace and nevertheless is not receptive of adoptive filiation, which is a secondary effect of grace. Therefore, since a divine person united to a created nature does not have as His primary formal effect the constitution of that nature as pleasing and holy, but the rendering of it subsistent, a nature capable of this effect, although incapable of the other, can be elevated to the hypostatic union.

7. You will ask, first, whether incomplete natures also, for example, matter alone or form alone, are assumable by a divine person.

I answer, first, that matter cannot be assumed unless it has some form. Since it is contradictory for matter to exist without form, as I presuppose from Thomistic philosophy, it is also contradictory for it to subsist without form, and consequently it is impossible for it to be assumed to the divine subsistence without form. As regards form, there is no doubt that a rational soul separated from the body can be assumed, because by the very fact that it is subsistent, it is receptive of its own subsistence and consequently of the divine subsistence, which supplies the function of its proper subsistence. In fact, during the three days of death, Christ's soul remained united to the Word. As regards corruptible and material forms, it is probable that they can be assumed, because they do not appear to depend for their being and conservation upon the matter in which they are received any more than accidents depend upon the subject by which they are sustained. Hence, just as accidents can be divinely separated from their subject and receive a certain mode of existing through themselves, as is clear in the quantity of bread in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, so also material and corporeal

forms, although they connaturally depend upon matter for their conservation, can nevertheless be supernaturally separated from it and receive a certain mode of subsisting similar to that which they had so long as they were united to matter, and consequently be hypostatically united to God. For the divine subsistence can supply such a mode, since it eminently contains it. The same must be said of integral parts separated from the whole, such as a head, hand, or arm, because through division and separation they acquire a proper subsistence which can be supplied by the divine subsistence, in which they are eminently contained. In that case, however, God could not be called a head or a hand, because the communication of idioms occurs only between complete substantial natures. He could only be said to have a head or a hand, just as during the three days of death He could not be called a soul, but only be said to have a soul. If you ask whether accidents also can be assumed so as to subsist by the divine subsistence, I answer negatively. Nothing is assumed to subsistence except a substance, since subsistence is the ultimate term and complement of substance. Some, however, judge not improbably that it is not contradictory for an accident to be united immediately to the divine existence. For since the existence of an accident is really distinguished from its essence and is eminently contained in the divine existence, it can be supplied by the latter.

8. You will ask, second, whether a created nature subsisting in its proper person can be assumed by God while retaining its proper personality.

I answer negatively, for its proper subsistence constitutes the nature as subsisting through itself and in itself, whereas a foreign subsistence constitutes it as subsisting in another. But it is contradictory for the same nature simultaneously to subsist through itself and in another. Therefore, it is contradictory for it to be assumed by God while retaining its proper personality. I add that if the assumption of a human nature while retaining its proper personality were possible, that personality would in fact have been retained in Christ's humanity, which is contrary to faith. The consequence is proved, first, because it is not fitting that Christ's humanity should be deprived of any connatural perfection. Hence, in the Sixth Synod, action 4, from the letter of Agatho, and action 11, from the letter of Sophronius, and in the Council of Chalcedon, action 5, the Word is said to have assumed the human nature with all its parts, properties, and connatural perfections, namely, those compossible with the person of the Word. Second, it is a greater miracle to impede a connatural and compossible perfection than actually to retain it. But miracles are not to be multiplied in the Incarnation of the Word without necessity. Therefore, if the proper subsistence of

Christ's humanity were compossible with the person of the Word, Christ ought in fact to have retained it.

9. You will say: A human nature terminated by a foreign personality, namely, that of the Divine Word, can be assumed by the Father or the Holy Spirit, for, as we showed in the preceding chapter, the three persons of the Trinity can assume the same nature. Therefore, the same nature terminated by its proper personality can be assumed by the Word without its proper subsistence being consumed or destroyed.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. For its proper subsistence constitutes the nature as subsisting through itself and in itself, whereas a foreign subsistence constitutes it as subsisting in another. It is contradictory for the same nature simultaneously to subsist through itself and in another, but not for it to have several modes of subsisting in another. For subsisting through itself and subsisting in another are mutually opposed modes, one of which, at least virtually, includes the negation of the other. But several modes of being in another do not have this repugnance and opposition among themselves, nor does one virtually include the negation of another.

§ 2.
Whether the Word in Fact Immediately Assumed All the Parts of the Human Nature.

10. There are four kinds of parts in the human nature: essential parts, such as the soul and body; integral parts, such as the four humors—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile; ornamental parts, such as the teeth, nails, and hair; and excrementitious parts, such as tears, saliva, sweat, and so forth. There is no difficulty concerning the first, since they essentially constitute humanity and therefore were manifestly assumed by the Word. It is likewise indubitable that the last were not hypostatically united to the Word, because in man they are neither informed by the rational soul nor do they pertain to the integrity of the human body. Hence they will not remain in glorified bodies, according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6: *Food is for the stomach, and the stomach for food, but God will destroy both it and them.* That is, after the resurrection there will be no use of food and no function of the stomach in digesting it. The controversy, therefore, concerns the intermediate parts, and chiefly the blood, under which name the other humors are to be understood. Durandus, IV, dist. 10, q. 1, and Gabriel, *Canonis Missae Expositio*, lect. 53, deny that the blood of Christ's body was

assumed by the Word. Capreolus calls this opinion *heretical*, Suárez *erroneous*, while the other theologians condemn it at least as rash.

11. I say, therefore, that the blood was immediately assumed by the Word.

This is proved, first, from Scripture and the holy Fathers, who attribute blood to the Son of God in the same manner as flesh, which was certainly assumed. Heb. 2: *Since therefore the children shared in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise partook of the same.* Nazianzen, Oration 5, says: *The Word truly became flesh, because He assumed a body consisting of flesh, bones, and blood.* The same is confirmed by various passages of Scripture in which our redemption is attributed to Christ's blood as its condign price. To these may be added what Clement VI says in the Extravagant *Unigenitus*, namely, that one drop of Christ's blood had infinite value *because of its union with the Word.*

12. It is proved, second, from the fundamental reason. The Word assumed whatever pertains to the integrity of the human body, for He assumed not a mutilated body but an integral body complete in all its parts, since, according to Athanasius in the Creed, Christ is *perfect God and perfect man*. But blood is a part pertaining to the integrity of the human body. Therefore, it was assumed by the Word. The major premise is evident. The minor premise, in which the whole difficulty lies, is proved, first, from the Council of Trent, which evidently presupposes that blood is a part of Christ's body when, sess. 13, ch. 3, it asserts: *The body is placed under the species of bread and the blood under the species of wine by the force of the natural connection whereby the parts of Christ the Lord are joined to one another.* Second, it is proved from Galen, Aristotle, St. Thomas, and all philosophers and physicians, who number blood among the parts of animals, and from the common judgment and conception of men, according to which a body without blood is not considered integral and perfect. Hence blood will also be present after the resurrection in glorified bodies. Third, because blood is a natural organ and instrument by means of which the soul exercises many vital operations in the body, as is clear in the movements of anger, fear, and joy. We become angry when the blood grows hot; we fear when it contracts; and we rejoice when it is diffused. Therefore, just as the other organs of the human body pertain to its integrity, so does blood.

13. You will say that blood is not actually a part of the human body, but only potentially, since it serves for the nourishment of the solid parts and is not continuous with the other parts because of its fluidity, just as water, because it flows or is fluid, cannot be continuous with earth. Hence Aristotle, *De partibus animalium* II, ch. 3, says that *blood is not continuous with flesh*.

I answer that just as the elements in the greater world, although only potential parts and transient matter with respect to mixed bodies, do not for that reason cease to be actual parts with respect to the universe itself, so in the lesser world, namely, the human body, although blood, which is as it were one of its elements, is only a potential part when compared with the other more perfect parts whose nourishment it serves, it is nevertheless called an actual part with respect to the whole body. And although it is not immediately continuous with all parts of the body, it is nevertheless continuous with them mediately. It has certain thicker parts which physicians call fibers, and these are continuous with the veins, while the veins are continuous with the flesh. But these matters belong to philosophers.

14. You will say, second: Many portions of Christ's blood are preserved even now on earth and consequently are not now hypostatically united to the Divine Word. Therefore, they were never assumed, and the same reasoning applies to the others. The consequence is clear from that familiar axiom of Damascene: *What He once assumed, He never relinquished.* The antecedent is evident in the blood which appears on the lance with which Longinus pierced the Lord's side; on the Shrouds of Turin and Belluno, in which Christ's dead body was wrapped; on Veronica's veil, upon which Christ imprinted the image of His bloodied countenance; and finally in that glass ampulla preserved in the church of St. Mary Magdalene at Saint-Maximin, in which the sacred blood has very often been seen to bubble on Good Friday around the hour of the Savior's death.

Several of our Thomists answer that these particles of blood are not parts of the natural blood assumed by the Word, but of nutritive blood, which was not assumed by the Word. Yet although the distinction of blood into natural and nutritive blood has a foundation in St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* V, a. 5, where he says that *not all nutritive blood generated from food pertains to the reality of human nature*, it is nevertheless improbable that so many particles of blood preserved in several churches and flowing from various parts of Christ's body were all merely nutritive blood. This is especially true of the blood with which the lance of Longinus was covered and which he afterward carried to Mantua. For since that blood was around the heart, which according to the philosophers is the workshop of natural blood, it is credible that it was natural and not purely nutritive. I add that it is highly probable that at the time of the Passion there was no nutritive blood in Christ the Lord, or at least very little. For by that most copious bloody sweat which He underwent before the Passion, He sweated out almost all His nutritive blood; and if any remnants remained, He digested them during the interval

between the sweat and the Passion and converted them into natural blood, as Cajetan correctly observes below, q. 54, a. 2.

15. It must therefore be said that the aforesaid particles of blood preserved in various churches are not particles of nutritive blood but of natural blood, because it is not necessary that all the natural blood shed by Christ in His Passion should have been reassumed by Him at the Resurrection. Since the entire quantity of blood which Christ shed in the Passion was not necessary for the integrity and perfection of the human nature, it did not all have to be resumed at the Resurrection. Some small portion could be left on earth for the consolation of the faithful and the remembrance of Christ's Passion, as Pius II declared in a bull addressed to the Abbot of St. Mary in the Diocese of Saintes. That blood of Christ left here for our consolation, however, no longer remains united to the Word. Hence the familiar axiom taken from Damascene, *What the Son of God once assumed, He never relinquished*, must be understood of integral parts, not of their particles, and especially not of particles which are unnecessary for the integrity of Christ's risen body.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

16. From what has been said you will infer, first, that not only the blood but also the other three humors, namely, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile, were assumed by the Word. This is so both because they are mixed with the blood and constitute one total mass which receives the name "blood" from its principal humor, and because those four humors are no less required for the perfection of the lesser world, which is man, than the four elements are required for the greater universe. Hence each of those humors expresses the qualities of one of the elements: blood imitates the moisture and heat of air; phlegm, the coldness and moisture of water; black bile, the dryness and coldness of earth; and yellow bile, the heat and dryness of fire.

17. You will infer, second, that the Word assumed the vital and animal spirits, because such spirits are as it were sparks and rays of the purest and most refined blood. They pertain to the integrity of the human body, contribute greatly to its strength and agility, and conduce to all vital operations. Hence they must remain in glorified bodies.

18. You will infer, third, that the teeth, nails, and hair were hypostatically united to the Word. The teeth are informed by the rational soul and pertain to the integrity of the human body. The nails and hair, although not required for its integrity in the same manner as organic parts, are nevertheless necessary for a better constitution, beauty, and ornament of the body. Hence

they are compared to the leaves of trees, which are ordained to cover and preserve their fruits and are informed by the soul of the whole tree.

19. You will infer, fourth, that Christ's blood was hypostatically united to the Divine Word not only while it was in Christ's living body, but also during the three days of death, when it remained separated from the body. Christ's body and soul, although separated from one another during those three days, remained hypostatically united to the Divine Word because they were parts of His humanity which they were again to compose in the glorified Christ, as theologians commonly teach with St. Thomas, III, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 1, qla. 3, ad 3. But the blood shed in the Passion was likewise a part of the humanity which it was again to compose in the glorified Christ, since Christ's body after the Resurrection had to be integral and perfect. Therefore, the blood shed in the Passion remained hypostatically united to the Divine Word during the three days of death. Hence, if the chalice had been consecrated by the Apostles at that time, the blood of Christ would have been present under the species of wine by the force of the words, and the Godhead by concomitance because of its union with the blood.

CHAPTER VIII.
On Christ's Substantial Grace.

1. There is a threefold grace in Christ: substantial, habitual, and capital. We shall treat the first in this chapter and the second and third in the following chapters.

I say, therefore, that besides the accidental holiness in Christ which proceeds from habitual grace, a substantial holiness must also be admitted, proceeding immediately from the person of the Divine Word substantially united to Him.

This is proved, first, from Scripture. In John 10 Christ said: *Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world*, and so forth. By these words, according to Hilary, Chrysostom, and other holy Fathers, Christ declares that He was sanctified by the mission itself, that is, by the Incarnation and hypostatic union.

It is proved, second, from the Fathers, who understand the passages of Scripture in which Christ is said to have been anointed in such a way that they hold the Godhead to have been the ointment and the assumption, or hypostatic union, to have been the anointing. Thus Nazianzen, Oration 36, explaining the name *Christ*, says that it is attributed to our Savior because of the Godhead: *For this is the anointing of the humanity, sanctifying not by an*

operation as in other Christs, but by the presence of the whole ointment. And in the same place he adds: *Christ is anointed with the Godhead, for this is the anointing of the humanity.* Likewise Cyril, *In Joannem* IV, says that Christ *was anointed, not as other saints and kings were, but because the Word became flesh.* Similarly, Jerome, explaining Ps. 44, *God has anointed You with the oil of gladness above Your companions*, says: *Christ was anointed by nature, not through grace, because in Him the Godhead was present in its fullness.*

2. It is proved, third, from the fundamental reason. By virtue of the grace of union, Christ's humanity is formally sanctified. But the grace of union is something substantial, distinct from habitual grace. Therefore, Christ's humanity is formally sanctified by something substantial and distinct from habitual grace. The minor premise is clear. The major is proved. Through habitual grace a man is formally holy because through it he is drawn to divine being, is constituted a son of God, and habitual grace has a repugnance to sin. But these three things belong much more perfectly to the grace of union. First, through it Christ's humanity is drawn to divine being in a far more perfect manner than through habitual grace, for through the grace of union it is drawn to divine being in itself, whereas through habitual grace it is drawn to divine being only by participation. Next, Christ as man becomes the Son of God through the grace of union in a nobler manner than the just become sons of God through habitual grace, since through the grace of union Christ is the natural Son of God, whereas through habitual grace the just are constituted merely adoptive sons. Likewise, the hypostatic union has a greater incompossibility with sin than habitual grace has, as will be evident below when we treat Christ's impeccability. Therefore, by virtue of the grace of union Christ's humanity is formally sanctified.

3. I said *formally*, not because the Word has the character of a form, but because through the grace of union Christ's humanity is truly, properly, and actually sanctified. This must be noted in order to remove the equivocation of certain persons who deny that the humanity is formally sanctified by the Word merely because He does not exercise the function of a form.

4. You will ask: Since two things are found in the person of Christ and in the hypostatic union, namely, the divine nature and the personal subsistence of the Divine Word, which of these two formally sanctifies Christ's humanity?

I answer that it is formally sanctified by the divine nature included in the subsistence of the Word. For Christ's humanity is formally sanctified by that with which it is anointed. But it is anointed with the Godhead, according to the passage from Nazianzen quoted above: *He is called Christ because of the Godhead, for this is the anointing of the humanity.* Therefore, Christ's humanity

is formally sanctified by the Godhead. I add that just as the relative subsistences of the divine persons add no perfection and goodness to the essence, as we showed in the treatise *De Trinitate*, neither do they add holiness, which is a goodness and perfection. Hence, just as all the goodness and perfection found in the personality of the Word proceeds from the essence which it includes, so also do all its holiness and its whole power of sanctifying the human nature which it terminates.

This is confirmed. Among created things habitual grace alone formally sanctifies because it participates in the Godhead under the concept of nature, and it is the formal cause of our justification and consequently of our sanctification, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 7. Therefore, in God the Godhead alone, under the concept of nature, is infinite holiness, but not the personality as virtually distinguished from the nature. Otherwise, a created subsistence would participate in the divine holiness no less than habitual grace does, and would sanctify the nature which it terminates no less than habitual grace sanctifies the subject which it informs.

5. Nor is this opinion opposed by the fact that Augustine in many places calls the hypostatic union, through which the humanity is united to the divine subsistence, *the highest grace*, whereas the highest grace ought to sanctify in the highest degree. This proves only that Christ's humanity is sanctified by the hypostatic union, not formally, but unitively, because the personality of the Divine Word is the bond joining the humanity to the divine nature by which it is formally sanctified. Or it may also be said that the personality of the Divine Word, communicated to Christ's humanity through the hypostatic union, formally sanctifies it, not by reason of what that personality explicitly expresses, but by reason of the predicate implicitly included in it, namely, the divine nature. This is the first root of living for and loving God, in which the character of holiness consists. From this it follows that the subsistence or person of the Son is said to be pleasing and especially beloved by God, an object of divine complacency, having a right to the glory and inheritance owed to sons, and wholly repugnant and incompossible with sin. By this all the arguments which a certain recent Thomist proposes against our opinion in his *Theologia mentis et cordis* are resolved.

6. But he presses the objection: Formal holiness is the union and conjunction of a rational creature with God. But through the subsistence of the Word the humanity is formally united to God. Therefore, through it the humanity is formally sanctified.

The answer is easy: not every union with God is sanctification, but only the union with the divine nature under the concept of nature. For the sanctifying form is the root of gifts pertaining to the order of grace and terminates divine love by radically giving the power to love God in return. Hence, as we noted above, among the forms or qualities of the supernatural order habitual grace alone formally sanctifies, because it alone participates in the Godhead under the concept of nature.

CHAPTER IX.
On Christ's Accidental or Habitual Grace.

1. Besides substantial grace, it is undoubted among theologians that Christ's soul was also adorned with accidental or habitual grace. Indeed, some judge this to be certain by faith, because they think that it is clearly gathered from Scripture and the Fathers, especially from Isa. 61: *The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because the Lord has anointed Me.* Christ declares in Luke 4 that these words were spoken of Himself, and according to the common explanation they signify that the Holy Spirit is in Christ's soul through the gift of habitual grace because He Himself was anointed through the hypostatic union with uncreated grace. Likewise, in John 1 Christ is called *full of grace and truth*. Fulgentius, explaining this passage in *De fide ad Petrum*, ch. 2, says: *Therefore the holy Evangelist proclaims Him full of grace and truth, because in the divine nature, in which He is God and truth, He is full of truth; and in the human nature, in which He is true man, He was made full of grace.*

2. Nor are testimonies of the holy Fathers lacking which confirm the same truth. Ambrose, explaining Ps. 132, Like ointment upon the head, says that this ointment is the grace common to Christ and to us, and therefore habitual grace. Bernard, Homily 4 on Missus est, explaining Luke 1, Therefore the Holy One who shall be born of you, says: He said "holy" without qualification, because whatever it was that the Virgin bore was without doubt holy and singularly holy, both through the sanctification of the Spirit and through the assumption by the Word. In these words he embraces both kinds of holiness in Christ: substantial holiness through the assumption by the Word, and accidental holiness through the sanctification of the Spirit.

St. Thomas proves the same truth from three considerations. First, from the union of the humanity with the Word, for the closer a receptive thing is to an influencing cause, the more it participates in that cause's influx. But Christ's soul is most intimately joined through the hypostatic union to God,

who is the cause of grace. Therefore, it receives habitual grace in the most perfect manner. Second, because of the nobility of Christ's soul, for every possible perfection not repugnant to the divine *suppositum* and to man must be attributed to Christ. Third, because Christ pours grace into other men as a head into its members and as a fountain into streams, according to John 1: *Of His fullness we have all received, grace for grace.* Therefore, it was most fitting that He possess in Himself the fullness of habitual grace which He pours into others. Nor does it follow from this that Christ is an adoptive Son of God, since adoptive filiation is only a secondary effect of habitual grace and can be separated from its primary effect, which is to render one pleasing and acceptable to God. This is especially true in Christ, who, since He is the natural Son of God, is incapable of adoption, which presupposes that the adopted person is a stranger.

3. You will say: Since Christ's soul is substantially and most perfectly sanctified by reason of the hypostatic union, accidental or habitual grace appears to be entirely useless and superfluous in it.

But, on the contrary, although Christ's soul is sanctified through the substantial grace of union, the addition of accidental or habitual grace is nevertheless still required in it for its complete and consummate sanctification. Holiness perfects the soul in relation to operations by which it is united to God as object, namely, knowledge and love, and other operations concerning moral objects. But the grace of union, or the personality of the Word united to Christ's humanity, cannot effect this. Therefore, besides that substantial grace, accidental or habitual grace is required in Christ's soul. The major premise is clear, for holiness gives rectitude not only of being but also of operation. The minor is proved. Substantial grace does indeed immediately and by reason of itself perfect Christ's soul as regards being, elevating it to the hypostatic union and divine being, but not as regards operation. For it cannot be either the principle by which, the formal principle, or the radical principle of the supernatural operations by which the soul is united to God. This is so both because subsistence is not a power of acting, but only the complement of nature and a condition without which it would not operate; and because the personality of the Divine Word cannot have the character of a physically informing form. Therefore, the substantial grace of union cannot effect what is required for perfect and consummate holiness. Accidental or habitual grace is further required as the radical principle in Christ's soul of supernatural operations, and as their proximate principle through the mediation of the infused virtues which emanate from grace as its properties.

4. Nor should you say that actual helps of the supernatural order suffice for the perfect holiness of Christ's soul, through which it might be elevated to eliciting supernatural operations and which might supply the function of the radical principle of supernatural life, namely, grace, just as in Paul's vision a transient help supplied for the habit of the light of glory. Against this stands the fact that a connatural inclination toward an end must presuppose in the subject from which it is elicited a nature proportioned to such an end. Therefore, for Christ's soul to be connaturally inclined toward supernatural acts, it must possess a nature proportioned to the supernatural end and consequently habitual grace, since the character of a nature of the supernatural order cannot be preserved in a transient help. I add that actual helps, since they give only a certain transient holiness and not permanent and stable holiness, do not suffice for the complete, perfect, and consummate holiness of Christ's soul.

5. You will say, second: Being holy through essence and being holy through participation are no less opposed to one another than being the natural Son of God and His adoptive son. But because Christ as man is the natural Son of God, He is not as man the adoptive son of God. Therefore, since He is holy through essence by reason of the hypostatic union, He cannot be holy through participation, and consequently cannot receive habitual grace, whose effect is to constitute one divine and holy through participation.

I answer by denying the major premise. For since holiness belongs to the *suppositum* by reason of the nature, diversity of natures in the same *suppositum* suffices for the denomination "holy through essence" and "holy through participation," so that according to one nature the *suppositum* is holy through essence and according to another it is holy through participation. Filiation, however, does not belong by reason of the nature but by reason of the *suppositum*. Hence, diversity of natures does not suffice for natural and adoptive filiation, but a real distinction of *supposita* is required. Therefore, since in Christ there is diversity of natures together with unity of *suppositum*, He can be holy through essence according to one nature and holy through participation according to the other, but He cannot be both the natural Son of God and His adoptive son. Thus St. Thomas, III, dist. 13, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

6. From what has been said it follows that habitual grace was infused into Christ from the first instant of His conception. Since it follows upon the hypostatic union, at the same moment in which Christ's soul possessed the grace of union, it was also adorned with habitual grace. Hence Abbot Guerric, Sermon 2 on the Annunciation, beautifully observes that Christ is

simultaneously called in Scripture a shoot, a flower, and a fruit, because without any gradual progress He existed from the beginning of His conception as perfect in Himself in every virtue and grace.

7. But you will ask, first, whether the habitual grace infused into Christ's soul at the first instant of conception was a physical or moral disposition for the hypostatic union. I answer negatively, because a physical disposition arising from the nature of the thing must belong to the same order as the form for which it disposes and must necessarily bring that form with it. Habitual grace has neither condition, since it does not belong to the hypostatic order and does not infallibly bring the hypostatic union with it. A moral disposition, however, is that in consideration of which a form is given to a subject. But the grace of union was not granted to Christ in consideration of habitual grace. Rather, conversely, in consideration and by reason of the hypostatic union, the charisms of all graces were given to Christ, according to John 1: *We saw His glory as of the Only-Begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth*. Here the Evangelist infers the fullness of all graces from natural filiation. These graces flowed into Christ's soul from the personal union with the Word as streams from a fountain. Therefore, the habitual grace infused into Christ's soul from the first instant of conception was neither a physical nor a moral disposition for the hypostatic union. It was nevertheless a means of fittingness in relation to that union, insofar as it was fitting and becoming that the Divine Word should assume a humanity filled with grace and adorned with all virtues and gifts. Thus in a maiden betrothed to a prince, rings, jewels, and other ornaments can be called means of fittingness insofar as they render her fitting or suitable for the prince. Thus St. Thomas, III, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, in the body, and *De veritate*, q. 29, a. 2.

8. You will say: Everything elevated to a form exceeding its nature must first be prepared by some disposition and rendered receptive of that form, as St. Thomas teaches, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 5. But the hypostatic union is above the nature of Christ's humanity. Therefore, for the humanity to be elevated to it, it must be prepared and adapted by some disposition, which can be nothing other than habitual grace.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. That which is elevated to a form by which it is constituted as an operator and from which it has qualified being must first be disposed: I grant the major premise. If it is elevated to a form by which it is constituted as a hypostasis or person and from which it has being simply and personal being: I deny it. Therefore, if a nature is elevated in relation to operation, it must be disposed by a habit or by something which completes the power in first act. In this manner the

intellect of the blessed is disposed by the light of glory for union with the divine essence in the manner of an intelligible species and is elevated to the beatific vision, for which the intellectual nature is not sufficiently complete. But if a nature is elevated to being simply, it need not be prepared for that being by any disposition. Hence a created nature requires no disposition for the subsistence from which it receives being simply, nor for receiving another subsistence in place of its own. Therefore, for Christ's humanity to be united to the personality of the Word, it needs no disposition, but the obediential potency alone for receiving it suffices.

9. You will ask, second, whether habitual grace is a property of the hypostatic union. I answer that it is not a physical property but only a moral one. First, because physical properties flowing from some form or nature dispose for it, and although they are posterior to it in the genus of efficient causality, they precede it in the genus of material and dispositive causality, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 13, ad 2, where he says: *The heat which becomes a disposition for the form of fire is an effect flowing from the already preexisting form of fire.* But habitual grace placed in Christ's soul from the first instant of conception was not a physical disposition for the hypostatic union, as is evident from what was said above. Therefore, it cannot be called a physical property of that union.

Second, physical properties must emanate from some nature which has the character of their radical principle. But no third nature is constituted from the humanity and the subsistence of the Word united to it. Therefore, habitual grace does not have the character of a physical property in relation to the hypostatic union. It can therefore be called only its moral property, because it is connaturally owed to it and because it was fitting for the humanity assumed by the Word to be adorned with habitual grace. In this sense St. Thomas must be understood when he says here, a. 13, that habitual grace *follows the union as a connatural property*. Thus, according to his doctrine in *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 5, the circular motion of the heavens, although natural and due to them, does not emanate from them by simple resultance, but is effected by a new action of the moving intelligence. Likewise, although habitual grace was due to Christ's soul by virtue of the hypostatic union under the title of connaturality and fittingness or congruity, it did not emanate from that union by simple resultance as properties customarily emanate from an essence. God produced it by an action wholly diverse from that by which the subsistence of the Word was united to the human nature, namely, by an eduction whereby it was educed from the obediential potency of Christ's humanity at the same instant in which that humanity was united to the personality of the Divine Word. Therefore, just as Augustine says that

God was in the angels simultaneously creating their nature and bestowing grace, although the substance of an angel and the grace placed in it from the first instant of creation were produced by distinct actions, so it can similarly be said that God was in Christ simultaneously joining the human nature to the Word and bestowing grace upon it, although the unitive action and the production of habitual grace are wholly diverse actions, because they were exercised at the same moment of the Incarnation.

10. You will ask, third, whether Christ, in the first instant of His conception, disposed Himself by an act of free choice for the habitual grace then placed in Him.

I answer affirmatively with St. Thomas, below, q. 34, a. 3, in the body, where he reasons as follows: Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His conception. But there is a twofold sanctification: one of adults, who are sanctified according to their own act; another of children, who are sanctified not according to their own act of faith, but according to the faith of their parents or of the Church. The first sanctification is more perfect than the second, just as act is more perfect than habit and that which is through itself than that which is through another. Therefore, since Christ's sanctification was most perfect, because He was so sanctified that He would be the sanctifier of others, it follows that He was sanctified according to His own movement of free choice toward God.

This is confirmed. In the first instant of conception Christ had to receive habitual grace in a manner as perfect as that in which the angels and Adam received it in the first instant of creation. But the angels and Adam then disposed themselves for it by a movement of free choice. For in the treatise on the angels we showed that all the angels received habitual grace through their own disposition and prepared themselves for it through the act of charity which they elicited in the first instant of creation. As regards Adam, St. Thomas teaches, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1, that in the first instant he consented to grace and consequently prepared himself for it by a movement and consent of free choice. Therefore, Christ similarly disposed Himself by a movement of free choice for the habitual grace which He received in the first instant of conception. Nothing prevents the disposition and the form from existing at the same instant, because temporal priority between the disposition and form is not required, but priority of nature and causality suffices. This is clear in the examples given and in the increase of grace, which is bestowed on the just man at the same moment in which he elicits an act with greater intensity than the preexisting habit. Nor is it an obstacle that Christ in the first moment of creation received habitual grace under the title of connaturality. This does not prevent Him from having obtained it at

the same time under another title, namely, that of physical disposition, just as, although the glory of the body was connaturally due to Him, He nevertheless received it under the title of merit, as we shall say below when treating Christ's merit.

11. You will ask, fourth, whether habitual grace was necessary in Christ for eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts.

I answer that it was necessary for Him to elicit those acts connaturally, because for an act to occur connaturally, it must presuppose a nature in the subject and proceed from it as from a radical principle. But habitual grace is that which holds the place of nature in the supernatural order. Therefore, for supernatural and meritorious acts to be produced connaturally by Christ, habitual grace was necessary.

This is confirmed. The infused virtues and helps of the supernatural order did not suffice for the connaturality of those acts. Therefore, habitual grace was necessary for it. The consequence is clear. The antecedent, as regards its first part, is proved as follows. For supernatural acts to be elicited connaturally, they require not only a proximate principle but also a radical principle of their own order. But the infused virtues are not the radical but the proximate principles of supernatural acts. Therefore, they did not suffice for Christ to elicit supernatural acts connaturally; habitual grace, which is the radical principle of supernatural life, was additionally required.

12. That even a transient help of the supernatural order would not suffice for the connaturality of those acts is proved from the reasoning of St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2. A natural agent cannot be perfectly inclined toward its end unless, besides an actual motion, it is inclined to its act through a permanent form. For this reason the author of nature gave permanent forms to natural agents in addition to actual motion. Therefore, likewise, for a supernatural agent to elicit its acts with perfect connaturality, it must be inclined to them by reason of a permanent form.

13. I said that habitual grace was necessary in Christ for eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts *connaturally*, because preternaturally and by the absolute power of God He could have elicited them without it by reason of an actual help of the supernatural order supplying the function of the radical principle of that order. Thus in Paul's vision a transient help supplied for the habit of the light of glory, and in a believing sinner supernatural acts of faith and hope occur without habitual grace, with only a help of the supernatural order supplying the function of the radical principle.

14. You will say: Vital acts of the natural order, such as intellection and volition, depend so essentially upon the soul that they cannot proceed from

any other principle. Therefore, likewise, supernatural and meritorious acts, since they are vital with a supernatural vitality, have so great and so essential a dependence upon habitual grace that they cannot be produced by any actual help of the supernatural order.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. For habitual grace, although it performs the function of nature in the supernatural order, does not have the character of nature as strictly as the rational soul does. It does not immediately receive in itself the properties of the supernatural order as the rational soul receives its properties, namely, intellect and will. Hence, although vital acts of the natural order depend essentially upon the soul, vital acts of the supernatural order do not depend essentially upon habitual grace, but only connaturally, that is, when they are elicited from it according to their connatural and ordinary manner.

CHAPTER X.
On the Perfection of Christ's Grace.

1. Christ's habitual grace can be considered in three ways: first, as a physical accident and according to the relation it has to the subject in which it is received; second, in the being of grace and according to its relation to the effects to which it extends; third, in moral being and according to the value and moral estimation which it possesses. This being presupposed,

I say, first: Christ's habitual grace, as a physical accident or quality received in a subject, is not gradually or intensively infinite.

2. This is proved both because an infinitely intense quality cannot exist, as I presuppose from Thomistic philosophy, and because, since grace is the root of the light of glory and is connaturally ordained to the beatific vision, grace infinite in physical being would be owed a similarly infinite light of glory and vision whereby God would be seen to the full extent of His visibility and consequently comprehended. This is impossible. I add that although an infinitely intense quality were possible, nevertheless it is gathered from Scripture that no actually infinite created thing exists, for Wis. 11 asserts that God made all things in number, weight, and measure.

3. I say, second, that Christ's grace is infinite under the character of grace.

The proof is that grace under the character of grace is measured according to its relation to the effects to which it extends or can extend. But Christ's grace, considered in itself, can extend to infinitely many effects, namely, to the redemption and sanctification of infinitely many men,

because grace is found in Christ as in a head. Therefore, Christ's grace, considered under the character of grace, can be called infinite.

4. I say, third, that Christ's grace, considered in moral being, must be called infinite, because it is joined to a divine *suppositum*, from which conjunction it possesses a certain infinite dignity and excellence. By reason of this conjunction it is the principle by which and formal principle of an infinitely meritorious and satisfactory operation, as will be evident below when we treat Christ's merit and satisfaction.

5. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: A cause which virtually contains infinitely many effects is physically infinite. But Christ's grace virtually contains infinitely many effects, namely, the redemption and sanctification of infinitely many men, which it can cause, as we said in the second conclusion. Therefore, it is physically and gradually infinite.

I answer that the major premise is true of a principal cause, but not of an instrumental cause. Christ's habitual grace, or Christ's humanity sanctified by habitual grace, is not the principal but merely the instrumental cause of the sanctification of men. Hence, for it to be able to sanctify infinitely many men without limit, it need not be affected by some permanent physical form by reason of which it virtually contains all the grace it can cause. It suffices that it can be elevated by a transient motion impressed by the principal cause.

6. You will object, second, against the second conclusion: Nothing can be greater than the infinite. But a greater grace, even in the being of grace, can exist than Christ's habitual grace. Therefore, Christ's grace is not infinite in the being of grace. The minor premise is proved. Christ's grace does not extend to meriting the Incarnation of the Father or the Holy Spirit, nor to causing grace in the angels and the first parents in the state of innocence, as we shall show below. But God could have conferred a grace extending to all those effects. Therefore, He could have caused a grace greater in the being of grace than that communicated to Christ's humanity.

I answer by denying the minor premise. To its proof I say that Christ's grace, considered on its own part, had sufficient power to merit the Incarnation of the Father and the Holy Spirit, and likewise to cause grace in the angels and the first parents. Nevertheless, because Christ did not in fact ordain His own merits proceeding from grace to such effects, His grace did not in fact extend to them.

7. You will object, third, against the third conclusion: Habitual grace is not the principle of the infinite value of the works of Christ the Lord, but the principle of this value is the *suppositum* of the Divine Word itself, as will be

evident below when we treat Christ's satisfaction. Therefore, habitual grace cannot for this reason be called infinite in moral being.

I answer that although the *suppositum* of the Divine Word is the radical and remote principle of the works of Christ the Lord and of their infinite value, grace is nevertheless their formal and proximate principle. From its conjunction with the person of the Word it draws an infinite dignity, from which Christ's works possess infinite value. The same must be said proportionally of Christ's glory. It likewise possesses infinite value and estimability from its conjunction with the Word and from corresponding to Christ's meritorious acts, which possess infinite value in the moral order.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

8. From what has been said you will infer, first, that Christ's grace could, by the absolute power of God, be greater intensively. For since the divine power is simply infinite, it cannot be restricted by any finite term. But Christ's grace is intensively finite, as we demonstrated in the first conclusion. Therefore, by the absolute power of God it can be further intensified and made more perfect in physical being.

9. Nor is it of any force to say that although it is not repugnant on the part of God, whose power is infinite, for Christ's grace to be further intensified, it is nevertheless repugnant on the part of the subject, which is not receptive of greater grace. Against this stands the fact that although the natural potency of Christ's soul is finite and limited as proportioned to its entity, in which alone it is founded, the obediential potency through which grace is received is wholly unlimited and terminatively infinite, since it is founded upon the power of the Creator, who can elevate His creature beyond any limit. Thus St. Thomas correctly says in *De veritate*, q. 19, a. 3, ad 3: *The natural potency for receiving can be wholly filled, but not the obediential potency, which extends to infinity syncategorematically.*

10. You will infer, second, that there is a twofold fullness of grace in Christ, namely, subjective and formal. As St. Thomas teaches here, a. 10, subjective fullness of grace is that which is considered on the part of the subject, namely, when the subject has all the grace pertaining to its state or office and preordained and prepared by divine wisdom and providence. It is manifest that Christ possesses this grace, since in Him there is the grace of the Head and Redeemer, for which He was chosen. Formal fullness of grace is that which is considered on the part of grace, namely, when grace is possessed in as great an excellence and intensity as can be possessed according to ordinary power. St. Thomas proves in a. 9 that this also was

present in Christ, by the two reasons indicated above. The first is that the nearer something is to an influencing principle, the more it participates in that principle's influx, as air nearer to fire or the sun is hotter and brighter. But no greater union can be conceived with God, who is the principle of grace, than Christ's hypostatic union. Therefore, no connaturally greater grace is possible. Hence Jerome, on Isa. 11: *Because it pleased Him that the fullness of the Godhead should dwell bodily in Him, not in parts as in the other saints, but, according to the Gospel written in the Hebrew language which the Nazarenes read, the whole fountain of the Lord descended upon Him.* The second reason is that grace was given to Christ as to the head and fountain from which it is poured into all others. Therefore, just as nothing can connaturally be brighter than the sun or hotter than fire, because all light is derived from the sun and all heat from fire, so Christ's grace must be in the highest degree.

11. The same holy Doctor adds a third reason in a. 12, where he reasons as follows: A measure is assigned to each thing by comparison with its end, just as there is no greater gravity than the gravity of the earth because there can be no place lower than the place of the earth. But the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. No greater union of the rational creature with God can exist or be understood than that which is in the person. Therefore, Christ's grace reaches the highest measure of grace.

12. From these things you will understand that the formal fullness of grace is proper to Christ, since He alone possesses grace in the greatest excellence and intensity which can be possessed according to God's ordinary law. Subjective fullness, however, is not proper to Him, since many saints have possessed all the grace pertaining to the state and office to which they were called. Hence St. Thomas, here, a. 10, ad 1: *The Blessed Virgin is full of grace, not on the part of grace itself, because she did not possess grace in the highest excellence in which it can be possessed, nor extending to all the effects of grace. But she is said to have been full of grace by comparison with herself, because she had grace sufficient for the state to which she had been chosen by God, namely, that she should be the Mother of His Only-Begotten.* Similarly, Stephen is called full of grace because he had grace sufficient for him to be a suitable minister and witness of God, for which he had been chosen. The same must be said of others.

13. You will infer, third, that in Christ there was both intensive and extensive fullness of grace. A form has intensive fullness when it is found in the highest degree of perfection, as heat is fully in fire and light in the sun. It has extensive fullness when it extends to all its proper effects, as life is fully in man because all modes of living are in him, but not in brute animals,

which do not live an intellectual life, nor in plants, which do not live a sensitive life. But habitual grace in Christ is in the highest possible degree according to the connatural state and God's ordinary law, as we showed by three reasons in the preceding consequence. In Him it has all its connaturally possible effects, namely, the removal of its contrary, sin; the sanctification of its proper subject and of other men, since it is the grace of the Head; and, considered in itself, it can extend to the sanctification of infinitely many men and angels, if they were possible. Therefore, it possesses intensive and extensive fullness.

14. From this you will infer, fourth, that Christ's habitual grace surpassed in intensity all the grace of angels and men taken together, because grace is in Christ as in the head from which it is or can be derived into all intellectual creatures, and as light is in the sun and water in the fountain. Hence, just as the sun possesses more light than all inferior luminous things and a fountain more water than all the streams into which its water flows, so Christ, of whose fullness we have all received, possesses more degrees of habitual grace than all the angels and men taken collectively. Therefore, St. Thomas, below, q. 35, a. 5, says that *Christ in the first instant of His conception received not only as much grace as the comprehensors possess, but more than all the comprehensors together.*

CHAPTER XI.
Whether All the Virtues, All the Gifts, and All the Graces Gratuitously Given Were in Christ.

1. I say, first, that all the theological or moral virtues infused through themselves were in Christ, except faith, hope, and penance.

The first part is clear, because such virtues are connected with habitual grace as its properties and always accompany it. Hence, just as habitual grace was in Christ, so also were those virtues. I add that habits of virtue are given for acting connaturally and readily; indeed, supernatural habits are given for the ability to act simply. Therefore, for Christ to act connaturally and elicit supernatural, meritorious, and satisfactory works, habits of the supernatural virtues were infused into Him by God.

The second part is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas, here, aa. 3 and 4. The virtues repugnant to the beatific vision or to the hypostatic union were not in Christ, since His soul was united to the personality of the Word and saw the divine essence from the first instant of His conception. But faith, since it concerns things obscurely known, is repugnant to the clear

vision of God; and hope, since it concerns a good not yet possessed, is incompossible with the enjoyment of that good. Similarly, penance, since it is sorrow for sin not of another but of oneself, cannot stand together with the hypostatic union, which, as will be evident below, renders a man intrinsically impeccable. Therefore, neither faith, nor hope, nor penance was in Christ.

2. I say, second, that all the gifts of the Holy Spirit were in Christ.

The proof is both that those gifts follow habitual grace, which was most full and perfect in Christ, and that they are certain perfections of the powers of the soul insofar as these powers are movable by the Holy Spirit. But Christ's soul was perfectly moved by the Holy Spirit, according to Luke 4: *Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan and was led by the Spirit into the desert.* Therefore, all the gifts of the Holy Spirit were in Christ.

3. I say, third, that all the graces gratuitously given were in Christ. Thus St. Thomas, here, a. 7, proves this both from Augustine, in his letter to Dardanus, who says that just as all the senses are in the head, so all graces were in Christ; and because the graces gratuitously given are communicated so that the teacher of the Gospel may confirm by signs the faith which he announces and persuade by words. Therefore, all these graces must be found in the most perfect and excellent preacher and teacher of the faith, such as Christ was.

4. I say, fourth, that even the moral virtues which are acquired by our own acts were in Christ.

The proof is that Christ's sensitive appetite, since it was of the same kind as ours, was not, by reason of its own entity, completely and perfectly inclined toward a naturally upright act. Hence, for it to elicit that act readily, it needed a superadded form. But this could be nothing other than an acquired virtue. The hypostatic union, since it is not operative, cannot be a form inclining toward upright acts; and habitual grace and the infused virtues following it incline only toward supernatural acts. Therefore, Christ needed a natural virtue for eliciting naturally upright acts.

This is confirmed. Natural sciences existed in Christ's intellect. Therefore, moral virtues also existed in His will. The consequence is clear, both from parity of reasoning and because Christ's will ought no less to have been perfected in relation to the good than His intellect in relation to the true.

5. You will object, first: Acquired moral virtues are posited for restraining immoderate passions. But such passions neither existed nor could exist in Christ, since they arise from the tinder of sin, which neither

existed nor could exist in Him. Therefore, acquired moral virtues were not in Christ.

I answer that acquired moral virtues are posited for restraining the passions secondarily and consequently, namely, so that if they find them immoderate in a subject, they may moderate them. First through themselves, however, they merely dispose the appetite to choose readily and promptly in their proper matters in conformity with right reason. Hence such virtues were infused accidentally into the first parents in the state of innocence, although no immoderate passion existed in them in that state, since through the gift of integrity the inferior part was perfectly subject to the superior.

6. You will object, second: Acquired moral virtues are not in the blessed. Therefore, neither were they in Christ, who was blessed from the first instant of His conception. The consequence seems evident. The antecedent is proved because in the blessed there is no proper object of the moral virtues, for example, pleasures of food and sexual activity, which are the object of temperance, or evils to be endured and dangers to be overcome, which are the object of fortitude.

I answer, first, by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that although the material object of certain moral virtues, for example, temperance, does not remain in the blessed, its formal object nevertheless remains in them, namely, the mean of reason concerning sensible delights. For under this mean the blessed desire delights, or rather despise them, and the perfection of virtue is found even in this contempt. He is perfectly humble who despises honors. Hence St. Thomas, here, a. 2, ad 3, says that temperance was in Christ, *although concupiscence was not in Him, because the more a man lacks concupiscence, the more perfect his temperance is.*

I answer, second, by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. Since Christ from the beginning of His conception was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehensor, while He lived a passible and mortal life He could exercise certain acts of the moral virtues concerning food and similar things, which cannot be exercised by the blessed in heaven.

7. You will ask whether Christ possessed these virtues by infusion or acquired them by His own acts. I answer that it is more probable that He possessed them by infusion.

The proof is brief. Christ never lacked those virtues, but possessed them in the first instant of His conception. But in that instant He could not acquire them by His own acts. Therefore, He then received them from God by infusion. The major premise is proved. Privation of those virtues for any

time is an evil, just as their possession renders one good simply. But we should posit no evil and no defect in Christ except those which conduce to the end of the Incarnation and the redemption of the human race; the lack of moral virtues cannot be of this kind. Therefore, Christ never lacked those virtues, but possessed them from the first instant of His conception.

The minor premise, which asserts that Christ could not have acquired such virtues by His own acts in that instant, is proved as follows. For Christ to have acquired all the moral virtues by His own acts in the first instant of His conception, He would have had to elicit in that moment at least internal acts of all those virtues, for example, an act of prudence, temperance, fortitude, justice, religion, humility, and so forth. But this appears wholly impossible, both because Christ's soul and its powers, since they were of finite and limited power, could not simultaneously tend toward so many diverse and disparate objects, such as the material objects of the moral virtues; and because the acts of the intellect and will of Christ's soul concerning such objects depended upon the senses, which operate through corporeal motion and depend upon the motion of alteration, which cannot occur in an instant. Therefore, Christ could not have acquired the moral virtues by His own acts in the first instant of His conception.

8. Nor is it of force to say that although Christ could not do this naturally and according to God's ordinary power, He could nevertheless do it miraculously, supernaturally, and by God's absolute power. This is of no force both because there is no foundation for asserting such a miracle and because the adversaries wish Christ to have elicited acts of all the moral virtues in the first moment of conception in order to preserve the claim that the moral virtues, which through themselves are acquirable, were connaturally possessed by Christ from the beginning of conception. But the miraculous eliciting of the acts contributes nothing to their connatural acquisition; rather, it impedes and destroys it, since what is connatural is opposed to what is supernatural. Therefore, and so forth.

9. It is proved, second: Christ could not acquire the virtue of prudence by His own acts in the first instant of conception. Therefore, neither could He acquire the other moral virtues. The consequence is clear, both because prudence is chief among the moral virtues and because they essentially depend upon prudence as their rule and are necessarily connected with it, as is demonstrated in the treatise on the virtues. The antecedent is proved as follows. Since prudence has to judge concerning the singular acts of the other virtues and establish the mean of reason in them, several species necessary for such a prudential judgment are necessarily prerequired in the intellect. Since according to the adversaries' opinion these species were not

accidentally infused into Christ in the instant of conception, they would have had to be acquired by Him at that time through the ministry of the senses and the agent intellect. But this could not occur in a single instant, since sense and imagination do not operate except through a corporeal motion, which cannot occur in an instant. Therefore, Christ could not have acquired the virtue of prudence in the first instant of conception. If He possessed it then, as the adversaries admit, it had to be accidentally infused into Him by God at that time, together with the species necessary for prudential judgment concerning the singular acts of the other virtues.

10. From this you will understand that the same account is not to be given of the species pertaining to the practical intellect as of those pertaining to the speculative intellect. The former were accidentally infused into Christ's soul from the beginning of His conception so that the virtue of prudence could immediately proceed to its act and establish the mean in the acts of the other virtues. The latter, however, were acquired by Christ so that a place might remain for the ministry of the agent intellect, as we shall show below when treating Christ's acquired knowledge.

11. You will object, first: The natural sciences were not infused into Christ in the first instant of conception, but were acquired by Him through His own acts in the course of time. Therefore, the same must be said of the moral virtues.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that this distinction exists between intellectual and moral virtues: the latter render a man good simply, whereas the former do not, as St. Thomas teaches, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 56, a. 3. Hence, if Christ had not possessed the moral virtues from the first instant of conception, He would not then have been good and perfect simply. This incongruity does not follow from His not having possessed the natural and acquired sciences in that instant, because science, since it is an intellectual virtue, does not render its possessor good simply, but only in a qualified respect.

12. You will object, second: It is nobler to possess something from oneself than to possess it from another, since to act is more perfect than to be acted upon. But we ought to attribute to Christ that which is nobler and more perfect. Therefore, it must be said that Christ did not possess moral virtues infused by God, but acquired them from Himself.

I answer that the major premise is true when the lack of the form or perfection does not detract more from the dignity of the subject than the acquisition of it adds to that dignity. It is otherwise when its lack is more prejudicial to the dignity and perfection of the subject than its acquisition

increases that dignity, as occurs in the present matter. For it detracts more from Christ's dignity that for some time He would not have been good simply than the acquisition of the moral virtues by His own acts would add to His perfection, as is clear from what was said above. The solution belongs to St. Thomas, below, q. 19, a. 3, in the body, where he reasons as follows: To possess some gift through oneself is nobler than to possess it through another.... But because every perfection and nobility must be attributed to Christ, it follows that He possessed through merit that which others possess through merit, unless it is of such a kind that its lack would prejudice Christ's dignity and perfection more than its acquisition through merit would increase them. Hence He merited neither grace, nor knowledge, nor the beatitude of the soul, nor the Godhead, because, since merit concerns only what is not yet possessed, Christ would have had to lack these things at some time, and lacking them would diminish Christ's dignity more than merit would increase it.

CHAPTER XII.
On Christ's Capital Grace.

1. That Christ, even as man, is the head of the body of the Church is certain and undoubted among theologians, and is gathered from the Apostle, Eph. 1: *Raising Him from the dead and establishing Him at His right hand in the heavenly places*, and so forth; *He gave Him as head over the whole Church*. From these words the following syllogism can be formed: The Apostle testifies that Christ was constituted head of the whole Church according to that nature according to which He was raised from the dead. But Christ was raised from the dead according to the human nature, not the divine. Therefore, He was constituted head of the whole Church according to the human nature, not the divine.

Reason also recommends this. Since the Church is a mystical body, lest it be monstrous, it must possess some mystical head. This can be none other than Christ, not precisely as God, both because under this aspect He is the head of the whole universe and not determinately of the body of the Church, and because there must be a certain proportion and unity of nature between the head and the members, and none exists between Christ as God and the Church. Therefore, Christ as man, under which aspect He is of the same nature and substance as the other men who are members of the Church, is *the head of the body of the Church*, as Paul says in Col. 1.

This is confirmed, for, as St. Thomas excellently reasons here, q. 8, a. 1, three prerogatives are found in a head: primacy and preeminence, fullness of perfection, and influence upon the members. This is clear in a natural body, for the head is the first part of the body, superior and preeminent over the others. All the interior and exterior senses also reside in it, whereas only touch resides in the other parts. Finally, it influences the other members by reason of the sensitive and motive power and also the power governing the whole body. It is evident that these three prerogatives are in Christ as man. He holds primacy among other men and is the first of all the predestined; in Him is the fullness of grace; and He possesses the power of influencing all the members of the Church. Therefore, Christ as man is the mystical head of the body of the Church.

2. If you ask whether Christ can be called not only the head but also the heart of the Church, I answer negatively with St. Thomas in the cited article, ad 3, where he reasons as follows: The head has a manifest preeminence with respect to the exterior members, but the heart has a certain hidden influence. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is compared to the heart, because He invisibly vivifies and unites the Church, while Christ Himself is compared to the head according to His visible nature, according to which man is visibly preferred to men. Therefore, Christ is the head of the body of the Church, the Holy Spirit is its heart, the Blessed Virgin, as more closely joined to Christ, is its neck, and the other faithful can be called merely its members.

3. It must also be observed with the same holy Doctor, III, dist. 13, q. 2, a. 2, ad 6, that this difference exists between a natural head and a moral or mystical head: since a natural head is a part and member of the body, it depends upon the other members and upon the whole body for its nourishment and life. But a moral head in no way depends upon the members or the body; rather, the contrary is true. Hence Christ under the aspect under which He is head of the Church is not properly called its member. Nothing prevents Him, however, from being called a member under another aspect, namely, insofar as Christ's humanity depends upon the Godhead. In this sense the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 12: *You are the body of Christ and members from a member*, that is, from Christ, as some interpret it.

4. These matters are almost certain among all, but a threefold difficulty and controversy can arise concerning Christ's capital grace. The first is whether Christ as man is the head not only of men but also of angels. The second is of which men Christ is the head: of all, or only of some. The third is through which grace Christ is constituted as head of the Church: through habitual grace or through the grace of union.

§ 1.
Resolution of the First Difficulty.

5. I say, first, that Christ insofar as He is man is the head of the angels, although not as perfectly as He is the head of men.

The first part is proved from Scripture. In Col. 2 Christ is called *the head of every principality and power*. But the Apostle speaks there of Christ as man, since in the same place he says that in Him *all the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily* and that *God raised Him from the dead*. Therefore, Christ as man is the head of every principality and power, and consequently of all the angels.

The same part is proved, second, by reason. Christ as man possesses, not only with respect to men but also with respect to the angels, the three conditions required for the character of a head. By reason of His union with the personal being of the Word He is preeminent over the angels; He participates more perfectly in the gifts of grace; and He influences them, if not with essential glory, concerning which below, at least with accidental glory, namely, the joy which they receive from the restoration of their seats abandoned by the apostate angels, and a clearer knowledge of the mysteries of faith, as Jerome teaches on Eph. 5. He gathers this from the Apostle's words: *That through the Church the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places.* Dionysius asserts the same in *De caelesti hierarchia*, ch. 7, where he says that Christ exercises hierarchical acts upon the angels, purifying and illuminating them concerning the mysteries of faith so that they know more clearly what they would otherwise understand more obscurely. Therefore, Christ insofar as He is man is the head of the angels.

6. Nor is it an obstacle that Christ as man does not agree in nature with the angels, both because it is not required of a mystical body that it be homogeneous and of the same nature as its members—otherwise not even God, from whose nature the angels are more distant than from Christ's human nature, could be their mystical head—and because generic agreement in nature between the head and members, together with specific agreement in the end to which they are ordained, suffices for the character of a head. This twofold agreement is found between Christ and the angels, for they agree generically in intellectual nature and specifically in the end to

which they are ordained, since the grace and glory of Christ and of the angels are of the same species.

From these considerations the second part of the conclusion also stands proved. For Christ as man is more conformable in nature to men than to the angels and influences men with essential grace and glory, but not the angels, as we shall show below when treating Christ's merit. Therefore, Christ is not as properly and perfectly the head of the angels as of men.

7. You will object against the first part of the conclusion: Christ is the head only of those into whom He influences the gifts by which they are constituted members of the Church militant or triumphant. But Christ as man does not influence such gifts into the angels, since He does not and did not influence faith or the beatific vision into them. Therefore, He is not their head.

I answer by denying the major premise. It is not of the character of a mystical body, nor even of a natural body, that the head should influence into the members the substantial form by which they are constituted as members. It is evident that the natural head does not communicate to the members the soul or its own substance, but some vital and accidental motion. Therefore, although Christ does not influence faith or the beatific vision into the angels, by which they are constituted members of the Church militant and triumphant, nevertheless, because He influences into them accidental motions and gifts permanently inhering in them, He must be called their head.

§ 2.
The Second Difficulty Is Resolved, and It Is Explained of Which Men Christ Is the Head.

8. It is certain that Christ is the head of all who exist in grace, since they are united to Him through faith and charity and receive spiritual life from Him. Hence the sole difficulty and controversy among theologians is whether He is the head not only of the just but also of the faithful existing in mortal sin, and of heretics who are baptized or whose heresy is occult. Cardinal Torquemada and Melchior Cano deny the first, while Cajetan and Bellarmine affirm the second. For the resolution:

9. I say, second, that Christ is actually the head of the faithful even when they exist in mortal sin, not perfectly and simply, but imperfectly and in a qualified respect.

The first part is proved. The faithful, although they exist in mortal sin, actually receive an influx from Christ as head, for they possess faith from Christ's merits. Therefore, Christ is actually their head.

This is confirmed. The faithful existing in mortal sin are simply and absolutely within the Church and are its members. Thus the Church is defined by Pope Nicholas and Innocent in the chapter *Firmiter*, *De summa Trinitate*: *the assembly or congregation of the faithful*. Hence in the Gospel the Church is compared to a net gathering fish of every kind; to a threshing floor in which chaff is gathered together with wheat; and to ten virgins, five of whom are foolish and without the oil of charity. St. Jerome, in his *Dialogue against the Luciferians*, says: *Noah's ark was a figure of the Church. As in it there were every kind of animal, so in the Church there are men of every nation and character. As there were leopards and kids, wolves and lambs, so here the just and sinners, that is, vessels of gold and silver together with those of wood and clay, dwell together.* But Christ is the head of the whole Church and of all its members. Therefore, He is the head of all the faithful, even those existing in sin. Nevertheless, because they are simply members of the devil and are not perfectly united to Christ, nor perfectly participate in spiritual life from Him, they are not perfectly members of Christ, but only imperfectly and in a qualified respect. From this the second part of the conclusion stands proved.

10. You will object against the first part: Hair, nails, and similar things, although called parts of the human body, are nevertheless not its members, because although they live a vegetative life, they do not live the principal life of the body, namely, sensitive life. Therefore, similarly, sinners who do not live the principal life of the body of the Church, namely, the life of grace and charity, are not actually members of Christ and of the Church, although they can be called parts of it.

I answer by denying the parity. A natural member of the human body depends upon the head only according to sensitive life, and therefore insensible parts are not members of the human body. But the faith which is in sinners is derived from Christ as head.

I say, third, that Christ is not actually the head of heretics, even if they are baptized or are occult heretics. Christ influences nothing into them pertaining to supernatural life, since faith, which they lack, is the beginning of the soul's spiritual life. Therefore, they neither live even an imperfect supernatural life nor are parts of the Church, since the Church is the congregation of the faithful, although they outwardly appear to be parts of the ecclesiastical body. Hence Augustine, *De unitate Ecclesiae*, final chapter, says: *Many such persons, namely heretics, are in sacramental communion with the Church and nevertheless are already no longer in the Church.*

11. You will say, first, with Cajetan: One who receives a supernatural influx from Christ is a member of Christ. But baptized heretics receive a supernatural influx from Christ, since from Him they receive the character, which is a supernatural quality derived from Christ. Therefore, they are members of Christ.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. One who receives a supernatural influx from Christ is a member of Christ if that influx is vital and unites him with Christ and the Church: I grant the major premise. If it does not possess these conditions: I deny it. Hence, since by reason of the baptismal character a heretic neither lives supernaturally nor is united to the other parts of the Church in any one thing believed or loved, he is not a member of Christ or of the Church.

12. You will say, second, with Bellarmine: A Pontiff who has fallen into occult heresy is not deposed by that very fact from the pontifical dignity, but remains head of the Church, as theologians commonly teach. Therefore, he is a member of the ecclesiastical body. The consequence seems evident, for it is repugnant to be the head of a body without being its member, since the head is the principal member of the body.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. The head of the Church is constituted through jurisdiction and influence upon others, but a member is constituted through the reception of an influx into himself whereby he lives supernaturally. Hence, because a Pontiff who has fallen into occult heresy still possesses jurisdiction over the Church, he retains the true character of a head. Nevertheless, because he does not truly live the supernatural life of charity or faith, he cannot be called a member of Christ and of the Church. To the proof of the contrary, it must be said that although it is repugnant to be the head of a physical and natural body without being its member, it is not repugnant to be the head of a moral and political body without being its member. This is clear in Christ, who is the mystical head of the Church and nevertheless cannot be called its member, as we noted above. The reason for the difference between a natural and a moral head is that a natural head cannot influence the other members unless it is informed by the soul and receives from it the influx of life. But a moral, political, or ecclesiastical head can exercise jurisdiction and command over the members of the Church although he is not informed by the form or soul of the Church, that is, by faith and charity.

13. From what has been said it follows that Christ is actually the head only of the blessed, the just, and the faithful, because they alone live the supernatural life of glory, grace, and faith. With respect to others, however, He can be called their head in potency, because they can be united to Him

through faith and charity. In this they are distinguished from the damned, who, since they are incapable of penance and amendment, can be called members of Christ neither actually nor potentially.

14. If you ask whether Christ as man can be called the head of irrational creatures, I answer negatively, because, as we said above, it belongs to the character of a head that it should influence something into its members. But Christ insofar as He is man influences nothing into irrational creatures. Therefore, He is not their head. The minor premise is proved. That which Christ insofar as He is man influences into His members must either be a gift of grace or pertain to the supernatural order. But all gifts communicated to irrational creatures pertain to the order of nature. Therefore, although they proceed from Christ as God and author of nature, they do not arise from Him as man or proceed from His merits. Hence Augustine, Epistle 113, says that *Christ merited for us that we should be just, not that we should be men or free*. It is as though he said that Christ merited supernatural gifts, but not those pertaining to the natural order.

§ 3.
The Third Difficulty Is Resolved, Namely, Through Which Grace Christ Is Constituted as Head.

15. I say, fourth, that Christ's capital grace is not the grace of union itself, but habitual grace, not considered precisely in itself, but as connoting the grace of union.

The proof is that, since influx into the members belongs to the character of a head, that grace in Christ is called capital through which He morally and efficiently influences grace into the members of the Church. But Christ as man does not possess this efficiency through the grace of union, but through habitual grace. The grace of union, since it is nothing other than the substance of the Divine Word as communicated to the humanity, is neither radically nor proximately operative, but is only the term and complement of the assumed nature. Therefore, Christ's capital grace is not the grace of union itself, but habitual grace, which is the radical principle by which of the operations through which Christ influences the members of the Church by merit and sanctification.

16. That habitual grace, insofar as it is the grace of the head, connotes and essentially presupposes the grace of union is manifest. Habitual grace is the grace of the head insofar as it constitutes Christ as man capable of meriting grace for us condignly and satisfying for our sins. But it does not

effect this without the grace of union, which gives infinite dignity to Christ's meritorious and satisfactory works. Therefore, habitual grace, insofar as it is the grace of the head, implies the grace of union by connotation and necessarily presupposes it. Hence the grace of a mere man, although of the same species as Christ's habitual grace, however greatly increased and intensified, cannot be capital grace or constitute its possessor as head of the Church.

17. You will object, first: That grace of Christ must be called capital which is prior and more perfect in Him and from which the value of Christ's satisfaction and merit for all men is derived. But these conditions do not belong to Christ's habitual grace, but to the grace of union. Therefore, the grace of union, not habitual grace, must be called capital. The major premise is clear, for, as we explained above, three things are required for the character of a head: priority, eminence, and influx. The minor premise is proved in each of its parts. First, that habitual grace is not prior in Christ seems manifest, since it presupposes the grace of union and follows it as a property. That it is not more excellent and eminent is no less evident, since Christ is holy in a more perfect manner through the grace of union than through habitual grace. Finally, that the value of satisfaction and merit in Christ's works proceeds not from habitual grace but from the grace of union is clear from the fact that, since such value is infinite, it can proceed only from the person of the Word united to the human nature.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. That grace of Christ must be called capital which is prior and more perfect in every order: I deny the major premise. In some order: I grant it. Under the same distinction of the minor premise, I deny the consequence.

The solution is explained as follows. Although habitual grace presupposes the grace of union and consequently is not first in every order, it is nevertheless first in its proper order, namely, the supernatural but non-hypostatic order. Just as this priority suffices for it truly and properly to acquire the character of nature, so it suffices for it to be the grace of the head. Likewise, although habitual grace is not simply and in every manner more perfect, and Christ is holy in a nobler manner through the grace of union than through habitual grace, habitual grace is nevertheless nobler and more perfect under the character of the principle by which of operation. This perfection is principally considered in the grace of the head, since it must constitute the head in the genus of active causality, as we showed above.

To what is added, namely, that the grace from which the infinite value of Christ's satisfaction and merit is derived must be called His capital grace, a

similar distinction must be made. From which it is derived formally: I deny it. Since a head belongs to the genus of active causality, it is constituted as head not through formal but through effective influx. Therefore, since the grace of union, which is the substance of the Word itself joined to Christ's humanity, gives dignity and value to Christ's meritorious and satisfactory works not efficiently but formally, as will be explained below when we treat Christ's satisfaction, it must not be called Christ's capital grace. Rather, habitual grace must be so called, which, as joined to the grace of union that it connotes and presupposes, effectively and in the manner of the principle by which influences infinite value into Christ's meritorious and satisfactory actions.

18. You will object, second: If no habitual grace had been given to Christ, He would still be the head of all men, for He would truly influence all men even meritoriously. Christ did not need habitual grace in order to merit, since through a transient help He could have elicited supernatural and meritorious acts, as we showed above. Therefore, even now He is the head of men through the grace of union, not through habitual grace.

I answer that He would then be the head, but not in the same manner or through the same form as He in fact is. He would not then influence or operate through any supernatural habit, but through actual helps or certain other gifts. He would by no means influence by reason of the divine personality itself, and thus He would not be head by reason of it, but by reason of some superadded gift.

CHAPTER XII.
On the Blessed Knowledge of Christ's Soul.

1. The Evangelist joined knowledge to grace as another endowment of Christ when he said: *We saw Him full of grace and truth.* Just as there is a threefold grace in Christ—substantial, habitual, and capital—of which we treated in the preceding chapters, so there is also a threefold knowledge in Him: blessed, infused, and acquired. These must now be discussed, first blessed knowledge, as more excellent than the others, and then infused and acquired knowledge.

It is certain and undoubted among theologians that from the first beginning of conception Christ's human intellect was illumined by blessed knowledge. For it was fitting that to a nature assumed to the supreme being there should be granted the supreme operation, namely, the beatific vision, and that there should be given to it not grace of any kind whatever, but grace

consummated through glory. Hence in Ps. 22 Christ, addressing the Father, says: *Upon You I was cast from the womb; from my mother's belly You are my God.* Eusebius of Caesarea, glossing these words in *Demonstratio Evangelica* X, introduces Christ speaking as follows: *From my mother's womb You are my God, for while I was still hidden within the chamber of her who bore Me in her womb, I nevertheless saw You as my God.*

It is no less certain in theology that by this knowledge Christ's soul does not comprehend the divine essence, both because the divine essence is incomprehensible to every created intellect, as we showed in the treatise on the beatific vision, and because in the Council of Basel, sess. 22, the following proposition of Augustine of Rome is condemned: *Christ's soul sees God as clearly and intensely as God clearly and intensely sees Himself.* Hence Albert the Great wisely says in III, dist. 14, a. 1: *God alone comprehends Himself. For if we said that He is enclosed by the comprehension of the capacity of Christ's soul, it would seem to me that this would redound to a blasphemy against Christ's Godhead.*

2. Nor is it an obstacle that Isidore says in ch. 2 on Exodus: *The Trinity is wholly known only to itself and to the assumed humanity.* As St. Thomas interprets him here, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1, Isidore said this because of the most excellent knowledge belonging to the soul of Christ the Lord, which is shared by no other creature. It is called complete, not because it is comprehensive, nor because it is the greatest possible by the absolute power of God, but because it is the highest possible under the established law. In the same way Christ's soul is said in John 1 to be full of habitual grace, not because greater and more intense grace is not possible by the absolute power of God, but because under the ordinary law no greater and more intense grace can be given. The words of Fulgentius, in his response to the third question of Ferrandus the Deacon, saying that *Christ's soul possessed in itself a full knowledge of the whole Godhead*, must be explained in the same way. This must not be understood of comprehensive knowledge, but of the most perfect knowledge which can be possessed under the ordinary law. These things being presupposed, in order to declare to what objects the blessed knowledge of Christ's soul extends:

3. I say, first, that through blessed knowledge Christ's soul does not know in the divine essence all possible creatures. For knowledge of all possible things in the known divine essence is comprehension of the divine essence, as we showed in the treatise on the beatific vision. But the divine essence is not comprehended by the intellect of Christ's soul, as we have just seen; indeed, it is contradictory for it to be comprehended by any created

intellect. Therefore, through blessed knowledge Christ's soul does not know in the divine essence all possible creatures.

4. This is confirmed. A greater or more intense light of glory is required in proportion as more possible creatures are known in the divine essence. Therefore, for exhausting and penetrating the infinite totality of possible things hidden in God's essence and power, an infinitely intense light of glory is required. But the light of glory in Christ's soul is not infinitely intense, since it is commensurate with His habitual grace, which, as we saw above, is finite intensively. Therefore, Christ's soul does not know in the divine essence the whole totality of possible things.

5. I say, second, that Christ's blessed knowledge extends to all present, past, and future things.

This is proved, first, from St. Thomas, here, a. 2, ad 2, where he says that *Christ's soul knows all the things which God knows in Himself through the knowledge of vision*. But through the knowledge of vision God knows all things which are, were, or will be as present in His eternity, as we explained in the treatise on God's knowledge. Therefore, through blessed knowledge Christ's soul knows all present, past, and future things.

6. The reason which the same holy Doctor indicates in the body of the same article also recommends this. All the blessed know in the divine essence through the beatific vision all things pertaining to their state, as we showed in the treatise on the vision of God. But all present, past, and future things pertain to Christ's state, even as man. Therefore, through blessed knowledge Christ knows in the divine essence all present, past, and future things. The minor premise is proved. Whatever is subject to Christ's dominion or judicial power pertains to His state. But Christ's dominion and judicial power extend to all rational creatures and consequently to all their present, past, and future volitions and cognitions. Therefore, the blessed knowledge of Christ's soul extends to them.

7. You will say that the future volitions and cognitions of men and angels after the day of judgment are not subject to Christ's judgment. Therefore, they do not pertain to His state.

I answer that these volitions and thoughts are subject at least to Christ's dominion. Moreover, they are also subject to His judgment insofar as they pertain either to the accidental reward of the blessed or to the punishment of the damned.

8. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: If Christ's soul through blessed knowledge did not know all possible creatures in the divine essence, this would chiefly be because it would thereby comprehend God's essence and omnipotence. But comprehension of God is not rightly inferred

from the knowledge of all possible things in the divine essence. Therefore, and so forth. The major premise is the principal foundation of our conclusion. The minor is proved, first, because Christ's soul sees in the Word all things which God knows through the knowledge of vision, as we said in the second conclusion, and nevertheless does not comprehend that knowledge. Therefore, similarly, although it saw in the Word all possible creatures which God knows through the knowledge of simple intelligence, it would not comprehend the divine omnipotence or the knowledge of simple intelligence. Second, the whole totality of possible things can be known outside the Word without God being comprehended. Therefore, it can also be known in the Word, or in the divine essence first known. Third, an inferior angel knows all the natural things contained in a superior angel as in their cause, and nevertheless does not comprehend that angel. Therefore, comprehension of a thing does not follow from knowledge of the things virtually contained in it. Finally, comprehension of the divine essence does not follow from knowledge of all the divine attributes in the divine essence as in their cause. Therefore, neither does it follow from knowledge of all possible creatures in God as in their cause.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To the first proof of the minor, having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that existing or future creatures are not the adequate term of the knowledge of vision, since by the same knowledge God could produce and see many others. But the totality of possible creatures is the adequate term of divine omnipotence, since beyond it nothing else can be produced by God or known as possible through the knowledge of simple intelligence.

9. To the second, I likewise deny the consequence and the parity. Comprehension of a cause is inferred only from knowledge of its effects in the cause itself and from the cause itself. Unless they are known in this manner, the cause is not known to the full extent of its knowability, which is required for its comprehension.

To the third, it is answered that an inferior angel perhaps knows all things contained in a superior angel, but not in the superior angel himself as in their cause. Otherwise he would comprehend him.

To the fourth, having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence, because all things eminently contained in God can be known quidditatively only through comprehending the cause, whereas the things which formally belong to God, such as His attributes, can be known quidditatively in the divine essence without being known comprehensively. Therefore, comprehension of the divine essence does not follow from knowledge of all

the attributes in the known divine essence, although it does follow from knowledge of all possible things in the divine omnipotence.

10. You will say: Why can those things which formally *inesse* in God be known quidditatively but not comprehensively, whereas the same is not true of the things eminently contained in Him?

I answer from St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 20, a. 1, and Cajetan, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 8, ad 1 of Scotus, that the reason for the difference consists in this: those things which formally belong to something are known immediately when it is seen, because they are among the things manifestly appearing. Hence, when the divine essence is seen, although in a weak and finite manner, the things which formally *inesse* in God are known. But those things which are eminently contained in a cause, as creatures are contained in God, do not manifestly appear, but lie hidden in the cause. Hence knowledge of them is obtained only by virtue of penetration of the cause. Therefore, for all the effects eminently contained in a cause to be known, an adequate penetration and consequently a comprehensive knowledge of that cause is required.

11. You will object, second, against the second conclusion: If the blessed knowledge of Christ's soul knew all present, future, and past things which God knows by the knowledge of vision, it would be as perfect as the knowledge of vision which is in God, since the perfection of knowledge is measured according to the number of objects to which it extends. But this seems absurd. Therefore, so does the antecedent.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. It would be as perfect as God's knowledge of vision materially and extensively: I grant the major premise. Formally and intensively: I deny it. The solution belongs to St. Thomas, here, a. 2, where he reasons as follows: The quantity of knowledge is measured not only according to the number of things known, but also according to the clarity of the cognition. Therefore, although the knowledge which Christ's soul possesses in the Word equals the knowledge of vision which God possesses in Himself as regards the number of things known, nevertheless God's knowledge infinitely exceeds the knowledge of Christ's soul as regards clarity of cognition, because the uncreated light of the divine intellect infinitely exceeds every created light received in Christ's soul.

12. You will object, third: If Christ's blessed knowledge extended to all present, past, and future things, it would attain an infinite multitude. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The consequence of the major premise is evident, for the future thoughts of men and angels throughout all eternity are infinite. The minor premise is proved as follows. A cognition whereby infinitely many objects are simultaneously known must

likewise be infinite. For if a cognition by which two objects are simultaneously known is more perfect than one by which only one object is attained, and so successively, the cognition extending to infinitely many objects will be of infinite perfection. But the blessed knowledge of Christ's soul cannot be called infinite, since the cognition of Christ's soul, by the very fact that it is created, must be finite. Therefore, it cannot extend to infinitely many objects.

This is confirmed. For all possible things hidden in the divine essence and omnipotence to be known, an infinite and comprehensive cognition is required. Therefore, likewise, for all things hidden in God's free knowledge and decree to be known, an infinite light and comprehensive cognition are required.

13. To the objection, having granted the major premise, I deny the minor. To its proof I say that light and cognition must be infinite only when the infinitely many objects which they attain exceed one another in species or order. For just as one individual does not add an essential perfection above another, so neither does the cognition of several individuals require a cognition more perfect in species, but only either a greater conformation or a cognition of a higher order. This is especially true when those objects are known in another thing first known and through one and the same species, as occurs in Christ's blessed knowledge, which knows infinitely many thoughts of men and angels in the Word through one species, namely, through the divine essence, which is the perfect likeness of all things.

To the confirmation, having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. An infinite and comprehensive cognition is required only when infinitely many things are known by virtue of the penetration of the essence and omnipotence, as possible things hidden in the divine essence are known. But the blessed knowledge of Christ's soul does not know the things hidden in God's free knowledge and decree by virtue of penetrating the divine essence, but through God's free revelation and manifestation disclosing past and future things, of which the divine essence is a free, not a necessary, mirror. An evident sign of this is that sometimes one who is less blessed knows more future or existing things than one who is more blessed.

CHAPTER XIII.
On the Infused Knowledge of Christ's Soul.

1. Besides beatific knowledge, it is entirely certain that Christ possessed infused knowledge, that is, knowledge cognizing things through species infused by God and in no way dependent upon the operation of the agent intellect. First, because the Apostle clearly intimates this when he says in Col. 2 that all the treasures of knowledge were hidden in Christ; for all the treasures of knowledge would not have been in him if he had lacked the ornament of infused knowledge, which is found in the angels and the other blessed. Second, because, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 9, a. 3, it was fitting that the Word, in assuming humanity, should assume it as perfect. But if that humanity had lacked infused knowledge, it would have been imperfect. Therefore, it did not lack it. The major premise is evident, and the minor is proved. Everything that is in potency is imperfect unless it is reduced to act. But Christ's soul was in potency to cognize objects not only through species abstracted from phantasms, but also through species infused by God, as angels and souls separated from the body cognize, since Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a possessor of beatitude. Therefore, if he had lacked infused knowledge, he would have been imperfect. Hence the same Holy Doctor says in *De veritate*, q. 20, a. 2, ad 1: *Since Christ was both a possessor of beatitude and a wayfarer, he had both modes of considering: one by which he was conformed to the angels, so that he considered without discourse; and another by which he considered through a turning toward phantasms.* And here, a. 3: *Just as a twofold cognition is posited in the angels, namely, a morning cognition, by which they cognize things in the Word, and an evening cognition, by which they cognize things in their proper nature through species implanted in them, so, besides divine and uncreated knowledge, there is in Christ according to his soul a beatific knowledge, by which he cognizes the Word and things in the Word, and an infused or implanted knowledge, by which he cognizes things in their proper nature through intelligible species proportioned to the human mind.*

2. The same truth may further be established by this argument. By reason of the hypostatic union, every perfection possible to Christ, and not repugnant to his beatitude or to the end of the redemption of the human race, was due to him by the title of connaturality. But infused knowledge was possible to Christ and had no repugnance to his beatitude or to the end of redemption, as is evident. Therefore, it must not be denied to Christ.

Some add that there had to be admitted in Christ some cognition directing and regulating his meritorious acts, and that this could be none other than infused knowledge, since faith was not in him, while beatific knowledge is given not for merit but for reward, and indeed is itself the whole reward. But more will be said of this below, when treating of Christ's merit.

3. You will object, first: Infused knowledge in Christ appears idle and superfluous, since he cognized supernatural objects through beatific knowledge and natural objects through acquired knowledge. Therefore, it does not seem that it should be admitted, because grace abhors the superfluous no less than nature does.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For although the potentiality of Christ's soul with respect to supernatural objects is satisfied through beatific knowledge as regards the number of things known, it is not satisfied as regards the mode of knowing and cognizing those same objects, since it can cognize them both in the Word and outside the Word, as can the angels and the other blessed.

4. You will object, second: Since infused knowledge is supernatural, it is not due to Christ's created intellect. Therefore, its absence is not privative but purely negative with respect to Christ's humanity, and consequently implies no imperfection in it.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. I grant it of Christ's intellect considered in itself, for in that sense no supernatural form can be due to it. I deny it of Christ's intellect as assumed to the personal being of the Word; for in this sense every supernatural form, and consequently infused knowledge, is due to it by the title of connaturality. Consequently, its absence would be privative when compared with Christ's intellect as assumed by the Word.

From this it is gathered that there is a twofold infused knowledge in Christ's intellect: one supernatural, by which he cognizes outside the Word the mysteries of grace and supernatural objects; the other natural, by which he contemplates natural things in themselves through species infused by God. For, as we said above, every receptive potency of Christ's soul had to be reduced to act, lest his humanity remain imperfect after its assumption. But Christ's soul was in obediential potency not only to cognize supernatural objects in the Word, but also outside the Word, and to know natural objects not only through species abstracted from phantasms, but also through species infused by God, as angels and souls separated from the body cognize them. Therefore, there was a twofold infused knowledge in Christ, one natural and the other supernatural. Hence St. Thomas, Opusculum 2, c. 216, acknowledges both in Christ; and both are found in the angels, since they

not only cognize supernatural objects outside the Word, but also contemplate natural objects through the species they received from God at their creation. These points having been established, the endowments and prerogatives of Christ's infused knowledge must now be briefly explained.

§ 1.
The First Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.

5. I say, first, that Christ's infused knowledge cognizes all natural objects, not only in common, or according to common, generic, or specific aspects, but also distinctly and in particular, and according to the proper and distinct aspect of each individual.

The first proof is as follows. Christ's dignity requires that the knowledge infused into him attain things in the most perfect manner possible. But the mode of cognizing natural objects according to the proper and distinct aspects of each individual is more perfect than the mode by which they are cognized only in common, or according to common, generic, or specific aspects, as is evident in itself. Therefore, this mode must be attributed to Christ's infused knowledge.

6. The second proof is as follows. Through infused knowledge the angels cognize all natural objects not only confusedly and in common, but also distinctly and in particular. Therefore, Christ does so as well through the knowledge implanted in his soul. The antecedent is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, qq. 55–56, and is proved from the fact that the species of infused knowledge in the angels, since they are not received from objects but are caused immediately by God after the exemplar of the divine essence considered as having the character of an intelligible species, clearly and distinctly represent all natural things according to their proper and individual aspects, just as the divine essence does. The consequence is proved, first, because Christ's infused knowledge would be inferior to angelic knowledge if it did not, as angelic knowledge does, cognize natural things distinctly according to their proper aspects, but only confusedly and according to common aspects, as Scotus and the Nominalists maintain. Second, the species used by the knowledge implanted in Christ's soul are caused immediately by God after the exemplar of the divine essence no less than are the species infused into angelic minds. Therefore, just as for this reason an angel cognizes through infused knowledge all natural objects distinctly and in particular, and according to the proper aspect of each individual, so does Christ through the knowledge implanted in him.

7. You will ask whether Christ cognizes all natural objects not only through natural infused knowledge, but also through supernatural infused knowledge. I answer affirmatively, against Vazquez and other more recent authors. The reason is that it was fitting that not only the natural potency, but also the obediential potency of Christ's soul should be reduced to act, lest it remain imperfect through being left in potency. But Christ's soul was in obediential potency to cognize all natural objects through supernatural infused knowledge. Therefore, it cognized them through that knowledge. The major premise is evident from what has been said above. The minor is proved from the fact that, although natural knowledge cannot ascend to supernatural objects, supernatural knowledge can nevertheless descend to natural objects, just as a finite entity can terminate an infinite cognition, a created entity an uncreated cognition, and a material entity an intellectual cognition. Therefore, cognition of natural objects through supernatural infused knowledge is possible to Christ's soul.

I add that, just as Christ's soul is more perfect than the angelic nature by reason of its union with the Word, so it ought to possess more perfect knowledge. But if it did not cognize natural objects by supernatural cognition, but only by natural cognition, it would cognize them not in a more perfect but in a less perfect manner than the angels; for the natural cognition possible to Christ's soul, whether through infused species or acquired species, is inferior to the cognition of the angels. Therefore, Christ's soul cognizes natural things by supernatural cognition.

8. You will object, first: There must be proportion between knowledge and its object. But natural beings, since they belong to an inferior order, have no proportion to supernatural knowledge. Therefore, they cannot be contained under its object.

I answer that the proportion required between knowledge and its material object, such as natural things are with respect to the knowledge implanted in Christ's soul, need not consist in their belonging to the same order, but in the object's not belonging to a higher order. Thus, although knowledge of an inferior order cannot extend to things of a higher order, because they exceed its perfection, knowledge of a higher order extends not only to higher but also to lower things, as is evident from the examples given above. Hence, although the supernatural infused knowledge of Christ's soul belongs to an order higher than natural objects, it can attain them under a certain universal aspect common also to supernatural things, namely, under the aspect of clear revelation outside the Word. In this it differs from faith, whose revelation is obscure, and from the beatific vision, which manifests

creatures not outside the Word but in the Word, or in the divine essence clearly seen.

9. You will object, second: If the infused knowledge of Christ's soul cognizes natural objects not only according to common aspects but also according to the proper and distinct aspect of each individual, how can it attain so many individuals, which are almost infinite, since this would require almost infinite species, which Christ's intellect could not survey?

I answer that Christ's implanted knowledge can attain all those individuals by very few species, because it is endowed with universal species patterned after the exemplary divine ideas and transcending their objects. Although such species are not as universal as angelic species, they are nevertheless not as particular as those abstracted from phantasms. Hence the same species clearly and distinctly represents a specific nature and all its individuals, as belongs to the more particular angelic species, as we explained in the treatise on the angels.

§ 2.
The Second Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.

10. I say, second, that through supernatural infused knowledge Christ cognizes the thoughts of hearts and future contingents.

Proof: It was most fitting that Christ's soul, as hypostatically united to the divine Word, should be reduced to act in the most perfect manner with respect to every potentiality it has for cognizing objects. But in Christ's soul there was an obediential potency to cognize the thoughts of hearts and future contingents outside the Word through species infused by God. No repugnance appears in this; rather, it seems required by Christ's dignity, since, as the head of men and angels and the judge of all our acts, including internal acts, he must cognize all things past and future, open and hidden, that he may judge, punish, or crown them all. Therefore, he cognizes them through supernatural implanted knowledge.

11. This is confirmed. The blessed cognize, not only in the Word through beatific knowledge but also outside the Word through infused knowledge, all those things that are cognized here in the state of the way through the gifts of prophecy and discernment of spirits. But through those two gifts the saints and prophets cognize future contingents and the thoughts of hearts. Therefore, these are likewise cognized by Christ through infused knowledge, since from the instant of his conception he was simultaneously a wayfarer and a possessor of beatitude.

12. You will object, first: Whatever is cognized by Christ and the blessed outside the Word through infused knowledge is cognized through some created species implanted by God. But future contingents cannot be cognized in themselves through any created species. Therefore, they are not cognized by Christ through infused knowledge. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. That which does not have determinate being cannot be represented by a proper species, since the representation of a species, being natural, cannot represent what is indifferent to being and non-being. But a future contingent does not have determinate being, but is indifferent to being and non-being. Therefore, it cannot be represented in itself by any created species.

This is confirmed. If there could be a created species representing future contingents in themselves, it would be either natural or supernatural. Not the first, for then it would be due to some creature, and consequently cognition of future contingents in themselves would be due to some creature. This cannot be said, since knowledge of future things is a most certain proof of divinity, according to Tertullian's statement in *Apologeticum*, c. 2: *The truth of prediction is, I think, a suitable testimony of divinity.* Nor the second, because many future objects are natural, whereas a supernatural species requires a supernatural object. Therefore, no created species representing future contingents in themselves is possible.

13. To the objection, I grant the major premise and deny the minor. Since intelligible species are produced in imitation of the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an idea, exemplar, and intelligible species, the essence of God, as accompanied by the decree and determination of the divine will determining secondary causes to the production of future contingents, represents future contingents in the manner of an intelligible species. In the same way, some created species can participate in this perfection so as to represent future contingents in themselves, provided that their causes, which of themselves are indifferent to producing them, have been determined by the efficacious decree of the divine will. Hence, to the proof of the minor, having granted the major, I distinguish the minor: A future contingent considered in itself does not have determinate being, I grant the minor; considered as subject to the efficacious and absolute decree of the divine will, I deny the minor and the consequence. The solution is evident from what was said in the treatise on God's knowledge, where we examined this doctrine at length.

To the confirmation, I deny the minor premise in its second part. To the proof to the contrary, I say that for the supernatural character of the species it is enough that the object be supernatural under the aspect of a cognizable

object, even though it is entitatively natural. Although many future contingents are entitatively natural, they are all supernatural under the aspect of cognizable objects, because cognition of them cannot be connatural to any creature made or capable of being made. Just as this suffices for their cognition to be entitatively supernatural, so also it suffices for the species representing them to be supernatural.

14. You will object, second: Of the four modes by which future things can be cognized, none can be assigned by which Christ's implanted knowledge cognized them. Future things are cognized either in their proximate cause, and in this way Christ could not have foreknown them with certainty through implanted knowledge, because, since the proximate cause is indifferent and indeterminate, it cannot be a certain medium for cognizing them. Or, second, they are cognized in the testimony of God revealing them, and cognition in this mode belongs to faith or prophecy, not to implanted knowledge, whose object is a created being as cognizable in itself and by reason of itself, not through extrinsic testimony and by means of divine revelation. Or, third, they can be cognized in God's decree causing their futurition, and this mode belongs to beatific knowledge, which sees in the divine essence those free decrees God wills to reveal. Or, finally, they are cognized immediately in themselves, that is, through species immediately representing them; and this mode also cannot belong to implanted knowledge, because it belongs to the nature of knowledge that things be cognized in or through their cause.

I answer that Christ cognizes future contingents through infused knowledge in two ways. First, immediately, through species implanted by God and immediately representing them, which we have already shown to be possible and consequently to have been infused into Christ's soul. For if he did not immediately cognize future contingents through such species, those species would be entirely idle and superfluous. Second, mediately, through a species implanted in Christ's soul that directly and immediately represents his beatific vision. For just as through such a species he indirectly cognizes the mystery of the Trinity, as will be said below, so also he indirectly cognizes God's free decrees concerning future things, and consequently future contingents, which are contained in those decrees as in their cause. We do not therefore deny that through infused knowledge Christ cognizes future contingents scientifically in the decree; but beyond this we acknowledge another mode by which he cognizes them through infused species immediately representing them.

15. You will object, first: The mode of cognizing future contingents in the decree belongs not to the infused but to the beatific knowledge of Christ's

soul. I answer that the mode of cognizing future contingents in the decree through a species directly representing it belongs to beatific knowledge. The mode of cognizing them in the decree through an infused species directly representing the beatific vision and only indirectly representing the divine decree belongs not to beatific but to infused knowledge, just as the implanted species that directly represents the beatific vision and indirectly represents the mystery of the Trinity belongs to such infused knowledge, as will be evident from what is said below.

16. You will object, second: God does not cognize future contingents immediately in themselves, as we showed in the treatise on God's knowledge. Therefore, neither does Christ. I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that divine cognition cannot be specified by created truth and consequently cannot be immediately terminated at it. Hence God contemplates all things, whether possible or future, in his own essence, either considered absolutely or as determined by the free decree of his will, as in a cause and a medium previously cognized. But created cognition in Christ's soul, just as it can be specified by creatures, can also be immediately terminated at them. Hence, although in God there is not a twofold mode of cognizing future contingents, namely, immediately in themselves and in himself as in their cause, both modes must nevertheless be admitted in Christ.

17. You will object, third: St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, and often elsewhere, that future things cannot be cognized by God except insofar as they are present to him in eternity. Therefore, all the more Christ does not cognize them immediately in themselves through species implanted in him by God and immediately representing them.

I answer that St. Thomas must be understood as speaking of intuitive cognition of future contingents. Since God does not cognize them immediately in themselves, if he did not see them as present in eternity, which is the measure of his cognition, he would cognize them not intuitively but abstractively. He is not speaking, however, of certain and infallible cognition of such future things, for God would have this by reason of the decree even if, per impossibile, future contingents were not present to him in eternity. This is evident in conditioned futures whose condition will never be fulfilled, for God cognizes them certainly and infallibly in the conditioned decree, although they are not present to him in eternity, because they will never exist in time owing to the absence of the condition, which will never be posited, as we showed in the treatise on God's knowledge.

18. From this you will understand that through infused knowledge Christ's soul does not cognize future contingents intuitively, as it does

through beatific knowledge, although it cognizes them clearly and distinctly through both. The measure of infused knowledge, namely discrete time, does not coexist with past and future things as eternity does, which is the measure of beatific knowledge. The same must be said of the cognition of future contingents that Christ's soul has through the prophetic light, because this likewise is measured not by eternity, as the beatific vision is, but by discrete time.

19. You will ask whether Christ's soul cognizes all possible creatures through infused knowledge. The reason for doubt is that every possible perfection should be attributed to Christ's soul, since it is hypostatically united to the divine Word. But it involves no contradiction for the whole collection of possibles to be cognized outside the Word through infused knowledge, as some of our Thomists teach with some probability. Therefore, it is in fact cognized by Christ's soul through implanted knowledge.

Nevertheless, I answer negatively for two reasons. The first is that it is unfitting to assert that Christ's soul cognizes more things outside the Word through infused knowledge than in the Word through beatific knowledge, since beatific knowledge is superior to infused knowledge and is compared with it as morning light with evening light. But through beatific knowledge Christ does not cognize all possible creatures in the Word, as we showed in the preceding chapter. Therefore, neither does he cognize them outside the Word through infused knowledge. The second reason is that, although every possible perfection not opposed to the connatural mode of operation of Christ's soul should be attributed to it, a perfection that does not preserve its connatural mode of operation should not be. But such is the cognition of all possibles outside the Word. Therefore, it must not be attributed to Christ's soul. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. It is connatural to Christ's soul to receive species of lesser universality than those of the angels, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 6. But cognition of all possibles cannot be had without a species received in Christ's soul that is more universal than the species infused into angelic minds. Therefore, the perfection consisting in cognition of all possibles does not preserve the connatural mode of operation of Christ's soul.

20. From this the solution to the reason for doubt is evident. When it is said that every possible perfection should be attributed to Christ's soul, this must be understood of a perfection possible according to the connatural mode of operation due to Christ's soul, not of one that does not preserve its connatural mode of operation. Hence, although it is probable that cognition of the whole collection of possibles outside the Word through infused knowledge involves no contradiction, nevertheless, because such cognition

does not preserve the connatural mode of operation of Christ's soul, it must not be granted to it.

§ 3.
The Third Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.

21. I say, third, that through supernatural implanted knowledge Christ cognizes all supernatural beings quidditatively and comprehensively.

The first part is proved, first, as follows. Christ is the efficient or final cause of all supernatural gifts, at least of those bestowed upon redeemed men. Therefore, it is most fitting that he cognize them quidditatively through infused knowledge. Second, Christ is the judge of all men, and it belongs to a judge to know the abundance of graces and gifts that were either given for acting well or are to be given as a reward. For no right judgment can be made concerning merits and demerits unless there precedes a cognition of the graces from which either the ingratitude of the wicked or the fidelity and meritorious cooperation of the good can be established. It is therefore necessary that Christ cognize habitual and actual grace, which is the principle of merit, and the light of glory and the beatific vision, which are the reward of merits. If these are known to him, then all the more will he cognize through supernatural infused knowledge the other supernatural gifts that are lesser and more imperfect.

22. The second part is also proved by this argument. Through supernatural infused knowledge every obediential potency in Christ's soul with respect to the cognition of things that can be cognized outside the Word was reduced to act. But created supernatural beings can be cognized outside the Word not only quidditatively but also comprehensively. Therefore, they are in fact cognized comprehensively by Christ outside the Word through infused knowledge. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Every entity of finite and limited perfection can be comprehended through finite and limited cognition. But created supernatural beings, such as grace, faith, charity, and the beatific vision, are of finite and limited perfection and entity. Therefore, they can be comprehended outside the Word through finite and limited cognition, and consequently through supernatural infused knowledge. The minor premise is evident, and the major is proved. What is of finite entity is also of finite cognizability, since passive cognizability follows entity and is commensurate with it. But what is of finite cognizability can be comprehended through finite light and cognition, since a finite cognitive power can equal the finite cognizability of

the object. Therefore, what is of finite and limited entity and perfection can be comprehended through finite light and cognition.

This is confirmed. Just as the angels comprehensively cognize all natural things inferior to themselves, so the supreme dignity of Christ fittingly comprehends all inferior natural and supernatural things, not only through the beatific vision but also through infused knowledge, by which he is constituted the judge and teacher of all.

23. You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: The beatific vision cannot be cognized quidditatively unless God as he is in himself is cognized quidditatively. But God as he is in himself cannot be cognized quidditatively through infused knowledge, but only through beatific knowledge. Therefore, Christ's soul cannot cognize the beatific vision quidditatively through infused knowledge. The minor premise is certain, and the major is shown as follows. No relation can be cognized quidditatively unless its term is likewise cognized quidditatively. But the beatific vision implies a transcendental relation to God as he is in himself, since God as he is in himself is its object. Therefore, the beatific vision cannot be cognized quidditatively unless God as he is in himself is cognized quidditatively.

I answer by denying the major premise. For the beatific vision to be cognized quidditatively, it suffices to cognize that the divine essence exists. To the proof to the contrary, I likewise deny the major premise, for it is false that, in order to cognize a relation quidditatively, its term must be cognized quidditatively. Otherwise an angel could not naturally cognize the creature's relation of dependence upon God, since it cannot naturally cognize God quidditatively. What we have said of quidditative cognition must all the more be said of comprehensive cognition. For an act expressing an order to some term to be comprehended, it is not required that the term be comprehensively cognized as it is in itself, but it suffices that it be cognized as terminating such an act according to what it is in itself. Hence, although through infused knowledge Christ does not comprehend God as he is in himself, who is the object of the beatific vision and to whom that vision has an intrinsic relation, he nevertheless comprehends the vision, because for this it suffices that he cognize God as he is in himself to be the term of such a vision.

24. You will object, second, against the second part of the conclusion: For comprehension it is required that the cognitive principle be of the same perfection and immateriality as the object comprehended. Hence, because a superior angel exceeds the intellect of an inferior angel in perfection and immateriality, it cannot be comprehended by the latter, as we taught in the

treatise on the angels. But the supernatural infused knowledge of Christ's soul does not equal in perfection and immateriality several supernatural beings, especially the light of glory and the beatific vision. Therefore, it does not comprehend them.

I answer that for comprehension it is not necessary that the entitative perfection of knowledge always equal the entitative perfection of the object, but it suffices that its radical principle equal the entitative perfection of the object. For the radical principle of knowledge together with knowledge itself constitutes the adequate cause of intellection, not because both concur as partial causes, but because they are parts of the integral cause of intellection. Thus, although the object exceeds the perfection of one part of the intellective principle, namely, its proximate potency, nevertheless, because the adequate principle composed of the radical and proximate principles equals the perfection of the object, the knowledge can comprehend it. Therefore, although Christ's infused knowledge is less perfect than beatific knowledge, or the beatific vision, it nevertheless comprehends that vision, because it has the hypostatic union as its radical principle, of which it is a property. That union immeasurably exceeds all other supernatural beings, including the beatific vision itself, since the hypostatic order exceeds the order of grace more than the order of grace exceeds the order of nature.

§ 4.
The Fourth Excellence of Christ's Infused Knowledge.

25. I say, fourth, that through infused knowledge Christ cognized the mysteries of our faith, and especially the mystery of the Trinity as regards its existence.

The first proof is as follows. Christ as a wayfarer was constituted by God the master and teacher of men and angels concerning the mysteries of our faith. Since it belongs to a teacher to cognize clearly and distinctly what he teaches to others, Christ cognized the mysteries of our faith in a more perfect manner than other wayfarers. But as a wayfarer he could not cognize them in a more perfect manner through faith, which was not in him, nor through the prophetic light, since a prophet only proposes obscurely and speaks from afar of the things revealed to him, nor through the light of glory, since this belonged to Christ not as a wayfarer but as a possessor of beatitude. Therefore, he cognized them only through infused knowledge, which belonged to him as a wayfarer.

26. The conclusion is proved, second, with particular reference to the mystery of the Trinity. Through implanted knowledge Christ cognized supernatural beings, for example, an act of faith and the beatific vision, not only quidditatively but also comprehensively, as we showed in the preceding section. But through infused knowledge he could not comprehend an act of faith and the beatific vision unless by the same light he cognized that God is believed by the faithful and seen by the blessed as triune, and consequently unless by that same light he immediately judged God to be triune. Therefore, through infused knowledge Christ cognized the mystery of the Trinity as regards its existence, that is, the existence of this mystery.

This is confirmed. As a wayfarer, Christ merited through love, piety, and obedience toward the Father, for which cognition of the Father was certainly required. But those acts were not directed by beatific knowledge, both because it did not belong to Christ as a wayfarer and because it is the rule only of necessary love, but by implanted knowledge. Therefore, through implanted knowledge Christ cognized the Father and consequently the other persons of the most holy Trinity.

27. You will object: Only those things represented through a proper species are cognized through implanted knowledge. But the Trinity of divine persons cannot be represented by any created species, even as regards its existence, since a species representing God as he is in himself is impossible, as we showed in the treatise on the vision of God. Therefore, Christ did not cognize the mystery of the Trinity through infused knowledge, even as regards its existence.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Only those things represented through a proper species are cognized immediately through implanted knowledge, I grant the major; mediately, I deny the major. For just as an effect is cognized by means of its cause, or a cause by means of its effect, so the Trinity of divine persons is cognized by means of some created effect represented through a proper species, namely, by means of an act of faith and the beatific vision. Since these regard God as triune as their object and express a transcendental order to him, they cannot be cognized quidditatively and comprehensively by Christ through infused knowledge unless the mystery of the Trinity is cognized through that knowledge, at least as regards its existence.

You will object: No created effect depends upon God precisely as triune, but only as one, since the productive power ad extra is common to the three persons and belongs to them by reason of the essence. Therefore, the Trinity of divine persons cannot be cognized through infused knowledge by means of any created effect represented through a proper species.

I answer that, although no created effect depends upon God as triune in the manner of a cause, for the reason assigned in the objection, some created effects, such as an act of faith and the beatific vision, depend upon God as triune in the manner of an object to which they express a transcendental order. This suffices for the existence of the Trinity to be cognized from those effects.

§ 5.
Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine.

28. From what has been said, it is gathered, first, that Christ's infused knowledge is distinguished from beatific knowledge and from the prophetic light in this: beatific knowledge cognizes creatures in the divine essence as in their cause; infused knowledge contemplates them in themselves; while the prophetic light rests upon the extrinsic testimony of God.

29. It is gathered, second, that Christ's infused knowledge is superior to the knowledge of the angels as regards the number of things known, since through it Christ cognizes more mysteries of grace, more future contingents, and more thoughts of hearts that are not revealed to the angels. It is nevertheless inferior to angelic knowledge as regards the mode of cognition, or the species it uses, because the species infused into Christ's soul are less universal than the species implanted in the angels, being commensurate with Christ's human intellect, which is not as perfect as an angelic intellect.

30. It is gathered, third, that through infused knowledge Christ could understand without turning toward phantasms or with such a turning, according to the choice of his will. For Christ had a twofold mode of understanding: one common to angels and the blessed, as a possessor of beatitude; the other common to men, as a wayfarer. Through the first mode he was altogether independent of phantasms, both because he had species infused by God, like the angels, and because he had dominion over his body, like the blessed. Therefore, from that standpoint he did not necessarily have to use phantasms. Similarly, as a wayfarer he had the mode of understanding common to other men, using the senses and phantasms. Therefore, from that standpoint he could turn toward phantasms, so that in them as in mirrors he might see the things he cognized through infused knowledge.

31. What we have said of turning toward phantasms must, with due proportion, also be said of discourse, namely, that through infused knowledge Christ could understand with or without discourse. For through it he could understand in the manner in which angels understand, namely,

by seeing effects in their cause and conclusions in their principles through a simple intuition. For the species infused into Christ's soul, being universal and patterned after the divine ideas, were naturally apt to represent principles as pregnant with conclusions and causes as filled with effects. Similarly, he could elicit conclusions from principles and effects from causes by distinct acts, and understand properties from the essence by distinct cognitions, one deduced from another. Therefore, he could use infused knowledge with or without discourse. This accords with the condition of such knowledge, which, since it stands between beatific and acquired knowledge, participates in the conditions of both. From beatific knowledge it imitates the mode of cognizing through simple intuition; from acquired and rational knowledge, the mode of cognizing through discourse.

CHAPTER XIV.
On Christ's Acquired Knowledge.

1. St. Thomas expressly teaches here, q. 9, a. 4, retracting what he had taught in the *Sentences*, that Christ did not receive the natural sciences by infusion at the instant of his conception, but acquired them by his own acts, although Suarez denies this. He proves it, first, from the fact that the agent intellect would have been entirely idle and purposeless in Christ if it had not abstracted any species from phantasms, since its sole, or at least principal, office is to abstract from the senses the species of things to be understood. He also proves it because Christ had to possess the sciences according to their proper and connatural mode of being possessed. Hence, just as he had beatific knowledge according to its own mode, namely, through the divine essence taking the place of a species, and infused knowledge according to its proper mode, namely, through infusion, so he had to possess natural sciences capable of being acquired in themselves according to the mode connatural to them, namely, through acquisition and not through infusion.

2. From this you will understand that there was in Christ a threefold mode of understanding corresponding to his threefold knowledge: a divine mode through beatific knowledge; an angelic mode through infused knowledge and implanted species; and a human mode through species received from the senses. According to this last mode, Christ is said in Luke 2 to advance in age and wisdom, as the Holy Doctor explains here, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3, following St. Ambrose in *De Incarnatione*, c. 7: *He first mentioned the stages of age so that you might believe this to be said according to his humanity. Therefore, if he advanced in human age, he advanced in human wisdom.*

Augustine, Fulgentius, Euthymius, Bede, and others teach similar things. From them it is gathered that, just as Christ advanced in age by acquiring a true increase of the flesh, so he advanced in wisdom by acquiring through his own acts and labor a true increase of human knowledge.

3. You will object: From the beginning of Christ's conception, habitual grace was communicated to him together with all infused virtues. At the first beginning of his conception he also possessed all moral virtues not repugnant to the beatific vision or the hypostatic union. Therefore, he likewise had to possess the natural sciences at that time by infusion; otherwise he would not then have been full of grace and truth, as is said in John 1, since natural knowledge is a cognition of natural truths, but there would then have been some ignorance in him.

This is confirmed, first. Every perfection not repugnant to the end of the incarnation was immediately conferred upon Christ. But the natural sciences are not repugnant to the end of the incarnation. Therefore, they were conferred upon him at the very moment of conception.

This is confirmed, second. Adam possessed these sciences at the very moment of his creation. Therefore, all the more did Christ possess them in the first instant of his conception.

4. To the objection, I grant the antecedent in all its parts and deny the consequence and the parity. The difference between supernatural and natural properties or perfections in Christ is that in the former proportion to the personal union is considered, and therefore they were infused immediately and in all fullness; but in the latter proportion to human nature and to the ordinary mode by which they are acquired is considered, so that the truth of human nature in Christ might thereby shine forth more clearly. I add that habitual grace and the infused virtues were necessary to Christ even in the first instant of conception, because he merited in that instant, which he could not have done without habitual grace and the infused virtues, since they are required in Christ for connaturally eliciting supernatural and meritorious acts, as we showed above. The natural sciences, however, were not necessary, since through natural infused knowledge he cognized in that instant all truths of the natural order. Hence he could then be called full of wisdom and truth and free from every ignorance, although he lacked acquired knowledge, because acquired knowledge brought no new truth to Christ's human intellect, but only a new mode of cognizing the same truth. The difference between moral virtues and natural sciences was given above in Chapter X. There we showed that the difference between moral virtues and natural sciences is that the former make a man good simply, whereas the latter do not. Hence, if Christ had not possessed the moral virtues in the

first moment of his conception, he would not then have been simply good and perfect; but he was so even though he did not then possess the natural sciences.

5. To the first confirmation, I say that it was in some way repugnant to the end of the incarnation for Christ to have possessed natural sciences infused by God alone from the beginning of his conception. For the end of the incarnation was both that, through human acts exercised in a human manner, he should perfectly experience in himself the truth of human nature, and that, through the very difficulties he experienced in human operations, he should merit for us mortals and at the same time have compassion upon us, according to Heb. 5: *He learned obedience from the things he suffered.* Who does not see that Christ more fully experienced the mode of operation of human nature, and through that experience was more able both to merit for us and to have compassion upon us, if he acquired the natural sciences by his own labor and exercise than if he had possessed them immediately infused by God?

16. [**sic**] To the second confirmation, I deny the parity and the consequence, because Adam was created at an age to which knowledge was due, so that he could instruct others, since he was given as teacher of the entire human race in natural matters. Christ, however, assumed the state of infancy, to which it is connatural to grow in age and wisdom. Nor did he come, like Adam, to teach the natural sciences, but to reveal to us the mysteries of grace, according to 1 Cor. 15: *The first man was of the earth, earthly; the second man was from heaven, heavenly.* Hence Christ had to possess immediately infused knowledge of supernatural things, but not infused knowledge of natural things as Adam did. Moreover, Adam had no other knowledge by which he could be assisted, unlike Christ, who from the first moment of his conception was endowed with beatific and infused knowledge, by which he could abundantly supply every use of natural knowledge and cognize all natural truths.

17. [**sic**] You will object: Therefore, one or the other of those kinds of knowledge, namely infused or acquired knowledge, was superfluous in Christ, if he cognized the same objects through both. I deny the consequence, because, although Christ cognized the same objects through natural infused knowledge and acquired knowledge, he did not cognize them in the same manner. Through infused knowledge he cognized them in an angelic manner and through species implanted by God; through acquired knowledge he cognized them in a human manner and through species received from things. Hence each was connatural and necessary to him for a different state: infused knowledge for the state of separation and beatitude,

and acquired knowledge for the state of mortal life; for he was simultaneously a wayfarer and a possessor of beatitude.

CHAPTER XV.
On Christ's Power to Cause Grace and Work Miracles.

1. Leaving aside the various errors concerning Christ's power that we reported and refuted in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, only one difficulty presents itself here for brief discussion, namely, whether Christ's humanity is a physical organ and instrument of the divinity for causing grace and working miracles.

The answer is affirmative. It is proved, first, from Scripture. In Luke 6 it is said of Christ that *power went forth from him and healed them all.* And Christ himself, after curing the woman suffering from a flow of blood, said in Luke 8: *I know that power has gone forth from me.* But these statements cannot be explained of moral power, which, since it is a mere being of reason, cannot be said to go forth from a body except very improperly and metaphorically. Therefore, there was in Christ's humanity a physical instrumental power for working miracles.

2. This is proved, second, from the councils and holy Fathers, who assert that Christ's flesh is life-giving, *vivifying, cooperating with the divinity, and operative of divine things*, as may be seen in the Council of Ephesus, Cyril, and others. But it is evident that the flesh cannot be a moral instrument impetrating the production of such effects. Therefore, for producing them it is a true physical instrument. Hence Cyril notes in *In Joannem* IV, c. 14, that in raising the dead Christ not only used his word and command as God, but also sometimes employed his flesh as a kind of cooperator. This is evident in Luke 7, when he raised the only son of the widow of Nain. The Evangelist narrates that, to recall him to life, Christ approached and touched the bier, *to show*, says Cyril, *that his flesh also, because it was joined to the Word, was life-giving.*

3. This is proved, third, from St. Thomas here, q. 13, a. 2, where he teaches that Christ's humanity, insofar as it is an instrument of the Word united to it, possesses instrumental power for effecting every miraculous change. But to possess instrumental power belongs only to a physical instrument. Therefore, he judges Christ's humanity to be a physical instrument for working miracles.

This is confirmed, for in the same place the Holy Doctor asserts that Christ's humanity cannot be an instrument of creation, but can be an

instrument of miraculous operation. Here he clearly indicates that he is speaking of a physical instrument, since it is evident that Christ's humanity can be a moral cause of creation through prayer and merit.

Finally, the same truth may be established by an argument often intimated above. It is fitting and appropriate to concede to Christ's humanity every dignity and prerogative that does not hinder the end of the incarnation or the office of Redeemer and otherwise involves no contradiction. But physical instrumental power for causing grace and working miracles does not hinder, but rather accords with, the end of the incarnation and the office of Redeemer, as is evident, and otherwise involves no repugnance. For if the fire of hell, through a power divinely bestowed upon it, acts physically upon the spiritual creatures it torments, why could the sacred humanity not, by the power of the divinity to which it is united, concur physically in supernatural works? Therefore, the conclusion follows.

4. The same truth is proved by all the arguments by which the Thomists show in the treatise on the sacraments that the sacraments of the New Law instrumentally and physically cause grace. For if the sacraments, which are separated instruments, physically effect our salvation, all the more will Christ's humanity physically effect it, since through it, as through a conjoined instrument, physically operative power is derived into the sacraments.

5. When we say that Christ's humanity physically produces grace, we understand this of it as existing. Before the incarnation Christ was only the moral cause of the grace of the ancient Fathers. His passion and death, however, are the physical and not only the moral and meritorious cause of our grace, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1, and below, q. 48, a. 5, where he acknowledges a twofold causality in Christ's humanity and passion: one in the manner of merit and impetration, the other in the manner of efficiency. Although Christ's passion does not now exist in itself, since it has passed, it nevertheless remains in a physical effect, namely, in the scars left by it. Hence, just as a deceased father is truly the efficient cause of a posthumous son because he acts through a power left by himself, namely, the seed separated from himself, so Christ's passion is likewise truly the efficient cause of our salvation and sanctification because it remains virtually in his humanity marked by scars. Other objections will be proposed and answered in the treatise on the sacraments, when we discuss the causality of the sacraments of the New Law.

CHAPTER XVI.
On Christ's Impeccability.

1. All agree that Christ's humanity was impeccable on two grounds. First, by reason of beatitude, or the beatific vision, which he possessed from the first instant of his conception. Since this joins the soul to the first rule of right operation, it renders the soul impeccable, as was shown in the treatise on beatitude. Second, because of the perfection and fullness of habitual grace that he received from God at the same moment. For that grace, by reason of its conjunction with the grace of union, and because it is in Christ in a perfect and connatural state, possesses a certain perfection of the grace of heaven, by reason of which it confirms Christ's soul in good and excludes the power of sinning. The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, is whether Christ's humanity is additionally impeccable by the precise force of the hypostatic union, so that, if the Word assumed humanity without beatitude and without any gift of grace besides the substantial grace of union, it could not sin either in the composite sense, that is, while the union with sin was retained, or in the divided sense, that is, by the union being destroyed through sin.

2. I say, first, that Christ's humanity is so impeccable by the force of the hypostatic union that it is repugnant for Christ to sin while such sin is composed with that union. Theologians commonly teach this, except Durandus and the disciples of Scotus.

It is proved, first, from the holy Fathers, who appeal not to the beatific vision or to another accidental gift, but to the hypostatic union alone in order to prove Christ's impeccability. Therefore, they hold that Christ is impeccable by the force of the hypostatic union, apart from any other gifts of beatitude or grace. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from Hilary, *De Trinitate* I, near the middle, where he asserts that Christ could not admit sin while remaining Christ, *because he who is Christ could not lose what it is to be Christ*, that is, the hypostatic union by which he was anointed from the first moment of his conception. Similarly, Anselm says in *Cur Deus Homo* II, c. 10, that Christ could not sin *because he was not only man but also God.* Rupert likewise says in *De voluntate Dei*, c. 11, that Christ's humanity, *not by creation but by assumption, was made such a creature as not only would not sin, but could not sin.* Finally, Tertullian, speaking of Christ's

humanity in *De carne Christi*, adds: *By assuming it, the Word made it his own; and by making it his own, he made it sinless.*

3. Several excellent arguments are also at hand for demonstrating the same truth. The first is this. Through union with the Word the humanity of Christ is infinitely and substantially holy, as we explained above in chap. 9. But it implies a contradiction that an infinite and substantial holiness be combined with sin. Therefore also the hypostatic union.

It is confirmed: Habitual grace is incompossible with mortal sin, even by absolute power, as was shown in the treatise on grace. Therefore, a fortiori, the grace of union. The consequence is evident; for if a participation of the divine nature excludes sin and cannot be combined with it, how much more will the grace of union effect this, which is the very nature of God itself, united to the humanity and communicated to it through the hypostatic union.

4. Second argument. A nature is rendered impeccable precisely from this, that it is immovably joined to the rule of right operation. But the humanity of Christ, precisely through the hypostatic union, is immovably joined to the first rule of right operation, namely to the divine sanctity and wisdom. Therefore precisely by force of such a union it is rendered impeccable.

It is confirmed. The beatific vision renders the humanity of Christ impeccable for this reason, that it joins it to the first rule of right operation, namely to God. But through the hypostatic union it is joined to God in a more perfect manner than through the beatific vision, since the first union is substantial and the other only accidental. Therefore precisely by force of the hypostatic union it is rendered impeccable.

5. The third argument is as follows. Whenever two things are united in the same nature or person, the inferior is subordinated to the superior. Consequently, the superior has the care of ruling the inferior, and the defect of the inferior is imputed to the superior. This is evident in man. Since the will and the sensitive appetite are united in one human person, the sensitive appetite is subjected to the government of the will as its superior, and the will is bound to rule the appetite, so that a defect of the appetite is imputed to the will. But the divine nature is united in the one person of Christ with the human nature and will, and by force of this union the human nature is subordinated to the divine as inferior to superior. Therefore, by reason of the hypostatic union, it belongs in a special manner, as though by a proper office, to the divine nature and will to rule and govern Christ's human nature and will. Hence, if the latter sinned, that sin would be attributed to God. The Fathers of the Sixth Synod intimate this argument in act 8. After asserting

that Christ's soul excited no natural motion in itself except at the direction of the Word hypostatically united to it, they conclude with this testimony of Gregory of Nyssa: *Just as our body is governed, adorned, and ordered by our intellectual and rational soul, so in the Lord Christ his whole human manner of life*, that is, his nature, *being always and in all things moved by the divinity of the same Word, was movable by God.*

6. The fourth argument is as follows. If the assumed humanity could sin while the sin was composed with the hypostatic union, the sinful action would redound upon the divine suppositum itself. For actions belong to supposita not only denominatively, as some say, but also elicitingly or effectively. Although personality is not operative and is not the principle by which the agent exercises causality, it is nevertheless the principle which acts. Hence, in divine matters the proposition "the essence begets" is heretical, whereas "the Father begets" is most true. John the Theologian at the Council of Florence also proves from this principle, with the Council's assent, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Moreover, even granting that actions belong to supposita only denominatively, it at least follows that, if the assumed humanity could sin, the divine suppositum could be denominated sinful, and God could be called a sinner. This offends pious ears and is rejected by the holy Fathers, who establish a difference between the statements "God was crucified and died" and "God sins" or "God is a sinner": the former is admitted in Christ, but not the latter. St. Thomas gives the reason above, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: death and similar things are evils of punishment introduced by God's justice and ordered to his glory, whereas sin is a moral indecency because it is a departure from divine goodness, wisdom, and the other rules.

7. I say, second, that Christ's humanity could not sin by a sin that would destroy the hypostatic union.

This conclusion is evident from what was said in the preceding argument. For if Christ's humanity sinned by a sin destroying the hypostatic union, such a sin would proceed elicitingly from the divine suppositum and would be attributed to it, and consequently God would be denominated as sinning. These are absurd and impossible. It may further be established by explaining four differences between the grace of union and habitual grace, which clearly prove that Christ could commit no sin by which his hypostatic union would be dissolved.

The first difference is that habitual grace does not constitute the suppositum, but accrues to it like other habits. Hence many actions can proceed from the suppositum that do not arise from habitual grace as their formal principle, and among these there may be a mortal sin that expels such

grace. But the grace of union, since it constitutes the suppositum, is the principle which performs all the operations proceeding from Christ's humanity. From this it follows not only that no operation of Christ can be evil and sinful, but also that every action of his has infinite merit and value.

The second difference is that habitual grace does not immovably establish a man in good, whereas the hypostatic union does, because it immovably joins Christ's humanity to the first rule of right operation, namely, God, and in a much more perfect manner than the beatific vision does, since the latter union is accidental and the former substantial.

The third difference is that sanctifying grace, since it is a habit, and we use habits when we will, is subject to the flexibility of free choice. The grace of union is not, since it is not habitual or accidental but substantial.

The fourth difference is that habitual grace, since it is finite holiness and only a diminished participation in the divine nature and holiness, expels sin from the soul but does not remove from it the power to sin. The grace of union, however, since it is supreme and infinite holiness, excludes not only actual sin but also the power to sin. The reason is that holiness, by its very concept, expresses an essential opposition to sin and a distance and remoteness from it. Hence supreme and infinite holiness implies supreme distance and remoteness from sin and supreme opposition to it. But opposition not only to actual sin but also to the power to sin, and remoteness not only from sin but also from a potency ready to sin, are greater than mere opposition to an act of sin and mere remoteness from it. Therefore, supreme holiness is opposed not only to actual sin but also to a potency ready to sin, and removes both from Christ's humanity.

8. From what has been said, you will understand that there are three causes of Christ's holiness and impeccability. The first is the hypostatic union, which supremely and infinitely sanctifies Christ's humanity and excludes from it not only sin but also the power to sin. The second is the beatific vision, which joins Christ's soul to the first rule of right operation and causes in it the beatific love by which it is perfectly sanctified. The third is habitual grace, which, by reason of its conjunction with the grace of union, exists in Christ in a perfect and connatural state and possesses a certain participation in the grace of heaven, by reason of which it confirms Christ's soul in good, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter. Hence Christ is rightly called *the Holy of Holies* in Dan. 9; and in Isa. 6, on account of this threefold title of holiness, the seraphim sing before his throne day and night that sacred trisagion: *Holy, Holy, Holy.*

9. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: God can permit, and has permitted, sin in the will of men and angels, because, although sin is evil,

the permission of sin is good and conduces to God's glory. Therefore, God can likewise, at least by absolute power, permit sin in Christ's will.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. Although it is not intrinsically evil, but good, for God to permit sin in the will of men and angels, it is intrinsically evil for him to permit it in the will of a nature assumed to God's personal being. With respect to other wills, God is related to them as universal cause and provider, ruling them through general providence, to which it belongs to permit some evils and sins for the manifestation of divine justice and mercy. With respect to the will of the assumed nature, however, he is related to it as a particular cause and provider, since he is bound to direct it in a special manner in its operations.

10. You will object, second: The properties of the divine nature were not communicated to Christ's humanity through the hypostatic union. For by force of such a union it was not made omnipotent, eternal, or immense. But impeccability is a property of the divine nature, like immortality and immutability. Therefore, Christ's humanity was not rendered impeccable by force of the hypostatic union.

I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. Impeccability intrinsically and from essential principles is a property of the divine nature, I grant the minor; impeccability extrinsically and by reason of some gratuitous gift accruing from without is a property of the divine nature, I deny the minor and the consequence. Therefore, although Christ's humanity is impeccable, because this impeccability does not belong to it from intrinsic and essential principles, nor flow from it in the manner of a property, but comes from a gift accruing from without and gratuitously communicated by God, namely, from the grace of union, no attribute proper to the divine nature is communicated to it. The divine nature possesses holiness and impeccability from intrinsic and essential principles.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

11. From what has been said, it follows, first, that there neither was nor could have been in Christ the tinder of sin, or a disordered inclination of the sensitive appetite toward sensible goods contrary to the rule of reason. For Christ possessed grace and the moral virtues in the most perfect degree. It is proper to virtue to subject the appetite to reason, and proper to the most perfect virtue to subject it so perfectly that it cannot rise against reason. Moreover, Christ's humanity is infinitely holy by force of the grace of union. But not only disordered movements of the appetite inclining toward sin, but

also a propensity and inclination of the sensitive appetite toward them, are repugnant to infinite holiness, for supreme holiness is supremely distant from sin. It is a greater distance from sin not only to be opposed to sin itself, but also to what inclines toward sin. Therefore, there neither was nor could have been in Christ a disordered inclination of the sensitive appetite toward sensible goods contrary to reason, in which the tinder of sin consists.

12. It follows, second, that there could not have been a vicious habit in Christ, both because vicious habits are incompatible with moral virtues in the heroic degree, such as Christ's virtues were, and because the infinite holiness of the divine suppositum excludes every propensity to sin, which a vicious habit brings with it.

13. It follows, third, that there could not have been venial sin in Christ. Although such sin is not opposed to habitual grace, it is opposed to the grace of union, because habitual grace is only a certain diminished and imperfect participation in the divine nature and holiness, whereas the grace of union is a communication of the whole divine holiness. Hence the holy Fathers cited above in Chapter IX assert that Christ's humanity was anointed through the grace of union with the ointment of the whole divinity. Therefore, although venial sin can exist in the just, it cannot exist in Christ.

14. It follows, fourth, that, even if Christ's body had not been conceived from the Virgin and formed by the Holy Spirit, but had drawn its origin from Adam through seminal propagation, his soul nevertheless would neither have contracted nor have been able to contract original sin at the instant of its union with the body. For at that instant there would have been in Christ's soul a form incompatible with original sin, namely, the substantial grace of union, which is no less opposed to original sin than to actual and habitual sin.

15. It follows, fifth, that every moral imperfection, and consequently every transgression or omission of any divine counsel, is repugnant to Christ. This is so both because such imperfection and omission are repugnant to Christ's holiness, than which no greater can exist, and because this defect would be attributed to the divine suppositum as its particular cause and would be imputed to the divine nature by reason of the obligation it has to govern Christ's will, which is altogether repugnant.

CHAPTER XVII.
The Harmony of Christ's Freedom with His Impeccability.

1. It is certain that, notwithstanding his impeccability, Christ was free in observing the precepts imposed upon him by the Father, and especially in undergoing death for the salvation of the human race. Christ himself testifies to this in John 10: *I lay down my life and take it up again. No one takes my life from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment I received from my Father.* Here the Savior openly joins the commandment of death with his free choice of it, when he asserts that in accepting it he retained the power of laying down his life of himself, a power in which no one doubts freedom to consist. Hence Augustine says in *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus* 119, near the end: *Who sleeps when he wills, as Jesus died when he willed? Who lays aside a garment when he wills, as he stripped himself of the flesh when he willed? Who departs when he wills, as he died when he willed?*

Reason also supports this. First, a precept supposes freedom in the one upon whom it is imposed, for it would be futile to command us to breathe or to love beatitude. Second, by dying out of obedience and fulfilling the other precepts Christ merited before the Father, as will be evident from what is said in the following chapter. But merit supposes freedom, upon which it rests as its foundation. Therefore, Christ was free in observing the precepts imposed upon him by the Father. Yet it is difficult to explain how his impeccability can be preserved and joined with such freedom. For if he was free in observing the Father's precepts, he could fail to execute them and consequently could sin, and thus was not impeccable. But if he could not transgress them, he was not free. Therefore, one of these two seems to have to be denied: either that Christ was free or that he was impeccable.

2. In order to resolve this knot and reconcile Christ's freedom with his impeccability, it is remarkable into how many opinions the more recent theologians are divided. First, some deny that Christ received from the Father a precept of dying in the strict sense, but only broadly and improperly, insofar as it signifies God's will decreeing that he would die for the salvation of men. But this appears openly repugnant to Sacred Scripture. For it is said in John 10: *This commandment I received from my Father*; in Chapter 12: *The Father who sent me has himself given me a commandment*; in Chapter 14: *As the Father gave me commandment, so I do*; and in Chapter 15: *If*

you keep my commandments, as I also have kept my Father's commandments. Here the precepts Christ received from the Father are called precepts in the same manner as those the apostles received from him.

I add that, according to Scripture, Christ died out of obedience to the Father, as is evident from Phil. 2: *He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death*. Hence Bernard says in *Sermo ad milites Templi*, c. 13, that *he held obedience in such esteem that he preferred to lose life itself rather than obedience, becoming obedient unto death*. But the formal object of obedience is a superior's precept taken strictly, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 104, a. 2. Therefore, Christ received from the Father a precept, strictly so called, of dying for the salvation of the human race.

3. Others think that, before the precept of dying was imposed upon Christ, he asked that such a precept be given to him, or it was proposed to him by the Father under the condition that he could either refuse or accept it. But this has no foundation in Scripture or the holy Fathers. Rather, we learn from Sacred Scripture that Christ, when entering the world, said to his Father: *My God, I have willed it, and your law is in the midst of my heart.* Therefore, in the first instant of conception the precept of dying was made known to him; it was not requested by him.

I add that this mode of speaking principally reduces the work of our salvation and redemption, obtained through Christ's death, to Christ's human will rather than to the divine will, and either altogether destroys or at least greatly diminishes the merit of Christ's obedience. For there is scarcely any obedience in a subject to whom nothing is commanded until the superior has first investigated and awaited his will. Hence Bernard excellently says in *Sermo de tribus ordinibus Ecclesiae*: W*hoever openly or secretly contrives that his spiritual father enjoin upon him what he already wills deceives himself if he should flatter himself as though he were acting from obedience. In that matter he does not obey the prelate; rather, the prelate obeys him.*

4. Others teach with Cardinal de Lugo that Christ freely fulfilled the precept of dying because this precept was proposed to him by the Father under the condition that he could either request or not request a dispensation from it. But besides the fact that this manner of speaking cannot reconcile Christ's freedom with his impeccability in the observance of precepts belonging to the law of nature, such as the precept of loving God above all things, since no dispensation can fall upon such precepts, it can be refuted in four ways.

First, if Christ could have avoided death and failed to fulfill the precept of dying imposed upon him by the Father by asking a dispensation from it,

Christ's prayer and petition, *Father, if it is possible, let this chalice pass from me*, would have been inept. For he could have removed this chalice from himself and been exempted from death by asking the Father for a dispensation from such a precept, which the Father would have been prepared to grant him.

Second, this opinion no less destroys the certainty of Christ's obedience than the preceding one. A superior's precept that is so left to the inferior's discretion that he can obtain a dispensation at will is an idol of a precept and a chimera of a command.

Third, since through beatific knowledge Christ saw the efficacious and absolute decree by which God had determined that he would die for the salvation of the human race, it is difficult to understand how he could ask a dispensation from the Father's precept of undergoing death. Just as the constancy of the divine will is immovable, so the conformity of Christ's human will with the divine will is most constant.

Fourth, even granting that Christ could absolutely have asked the Father for a dispensation from such a precept, since it was better and more perfect not to ask it, he was under a counsel not to ask it. But not only could Christ not fail to fulfill the precepts; it was also repugnant for him not to embrace God's counsels, as we showed in the preceding chapter. Therefore, Cardinal de Lugo's manner of speaking is no less useless than the preceding one for reconciling Christ's freedom with his impeccability.

5. Finally, others have devised another way of reconciling Christ's freedom with his impeccability in undergoing death. They say that Christ freely fulfilled the precept of undergoing death because, although God commanded death with respect to its substance, he did not command its circumstances, such as its time, place, the intention of the act, and similar things, and consequently Christ could exercise freedom concerning these. Thus commonly teach Valencia, Vazquez, Lessius, Becanus, and other more recent authors.

But this manner of reconciling Christ's freedom with his impeccability also displeases our Thomists and is rejected by them. First, because it is false that Christ's death was commanded only as regards its substance and not as regards its circumstances. Christ died from the most perfect obedience, as is evident from what was said above. But obedience that supposes the work to be commanded as regards both its substance and all its circumstances is more perfect than obedience that supposes only the substance of the work to be commanded. Therefore, the precept of dying imposed upon Christ by the Father extended not only to the substance of death but also to all its circumstances.

This is gathered from Scripture, at least as regards the circumstance of time. Christ said in Luke 12: *I have a baptism with which I must be baptized, and how I am constrained until it is accomplished.* By these words Christ testifies that he was distressed by the delay or postponement of his death. But if its time had not been determined by the Father, but left to Christ's will, there would have been no reason for Christ to be thus distressed by the delay of his death, since its time would have depended upon his own choice and determination. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

6. Second, because from this opinion it follows that Christ did not merit precisely from the fact that he died, but only from the fact that he died in such a manner, at such a time, in such a place, and from this or that motive or affection. This appears absurd and repugnant to Scripture, which attributes the reward of the redemption of men and the exaltation of Christ's name not to circumstances but to the very substance of his death. This is evident from Isa. 53: *If he lays down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed*, and from Phil. 2: *He became obedient unto death, for which reason God exalted him.*

The consequence is proved. Christ's death is meritorious insofar as it is free, since freedom is the foundation of merit. But according to the doctrine of the adversaries, Christ's death was not free as regards its substance, but only as regards its circumstances. Therefore, it was not meritorious as regards its substance, but only by reason of its circumstances. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Christ's death was commanded by God as regards its substance, as the adversaries admit, and as is evident from the fact that Christ died from obedience and preferred to lose life rather than obedience, as Bernard says in the passage cited above. Therefore, it was not free as regards its substance, since according to the adversaries precept and freedom cannot fall upon the same aspect. For this reason they assert that the circumstances of Christ's death and passion were not commanded to him, but left to his choice and determination.

This is confirmed. A will necessitated, for example, to love God, and free only to love him from this or that motive, would not properly be said to merit because it loved God, but because it loved him from this or that motive. Therefore, if Christ's will, by reason of the Father's precept, was necessitated through his impeccability to accept death, and remained free only to accept it from this or that motive, it is evident that Christ did not merit precisely because he accepted death, but because he accepted it from this or that motive and under this or that circumstance.

7. This manner of reconciling Christ's freedom with his impeccability can further be refuted by destroying the adversaries' principal foundation.

Their principal reason for asserting that the precept of dying imposed upon Christ extended only to the substance of death and not to its circumstances is that, if both the substance and circumstances of Christ's death fell under the precept, it would in no way be free and consequently would not be meritorious. But this argument is worthless. Therefore, the principal foundation of the contrary opinion collapses.

The minor is proved, first, because it is repugnant that a precept should destroy the freedom of the act commanded. Therefore, even if the precept of dying imposed upon Christ by the Father prescribed all the circumstances of death, it nevertheless did not take away his freedom in accepting death. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. A precept cannot destroy its own proper matter, for otherwise it would destroy itself, which is impossible. But the proper matter of a positive precept is a free act. Therefore, it is repugnant that a precept should destroy the freedom of the act commanded. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved, first, because the matter of a precept is the object of obedience, and obedience can incline only toward free acts. Second, necessary acts, such as the motion of the heart, natural digestion, and love of beatitude in general, are not matter for a precept because they are not subject to our power and freedom. Therefore, the proper matter of a precept is a free act.

Second, the principal minor premise, which asserts that the adversaries' fundamental argument is worthless, may be proved as follows. All the circumstances of Christ's death were predefined and preordained by God, and yet, notwithstanding this, his death was free and meritorious. Therefore, likewise, notwithstanding a precept extending both to the substance of Christ's death and to all its circumstances, it could be free and meritorious. The consequence is evident from parity of reasoning. Since Christ through beatific knowledge beheld the decree of the divine will, it was no less repugnant for him not to will conformity to the predefinition of God's will than to his precept. Hence, if notwithstanding such predefinition he remained free in accepting death, his death could likewise be free and meritorious notwithstanding a precept extending to both the substance of death and all its circumstances.

The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is proved from Scripture, which asserts in various places that the circumstances of Christ's death and passion were predefined by God. The circumstance of time is indicated in John 13: *Jesus, knowing that his hour had come*, and in Chapter 17: *Father, the hour has come; glorify your Son.* Explaining these words in *In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus* 104, Augustine says that *this hour came not through the compulsion of fate, but rather through God's ordination.* Similarly, in Acts 4 the

circumstance of Christ's death that Herod and Pilate should meet in Jerusalem is said to have been decreed by God: *There assembled in this city against your servant Jesus, whom you anointed, Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do what your hand and counsel decreed should be done.* Likewise, Christ himself said in Luke 22: *The Son of Man goes as it has been determined.* Hence Pope Leo says in *Sermo 7 de Passione Domini*: *What had been mercifully disposed and immutably predetermined before the eternal ages could not be disturbed.*

Reason also supports this. God possessed most perfect providence concerning the actions and passions of Christ the Lord, since they were of infinite value and the salvation of the world and the restoration of divine honor depended upon them. But since God's providence extends to everything to which his causality extends, it attains things not only as regards their substance but also as regards all their circumstances, formalities, and modes. Therefore, divine providence predefined Christ's death and passion not only as regards their substance but also as regards all their circumstances.

8. You will object: The precepts imposed upon men attain only the substance of our acts, not their intention, duration, and other circumstances, which are left to the determination and freedom of the human will. Therefore, the same is true of the precepts imposed upon Christ.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. Since our wills are not so prompt to execute a superior's will, the precepts imposed upon us must be gentle and consequently must not oblige us as regards all circumstances. But since Christ's will was most prompt to obey the Father in all things, in order that his merit might be greater, he had to be obliged to a most perfect act of obedience, and consequently to one extending not only to the substance but also to all the circumstances of his passion and death.

9. Having therefore set aside and rejected those four opinions and modes of reconciling Christ's freedom with his impeccability, I judge that the true and legitimate mode of reconciling and composing those extremes, which appear to conflict with each other, is no different from that by which the Thomists reconcile human freedom with the efficacy of the divine decrees and aids. Since the precept of dying imposed upon Christ proceeded from the efficacious and absolute decree of the divine will and was its execution, one must reason about that precept in the same manner as about the decree itself.

Therefore, just as God's efficacious decree so determines free causes to act that it attains not only the substance but also the mode of their works, and effects not only that they act but also that they act freely, that is, with the power of acting otherwise, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8, and as we explained at length in the treatise on God's will, so likewise the precept of dying imposed upon Christ morally determined him with respect to the substance and mode of the work, namely, that he should die in the manner the Father willed, that is, freely and with the power not to die. Hence Christ's death had infallibly to follow from such a precept because he was impeccable, but not necessarily, because he was free and under such a precept retained the power not to die. This is especially so because, as we said above, since the matter of a precept is a free act, it is repugnant that a precept should destroy the freedom of the act commanded.

A precept nevertheless differs from a decree and the motion executing it in this: the latter, since it is intrinsic to man and of infinite efficacy, not only does not violate the freedom of the human will but also causes it, applying man's will under the objective indifference of the judgment so that, under such indifference, it may freely determine itself. A precept, however, since it is purely extrinsic to the will, does not inwardly incline it, but only directs it and moves it morally to perform the commanded act freely and with the power of acting otherwise.

10. This mode of reconciling Christ's freedom with his impeccability has a foundation in Sacred Scripture. In John 10 Christ said: *I lay down my life that I may take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This commandment I received from my Father.* All interpreters understand by this power of laying down his life the freedom of indifference that Christ had in dying, for one who has something in his power does it in such a way that he can refrain from doing it. When Christ adds, *This commandment I received from my Father*, he sufficiently indicates that by force of that very precept he possessed this power and indifference, because the Father, in commanding death to him, willed him to die freely, or with the power not to die. Thus Christ neither acted nor could act against the Father's will by having the power not to die, since this itself was rather in accordance with the Father's will. Therefore, notwithstanding the precept of dying imposed upon him by the Father, Christ was simultaneously free and impeccable.

11. You will object, first: Supposing the precept of dying imposed upon him by the Father, Christ could not refrain from dying. Therefore, he died not freely but necessarily.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. Christ could not refrain from dying if the expression "not to die" is taken privatively, insofar as it signifies the absence of death precisely as evil and prohibited, I grant the antecedent. If it is taken purely negatively, insofar as it signifies the absence of death considered in itself and precisely, I deny the antecedent and the consequence.

12. You will insist: To be able not to die while the precept remains is to be able not to obey. But Christ could not fail to obey the Father; otherwise he could have sinned. Therefore, while the precept of dying remained, Christ could not refrain from dying.

I answer, first, by distinguishing the antecedent. To be able not to die while the precept remains is to be able not to obey, if "not to die" is taken privatively, I grant the antecedent. If it is taken purely negatively and precisively, I deny the antecedent and the consequence.

13. Second, one may answer with Alvarez that, just as "not to die" can be used negatively or privatively, so "not to obey" can be taken either for the simple negation and absence of obedience, or for its privation, that is, for the absence of the observance of a precept that ought to be present. If taken in the first manner, Christ could fail to obey, because the simple absence and negation of obedience, considered precisely in itself, is not a sin. He could not do so if the expression is used in the second manner, because under this aspect it is sin. Hence some say that Christ could indeed "not obey," but could not "disobey," because "not obeying" signifies a simple absence of obedience, whereas "disobeying" implies transgression of a precept and is the sin of disobedience.

14. You will press: Actually not to obey is actually to sin. Therefore, to be able not to obey is to be able to sin. Consequently, if Christ could fail to obey, he could sin.

I deny the consequence, for the inference from act to potency is invalid here. The negation of obedience as existing is not a pure negation but a moral privation, and is posited and composed with the precept, because as existing it cannot prescind from that accident whose conjunction with the precept is the basis of moral privation. But if it is considered as merely possible, it is a pure negation and prescinds from the precept, because potency can prescind from things accidentally conjoined with an act or its negation and tend toward them as considered in themselves according to their essentials.

Hence this reasoning is invalid: *Actually not to obey is actually to sin. Christ could fail to obey. Therefore, he could sin.* For the argument proceeds from one proposition in the composite sense and another in the divided sense to a

third in the composite sense, and the signification is changed. Or it proceeds from the unrestricted to the restricted. From the fact that Christ could posit a negation of obedience under the aspect of negation, it infers that he could posit it under the concept of privation, in which, as such, the sin of disobedience consists. Similarly, this reasoning is invalid: *Actually not to posit an act foreknown by God is actually to falsify God's knowledge. But a man can fail to posit an act foreknown by God. Therefore, he can falsify God's knowledge.* A similar defect is committed in it, and there is likewise a passage from the composite to the divided sense.

15. You will object, second: Christ could not divide the negation of death from the precept. Therefore, he could not refrain from dying even in the divided sense, and consequently he did not die freely, since freedom of an act requires in the agent a power for the opposite, at least in the divided sense. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. To be able to divide one thing from another is to be able to posit one and remove the other. But Christ could not remove the precept from himself. Therefore, neither could he divide the negation of death from the precept.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. I grant it concerning divisibility taken positively, and deny it concerning purely precisive divisibility. Although a power to remove the precept is required for the former, it is not required for the latter. For the latter it suffices to have a power for the negation of death considered in itself, according to which it prescinds from the precept. Hence, although Christ could not remove the precept from himself, nevertheless, because while the precept remained he possessed a power for the negation of death considered in itself, he could refrain from dying in the divided sense. For "division" here signifies not a positive division of the negation from the precept, but only a precisive division.

16. You will object, third: Antecedent necessity removes freedom, as theologians commonly teach with Anselm. But the necessity of dying arising in Christ from the precept was antecedent. Therefore, it destroyed his freedom. The minor is proved. A necessity arising from something that belongs on the side of first act is antecedent. But the precept as known belongs on the side of first act. Therefore, the necessity of dying arising in Christ from the precept was antecedent.

This is confirmed. Only the necessity that follows our freedom is consequent necessity, as Anselm teaches. But the necessity of dying arising in Christ from the precept does not follow his freedom, but precedes it. Therefore, it is not consequent but antecedent necessity.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof I say that, when something belonging on the side of first act in no way presupposes or connotes freedom, it induces antecedent necessity. It is otherwise if it presupposes freedom formally or virtually, that is, equivalently. The precept of dying in Christ connotes freedom because a precept concerns only a free act as such, as we showed above. It also contains freedom virtually or equivalently because it is derived from God's efficacious decree, in which, as in the first free principle and the first root of all created freedom, the freedom of human acts is contained eminently or virtually as in its cause, no less, and indeed in a more perfect manner, than in our will. For, as Augustine says, *God has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own wills*, as we explained more fully in the treatise on God's will when explaining the harmony of our freedom with the efficacy of the divine decrees.

17. From this the response to the confirmation is evident. In order for something to induce only consequent necessity, it suffices that it follow freedom either formally or equivalently; it is not necessary that it follow it formally. But the necessity of dying arising in Christ from the precept equivalently follows freedom for the two reasons we assigned. Hence it is not antecedent but consequent necessity.

CHAPTER XVIII.
On Christ's Merit.

Having explained Christ's freedom, it follows that we should discuss his merit, which rests upon freedom as its foundation, and briefly declare whether, when, and what Christ merited for himself, men, and angels, and by which acts he merited.

§ 1.
Whether and When Christ Merited.

1. It is certain by faith that Christ truly and properly merited. This is openly gathered from the various passages of Scripture cited below, in which the redemption of the human race and Christ's exaltation are attributed to his passion, humility, and obedience as their meritorious cause. It is also evident from the fact that Christ possessed all the conditions required for merit. He enjoyed perfect freedom, as was shown in the preceding chapter. His

humanity was pleasing to God both through the grace of union and through habitual grace. All his actions were good in their object and circumstances, as he himself testifies in John 8: *I always do the things pleasing to him.* Through an act of charity he referred all his works to God's glory, according to John 8: *I do not seek my own glory, but the glory of him who sent me.* There was also the Father's promise to reward his actions and sufferings, as is evident from Isa. 53: *If he lays down his life for sin, he shall see a long-lived seed. Because his soul labored, he shall see and be satisfied.* Finally, Christ was a wayfarer because he lacked the beatitude of the body. Hence it is said of him in Jer. 14: *You will be as a settler in the land and as a wayfarer turning aside to lodge.*

2. It is also certain that Christ merited in the first instant of his conception. First, because in that instant he offered himself to the Father through an act of charity as a victim for the salvation and redemption of the human race, as the Apostle indicates in Heb. 10: *Entering the world he said, "You did not will sacrifice and offering; then I said, 'Behold, I come,'" and in this will we have been sanctified.* Second, what is granted to the angels must not be denied to Christ. But in the first instant of their creation the angels merited through the act of charity by which they freely turned themselves toward God, as was shown in the treatise on the angels. Therefore, Christ did so as well, especially since in that instant he possessed the use of reason and infused knowledge independent of phantasms, which could regulate his merit.

3. It is also held as certain by almost all that Christ did not merit any further after death, because he was then no longer in the state of the way, which according to the ordinary law is required for merit. Christ himself indicates that he was not exempt from this law in John 6: *I must work the works of him who sent me while it is day. The night comes when no one can work.* Here "day" means the time of life, while "night" means the time of death, as Jerome, Chrysostom, Augustine, and Origen interpret in Ps. 36, whose words we transcribed in the last chapter, § 1, of the treatise on grace.

4. Some nevertheless think that Christ merited in the instant of his death, because, they say, death was then voluntary to him in its cause, namely, through the free act of his will by which he subjected himself to the causes of death; and what is voluntary in its cause suffices for merit and demerit, as is taught in the treatise on sins. But this opinion is false, because in that instant Christ's soul was not united to his body. Therefore, in that instant Christ was not in the state of the way and consequently was not capable of merit. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from the common opinion of philosophers, who teach that living beings are defined by the first instant of their non-being. Therefore, in the instant of

Christ's death it was true to say: now for the first time Christ does not exist as a man living a mortal life.

From this the response to the foundation of the contrary opinion is evident. Although what is voluntary in its cause suffices for merit when all the conditions required for meriting are present, it does not suffice when some condition is absent. But in the instant of Christ's death a condition necessary for meriting was absent, namely, the state of the way.

5. From this you will understand that the wound inflicted upon Christ's side after his death was not meritorious, because Christ was then no longer in the state of meriting, since his soul was separated from his body. It was nevertheless very salutary for us, as the holy Fathers commonly teach, especially Ambrose in *Sermo 3 in Psalmum 118*, where he asserts that, just as in the vineyards of Engaddi there is a tree that emits ointment or balsam if someone pierces it, *so Christ, pierced upon the cross, poured forth balsam through the opening of the wound and diffused the fragrance of the remission of sins and redemption.*

§ 2.
What Christ Merited or Could Have Merited for Himself.

6. I say, first, that Christ merited the glory of his body, the exaltation of his name, and the other extrinsic goods he received after his passion. This is against Calvin, *Institutio Christianae Religionis* II, c. 17, who affirms that Christ merited nothing for himself, but only for us. The conclusion is nevertheless evidently gathered from several testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers. It is said in Luke 24: *Was it not necessary for Christ to suffer and so enter into his glory?* This refers to the glory of his body, since he possessed the glory of his soul from the first moment of conception. Hence Tertullian excellently says in *De corona militis*: *Christ tasted honeycombs after gall, and was not greeted as the King of glory in heaven before he had been proscribed upon the cross as the King of the Jews.*

7. The Apostle teaches the same truth in Phil. 2, where, speaking of Christ, he says: *He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, for which reason God exalted him.* And in Heb. 2: *We see Jesus crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death.* By these words he commends the reward of Christ's humanity and passion, by which Christ merited for himself his resurrection, the manifestation of his divinity, and the exaltation of his name.

From this Bernard infers in Sermo 3 de Ascensione that, although God is most perfect by his nature and nothing can be added to him by way of increase or withdrawn from him by way of diminution, he nevertheless found through the incarnation a mode by which he could advance: Christ, he says, since by the nature of his divinity he had no way to grow, ascend, or advance, discovered by descending how he might grow: by coming to be incarnate, to suffer, and to die, lest we die eternally; for which reason God exalted him. Pliny says similar things of Trajan in his panegyric: One for whom nothing remains to increase his eminence can grow in one way alone: by lowering himself, secure in his greatness.

8. Reason also supports this. As St. Thomas argues here, q. 19, a. 3, to possess something through merit is more dignified and perfect than to possess it without merit, other things being equal, that is, provided no loss of some greater dignity follows. But Christ could possess the glory of his body and the exaltation of his name through merit, and no loss of any greater dignity follows from this. Therefore, Christ merited both. Hence it is said in Rev. 5: *Worthy is the Lamb who was slain to receive power and divinity.* These words openly declare that Christ's death and passion were the meritorious cause of his resurrection, in which Christ is said to have received divinity because in it the whole humanity was reunited to the Word, and there occurred a kind of restoration of the hypostatic union.

9. You will object: What is due and naturally results in the manner of a property does not fall under merit. But the glory of the body was due to Christ by reason of the glory of the soul and the hypostatic union, and flowed connaturally from the beatitude of the soul. Therefore, Christ did not merit it.

I answer that the major premise is true when the emanation or result of what is connaturally due and possesses the character of a property is not suspended. It is otherwise if such result is impeded, as happened in the present case. For in Christ the glory of the body was suspended so that there might be room for him to suffer as Redeemer.

10. I say, second, that Christ did not merit for himself habitual grace or the essential glory of the soul.

The first part is proved as follows. The meritorious acts Christ elicited in the first instant of conception proceeded from habitual grace as the principle by which he acted. Therefore, since the principle of merit does not fall under merit, he did not merit habitual grace through such acts. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Christ's soul elicited those meritorious acts in a connatural manner, since we must judge of Christ's acts in conformity with their nature unless the contrary is revealed

or some unfitting consequence follows. But for those acts to be connaturally elicited, they had to proceed from habitual grace as the principle by which, as we showed above in Chapter X. Therefore, the meritorious acts Christ elicited in the first instant of conception proceeded from habitual grace. Hence, although they disposed him for that grace, because, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 34, a. 3, Christ in the first instant of his conception was sanctified through his own act and disposition, which is the mode of sanctification of adults and is more perfect than the mode of sanctification of infants, they nevertheless did not merit it.

The second part, concerning essential glory, is shown as follows. Since Christ's merit could not be regulated through faith, which was not in him, it had to be regulated through beatific knowledge or through infused knowledge consequent upon it. Therefore, every merit of Christ presupposed beatific or infused knowledge as its rule. Consequently, since the principle of merit does not fall under merit, Christ merited neither beatific knowledge, which is the beatific vision itself, nor infused knowledge consequent upon it, but received both from God in the first moment of conception by the title of connaturality.

11. I say, third, that by God's absolute power Christ could have merited the habitual grace and beatitude of soul that he possessed from the beginning of his conception. Several of our Thomists teach this, followed by Master Godoy, the Bishop of Osma, and Master Cipullus. Indeed, the first says that it is the common opinion among theologians against Henry. Nevertheless, a certain younger Thomist in his *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* boldly asserts that it is contrary to St. Thomas here, q. 19, a. 3, although St. Thomas there says only that Christ *merited neither grace, nor glory, nor beatitude, nor divinity*, and says not a word about merit possible by absolute power, which alone is the subject of our conclusion.

The conclusion may be proved as follows. That Christ should merit habitual grace and the beatitude of soul possessed from the beginning of conception is repugnant neither to the general nature of merit and reward nor to the special nature of Christ's merit and reward. Therefore, by absolute power Christ could merit them. The consequence is evident. The antecedent as regards its first part is shown as follows. It does not belong to merit as such that it precede the reward in time; it suffices that it precede it in the order of nature. This is evident in an increase of grace given as the reward of more intense acts of a habit, which exists simultaneously in time with the reward. The reason is that merit does not consist in a successive motion, but in an instantaneous action. Although in successive actions a subject cannot both be at the term and be moved toward the term, it can in

instantaneous actions, for when the way is instantaneous it is simultaneous with its term. Theologians agree that the final disposition for grace is in some way a cause and way to grace, and nevertheless is infused simultaneously in time with it. That this is not repugnant to the special nature of Christ's merit and reward will be evident from the solution of the arguments proposed to the contrary by that more recent Thomist.

12. He objects, first: Although priority of time between merit and reward is not always required, priority of causality and nature is nevertheless necessarily required. But Christ's merit could not precede grace and glory in nature and causality, because grace and glory are properties of the hypostatic union, either resulting naturally from it or at least due to it by the title of connaturality. Hence, just as the hypostatic union precedes Christ's meritorious actions in nature, and consequently cannot fall under their merit, neither can the grace and glory possessed from the beginning of conception.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. Christ's merit could precede in nature and causality the grace and glory possessed from the beginning of conception. First, because by absolute power Christ, through the grace of union with actual grace alone, or a transient aid, could in the first instant of conception elicit an action meritorious of habitual grace and beatitude, as we showed above in Chapter X. Second, even if that meritorious action proceeded from habitual grace as the principle by which, this would not prevent it from preceding that grace in nature and causality. This is evident in the final disposition for justifying grace, which proceeds from that grace and nevertheless precedes it in the order of nature and causality, as we showed in the treatise on grace, c. 14, § 6.

Hence, by absolute power, Christ could merit by condign merit the grace and glory possessed from the beginning of conception. Nor is it an obstacle that they are due to the hypostatic union by the title of connaturality, whereas the union neither falls nor can fall under merit, even by God's extraordinary power. For the glory of the body follows the glory of the soul no less than the glory of the soul follows the grace of union, and yet Christ in fact merited the beatitude of the body, although he did not merit the beatitude of the soul.

13. He objects, second: Merit presupposes an act of hope for obtaining the reward. But it is contradictory for there to be in Christ an act of hope concerning the glory he possessed from the beginning of conception, since hope for glory is incompatible with actual possession, according to the Apostle: *What a man sees, why does he hope for it?* Therefore, it is

contradictory that Christ merited the glory he possessed in the first instant of conception.

I answer that, although according to God's ordinary law merit of beatitude does not exist without hope of attaining it, it cannot be shown that this is impossible by absolute power. Similarly, according to the ordinary law, merit of essential beatitude does not exist without an act of faith, and yet by absolute power it can exist without such an act. Likewise, according to the ordinary law, merit of the beatitude of the body is not found without an act of hope, yet it existed in Christ without such an act, as was shown in the treatise on beatitude.

14. He objects, third: Since the act of charity by which Christ merited could not be regulated through faith, which was not in him, it had to be regulated either by beatific knowledge or by infused knowledge. But it is contradictory for an act regulated by the beatific vision to merit that vision, because the vision is prior to the act and has the character of a principle of merit, which cannot fall under merit. If it is said that the act was regulated by infused knowledge, the same difficulty returns, because this knowledge in Christ presupposes the vision to which it is subordinated.

I answer that the act of charity by which Christ merited was regulated through infused knowledge. To the proof to the contrary, I say that, although such knowledge is by its nature posterior to beatific vision and dependent upon it, this dependence is not essential. Consequently, it involves no contradiction that such knowledge should, by absolute power, be infused into Christ prior in nature to the light of glory and the beatific vision. Thus an act of love in Christ could be regulated by a cognition of infused knowledge preexisting in this way, by absolute power, before the vision. Since in such a case the act, although coexisting with the vision, would nevertheless depend upon it neither immediately nor mediately, it could merit the vision without the principle of merit falling under merit.

15. He objects, fourth: St. Thomas says in the place cited above that Christ *merited neither grace, nor glory, nor the beatitude of the soul, nor divinity.* Here he places all these on the same footing, asserting that, just as Christ's divinity and hypostatic union could not fall under his merit, neither could the grace and glory conferred in the same instant in the manner of nature.

I answer that St. Thomas there places all these on the same footing with respect to actual merit, which in fact existed in Christ, for Christ in fact merited none of them. He does not place them on the same footing with respect to merit possible to him by absolute power. Hence it is false when that author says that St. Thomas there asserts that, just as Christ's divinity and hypostatic union could not fall under his merit, neither could grace and

glory. The Holy Doctor says not a word there about possible merit, but treats only of actual merit.

§ 3.
What Christ Merited for Men and Angels.

16. I say, first, that Christ merited for men glory, habitual grace, all aids and supernatural gifts, and finally all the effects of our predestination.

The conclusion is certain by faith, for it is gathered from the Apostle's words in Eph. 1: *He blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in heavenly things.* By these words he openly teaches that God conferred every spiritual blessing upon us through Christ, or through Christ's merits. But glory, habitual grace, and supernatural aids are spiritual blessings. Therefore, they are conferred upon us through Christ's merits.

17. The same truth is taught by the Council of Trent, session 6, c. 16: *Christ Jesus, as the head into the members and as the vine into the branches, continually pours power into the justified*, and so forth. By these words Christ, as regards the supernatural influx he has upon us, is compared to a head and a vine. But a branch possesses nothing except in dependence upon the vine, and the members of the human body depend in all their movements and vital operations upon the direction and influx of the head. Therefore, likewise, there is nothing supernatural in us except in dependence upon Christ's merits and influx.

18. Reason also supports this. It belongs to a perfect Savior and Redeemer to confer upon us everything necessary for justification and salvation, and to merit whatever Adam demerited for us. But glory, habitual grace, aids, and supernatural gifts are necessary to us for justification and salvation, and Adam merited, or rather demerited, their loss through his sin. Therefore, they are conferred upon us through Christ's merits, so that where sin abounded, grace might abound all the more.

I add that grace was in Christ as in a universal principle within the genus of these blessings of grace. But the power of the first and universal principle in any genus extends universally to all the effects of that genus, as is evident in the sun, whose power extends to all generations of inferior things because it is the universal cause of generation. Therefore, Christ's merit and capital grace extend to every grace, whether actual or habitual, and to all supernatural goods and gifts. Hence Bernard says in *Sermo 13 in Cantica*: *Whatever wisdom and whatever virtue you trust that you possess, attribute it to Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.* Therefore, just as there is no

accident that does not derive its origin from substance, so there is no accidental grace in men that does not derive its origin from Christ's substantial grace, according to John 1: *Of his fullness we have all received.*

19. You will object, first: Only those things Adam lost through sin are conferred upon us through Christ's merits. But Adam did not lose faith or hope through sin, since these virtues are lost only through acts of unbelief and despair, which Adam did not elicit in sinning. Therefore, Christ's merit does not extend to acts of faith and hope or to the aids necessary for eliciting them.

I answer that Adam, by sinning, did not indeed lose faith or hope for himself, for the reason intimated in the objection, but he lost them for us, as he lost the other gifts of grace that he would have transmitted to us if he had not sinned.

20. You will object, second: It is contradictory that Christ merited the grace conferred upon the ancient Fathers who preceded the incarnation, for merit, since it is the cause of the reward and the way to it, must exist first. Therefore, Christ did not merit all grace for men.

I answer by denying the antecedent. It is not necessarily required that merit exist prior to the reward in execution; it suffices that it preexist in the foreknowledge of the one rewarding. The reason is that merit is not a physical but a moral cause of the reward. For a moral cause to move, it suffices that it exist in the foreknowledge and intention of another. Hence, for Christ to be called the meritorious cause of the grace conferred upon the ancient Fathers, it suffices that God eternally foresaw his merits, which would exist in time, and, moved and prompted in view of them, conferred grace upon the ancient Fathers and others who were justified before the incarnation and Christ's coming.

21. I say, second, that Christ did not merit essential grace and glory for the angels, but only certain illuminations and joys, or accidental rewards. Thus St. Thomas teaches in *De veritate*, q. 29, a. 7, ad 5, and below, q. 59, a. 7, where he denies that the angels are subject to Christ's judgment as regards essential reward. But if they had attained it through his merits, it would undoubtedly belong to Christ to judge the merit of the angels and the essential reward corresponding to it at the last judgment. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

The conclusion is proved, first, from the doctrine of Scripture and the holy Fathers. Nowhere in Scripture or the Fathers is it read that Christ is the Savior and sanctifier of the angels. Rather, on the contrary, it is intimated that he did not come on account of the angels, since they did not need his coming. Thus it is held in Matt. 8 and Luke 15 from the parable of the

shepherd who left ninety-nine sheep in the wilderness, that is, the angels, as the Fathers commonly interpret it. Christ assigns the reason in Matt. 9: *Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are ill.* That is, the incarnation of the Word was not needed by the angels, because it was effected only in the manner of a medicine, as a remedy for sin, and to confer healing grace, as St. Thomas speaks.

St. Bernard draws and weighs in the same sense the words of Isaiah, *A little child is given to us. Not to himself*, he says, *because long before the ages he was born from the Father in a far nobler manner; not to the angels, because, since they possessed the great one, they did not require the little one; therefore, he was born to us, because he was necessary to us.* But if the angels had attained grace and glory only through Christ's merits, Christ would have been born no less for the angels than for us, and the incarnation would have been no less necessary for them. Hence they would have required the little one as Savior, and would not have possessed the great one without the little one, that is, they would not have enjoyed God through the beatific vision without Christ born of the Virgin. Therefore, the angels did not receive grace or glory through Christ's merits.

22. Arguments supporting the same truth are also not lacking. The first is taken from what was said above in Chapter IV, where it was proved that the incarnation was decreed after Adam's sin was foreseen. Since Adam's sin is posterior to the sin of the angels, and the angels' sin is posterior to their sanctification, it is evident that grace was decreed for the angels, and consequently glory for those who persevered, before the incarnation and Christ's merits were present in the divine foreknowledge.

The second argument is as follows. Christ merited only for those for whom he died, since his merits did not move God except as consummated by death. But Christ did not die for the angels, as the holy Fathers commonly teach, especially Augustine in *Enchiridion*, c. 61: *Christ did not die for the angels*, and Bernard in a sermon for Wednesday of Holy Week: *The Lord's passion was given to me, because it could not be given to another. Was it given to an angel? But he did not need it. Was it given to the devil? But he does not rise again.* Therefore, Christ did not merit essential grace and glory for the angels.

The third argument is as follows. No one justified through Christ's merits was glorified before Christ's passion, by which, as we have said, his merits were consummated. This is evident in the ancient Fathers who preceded the incarnation, for they were not glorified before Christ's passion because their grace was derived from Christ, since it was given to them through the merits of Christ to come. Therefore, it ought not to have been

consummated in the members before it was consummated in the head from whom it was derived. But the angels were glorified before Christ's merits were consummated through the passion, as is evident from Matt. 18: *Their angels always see the face of my Father.* Therefore, they were not justified through the merits of Christ the Savior, but through the liberality of God the Creator.

23. You will object, first: The Apostle says in Eph. 1 that God recapitulates in Christ *all things that are in heaven and that are on earth*. In Col. 1 he asserts that Christ *made peace through the blood of his cross, whether the things on earth or the things in heaven.* Likewise, in Heb. 3 he says that before his passion Christ *had brought many sons into glory.* But this cannot be understood of men, because before Christ's passion no man entered heaven. Therefore, it must be explained of the angels, and consequently they received essential glory through Christ's merits.

I answer that Christ recapitulates all things in heaven, not because he died for the angels, but because by redeeming man he filled the ruins left by the angels, or because through Christ the angels were reunited under the authority of the same head with men, from whom they had been divided while men were not yet reconciled to God. In this sense he is said to have made peace through the blood of his cross, whether the things in heaven or the things on earth.

When it is said in Heb. 3 that before his passion Christ had brought many sons into glory, this must not be understood of the angels, but of men whom Christ had brought into glory in the order of intention, not of execution, that is, whom he had preordained to be brought there, as St. Thomas interprets it. But if someone wishes to explain the Apostle's words of an actual bringing into glory, he may say that the past tense is there used for the future. For often in Sacred Scripture, because of the certainty of prophecy or of the future event, what is truly future is signified in the manner of something past, as when it is said in Isa. 9: *A little child is born to us, and a son is given to us.*

24. You will object, second: St. Bernard says in *Sermo 1 de Circumcisione*: *He is indeed the Savior both of the angel and of man, but of man from the incarnation, and of the angel from the beginning of creation.* And in *Sermo 22 super Cantica*: *He who raised fallen man gave to the standing angel that he should not fall.* But it is evident that these statements must be understood of Christ according to his divinity, because the same saint in the passages cited above asserts that Christ was neither given to the angels nor died for them.

25. You will object, third: St. Thomas, commenting upon John 1, lecture 10, explains the Evangelist's words, Of his fullness we have all received, and

adds: that is, all the apostles, patriarchs, prophets, and just who were, are, and will be, and also all the angels.

I answer that the angels received from Christ's fullness, not because he merited essential grace and glory for them, but because they received various illuminations and accidental glory through Christ's merit.

26. You will object, fourth: Christ is the first of all the predestined. Therefore, since the first in every genus is the cause of the others, he must be the cause of the predestination of all the elect, both angels and men, and consequently must cause all the effects of predestination both in angels and in men.

I answer that, although Christ is the first of all the predestined, he is not so in the same manner with respect to all. With respect to men he is the first of all the predestined not only by priority of dignity and perfection, but also by priority of causality and influx, because he was predestined as their Redeemer, presupposing the foreseen original sin. With respect to the angels, however, he is first by priority of dignity, but not by priority of causality and influx as regards essential grace and glory, because he was not predestined to be their Redeemer.

When it is said that the first in every genus is the cause of the others, this must be understood of causality in some genus of cause, whether efficient, exemplary, or final. It is not required, however, that it be a physically or morally efficient cause, as is evident in man, who, although first in the genus of animal, is not the efficient cause of the other animals.

27. You will object, fifth: Christ is the head not only of men but also of the angels, as we taught above in Chapter XI. But the head pours essential life into the members. Therefore, Christ pours into the angels the supernatural life of essential grace and glory.

I answer that, although it belongs to the nature of a natural and physical head to pour essential life into the members, this does not belong to the nature of a moral and mystical head, as is evident in a prince with respect to the commonwealth. Hence, although Christ does not pour essential grace and glory into the angels, he can nevertheless be called their head, though not as properly as he is called the head of men, because it suffices for this that they receive from him supernatural illuminations and some accidental glory.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

28. From what has been said, it is gathered, first, that, although the angels while in the state of the way possessed faith in Christ to come, they

did not possess it through Christ's influx or merits. Hence they received grace through faith in Christ as the object believed, not as the meritorious cause of the grace conferred upon them for believing.

29. It is gathered, second, that the grace conferred upon Adam in the state of innocence was not through Christ's merits. For grace conferred through Christ's merits, since it depends upon the foreseeing of sin, is healing and redeeming grace, and hence is called medicinal by theologians. But the grace of the state of innocence was not healing grace but grace of holiness, for it is said in Matt. 9: *Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are ill.* Therefore, it was not through the merits of Christ the Redeemer, but from the liberality of God the Creator alone.

30. It is gathered, third, that the opinion of some Thomists must be rejected who think that essential grace and glory were given to the angels under a twofold title, namely, through God's liberality and through Christ's merits. First, because, as we showed above, grace and glory given through Christ's merits are the fruit of his blood and passion, since all Christ's merits were consummated through his death. But Christ did not die for the angels, as the holy Fathers cited above teach. Second, although it is not repugnant for something to be possessed under several titles when those titles are not conflicting and opposed to one another, as is evident in Christ, who possessed the glory of the body under the titles of connaturality and merit, it is repugnant when the titles conflict and exclude one another, as do the titles of merit and pure liberality. The former belongs to justice, the latter to pure mercy; the former is remunerative, the latter purely gratuitous.

Hence these authors vainly invent two decrees in God, one antecedent to the foreseeing of Christ and the other consequent upon it. By the prior decree they hold that God determined to bestow grace and glory upon the angels from mere liberality, and by the posterior decree that he determined to confer them on account of Christ's merit. For by the very fact that God, by force of the posterior decree, determined to give grace and glory to the angels on account of Christ's merits, he could not retain the first decree to give the same things under the title of pure mercy and liberality, since this title excludes every other remunerative title. If the author of the *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* had considered this, he would not have admitted this opinion as probable, nor said that I undeservedly ridicule that twofold title as vain and useless, even though I admitted a twofold title in a similar matter in disp. 12, a. 1, § 3. For the different titles I admitted there are not conflicting and opposed to one another, as are those now in question.

§ 4.
By Which Acts Christ Merited.

31. It is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter that Christ merited through the act of obedience by which he accepted undergoing death for the salvation of the human race, since that act was free notwithstanding Christ's impeccability, as we showed. It is no less certain that he merited through acts of humility, patience, fortitude, temperance, and the other moral virtues. For if such acts, as commanded by charity, are meritorious in us, all the more were they meritorious in Christ, in whom merit was found most perfectly.

Hence the only difficulty concerns the act of charity by which he loved God. Since that act was regulated through beatific knowledge, which clearly represented God as possessing every aspect of goodness, it does not appear to have been free or consequently meritorious.

32. In order to escape this difficulty more easily, Vazquez absolutely denies that Christ merited through an act of charity. But besides the fact that this manner of speaking does not solve the proposed difficulty but succumbs to it, it appears openly repugnant to Scripture and the holy Fathers, who attribute the work of our redemption, by which Christ merited our salvation, to his eminent charity. This is evident from the words Christ said of himself when about to undergo death: *That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father gave me commandment, so I do.*

It is also contrary to the common opinion asserting that merit is found primarily and of itself in the act of charity and dependently upon it in the acts of the other virtues, and consequently that the merit of charity is greater and more perfect than that of the other virtues. Hence, since the most perfect merit must be admitted in Christ, it cannot be denied that he merited through the act of charity by which he loved God. This opinion must therefore be rejected as altogether improbable.

33. There are two ways of speaking and resolving this most difficult knot that appear sufficiently probable. The first teaches that the act of charity by which Christ loved God can be considered in two ways: first, insofar as it is terminated at the divine goodness considered in itself, or insofar as it is the reason for loving God; second, insofar as it tends toward the divine goodness as the reason for loving creatures, with which creatures it has no necessary connection. Under the first formality or termination it was necessary; under

the second consideration or termination it was free and consequently meritorious.

This opinion, as I have said, is not without probability. Although necessity and freedom cannot belong to the same act with respect to the same object under the same aspect, there appears to be no repugnance in their belonging to it with respect to different objects, or to the same object under different aspects. Therefore, although Christ's act of beatific charity, as terminated at the divine goodness insofar as it is the reason for loving God and his necessary perfections, was necessary, it could nevertheless be free insofar as it was terminated at the same goodness as the reason for loving creatures, just as the beatific vision is intuitive with respect to the divine essence and abstractive with respect to possible creatures.

This is confirmed. There is greater necessity in the uncreated act of infinite love by which God loves himself than in the created act of beatific love by which Christ's soul loved God. But notwithstanding that God's love is necessary insofar as it is terminated at the divine goodness as the reason for loving God and his necessary perfections, it is nevertheless free insofar as it is terminated at that same goodness as the reason for loving creatures. Therefore, the beatific love of Christ's soul can likewise be simultaneously necessary and free according to those different terminations.

34. You will object, first: That which belongs to the uncreated act of divine love by reason of its infinity must not be attributed to the beatific love of Christ's soul. But the fact that the uncreated act of divine love possesses that twofold termination belongs to it by reason of its infinity. Therefore, it must not be attributed to the beatific love of Christ's soul.

I answer by denying the minor premise. The fact that the uncreated act of the divine will is borne necessarily toward God's goodness insofar as it is the reason for loving perfections intrinsic to him, but freely toward the same goodness insofar as it is the reason for loving creatures, does not arise from the infinity of that act, but from the fact that intrinsic perfections have a necessary connection with God, whereas creatures, or goods extrinsic to God, do not. Hence infinity is required in that act only so that it may be really identical with the divine will. Consequently, it is repugnant for this to belong to the beatific love of Christ's soul, which is really distinct from his will.

From this you will understand that the beatific love of Christ's soul is a participation in God's uncreated love. To participate is nothing other than to take a part and leave a part. The beatific love of Christ's soul does this with respect to God's uncreated love. For since that love possesses two things, namely, to enjoy the aforesaid twofold termination and to be really identical

with the divine will, the beatific love of Christ's soul receives the first but not the second, because the second belongs to God's uncreated love by reason of its infinity and consequently cannot be participated in by any creature.

35. You will object, second: The love by which Christ merited belonged to him as a wayfarer. But love regulated by beatific knowledge belonged to Christ not as a wayfarer but as a possessor of beatitude, since it belonged to him only by means of the beatific vision. Therefore, he did not merit through it.

I answer by denying the minor premise. To its proof I say that the love by which Christ merited belonged to him through the beatific vision, not insofar as the vision proposed God as necessarily lovable and according to his necessary perfections, but insofar as it proposed God as freely lovable and as the reason for loving creatures. Although such love, as regulated through the vision in the former manner, belonged to Christ as a possessor of beatitude, as regulated in the latter manner it belonged to him as a wayfarer.

36. You will object, third, with the author of the *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*: It is difficult to say and believe that Christ merited nothing by loving God as he is in himself and for his own sake, but merited only by loving God's creatures, since the merit of charity should chiefly consist in its principal act, which is the love of the divine goodness in itself and for its own sake. It is also improbable that the eminence of divine freedom, which consists not in the will's indifference toward the act but only toward its termination at creatures, belongs to the beatific love of Christ's soul, which is a created and finite act.

I answer that neither of these is incredible or difficult for the truth. The first is not, because, since the love of the divine goodness as it is in itself was in Christ not a free but a necessary act, both as regards specification and as regards exercise, as it is in the other blessed, and belonged to him not as a wayfarer but as a possessor of beatitude, it is not surprising that Christ did not merit through it, since freedom and the state of the way are required for merit. Nor is the second incredible, because, since the beatific love of Christ's soul was a participation in the uncreated act of the divine will, it could participate in this eminence of divine freedom, with this difference: the divine will entitatively identifies the free act with itself, whereas the created will of Christ's soul does not.

37. Another manner of speaking, which also appears probable, distinguishes two loves in Christ, both terminated at God's goodness in itself and for its own sake: one regulated through beatific knowledge, the

other through supernatural infused knowledge. It asserts that the first was necessary, while the second was free and meritorious.

If it is said that these two loves cannot be specifically distinct because charity, which is a virtue of an indivisible species like faith and hope, cannot elicit two specifically diverse acts, nor can they differ only numerically, since two accidents differing only numerically cannot simultaneously exist in the same subject, the authors of this opinion answer that this twofold love is diverse modally in species, not substantially, because necessity and freedom are two really distinct modes separable from an act of the will.

But if it is objected to them that, if the act of love regulated through infused knowledge is modally distinct in species from the act of charity regulated through beatific knowledge, all the more will the act of charity in us wayfarers regulated through faith be modally distinct in species from the love regulated through the beatific vision, and consequently the charity of the state of the way will not remain in heaven but will be destroyed, contrary to 1 Cor. 13, *Charity never falls away*, they answer that the Apostle's words must be understood of habitual charity, which perseveres in heaven, not of actual charity, which they hold does not endure in heaven. This is evident, they say, in the holy angels, whose love in the state of the way was distinct from their love in heaven; otherwise there would have been in them only one instant both for the way and for the term, which is commonly rejected.

CHAPTER XIX.
On the Satisfaction of Christ.

1. Since Christ's merit and satisfaction have a great affinity and connection with each other, after discussing Christ's merit, we now treat of his satisfaction. We presuppose as certain by faith that Christ made equivalent satisfaction for the sins of all men, since Sacred Scripture attributes to Christ the office of Redeemer, and redemption requires the payment of an equal price. The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, concerns: first, whether Christ's satisfaction was condign of itself, or by its own intrinsic value, or only through God's acceptance, by which he willed to accept it as sufficient; second, whether it was exceeding and superabundant; third, whether it was of simply infinite value; fourth, whether it was according to strict justice; fifth, by which virtue it was elicited.

§ 1.
Christ's Satisfaction Was Condign by Its Own Intrinsic Value.

2. Proof: That satisfaction is intrinsically sufficient and condign whose value, in moral estimation, equals the gravity of the injury. But the value of Christ's satisfaction, of itself and intrinsically, equals the gravity of the injury inflicted upon God. Therefore, it is of itself and intrinsically sufficient and condign. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. The gravity of the offense inflicted upon God is derived from the fact that it is against God. But Christ's satisfaction is satisfaction made by God. Therefore, it at least equals the gravity of the offense.

This argument is confirmed and further clarified. The dignity of the person making satisfaction is no less capable of imparting moral value to a satisfactory act than the dignity of the person offended is capable of imparting gravity and moral malice to the offense inflicted upon him, as will be evident from what is said below. Therefore, since Christ's satisfaction is the satisfaction of a divine person, its value, by its own nature and intrinsically, at least equals the gravity of the divine offense, or of the offense inflicted upon God.

3. You will object first: If Christ had made condign and equal satisfaction for our sins, God could not demand any further satisfaction from us for them. But this is heretical and contrary to the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14. Therefore, etc. The consequence of the major premise is proved: once equal satisfaction has been rendered for an offense, it is unjust to demand another satisfaction. Thus, if someone paid on my behalf the hundred sesterces that I owed another, it would be unjust to demand anything further from me.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. Although Christ made condign and equal satisfaction for our sins, he nevertheless wills that, for his satisfaction to attain its effect, it be applied to us through the sacraments, through contrition and love of God above all things, through indulgences, or through our own penitential works. St. Thomas gives the reason below, q. 49, a. 1, ad 4, where he says that Christ's Passion effected the remission of our sins as a universal cause. A universal cause, however, does not exclude the concurrence of a particular cause, because, although the latter does not receive its power from the universal cause, the power of the universal cause nevertheless descends through it to the effect, as is evident in the heavens, the sun, and other universal causes.

4. You will object second: Christ did not make satisfaction for men's sins insofar as he was man, because one making satisfaction, as such, is inferior to the one to whom satisfaction is made. But Christ, insofar as he was man, could not communicate to his satisfactory works a value equal to the gravity of the offense inflicted upon God. Therefore, Christ did not make condign and equal satisfaction.

I answer that, if the expression "insofar as" is taken reduplicatively with respect to the formal principle by which satisfaction was made, Christ made satisfaction insofar as he was man. But if it is taken reduplicatively with respect to the principle which made satisfaction, he made satisfaction as God, and consequently communicated to his satisfactory works a value equal to the gravity of the offense, since the value of satisfaction is derived principally from the principle which makes satisfaction.

§ 2.
Christ's Satisfaction, by Its Own Intrinsic Value, Was Exceeding and Superabundant.

5. This is proved first from the words of the Apostle in Rom. 5: For if by the offense of one many died, much more have the grace of God and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ abounded unto many. Explaining these words, Chrysostom says: Christ paid for us far more than we owed, and as much more as the immense sea exceeds a tiny drop.

It is proved second by a fundamental argument. Satisfaction has either its whole value or its principal value from the person making satisfaction, and the greater the dignity of the person, the greater the satisfaction. But the person of Christ making satisfaction is of such dignity that he surpasses the offense of all men in the moral order. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction, by reason of itself and by its intrinsic value, is superabundant, and not merely through divine acceptance. The major premise is certain. Although the minor premise presents a difficulty in our position, which asserts that the malice of sin is intrinsically and simply infinite, as we demonstrated in the treatise on sins, it can nevertheless be proved, even granting this opinion, in the following manner. Through mortal sin, man indeed subjects God to a creature, but only affectively and morally, or interpretatively, not really and physically. Through satisfaction, however, Christ subjected to God a person of infinite dignity, namely, the person of the Divine Word in the assumed nature, not only morally and affectively, but also physically, really, and effectively. For God really and physically dies, is sacrificed, is offered, grieves

over men's sins, and so forth. But it is greater for a divine person physically and really to subject himself to God in his service than to subject God to a creature merely affectively and morally or interpretatively. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction, by reason of the infinite dignity of the person making satisfaction, surpasses the offense of all men in the moral order. Hence, in the Council of Trent, c. 19, it is said that more wine than water must be placed in the chalice, to signify that the value of Christ's blood, signified by the wine, is far greater than the offenses of the whole people, signified by the water, according to the words of the Apocalypse: *Many waters are many peoples.*

6. You will object first: One infinite thing cannot be greater than another. But the gravity of the offense inflicted upon God is simply infinite, as we taught in the treatise on sins. Therefore, the value of Christ's satisfaction cannot be greater than the gravity of the offense.

I answer that, although one infinite thing cannot be greater than another in the genus in which it is infinite, it can indeed be greater in another genus. For example, if there were an infinite line in the genus of line, there could be no greater line, although a greater quantity could exist, namely, the quantity of an infinite body. Now the infinity of Christ's satisfaction and the infinity of the gravity of the offense are in diverse genera. The former is in the genus of value and moral goodness, while the latter is in the genus of evil, or of offensive gravity. Hence, although nothing can be greater in the latter genus, Christ's satisfaction, when compared in value with the gravity of the offense, can nevertheless surpass and exceed it.

7. You will object second: If Christ's satisfaction were of greater value than the gravity of the offense, God would have exacted it unjustly, for an exceeding and superabundant satisfaction is unjustly demanded from a debtor.

I answer that satisfaction exceeding the gravity of an offense is indeed unjustly demanded when a purely equal satisfaction is possible, but not when a purely equal satisfaction is impossible, as occurs in the present case. For equal satisfaction for sin cannot be given unless it is offered by a divine person subsisting in a created nature, as we demonstrated above, c. 3. But satisfaction made by a divine person subsisting in a created nature cannot fail to exceed the gravity of the offense, as is evident from what was said in the second proof. It follows that Christ's satisfaction, although exceeding and superabundant, could justly be demanded by God. Thus, if someone had taken a silver coin from an extremely needy poor man and afterward possessed only a gold coin to restore to him, he would be bound to give him the gold coin, although it exceeded the silver coin he had taken, because in

such a case he could not offer a purely equal satisfaction, but only one that was superabundant and exceeding.

§ 3.
The Operations of Christ the Lord Had, Intrinsically, a Simply Infinite Satisfactory and Meritorious Value.

8. The first part is proved from Clement VI, in the Extravagant *Unigenitus*, on penance and remission, where he teaches that the treasury of Christ's satisfactions left to the Church cannot be exhausted because, he says, *Christ's merits are infinite*. In the same place he says that *one drop of Christ's blood, because of its union with the Word, would have sufficed for the redemption of the whole human race*. To demonstrate the infinite value of Christ's satisfactions, the Pontiff does not have recourse, as the disciples of Scotus do, to God's extrinsic acceptance, but to their intrinsic conjunction with the Word. He consequently judges that Christ's operations intrinsically possessed a simply infinite satisfactory value.

9. The same truth can be established by this fundamental argument. The greater the dignity of the person making satisfaction, the greater the value of the satisfaction. But the dignity of Christ's person making satisfaction is simply infinite. Therefore, the satisfactory value of his operations is also simply infinite. The major premise is proved, first, because satisfaction for an offense or injury, of which we are speaking here, is made by exhibiting honor and reverence. But honor is greater in proportion to the dignity of the person rendering honor. For to be honored by a king is esteemed more highly than to be honored by a knight, and by a knight more than by a commoner, because honor is in the one rendering it. Therefore, the greater the dignity of the person making satisfaction, the greater the value of the satisfaction.

It is proved also because the dignity of the person making satisfaction morally informs works performed in another's service and, in a certain manner, communicates itself to them. For the person does not merely offer those works as though in the abstract, but through them subjects himself to the one whom he serves. He therefore dignifies them, not only as an extrinsic term, in the manner in which an object dignifies the act that it terminates, but also as an intrinsic form morally informing them. Hence, Christ's infinite person gave infinite value to the works that he offered in God's service. To understand this more clearly:

10. It must be carefully observed that there were two kinds of actions in Christ. Some did not reflect back upon the suppositum of the Divine Word, such as walking, eating, and so forth. Others redounded upon the person himself and reflected back upon the divine suppositum, such as acts of obedience, humility, satisfaction, and other similar acts, by which Christ's divine suppositum itself, in the assumed nature, subjected itself to God. These operations are customarily called by theologians, after Dionysius and Damascene, theandric, or divine-human. The actions of the first kind in Christ were not of infinite dignity and value, because, since they did not reflect back upon the suppositum of the Divine Word, they could not derive infinite value from it. The operations of the second kind, however, did possess infinite value, because Christ's person concurred with them, morally informing them and constituting with them one integral satisfaction. Consequently, they were of as much dignity and worth as Christ's divine suppositum itself.

11. The second part, concerning the meritorious value of Christ's operations, is proved because, just as the divine person so dignified Christ's works that reflected back upon the suppositum of the Divine Word as to give them power to make satisfaction for the sins of infinitely many men, if such existed, so also he gave them value to merit any reward whatsoever, ever greater without limit. Otherwise, one could arrive at some reward equal to those works and beyond which they could not extend. This is contrary to Clement VI in the Extravagant cited above, where, speaking of the Church's treasury consisting of Christ's merits and satisfactions, he says that *there is no reason whatever to fear its exhaustion or diminution, because of the infinite merits of Christ*.

12. I add that the meritorious value of works is derived principally from the holiness of the person acting. Hence, infinite holiness confers infinite meritorious value upon them. But Christ's holiness is infinite, since his humanity was infinitely sanctified through the grace of union. Therefore, his operations contained a simply infinite meritorious value.

13. You will say first: Although Christ's person is infinitely holy, it nevertheless does not impart simply infinite meritorious value to his actions, because it does not immediately influence them, but does so through the mediation of the humanity as the principle by which they are elicited.

But to the contrary: Although the principle by which the acts are elicited produces their entity, it does not produce the dignity or moral value derived from the person. Therefore, although the limitation of the eliciting principle by which limits Christ's acts with respect to physical perfection, it does not limit them with respect to their dignity and moral, meritorious, or

satisfactory value, which belongs to them from the holiness and dignity of the person.

14. You will say second: Grace in a just man does not dignify his works except according to the measure of the influence that it exercises. Hence, although grace is intense to the degree of eight, if it influences only to the degree of four, it dignifies his actions only to the degree of four. Therefore, similarly, although Christ's holiness is infinite, it does not follow that it imparts infinite value to his meritorious actions.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that Christ's infinite holiness, since it is substantial and personal, is necessarily prior by nature to all Christ's operations, just as is the personality with which it is identified. Consequently, it necessarily morally informs and dignifies them to the fullest extent possible. It is otherwise with the grace of a just man. Since it is accidental, it is not necessarily prior by nature to all his operations, but only to those upon which it physically influences through infused habits. It therefore dignifies them, not adequately according to its own intensity, but only in the proportion in which it influences them through those habits.

15. You will object first: Value is a property consequent upon the moral goodness of an operation. But the moral goodness of Christ's works was finite, since it followed upon a finite entity. Therefore, their value was also finite.

I answer that there was a twofold value in Christ's actions: one essential, the other personal. The former was derived from the object and circumstances of the act, and therefore is called objective by some. The latter followed from the dignity of the person morally informing those acts, and is therefore called personal. The former was finite, since it was caused by a finite principle and followed upon the moral goodness of Christ's works. Hence, it was not equal in all Christ's actions, but greater or lesser according to the greater or lesser excellence of the object. The latter, however, was infinite, since it was caused by an infinite principle, namely, the personality of the Divine Word, and consequently was equal in all Christ's works.

16. You will say: Christ made satisfaction not as subsisting in the divine nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. But Christ, as subsisting in the human nature, could not impart infinite personal value to his operations, since under this aspect he is not infinite. Therefore, the personal value of Christ's works was not simply infinite.

I answer that Christ made satisfaction as subsisting in both the divine and human natures. For if the expression "as" is taken reduplicatively to signify the formal reason for imparting infinite value to Christ's satisfactory

actions, he made satisfaction as subsisting in the divine nature. But if "as" denotes only the condition required for imparting such satisfactory value, he made satisfaction as subsisting in the human nature.

17. You will object second: If Christ's operations intrinsically possessed infinite satisfactory and meritorious value, it follows that Christ, through a single action, sufficiently made satisfaction for the sins of the human race, and consequently that his other actions were superfluous. It also follows that he consummated his merit through the one action elicited at the instant of his conception, which is contrary to the common opinion of theologians asserting that Christ's merits were consummated only in his death. Third, it follows that Christ's works were worthy of an infinite reward, and consequently that he merited more than God could confer, since no infinite reward can be given.

18. To the first alleged absurdity, I say that Christ through one action did indeed make sufficient satisfaction for the sins of the human race with respect to the quantity of the price, because one action was of sufficient value to redeem the human race and to make satisfaction for all sins. He did not, however, do so with respect to the designation of the price. For, to advance his Father's glory and manifest his love for men more fully, Christ did not will to designate each of his actions separately as complete satisfaction, but willed to order and designate all his operations and sufferings, up to and including his death, for our redemption as one integral and complete price. Therefore, only in Christ's death and Passion was the redemption of the human race completed and perfect satisfaction offered for our sins.

19. To the second, I deny the consequence. Although Christ's first operation, elicited at the instant of his conception, was meritorious of any reward whatsoever with respect to sufficiency and value, it was not so with respect to efficacy and application. For condignity of works is not sufficient for merit; the ordination of the one meriting is also required. Christ willed to order and apply not only the first operation that he elicited at the instant of his conception, but also all the others that he exercised throughout his life, and especially his Passion and death, to the redemption of the human race, the glorification of his body, the exaltation of his name, and other rewards. Hence, theologians say that Christ consummated his merit through his Passion and death.

20. To the third, I answer first that Christ's works were not worthy of a reward actually and categorematically infinite, but they were worthy of a reward potentially and syncategorematically infinite, because they were worthy of any finite reward whatsoever, ever greater without limit. This

proves an infinite meritorious value in his works, just as theologians prove that God's power is simply infinite from the fact that, given any effect whatsoever, he can produce another more excellent effect, although each of them is always finite.

Second, it can be said that Christ's works were worthy of a simply and actually infinite reward, namely, the hypostatic union of his humanity, or of another man's humanity, with the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, which union is an infinite good.

21. From what has been said, you will understand that the value of Christ's works is nothing other than their intrinsic relation to the divine suppositum from which they proceed and to which they are united as a form morally informing them. For from this union and moral information they derive infinite dignity and worth, as we explained above.

§ 4.
Christ's Satisfaction Was According to Strict Justice.

22. Proof: That satisfaction is according to strict justice in which all the conditions required for strict satisfaction are found. But all the conditions required for strict satisfaction are found in Christ's satisfaction. Therefore, it is according to strict justice. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Strict satisfaction first requires that it be rendered to another, because strict satisfaction is an act of justice, and there cannot be justice of a person toward himself, as Aristotle teaches in *Ethics* V, c. 11. Next, it is required that it not be founded upon the favor of the offended party, because favor and strict justice are opposed. Third, it is necessary that it be made from the debtor's own goods, for no one can pay his debts with grain taken from the creditor's granary or money drawn from the creditor's treasury. Fourth, what is offered must not already be owed under several titles. For one who owes Peter one hundred coins under the titles of theft, annual rent, and a loan does not make satisfaction by giving only one hundred, but still owes another two hundred. Some add a fifth condition, namely, that the creditor be bound to accept the satisfaction. But all these conditions belong to Christ's satisfaction. Therefore, all the conditions required for strict satisfaction are found in it. The minor premise cannot be proved more forcefully than by resolving the arguments brought forward to show that some one of these conditions is lacking in Christ's satisfaction.

23. It is objected first: Satisfaction according to strict justice must be rendered to another. But Christ's satisfaction was not rendered to another,

since he made satisfaction to himself as well as to the Father and the Holy Spirit. For the Father alone is not the creditor passively offended by sin, but the whole Trinity of persons. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction was not according to strict justice.

24. Having reported and refuted in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* the various answers given to this objection, I answer briefly that true and strict justice does not necessarily require a distinction of supposita, but that a distinction of natures subsisting in the same suppositum, such as is found in Christ, is sufficient. For that distinction which suffices for a distinction of rights is sufficient for true and strict justice. But a distinction of rights is fully preserved by a mere distinction of natures, since from the very fact that there is a diversity of natures, there is a distinct freedom by reason of distinct wills.

Thus, if one divine person assumed two humanities, there could be acts of strict justice between the same person as existing in one nature and himself as existing in the other, because in each of those natures he would possess a particular will, freedom, dominion, and distinct right, upon which justice would be founded. In like manner, Christ, subsisting in the human and divine natures, could as subsisting in one nature exercise an act of justice toward himself as subsisting in the other. For although he is one suppositum in reality, he is virtually or equivalently twofold. Since by reason of his infinity he subsists in two natures, he is equivalent to two supposita. Nor is it surprising that Aristotle did not recognize this kind of justice but required a real distinction of supposita for true and strict justice, since he did not know that two natures possessing two free wills and proper dominion over their acts could be united in one suppositum.

25. It is objected second: Satisfaction according to strict justice must not be founded upon the favor of the creditor or offended party. But Christ's satisfaction is founded upon the favor of the creditor, namely, upon the grace of union granted to the humanity, for this union was necessarily presupposed in order that the person of the Divine Word might impart infinite value to his satisfactory and meritorious actions. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction is not according to strict justice.

I answer that not every favor granted by the offended party or creditor prevents strict satisfaction, but only one that supplies a defect in the value of the satisfaction or formally enters into the payment of the debt, so that the favor given not only assists in making satisfaction but is itself that by which satisfaction is made. In that case, the conferral of the gift is virtually a remission of the debt. But if the creditor's favor is only presupposed, so that, although it was granted for the sake of satisfaction, it nevertheless does not

supply a defect in the value of the satisfaction, nor is satisfaction made through it alone, but through other goods acquired by labor and industry, then it does not prevent strict satisfaction. This is evident in one who, seeing himself unable to pay a debt, borrows money from the creditor and increases it through his own labor and industry. He can make satisfaction to the creditor according to the whole rigor of justice with the money he gained through trade, because in such a case the creditor's favor does not supply a defect in the value of the satisfaction, nor does it formally enter into the payment of the debt.

Similarly, in our case, although the grace of union was granted to Christ's humanity, it did not supply a defect of value in Christ's satisfaction, but rather gave the works of the humanity a dignity and value equal to, and indeed superabundantly exceeding, the gravity of the offense. Nor did Christ make satisfaction through this grace alone, but also through acts of obedience, humility, charity, and innumerable others, which he exercised from the first instant of his conception until death. His satisfaction was therefore according to the whole rigor of justice.

26. It is objected third: Strict satisfaction must be made from the goods of the one making satisfaction, not from things belonging to the creditor. But Christ's satisfaction was not made from his own goods, but from the goods of the creditor or offended party, namely, God, under whose dominion all Christ's actions existed, since God by title of creation has supreme dominion over all things. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction was not according to strict justice.

I answer that the satisfactory actions elicited by Christ can be considered in two ways: first, physically or entitatively, insofar as they proceed from the human nature as from the formal principle by which; second, morally, insofar as they reflect back upon the suppositum of the Divine Word. Considered in the first manner, they are under God's dominion, as are all other creatures. Considered in the second manner, however, they are not, because under this aspect they morally involve the suppositum of the Divine Word himself, who is not contained under God's dominion, since he is God, as are the other persons of the Most Holy Trinity.

27. You will say: Christ's satisfaction derives its value from the person of the Divine Word. But the person of the Divine Word has the character of creditor and offended party, for he was injured and offended, as were the other two persons. Therefore, such satisfaction is made from the goods of the injured person.

I answer that the person of the Divine Word communicated infinite value to his satisfactory works insofar as those actions involved him, as it

were, and subjected him to God, as we explained in the preceding section. But the person of the Word, as subsisting in the divine nature, was not subjected to God, but only as subsisting in the human nature. Under this aspect he was not the injured and offended party, but rather the surety and guarantor for the sinners who had offended. Hence, Christ's satisfaction was not made from the goods of the injured person.

28. It is objected fourth: Strict satisfaction cannot be made from goods already owed under other titles. But all Christ's actions and sufferings were owed to God under several titles, namely, those of servitude, religion, obedience, and so forth. Therefore, Christ did not through them make satisfaction for our sins according to strict justice.

I answer that, although God could demand all Christ's operations under all those titles, nevertheless, since their value, derived from the divine person, was simply infinite, they were of such worth that they could discharge those infinite debts and exhaust all those titles, and in addition constitute a price equal to, and indeed superabundantly exceeding, the gravity of the offense. Hence, when it is said that strict satisfaction must be made from goods not otherwise owed, this must be understood of satisfaction possessing finite value, not of satisfaction containing simply infinite value, such as Christ's satisfaction.

29. I add that, even among men, when titles do not multiply the matter, one operation can satisfy all of them according to strict justice. If I owe Peter one hundred coins under the title of justice, by reason of a contract; under the title of obedience, because my superior commands me to pay; under the title of mercy, because Peter is in need because of the lack of payment; and finally under the title of religion, because I bound myself by vow to pay that sum, I can satisfy all these titles by one payment, paying only the one hundred coins. For the diverse titles under which I am bound to pay that sum do not multiply the matter or debts, but fall upon the same matter, which they render due in several ways. Hence, although Christ's operations were owed to God under the titles of religion, gratitude, obedience, and so forth, nevertheless, because these titles fell upon the same actions, Christ could through those same operations make satisfaction to God for all of them and, in addition, for the gravity of the offense, according to strict justice.

30. You will object fifth: Strict satisfaction imposes upon the creditor or offended person an obligation of strict justice to accept it. But Christ's satisfaction did not impose upon God an obligation of strict justice to accept it, since a strict obligation arising from another's right is repugnant to God. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction was not according to strict justice.

I answer that, even if strict satisfaction among men caused in the person to whom it is offered a debt of strict justice to accept it, which many theologians deny, this would not apply to God, because he is of a higher order and possesses absolute and universal dominion over all things. Hence, God was bound to accept Christ's satisfaction only under the title of fidelity and truthfulness. For an obligation arising from the supposition of a covenant or promise is not repugnant to God, because it arises not so much from another's right as from the infinite rectitude of the divine will. Supposing, therefore, that God willed Christ to become the head and surety of men and, as such, to offer him condign satisfaction for their offenses, he could not reject it, but was bound by fidelity, which is a kind of imperfect justice, to accept it. In this sense Anselm must be understood when he says in *Cur Deus homo*, II, c. 19: *I see that the Father must repay the Son; otherwise, he would appear unjust if he refused.*

§ 5.
Christ's Satisfaction Was an Act Elicited by the Virtue of Commutative Justice.

31. This is proved by a fundamental argument. Two things are required and sufficient for commutative justice: a strict obligation to pay a debt, and perfect equality in its compensation. Hence, religion, penance, gratitude, and similar virtues directed toward another fall short of the nature of strict justice and are constituted its potential parts, because they fall short either of perfect equality or of a strict debt and obligation, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 80. But these two conditions are found in Christ's satisfaction. For it was condign and equal to the offense, and indeed exceeded it, as we demonstrated above. Moreover, since Christ had offered himself as surety and guarantor for men, he was bound in justice to pay the debt. Therefore, Christ's satisfaction was an act of commutative justice. Hence, in Scripture it is called a purchase, redemption, and payment of a price, which are acts of commutative justice. Indeed, in Ps. 88, according to Augustine's interpretation, it is called an exchange, when it is said: *They reproached the exchange of your Christ.*

32. You will object first: Commutative justice exists only between equals. Therefore, according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, there is no commutative justice between father and son or master and servant. But Christ, insofar as he made satisfaction, was not equal to God, because he made satisfaction

insofar as he was man and consequently as less than God. Therefore, his satisfaction was not an act elicited by commutative justice.

I answer that it is not universally true that commutative justice is exercised only between equals. It is sufficient that it render an equal thing. Thus, a subject, although unequal to the king, pays according to commutative justice when he delivers money equivalent to the debt. But whatever may be said of this, granting the major premise, I distinguish the minor. Christ, insofar as he made satisfaction, was not equal to God, if "insofar as" is taken reduplicatively with respect to the principle by which satisfaction was made: I grant the minor. If it is taken reduplicatively with respect to the principle which made satisfaction: I deny the minor and the consequence. The answer is evident from what has been said above.

33. You will object second: Men do not owe God satisfaction according to commutative justice. Therefore, Christ did not make satisfaction according to that virtue. The consequence is evident from the fact that a surety assumes no obligation other than that of the principal debtor. The antecedent is proved: When men sin, they do not always sin against the special virtue of justice, but only against general justice. Otherwise, every sin would contain two deformities specifically diverse, one against justice and the other against some other virtue, such as temperance or another similar virtue.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I say that injustice is implicitly found in every sin, although it does not constitute a specifically diverse moral deformity, because it is not intended essentially and directly, but indirectly and implicitly. It is therefore a general condition of every sin, just as disobedience is involved in the transgression of every precept.

34. From what has been said, it follows that Christ's commutative justice is specifically distinct from men's commutative justice, because they have objects of diverse formality. The object of Christ's commutative justice is a divine right as capable of being repaired to equality, whereas the object of ours is a human right as capable of being compensated to equality. I add that Christ's commutative justice, because of its excellence, possesses the formal nature of justice in such a way as eminently to contain also the nature of mercy, magnificence, and religion. For it renders to God an equal thing for offenses, in which the nature of justice consists, while also rendering something superabundant, in which the virtue of magnificence consists. Since Christ is impeccable, he cannot render to God an equal thing for his own offenses, but only for those of others, in which the virtue of mercy consists. Likewise, Christ cannot render an equal thing to God for offenses unless he offers an act of simply infinite value, and thus unless he renders an

equal thing to God for his supreme excellence and for the benefits received from him, in which the virtues of religion and gratitude consist. From this the excellence of such a virtue is especially commended, since it approaches most closely to the eminent perfection of the divine attributes.

CHAPTER XX.
On Christ's Servitude.

1. There are three kinds of servitude: moral, legal, and natural. The first is contracted through sin. For one who sins is said to be the servant of sin and of the devil, because he has been overcome by him, according to 2 Pet. 2: For by whatever a man is overcome, of this he is also the servant. The second is that by which one becomes the servant of another according to the disposition of law, for example, through war, purchase, or birth from a female slave. Hence Justinian, Institutes, I, title 4: Slaves are either born or made. They are born from our female slaves; they are made either by the law of nations, that is, through captivity, or by civil law, when a free man over twenty years of age has permitted himself to be sold in order to share in the price. The third is founded upon production, by reason of which everyone is bound to serve the one from whom he received his nature. Thus, man is naturally the servant of God, by whom he was created, and of his parents, by whom he was begotten.

It is certain, however, that the first and second kinds of servitude were not in Christ, since he was neither subject to sin nor acquired by God through the right of war, purchase, or redemption. Hence, the only difficulty concerns the third kind. Many recent theologians deny that Christ, as man, can be called God's servant by natural servitude. The Thomists, with Suárez, Valencia, and others, affirm it. Yet this difficulty is ultimately reduced to a question concerning a manner of speaking, as Suárez observed. For it is certain that the authors of both opinions agree upon two points about which no one can doubt. All concede that Christ, by reason of his humanity, is essentially dependent upon God and subject to him, and consequently that God can dispose of it at his pleasure. No one denies that Christ's humanity, by reason of the hypostatic union, shares in God's goods and honors, since in it are all the treasures of grace and wisdom, it is adored with the worship of latria as God is, and it sits at God's right hand in heaven.

The only difficulty and controversy, therefore, is whether, by reason of this dependence and subjection, Christ's humanity can be called a servant, and Christ by reason of it be denominated a servant by natural servitude; or

whether, beyond this dependence and subjection, there is required the absence of a sharing with God in goods, honor, and throne, which absence does not belong to Christ as man, so that he cannot truly and properly be called God's servant by natural servitude. For the resolution of this question:

2. I say briefly that the absence of a sharing in goods, honor, and throne is not essentially required for natural servitude, but the creature's essential dependence upon God in existing, being made, and being preserved is sufficient. Consequently, although Christ shares in goods and honors with the Father, he can truly and properly be called his servant by natural servitude.

This is proved first from St. Thomas, here, a. 1, in the body, where he says that the human nature, from its own condition, has a threefold subjection to God. One is according to the degree of goodness that belongs to God by essence and to human nature by participation. Another is with respect to God's power, insofar as it is subject to the operation of divine governance. The third is with respect to operation, insofar as it obeys God's commands. Speaking of the second subjection, he adds: *And this is the subjection of servitude, according to which every creature serves God.* He therefore judges that the foundation of a creature's natural servitude to God is nothing other than its dependence upon God in existing and acting.

3. Reason also supports this. By the mere fact that a rational creature belongs to God, so that he can use it for whatever purposes he wills without injury, everything required for natural servitude is preserved, since this alone preserves in God the character of perfect dominion, to which natural servitude corresponds in the creature. But by the mere fact that a creature depends upon God in existing, being made, and being preserved, it belongs to God in such a way that he can do with it whatever he pleases without any injury to it. Therefore, by this dependence alone of the creature upon God, the creature's natural servitude to God is preserved.

This is confirmed first. Legal servitude excludes friendship with the master, adoptive filiation, and a right to the master's inheritance. Yet natural servitude to God is compatible with friendship with him, adoptive filiation, and a right to the inheritance, as is evident in the saints, who, although they are God's servants by natural servitude, are nevertheless his friends and adoptive children and consequently his heirs, according to Rom. 1: *If children, then heirs.* Therefore, likewise, although legal servitude requires the absence of a sharing with the master in goods, honor, and throne, natural servitude does not require such an absence.

This is confirmed second. The relation of motherhood is incompatible with legal servitude, for a mother cannot be the legal servant of her son. Yet

natural servitude to God is compatible with divine motherhood, for the Most Blessed Virgin is Christ's Mother and at the same time his servant by natural servitude, as she professes concerning herself in Luke 1, saying: *Behold the handmaid of the Lord.* Therefore, likewise, although legal servitude excludes a sharing with the master in goods, honor, and throne, natural servitude does not.

4. The adversaries object first from the authority of the Council of Frankfurt and Pope Hadrian, who condemned and sharply reproved Felix, Bishop of Urgel, and Elipandus, Archbishop of Toledo, because they said that Christ was God's servant and his adoptive son. Leaving aside the various answers given to this objection, it can be answered in two ways.

First, the Council and the Pontiff were speaking of pure servitude belonging to Christ by reason of his person and multiplying supposita in him, such as Felix and Elipandus attributed to him. This is gathered from the fact that those heretics asserted that Christ was a servant in the same manner and in the same sense in which they asserted that he was an adoptive son. But they placed adoptive filiation in Christ by reason of a created suppositum, and consequently in a manner multiplying supposita in Christ and therefore in a Nestorian sense, as will be evident from what is said in the following chapter. Therefore, they understood servitude in the same manner. Hence Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, III, c. 21: *Those who call him a servant divide the one Christ into two, in the manner of Nestorius.*

Second, it can be said that the Council and the Pontiff intended to condemn in Christ only that servitude which excludes from Christ a participation in the same honor and excellence. This is gathered from the error of Elipandus, who asserted that Christ as man was a servant because he thought that Christ was the Son of God not by nature but by adoption, and consequently denied to Christ as man a participation in the same dignity and excellence as God.

5. They object second: A servant must be a person distinct from the master. But Christ, by reason of the hypostatic union, is the same person as God. Therefore, he is not God's servant, even by natural servitude.

I answer that among men the servant must indeed be personally distinct from the master, because among them a diversity of natures cannot be found with unity of suppositum. In Christ, however, true servitude toward God can be found by reason of diverse natures with unity of suppositum, just as in him, by reason of the diversity of natures alone, strict satisfaction and commutative justice toward God are found, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter.

6. They object third: It is contrary to the nature of servitude to share in the master's goods and in the same honor and throne, for one would then be simultaneously master and servant. But Christ shares with God in the same goods, honor, and throne, since he is worshiped with the same worship of latria as God himself and is said to sit at his right hand. Therefore, he is not God's servant, even by natural servitude.

I answer that the major premise is true of legal servitude, not of natural servitude, as was demonstrated above. Moreover, even Christ according to his humanity does not share in God's goods and honor on a basis of equality, but in a far inferior manner. For the worship of latria belongs to God by essence, but to Christ's humanity through a gracious communication and conjunction with God.

CHAPTER XXI.
On Christ's Adoption.

1. Durandus and Scotus think that Christ, as man, can be called God's adoptive son. Vásquez condemns this opinion as heretical, because the Council of Frankfurt defined that Christ is not God's adoptive son, but his natural Son. This censure, however, appears excessively severe, because the Council seems to have intended only to condemn the error of Felix and Elipandus, who asserted in a Nestorian sense that Christ was God's adoptive son, namely, by a pure adoption incompatible with natural filiation and consequently multiplying persons in Christ. This is clearly gathered from the letter of that Council, p. 153 of the Cologne edition, where the Fathers of the Council address Felix and Elipandus in these words: *Was not your heresy long ago refuted and condemned in Nestorius by the universal holy Church?* And in the book *Sacrosyllabus*, p. 147, it is said: *There are not two sons, so that, as they erroneously suppose, the son of man is an adoptive son and the Son of God is without adoption.* Durandus and Scotus, however, admit adoptive filiation in Christ by reason of the human nature, together with unity of person, and consequently in a sense entirely diverse from that condemned by the Council. Whatever may be said of this, that opinion must be wholly rejected, because from every manner of adoption there follows, or can be inferred, a substantial distinction of persons in Christ, as will be evident from what is said below.

2. I say, therefore, that Christ, insofar as he is man, is not God's adoptive son. This is proved by the argument given in the aforesaid *Sacrosyllabus*. One is called adoptive who is a stranger to the adopter and is admitted by him to

the inheritance gratuitously, not by right or debt. But Christ as man is neither a person foreign to God nor admitted gratuitously to his inheritance. Therefore, he cannot be called God's adoptive son. The major premise is evident from the definition of adoption given by jurists: *Adoption is the gratuitous and liberal assumption of a person who is a stranger into an inheritance.*

The minor premise is also manifest in both its parts. For Christ, as man, is the very person of the Word subsisting in the human nature, since "Christ as man" does not signify the humanity alone, but also includes the suppositum by which it subsists. Therefore, Christ as man, although he can be called the suppositum of a foreign nature, cannot be called a person foreign to God. Likewise, by reason of the hypostatic union, Christ has an intrinsic right to God's inheritance, namely, to the beatific vision, since this is connaturally owed to the humanity united to the Word, as are habitual grace, the infused virtues, and the other supernatural gifts. Therefore, he is not admitted gratuitously to God's inheritance.

3. This is confirmed. A natural son cannot be an adoptive son. But Christ, insofar as he is man, is God's natural Son. Therefore, he cannot be an adoptive son. The minor premise is certain. Since the suppositum of the Divine Word did not lose its natural divine filiation through terminating the humanity, it is rightly called God's natural Son even as terminating this humanity, provided that the expression "as" does not designate the reason for which he is Son, but the reason for which it is not repugnant to him to be God's Son; or, as some say, provided "as" is taken specifically, not reduplicatively.

The major premise is demonstrated as follows. One who is adopted as a son is joined to the adopter not according to nature, but by affection alone. For to adopt is to choose someone as a son and to will that he be one's son when he is not such naturally, but is alien and a stranger. Hence the Council of Frankfurt, in its letter to the bishops of Spain, p. 153: *What is adoption,* it says, *except a union of charity by which a father joins to himself as a son one whom he does not have as his own?* But by the very fact that someone is a natural son, he cannot be joined to his generator by affection alone. Therefore, he cannot be his adoptive son.

I add that adoptive filiation is an imperfect imitation of natural filiation. But that which is said of someone truly and according to a perfect notion cannot be said of him imitatively and according to an imperfect notion. Therefore, a natural son cannot be an adoptive son. From this you will understand that a distinction of persons in Christ is rightly inferred from the manner of adoption admitted by Durandus and Scotus. For since adoption

terminates at a person, just as generation does, if Christ were at once God's natural and adoptive son, there would have to be two persons in him, one terminating adoption and the other generation. Hence the Council of Frankfurt says that *the unity of person that exists in the Son of God and the Son of the Virgin removes the injury of adoption.*

4. You will object first: Habitual grace gives the being of an adoptive son of God. But habitual grace is found in Christ, as was demonstrated above, c. 10. Therefore, Christ is God's adoptive son.

I answer that habitual grace gives the being of an adoptive son of God when the recipient is capable of adoptive filiation, but not when he is incapable of it. Christ, since he is not a person foreign to God and by reason of the hypostatic union has an intrinsic right to God's inheritance, is incapable of adoptive filiation, which is only a secondary formal effect of habitual grace. A subject, however, can possess a capacity for a form while lacking capacity for one of its merely secondary formal effects.

I add that, just as nature does not formally give the being of a natural son except as possessed through generation, neither does grace formally give the being of God's adoptive son except as possessed through spiritual generation. But habitual grace is not communicated to Christ through spiritual generation, because its infusion does not terminate at him as possessing the mode of a nature, but rather as possessing the mode of a property consequent upon the grace of union. Therefore, in Christ it does not found adoptive filiation as it does in other just persons.

5. You will object second: By reason of the two natures that he terminates, Christ is simultaneously God's natural servant, as subsisting in the human nature, and supreme Lord, as subsisting in the divine nature. Therefore, likewise, he can be God's natural Son as subsisting in the divinity and his adoptive son as subsisting in the assumed humanity.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. Servitude and dominion are predicated of the suppositum by reason of the nature, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2. Hence, because two natures are found in Christ with unity of person, he can by reason of one be supreme Lord and by reason of the other a servant, just as by reason of one he is creditor and by reason of the other debtor and one making satisfaction. Filiation, however, does not belong by reason of the nature, since a nature is not called daughter or begotten, but is immediately referred to the suppositum, which is denominated begotten or born. Hence, since there is one suppositum in Christ, who is not a stranger but God's natural Son, he cannot be or be called God's adoptive son.

This is St. Thomas's solution here, q. 23, a. 4, ad 3, where he says: Servitude or subjection to God regards not only the person but also the nature, which cannot be said of filiation; therefore, the argument is not parallel.

CHAPTER XXII.
On Christ's Predestination.

1. It is certain by faith that Christ as man, or as subsisting in the human nature, was predestined by God from eternity to some supernatural end, since Scripture frequently asserts this, especially the Apostle in Rom. 1, where, speaking of Christ, he says: *Who was predestined the Son of God in power.* Reason also supports it. As St. Thomas argues here, q. 24, a. 1, those things are called predestined which are preordained by God, that is, ordained from eternity to receive some supernatural end. But Christ as man was from eternity preordained to some supernatural end, namely, to the hypostatic union of his humanity with the Word; to sanctifying grace; to the glory both of soul and body; to priestly, royal, and judicial dignity; and to whatever else pertains to the perfect excellence conferred upon him. Therefore, Christ was truly predestined by God.

The only remaining difficulty concerns that to which Christ was primarily and principally predestined, or what was the primary and principal term of his predestination. Some assign as the primary and principal term of Christ's predestination, not divine filiation, but its declaration and manifestation. Others assign the power of miracles, according to Rom. 1: *Who was predestined the Son of God in power.* Others assign the glory both of soul and body, according to Christ's words in John 17: *Father, glorify me with the glory that I had with you before the world was made.* Explaining these words, Augustine, tract. 105 on John, says: *He was asking for the glory of his resurrection, which he said that he possessed according to predestination.* But rejecting these opinions, which we refuted in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*:

2. I say first that natural divine filiation is the primary and principal term of Christ's predestination, while beatitude, or the beatific vision of his soul, the resurrection of his body, and the other supernatural gifts conferred upon him are only its secondary and less principal terms.

This is proved briefly. That is called the primary and principal term of Christ's predestination which was primarily and principally intended and followed from his predestination. But natural divine filiation was primarily

and principally intended in Christ's predestination, not the beatific vision, bodily glory, and the other supernatural gifts conferred upon him, since these are divine only by participation, whereas natural filiation, or the hypostatic union, is divine by essence. Therefore, natural filiation is the primary and principal term of Christ's predestination, according to Rom. 1: *Who was predestined the Son of God in power.*

But a difficult argument militates against this, which can be proposed in the following form. The subject of predestination must not include its term, but rather must be presupposed to it. But natural filiation is intrinsically included in Christ as man, since Christ as man is composed of the subsistence of the Word and the humanity. Therefore, natural divine filiation is not the term of Christ's predestination.

3. It is remarkable how greatly this difficulty torments the minds of theologians and into how many diverse manners of speaking it drives them. Leaving aside those opinions, by which this knot is entangled rather than untied, the following must be observed in order to give the true solution and make it more easily understood.

The subject of predestination is twofold, namely, the "subject which" and the "subject by which." The subject which is that of which the term is concretely predicated. The subject by which is that by reason of which the subject which is constituted capable of the grace and antecedence implied in predestination. Similarly, the term of predestination is taken in two ways, namely, as the "term which" and the "term by which." The term which is the concrete thing predicated of the subject, while the term by which is the form of that concrete thing. Hence, the subject which of Christ's predestination is this man; the subject by which is the humanity; the term which is the natural Son of God; and the term by which is natural filiation itself. With this premised:

4. The objection is answered by distinguishing the major premise. The subject by which of predestination must not include its term by which: I grant the major premise. The subject which of predestination must not include its term by which: I further distinguish. It must not include it formally: I grant the major premise. It must not include it really: I deny the major premise. With the same distinction applied to the minor premise, I deny the consequence.

For Christ's predestination it is therefore sufficient that its subject by which, namely, the humanity, be really distinguished from its term by which, namely, natural filiation, and not really include it. A real distinction between the subject which and the term which is not required, but a virtual distinction is sufficient. Hence, just as we said above that a sufficient

distinction for the notions of one making satisfaction and creditor, and of one rewarding and one meriting, is found between Christ as man and Christ as God, so likewise it must be said that the virtual distinction between Christ as man and Christ as God and the natural Son of God is sufficient for him, insofar as he is man, to be the subject which of his predestination, and, insofar as he is God and God's natural Son, to be its term which.

Similarly, Christ's predestination does not require that its subject which should not really include the term by which, or formal term, but only that it should not formally include it. Thus, although the subsistence of the Word is included in Christ as man and this subsistence is natural filiation, nevertheless, because in Christ insofar as he is man it is not included under the function of divine filiation but under that of human personality, it can be the term by which of Christ's predestination. Certain objections can be made against this solution, which may be seen in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

5. I say second that Christ is the cause of our predestination in three ways, or in three genera of cause, namely, as exemplary, final, and morally efficient cause. St. Thomas proves the first here, a. 3, because Christ was predestined as God's natural Son, while we are predestined as adoptive children. But natural filiation is the exemplar of adoptive filiation. Therefore, Christ's predestination is the exemplar of our predestination. Hence Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 15, calls Christ *the most splendid light of predestination and grace*, insofar as our predestination is manifested through his predestination and grace, which pertains to the nature of an exemplary cause.

6. The second is gathered from 1 Cor. 3: *All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.* St. Thomas says that this signifies that, just as all things were created for the predestined, so all created things and the predestined themselves exist for Christ as their end, just as all these things and Christ himself exist for God as their ultimate end. Reason also supports this. Right order requires that the head should not be for the members, but rather that the members should be ordered to the head as their end. Therefore, since Christ is the head of all the predestined, it is fitting that Christ's predestination should be the end of our predestination, just as his glory is the final cause of our justification, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 7.

7. The third is evident from what was said above, c. 18, § 3, where we demonstrated that Christ merited all the effects of our predestination, and consequently our predestination itself. For predestination, taken as God's uncreated act, cannot fall under merit, but only according to its free

termination toward the creature and insofar as it infers and causes the effects of our predestination.

8. If you ask whether Christ merited our predestination not only under the aspect of a simple love of the predestined, but also under the aspect of the election of one over another, or insofar as it is comparative, I answer affirmatively. This is gathered from Christ's words in John 15: *You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.* Augustine understands these words in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 19, and *De correptione et gratia*, c. 7, not only of election to the grace of the apostolate, but also to glory and the eternal kingdom.

Moreover, since Christ's merits, as those of the first of all the predestined both in order and dignity, were prior to the predestination of men insofar as it is comparative and an election of one over another, there is no reason to deny that such merits moved God to choose one over another. Nor is it an objection that the election of the predestined to glory is called gratuitous in Scripture and the holy Fathers, and is reduced to the good pleasure of the divine will, and that, to explain this, the Apostle uses in the Epistle to the Romans the example of the potter and the clay, because no reason can be assigned on the part of the clay why from it one vessel should be formed unto honor and another unto dishonor. For this election is called gratuitous not in comparison with Christ, but in relation to us, because God chose us for glory without any preceding merits of ours. Hence, the example of the clay used by Paul proves only that no cause of the divine election can be assigned on our part; it does not prove that no reason for our election is given on Christ's part.

TREATISE II.
ON THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL.

After the Holy Doctor had discussed the mystery of the Incarnation at length, he treats in a fitting order of the sacraments, which, as he says in the prologue to the fourth book of the *Sentences ad Annibaldum*, are certain relics of the Lord's Incarnation and, as it were, vessels containing Christ's blood, springs of spiritual water leaping up unto eternal life, and finally those fountains of the Savior foretold by the prophet Isaiah in these words: *You shall draw waters with joy from the fountains of the Savior.* Before treating individually of each sacrament of the New Law, however, he first sets forth certain questions concerning the sacraments in general, explaining their essence, necessity, effects, and causes. We too shall discuss these matters briefly in this treatise, so far as possible.

CHAPTER I.
The Quiddity or Essence of a Sacrament in General.

1. I say first that a sacrament is essentially in the genus of sign. For it is essentially and primarily instituted to signify a sacred reality. Hence Dionysius and the other Fathers call the sacraments sacred signs and symbols, and the Councils of Florence and Trent explain the nature of the sacraments, especially those of the Old Law, precisely by the fact that they signify a sacred reality.

Since something can be called sacred in three ways, namely, formally, efficiently, and significatively, just as something can be called healthy either formally, from the health that exists in an animal; efficiently, from the power of causing health, as medicine or diet; or significatively, insofar as it is a sign and indication of health, as urine or the pulse, theologians principally attend to this last sense and use the word sacrament insofar as it implies the relation of a sign of holiness. Hence, the sacraments require some likeness of the external sign to the internal operation that they signify. For this reason Augustine says, epist. 23 to Boniface: *If the sacraments did not possess a certain likeness to the realities of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all.* Thus, washing with water bears a likeness to the washing away of sins effected by Baptism. For this reason the Greek Fathers customarily call the sacraments σύμβολα, because they have a species and form similar to the reality that they signify.

2. You will say: A sacrament is some sensible action or thing. Baptism, for example, is washing with elemental water. Therefore, it is not in the genus of sign, but in that of action or something similar.

I answer that a sacrament is an action or sensible thing instituted to signify a sacred reality. Therefore, it formally implies the relation of a sign and only materially the nature of an action or sensible thing.

You will insist: A sign formally taken is a being of reason fashioned by the mind. But it is absurd to say that the sacraments are beings of reason. Therefore, it is also absurd to say that they are signs.

I answer that, in common usage, a sign and every other concrete term supposes for its material element. Hence, the proposition "a sign is a being of reason" is altogether false, just as the proposition "a sacrament is a being of reason," stated absolutely, is false, because "sacrament" supposes for its material element, which is an action or sensible thing. I said "stated absolutely," because with an addition it is true to say that a sacrament is a being of reason formally.

3. I say second that a sacrament is not a natural sign, but a sign by convention and divine institution. For it is a sensible sign of grace and perfect holiness, as we shall demonstrate below. But no sensible thing signifies grace by its own nature, since grace is a supernatural form. Therefore, this signification must accrue to it through God's good pleasure and free institution.

4. I say third that it belongs to the nature of a sacrament that it be a sign permanently instituted by God in the Church. For since the sacraments are signs through which men are gathered into the unity of one religion, as Augustine says, just as religion is stable and permanent, so those signs must

also be stable. Hence, although, when Christ breathed upon the Apostles and said to them, *Receive the Holy Spirit*, this sensible ceremony was an instrument through which the Apostles received grace and the Holy Spirit, it was not a sacrament of the New Law, because it was not permanently instituted by Christ in the Church to signify grace.

5. I say fourth that it belongs to the nature of a sacrament to signify grace, not in just any manner, but practically, that is, as to be received in the actual use of the sacrament. For speculative signs of a sacred reality, such as crosses, images, and other things of this kind, are not sacraments. Hence St. Thomas, here, q. 60, a. 2, teaches that a sacrament is a sign of a sacred reality insofar as it sanctifies men. He therefore judges that a sacrament is a practical and not a merely speculative sign of sanctifying grace.

Hence, not all the sacrifices of the Old Law were sacraments, because, although they either petitioned for grace or prefigured it as to be given by Christ, they did not confer it practically. Similarly, the bronze serpent raised by Moses at God's command in the desert was not a true sacrament. Although it represented a sacred reality, namely, Christ crucified, it did not signify Christ as actually consecrating or sanctifying. For it was not employed so that some effect of sanctification might be received by those who used the sign, but only so that they might be healed from the bites of serpents, as St. Thomas teaches in IV *Sentences*, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 3.

6. I say fifth that the sacraments, from their genus, signify a sacred reality simply, that is, sanctifying grace, not imperfect or legal holiness. Thus St. Thomas, in the article cited, ad 3, asserts that only those things are sacraments which signify the perfection of human holiness, not those which signify a disposition toward it.

Reason also supports this. If any imperfect holiness, such as the legal holiness of the Jews, or even any disposition toward grace, sufficed for the nature of a sacrament, there would be innumerable sacraments both in the New and in the Old Law. For in the New Law, first tonsure is a sacred ceremony through which a man begins to be dedicated to divine worship, and therefore signifies a certain holiness. Likewise, holy water is also a sacred ceremony conferring a certain holiness upon the person to whom it is applied, insofar as it removes venial sins. Similarly, in the Old Law there were many ceremonies that caused and signified an imperfect and legal holiness, as is gathered from Heb. 9: *Only in foods and drinks and various washings and justices of the flesh.* Yet no one will say that all those ceremonies, washings, and justices of the flesh were sacraments.

This is confirmed. If the signification of any imperfect holiness sufficed for the nature of a sacrament, then, just as the Church can by her own

authority institute ceremonies that confer and signify such holiness, she could likewise by her own authority institute sacraments. The same must proportionately be said of the Synagogue. But the falsity of this will be evident from what is said below. Therefore, etc.

7. You will say: The sacraments of the Old Law did not cause grace, but only legal and imperfect holiness, which was proper to the state of the Mosaic Law. Therefore, it does not belong to the nature of a sacrament as such to signify the perfect holiness effected through grace.

I answer by denying the antecedent. Although the sacraments of the Old Law did not possess the power to produce grace, as do the sacraments of the New Law, they nevertheless moved and morally prompted God to give it to those who received them rightly, insofar as they were signs of Christ to come. Consequently, they were signs of grace and perfect holiness. We shall treat this more fully in the following treatise, when we discuss circumcision.

8. From what has been said, it follows first that the sacraments of the New and Old Laws agree univocally in the nature of a sign of grace, but not if they are considered as its causes.

The first part is evident. Although the sacraments of the New Law signify grace in a more perfect manner than those of the Old Law, this inequality does not remove univocity, just as, by analogy, the inequality with which man and horse participate in the nature of animal does not prevent it. I add that, just as the Old and New religions agree univocally in the nature of religion, so the sacraments, which are the symbols and, as it were, the pillars and exterior professions of those religions, must agree univocally, at least insofar as they are signs of a sacred reality.

9. That they agree only analogically when considered as causes of grace is evident from the fact that the sacraments of the New Law possess in themselves the power to produce grace, as will be evident below when we treat of their causality. The ancient sacraments lacked such power, and therefore are called by the Apostle empty and needy elements. They only morally prompted God to confer grace through the merits of Christ to come, whom they figured or represented. But true and metaphorical causality agree only analogically. Therefore, the sacraments of the New and Old Laws also agree only analogically if considered under the aspect of causes of grace. In this sense St. Thomas must be understood when he says in IV *Sentences*, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3, ad 5: *Sacrament is not divided into the sacraments of the Old and New Laws as a genus into its species, but as an analogous term into its parts.*

10. It follows second that a sacrament as such signifies three things, namely, Christ's Passion, grace, and glory. For, as the Holy Doctor argues here, a. 3, a sacrament is essentially a sign of our sanctification. In that

sanctification three things can be considered: the cause from which it proceeds, which is Christ's Passion; the form through which it is effected, which is sanctifying grace; and the ultimate end to which it is ordered, which is glory or eternal life. Therefore, a sacrament as such signifies these three things: Christ's Passion, grace, and glory.

It principally signifies grace, however, because a sacrament is essentially and primarily instituted to signify the formal and intrinsic cause of our sanctification. From this St. Thomas infers, at the end of the body of the same article, that the sacraments of the New Law are commemorative, demonstrative, and prognostic signs: commemorative of that which preceded, namely, Christ's Passion; demonstrative of that which is effected in us through Christ's Passion, namely, grace; and prognostic of that which is awaited in the future, namely, glory. Hence, in the office composed by the same saint for the venerable Sacrament of the Eucharist, the Church sings: *O sacred banquet, in which Christ is received, the memory of his Passion is renewed, the mind is filled with grace, and a pledge of future glory is given to us.*

11. It follows third that a sacrament is rightly defined as *a sign of a sacred reality sanctifying men*. By "sacred reality" is understood habitual grace as conferred in the actual use of the sacrament. By "sign" is understood a sign instituted by God, because, since it belongs to God alone to confer grace as principal cause, it belongs to him to institute signs infallibly signifying its conferral. It is also understood as a sign permanently instituted in the Church, because, according to Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XIX, c. 11, the sacraments are the principal ceremonies through which the people of God are united in one religion and distinguished from others, and consequently must endure as long as the form of religion for which they were instituted endures.

CHAPTER II.

The Intrinsic and Essential Parts of the Sacraments.

1. I say first that the sacraments consist of some sensible reality.

This truth, which depends upon God's will alone, cannot be demonstrated by reasons, but is explained by various considerations of fittingness. St. Thomas derives the first from God's gentle providence, which, as Dionysius says, accommodates itself to the natures of things. Since it is connatural to man to be led from the knowledge of sensible things to the knowledge of spiritual things, it follows that God most fittingly chose sensible realities as signs and sacraments of invisible realities. Hence

Gregory Nazianzen excellently says in his oration on Baptism: *A medicine partly corporeal and partly spiritual is most fittingly adapted to the sick whose nature consists of body and spirit.* And Chrysostom, hom. 83 on Matthew: *If you were incorporeal, he would have delivered to you the incorporeal gifts in their naked form; but because your soul is joined to a body, intelligible things are delivered to you in sensible things.* He has similar words in hom. 62.

The second consideration is derived from God's wisdom and omnipotence, which shine most brightly in the fact that sensible things become remedies and instruments of salvation, although they are very often occasions of sin. The third is derived from one of the ends of a sacrament, namely, that the faithful may be united into one visible body of the Church and distinguished from others. For the members of a visible body cannot be designated except by a visible or sensible sign.

2. You will ask whether the nature of a sensible sign is so essential to a sacrament that it is altogether repugnant for a sacrament to be instituted in some spiritual and insensible reality.

I answer affirmatively, if we are speaking of sacraments instituted for men, since every sign instituted by or for man must be sensible. Hence, a sign instituted for men is defined by Augustine, *De doctrina Christiana*, II: *A sign is that which, besides the appearance it presents to the senses, causes something else to enter into cognition.* From this he infers in epist. 23 to Boniface that, if the sacraments did not possess some likeness or representation of the realities of which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments at all, as we reported above.

I said "if we are speaking of sacraments instituted for men," because some not improbably think that there is no repugnance or contradiction in God's instituting some sacrament for angels, consisting in one of their operations, and elevating a purely interior act, for example, one of adoration, to signify and cause grace instrumentally, just as he can employ an interior motion of man as an instrument for working miracles, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 178, a. 1, ad 1. Hence, a sign taken universally, insofar as it abstracts from sensible and spiritual, angelic and human signs, must be defined or described as follows: a sign is that which, through or presupposing knowledge of itself, leads to the knowledge of another, whether the first knowledge pertains to sense or to intellect.

3. I say second that words properly or improperly so called are required in the sacraments of the New Law, but in the sacraments of the Old Law it was not necessary that words be added to the realities.

The first part is of faith, defined in the Council of Florence and in the Decree of Union, where the words by which each sacrament of the New Law

is perfected are set forth. St. Thomas explains it here, a. 6, through the following argument. The sacraments of the New Law can be considered in three ways: on the part of their cause, which is the Incarnate Word; on the part of man, who is the subject of the sacraments; and on the part of sacramental signification. Under all three aspects, they require that they be perfected by words together with realities, so that each may have a certain proportion and conformity with them. For Christ is composed of a sensible human nature and the Divine Word hypostatically united to it. Man also consists of a sensible body and a spiritual soul. Finally, sacramental signification is accomplished more perfectly by words than by sensible things, for words hold the principal place in signifying, as Augustine says in *De doctrina Christiana*, II, c. 3.

I said that words properly or improperly so called are required in the sacraments of the New Law because, in the sacraments of Penance and Matrimony, gestures or other signs that take the place of words and are equivalent to vocal expressions sometimes suffice.

4. The second part, which asserts that it was not necessary in the sacraments of the Old Law for words to be added to the realities, is proved from the fact that we manifest a present reality more clearly than a future one. But the sacraments of the Old Law foretold Christ to come, and therefore did not signify Christ as expressly as the sacraments of the New Law. It was consequently unnecessary that words, which, as we saw from Augustine above, hold the principal place among men in signifying, should be added to the realities in those sacraments. Hence, in the Old Testament, when the sacraments are mentioned, no words are prescribed by which they are to be perfected, as in Gen. 17, when the rite of circumcision is treated; Exod. 12, when the sacrifice of the paschal lamb is commanded; and Lev. 8, when the rite of ordination is mentioned.

5. I say third that the sacraments of the New Law consist of realities and words as matter and form, and as intrinsic and essential parts.

The first part is evident from the Council of Florence, which asserts that the sacraments of the New Law are perfected by realities as matter and by words as form. It is explained by St. Thomas here, a. 7, through this argument. Matter is that which is determined by another. Thus, in natural things matter is determined by form to one species, such as man or lion; and in artifacts figure is the form, because it determines the thing to one artificial species, for example, a house or chair. Hence, since the sensible realities in the sacraments are determined by words to one artifact, as it were, namely, a sign of grace, the words must possess the character of form and the sensible realities must possess the character of matter.

6. You will say: Matter and form must exist simultaneously in those things composed of them. But in the sacraments of the New Law the realities and words need not necessarily exist simultaneously. Therefore, the sacraments of the New Law are not composed of realities and words as matter and form. The minor premise is proved, for in the sacrament of Baptism, for example, the reality, namely, the washing, can precede the words, and conversely the words can precede the washing.

I answer that, although in substantial composites matter and form must exist together with physical simultaneity, in successive and artificial things, such as the sacraments, moral simultaneity is sufficient.

7. The second part, which asserts that the realities and words in the sacraments of the New Law are intrinsic and essential parts, is supported by this argument. Since the sacraments are essentially practical signs of grace, those things which of themselves concur simultaneously and necessarily in the sacraments to signify and effect grace are their intrinsic and essential parts. But both the realities and the words in the sacraments of the New Law concur simultaneously and necessarily in signifying and causing grace. Therefore, they are intrinsic and essential parts of the sacraments of the New Law. The major premise is evident, and the minor also appears manifest, for without the realities the words do not practically signify grace, nor do the realities without the words. From both together there arises one thing that signifies and infallibly causes grace.

8. It must nevertheless be observed that, since the Sacrament of the Eucharist does not consist in its use but in a permanent reality, namely, the consecrated species insofar as they contain Christ's body and blood, matter and form are not its intrinsic parts except in its becoming, that is, in the actual consecration of the matter, not in its completed state. For when grace is infused and the sacrament is received in Holy Communion, the words have long since passed away. They therefore cannot, together with the Eucharistic species, constitute the permanent sacrament as intrinsic parts. This will be explained more fully when we discuss the essence of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

9. I say fourth that all the matters and forms of the sacraments were instituted by God or by Christ, but not every one of them according to species. Some were instituted only according to genus and were to be determined according to species by the Apostles or the Church.

10. The first part of this assertion is certain. The matters and forms of the sacraments were determined by the one who instituted the sacraments, for one is said to institute the sacraments who institutes their matter and form, of which they essentially consist. But we recognize no author of the

sacraments other than God with respect to the ancient sacraments, and Christ with respect to the new. Therefore, all the matters and forms of the sacraments were instituted either by God or by Christ. This will become more evident when we explain the matter and form of each sacrament.

11. The second part is evident first in the sacrament of the law of nature instituted for children to remove original sin. No fixed matter was determined by God for it in species, but only in genus, under the aspect of a sensible sign professing divine worship and religion, as will be evident below.

It is also evident in certain sacraments of the New Law, especially the Sacrament of Order. The Greek Church employs as the matter in sacred orders only the imposition of hands, and as the form these words: *Divine grace, which heals what is weak, promotes this subdeacon to the diaconate, and this deacon to the priesthood.* The Latin Church, however, in the subdiaconate employs as matter the presentation of an empty chalice with an empty paten and of the book of Epistles, and as form these words: *Receive the book of Epistles and the power of reading them in the Church of God, etc.* In the diaconate, the presentation of the book of the Gospels is employed as matter, and as form these words: *Receive the power of reading the Gospel in the Church of God, etc.* In the priesthood, the presentation of the paten with a host and of the chalice with wine is employed as matter, and as form these words: *Receive the power of offering sacrifice to God, etc.*

Since the Church cannot err concerning the substantial matters and forms of the sacraments, and the manner of conferring orders used by the Greek Church is valid and approved by the Roman Church, it must be said that no matter or form in species was determined by Christ for this sacrament, but only in genus under the aspect of some sensible sign expressing the power conferred through Order. We shall treat this more fully when discussing the Sacrament of Order.

CHAPTER III.
On the Existence or Necessity of the Sacraments.

1. Since man can be considered in four states, namely, the state of innocence, the state of the law of nature, the state of the written or Mosaic Law, and the state after Christ's advent, or under the New and Evangelical Law, the existence or necessity of the sacraments must be investigated with respect to all these states. As regards the state of glory, however, it is evident that it

is not capable of sacraments, because where the clear reality is present, the shadow of every sign flees.

2. I say first, therefore, that no sacrament was in fact instituted in the state of innocence.

This conclusion appears certain, both because no trace exists in Scripture or the Fathers of the institution of sacraments for the state of innocence, and because in the very brief time during which the state of innocence endured in our first parents, there could scarcely have been occasion for any sacrament. Sacraments are principally required to perfect men in grace and knowledge. But our first parents were created perfect in both. Therefore, in that most happy state in which they were created, they needed no sacraments.

Hence, neither Adam's marriage with Eve nor the tree of life was truly and properly a sacrament. Although they bore the type and figure of a sacred reality, namely, the union of Christ with the Church and the Sacrament of the Eucharist, they were not at that time instituted by God as practical signs of grace and human sanctification. Hence, when the Apostle calls the marriage of Adam and Eve *a great sacrament*, and when Augustine, speaking of the tree of life, says that for Adam *the other trees were nourishment, but this one was a sacrament*, they use the name sacrament in a broad sense, as signifying the same as mystery.

3. You will ask whether, if Adam had not sinned and he and his posterity had persevered in the state of innocence, sacraments would have been instituted by God by virtue of the present decree.

I answer negatively. First, because the state of innocence would have been the same in Adam persevering and in his posterity not sinning as it was in fact before Adam sinned. Therefore, if no sacrament was in fact instituted in the state of innocence because of the perfection of that state, none would have been instituted if that state had endured.

Second, just as, if Adam had not sinned, the Word would not have become incarnate, as the Fathers testify after Scripture, because, although many considerations of fittingness for his coming could be proposed even if sin did not exist, nevertheless the principal and sole end of the Incarnation expressed in Sacred Tradition is redemption from sin, and therefore we assert that the Word would not have become incarnate if Adam had not sinned; so in the present matter, because the sacraments, by virtue of the decree God in fact made, are spiritual medicines instituted by Christ our Redeemer and physician as remedies for sin, they would not by virtue of that decree have been instituted in any manner for the state of integrity and health, since they would have been entirely useless and superfluous for that

state. For those who are well do not need a physician, but those who are ill. Hence Augustine, sermon 9 on the words of the Apostle: *Remove diseases, remove wounds, and there will be no reason for medicine.*

4. You will say first: Although there would have been no original sin in the state of innocence, there could have been some actual sins. For even if the first parent had not sinned, some of his descendants could have sinned. Therefore, some sacrament would have been instituted for those who sinned, through which they might recover the grace they had lost.

But to the contrary: The sacraments by their institution are not ordered as remedies for every possible sin, but only for original sin or actual sin proceeding from original sin. For since they are instituted only to convey and apply Christ's merits to us, they are instituted only as remedies for that sin which Christ's merits avail to remove, or for the removal of which Christ became incarnate and died. But Christ became incarnate and died only as a remedy for original sin and actual sin proceeding from it, as was demonstrated in the preceding treatise, c. 3. Therefore, since in the state of innocence, if Adam had not sinned, there would have been no original sin and consequently no actual sin proceeding from original sin, no sacrament would then have existed by virtue of the present decree, even if some of Adam's posterity had sinned. Hence, those who sinned would not have recovered grace through sacraments, but through acts of charity and contrition, which, because of their more perfect knowledge of God, they could have elicited more easily in that state than we can.

5. You will say second: The Sacrament of the Eucharist was not instituted as a remedy for original or actual sin, but to cause an increase of grace. Therefore, at least this sacrament would have existed in the state of innocence if that state had endured in Adam and his posterity.

But to the contrary, first: The Eucharist presupposes that Christ would come in passible flesh, because it contains him as such, at least according to the manner in which it was instituted by virtue of the present decree. Therefore, since Christ's coming in passible flesh depends upon sin, as all admit, the Eucharist also cannot fail to presuppose sin, at least according to the manner in which it was instituted and by virtue of the present decree.

Second: The Eucharist, under the aspect of an unbloody sacrifice, was instituted to represent the bloody sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore, it was instituted because of Christ's death upon the Cross and on the supposition of sin. Likewise, under the aspect of a sacrament it was instituted after the manner of spiritual food. Just as bodily food is especially necessary to preserve and repair substance lost through natural heat, so this spiritual food was principally instituted to preserve and repair grace lost through the

ardor of concupiscence left by original sin. Hence, the Eucharist was instituted not only after the manner of food but also after the manner of a preservative medicine, to assist our frailty and preserve us from frequent falls.

Nor is it an objection that it is a sacrament of the living and was instituted to increase grace. It was not instituted to increase original grace or justice, but regenerative or healing grace, which is first conferred upon us through the sacrament of Baptism or Penance.

6. I say second that, under the law of nature, some remedy was instituted by God for the justification of children, and that this remedy was a true sacrament.

The first part is certain. God has a will to save all men, which comprehends not only adults but also children, as Augustine teaches in *Contra Julianum*, IV, c. 8. This is also evident because otherwise Christ would not be the Redeemer of all children, since his redemption does not extend objectively beyond the general will God has for men's salvation, as it is commanded by that will. But through this will sufficient means of salvation are prepared for all according to the capacity of each; otherwise, the will would not be true and sincere. Hence St. Thomas, in I *Sentences*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, says: *The effect of this will is the very ordering toward the end of salvation and the advancement toward that end, universally proposed to all through both natural and gratuitous means.* Therefore, in every law and state of nature, God had to prepare a sufficient remedy for the salvation and justification of children, or for their cleansing from original sin.

Hence, the author of De cardinalibus Christi operibus among the works of Cyprian says: Certainly, original sin, which flowed from the first parents into the whole succession of the human race, had to be expiated at all times by some remedies. And Augustine, Contra Julianum, V, c. 6: It must not be believed that, before circumcision was given, God's servants, since faith in the Mediator to come in the flesh was present in them, assisted their children through no sacrament of his, although Scripture willed for some necessary reason to conceal what that sacrament was.

7. The second part, which asserts that this remedy instituted by God under the law of nature for the justification of children was a true sacrament, is demonstrated as follows. That remedy was external and sensible, not purely internal and spiritual. Therefore, it was a true sacrament. The consequence is evident, because for the true nature of a sacrament it is sufficient that it be a sensible and practical sign of sanctifying grace.

The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in several ways. First, that remedy of the law of nature had to be applied to children for them to attain salvation. But there is no fitting application among men and in a human manner if it is made through a purely internal act and not through some external operation. Second, when children were justified under the law of nature, they were united to the Church of the faithful. But men are not united under the name of any religion without fellowship in visible sacraments, as Augustine says. Therefore, the remedy through which children were justified under the law of nature was external and sensible, not purely internal and spiritual. Third, the Church has always been visible. Therefore, that through which children became members of the Church under the law of nature was also visible. Fourth, circumcision succeeded the remedy of the law of nature for the justification of children under the written Law, and Baptism succeeded it under the New Law. Therefore, just as these remedies are external and sensible, so that remedy was sensible. Finally, it is fitting that, just as Christ redeemed men not through a divine or interior operation alone, but through the sensible and exterior shedding of blood and death on the Cross, so men, consisting of body and spirit, should not be sanctified without some sensible sign through which they externally profess faith in Christ the Savior.

Hence, the remedy through which children were justified in the state of the law of nature was some external act professing faith in the Messiah to come. For just as God decreed to save no adult without his own faith in Christ, according to Acts 4: *For there is no other name under heaven given to men in which we must be saved*, so he decreed to justify no child without the faith of the parents or of another person in Christ.

8. This sign professing faith in the Messiah to come was not determined by God in species, but only in genus, being left to the person applying it to determine it in species and individually. First, because this was fitting for that state, in which God directed men to salvation without any positive law, through the interior instinct of grace and private revelation alone. Second, because for the true nature of a sacrament it is sufficient that it be a practical sign of grace instituted by God only according to its generic nature. This is evident from the matter of the chalice, which is not this or that wine determined in species, but wine from the vine in general; and from the matter of Matrimony, which is not a contract clothed with these or those circumstances, but any legitimate contract confirmed under whatever conditions. Order also, as we said above, was not instituted by Christ with a fixed and determinate matter or form, but only in genus under the aspect of a sign expressing the power conferred through Order.

9. I say third that under the law of nature there was some sacrament for adults to remove actual sins. This assertion is gathered from what was said in the preceding paragraph. Divine providence had to prepare a remedy for removing actual sins no less than one for removing original sin, since God has an antecedent will to save all men, whether children or adults, and through that will the means or remedies of salvation are prepared for men. But the remedy instituted under the law of nature for removing actual sins had to be no less sensible than the remedy instituted under the same law for removing original sin, since the arguments proving this of the one also support it of the other. Therefore, under the law of nature there was some sensible remedy for removing actual sins, and consequently some sacrament instituted for adults as a remedy for actual sins.

Hence St. Thomas, in IV Sentences, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2: Before the written Law there were certain sacraments of necessity, such as that sacrament of faith which was ordered to the removal of original sin, and likewise that of penance, which was ordered to the removal of actual sin.

10. Observe, however, that the sacrament instituted under the law of nature for removing actual sins was not of the same nature as that instituted by Christ under the law of grace. It was not performed in the same manner, namely, through the vocal confession of sins to priests, because the ceremonies under the law of nature and the Mosaic Law ordered to the remission of actual sins were of a different nature from ours.

11. I say fourth that there were many sacraments under the Mosaic Law. This is evident from the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union and from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 2, where they speak of the sacraments of the Old Law as several and call them sacraments in the plural. St. Thomas reduces them to four in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 102, a. 5: circumcision, to which Baptism succeeded; the paschal lamb, which was a figure of the Eucharist; purifications, to which Penance corresponded; and the consecration of the high priest and priests, to which Order corresponds.

Nothing in the Old Law corresponded to Confirmation and Extreme Unction, because the former is the sacrament of the fullness of grace, which is proper to the Evangelical Law, while the latter is an immediate preparation for glory, the entrance to which was closed under the Old Law. Matrimony was not a sacrament under the Old Law, because the union of the humanity with the Word, of which it is a symbol, had not yet taken place, but it existed only for the office of nature. Hence, at that time a bill of divorce was permitted.

12. I say lastly that under the New Law there are seven sacraments instituted by Christ. This truth is defined in the Councils of Florence and

Trent and is illustrated by the following argument of St. Thomas here, q. 65, a. 1.

The sacraments are signs through which the perfection of spiritual life is signified. There is a certain conformity between spiritual and bodily life. Hence, just as man is perfected bodily in relation to himself and in relation to the community, so also in spiritual life. In relation to himself, he is perfected in four ways: first, through generation; second, through growth; third, through nourishment; fourth, through the removal of impediments to life, such as sickness or weakness left by disease. In relation to the community, he is perfected in two ways: first, by receiving the power of governing the multitude and exercising public acts; second, through propagation.

Similarly, therefore, man is perfected in spiritual life through seven sacraments. First, he is regenerated through Baptism. Second, he is strengthened through Confirmation. Third, he is nourished through the Eucharist. Fourth, he is healed from sins through Penance. Fifth, he is freed from the remnants of sins through Extreme Unction. Sixth, he receives the power to exercise public and hierarchical acts through Order. Finally, through Matrimony he is disposed to propagation according to the law of God and Christ.

CHAPTER IV.
On Sacramental Grace.

There are two effects of the sacraments. One is primary and principal, namely, grace. The other is secondary and less principal, namely, the character produced through Baptism, Confirmation, and Order. We shall treat of the first in this chapter and of the second in the following chapter.

§ 1.
Two Points Are Premised That Are Certain Among All Catholics.

1. First, it is a dogma of faith that the sacraments of the New Law not only arouse the faith through which grace is produced, but also cause grace itself. This truth is defined by the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union, where it is said that the sacraments of the Old Law differ from ours in this: *those did not cause grace, but only figured it as to be given through Christ's*

Passion; ours, however, contain grace and confer it upon those who receive them worthily. The Council of Trent teaches the same, sess. 6, can. 6 and 8.

There are also many testimonies of the Fathers in evident confirmation of this truth, which will be more fittingly examined below when we discuss the manner in which the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. The foundation is divine institution manifested by revelation. The fittingness is that, once the price of our redemption had been paid through Christ's Passion, the remedy for our salvation should be applied more certainly, efficaciously, and easily. I add that, if the sacraments of the New Law merely aroused faith but did not confer the grace by which we are justified, Baptism would be conferred upon children in vain, since they are incapable of acts of faith. It ought rather to be conferred upon the bystanders, since they would receive fruit from the arousal of faith through this sacrament.

2. It is also certain by faith that the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace by virtue of the rite performed. This is defined in the Council of Trent cited above in these words: *If anyone says that grace is not conferred through the sacraments of the New Law themselves by virtue of the rite performed, let him be anathema.*

Reason also supports this. To cause grace by virtue of the rite performed is to cause it by virtue of the work already accomplished and completed by Christ, not by the merit of the one confecting, administering, or receiving the sacrament. But the sacraments of the New Law cause grace not by the merit of the minister or recipient, but by the merit of Christ's Passion already accomplished and by the power and efficacy communicated to them by Christ. Therefore, they cause it by virtue of the rite performed.

I add that either they confer grace without any disposition required in the subject, as in children, or, if they require some disposition, as in adults, they do not confer grace according to the proportion of that disposition. This is either because such a disposition does not suffice for grace, as attrition does not suffice for grace remitting guilt, or because it does not suffice for so much grace as is conferred by the power of the sacrament. For more grace is conferred upon a just but attrite person through the Sacrament of Penance than would be conferred without it.

Nor should heretics ridicule and mock as barbarous and unusual this manner of speaking employed by the Scholastics to explain the efficacy of the sacraments. As Augustine says on Ps. 138: *It is better for the grammarians to rebuke us than for the people not to understand.* Moreover, Innocent III, *De sacro altaris mysterio*, III, c. 5, employed this manner of speaking before all the Scholastics, saying: *Although the performing work is sometimes unclean, the work performed is nevertheless always clean.*

3. These points are certain and indubitable among all Catholics. But a grave difficulty and celebrated controversy concerns the manner in which the sacraments of the New Law produce grace, namely, whether they do so instrumentally and physically, or only morally. We shall resolve this in the following section.

§ 2.
The Physical Causality of the Sacraments of the New Law Is Established.

4. This can first be demonstrated from the holy Fathers, who, in order to explain the efficiency and causality of the sacraments of the New Law, employ various comparisons that designate more than moral causality. St. Leo says that Baptism is like the virginal womb from which Christ was born. Chrysostom compares it to the womb in which a man is conceived. Gregory of Nyssa compares it to the seed from which one is generated. Cyril of Alexandria compares it to boiling water which, having been heated by fire, burns no less than the fire itself. Finally, St. Thomas, here, q. 62, a. 1, teaches that, just as an axe makes a bed, so a sacrament effects grace.

If the holy Fathers recognized in the sacraments no physical and real causality, but only moral and metaphorical causality, they ought not to have employed such magnificent examples, but others of a different nature, such as a written bond, a seal, or a purse filled with money, which the adversaries employ. For brevity, we do not report the Fathers' words here, because they can be seen in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, where we examined them at length.

5. This is confirmed. The holy Fathers teach that the sacraments operate through a power intrinsic to them and derived from the Holy Spirit. St. Augustine, in a sermon on the Epiphany, says that this power is subtler than dew, that it passes through the hidden causes of life and penetrates all the secret places of the conscience. Tertullian, in *De baptismo*, asserts that this power is absorbed into the sacraments: *The Spirit comes from heaven,* he says, *and remains over the waters of Baptism, sanctifying them from himself; and, thus sanctified, they absorb the power of sanctifying.* St. Thomas, here, a. 3, teaches that it is *flowing and incomplete*.

But these things can be verified only of a physical power, not of a moral one. Since the latter is a mere being of reason or extrinsic denomination, who would say that it is subtler than dew, is absorbed or imbibed into baptismal water, or possesses a flowing and incomplete existence?

Therefore, the holy Fathers recognize in the sacraments of the New Law a physical power productive of grace.

6. This is further confirmed from Augustine, tract. 80 on John, who exclaims: *What great power water possesses, that it touches the body and washes the heart!* But if the sacraments of the New Law concurred in the production of grace and the sanctification of men only morally, and were merely signs and written instruments morally moving and prompting God to produce grace, such an exclamation and wonder would be altogether absurd, inept, and childish. For it is common and customary among men that, by virtue of a written instrument, a royal seal impressed in wax, or other sensible signs, offices, dignities, money, and other things of great importance are conferred. Therefore, according to Augustine's mind and teaching, the sacraments of the New Law concur instrumentally and physically in causing grace.

Hence the Catechismus Romanus, published by order of Pius V, part II, chapter 1 of the Creed, weighing this celebrated expression of the great Augustine, writes: How so great and admirable a reality is effected through a sacrament, so that, according to the celebrated saying of St. Augustine, water touches the body and washes the heart, cannot be comprehended by human reason and understanding. For it must be held as certain that no sensible reality is endowed by its own nature with such power that it can penetrate to the soul. But by the light of faith we know that the power of almighty God is present in the sacraments, by which they effect what natural realities themselves cannot accomplish by their own power.

In these words, first, the real and physical efficiency of the sacraments is expressed most clearly. Second, it is explained that this opinion must not be rejected because it is not so easily understood as the opinion attributing only moral causality to them. Third, Augustine's passage just cited is adduced to establish it. Finally, in giving the reason why this efficiency of the sacraments cannot be so easily understood by the natural light, it says that this is because no sensible reality is by its own nature endowed with such power that it can penetrate to the soul. This reason, as is evident, applies only to a physical instrument, since moral instruments need in no way touch the subject in which the principal cause's effect is produced.

7. The same truth can further be supported by several arguments. The first can be proposed as follows. The sacraments of the New Law truly and properly effect sacramental grace as instruments of divine power, and cause it in a nobler and more perfect manner than the ancient sacraments. But neither will be true if they cause grace only morally. Therefore, physical causality must be admitted in the sacraments of the New Law.

The major premise is evident. The minor, as to the first part, is demonstrated as follows. Moral causality is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical, and pertains more to the genus of final than efficient causality. For it takes place through the manifestation of a goodness which by its fittingness attracts someone's will to give or do something, as philosophers teach. Therefore, if the sacraments of the New Law cause sacramental grace not physically but only morally, they will not truly and properly effect it, but only improperly and metaphorically. Consequently, they will not be true and proper instruments of God or Christ for causing it, since a true and proper instrument pertains to the genus of efficient causality.

The minor is also proved as to the second part. Moral causality was not lacking in the sacraments of the Old Law. Since they were signs and figures of Christ's future Passion, in consideration of which God conferred grace under the Old Law, they possessed a certain moral power of moving and prompting God to confer grace upon the ancient Fathers because of Christ's future Passion and merits. Therefore, if no power is attributed to the sacraments of the New Law other than this moral and prompting power, it is manifest that they are not elevated above the ancient sacraments, nor do they differ from them as to the manner of causing, but only on the part of the thing caused, namely, the greater and more abundant grace caused by the sacraments of the New Law because they signify Christ's Passion as past, whereas the ancient sacraments represented it only as future.

8. Nor is it a valid reply to say that the ancient sacraments did not confer present grace or confer it by virtue of the rite performed, as the sacraments of the New Law do. Apart from the fact that many deny this of circumcision, even granting it, the difference on the part of sacramental causality handed down by the councils is not apparent, namely, that the ancient sacraments simply and absolutely did not cause grace, while ours simply and absolutely effect it.

As St. Thomas argues in *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 4, the fact that grace is now given by virtue of the rite performed pertains to the condition of the time, not precisely to the efficacy of the sacraments. Hence, if the same things that are now sacraments had been sacraments formerly, they would not have conferred grace by virtue of the rite performed; and conversely, if the ancient sacraments now existed, they would confer grace by virtue of the rite performed. Therefore, since the councils recognize the prerogative of the sacraments of the New Law from their causality, it must be measured not from the conferral of grace by virtue of the rite performed, but from a real and physical manner of operation.

9. The second argument is indicated by St. Thomas, *Quodlibeta* XII, a. 15, in these words: *Just as Christ's flesh possessed instrumental power to work miracles because of its conjunction with the Word, so the sacraments possess it through their continuity with Christ crucified and suffering.* But Christ's flesh, from its conjunction with the Word, possessed a physical instrumental power to work miracles, as we demonstrated in the treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore, a physical instrumental power productive of grace must not be denied to the sacraments of the New Law.

10. The third argument is derived from the form of the sacraments, which will not be properly and strictly true if only moral causality is recognized in them, especially the form of the Sacrament of Penance, which is given after the manner of a judicial sentence. For a judge absolves the accused by himself; he does not move and induce another to absolve him. But an instrumental moral cause does nothing except move and induce the principal cause to operate. Therefore, the form of Penance will not be properly and strictly true if only moral causality is admitted.

11. Finally, the same truth can be supported by this argument. Physical causality must not be denied to the sacraments of the New Law if it is possible and involves no contradiction. But it is possible and involves no contradiction. Therefore, it must not be denied to the sacraments of the New Law.

The major premise is evident, first, because physically conferring grace contributes to the greater dignity of the sacraments and the manifestation of God's omnipotence. Second, because, once this causality is admitted, the passages of the Fathers and councils, the difference between the sacraments of the two laws, and the manner in which the new excel the old are explained with complete propriety. A just proportion and conformity is also preserved in the instruments of our salvation, namely, Christ's humanity and the sacraments, which are related as a conjoined and separated instrument, or as the hand and a staff.

The minor premise, besides becoming evident from the resolution of the objections, can be explained by this example. Infernal fire, although corporeal, is nevertheless elevated to produce a spiritual effect, namely, true pain impressed upon demons and the souls of the damned, as was demonstrated in the treatise on the angels. Why, then, could a corporeal sacrament, moved and elevated by God, not instrumentally and physically effect sanctifying grace, so that it serves the divine goodness as fire serves divine justice? Just as Augustine says in *De civitate Dei*, XXI, c. 10, that the fire of hell torments demons *in wondrous but true ways*, so likewise we can say that the sacraments of the New Law produce grace and sanctify souls in a

wondrous but true manner, namely, instrumentally and physically, as we explained above from the *Catechismus Romanus*.

§ 3.
The Objections Are Resolved.

12. You will object first: Physical causality is impossible in the sacraments of the New Law. Therefore, it must not be admitted. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved first: A corporeal thing cannot physically produce a spiritual thing. But a sacrament is corporeal, while grace is spiritual. Therefore, it is repugnant for a sacrament physically to produce grace.

If you say that the corporeal sacrament is elevated by divine power to produce grace, I reply: Is this power spiritual or corporeal? If corporeal, it remains disproportionate. If spiritual, it cannot be received in a corporeal subject. For just as a corporeal accident is not received in a spiritual substance, neither is a spiritual accident received in a corporeal subject.

The antecedent is proved second: That which does not exist cannot physically produce anything. But when the sacraments produce grace, they are nothing. Therefore, they cannot physically cause it. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Grace is not conferred except at the instant extrinsically terminating the words and the sacramental action, because only at that instant do these possess complete signification and consequently their ultimate perfection in sacramental being, before which they cannot cause. But at that instant the sacraments are nothing, since the sacramental action and the successive utterance of the words have already passed. Therefore, when the sacraments produce grace, they are nothing.

This is confirmed. A sacrament received with an obstacle causes grace when the obstacle is removed. But when the obstacle is removed, the sacrament has long ceased to exist. Therefore, it causes grace when it no longer exists.

13. I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof, I say with St. Thomas, here, q. 62, a. 4, ad 1, that a spiritual power exists in the sacrament which, since it is an incomplete and transient quality, can be received in a corporeal subject. Thus, the rational soul, because it is an incomplete form, is received in a body.

There is a disparity between a spiritual and a corporeal accident. A corporeal accident requires an extended subject and is not received in substance except through quantity, and therefore cannot be received in a

spiritual subject. But an incomplete and transient spiritual accident, since it exists more for the sake of its term than for the sake of its subject, need not be proportioned to the subject in the same manner. Hence, it can supernaturally be received in a corporeal subject.

14. You will insist and say: Since every accident possesses existence from the subject in which it is received, if a spiritual accident is received in a corporeal subject, its existence will be corporeal. But this is repugnant, since existence must be proportioned to the subject that it actualizes. Therefore, the former is also repugnant.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. Although a spiritual accident is received in a corporeal subject, it is not received in it precisely insofar as the subject is formally corporeal, but insofar as it is a being and a created substance. For it is received in it only by reason of the passive obediential potency that belongs to created things under the general aspect of being and created substance, not precisely under the aspect of body. Hence, although a spiritual accident is received in a corporeal subject by reason of this potency, its existence need not be corporeal.

To the second proof of the principal antecedent, I answer by distinguishing the major premise in two ways. That which does not exist and did not exist immediately before cannot physically produce anything: I grant the major premise. That which does not exist but did exist immediately before cannot physically produce anything: I further distinguish. I grant this of things that act as the principle which and are permanent beings, but deny it of successive beings and things that act only as the principle by which. For it belongs to the nature of a successive action that, if a term is produced through it, that term does not exist until the successive action itself has ceased. This is evident in the common teaching of Thomists concerning alteration that immediately disposes matter for the introduction of a substantial form. As long as the alteration endures, the form is not introduced, but results at the final instant terminating it, at which it is true to say: the alteration now for the first time does not exist, and immediately before it did exist. Similarly, a permanent state is not attained through local motion until that motion has been completed, namely, at the instant extrinsically terminating it, at which it is true to say: local motion does not now exist, and immediately before it did exist. Since sacramental actions are successive and are assumed as the causalities of ministers applying the sacraments, sacramental grace ought not to be produced while those actions exist, but when it is true to say that they existed immediately before.

15. Second, I distinguish the major premise in another manner. That which exists neither in itself nor in its power cannot physically produce

anything: I grant the major premise. That which does not exist in itself but exists in its power cannot physically produce anything: I deny the major premise.

At the instant extrinsically terminating the sacramental motion, its power remains because the term produced through it remains, in which the power productive of grace is received. Such a term is the final state of having been changed, which is measured by that instant extrinsically terminating the motion.

16. To the confirmation, I say that, when sacraments that do not imprint a character are received with an obstacle and afterward produce grace when the obstacle is removed, in that extraordinary case they do not physically cause grace, but only morally, because they neither exist nor existed immediately before, nor do they remain in themselves or in their power.

I said "sacraments that do not imprint a character," because, if we are speaking of those that imprint a character, it can probably be said that they physically produce grace when the obstacle is removed. Although they do not then exist formally in themselves, they nevertheless exist in their power, namely, in the character, which is then elevated by God to cause grace. St. Thomas expressly teaches this in IV *Sentences*, dist. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qa. 3: *In Baptism a character is imprinted which is an immediate cause disposing for grace. Therefore, since the obstacle does not remove the character, when the obstacle that impeded the character's effect is removed, the character present in the soul begins to exercise its effect, and thus Baptism obtains its effect when the obstacle is removed.*

17. You will object second: Since Christ's Passion has already passed, it does not physically cause grace in men who are justified, but only morally and meritoriously. Therefore, neither do the sacraments of the New Law, which possess their whole power of operating and causing from it.

I answer first by denying the antecedent. Granting that Christ's Passion, while it was being enacted, caused grace in men only morally and meritoriously, it cannot nevertheless be denied, according to St. Thomas's position, that the Passion in its completed state, that is, Christ's humanity by reason of the fact that it suffered upon the Cross and was wounded, the scars of which wounds still remain in it, operates physically. For it is the conjoined instrument of the divinity, which the Divine Word employs to cause grace physically, while a sacrament is a separated instrument, just as the hand is a man's conjoined instrument and a staff a separated one.

I answer second, granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Nothing prevents a moral cause from employing a physical instrument, just as one commanding or counseling a murder employs a minister who really

and physically kills a man. Christ could therefore through his Passion merit that the divine power productive of grace should be derived into the sacraments of the New Law, through which they operate physically.

18. You will object third: Every physical instrument must possess of itself a prior action through which it operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent, as our Thomists teach in philosophy. But the sacraments do not possess such a prior dispositive action, because, since they are corporeal, they cannot by their own powers operate dispositively toward God's effect, namely, grace. Therefore, they are not physical instruments.

I answer that every physical instrument must indeed possess of itself some prior action. Supernatural instruments, however, differ from natural ones in this: natural instruments must always possess a prior action through which they dispositively operate toward the effect of the principal agent, whereas for supernatural instruments a prior action is sufficient through which they become capable of being elevated, or are rendered ultimately capable and disposed to receive God's motion. It is not required that this action produce in the subject something disposing it for grace or another supernatural effect.

For God differs from natural agents in this: when natural agents assume instruments, they employ only those possessing a prior action proportioned to the effect of the principal agent, or producing in the subject something disposing it toward such an effect. A craftsman, for example, does not employ a brush to make a bench, but a saw or axe, because these possess of themselves the power to divide wood, which is a disposition toward the form of a bench. But God, because he is an agent of infinite power, does not always choose such instruments, but indifferently employs any creature, although its prior action is disproportionate to the effect to be produced.

I deny, therefore, that a prior action in the manner explained is not found in the sacraments of the New Law. Baptismal water, for example, washes the body in order to cleanse the heart. The priest pronounces words in order to heal the soul. Sacred anointing anoints the body in order to strengthen the soul, and so with the others.

19. You will object lastly: It belongs to the nature of a physical instrument immediately to touch the subject in which the principal cause's effect is to be produced. But the sacraments do not always do this, both because they are frequently locally distant from the man who receives them, and because, since they are corporeal, they cannot immediately touch the rational soul in which grace is produced. Therefore, they are not physical instruments for its production.

I answer first that, granting that natural or artificial instruments must immediately touch the subject in which the principal cause's effect is produced, instruments of divine power such as the sacraments can nevertheless act at a distance, because God, who is the principal cause of grace and miracles, is intimately present to all things.

I answer second by distinguishing the major premise. It belongs to the nature of a physical instrument immediately to touch the subject by contact of the suppositum or thing: I deny the major premise. By contact of power and causality: I grant the major premise. The sacraments immediately touch the rational soul by contact of power and causality, although not by immediacy of the suppositum. St. Thomas teaches the same concerning Christ's Passion above, q. 48, a. 9, ad 2, saying: *Although Christ's Passion is corporeal, it nevertheless possesses spiritual power from the united divinity, and therefore obtains efficacy through spiritual contact.*

§ 4.
What Grace Do the Sacraments of the New Law Cause: First or Second Grace?

20. Theologians distinguish a twofold sanctifying grace, first and second. That grace is called first which is first infused into a subject not yet possessing any degree of sanctifying grace and therefore existing in mortal sin. That grace is called second which comes to a subject already pleasing and sanctified, or which presupposes and increases the former grace.

They likewise customarily distinguish two kinds of sacraments: sacraments of the dead and sacraments of the living. Sacraments of the dead are those instituted for persons spiritually dead through the death of sin, namely, Baptism and Penance, which give life to one dead through original or actual sin. Sacraments of the living are those that presuppose spiritual life in the soul and are ordered to perfect it; these are the other five. With these points premised:

21. I say first that the sacraments of the dead essentially and primarily cause first grace, while the sacraments of the living essentially and primarily cause second grace.

This is proved briefly. That is said essentially and primarily to belong to the sacraments which belongs to them by virtue of their institution. But it belongs to the sacraments of the dead by virtue of their institution to cause first grace. Therefore, they essentially and primarily cause it.

The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. The sacraments of the dead were essentially instituted to remove mortal sin, whether original or actual. But those sins are removed not through second grace but through first grace. For just as second grace necessarily presupposes first grace, because it is nothing other than its increase, so it presupposes that mortal sin has been removed, since mortal sin is incompatible with first grace. Therefore, the sacraments of the dead were essentially instituted to cause first grace.

From this the second part of the assertion is also proved. The sacraments of the living were essentially and primarily instituted not to cause the first life simply, but to perfect it, just as in natural things nourishment and growth exist in addition to the generation of living things. Therefore, the sacraments of the living essentially and primarily cause not first grace, but its increase, which is called second grace.

22. I say second that the sacraments of the dead secondarily produce second grace, and the sacraments of the living produce first grace.

The first part is evident in a penitent who approaches the sacrament with contrition and is justified by virtue of that contrition. He does not receive first grace through the sacrament, since he already possessed it from another source, namely, by virtue of contrition. Nevertheless, he receives some grace, because the sacrament is not idle in his regard, since the Council of Trent defines that the sacraments cause grace in those who place no obstacle. Therefore, he receives second grace, or an increase of first grace, by virtue of the rite performed through the Sacrament of Penance. The same must proportionately be said of one who approaches the Sacrament of Baptism with contrition.

The second part, denied by certain recent theologians, is manifestly taught by St. Thomas below, q. 72, a. 7, ad 3; q. 79, a. 3; and IV *Sentences*, dist. 23, q. 1, a. 2. In these passages, which can be read in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, he asserts that the sacraments of Confirmation, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction sometimes confer first grace.

23. Reason also supports this. It frequently happens that a sick person near death can receive no sacrament other than Extreme Unction, and that in those straits it is exceedingly difficult to elicit contrition. Therefore, it must be believed that divine clemency instituted and ordained this sacrament to assist him at that time and incidentally confer first grace.

Hence Jas. 5 says: *If he is in sins, they shall be forgiven him*. The condition, *if he is in sins*, cannot be understood of the remnants of sins, since these are unquestionably found in the sick person, but only of actual sins, which

incidentally, by virtue of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, will be forgiven him if he previously possessed attrition for them.

The same must be said of the Eucharist, which contains Christ, the fountain of all grace. If someone approaches it in good faith, believing that he has contrition for his sins or has been absolved from them, although in reality he possesses only attrition for them or was not absolved because of the priest's malice or lack of jurisdiction, he incidentally receives first grace by virtue of this sacrament, through which those sins are removed. Hence, in one of her collects the Church asks that the Eucharist may be *a washing away of crimes*. And St. Augustine, cited in the law *De consecratione*, dist. 2, c. *Invitat*, says: *When Christ is eaten, he gives life to the dead*, because the Eucharist sometimes incidentally confers first grace, which is the spiritual life of the soul.

24. You will say: Food, however much it may be applied to a dead person, cannot restore life to him. Therefore, neither can the Sacrament of the Eucharist, which exists after the manner of spiritual food, when applied to a soul dead through sin, give life to it and confer first grace, which is the soul's first life.

The answer is easy. Material food, which is converted into the substance of the one nourished, is indeed incapable of restoring life. But the spiritual food of the Eucharist, which is life by essence and can convert the one nourished into itself, can give life even to a man dead through the death of sin, provided he possesses attrition for that sin which in good faith he believes to be contrition. This is especially so because that man is not so dead that he cannot exercise some act of supernatural life, although imperfect, by eating this food with faith and reverence.

25. You will ask what sacramental grace adds to habitual grace.

I answer that it adds a right to special helps necessary for exercising sacramental actions, not merely the helps themselves. Sacramental grace is conferred in the reception of the sacrament. But in the reception of the sacrament these helps are not always conferred, but only at the time when they are necessary for exercising sacramental actions. The moral right to receive them when they are necessary, however, is actually conferred when the sacrament is received. Therefore, sacramental grace consists in such a right, not in the helps themselves.

From this you will understand that, although God nowhere fails to provide at least sufficient help for performing the works to which we are bound, since he never commands impossibilities, he nevertheless assists under a special title those who receive the sacraments, namely, by reason of

the special right that sacramental grace gives them to the helps necessary for the special acts of the sacraments.

26. If you ask to which helps the grace proper to each sacrament gives a right, I answer that the sacramental grace of Baptism gives a right to helps by which a man is assisted to receive the other sacraments rightly and religiously, which is Baptism's proper end. The sacramental grace of Confirmation gives a right to helps by which a man steadfastly professes the faith, since Confirmation is ordered to the steadfast exercise of the profession of faith as its end. The sacramental grace of the Eucharist gives a right to the helps necessary for acts of charity and devotion by which the soul is spiritually nourished, which nourishment is the special end of the Eucharist. The sacramental grace of Penance gives a right to helps for making satisfaction to God for past sins and avoiding future sins. The sacramental grace of Extreme Unction gives a right to special helps for mitigating the weakness arising from bodily sickness and affliction and for overcoming the temptations of demons, which are most severe at the point of death. The sacramental grace of Order gives a right to the helps necessary for the good use of the office received. Finally, the sacramental grace of Matrimony gives a right to helps for restraining carnal lust, preserving conjugal fidelity, and caring for offspring.

CHAPTER V.
On the Sacramental Character.

1. Having explained sacramental grace, which is the primary effect of the sacraments, it remains for us to discuss briefly their second effect, namely, the sacramental character. Before treating of it and explaining its quiddity and subject, however, one point must be presupposed as certain by faith and admitted by all Catholics, namely, that certain sacraments of the New Law, namely, Baptism, Confirmation, and Order, imprint a character, while the others do not.

The first part of this supposition is defined in the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union and in the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 9, where it is said: *If anyone says that in the three sacraments, namely, Baptism, Confirmation, and Order, a character is not imprinted upon the soul, let him be anathema.*

2. Reason also supports this. As we shall say below, a character is a certain spiritual power by which a man is appointed to perform or receive things pertaining to the worship of Christ's priesthood. But through the sacraments of Confirmation and Order, a man is appointed to perform

something pertaining to Christ's priesthood, namely, to defend his faith or administer the sacraments to others. Through the sacrament of Baptism, however, he receives the power to receive the other sacraments, for which reason Baptism is called the door of all the sacraments. Therefore, a character is imprinted through these three sacraments.

3. That a character is not imprinted through the other four sacraments of the New Law, besides being expressly stated in the aforesaid councils, can be explained from the analogy of spiritual with natural things. Among men, only those who are incorporated into the prince's household, assigned to military service, or appointed to a public office are marked with a character, not all those who eat at the king's table or are reconciled with him. Similarly, because Baptism is entrance into Christ's household, Confirmation is enrollment in his army, and Order is assumption into a sacred office and the ministry of the Church, a character is imprinted in these three sacraments, but not in the others.

4. With this premised, there is a grave difficulty and celebrated controversy among theologians concerning what this character imprinted in those three sacraments is, or to which species of quality it is reduced, namely, whether to habit or power. Suárez and most recent theologians assert that it is a habit. St. Thomas and his disciples, on the contrary, teach that it pertains to the second species of quality, namely, power.

§ 1.
St. Thomas's Opinion is Preferred.

5. I say, therefore, that the sacramental character is not a habit, but is reduced to power.

The conclusion is proved by three arguments. The first is this: Habits are intensified and diminished, and are destroyed by contraries. But the sacramental character is neither intensified nor diminished nor destroyed by any contrary, since it is indelible, as we shall say below. Therefore, it is not a habit but a power.

The second can be proposed as follows. No habit is indifferent to operating well or badly, but every habit is determined to the one or the other. But the character is indifferent to operating well or badly, as is evident in a priest who uses his priestly character to consecrate from a good or bad end. Therefore, the character is not a habit, but a power, which perfects a subject for operation absolutely and indifferently, whether well or badly.

This is evident in the will, which is the principle not only of virtuous but also of vicious volition.

The major premise contains the essential difference between power and habit taught by the Philosopher in *Ethics* II, c. 5, and *Metaphysics*, text 25, and is evident inductively in all habits. For moral virtue is defined by St. Augustine and others as *a good quality of mind which no one uses badly*. The same is evident in intellectual virtue, science, art, and similar habits. One who uses science always reasons well. Conversely, vicious habits never operate well or concur in a good act.

The reason is that a habit is given to determine a power to a good or bad manner of operating, whereas a power is ordained simply and absolutely to action. St. Thomas indicates this argument here, a. 2, in the argument to the contrary: There is no habit that can be related to acting both well and badly. But the character is related to both, for some use it well and others badly, which does not occur in habits, since no one uses a habit of virtue badly or a habit of vice well.

6. You will say that the character is determined to a good object, namely, divine worship.

But to the contrary: Although the character has a good object, namely, divine worship, it nevertheless leaves the subject undetermined so that he can use it well or badly. Therefore, it is not a habit, but a power.

The consequence is evident, because the difference between habit and power is not derived from the fact that a habit inclines toward a good object while a power regards an object indifferent to goodness and malice. Every power has a good object, as is evident in the intellect, will, sight, and so forth. The difference is derived from the fact that a habit regards good or evil determinately on the part of the subject, for it makes the possessor good or evil and implies a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to the subject himself. A power, however, implies indifference on the part of the subject, because it does not determine the subject according to the aspect of good or evil, fitting or unfitting.

7. The third argument, which the Holy Doctor gives in the body of the same article, can be proposed briefly as follows. A quality that renders its subject really and physically capable of receiving or operating something is reduced to a receptive or operative power. But through the sacramental character a man is rendered really and physically capable of receiving or operating something. Therefore, the character is reduced to power.

The major premise is evident. The minor is proved from the Catechismus Romanus, on the sacraments in general, penultimate section,

where it is said: The character brings it about that we are rendered fit to receive or accomplish something.

8. Reason also supports this. The character is not a mere sign, such as the insignia of a magistrate, nor is it only a moral power, such as the power of a judge or governor, but it is a real and physical quality through which a man is elevated to exercise things pertaining to divine worship.

Without the baptismal character, the other sacraments cannot be validly received. That is, the other characters or sacramental grace are not connaturally received unless this character, really and physically disposing the subject, is presupposed. For this reason Baptism is called the door of all the sacraments.

The priestly character is a real and physical power of confecting the Sacrament of the Eucharist, that is, of instrumentally producing Christ's body, grace, and the characters of the other orders. The character of the lower orders likewise gives the power to exercise hierarchical offices. Finally, the character of Confirmation is a power to profess Christ's faith firmly and steadfastly by producing a certain vigor in the acts of the will or other powers, or at least by directing and moving the other powers toward this profession of faith.

§ 2.
The Objections Are Resolved.

9. You will object first: If any nature of power belonged to the baptismal character, it would especially be the nature of a passive or receptive power for the other sacraments or for the characters produced by the other sacraments. But the baptismal character is not a passive or receptive power for the other sacraments or for the characters produced by them. Therefore, the nature of a passive or receptive power does not belong to it.

The major premise is evident from what was said in the third proof. The minor is demonstrated as follows. First, it appears manifest that the baptismal character is not a power for receiving the other sacraments, because, since they are sensible realities and are perfected through sensible actions, they are received in the body. The baptismal character, however, since it is spiritual, is not received in the body, but in the soul or one of its powers, namely, the practical intellect, as we shall say below.

That it is not a power for receiving the characters produced by the other sacraments, namely, Confirmation and Order, appears no less certain, because the characters of Confirmation and Order are received immediately

not in the baptismal character, but in the soul itself. For if the baptismal character itself is received without the preparation of a preceding character, why could not the other characters also be received in the soul's obediential potency without the prior disposition of the baptismal character?

I answer, granting the major premise and denying the minor in both its parts. The baptismal character is a receptive power for the other sacraments, since none can be validly received unless it has first been possessed.

To the proof to the contrary, it must be said that, although the sacraments are received in the body naturally, as it were, or as corporeal entities, they are received in it sacramentally through the mediation of the baptismal character, or insofar as they are sacramental actions. Just as, to effect the sacraments not only insofar as they are natural actions, for example, washing or anointing, but also insofar as they are sacramental and productive of grace, a man needs a certain supernatural active power, so, for a man to receive the sacraments in himself sacramentally, or insofar as they are valid sacramental actions, the baptismal character is required. For it is evident that, if Confirmation or Order is given to an unbaptized man, no sacrament is effected and the actions through which such a sacrament is conferred are not sacramentally received in him.

10. To the proof of the second part of the minor, I say that it is not necessary for the nature of a passive power that it should receive in itself the form or act to which it is ordered. It is sufficient that it render the subject capable of that act and dispose it for its reception.

For heaviness in earth is a passive power for downward motion, as St. Thomas teaches in *Metaphysics* V, lect. 14, and yet it does not receive that motion in itself, but only renders the earth capable of receiving it. Likewise, softness, although it does not receive the figure of the seal, is nevertheless placed by Aristotle in the species of passive power in the chapter on quality, because it renders wax fit to receive the seal.

Why, then, although the baptismal character does not properly receive in itself the characters of the other sacraments, should it not possess the nature of a passive power with respect to them, since it disposes a man for their reception?

Nor is it an objection that the baptismal character is received immediately in the soul without the disposition of a preceding character. It does not rightly follow from this that the same is true of the characters of the other sacraments. For the reception of the first disposition does not require another disposition, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. A foundation stone is placed beneath the others but rests upon none. Similarly, because Baptism is the birth of the new creature, it presupposes

nothing else in the supernatural order, although it is itself presupposed by the others.

11. You will object second: If the character of Confirmation were an active power, this would belong to it through an ordination toward some act, which could be no other than the official defense of the faith. But through ordination toward this act it cannot possess the nature of power. Therefore, it is not an active power.

The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. The character of Confirmation is not simply necessary for someone to be able officially to profess and defend the faith. For an extrinsic deputation suffices for this, together with the virtues of faith, religion, and fortitude, which elicit the acts necessary to defend the faith. Therefore, the character of Confirmation cannot be a power for the official defense of the faith.

I answer, granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof, I deny the antecedent. For a man to be able to profess and defend the faith officially and as a soldier of Christ, an extrinsic deputation, as among men, is not sufficient. The impression of some supernatural character and power is also required.

For this difference exists between God and men: when men appoint someone to an office, they do not intrinsically change him or give him some quality by which he is rendered fit to exercise it, but presuppose that quality. God, however, does not presuppose such fitness in his ministers, but produces it. By choosing them for the ministries of his worship, he simultaneously gives them power to exercise those ministries through the impression of a supernatural quality, which we call a character. Similarly, although friendship among men does not posit anything intrinsic in the persons loved, divine love produces a supernatural form and quality in the soul, namely, sanctifying grace, and does not presuppose goodness in things.

To what is added concerning the infused virtues of faith, religion, and fortitude, it must be said that these virtues regard the acts necessary for defending the faith insofar as those acts possess moral goodness within their proper objects, and therefore determinately under the aspect of good. Beyond these virtues, therefore, the character of Confirmation is required to defend the faith under an indifferent aspect and while abstracting from morally good or bad exercise.

12. You will object third: The character of Order in a simple priest cannot validly confer Confirmation or the minor orders, yet it can do so when joined to a papal dispensation. Therefore, it is not a physical power for effecting sacramental acts, because a papal dispensation cannot confer a physical power, but only a moral one.

I answer, granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. There is no repugnance in a physical, sacramental, and supernatural power depending for the validity of its act upon a moral condition, such as a commission or the conferral of jurisdiction. This is evident in a priest who, although through his priestly character he possesses an instrumental physical power to absolve from sins and produce grace in the penitent's soul, nevertheless depends in its exercise upon a certain moral condition, namely, jurisdiction and approbation, without which he cannot validly absolve. Other objections can be seen in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

§ 3.
What Is the Proximate and Immediate Subject of the Sacramental Character?

13. Durandus places it in the minister's executive power, which applies the matter and form of the sacraments, as in the hand applying the matter and the tongue pronouncing the words. Suárez thinks that it is received immediately in the substance of the soul; Scotus, in the will; St. Thomas and his disciples, in the intellect, not the speculative but the practical intellect. Hence:

14. I say first that the executive power is not the proximate and immediate subject of the sacramental character. For the character is a spiritual and indelible sign, as we shall say below. Therefore, it cannot exist in an organic power, which is corporeal and corruptible.

Nor is it a valid reply to say that the character is ordered to perfect the executive power for the right administration of a sacrament, and consequently resides in it. For art is ordered to perfect the executive powers and nevertheless exists in the soul, or in the practical intellect.

15. I say second that the character does not exist immediately in the essence of the soul, but in one of its powers. Since the character is an active power, as we explained in § 1, its immediate subject must be immediately operative. But the substance of the soul is not immediately operative, but operates through its powers. Therefore, the character does not exist immediately in the essence of the soul, but in one of its powers.

16. You will say: Natural powers are immediately received in the soul. Therefore, supernatural powers, among which the character is numbered, are also immediately received in it.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. First, because natural powers do not presuppose another power, but emanate from the soul itself as its

proper powers. Second, because natural powers do not elevate their subject to operate and consequently need not presuppose that it is proximately active, whereas the opposite belongs to a supernatural power.

17. I say third that the proximate and immediate subject of the character is not the will, but the intellect, and not the speculative but the practical intellect.

This is proved as follows. Since the character is essentially and primarily ordered to acts of divine worship through which a profession of faith is made, it must possess as its immediate subject the power in which the habit of faith is immediately subject. But the habit of faith is immediately subject in the intellect. Therefore, so is the character.

I add that St. Dionysius, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, c. 2, teaches that the character is a certain light through which we are illuminated and configured to Christ. But light does not pertain to the will, which is a blind power, but to the intellect, which is a cognitive power.

18. I said that the sacramental character resides in the practical, not the speculative, intellect. First, because the act of the character passes outside the intellect. For it is not given for the simple cognition of truth, but effects the exterior worship of God. Second, because that power in man must be the immediate subject of the sacramental character which, through its act as elevated by the character, moves and directs the other powers toward actions pertaining to divine worship. But the practical intellect is such a power, since through the act of command proper to it, it directs, moves, and applies the other powers and faculties to operation, as we demonstrated in the treatise on human acts. Therefore, the sacramental character immediately resides in the practical intellect.

19. You will ask whether the sacramental character existed in Christ. The reason for doubt is that all power in heaven and on earth was given to Christ, as is said in the last chapter of Matthew. Therefore, since the character is a certain spiritual power, it appears that it existed in Christ.

Nevertheless, theologians commonly teach that the sacramental character did not exist in Christ, because, although it is a certain spiritual power, it is diminished and participated from another, whereas in Christ there exists the whole fullness of power and the supreme and everlasting priesthood.

I add that to be marked with a character is proper to sheep, servants, soldiers, and members. But Christ, even as man, is shepherd, Lord, leader, and head. Therefore, he ought not to have been marked with a character, but Christians, as his sheep, servants, soldiers, and members, must be marked as belonging to him through the character.

Hence Basil, hom. 13, which is an exhortation to Baptism, exhorts catechumens to receive Baptism without delay in these words: No one will know whether you belong to our side or to that of the adversary unless the light of the divine countenance has been marked upon you. Unless the angel recognizes the character in you, how will he fight for you or vindicate you from your enemies? How, I ask, will you say, "I belong to God," if you display no marks? Do you not know how the destroyer passed over the marked houses in Egypt, but slew the firstborn in those that were not marked? An unsealed treasure will easily lie open to thieves; likewise, a sheep without a mark is immediately exposed to snares.

§ 4.
Whether the Character Is Indelible and Incorruptible by Its Nature.

20. I answer affirmatively as to both parts. First, it is certain by faith that the character is indelible, at least in the present state and life, since this was defined by the Councils of Florence and Trent. It is also gathered a posteriori from the fact that the three sacraments that imprint a character cannot be repeated, for no other reason than that they imprint an indelible character. For if it could be erased, it would have to be imprinted again by repeating the sacrament.

21. The second part, namely, that the character is by its nature incorruptible, is taught by St. Thomas here, a. 5, and is proved from the fact that the character by its nature has no contrary through which it could be corrupted. It has no physical contrary, since it is not a habit but a power, nor a moral contrary, namely, sin, since it is imprinted upon a man existing in mortal sin, as is evident in one who approaches the Sacrament of Baptism with an obstacle, and remains in heretics and wicked persons. Therefore, it is intrinsically and by its nature incorruptible.

The consequence is evident, because the rational soul and angels are said to be immortal and incorruptible by their nature because they are not composed of parts opposed to one another and possess no contrary by which they can be destroyed. The fact that they can be annihilated by God through suspension of his conserving concurrence is irrelevant, because this would be miraculous, preternatural, and extrinsic. They rather connaturally require to be conserved, as we explained in the treatise on the angels. The same must proportionately be said of the character.

22. You will say: Grace is more perfect than the character, and yet it can be lost and corrupted in this life. Therefore, the character can also be lost.

But I deny the consequence and the parity, for two reasons of difference. The first is that grace has a contrary, namely, sin, but the character does not. The second is that grace, since it is a habit and complete quality, is received in the soul according to the manner fitting and connatural to the soul, and consequently in dependence upon free acts of the will as dispositions upon which it depends in its production and conservation. The character, however, is an instrumental power derived from God alone as principal cause, upon whom alone it consequently depends in its production and conservation.

23. From this it follows that the character inheres indelibly in the soul even in the future life, since in that life it possesses no contrary by which it can be erased, and otherwise God never destroys a reality once created unless secondary causes require it. Hence, if a baptized or ordained man were to die and return to life, he could not be rebaptized or reordained, and by consecrating he would confect the sacraments, as St. Thomas teaches in his commentary on Rom. 7, lect. 1, and Heb. 11, lect. 7.

24. You will say: When an end ceases, those things ordered to the end must cease. But the end of the character, namely, the administration or reception of the sacraments and exterior worship, will cease after this life. Therefore, the character will also cease.

I answer that, besides this end of the character, there is another, namely, the distinction of the faithful from unbelievers, which distinction must remain in the other life: in the good unto glory and in the wicked unto ignominy. *Just as the military character remains in soldiers after victory has been obtained—in those who have conquered unto glory, but in those who have been defeated unto punishment*, as the Holy Doctor says here, a. 5, ad 3.

CHAPTER VI.
On the Institutor of the Sacraments.

1. Several of the ancient theologians held that two sacraments of the New Law, namely Confirmation and Extreme Unction, were instituted by the Apostles. But the common and certain opinion of the Scholastics is now that Christ instituted all the sacraments of the New Law. For the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 1, defines thus: "If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law were not all instituted by Christ Jesus our Lord, let him be anathema." Nor can the Council be understood as speaking of mediate

institution, insofar as Christ conferred upon the Church or the Apostles the power to institute the sacraments. First, because the holy Synod, sess. 14, cap. 1, teaches that Extreme Unction was instituted by Christ the Lord and merely promulgated by St. James. Second, because the same could likewise have been asserted of the ceremonies and sacramentals instituted by the Church through the power given to her by Christ, whereas the Council teaches the contrary in sess. 21, cap. 1.

2. The holy Fathers also favor this doctrine, especially Ambrose, *De Sacramentis*, l. 4, cap. 4, where he says: "Who is the author of the sacraments except the Lord Jesus?" Nor are several arguments of fittingness lacking, drawn from St. Thomas here, a. 4, in the replies to the objections. The first is that the faithful should not place their hope in a man, as they would if they obtained sanctifying grace through him. Hence Augustine, tract. 8 on John: "Christ Jesus could, had he wished, have given power to some servant to confer Baptism as in his own place, and could have transferred to him the power of baptizing. He did not will this, so that the hope of those baptized might be in him by whom they knew themselves to have been baptized." The second is that division should not arise among the faithful, as it formerly did among those who said, "I belong to Paul, but I to Apollo, and I to Cephas," 1 Cor. 1. The third is that, since the sacraments are the primary foundations of the Church, they all had to be instituted by him who immediately founded the Church. But Christ alone is the head and founder of the Church. Therefore he alone immediately instituted all the sacraments of the New Law. For this reason Paul, 1 Cor. 4, calls himself and his fellow Apostles "ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God."

3. You will say: Under the law of nature, men instituted sacraments by divine commission. Therefore, with all the more reason, this should have been entrusted to the Apostles or to the universal Church under the New Law. The antecedent is proved: To institute a sacrament is nothing other than to select and determine a sensible thing to signify grace. But men did this under the law of nature, as is evident from what was said above, cap. 2. Therefore, under the law of nature, they instituted sacraments by God's commission.

I answer first by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that it is one thing to institute a sacrament and another to determine the matter of a sacrament. For the first, it is required that the institutor give sensible things the power of practically signifying grace. For the second, it is enough that one thing be chosen from among several, to which God then gives the power and efficacy of practically signifying grace. Hence, because men under the

law of nature performed only the latter, they did not institute sacraments by God's commission.

I answer second by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity, because of the greater excellence and efficacy of the sacraments of the New Law over those of the law of nature and the Mosaic Law.

4. Theologians ask here whether the ministerial power of instituting sacraments, and the power of excellence that existed in Christ, could have been communicated to a mere man. I answer affirmatively as to both parts. First, as regards ministerial power, this seems manifest. It follows both from the authority of Augustine cited above, which asserts that Christ Jesus could, had he wished, have given power to some servant to confer Baptism as in his own place; and also because God could have entrusted to a mere man not only the determination of certain signs, but also the giving to those signs, not by primary but by delegated power, the efficacy of practically signifying grace. In that case, although God would be the first author of the sacrament, that man would nevertheless be its secondary and delegated author, since God would give such efficacy to his sign.

5. That God could also have communicated to a mere man the power of excellence existing in Christ to institute sacraments is shown as follows. The power of excellence belongs to Christ insofar as he is head of the whole Church. But, by absolute power, God could have constituted a mere man head of the whole Church and ordained his grace and works to the justification of other men, just as Adam was in fact constituted not only the natural but also the moral head of the whole human race as regards the transmission to his descendants of original justice or its privation, as was shown in the treatise on sins. Therefore God could have communicated to a mere man the power of excellence that existed in Christ for instituting the sacraments, though not with the eminence and perfection with which it existed in Christ. For Christ, as man, is the conjoined instrument of the divinity, whereas other ministers to whom God might communicate the power of excellence would be its separated instruments. Hence the power of excellence in Christ connoted the infinite dignity of his person, by reason of which he was the principle of merit and satisfaction of infinite value. This cannot belong to a mere man, as we explained in the treatise on the Incarnation.

CHAPTER VII.
On the Minister of the Sacraments.

1. It is certain that wayfaring men alone are the ordinary ministers of the sacraments of the New Law. St. Thomas establishes this here, a. 7, from the words of the Apostle, Heb. 5: "Every high priest taken from among men is appointed for men in the things that pertain to God." St. John Chrysostom expressly teaches the same in *De Sacerdotio*, l. 3, cap. 5, saying: "To those who dwell upon the earth and live upon it, it has been entrusted to administer the things that are in heaven. To them it has been given to possess a power that God in his goodness willed to grant neither to Angels nor to Archangels." Reason also supports this. Since the sacraments consist of sensible things and words, it is fitting that only those who can speak sensibly and vitally should be ministers of the sacraments. Again, since only wayfarers are permitted to receive the sacraments, it also belongs, by God's ordinary law, to wayfarers alone to minister them.

2. Nevertheless, by extraordinary power and law, Angels can confect and administer sacraments, since divine power is bound neither to any sign nor to any minister. Hence various monuments of ecclesiastical history relate that, by special dispensation, they ordained bishops, distributed the Eucharist, and consecrated churches, as may be seen in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*. The same must be said with even greater reason of men who are comprehensors and saints existing in heaven, because of the character they indelibly retain there. Indeed, after the resurrection, when they have resumed their bodies, nothing prevents them from becoming ordinary ministers of the sacraments. For nothing required by the institution of a sacrament will be lacking in them, since they will be men composed of body and soul and will possess an indelible character. Nevertheless, after the resurrection there will be no sacrament, because the state of men and of grace will be immutable, so that lost grace will neither be capable of recovery nor acquired grace of increase.

3. These points are certain among nearly all theologians. But it may be doubted what kind of intention is required in the minister for the validity of a sacrament. Several kinds of intention are distinguished: one is interpretative and in its cause; another formal and in its effect; one absolute, another conditional; one actual, another virtual, another habitual.

First, it is certain that an interpretative intention existing in its cause is insufficient, and that a formal intention is required. Hence a priest does not consecrate if, foreseeing that while drunk he will pronounce the words of consecration, he voluntarily becomes intoxicated and while drunk pronounces the words of consecration over determinate matter. It is otherwise in the recipient of a sacrament, in whom an interpretative intention existing in its cause is sufficient. For the recipient has the character of one who undergoes, while the minister or confector has the character of an agent. Greater liberty and advertence are required in an agent than in one who undergoes. Hence, if someone before sleeping or becoming intoxicated desires Baptism, and is later baptized while asleep or drunk, he receives the sacrament.

Second, it is certain that an absolute intention is required for the validity of a sacrament, and that a conditional intention is insufficient unless it immediately passes into an absolute intention. The first is evident, because the intention required for a sacrament must be efficacious and operative, since it must be the operative principle of the sacramental action. But only an absolute intention is efficacious and operative, since a conditional intention places nothing in being. The second is evident because a conditional intention that, once the condition is fulfilled, passes into an absolute intention is equivalent to an absolute one. Hence, if someone intends to absolve a penitent if he approaches and confesses, and afterward absolves that same penitent once he has confessed, he truly absolves him.

Third, it is certain that, just as an actual intention is not necessary for confecting a sacrament, because it is morally impossible always to retain it, so a habitual intention is insufficient, because it is not the proximate principle of the sacramental action, since it can exist in one who is asleep. A virtual intention is therefore necessary and sufficient, provided that it perseveres in some external action commanded by the minister, directed toward accomplishing the sacramental work, and not yet morally revoked by an interruption of time.

4. You will say: St. Thomas here, a. 8, ad 3, manifestly teaches the contrary, for he says that "although one who is thinking of something else does not have an actual intention, he nevertheless has a habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament."

I answer that an equivocation lies hidden in the word "habitual." For among the older theologians and canonists, "habitual intention" is taken for "virtual intention," as is evident from St. Bonaventure, II *Sententiae*, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3, in the reply to the sixth argument, where he asserts that a habitual relation to God suffices for a meritorious work, and adds: "It is called a

habitual relation, not because one possesses charity, by which one is capable of referring the act to God, but because at the beginning of that operation, or of another to which it is consequent, one has an intention directed toward God." Here the Seraphic Doctor manifestly uses a habitual relation to God for a virtual relation. It can therefore be called habitual because it perseveres after the manner of a habit, although it presupposes a preceding act. The Angelic Doctor spoke in the same sense when he said that a habitual intention suffices for the perfection of the sacrament. Unless perhaps one prefers to say that the text should be corrected and that through the printer's negligence the word "virtual" was changed to "habitual." A manifest indication of such a change is that certain editions from the year 1540 read "virtual intention," not "habitual intention," as Father Nicolai rightly observed in his scholia on a. 8 of this question and in the additions to Raynerius, under the word *Baptismus*, cap. 1, § 8.

5. These points having been presupposed, about which there is no controversy or only slight controversy among theologians, three difficulties concerning the ordinary minister of the sacraments remain to be resolved here. The first is whether, for the validity of a sacrament, an intention in the minister to perform only the external act is sufficient, that is, seriously to pronounce the words and apply the matter of the sacrament; or whether there is further required an intention to perform that act as sacramental, or as a sacred ceremony instituted by Christ. Catharinus, Salmeron, Scribonius, Pasqualigus, and others teach that the first is sufficient. Other theologians commonly judge that the second is required for the validity of a sacrament.

6. The second difficulty is whether faith and holiness are required in the minister for the validity of a sacrament, so that unbelievers and sinners cannot validly confect or confer sacraments. For formerly St. Cyprian in Africa, together with eighty-five bishops, and Firmilian in Asia, together with many others, asserted that sacraments conferred by heretics and schismatics are not true sacraments. The Donatists added that not only heretics, but also wicked and sinful members of the faithful, cannot validly confect sacraments. Wycliffe increased this heresy to such a degree that he said that only the predestined confer grace through the sacraments.

The third difficulty is whether ministers who minister while in mortal sin always sin mortally.

§ 1.
Resolution of the First Difficulty.

7. For the resolution of the first difficulty, it must be carefully observed that there can be a twofold intention of confecting or ministering a sacrament. One is explicit and particular, by which someone expressly and as though in a signified act intends to confect or minister a sacrament. The other is implicit and general, by which he intends to do what Christ and the Church do. For in this general intention there is implicitly included the particular intention of confecting or administering a sacrament, or of performing the external act as sacramental. This being presupposed:

8. I say first: For the validity of a sacrament, there is required in the minister an intention formally to confect a sacrament, or to perform the external act as sacramental, not indeed expressly and in particular, but implicitly and generally, namely, to do what the Church does.

The first proof is from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 11, where it is stated: "If anyone says that in ministers, while they confect and confer the sacraments, there is not required at least the intention of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." But what the Church does is not merely to apply the matter and outwardly pronounce the words, for this can be done outside the Church by a pagan, but by these to confect a sacred ceremony or sacrament. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, there is required for the validity of a sacrament in the minister an intention formally to perform a sacrament.

This is confirmed. The same Council, sess. 14, cap. 6 and can. 9, defines that the penitent does not remain absolved and the sacrament is not perfected "if the priest lacks the intention of acting seriously and truly absolving." Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, beyond the external pronunciation of the words seriously made as regards the exterior, there is required for the validity of absolution an interior intention in the priest, namely, the intention of absolving from sins and perfecting the sacrament. Reason also commends this. For in absolving, the priest pronounces sentence as a judge and remits sins. But a sentence pronounced by a judge without an interior intention is not valid, nor is a debt remitted without an interior intention of remitting it. Therefore, for the validity of absolution, there is required in the priest an intention of absolving from sins and perfecting the sacrament of Penance.

9. The conclusion is proved second by the reasoning of St. Thomas here, a. 8. An action indifferent to many things must be determined to one, at least by the intention of the agent, so that it determinately effects or signifies this one thing. But the action of a sacrament is indifferent to effecting or signifying several things. Thus external washing can be ordered merely to external cleanliness, to bodily health, to play, or to the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore, for it to regard the sacrament rather than external cleansing, play, or a profane action, it must be determinately ordered by the intention of the agent, at least implicit and general, toward effecting the sacrament. Nor is the intention of Christ or the Church sufficient. For since, as the holy Doctor says in the reply to the first objection, Christ employs a free and rational minister, he is not judged determinately to intend anything except insofar as the minister himself deliberately intends it. Otherwise, whenever a priest pronounced the words of consecration, he would consecrate the bread or wine present, even if he intended merely to read or recite those words, which is absurd. Hence St. Thomas adds there that there is required in the minister an intention by which he intends "to do what Christ and the Church do." This is to possess an implicit and general intention of confecting a sacrament, or of performing the external act as sacramental, as is evident from what was said above.

10. The conclusion is proved third by another argument. The same intention is required in one who ministers Baptism as in one who receives it. Indeed, because the recipient has the character of one who undergoes, while the minister has that of an agent, a more express and perfect intention seems to be required in the latter than in the former for the validity of the sacrament, as we observed above. But in one receiving Baptism, an intention to receive the sacrament is required for its validity, as St. Thomas expressly teaches below, q. 68, a. 7. Hence in the reply to the second objection he says that "if an adult lacked the intention of receiving the sacrament, he would have to be rebaptized." Therefore, for Baptism to be validly conferred, an intention of confecting the sacrament is required in the minister, and an intention merely to perform the external act is insufficient.

11. You will object first: Athanasius, while still a boy, baptized other boys in play, and Alexander, Patriarch of Alexandria, approved the Baptism and refused to repeat it. Likewise, Genesius the mime was baptized in the theater before Diocletian by another mime, and yet the Baptism was valid. Therefore, for the validity of Baptism, an intention to perform the sacrament is not required, but an intention merely to perform the external act suffices.

I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. For the validity of Baptism there is not required an intention to confect the

sacrament that is express and in a signified act: I grant. An intention that is implicit, general, and in an exercised act: I deny. Although Athanasius baptized the other boys in play, because he then intended to do what he had seen done in the Church, he possessed an implicit and general intention of confecting the sacrament of Baptism. The same must be said of the mime who baptized St. Genesius. For he then intended to do what the Church of the Christians does, although he further ordered this to play and the derision of the Christian religion. Consequently, he truly baptized him. Similarly, a priest who wishes to baptize for gain, or to consecrate in order to perform an evil deed, truly baptizes and consecrates, because, although he then orders those sacramental actions to an evil end, he nevertheless truly intends to do what the Catholic Church does. Consequently, he possesses the implicit and general intention of confecting the sacrament, which suffices for its validity, as we said in our conclusion.

12. You will object second from the celebrated testimony of Augustine, *De Baptismo*, l. 7, cap. 53, where he says: "As regards the integrity of the sacrament, it makes no difference whether some perform it deceitfully or truthfully." I answer that the holy Doctor is speaking there of deceit as regards faith, against the Donatists, and intends only that a minister existing in the Catholic Church, or in any other body thought to be the true Church, validly ministers the sacrament, although he himself erroneously thinks that no true sacrament exists in such a Church. Hence he immediately adds: "I do not doubt that even those possess Baptism who, although they receive it deceitfully, nevertheless receive it in the Church, or where the Church is thought to exist."

13. Several testimonies of St. Thomas can also be objected, in which he manifestly seems to teach that an intention formally to perform a sacrament is not required in the minister for the validity of a sacrament. These, however, must be understood and explained of an explicit and particular intention, which is not necessary for the validity of a sacrament. The holy Doctor does not exclude an implicit and general intention formally to perform the sacrament, that is, an intention to do what Christ and the Church do, in which an intention formally to perform the sacrament is implicitly contained. For he expressly teaches here, a. 8, ad 1, that this is necessary for the validity of a sacrament, where he says that there is required in the minister an intention "by which he intends to do what Christ and the Church do." Other objections may be seen in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

§ 2.
Resolution of the Second Difficulty.

14. I say second: Sacraments are validly confected and ministered through evil ministers, even heretics and schismatics. The conclusion is certain by faith, having been defined in various Councils: first at Carthage against the Donatists, at Constantinople against John Hus and Wycliffe, and at Trent against the Lutherans.

The first proof is from the tradition and custom of the Church, which has always held the Baptism of heretics to be valid if it was conferred with the words of the Gospel. Stephen I vigorously defended this tradition against Firmilian and St. Cyprian, decreeing: "If anyone comes to us from any heresy whatsoever, let nothing be introduced beyond what has been handed down, namely, that a hand be imposed upon him for penance." Hence St. Augustine, *De Baptismo*, l. 2, cap. 9, says: "The world was held by the force of custom, and this alone was opposed to those who wished to introduce novelty, because they could not grasp the truth." And in cap. 7, excluding the error of St. Cyprian, he writes thus concerning the same custom and apostolic tradition: "For the question of Baptism had not yet been carefully examined, but the Church nevertheless retained the most salutary custom of correcting in schismatics and heretics what was perverse, not repeating what had been given; healing what was wounded, not treating what was sound. I believe this custom comes from apostolic tradition, like many things not found in their writings or in later Councils, yet because they are observed throughout the universal Church, they are believed to have been handed down and commended by the Apostles themselves."

15. The second proof is from the argument employed by the same Augustine against the Donatists, *De Baptismo*, l. 1, cap. 1. One who departs from the Church does not lose the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore, neither does he lose the sacrament of giving Baptism, that is, ordination. Consequently, Baptism conferred outside the Church is valid. He says: "The sacrament of Baptism is what the baptized possesses, and the sacrament of giving Baptism is what the ordained possesses. Just as one who is baptized does not lose the sacrament of Baptism if he departs from unity, so one who is ordained does not lose the sacrament of giving Baptism if he departs from unity. No injury must be done to either sacrament. If he departs from the evil, both depart with him; if he remains among the evil, both remain.

Therefore, just as the Baptism possessed by one who had departed from unity was to be accepted, because he could not lose it, so the Baptism given by one who, upon departing, had not lost the sacrament of giving it must also be accepted. For just as those returning who were baptized before they departed are not rebaptized, so those returning who were ordained before they departed are certainly not ordained again."

The third proof is from the argument of St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, l. IV, cap. 77. God is the principal cause of the sacraments, while the minister is only instrumental. But an effect is assimilated more to the principal cause than to the instrumental cause, and does not depend upon the moral goodness or malice of the instrument, but upon the motion and power of the principal cause. Therefore, whether the minister is good or evil, he confects or ministers a true sacrament if he applies the due matter and form. Hence Augustine, *De Baptismo*, l. 5, cap. 29: "Whether Judas or Paul baptizes, Christ washes away, absolves, and destroys sin."

Finally, this truth can be illustrated by examples used by the holy Fathers. For seed to bear fruit, it makes no difference whether it is sown with clean or dirty hands. For a seal to impress its figure upon wax, it makes no difference whether it is iron or gold. It makes no difference whether the pipe through which water passes is silver, lead, or clay. Finally, for a physician to confer health, it makes no difference whether he himself is healthy or sick. In the same way, for the sacraments to confer their effect, the faith or holiness of the minister is irrelevant, since by heresy or impiety he does not lose the power of confecting the sacraments, which resides in the indelible character.

16. You will object first: Canon 49 of the Apostles says that those baptized among heretics must be rebaptized. And in the First Council of Nicaea, can. 19, the Paulianists are commanded to be rebaptized. But if heretics confected true sacraments, those baptized by them should not be rebaptized. Therefore, and so forth.

I answer that the Paulianists were commanded at the Council of Nicaea to be rebaptized because they had not been baptized in the name of the Holy Spirit. Likewise, can. 49 of the Apostles says that those baptized by heretics must be rebaptized because those heretics did not employ the true form in Baptism. Hence from these and similar passages it can only be inferred that heretics do not confect true sacraments when they do not apply the due matter or form.

17. You will object second: Christ delivered the sacraments only to the Church. But heretics, Jews, and other unbelievers are entirely outside the Church. Therefore no sacrament can be confected or ministered by them.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For heretics are members of the Church, although dead members, and are subject to her power. Jews and other unbelievers, although by reason of their persons they are outside the Church and are not subject to her power, nevertheless, by the very fact that they wish to confect true sacraments, exercise a ministry proper to the Church and voluntarily present themselves as her ministers in this operation. Consequently, they in some way pertain to her.

18. You will object third with St. Cyprian, ep. 74 to Pompey: Those baptized by the Church are spiritually begotten, for only the spouse of Christ can spiritually give birth and beget children for God. Hence one who is not a son of the Church cannot possibly have God as Father before having the Church as mother. Therefore those baptized outside the Church by heretics or schismatics do not truly receive Baptism.

I deny the consequence. For although some are baptized outside the Church by heretics or schismatics, the Church nevertheless begets them and gives birth to them for God, not immediately through herself, but through heretics or schismatics, just as Sarah, Leah, and Rachel, by marital right, bore children through the wombs of their handmaids. This answer is suggested by St. Augustine, *De Baptismo*, l. 1, cap. 16, where he says: "When such persons are evangelized and imbued with the sacraments by spiritual men, Rebecca gives birth to them as though through herself, as she did to Esau. But when such persons are begotten among the people of God through those who do not preach the Gospel with purity, it is indeed Sarah who gives birth, but through Hagar. Likewise, when good and spiritual persons are begotten through carnal evangelists or ministers of Baptism, it is indeed Leah or Rachel who, by marital right, gives birth to them, but through the wombs of the handmaids. But when good believers are begotten in the Gospel through spiritual men, they are born to a new life and a new covenant, like Isaac from Sarah's womb or Jacob from Rebecca's."

§ 3.
Resolution of the Third Difficulty.

19. I say third: Ministers who are destined by a special consecration to confect the sacraments, and who are also called ministers of solemnity, sin mortally when they confect or administer them while in a state of mortal sin. It is otherwise with ministers of necessity who are not consecrated.

The first part of this assertion is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas. Since ministers of solemnity are deputed by a special consecration to confect and minister the sacraments, they ought in holiness to conform themselves to God and Christ, whose ministers they are, according to Lev. 19: "You shall be holy, because I am holy"; and to the sacraments themselves, which are holy actions consecrated to God by a special sanctification. Hence, if they handle them with the uncleanness of mortal sin, they sin gravely and incur the crime of sacrilege. From this the second part remains proved. For one who ministers or confects a sacrament not by office but as a minister of necessity does not do this by presenting himself as a minister of Christ and the Church, but merely to assist the necessity of the recipient. Therefore he is not bound to conform himself in holiness to God and Christ as author of the sacraments, nor to the sacraments themselves. Consequently, although he confects or administers them while in a state of mortal sin, he does not sin mortally.

20. For a fuller understanding of this conclusion and the resolution of several cases of conscience, it must be observed with Cajetan here, a. 6, that for a minister of the sacraments to sin mortally in the exercise of his ministry, he must act as a consecrated minister or by office, and the action must be either productive of a sacrament or at least sacramental, that is, ordered to confecting a sacrament, or distributive of a sacrament already confected. Thus, if either of these conditions is absent, mortal sin is not committed in the exercise of sacred ministry. From this doctrine of Cajetan:

21. It is inferred first that a sinful priest does not sin by baptizing without solemnity in an urgent necessity, because he then does not act as a consecrated minister, but conducts himself after the manner of a layman.

22. It is inferred second that those contracting marriage while in mortal sin do indeed sin mortally, because they receive the sacrament without the due disposition, but not because they administer it. For they possess no special consecration for ministering this sacrament. Nor is it an objection that there is no other more proximate minister of this sacrament, so that they seem to be ministers by office. For this is not enough for a minister by office, but it is further required that he be deputed to this by a special consecration.

23. It is inferred third that a confirmed person who publicly confesses the faith before a tyrant while in mortal sin does not sin mortally. For although through Confirmation he is given the power and special grace to profess the faith in this manner, that profession is not an action productive of a sacrament or a sacramental action.

24. It is inferred fourth that a priest celebrating while in mortal sin commits two sins, one because he confects the sacrament and the other because he receives it. Just as laymen who unworthily receive this sacrament sin mortally and are guilty of sacrilege.

It is inferred fifth that to minister the Eucharist while in mortal sin is a mortal sin. For although this action is not productive of the sacrament, it is distributive of it and consequently is in some way sacramental.

25. It is inferred sixth that a priest who hears confessions while in mortal sin sins mortally, because he then acts by priestly office and takes the place of Christ.

26. It is inferred seventh that it is more probable that deacons and subdeacons who solemnly exercise their offices while in mortal sin sin mortally. For although the actions they then exercise are not sacraments, they are sacramental actions, since they regard the sacrament of the Eucharist and closely approach it.

27. It is inferred eighth that bishops who consecrate chrism and the oil of the sick while in mortal sin sin mortally, since actions of this kind are sacramental, being proximately ordered to the confection of a sacrament. They do not, however, sin mortally when in mortal sin they bless churches, vessels, sacred vestments, virgins dedicated to God, or abbesses. For these actions are neither sacraments nor sacramental actions, nor do they pertain to a bishop by divine law, but only by ecclesiastical law.

28. It is inferred ninth that a preacher who preaches while in mortal sin does not sin mortally, since preaching is not a sacramental action and can be entrusted to a layman. It is presupposed, however, that the sin is occult, for if it is public, he sins mortally by reason of scandal.

TREATISE III.
ON BAPTISM AND CONFIRMATION.

Having explained those things that are common to the seven sacraments of the New Law, we proceed to an exposition of each in particular. First we treat the sacrament of Baptism, which is first in the order of nature, as regeneration in Christ and the first spiritual birth. Hence Augustine says admirably, tract. 11 on John: "There are two births, one from earth and another from heaven; one from flesh and another from spirit; one from mortality and another from eternity; one from male and female and another from God and the Church. The former makes children of the flesh, the latter children of the spirit; the former children of death, the latter children of the resurrection; the former children of this world, the latter children of God; the former children of wrath, the latter children of mercy; and consequently the former makes them bound by original sin, while the latter frees them from every bond of sin."

CHAPTER I.
At What Time Baptism Was Instituted by Christ.

1. Some think that Christ instituted the sacrament of Baptism when he said to Nicodemus, John 3: "Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." Others place its institution at the time when Christ, about to ascend into heaven, said to the disciples, Matt. 28:

"Go, therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them," and so forth. But far more probable is the opinion of St. Thomas here, q. 66, a. 2, teaching that Baptism was instituted by Christ on the day when he was baptized by John in the Jordan. That it was instituted before Christ's death and resurrection is clearly gathered from Scripture. For since we read in John 3 and 4 that Christ baptized through his disciples before his Passion, there is no reason to deny that this was Christ's Baptism, and consequently instituted before his Passion. For it is not probable that Christ's disciples baptized with John's Baptism. First, because John's disciples, murmuring against that Baptism, complained of it to John, as is related in John 3. They certainly would not have done this, but rather ought to have rejoiced, if Christ's disciples had administered John's Baptism. Second, because John's disciples, moved by anger that Christ's disciples were baptizing, reported the matter to their master and did not say that Christ's disciples were baptizing, but that Christ was baptizing. For, as Cyril noted, l. 2 on John, although the disciples themselves baptized, as is expressly said in John 4, they did not do so by their own power and in their own name, but by the power and in the name of Christ, who was therefore said to baptize through them. This could not have been said if they had baptized in John's name and with John's Baptism, because then they should rather have said that John baptized through the Apostles. For one is said to baptize through others in whose name the Baptism is conferred.

2. An argument of fittingness is added for why this sacrament had to be instituted before the Passion. Since it is the gate to the other sacraments, and since without it, according to the law established by Christ, the effects of the other sacraments cannot be shared, it was fitting for it to be instituted before the Eucharist and Holy Orders. Hence, since these two sacraments were instituted before Christ's Passion, namely at the Last Supper, as is defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 22, can. 2, it is manifest that the sacrament of Baptism was also instituted before Christ's Passion. Similarly, in the Old Law, circumcision, which Baptism succeeded, was instituted before all the other sacraments.

3. That Baptism was instituted when Christ was baptized in the Jordan is proved by St. Thomas here, a. 2, by this reasoning: A sacrament seems to be instituted when it receives the power of producing its effects. But Baptism began to possess this power when Christ was baptized, as the holy Fathers teach, especially Augustine and Ambrose. Augustine says in serm. 36, *De Tempore*: "From the moment the Savior immersed himself in the water, he consecrated the course of all waters and the veins of every spring by the mystery of Baptism." Ambrose writes in l. 2 on Luke, final chapter: "The

Lord was therefore baptized, not wishing to be cleansed, but to cleanse the waters, so that, washed by the flesh of Christ, which knew no sin, they might possess the right of Baptism." Therefore Baptism possessed the power of regenerating and sanctifying when Christ was baptized in the Jordan.

4. Arguments of fittingness are also not lacking. The whole Trinity was then present under sensible signs, namely, the Father in the voice, the Son in human nature, and the Holy Spirit under the appearance of a dove, so that the form of Baptism, to be pronounced in the name of the Trinity, might be designated together with its matter. Likewise, the heavens were opened, so that the principal effect of Baptism, which is the opening of the heavenly kingdom, might be declared. Hence Augustine, *De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae*, cap. 5, says that the dove appeared and heaven was opened "to show the efficacy of the sacrament of Baptism." Therefore, according to this opinion, Baptism was instituted in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar, when Christ was about thirty years of age and, as is commonly believed, on the sixth day of January, when we celebrate the Epiphany. Hence St. Maximus, hom. 1 on the Epiphany: "As we are instructed by the account of the paternal tradition, they relate that today Christ the Lord, having received Baptism from John, consecrated the streams of the Jordan and at the same time purified his Baptism."

CHAPTER II.
At What Time the Obligation of Baptism Began.

1. The opinions of authors also vary concerning this point. Some, mentioned by St. Bernard, ep. 77, formerly thought that the precept of Baptism began when Christ said to Nicodemus: "Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit," and so forth. But this opinion is commonly rejected. First, because Christ was then holding a private conversation with Nicodemus, whereas the precept of Baptism ought not to have been given in a private but in a public discourse. Second, because Baptism was not commanded during the whole period in which the law of circumcision was in force. But the law of circumcision was in force throughout the period preceding Christ's death and Passion, because the Law of Moses endured until Christ's Passion. It was not adequately and perfectly fulfilled before Christ, now about to expire, said, "It is consummated." Third, Baptism began to be commanded only when it began to possess its whole perfection, for as long as it lacked this, it ought not to have been commanded. But before Christ's death and resurrection, Baptism did not possess its whole perfection, since one of the

perfections of Baptism is to configure us to the death and resurrection of Christ, as the Apostle teaches in Rom. 6. Therefore, it was not commanded before Christ's death and resurrection. Hence Jews instructed in the doctrine of Christ before his Passion, although they were bound to believe in Christ, were not yet bound to receive Baptism or profess the evangelical law, because it did not yet oblige.

Others teach that the obligation of Baptism began during the three days of Christ's death. But this opinion remains refuted by what has already been said, both because Baptism began to possess its whole perfection and complete signification only after the resurrection, and because Christ promulgated the law of Baptism only after the resurrection, as will be evident from what follows.

2. You will say: In John 19 Christ, when already about to die, uttered the words "It is consummated," by which he signified that the work of our redemption was entirely completed and consequently that the Old Law was totally extinguished. Therefore, the obligation of the precepts of the New Law, the first of which concerns Baptism, began at that time.

I answer that these words of Christ indeed refer to his death, but not as separated from his resurrection; rather, they include it. For just as our justification is one movement including two termini, namely, a terminus from which, which is departure from sin, and a terminus toward which, which is approach to grace, so Christ's death and resurrection constitute one movement of our redemption and salvation, having two termini: Christ's death, by which sin was destroyed, as the terminus from which; and his resurrection, by which spiritual life was consummated, as the terminus toward which.

Others judge that the obligation of Baptism did not begin until the day of Pentecost, when the evangelical law had been sufficiently promulgated. But truer and more probable is the opinion of those who assert that the obligation of Baptism began immediately after Christ's Passion and resurrection, when Christ appeared to his disciples and said to them in the final chapter of Matthew: "Go, teach all nations, baptizing them," and so forth. For since Baptism is the foundation of the whole evangelical law, its obligation began as soon as the evangelical law began to oblige. But the evangelical law began to oblige immediately after Christ's resurrection. Therefore, so did the precept of Baptism. The minor premise is proved. The evangelical law began to oblige as soon as the Mosaic Law was extinguished, for the generation of the former had to arise from the corruption of the latter. But the Mosaic Law was entirely extinguished as regards all its force in the death and resurrection of Christ. Therefore, the evangelical law began

to oblige immediately after Christ's death and resurrection. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 108, a. 3, ad 2, where he says: "The mystery of the redemption of the human race was completed in Christ's Passion. Hence the Lord then said, 'It is consummated,' as is found in John 19. Therefore, the legal observances then had to cease entirely, since their truth had now been fulfilled." As a sign of this, the veil of the Temple is read to have been torn in Christ's Passion, Matt. 27. I add that in the sacrifice of Christ's death, the immaculate Lamb, the priesthood of Aaron was transferred to the priesthood of Christ; and "when the priesthood is transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the law also be made," as the Apostle says in Heb. 7. These things, as we explained above, must be understood of Christ's death as conjoined with his resurrection, in which Christ resumed an immortal and unfailing life and fulfilled David's prophecy: "You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek."

You will say: After Christ's resurrection, the Apostles practiced circumcision and other legal rites, as is evident from their Acts. Indeed, Paul himself, that magnificent preacher of the law of grace, circumcised Timothy, as is read in Acts 16. Therefore, the obligation of the New Law and of Baptism did not begin immediately after Christ's Passion and resurrection. Especially because a law does not oblige before sufficient promulgation. But the evangelical law and the precept of Baptism, which is its foundation, were not sufficiently promulgated before the preaching of the Gospel, nor should they have been promulgated before the mysteries of Christ's religion were completed, namely, the Ascension and the sending of the Holy Spirit on the sacred day of Pentecost.

I answer that although the legal observances ceased after Christ's death and resurrection, the Apostles could nevertheless lawfully retain them for a time through a special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, not in order to observe the ceremonies of the Law, but lest they provoke the Jews, zealous for the traditions of their fathers, and lest the Jewish rites be believed to be abominable in themselves if they were suddenly cast aside in the same manner as the ceremonies of the Gentiles; and "so that the union of Gentiles and Jews dwelling together might be consolidated," as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 103, a. 4, ad 3. St. Augustine gives another excellent argument of fittingness in ep. 19 to Jerome, where he says that just as it is customary to preserve dead men for a time before burial, so the legal observances, which after Christ's death could not be preserved as living, were rightly preserved as dead until the publication of the Gospel, so that the dead mother, the synagogue, might be buried with honor.

As to the further claim that the law of Baptism was not sufficiently promulgated from the time of Christ's resurrection, this indeed proves that those were excused who were ignorant of the promulgation of this law made by Christ on the very day of his resurrection, when he said to the Apostles, "Go, teach all nations, baptizing them," and so forth. But it does not prove that those who were aware of such a law were exempt from its obligation.

CHAPTER III.
The Remote and Proximate Matter of Baptism.

1. Innumerable testimonies of Scripture plainly declare that the remote matter of Baptism is water. Several arguments of fittingness are also commonly brought forward, drawn from the analogy and likeness found between the properties of water and the effects of this sacrament. First, just as water washes away the filth of the body, so the grace of Baptism washes away the filth of souls, according to Ezek. 36: "I will pour clean water upon you, and you shall be cleansed from all your impurities." Hugh of St. Victor admirably explains this fittingness in *De Sacramentis*, l. 2, part 6, cap. 14, in these words: "The sacrament of Baptism was instituted to be consecrated in the element of water alone, because this alone possesses full and perfect cleansing. All other liquids are purified by water, and if anything is touched by any other liquid, it is washed with water so that it may be cleansed. Therefore the sacrament of cleansing consists in water alone."

Second, just as water cools and tempers the heat of burning, so the grace of Baptism, if it does not entirely extinguish the heat of the passions and the flames of concupiscence, at least moderates and mitigates them. Hence the Roman Catechism, title on Baptism, n. 10: "Just as water is most suitable for cooling bodies, so through Baptism the heat of desire is in great part restrained."

Third, just as water is a principle of the generation of living things, so Baptism is the sacrament of regeneration, by which the faithful receive supernatural life and are spiritually reborn. Hence Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, calls Christians little fish. "We little fish," he says, "are born in water, and we are saved in no other way than by remaining in the water." For this reason Pope Leo also compares Baptism to the virginal womb, serm. 4: "For every man who is reborn, the water of Baptism is like the virginal womb, for the same Spirit fills the font who filled the Virgin." Augustine goes further, for in serm. 36, *De Tempore*, he in some way prefers Baptism to the virginal womb, in these words: "The water has been enriched with almost a greater gift than

Mary. For she merited chastity for herself alone, while the water conferred sanctification upon us. She merited not to sin; the water merited to purify sins. She repelled her own faults from herself; the water, by God's grace, pardons the faults of others within itself. Virginity was bestowed upon her; fruitfulness was given to the water. She brought forth one and remained pure; the water regenerated many and is a virgin. Apart from Christ, she knows no other son; together with Christ, the water is the mother of peoples."

2. Finally, water, as the holy Doctor says here, a. 3, is by reason of its commonness and abundance a suitable matter for the necessity of this sacrament, because it can easily be obtained everywhere. St. Peter seems to allude to this in Acts 10 when he says: "Can anyone forbid water, that these should not be baptized?" From this you will understand how shamefully the Seleucians and Jacobites erred. From the words of Matt. 3, "He will baptize you in the Holy Spirit and fire," badly understood, they inferred that the matter of Baptism was not water but fire, and therefore impressed a kind of burn upon the forehead or cheeks of children whom they baptized. For these words must be understood of metaphorical fire, that is, the power of Baptism, which through grace and charity purifies hearts and consumes the rust of sins like fire.

When we said that water is the matter of this sacrament, this must be understood of simple or elemental water, not so mixed that its nature and species are destroyed. Hence all artificial waters, or liquids and juices expressed from flowers or plants, aqueous fluids such as sweat, saliva, and tears, and all liquids of a species different from water, such as milk, oil, and wine, are not suitable matter for this sacrament. Nor does it matter that Stephen II, in a rescript to the monks of a British monastery, cap. 11, says: "If someone, because he could find no water, baptized an infant in immediate danger entirely with wine, no fault is imputed to him on that account; infants thus baptized are to remain in their Baptism." For either that rescript is not authentic or it is badly composed, as Father Nicolai rightly observed in his scholia on q. 66, a. 3, where he should be consulted.

3. From what has been said, it is evident that the proximate matter of Baptism is washing. For proximate matter is nothing other than the use or application of remote matter. But washing is the use or application of water, which is the remote matter of Baptism. Therefore washing is its proximate matter. As to how much and what kind of washing is required for the sacrament, all agree that an amount suffices by which a man can morally be said to have been washed, whether it is done by immersion of the person to be baptized in water, by sprinkling, or by the pouring of water. This makes

no difference to the validity of the sacrament. Hence one would not be baptized if only his clothing were washed, or only his hair or fingernails, or some minimal part of the body, such as the tip of a finger, because these do not suffice for the man to be denominated washed. Rather, the washing must take place upon some notable part of the body, especially the head, because it is the principal part in which all the senses flourish. Therefore, one who outside a case of necessity omitted the head and washed another part would sin mortally, because in a grave matter he would act against the common custom of the Church.

4. From what has been said, you will understand why Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, cap. 19, not without reason said that "Christ is never without water," since the principal mysteries of our religion were accomplished by the element of water. "For Christ himself is washed with water; when called to the wedding, he inaugurates the first beginnings of his power with water; when he speaks, he invites the thirsty to eternal water; when he teaches concerning the agape, he approves a cup of water offered to a brother among the works of charity; at the well he restores his strength; he walks upon the water, readily crosses the sea, and ministers water to his disciples. The testimony of Baptism perseveres even to the Passion. When he is delivered to the Cross, water intervenes, as Pilate's hands know; when he is wounded, water bursts forth from the wound, as the soldier's lance knows." Nor did the Holy Spirit seem to love waters less, since from the beginning of creation, delighted by the purity of this element, he chose water as his proper seat or as a triumphal chariot upon which he might be borne. The same author says in cap. 4 of the same work: "Then the earth was invisible and unformed; the whole darkness still lacked the adornment of stars; the abyss was shapeless and gloomy; the earth unprepared and heaven rude. Water alone, always perfect matter, joyful, simple, and pure of itself, offered itself beneath God as a worthy vehicle." Hence when Christ was baptized on the bank of the Jordan, "then," the same Tertullian adds, "that most holy Spirit willingly descended from the Father upon the waters of Baptism, and, recognizing the water as his ancient seat, rested there, descending in the form of a dove."

CHAPTER IV.
The Form of Baptism.

1. It is certain that the form of Baptism consists in these words: "I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." This is

defined in the Council of Florence in the decree of union and in the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 4, and is gathered from Christ's words in Matt. 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." St. Thomas here, a. 5, assigns as a fittingness that it is highly suitable for the cause of Baptism to be expressed in its form, not only the ministerial cause that completes the sacrament, but also the principal cause from which the whole power of the sacrament is derived. The aforesaid form expresses the minister when it is said, "I baptize you," and designates the principal cause when it is added, "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." I add that it was fitting for the principal object of faith, which is the Trinity of Persons, to be expressed in the sacrament of faith; for the Trinity, from whom the beginning of our creation was received, to be designated in the sacrament of regeneration; and finally for the ultimate end and principal object of our beatitude to be proposed in the sacrament that is the beginning of our justification and tendency toward supernatural beatitude.

2. Two difficulties concerning this form must be briefly resolved here. The first is whether Baptism in the name of the Begetter, the Begotten, and the One Proceeding from both is valid. The reason for doubt is that these names seem to be synonymous with the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and formally to signify the same thing. Hence the Church indifferently invokes and praises these divine Persons under either the first or the second names. Therefore Baptism in the name of the Begetter, the Begotten, and the One Proceeding from both seems valid. Nevertheless, the negative opinion seems truer and more probable, and is proved from the contrary foundation. For it is false that these terms are synonymous and signify the same thing. The name "Father" signifies the subsistence of the first Person, or the relation by which he is constituted as such a Person. "Begetter," however, does not signify subsistence or relation, but the notional act that is, as it were, the foundation of the subsistence or relation itself, by which a divine Person is not formally constituted, as we showed in the treatise on the Trinity. Hence St. Thomas, IV *Sententiae ad Hannibaldum*, dist. 3, q. unica, a. 2, ad 4: "It must be said that 'begetter,' since it is a verbal noun, does not signify the Person as a subsisting hypostasis, but rather after the manner of an act. Hence, if it is said, 'In the name of the Begetter and the Begotten,' there will be no Baptism." Nothing clearer or more express can be said. Therefore, although outside the sacrament one may invoke the Trinity under the names of the Begetter, the Begotten, and the One Proceeding from both, and the Church in fact often invokes and praises the Trinity under those names, they may not be used in the sacrament of Baptism. For it is uncertain

whether these names are altogether synonymous with the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and it is more probable that they are not. But in moral matters, especially in the matter of the sacraments, it is not lawful to follow a less probable opinion while abandoning the more probable.

The second difficulty is whether Baptism in the name of Christ is valid. The reason for doubt is that in Acts 8, men and women are said to have been baptized in the name of Jesus Christ. Hence Pope Nicholas, replying to the questions of the Bulgarians, who asked what should be done concerning those who had been baptized by a certain Jew, answered, as is reported in *De Consecratione*, dist. 4, cap. *A Quodam Judaeo*: "Certainly, if these were baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity, or only in the name of Christ, as is read in the Acts of the Apostles, for it is the same, as St. Ambrose says, they must not be rebaptized." Therefore Baptism can be conferred in the name of Christ alone.

3. Nevertheless, the negative opinion must be held. For although what St. Thomas says here, a. 6, ad 1, is highly probable, namely, that "by a special revelation of Christ, the Apostles in the primitive Church baptized in the name of Christ, so that the name of Christ, which was hateful to Jews and Gentiles, might be made honorable through the fact that the Holy Spirit was given in Baptism at its invocation," and although the Roman Catechism, in the chapter on Baptism, indicates that this opinion is probable, nevertheless afterward, when the cause of such a dispensation ceased and the name of Christ was diffused throughout the whole world and acknowledged by Jews and Gentiles, Baptism conferred in the name of Christ alone became invalid. Nor does it matter that the cited Nicholas thought that such a dispensation still endured in his own time, and consequently that Baptism conferred in the name of Christ alone was valid as it had been in apostolic times and at the beginning of the nascent Church. For, as Soto and Sylvius say, he held this as a private doctor, thinking it to be the opinion of Ambrose, whom he cites. For in *De Sacramentis*, cap. 7, Ambrose relates that in his own time it was customary at each immersion to ask the catechumen: "Do you believe in the Father?" at the first; at the second, "Do you believe in the Son?"; at the third, "Do you believe in the Holy Spirit?"

CHAPTER V.
The Minister of Baptism.

1. There is a twofold minister of Baptism, one ordinary and by office, the other extraordinary and in a case of necessity. The first is the priest alone, to

whom it belongs solemnly and by office to minister Baptism, as is defined in the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene. Since priests alone possess power over Christ's natural body, to be confected in the venerable sacrament of the Eucharist, they alone also possess power over the mystical body of the Church and its members. Consequently, it belongs to them alone to introduce and receive others into the household of Christ and to incorporate them through Baptism into the other members of the Church. A deacon, however, can solemnly baptize by a special commission from a priest or bishop, as is evident from Philip the deacon, who was sent by the Apostles to baptize and preach, Acts 8. Hence in the Roman Pontifical, in the ordination of a deacon, it is said that a deacon ought to baptize and preach. This is an evident argument that by virtue of his ordination he receives the faculty of solemnly baptizing by commission of a priest or bishop. Such a commission, however, cannot be given to him except because of a great necessity or utility of the Church, for example, if there were no priests who could baptize solemnly. Such necessity or utility of the Church can scarcely now be found because of the multitude of priests. It must also be observed that when the ancient Fathers, Tertullian in *De Baptismo* and Jerome in his dialogue *Adversus Luciferianos*, teach that a priest cannot solemnly baptize without the commission of a bishop, they are either speaking of the Baptism that in the primitive Church was customarily celebrated by the bishop with solemn ceremony on certain days of the year, such as the vigils of Easter and Pentecost, or they are speaking of a simple priest who, although he received the power of baptizing in his ordination, nevertheless requires jurisdiction granted by the bishop, or by one to whom the bishop has entrusted it, such as a pastor, in order to reduce that power to practice.

As regards a minister of necessity, the Council of Florence in the aforesaid decree of Eugene states: "In a case of necessity, not only a priest or even a deacon, but also a layman or woman, indeed even a pagan and heretic, can baptize." The reason why any man whatsoever suffices to minister this sacrament, besides Christ's institution and good pleasure, is the supreme necessity of this sacrament, on account of which Christ also willed its matter to be water, which can easily be obtained everywhere. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 5, says: "Just as, on the part of the matter, any true and natural water suffices because of the necessity of the sacrament, so also on the part of the minister any man suffices."

2. Nor is this opposed by the reply of Gregory II, writing to Boniface that those baptized by certain pagans were to be rebaptized. For he presupposes that, since they were ignorant of the mysteries of faith, they had not applied everything necessary for the sacrament. Nor is it an objection that St.

Augustine doubted this question and left it undecided in l. 2 *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani*. For this was afterward determined by the Church, especially by Pope Nicholas in the canon *A Quodam Judaeo*, *De Consecratione*, dist. 4, and indeed by Augustine himself in various places, including the very book cited, where he speaks thus of Baptism: "Even if it is usurped without any necessity and given by anyone to anyone, it cannot be said not to have been given, although it can rightly be said to have been given unlawfully."

Although in a case of necessity anyone is a suitable minister of this sacrament, and no one, not even an unbeliever, is excluded from administering so necessary a sacrament, the due order must nevertheless be observed, so that the less worthy yields to the more worthy: the unbaptized to the baptized; a woman to a man, unless for the sake of modesty it is fitting for a woman rather than a man to baptize an infant not yet delivered; a non-cleric to a cleric; and the other clerics to a priest. There is nevertheless a difficulty and controversy among theologians whether it is a mortal sin to invert this order. I answer that it is mortal when the order is not observed toward a priest, upon whom by office it is incumbent to minister this sacrament, or toward a deacon, to whom this belongs by commission of a priest. It is otherwise when the order is not observed among the others. For although some impropriety is found in this, it is slight and therefore only venial.

3. You will ask whether, if two ministers partially concurred in baptizing someone, so that one performed the washing and the other pronounced the form, the Baptism would be valid. I answer negatively, against Cajetan and Marsilius, because in such a case the form of Baptism would not be verified. For one who merely pronounced the words could not truthfully say, "I baptize you," because in reality he would not perform the washing. Therefore such a Baptism would be invalid. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4: "If two were to concur, one mute, who could not pronounce the words, and the other lacking hands, who could not perform the act, the two could not baptize together, one saying the words and the other performing the act."

You will say first: In the sacraments of Penance and Matrimony, the matter is applied by one and the form by another. Therefore the same will be possible in the sacrament of Baptism. I deny the consequence and the parity. For the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment, in which the accused and the judge must be distinct, and the confession must be made by the accused, while the absolution is given by the judge. Matrimony has the character of a contract of mutual delivery and acceptance, which cannot be found within one and the same person.

4. You will say second: If several ministers simultaneously performed the washing and pronounced the words, all would truly baptize, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 6, and as is evident from the example of priests simultaneously consecrating the same host on the day of their ordination. Therefore plurality of ministers does not impede the validity of the sacrament of Baptism.

I answer that plurality of ministers renders the sacrament of Baptism invalid only when they destroy the truth of the form. But in the case in which several ministers, each after the manner of a total cause, simultaneously performed the washing and pronounced the words, the truth of the baptismal form would remain, because each would truly wash and baptize. It would be otherwise if several partially concurred in baptizing someone, so that one performed the washing and another pronounced the form. The latter could not truthfully say, "I baptize you," but would say something false.

CHAPTER VI.
The Subject of Baptism.

1. It is certain that all, both infants and adults, of either sex, are capable of Baptism. For all those can be regenerated in Christ through Baptism who contract original sin through natural generation, since "as in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive," as is said in 1 Cor. 15. But all contract original sin from Adam. Therefore all can also be regenerated in Christ through the sacrament of Baptism. Indeed, even if someone were sanctified in his mother's womb by a special privilege, he would nevertheless be capable of Baptism and ought to be baptized, because he would have to enter the visible Church through Baptism and become capable of the other sacraments. Hence St. Thomas, IV *Sententiae*, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 3, says: "One sanctified in the womb ought to be baptized for three reasons. First, in order to acquire the character by which he is numbered among the people of God, which is, as it were, to be deputed to receive the divine sacraments. Second, so that through the reception of Baptism he may also be bodily conformed to Christ's Passion. Third, because of the good of obedience, since the precept of Baptism was given to all and must be fulfilled by all, unless an urgent necessity excludes the sacrament."

You will say: The form of Baptism cannot be verified of such a subject, for it signifies not only material but also spiritual washing from original sin. But one sanctified in his mother's womb could not be spiritually cleansed by

Baptism from original sin, since through sanctification in the womb he had already been cleansed of it. Therefore the form of Baptism could not be verified of him.

I answer first that this argument proves too much, for it proves that Baptism cannot be conferred upon an adult who had been cleansed from sins through an act of charity or contrition, because the form of Baptism could not be verified of him.

I answer second by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that, just as the words "I absolve you from your sins," which are the form of the sacrament of Penance, signify nothing other than "I impart to you grace that remits sins," or grace that of itself is capable of loosening the bonds of sins if the subject is found bound by them, so likewise the words "I baptize you," which are the form of the sacrament of Baptism, essentially signify nothing other than the infusion of sanctifying grace, which of itself is capable of destroying original and actual sin if they are found in the subject. Hence, just as in the sacrament of Penance the aforesaid words "I absolve you from your sins" are verified even if the penitent confesses only sins already confessed and remitted, by which he is consequently no longer bound, so likewise in the sacrament of Baptism the words "I baptize you" are true even if the person baptized was sanctified in his mother's womb and cleansed of original sin.

From these things it is evident that children are capable of Baptism before they reach the use of reason. For as soon as an infant is delivered from the mother's womb, he is capable of salvation and must have some means of attaining it. Under the New Law no other means is given than Baptism, as will be evident from what is said in the following chapter, where we treat the necessity of Baptism. This is confirmed. Under the law of nature, as soon as an infant was delivered from his mother's womb, he was capable of the sacrament cleansing from original sin. Under the Mosaic Law, when because of danger of death the eighth day could not be awaited for the infant's circumcision, the sacrament of the law of nature was applied to him. Therefore, much more under the New Law, in which grace is more abundant and universal because Christ's Passion has been accomplished, Baptism can be applied to a child as soon as he is delivered from his mother's womb. Hence the Second Council of Milevis, can. 2: "It has been decreed that whoever denies that newborn infants ought to be baptized is anathema." And the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 4, pronounces anathema upon those who contend that no one should be baptized except at the age at which Christ was baptized.

From this it is inferred that no disposition is required in infants for the validity of Baptism. For just as they can contract the stain of origin without their own will, so they can receive cleansing from that stain without their own will and disposition. Hence when Christ in the final chapters of Matthew and Mark commands Baptism to be conferred upon those who have believed and have been taught his law, this must be understood of the Baptism of adults, as the holy Fathers explain.

2. If you ask what dispositions are required in an adult in order that he may receive the sacrament of Baptism validly and lawfully, or with fruit:

I answer first that for its validity there is required voluntary consent by which he wills to receive Baptism. Since Baptism is a certain profession of faith, on account of which it is called the sacrament of faith, just as no one receives faith unless willing and consenting, so neither does anyone receive the sacrament of Baptism. I add that in receiving Baptism an obligation is contracted to embrace Christ's law and religion, so that one baptized can be compelled by the Church to preserve his faith and obey her precepts. But an adult cannot contract such an obligation unless he wills and consents. Therefore, neither can he validly receive Baptism. Nor is the opinion of some satisfactory, who think that for the validity of Baptism in an adult it is enough that he conduct himself merely negatively or indifferently toward it, neither consenting nor dissenting. For this indifference or negative permission is insufficient for receiving the faith and contracting an obligation to embrace Christ's law and religion. Hence Augustine, in the celebrated can. *Cum a Multis*, *De Consecratione*, dist. 4, says that no one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit unless willing. But one who conducts himself merely negatively and indifferently toward Baptism is not willing, as is evident. Therefore he is not reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, and consequently does not receive a valid sacrament. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 68, a. 7, says that "if an adult lacked the intention of receiving the sacrament, he would have to be rebaptized."

Therefore, for the validity of Baptism there is required positive consent, whether formal or at least virtual or interpretative. Hence, if someone while awake had the intention of receiving Baptism, and afterward, without changing that intention, was baptized while asleep, he would truly be baptized, as Innocent III determined in cap. *Majores*, *De Baptismo*. If someone also, under fear capable of affecting a steadfast man, permits himself to be baptized, he receives a true sacrament, as the same Pontiff defined there and St. Thomas expressly teaches in IV *Sententiae*, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 3, in these words: "If the coercion is inducive, as by threats or blows, so that the baptized person chooses rather to receive Baptism than to suffer

such things, he then receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament." Reason also supports this. For things done from fear, although involuntary in a certain respect, are nevertheless simply voluntary. Thus one who through fear of a storm casts merchandise into the sea absolutely wills to cast it away, although in a certain respect and conditionally he would will to retain it. Therefore consent elicited from grave fear suffices for Baptism, although it does not suffice for Matrimony. For Matrimony, since it not only has the character of a sacrament but is also a civil contract, is subject to civil law, which determined that a marriage contracted under fear capable of affecting a steadfast man is invalid.

3. Second, for adults to be baptized lawfully and fruitfully, a necessary act of faith is required, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 68, a. 8, and as is evident from Christ's words, Mark 16: "He who believes and is baptized shall be saved"; and from Philip's words to the eunuch, Acts 8: "If you believe with your whole heart, it is permitted." The Council of Trent also, sess. 6, cap. 6, in enumerating the dispositions for attaining justification, whether through Baptism or otherwise, places the act of faith first. This was treated in the matter of justification.

4. Third, in those adults who sinned mortally before Baptism, some sorrow for the sins committed is necessary if they are fruitfully to receive this sacrament. For Paul teaches in Rom. 6 that one who is baptized must die entirely to sin, and Peter answered the great multitude who had asked him what must be done to receive Baptism worthily and fruitfully, Acts 2: "Do penance, and let every one of you be baptized." And in cap. 3: "Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." Hence Augustine, *De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia*, cap. 8: "Without penance, Baptism has profited no one who sinned voluntarily."

5. If you ask what kind of sorrow this must be, I answer that attrition alone suffices for receiving Baptism fruitfully, and perfect contrition is not required. For, as we showed in the treatise on Penance, attrition suffices in the sacrament of Penance. Therefore it also suffices in Baptism, which acts equally by the work worked and is no less efficacious for destroying sins than Penance. Hence St. Thomas, IV *Sententiae*, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5: "For a man to prepare himself to receive grace in Baptism, faith is prerequisite, but not charity, because preceding attrition suffices even if it is not contrition." Reason also commends this. For if true contrition were always required in adults for Baptism, Baptism would never confer first grace upon them, and consequently would not be a sacrament of the dead but of the living, and would never be regeneration in adults. For it would always presuppose the life of grace and regeneration already accomplished through an act of

contrition, which of itself and in relation to the use of the sacrament possesses the power of justifying, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 14, cap. 4. But this is treated more fully in the treatise on Penance, cap. 4, § 4.

6. You will ask whether it is lawful to baptize the infants of unbelievers against the will of their parents.

I answer that it is not lawful to baptize, against the will of their parents, the children of unbelievers who are subject only politically and civilly to the Church or to Christian or ecclesiastical princes. It is lawful, however, to baptize the children of unbelievers who are truly their slaves, such as the children of Turks and Moors who become slaves of Christians through a just war.

The first part of this resolution, which is against Scotus, is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, q. 68, a. 10, and in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 12, where he suggests this reason: If the children of unbelievers who are subject only politically and civilly to the Church or to Christian princes were baptized against the will of their parents, an injury would be done either to the sacrament or to the parents. For either such baptized infants would be left under the care of their parents, in which case there would be almost moral certainty that, when they reached adulthood, because of affection for their parents or ignorance of the mysteries of faith, they would apostatize from the faith they had received, to the great injury of religion and the sacrament; or they would immediately be removed from the power of their parents, but this is contrary to the natural right parents possess over their children. For children, by reason of natural generation, are part of their parents, and therefore by natural right are under their power. Christ did not will this paternal right to be violated by the law of Baptism. This is evident a posteriori from the fact that the Church never sought to have the children of unbelievers baptized against the will of their parents when those parents were under the power of Christian rulers, such as Constantine the Great, Theodosius, and others, who would most willingly have done this if they had judged it lawful and indeed obligatory, as Scotus thinks. Even now the Supreme Pontiffs do not seek the Baptism of Jewish infants whose parents in great number are subject to the civil power of the Church, but permit them to be circumcised.

7. From this reasoning it is inferred that if a child of unbelievers is foreseen to be about to die immediately without any hope of life, he can be baptized. For in that case no injury is done either to the sacrament, because such an infant is not exposed to danger of apostasy, or to the parents, since he is removed from them not by Baptism but by death.

That it is lawful to baptize against their parents' will the children of those unbelievers who are true slaves or bondsmen, whether purchased or enslaved by the law of war, is evident first from continuous practice. For the children of Turks and Moors who become slaves of Christians through a just war are baptized by their masters against the will of their parents. It is also evident because such slaves, together with their children, are subject to real dominion, so that the master can, at his pleasure, retain them with himself, sell them to others, or even separate them from one another. Once that separation has been made, the danger of apostasy in the children and the injury to the parents cease, since the latter are deprived of the dominion and paternal right they have over their children by reason of servitude, which was introduced as a just penalty by the law of nations in order to redeem the life of those who, having been captured in a just war, ought to have been deprived of it.

8. Nor is the doctrine of St. Thomas here, a. 10, ad 2, and *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 11, ad 3, contrary to this resolution and doctrine, as a certain recent author objects against us in his *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*, p. 377. For in those passages the holy Doctor is speaking of the children of unbelievers who are subject to Christian princes only by civil and political subjection and servitude, not of those who are their true bondsmen, as will be evident to the reader. Nor is it true, as the aforesaid author asserts in the same place, that Jews are true bondsmen of Christian princes because they wickedly conspired in the Lord's death. For Christian princes cannot at their pleasure kill, give away, sell, or apply them to whatever uses they wish, as a master can do with a bondsman; nor has any Christian prince ever arrogated such authority and power to himself. Hence when St. Thomas here, q. 68, a. 10, ad 2, says that Jews are servants of princes, he is speaking only of civil and political servitude. For he adds that they are "servants of princes by civil servitude, which does not exclude the order of natural right." He repeats this in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 11, ad 3. Innocent III must be understood in the same manner in cap. *Etsi Judaeos*, *De Judaeis et Sarracenis*. Hence neither contradicts our opinion; rather, both establish it, since in the first part of our resolution we said that it is not lawful to baptize against their parents' will the children of those unbelievers who are subject only politically and civilly to Christian princes.

CHAPTER VII.
The Necessity of Baptism.

1. Cajetan here, q. 68, a. 2, teaches that when there is no opportunity to baptize infants, a desire for Baptism conceived by their parents or by others suffices for their salvation, especially when joined to some external sign. He explains this there as follows: "In such a case the parent ought to fortify the infant with the sign of the Cross and the invocation of the Trinity, and thus offer the dying child to God in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." And on a. 11 of the same question he writes: "On the eleventh article it must be written and consequently said, though subject to correction, that infants endangered in their mothers' wombs can be saved through the sacrament of Baptism received not in reality but in desire, together with some blessing of the child or offering of him to God with the invocation of the Trinity." John Gerson, Chancellor of Paris, inclines to the same opinion in his sermon on the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin delivered at the Council of Constance, as does Gabriel in IV *Sententiae*, dist. 4, q. 2, a. 3, dub. 2. Serra here, a. 2, and Caramuel, *Theologia Fundamentalis*, cap. 7, fund. 64, testify that some recent authors regard it as probable. The other theologians, however, reject it as erroneous, because in John 3 this universal law was established by Christ: "Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." But when a general law is certain, unless a derogating privilege is also certain, no such privilege is presumed. Cajetan's privilege derogating from the universal law of Baptism is not known to us. Indeed, the contrary is rather gathered from the tradition of the Church, from Councils, and from the holy Fathers. Therefore such a privilege must be regarded as null and fictitious. The minor premise is proved in each of its parts.

First, that such a privilege is contrary to the tradition of the Church is evident because the Church has never numbered among her members infants who were not reborn in Christ by Baptism of water or blood, since she has always denied ecclesiastical burial to those dying without it. Hence Augustine, *De Origine Animae*, cap. 9, says: "No one becomes a member of Christ except by Baptism in Christ or by death for Christ."

That it is opposed to the Councils is evident from the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene, where it is said: "Since death entered into all through the first man, unless we are reborn of water and the Holy Spirit,

we cannot, as the Truth says, enter the kingdom of heaven." And from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 4, where in describing the justification of the impious it says that it is a translation from the state in which man is born a child of wrath into the state of grace and adoption as children of God, "which translation, after the promulgation of the Gospel, cannot be made without the washing of regeneration or its desire." Hence, since infants, as lacking the use of reason, are not capable of a desire or wish for Baptism, it is manifest that according to the Council of Trent they cannot be saved without the actual reception of Baptism.

The holy Fathers teach the same everywhere. Ambrose, *De Abraham*, l. 2, final chapter, explaining Christ's words, "Unless one is reborn," adds: "He certainly excludes no one, neither an infant nor one prevented by any necessity." Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, l. 1, cap. 23: "It is not within our judgment to promise eternal salvation to infants apart from Christ's Baptism, beyond what divine Scripture promises, which must be preferred to all human talents." And in cap. 27: "Since infants do not begin to be among his sheep except through Baptism, if they do not receive it, they will perish." Likewise, *De Origine Animae*, l. 3: "Do not believe, do not say, do not teach that infants before they are baptized can attain the remission of original sins, if you wish to be a Catholic."

Finally, St. Thomas here, q. 68, a. 1, reasons thus: No one can be saved without that through which man is incorporated into Christ and becomes his member. For no one can attain salvation except through Christ and consequently unless he is incorporated into Christ, because, as the Apostle says in Rom. 5, just as through the offense of one man condemnation came upon all men, so through the justice of one justification came upon all men. But man is incorporated into Christ through Baptism alone. Therefore no one can attain salvation without Baptism.

2. You will object first with Cajetan. Under the Old Law, when a child was endangered before the eighth day, on which circumcision was customarily performed, the remedy or sacrament ordained under the law of nature for the salvation of infants sufficed for him, namely, the faith of the parents manifested by some exterior and sensible sign. "For what," Gregory says, "the water of Baptism effects among us, faith alone effected among the ancients for infants." Therefore, similarly and indeed with even greater reason, under the evangelical law the same remedy could be applied to infants to whom Baptism cannot be applied. Otherwise, under the law of grace the way of salvation would have been narrowed and made more difficult for infants than under the law of nature or the Mosaic Law, and they would be in a worse condition.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that, since under the Law of Moses God forbade children to be circumcised before the eighth day, it was necessary that he leave another remedy to be applied to those endangered before that time, namely, the sacrament of the law of nature. But now, because he so instituted the sacrament of Baptism that he did not forbid it to be applied to infants as soon as they are born, it is not surprising that he left no other remedy for them. Nor for that reason has the way of salvation been narrowed or made more difficult for infants than under the law of nature or the Mosaic Law. First, because more infants are saved under the evangelical law, diffused throughout the whole world, than under the law of nature or the Mosaic Law, when true faith was found among few. Second, because Baptism confers more abundant grace and leads more quickly to glory. Third, because water, which is the matter of Baptism, is very common, and it is easier to wash and pronounce certain words than to join an act of supernatural faith to a sensible sign, as was required for the remedy of the law of nature. I add that fewer infants could be assisted then than now, because at that time the sacrament instituted for infants could be applied only by the faithful, whereas now Baptism can be administered even by heretics, pagans, and unbelievers, as was shown in cap. 5. Hence, speaking absolutely and in itself, the condition of infants has not been made worse but better, although accidentally and in a certain respect it may be called worse with regard to those who die so suddenly immediately after birth that they cannot receive Baptism through any diligence of their parents.

3. You will object second: If no remedy were given under the evangelical law for the salvation of infants to whom Baptism cannot be applied, it would follow that the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved would not extend to those infants, and consequently that such a will would not be universal. But this cannot be said. Therefore neither can the former. The consequence of the major premise is evident, because through that antecedent will God gives means sufficient for salvation. Otherwise such a will would not be true and sincere, but fictitious and simulated. Hence St. Thomas, I *Sententiae*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, says that "the effect of this will is the ordination to the end of salvation and those things that promote toward the end, both natural and gratuitous, which are proposed in common to all." Therefore, if God left no remedy under the evangelical law for the salvation of infants to whom Baptism cannot be applied, they would not be included under the antecedent will by which he wills all men to be saved.

4. Vasquez, oppressed by the difficulty of this argument, admits that the antecedent will God possesses concerning the salvation of all does not

include those infants, and consequently that God denies them the means necessary for salvation. But St. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, l. 4, cap. 8, expressly teaches that they are included under such a will. This is also evident because otherwise Christ would not be the Redeemer of all infants, since his redemption does not extend objectively beyond God's universal will concerning the salvation of men, being commanded by that will.

5. It is therefore better to answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. For the antecedent will by which God desires the salvation of all men, and the universal redemption of Christ, to extend to all infants, it is not required that God in fact confer upon all a means or remedy by which original sin can be destroyed in them. It suffices that Baptism was universally instituted for all infants, offered and prepared for all, and obtained for all by Christ's merits as regards sufficiency. Hence, when it is said that through the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved he gives to all helps and remedies sufficient for salvation, a distinction must be made. If the word "give" is taken as signifying the same as preparing or offering in common, it must be granted. If "give" is taken as correlative to receiving, and as signifying the intrinsic reception of the helps or their actual application, it must be denied.

Therefore sufficient means of salvation are not presented to all in the same manner by virtue of the antecedent will by which God wills all men to be saved, but in diverse manners. We extend this diversity in such a way that for some Baptism is foreseen as actually to be applied, namely, those who are in fact washed by the laver of regeneration. For others it is foreseen only as proximately applicable through human diligence, namely, those to whom it was not applied because of human negligence. For others, finally, it is foreseen neither as applied nor as applicable through any diligence, but as instituted for them insofar as depends upon God and obtained through Christ's merits as regards sufficiency. Such are those who die in the mother's womb, to whom Baptism cannot be applied by any human diligence, both because they cannot be subjected to the operation of the Church's ministers and because infants not yet born are incapable of Baptism, since one cannot be reborn unless first born.

6. You will say: If under the New Law no remedy applicable by human diligence is given for original sin in infants dying in their mother's womb, it follows that Christ's merit is less than Adam's demerit. But this cannot be said. Therefore neither can the former. The consequence of the major premise is evident. For Adam, through seminal propagation, in fact infects those children dying in the mother's womb and communicates to them the

stain of original sin. Therefore, if Christ prepared no remedy for them under the New Law to destroy that sin, his merit will be less than Adam's demerit.

I answer that this argument proves only that Christ's merit in second act is, in a certain respect and as regards extension or application, less efficacious than Adam's demerit, insofar as Adam's sin is in fact transmitted to all by natural propagation, while Christ's merit profits only those to whom it is applied through certain means instituted by him. This is nevertheless compatible with Christ's merit being absolutely more efficacious in first act, and in some way also in second act, insofar as it destroys not only original sin but also actual sins, and insofar as by its power certain supernatural goods are conferred that are far greater than those lost through Adam's demerit.

CHAPTER VIII.
The Effects of Baptism.

1. So various and marvelous are the effects of this sacrament that Tertullian rightly exclaimed in *De Baptismo*, cap. 3: "How many wonders of nature, how many privileges of grace, how many solemn rites of discipline, figures, preparations, and prayers have established the religion of water!" The first and principal effect is the remission of original sin and of all actual sins preceding Baptism. For through Baptism the Christian becomes a new man created in Christ Jesus, and consequently nothing of the oldness of sin remains in him. Hence Augustine, *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, l. 1, cap. 15: "Through generation by the flesh, original sin alone is contracted; but through regeneration by the Spirit, remission is made not only of original but also of voluntary sins." Therefore through Baptism all our sins are cast into the depth of the sea, as Micah had foretold, just as all the Egyptians were formerly submerged and destroyed in the Red Sea. Hence Gregory the Great, l. 9, ep. 39: "Let one who says that sins are not utterly remitted in Baptism say that the Egyptians did not truly die in the Red Sea." And St. Bernard, serm. 39 on the Canticle, explaining more fully the same figure and likeness or analogy of Baptism with the Red Sea, says: "There the people were led out of Egypt; here man is led out of the world. There Pharaoh is overthrown; here the devil. There Pharaoh's chariots are overturned; here carnal and worldly desires, which wage war against the soul, are overwhelmed: they in the waves, these in tears; those waters were of the sea, these are bitter."

2. The second effect of Baptism is the full remission of all punishment due to sin, without satisfaction, and consequently the opening of access to the kingdom of heaven without delay if someone dies after Baptism without a new sin. Concerning this effect, the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene says: "The effect of this sacrament is the remission of every fault, original and actual, and of every punishment due for that fault. Therefore no satisfaction for past sins is to be imposed upon the baptized, but those who die before committing any fault immediately attain the kingdom of heaven and the vision of God." Similarly, Ambrose on Rom. 11: "The grace of God in Baptism does not seek groaning, lamentation, or any work, but only profession from the heart. For the gift of God's grace forgives sins in Baptism."

Reason also supports this. Christ instituted this sacrament after the manner of spiritual generation. Hence, just as in bodily generation, according to the more probable opinion of Aristotle and St. Thomas, there is a resolution as far as prime matter, so that no accident that existed in the corrupted thing remains in the thing generated, so no accident pertaining to spiritual generation should remain in a man regenerated through Baptism, whether as regards guilt or punishment. Hence Chrysostom, hom. 24 on John: "When the head is immersed in the water of Baptism as in a tomb, the old man is buried; when it emerges, the new man rises."

3. Although through Baptism man is freed from every debt of punishment due for guilt, the penalities of this life are not removed through it. For experience shows that concupiscence and the incentive of sin remain in the baptized, and that they are subject to hunger, thirst, illnesses, sorrows, and other miseries to which Christ our head was subject until his resurrection, so that they may be more assimilated to him and so that their crown may be greater from victory in a greater struggle. Hence Augustine, *Enchiridion*, cap. 66: "We see infants after the washing of regeneration tormented by affliction from various evils, so that we may understand that everything accomplished through the saving sacraments pertains more to the hope of future goods than to the retention or acquisition of present goods."

4. The third effect of Baptism is the infusion of habitual grace and of the virtues and gifts accompanying it. The reason for the former is that original sin formally consists in the privation of habitual grace owed to us in our origin, as we showed in the treatise on sins. Hence, since a privation cannot be removed from a subject except through the opposed form, original sin cannot be remitted except through the infusion of habitual grace. The reason for the latter is drawn first from the fact that the infused virtues are

properties of habitual grace inseparable from it, as we demonstrated in the treatise on the virtues. It is also drawn from the fact that Baptism is a sacrament perfectly regenerative of man in Christ, and consequently ought to confer everything required for perfect regeneration in Christ. But for this there is required not only habitual grace, which transfers man from the state of sin to the state of adoption as a child of God, but also those things that render him intrinsically capable of exercising all the works proper to the children of God. These are the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, and of the other infused moral virtues. Therefore Baptism of itself confers all these things. Hence Prosper, *De Vocatione Gentium*, cap. 18, says: "The origin of true justice is placed in the sacrament of regeneration, so that where man is reborn, there also the reality of the virtues arises."

5. The fourth effect of Baptism is a right to helps proportioned to its end, namely, to live holily and as a Christian, as befits adopted children of God, brothers of Christ, and heirs of the heavenly kingdom, according to the words of Leo the Great, serm. 1 on the Nativity of Christ: "Recognize, O Christian, your dignity, and, having been made a sharer in the divine nature, do not return by degenerate conduct to your former baseness."

The fifth is moral union with Christ as head, in order to participate in his merits with respect to spiritual generation. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, a. 5: "Through Baptism one is incorporated into Christ as his member. But just as sense and motion are derived from the natural head to the members, so spiritual sense, which comes through the infusion of grace, is derived from the spiritual head, who is Christ, to his members. Hence John 1 says: 'We saw him full of grace and truth, and from his fullness we have all received.'" The Apostle speaks of this union in Gal. 3 when he says: "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ." And in Rom. 6: "For we have been buried with him through Baptism into death, so that, just as Christ rose from the dead through the glory of the Father, we also may walk in newness of life."

6. The sixth effect of Baptism is the character. For, as the Council of Florence says in the decree of Eugene: "There are three sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders, which imprint a character, that is, an indelible spiritual sign, upon the soul, and therefore are not repeated in the same person." Baptism therefore cannot be repeated. First, because by the seal of this indelible character a Christian remains eternally consecrated to God. But a thing once consecrated to God, since it perpetually remains such by the very nature of consecration, does not require a repeated consecration. Hence Cyprian, or the author of the sermon *De Ablutione Pedum*: "The rules of the Church forbid Baptism to be repeated, and after

persons have once been sanctified, no consecrating hand presumes to approach them again, because it would be an insult to the Holy Spirit if what he had sanctified could be made void, or if another sanctification could amend what he had once breathed upon and confirmed."

Second, because Baptism is a certain spiritual rebirth. Hence, just as carnal birth is one, so Baptism ought to be one. Therefore Augustine, tract. 11 on John: "Just as the womb cannot be repeated, neither can Baptism."

Third, because Baptism is a figure of Christ's death and resurrection. For through it we die to sin and rise to newness of life, as is evident from the words of the Apostle in Rom. 6 quoted above. Therefore, just as Christ died and rose only once, so it is fitting that man be baptized only once.

Fourth, Baptism is given principally against original sin. Therefore, just as original sin is not repeated, neither should Baptism be repeated. On the contrary, because Penance is a remedy against actual sins, which are often committed, it must be repeated many times.

7. Besides these effects of Baptism, Chrysostom, in his homily to the newly baptized mentioned by St. Augustine in *Contra Julianum*, l. 1, cap. 6, enumerates ten endowments or privileges of Baptism in these words: "Blessed is he who alone has done wonders, who has made all things and transformed all things. Behold, those who a little before were held captive now enjoy the serenity of liberty; those who wandered in the error of exile are now citizens of the Church; those who were in the confusion of sin now possess the lot of justice. For they are not only free, but also holy; not only holy, but also just; not only just, but also children; not only children, but also heirs; not only heirs, but also brothers of Christ; not only brothers of Christ, but also fellow heirs and members; not only members, but also a temple; not only a temple, but also instruments of the Spirit. See how many gifts Baptism bestows. Some suppose heavenly grace to consist only in the remission of sins, but we have counted ten honors."

CHAPTER IX.
The Reviviscence of Baptism.

1. Baptism validly received as regards its substance, but with the obstacle of insincerity, whether privative or positive, that is, arising from the voluntary and culpable omission of a required disposition, or from an actual attachment to some mortal sin, revives when that insincerity is removed through penance. That is, it confers upon the baptized person the same grace and the same degree of grace that it would have conferred at the time

of reception if it had not found the subject insincere or indisposed. Theologians commonly teach this, with few exceptions.

The first proof is from Augustine, *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, l. 1, cap. 12, where he speaks thus of Baptism received in a state of schism or deadly separation from the Church: "Yet this Baptism profits for the remission of sins when a person, reconciled to unity, is divested of the sacrilege of dissension by which his sins were held and prevented from being remitted. For just as one who approached insincerely is not baptized again, but is purified by a pious correction and true confession, which could not profit him without Baptism, so what was given before begins to avail for salvation when that insincerity has departed through true confession." And again in l. 3, cap. 13: "That same Baptism begins to avail for the remission of sins when they have come to the peace of the Church, not so that sins already remitted may be retained, nor so that Baptism may be rejected as foreign or another Baptism given, but so that the very same Baptism that outside worked death on account of discord may within work salvation on account of peace." The same is taught by the author of the sermon on Christ's Passion among the works of Cyprian, who says: "Although those who receive Baptism are unworthy, nevertheless, when they return to their heart, the gift of washing is established and the effect of the gifts returns. Nor is it then to be sought again or made salutary by repetition."

2. You will say: Augustine there refers the effect of Baptism to the sacrament of reconciliation. Therefore he attributes the effect of Baptism received insincerely not to Baptism but to Penance, and consequently does not think that Baptism itself revives when insincerity is removed. I deny the consequence. For in those passages Augustine intends only that Baptism profits an insincere and unworthy person only when he is reconciled to God through Penance and healed by sincere conversion. This does not prevent Baptism, at that time, from conferring its effect and imparting regenerating grace upon the man disposed through Penance and removing the obstacle he had placed. Hence both the sacrament of Baptism and the sacrament of Penance then have their place, as will be evident from what follows.

3. The second proof is from a fundamental argument. When someone receives Baptism insincerely and afterward confesses with attrition, he is without doubt justified and cleansed from original sin. But original sin cannot be removed through the sacrament of Penance, which was instituted only for actual sins, but only through the sacrament of Baptism, which was instituted as a remedy for original sin. Therefore original sin is then removed through Baptism, and consequently Baptism revives when insincerity departs, or produces its effect.

This is confirmed. Regeneration, or first justification, must be accomplished through Baptism, either in reality or in desire, as is gathered from John 3, "Unless one is reborn," and from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cap. 4. But in the case proposed, it cannot be accomplished through a new Baptism in reality, since Baptism is unrepeatable, nor through the desire for Baptism, since such a man has already received it in reality. Therefore it must be accomplished through the reviviscence of the Baptism previously validly received.

It is further confirmed by the reasoning of St. Thomas here, q. 69, a. 10. When a cause is of itself productive of some effect, if it is impeded, it afterward produces that effect when the obstacle is removed. Thus, because downward motion ought to result from the generation of a heavy body, if that motion is impeded, it results afterward when the impediment is removed. But valid Baptism of itself requires the production of regenerating grace. Therefore, when insincerity is removed, it immediately produces that grace by the work worked. As to how it then produces it, whether physically or only morally, we treated this in the treatise on the sacraments in common, cap. 2, § 5. We therefore refer the reader there, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

4. You will object first: For Baptism to revive when insincerity departs, or to produce its effect, it would have to destroy original sin. But Baptism does not do this; Penance does. Therefore Baptism does not revive when insincerity departs. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Grace conferred through Penance is infused before the grace of Baptism, since Baptism cannot break forth into any effect unless insincerity is first removed through grace obtained by Penance. Therefore, since every sanctifying grace is incompatible with every mortal sin, whether original or actual, original sin is already presupposed to have been remitted through Penance before Baptism can destroy it.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof, I deny the major premise. Grace proceeds from both sacraments, Baptism and Penance, in the same real instant, though under diverse formalities: as regenerative, from Baptism; as healing, from Penance. These two sacraments mutually assist one another, not with each independently working its effect apart from the other, but each allowing the other its effect. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 10, ad 2: "Baptism and Penance concur in obtaining the effect of Baptism, but Baptism as a cause acting through itself, and Penance as an accidental cause, that is, as removing an impediment."

From this you will understand that when the sacrament of Baptism, after insincerity departs through contrition or through the sacrament of Penance,

begins to possess its effect, the following order is found. First in the order of nature, Penance removes the insincerity. This priority is reduced to the genus of material and dispositive causality, both because the removal of an impediment is understood as prior in nature to the introduction of the impeded form, and because the removal of insincerity is, as it were, a disposition for Baptism to possess its effect. In the second instant of nature, Baptism remits the sins committed before it, because the infusion of regenerating grace cannot be understood before the removal of original guilt and of actual mortal guilt. In the third instant of nature, Baptism justifies the soul through regenerating grace, because the regenerating grace conferred through Baptism precedes in the order of nature the healing grace infused through Penance. Finally, in the fourth instant, Penance justifies the man through healing grace, because generation into spiritual life through Baptism is prior in nature to healing through Penance.

5. You will object second: If Baptism obtained its effect when insincerity departed, all actual sins whatsoever would be remitted through the grace of Baptism, whether preceding, accompanying, or following it. But this cannot be said. Therefore neither can the former. The consequence of the major premise seems manifest, because the grace of Baptism, since it renews the whole man and transforms him into a new creature, removes every stain of sin obstructing this perfect renewal.

6. This argument requires us briefly to explain what sins are remitted through Baptism when insincerity departs. They are of three kinds. Some precede Baptism received insincerely; others are committed in the very reception of Baptism; and others are committed after its reception.

As regards sins of the first kind, nearly all theologians except Scotus and Vasquez grant that, when insincerity departs, they are remitted through Baptism itself, not through the sacrament of Penance. For through that sacrament only those sins are remitted that fall under the Church's jurisdiction. But sins committed before Baptism do not fall under the Church's jurisdiction. For just as the Church possesses no power or jurisdiction over a man not yet baptized, so she possesses none over the sins he committed before his Baptism.

For the same reason, many think that sins committed in the very reception of Baptism are not remitted through Penance, but through Baptism when insincerity departs, because likewise, since they are sins of a man not yet baptized, they are not subject to the keys and jurisdiction of the Church. This opinion seems highly probable, not only because of the argument alleged, but also because of the authority of St. Thomas, who openly seems to favor it here, a. 10, ad 2, where he says: "Insincerity is not

removed through Baptism, but through subsequent Penance. When it has been removed, Baptism takes away the guilt and debt of all preceding sins and also of those existing simultaneously with it."

Nor is it valid to say that, in the instant in which someone receives the character and Baptism, he is truly a Christian and subject to the Church, and consequently a sin committed by him in that instant is subject to her keys and jurisdiction; just as, because in the instant in which a novice emits religious vows he is truly a religious, if in the same instant he consents to a shameful thought, he commits sacrilege. This is not valid. For although in the instant in which someone receives the sacrament of Baptism he is a Christian initiatively and in becoming, he is not yet completely and in completed being. Likewise, in the instant in which a novice emits his vow, he is not yet professed or a religious completely and in completed being, but only incompletely and in becoming. Hence, if in that instant he consents to a shameful thought, he does not commit the sin of sacrilege, because he is not yet a sacred person dedicated to God by a vow of chastity, but only becoming and tending toward it.

7. As regards sins committed after Baptism was insincerely received, there is no difficulty. Since they are subject to the keys of the Church, it is manifest that they are remitted not through Baptism but through Penance. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 10, ad 3: "The effect of Baptism is not to remove future sins, but present or past sins. Therefore, when insincerity departs, subsequent sins are indeed remitted, but through Penance, not through Baptism. Hence they are not remitted as regards the whole debt of punishment, as are sins preceding Baptism."

8. You will say: Although the sacrament of Penance was not instituted to destroy sins that are not confessed, it nevertheless remits by concomitance even those that through inculpable forgetfulness were not confessed. Likewise, although the Eucharist was not of itself instituted to destroy sin with attrition alone, it nevertheless sometimes remits it accidentally in one who, thinking himself contrite, approaches that sacrament. Therefore, similarly, although Baptism was not of itself instituted to remit sins committed after its reception, it can nevertheless sometimes remit them accidentally.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence, because no sacrament has power to remit sins committed after its reception, either directly or indirectly. For the sacraments are medicines curative of preceding sins and preservative only as regards subsequent sins. Hence I deny the parity. A sin forgotten in confession is presupposed to have been committed before the reception of the sacrament of Penance. Likewise, the

Eucharist does not make one who is merely attrite contrite except with regard to a sin committed before the reception of that sacrament.

From what has been said it is inferred that Baptism, when insincerity departs, remits not only mortal but also venial sins committed before its reception or in its actual reception. For the grace given when insincerity departs is as truly regenerative as if it had been given in the presence of Baptism, and therefore, insofar as depends upon itself, it entirely transforms the man and destroys every stain of his past life.

9. You will ask first what disposition suffices to remove insincerity so that Baptism may possess its effect. I answer that, for the reviviscence of Baptism in one who approached with merely privative insincerity, that is, arising from the involuntary and inculpable omission of a necessary disposition, and who afterward committed no mortal sin, attrition suffices. For in that case there is no obstacle to the efficacy of Baptism except the mere absence of the disposition required from the beginning. Consequently, once this disposition is present, which in Baptism need not necessarily be contrition, but for which attrition alone suffices, as we explained in cap. 6, Baptism operates as it would have operated from the beginning.

In one who approached with positive insincerity, that is, with an actual attachment to some mortal sin, contrition is required, or attrition together with the sacrament of Penance. For that sin cannot be removed by the power of Baptism itself. Therefore, in order that it be removed, attrition alone does not suffice, but contrition is necessarily required, or attrition together with the sacrament of Penance. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Since such insincerity and sin, as I presuppose, continues even in the instant in which Baptism ought to possess its effect, which according to the Thomistic opinion is the instant extrinsically terminating the reception, it follows upon Baptism itself. But sins subsequent to Baptism, since they are subject to the keys of the Church, are remitted not by the power of Baptism, but only through contrition including the desire for the sacrament of Penance, or through attrition together with the sacrament. Therefore such insincerity and sin cannot be removed or remitted by the power of Baptism itself, but only through contrition or attrition together with the sacrament of Penance.

10. You will ask second whether other sacraments received insincerely produce their effects when insincerity departs.

I answer that this seems certain not only of Baptism, but also of the other two sacraments that imprint a character, namely, Holy Orders and Confirmation. For since those sacraments are unrepeatable, there is a special necessity in them that they obtain their effect when insincerity departs.

Otherwise, those who received them insincerely would remain forever deprived of their proper effect, and yet would be obliged to discharge the offices to which they are bound by virtue of the character, for example, constantly to profess the faith and rightly exercise hierarchical acts. This seems unfitting and plainly repugnant to the gentleness of divine providence.

11. For the same reason, it seems probable and fitting that the same privilege belongs to Extreme Unction and Matrimony. For although these two sacraments are not simply unrepeatable, as are those that imprint a character, they are nevertheless unrepeatable in a certain respect. Matrimony cannot be repeated while the other spouse is living, nor Extreme Unction in the same state of illness. Therefore, lest one who approached the sacrament of Matrimony insincerely lack throughout his life the grace of that sacrament, which is especially necessary to him for living duly and honorably in the marital bond, and lest likewise a sick person who received Extreme Unction insincerely lack in that final struggle sacramental grace and the right to special helps especially necessary to overcome the more vehement temptations of demons that then occur, it seems fitting that these two sacraments also, when received insincerely, revive and produce their effects once insincerity has been removed.

There remains only the difficulty concerning the two other sacraments, namely, the Eucharist and Penance: whether they revive and produce their effects when insincerity is removed. St. Thomas expressly denies this of the first in IV *Sententiae*, dist. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qla. 3, ad 3. But he affirms it of the other in the same work, dist. 17, q. 3, a. 4, and in *Summa Theologiae*, Supplement, q. 9, a. 1, where he says: "Confession can exist even in one who is not contrite, because he can disclose his sins to a priest and subject himself to the keys of the Church. Although he does not then receive the fruit of absolution, nevertheless, when insincerity departs, he begins to receive it, as also happens in other sacraments. Hence one who approached insincerely is not bound to repeat his confession, but is afterward bound to confess his insincerity."

12. This resolution and doctrine, however, displeases a certain recent Thomist. Hence in his *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* he says that it requires some qualification and a benign interpretation drawn from the same holy Doctor. He objects first that, in the passage cited where St. Thomas taught that Penance produces its effect when insincerity departs, he adds: "As also happens in other sacraments." Therefore, he judges universally that all the other sacraments, and consequently also the Eucharist, revive and produce their effects when insincerity departs.

Second, Penance is not more efficacious than the sacrament of the divine Eucharist. Therefore what is denied to the latter ought not to be granted to the former, nor what is granted to the former denied to the latter.

Third, if the words of St. Thomas were taken as they sound, nakedly and superficially, it would plainly follow that a sacrilegious confession, that is, one made without contrition and a sincere purpose of new life, need not be repeated but would produce its effect when insincerity departed. This is repugnant to the whole doctrine of St. Thomas, to the common opinion of theologians, and to the very sentiments of Catholic piety.

13. But these objections are too slight and frivolous to compel us to depart from the mind and doctrine of the holy Doctor, to soften it by some false interpretation, or to say with that recent author that these things were written by St. Thomas while still young.

To the first, I answer with Melchior Cano that St. Thomas did not say "in all sacraments," but "in other sacraments." Therefore he means only that, besides Penance, there are certain other sacraments that produce their effect when insincerity departs, not all of them, since in the passage cited by us he expressly excepts the Eucharist.

To the second, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For this privilege is not denied to the Eucharist because of a defect of activity, perfection, or excellence, but rather because of its supreme perfection and excellence, which requires men to approach it with the greatest caution and diligence. Moreover, there is this difference between the Eucharist and the other sacraments: the other sacraments are unrepeatable either simply or in a certain respect, as we said above; or at least are altogether necessary, as Penance is, without which no sin committed after Baptism can be remitted. But the Eucharist is neither simply unrepeatable, as are the sacraments that imprint a character, nor unrepeatable in a certain respect, as are Extreme Unction and Matrimony, nor so necessary as Penance.

To the third, I deny the consequence. For St. Thomas in the cited passage is not speaking of a sacrilegious confession, but of a valid yet unformed confession, which we shall show can exist in the treatise on Penance. This need not be repeated, since it possesses everything essentially required for the sacrament of Penance and produces its effect when insincerity departs.

CHAPTER X.
On the Baptism of the Spirit and of Blood.

1. With St. Thomas here, q. 66, a. 11, theologians distinguish three Baptisms: of water, of the Spirit, and of blood. Baptism of water is the ordinary sacrament of Baptism, performed in water under the customary form of words. Baptism of the Spirit is perfect conversion to God including the desire for Baptism. Baptism of blood is martyrdom suffered for Christ. These three Baptisms are not three sacraments, because the latter two do not arise when the word is added to an element, but merely supply the place of the sacrament through contrition of heart and the shedding of blood for Christ; or, as the Ordinary Gloss says, "because man is thus cleansed from sins through penance or the shedding of blood just as through the washing." We treated Baptism of water in the preceding chapters. Hence only a few things remain to be said here concerning Baptism of the Spirit and of blood.

2. I say first: Baptism of the Spirit supplies the defect of sacramental Baptism as regards the remission of sins and the infusion of grace, and consequently as regards the remission of eternal punishment; but not always as regards the remission of all temporal punishment, and never as regards the impression of the character.

The first part is proved. Baptism of the Spirit is perfect contrition or love including the desire for Baptism. But this remits sin and confers grace, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 14, cap. 4. Therefore Baptism of the Spirit does so as well. Hence the Council says in sess. 6, cap. 4, that "the translation from the state in which man is born a child of the first Adam into the state of grace and adoption as children of God cannot, after the promulgation of the Gospel, be made without the washing of regeneration or its desire." By these words it presupposes that justification, which includes the remission of sins and the infusion of grace, is accomplished not only through Baptism of water but also through Baptism of the Spirit, including the desire for Baptism.

Hence in Acts 10 Cornelius, a just man fearing God, and others were filled with the Holy Spirit before they were baptized. Ambrose says concerning Valentinian, who died as a catechumen: "I lost the one whom I was about to regenerate, but he did not lose the grace he requested." Thus St. Bernard, ep. 77, considering the Savior's words, "He who believes and is baptized shall be saved; but he who does not believe shall be condemned,"

observes that Christ did not add, "He who is not baptized shall be condemned," so that it might be signified that in a case of necessity someone can be saved by the desire for Baptism without Baptism received in reality.

Hence St. Thomas here, q. 68, a. 2, says: "The sacrament of Baptism can be lacking to someone in reality but not in desire, as when someone desires to be baptized but is forestalled by death through some accident before he receives Baptism. Such a person can attain salvation without actual Baptism because of the desire for Baptism, which proceeds from faith working through love, by which God inwardly sanctifies man, since his power is not bound to the visible sacraments." From these words it is evident that the universal rule "Unless one is reborn," and so forth, must be understood of Baptism either in reality or in desire. Likewise, when the Fathers sometimes assert that sins cannot be remitted unless Baptism is received, they are either speaking of what occurs regularly and ordinarily, or they are inveighing against those who, although given an opportunity, neglect to receive Baptism, or defer it until the end of life so that they may indulge their vices more freely. Hence Augustine, *De Baptismo contra Donatistas*, l. 4, cap. 25: "Conversion of heart can indeed exist without Baptism having been received, but it cannot exist when Baptism is despised. For it cannot be called conversion of the heart to God when God's sacrament is despised."

3. The second, negative part, concerning the relaxation of all temporal punishment, is manifest. For contrition often does not attain such a degree of perfection that the contrite person merits the remission of all temporal punishment. Since the remission of temporal punishment, into which eternal punishment is commuted by virtue of justification, occurs in contrition after the manner of condign satisfaction, and since not every contrition is a condign and adequate satisfaction for all temporal punishment, Baptism of the Spirit does not always supply the place of Baptism as regards the relaxation of all temporal punishment. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 68, a. 2, ad 2: "If someone is a catechumen possessing the desire for Baptism, such a person dying does not immediately attain eternal life, but will suffer punishment for past sins. Nevertheless he himself shall be saved, yet as through fire, as is said in 1 Cor. 3." Hence Ambrose, *De Obitu Valentiniani*: "Let us ask rest for him with pious affection. Let us accompany his pious soul with our offerings."

4. Finally, the third part, namely, that Baptism of the Spirit does not supply the effect of sacramental Baptism as regards the impression of the character, is evident because the character is impressed only by a sacrament. Otherwise, one justified through contrition alone would not be bound, and

indeed ought not, to receive Baptism, since Baptism cannot be received by one who possesses the baptismal character, for it is unrepeatable by reason of the character. Hence catechumens justified through Baptism of the Spirit are bound to receive sacramental Baptism so that they may receive the character, enter the Church, become members of her body, and share in the other sacraments. Therefore, in Acts 10, those who had abundantly received the Holy Spirit before Baptism of water were nevertheless baptized at Peter's command.

Likewise, martyrs must be baptized before the consummation of their martyrdom if they can. Hence St. Romanus, immediately before being killed for Christ, urged St. Lawrence in these words: "Hasten to baptize me." Indeed, if they were restored to life after martyrdom, they would have to be baptized, because just as Baptism of the Spirit does not supply the defect of sacramental Baptism as regards the impression of the character, neither does Baptism of blood. It indeed imprints a sacred and honorable mark upon the members of martyrs in which they received wounds for Christ, but it does not cause in their souls that spiritual seal which is the proper effect of sacramental Baptism.

5. I say second: Baptism of blood, or martyrdom, possesses the power of justifying infants by the work worked. Theologians commonly teach this with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 124, a. 1; *Quodlibeta*, VI, a. 6; and IV *Sententiae*, q. 3, a. 3, qla. 3, where he says: "Just as in Baptism of water man is freed from all preceding guilt and punishment, so also in Baptism of blood." And in the reply to the first objection: "Baptism of blood does not possess this merely from the work of the one working, but from the imitation of Christ's Passion. Therefore children, although they do not possess free choice, are saved if they are killed for Christ, being baptized in their own blood."

6. This truth is also evident from the universal tradition of the Church, which has always honored indiscriminately as saints and true martyrs all the infants killed by Herod because of Christ, as Baronius shows under the first year of Christ, n. 37, and as Origen suggests in hom. 3 on various passages, where he says: "Rightly, therefore, and according to God's will, the holy Fathers commanded that their everlasting memory be celebrated in the churches as those dying for the Lord." Since this Father lived near the time of the Apostles, around the year 200, by "the holy Fathers" he could have understood none other than the Apostles or their immediate successors.

But if the cause of the salvation of these infants had not been the shedding of blood for Christ, but circumcision alone, then, since circumcision had not been applied to all, namely, those who had not yet

reached the eighth day or who were children of Gentiles dwelling among the Jews, the Church could not have honored all of them indiscriminately as saints, nor indeed venerated them as martyrs, since not martyrdom but circumcision alone would have made them saints. Therefore Baptism of blood, or martyrdom, possesses the power of justifying infants by the work worked.

7. Nor can it be said that the infants killed by Herod were saved not by virtue of martyrdom, but by a special privilege granted to their persons, which therefore ought not to be extended to others. For the holy Fathers refer the whole cause of the salvation of those children to the death suffered for Christ and compare it to the washing of Baptism, which of itself possesses the power of justifying from sins. Augustine says in *De Symbolo ad Catechumenos*, l. 3, cap. 4: "Christ granted them to die for Christ; he granted them to be washed from original sin in their own blood." Bernard, sermon on the Nativity of the Innocents: "Can anyone doubt the crowns of the Innocents? Let the one who doubts that infants killed for Christ are crowned among the martyrs doubt that those regenerated in Christ are numbered among the adopted children." And the author of *De Stella, Magis et Nece Innocentium*, among the works of Cyprian: "These, newly washed with their milky blood, consecrated the first fruits of Baptism by martyrdom, handing on to later generations a model by which, when an urgent necessity excludes delay, blood is no less efficacious for the washing of the soul than waters sanctified by solemn words."

8. From these things it is inferred first that what has been said of the infants killed by Herod must be said of others who were or are killed for a similar cause. First, because the infants killed by Herod because of Christ did not possess their justification and salvation through martyrdom by a special privilege granted to their persons, as we have already shown. Second, because if death inflicted upon those infants in hatred of Christ could justify them from original sin without circumcision, the same death will likewise be able to justify other infants from original sin without Baptism. Nor does it matter that Christ's promise in Matt. 10, "Everyone who confesses me," and so forth, does not seem to apply to infants. For they confess Christ in their own manner, not with their tongue but with their blood, not by speaking but by dying, as the Church sings of the Holy Innocents.

It is inferred second that infants who are killed in the womb together with their mother because of Christ attain the aureole of martyrdom no less than those who, having been delivered from their mother's womb, are killed for Christ. Nor is it valid to say that, just as infants who die in their mother's womb are not capable of Baptism of water, neither are they capable of

Baptism of blood. For the same reasoning does not apply to the latter Baptism as to the former. Water cannot reach an infant enclosed within the mother's womb, whereas death inflicted because of Christ can reach him. Although he cannot be subjected to the operation of the ministers of the Church, he can nevertheless be subjected to the sword and steel of the enemies of Christ or the Church.

I say third: Even in adults, martyrdom, insofar as it is a certain likeness and imitation of Christ's Passion, possesses through a singular privilege and special promise of Christ the power of justifying and conferring first grace by the work worked, even apart from an act of charity preceding or commanding it.

The first part is proved from the holy Fathers, who assert that martyrdom succeeds in the place of Baptism and possesses equal or greater power and efficacy for washing away sins. Thus Clement, *Constitutiones Apostolorum*, l. 5, cap. 7, says: "Even if he is a catechumen, let him depart with joy, for the suffering he endures for Christ shall serve him as a truer Baptism," and so forth. Cyprian, ep. 73: "Can the power of Baptism be greater than confession, than the shedding of blood, by which someone confesses Christ before men and is baptized in his own blood?" Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, l. 13, cap. 7: "Whoever dies for the confession of Christ without having received the washing of regeneration is aided for the remission of sins as much as if he had been washed in the sacred font of Baptism." Prosper has the same under the same words in his book of sentences, sent. 149.

But Baptism justifies and confers grace by the work worked not only upon infants but also upon adults. Therefore martyrdom does so as well. Hence St. Thomas, IV *Sententiae ad Hannibaldum*, dist. 4, q. unica, a. 4, ad 3: "Baptism of blood does not supply the effect of Baptism of water by the work of the one working, as was objected, but through the imitation of Christ's Passion."

This is confirmed. Martyrdom remits every punishment, and does so by the work worked. Therefore it also remits every fault. The consequence is evident, because no reason can be assigned why the former rather than the latter should be attributed to martyrdom. The antecedent is proved from Innocent III, cap. *Cum Marthae*, *De Celebratione Missarum*, where he says: "One does an injury to a martyr who prays for a martyr." For if every punishment were not remitted to a martyr by the power of martyrdom, the Church could pray for the martyr so that he might be freed from the punishment he suffered in Purgatory.

That martyrdom confers this remission of all punishment by the work worked is evident because its severity is often not proportionate to the punishment merited by the martyr for sins committed. For it can happen that the martyr committed most grave crimes and dies from a very slight blow, as when he undergoes death through an instantaneous stroke to the head before he feels it, or when, struck by the shot of a weapon of war, he dies within a very brief time. Hence St. Thomas, IV *Sententiae*, dist. 4, q. 3, a. 3, qla. 3, ad 2, refers the cause of this power and efficacy possessed by martyrdom to remit every punishment to Christ's Passion, of which it is the imitation and likeness. For he says: "Although that punishment considered in itself would not be sufficient to free one from every punishment of sin, nevertheless, when referred to the cause of the suffering, it receives efficacy from Christ's Passion, to which someone is conformed through such punishment. From this it can wash away every punishment."

9. The same part is proved second. Martyrdom possesses the power of justifying infants by the work worked, as we showed in the preceding conclusion. Therefore it also possesses the power of justifying adults. The consequence is evident, first, because the words of Christ, "Whoever confesses me," by which grace or eternal life is promised to those dying for Christ, were primarily spoken to adults, who can confess Christ not only by deed, like infants, but also by mouth. Second, because the power of saving infants does not belong to martyrdom through a privilege granted to their age, but to death, because the death of martyrdom is a real imitation of Christ's Passion and death, as St. Thomas teaches in the passages cited above. But death endured for Christ possesses the same character in adults, as is evident. Therefore, if martyrdom possesses the power of justifying infants by the work worked, it also possesses the power of justifying adults, and consequently of making them contrite from being merely attrite, as the sacraments of Baptism and Penance do.

This can be illustrated by the following example. Let there be a sinner who is unexpectedly seized and immediately carried away to martyrdom. Let him strive to elicit an act of contrition, but not attain it, instead eliciting an act of attrition, while morally judging that he has elicited an act of contrition. Nor is time allowed him to employ greater diligence, since he must answer the tyrant questioning him about the faith, endure his insults, and fortify himself against the violence of torments and the bitterness of death. I ask whether he will be saved with the act of attrition alone. If the first is said, the point is established, namely, that martyrdom makes a martyr contrite from being merely attrite. If the second is said, it is difficult to

believe and unworthy of divine clemency. For although this man did not do all that he could, he nevertheless did all that he morally thought he could do.

10. From these things the second part of the conclusion remains proved, namely, that martyrdom in adults possesses the power of justifying even apart from an act of charity preceding or commanding it. For if it justified only by virtue of an act of charity commanding it, it would justify not by the work worked, but by the work of the one working. Nor would it possess the power of remitting every sin insofar as it is a likeness and imitation of Christ's Passion, but insofar as it is love of God. Nor would it ever destroy guilt immediately through itself, but would presuppose contrition or charity by which it was commanded. Consequently, it would never make a man contrite from being merely attrite, nor ever cause first grace, but only second grace. Hence the holy Fathers could not truly say that it succeeds Baptism and equals or surpasses its power and efficacy. Finally, if martyrdom derived its efficacy for justifying from sins solely from an act of charity commanding it, it would not be distinguished from Baptism of the Spirit, for the latter also possesses the power of justifying from sins through an act of charity or contrition.

11. You will object first against the first part of the third conclusion: If martyrdom conferred grace by the work worked, it would be a true sacrament of the New Law, for it would be a sign of a sacred reality sanctifying men. The consequent is false, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 66, a. 11, ad 2. Therefore the antecedent is also false.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. For martyrdom to be a sacrament of the New Law, it would have to have been instituted by Christ so as to confer the grace it signifies. But this does not belong to it, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited passage. Moreover, it would have to be a remedy that man could use by the ordinary way whenever he wished for his own utility and sanctification, which manifestly does not belong to martyrdom. Likewise, for it to possess the character of a true sacrament, it would have to be an instrument of God for causing grace, which also does not belong to it. It is merely a certain condition upon the presence of which God infallibly confers grace by reason of his promise and of the representation or imitation of Christ's past or future Passion. I add "future" because martyrdom also conferred grace by the work worked under the Old Law upon those dying for the faith or divine law, such as the Maccabees, whose martyrdom the Church venerates on the first day of August.

12. You will object second: No time can be assigned at which martyrdom produces grace by the work worked. For as long as the martyr lives, there is

not yet martyrdom, and consequently it does not yet produce grace. After death, however, the time is not suitable for conferring grace, but is destined for the bestowal of glory and reward, since there is no longer a wayfaring state, but the terminus. Therefore martyrdom does not confer grace by the work worked.

I answer that martyrdom confers grace shortly before death, when the martyr, having received a mortal wound, can no longer naturally live or use his senses or reason. For then martyrdom is morally judged to have been consummated, and the martyr cannot then lose the grace of martyrdom, since he is no longer in a state of acting freely and consequently of sinning. If after receiving a mortal wound death were divinely impeded, he would not for that reason lose the aureole of martyrdom. This is evident from Blessed Cecilia, who survived three days after receiving a mortal wound, and from Blessed John the Evangelist, who, having been placed in a vat of boiling oil, emerged unharmed and after many years breathed forth his soul, yet is honored by the Church as a martyr.

Hence, in those extraordinary and miraculous cases, God confirmed those martyrs still surviving in life in grace, and consequently rendered them incapable of sinning and losing the aureole of martyrdom. For the grace of martyrdom, because of its excellence, requires the confirmation of the martyr in grace. Nor does it matter that we read of certain Christians who, after overcoming torments, were conquered by vices and corrupted by pleasure, although pain could not overcome them. Hence Tertullian admirably says in *De Exhortatione Castitatis*, cap. 13: "It is a greater thing to live in chastity than to die for it." This does not matter, because those persons had not yet received any mortal wound for Christ and had not obtained the aureole of martyrdom, as had those of whom we speak. Hence it is not surprising that they were not confirmed in grace as these were.

13. You will object third against the second part of the same conclusion: The Apostle says in 1 Cor. 13: "If I deliver my body so that I burn, but do not have charity, it profits me nothing." By these words he openly teaches that martyrdom is entirely without value apart from charity. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 66, a. 12, ad 2, says that "the shedding of blood does not possess the character of Baptism if it is without charity." Therefore martyrdom in adults does not possess the power of justifying apart from an act of charity preceding or commanding it.

I answer that those words of the Apostle and St. Thomas must be understood of charity that either precedes martyrdom, as regularly and ordinarily occurs, or accompanies it. For although martyrdom does not always proceed from charity commanding it, as we shall presently show, it

nevertheless always finds and brings charity, because in and through martyrdom grace and the charity inseparable from it are always infused. Consequently, martyrdom is always accompanied by charity, and it never happens, nor can it happen, that a martyr dies without charity.

14. You will say: St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 124, a. 2, expressly teaches that martyrdom is an act elicited by fortitude and commanded by charity, and that charity inclines, moves, and induces one to the act of martyrdom. But charity that commands, moves, and inclines is antecedent and not merely concomitant. Therefore St. Thomas judges that martyrdom possesses the power of justifying from an act of charity preceding or commanding it.

I answer that St. Thomas in that passage means only that martyrdom is regularly and ordinarily commanded by charity, and that such command is indeed necessary for someone to suffer martyrdom promptly and with delight, but not for him absolutely to suffer it. This is evident from the same holy Doctor, *Quodlibeta*, IV, a. 19, where he says: "This work of offering oneself for martyrdom, or even suffering martyrdom, can be done not only by perfect charity, but also by imperfect charity, and, what is more, even by one who lacks charity. But perfect charity does this promptly and with delight, as is evident in Lawrence and Vincent, who showed joy amid their torments. Imperfect charity, or even one who lacks charity, cannot do this."

Certainly, that not only charity but also other virtues can command martyrdom and move and induce one to it is evident from the fact that Christ in Matt. 10:28 proposes fear of Gehenna as a sufficient motive for enduring martyrdom when he says: "Do not fear those who kill the body," and so forth, "but rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in Gehenna." And in verse 32 he proposes the motive of hope of glory when he says: "Therefore, everyone who confesses me before men, I also will confess him before my Father who is in heaven." Hence the forty martyrs who suffered at Sebaste under Licinius, and who were placed in an icy pool and killed by the cold, endured a most bitter death through the hope and motive of heavenly glory and the reward of eternal life, as is read in their acts on March 9.

I add that, if it were of the essence of martyrdom to be commanded by charity, it would never produce first grace, nor make one contrite from being merely attrite, nor justify by the work worked, but only by the work of the one working, namely, by virtue of the act of charity commanding it. Consequently, it would not possess the same power and efficacy as Baptism. That these consequences are false and entirely alien to the mind and doctrine of the holy Fathers is manifest from what has been said above.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

15. From what has been said it is inferred first that martyrdom can be considered in two ways: insofar as it is an act of the virtue of fortitude commanded by charity, and insofar as it is a real imitation of Christ's Passion, and not merely a representative imitation as is Baptism of water. In the first manner it confers grace by the work of the one working; in the second, by the work worked. For Christ applies the power of his Passion in a special manner to one who imitates his Passion by dying for him.

Moreover, Baptism of blood is a work supremely arduous and difficult, and far more excellent than Baptism of water, which possesses the power of justifying by the work worked. For, as Gennadius elegantly says in *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*, found in the appendix to the third volume of the works of St. Augustine, cap. 74: "The baptized person confesses his faith before the priest; the martyr before the persecutor. The former, after confession, is sprinkled with water; the latter with blood. The former receives the Holy Spirit through the imposition of the bishop's hand; the latter is made a temple of the Holy Spirit."

16. It is inferred second that in a just man no disposition is required for martyrdom other than the free acceptance of death for Christ. In a sinner, however, besides the acceptance of death, there is further required, in order that martyrdom may confer first grace by the work worked, some penance and supernatural sorrow for sins. For martyrdom has the character of Baptism. But for Baptism in a just man, an intention or will to receive it is required and sufficient; whereas in a sinner, besides this free consent, some sorrow for sins committed is also necessary, as we showed above in cap. 6. Therefore the same applies to martyrdom.

17. It is inferred third that, as regards the disposition required to obtain the effect of martyrdom, contrition is not required in a sinner, but supernatural attrition suffices. For this suffices for Baptism, and according to the Fathers cited above martyrdom does not yield to Baptism in the power of justifying and of making one contrite from being merely attrite.

I said "as regards the disposition required to obtain that effect," because it is highly probable that from another source a sinner is bound to elicit an act of contrition, or at least must strive and do all that lies within him to elicit it. For in the danger of death he is bound to employ the safest means of salvation available to him, abandoning uncertain ones, lest otherwise he expose himself to the danger of irreparable loss, as a sinner would do if he

voluntarily and advertently endured death with attrition alone. For if the opinion denying that martyrdom possesses the privilege of justifying without an act of charity should perhaps be true, an opinion embraced by many theologians of no contemptible authority, the probability of the affirmative opinion or good faith would not save him. Moreover, many think that the precept of love obliges in the danger of death. This is treated in the treatise on Penance, cap. 4, § 2.

It is inferred fourth that death incurred from plague while serving the sick, although it is an eminent work of charity and Christian patience, is nevertheless not true and properly so-called martyrdom. For true martyrdom is an act of virtue by which someone firmly perseveres in justice and truth against the attacks of persecutors, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 124, a. 1. But those pious Christians who serve the sick during a raging pestilence and die in their service do not suffer violent death from a tyrant persecuting truth or justice. Rather, they voluntarily offer themselves to death in order to assist the sick and exercise charity. Therefore they are not true martyrs.

This is confirmed. True martyrdom possesses three privileges in common with Baptism, namely, justification by the work worked, remission of all guilt and punishment, and exemption from the need for the prayers and suffrages of the Church. It also possesses another privilege special to itself, namely, that if a mother is killed because of Christ, the child she bears in her womb is cleansed from original sin. But death incurred from plague while serving the sick does not enjoy those privileges, as is evident especially of the third and fourth. For the Church prays and offers the sacrifice of the Mass for those who died while ministering to the sick. And no Catholic has ever said that original sin is remitted to an infant dying in the mother's womb together with a mother who died in such service. Therefore such a death is not true and properly so-called martyrdom, but only improperly and analogically. In this sense the holy Fathers sometimes call religious and other Christians who lead an austere life and crucify the flesh with its concupiscences martyrs. Hence Augustine, serm. 250, *De Tempore*: "Let no one say that the contests of martyrdom cannot exist in our times, for our peace also has its martyrs. To calm anger, flee lust, guard against injustice, despise avarice, and humble pride is a great part of martyrdom." And Gregory the Great, hom. 3 on the Gospels: "Although the occasion of persecution is lacking, our peace nevertheless also possesses its martyrdom, because, even if we do not subject the necks of the body to the sword, we nevertheless slaughter the desires of the flesh in the mind by a spiritual sword."

CHAPTER XI.
On Circumcision, Which Was Succeeded by Baptism.

1. Circumcision was instituted chiefly for three reasons. The first and principal reason was that original sin might be removed through it; and therefore it was performed upon the organ of generation, through which such sin is contracted, and in a circular manner, to signify a certain circle of original sin, which passes both from the person into nature and from nature into the person. For in the first man the person corrupted nature, whereas in others nature corrupts the person. For the same reason it was instituted only for males and not for females, because the man alone, as the head of the woman and of the whole nature, was the cause of original sin. Hence the Apostle says in Rom. 5: *Through one man sin entered into the world.* And St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 81, a. 4, and here q. 70, a. 2, ad 4, says: *Original sin, against which circumcision was specially ordained, is derived from the father, not from the mother.*

2. The second reason for the institution of circumcision was the diminution of carnal concupiscence, which is especially vigorous in that member in which circumcision is performed, because of the abundance of venereal pleasure, as St. Thomas says here, q. 70, a. 3, ad 1. Hence the Gloss, on Gen. 17, *You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin*, adds this reason: *Because in this part the corruption is propagated, so that, being circumcised in that member in which lust is accustomed to rule, he might know that chastity must be preserved and shamelessness restrained*. Therefore, just as through circumcision a certain small portion of flesh was removed while the greater part remained, so by its power some part of concupiscence was removed while another remained; it was not wholly cut away.

3. Third, circumcision was instituted as a sign distinguishing the people of God, namely, so that the faithful people, that is, the Jewish people, from whom Christ was to be born, might be distinguished from other unbelieving peoples. For it was fitting that the people from whom the Author of all holiness was to be born should be distinguished from others by some special sign of sanctification, namely, circumcision. Hence circumcision was given only to the Jews and not to the Gentiles. In this circumcision differed from baptism, which is offered not to one particular nation or people, but to absolutely all nations, because it contains within itself the perfection of salvation, to which God calls all men, according to 1 Tim. 2: *God wills all men*

to be saved. Circumcision, however, as St. Thomas says here, q. 70, a. 2, ad 3, *did not contain the perfection of salvation, but prefigured it as something to be accomplished through Christ, who was to be born from the Jewish people. And therefore circumcision was given to that people alone.*

It was not instituted immediately after the fall of our first parent, but only around the time of Abraham, or in the third age of the world, which began with Abraham. First, because, since Adam had been most fully instructed in the knowledge of divine things and had imbued his descendants with it, the human race at that time did not need determinate signs of faith by which the faithful might be distinguished from unbelievers; rather, each person chose at will those signs by which he professed his worship of and faith in God. Second, because the disease of original sin was still recent, and its gravity was not yet known in the earliest time; it therefore required a mild medicine, lest the sick person reject a stronger one. And so God then willed either faith alone, or faith together with sacrifices and tithes, to be applied as an easy and lighter medicine, but afterward a more severe remedy in circumcision. Hence he reserved it for the aforesaid age of the world, in which the magnitude of the disease and the usefulness of the remedy became better known. Third, the nearer the advent of the Savior approached, the more explicit the signs of salvation and the more efficacious the remedies had to be; and among these no sign could be more evident or explicit than circumcision. Fourth, idolatry is said to have begun in the time of Abraham; and because Abraham alone was the first among many idolaters to retain the faith and separate himself from unbelievers, circumcision was given to him as a sign of his fidelity. For this reason the Apostle calls it *the seal of faith*. Finally, in the time of Abraham those unspeakable sins against nature arose, along with the dreadful crimes that Tertullian calls *the frenzies of lust*, and which should be called not so much crimes as monstrosities. Hence the sacrament of circumcision was fittingly instituted at that time as a kind of cautery by which carnal concupiscence, overflowing into every kind of obscenity and baseness, might be restrained.

4. From these things it is gathered that circumcision had three principal effects. The first was the remission of original sin, for it was principally instituted as a remedy for this sin, as we showed above. Hence Bernard, sermon 2, De Assumptione Beatae Mariae, says that just as now grace alone washes away this stain of original sin in baptism, so the stone of circumcision alone formerly scraped it away, etc. And Bede, in his homily on the Circumcision of the Lord, says: Circumcision under the Law afforded the same aid of saving healing against the wound of original sin that baptism has

been accustomed to provide in the revealed time of grace. Likewise Gregory the Great, Moralia, l. 4, c. 3, or c. 2, as it is noted in some copies: What the water of baptism avails among us, among the ancients was accomplished either by faith alone for infants, or by the power of sacrifice for adults, or, for those descended from the stock of Abraham, by the mystery of circumcision.

5. You will say: the Israelite people were not circumcised during the forty years in which they remained in the desert. Therefore circumcision was not necessary for the Jews in order to remove original sin; and consequently the remission of this sin was not its first and principal effect.

I answer with St. Thomas, here a. 4, ad 3, that a divine dispensation was granted to that people dwelling in the desert for forty years, so that they could be saved without circumcision and cleansed from original sin by using the remedy of the natural law. There were three causes of this dispensation. The first was that at that time the camp of the Hebrews moved according to the movement of the pillar of fire and cloud, which movement was uncertain. Consequently, not knowing when the camp would have to move or when they would have to fight against enemies, they could not be circumcised without grave and evident danger, since circumcision caused very great pain that would have rendered them incapable of fighting, as happened to the Shechemites in Gen. 34. The second was that the Jews did not then need any sign of distinction when they were dwelling apart from other peoples. The third cause of the dispensation was that God willed circumcision to be deferred at that time so that one general circumcision might be performed in the promised land, as a sign and figure of that perfect circumcision which will be in the heavenly homeland. The Holy Doctor adds that it seems probable that none of those born in the desert and left uncircumcised died before they were afterward circumcised at Joshua's command, because, as Ps. 104 says: *There was no weak person among their tribes.* And Josh. 5 says only that those who had departed from Egypt died in the desert, all of whom had been circumcised. Yet if any uncircumcised persons died there, the same must be said of them as of those who died before the institution of circumcision.

6. The second effect of circumcision was the conferral of sanctifying grace. For since original sin consists in the privation of the grace owed at one's origin, and no privation can be removed from a subject except through the form opposed to it, it is evident that habitual grace was infused in circumcision, by which original sin was remitted. Hence St. Thomas, above q. 62, a. 6, ad 3, and here a. 4, rejects the opinion of the Master of the Sentences and other ancient authors who said that grace was not conferred in circumcision, but only sin was removed. *For this*, he says, *cannot be, because*

guilt is not remitted except through grace, according to Rom. 3: Being justified freely by his grace.

7. Its third effect was the diminution or mitigation of carnal concupiscence, for it was instituted for this effect, as we showed above. Hence St. Thomas, here a. 4, refutes an opinion that had pleased him when he was younger, which asserted that grace was conferred through circumcision as regards a certain positive effect, namely, making one worthy of eternal life, but not as regards every effect, because it did not suffice to restrain the concupiscence of the tinder of sin or to fulfill the commandments of the Law. And he adds: This also once seemed true to me. But to one who considers the matter carefully, it appears not to be true, because the smallest grace can resist any concupiscence and avoid every mortal sin committed through transgression of the commandments of the Law. For the smallest charity loves God more than covetousness loves thousands of pieces of gold and silver.

8. You will ask whether circumcision and the other sacraments of the Old Law had within themselves a power productive of grace, as the sacraments of the New Law have. I answer that they did not have the physical instrumental power productive of grace which, according to the opinion of St. Thomas and his disciples, belongs to the sacraments of the New Law. For this reason the Apostle calls the old sacraments in Gal. 4 *weak and needy elements*. They nevertheless possessed a certain moral power that moved God to give grace to those who received them duly. For they were signs and figures of the future Passion of Christ, in consideration of which God conferred grace under the Old Law; and the power of morally moving is inseparable from the character of a sign. I add that a promise has moral power to move the one who made it to fulfill what was promised. But circumcision and the other sacraments of the Old Law were promises or signs through which God, as though in figures, promised Christ and the grace to be given through his merits. Hence the Apostle in Rom. 11 calls them *renewed promises*, because through those sacraments God continually renewed what he had promised, promising it anew each day. Therefore circumcision and the other sacraments of the Old Law did not lack a morally moving power by which, at their presence, they morally moved God to confer grace.

From this you will understand that circumcision did not actively cause grace by the work performed, as the sacraments of the New Law do. For since it lacked a power productive of grace, it could have no activity toward the production of grace, nor could it actively influence or confer grace upon infants as baptism now does. It caused grace only passively. For this it was

sufficient that, upon its performance and presence, God conferred grace without any merit or disposition on the part of the recipient, in consideration of the future Passion of Christ, of which circumcision was a certain representation or figure. Hence St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 4, qla. 2, says: *Because a child who had been born could not prepare himself for grace before having the use of free choice, lest he be left altogether without religion, it was necessary that some remedy be given which would wash away sin by the work performed; and such a remedy was circumcision. And therefore all concede that it removed sin, just as it signified the removal of sin; and in this it agreed in a certain way with the sacraments of the New Law, because it effected what it prefigured.*

9. Nor is it an obstacle that the same Holy Doctor says here, q. 70, a. 4, that grace was conferred in circumcision by the power of faith in the Passion of Christ. For he does not mean that grace was conferred by the power of faith insofar as faith was an act of the person, but insofar as it regarded its object. This is clear from the fact that in the reply ad 2 he says that, just as before the institution of circumcision faith in the future Christ alone justified both infants and adults, so also after circumcision had been given. But it is certain that, in St. Thomas's doctrine, before circumcision the faith of the parents did not justify infants insofar as it was an act of the person, but insofar as it regarded its object, as the same Holy Doctor expressly teaches in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2, in these words: *It must be said that the faith of another did not help insofar as it was an act of the person, but according to that aspect by which it regarded its object, namely Christ, who was the medicine of the whole nature. In this it had a certain likeness to our sacraments, insofar as it justified from its object, as though by the work performed, and not from the work of the one acting.*

10. You will ask secondly whether it is now lawful to receive circumcision together with baptism, not as a legal ceremony, but out of devotion to imitating Christ and bearing in one's own body the same wound and the same mark which Christ bore in his, as the Ethiopian Christians commonly called Abyssinians do, according to Beyerlinck in *Theatrum vitae humanae*, vol. 2, under the word *Circumcision*. I answer in the negative, because conformity to Christ in that bodily injury possesses no moral goodness of virtue and contributes nothing to Christ's honor, but is an altogether superstitious and empty worship. Otherwise it would also be lawful to pierce one's own hands, feet, and side in imitation of Christ. Hence St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 5, qla. 3, ad 3, says that *the use of circumcision cannot be rendered morally good by any morally good end*

whatever, because it was made evil by prohibition, and an evil act is not rendered good by a good intention.

Therefore, when this doubt was proposed by the Patriarch of Ethiopia to the Sacred Congregation of the Inquisition, namely, whether the Abyssinians might circumcise themselves, a congregation of the qualified Fathers of the Holy Office was held on July 30, 1637. They answered: *Circumcision is not to be tolerated under any pretext whatever, and pastors must correct their subjects as far as they can, while the obstinate are to be excluded from communion.* From this it is evident that the Roman Church by no means approves that rite of the Abyssinians; indeed, she does not even tolerate it.

CHAPTER XII.
On the Sacrament of Confirmation.

1. Five things concerning this sacrament must be explained briefly here: namely, its existence or institution, its matter, form, effects, and minister.

§ 1.
Existence and Institution of This Sacrament.

Confirmation, so called from its primary effect, namely, spiritual strengthening for the fearless profession of the faith, is called by the Holy Fathers a certain completion of baptism. This is not because baptism without it is not a perfect and complete sacrament, but because it is given for the increase of grace, which completes and perfects the first regenerating grace conferred through baptism, as the Holy Doctor explains here, q. 72, a. 7, ad 2.

That it is a true sacrament of the New Law, and not a mere ceremony of the Church or a purely human invention devised by the Roman Pontiffs, as the Lutherans and Calvinists say, is evident first from Scripture. For Acts 8 says that the Apostles conferred the Holy Spirit, that is, an abundance of sanctifying grace, upon the baptized through the imposition of hands. Since this imposition of hands was a sensible sign of sanctifying grace in the actual bestowal of that grace, it could not fail to be a true sacrament. And since it was performed only after baptism and applied only to the baptized, it could not fail to be distinct from baptism.

2. Nor is the claim of the heretics valid that through that imposition of hands sanctifying grace was not given, but only certain graces freely given,

such as the gift of tongues or the gift of prophecy. They prove this from the fact that Acts 19 says that those upon whom Paul had imposed hands spoke in various tongues and prophesied. This is not valid, I say, because the Holy Spirit is not given through the conferral of a grace freely given, but only through the infusion of sanctifying grace. Moreover, graces freely given were not conferred upon everyone in the primitive Church, but only upon some, according as it was expedient for the Church. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 12: *Are all prophets? Do all speak with tongues?* etc. But the gift of the Holy Spirit of which Scripture speaks in the cited passage was given to all through the imposition of hands. Therefore that gift was sanctifying grace, not some grace freely given, although at times certain graces freely given were also conferred through such an imposition of hands together with sanctifying grace.

3. The same truth is evident secondly from the testimonies of the Holy Fathers. For Dionysius, in De ecclesiastica hierarchia, expressly mentions the sacrament of confirmation, since in c. 2 he says: They clothe the baptized person in a white garment and lead him to the bishop; he marks the man with an entirely divine and deifying ointment. And in c. 4: Adjacent to it, namely the synaxis, is another sacrament, which our teachers call the mystery of ointment. Clement of Rome also mentions it in epistle 4, where he writes: All must hasten without delay to be reborn to God and then to be signed by the bishop, that is, to receive the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit, since otherwise one who has omitted this sacrament can by no means be a perfect Christian, as we received from blessed Peter and as the other Apostles taught at the Lord's command.

Tertullian, *De resurrectione carnis*, c. 8, indicating the ancient custom of the Church by which three sacraments were conferred on properly prepared adult catechumens on the same day—first baptism, secondly confirmation, and thirdly the Eucharist—says of baptism: *The flesh is washed so that the soul may be cleansed of its stain.* Of confirmation: *The flesh is anointed so that the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed so that the soul may be fortified; the flesh is overshadowed by the imposition of hands so that the soul may be illuminated by the Spirit.* Of the third, namely, the Eucharist, he adds: *The flesh is fed on the body of Christ so that the mind may be enriched with God.* In these words he clearly described the three things found in the sacrament of confirmation, which stands between baptism and the Eucharist. For in confirmation we are first anointed with chrism; then we are signed, because the form of this sacrament is: *I sign you with the sign of the cross; I anoint you with the chrism of salvation.* Finally, we are overshadowed in it by the imposition of hands.

4. To these three most ancient Fathers I add three others who flourished in the third or fourth century: Cyprian, Cyril of Jerusalem, and Augustine. The first says in l. 1, final epistle: It is also necessary for one who has been baptized to be anointed, so that, having received chrism, that is, anointing, he may be an anointed one of God and may have within himself the grace of Christ. The second says in catechesis 3: The body is anointed with visible ointment, but the soul is sanctified by the holy and life-giving Spirit. Finally, the third speaks of this sacrament in Contra litteras Petiliani, l. 2, c. 104: He wishes to interpret in this ointment the sacrament of chrism, which is indeed most sacred within the class of visible seals, just as baptism itself is. And he concludes: Therefore distinguish the visible holy sacrament, which can exist both in the good and in the wicked—to the former for reward, to the latter for judgment—from the invisible anointing of charity, which is proper to the good.

5. Nor can it be said with the heretics that these Holy Fathers spoke of confirmation as a ceremony instituted by the Church. First, because they expressly say that through it grace and the Holy Spirit are given to us; but the Church does not have the power to institute a sign that confers grace or the Holy Spirit. Second, because some expressly assert that the use of this sacrament descends from the Apostles themselves. Third, because some compare this sacrament with baptism and prefer it to baptism, on the ground that grace is given in baptism but the fullness of grace in confirmation. Finally, because some expressly call that ceremony a sacrament. Hence Pope Melchiades, in his epistle to the bishops of Spain, when asked which sacrament was greater, baptism or confirmation, answered: *Know that each is a great sacrament.*

6. Reason also supports this. For as St. Thomas argues here, q. 72, a. 1, the sacraments of the New Law are ordained to special effects of grace. Hence, wherever a special effect of grace is necessary, a special sacrament is also necessary, naturally suited to producing that particular effect of grace. But in the spiritual life, after regeneration conferred upon new creatures in baptism, spiritual growth is necessary, by which those begotten in Christ receive full strength of soul. Therefore there must also be a sacrament that grants such strength and growth, namely, confirmation. Hence Pope Melchiades, canon *Spiritus Sanctus*, *De consecratione*, dist. 5: *The Holy Spirit, who descended with a saving influx upon the waters of baptism, gives in the font the fullness required for innocence, and in confirmation provides an increase of grace. And because those who are to live their whole lives in this world must walk amid invisible enemies and dangers, we are regenerated unto life in baptism, and*

after baptism we are confirmed for battle; in baptism we are washed, and after baptism we are strengthened.

7. Catholics are not agreed concerning the time at which this sacrament was instituted by Christ. The more probable opinion asserts that it was instituted on the night of the Supper, when Christ instructed the Apostles concerning this and the other sacraments. Thus the Roman Catechism teaches in the chapter on confirmation, and this is gathered from Pope Fabian, epistle 2, where he says: *On that day the Lord Jesus, after he had supped with his disciples and washed their feet, taught them how to prepare chrism, as our predecessors received from the Holy Apostles and handed down to us.* And this is the reason why the Church each year, after burning the old chrism, consecrates new chrism on the day of the Supper.

Therefore I do not consider true the opinion of some who teach that this sacrament was not instituted until after the Resurrection, namely, when Christ said to the Apostles in John 20: *Receive the Holy Spirit*, because at that time he made them bishops and gave them the power to minister this sacrament. For since the essence of a sacrament must be judged more from the matter by which it is intrinsically constituted than from the minister, who is related to it only extrinsically and efficiently, the sacrament should rather be said to have been instituted when its matter was designated than when its minister was instituted. Hence theologians commonly teach that baptism was instituted when Christ was baptized in the Jordan, because he then designated its matter, although the power to baptize was not then given to the Apostles, but afterward, as is gathered from Matt. 4. The same must be said proportionately of the sacrament of confirmation: namely, that it was instituted on the night of the Supper, when its matter, chrism, was designated, so that it might be administered by the Apostles at the proper time.

§ 2.
The Matter, Form, and Effect of This Sacrament.

8. That the remote matter of the sacrament of confirmation is chrism, or olive oil mixed with balsam and blessed by a bishop, is evident from the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene. St. Thomas gives the fittingness of this here, a. 2, from the fact that oil, because of its richness, designates the fullness of grace granted in this sacrament; and balsam, because of its fragrance and sweetness, signifies the odor of a good reputation, which the

faithful fortified by this sacrament ought to diffuse among others, according to 2 Cor. 2: *We are the good odor of Christ.*

Nevertheless, concerning the matter of this sacrament there is a threefold difficulty and controversy among theologians. The first is whether the mixing of balsam with olive oil belongs to the essence of the matter of confirmation, so that, if true balsam is not added, the sacrament is not effected. Cajetan, Soto, Navarre, and many others think that oil alone is required of itself as the matter of this sacrament, while balsam is mixed with it only by ecclesiastical precept, just as water is mixed with wine in the sacrament of the Eucharist. But this opinion does not seem true or probable in practice, because the Council of Florence says in the cited decree: *The second sacrament is confirmation, whose matter is chrism composed of oil, which signifies the splendor of conscience, and balsam, which signifies the odor of a good reputation.* Here it seems clearly to teach that oil and balsam belong equally to the matter of confirmation. Hence, since it is certain that oil is its essential matter, the same must be said of balsam.

9. Nor does it matter if you say that the same Council taught in the same place that the matter of the chalice is wine mixed with water, although it is certain that the mixing of water with wine is not necessary for the sacrament but only by precept. This does not matter, I say, for the Council, when speaking of the matter of the chalice, does not say that it is wine mixed with water, or a compound of wine and water, but that it is wine to which water must be mixed. But of chrism it teaches that it is composed of oil and balsam.

10. From this the manifest disparity between the sacraments of confirmation and the Eucharist is evident. Cajetan's opinion can also be attacked from the fact that the Council teaches in the same place that the matter of confirmation, necessary by the necessity of the sacrament, is chrism. Long before, Fabian had taught the same in epistle 2 to the bishops of the East, where he testifies that the Apostles received the preparation of chrism from the Lord and handed it down to us. But the name chrism designates not oil alone, but oil mixed with balsam. Therefore the matter of the sacrament of confirmation consists essentially of oil and balsam, or, as St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 7, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 2, *it is balsamated oil*.

The minor premise is proved from the Holy Fathers. Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, c. 4, speaking of chrism, says that it is composed of a fragrant substance. This cannot be understood of simple oil, but it can well be understood of oil with balsam, which has a most pleasant odor. The author of De unctione chrismatis among the works of Cyprian says: Today

chrism is prepared, in which balsam mixed with oil expresses the unity of royal and priestly glory. Likewise Gregory the Great, on Song 1, A cluster of Cyprus in the vineyards of Engaddi, says: Balsam is produced in Engaddi, and when it is joined with oil by a pontifical blessing, it becomes chrism. Hence the Roman Catechism, explaining the matter of confirmation, says: This is called chrism. Although this name, received from the Greeks, signifies every kind of ointment among profane writers, those who hand down divine things have, by common usage, applied it only to that ointment which is prepared from oil and balsam by the solemn consecration of the bishop.

It does not matter that some Holy Fathers call confirmation the sacrament of oil, for they take the name from the greater part, because there is much oil in chrism but very little balsam. Nor is it an obstacle that Paul III, Pius IV, and Gregory XIII permitted American balsam to be used in preparing chrism instead of Syrian balsam. They merely declared that American balsam is true balsam, even though perhaps specifically distinct from Syrian balsam, just as it is probable, for example, that French wine differs specifically from Palestinian wine, and white wine from red.

11. You will say: Innocent III, c. *Pastoralis*, *De sacramentis non iterandis*, when asked whether confirmation was to be repeated in one who through error had been anointed not with chrism but with simple oil, answered that *nothing was to be repeated, but what had been carelessly omitted was to be cautiously supplied*. Therefore he supposes that what had been omitted, namely, the chrismal anointing, was not essential; otherwise the sacrament would have been null and consequently would have had to be conferred anew.

I answer that the Pontiff there intends only that, in that case, the external solemnity with which this sacrament is ordinarily administered is not to be repeated, in order to avoid scandal. He does not deny, however, that the things pertaining to the essence and necessity of the sacrament, or substantial defects, are to be supplied; and consequently that the anointing with oil and balsam, together with the due form, is to be applied again secretly, privately, and without solemnity. This is gathered not obscurely from the word *cautiously*. Nor does it matter that the Pontiff answers in the same way in the same place that the imposition of hands omitted in the conferral of the subdiaconate is to be supplied, although according to the opinion of many it is only accidental. From this it is gathered only that the Pontiff wished, for the sake of brevity, to satisfy both questions by one general answer, but in a manner proportioned to each: namely, that in one

sacrament what had been omitted substantially should be supplied, and in the other what had been omitted accidentally.

12. The second difficulty is whether the consecration of the chrism by a bishop is required for the validity of this sacrament, at least as by the ordinary consecrator. I answer affirmatively. For this is gathered from the Council of Florence in the aforesaid decree of union, where it expressly says that the matter of this sacrament is chrism blessed by a bishop. The Roman Catechism declares the same more fully in these words: Chrism is consecrated by the bishop with solemn ceremonies. For Fabian, a Pontiff most renowned for holiness and the glory of martyrdom, handed down that our Savior taught this at the Last Supper, when he entrusted to the Apostles the manner of preparing chrism. And it assigns the reason why the matter must be consecrated by a blessing: Because in most of the other sacraments Christ so instituted their matter that he also bestowed holiness upon it. For he not only willed water to be the element of baptism when he said: Unless a man is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God; but when he himself was baptized, he brought it about that thereafter water was endowed with the power of sanctifying. Therefore, because the Lord did not sanctify this matter of confirmation by his own use and handling, it is necessary that it be consecrated by holy and religious prayers. St. Thomas also uses this reason here, a. 3.

13. But a more serious controversy remains: whether, at least through a dispensation of the Pontiff, the consecration of chrism can be committed to a simple priest, just as blessed Gregory is read to have once committed the administration of confirmation, which is something greater than the consecration of chrism. It must nevertheless be said that not even by commission of the Supreme Pontiff can a simple priest prepare chrism, much less by commission of a bishop, as Ledesma holds. For Pope Fabian, cited above, testifies that Christ at the Last Supper taught the Apostles to prepare chrism. Therefore he understood the consecration of chrism to belong by divine law only to bishops, the successors of the Apostles. The Roman Catechism also seems to indicate this in the passage cited above, saying: *Nor can its preparation belong to anyone other than a bishop.* By these words it seems altogether to exclude every inferior priest. Hence, although the Council of Florence in the decree of union acknowledges that a dispensation was sometimes granted so that a simple priest might confirm, it adds that he had to do so with chrism blessed by a bishop. This is a probable argument that the Council supposed this to be necessary by the necessity of the sacrament and, consequently, that neither the Pontiff nor the Church can dispense in this matter.

Nor is an argument from the greater to the lesser valid in the matter of the sacraments. For a simple priest cannot consecrate altars or ordain priests or bishops, and yet he can consecrate the body of Christ, which is something greater. Moreover, just as in natural things it is more excellent and noble to produce matter than the whole composite, because matter can be produced only by creation, so it seems greater to consecrate the matter of confirmation than to minister the sacrament itself. For one who prepares the matter acts after the manner of a creator, and therefore this is reserved to the highest rulers of the Church, namely, the bishops.

14. The third difficulty is whether the chrismal anointing so belongs to the essence and necessity of this sacrament that its effect cannot be conferred without it. The reason for doubting, and a most serious one, is that the Apostles in the primitive Church conferred this sacrament by the imposition of hands alone, as is evident from Acts 8 and 19. Therefore the chrismal anointing does not belong to its essence.

15. To extricate themselves from this difficulty, Father Sirmond and Cardinal Bellarmine proceed along altogether different paths. The first, in *Antirrheticus*, teaches that the chrismal anointing does not belong to the essence of this sacrament, but is only a certain accidental ceremony invented by the Church for its adornment and added to the bare imposition of hands. Consequently, by a dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff, it can be conferred by the imposition of hands alone. The other, however, in *De confirmatione*, l. 2, c. 9, asserts on the contrary that the chrismal anointing so belongs to the essence of this sacrament that it has never been administered without it. Hence, when the Acts of the Apostles says that the Apostles conferred this sacrament through the imposition of hands, he says that this imposition of hands was chrismal and therefore the same as that now employed by bishops.

But each opinion is false. The first is false because, since the remote matter of this sacrament is chrism, as the Council of Florence asserts, its proximate matter cannot be anything other than the chrismal anointing, as we shall say below. But whatever has the character of matter, whether proximate or remote, in the sacraments belongs to their essence, since they are essentially constituted of matter and form. Therefore the chrismal anointing belongs to the essence of the sacrament of confirmation and is not an accidental ceremony added to it, as Sirmond says. The second is false because the same Council of Florence says that confirmation, that is, the anointing with chrism, succeeded in the Church in place of the imposition of hands used by the Apostles. It openly signifies that the imposition of hands used by the Apostles at that time was different from that which the Church

now uses; otherwise it could not be said that the anointing with chrism now succeeds in its place, since properly speaking no thing succeeds in its own place.

16. Therefore the reason for doubting is better answered with St. Thomas, here a. 2, ad 1, and a. 4, ad 1: although chrism composed of oil and balsam is the matter of this sacrament, determined and instituted by Christ on the night of the Supper, nevertheless in the primitive Church the Apostles, by the inspiration and dispensation of the same Christ, conferred this sacrament through the imposition of hands alone, without the anointing with chrism. For since at that time the Holy Spirit descended visibly upon the baptized, and the interior anointing was sufficiently made known by that evident descent of the Holy Spirit, no exterior and sensible anointing, namely, the application of chrism, was necessary to designate it. Moreover, since at times many thousands of persons were baptized in one day, and the custom was then that the baptized were immediately confirmed, it was fitting that, while the Apostles were occupied with such matters and did not have leisure to anoint each individual, Christ should free them from this care by causing the Holy Spirit to come manifestly at the imposition of hands alone.

The Council of Mainz, celebrated in 1549 under Paul III, c. 8, teaches the same. It can be confirmed by the example of baptism. Although a perpetual and stable form was instituted by Christ for baptism, with the express invocation of all the divine Persons, nevertheless, for the celebration of the name of Jesus, then hated by Jews and Gentiles, the Apostles, by the inspiration and dispensation of the same Christ, baptized in the name of Jesus alone at the beginning of the nascent Church, as we showed above, c. 4. Likewise, although the chrismal anointing was instituted by Christ as the perpetual and stable matter of confirmation, he nevertheless willed, for the reasons given, to dispense the Apostles at the beginning of the nascent Church so that they might minister this sacrament through the imposition of hands alone, without the chrismal anointing.

17. From what has been said it is easily gathered what the proximate matter of this sacrament is. Since the proximate matter in sacraments consisting in use is nothing other than the application of the remote matter, and the remote matter of this sacrament is chrism, it is manifest that its proximate matter is the application of chrism, or the chrismal anointing. As the Council of Florence says, this must be performed on the forehead, where the seat of shame is found, lest the one being confirmed be ashamed to confess the name of Christ. It must also be made in the form of a cross, both so that the words of the form, *I sign you with the sign of the cross*, may be

verified, and so that it may thereby be declared that a Christian must not be ashamed of the cross of Christ, which according to the Apostle was a scandal to the Jews and foolishness to the Gentiles. Finally, as Cyprian says in *De baptismo Christi*: *The power of the cross accomplishes all the sacraments; without this sign nothing is holy, nor does any consecration attain its effect.*

18. As regards its form, the one used by the Roman Church consists in these words: *I sign you with the sign of the cross, and I confirm you with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* In this form three things found in this sacrament are designated: namely, the sign by which the one who is about to enter the contest of Christian warfare is marked; the spiritual strength conferred upon him; and the cause conferring such strength, namely, the Most Holy Trinity. The Trinity is most fittingly expressed in this sacrament, both because confirmation is the perfection of baptism, which is performed with the express invocation of the Trinity, and because in confirmation the soldier of Christ is armed so that, among the other mysteries, he may not be ashamed to profess the Trinity.

The Greek Church uses another form, namely: *The seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit*, etc., as is evident from all the Greek Euchologia. Hence, since this differs specifically from the form used by the Roman Church, it must be said that Christ did not determine the form of this sacrament according to its species, but only according to its genus. He instituted only that it should be celebrated through some words signifying its effect, and left to the power of the Church the determination of those words. Hence arose that diversity of forms and the different rites of ministering this sacrament in the Latin and Greek Churches. More will be said of this below when we treat of the sacrament of orders.

19. Finally, the proper effect of this sacrament is easily gathered from what has been said. It is an increase of grace by which a man is strengthened to profess the faith and acquires a right to special helps for eliciting that act with constancy. For the anointing, the signing, and the words of the form, *I confirm you*, signify that the grace conferred by the power of this sacrament is given in order to conflict and combat and confers spiritual strength for the constant profession of the faith. Hence *De consecratione*, dist. 5, relates this decree of Pope Urban: *All the faithful ought, after baptism, to receive the Holy Spirit through the imposition of the bishops' hands, so that, just as in the font we receive fullness for innocence, so in confirmation we may receive growth and strength for battle.* Besides this effect special to itself, confirmation causes another that is also produced by baptism and orders, namely, a character, by

reason of which it cannot be repeated, just as baptism and orders cannot be repeated. This was treated in the preceding treatise, c. 4.

§ 3.
The Minister of This Sacrament.

20. It is of faith that the ordinary minister of this sacrament is a bishop alone, as is defined in the Council of Florence in the decree of union and in the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 3 on confirmation. It is also gathered from Scripture. For Acts 8 says that Peter and John were sent from Jerusalem to Samaria to confirm those who had been baptized by Philip the deacon. No reason can be given why the Apostles rather than others, or Philip himself who had baptized them, conferred this sacrament, except that only the Apostles were bishops at that time. Therefore this office of confirming the baptized belongs only to bishops as ordinary ministers. Hence Innocent IV, in an epistle to the bishop of Tusculum, legate of the Apostolic See in the kingdom of Cyprus, says: *Let bishops alone sign the baptized with chrism upon their foreheads, because this anointing ought to be performed only by a bishop, since only the Apostles, whose place the bishops hold, are read to have bestowed the Holy Spirit through the imposition of hands represented by confirmation or the chrismation of the forehead.*

21. The fittingness is, first, that through this sacrament a man is enrolled in the army of Christ. But enrollment in an army belongs not to everyone but to the commanders of the army, such as the bishops are in the ecclesiastical army, since they succeed the Apostles. Second, confirmation is the perfection and consummation of baptism, for through it the baptized person becomes a perfect and complete Christian, as Urban I says in his epistle to all Christians. Therefore this sacrament belongs to those who are in the state of acquired perfection, namely, bishops alone.

St. Thomas illustrates this reason here, a. 11, where he argues as follows: in every work the ultimate completion is reserved to the higher art. Thus, in the construction of a building, the inferior workers prepare the matter, cut the stones, shape the timbers, and make the mortar; but the completion of the work and the form of the completed house are produced by the architect. Therefore the faithful, who are a certain divine work and a temple of God, according to 2 Cor. 3, *You are God's building*, are indeed prepared in baptism by other ministers, but are perfected and consummated in confirmation only by the highest priests, who are bishops.

22. This is certain among all Catholics, but the difficulty and controversy among theologians is whether simple priests can, by a dispensation of the Apostolic See, be extraordinary ministers of confirmation. I answer affirmatively, against Durandus, Estius, Peter Aurelius, and others. First, because the Council of Florence says in the decree of Eugene: *It is read that sometimes, by a dispensation of the Apostolic See for a reasonable and very urgent cause, a simple priest administered this sacrament of confirmation with chrism prepared by a bishop.* Here the sacred Council not only recounts that such a dispensation was granted, but also approves it and testifies that it proceeded from a reasonable cause. Second, when the First and Second Councils of Orange, the First Council of Toledo, the Council of Florence, and the Council of Trent teach that the ordinary minister of this sacrament is a bishop, they tacitly indicate that another can be the extraordinary minister. Third, blessed Gregory the Great forbade the priests of Sardinia to confirm; but when he understood that scandal had arisen from this, he granted them permission to confirm, as Baronius testifies under the year 594, and as is related in c. *Pervenit*, dist. 95, in these words: *It has come to our attention that some were scandalized because we forbade priests to anoint the baptized with chrism. We indeed acted according to the ancient custom of our Church. But if some are altogether saddened for this reason, where bishops are absent we grant that priests may also anoint the baptized with chrism upon their foreheads.* Hence St. Thomas, here q. 72, a. 11, ad 1, says: *The Pope possesses the fullness of power in the Church, from which he can commit to certain inferiors some things belonging to higher orders, just as he grants to certain priests the conferral of minor orders, which belongs to episcopal power. And from this fullness of power blessed Pope Gregory granted that simple priests should confer this sacrament for as long as the scandal endured.*

What some say, however, that at that time all priests were simultaneously bishops by ordination and consecration, is false and altogether improbable. For long before the time of St. Gregory the Great, simple priests had begun to be distinguished from bishops both by ordination and by jurisdiction, as is openly gathered from Pope Eusebius, epistle 2 to the bishops of Tuscia, and from Melchiades, decretal epistle to the bishops of Spain. Likewise, the answer of Estius and Aurelius that the chrismal anointing granted by St. Gregory was not the sacrament of confirmation but another ecclesiastical ceremony is most openly contrary to St. Thomas, already cited, who understood that concession of the sacrament of confirmation. It also seems contrary to the Council of Florence, which, when treating of the sacrament of confirmation, most expressly says that it is read that the Apostolic See sometimes dispensed so that priests might

administer it. Without doubt it alludes to that dispensation of Gregory the Great, attested by his own writings and related in canon law.

I add that, if St. Gregory granted only a change of ceremony, why did he so strictly command that this rite be used only in the absence or scarcity of a bishop? For a pious ceremony, even if different in rite, can be performed equally in the presence or absence of a bishop, since the ceremonies of all Churches are not the same.

23. Finally, the same opinion is proved from the fact that Arcudius and others report that this custom, namely, that priests confirmed by a tacit or express concession of the Supreme Pontiff, flourished in the Greek Church long before the schism, and that Eugene and the Council tacitly approved it. For in session 25, when Eugene proposed eleven questions to the Greeks, the sixth of which was: *Why do priests and not bishops anoint with sacred chrism, although this has been given to bishops?*, the Council adds: *The bishop of Mytilene legitimately and according to the canons resolved all these objections made by the Latins, except two: namely, the dissolution of marriage as regards the bond, and the creation of a patriarch outside Constantinople.* Therefore Eugene together with the Council tacitly approved the Greek rite of confirmation by priests. This custom began in the fourth century, as Vericelli shows in *De apostolicis missionibus*, tit. 7, q. 130.

That the Apostolic See expressly or tacitly consented to it he proves in the same place from the fact that, before the East defected from her, the Apostolic See was accustomed each year to send chrism to the people of Constantinople, as Arcudius testifies in *De concordia Ecclesiae occidentalis et orientalis*, l. 2, c. 9. Hence it is not credible that the Roman Pontiff was not informed by his apocrisaries of the rite by which Greek priests confirmed infants. Therefore he consented to it, either expressly or tacitly, for he could easily have prohibited it at that time. Since the people of Constantinople then showed such reverence to the Roman Church that they asked sacred chrism from her each year, although the Greek bishops could themselves consecrate it by the power of their order, how much more would they have obeyed and the priests abstained from conferring the sacrament of confirmation if the Roman Pontiff had forbidden them? But the Holy See willed to indulge this to them, so that they might more easily withdraw from the pernicious custom of baptizing in adult age, which then prevailed among the Greeks, as in fact they did.

24. You will object first: Innocent III, c. 4, *De consuetudine*, decrees that the faithful should rather lack the sacrament of confirmation than receive it from priests. But if priests could confirm by a concession of the Supreme Pontiff, the Supreme Pontiff should rather have granted them this than

deprived the faithful of so useful a sacrament, without which men are not perfect Christians. Therefore priests cannot confer the sacrament of confirmation by commission of the Supreme Pontiff.

It is confirmed: the Pontiffs speak in the same manner concerning the administration of confirmation and concerning the preparation and consecration of chrism, as is clear from Leo the Great, epistle 88, where he says: *Neither to prepare chrism nor to sign with chrism the foreheads of the baptized is lawful for priests and chorepiscopi. The authority of the canons commands that all these things are owed to bishops alone.* But priests cannot prepare chrism even by a concession and dispensation of the Apostolic See, as we showed in the preceding section. Therefore they cannot administer the sacrament of confirmation either.

To the objection I answer that Innocent III wished to restrain the presumption of certain priests who, by an intolerable abuse, arrogated to themselves the power of confirming, although they had no concession of the Apostolic See for this, pretending that they could do so by custom. Therefore, to abrogate or restrain that custom, which was contrary to the ancient and venerable practices of the Church, the Pontiff decreed that it was better for the faithful to lack for a time the sacrament of confirmation, which is not necessary for salvation, than to confer such power indiscriminately upon all priests and for every time.

To the confirmation I answer that, although Pope St. Leo and other Supreme Pontiffs sometimes speak in their decretals in the same manner concerning the administration of confirmation and concerning the preparation and consecration of chrism, nevertheless, since it is never read that a simple priest was given the faculty of preparing chrism, although the faculty of administering confirmation is indeed read to have been granted, there is a compelling argument that a simple priest cannot prepare chrism even by a concession of the Apostolic See, but can administer the sacrament of confirmation with chrism consecrated by a bishop.

25. You will object secondly: a sacrament cannot be completed without a minister instituted by Christ. But the minister of confirmation instituted by Christ is a bishop alone, as is defined in the Council of Florence and the Council of Trent cited above. Therefore this sacrament can be conferred only by a bishop.

It is confirmed: when a bishop confirms, he does not do so precisely by reason of the power of jurisdiction that he has over his diocese, but by reason of the power of order divinely attached to his character. Otherwise he could confer the power of confirming upon his vicars general, to whom he

gives his jurisdiction. Therefore whoever lacks the episcopal character also lacks the power of confirming essentially annexed to it.

To the objection I answer that the ordinary minister of confirmation instituted by Christ is indeed a bishop alone; nevertheless, by the same institution of Christ, a simple priest is its extraordinary minister in a case of necessity and upon the commission of the Supreme Pontiff. For since Christ committed the governance of the whole Church to the Supreme Pontiff, he consequently gave him the power to provide a suitable minister of confirmation in certain extraordinary cases in which a bishop cannot be present to minister that sacrament.

Hence, to the confirmation, I say that a bishop, as the ordinary minister, confirms by reason of his episcopal character; but a priest, as an extraordinary minister commissioned by the Supreme Pontiff, does so by reason of his priestly character, though dependent upon the concession or dispensation of the Apostolic See. For although the power of order for confirming does not depend upon the power of jurisdiction when it is perfect and complete, as episcopal power is, it nevertheless depends upon the supreme power of jurisdiction existing in the Supreme Pontiff when, like the power of a simple priest, it is incomplete for that effect. Hence, in a simple priest the power of order for confirming implies not only the priestly character, but also connotes the concession of the Supreme Pontiff and consequently the supreme jurisdiction existing in him as the head of the whole Church. From this you will understand that a simple priest cannot confirm by commission of a bishop, because those things that pertain to the governance of the whole Church—such as providing a suitable minister of confirmation in certain extraordinary cases in which a bishop cannot confirm—belong to the Supreme Pontiff alone. Hence nowhere is it read that priests confirmed by the command or dispensation of a bishop, but only by the privilege of the Supreme Pontiff. You will also understand that the Pontiff cannot grant a deacon the faculty of confirming, because such a power necessarily presupposes or requires either the episcopal or at least the priestly character. For a sacramental operation upon the mystical body of Christ must proceed from one who has power over the true body of Christ, which a deacon does not have, since he cannot consecrate the body of Christ. Hence St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 7, q. 3, a. 1, qla. 3: *Promotion to those perfections which do not regard the true body of the Lord but only the mystical body can be committed by the Pope, who has the fullness of pontifical power, to a priest, who possesses the highest act over the true body of the Lord; but not to a deacon or anyone inferior, who does not have the power to perfect the true body of the Lord.*

TREATISE IV.

ON THE MOST AUGUST SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST.

Just as in the Old Testament the Paschal Lamb had the character both of a sacrament and of a sacrifice, so in the New Law the Eucharist possesses each character. For it was instituted not only for the salvation of souls, like the other sacraments, but was also ordained to the special worship of God, according to which it has the character of sacrifice. We shall consider it under both aspects in this treatise. First we shall treat of it insofar as it has the character of a sacrament; then we shall contemplate it as the sacrifice of the New Law, first invoking the grace of this admirable sacrament and unbloody sacrifice in the words of the divine Dionysius, who, when about to treat of the Eucharist in c. 3 of *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, begins thus: O *wholly divine and holy mystery, deign to open for us the coverings of signs drawn over you, shine upon us manifestly and openly, and fill our spiritual eyes with the singular and unveiled splendor of your light.*

CHAPTER I.
On the Existence, Essence, Unity, Necessity, and Institution of This Sacrament.

§ 1.
The Existence and Essence of This Sacrament.

1. Although many heretics have erred concerning the Eucharist, none of them has denied that it is a true sacrament of the New Law. Scripture, the councils, and the Holy Fathers openly hand this down, and the fitting reason given by St. Thomas here, q. 73, a. 1, easily persuades. For since the sacraments of the New Law, he says, were instituted so that through their aid men might be assisted in the spiritual life, and their spiritual life resembles bodily life, it is manifest that, just as bodily life requires generation, through which a man receives life, growth, through which he is brought to the perfection of life, and food, by which he is preserved in life, so the spiritual life, besides baptism, which is spiritual generation, and confirmation, which is spiritual growth, required the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual food.

Nor does it matter that in bodily life growth and nourishment arise from the same food. For there is no exact and perfect likeness between bodily and spiritual things. Bodily growth takes place successively through the repeated consumption of food and drink, whereas spiritual growth takes place all at once through the sacrament of confirmation, which therefore cannot be repeated. Likewise, the spiritual strength given in confirmation is not produced in the manner of nourishment, but in the manner of an athletic anointing. Hence it was fitting that, besides confirmation, through which such strength is conferred by the chrismal anointing, Eucharistic food and drink should be given for spiritual refreshment. I add that, although Christ could have provided these two things by a single sacrament, it was nevertheless more fitting that he should bestow these effects through two sacraments, both so that the variety and multitude of the effects of grace might be recognized in the diversity of the sacraments themselves, and so that God might be worshiped more fully by men through this admirable and most wise variety of the sacraments.

2. The greater difficulty is in what the essence of this sacrament consists. First, the heretics of this time think that this sacrament does not consist in

any permanent reality, but in use or reception alone, so that, just as water in baptism does not have the character of a sacrament except when it is actually applied, so the Eucharist does not have the character of a sacrament except when it is actually eaten, and not when it is reserved in a pyx. This error is condemned by the Council of Trent, sess. 13, can. 3 and c. 3, where it says: *This is excellent and singular in the Eucharist: the other sacraments first possess the power of sanctifying when someone uses them, but in the Eucharist the Author of holiness is present before its use. For the Apostles had not yet received the Eucharist from the Lord's hand when he nevertheless truly affirmed that what he offered was his body.*

By these words the holy Synod indicates this reason: the body of Christ was present on the night of the Supper when these words were pronounced by him, *This is my body*; otherwise his proposition would have been false and Christ would have uttered a lie. But Christ pronounced those words before the Apostles ate his body. Therefore the body of Christ was under the species of bread before the use and reception of this sacrament, and consequently the sacrament of the Eucharist then existed.

3. The Calvinists deny the minor premise, contending that the words *This is my body* were not pronounced before the act of eating but while they were eating. They think this is gathered from the sequence of the words of St. Matthew, c. 26: *Jesus took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to his disciples, and said: Take and eat; this is my body.* But this is easily refuted, because Christ invited his disciples to eat on the ground that the food he held in his hands was his body. Therefore the body of Christ was under the species of bread before the Apostles ate it.

Hence the sequence of St. Matthew's words must not be attended to here. Otherwise from Mark 14, *And taking the chalice, giving thanks, he gave it to them, and they all drank from it, and he said to them: This is my blood*, etc., it would follow that the body and blood of Christ are in this sacrament only after its use and reception, which not even the heretics admit. Rather, only the signification and sense must be attended to, and from the constant understanding of the Church and the Fathers it is certain that the sense is this: Christ, while he was still holding the bread in his hand before its distribution, said: *This is my body.*

4. There is added the authority of very many Fathers, who assert that the Eucharist was preserved and enclosed in small chests or pyxes, carried home, borne about by the faithful, suspended from the neck, and the like, which openly declare it to be something permanent. Tertullian, in *Ad uxorem*, l. 2, indicates that it was once customary for the faithful to carry the Eucharist with them and receive it at a suitable time. Basil, in his epistle to

Caesaria Patricia, testifies that anchorites who could not conveniently frequent a church carried the Eucharist with them into the desert. Cyprian, in his sermon *De lapsis*, recounts that a woman who attempted with unworthy hands to handle the Eucharist enclosed in a small chest in her house was suddenly terrified by a fire arising from it. Ambrose, in his oration *De obitu Satyri fratris sui*, c. 7, writes that his brother, *when the ship was wrecked, caused the sacrament of the Lord to be bound in a cloth and then cast himself into the sea, from which by God's favor he escaped unharmed*. Justin Martyr, who lived in the first century after the Apostles, writes near the end of his second Apology that, after the sacred rites had been completed in church, the Eucharist was customarily given to deacons to carry to absent persons who for a reasonable cause had been prevented from attending the celebration of the mysteries. Finally, St. Jerome, in his epistle to Rusticus, praises St. Exuperius, bishop of Toulouse, because through voluntary poverty he was compelled to carry the body of Christ in a basket. His words are: *Nothing is richer than he who carries the body of the Lord in a wicker basket and his blood in glass.*

Finally, Cyril of Alexandria, in his epistle to Calosyrius, says: I hear that there are some who say that the mystical Blessing does nothing to sanctify if some of it remains for another day. Those who assert these things are mad. For Christ is not altered, nor is his holy body changed, but the power and efficacy of the blessing and its life-giving grace remain perpetually within it. These testimonies are so explicit and manifest that Calvin was forced to admit that the example of the ancient Church stands for us. But in a matter so great, he says, it is safer to follow the truth—that is, the truth revealed to him and other apostates of his kind, but hidden from the Holy Fathers and the whole Church in previous centuries.

5. Reason also supports this. For the sacrament of the Eucharist was instituted by Christ in the manner of food and drink, according to John 6: *My flesh is truly food, and my blood is truly drink*. But food and drink are something permanent; and the use of food and drink, or their reception, is not judged to belong to their essence, but is only their application or a condition required for nourishment. Therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist is likewise something permanent, and its reception or use is only a condition required so that its power may have its effect, namely, the spiritual refreshment of the soul.

Nor does it matter that baptism, confirmation, and the other sacraments of the New Law consist in use. In this the Eucharist differs from the other sacraments of the New Law: it contains the sacred reality absolutely, namely, the body of Christ, whereas the others contain a sacred reality only in

relation to another, namely, the power to sanctify those to whom they are applied. From this it follows that the Eucharist is completed in the consecration of the matter alone, whereas the others are completed in their application to the man to be sanctified.

6. As regards Catholics, who universally hold that this sacrament consists in some permanent reality, the difficulty and controversy among them is what in the Eucharist properly and essentially possesses the character of a sacrament, or of a sensible sign of sanctifying grace. For there are many things in it concerning which it can be doubted whether such a character belongs to them: namely, the words of consecration; the transubstantiating action, or the action converting bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; the species containing the body and blood of Christ; the body and blood of Christ contained under the species; and finally the reception of the Eucharist, which is called its use. Therefore it is asked which of these five properly and essentially possesses the character of a sacrament in the Eucharist.

7. I answer briefly that the sacrament of the Eucharist, insofar as it is a sacrament or sensible sign of sanctifying grace, consists essentially in the consecrated species. These nevertheless connote the body and blood of Christ contained under them as causative of nourishing grace, the words of consecration and the consecration itself as the cause or action through which it is effected, and its use or reception as the end to which it is ordained.

First, it is manifest that neither the words of consecration, nor the consecration itself or action converting bread into the body and blood of Christ, nor the use or reception of the Eucharist can be the sacrament of the Eucharist itself or essential and intrinsic parts constituting it. For, as we have already shown against the heretics, the sacrament of the Eucharist consists in some permanent reality, whereas these are successive entities. Moreover, the words of consecration and the consecration itself are the cause or action through which the Eucharist is produced, or the process and path toward the sacrament. But the cause or action through which a sacrament is produced is not the sacrament itself, and the path is not a constitutive principle of the terminus. Therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist does not consist essentially in the words of consecration or in the consecration itself, nor can these be intrinsic and essential parts of it.

The same must be said of use or reception. For the use of food is not the food itself, but only its application. Hence before the reception of the Eucharist, and immediately after consecration, the complete and integral sacrament of the Eucharist exists.

It is likewise evident that neither the sacramental species alone nor the body and blood of Christ alone contained under them constitute the whole sacrament of the Eucharist. The species alone, apart from the body and blood of Christ, cannot be spiritual food and the cause of the soul's life and nourishment, since they do not have the power to sanctify and vivify except from the body and blood of Christ contained under them. But the body of Christ itself, since it is not sensible except by reason of the species, cannot by itself and apart from them possess the character of a sacrament, or of a sensible sign of sanctifying grace.

Therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist must consist either in an aggregate of the species and the body and blood of Christ, as many more recent authors hold, or, as the Thomists say more correctly, in the species as consecrated and as containing and connoting the body and blood of Christ. For of the species so considered is verified whatever belongs to the character of a sacrament, namely, that it is a sensible sign of sanctifying grace. They are sensible of themselves, as is evident; but by reason of the body and blood of Christ which they connote and contain, they possess the power of sanctifying and causing grace that feeds and refreshes the soul.

Hence the Roman Catechism openly teaches this opinion under the title on the Eucharist, n. 8, in these words: It must be carefully observed that there are many things in this mystery to which sacred writers have sometimes given the name of sacrament. For sometimes the consecration, and frequently the body and blood of the Lord contained in the Eucharist, have been accustomed to be called a sacrament.... But it is evident that all these are called sacraments less properly. The species of bread and wine themselves possess the true and absolute character of this name.

8. You will object first: the Council of Florence, in the decree of Eugene, says that the sacraments of the New Law are completed by things as matter and by words as form. Therefore, just as in the other sacraments the words are an intrinsic form and an essential part, so also the words of consecration are in the sacrament of the Eucharist, especially since through them the species are determined to signify nourishing grace, just as in baptism water is determined by the words to signify regenerating grace.

I answer that the words of the Council of Florence are to be understood and applied to the sacraments of the New Law by an accommodated distribution. Of those which consist in use it can be said that they are intrinsically composed of things and words; but of the Eucharist, which does not consist in use but in a permanent reality, this can be said only extrinsically. For in this sacrament the words of consecration determine the matter only extrinsically and efficiently, insofar as they convert it into the

body and blood of Christ. But in baptism and the other sacraments consisting in use, the words intrinsically and formally determine the matter to signify sacramental grace, or the grace proper to each sacrament.

9. You will object secondly: the sacraments of the New Law are practical and effective signs of grace. But the Eucharist does not cause grace except in its actual use and reception. Therefore such use and reception are either the sacrament of the Eucharist itself or at least an essential part of it.

I answer that it does not belong to the character of a sacrament not consisting in use, such as the Eucharist, always to cause grace in second act. It is sufficient that it always be apt to cause it and that it in fact cause grace when the requisites are present, and thus when use or application is present as an indispensable condition. Hence use is not an intrinsic part of this sacrament, but only the end to which it is ordained and consequently an extrinsic connotation of it.

10. You will object thirdly: the Holy Fathers say that the Eucharist is the flesh or body of Christ and that it is the spiritual food of the soul. But these statements cannot be verified unless this sacrament consists of the body of Christ as an intrinsic part composing it together with the species. Therefore the body of Christ is truly a part of this sacrament and not only something contained in it. Hence St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 1, ad 2: *From the species and the body of Christ one sacrament is made.*

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. The Eucharist is called the flesh or body of Christ by the Holy Fathers through metonymy, attributing to the container the name of the thing contained, which is a very frequent manner of speaking. It is likewise called the spiritual food of the soul because it signifies and causes grace that feeds the soul. This belongs not only to the body of Christ but also to the consecrated species as elevated to cause grace. By reason of this elevation they are food of the soul by which it is spiritually nourished. Nevertheless, because the body of Christ, as an instrument joined to the Divinity, concurs in a nobler manner toward this nourishment, it is simply and commonly called the food of the soul.

To St. Thomas it must be said that, in order for one sacrament to be said to be made from the consecrated species and the body of Christ, it is not required that they be related to one another in the manner of parts or extremes composing a whole. It is sufficient that the consecrated species contain the body of Christ as the reality contained and signified by them. Hence the same Holy Doctor, after the words cited in the objection, adds: *Just as in the other sacraments one thing is made, as it were, from the element and*

the power. But the power through which the other sacraments are elevated is not the sacrament or an intrinsic part composing it, nor does it belong to it directly, but only obliquely. Therefore in the sacrament of the Eucharist the body of Christ is not related to it in the manner of an intrinsic part, but only in the manner of the thing contained and signified by the consecrated species.

Therefore one sacrament is made from the species, which are implied directly, and the body of Christ, which is implied obliquely, because the species cannot possess the character of a sacrament unless they contain the body of Christ itself. Otherwise they would not signify nourishing grace, since they do not possess the ability to signify it except from the determination made by the words; and in order for the words to be verified, the species must really contain the body of Christ.

11. You will object fourthly: the sacrament of the Eucharist in itself is to be adored with the adoration of latria, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 13, c. 5. But the species, even considered with a relation to the present body of Christ, ought not to be adored with the worship of latria, because, as the Seventh Synod frequently teaches, God alone must be adored with this worship. Therefore the consecrated species, even as implying a relation to the present body of Christ, are not the sacrament of the Eucharist itself and do not stand for it.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For since the sacramental species, by containing Christ, are joined to him, they are presented for adoration in the same act by which Christ is adored. Hence, just as one who adores the Word in the flesh adores the flesh itself by the same act, so one who adores Christ under the Eucharistic species adores the species themselves with the same adoration.

For a better understanding, it must be observed that the Eucharistic species can be adored in two ways: either together with Christ himself, or separately from him and precisely because of the dignity they have from containing him. If they are adored together with Christ, although the reality first and principally adored is Christ, those species are nevertheless concomitantly and, as it were, implicitly adored with the same worship as Christ. But if they are adored as distinct from Christ, I admit that such adoration is not perfect latria but hyperdulia. For although the dignity arising in those species from their conjunction with Christ is greater than every purely created and creatable excellence and dignity, it is nevertheless less than the dignity of Christ considered in himself. In this sense the Seventh Synod must be explained.

12. From what has been said it is gathered first that, in the Eucharist, the consecrated species containing the body and blood of Christ are the sacrament only; the body and blood of Christ contained under them are both the reality of the sacrament and sacrament; while sanctifying grace is the reality of the sacrament only. The reason is that the consecrated species signify and are not signified. The body and blood of Christ are signified by the species and signify grace. Sanctifying grace in the manner of spiritual food is only signified and does not signify anything that is a proper effect of this sacrament, although it signifies glory, which is the common signified reality of all the sacraments.

It is gathered secondly that the sacrament of the Eucharist, taken physically, is nothing other than the consecrated species of bread and wine, which by the power of the words of the form really contain Christ for the purpose of causing grace that nourishes the soul. Considered metaphysically, however, it is a sacrament of the New Law signifying Christ as really contained under the species themselves and grace as nourishing the soul.

§ 2.
The Unity of This Sacrament.

13. It is certain that the sacrament of the Eucharist, although it consists of two species and partial forms, is nevertheless one specifically indivisible sacrament and not several specifically diverse sacraments. For the Roman Catechism, part 2, c. 4, says: *Although there are two elements, namely bread and wine, from which the integral sacrament of the Eucharist is confected, nevertheless, led by the authority of the Church, we confess not several but only one sacrament of the Eucharist.*

The difficulty, however, is from what the specific unity of this sacrament is to be taken. Some take it from the unity of the contained reality, which is Christ; others from the unity of institution; others from the unity of Christ's Passion, which it signifies; or from the union of the faithful, which it causes. But St. Thomas better teaches here, a. 2, that it must be sought from the unity of the end to which it is ordained by Christ's institution. He argues as follows: The sacrament of the Eucharist is ordained to spiritual refreshment, which is conformed to bodily refreshment. But for bodily refreshment two things are required: food, which is dry nourishment, and drink, which is moist nourishment. And therefore two things also concur toward the integrity of this sacrament, namely, spiritual food and spiritual drink, according to John 6: My flesh is truly food, and my blood is truly drink.

Therefore this sacrament is materially many things, but formally and perfectively one.

This reason can be illustrated by the example of the sacrament of extreme unction. For just as in extreme unction there are several partial anointings and several partial forms, and nevertheless there is one sacrament because all these are ordained to one end and one effect, namely, the removal of all the remnants of sins which arise from the senses and weigh down the soul, so the sacrament of the Eucharist, although it consists of two species and partial forms, is nevertheless judged to be one sacrament in species because it is ordained to one end, namely, one integral spiritual refreshment.

14. It seems no less certain that the sacrament of the Eucharist, although one in species, is nevertheless divided into several sacraments in number according as it is consecrated in different churches and upon different altars. For since there are then several matters and several forms of this sacrament, numerically diverse, there cannot fail to be several numerically distinct sacraments. But the difficulty and controversy among theologians is from what the numerical unity or distinction of this sacrament is then to be taken.

Some think that it is taken from the physical unity and continuity of the species, so that there are as many numerically distinct sacraments as there are physically discontinuous species of bread and wine. Others think that it depends upon the consecration through which it is confected, so that what is confected by one consecration is one sacrament, but what is confected by diverse consecrations is several sacraments in number. Finally, others assert that the numerical unity of the Eucharist must be taken neither from the physical continuity of the species nor from the unity of consecration, but from its order to one reception.

This opinion seems more probable, because the sacrament of the Eucharist was instituted by Christ in the manner of a spiritual banquet by which the soul is refreshed. Hence it must be treated proportionately and analogically to a material banquet. But a material banquet does not have its numerical unity from the physical continuity of foods, since several physically discontinuous courses can be served at the same banquet; nor from the action by which it is prepared, since it can be prepared by one action or by several discontinuous and numerically diverse actions; but from the foods and courses insofar as they are ordained to one refreshment. Therefore the numerical unity of the sacrament of the Eucharist is likewise taken not from the physical continuity of the species or from the unity of the consecration through which it is confected, but from its order to one

numerically distinct refreshment which it serves. For this to be declared and illustrated more fully:

15. It must be observed that there is a twofold constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist in individual being. One is incomplete and belongs to it from at least the virtual intention of the consecrating priest, through which it is appointed to one or several refreshments. The other is complete, by which, in consequence of such an intention, the same sacrament in fact serves one or several refreshments.

Hence, although a priest consecrates several hosts in order to several refreshments, they do not yet have completely but only inchoatively the being of several numerically distinct sacraments before in their reception they actually serve several refreshments. Likewise, if he consecrates several hosts in order to a single numerical refreshment, they will from that time be only inchoatively one sacrament in number, but completely so in the one actual reception.

Similarly, several courses appointed to several refreshments constitute several banquets only inchoatively from that appointment; they become completely several when they actually serve several refreshments. Conversely, when several courses are appointed to only one refreshment, from such appointment they constitute only inchoatively one banquet; they constitute it completely when they are actually served and minister to one refreshment alone.

§ 3.
The Necessity of This Sacrament.

16. It is certain that this sacrament, received in reality, is not necessary by necessity of means for salvation. For infants washed in the sacred waters or baptized in their own blood obtain salvation without the actual reception of the Eucharist, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 21, c. 4. Adults are also often placed in circumstances in which they can by no means be fed with this heavenly food, as when they are tossed by a storm and buried in the waters, or condemned to death, or suffer vomiting. The Church is not accustomed to give the sacrament of the Eucharist to such persons even at the point of death.

It is also certain that a formal and explicit desire to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist is not necessary for salvation. For the desire of a thing supplies for that thing and is therefore called its substitute; consequently it cannot be more necessary for salvation than the thing

desired. Therefore, if the Eucharist actually received is not necessary for salvation, its formal and explicit desire will not be simply necessary for salvation.

The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, is whether at least an implicit and virtual desire of the Eucharist is necessary for all by necessity of means for salvation. Many more recent authors deny this, but the Thomists affirm it with the Holy Doctor, here a. 3, where he says: *Through baptism a man is ordained to the Eucharist, and therefore, from the very fact that children are baptized, they are ordained to the Eucharist through the Church. And thus, just as they believe through the faith of the Church, so through the faith of the Church they desire the Eucharist.* And q. 79, a. 1, ad 1: *This sacrament of itself has the power of conferring grace, and no one has grace before receiving this sacrament except through some desire for it, either personally, as in adults, or through the desire of the Church, as in infants.*

17. Reason also supports this. Baptism and penance are necessary by necessity of means for salvation. But in baptism and penance and the other sacraments there is implicitly, virtually, and interpretatively included a desire for the Eucharist. Therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist, at least in an implicit, tacit, and interpretative desire, is necessary for salvation by necessity of means.

The major premise is certain. The minor is proved. In the willing of a means there is included, at least implicitly, virtually, and interpretatively, the intention of the end, or the will and desire for it. But the sacrament of the Eucharist is the end of baptism, penance, and the other sacraments. Therefore in baptism, penance, and the other sacraments there is implicitly, virtually, and interpretatively included a desire for the Eucharist.

The major is evident. The minor is proved by St. Thomas, above q. 65, a. 3, where he argues as follows: All the other sacraments seem to be ordained to the sacrament of the Eucharist as to their end. For it is manifest that the sacrament of orders is ordained to the consecration of the Eucharist, while the sacrament of baptism is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. In confirmation also someone is perfected so that he may not fear to withdraw himself from so great a sacrament. Through penance and extreme unction a man is also prepared to receive the body of Christ worthily. Matrimony likewise, at least by its signification, reaches this sacrament insofar as it signifies the conjunction of Christ and the Church, whose unity is prefigured by the sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence the Apostle also says in Eph. 5: This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.

It is confirmed first: every thing is inclined toward its perfection and consummation as toward its proper end. But the Eucharist is the perfection

and consummation of the other sacraments, because the grace conferred in them has as its purpose to unite us to Christ, and this union is most perfectly accomplished and consummated through the Eucharist. Hence Dionysius, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, c. 3, says that *no one can be perfected by hierarchical perfection except through the most divine Eucharist*. Therefore it is the end of the other sacraments.

It is confirmed secondly: since God is the end of all creatures, that in which he dwells in a special manner has the character of an end in relation to the others. Hence, because God is in Christ as man in a special manner, namely, through the hypostatic union, Christ as man is the end of all creatures. Therefore the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, says that the final cause of our justification is the glory of God and of Christ. But Christ, God and man, is in the sacrament of the Eucharist in a special manner, since this sacrament really and substantially contains him. Therefore it is the end of the other sacraments.

18. From these things you will understand that, although the real and sacramental reception of the Eucharist is not necessary for salvation, its mystical and spiritual reception is indeed necessary. This consists in union and incorporation with Christ, to which all the sacraments are ordained as to their end, especially baptism, since it is the beginning of the spiritual life, which by a special reason is inclined toward its perfection and consummation as toward an end.

Hence Augustine extends the words of Christ in John 6, *Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you*, to infants. For he says in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, l. 1, c. 20: *Will anyone dare to say that this sentence of the Lord does not pertain to infants, and that without participation in this body and blood they can have life in themselves?* This is not to be understood of real and sacramental participation, as the Calvinists falsely impute to Augustine, but of mystical and spiritual participation, which consists in union and incorporation with Christ, to which baptism is specially ordained, as the Holy Doctor himself explains in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, l. 3, c. 4, and as St. Thomas interprets him above, q. 95, a. 4, ad 2, and here q. 73, a. 3, ad 1.

19. The arguments of the adversaries remain solved by what has been said. For they prove only that actual reception of the Eucharist, or an explicit and formal desire for it, is not necessary for salvation. They do not show this of the implicit and virtual desire for the Eucharist included in the reception of baptism and the other sacraments.

Hence it must be carefully observed that the Eucharist can be considered in two ways: namely, as one particular sacrament, and as the

universal cause of the other sacraments, which are ordained to it as to their end, insofar as it incorporates us into Christ and perfectly unites us to him, who is the end of all the sacraments, as was explained above. In the first manner it concurs efficiently in producing the grace it confers, distinct from the graces of the others. In the second manner it influences every grace and all the effects given through the other sacraments in the manner of a final cause. Hence, if it is considered in the first manner, a desire for it is not necessary for salvation; but it is necessary if considered in the second manner, because no one can attain salvation unless he is united to and incorporated into Christ.

§ 4.
The Institution of This Sacrament.

20. It is certain by faith that this sacrament was instituted by Christ on the night of the Last Supper held with his disciples on the day before he suffered, since the Evangelists openly testify to this, especially Matthew, c. 26. That time was most fitting for its institution, because testaments are customarily made before the death of the testator. Therefore, since Christ in the Eucharist bequeathed his body and blood to his disciples and the other faithful as though by testament, as is said in Luke 22, it was most fitting that he should institute this admirable sacrament on the day before he died. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 2: *Our Savior, when about to depart from this world to the Father, instituted this sacrament, in which he poured forth, as it were, the riches of his most divine love toward us.*

21. All Catholics agree on this, but there is a celebrated controversy between the Greeks and Latins concerning the day on which Christ held the Last Supper with the Apostles. The Greeks, to defend their rite of confecting the Eucharist in leavened bread, assert that Christ celebrated that Supper not on the fourteenth day or moon of the first month, which among the Jews was March, since at that time the Jews were not permitted to eat leavened bread, as is evident from Exod. 12, but on the thirteenth day or moon, when the Jews used not unleavened but leavened bread.

The Latins, on the contrary, to defend their rite of consecrating in unleavened bread, affirm that Christ celebrated the supper of the Paschal Lamb on the fourteenth day or moon of the first month, on which the solemnity of the first day of unleavened bread began, and consequently that Christ consecrated in unleavened and not leavened bread. This opinion rests upon evident testimonies of Scripture. Matt. 26 says: *On the first day of*

unleavened bread, the disciples came to Jesus saying: Where do you wish us to prepare for you to eat the Passover? And a little afterward it says that, when evening had come, Christ reclined and supped with them. Mark 14 and Luke 22 assert the same.

But the first day of unleavened bread was not the thirteenth day of the first month, because leavened bread was eaten throughout the thirteenth day, but the fourteenth, on whose evening the eating of unleavened bread began, and it was not lawful to eat leavened bread or even to have it in the houses, as is evident from Exod. 12. Therefore Christ did not celebrate the Paschal Supper with his disciples on the thirteenth day but on the fourteenth day of the first month, and at that Supper he instituted the sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence Theophylact on Luke 22 says: *He calls Thursday the day of unleavened bread, on whose evening they were to sacrifice the Passover.*

22. Nor is what Euthymius says valid, namely, that by the first day of unleavened bread the Evangelists understood the day before unleavened bread, on which they wish Christ to have celebrated the Paschal Supper with his disciples and thus anticipated that solemnity by one day. This is not valid, first because Luke adds that it was a feast day; but only the first and seventh days of unleavened bread were feast days, as is evident from Exod. 12. Second, no sufficient cause can be assigned why Christ, the most observant worshiper of the Law, who had not come to dissolve the Law but to fulfill it, should have wished to transgress it and celebrate the legal Supper on the day before the Law commanded. Certainly, if he had anticipated the day prescribed by the Law for eating the Paschal Lamb, the Jews would have found a just cause to accuse him and deliver him to death, since concerning the observance of unleavened bread the Law says in Exod. 12: *Whoever eats leavened bread, that soul shall perish from Israel.*

Nor is what the same Euthymius says true, namely, that under the Old Law it was lawful to anticipate the Passover, although it was not lawful to defer it beyond the day established by the Law. Scripture nowhere even appears to indicate this, but rather openly indicates the contrary. In Num. 9 the Law indeed permits, in favor of the unclean and of travelers, that because of uncleanness or a distant journey outside the land of Canaan they may defer their Passover to the second month. It nevertheless commands that they celebrate it on the fourteenth moon itself toward evening.

23. The Greeks object with several testimonies of St. John from which it seems openly to be gathered that Christ celebrated the Passover with his disciples before the Jews celebrated it, and consequently anticipated the day established by the Law, which was the fourteenth day. First, John 13 says that

all the things Christ did at the Supper were done *before the feast day of the Passover*. Second, the same Evangelist says in c. 18 that on the day of the Lord's Passion the Jews did not enter the praetorium *that they might not be defiled, but might eat the Passover*, that is, the Paschal Lamb. Therefore it was eaten by the Jews on that day, and consequently Christ celebrated the Passover with his disciples on the day before the Jews celebrated it. Third, in c. 19 Christ is said to have died on the Preparation Day of the Passover. But Preparation Day is preparation for the feast to be celebrated, or the vigil of the Passover. Finally, the Sabbath immediately following the death of Christ is called in John 19 *a great Sabbath day*. It would not have been designated by this name unless it had been the first day of unleavened bread, because it would have possessed no special greatness or solemnity above other Sabbaths. Therefore Christ did not suffer on the first day of unleavened bread, and consequently he celebrated the Passover with his disciples before that day.

To the first I answer that the things done by Christ on the night of the Supper are said by the Evangelist to have been done before the feast day of the Passover, taking "day" for the artificial day as distinguished from night, and not for the natural day as including the night. Hence he did not say "before the feast," but "before the feast day." This explanation is St. Thomas's in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 11, q. 2, a. 2, qla. 3, ad 1, and that of the Roman Catechism in the chapter on the Eucharist.

For this to be understood more clearly, it must be known that among the Jews there were three kinds of days: legal, natural, and artificial. Legal days were reckoned from the evening of one day to the following evening, according to Lev. 23: *From evening until evening you shall celebrate your Sabbaths.* Natural days were reckoned among the Hebrews as among us, from midnight to the following midnight; or, as some hold and as St. Thomas indicates in the passage cited above, reply ad 2, from sunrise to the following sunrise. Artificial days were also distinguished, as now, from night, so that they included only the period in which the light of the sun appeared.

To the second I answer with the same Holy Doctor, in the same place, ad 3, that when the Evangelist says that on the day Christ was crucified the Jews did not enter the praetorium lest they be defiled, but that they might eat the Passover, by "Passover" he did not mean the eating of the Paschal Lamb, but the eating of the unleavened bread eaten for seven days, or of the victims offered during the Paschal days and called "Passovers." These could be eaten only by the clean.

To the third it must be said that by the Preparation Day of the Passover is understood not preparation for the Passover, but the Preparation Day

occurring during the feast of the Passover, that is, the Friday falling within the Paschal feast that year. For the Jews called every Friday the Preparation Day, because on it they prepared what was necessary for the following Sabbath, on which they were not permitted to perform any work, not even to prepare food. This explanation is confirmed by Mark 15: *It was the Preparation Day, which is before the Sabbath*, and John 19: *The Jews therefore, because it was the Preparation Day, so that the bodies might not remain upon the cross on the Sabbath*, etc. From these passages it is evident that the Preparation Day was not preparation for the Passover but for the Sabbath.

To the fourth I answer that the Sabbath immediately following the death of Christ is called by the Evangelist a great Sabbath day because it fell upon the second day of unleavened bread, which was most celebrated because of the multitude of the people who had assembled for the Passover.

CHAPTER II.
The Matter of This Sacrament.

1. The matter of this sacrament is assigned by the Council of Florence in the decree of union, frequently cited, in these words: *The third is the sacrament of the Eucharist, whose matter is wheaten bread and wine from the vine.* Hence not every bread is sufficient matter for this sacrament—for example, bread made from barley, millet, oats, or legumes—but only bread made from wheat flour and natural water and baked by fire. Therefore, *if rose water, or any liquid other than true water, were mixed with the flour, the sacrament could not be confected from it*, because it would not be true bread, as St. Thomas says here, q. 74, a. 7, ad 3.

Likewise, raw dough, dough dried by the sun, or fried in oil is not suitable matter for this sacrament, nor is starch, which is made from corrupted wheat, since its matter is not so much wheat flour as milk expressed from it, as Soto observed.

The reason is none other than Christ's institution, for he instituted this sacrament in ordinary bread. Ordinary bread is that made from wheat flour and natural water and baked by fire. Every other bread is substituted in default of this and is not customarily called bread simply, but with an addition: barley bread, millet bread, and so forth. Therefore only bread made from wheat flour and natural water and baked by fire is sufficient matter for the Eucharist. This is judged to be an apostolic tradition confirmed by ecclesiastical authority, as the Roman Catechism testifies.

2. Nevertheless, it makes no difference to the validity of this sacrament whether the bread is unleavened or leavened, as the Council of Florence defined in its last session in the decree of holy union, in these words: *We define that the body of Christ is truly confected in wheaten bread, whether unleavened or leavened.* Yet unleavened bread is more fitting than leavened.

First, because Christ consecrated in unleavened bread, since he celebrated the legal Supper and instituted the sacrament of the Eucharist on the first day of unleavened bread, on which no bread except unleavened bread was to be found in the houses of the Jews, as is commanded in Exod. 12 and as we showed in the preceding chapter, § 4.

Second, even if we granted that Christ, as the Greeks wish, anticipated the legitimate time for the celebration of the Passover, namely, the first day of unleavened bread or the fourteenth moon, it still would not follow that he used leavened bread at the Last Supper, but rather unleavened bread. For just as he willed to observe the sacrifice and eating of the Paschal Lamb, so it must be believed that he willed to observe the entire rite prescribed for it in the Law, which among other things required it to be eaten with unleavened bread and wild lettuce. Hence Chrysostom, homily 82 on Matthew: *In all things, always, even to the final day of his Passion, he showed that he was not an adversary of the Law.*

Finally, since unleavened bread in Scripture signifies purity, brightness, simplicity, humility, and incorruption, it seems to accord more closely with the properties of this sacrament than leavened bread, which is generally taken in an unfavorable sense. Hence the Apostle in 1 Cor. 5: Do you not know that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump? Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new dough, as you are unleavened. For Christ our Passover has been sacrificed. Therefore let us feast, not with the old leaven, nor with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.

I nevertheless admit that the Greek custom of celebrating in leavened bread is not without its own fittingness. For since leavened bread has flavor from the leaven and warmth from salt, it seems to accord with the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of love and spiritual sweetness. Moreover, as St. Thomas observed in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 69, from St. Gregory in the *Registrum*: *The Roman Church offers unleavened breads because the Lord assumed flesh without any admixture, but the other Churches offer leavened bread because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh and is true man, just as leaven is mixed with flour.*

Indeed, Richard, Scotus, Durandus, and others assert that the Roman Church once consecrated in leavened bread. St. Thomas testifies to this in

Scriptum super Sententiis IV, dist. 11, q. 2, a. 2, qla. 3, where he says: The Roman Church received this custom of celebrating in unleavened bread from the Apostles who founded her, as Innocent III says. But afterward, when the heresy of the Ebionites arose, who said that the legal observances had to be kept together with the Gospel, the Holy Fathers, lest they seem to consent to them, willed for a time, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, that the sacrament should be confected from leavened bread. After that heresy ceased, the Roman Church returned to her former custom. From this it is clear that the author of Theologia mentis et cordis had not read St. Thomas when he called this into doubt and said that the contrary was probable, dissertation 2 on the matter of the Eucharist, c. 2.

3. As regards the matter of the chalice to be consecrated, it is no less certain that it is wine from the vine than that the matter from which the body of Christ is confected is wheaten bread. For just as wheaten bread alone is properly and simply called bread, and olive oil alone is properly and simply called oil, so wine from the vine alone is properly and simply called wine.

Hence liquid expressed from pomegranates, apples, or mulberries is not matter for this sacrament, because it is not wine from the vine. Neither is vinegar, because it is not simply wine but corrupted wine, just as a corpse is not a man but a dead man. Nor is verjuice, or juice expressed from unripe grapes, because it does not yet possess the species of wine but is in the process of generation. Must, however, is suitable matter, because it is simply wine from the vine, although it is not perfectly purified and clarified. Consecration can also be performed in juice expressed from dried grapes, in which it is reported that the Egyptians consecrate, because such juice is wine from the vine and is the more perfect the more it has been purified from watery moisture.

4. To mix a little water with the wine to be consecrated is not necessary by the necessity of the sacrament, but only by the necessity of ecclesiastical precept, as the Council of Florence declares in the decree of Eugene and the Council of Trent, sess. 22, c. 7, in these words: *The holy Synod admonishes that it has been commanded by the Church to priests that they mix water with the wine in the chalice that is offered.*

St. Thomas gives three reasons for this ceremony here, a. 6. The first is the imitation of Christ, who is believed to have instituted and completed this sacrament in wine mixed with water, as is asserted in the liturgies of St. James the Apostle and Basil and attested by Clement of Rome, *Constitutiones apostolicae*, l. 8, c. 17, in these words: *Likewise, mixing the chalice from wine and water and sanctifying it, he handed it to them, saying: Drink from it, all of you.*

The second is the representation of his Passion, in which water together with blood flowed from his side. The third is the signification of the effect of this sacrament, which is the union of the faithful people with Christ their head. Wine signifies Christ, or his blood, while water is the symbol of peoples, according to Rev. 17: *The waters which you saw are peoples and nations.*

5. Concerning this ceremony of mixing water with wine in the chalice to be consecrated, there is a celebrated difficulty and controversy among theologians: whether such water is immediately converted into the blood of Christ, or only mediately, so that it must first be converted into wine before being converted into blood. I answer briefly that the second is much more probable.

For Innocent III seems to hold it in c. *Cum Marthae*, *De celebratione missarum*. There the Pontiff relates three opinions. The first asserts that the water mixed with the wine is converted into the water that flowed from Christ's side. The second says that it is changed into blood *since, mixed with wine, it passes into wine*, that is, because it had first been turned into wine. The third says that it remains entire and unchanged. After relating these three opinions, the Pontiff concludes *in favor of the second as the more probable*, saying: *Among the aforesaid opinions, that one is judged more probable which asserts that the water is changed with the wine into the blood because it had been converted into wine by the mixture.* The second opinion asserts only this, and no other of the opinions related by him says that the water is converted immediately into blood. Therefore the Pontiff judges that, if the water is not first turned into wine, it is not changed into blood.

Hence St. Thomas, here a. 8, relating this second opinion, says: Therefore, as Innocent himself says, the opinion of those is more probable who say that the water is converted into wine, and the wine into blood. The Pontiff himself clearly expressed his mind and anticipated every evasion in De sacro altaris mysterio, l. 4, c. 31, where he says: It does not seem absurd to some that water passes with wine into blood, for this reason: water through admixture passes into wine, and wine through consecration into blood. For who doubts that water passes into wine when a small amount of water is poured into much wine?

6. The Roman Catechism teaches the same opinion in the treatise on the Eucharist, c. 4, in these words: Priests must observe that, just as water must be added to wine in the sacred mysteries, so also only a small amount is to be poured in. For according to the opinion and judgment of ecclesiastical writers, that water is converted into wine. The Roman Sacerdotale has similar words, which we shall cite below.

To these can be added the authority of the Council of Trent, sess. 13, can. 2, defining that after consecration only the species of bread and wine remain. But if the water, not converted into wine but remaining in its own species as water, were converted into the blood of Christ, not only the species of wine but also the species of water, under which the blood of Christ would exist, would remain. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, water not converted into wine is not converted into the blood of Christ.

7. An efficacious reason also supports our opinion. Only that which is the matter of the consecration of the chalice is immediately converted into the blood of Christ. But water, even as mixed with wine, is not the matter of the consecration of the chalice. For all sacramental matter was designated and instituted by Christ, whereas the mixing of water with the wine to be consecrated belongs only to ecclesiastical law and precept, as the Council of Trent, cited above, teaches. Therefore water mixed with the wine to be consecrated is not immediately converted into the blood.

This reason is confirmed and illustrated more fully. If that which is not matter for consecration, but is mixed with the necessary matter only by precept of the Church, could be changed immediately into the body or blood of Christ, it would follow that, if by precept of the Church rose water were mixed with the chalice to be consecrated instead of natural water, it also would be converted immediately into the blood of Christ. Likewise, if by command of the Church some butter, honey, or other liquid were mixed with the bread to be consecrated, such matter would be converted into the body of Christ. But these conclusions are absurd and altogether foreign to the common judgment of theologians. Therefore it likewise seems absurd to say that water mixed with wine by precept of the Church is converted immediately into the blood of Christ.

8. You will say with the adversaries that the reasoning is not the same. Rose water, even as mixed with wine, is not matter for this sacrament, but natural water mixed with wine is. For, they say, the sufficient matter for the consecration of the chalice is ordinary wine, by which is understood wine diluted with a little water. They say that Christ consecrated in such wine at the Last Supper and consequently designated it as sufficient matter for the consecration of the chalice.

But against this, first: Scripture, the councils, and the Holy Fathers assert that the matter of the consecration of the chalice is the fruit of the vine, or wine from the vine. Hence Christ, after the institution of this sacrament, said in Matt. 26: *I shall not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine*, etc. But by the fruit of the vine, or wine from the vine, nothing is properly

signified except liquid expressed from grapes. Therefore that liquid alone can be called the matter of this sacrament.

Against it, secondly: the wine that was the ordinary drink among the Jews was diluted with much water because it was strong and generous, such as the land of Palestine produces. Therefore, if by the name of wine, which is the matter of this sacrament, ordinary wine must be understood, it must be said that the wine which is the matter of the consecration of the chalice can and must be diluted with much water. But this is contrary to the Council of Florence, which says that the matter of this sacrament is wine from the vine, to which a very small amount of water must be mixed before consecration. By this it corrects what had previously been decreed in the provincial Council of Tribur, namely, that a third part of water should be mixed with the wine to be consecrated. It certainly ought not to have corrected this, but rather confirmed it, if what the adversaries say were true, that ordinary wine is sufficient matter for the consecration of the chalice, since ordinary wine requires at least a third part of water.

Against it, thirdly: since diluted or ordinary wine is a certain mixture of wine and water, if it is the matter of the consecration of the chalice, it follows that not only wine but also water is at least partial matter of this sacrament. Coninck concedes this, saying that water is matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, not necessary and essential like wine, but free and sufficient, just as venial sins are sufficient and free matter of the sacrament of penance. But this seems absurd. Therefore so does the premise.

The minor premise is proved, first, because this distinction of the matter of the Eucharist into free and necessary is an invention hitherto unheard of in the Church. Second, because, as we argued above, all sacramental matter is designated and instituted by Christ, whereas the mixing of water with the wine to be consecrated belongs only to ecclesiastical law and precept. Finally, if water mixed with wine were free matter of this sacrament, it could be added to the chalice to be consecrated in a large quantity. For why would a very small amount be prescribed if it could be immediately converted into Christ's blood and did not first have to be changed into wine?

It cannot be said that this is done because of mystical signification, namely, to signify that *the majesty of Christ*, signified by the wine, *is greater than the frailty of the people*, signified by the water, as the Council of Tribur says. For this mystical signification could be expressed as well by a notable quantity of water as by a very small quantity. Hence that Council commands that, to express this mystical signification of the union of the people with Christ their head, a third part of water be mixed with the wine to be

consecrated. Therefore there can be no other reason moving the Church to command that a very small amount of water be mixed with the chalice to be consecrated, and that such mixing be done at the beginning of Mass, as is observed in some religious orders, except that she judges the water must first be converted into wine before it is converted into blood. Hence the Roman *Sacerdotale*, part 1, tract. 10, c. 2: *The water mixed with the wine in the chalice must be in a small quantity, because it must be converted into wine.*

9. The adversaries first object with several testimonies of the Holy Fathers in which they assert that water and wine are consecrated and are converted by consecration into the blood of Christ. But these must be understood and explained of mediate consecration and conversion. None of them says that water according to itself is proximately converted into blood, but that water together with wine passes into blood: joined to the wine not only by infusion, but also by being changed into wine.

Nor is it valid if you say that water changed into wine should not be called water but wine. For substances changed into others are often called by the name they had before their conversion. In John 2, water changed into wine by the Lord at the wedding is called by its former name: *When the chief steward had tasted the water made wine*, he says. In Exod. 7, the serpent made by the conversion of Moses' rod is called a rod. More to the point, the body of Christ in the Eucharist is called bread by Scripture and the Holy Fathers because it was made from bread. Why, then, can wine made from water converted and changed into it not likewise be called water by the Holy Fathers through a certain extension of the term?

10. They object secondly: in the rubrics of the Roman Missal it is prescribed that, if the priest notices shortly before consecration that water was not placed in the chalice at the time of the offertory, he should add it and immediately consecrate. But in so brief an interval the added water cannot be converted into wine. Therefore it is then immediately converted into blood.

I answer first that, if in that case a very small amount of water, for example, only one drop, is added to the chalice to be consecrated, it can be converted into wine before the words of consecration are pronounced. For wine can in a very brief time corrupt water mixed with it in a small quantity and convert it into its own substance. If you ask how this can occur, I answer briefly that it occurs through division, by reason of which that small amount of water is immediately divided into minimal parts under which the form of water cannot remain, and consequently the form of wine immediately succeeds.

I answer secondly that, if in the stated case the water has not been converted into wine before the words of consecration are pronounced, it will not be converted into blood but will remain in its own species, surrounded by the accidents of the wine, until by the action of those accidents it has been converted into the substance of wine. It will then remain wine mingled with the blood.

11. Against this second answer the adversaries insist in three ways. They say that, if in that case the water were not converted into blood but remained in its own species, the form of the chalice would not be verified, since the pronoun *This* falls upon everything contained in the chalice. An occasion of idolatry would also be given, since everything contained in the chalice is presented to the people for adoration. Some add with Baronius, at the end of the year 1188, that it must be held by faith that the whole liquid contained in the chalice is converted into the blood through consecration, and that this has always been believed by the faithful.

But these arguments have little force. To the first insistence it is easily answered that in that case the words of consecration are verified, because the pronoun *This* does not regard absolutely everything found in the chalice, but only matter suitable for consecration. Water not converted into wine is not such matter, as was shown above.

To the second I likewise say that in that case no occasion of idolatry is given to the people, because, since the adoration of the faithful is directed by faith, it is borne only toward the blood of Christ hidden under the Eucharistic species, and not toward other things accidentally joined to them. Thus, if a hair has fallen upon a consecrated host or a fly falls into the chalice, as frequently happens, no one is believed to adore these things.

To the third I answer that Baronius and others who think it certain by faith that the whole liquid contained in the chalice is always and immediately converted into blood through consecration, and that this has always been the common understanding of the faithful and the tradition of all ages, go considerably too far in this and contradict not only the Roman Catechism and *Sacerdotale* cited above, but also Innocent III. For he signifies clearly enough that the matter is not of faith when, in the chapter cited above, he relates as probable the opinion of several theologians of his time asserting that water remains after consecration mixed with the accidents of wine. Afterward he merely prefers as more probable the other opinion asserting that the water is converted mediately into blood when it first passes into wine, as we related above.

And certainly, if the opposite opinion was always the common understanding of the faithful and theologians, how did not only Innocent III,

a most learned Pontiff, but also St. Thomas, who flourished not long after him, remain ignorant of this common understanding, as did St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and several other ancient theologians who openly teach our opinion?

12. They object thirdly: Christ, as is evident from the Fathers, councils, and tradition, consecrated wine mixed with water, and it is likely that he mixed a fairly large quantity of water with the wine, both because of the custom of that hot region and so that he might give an example of temperance. Therefore, since the consecration immediately followed that mixing, such water could not have been converted into wine before being converted into the blood of Christ.

I answer that it is likely Christ used so little water in the chalice to be consecrated that, by the strength and efficacy of the powerful and generous wine of that very hot region, it was easily converted into wine in a very brief time. For at that time he added water to the wine not merely for ordinary drinking, but for a mystical and sacramental purpose. Hence St. Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* IV, dist. 11, p. 2, a. 2, q. 3, says that Christ the Lord did not consecrate the chalice until the water had been converted into wine.

13. There is another difficulty concerning the matter of the Eucharist to be resolved briefly here: whether it is of divine law that the sacrament of the Eucharist be confected only by consecrating both species, and consequently whether the Supreme Pontiff cannot dispense so that a priest consecrate under only one species.

I answer affirmatively. First, because those things necessary for the integrity of a sacrament are of divine law. But the consecration of both species is necessary for the integrity of the sacrament of the Eucharist, because it was instituted in the manner of a banquet, for whose integrity food and drink are required.

Second, because the Eucharist does not possess only the character of a sacrament, but also of a sacrifice. But the sacrifice cannot be offered unless each species is consecrated, because in it there must be a certain mystical separation of Christ's body from his blood, insofar as by the power of the words and the signification of the species the body is placed in one and the blood in the other, as will be explained more fully below when we treat of the sacrifice of the Mass.

From this it is evident that the Supreme Pontiff cannot dispense so that a priest consecrate under only one species. For although he can dispense in some matter of divine law, for example, in the fulfillment of simple vows, he cannot dispense in divine law pertaining to the substance or integrity of the

sacraments or of the sacrifice of the Mass, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 21, c. 2.

Hence what Volaterranus relates in *Geographia*, l. 3, c. *De Saxonibus*, is fabulous: namely, that Innocent VIII dispensed the Saxons to consecrate only in bread. No record of such a concession exists elsewhere, and the very reason he gives for the alleged dispensation does not stand, namely, that wine does not grow in Norway and that wine imported from elsewhere quickly turns sour. This is contrary to experience itself, since wine carried into those regions is preserved so long that not even the laity wish to communicate without the species of wine.

CHAPTER III.
The Real Presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Eucharist.

1. That the body and blood of Christ are truly and really contained in this sacrament can first be proved by two testimonies of Scripture. The first is found in John 6, where Christ says: *The bread that I shall give is my flesh for the life of the world. Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you.*

That Christ is speaking not of spiritual eating through faith, as the Calvinists contend, but of real and substantial eating, is evident first because he speaks in the future: *The bread that I shall give is my flesh.* But if he were speaking only of himself as eaten through faith, namely, by believing in his divinity and Incarnation, he should not have spoken in the future but in the past, because he had already long since given this. Therefore the bread which he promises to give, and which he had not yet given, is something else.

It is evident secondly because Christ there expressly distinguishes flesh and blood in the manner of food and drink, saying: *My flesh is truly food, and my blood is truly drink.* But if he were speaking only of eating through faith, that distinction would be empty and superfluous, because eating and drinking through faith are one and the same thing, namely, believing in Christ. Therefore Christ was not speaking there of eating through faith alone.

It is evident thirdly because the Jews, hearing Christ say, *My flesh is truly food, and my blood is truly drink*, disputed among themselves, saying: *How can this man give us his flesh to eat?* Some of Christ's disciples were also scandalized by these words and said: *This is a hard saying; who can hear it?* But if Christ had spoken of spiritual eating through faith, he could easily

have calmed this scandal and murmuring and removed the whole difficulty with one word about eating through faith. Yet Christ did not do this. Rather, insisting more forcefully and confirming what he had said by repeated affirmations, he added: *Amen, amen, I say to you: unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you.* And to establish belief in this mystery, he mentioned the miracle of his future Ascension, saying: *Does this scandalize you? What then if you see the Son of Man ascending where he was before?* He wished, as it were, to confirm one marvelous reality by another equally marvelous reality.

Therefore Christ was not speaking there of the spiritual eating of his body through faith, but of true and real eating performed by the bodily mouth through the mediation of the species of bread.

2. Nor is it an obstacle that Christ answered the murmuring people of Capernaum: *It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh profits nothing*, etc. By these words he did not wish to signify, as the sectaries think, that what he had said about eating his flesh was to be understood figuratively of spiritual eating through faith alone.

The sense of these words is this: my flesh does not possess from itself the power of spiritually giving life, but from the spirit, that is, from the Divinity united to it. Or they signify that Christ's words are not to be understood carnally, that is, of eating performed in a carnal and customary manner through the division and mastication of flesh and its conversion into the substance of the one eating, as happens when the flesh of animals is eaten; but spiritually, that is, not through faith alone according to the mind of the heretics, but by sacramental and, as it were, spiritual eating through the reception of the species under which the flesh is invisibly and, as it were, spiritually contained.

Hence Augustine, tractate 27 on John: The flesh profits nothing, but as they, namely the people of Capernaum, understood it. For they understood flesh as it is torn apart in a corpse or sold in a butcher's shop, not as it is animated by the spirit. Let the spirit be joined to the flesh, and it profits exceedingly; for if the flesh did not profit, the Word would not have become flesh.

3. The second testimony is taken from Matt. 26, where Christ, fulfilling what he had promised in John 6 and instituting the sacrament of the Eucharist, says to his disciples: *Take and eat; this is my body.* That these words must be understood not figuratively but in their proper sense is evident from the fact that Christ was establishing his testament in these words. But testaments are customarily made by good and prudent men only in proper and clear words, lest disputes spring up from the very thing through which

they ought to be extinguished. Therefore the aforesaid words must not be understood in a figurative sense.

Certainly, since the Old Testament, which was the shadow and figure of the New, was given to the ancient Fathers in explicit and clear words in Exod. 24, it is not credible that Christ wished to wrap the New Testament he was establishing in figurative and obscure expressions. This is especially true since in these words he instituted the most excellent of all the sacraments, as the heretics admit. For since the sacraments are the bases and foundations of the Church, they ought least of all to be handed down and instituted in tropological and obscure words, lest an occasion be given for most serious error concerning their use. Hence circumcision is instituted in the clearest words in Gen. 17, the eating of the Paschal Lamb in Exod. 12, and baptism in the final chapter of Matthew.

Who, then, can persuade himself that Christ spoke obscurely and tropologically when instituting and handing down the principal sacrament of the evangelical law, and used the words This is my body not in their proper but in a figurative sense? Perhaps, Hilary says, he who is the Word and who is Truth did not know how to speak true things; and he who is Wisdom erred in foolish speech; and he who is Power was so weak that he could not express what he wished to be understood.

4. This is confirmed from councils and the Holy Fathers, who openly hand down that those words of Christ must be understood not figuratively but in their proper sense. First, the Seventh General Synod, act 6, condemns the heretics who called the Eucharist a figure or image of the body of Christ, and gives the reason for its anathema: *Christ did not say: Take the image of my body, but: Take my body.*

Second, Cyril of Jerusalem, mystagogical catechesis 4, shortly after the beginning, says: Since Christ himself therefore affirms and says of the bread, This is my body, who will thereafter dare to doubt? And since he confirms and says, This is my blood, who, I ask, will doubt and say that it is not his blood?

Third, John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, l. 4, c. 14, says: The bread and wine are not a figure of the body and blood of Christ—far be this—but the deified body of the Lord itself, the Lord himself saying: This is mine; not a figure of the body, but the body; not a figure of the blood, but the blood.

Theophylact has similar words on Matt. 26 and Mark 14, where, explaining the same words of Christ, This is my body, he adds: He shows that the bread sanctified upon the altar is the Lord's body itself and not a corresponding figure. For he did not say: This is a figure, but: This is my

body. The other Holy Fathers teach the same everywhere, and for the sake of brevity we omit their testimonies.

The testimony of Luther, however, must not be omitted. Although he was greatly inclined to deny the real presence of Christ in this sacrament, he nevertheless candidly confesses in his epistle to the people of Strasbourg that he cannot resist so manifest a testimony of Scripture. I wish, he says, that someone could persuade me that there is nothing in the Eucharist except bread and wine; he would assist me with a great benefit. I have labored under grave anxieties in this matter so often. But I see that I am captured; no way of escape is left to me; the text of the Gospel is too clear.

5. The Catholic truth concerning the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist can also be commended by various reasons or fittingnesses.

The first is this: if the Eucharist is only a sign or figure of the body of Christ and does not contain it, it will not be more excellent as a sacrament than manna or the Paschal Lamb. But this cannot be said. Therefore neither can the premise.

The sequence of the major premise is proved. Manna, which fell from heaven and was made by the marvelous skill of angels, was more excellent than ordinary bread coming from an oven. Manna also represented the body of Christ more perfectly than bread did: both because it came from heaven, Ps. 77; because with marvelous flavor it contained all sweetness, Wis. 16; because it was taken in equal measure by all, although gathered unequally, Exod. 16; and finally because it was incorruptible on the Sabbath day, by which the body of Christ, which was not to be corrupted in the tomb on the Sabbath, was signified.

The same must all the more be said of the Paschal Lamb. For the flesh of Christ was better expressed by the true flesh of a lamb, his death by the lamb's true death, and his blood by blood, than by bread alone or the breaking of bread. Therefore, if the Eucharist is only a sign or figure of the body of Christ and does not contain it, it will not be more excellent but inferior and less perfect as a sign and sacrament than manna and the Paschal Lamb.

6. The second reason: if the faithful of the New Testament do not eat the flesh of Christ really and substantially as contained under the Eucharistic species, but only spiritually and through faith, as the Calvinists teach, it follows that the faithful of the New Testament are not in a different and better condition as regards the eating of Christ's body than the Fathers of the Old Law were. But this is false. Therefore so is the premise.

The minor premise is evident from the words of Christ in John 6, promising that he would give the faithful of the New Testament his flesh to eat in a manner in which the faithful of the Old Testament had not eaten it. He says: Moses did not give you bread from heaven, but my Father gives you the true bread from heaven. The bread of God is that which comes down from heaven and gives life to the world. Your fathers ate manna in the desert and died. This is the bread coming down from heaven, so that if anyone eats of it, he may not die, etc.

The major premise, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. The Fathers of the Old Law who ate manna in the desert believed in Christ, and consequently ate his body by spiritual eating through faith. Hence Augustine, tractate 26 on John: Moses ate manna, Aaron ate manna, Phinehas ate manna, and many ate there who pleased the Lord and did not die. Why? Because they understood the visible food spiritually; they hungered spiritually and tasted spiritually, that they might be spiritually satisfied. Therefore, if the faithful of the New Testament eat the body of Christ only by spiritual eating through faith, they are not in a different and better condition, as regards the eating of Christ's body, than the Fathers of the Old Law were.

7. The third reason: the sacrament of the Eucharist must be adored by the faithful. But it ought not to be adored—indeed, such worship would be idolatry—if it did not truly and really contain Christ. Therefore Christ is truly and really contained in the sacrament of the Eucharist.

The minor premise is evident, for the worship of adoration is to be shown to God alone. The major is taught everywhere by the Holy Fathers. Cyril of Jerusalem, mystagogical catechesis 5, teaches that one about to receive the Eucharist must approach *bowed down in the manner of adoration*. Chrysostom, homily 24 on 1 Corinthians, says: *The Magi revered this body lying in the manger and adored it with great fear and trembling. Let us therefore imitate them. You see him not in a manger but upon the altar; you see not a woman holding him, but a priest standing by*, etc.

Likewise Augustine, epistle 120, c. 27, says that the faithful come to the table, eat, and adore. And on Ps. 98, explaining the words Adore the footstool of his feet, he understands by the footstool the flesh of Christ and adds: Because no one eats that flesh unless he has first adored it, it has been discovered how such a footstool of the Lord's feet is to be adored, so that we not only do not sin by adoring, but sin by not adoring.

Similarly Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, l. 3, c. 12: *By the footstool the earth is understood, and by the earth the flesh of Christ, which today also we adore in the mysteries and which the Apostles adored.* Other Holy Fathers also interpret the

words of Ps. 21, *All the rich of the earth have eaten and adored*, of the use and adoration of Christ in the Eucharist, among them Basil, Jerome, Augustine, and Theodoret. Likewise Chrysostom, *De sacerdotio*, l. 6; Ambrose, first preparatory prayer for Mass; and Gregory the Great, *Dialogi*, l. 4, c. 58, testify that the Eucharist is adored even by the angels themselves, who are frequently present at our mysteries. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 5, teaches that the worship of latria is to be shown to it according to the custom always received in the Church.

8. No slight argument that the faithful formerly received the flesh and blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine not only figuratively but truly, really, and substantially is the fact that, among other things, Christians were once accused by pagans of eating human flesh in their sacred rites. This is evident from Tertullian, *Apologeticum*, c. 7, where he says: *We are said to be utterly wicked because of the sacrament involving the murder and consumption of an infant.* And from Minucius Felix in *Octavius*, where he says that the Gentiles were accustomed to reproach Christians with piercing an infant covered in flour by inflicting wounds upon it and dividing its limbs among themselves.

But if the faithful received in the Eucharist the flesh and blood of Christ only figuratively and not really, those eminent defenders of the Catholic faith should have declared this altogether openly in their Apologies, so that they might entirely remove the monstrous crime of infanticide with which Christians were formerly charged and completely silence the Gentiles, who call us impious because we eat our God. For this would have been the easiest defense if it had been true.

Yet they by no means do this in their Apologies. They have recourse not to the tropes of the sectaries but to the omnipotence of God in explaining the mystery of the Eucharist. This is evident from Justin Martyr, who, answering the calumny of the pagans in his Apology, says: We do not receive these things as common bread. But just as Jesus, the Word of God incarnate, possessed flesh and blood, so we have been taught that the food made Eucharist by the prayer of the word received from him, by which our flesh is nourished, is the flesh and blood of the incarnate Jesus himself.

9. The heretics first object that in many passages of Scripture the verb "is" is taken for "signifies," as when 1 Cor. says: *The rock was Christ*, and when Christ says of himself in the Gospel: *I am the true vine. I am the door.* Why, then, may the words of Christ, *This is my body*, not be understood in a metaphorical and figurative sense, as referring to the figure and representation of the body of Christ?

I answer that the reason for the difference is that, in the passages alleged, a subject or predicate is added from which the allegorical or metaphorical sense is manifestly detected. Immediately before Paul said, *And the rock was Christ*, he had said of the Hebrews: *They drank of the spiritual rock that followed them.* Consequently, the discourse concerned a spiritual rock and its sign. Likewise, when Christ said that he was the vine or the door, it is openly gathered from what precedes or follows that he was speaking of a spiritual vine and door.

But the contrary occurs in our case. For the words which Christ added concerning his body and blood, saying, *which shall be given for you, which shall be poured out for you*, are incompatible with a metaphor or allegory, since what was given or poured out was Christ's true body and his true blood, and not only their representation and figure.

10. I add that, if this argument of the heretics were valid, it would prove that it is lawful to interpret not only Christ's words, *This is my body*, in a metaphorical and improper sense, but also these: *I and the Father are one. These three are one. The Word was made flesh.* For these words do not more expressly signify the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, the unity of the divine nature in the three Persons, and the assumption of flesh by the Word, than the words *This is my body* signify the real existence of Christ's body under the species of bread. Therefore, if these words are to be explained by tropes and figures, why not the others? Or if the proper sense must be retained in the others, why not also in these?

Hence Augustine excellently says in De doctrina Christiana, l. 3, c. 10: If the opinion of some error has occupied a man's mind, whatever Scripture asserts otherwise he judges to be figurative. The words of Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, l. 4, c. 35, can also be rightly adapted to the sacramentarians: Such men are compelled always to invent types of types and images of images and never to fix their mind upon the one true God. Or, as Feuardent, his commentator, says on l. 2, c. 12: Gasping after the shadow of metonymies, they lose the use of the true body of Christ, like Aesop's dog, which left the bread, rushed after its shadow, and lost its food.

11. They object secondly: in Matt. 26, when the disciples murmured because the price of the ointment poured upon Christ's head by Mary Magdalene had not rather been given to the poor, Christ said: *You will always have the poor with you, but you will not always have me.* By these words he signified that he would not be on earth after his glorious Ascension. But if he were really and substantially present in the Eucharist, he would still remain on earth after his Ascension. Therefore he is not really and substantially present in the Eucharist.

I answer that by these words Christ wished to signify only that, after his glorious Ascension, he would not be upon earth by the ordinary and familiar presence in which the service of pouring ointment or similar acts could be shown to him. He did not thereby exclude his being present upon earth by another, miraculous and supernatural presence, such as that which he has in the Eucharist.

Hence, when Christ said, *But you will not always have me*, this must be understood: "in the manner in which you will have the poor," that is, visibly and conversing in a human manner. For the antithesis requires this.

12. They object thirdly: Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, l. 4, c. 4, speaking of Christ, says: Having taken the bread and distributed it to the disciples, he made it his body, saying: This is my body, that is, the figure of my body. Therefore, according to Tertullian, the body of Christ exists in the Eucharist only figuratively.

I answer that Tertullian in that passage wished only to declare that Christ fulfilled all the figures of the Law by substituting truth for the figure. Among the examples of these changes from figure into truth fulfilled by Christ, he presents this: bread in the Old Law was a figure of the body of Christ, according to Jer. 11, *Let us put wood into his bread*, that is, the cross into his body; and in the New Law Christ fulfilled that figure, or changed it into truth, by converting bread into his body.

Hence he immediately adds: *But it would not have been a figure unless there were a body of truth*. These last words openly declare that he is speaking of the bread which in the Old Testament was a figure of Christ's body, not of Eucharistic bread. For if he were speaking of the Eucharist, he would not say "it would not have been a figure," but "it would not be a figure."

Therefore, when Tertullian said, *This is my body, that is, the figure of my body*, the term "figure" is applied not to the body but to the word "This," which, according to his mind, stands for bread. The sense is: Christ made the bread which in the Old Law was the figure of his body into his body, saying: This, that is, the figure of my body, is my body.

Hence he used a transposition lest by explaining the word "This" he interrupt the order of the Lord Christ's words. Likewise, in *Adversus Praxean*, c. 29, explaining how Christ, though God, could die, he cites 1 Cor. 15: *Since Christ died*, and says: *Christ is said to have died, that is, the anointed one; it shows that what was anointed died, that is, the flesh*. Here he did not place the phrase "that is, the anointed one" immediately after "Christ," lest the sequence of the Apostle's words be interrupted. This metathesis or transposition is familiar to Tertullian's concise and involved style.

13. They object fourthly: St. Maximus, in his annotations on c. 3 of *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, says: *The gifts perfected upon the altar, that is, the Eucharist, are symbols and not the truth.* And Ambrose, *De officiis*, l. 2, says: *Christ is offered here in an image, but in heaven in truth.* Other Holy Fathers have similar statements, calling the Eucharist a figure, sign, and antitype of Christ's body. Therefore it does not contain that body really and substantially, but only signifies or represents it.

I answer that St. Maximus in the cited passage does not mean that the gifts upon the altar are not in truth the body of Christ, but only that they are not eternal beatitude itself and the future glory of the saints. For there, together with Dionysius whom he is interpreting, he distinguishes three things: shadow, image, and truth. He says that the shadow existed in the Old Law, the image exists in the Gospel, and the truth will exist in heaven. Hence in annotation 5, after the words cited in the objection, he adds: *The gifts perfected upon the altar are the image; the shadow was in the legal sacrifices; the truth will be in heaven.*

From this the passage of Ambrose is also easily understood. For there he opposes image not to substance and truth but only to clear knowledge. Hence he adds: *Here, therefore, we walk in an image and see in an image; there face to face, where there is full perfection, because every perfection is in truth.*

In the same sense the words of St. Bernard, sermon 33 on the Canticle, which are also objected by the heretics, must be understood: *I too have the Word, but in flesh; and truth is set before me, but in a sacrament. The angel is fattened with the finest wheat and is satisfied with the naked grain. Meanwhile I must be content with a certain husk of the sacrament, with the bran of the flesh, the chaff of the letter, and the veil of faith.* He signifies that the angels enjoy the kernel itself because they behold the Word face to face, while we do not have him in sight except under the husk of the sacrament. For we see nothing other than the species of bread and wine. Yet that mellifluous Doctor had said above that the grain also, namely, the body and blood of Christ, lies hidden within that husk.

Finally, when other Holy Fathers call the sacrament of the Eucharist a figure, sign, or antitype of Christ's body, they either speak of the Eucharist according to the species alone and the external symbols, which are signs of Christ's body, not empty but full of the signified reality, just as a pie signifies the meat it contains; or they mean that the Eucharist is a symbol of the mystical body, which is the Church, whose unity is represented by bread made from many grains, as Augustine explains in tractate 26 on John; or, finally, that it is a figure and representation of our future glory and of the enjoyment of the divine essence, of which it is, as it were, the pledge,

according to Prosper: *He who receives the body of Christ receives the food of salvation and drinks the cup of eternity.*

14. From these things you will understand how great is the perfection of our religion, to which it has been given to possess in reality what in the time of the Mosaic Law had been foreshadowed only in signs and figures, and to await the clear vision of this mystery which the blessed enjoy in the heavenly homeland.

Hence Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, c. 5, says that our Church is intermediate between the Synagogue and the heavenly Jerusalem and therefore participates in both. And Eucherius says: God has made for himself three tabernacles: the Synagogue, which possessed the shadow without the truth; the Church, which possesses the truth and shadows; and heaven, where there are no shadows but naked truth.

The Roman Catechism, part 2, under the title on the Eucharist, n. 3, elegantly expressed the same in these words: The faithful can never sufficiently admire the perfection of holy Church and the height of her glory, since there seems to be only one degree between her and heavenly beatitude. For this we possess in common with the heavenly citizens: each of us has Christ, God and man, present. But in this one degree we differ from them: they enjoy him present in the blessed vision, while we venerate him present yet removed from the sense of our eyes, concealing himself under the admirable covering of the sacred mysteries, by firm and constant faith.

Matthew of Worms accords with this when he most excellently called the sacred Eucharist by these names: The memorial of redemption, the pledge of the eternal inheritance, the lovable prelude of future joy, the earnest of the bride, a divine jewel given her from heaven, the sweet bond and fraternal union of the Church militant with the Church triumphant, since the former possesses under a sacrament the sweetness which the latter enjoys without a veil; and although that heavenly Jerusalem possesses her God more joyfully, the Church militant upon earth possesses him more marvelously.

15. The heterodox object with several testimonies of Origen by which he seems to deny the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist. But I plainly demonstrate by two of his testimonies that Origen held a correct doctrine concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist.

The first is taken from homily 7 on Numbers, where he says that under the Old Law only figures and enigmas excelled of those realities whose appearance and truth we enjoy under the New Law. Now, he says, Christ is the rock in appearance. For now God speaks through the Law of what is. Formerly baptism was in an enigma, in the cloud and in the sea; but now

regeneration in water and the Holy Spirit exists in appearance. Then manna was food in an enigma, but now the flesh of the Word of God is true food in appearance, as he himself says: My flesh is truly food, and my blood is truly drink.

But if these last words were to be understood in the Calvinistic sense, they would yield a wholly inept meaning, namely: under the Old Law manna was food in an enigma insofar as it signified the flesh of Christ; but under the New Law bread is a figure of the flesh of Christ. If, however, the words are understood according to the Catholic opinion, Origen's antithesis is splendid and excellent. He says that manna was a figure under the Old Law, but now the flesh of Christ is the true food foreshadowed by manna and fulfilling that ancient figure of the Mosaic Law.

The other testimony of Origen is found in homily 13 on Exodus, where he says: When you receive the body of the Lord, you preserve it with every care and veneration, lest a small part of it fall, lest anything of the consecrated gift be lost. For you believe yourselves guilty, and rightly believe it, if anything of it falls through negligence.

From this testimony it is evident that in the primitive Church the faithful guarded with the greatest reverence lest anything of the Eucharistic bread fall to the ground, and judged themselves guilty if this happened through their negligence. The Calvinists labor under no scruple of this kind, because they think it is merely a figure of the body of Christ, whereas the former believed it to be the true body of Christ.

16. Finally, the heretics object that the real existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist conflicts with three principles of Peripatetic philosophy, namely: *Accidents cannot exist without a subject. A body cannot lack local extension and be placed in an indivisible point. One body cannot exist simultaneously in several places.* For if the body of Christ truly, really, and substantially existed under the Eucharistic species, the accidents of bread and wine would remain without a subject, as we shall say below; Christ's body would be contained under the species in an indivisible manner; and, while remaining in heaven, it would exist simultaneously in several other and distant places.

To these things I answer first that other mysteries of our faith believed by the heretics seem equally difficult and contrary to philosophical principles as the mystery of the Eucharist and the true and real existence of Christ's body and blood under the species of bread and wine.

For it seems no less repugnant that Christ's humanity should lack its own subsistence than that the Eucharistic accidents should lack the inherence naturally owed to them, since it belongs no less to the nature of

substance to subsist through itself than to the nature of an accident to inhere in another.

Likewise, it seems to involve no greater repugnance that Christ's body in the Eucharist should, with its dimensions, be reduced to a point and lack local extension than that, in the mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Word should have enclosed his immensity, as it were, within a tiny body, just as Elisha fitted his body to the body of the child in order to restore him to life.

Finally, it is more marvelous that one nature exists in three really distinct Persons than that one body should be placed in several places distant from one another. For a body is in no way identified with those places, whereas the divine nature is indeed identified with the three Persons.

Therefore, since the heretics believe the mystery of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, they unjustly reject the mystery of the Eucharist and the real presence of Christ under the species of bread and wine because of the reasons adduced.

17. I answer secondly that, although the mystery of the Eucharist is above reason and surpasses the grasp of the human intellect, it is not contrary to reason and in no way conflicts with the principles of true philosophy.

First, although it belongs to the nature of accidents to have an aptitude and natural inclination to inhere in a subject, it does not belong to their essential nature actually to inhere. They can therefore be divinely preserved without a subject. Likewise, although it belongs to the nature of substance to have an aptitude and inclination to subsist in and through itself, the humanity of Christ in the mystery of the Incarnation is deprived of its own hypostasis and subsistence so that it may subsist in another, namely, in the Word.

Next, it implies no contradiction that a body should be freed from the local extension naturally owed to it. For actual local extension and the disposition of parts in place according to a certain correspondence with it do not belong to the essence of a body. Its essence requires only extension in relation to itself, which consists in the very multitude of parts of which its entity is composed and which is apt to be coextended with divisible place and space.

Hence, although Christ's body in the Eucharist lacks local extension and is placed in an indivisible point, it does not on that account cease to have two ears, two arms, two feet, and all the parts it possessed before. Nor does the head cease to be joined immediately to the neck and not to the breast, or the neck to the shoulders and not to the feet, although all these are together according to place and are enclosed within one point of space.

Finally, granted that it is repugnant for the same numerical body to be simultaneously in several places circumscriptively—a matter disputed by philosophers in the books of physics—it does not imply a contradiction that it should be in one place circumscriptively and in several others sacramentally. Hence the body of Christ can be present in heaven circumscriptively and sit at the right hand of the Father in its proper appearance, while existing at the same time upon several altars.

Nor, says the Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 1, are these things opposed to one another: that our Savior himself should always sit at the right hand of the Father in heaven according to the natural manner of existing, and nevertheless be present to us substantially in many other places in a sacramental manner.

Hence Father Nicolai excellently says in his scholia on q. 76, a. 5: It is unskilled and useless for establishing the truth of the Eucharist—indeed, more dangerous and harmful than profitable and secure for its defense—to assert that one body can be circumscribed by several places or exist in several places through its quantitative extension. For however such a mode of existing is established, it has nothing in common with the proper mode by which Christ exists singularly in the sacrament, nor is it subject to the same difficulties: for example, that the body of Christ would be said to exist simultaneously above and below itself, simultaneously to its own right and left, as must necessarily occur in bodies locally extended. There are also many other inconsistencies or contradictions necessarily following from this, such as that the same body could simultaneously sit and stand, or simultaneously rest and be moved, and the like, whereas the sacramental mode of Christ's body suffers nothing of this kind.

CHAPTER IV.
Eucharistic Transubstantiation.

1. Berengar, Archdeacon of Angers, fell into two errors concerning the most august Sacrament of the Eucharist. First, he began to say that the bread and wine of the Eucharist are only a sacrament, or sign of Christ's body, and consequently that the Eucharist contains Christ's flesh and blood not truly and really, but only figuratively. He retracted this error at the Council of Tours under Victor II and at the Roman Council under Nicholas II, in these words recorded in *De consecratione*, dist. 2: *I, Berengar, unworthy deacon of the Church of St. Maurice of Angers, acknowledging the true Catholic and Apostolic faith, anathematize every heresy, especially that of which I have hitherto been*

accused, which attempts to maintain that the bread and wine placed upon the altar are, after consecration, only a sacrament and not the true body and blood of Jesus Christ. Yet that most fickle Proteus, after twice abjuring this heresy, fell into another error, by which he asserted that the entire nature of the substance of bread and wine remains after consecration in the Eucharist, accidentally joined to the body of Christ in the manner in which one suppositum can be locally joined to another. Hence by this second heresy he denied the transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. He also solemnly abjured this error at another Council held at Rome under Gregory VII, in these words: *I, Berengar, believe in my heart and confess with my mouth that the bread and wine placed upon the altar are, through the mystery of sacred prayer and the words of our Redeemer, substantially converted into the true, proper, and life-giving flesh and blood of Jesus Christ our Lord, and that after consecration they are the true body of Christ, which was born of the Virgin and hung upon the cross for the salvation of the world.* Calvin adhered to both errors of Berengar. Luther, however, admitted the true and real presence of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist, defended it tenaciously, and even published an apology for it; but he embraced Berengar's other error, by which he asserted that the entire substance of bread and wine remains after consecration, and consequently denied transubstantiation. Many of his disciples in Germany followed him in this, and were therefore called "Impanators," or "Bread-men." We refuted the first error throughout the preceding chapter. It remains, therefore, briefly to refute the second here, and to establish and explain that wonderful conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ which theologians call transubstantiation.

§ 1.
The Substance of Bread and Wine Is Wholly Converted into the Body and Blood of Christ the Lord; Consequently, True Transubstantiation Occurs in the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

2. This orthodox truth has been defined in several Councils: 1º in the Roman Council under Gregory VII, in which Berengar, as we saw above, retracted his second error, by which he denied transubstantiation; 2º in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, where the bread and wine are said to be transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ; 3º in the Council of Constance, sess. 8, where Wycliffe's error, asserting that the substance of bread and wine remains in the Sacrament of the altar, is condemned; 4º in

the Council of Florence, in the instruction to the Armenians, where this change of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ is expressly stated; finally, in the Council of Trent, sess. 13, can. 2, where it is said: *If anyone says that in the Sacrament of the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine remains together with the body and blood of Christ, let him be anathema.*

3. The holy Fathers teach the same everywhere. First, Ambrose speaks so openly of transubstantiation, or of the change of bread into Christ's body, that it would be the height of impudence to call it into doubt. For in De sacramentis, l. 4, c. 4, he says: Perhaps you say, "My bread is ordinary bread." But this bread is bread before the words of the Sacraments; when consecration has taken place, from bread it becomes the flesh of Christ. And again, c. 5: Before it is consecrated, it is bread; but when the words of Christ have been added, it is the body of Christ. Before the words of Christ, the chalice is full of wine and water; when the words of Christ have effected their work, there the blood that redeemed the people is produced. And in De mysteriis initiandis, c. 9: How many examples do we use to prove that this is not what nature formed, but what the blessing consecrated, and that the power of the blessing is greater than that of nature, because by the blessing even nature itself is changed? Moses held a rod; he cast it down, and it became a serpent. He then recounts many other miracles of Moses, Elijah, and Elisha, and finally concludes: But if a human blessing had such power that it changed nature, what shall we say of the divine consecration itself, in which the very words of the Lord and Savior operate? For this Sacrament which you receive is effected by the word of Christ. If the word of Elijah had such power that it brought fire down from heaven, will the word of Christ not have power to change the species of the elements? You have read concerning the works of the whole world: "For he spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created." Therefore, can the word of Christ, which was able to make from nothing what did not exist, not change the things that exist into what they were not? For it is no less to give new natures to things than to change their natures.

4. Cyprian, or the author of the sermon De cena Domini, whom the heretics admit to have been some ancient and most learned Father, teaches transubstantiation no less clearly. For in that sermon it is said: That bread which the Lord gave to his disciples, changed not in appearance but in nature, was made flesh by the omnipotence of the Word. Likewise Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis mystagogica 4, openly teaches the transmutation of bread into Christ's body and asserts that only the species remain after that transmutation. His words are: Christ once changed water into wine, which is akin to blood, at Cana of Galilee, by his will alone; and shall he not be worthy

of our belief when he has transmuted wine into blood? Therefore, with all certainty, let us receive the body and blood of Christ; for under the species of bread the body is given to you, and under the species of wine the blood is given. Gregory of Nyssa teaches similar things in Oratio catechetica, c. 37, where he says: Rightly, therefore, I now also believe that the bread sanctified by the word of God is transmuted into the body of God the Word. Likewise Theophylact on John 6: That bread is transformed by the secret words, through the mystical blessing and the coming of the Holy Spirit, into the flesh of the Lord. Finally, John Damascene taught and expressed the same truth in the clearest words in De fide orthodoxa, l. 4, c. 14: The Virgin asked, "How shall this happen to me?" Gabriel the Archangel answered: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon you." You likewise now ask how the bread becomes the body of Christ and the wine mixed with water becomes the blood of Christ. I answer you likewise: the Holy Spirit comes upon them and effects things that surpass the capacity of speech and the understanding of the mind.

5. From these testimonies it is clear that the heretics lie when they assert that transubstantiation was an invention of St. Thomas and was never acknowledged by the Greeks. The latter claim is shown to be utterly false by Jeremiah, the schismatic Patriarch of Constantinople, c. 10 of his censure against the Lutherans. It is also shown by Arcudius, l. 3, c. 2, where he says: In the Sacrament of the Eucharist the Greeks acknowledge and embrace, and indeed most firmly believe, a true μετανοίαν, that is, transubstantiation, as is sufficiently clear from the ancient Greek Fathers and those of every age. But nothing more authoritative can be produced than the testimony of the Patriarch of Constantinople, three former Patriarchs of Constantinople, the Patriarch of Alexandria, and thirty-five Metropolitans. They not only confirmed that they believed almost all the articles disputed between Catholics and Calvinists, but also expressed their faith concerning the Eucharist most clearly in the following words, confirmed by their signatures at Constantinople, in the patriarchal residence, on January 20, 1672: Concerning the awesome Sacrament of the Eucharist, we believe and confess without doubt that the true body of our Lord Jesus Christ is invisibly present by a real presence in the Sacrament. For by the operation of the most Holy Spirit, in a supernatural and ineffable manner, the bread is really, truly, and properly converted into the proper body of Jesus Christ, and the wine into his living blood. We also believe that the whole Christ is offered and offers himself, and that he is consumed whole by the recipients in an impassible manner. This Sacrament is worthy of true adoration, for in it we honor the body of Jesus Christ the Savior, assumed by the Divinity,

with no less a worship of veneration than that with which we adore the Divinity itself. It is offered in sacrifice for all orthodox Christians, both living and departed. See other recent and authentic testimonies of the Greeks which we reported in our Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae, tract. on the Eucharist, disp. 1, last a.

6. Finally, the same truth is demonstrated by the reasoning of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 75, a. 2. The truth and propriety of the words of the form of consecration, *This is my body*, require that the bread not remain, but be converted into Christ's body. For the demonstrative pronoun *this* signifies the substance hidden beneath the species. Therefore, if the substance of bread remained beneath them after consecration, the sense of these words, *This is my body*, would be: "The substance of bread is my body," which is plainly false. Hence Christ should not have said, *This is my body*, but "Here is my body." For the mere intimate presence of one thing in another is not sufficient for one to be predicated of the other. When Christ's body came forth from the tomb, it was intimately present within the stone, because it penetrated it; and yet, while pointing to the stone, one could not truly say, "This is my body," but only, "Here is my body."

This reasoning is confirmed and further illustrated, and at the same time an objection that can be raised against it is answered. The pronoun *this* can be applied either to a thing or substance that by its nature, or by art and common usage, is fitted to contain another, such as a purse, a cask, a chest, and so forth; or to a thing or substance not fitted to contain another, such as wheat, for example, or bread and similar things. In the former case it can, in a sufficiently proper, common, and customary signification, designate the substance contained beneath another substance, as when we say of a purse or cask: *This is my gold; this is my wine.* But not so in the latter case. For if silver were contained beneath bread, no one, while pointing to the bread, would rightly say, "This is my silver." Since, therefore, the substance of bread is fitted neither by its nature nor by common human usage to contain Christ's body, one cannot point to such a substance in the Sacrament and say, *This is my body*. Consequently, those words of Christ cannot be true unless the substance of bread is converted into Christ's body. Hence Guitmund, l. 3, *De corporis et sanguinis Christi veritate*: *The Lord himself slew these Impanators by the word of his mouth when, taking bread, giving thanks and blessing it, he said: "This is my body." He did not say, "My body lies hidden in this." Nor did he say, "In this wine is my blood," but: "This is my blood."*

7. The sacred Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 4, confirms this reasoning of St. Thomas drawn from the words of Christ: Because Christ our Redeemer said that what he offered under the species of bread was truly his body, it has

therefore always been the conviction of the Church, and this holy Synod now declares anew, that by the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ the Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. Hence the opinion of Scotus, Durandus, and other Scholastics is not safe when they judge that there would still be a true form of consecration even if the substance of bread remained in the Eucharist, and that transubstantiation is known to be of faith only by the authority of the Church. For the sacred Council expressly declares that transubstantiation is inferred from the words of Christ.

8. Against these things the Lutherans first object that the Eucharist is frequently called bread by Scripture and the Fathers, as in 1 Cor. 10: *The bread which we break, is it not a participation in the body of the Lord?* But the answer is easy: it is so called either because it is from bread as transitory matter—for, as we noted above, substances transmuted into another are commonly called by the name they bore before their conversion—or because it retains the species, properties, and operations of bread.

9. They object, secondly, that John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, l. 4, c. 14, says that Christ joined his Divinity with the bread and wine. But this must be understood of the bread and wine remaining only as to their species, as the following words declare: *For the body is truly joined to the Divinity, namely, the body that is from the holy Virgin; not that the body assumed from her descends from heaven, but that the bread and wine themselves are transmuted into the body and blood of God.* Shortly afterward he adds that the bread and wine are transmuted into Christ's body and blood by the invocation and coming of the Holy Spirit, just as food and drink are converted into the substance of the one nourished, so that there are not two things, but one and the same.

10. They object, thirdly, these words of Theodoret in Dialogue 2, which seem difficult and obscure: *The mystical signs do not depart from their proper nature after sanctification, for they remain in their former substance, figure, and form.* This testimony can be answered in two ways. First, with Cardinal Perron, by saying that this passage of Theodoret should not be read in that manner, but thus: *After sanctification the mystical signs remain in the figure and form of the former substance.* According to this reading, the meaning is plain: the same accidents which were in the former substance of bread and wine remain after the conversion of both, unchanged as before, and do not depart from their nature, that is, from the power they naturally possess to affect the senses, nourish, and so forth.

Secondly, it can be answered with Father Nicolai in his scholia on *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 75, a. 1, that by "substance" in that passage is not meant that which gives substantial being, constitutes the category of substance, and is opposed to accidents. Rather, by the name "substance" is signified the essence that is attributed even to accidents and is called οὐσία by the Greeks. Hence by those words Theodoret intends only that after sanctification the same essence of the accidents or symbols remains, and that after consecration they have the same natural properties and produce the same effects as before, namely, nourishing, affecting sight or touch, and so forth. This is clear from the words he adds there: *And they can be seen and touched as before.*

11. They object, fourthly: accidents cannot remain without a subject, and what remains in the Eucharist after consecration can be altered and corrupted into worms, as experience makes evident. But this would not occur unless the substance of bread and wine remained as the subject of these changes. Therefore, and so forth. We answered the first point in the preceding chapter. The solution to the second will appear below in Chapter VII, where we shall explain how something can be generated from the sacramental species.

12. From what has been said it is inferred, first, that the substance of bread and wine is not united hypostatically to the Divine Word as the human nature is united to him, contrary to what Rupert seems to teach in *De divinis officiis*, l. 2, c. 2. For what remains in its own substance while being hypostatically united to another is not converted into it. Hence in the mystery of the Incarnation we believe that the humanity remains in its own nature because it is united hypostatically to the Divine Word. But the substance of bread is converted into Christ's body, as has been shown. Therefore, it is not united hypostatically to the Word. I add that it seems absurd that the Divine Word should be said to be "impanated" just as he is said to be incarnate.

It is inferred, secondly, that after consecration there remains neither the matter of the bread, as Durandus asserts; nor its substance, as Godfrey teaches; nor its existence, as Bañez judges probable. For the Council of Trent cited above expressly teaches that in the Eucharist there occurs a conversion of the whole substance of bread and wine into Christ's body and blood, only the species remaining.

§ 2.
Eucharistic Transubstantiation Is an Action Productive of Christ's Body, Not Absolutely and Simply, but in a Determinate Manner, Namely, from the Substance of Bread Converted into Christ's Body.

13. The first part of this assertion is gathered from the holy Fathers, who explain Eucharistic transubstantiation by words signifying production. Cyprian, or the author of the sermon *De cena Domini*, speaks thus of Christ: *Today he creates his most true body and distributes it to those who receive devoutly.* Ambrose, *De sacramentis*, l. 3, c. 4: *From bread the body of Christ is made.* Augustine, cited in the canon *Utrum sub figura*, *De consecratione*, dist. 2, says that through the Holy Spirit Christ's body is created and produced from the substance of bread. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, l. 4, c. 14: *He made the bread and wine his body and blood.* Also well known are the words of Jerome, epist. 1 to Heliodorus: *Far be it from me to speak anything unfavorable of those who, succeeding to the apostolic rank, effect the body of Christ with their sacred mouth.* Hence the holy Fathers call the priesthood an astounding miracle, the most excellent of all adornments, the summit of all the goods found among men, something divine, and, as it were, the ultimate goal of all things sought among men.

14. Reason also supports this. Every substantial conversion is a true production of a substance. But Eucharistic transubstantiation is a substantial conversion, for through it the substance of bread is converted into the substance of Christ's body. Therefore, it is a true production of a substance. The minor premise is evident. The major is proved: 1º because "production" is a common name embracing creation, generation, eduction, and conversion; 2º because there is no action converting one thing into another without an action productive or reproductive of that into which the conversion takes place, as when Lot's wife was converted into a statue of salt, Aaron's rod into a serpent, and water into wine at the wedding feast of Cana; 3º because the communication or influx of a substantial being is a true production, as is clear in the divine emanations, which are called productions precisely because the divine essence which is in the Father is communicated to the other divine supposita by intellection and love. Similarly, the communication of divine being made to the assumed humanity is called the production of the God-man, and through it the Word of God became flesh. But every substantial conversion is a communication or influx

of some substantial being, since substantial conversion differs from accidental conversion in this: through the former a passage is made to a substantial terminus, but through the latter only to an accidental terminus, as when a subject becomes black from being white, or cold from being hot. Therefore, every substantial conversion is a true production of a substance.

15. This is confirmed. Through the Eucharistic conversion, Christ's body and blood begin to be beneath the species of bread and wine. But they do not begin to be there through an adductive action, as Scotus, Bellarmine, and Vásquez think; nor through a union of Christ's body and blood with the species of bread and wine, as Valencia judges; nor through a conservation of Christ's body and blood beneath the Eucharistic species, as Suárez asserts. Therefore, this occurs only through the production of Christ's body and blood from the substance of bread and wine, as the Thomists and many others teach. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved as to each of its parts.

First, it seems manifest that Christ's body does not begin to be beneath the Eucharistic species through an adductive action. The conversion by which Christ is placed beneath the Eucharistic species is substantial, whereas a merely adductive action is not a substantial conversion, but the production of an accidental presence. Indeed, it cannot even be called a conversion. For conversion requires that the terminus to which be incompatible with the terminus from which; otherwise the terminus from which could remain in itself, which is incompatible with its conversion into the terminus to which. But the terminus to which of an adductive action concerning Christ's body has no such incompatibility with the terminus from which. Therefore, such an action is not a true conversion. The minor is proved: the terminus to which of the adductive action concerning Christ's body is sacramental presence. But this is not incompatible with the substance of bread, which is the terminus from which of the Eucharistic conversion, because that presence is not quantitative and divisible, but sacramental and indivisible, and is similar to that by which an angel becomes present to a place. Hence, just as an angel, by becoming present to some space, does not thereby expel the bodily substance that is in it, so in the Eucharist, precisely because Christ's body becomes present to the species, the substance of bread previously existing beneath them is not necessarily expelled. Nor is Bellarmine's answer valid, namely, that Christ's body is incompatible with the substance of bread and wine because of God's intention to destroy them. For in a true conversion the incompatibility of the terminus to which with the terminus from which must be drawn not from some extrinsic ordinance of God, but from the nature of the

conversion itself. Otherwise everything that, by God's will, ceases to exist at the same time that something else begins to exist would be said to be converted into that other thing, which is absurd. Hence that adductive action should be called not conversion or transubstantiation, but transposition or translocation.

16. From these considerations the second opinion is easily refuted, and the second part of the principal minor premise is proved against Valencia. For the union of Christ's body with the Eucharistic accidents is not substantial, but only accidental, since no composite can be made from a substance and accidents except accidentally. Therefore, the Eucharistic conversion, which is substantial, cannot consist in such a union. This is especially so because it is impossible to understand Christ's body as united to the Eucharistic species unless it is first present there, and consequently unless an action converting the bread into Christ's body is first understood. The same must be said of an action conserving Christ's body beneath the same species, for a thing must first be somewhere before it can be conserved there. Moreover, mere conservation does not affix the conserved thing to any place, but abstracts from every place, since creation and conservation would remain the same even though the presence were changed daily. Thus the opinion of Suárez is refuted, and the third part of the principal minor premise is proved.

17. The second part of the assertion, however, which says that transubstantiation or Eucharistic conversion is not an action productive of Christ's body simply and absolutely, but in a determinate manner, namely, from another substance that is converted into it and in whose place it succeeds, is manifest. For Christ's body simply and absolutely is presupposed to have been produced and to exist in reality before the words of consecration are pronounced by the priest and the conversion of the bread into it occurs. Therefore, such a conversion cannot be called the production of Christ's body simply and without qualification, but only in a qualified respect and with an addition, namely, from the substance of bread and beneath its species. Consequently, the formal and primary terminus of transubstantiation is neither Christ's presence alone beneath the species, nor the union of Christ's body with them, nor a mode of conserving it beneath them, nor Christ's body absolutely and simply, but Christ's body insofar as it is made from bread.

Hence, although Christ's body exists in heaven; although as regards the soul by which it is informed it was produced through creation under the notion of a being, and as regards the whole composite through generation under the notion of a man; nevertheless, because it has not been produced

under the notion of such a body producible from bread by a proper action terminating primarily and of itself in this formal notion and specified by it, it remains capable of being produced again in the Eucharist through an action formally regarding it according to that notion. Although that notion is only one formally in species, it can nevertheless be multiplied numerically to infinity syncategorematically. This solves several objections of the adversaries, which prove only that transubstantiation, since it presupposes Christ's body already produced and existing, cannot produce it simply and absolutely. They do not prove that it cannot be produced by such an action in a qualified respect and in a new manner, namely, from bread and beneath the Eucharistic species.

18. You will say, first: what is produced passes from non-being to being. But through transubstantiation Christ's body does not pass from non-being to being, since it pre-exists that action. Therefore, it is not produced through it.

I answer that what is produced passes from non-being to being in the manner in which it is produced. Thus, if it is produced simply, it passes from non-being simply to being simply; but if it is produced only with an addition and in a qualified respect, it passes from non-being with an addition and in a qualified respect to being with an addition and in a qualified respect. Hence, since Christ's body is not produced through transubstantiation by a production spoken of absolutely and simply, but with an addition, namely, from bread and beneath the species, it does not pass from non-being simply to being simply, but from not being beneath the Eucharistic species and from bread to being from bread and beneath those species.

19. You will say, secondly: an action that proceeds efficiently from some agent cannot be productive of that agent; otherwise the same thing would be simultaneously prior and posterior to itself in the same respect. But Eucharistic transubstantiation proceeds efficiently from Christ's body, or from his humanity, as from an instrument joined to the Divinity. Therefore, it cannot produce Christ's body.

I answer that an action which proceeds efficiently from some agent cannot be the first production of that agent, but it can be its repeated production under a new mode of being. For although the same thing, as first produced, cannot be prior to itself as first produced, it can be prior to itself as reproduced, or as produced under a new mode of being. Thus Christ's body, as first produced, is prior to itself as reproduced under the new sacramental mode of being and as existing beneath the Eucharistic species. Therefore, the same thing is not prior and posterior to itself in the same respect.

20. You will say, thirdly: if Christ's body were produced through transubstantiation, it would follow that the same effect proceeds from two total causes. For Christ's body existing in heaven was produced by one total action, and in the Sacrament it is produced by another total action.

I answer that two total actions can terminate in the same effect under diverse formal notions. The formal notion under which Christ's body is produced upon the altar is specifically different from that under which it is produced or conserved in heaven, because the former is conversive, whereas the latter is not.

21. One might insist: Christ's body is consecrated at the same time upon many altars. But such consecrations are of the same species, since all convert bread into Christ's body. Therefore, if they are productive of it, the same effect could be produced under the same formal notion by several total actions.

I answer that it is not unfitting for the same effect to be produced through distinct total instrumental actions, because the effect does not depend of itself upon them. But the actions by which Christ's body is consecrated by different priests upon several altars are not principal, but only instrumental, since the priest concurs only instrumentally in the consecration or production of Christ's body upon the altar. Should it be said that several actions, whether principal or instrumental, cannot be received in the same subject, namely, in the same body of Christ, since otherwise several accidents differing only numerically would exist in the same subject, which truly conflicts with philosophy, the answer is that those instrumental actions are not received in Christ's body taken simply and absolutely, but in Christ's body insofar as it is made from this bread and beneath these species. Hence, although their subject is materially the same, it is formally diverse and consequently equivalent to distinct subjects. It therefore does not follow that several accidents differing only numerically are received in the same subject.

22. You will say, fourthly: if Christ's body were produced in the Eucharist from the conversion of bread into it, it could not be said to have been born of the Virgin, just as the wine made from water at the wedding feast of Cana could not be said to be wine from the vine.

I deny the parity. That wine in its first production was formed from water without a vine, whereas Christ's body in its first production was born of the Virgin and in its second is reproduced from bread. Hence the holy Fathers say that the Eucharist is a certain extension of the Incarnation. Celebrated also is that saying attributed to St. Augustine or Gregory the

Great: *O great dignity of priests, in whose hands, as in the womb of the Virgin, Christ is daily incarnate.*

23. You will ask whether the substance of bread and wine in the Eucharist ceases through annihilation. The reason for doubting is that whatever ceases in such a manner that absolutely nothing of it remains is annihilated. But the substance of bread and wine is in this condition after consecration has been completed, for neither its matter, form, subsistence, nor existence remains, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore, it is truly annihilated.

24. Nevertheless, the negative opinion must be held against Scotus and the Nominalists. The reason is that a cessation terminating in something positive is not annihilation. Since annihilation is opposed to creation in this respect, that creation begins from nothing and terminates in something positive, whereas annihilation begins from something positive and ends in nothing, just as a production that begins from something positive presupposed cannot be creation, so a cessation that terminates in something positive cannot be annihilation. But although, once consecration has been completed, nothing further of the substance of bread and wine remains, their cessation terminates in something positive, namely, in Christ's body and blood. Therefore, such substance does not cease through annihilation.

This is confirmed. What passes from one being into another is not annihilated. For annihilation is a passage from being simply to non-being simply, just as creation, conversely, is a passage from non-being simply to being simply. But the substance of bread ceases through consecration in such a manner that it passes from the being of bread to the being of Christ's body beneath the species. Therefore, it is not annihilated.

From this the answer to the reason for doubting is clear. The major premise must be distinguished: whatever ceases in such a manner that absolutely nothing of it remains is annihilated, if it so ceases that from the mode of its ceasing it does not tend to something positive succeeding it and into which it is converted, I grant the major premise. If from the mode of its ceasing it tends to something into which it is converted, I deny it. Thus a substantial form is not said to be annihilated, although nothing of it remains after its corruption, because by virtue of the action by which it is corrupted, another form is produced, succeeding in its place and informing the same matter. The substance of bread is proportionately similar, because it ceases to exist in such a manner that from the mode of its ceasing it tends to something into which it is converted, and therefore it is not annihilated. Hence St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 11, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4: *Although the bread remains neither in itself nor in another, the body of Christ into*

which the bread was converted remains; and therefore it does not follow that there is annihilation.

CHAPTER V.
The Manner in Which Christ Exists in the Eucharist.

Concerning the manner in which Christ exists in the Eucharist, there are certain difficulties and questions which must be briefly resolved here.

§ 1.
What Is Contained by the Power of the Words and What by Concomitance beneath Each Species.

1. Two things are certain and beyond doubt among all Catholics. The first is that Christ's body is contained formally, or by the power of the words of consecration, beneath the species of bread, and his blood by the power of the words consecrating the chalice beneath the species of wine. For that is said to be formally and by the power of the words of consecration beneath the Eucharistic species which is expressly designated by the words of consecration. But Christ's body is expressly designated by the words consecrating the bread, and his blood by the words consecrating the wine, as is evident. Therefore, these are formally and by the power of the words beneath the species of bread and wine.

The second is that beneath the species of bread the blood, beneath the species of wine the body, and beneath each species the soul and Divinity are contained in this Sacrament by concomitance. For those things are said to be beneath the species by concomitance which, although they are not expressed by the words of consecration, are nevertheless really connected and joined with those things which are there by the power of the words. But the body is really joined with the blood, the blood with the body, and the soul and Divinity with both. Therefore, they are contained beneath the aforesaid species by concomitance.

The Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 3, expressly defined this doctrine in these words: This faith has always existed in the Church of God, that immediately after consecration the true body of our Lord and his true blood exist beneath the species of bread and wine together with his soul and Divinity; but the body beneath the species of bread and the blood beneath the species of wine by the power of the words; the body itself beneath the

species of wine, the blood beneath the species of bread, and the soul beneath each, by the power of that natural connection and concomitance by which the parts of Christ the Lord, who has now risen from the dead and will die no more, are joined together; and the Divinity because of its wonderful hypostatic union with his body and soul. Therefore, it is most true that as much is contained beneath either species as beneath both. For the whole and entire Christ exists beneath the species of bread and beneath every part of that species, and likewise the whole Christ exists beneath the species of wine and beneath its parts.

2. These things, as I have said, are certain and beyond doubt among all. But first it is disputed what is understood by the name "body," which is beneath the species of bread by the power of the words. Some, such as Gabriel, lect. 42 on the Canon, understand by "body" prime matter taken nakedly, stripped of every substantial form and affected only by quantity. But they both improperly call "body" what is not a body—for when a man is said to be composed of body and soul, the common understanding of men is not that this body is prime matter—and falsely suppose that prime matter can exist without a substantial form.

Others think that by "body" is signified prime matter as affected by a form of corporeity, or by some other partial form constituting an organic body. But they suppose that there are partial forms in a composite, which is false, or at least uncertain, and contrary to St. Thomas, who in Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 3, teaches that in man there is no other form than the intellectual soul, which virtually contains all inferior forms and alone effects whatever the more imperfect forms effect in other things. And here, Summa Theologiae III, q. 75, a. 6, ad 2, he says: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the entire order of perfect being, namely, being, corporeal being, animated being, and so on. Therefore, the form of bread is converted into the form of Christ's body insofar as it gives corporeal being, but not insofar as it gives animated being by such a soul.

Hence, according to St. Thomas, by the name "body," which is beneath the species of bread by the power of the words, there must be understood matter informed by Christ's soul insofar as it gives corporeal being, but not insofar as it gives living being or confers the grade of life. For Christ's body, insofar as it is beneath the species of bread by the power of the words, abstracts from living and dead, since the formal signification of "body" is now the same as it was during the three days of his death. Therefore, when the Council of Trent says that Christ's soul is beneath the species of bread and wine only by concomitance, this must be understood of Christ's soul insofar as it confers the grade of life, not insofar as it gives corporeal being.

Indeed, Christ's soul, even insofar as it confers the grade of life, is not in this Sacrament by concomitance except when Christ's body in its proper species happens to be informed by the rational soul. For if it were informed by another form, as during the three days of his death by the form of a corpse, the rational soul would not be placed even concomitantly beneath the Eucharistic species, but the form of the corpse itself would be.

3. Secondly, it can be asked whether all Christ's blood is beneath the species of wine by the power of the words, or only that which was shed in the Passion. It seems that only the latter is contained beneath the species of wine by the power of the words, since only this is expressed in the form of consecration: *Which shall be shed for you.*

I answer, however, that all the blood now in Christ's glorious body, even if it was not shed in the Passion, is beneath the species of wine by the power of the Sacrament. For the words *Which shall be shed for you* do not limit the preceding words to signify only the blood that was shed in the Passion, but express the primary end of this Sacrament, which is the representation of Christ's Passion. Thus, if Christ had converted water into wine with these words, *This is the wine which shall be drunk by you*, the latter words would not have limited the former so that only the water which was to be drunk by them was converted into wine, but would merely have denoted the end of the miracle, even if not all the wine was to be drunk by them.

This is confirmed. Some blood was sacramentally present beneath the species of wine at the Supper which was not shed in the Passion, namely, that which before the Passion was converted into flesh. Therefore, to verify the words of consecration, it is not necessary that all the blood placed beneath the species of wine by the power of the words should have been shed in the Passion. Hence, if the Apostles had consecrated during the three days of Christ's death, there would have been in the chalice by the power of the words not only the blood shed, but also the other portion remaining in Christ's dead body, supposing that he did not shed every drop with mathematical exactness.

4. Thirdly, there can be doubt whether the Divine Word is in this Sacrament by the power of the words or only by concomitance. The reason for doubting is that Christ's body and blood, which are the formal termini of the sacramental signification, are expressed in the manner of a subsistent thing, and consequently formally imply subsistence: not a created subsistence; therefore, the uncreated subsistence of the Word, by which all things in Christ subsist.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the Word is not in this Sacrament by the power of the words, but only by concomitance. For according to the

Council of Trent, the Divinity is not in the Sacrament by the power of the words, but only by concomitance, because it is there *only because of that wonderful hypostatic union which it has with the body and soul*. But similarly, the Person of the Word is not in this Sacrament except by reason of the hypostatic union which he has with Christ's body and blood. Therefore, he is not in this Sacrament by the power of the words, but only by concomitance.

To the reason for doubting, I answer that body and blood do not imply subsistence of themselves and formally, but only the concrete of substance. Otherwise it could not be said that the Word assumed a body or blood, because the Word cannot be said to have assumed something subsistent. Hence this proposition, "The Word assumed a man," is not true, because "man" implies subsistence.

5. Finally, some inquire here whether the other divine Persons are in this Sacrament by concomitance. Since they are united with the Son and are identified with the divine essence, it does not seem possible to deny that they are concomitantly in this Sacrament, just as the Divinity itself and the Person of the Word are. Nevertheless, the negative opinion seems more probable and more conformable to the doctrine of the Council of Trent. For the Council grounds this sacramental concomitance solely upon the hypostatic union which the Word and the Divinity have with the humanity. But the Father and the Holy Spirit are not hypostatically united to the humanity. Therefore, they are not in this Sacrament by concomitance. Hence the Son alone is said to be offered and sacrificed upon the altar, not the Father or the Holy Spirit. Nor does it matter that the Father and the Holy Spirit are united with the Son and identified with the divine nature. For just as this union and identity do not cause the Father or Holy Spirit also to be concomitantly incarnate, so neither do they cause them to be found concomitantly in the Eucharist.

§ 2.
What Is the Sacramental Presence of Christ's Body in the Eucharist?

6. I answer that it is a certain supernatural and substantial mode by which Christ's body is affected and which imitates the mode of existence proper to a substance.

This is proved as to each part. First, that such a presence is some real mode is evident because Christ's body being indivisibly present beneath the species is a real effect newly existing in Christ's body which was not there before, and consequently proceeds from some form superadded to it. This

form is not really distinct, because such a distinction is unnecessary. Therefore, it is distinct only modally.

Secondly, that such a mode is supernatural is evident because it is not due to a body or to any created nature, for it is a certain participation in the divine immensity.

Thirdly, that it is substantial is proved because by its benefit Christ is in the Eucharist in the manner of a substance, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 76, a. 5: *Christ's body is not in this Sacrament as in a place, but in the manner of a substance, namely, in the manner in which a substance is contained by dimensions. For the substance of Christ's body succeeds in this Sacrament to the substance of bread. Hence, just as the substance of bread was not beneath its dimensions locally, but in the manner of a substance, neither is the substance of Christ's body.* Reason also supports this. To be in the manner of a substance is to be whole beneath the whole quantity and whole beneath every part. But Christ's body is whole beneath the whole quantity of bread and whole beneath every part of it. Therefore, it is beneath that quantity in the manner of a substance. Thus the final part of our answer is proved, which asserts that this mode of the sacramental presence of Christ's body imitates the mode in which a substance exists.

7. From these things it is inferred, first, that the sacramental presence of Christ's body beneath the species does not belong to the category of where, but is reduced to the category of substance. For not every mode of presence belongs to the category of where, but only that by reason of which a thing is denominated as existing in a place. Hence we said in the treatise on the angels that an angel's presence in a place, or in a body upon which it acts, does not belong to the category of where, but is reduced to the category of action. But by reason of the sacramental presence, Christ's body cannot be said to be in a place, as St. Thomas teaches in the article cited, which he concludes with these words: *Hence in no manner is Christ's body in this Sacrament locally.* Therefore, such a presence does not belong to the category of where, but is reduced to the category of substance.

8. It is inferred, secondly, that Christ's body is not in this Sacrament definitively, as the same holy Doctor teaches in the same place, ad 1: Christ's body is not in this Sacrament definitively, because then it would be nowhere except upon this altar where this Sacrament is effected, whereas it is both in heaven in its proper species and upon many other altars beneath the sacramental species.

From this you will understand that the sacramental presence of Christ's body beneath the species has two conditions: one in which it agrees with the presence of a spiritual thing, and another in which it surpasses it. It agrees in

this: each makes the thing present indivisibly, namely, whole in the whole and whole in every part. It surpasses it in this: although the spatial presence of a spiritual thing is indivisible, nevertheless, because it arises from a finite and limited power, it is so limited and restricted to a determinate distance and place that it is not beyond that sphere, and is therefore called definitive spatial presence. But the sacramental presence of Christ's body beneath the species arises from the infinite power of God converting the bread into it. Hence Christ is so present in one host and upon one altar that he is not terminated and limited so as not to be present in others. Thus it is not a definitive spatial presence like the presence of an angel, although it exists indivisibly; rather, it is called sacramental presence, because Christ is indivisibly and totally present in every host and in every part of it in such a way that he can also be present in other hosts and upon other altars if bread is consecrated there.

Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 75, a. 1, ad 3, says that Christ's body is in the Eucharist in a certain special manner proper to this Sacrament. Cajetan writes at the end of his commentary: This mode is rightly called proper to this Sacrament, not only because of its difference from the other Sacraments, but also because in the entire universe no single mode appears similar to it. Therefore, with wonder and veneration, let us confess the deficiency of our knowledge concerning it.

9. It is inferred, thirdly, against William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, and St. Bonaventure, that the whole Christ is beneath every part of the consecrated host, even before its division. First, because before consecration the substance of bread was whole and actually present in each part of the host. Therefore, after consecration the whole substance of Christ's body, which succeeds in the Sacrament to the substance of bread, will be in every part of the consecrated host. Secondly, because according to the Council of Trent cited in the preceding section, the whole Christ is in each part after division. Therefore, he is also there before division. For division alone, since it is effected by natural power, does not place Christ where he was not previously present. Otherwise, without a new consecration and by natural power alone, Christ would become sacramentally present where he was not present before.

10. You will say with William of Auxerre: just as in a mirror before its breaking there is only one image, but after its breaking the image is multiplied in each broken part, so before division Christ is present only once in the whole host, but after division he is multiplied in each divided part.

I deny the parity. St. Thomas assigns the reason for the disparity in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 76, a. 3, in the body of the article. Since the image

represented in a mirror proceeds from the reflection of the mirror's surface as from a cause, just as when the mirror is broken there arise diverse surfaces of the parts, so there arise diverse reflections or reverberations of them and therefore several actual images. But by the breaking of the host there is no new production of the presence of Christ's body in the diverse parts of the broken host, because this presence is produced only upon the pronouncement of the sacramental words. Therefore, if before the breaking the whole Christ was not in each part of the host, he could not become present in them by the power of the breaking.

11. It is inferred, fourthly, that the whole Christ is beneath every part of the host smaller than the natural minimum when it is joined to the continuum and to the other larger parts which it composes, but not when divided and separated from them. For the whole Christ is beneath those parts of the host beneath which the substance of bread can exist, but not beneath those beneath which such substance cannot be conserved. But the substance of bread can be conserved beneath any part of the host smaller than the natural minimum when joined to the continuum and to the other larger parts which it composes; it cannot be so conserved if divided from the continuum. Therefore, and so forth.

12. It is inferred, fifthly, that Christ's whole body is contained beneath every indivisible point of the consecrated host, both continuative and terminative. For beneath every indivisible point of quantity there is an indivisible point of substance, lest an accident exist without a proportionate subject. But by the power of consecration Christ's body becomes present beneath everything beneath which something of the substance of bread previously existed, since it adequately succeeds to that substance. Therefore, it becomes present beneath every indivisible point of the consecrated host.

When the host is broken, the indivisible points which continued its joined parts become through the breaking and division the termini of the divided parts. Consequently, Christ's body, which previously existed beneath those indivisible points insofar as they continued united parts, exists beneath the same insofar as they terminate divided parts.

13. You will ask whether the sacramental presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist includes some union of Christ's body with the species. I answer affirmatively. The reason is that Christ is moved with the movement of the species, as we shall say in the following section. But unless some connection is posited between Christ's body and the species, Christ will not be moved, for presence alone does not connect Christ's body with the species. Therefore, some union of Christ's body with them must be admitted.

§ 3.
Whether Christ in the Eucharist Can Be Moved Locally, Act or Suffer by a Bodily Action, and Be Seen by a Bodily Eye.

14. I say, first, that Christ in the Eucharist cannot be moved locally of himself, but he can be moved accidentally.

The first part is evident. What is not in a place cannot be moved locally of itself, because to be moved locally is to change place, or to leave one place and acquire another. But Christ is not in this Sacrament as in a place, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section. Therefore, he cannot be moved locally of himself in it.

That he can be moved accidentally with the movement of the species is proved against Durandus. Christ's body is contained beneath the species in the manner in which the substance of bread was contained. But the substance of bread was contained beneath the species in such a manner that it was moved when they were moved. Therefore, so also is Christ's body. Hence it is said to be carried in processions, borne to the sick, elevated by priests after consecration, and similar things which cannot be explained without local motion.

Nevertheless, Christ's body differs from the substance of bread in this respect: while the latter was moved accidentally with the movement of the species, it received local motion within itself, but Christ's body does not. For since local motion is something bodily and extended, just as circumscriptive spatial presence, which is its terminus, only that which is naturally capable of receiving an extended accident receives motion intrinsically. But Christ's body existing indivisibly in the Eucharist is not fitted to receive a bodily and extended accident as the substance of bread was. Hence local motion is not received in it, but only in the species, with whose motion it is moved accidentally.

15. I say, secondly, that Christ's body, insofar as it is in this Sacrament, can neither act nor suffer by a bodily action or passion. The reason is that every bodily action and passion requires local extension in the agent and patient, which Christ's body lacks in the Eucharist, since it is there in an indivisible and unextended manner.

16. You will say: Christ can die in this Sacrament, as St. Thomas teaches below in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 81, a. 4. Therefore, he can also suffer by a bodily passion.

I answer that when the holy Doctor says Christ can die in the Eucharist, this must not be understood of death inflicted upon him insofar as he is in this Sacrament, but of death inflicted upon him insofar as he exists in his proper species. For since numerically the same body of Christ exists in each state, by the very fact that he died in his proper species, he would consequently or concomitantly also die in this Sacrament. Hence in the same place St. Thomas teaches that if this Sacrament had been reserved or consecrated at the time of Christ's death, Christ dying upon the cross would also have been dead in the Sacrament.

17. I say, thirdly, that a bodily eye can be supernaturally elevated to see Christ's body as existing in the Eucharist, but not to see the mode by which it exists there.

The first part is proved by a fundamental reason. A cognitive power can be divinely elevated to perceive all things contained within the latitude of its specifying object, although they are not contained within the latitude of its connatural and proportionate object. Thus, although God as he is in himself is not the proportionate object of our intellect, he can nevertheless be seen supernaturally by it because he is contained within its specifying object, as we declared in the treatise on the beatific vision. But although Christ's body as it exists in the Sacrament is not contained within the connatural and proportionate object of the visual power, because it is not locally extended there, it is nevertheless contained within the latitude of its specifying object, which is the colored and luminous. Therefore, although a bodily eye cannot naturally see Christ's body as it is in the Eucharist, it can nevertheless be divinely and supernaturally elevated to do so.

From this the second part of the conclusion is proved. Since the mode by which Christ's body is in the Sacrament is not colored but only intelligible, it is not contained within the specifying object of the visual power, but only of the intellectual power. Consequently, it cannot be seen by a bodily eye, but only perceived and known by a created intellect. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 76, a. 7, ad 2: *Christ's eye sees itself existing beneath the Sacrament, but it cannot see the mode of being by which it exists beneath the Sacrament, for this pertains to the intellect alone.* By these words he openly teaches both parts of our conclusion.

18. But you will say: why does St. Thomas grant that Christ's bodily eye sees itself existing in the Sacrament, while denying this of other glorified eyes? For he adds: There is not a similar case with another glorified eye, because Christ's eye is also beneath this Sacrament, in which respect another glorified eye is not conformed to it.

I answer that Christ's eye existing in the Eucharist differs from other glorified eyes in this: since it is in the Sacrament in the manner of his body, that is, indivisibly and without extension, it connaturally receives the species of his body existing in the Sacrament, although that species is indivisible and unextended, because of its connatural union with his body. But another glorified eye is not capable of connaturally receiving a species from that object, because however glorious it may be, it can naturally see its object only through extended species, which Christ's body in the Eucharist does not emit.

This is what St. Thomas intended when he said: Because Christ's eye is also beneath this Sacrament, in which respect another glorified eye is not conformed to it. Nevertheless, the holy Doctor does not deny that other glorified eyes existing outside the Sacrament can divinely and supernaturally see Christ's body existing in the Eucharist. Rather, he expressly asserts this in Scriptum super Sententiis IV, dist. 11, q. 1, a. 4, qla. 1, ad 1: Christ's eye existing outside the sacramental species does not see itself existing within the sacramental species except miraculously; and likewise other glorified eyes do not see him here except perhaps by a miracle.

19. You will object, first, against the first part of this assertion: no object can be seen without a species. But Christ's body existing in the Sacrament cannot emit a species of itself and diffuse it through a medium into the visual power, since such an emission and diffusion of a species require extension and quantitative contact with the medium, which do not belong to Christ's body in the Eucharist. Therefore, Christ's body existing in the Sacrament cannot be seen by a bodily eye.

I answer that although Christ's body existing in the Eucharist cannot connaturally and by God's ordinary power emit a species of itself and impress it upon the sense, there is no incompatibility in its emitting a species of itself into the eye through a higher natural action, with God concurring supernaturally and supplying in the object the defect of local extension, just as he sometimes supplies the defect of presence and proximity, as is evident in the blessed Stephen, who saw from earth Christ standing in heaven. Even granting that this were impossible, it cannot be denied that God can immediately produce such a species in the eye by himself, for no incompatibility appears in this.

20. You will say: such a species emitted by Christ's body or immediately produced by God would be either divisible or indivisible. If indivisible, it could not be received in an extended bodily eye. If divisible, it could not represent Christ's body existing in the Eucharist in an indivisible and unextended manner.

I answer that this species would be divisible and would nevertheless represent Christ's body existing in the Eucharist. For although a divisible species cannot represent an object existing indivisibly if that object is indivisible both in relation to itself and in relation to place, it can do so if the object is indivisible only in relation to place and divisible in itself. Hence, since Christ's body in the Eucharist possesses the integral extension of its parts in itself, although it lacks local extension, it can be represented to a bodily eye through a divisible species.

21. You will object, secondly, against the second part of the same conclusion: if a bodily eye saw Christ's body as existing in the Sacrament and nevertheless did not perceive the mode by which it exists there, it would abstract one from the other. For a power knowing one thing while not knowing another joined to it is said to abstract or prescind one from the other. But the visual power, since it is bodily and immersed in matter, is not abstractive, as philosophers teach. Therefore, a bodily eye cannot see Christ's body as existing in the Sacrament unless it also sees the mode by which it exists there.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise and distinguishing its proof. A power knowing one thing while not knowing another joined to it is said to abstract if what is not known pertains to the object of the power, I grant; if it does not pertain to its object, I deny. Thus, when sight perceives the color of an apple without perceiving its odor, it is not said to abstract one from the other, because the apple's odor does not pertain to the object of the visual power. Likewise, the eyes that saw Christ living upon earth saw him as existing, but did not perceive his divine existence and subsistence; yet this vision was not abstractive, because existence and subsistence do not pertain to the specifying object of the visual power. Similarly, although a bodily eye supernaturally saw Christ existing in the Sacrament without seeing the supernatural mode by which he exists there, it would not be said to abstract one from the other, because such a mode, being spiritual and incorporeal, is not contained within the object of the visual power.

CHAPTER VI.
The Eucharistic Accidents.

1. That the accidents of bread and wine remain in the Eucharist after consecration is taught not only by faith and defined by several Councils, but is also certainly established by the experience of the senses. For in the

consecrated host we see whiteness and perceive a certain taste; we touch its figure, and so forth. It is no less certain that they then remain without any substantial subject. For they do not inhere in the substance of bread and wine, since that ceases through consecration; nor in Christ's body and blood, otherwise Christ's body in the Eucharist would be alterable, corruptible, and locally extended; nor in another substance substituted in place of the bread and wine, for this conflicts with the propriety of the words of the form of consecration, because then not Christ's body, but that substance beneath the accidents would be demonstrated. Therefore, there is no substantial subject in which they then inhere, and consequently they are conserved without a substantial subject, with divine power sustaining them, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 77, a. 1.

When God is said to sustain them, one must not think that he concurs materially and subjectively, for this involves too great an imperfection to be attributed to God. Rather, he sustains them efficiently, insofar as by efficient causality he supplies what is lacking in material concurrence. Nor should anyone think that through this any violence is inflicted upon the aforesaid accidents, since there is implanted in every being a universal obedience to the Creator, which is prior to and stronger than every particular inclination.

2. Since, therefore, the Eucharistic accidents lack a substantial subject and inhere in no substance, it follows that they are subjected in the quantity of bread and wine, which performs the function of a substance and of a receptive and sustaining principle as that which receives and sustains. For the opinion of the Nominalists, who think that all the accidents are without a subject and exist through themselves, seems improbable. This is to multiply miracles without necessity, because, once it is supposed that quantity can subsist through itself, it can underlie the other accidents and perform the function of a substance, especially because among bodily accidents quantity holds the first place, is the first disposition of matter, and approaches most closely to the genus of material cause.

Almost all theologians agree on this, but there is a difficulty and controversy among them concerning that by which God causes quantity to subsist through itself and to underlie the other accidents: whether he does so immediately through himself and by the mere maintenance or special concurrence by which he conserves quantity without a subject; or through some mode of existing through itself, similar to that by which a substance exists through itself and independently of a sustaining subject.

Each manner of speaking is probable, but the second seems more probable. First, because, since this mode of existing through itself supplies the function of a subject, quantity exists through it more connaturally than

through the merely extrinsic maintenance of God, or concurrence conserving it without a subject. Secondly, because, once such a mode is admitted, it is better understood and explained how the quantity of bread and wine, which before consecration was only a receptive and sustaining subject as that by which the other accidents were received and sustained, becomes a receptive and sustaining subject as that which receives and sustains. Finally, because it seems fitting that, just as quantity after consecration performs the function of a substance, so it should receive some mode of existing through itself which is a certain participation in the mode by which a substance exists through itself, independently of every sustaining subject.

Although the mode of inherence cannot be communicated to a substance, the mode of existing through itself can be communicated to an accident. For although it is incompatible with substance to be cast down to the state of an accident, nothing prevents an accident from being divinely elevated to a participation in the mode of existence proper to a substance.

From this you will understand that the mode of existing through itself communicated by God to Eucharistic quantity is substantial, not accidental, as some think. It does not matter if you say that a mode cannot be more perfect than the thing it modifies; but if that mode were substantial, it would be more perfect than the thing modified, namely quantity, which is a pure accident. The answer is easy: although a mode connatural to the thing it modifies cannot be more perfect than that thing, a mode of a superior and supernatural order can be, such as the one of which we speak.

Nor is the objection of some valid, namely, that after consecration nothing substantial remains in the Eucharist, but only the accidents, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 13, c. 4. For the sacred Synod intends only that after consecration nothing of the substance of bread and wine remains, that is, neither matter, form, subsistence, nor existence, and that no other substance succeeds it except Christ's body and blood. This is not opposed to saying that a substantial mode by which it subsists through itself and underlies the other accidents is divinely and supernaturally added to quantity.

CHAPTER VII.

How Something Can Be Generated from the Sacramental Species.

3. It is evident to the senses and established by experience itself that something can be generated from the sacramental species. For we see worms

generated from the consecrated species through moisture, ashes through their combustion, or vinegar through the corruption of the species of wine. But how this generation occurs is difficult to explain. For that which is generated comes from some matter, from whose potentiality the form is educed. But beneath the sacramental species there is no matter other than that of Christ's body, which is incorruptible. For the matter of bread ceased through its conversion into Christ's body, as is certain from what has been said. Therefore, it seems impossible for anything to be generated from the sacramental species.

4. Certain ancient theologians reported by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 77, a. 5, in order to escape this difficulty, said that when worms or similar things are generated in this Sacrament, such generation does not occur from the sacramental species, but from the surrounding air. Others whom he recounts in the same place affirmed that this generation occurs from the returning substance of bread and wine.

But both opinions are wholly alien to the truth, as the holy Doctor shows there. The first is false because such things as worms, ashes, or vinegar are not ordinarily generated from air; and even if no air surrounds the species, but they are enclosed in solid bodies such as gold or silver, a similar generation occurs. The second is false because, since the substance of bread and wine has been converted into Christ's body and blood, it cannot return while the species remain except either through a conversion of Christ's body and blood into it, which repeated conversion must not be admitted, since no one has hitherto acknowledged it; or through its reproduction, which also must not be admitted, because, since by the ordinary course of nature the numerically same thing is not reproduced, miracles would be multiplied without necessity. This, as the holy Doctor warns, must be altogether avoided in this mystery.

5. Nor is what Scotus and Vásquez say valid, namely, that the worms or ashes which are sometimes seen to be produced from the Eucharistic species are miraculously created by God. First, because St. Thomas and theologians generally teach that they are produced through generation and eduction, not through creation. Secondly, because, since the true generation of worms or ashes can be preserved, as will be clear from what is said below, there is no reason to have recourse to creation and multiply miracles without necessity.

Thus also is refuted the opinion of some who think that when worms are generated in the Eucharist, the quantity of bread is miraculously converted by God into the whole composite. For such a conversion could not be called generation, since the form would not be educed from the potentiality of matter. Moreover, besides the miracle consisting in the conversion of the

quantity of bread into the whole composite, another would have to be admitted, consisting in this: the natural agent would place all the dispositions for some form and yet would not introduce it.

6. Finally, although the opinion of certain theologians was once celebrated, who thought that when something is generated from the Eucharistic species no prime matter is produced by God from whose potentiality the substantial form is educed, but that quantity itself then performs the function of matter, not only in receiving the previous dispositions, but also in the eduction of the substantial form of the newly generated composite, so that this composite consists only of quantity and substantial form, nevertheless in our times this opinion is generally rejected because of the various absurdities and inconveniences that follow from it.

For if what is generated from the sacramental species had no matter but consisted only of quantity, performing the function of matter and sustaining the produced form, it would follow, first, that worms generated from the sacramental species would be neither substantial nor accidental composites, but monsters of nature, or half-substances and half-accidents. Secondly, it would follow that vinegar generated from corrupted species of wine would not be of the same nature and species as other vinegar generated from corrupted wine, and consequently could not produce effects of the same species. Thirdly, there would be a perpetual miracle. For that quantity which possessed the character of matter would be without a subject not only as long as the Eucharist endured, but afterward until the end of the world, so that although infinitely many generations occurred successively from it, it would always remain without a subject and exercise the function of prime matter, since there is no greater reason for one generation than for another. Finally, it could occur that one nourished only by the Eucharistic species would be in such a condition that his soul would inform partly prime matter and partly quantity alone, and thus he would be only half a man and half a composite. This is, as Soto rightly says, to expose all philosophy to ridicule.

7. Nor does it matter that St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion in Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 5, where he says: In the consecration itself it is miraculously given to the dimensive quantity of bread and wine that it be the first subject of subsequent forms. But this is proper to matter; and therefore, as a consequence, everything pertaining to matter is given to the aforesaid dimensive quantity. Hence whatever could be generated from the matter of bread, if it were present, can be generated entirely from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of bread and wine, not indeed by a new miracle, but by the power of the miracle already performed.

This authority of the holy Doctor does not present an obstacle. For with Cajetan, Capreolus, and other Thomists, the answer is that St. Thomas's meaning is that the quantity of the species miraculously receives in the consecration itself the ability to discharge the office of matter and to be the subject of subsequent accidental forms, namely, of the qualities altering the consecrated species; but not of the substantial form of the composite newly produced upon the corruption of those species.

Hence, when he adds, *Whatever could be generated from the matter of bread, if it were present, can be generated entirely from the aforesaid dimensive quantity*, he does not take generation for the eduction and reception of the generated form—for that form is educed not from quantity, but from matter produced by God, as we shall immediately say—but for the preceding alteration which disposes toward such eduction and reception of the form. For this alteration is received in quantity performing the function of matter.

For the resolution of the difficulty, therefore, it must be proposed that when something is generated from the sacramental species, prime matter is produced by God, from whose potentiality the substantial form of the generated thing is educed and in which it is received, not in quantity itself. The reason is that it belongs to the nature of every material and physical composite to consist of matter and form, nor can it otherwise be called a physical composite. But a worm generated from the sacramental species is truly a physical and material composite. Therefore, it consists of matter and form. Consequently, when it is generated from such species, prime matter must necessarily be produced by God, from whose potentiality the worm's substantial form is educed.

8. If you ask by what action that matter is produced, I answer that it is more probable that it is produced by God through the conversion of quantity into it than that it is created by him. First, because it seems more connatural that the subject into which a natural agent introduced the accidents and dispositions for a substantial form should, since it cannot receive the substantial form itself, be converted by God into the matter in which that form must be received. Secondly, because from the power of the former miracle it follows more connaturally that, just as the substance of bread was converted into Christ's body, so what remains of the substance of bread, namely quantity, should be converted into the matter from which the substantial form is to be educed.

Hence St. Thomas favors this opinion in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 77, a. 5, in the body and ad 3, and a. 6, ad 2, where he teaches that when a substantial composite is generated from the consecrated species, matter is produced at the instant of generation through the conversion of quantity into it.

9. Nor is it valid to say that true generation requires that the subject precede the form to be educed from it, since generation is essentially a change or passage from privation to form. To this it is answered with Cajetan that for true generation it is not necessary that matter should have preceded the introduction of the new form in time, provided that it preceded in the quantity performing its function. For since equivalent things are judged in the same manner, it is sufficient that quantity, supplying the function and offices of matter throughout the whole time preceding the instant of generation, should have preceded beneath the privation of the new form.

CHAPTER VIII.
The Form of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

1. It is certain that the necessary and essential form of the consecration of the bread consists adequately in these four words: *This is my body.* Consequently, even if the other preceding or subsequent words are not pronounced, the bread is transmuted into Christ's body.

For only those words belong to the essence of the consecration of the bread which signify the presence of Christ's body beneath the species. But only the aforesaid words signify this presence. For the words *Who the day before* in no manner signify such a presence, as is evident. Nor do the words *Take* and *eat*, because they signify only use and distribution, which are not necessary to the Sacrament and which presuppose the presence of Christ's body beneath the species rather than effect it. Nor, finally, do the words *Which shall be given for you*, for even if they are not added, the presence of Christ's body beneath the species of bread is signified. Hence Luke alone among the Evangelists and Paul alone among the Apostles report these words.

2. From this is refuted, first, the opinion of certain Greeks who think that for the transmutation of the bread into Christ's body, besides the aforesaid words, *This is my body*, certain prayers handed down by the holy Fathers must necessarily be added, which through the invocation of the Holy Spirit possess the power of transmuting bread and wine into Christ's body and blood.

This opinion, or rather error, is refuted: 1º because, since the words in the Sacraments effect what they signify, if the aforesaid words signify the presence of Christ's body beneath the species of bread, they effect it. Consequently, no other prayers are necessary to transmute the bread into

Christ's body; 2º because according to the perpetual tradition of the Church, immediately after the words of consecration have been pronounced, the priest presents the consecrated bread and wine to the people for adoration, not only in the Latin Church but also in the Greek, as Cardinal Bessarion reports in his book *De verbis consecrationis*, and Peter Arcudius in *De concordia Ecclesiae occidentalis et orientalis in septem sacramentorum administratione*, l. 4, *De Eucharistia*, c. 13. Therefore, the words of consecration alone suffice to consecrate Christ's body and blood, and no other prayers or blessings besides them are required for this.

3. Nor does it matter if you say that in the liturgies of St. James, St. Basil, and St. John Chrysostom, after the words *This is my body. This is the chalice of my blood*, the priest prays that the bread and wine may become Christ's body and blood. For, as the Greeks explained at the Council of Florence when questioned about this matter, by these words it is not asked that it become Christ's body simply, but that it become so for us, that is, that it profit us and not become poison through our fault when it ought to be an antidote and saving food. Or, as Cardinal Bessarion says in the book cited above, by these words the priests pray that those standing before the mysteries may, through worthy reception of the Sacrament, be made one body with Christ.

This interpretation is confirmed by the prayers which Basil and Chrysostom immediately append after the consecration of the Eucharist: That all of us who partake of the one bread and the one chalice may be united with one another in the communion of the one Holy Spirit, and that you may cause us to receive your holy body so that we may find mercy and grace in the age of all the saints.

4. Secondly, the opinion of Scotus and Angelus is refuted. They teach that in order to effect the Sacrament of the Eucharist, these words of the Canon must necessarily be placed before the form: *Who the day before he suffered*, and so forth, because unless they are placed before it, the priest does not signify that he is speaking in the Person of Christ, but in his own person; and consequently when he says, *This is my body*, he demonstrates not Christ's body, but his own.

St. Thomas refutes this opinion excellently in Summa Theologiae III, q. 78, a. 1, ad 4: Some have said that this Sacrament cannot be completed by pronouncing the aforesaid words, namely, "This is my body; this is the chalice of my blood," while omitting the others, especially those contained in the Canon of the Mass. But this is plainly false, both from the words of Ambrose cited above and because the Canon of the Mass has not been the same among all or at all times, but diverse words have been added by diverse persons. Hence it must be said that if the priest pronounced only the

aforesaid words with the intention of effecting this Sacrament, the Sacrament would be completed, because his intention would cause these words to be understood as pronounced in the Person of Christ, even if this were not recited in the preceding words.

From this the answer to Scotus's foundation is clear. Although the sacramental words, considered precisely according to the force of the discourse, are not referred to the Person of Christ, they are so referred when joined with Christ's institution and the priest's intention. Thus, if a king instituted certain words which, whenever spoken by a magistrate or judge, would represent the person of the king, by the very fact that they were afterward pronounced by them in the manner and circumstances prescribed by the king, they would represent his person without other words signifying that they speak in the king's person.

5. A more serious controversy concerns the form of the chalice, namely, whether all these words contained in it—For this is the chalice of my blood, of the new and eternal covenant, the mystery of faith, which shall be shed for you and for many for the remission of sins—belong to its essence.

Many of our Thomists think that only the words *This is the chalice of my blood* pertain to the essence and consecration of the chalice, and consequently that these alone transmute wine into Christ's blood. The other words, however, belong only to the integrity of the form, just as satisfaction is an integral but not essential part of the Sacrament of Penance, and just as in its form the words *from your sins* are judged substantial, but not essential.

6. Nevertheless, I think that St. Thomas manifestly supports the opposite opinion. Hence, although it seems more difficult because of the argument drawn from various liturgies in which some of the aforesaid words are omitted, nevertheless, following the footsteps of the older theologians and Thomists, with whom many recent authors agree, especially the learned Father Nicolai in his scholia on *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 78, a. 3, I shall briefly undertake to defend it.

In its favor I produced several testimonies of the holy Doctor in the Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae. Here I shall report only two which seem clearer and more explicit. The first is taken from his commentary on 1 Cor. 11, lect. 6, where he writes: Concerning these words which the Church uses in the consecration of the blood, some think that not all are necessary to the form, but only what is said, "This is the chalice of my blood," and not the remainder that follows, "of the new and eternal covenant, the mystery of faith, which shall be shed for you and for many for the remission of sins." But this does not seem fittingly said. For the whole of what follows is a certain determination of the predicate, and therefore pertains to the

meaning or signification of the same utterance. And because, as has often been said, the forms of the Sacraments effect by signifying, the whole pertains to the effective power of the form.

7. From these words a twofold argument can be drawn in favor of our opinion. The first is this: what is necessary to the form of a Sacrament also belongs to its essence. For the Sacrament can be effected and completed when those things are excluded which do not belong to its essence, but only to its integrity, or which are merely accidental to it. But according to St. Thomas just cited, not only the words *This is the chalice of my blood*, but also those that follow, *of the new and eternal covenant*, and so forth, are necessary to the form of the consecration of the chalice. Therefore, they also belong to its essence.

8. The second can be proposed thus: since the Sacraments are practical signs, effecting what they signify and signifying what they effect, whatever pertains to the effective power of the Sacraments also belongs to their essence, or to their essential signification. But according to St. Thomas, not only the words *This is the chalice of my blood*, but also the words that follow pertain to the effective power of the form of consecration of the chalice. Therefore, they also belong to its essence.

9. This twofold reasoning can be confirmed and illustrated by an example drawn from the form of the Sacrament of Penance. Since, according to the more common opinion of theologians, that form essentially and adequately consists only in the words *I absolve you*, the words *from your sins* are neither judged necessary to it nor considered to contain the power productive of grace remitting sins. Rather, they pertain only to its integrity or fuller explanation. Hence, if they were omitted by the priest, the penitent would be truly absolved and would receive grace remitting sins.

Likewise, therefore, if the words of the form of consecration of the chalice, *of the new and eternal covenant*, and so forth, did not belong to its essence, but only to its integrity, and were added only for a fuller explanation, they could not be said to be necessary to it or to contain the effective power of Christ's blood. Since St. Thomas teaches the opposite in the words cited above, it is manifest that the holy Doctor supports our opinion.

Hence it is a mere evasion and mockery when the author of the *Theologia mentis et cordis* says that when St. Thomas teaches that all the aforesaid words are necessary to the form and contain a power productive of Christ's blood, this must be understood not by way of constituting the form, but by way of its fuller explanation. For those things which in the Sacraments pertain only to the fuller explanation of the form are neither said to be

necessary to them nor to contain the effective power of grace or of Christ's body, as is evident in the example given of the form of the Sacrament of Penance.

Hence, assigning the reason why the aforesaid words contain the power productive of Christ's blood, St. Thomas says: *Because the forms of the Sacraments signify the effect, the whole pertains to the effective power of the form.* By these words he openly teaches that the productive power in the forms of the Sacraments proceeds from their essential signification, because, as we said above, the Sacraments are practical signs of grace and effect what they signify and signify what they effect.

10. The second testimony of the holy Doctor is found in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 8, q. 2, a. 2, qla. 1, where, after reporting the opinion of those who say that only the words *This is the chalice of my blood* belong to the form of the consecration of the chalice, so that the form of each consecration may be similar, he adds shortly afterward: *Others say more probably that the whole of what follows belongs to the form.*

That he is speaking of the essential form is evident from his answer ad 3. The objection proceeded thus: Properties naturally follow the substance of a thing. But what follows the substance cannot be productive of transubstantiation. Therefore, since the words that follow designate certain properties of the blood into which transubstantiation occurs, it seems that they do not belong to the form.

He answers this argument: To the third it must be said that although the words that follow designate certain properties of the blood if considered in themselves alone, nevertheless they are essential to the blood insofar as it was shed through the Passion. Therefore, the words that follow are essential to the blood insofar as it is consecrated in this Sacrament, and hence they must belong to the substance of the form. Here he clearly takes "substance" for essence.

Hence one may argue thus: those things which are essential to the blood insofar as it is consecrated in this Sacrament are also essential to the form by which such consecration occurs. But according to St. Thomas, *the words that follow are essential to the blood insofar as it is consecrated in this Sacrament*. Therefore, they are also essential to the form by which such consecration occurs.

11. Nor is what the aforesaid recent author says valid, namely, that St. Thomas calls those words essential to the blood insofar as it is consecrated in this Sacrament because they explain the essence of the blood as actually separated, which the words essential in themselves signify only generally. For I ask him whether that explanation and signification of the blood as

separated from the body is essential to the blood insofar as it is consecrated in this Sacrament or not. If it is essential, it follows that the words *which shall be shed for you and for many* belong to the essence of the form. But if it is not essential, it is false for that author to say that St. Thomas calls those words essential because they explain the separation of the blood from the body.

The fundamental reason for our opinion is none other than that which St. Thomas indicates in various places. The Eucharist was instituted not only to signify Christ's body and blood in the manner of food and drink, but also to express the efficacy of Christ's Passion communicated to us perpetually in the manner of a new covenant. It is one of the chief mysteries of our faith, confers a right to eternal life, and remits sins. Therefore, it was fitting that its essential form should include all those words signifying such properties and effects of the Eucharist.

Moreover, the Eucharist has not only the nature of a Sacrament, but also the nature of a sacrifice. But the nature of a sacrifice cannot be expressed, just as it cannot actually be effected, without the shedding of blood. Therefore, the words *which shall be shed for you and for many* are necessary to express adequately and perfectly the nature of the Eucharist.

This reasoning is confirmed and further illustrated by the example of the form of Baptism. Because Baptism is not only a Sacrament instituted to regenerate the faithful, but also a profession of faith, the essence of its form includes not only the words signifying regenerating grace, but also those expressing the Persons of the Trinity, which is the chief mystery of our faith. Similarly, therefore, since the Eucharist has not only the nature of a Sacrament, but also that of a sacrifice, not only the words signifying the presence of Christ's blood beneath the species of wine, which pertains to the nature of a Sacrament, belong to the essence of the form of the chalice, but also those expressing the shedding of the blood, by which the nature of the sacrifice is signified and declared.

12. Nor does it matter if you say with the aforesaid recent author that the nature of the sacrifice is sufficiently expressed in the Eucharist through the mystical and sacramental separation of the body from the blood, which occurs in this Sacrament because the species of bread are consecrated separately from those of wine.

For in the other Sacraments it is not sufficient that the sacramental effect be expressed only by things; it is also required that it be expressed by words, which signify more explicitly than things. This is evident in Baptism. Its effect is designated not only by the external washing, which is its matter, but also by the words of the form, which signify more expressly and

determine the external washing, which of itself is indifferent to being ordered to various effects, so that it designates the internal washing through sanctifying and regenerating grace. Therefore, neither will the expression by things alone suffice to express the sacrifice of the New Law; in addition, the signification of words is required.

13. You will say: the words *This is my blood* not only place Christ's blood as mystically separated from his body, but also signify it as mystically separated from the body. Therefore, they sufficiently express the nature of the sacrifice.

To the contrary: grant that the words expressing the conversion of the wine into Christ's blood signify it as mystically separated from the body. They still do not thereby express the nature of sacrifice sufficiently. For even an action mystically separating the blood from the body upon the altar is of itself indifferent to separating it merely in the manner of food and drink, or also in the manner of a sacrifice. Therefore, for it to be mystically separative in this second manner, it must be expressed by the word *shall be shed*, since in the form of the chalice there is no other word capable of determining that mystical separation of the blood from the body to the nature of a sacrifice. For the word *shall be shed* perfectly expresses the action by which the victim is immolated.

14. The adversaries object, first, that St. Thomas in Summa Theologiae III, q. 78, a. 1, ad 4, says: If the priest pronounced only the aforesaid words with the intention of effecting this Sacrament, the Sacrament would be completed. By "the aforesaid words" he understands those which he had placed in the title of the article. But the title is: Whether this is the form of this Sacrament: "This is my body," and "This is the chalice of my blood." Therefore, St. Thomas judges that the consecration of the chalice is completed by the words This is the chalice of my blood alone.

I answer that when the holy Doctor says, If the priest pronounced only the aforesaid words, the Sacrament would be completed, by the word only he excludes the words preceding the consecration of the body and blood, namely, Who the day before he suffered, and so forth, but not the subsequent words, namely, of the new and eternal covenant, and so forth.

That this interpretation is legitimate and according to the mind of the holy Doctor is evident, first, from the text itself. For he says: If the priest pronounced only the aforesaid words with the intention of effecting this Sacrament, the Sacrament would be completed, because his intention would cause these words to be understood as pronounced in the Person of Christ, even if this were not recited in the preceding words. Therefore, the holy Doctor excludes only the preceding words, not the subsequent ones.

Secondly, this is evident from the words of the argument which he raises against himself: *If the other words were omitted, the aforesaid words*—namely, *This is my body; this is the chalice of my blood—would be understood as spoken in the person of the priest pronouncing them, into whose body and blood the bread and wine would be converted.* As we saw above, this was the sole foundation by which Scotus and certain other ancient theologians were led to think that the Sacrament of the Eucharist is not completed unless the words of the Canon, *Who the day before he suffered*, are recited by the priest.

St. Thomas overturns this foundation in the words already cited, saying that if the priest pronounced only the aforesaid words with the intention of effecting this Sacrament, the Sacrament would be completed, because his intention would cause these words to be understood as pronounced in the Person of Christ, even if this were not recited in the preceding words, namely, Who the day before he suffered. It therefore cannot be called into doubt that St. Thomas excludes there only the preceding words and not the subsequent ones.

Nor does it matter that in the fourth objection which he raises against himself it is said: *It seems that sometimes this Sacrament can be completed by pronouncing these words alone and omitting all the others said in the Mass.* For the words which he immediately adds, and which we cited above, manifestly show that this must be limited to all the words said in the Mass before consecration, since the only question is whether they are required so that the priest may pronounce the words of consecration in the Person of Christ. No one has ever said that words pronounced after consecration are necessary for this.

15. They object, secondly: only those words belong to the essence of the form of the chalice which signify the conversion of wine into blood, just as only those belong to the essential form of the consecration of the body which designate the conversion of bread into Christ's body. But the words *This is the chalice of my blood*, even when separated from the others, signify the conversion of wine into blood just as much as the words *This is my body* signify the conversion of bread into Christ's body. St. Thomas teaches this in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 78, a. 3, in the body: *When it is said, "This is the chalice of my blood," the conversion of wine into blood is signified in the same manner as was stated concerning the form of the consecration of bread.* Therefore, only those words belong to the essence of the form of the chalice, while the subsequent words pertain only to its integrity. Hence the same holy Doctor says in the same place that they pertain *to the integrity of the same utterance*.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Only those words belong to the essence of the form of the chalice which signify the conversion of wine into blood absolutely, I deny the major premise; into blood as shed for us for the remission of sins and with the other circumstances and properties explained above, I grant it.

The solution is evident from what has been said. Since the Eucharist has not only the nature of a Sacrament but also that of a sacrifice, whose nature includes the immolation of a victim and the shedding of blood, words signifying the conversion of wine into blood do not suffice for the essence of the form of the chalice. Other words designating its shedding are also required.

Hence, when St. Thomas says that the conversion of wine is signified by the words *This is the chalice of my blood*, this must be understood only materially and grammatically, because this is what the words present of themselves, although he presupposes that all that follows pertains to the formal signification by Christ's institution. Hence, in the passage cited above from his commentary on 1 Corinthians he says: *Because the forms of the Sacraments effect by signifying, the whole pertains to their effective power.* Here he openly teaches that all the words pronounced in the consecration of the chalice pertain to the signification and consequently to the effective power of the form.

Thus, in the form of Baptism, although the words *I baptize you* alone materially and grammatically signify the effect of this Sacrament, nevertheless the words that follow pertain to its formal signification by Christ's institution, so that the essence of the form of Baptism requires the addition *in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*, because Baptism not only has the nature of a Sacrament conferring regenerating grace, but is also a profession of faith. Similarly, because the Eucharist is one of the chief mysteries of our faith, has not only the nature of a Sacrament but also that of a covenant and sacrifice, confers a right to eternal life, and remits sins, not only the words *This is the chalice of my blood*, but also those that follow pertain by Christ's institution to the formal signification of the form of the chalice and consequently to its power effective of the blood.

16. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas says the words that follow pertain to the integrity of the utterance. For this does not exclude their pertaining to the essence of the form. An utterance can be essentially composed of words pertaining to its integrity, as is evident from the preceding words, *This is the chalice of my blood*, which the adversaries admit to pertain to the essence of the form of the chalice, yet which together with the subsequent words complete and compose one utterance. For, as St.

Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 78, a. 4, ad 3: *A certain composition is made from the words outwardly pronounced.*

Certain recent authors therefore err in failing to notice that St. Thomas never said that the subsequent words pertain to the integrity of the form, but only to the integrity of the same utterance. This does not exclude their pertaining to the essence of the form. Thus, in the form of Baptism the words *in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit* pertain to the integrity of the same utterance, because together with the preceding words they complete and compose it; yet this does not prevent them from belonging to the essence of the form. The same must be said proportionately in the present case, especially because regenerating grace does not include the profession of faith in the most Holy Trinity as intrinsically and of itself as the consecration of the blood sacramentally separated from the body includes the nature of a perfect sacrifice.

17. They object, thirdly: in various authentic liturgies approved by the Roman See, all these words are not found: *of the new and eternal covenant, the mystery of faith, which shall be shed for you and for many for the remission of sins.* They are either entirely omitted, or not all are present, some being reported in certain liturgies and others in others. But the words *This is my blood* are contained constantly and uniformly in all. Therefore, these words alone belong to the essence of the form of the chalice, not the others that follow.

I answer, first, that if this argument were valid, it would prove that the subsequent words not only do not belong to the essence of the form of the chalice, but do not even belong to its substance and integrity, and are merely accidental, as recent authors commonly think, chiefly because of this argument drawn from the aforesaid liturgies. For it is incredible that the Apostles and holy Fathers, who composed those liturgies under a special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, did not hand down a form integrally complete in substance, but one defective and mutilated, and wished to omit several words required for its substance and integrity, and that the Apostolic See nevertheless approved them.

I answer, secondly, that in all approved liturgies the words *which shall be shed for you and for many* are found. For in the liturgy of St. James it is said: *This is my blood of the new covenant, which is shed and given for you and for many for the remission of sins.* In the liturgy of St. Mark: *For this is my blood of the new covenant, which is shed for you and for many for the remission of sins.* In the liturgy of St. Basil: *This is my blood of the new covenant, which shall be shed for you and for many for the remission of sins.* In the liturgy of St. John Chrysostom: *For this is my blood of the new covenant, which shall be shed for you and for very many for the remission of sins.* In the liturgy of the Ethiopians,

whose author is believed to be St. Matthew: *This is the chalice of my blood, which shall be shed for you and for the redemption of many.* Finally, the same is contained in the Mozarabic liturgy, in which the form of the chalice is the same as that used by the Roman Church.

The liturgy of St. Peter, however, in which only these words are given as the form of the chalice, *This is my blood*, is not believed to be authentic, because it is said merely to have been published through the efforts of William Lindanus, Bishop of Ghent, and no ancient author mentions it. This is especially so because in it these words are given in the form for the body: *which is broken for you*. It is not likely that St. Peter used these words, for otherwise the other Supreme Pontiffs, his successors, would likewise have used that form in order to conform themselves to him.

Therefore, if the argument drawn from the ancient liturgies is valid, it follows that not only the words *This is the chalice of my blood*, but also *which shall be shed for you and for many* belong to the essence of the form of the chalice, since both the latter and the former are contained constantly and uniformly in all authentic and approved liturgies.

I answer, thirdly, that this argument presents no greater difficulty than that commonly raised concerning the form of the Sacrament of Confirmation and the matter and form of the Sacrament of Order. For in conferring the Sacrament of Confirmation, the Greeks use this form: *The seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit*, which is altogether different from that used by the Roman Church. Likewise, in the Greek Church priests are not ordained, as in the Latin Church, by the presentation of the chalice and paten, nor by the pronouncement of the form *Receive the power*, and so forth, but only by the imposition of hands joined with the words: *Divine grace, which always heals what is weak and supplies what is lacking, promotes N., the venerable deacon, to the priesthood*, and so forth.

Nevertheless, the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene defines that the priesthood is conferred through the presentation of the chalice with wine and the paten with bread and through these words, which take the place of the form: *Receive the power of offering sacrifice in the Church for the living and the dead.*

Therefore, just as several celebrated theologians, in order to escape this difficulty and preserve the valid conferral of the Sacraments of Confirmation and Order in the Greek Church, notwithstanding that the Greeks use matter or form specifically diverse from that employed by the Latin Church, answer that Christ did not determine the form of the Sacrament of Confirmation and the matter and form of the Sacrament of Order specifically, but only generically, leaving their specific determination to his Church, so that

according to the diverse traditions of the Latin and Greek Churches they are variously designated; likewise I say that Christ did not determine the specific form of the chalice, but left its determination to his Church. Hence, according to diverse traditions, various liturgies were composed in which the form is handed down in different ways, and certain words found in one are changed or omitted in another.

18. The author of the *Theologia mentis et cordis* rejects this answer and says that the doctrine concerning the variation of forms or matters in the Latin and Greek Churches is irrelevant to the present question. For, he says, if the Greeks used in the consecration of the chalice a form specifically and essentially diverse from that used by the Roman Church, the Roman Church could not and ought not tolerate this error, this mutilation of the form, and the suppression of so many essential words, since she possesses no power to change anything pertaining to the essence of the Sacraments.

19. But that author fails to notice that this objection militates no less against his own opinion than against ours. For although he does not think that the aforesaid words *of the new and eternal covenant, the mystery of faith*, and so forth, belong to the essence of the form of the chalice, he nevertheless judges them to belong to its substance and integrity. But the Church can neither approve what is contrary to the substance and integrity of the Sacraments nor tolerate defective and mutilated forms, since she has no power over anything pertaining to the substance and integrity of the Sacraments, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 21, c. 2.

Hence, as we showed above, she cannot dispense so that the Sacrament of the Eucharist be conferred under one species alone, because the consecration of both species pertains to the integrity of this Sacrament, which was instituted in the manner of a banquet.

This having been premised, I answer the objection by saying that the Roman Church prudently tolerates the rite of the Greek Church consecrating the chalice with only these four words, *This is the chalice of my blood*, because Christ did not will to determine the specific form of the consecration of the chalice, just as he did not determine specifically, but only generically, the form of the Sacrament of Confirmation and the matter and form of the Sacrament of Order. Hence, just as the Roman Church prudently permits the rite of the Greeks in conferring the Sacraments of Confirmation and Order, although it differs altogether in matter or form from the rite of the Roman Church, so she wisely tolerates their rite in the consecration of the chalice, although it differs from the rite of the Latin Church.

CHAPTER IX.
The Effects of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

1. The proper and principal effect of this Sacrament is to confer grace in the manner of nourishment and increase in the spiritual life. For it was instituted in the manner of spiritual food and drink, according to John 6: *My flesh is truly food, and my blood is truly drink.* Therefore, just as material food nourishes and increases the body, so the Eucharist nourishes and increases the soul. It cannot do this otherwise than by conferring grace in the manner of nourishment and increase in spiritual life.

In this it differs from the Sacrament of Confirmation, which bestows athletic grace and strength to resist the enemies of the faith. A sign of this difference is that the confirmed person is anointed upon the forehead, whereas the Eucharist, received in the manner of food, penetrates to the heart. The principle of strength is in the heart, says the holy Doctor in Summa Theologiae III, q. 72, a. 9, ad 2, but its sign appears upon the forehead. Hence it is said in Ezek. 3: "Behold, I have made your forehead harder than their foreheads." Therefore, the Sacrament of the Eucharist, by which man is strengthened in himself, pertains to the heart, according to Ps. 103: "May bread strengthen the heart of man." But the Sacrament of Confirmation requires a sign of strength in relation to others, and therefore it is administered upon the forehead.

2. A second effect especially proper to this Sacrament is a certain joy, sweetness, and spiritual delight by which pure souls are filled and, as it were, made drunk in receiving it. St. Thomas declares this in Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 1, ad 2: By the power of this Sacrament the soul is spiritually refreshed, insofar as the soul is spiritually delighted and in a certain manner inebriated by the sweetness of divine goodness, according to Cant. 5: "Eat, friends, and drink, and be inebriated, dearly beloved."

In commendation of this wonderful effect it is said in Isa. 25: *The Lord of hosts shall make upon this mountain*—namely, the Church—*a feast of rich foods and a feast of the vintage, a feast of rich foods filled with marrow and of purified wine.* For here pure delights are presented to us, having nothing of bitterness mixed with them, because in this Sacrament sweetness is tasted at its proper source, as St. Thomas says in opusc. 58, and the milk of the divine breasts promised in this prophecy of Isaiah is offered to us: *You shall be nursed at the breasts of kings.*

Hence Hugh of St. Victor says: Wisdom was bread above, and was turned below into milk; and the little child was nourished by the milk of humanity, so that, growing and becoming strong, he might be able to receive the food of the Divinity.

Likewise Gregory the Great, Moralia, l. 15, c. 9, applies to Christ the words of Job 20: Let him not see the streams of the river, the torrents of honey and butter. He adds: Honey comes from the air, but butter from flesh. The Only-Begotten of the supreme Father, being God above all things, became man among all things; and when he filled us in the Eucharist with the sweetness of his Divinity and the mystery of his Incarnation, he satisfied us equally with honey and butter.

Finally, Cyprian, or the author of the sermon De cena Domini, elegantly expressed the wonderful delights of this most sweet Sacrament: Wonderful are the things he feels, great the things he sees, and unheard-of the things he speaks, whom the Paschal Lamb himself has inhabited and whose soul the strength of this wine has inebriated with inexplicable gladness. This bread of angels surpasses all the incitements of carnal labors and the sweetness of every pleasure.

It is no obstacle that very many frequently do not experience the wonderful sweetness of this heavenly food, for the palate of their heart is infected with harmful humors and with the delights of earthly things. *He is altogether mistaken,* says Bernard in sermon 6 on the Ascension, *who thinks that heavenly sweetness can be mingled with this ash, that divine balsam with this poison, or the gifts of the Spirit with enticements of this kind.*

I add with Cajetan on *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 79, a. 1, that although an increase of grace and spiritual sweetness are effects of this Sacrament, they do not have a necessary connection, but can be separated from one another. For in Christ the second effect existed without the first, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 81, a. 1, ad 3, where he says that although grace was not increased in Christ through the reception of this Sacrament, he nevertheless possessed spiritual delight.

Conversely, Cajetan says, we believe that an increase of habitual grace from this Sacrament occurs in very many who approach it worthily and devoutly, yet are without spiritual sweetness, so that their voice to the heavenly Father is: *Behold, for so many years I have served you, and you have never given me a kid that I might feast with my friends.* Yet he was a son who could truly say: *I have never transgressed your commandment*, Luke 15.

Therefore, just as the Sacrament of Extreme Unction does not always cause bodily health, but only when it is expedient for the salvation of the soul and no impediment exists on the recipient's part, so neither does the

Eucharist always cause spiritual delight and fervor, especially sensible fervor overflowing into the lower powers, but only insofar as this is expedient for the increase of grace and the virtues, or when no impediment is placed in its way by an indisposition of the subject, as happens in those who approach this Sacrament with distraction and without actual attention and devotion.

3. The third effect of this Sacrament is to remove venial sins and preserve from mortal sins, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 13, c. 2, saying that this Sacrament is *an antidote by which we are freed from daily faults and preserved from mortal sins.*

That it removes venial sins arises from two causes, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 79, a. 4. First, from the very nature of the nourishing grace it causes. For just as it is proper to bodily food to restore what is daily consumed and lost through natural heat, so it is proper to this spiritual food to restore and repair what is daily lost from the fervor and heat of charity through venial sins. Hence Ambrose, *De sacramentis*, l. 5, c. 4: *This daily bread is received as a remedy for daily weakness.*

Secondly, it removes venial sins mediately insofar as it arouses the fervor of charity, by which venial sins are remitted, since they are opposed not to the habit itself, but to the exercise or fervor of charity. Therefore, William of Paris calls this Sacrament *the food of love itself.*

This is especially true of those venial sins which are daily committed not by purpose and deliberation, but through an excessive preoccupation of unforeseen self-love. For it frequently happens, says Gregory the Great, Pastoral Rule, l. 3, c. 9, that because the mind deceives itself concerning itself, it pretends that it loves in a good work what it does not love and does not love the glory of the world which it does love. Thus one thing is suppressed in the depths by the intention, while the surface of the deliberating soul's thought displays another.

Hence the Roman Catechism, part 2, title on the Eucharist, n. 53, after saying that by the devout use of the Eucharist whatever we have lost through the ardor of concupiscence drawing us into slight offenses is restored, adds: *This, however, must be understood of those sins by whose sensation and delight the mind is not moved.*

That it preserves from mortal sins also occurs in two ways, as the same holy Doctor teaches in a. 6. Just as the body is preserved from death in two ways—first, insofar as man's nature is inwardly strengthened against corruptive influences, and thus is preserved from death through food and medicine; secondly, insofar as it is fortified against external attacks, and thus is preserved by the arms with which the body is defended—so also this Sacrament preserves the soul from the spiritual death of sin in those two

ways. First, it inwardly strengthens it as spiritual food and medicine. Secondly, it repels every assault of the demons insofar as it is a memorial of Christ's Passion, by which the demons were conquered. Hence Chrysostom, hom. 35 on John, compares the faithful refreshed by this Sacrament to lions breathing fire and declares that they are made terrible to the devil. Shortly afterward he adds that *this mystical blood drives the demons far away; for when they see the Lord's blood in us, they turn in flight*, and so forth.

4. Fourthly, the Eucharist, both insofar as it is a sacrifice and insofar as it is a Sacrament, remits the punishment due to sins, if not entirely, at least in part. Insofar as it is a sacrifice, it does this of itself and directly, for under this aspect it possesses the power of satisfying and appeasing God and rendering him propitious to us, as will be evident below when we treat of the sacrifice of the Mass.

Insofar as it is a Sacrament, it does so consequently and concomitantly. First, because, as seen above, this Sacrament possesses the power to remit venial sins and sometimes, although accidentally, mortal sins, as we showed in the treatise on the Sacraments in general. But sin is never remitted as to guilt without some remission of temporal punishment. Therefore, the debt of punishment is removed by the Eucharist as a Sacrament, if not entirely, at least in part. Secondly, because the Eucharist as a Sacrament arouses the fervor of charity, through which man obtains remission not only of guilt, but also of punishment.

5. The fifth effect of this Sacrament is the mitigation or diminution of the fomes, and consequently the cooling of concupiscence and the love of chastity. For, as St. Thomas says in Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 6, ad 3: Although this Sacrament is not directly ordered to diminishing the fomes, it nevertheless diminishes it as a consequence insofar as it increases charity, because, as Augustine says in the book of Eighty-Three Questions, the increase of charity is the diminution of cupidity.

Hence in Zech. 9 this Sacrament is called wine producing virgins, because, as Paschasius says in his book De corpore et sanguine Domini: By the wine of our race chastity is corrupted, but by this wine virgins are produced. And the Gloss on Ps. 67, Selmon, a mountain of God: From the body of Christ the members remain in grace, which is for us a defense against the incitements of vice and carnal concupiscence. And Bernard in a sermon on the Lord's Supper: If any of you now feels neither such frequent nor such bitter movements of anger, envy, lust, or other such vices, let him give thanks to the body and blood of the Lord, because the power of the Sacrament is operating in him.

6. Sixthly, immortality and the resurrection of bodies are attributed to this Sacrament by reason of the conjunction and union of our flesh with Christ's flesh, which is life-giving because it is hypostatically joined to the Divine Word, by whom all things are vivified. Hence Cyril of Alexandria, l. 14 on John, c. 2: *Just as we place a spark among much straw so as to preserve a seed of fire, so also our Lord Jesus Christ, through his flesh, conceals life within us and implants, as it were, a certain seed of immortality which abolishes all the corruption existing in us.*

And Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, l. 4, c. 34, argues thus against the Valentinians, who denied the resurrection of bodies: How do they again say that the flesh passes into corruption and does not receive life, when it is nourished by the Lord's body and blood? Fisher interprets this passage thus: It is as though he had said: because Christ's flesh is life-giving and rose to incorruptible life, it follows that the bodies of those who have worthily eaten that flesh will undoubtedly rise to immortality, provided that afterward they do not through their own fault lose the power they received.

Hence the holy Fathers call this Sacrament the symbol of the resurrection, the medicine of immortality, and a preservative against death. Indeed, in certain Churches it was customary to place it in the mouths of the dead, so that by this contact a seed of immortality might be bestowed upon their bodies. This practice was afterward prohibited by various Councils, especially the Third Council of Carthage, can. 6, and the Sixth General Council in Trullo, can. 83, because, as the Fathers gathered there say, it is written, *Take and eat*, which the dead cannot do.

7. The seventh effect of this Sacrament is final perseverance. First, because the Eucharist, having been instituted in the manner of food, nourishes and fosters the spiritual life. Secondly, because, as we showed above, it preserves from mortal sins. But by preserving from mortal sins, it confers perseverance, because it prevents the destruction of grace. Finally, because it confers actual aids for conquering the temptations of the flesh and the devil, according to Ps. 22: *You have prepared a table before me against those who afflict me.*

For this reason the Eucharist is rightly called by the Fathers the viaticum of our pilgrimage, and is administered by the Church in the manner of viaticum to the sick oppressed by illness and surrounded by the snares and temptations of the common enemy, so that in the strength of this food they may more cheerfully complete the journey to eternity. Hence Jerome on Matt. 15: *He is endangered who hastens to reach the desired dwelling without heavenly bread.*

From this follows the last and chief effect of this Sacrament, namely, the attainment of glory. For perseverance is, as it were, the gate through which the elect enter the palace of the heavenly kingdom, and it alone is, as Bernard says, *that to which eternity is given, or which gives man to eternity*.

Chrysostom speaks elegantly of the effects of the Eucharist in hom. 45 on John, where he says: This sacred blood offered to us in the Eucharist restores within us the living and breathing image of our King. This blood waters and fosters the soul with perpetual streams and does not permit its excellent beauty and nobility to wither or degenerate. This blood, worthily tasted, drives the demons away and puts them to flight far from us, but draws the angels and the Lord of angels to us. This blood is the salvation of souls; by it the soul is refreshed, adorned, inflamed, and rendered brighter than fire and more splendid than gold. From this table springs a fountain pouring forth spiritual rivers, beside which there grow not barren willows, but trees that reach heaven itself and bear fruits always timely and never withering.

8. You will ask, first, when the Eucharist confers grace upon the recipient. I answer that it is more probable that it causes grace at the instant extrinsically terminating the act of eating, in which it is true to say: "The act of eating does not now exist, but immediately before it did," that is, when the sacramental species first reach the stomach.

The reason is that Christ did not promise grace to those who merely received this Sacrament with the mouth and teeth, but to those who truly eat it by a perfect and complete act of eating. Such an act exists only when the sacramental species first reach the stomach. Hence one who receives the sacramental species but afterward spits them out, being unable to swallow them because of some illness or weakness of nature, or one who retains the host in his mouth so long that the species are corrupted before being swallowed, does not receive the effect of this Sacrament. But one who swallows them and afterward vomits does receive it, because the former do not eat Christ's body by a complete and perfect act of eating, whereas the latter does. Vomiting is not opposed to eating, but rather presupposes it, although it prevents digestion.

9. You will ask, secondly, whether this Sacrament continually increases grace as long as it remains within us. I answer that it is very probable that if, during the time the sacramental species remain in the stomach, a man elicits new and more fervent acts of faith, charity, and the other virtues, by which he disposes himself more and more, he will receive by virtue of the Sacrament itself a grace greater than that which he received at first when the sacramental species initially reached the stomach.

For this Sacrament was instituted in the manner of food and therefore, as the Council of Florence says, produces the same effects in the soul that material food produces in the body. But food, throughout the whole time it remains in the stomach and natural heat acts upon it, nourishes and strengthens the body. Therefore, similarly, throughout the whole time Christ's body remains sacramentally in the recipient, it spiritually nourishes and strengthens the soul by increasing sanctifying grace in it, provided that the man disposes himself more and more to such increase by the supernatural heat of faith, charity, and the other virtues.

Certainly, since Christ is the light of the world and the source of all grace, it seems consonant with reason that as long as he remains sacramentally within us, he should illuminate the soul with the light of grace, according to John 9: *As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world*; and continually pour streams of grace into all its faculties, as into channels overflowing from him. Since he is a fire consuming sins and perfecting the virtues, it is fitting that he should then fulfill what he says in Luke 12: *I have come to cast fire upon the earth, and what do I will except that it be kindled?*

Hence Cardinal de Lugo says that although this opinion was formerly received unfavorably, it is now generally accepted. For it accords with the dignity of this Sacrament and arouses the piety of the faithful to increase their devotion and fervor after receiving the Eucharist.

10. You will ask, thirdly, whether actual devotion excluding distraction of mind and venial sins actually exercised is required to obtain the effect of this Sacrament.

I answer that it is required to obtain the secondary and less principal effect of this Sacrament, that is, to receive the grace of spiritual refreshment and sweetness, but not to obtain its primary and principal effect, namely, an increase of habitual grace. Thus St. Thomas in Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 8: The effect of this Sacrament is not only the attainment of habitual grace and charity, but also a certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness. This is impeded if someone approaches this Sacrament while distracted in mind by venial sins, but the increase of habitual grace and charity is not removed. Nothing clearer or more explicit can be said in favor of our answer.

11. Reason also supports this. First, that actual devotion excluding distraction of mind is required to receive the grace of spiritual refreshment and sweetness is evident because this grace consists in holy thoughts and pious affections, which are impeded by any distraction of mind.

This is confirmed. For this grace to be received in us, a capable subject is required. But the subject is not capable unless it is stripped of every other

thought of the mind, because, since the proximate subjects of this grace are the intellect and will, and these powers cannot perfectly attend to several things at once, if at the time of reception they are occupied in thinking about other things, they will not be fitted to receive divine illuminations and pious motions and affections.

That actual devotion excluding venial sins is not required to receive an increase of habitual grace is evident because the Sacraments of the New Law confer grace upon those who place no obstacle. But one who approaches this Sacrament with venial sin or without actual devotion does not place an obstacle to the increase of habitual grace, since neither the absence of actual devotion nor venial sin is opposed to habitual grace and charity. Therefore, he receives an increase of sanctifying grace.

Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 7, requires no other necessary disposition for receiving this Sacrament worthily and fruitfully than that the one approaching should not be conscious of mortal sin. And Augustine, tract. 26 on John, says: *See, brothers: eat the heavenly bread spiritually; bring innocence to the altar. Even if sins are daily, let them not be deadly.*

12. You will say: no sinful act can cause an increase of habitual grace. But to approach the Eucharist with venial sins is a venial sin, at least when those venial sins are opposed to the right use of this Sacrament and the reverence due to it. Therefore, it cannot increase grace.

I answer that a venially sinful act cannot cause an increase of grace by virtue of the recipient's action, that is, by its proper power and efficacy; but it can do so by virtue of the Sacrament itself, or by the power and efficacy of the Sacrament received with a sufficient disposition.

13. You will ask, fourthly, whether one who is voluntarily distracted at the time of Communion receives an increase of grace, even though he does not receive spiritual sweetness, as we said of those who are then distracted through tepidity, lack of devotion, or negligence.

I answer that it seems very probable to me that he receives no fruit or benefit at all from receiving the Eucharist. For such a voluntary and deliberately admitted distraction, since it is a notable irreverence against the most august Sacrament of the Eucharist, is a grave and mortal sin according to the judgment of several weighty authors, and consequently an obstacle to receiving grace.

Thus Diego Núñez among our authors teaches here. Although in his second conclusion he seems to have spoken somewhat obscurely, nevertheless in his answer ad 2 he says: *If by a formal intention he wills at that time*—namely, the time of Holy Communion—*to remain distracted, I believe*

that he sins mortally and therefore obtains no effect of the Sacrament, because that irreverence is grave.

There are, therefore, three kinds of distraction. Some are merely natural and wholly involuntary. Others are venial, arising from negligence and tepidity that is venially culpable, though not expressly chosen by the will. Others are formally voluntary, deliberately sought or willingly admitted.

The first remove neither the increase of grace nor spiritual sweetness. The second impede sweetness and spiritual savor, but do not prevent an increase of grace, as we showed above from St. Thomas. The third place an obstacle to both effects of the Eucharist.

From this you will understand the intolerable laxity of certain recent casuists who affirm that one who approaches the Eucharist voluntarily distracted commits no sin, not even a venial one, because, they say, the reception of the Eucharist is not a conversation with God like prayer, but an act of eating, and no injury is done to food if it is eaten distractedly. As though the same account applied to that divine and heavenly food as to material and bodily food.

Hence St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, p. 6, c. 9, says: Because our capacity for receiving Christ is not in the flesh but in the spirit, not in the stomach but in the mind, and because the mind does not attain Christ except through knowledge and love, through faith and charity, so that faith illuminates for recognition or remembrance and charity inflames for devotion, therefore, for someone to approach worthily, he must eat spiritually. Thus he must, as it were, chew Christ through the remembrance of faith and receive him through the devotion of love. By these he does not transform Christ into himself, but rather is himself transferred into Christ's mystical body.

I add with St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 1, qla. 3, that Eucharistic food perfects man by joining him to the ultimate end. But man is not joined to the ultimate end except through acts of intellect and will. Therefore, the fruitful reception of this food requires acts of intellect and will, and consequently attention of mind, although no injury is done to bodily food when it is taken with distraction and wandering of mind.

CHAPTER X.

The Obligation to Receive the Eucharist.

1. The faithful are bound to receive the Eucharist not only by an ecclesiastical precept, but also by divine law and Christ's command. For just

as the precept of receiving Baptism is gathered from John 3, *Unless someone is born again*, and so forth, and the precept of penance from Luke 13, *Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish*, so the precept of Christ concerning the reception of this Sacrament is gathered from John 6: *Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you.*

A fitting reason also commends this. If by the law of nature man is bound to take bodily food because without it he cannot long preserve bodily life; and if Adam in the state of innocence would have been bound by a divine precept to eat of the tree of life, which was a type of the Eucharist, in order to preserve bodily life, as several theologians teach; how much more fitting was it that fallen man, in order to preserve the spiritual life of the soul, should be bound by a divine precept to eat of this life-giving tree.

This precept obliges one to receive the Eucharist: 1º at the point of death, when the sick person is bound, insofar as he can, to incorporate himself into Christ and provide himself with a safe viaticum for the perilous journey; 2º several times during life. For just as it does not suffice for bodily life to take food only once or twice during a lifetime, neither does this suffice for spiritual life. For bodily life is gradually diminished by the action of natural heat continually consuming the radical moisture, and spiritual life by the action of concupiscence perpetually consuming the radical moisture of divine love.

2. Besides this divine precept, which does not determine the times for receiving the Eucharist, there is another ecclesiastical precept enacted in the great Lateran Council in the celebrated chapter *Omnis utriusque sexus*. By it all the faithful, when they have reached the years of discretion, are commanded to communicate once a year, namely, at Easter.

This precept virtually includes two things: one is that Communion not be deferred beyond a year; the other, that it be made at Easter insofar as possible, out of reverence for so great a solemnity. Hence this precept is violated by those who, foreseeing that because of a very long voyage or other business they will be prevented from approaching the sacred table at Easter, neglect to anticipate that time. It is also violated by those who, being impeded at Easter, do not afterward communicate at an opportune time, but defer Communion for a long period. For Easter Communion is not a work bound exclusively to that time, like the recitation of the breviary or a fast assigned to a determinate day, but is the determination of the divine precept obliging one to communicate several times during life.

The precept is also transgressed not only by those who abstain from Holy Communion at Easter through mere carelessness, but also by those who approach Holy Communion unworthily. First, because, as we have said,

the ecclesiastical precept is merely an interpretation of the divine precept, fixing and determining the time for fulfilling it. But we do not satisfy the divine precept through a sacrilege. Therefore, neither do we satisfy the ecclesiastical precept through sacrilegious Communion.

Secondly, because the same reason seems to apply to the precept of Communion as to the precept of confession. But one who makes a sacrilegious and voluntarily invalid confession does not satisfy the precept of annual confession, as Alexander VII declared in the General Congregation of the Inquisition held on September 24, 1665, condemning the contrary opinion taught by certain recent casuists as rash and scandalous. Therefore, likewise, one who communicates sacrilegiously while in mortal sin does not satisfy the precept of annual Communion.

CHAPTER XI.
Communion under Both Species.

3. Two celebrated difficulties and controversies occur here and must be briefly resolved. The first is with Catholics, namely, whether priests celebrating and communicating under both species receive more grace than laypersons communicating under only one species. Following Alexander of Hales, several recent authors affirm this; the Thomists, Suárez, Bellarmine, and many others deny it.

The second is with the Lutherans and Calvinists, namely, whether Communion under both species could be prohibited to the laity by the Church and whether it was fittingly prohibited to them for just reasons. Luther writes in his book De captivitate Babylonica that all are impious who deny the laity Communion under both species. Calvin, however, in Institutio Christianae religionis, l. 4, c. 17, § 47, says that from the workshop of the devil came that constitution which either stole or tore away half of the Supper from the better part of the people of God, namely, the symbol of the blood, which, being forbidden to lay and profane persons, became the private possession of a few vessels and useless men—for thus he calls priests.

§ 1.
Resolution of the First Difficulty.

4. I say, first, that a priest communicating under both species does not receive more grace than a layperson communicating under only one species, if each is equally disposed.

This is proved, first, by Cajetan's reasoning. Christ's blood, insofar as it is contained in this Sacrament by concomitance, confers the same grace as it does insofar as it is contained there by the power of the words. But laypersons communicating only beneath the species of bread receive Christ's blood by concomitance. Therefore, they receive the same grace as priests who receive it beneath the species of wine insofar as it is contained in this Sacrament by the power of the words.

The minor premise is certain, for the Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 3, says that Christ's body is beneath the species of wine and his blood beneath the species of bread by the power of that natural connection and concomitance by which the parts of Christ the Lord are joined together.

The major premise is proved. What causes grace in the reception of the Eucharist is not only that which is contained in this Sacrament by the power of the words, but also that which is there by concomitance. Otherwise the Divinity and the Person of the Word would not cause the grace of this Sacrament, since they are there only by concomitance. Therefore, Christ's blood causes the same grace insofar as it is contained in this Sacrament by concomitance as insofar as it is contained there by the power of the words.

Hence St. Thomas, opusc. 58, c. 26: These four—body, blood, soul, and Divinity—can now no longer be separated. Therefore, just as the priest sacramentally receives Christ's blood from the chalice, so the people receive it intellectually beneath the species of bread from Christ's body itself; and it is as beneficial and sweet to them as to the priests who receive it from the chalice beneath the species of wine. Cant. 1: My beloved is to me a cluster of Cyprus. I receive two things in the cluster: first, the Lord's body as food; and from the grape I draw his sweet blood as drink.

The conclusion is proved, secondly, by this reasoning. If a priest communicating under both species received more grace than a layperson communicating under only one, this inequality would proceed either from the containing species, from the reality contained beneath them, or from their signification.

It does not proceed from the containing species, for the species considered in themselves and as abstracted from the reality contained have no power productive of grace. Nor does it proceed from the reality contained, since the same and whole Christ is contained equally beneath one species, the other, or both, as the Council of Trent teaches in the passage cited above. Finally, it does not proceed from the signification of the species, because the whole signification of the Sacrament subsists in a single species.

For the species of bread alone, for example, signifies Christ present. It also signifies Christ's Passion and death, since it represents his body as though separated from the blood. It also signifies the spiritual refreshment of the soul, which is represented by food no less than by drink. Likewise, since either species sacramentally unites us to Christ, one species no less than the other or both signifies the perfect union of our soul with Christ. Finally, one species signifies the spiritual union of the faithful, for the Fathers willed the unity of the faithful to be understood by bread made from many grains, just as by wine flowing from many clusters. Therefore, a priest communicating under both species does not receive more grace than a layperson communicating under only one.

5. You will say: the whole signification of the Sacrament indeed subsists in one species, but is more expressly and fully declared through both. This is evident concerning spiritual refreshment, which is better expressed and signified through both species of bread and wine than through one alone, since it belongs to the nature of perfect refreshment to remove hunger and quench thirst.

To the contrary: grant that under both species there is a more perfect signification as to the manner of signifying than under one alone. This nevertheless does not suffice to cause an unequal effect. This is evident in Baptism, which by immersion more expressly signifies, as to the manner of signifying, the burial of the baptized person with Christ than by sprinkling alone; yet Baptism conferred by either manner causes the same grace, by which the baptized person is buried together with Christ.

The same applies to Matrimony. Although marriage contracted through words more perfectly signifies the marriage bond than one contracted merely through signs or gestures, it does not therefore effect a greater or more perfect bond, but entirely the same. Therefore, similarly, although two species express and signify the effect of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, namely spiritual refreshment, more perfectly as to the manner of signifying than one alone, they do not for that reason cause more abundant grace, but equal grace if the subjects are equally disposed.

This is confirmed by the example of manna, which was a figure of this Sacrament. For in Exod. 16 it is said: He who had gathered more did not have more, nor did he who had prepared less find less. Hence Pope Hilary in his decrees contained in part 3 of the Councils says: Where a part of the body is, there is the whole. The same account applies to the Lord's body as to the manna which preceded it as a figure, concerning which it is said that he who had gathered more did not have more, nor did he who had prepared less have less.

And Guitmund in his book De veritate Eucharistiae: We can say that as much is present in one small portion as was present in the whole host, just as we read of the manna that he who had gathered more did not have more, nor did he who had gathered less have less. Each receives Christ the Lord, and he is whole in each portion; he is not diminished by being received by each, but presents himself whole to each.

What they say of a particle of the host in comparison with the whole can be said of one species in comparison with both together. For just as as much is present in one particle of the host as in the whole, so everything contained beneath both species is found beneath one.

6. You will object, first: if the species of bread and wine did not cause diverse graces, but only one, either the whole of this grace would be conferred upon the priest in receiving the species of bread alone, in which case the species of wine would not be a true Sacrament, because it would not confer upon one placing no obstacle the grace which it signifies; or the whole grace would be conferred in receiving the chalice alone, in which case the species of bread would not be a true Sacrament for the same reason; or part would be conferred in receiving the host and part in drinking the chalice. This also cannot be said, because no reason can be assigned why the species of bread received by a layperson should immediately confer upon him all the grace it is fitted to confer, but should confer upon the priest not the whole but only half, leaving the other half to be caused by the subsequently received species of wine. Therefore, and so forth.

I answer that the whole grace is given to the priest in the reception of the host, and it does not therefore follow that the reception of the chalice is not a true Sacrament. For to be a true Sacrament it is not necessary that it actually confer grace—the Eucharist while in the ciborium is a true Sacrament and yet does not actually confer grace—but it suffices that of itself it be able to confer grace if the subject is disposed.

Here, however, the subject is not disposed, because he received the whole effect of the Sacrament in receiving the species of bread. Similarly, if a layperson immediately received another particle after receiving one, he

would receive no further grace, because the subject would likewise not be disposed, having received the whole effect of the Sacrament in receiving the first host.

7. You will object, secondly: the Sacraments of the New Law cause what they signify. But the two species signify a greater grace than either alone, for the two species signify the fullness of the spiritual banquet and the perfect refreshment of the soul, which the individual species taken separately do not signify. Therefore, the two species cause a greater grace than one.

I answer, granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof, I deny that a fuller spiritual refreshment is signified on the part of the thing signified through both species together than through either alone. It is signified more fully only on the part of the manner of signifying. This does not suffice for the Sacrament to produce a fuller or more perfect effect, as we showed in the second proof of the conclusion and declared by two examples.

§ 2.
Resolution of the Second Difficulty.

8. I say, secondly, that no divine law exists by which laypersons and clerics not consecrating are obliged to receive the Sacrament of the Eucharist under both species. Consequently, the Church can prohibit the use of the chalice to the laity.

This is proved, first, from Christ's action, for in Luke 24 he gave Communion beneath the species of bread alone to the two disciples going to Emmaus. Augustine, *De consensu Evangelistarum*, l. 3, c. 25, Jerome on Lev. 9, Bede, and Theophylact understand the words *They recognized the Lord in the breaking of bread* of the Eucharist.

9. It is proved, secondly, from Scripture, in which Communion beneath the species of bread alone is frequently mentioned. For in Acts 2 it is said: *They persevered in the communion of the breaking of bread.* And in c. 20 the faithful are said to have assembled on the first day of the week *for the breaking of bread*. All interpret this of sacramental Communion.

Indeed, Christ himself in John 6 signified Eucharistic Communion by the eating of bread alone in these words: *He who eats this bread shall live forever.* And, as Peter of Ragusa excellently observed when at the Council of Basel he most vigorously defended this truth against the heretics, Christ in the same chapter made mention eleven times of this Sacrament beneath the

species of bread, but only four times under the name of flesh and blood, to show that the species of bread alone suffices for salvation.

10. The same truth is openly gathered from the ancient custom of the Church. In former times the Holy Eucharist was carried home by the faithful, into the wilderness by monks, and to the most distant places by travelers, so that they might receive it with their own hands at an opportune time, as we showed above in Chapter I, § 1. But this cannot be verified except of the Eucharist under one species alone, namely, bread.

First, because the sacred chalice was never placed in the hands of laypersons, much less customarily carried by anyone, but was administered through the hands of deacons. Secondly, because women were then accustomed to receive the Eucharist in a clean linen cloth, as is evident from the Council of Auxerre, can. 39: *Every woman, when she communicates, is to have her Lord's cloth*—that is, a most clean linen cloth fitted to receive the Lord's body. *If she does not have it, she is not to communicate until another Sunday.* This plainly cannot be understood of the species of wine.

Finally, the Eucharist carried in this manner was sometimes preserved for an entire year in solitude, especially during a raging persecution, as is recorded in *Pratum spirituale*, c. 49. But the species of wine could not have been preserved so long, since wine easily and quickly turns sour and is corrupted. Therefore, in the primitive Church the Eucharist was sometimes received under the species of bread alone.

It is also certain that the Nazarenes at the beginning of the nascent Church were accustomed to communicate only beneath the species of bread, since the Mosaic law, which they were permitted to observe at the beginning of their conversion, did not allow them to drink wine.

Likewise, in former times the Eucharist was offered to infants beneath only one species. Since they could not take solid food, some of the Lord's blood was instilled into their mouths by a priest or deacon.

It is also an ancient custom of the Church that on Good Friday this Sacrament is received beneath the species of bread alone by the priest celebrating the office, and that the sacrifice of the Mass is not offered on that day. Hence Hugh of St. Victor, *Miscellanea*, l. 5: *Today we do not sacrifice, while the victim is taken from our hands; friends do not sacrifice while enemies slaughter.*

Finally, Pope St. Leo, sermon 4 on Lent, reports that the Manichaeans, in order to pretend that they were Catholics, communicated with Catholics. This cannot be understood of Communion under both species, but only of Communion beneath the species of bread, because the Manichaeans superstitiously abhorred wine as the gall of the dragon and as made by the

demon, judged its drinking sacrilegious, and did not believe that Christ was present beneath its species in the Eucharist.

Therefore, in the primitive Church it was lawful for the faithful to communicate beneath one species alone. This is an evident argument that no divine law exists concerning lay Communion beneath both species, for otherwise it would then have obliged all capable of receiving the precept.

11. Reason also supports this. There are only four things in this Sacrament from which the necessity of communicating under both species in relation to laypersons, and consequently some divine law obliging them to such Communion, could appear to be drawn: its effect, signification, the reality contained, and the containing species. But such necessity cannot be drawn from any of these. Therefore, and so forth.

The major premise is evident from a sufficient enumeration. The minor is proved as to each part. First, such necessity cannot arise from the effect, since either the whole effect of the Sacrament of the Eucharist is bestowed upon one communicating beneath one species, so that, speaking of itself, one communicating beneath both species does not receive more grace, as we taught in the preceding section; or, if, as some think, a greater effect is given through the reception of two species, it is nevertheless not necessary for salvation, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 21, c. 3, saying that *those who receive only one species are deprived of no grace necessary for salvation*.

Such necessity also cannot be drawn from the signification, because the whole signification of the Sacrament subsists in one species, as was shown in the preceding section. Nor can it be drawn from the reality contained in this Sacrament, since the whole Christ is contained beneath either species. Finally, it cannot be drawn from the species themselves, because the reception of the species is solely for the sake of the signification, the effect, or the reality contained. If from none of these three follows a necessity of communicating under both species, it is manifest that no such necessity arises from the species themselves.

12. The heretics object, first, with Christ's words in John 6: *Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you shall not have life in you.* From this they infer that to deprive the people of the chalice is to deprive them of eternal life. For Christ says: *Unless you drink the blood, you shall not have life.* Nor does it suffice to say that Christ's blood is contained beneath the species of bread, because Christ commanded drinking. But to receive the species of bread is not to drink; otherwise the priest would drink the blood twice, once beneath the species of bread and again beneath the species of wine.

I answer, first, by turning the argument against the heretics. They permit abstainers, who cannot endure the taste and odor of wine, to communicate beneath the species of bread alone, and yet they do not believe them to be deprived of eternal life on that account. Therefore, they openly contradict themselves when they say that by depriving the people of the chalice the Roman Church deprives them of eternal life and that Communion under both species is of divine law. For if a divine law or precept of Christ existed concerning this, they could not dispense with it in their ecclesiastical ordinances and permit abstainers to communicate beneath the species of bread alone.

I answer, secondly, that the sense of the proposition *Unless you eat and drink* is disjunctive, according to the manner of speaking of the Hebrews, who frequently use the copulative particle for the disjunctive. Thus in Lev. 20: *He who curses father and mother, his blood shall be upon him*, that is, father or mother. And according to the Hebrew of Exod. 21: *He who strikes his father and mother shall die*, that is, his father or mother.

Likewise the Apostle in 1 Cor. 11: *He who eats and drinks unworthily eats and drinks judgment to himself*, that is, he who eats or drinks. For in order that someone bring judgment or condemnation upon himself through the unworthy reception of this Sacrament, it is not necessary that he receive it unworthily under both species. It suffices that he receive the Eucharistic bread or the chalice unworthily.

13. They object, secondly, that Pope Gelasius in the chapter Comperimus, De consecratione, dist. 2, severely rebukes certain faithful who abstained from receiving the chalice. He says: We have learned that certain persons, having received only a portion of the sacred body, abstain from the chalice of the sacred blood. Since they appear without doubt to be bound by some superstition unknown to me, let them either receive the Sacraments in their integrity or be kept entirely from them, because a division of one and the same mystery cannot occur without great sacrilege.

Some answer that in the cited canon the Pontiff inveighs against the Manichaeans, who, communicating only beneath the species of bread, abhorred the chalice because they detested wine as made by the demon. Therefore, he enacted this decree concerning Communion under both species so that in this manner the Manichaeans hiding under the Catholic name might be detected and sent into exile.

But it is better answered that in that canon the discourse concerns only priests consecrating. For the marginal Gloss says: *Understand this of the one consecrating*, and so forth. And St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 80, a. 12, ad 1, says: *Gelasius speaks in relation to priests.*

The title prefixed to the canon openly proves the same: Likewise Pope Gelasius to the Bishops Majoricus and John: A priest ought not receive Christ's body without his blood.

14. They object, thirdly: the Sacrament of the Eucharist is the final covenant by which Christ, being near death, bequeathed his body and blood to his children. Therefore, the Church cannot without injustice deprive Christians of this inheritance, since she is not mistress but only administrator of the Sacraments.

I answer that by depriving the laity of the use of the chalice, the Church does not thereby deprive them of the inheritance bequeathed by Christ. First, because whatever they would receive through both species they receive through one, as we showed in the preceding section. Secondly, because, even granting that they were deprived of some grace, since this grace is not necessary for salvation, they would not be deprived of their paternal inheritance, which is preserved in grace necessary for salvation. Thus infants are not said to be deprived of their paternal inheritance because they are deprived of the sacramental grace which they might receive from eating this Sacrament.

15. From what has been said it is inferred that, by the power of the divine precept, it would be no less lawful and sufficient for salvation to receive this Sacrament beneath the species of wine than beneath the species of bread, since either species contains no less than the other the whole Christ and the whole spiritual refreshment of the soul.

Nevertheless, the Church determined the Communion of the laity to the species of bread rather than wine: either because of the difficulty of preserving the blood for the sick; or because of the danger of spilling it in administration; or, finally, because of the difficulty of purifying the vessels in which a great quantity of the blood would have to be preserved for communicating the whole people.

Moreover, she observed that some persons are abstainers by nature and recoil from wine, being unable to endure its taste and odor; that in many places wine cannot be obtained in such abundance that many thousands of persons could communicate; and that it would be burdensome for the priest to consume what had been tasted by all and remained, especially when some who approached Communion were ill-disposed, unclean, or foul-smelling, and would even deter others from Communion because they had to drink from the same chalice.

CHAPTER XII.
On the Sacrifice of the Mass.

1. Here too we must enter into a twofold controversy, one with heretics and the other with Catholics. For modern heretics, together with Luther and Calvin, deny that the Mass, or that sacred action by which the Eucharist is confected in the Catholic Church, is truly and properly a sacrifice. Catholics, however, unanimously holding that it is a true sacrifice, dispute in which action the essential character of such a sacrifice consists: whether in the consecration, the offering, or the breaking of the host, or in its reception and consumption.

§ 1.
The Mass Has the True and Proper Character of a Sacrifice.

2. This is proved from Scripture. First, in Mal. 1, after the ancient priests have been rebuked for offering polluted sacrifices, a clean oblation is promised as one that will be offered among the nations and in every place; that is, as Tertullian, Irenaeus, Augustine, and Damascene interpret it, the sacrifice of the Eucharist, which, as the Council of Trent says, sess. 22, c. 1, is called a clean oblation because *it cannot be defiled by any unworthiness or malice on the part of those who offer it*. That this passage speaks of a sacrifice properly so called is clear from the fact that this oblation is contrasted with the Jewish sacrifices properly so called, and a comparison is made between things of the same genus.

Secondly, in Dan. 8 the Antichrist is foretold as one who will take away *the continual sacrifice*, namely, that of Christians, which is therefore presupposed to endure until that time. Nor does the passage speak of an improper sacrifice, that is, an internal and invisible one, as the heretics claim; for that sacrifice will not cease even then, nor is it called sacrifice without qualification, but with an addition, such as a sacrifice of praise, a sacrifice of the spirit, a sacrifice of justice, and so forth.

Thirdly, in Ps. 109 and Heb. 7 Christ is called a priest according to the order of Melchizedek. But he cannot be so called on account of the sacrifice of the Cross, because, since that sacrifice was bloody, by reason of it he ought rather to be called a priest according to the order of Aaron. Therefore,

he is so called only by reason of the sacrifice of the Eucharist, which is offered in bread and wine, as was the sacrifice of Melchizedek. Hence Cyprian, lib. 2, epist. 5, *Ad Caecilium*: *In the priest Melchizedek we see the sacrament of the Lord's sacrifice prefigured, according to what divine Scripture testifies and says: "And Melchizedek, king of Salem, brought forth bread and wine. He was the priest of the Most High God, and he blessed Abraham."*

To these passages I add another, taken from Ps. 71, v. 16, where our Vulgate reading has: *There shall be a firmament upon the earth, upon the tops of the mountains*; others render the Hebrew source thus: *There shall be a portion of grain upon the earth, upon the summit of the mountains.* But Rabbi Jonathan, who wrote before the birth of Christ, explains it somewhat differently: *A cake of bread*, he says, *shall become a sacrifice upon the heads of the priests who are in the Church*. Nothing clearer could have been said in these words to signify the unbloody sacrifice of the Mass. For how is a cake of bread a sacrifice upon the heads of priests, unless when a host made from wheaten bread is consecrated by priests in the Church and, after the consecration, is raised above the heads of the priests and presented to the people for adoration?

3. To these testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers may be added an argument drawn from the definition of sacrifice, which is described as follows: A sacrifice is the offering to God of a sensible thing, together with a change made in it, as a sign of his supreme dominion over all things, according to a legitimate institution. But the Mass, or that sacred ceremony by which the Eucharist is confected in the Catholic Church, possesses all these conditions. Therefore, it is a true and proper sacrifice.

The minor premise is proved. First, in the Mass there is an offering of a sensible thing, namely, the body and blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine. In it there is also a sufficient change of the victim, not indeed through the true and real death of Christ, but either through the consumption of the species by the celebrant, upon which the body and blood of Christ lose sacramental being, or through the fact that, by virtue of the words of consecration, the blood is placed separately from the body, although by concomitance it exists together with it, as will be explained in the following section.

Likewise, in it there is an acknowledgment of God's supreme dominion, since the offering and change of the victim are made for this purpose. Finally, it does not lack a legitimate institution by Christ the Lord, as is gathered from those words of Matt. 26: *Do this in commemoration of me*, by which he established a law that would endure perpetually concerning the offering of this sacrifice in the Church. Hence Ambrose, lib. 1, *Praeparatio ad*

Missam: *Although I am a sinner*, he says, *I approach your altar and offer the sacrifice that you instituted and commanded to be offered.*

This is confirmed. Since sacrifice belongs to the natural law, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 85, a. 1, and is the noblest act of religion, there is no reason why the Church should lack a true sacrifice proper to itself, by which it may worship God publicly, any more than the Synagogue or the Church that existed in the time of the law of nature. But the true and proper sacrifice of the law of grace can be nothing other than the Mass. Therefore, the Mass has the true and proper character of a sacrifice.

4. Nor is the heretics' answer valid, namely, that the sacrifice proper to the law of grace is the sacrifice of the Cross and that, apart from it, no other sacrifice can exist in the new law, because Christ, through the sacrifice of the Cross, fully satisfied for the sins of all men and *has perfected forever those who are sanctified*, as the Apostle says in Heb. 10. Hence Christ, to signify that by the whole sacrifice he had accomplished everything necessary for our salvation, said before giving up his spirit upon the Cross: *It is consummated.*

This answer, I say, is not valid. For the sacrifice of the Cross is not proper to the law of grace, but is common to all the laws as their end. Hence Christ upon the Cross satisfied for the sins not only of men living under the new law, but also of those who lived under the law of nature and under the written law; and yet under each of those laws there were true sacrifices. In the same way, therefore, although Christ through the sacrifice of the Cross fully satisfied for our sins, this does not prevent there being another sacrifice in the new law by which that satisfaction is applied to us. This can be nothing other than the sacrifice offered in the Mass, by which Christ's Passion is represented and commemorated.

Those words, *It is consummated*, which Christ uttered before giving up his spirit, were spoken both because of the consummation of the Scriptures and the figures of the old law, all of which were verified and fulfilled in Christ's death, and because of his singular obedience to the Father's command that he undergo death. For, as the Apostle says, *he became obedient unto death*; indeed, as Bernard says, lest he lose obedience, he lost his life.

5. The heretics object first: When the Samaritan woman asked Christ the Lord whether God ought to be worshiped and adored in the temple of Jerusalem or on Mount Gerizim, he answered in John 4: *Woman, believe me, the hour is coming when you will adore the Father neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem.* And he adds the reason: *For true adorers will adore the Father in spirit and in truth. God is spirit, and those who adore him must adore him in spirit*

and in truth. Therefore, for the new law Christ established only spiritual and invisible sacrifices, not external and visible ones.

I answer that, in that conversation with the Samaritan woman, Christ wished only to declare that God would no longer be adored or worshiped immovably either on that mountain or in Jerusalem by the carnal sacrifices of the Jews. He did not, however, deny that there would be another adoration and sacrifice wholly spiritual as regards its power and the manner of existence of the thing offered, namely, the sacrifice of the Eucharist, in which Christ is contained invisibly and sacramentally, although it is visible on the part of the species under which he is contained and of the ceremonies by which it is celebrated. Hence one who worships God by this sacrifice adores him in spirit and in truth.

6. They object secondly: In Ps. 109 and Heb. 7 Christ is called a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek, and consequently he has no successors to his priesthood under the law of grace; for, as the Apostle says in the same place, *many were made priests because they were prevented by death from continuing*. Therefore, since sacrifice and priesthood mutually correspond to one another, there is no true and properly so-called sacrifice under the law of grace.

I answer that although, because Christ is a priest forever, he has no successors in the priesthood, and consequently under the law of grace there are no priests possessing power equal to his, it does not follow that he has no priests, vicars, ministers, and dispensers. On the contrary, since he no longer exercises his priesthood by immediately offering sacrifices in his own person, it is necessary that he have many vicars through whom he does this. Nor is it contrary to the unity of Christ's priesthood that he should have many ministers on earth who visibly offer sacrifice in his place. In the same way, although Christ is the one Teacher and Master, as is said in Matt. 23, this does not prevent him from having many ministers on earth who teach in his place and feed the flock by word and doctrine.

7. From what has been said, you will understand that the Eucharist simultaneously has the character of sacrament, sacrifice, and testament. It is a sacrament insofar as it is ordered to our sanctification; a sacrifice insofar as it is offered to God in acknowledgment of his supreme dominion over life and death; and a testament insofar as it is an authentic instrument of the divine will and of the promise of eternal life. Thus, in Exod. 24, the blood of the victims poured upon the people was at once a sacrifice and a testament; and the paschal lamb under the old law had at once the character of sacrament and sacrifice. Hence the heretics wrongly infer that the Eucharist

is not a sacrifice from the fact that it has the character of a testament and a sacrament.

§ 2.
The Essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass Consists in the Consecration, as Including a Transcendental Order to Reception as Its Extrinsic End and Term.

8. This is proved first. The essence of the sacrifice of the Mass cannot consist in the offering made after the consecration, since by such an offering no change is made in the thing offered, although such a change belongs to the character of sacrifice. Nor can it consist in the breaking of the consecrated host into three parts, which is done by the priest before reception, because this breaking concerns only the species of bread, whereas the sacrificial action must embrace both species, since the sacrifice of the Mass is according to the order of Melchizedek, who offered bread and wine in sacrifice. I add that this breaking of the host is not from Christ's institution, but is only a ceremony instituted by the Church.

Nor can it consist in reception as an intrinsic and essential part, because the sacrifice is offered in the person of Christ, who is the principal offerer and priest, whereas reception is not an action done in the person of Christ, but in the person of the recipient himself and for his benefit. Nor can it consist in the consumption of the species, for the action essential to sacrifice must take place upon the altar, since sacrifice is offered upon the altar; but the consumption of the species does not take place upon the altar, but in the stomach through the power of natural heat. Apart from these four actions, however, no other can be assigned in which the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass might consist except the consecration. Therefore, the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass consists in the consecration.

9. It is proved secondly. Only two things are required for the complete and adequate character of a sacrifice, namely, the offering and the change of the victim, as is clear from its definition given above. But both are found in the consecration.

The offering is found there because it is not necessary that the priest signify in an expressly formulated act that he offers the victim, by saying, "I offer," or *we offer to your majesty*; it is sufficient that by the very exercise of the act he place and present the victim before God. In this way Christ offered himself upon the Cross not so much by words as by deeds, namely, by dying for God's glory and for our salvation. Likewise, under the old law,

the slaughtering or burning of a sheep, done for the worship of God, was a real and exercised offering sufficient for the character of sacrifice.

The change is found there because an action separating blood from the substance of a living being changes and destroys that being. But the consecration, speaking of itself and by virtue of the words, separates the blood from Christ's body. For by the consecration of the bread only the body is placed there by virtue of the words, and by the consecration of the chalice only the blood, so that, in relation to the consecration, it is as though accidental that, when the consecration has been completed, the blood is found in Christ's body. Hence the consecration, considered in itself, is a certain mystical immolation of Christ and a certain mystical shedding of his blood by *the sword of the words*, as Cyril says. Therefore, the consecration possesses everything required for the complete and adequate character of a sacrifice.

10. That the consecration, insofar as it constitutes the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, includes a transcendental order to reception as its extrinsic end and term, is clear from the fact that this sacrifice has the character of food and drink, and is therefore offered under the species of bread and wine. But reception is the extrinsic end and term of nourishment. Therefore, it belongs to this sacrifice as its extrinsic end and connotation; and although it is not an essential part of the sacrifice, it nevertheless belongs in some way to its integrity, and is therefore called its perfection and consummation.

Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 83, a. 6, ad 3, says that if poison should happen to be in the consecrated chalice, it must not be consumed, but the blood of Christ must be placed in another vessel, and other wine must be consecrated so that the sacrifice may be completed. The Church herself also strictly commands that, if a priest should happen to die before consuming the species, another priest, even one who is not fasting, consume the consecrated species for the integrity and perfection of the sacrifice.

You will object first: A sacrifice is essentially an action changing and destroying the victim. But in the sacrifice of the Mass the consecration does not destroy the victim, namely, Christ's body, but rather places it under the species. Therefore, the sacrifice of the Mass does not consist in the consecration.

I answer by denying the major premise. The actual change and destruction of the victim is not essentially required for the character of sacrifice; it is sufficient that, from the manner in which it is offered, the death of the victim should naturally follow, even though it does not in fact

follow. For if, under the old law, after a lethal wound had been inflicted, God had miraculously preserved the victim, there would still have been a true sacrifice, because, since the wound was lethal, that action would signify God's dominion over life and death no less than if death had in fact followed.

Likewise, martyrdom, which bears the likeness of a sacrifice, does not essentially require that death actually follow; it is sufficient that a wound be inflicted which by its nature is apt actually to cause death, although death is prevented by some accidental cause. Therefore, since the consecration, considered in itself and by virtue of the words, has the power to separate the blood from Christ's body, although it does not in fact destroy Christ, it has the true character of sacrifice, because, considered in itself, it is an action changing and destructive of the victim. For words in definitions, as the philosophers say, do not signify actual exercise, but aptitude. I add that through the consecration there is some destruction of the victim, not physical and perfect, but imperfect and moral, as will be explained in the answer to the following objection.

12. You will object secondly: Sacrificing essentially presupposes the thing that is to be sacrificed. But the consecration does not presuppose, but places, Christ's body under the species. Therefore, it is not a sacrificing or sacrifice of Christ's body, such as occurs in the celebration of Mass.

I answer by denying the major premise, because it is not universally true that the act of sacrificing presupposes the thing to be sacrificed. In the sacrifice of incense, the smoke or sweet-smelling vapor produced by the very act of sacrificing was offered. Similarly, in the sacrifice of the Mass, the same action can be both the production of the victim and its change, according to diverse aspects and formalities.

Hence three formalities must be distinguished in the consecration, one of which precedes another by a certain priority of reason. First, the consecration is an action productive of the victim insofar as it is the conversion of bread and wine into Christ's body and blood. Secondly, insofar as by the same action the victim is presented to God by the very exercise of the act, in his honor and worship, it has the character of an offering. Thirdly, the same consecration is changing and destructive of the victim insofar as, considered in itself and by virtue of the words, it produces the body separated from the blood and places it under the species in a certain dead manner, incapable of its natural functions and ordered to destruction, since it is placed there after the manner of food and drink ordered to consumption, and for the purpose that, when the species have been consumed and corrupted, it cease to be there.

Although this destruction is not perfect and physical, but only imperfect and moral, it is nevertheless sufficient for the character of sacrifice, as is clear from a libation, in which wine was formerly poured out and sacrificed, not by physical but by moral destruction, that is, by being poured upon the ground, through which the wine was judged morally destroyed because it had been rendered useless for human purposes. These three formalities of the same action have this order among themselves: the second presupposes the first, and both precede the third.

13. From what has been said it follows, first, that on Good Friday a sacrifice is not properly offered, but only a host consecrated on the preceding day is consumed. This is improperly called a sacrifice by reason of ceremonies that resemble the ceremonies of sacrifice. Hence Hugh of St. Victor, second codex of the *Miscellanea*, lib. 5: *Today we do not sacrifice, when the victim is taken from our hands; the friends do not sacrifice while the enemies slaughter.*

14. It follows secondly that the sacrifice of the Mass is latreutic, eucharistic, propitiatory, and impetratory. For it renders to God worship and honor of infinite value on account of his supreme excellence; it gives him thanks for benefits received; it avails for the remission of sins and the relaxation of punishments; and it also avails for obtaining various spiritual and temporal benefits. Consequently, it contains in the most perfect manner all the differences and species of the ancient sacrifices. Hence the Church says in the Secret after the Seventh Sunday after Pentecost: *O God, who by the perfection of one sacrifice have consecrated the diversity of the victims of the law.*

15. You will ask whether the value of this sacrifice is infinite. I answer that it is infinite as regards sufficiency, but not as regards efficacy. For it is numerically the same as the sacrifice of the Cross on the part of the thing offered and of the principal offerer, although it differs in rite and manner of offering, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 22, c. 1. But the sacrifice of the Cross is of infinite value as regards sufficiency, because it cannot cause so many merits and satisfactions in us that its power could not extend infinitely to more. Therefore, the sacrifice of the Mass is likewise of infinite value as regards sufficiency.

Nor is it an obstacle that it is offered through the ministry of priests, because they are not the principal offerers; Christ is. Hence Chrysostom says excellently, hom. 2 on 2 Tim.: I wish to add something altogether wonderful. What is it? The sacred oblation itself, whether Peter offers it, or Paul, or a priest of any degree of merit, is the same as that which Christ himself gave to the disciples and which priests now confect. This has nothing less than

that. Why? Because men do not sanctify this oblation, but Christ, who had sanctified it before.

16. That the value of this sacrifice is not infinite as regards efficacy is clear from the same example of Christ's Passion. Although the Passion is of infinite value in the genus of merit and satisfaction, it does not actually produce any infinite effect in us, because it acts after the manner of a universal cause in the supernatural order, which acts only according to the measure of the subject's disposition.

The same must be said of the sacrifice of the Mass. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 79, a. 5, says: Although this oblation by its own quantity is sufficient to satisfy for every punishment, it becomes satisfactory for those for whom it is offered, or even for those who offer it, according to the measure of their devotion, and not for the whole punishment.

17. From this you will understand that a sacrifice offered for many benefits each one as much as if it were offered for one alone, since the infinite value of this sacrifice can never be exhausted, as Cajetan rightly teaches, tom. 3, opusc., tract. 3, q. 2. Yet it may not be inferred from this that a priest can accept several stipends for one Mass. For stipends are not given to the celebrant as the price of the fruit of the sacrifice, but as alms for sustaining his life, or as payment for the ministry he performs. That ministry is not owed so great a compensation, but only what has been fixed by law or custom.

18. Hence the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals charged with interpreting the Council of Trent prohibited the acceptance of several stipends for one Mass, even if the stipends are unsuitable and small, because the priest relinquishes the right he has to ask for a suitable stipend by the very fact that he has accepted an unsuitable one for celebrating the Mass.

On July 21, 1625, the same Congregation also determined that a priest may not receive large stipends for Masses and arrange for the Masses to be celebrated by other priests for smaller stipends, retaining for himself whatever remains above just and suitable stipends. Likewise, in the time of Paul V, it declared that a priest may not say Masses in advance for those who will later offer him stipends, and then, when alms are given, satisfy the obligation by applying Masses already said with that intention.

Finally, on January 25, 1659, in the same Sacred Congregation, there was proscribed and condemned the opinion of certain recent casuists asserting that a priest who celebrates a Mass for someone after receiving an alms may also accept another alms from another person for the application of the fruit of the sacrifice owed to the celebrant himself, which he renounces and transfers to the other person. One reason is that it is very uncertain whether

this fruit proper to the priest can be applied to another, for it appears to be a personal benefit incapable of being communicated to another. Another reason is that, even if it can be applied, it is nevertheless very unworthy for a priest to renounce this spiritual fruit for a small sum of money and to exchange a spiritual thing for the shameful profit of avarice.

19. It has seemed fitting to conclude this treatise on the sacrament and sacrifice of the Eucharist with the splendid words of Gregory the Great, Dialogi, lib. 4, c. 59: While we perform this sacrifice, it is necessary that we immolate ourselves in contrition of heart, because we who celebrate the mysteries of the Lord's Passion ought to imitate what we perform. Then the victim will truly and properly be offered to God for us when we have made ourselves a victim—which we accomplish through contrition and penance—placing flesh for flesh, what has been sanctified for what is holy, what has been chastised for what is chaste, and, in return for the blood poured out upon the altar of the Cross, blood poured out in the blush of confession, as Peter of Celle beautifully says.

I shall add the words of Ambrose in the sermon for the Fourth Sunday of Advent: Let him, therefore, change his life who wishes to receive life; for if he does not change his life, he will receive life unto judgment, and he will be corrupted by it rather than healed, killed rather than given life.

TREATISE V.

ON THE SACRAMENTS OF PENANCE AND EXTREME UNCTION.

Just as the supernatural life of the soul is conferred through Baptism, strengthened through Confirmation, and nourished through the Eucharist, so, when extinguished through sin, it is restored to life and made to flourish through the sacrament of Penance. For this reason, it is called the sacrament of the dead and the second plank after shipwreck, which, as Tertullian says in *De paenitentia*, c. 4, *lifts up a man submerged by the waves of sins and brings him into the harbor of divine clemency*. The same author adds: *When it casts a man down, it raises him all the more; when it makes him squalid, it renders him all the cleaner; when it accuses and condemns, it absolves.*

Chrysostom also has many things in serm. 1, De paenitentia, in praise and commendation of this virtue and sacrament. I shall record here only these words: O Penance, what new thing shall I report of you? You restore all things dissolved, mitigate all adversities, heal all things broken, enlighten all things confused, and give life to all things despaired of. O Penance, more radiant than gold, more splendid than the sun, whom sin does not conquer, failure does not overcome, and despair does not destroy. O Penance, mother of mercy and mistress of virtues, and so forth.

Now Penance has this singular feature among the other sacraments: it is not only a sacrament, but also a virtue of the soul. And these two aspects are so joined in the new law that neither can the virtue avail without the sacrament, or at least an order to the sacrament, nor can the sacrament be conferred without the virtue. Therefore, Penance considered under both

aspects must be discussed briefly here. To adhere to the method and order of St. Thomas, we must treat first of Penance insofar as it has the character of a sacrament, and then insofar as it has the character of a virtue.

CHAPTER I.
On Penance as a Sacrament.

§ 1.
The Existence of This Sacrament.

1. I say first that there exists in the Church a true and special sacrament of Penance possessing the power to remit sins. This is against the Novatians and modern heretics, who have attempted to remove the sacrament of Penance for diverse and diametrically opposed reasons. The former, leading men into despair, said that no remedy was given in the Church by which sins committed after Baptism could be remitted, and for this reason they were called cruel by the Fathers. *Who before the most cruel Novatian*, says Vincent of Lérins, *called God cruel because he preferred the death of the dying man to his returning and living?*

The Lutherans and Calvinists, on the contrary, presuming upon divine clemency, entirely remove the necessity of penance and confession. They suppose that the mere remembrance of Baptism already received, together with faith in the remission of sins, is sufficient for their remission, and consequently hold either that Penance is not a sacrament of the new law or that it is not distinct from Baptism.

The conclusion is proved first from Scripture, John 20: *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained.* By these words, according to the common understanding of the Fathers, Christ gave the Church a perpetual and permanent power to remit sins, to be exercised in a visible manner adapted to men, that is, through some sensible sign possessing by his institution the power to signify and cause the remission of sins, and therefore constituting a true sacrament.

2. It is proved secondly by the argument of St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 84, a. 1. A sacrament is a sign of a sacred reality that sanctifies man. But in the Penance administered in the Church something sacred and sanctifying to man is signified, both on the part of the penitent confessing his sins and on the part of the priest absolving him. For the acts of the penitent by which he declares his sorrow and confesses his sin signify that his heart has withdrawn from sin. The act of the priest absolving from

sins also signifies something holy precisely as holy, or as sanctifying, namely, the remission of sins. Therefore, Penance as administered in the Church is a sacrament properly so called.

That it is distinct from Baptism is clear from the fact that the rite of each sacrament is different. For Baptism cannot be repeated, whereas Penance can be repeated. Hence the holy Fathers clearly distinguish these sacraments. Tertullian says in *De paenitentia*, c. 12: *Since you know that, against hell, after those first defenses of the Lord's institution*—that is, after Baptism—*there are still second helps in confession, why do you delay your salvation? Why do you cease to undertake what you know will heal you?*

Chrysostom, De sacerdotio, lib. 3: Priests not only regenerate, but also possess the power to forgive sins.

Cyril of Alexandria, lib. 12 on John, c. 56: Men filled or inspired by the Spirit of God remit and retain sins in two ways: either when they admit the worthy to Baptism and exclude the unworthy, or when they correct the children of the Church and pardon the penitent.

Augustine, De adulterinis coniugiis, lib. 2, c. 16: If homicide has been committed by a catechumen, it is washed away by Baptism; but if by one already baptized, it is healed by penance and reconciliation.

Finally, Pope Leo, epist. 91, Ad Theodorum: The manifold mercy of God so assists human falls that the hope of eternal life is restored not only through the grace of Baptism, but also through the medicine of Penance, so that those who have violated the gift of regeneration may attain the remission of their crimes by condemning themselves through their own judgment. The aids of divine goodness have been so ordered that God's pardon cannot be obtained except through the supplications of priests.

3. The chief foundation of the Novatians was taken from two testimonies of the Apostle in which he appears to teach that no remedy is given in Christ's Church by which sins committed after Baptism can be expiated and destroyed. The first is found in Heb. 6, where the Apostle says: It is impossible for those who were once enlightened, who have also tasted the heavenly gift and become partakers of the Holy Spirit, who have moreover tasted the good word of God and the powers of the age to come, and have fallen away, to be renewed again unto penance, crucifying again for themselves the Son of God and making him a mockery. The second is taken from c. 10 of the same Epistle, where it is said: If we sin willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there now remains no victim for sins, but a certain fearful expectation of judgment and a raging fire that will consume the adversaries.

To these passages, however, it is answered that the meaning of the Apostle's words in the first testimony is that it is impossible for those once enlightened, that is, baptized, to be renewed again unto penance, that is, to be baptized again. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Theophylact explain the passage in this manner, as does St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 84, a. 10, ad 1, where he says: Because among the Jews certain washings were instituted according to the law, in which they repeatedly purified themselves from uncleanness, some Jews believed that a person could likewise be purified repeatedly through the washing of Baptism. To exclude this, the Apostle writes in Heb. 6 that it is impossible for those who have once been enlightened, namely, through Baptism, to be renewed again unto penance, namely, through Baptism, which is the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, as is said in Titus 3. He assigns the reason from the fact that through Baptism man dies together with Christ, and therefore adds: "Crucifying again for themselves the Son of God."

In the same sense, the second testimony says that for us who sin willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there remains no victim for sins, that is, no other death of Christ that might be represented through Baptism and applied again for the entire remission of all guilt and punishment. Paul also appears in this second passage to be speaking to certain Jews wavering in the faith and wishing to join the law of Moses to that of Christ, and to assert that no victim for sin now remains for men of this kind. For the victim offered upon the Cross no longer profits those who abandon Christ for Moses, nor do the victims offered under the old law, since these have now been abolished by the law of Christ and by the victim offered upon the Cross.

4. The principal foundations of the Lutherans and Calvinists are taken from certain testimonies of Augustine that have been badly understood, especially from the statement in tract. 70 on John: *The word comes to the element, and the sacrament is made.* From this they argue: Word and element are required for every sacrament. But there is no element in Penance. Therefore, neither is there a sacrament.

It is easily answered that Augustine is not speaking there of every sacrament, but only of Baptism, as is manifest from the text. But if the statement is extended to the other sacraments of the new law, "element" must not be taken strictly and properly, for otherwise not even the Eucharist would be a sacrament, since bread and wine, which are its matter, are not elements strictly and properly. Rather, by "element" there must be understood any sensible thing instituted by Christ. In this sense we can say that the word in the sacrament of Penance, namely, the priest's absolution,

comes to the element, namely, the confession of sins, and the sacrament is made.

5. They object further: Augustine, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, lib. 1, c. 33, teaches that through the washing of regeneration not only past sins but also sins committed afterward are remitted. Therefore, we do not need a sacrament of Penance distinct from Baptism in order to obtain the remission of sins; it is sufficient for this that Baptism be recalled to memory, through which the faith by which sins are remitted is aroused. Hence Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 30, calls Baptism *the sacrament of faith and penance*.

I answer that Augustine attributes to Baptism the removal of sins committed after its reception not proximately and formally, but remotely and radically. For through Baptism, which is the gate of all the sacraments, we are rendered capable of receiving the sacrament of Penance, through which sins committed after Baptism are remitted to us.

That this interpretation is legitimate is clear, first, from the words he immediately adds in the same place: *For what profit is penance before Baptism unless Baptism follows, or afterward unless Baptism preceded?* It is also clear because, in epist. 23, he openly teaches that a sacrament distinct from Baptism is necessary for removing sins committed after Baptism. For he says of a baptized infant: *If, upon reaching a later age, he becomes wicked, he will then have sins through his own iniquity, which are not removed by regeneration but are healed by another remedy.*

To Fulgentius it is easily answered that he calls Baptism the sacrament of Penance because some act of the virtue of penance is necessary for its legitimate reception by adults who sinned mortally before being baptized, as is gathered from Acts 2, where Peter says: *Do penance, and let each one of you be baptized.*

§ 2.
The Institution of This Sacrament.

6. I say secondly that this sacrament was immediately instituted by Christ. This is clear from what was said in the Treatise on the Sacraments in General, c. 5, where we showed that all the sacraments of the new law were instituted by Christ, according to the words of Ambrose, *De sacramentis*, lib. 4, c. 4: *Who is the author of the sacraments except the Lord Jesus?* It is also clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 1: *If anyone says that Penance in the*

Catholic Church is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ the Lord, let him be anathema.

Reason also supports this. Since faith and the sacraments are the bases and foundations of the Church, it belongs only to him who is the head and founder of the Church to establish articles of faith and institute sacraments. Hence, just as the Church cannot establish new articles of faith or remove those already established, so neither can she institute new sacraments, abolish those already instituted, or change them. This belongs to Christ alone, who is the founder of the Church and in whom resides the power of excellence with respect to the institution of the sacraments.

This is especially true of the sacrament of Penance, in which the remission of sins takes place, because divine omnipotence especially shines and is manifested in the remission of sins, according to what the Church sings in a certain collect: *O God, who manifest your omnipotence chiefly by sparing and showing mercy.* St. Thomas gives three excellent reasons for this statement in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 25, a. 3, ad 3, where he should be read.

7. Theologians ask here at what time Christ instituted this sacrament. But the Council of Trent resolves this difficulty, sess. 14, c. 1, in these words: The Lord instituted the sacrament of Penance chiefly when, having risen from the dead, he breathed upon his disciples, saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained."

Reason also commends this. Since the sacrament of Penance is a spiritual tribunal of judgment, it is truly instituted when judicial power is conferred upon priests to absolve or condemn according to the merits of the offender. But this power is conferred in John 20 by the words cited. Therefore, the sacrament of Penance was instituted at that time.

It should be observed, however, that the sacred Synod said that Christ *then chiefly instituted the sacrament of Penance*, because the Savior indicated this sacrament in other places, both when he pointed out its necessity and when he promised to give his disciples the power of binding and loosing, and Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Yet he chiefly instituted it in John 20, when he uttered the words quoted above, because, as we have said, he then erected the tribunal of Penance by attributing to the Apostles and their successors the judicial power of remitting and retaining sins.

8. But if you ask why Christ wished to defer the institution of this sacrament until after his Resurrection, although he had instituted the other sacraments before his death and Passion, I answer that no other reason can be assigned a priori than the will of the institutor himself. Two reasons of fittingness, however, can be given.

The first is that Christ's Resurrection is the type and exemplar of our justification, according to the words of Paul in Rom. 4: *He was delivered up for our offenses and rose again for our justification*, that is, so that he might present to us a perfect exemplar of justification. For just as Christ rose quickly, truly, and perfectly, or so as never to die again, so the sinner must rise quickly from sins through penance, not delaying it from day to day; he must turn truly and sincerely to God; and he must not die again by the death of sin, for Christ, *rising from the dead, now dies no more*, as the same Apostle says.

The second is taken from St. Thomas on John 20, where he says that, since the remission of sins takes place through charity, and the Holy Spirit is charity, it was not fitting for the Apostles to receive the power of remitting sins until they had received the Holy Spirit through that mystical breathing of Christ, which occurred only after his Resurrection.

9. From what has been said it follows that the sacrament of Penance was immediately instituted by Christ not only as regards the formal element, or the power of absolving from sins, but also as regards the material element, or the confession of sins. For since confession is a part of this sacrament, if it had not been immediately instituted by Christ, the whole sacrament could not be said to have been instituted by Christ. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, says: *From the institution of the sacrament of Penance already explained, the universal Church has always understood that the complete confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord.*

Therefore, what Calvin says is false, namely, that the necessity of confession was first introduced by Innocent III in the chapter *Omnis utriusque sexus*. For Innocent only determined the time of annual confession and corrected the depraved custom of some who deferred confession and Communion for many years.

Calvin also falsely alleges that private confession was abolished by Nectarius, Patriarch of Constantinople. Nectarius did not abolish private confession, but only public confession and the public penitentiary appointed over it, because of the scandal arising from the publicly disclosed sin of a certain noblewoman with a deacon.

Chrysostom, the successor of Nectarius, must be understood of the same public confession when he says in hom. 2 on Ps. 50: Tell your sins, that you may destroy them. If you are ashamed to tell them to someone, tell them daily within your soul. I do not tell you to confess them to your fellow servant, so that he may reproach you. Tell them to God, who knows them. For the words "so that he may reproach you" clearly indicate that he is speaking of public confession, from which disgrace and confusion commonly followed for penitents, and which Nectarius, his predecessor, had abolished.

Nor is it an obstacle that he says confession is to be made to God alone. He does not thereby exclude the priest, because, as Arcudius rightly observes, lib. 4, c. 2, since the priest hears confession and absolves from sins as Christ's vicar, he is not distinguished from Christ in such a way as to stand apart from him. Hence confession made to a priest is judged to be made to God alone. For the same reason, Chrysostom, speaking of the Eucharist in hom. 50 on Matthew, says: *When you see the priest presenting it to you, do not think that the priest does this, but the hand of Christ. Likewise, when you are baptized, it is not he who baptizes, but God*, and so forth. *For the gift belongs to him alone.*

§ 3.
The Matter and Form of This Sacrament.

10. The Council of Trent expressly teaches, sess. 14, c. 3, that the proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance consists in the acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. It does not matter that the Council calls such acts *as it were the matter*. For, as the *Catechismus Romanus*, on the sacrament of Penance, n. 14, says: *These acts are called as it were the matter by the holy Synod, not because they lack the character of true matter, but because they are not matter of the kind applied from without*, as water is in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation.

Reason also supports this. The sacrament of Penance is exercised after the manner of a corrective and reconciling judgment, as is clear from the words of John 20: *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them*, and so forth. But the matter of a corrective judgment consists in accusation, sorrow, and satisfaction. For a corrective judgment requires the accusation of the guilty party and the manifestation of the offense, which consists in confession. It also requires the guilty person to disclose his offenses with sorrow; otherwise the disclosure of sins, in the absence of sorrow, would be a mere narration and a boasting in offenses. Likewise, punishment or satisfaction for the offense belongs to the integrity of judgment. Therefore, the proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance consists in the penitent's acts of contrition, confession, and satisfaction.

It follows that the sins disclosed in confession are the remote matter of this sacrament, both because remote matter is said to be that concerning which the proximate matter is exercised and because the crime treated in a judgment is said to be its matter.

As regards the form of this sacrament, the Councils of Florence and Trent teach that it consists in the words of absolution pronounced by the priest. Reason commends this, for in a judgment the sentence of the judge is related as form, because it is as it were the completion and consummation of the judgment.

11. From this it follows, against Scotus and others, that not only absolution, but also contrition, confession, and satisfaction are intrinsic parts of this sacrament. For in every artificial composite, such as a sacrament is, matter and form are related as intrinsic parts, and every judgment intrinsically consists of the accusation of the guilty party and the sentence of the judge. Satisfaction, however, is not an essential part of this sacrament, but only an integral part, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 14, c. 3. We shall discuss this below when treating satisfaction.

Although the priest does not produce the matter of this sacrament, which consists in the penitent's acts, he is nevertheless said to administer and effect this sacrament, because it is sufficient that he unite the form consisting in absolution to this matter either physically or morally. Likewise, in natural things, although the generator does not produce the matter, and sometimes does not even produce the form, as happens in human generation, nevertheless, by the very fact that he unites it to the matter, he is said to produce the composite and generate the man.

12. Contrition is rendered sufficiently sensible through confession, as Christ's body is rendered sensible in the Eucharist through the species. Likewise, the parts of a moral composite, such as a sacrament is, do not require physical conjunction or simultaneity, but only moral conjunction, such as commonly exists between the accusation of the guilty party and the sentence of the judge.

Finally, although in the sacrament of Penance the power productive of grace is found principally in the words of absolution, nevertheless, through absolution and by the power of the keys, the penitent's acts are elevated to cause grace and instrumentally produce it, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 6. Satisfaction, which is only an integral part of this sacrament, confers grace *insofar as it exists in intention*, and increases it *insofar as it is carried into execution*, as the same holy Doctor says in q. 90, a. 2. From these principles you will solve many arguments commonly raised against what has been said above.

13. From what has been said it is clear that this sacrament is called reconciliation from its effect, absolution from its form, confession from its better-known part, and Penance from contrition, which is its act. It is never

called the sacrament of satisfaction, because, although satisfaction belongs to its integrity, it does not belong to its essence.

Nor is it called the laying on of hands, because, although this is employed in the administration of this sacrament, it is not necessary for it. For, as St. Thomas reasons in Summa Theologiae III, q. 84, a. 4: The laying on of hands in the sacraments of the Church is performed to signify a certain abundant effect of grace, by which those upon whom hands are laid are in some manner joined through a certain likeness to the ministers, in whom an abundance of grace ought to exist. Therefore, the laying on of hands is performed in the sacrament of Confirmation, in which the fullness of the Holy Spirit is conferred, and in the sacrament of Orders, in which a certain excellence of power concerning the divine mysteries is conferred. But the sacrament of Penance is not ordered to attaining some excellence of grace, but to the removal of sins. Therefore, the laying on of hands is not required for this sacrament, just as it is not required for Baptism, in which, nevertheless, a fuller remission of sins occurs.

14. It is also clear from what has been said that this sacrament can be defined or described as follows: Penance is a sacrament of the new law, instituted by Christ to signify and cause saving grace and to remit sins committed after Baptism.

From this definition it is clear that this sacrament, either in reality or in desire, is necessary by necessity of means for destroying sins committed after Baptism, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 14, cc. 2 and 4. For those sins cannot be remitted except either through the sacrament of Penance itself actually received or through contrition, in which the desire for the sacrament of Penance is included, as the cited Council says.

This is indicated in Matt. 16 through the metaphor of the keys, under which the power of remitting or retaining sins was granted to St. Peter and his successors. For just as no one can enter a house while its door is closed unless a key opens it, so no one can be absolved from a lethal sin committed after Baptism except through the spiritual power of remitting sins granted to priests, and consequently except through the sacrament of Penance received either in reality or in desire.

That desire, however, need not necessarily be explicit; an implicit desire is sufficient. For it can happen that a man existing in sin elicits an act of contrition and yet does not at that time think of sacramental confession, either from forgetfulness or from invincible ignorance. In this case he would not have an explicit desire for the sacrament of Penance, but only an implicit desire contained in the contrition itself.

15. You will say first: An implicit desire for the sacrament of Penance is no more included in contrition than a desire for the sacrament of the Eucharist, since contrition does not implicitly include the intention to observe one divine commandment any more than another. Therefore, the sacrament of the Eucharist will be no less necessary in desire by necessity of means for obtaining the remission of sins committed after Baptism than the sacrament of Penance.

But I deny the antecedent. From the fact that the sacrament of Penance, and not the Eucharist, was instituted for remitting the sins of the baptized, an implicit desire for the sacrament of Penance, but not of the Eucharist, is specially included in contrition for sins committed after Baptism. Likewise, in contrition for sins committed before Baptism, a desire for Baptism is contained in a certain special manner for the same reason.

16. You will say secondly: Martyrdom, together with mere attrition, remits mortal sin and justifies by virtue of the rite itself not only infants but also adults, as we showed in Treatise II, c. 10. Therefore, the remission of sin committed after Baptism can be obtained without the sacrament of Penance either in reality or in desire.

But I deny the consequence, for an implicit desire for the sacrament of Penance is contained in martyrdom itself. First, because if time permits the martyr either to subject his sins to the keys of the Church or at least to elicit an act of contrition, he is bound to do so. Secondly, because if he is suddenly seized for martyrdom or is killed while sleeping, even in that case, by reason of an attrition previously elicited and the will to undergo martyrdom, he is judged to possess an implicit desire for the sacrament of Penance included in the attrition, although not as perfectly as in contrition, because attrition is not as efficacious.

CHAPTER II.

On Penance as a Virtue.

1. That Penance is a virtue is manifest, since it is an elective habit according to right reason, consisting in a mean. For right reason dictates that one must grieve for sins insofar as they are offenses against God, and that such grief must consist in a mean. Just as it happens that some men grieve too little for sins committed, according to Prov. 2: *They rejoice when they have done evil and exult in the worst things*, so it also happens that others grieve and are saddened over them immoderately and unto despair, as is clear from Cain and Judas. The former, having fallen into despair, said: *My iniquity is greater*

than that I should deserve pardon; the latter, being moved by remorse, hanged himself. But the habit of Penance holds the mean between these extremes. Therefore, it is a true virtue.

2. You will say first: No virtue can essentially presuppose sin in its subject, since virtue ought to be desirable of itself. But Penance essentially presupposes sin. Therefore, it is not a true virtue.

I answer that the major premise is not universally true. For virtues that tend to the destruction or punishment of sin essentially presuppose it, as is clear in vindicative justice, which essentially presupposes sin in another subject. Why, therefore, may Penance not likewise essentially presuppose sin in its own subject? Hence such virtues are not desirable of themselves, but only accidentally, on the supposition of sin, just as medicine is not desirable except by reason of disease.

3. You will say secondly: Virtue has delight of itself, as the Philosopher teaches in the books of the Ethica. But Penance has not delight, but sorrow, punishment, and sadness. Indeed, one is said to do penance as though "to hold punishment," as Isidore says. Hence Tertullian, describing it in De paenitentia, says that it consists in lying upon sackcloth and ashes, obscuring the body with filth, casting down the soul with sorrows, changing the things in which one sinned by sorrowful treatment, nourishing prayers with fasts, groaning, weeping, and crying out to the Lord God day and night, and so forth. Therefore, Penance is not a virtue.

I answer that although Penance does not have delight, but sadness and sorrow, concerning its object, namely, the sin committed, it nevertheless delights in its own act and rejoices in its sorrow, as St. Thomas says in *De spe*, q. un., a. 1, ad 14. Hence in the last chapter of Job, where the Vulgate has, *I do penance in dust and ashes*, the original text reads, *I take comfort in dust and ashes*. And the author of *De vera et falsa paenitentia*, among the works of Augustine, says: *Let the penitent always grieve, and let him rejoice in his grief.*

4. It is no less certain that Penance is not some general and common virtue constituting a general condition of all virtues, in the way that injustice or iniquity is called a general condition of all sins. For Penance has a special object, namely, an offense against God insofar as it can be expiated through a satisfaction that does not attain perfect equality, as will be clear from what is said below. It also elicits a special praiseworthy act, namely, acting toward the destruction of past sin insofar as it is an offense against God. This does not belong to the character of another virtue, as St. Thomas reasons in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 85, a. 2.

It follows that Penance is not a general virtue constituted by the aggregation of many virtues, as some recent authors suppose. For although

other virtues concur in hatred of sin insofar as sin is opposed to the proper good of each virtue—because it belongs to the same virtue immediately to pursue the good and to hate the evil opposed to it—the hatred of sin considered as an offense against God, which must be destroyed through satisfaction, proceeds neither elicitedly nor imperatively from the other virtues. For under this aspect sin does not fall under their object, but pertains only to the object of Penance, and therefore is elicited by Penance alone.

5. Finally, we presuppose as certain that the formal object of Penance is the divine right violated through an offense insofar as it can be repaired through satisfaction and a certain compensation. For to attain sin under this aspect is a praiseworthy act involving the greatest difficulty, and consequently it must belong to some virtue. This virtue can be none other than Penance, as will be clear from what is said below. Therefore, the formal object of Penance is the divine right violated through sin insofar as it can be repaired through satisfaction.

Its material object is sin itself insofar as it is an offense against God capable of expiation through satisfaction. Hence, because an offense insofar as it can be expiated is considered as past—for it cannot be expiated unless it has been committed—Penance primarily and principally concerns past sins, but secondarily and less principally concerns future sins insofar as it purposes to commit none thereafter.

6. From this it follows, first, against Alexander of Hales, that Penance is a virtue distinct from charity. For although charity is opposed to sin and endeavors to destroy it, as does Penance, they nevertheless regard sin differently and tend to its destruction in different ways. Charity regards it as contrary to the divine good and intends to destroy it under that aspect. Penance, however, is directed toward it as opposed to a juridical right, insofar as it has the character of an offense, with the intention of destroying it and repairing the injury inflicted upon God. This solves the principal foundation of the contrary opinion.

7. You will say: Contrition, which is the proper act of Penance, is elicited by charity. Therefore, Penance is not a virtue distinct from charity. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. Contrition is sorrow for sin on account of God loved above all things. But such sorrow is elicited by charity, since it belongs to the same virtue to rejoice in a friend's goods and to grieve and be saddened by his evils. Therefore, contrition is elicited by charity.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise. Contrition is sorrow for sin, and so forth, by a simple displeasure

with it: I deny the major premise. Together with the intention of destroying it and satisfying the offended God: I grant the major premise. Likewise, I distinguish the minor premise. Such sorrow is elicited by charity insofar as it is a simple displeasure with sin: I grant the minor premise. Insofar as it is the intention to destroy sin and satisfy for it: I deny the minor premise and the consequence.

This solution is St. Thomas's in Summa Theologiae III, q. 85, a. 2, ad 1, where he says: If in the act of the penitent there is considered only displeasure with a past sin, this pertains immediately to charity, just as does rejoicing in past goods. But the intention of acting toward the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue under charity.

8. It follows secondly, against Cajetan, that Penance is a virtue distinct from religion, because these virtues regard rights of a different character. Penance regards the divine right violated through an offense and capable of repair through satisfaction. Religion, however, regards the divine right arising from God's supreme excellence and from benefits received from him, as St. Thomas teaches in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 14, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 5: *A person becomes a debtor to God because he receives something from him, and under this aspect latria or religion renders to God the honor due to him. In another way, a person becomes a debtor because he has sinned against God, and in this way he renders to God the debt of Penance.*

Hence Penance necessarily presupposes sin, but religion does not. Religion can and ought to be exercised even by the innocent. Religion regards worship to be rendered to God as supreme Lord; Penance endeavors to expiate sin and to repair the violated divine right through satisfaction.

9. You will say first with Cajetan: It belongs to the same virtue to regard a good and the evil opposed to it. But Penance regards the evil opposed to the virtue of religion. For religion is occupied with the worship and honor of God, while Penance endeavors to repair an injury directed against divine honor. Therefore, Penance is not distinct from religion.

I answer, granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof, I say that although Penance endeavors to repair an injury directed against divine honor, it does not for that reason regard an evil opposed to the virtue of religion. For it does not regard sin precisely insofar as sin is opposed to divine worship, but insofar as it must be compensated by satisfaction. Its formal object is the divine right violated through an offense insofar as it is capable of repair through satisfaction, while the object of religion is the divine right arising from God's supreme excellence and from benefits received from him.

10. You will say secondly: Through the same virtue of commutative justice among men, equality is established in purchases and sales, and in offenses and satisfactions. Likewise, through the same virtue of piety a son renders to his father what is due and satisfies for injuries inflicted upon him. Therefore, similarly, through the same virtue of religion a man offers the worship due to God and satisfies for injuries inflicted upon him.

I answer that not everyone admits the antecedent. For Soto and Valentia hold that even among men a special virtue is required for satisfying for injuries inflicted, distinct from the virtue that satisfies for things received in voluntary exchanges, restores what was taken, and pays debts. But whatever may be true of this, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity.

The reason for the disparity, as regards the first example, is that perfect equality can exist between man and man. Under this one indivisible formal aspect, the same virtue can regard a thing owed insofar as it must be restored, and an injury inflicted insofar as it must be compensated. But man cannot render to God an equal return either for benefits received or for injuries inflicted. Therefore, one virtue cannot regard these things under the aspect of perfect equality.

Nor can it regard them under the aspect of inequality, because inequality, since it occurs in many ways, namely, through excess and defect, is not one indivisible aspect capable of specifying one virtue. Consequently, the specification must be drawn from another source, so that diverse inequalities arising from diverse causes specify and distinguish diverse virtues. Hence inequality arising from benefits received will specify one virtue, namely, religion; and inequality arising from injuries inflicted will specify another, namely, Penance.

11. As regards the other example concerning the virtue of piety, the disparity is likewise manifest. For the son's piety regards the same right, whether he gives worship to his father or satisfies for an injury inflicted upon him, namely, paternal right, in which these diverse added aspects can specify one virtue.

But the virtue rendering to God the worship due for benefits and the virtue satisfying him for injuries regard rights of a different character in God. The former regards in God the right of dominion that he possesses over all our actions by reason of being the first principle. The latter regards the right of ownership that belongs to him as the ultimate end of the rational creature. For because God is the creature's ultimate end, the creature is bound to direct all its actions to him. This right is violated through mortal

sin, by which man turns away from God as supreme good and ultimate end and turns to the creature as though to an ultimate end.

Hence the objection of a certain recent author is invalid. He rejects and attacks this solution and disparity on the ground that, as he says, a father possesses over his son's actions not only a right of dominion but also of ownership. This is clearly false, because such a right is founded upon the character of an ultimate end, which a father does not possess with respect to his son and which belongs to God alone.

12. It follows thirdly, against Durandus and Suárez, that Penance is distinct from commutative justice. Commutative justice regards a strict right to be compensated according to equality. Hence, since man cannot render to God an equal return either for benefits received or for injuries inflicted, commutative justice cannot exist between man and God, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 1: *It is manifest that justice between man and God cannot be according to perfect equality.*

But Penance does not satisfy God according to equality, because no satisfaction of a creature can in any way equal the injury inflicted upon God, as we showed in the Treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore, Penance is distinct from commutative justice.

13. It follows fourthly, against Scotus, that although Penance manifests a certain mode of vindicative justice insofar as it punishes the guilty sinner to avenge the injury done to God, it nevertheless falls short of the perfect character of vindicative justice. For vindicative justice does not exist in the guilty person, but in the judge, in whom it possesses a certain character of commutative justice insofar as it observes proportion and commensuration between punishment and fault. Penance, however, exists in the guilty person himself, and there is no proportion between the punishment it exacts from the sinner and the fault itself. For the punishment is simply finite, whereas the sin possesses simply infinite malice.

14. It follows fifthly, against Gabriel, that although Penance in some way imitates distributive justice, insofar as it prescribes and distributes punishments according to the quality, gravity, and number of crimes, it nevertheless falls short of the character of perfect distributive justice.

First, because it is proper to distributive justice to distribute goods and punishments in proportion to praiseworthy and blameworthy acts. But, as we have just said, there is no proportion between the guilt of mortal sin and the satisfaction offered for it through Penance.

Secondly, because distributive justice is exercised by a superior toward inferiors, since it belongs to a superior to distribute common goods and punishments to inferiors in proportion to each one's merit or demerit.

Penance, however, belongs rather to an inferior, namely, the creature, in relation to a superior, namely, God. Therefore, although Penance emulates the mode of distributive justice, it is not distributive justice.

15. It follows sixthly that Penance is a potential part of commutative justice. This corollary is explained and proved at the same time. Besides the three species of rigorous justice properly so called, namely, legal, commutative, and distributive justice, there are other virtues that pertain reductively to justice and are commonly called potential parts of justice. They imitate and emulate the character of justice, but fall short of it either because they cannot render an equal return, as religion, piety, and observance, or because, although they can render an equal return, they do not have a rigorous and legal debt, but only a moral debt, which is measured according to a certain moral goodness and fittingness rather than according to an obligation of law, as in liberality, gratitude, fidelity, and friendship.

Since, therefore, Penance cannot render to God an equal return for sins committed, it falls short of the character of true and strict justice and is constituted a potential part of it, not through a lack of strict debt, but through an inability to offer God an equal and condign satisfaction.

16. Nor is it valid to say that for commutative and perfect justice it is not necessary that a man actually satisfy, or be able to satisfy, God according to equality, but that it is sufficient that he choose to satisfy him according to equality if this were possible. Thus, although a poor man cannot exercise the external acts of liberality and magnificence, he can nevertheless possess the habits of those virtues, because he can choose their moral goodness and elicit a conditional act of exercising them if he had the means.

This answer, I say, is not valid. For there can be a twofold inability to perform something. One is accidental and exists precisely on the part of the subject. This for the most part does not prevent the act or habit of a virtue. The other is essential and exists on the part of the object. This prevents both the habit and the act of a virtue. For since virtue is an elective habit, and choice concerns only possible things, it is manifest that virtue cannot be concerned with things that are impossible of themselves and from the object.

Such is the inability of a mere man to offer God an equal satisfaction for sin. Equality with the violated divine right is impossible for a mere creature from the object and of itself, so that it involves a contradiction. The inability found in a poor man to exercise an external act of liberality and magnificence belongs to the first kind, because it is not repugnant for him to become rich and possess much money to distribute to others.

17. It follows seventhly that the immediate subject of Penance is the will. For it is a potential part of justice, as we have shown, and every justice exists in the will, since, according to Ulpian, justice is *the perpetual and constant will rendering to each one his right*.

Its remote subject is anyone guilty of sin, or at least capable of it, because, as was seen above, its material object is sin insofar as it is to be detested and punished. It follows that the habit of Penance did not exist in Christ, because by reason of the hypostatic union he was intrinsically impeccable. Consequently, he satisfied condignly and equally for the sins of men, not through an act of Penance, but through an act of perfect and rigorous justice.

It also follows that Penance cannot exist in an angel. For since an angel immovably adheres to an object once chosen, he cannot retract an elicited act and consequently cannot repent of it.

It follows likewise that the habit of Penance was infused into Adam together with grace and the infused virtues before sin. For since in that state he was capable of sin, as the tragic experience sufficiently showed, he was also capable of Penance.

Whether Penance existed in the Blessed Virgin is affirmed by many, because although by privilege she did not sin even venially, nor was she able to do so, nevertheless, by reason of her state as a wayfarer and the condition of created freedom, she had the radical capacity to sin and was not intrinsically impeccable as Christ was. Others deny it, because, since in the Blessed Virgin the tinder of sin was either wholly extinguished or at least bound from the first instant of the infusion of grace, and was wholly removed at the conception of the Divine Word, just as she could not sin, so neither could she repent. Consequently, the habit of Penance would have been wholly idle and superfluous in her.

CHAPTER III.
On the Effects of Penance.

Since Penance can be considered both as a sacrament and as a virtue, its principal effects must be briefly explained here. Afterward we shall discuss the parts of which the sacrament of Penance consists, namely, contrition, absolution, and satisfaction.

§ 1.
The First Effect of Penance: The Remission of All Mortal Sins.

1. It is certain by faith that both the virtue and the sacrament of Penance possess sufficient power and efficacy to destroy any sins whatsoever that are rightly subjected to them, so that there is no sin that cannot be remitted if true Penance is had for it. For it is said in Ezek. 18: *If the wicked man does penance*, and so forth, *I shall not remember all his iniquities*. And in Isa. 1: *If your sins are like scarlet, they shall be made white as snow; and if they are red like crimson, they shall become white as wool.*

Likewise, concerning the sacrament of Penance it is asserted absolutely and without any limitation in John 20: *Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.*

Reason also supports this. The sacraments of the new law effect what they signify. But the sacrament of Penance signifies the remission of all mortal sins, as is clear from the words of the form: *I absolve you from all your sins.* Therefore, all mortal sins are remitted through it. Hence the *Catechismus Romanus*, part 2, n. 23, says that *there is no crime so grave and wicked that it cannot be destroyed by the sacrament of Penance, not only once, but again and again.*

2. There are, however, certain testimonies of Scripture that appear to assert the contrary. For Christ says in Matt. 12, Mark 3, and Luke 12 that a sin against the Holy Spirit is never forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come. And in 1 John 5 it is said: *There is a sin unto death; for that I do not say that anyone should pray*, because, namely, it cannot be remitted. Therefore, there are some sins that cannot be expiated or remitted through Penance.

To the first it must be said that a sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be forgiven neither in this age nor in the age to come either because, as Augustine holds in serm. 11, *De verbis Domini*, Christ is speaking there of final impenitence, that is, of mortal sin enduring until the instant of death or committed at that instant, after which there is no remission.

Or, if it is understood of a sin of malice or a blasphemy uttered against the very Person of the Holy Spirit, Christ wished to signify that such a sin is forgiven with difficulty because it despises and repels the very fountain of grace and piety, namely, the Holy Spirit. Likewise, a disease is called lethal and incurable when it is cured only with difficulty and the sick person hates the medicine and detests the physician himself.

To the second, it is similarly answered with Augustine, *Retractationes*, lib. 1, c. 19, and Bede on that passage of John, that it speaks of the sin of final impenitence. This is specially called *a sin unto death* because it always has eternal death joined to it and infallibly brings it about.

Or, if by a sin unto death some most grave sin is understood, from which men are corrected only very rarely and with the greatest difficulty, the Apostle does not prohibit absolutely everyone from praying for such a sinner, but only prohibits just anyone from doing so. Since the offense is most grave, it needs a great intercessor, or a man of great holiness, to pray for the conversion of such a sinner.

3. Many ask here with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 86, aa. 2 and 3, whether sin can be remitted without Penance, and whether through Penance one sin can be remitted without another. But we discussed these matters in the Treatise on Grace, when treating the justification of the sinner.

§ 2.
Through Penance the Debt of Eternal Punishment Is Removed, Although a Debt of Some Temporal Punishment Can Remain.

4. The first part is taught by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, where it is expressed in explicit words, and in c. 7, where this reason is indicated. Mortal sin is never remitted unless grace is infused, through which man is inwardly renewed. But grace, since it constitutes man an adopted son of God and consequently gives him a right to the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom, is incompatible with the debt of eternal punishment.

The second part, namely, that after the remission of guilt the debt of some temporal punishment can remain, is likewise defined by the same sacred Synod, sess. 6, can. 30, in these words: If anyone says that, after the grace of justification has been received, the guilt is so remitted and the debt of eternal punishment so destroyed for every penitent sinner that no debt of temporal punishment remains to be discharged either in this age or in the age to come, and so forth, let him be anathema.

Likewise, sess. 14, c. 8, it says: The holy Synod declares that it is altogether false and foreign to the word of God that guilt is never remitted by the Lord without the whole punishment also being pardoned. For clear and illustrious examples are found in sacred Scripture by which, apart from divine tradition, this error is most manifestly refuted.

In the same place the Council adds several reasons to prove that it was fitting for this to be so, that is, that when guilt and the debt of eternal punishment have been remitted, the entire debt of temporal punishment is not immediately remitted.

First, the nature of justice requires that those who sinned through ignorance before Baptism be received into grace by God differently from those who, after having once been delivered from the slavery of sin and the devil, did not fear to violate the temple of God and grieve the Holy Spirit.

Secondly, it was fitting that this be so in order that the malice and gravity of mortal sin might appear more clearly. Hence Augustine, tract. 124 on John: Punishment is more prolonged than guilt, lest guilt be thought slight if punishment also ended together with it. Thus punishment temporally detains even the man whom guilt no longer detains as liable to eternal damnation.

Thirdly, it serves to restrain the license to sin, which would be greater if all punishment were so easily remitted.

Fourthly, through satisfactory acts by which we discharge temporal punishment, we remove the remnants of sins and the vicious habits contracted through evil living by means of contrary acts, and we are conformed to Christ our head, who suffered so greatly for us in the flesh.

5. St. Thomas proves the same truth in Summa Theologiae III, q. 86, a. 4, ad 3, from the distinction found between the sacraments of Baptism and Penance: Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to remove every debt of punishment, not only eternal but also temporal. According to the manner in which a man participates in the power of Christ's Passion, he also receives absolution from the debt of punishment. In Baptism, however, a man participates totally in the power of Christ's Passion, as one who through water and the Spirit has died with Christ to sin and has been regenerated in him unto new life. Therefore, in Baptism a man obtains remission of the debt of all punishment. But in Penance he obtains the power of Christ's Passion according to the manner of his own acts, which are the matter of Penance, just as water is the matter of Baptism. Therefore, through the first act of Penance, by which guilt is remitted, the debt of all punishment is not immediately discharged, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed. He expounds this argument more fully in Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 72.

He gives another argument in the body of the same fourth article, which can be briefly presented as follows. Just as in mortal sin there are two elements, namely, aversion from God and conversion to the creature, so a twofold punishment is owed to it. One is eternal and corresponds to sin on

the part of aversion, because just as sin is in some way infinite under this aspect, so a punishment in some way infinite is due to it. The other is temporal and corresponds to the conversion, which is finite, greater or lesser according to the quality of the object or of the act by which the sinner is affected toward it.

Therefore, since in the justification of the sinner, when guilt is remitted through grace, aversion from God is always removed—because through grace and charity man is joined to God as his ultimate end—the debt of eternal punishment is consequently always removed. But since in justification the disordered conversion that the sinner has to the creature is not always removed, the debt of temporal punishment corresponding to this disordered conversion is not always removed.

6. In this argument of St. Thomas, however, it is difficult to explain what he understands by "disordered conversion." For if we say that he understands a habitual conversion to the creature as ultimate end, it will be impossible to maintain that this conversion remains when aversion has been removed, since it is impossible for a man to possess two ultimate ends, namely, God and the creature.

But if we say that by conversion he understands the habitual inclination made by a vicious habit toward a particular object, it cannot be universally verified that a disordered conversion to the creature is found in every sin. For sin does not always cause a vicious habit in the sinner, since such a habit is produced only by many repeated acts.

7. A certain recent Thomist answers in his *Theologia mentis et cordis* that by the disordered conversion to a changeable good from which, St. Thomas says, the debt of temporal punishment follows, St. Thomas understands nothing other than depraved habits or dispositions caused by preceding acts, to which temporal punishment is due by reason of the act they connote.

But Martínez de Prado refutes this answer in three ways. First, from St. Thomas, Scriptum super Sententiis II, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, who says that the debt of punishment, speaking of itself, is not founded upon a disposition or habit, but accidentally, insofar as such a disposition or habit is joined to some defect. Therefore, something other than the habit or disposition must be assigned as founding the debt of temporal punishment of itself.

Secondly, St. Thomas reserves his treatment of the remnants of sin for a. 5, where he treats such habits remaining after the manner of dispositions. Therefore, in a. 4 he treats something else that precedes and grounds the debt of temporal punishment.

Thirdly, it often happens that a person is justified by a vehement contrition sufficient to destroy not only all guilt, but also all temporal

punishment, while habits of vice nevertheless remain in him. These are expelled only by many acts, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 12: *An act is not directly contrary to a habit, but to an act. The continuation of a habit in its subject does not require the continuity of an act. Therefore, from the occurrence of a contrary act, an acquired habit is not immediately excluded.* Therefore, the debt of temporal punishment does not follow upon habits caused by preceding acts.

8. From this you will understand that the aforementioned author was mistaken because he did not distinguish between the debt of temporal punishment and the remnants of sins, and supposed that what St. Thomas said in a. 5 concerning the remnants of sins ought to be understood of the debt of temporal punishment.

The remnants of sins, therefore, are depraved dispositions or habits left by preceding vicious acts. The debt of temporal punishment, however, is the obligation to temporal punishment consequent upon a sinful act. Hence, although the debt of temporal punishment is removed through indulgences, the remnants of sins are not removed through them, because the depraved habits or dispositions left by preceding acts are not removed through indulgences.

9. The proposed difficulty is therefore better answered with Cajetan, Soto, and other older Thomists, who hold that when St. Thomas says that the debt of temporal punishment corresponds to disordered conversion, by disordered conversion he understands the illicit and disordered delight that the sinner receives from conversion to the creature and from the object of sin, by indulging himself in it more than he ought.

That this is the mind of St. Thomas appears to be clearly gathered from the text itself. For he says: On the part of conversion to a changeable good, insofar as it is disordered, there follows upon mortal sin a debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is not reduced to the order of justice except through punishment. For it is just that one who has indulged his will more than he ought should suffer something contrary to his will; thus equality will be restored. Hence it is said in Apoc. 18: "As much as she glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment and mourning give to her."

It does not matter that the disordered delight the sinner receives from a disordered conversion to the creature passes away together with the sin itself. This does not prevent it from remaining virtually or morally by reason of the obligation to temporal punishment that is left by it after the guilt and debt of eternal punishment have been remitted.

10. The arguments by which the heretics attempt to prove that, after guilt and the debt of eternal punishment have been remitted through Penance, no debt of temporal punishment remains in the justified are exceedingly weak.

First, they object from the words of the Apostle in Rom. 8: *There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus.* But this is frivolous. For although, after guilt and the debt of eternal punishment have been remitted, the debt of some temporal punishment remains in the justified, no condemnation remains on that account, because such a debt cannot be called condemnation. For how could that be called condemnation which can contribute to salvation and unite and conform us to Christ our head, as the discharge of temporal punishment through acts of satisfaction can do?

11. Secondly, they object from Tertullian, *De baptismo*, c. 5: *When the debt is removed, the punishment is also removed.* By this it appears to be signified that, when guilt and the debt of eternal punishment have been remitted through Penance, no debt of temporal punishment remains.

It is easily answered that this statement is to be understood only of Baptism and eternal punishment. Even if it were understood of temporal punishment, it would conclude nothing against Catholic truth. For, as we showed above from St. Thomas, this difference exists between Baptism and Penance: since Baptism was instituted after the manner of spiritual generation, nothing remains in a man regenerated through Baptism, either as regards guilt or punishment. Likewise, in natural generation, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, nothing remains in the generated thing from the action that previously existed in the corrupted thing, but there is a resolution as far as prime matter.

Hence Chrysostom, hom. 24 on John: For those who plunge their head into the water of Baptism as into a tomb, the old man is buried; for those who emerge from it, the new man rises.

On the contrary, since the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of spiritual medicine, it does not always heal a man perfectly and totally, but leaves in him depraved habits and dispositions as though remnants of disease. In this way, after a wound has been healed and the pus discharged, certain scars remain, which must themselves also be treated.

§ 3.
The Remission of Venial Sins, the Third Effect of Penance.

12. Three difficulties must be briefly resolved here. The first is whether and how venial sins are remitted through Penance and the other sacraments. The second is whether and how they are remitted through sacramentals. The third is whether venial sins are destroyed outside the sacraments and sacramentals through other acts of virtue.

I say first, therefore, that the sacrament of Penance possesses the power to remit venial sins subjected to it by virtue of the sacramental action itself. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, and from the practice of devout faithful approved there by the Council, and by St. Cyprian in the sermon *De lapsis*, where he praises those who seek a saving remedy through priestly confession even for small wounds.

Likewise, Augustine, lib. 50 Homiliarum, hom. 50, says: Although they are perceived individually not to strike with a lethal wound, nevertheless, when all are gathered together, they destroy our beauty like a scab, so as to separate us from the most chaste embraces of that bridegroom who is beautiful above the sons of men, unless they are cut away by the medicine of daily Penance.

Reason also supports this. First, because not only mortal but also venial sins are matter of this sacrament, as we shall say below when treating confession. Secondly, because it is not consonant with reason to suppose that the sacrament of Penance can indeed destroy mortal sins committed after Baptism, but not venial sins, which are of lesser gravity and can be remitted more easily.

Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 87, a. 1, in the body and ad 1, says that this distinction exists between mortal and venial sin: For the remission of mortal sin a more perfect Penance is required, namely, that a man actually detest mortal sin insofar as he is able, so that he applies diligence to recalling each sin and detests each one insofar as he is able. But this is not required for the remission of venial sins. Rather, a certain virtual displeasure is required, as when someone is so borne by affection toward God and divine things that whatever might occur to him that would retard him from this movement would displease him, and he would grieve that he had committed it, even if he did not actually think of it. This, however, does

not suffice for the remission of mortal sin except as regards sins forgotten after diligent inquiry.

Hence he concludes in the answer to the first objection that, because a just man can avoid each individual venial sin, but not all venial sins collectively, it is required for Penance concerning venial sins that a man intend to abstain from each one, although not from all collectively, because human weakness does not permit this. Nevertheless, he must—and his words are most worthy of note—*have the intention of preparing himself to lessen venial sins; otherwise he would be in danger of failing, since he would abandon the desire of being perfected, or of removing the impediments to spiritual progress, which are venial sins.*

13. You will ask whether one who confesses some venial sin but voluntarily and intentionally conceals others, in which, as I suppose, he takes no complacency, obtains their remission by the power of the sacrament of Penance.

The reason for doubt is that through the other sacraments received with attrition concerning venial sins, venial sins are remitted although no confession of them is made, as will be clear from what is said below. Therefore, it appears that the same should be said of the sacrament of Penance, namely, that when one approaches it with attrition and confesses only one venial sin, he obtains the remission of all venial sins in which he takes no complacency, although he does not confess them or subject them to the keys of the Church. For what is granted to the other sacraments does not appear to be deniable to the sacrament of Penance.

Nugno answers by denying the supposition, namely, that one who confesses some venial sin and voluntarily and intentionally conceals others does not thereby retain affection for them. For since the proper mode of this sacrament is to remit sins through confession, not to will to confess them is, he says, to possess a certain virtual complacency in them. This answer is not without probability.

Nevertheless, I answer negatively to the case proposed. To the contrary reason for doubt, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the disparity is that the confession of sins, whether mortal or venial, is a part of the sacrament of Penance, but not of the other sacraments. Hence, although venial sins that are voluntarily and intentionally concealed are not remitted in the sacrament of Penance, their remission is nevertheless obtained in the other sacraments, although no mention of those sins is made in receiving them.

14. I say secondly that not only Penance, but also the other sacraments of the new law, possess the power to remit venial sins by virtue of the

sacramental action itself. This belongs in a special manner, however, to certain sacraments, namely, Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction.

The first part is taught by St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 87, a. 3, in the body: *Through all the sacraments of the new law in which grace is conferred, venial sins are remitted.* They are certainly remitted by virtue of the sacramental action itself, because, since these sacraments confer grace by virtue of the sacramental action itself, and the remission of venial sins follows upon the infusion of grace, as the holy Doctor teaches in the same place, they also cause that remission by virtue of the sacramental action itself.

Reason also commends this. All the sacraments of the new law possess the power to remit all mortal sins by virtue of the sacramental action itself. Some possess it by the power of their primary institution and are therefore called sacraments of the dead. Others possess it by the power of their secondary institution and are called sacraments of the living, as we explained in the Treatise on the Sacraments in General. Therefore, since venial sins are more easily remitted, venial sins are remitted through all the sacraments of the new law by virtue of the sacramental action itself.

15. The second part of the conclusion, which asserts that this belongs in a special manner to Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction, is proved by considering these sacraments individually.

First, it is manifest concerning Baptism. Since it was instituted after the manner of spiritual regeneration, the grace given in it is regenerative and consequently wholly transforms man and destroys every stain of his past life, whatever it may be.

The same is clear concerning Confirmation. Since its proper effect is strength of soul and an increase of spiritual life, it must remit by virtue of the sacramental action itself venial sins, which are opposed to the perfection and increase of spiritual life.

Concerning the Eucharist it is proved, first, because it was instituted after the manner of spiritual food and nourishment. Hence, by its proper power it restores what is lost through the heat of concupiscence, from which venial sins proceed. Secondly, because the proper effect of this sacrament is to arouse the fervor of charity, by which venial sins are remitted. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 13, c. 2, affirms that it is an antidote by which we are freed from daily faults, that is, venial sins, and preserved from mortal sins.

Finally, this is easily shown concerning Extreme Unction. Since this sacrament was instituted to dispose a man perfectly for entrance into and

possession of glory, it must by its own power and institution remove venial sins, which delay him from entering and attaining glory.

16. I say thirdly that not only the sacraments, but also some sacramentals, remit venial sins by virtue of the rite itself, not indeed immediately, but only mediately, insofar as, through the merits of Christ or the prayers of the Church, they obtain from God certain supernatural helps for eliciting supernatural acts by which venial sins are formally or virtually displeasing and retracted.

The first part is proved from the chapter Aquam sale, De consecratione, dist. 3, where Alexander I says: We bless water mingled with salt among the people, so that all who are sprinkled with it may be sanctified, and we command all priests to do this. For if the ashes of a heifer, when sprinkled, sanctified and cleansed, much more does water mingled with salt and consecrated by divine prayers sanctify and cleanse the people.

From these words one may argue as follows. Theologians gather from the doctrine of the Fathers that the sacraments of the new law cause grace and remit mortal sins by virtue of the sacramental action itself because the Fathers say absolutely and without qualification that they sanctify and purify souls. Therefore, since the holy Fathers similarly say that certain sacramentals sanctify us and cleanse us from venial sins, this is more properly and fittingly understood of the remission of venial sins by virtue of the rite itself than merely by virtue of the act of the recipient.

This opinion also fosters and increases the devotion of the faithful toward holy water and the other sacramentals of the new law, and is expressly taught by St. Thomas in Summa Theologiae III, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3: The infusion of grace is not required for the destruction of venial sin. Hence, since grace is infused in every sacrament of the new law, no sacrament of the new law was instituted directly against venial sin, which is removed by certain sacramentals, such as holy water and other things of this kind.

From this it is clear that Petrus Aurelius went too far when he wrote in the Vindiciae censurae Sorbonicae: That opinion, which certain petty scholastics have lately devised—not only without the authority of Scripture, the holy Fathers, and the Church, but even contrary to the judgment both of all of them and of almost the whole school of theologians—that sacramentals produce by virtue of the rite itself the effects for which they were instituted, must be rejected and banished far from the minds of Catholics.

17. The second part of the conclusion, namely, that holy water and the other sacramentals cause the remission of venial sins by virtue of the rite itself only mediately, is clear from this: since venial sins are opposed to the

fervor of charity and cause its privation, and no privation can be removed except through the positing of the opposite form, the sacraments and sacramentals cannot remit venial sins otherwise than by obtaining, through the merits of Christ or the prayers of the Church, supernatural helps by which a man is moved by God to elicit fervent acts of charity or Penance through which such sins are formally or virtually retracted.

From this appears the difference between mortal and venial sins, and the reason why mortal sins are remitted immediately through the sacraments by virtue of the sacramental action itself, but venial sins are not. The reason is that the sacraments immediately cause habitual grace, to which the stain of mortal sin is privatively opposed, but they do not immediately cause the actual fervor of charity, to which venial sin is opposed.

18. Against the first part of this conclusion, the author of the *Theologia mentis et cordis* objects first from certain testimonies of St. Thomas in which he asserts that sacramentals do not avail for the remission of venial sins except insofar as they are accompanied by a movement of detestation for sins or a movement of reverence toward God and divine things.

But these testimonies show only that sacramentals do not remit venial sins immediately, but only mediately, insofar as, through Christ's merits, supernatural helps are conferred by God in their actual and devout reception for eliciting supernatural acts by which venial sins are formally or virtually displeasing and retracted. Hence they indeed prove the second part of our conclusion, but do not touch the first.

19. He objects secondly that the Church does not possess the power to impart to sacred ceremonies such a power that they destroy venial sins, cleanse interior stains, and operate within the soul.

But this too is frivolous. For sacramentals remit venial sins not by the power of the Church, but by the power of Christ the Lord. Christ left to the Church the power to institute and determine certain sacred ceremonies that we call sacramentals. When these have been determined, Christ himself elevates them and grants them the power to remit venial sins by virtue of the rite itself, or rather, to obtain from God efficacious helps for eliciting supernatural acts by which such sins are formally or virtually displeasing.

20. He objects thirdly that, if some sacramentals destroyed venial sins by virtue of the rite itself, they would truly be sacraments. For they cannot effect the remission of venial sins by virtue of the rite itself except either by producing habitual grace, by adding a new mode through which sacramental grace would cleanse venial stains, or at least by inspiring actual internal grace through which devout movements of Penance and charity suitable for

destroying venial sins are aroused. But this is to be a sacrament, namely, a visible sign of invisible grace. Therefore, and so forth.

I answer by denying the inference of the major premise. The sacraments of the new law are ordered to the perfect sanctification of the soul, which occurs through the infusion or increase of habitual grace. But the remission of venial sins through sacramentals is not the perfect sanctification of the soul, because it can occur without the infusion or increase of habitual grace, through actual grace alone, by which the fervor of charity, to which venial sin is opposed, is aroused.

This solution is that of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 65, a. 1, ad 6, where he says: Holy water and other consecrations are not called sacraments because they do not lead to the effect of a sacrament, which is the attainment of grace.

21. I say fourthly that, for venial sins to be remitted outside the sacraments or sacramentals by virtue of the agent's act, an act of formal or virtual Penance is required.

The reason is that venial sin causes some disorder in the human will, not indeed concerning the ultimate end, but concerning the means leading to it, through an immoderate adherence to a created good. Therefore, for the remission of venial sin, this disorder must be repaired or removed. But it cannot be removed except through an act of formal or virtual Penance, because as long as the will does not formally or virtually retract that affection for the creature, it is always judged morally to persevere in it. Therefore, for venial sins to be remitted by virtue of the agent's act, an act of formal or virtual Penance is required.

By the name virtual Penance we understand not only an act of charity by which we are moved toward God as ultimate end, but also every movement or act by which a person is so borne toward God or divine things that venial sins would displease him if they occurred to his memory. Such a movement or act can be called Penance virtually or equivalently, as is openly gathered from St. Thomas in the present article, where he says that for the remission of venial sin there is required a certain virtual displeasure, *as when someone is so borne by affection toward God and divine things that whatever might occur to him that would retard him from this movement would displease him, and he would grieve that he had committed it, even if he did not actually think of it.*

Hence I hold that for the remission of venial sin by virtue of the agent's act, an act of religion, hope, or another supernatural and infused virtue is sufficient in a just person, provided that through it one is so borne toward God or divine things that venial sins would displease him if they occurred to his memory.

For since the stain of venial sin consists in a privation and diminution of that fervor and promptitude by which the soul is borne toward God, not only an act of charity, but also an act of religion is opposed to it, such as devotion by which a person is borne promptly and fervently toward God or divine things.

Many recent authors also hold, not improbably, that for the remission of venial sins by virtue of the agent's act, attrition virtually containing at least an intention not to commit the same venial sins is sufficient in the just, because through it the will is changed and turned away from those sins.

Indeed, it appears harsh that, for the remission of venial sins outside the sacraments or sacramentals, an act of perfect contrition should be required even in the justified, no less than for the remission of mortal sins. The Council of Trent appears to extend their remission more broadly when it says, sess. 14, c. 5, that venial sins need not necessarily be subjected to the sacrament of Penance as mortal sins must be, but can be expiated by many other remedies. For there would not be many such remedies if, outside the sacrament, venial sins could be remitted only through acts of contrition, just as mortal sins are, especially if there were no sacramentals possessing the power to remove them by virtue of the rite itself, as the authors whom we opposed in the preceding conclusion suppose.

22. From what has been said it follows, first, that a new infusion of habitual grace is not required for the remission of venial sins in the just, although actual grace, or supernatural help from divine grace, is required.

The first part of this corollary is taught by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 87, a. 2, ad 3, where he indicates the following reason. That is required for the remission of venial sin which is related as a form removing the stain arising from it. But habitual grace is not a form removing the stain of venial sin, since that stain does not consist in the privation of habitual grace, as the stain of mortal sin does, but in a certain disordered conversion to a changeable good that retards the affection of the will from being borne promptly toward God. Therefore, a new infusion of habitual grace is not required for the remission of venial sins in the just.

That some actual grace is required is clear from what has been said above. For we showed that venial sins cannot be remitted by virtue of the rite itself without some act of formal or virtual Penance, or of another infused and supernatural virtue. But supernatural help is required for eliciting acts of this kind. Therefore, it is also required for the remission of venial sins in a justified man. Hence St. Thomas says in the present a. 4, ad 2: *Although a new infusion of habitual grace is not required for the remission of venial sin, nevertheless some act of grace is required.*

23. From what has been said there also follows the difference found between mortal and venial sins. Since mortal sins are not destroyed except through sanctifying grace, which is incompatible with every mortal sin, it is repugnant for one mortal sin to be remitted without another.

On the contrary, since venial sins are remitted through the fervor of charity or through acts of other virtues, which sometimes are not of such efficacy as to exclude all venial sins and to imply a virtual displeasure with them, one or several venial sins can be remitted without the others.

§ 4.
The Recovery of the Virtues and the Revival of Merits, the Fourth Effect of Penance.

24. It is certain that the infused virtues lost through sin are restored through Penance, since they are properties of habitual grace inseparable from it, and habitual grace is infused in the justification of the sinner. Hence, in Luke 15, the father of the household commands that the first robe, a ring, and shoes be restored to his repentant son, that is, the graces and virtues previously infused and lost through sin, as Jerome, Ambrose, and other Fathers interpret the passage.

Nor does it matter if you say that virginity, once lost, cannot be restored or recovered, according to Jerome, epist. 22, *Ad Eustochium*: *I shall speak boldly: although God can do all things, he cannot raise up a virgin after her fall.*

It is answered with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 152, a. 3, ad 3, that virginity can be repaired through Penance as regards what is formal in the virtue, but not as regards what is material in it. For if a magnificent man has consumed his wealth, the wealth is not restored through Penance for the sin. Likewise, one who has lost virginity does not recover the matter of virginity through Penance, but recovers the intention of virginity.

Therefore, the flower of virginity, never withering and never losing its beauty, is not recovered through Penance; but the fruit of virginity is recovered, namely, the intention of preserving chastity.

25. It is no less certain that merits, or good works, mortified through sin, revive through Penance. To understand this clearly, it must be observed that human works differ in many ways. Some are living, some dead, some death-dealing, and some mortified.

Living works are those that proceed from the vital principle of the supernatural order, namely, grace and charity, which in the soul of the just

man is that fountain of water springing up unto eternal life of which John 4 speaks.

Dead works are those that are good according to their genus and proper object but, because they are elicited by a man existing outside the state of grace, wholly lack the principle of life.

Death-dealing works are those that inflict death upon the soul by depriving it of grace. As regards supernatural life, grace is related to the soul as the soul is related to the body as regards natural life, according to Augustine, serm. 5, or, as others read, serm. 6, *De verbis Domini*: *As the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul*—God united to it through grace and charity. *As the body expires when it gives up the soul, so the soul expires when it loses God. God lost is the death of the soul; the soul given up is the death of the body.*

Finally, those works are called mortified which, having been elicited from grace and charity, are prevented by a subsequent sin from possessing the power and efficacy to lead man to eternal life.

We say, therefore, that these merits, or good works, mortified through sin, revive through Penance, or recover the power and efficacy to lead man to eternal life of which they had been deprived through sin.

For a cause deprived of some effect through an impediment ought to produce that effect when the impediment has been removed. For example, a stone suspended in the air and prevented by a rope from being borne downward returns to the center when the rope is cut and the obstacle removed.

But the merits a man acquired before sin were prevented by subsequent sin from having their effect and giving man a right to eternal life. Therefore, when such an impediment has been removed through Penance, they ought to attain their effect and again give the penitent man such a right to eternal life.

Just as the wind that removes a cloud restores the sun to us, so Penance, by removing the impediment, restores to us sanctifying grace, the ornaments of the virtues, and our former merits, as St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 14, q. 2, a. 2.

Or just as the water of rivers, frozen by the cold of winter or the north wind and prevented from flowing and reaching its end, melts when the south wind blows and, when the impediment is removed, moves as it did before, so our merits, as though frozen by the cold of subsequent mortal sin, are melted when the Holy Spirit blows through Penance, and flow again to lead man to eternal life.

Hence Augustine, explaining the words of Ps. 125, Turn our captivity, O Lord, like a torrent in the south wind, says: As cold binds water so that it cannot flow, so we, bound by the cold of sins, became frozen. But the south wind is a warm wind. When the south wind blows, the ice melts and the torrents are filled. We had therefore become frozen in captivity; our sins constrained us. The south wind, the Holy Spirit, blew; our sins were forgiven; we were released from the cold of iniquity. As ice melts in clear weather, so our sins are dissolved. Let us run toward our homeland like a torrent under the south wind.

26. There are also many testimonies of Scripture that indicate with sufficient clarity this revival of mortified merits. A celebrated one is Ezek. 33: *The wickedness of the wicked man shall not harm him on whatever day he is converted.* But it would harm him greatly if it prevented the fruit of his former merits.

Likewise, Joel 2: I shall restore to you the years that the locust, the caterpillar, the mildew, and the palmerworm have consumed. That is, the reward of past actions, as Jerome explains, who immediately adds: If after Penance God promises so great an abundance, what answer will Novatus give, who denies Penance and denies that sinners are restored to their former state?

The Council of Trent also adduces, sess. 6, c. 16, the words of the Apostle in Heb. 6: God is not unjust, that he should forget your work and the love that you have shown in his name. And a little afterward the Council adds: It must be believed that nothing further is lacking to the justified themselves, so that by those works that have been done in God they have fully satisfied the divine law according to the condition of this life, and have truly merited eternal life, to be attained in its proper time, provided, however, that they depart in grace.

The words *provided, however, that they depart in grace* should be noted. From them it is sufficiently and openly proved that merits mortified through sin revive through Penance. For a merit to revive is nothing other than for a man to be constituted in such a state that, if he dies in it, he obtains the reward due to his good works.

27. You will say: Evil merits, or sins remitted through Penance, do not return, as theologians commonly teach and as is clear from Pope Gelasius in the final chapter, *De paenitentia*, dist. 4, where he says: *Divine clemency does not permit forgiven sins to return again for punishment.* Therefore, neither do good merits mortified through sin revive.

The consequence is proved both by parity of reason and because, just as it is said in Ezek. 18 concerning the sinner who does Penance, *I shall not*

remember any of his iniquities, so it is said of the just man who has committed a lethal crime, *none of his just works shall be remembered.*

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the disparity is that God is more inclined to do good and show mercy than to punish, and he is the author of merits, but not of sins. Hence it is not surprising that merits mortified through sin remain accepted by God and, when the sin preventing their effect has been removed, revive, whereas remitted sins do not remain under divine indignation so as to return in guilt or eternal punishment through a subsequent mortal sin.

Moreover, promises must be understood broadly and favorably. Threats, on the contrary, because they are odious, ought rather to be restricted and understood with a favorable moderation. Therefore, since God's statement that he will not remember iniquities is a promise, while his statement that he will not remember the good works of a just man who has fallen into sin is a threat, the former must be understood most broadly and the latter with a favorable restriction. This answers the words of Ezekiel adduced in the objection.

28. These matters are certain and indubitable among all theologians. But there is a grave difficulty and controversy concerning the manner and quantity in which merits mortified through sin revive through Penance.

The Nominalists, followed by Suárez, Coninck, and other recent authors, hold that merits mortified through sin revive so perfectly through Penance that a man rising from sin through an act of contrition or charity, however remiss, immediately recovers all the grace, in its being as a quality and habit, that he possessed before sin.

But this opinion is openly opposed to St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 89, a. 2, where he asserts that the penitent sometimes rises in greater grace than he possessed before, sometimes in equal grace, and sometimes even in lesser grace. This would be false if he always recovered all the grace, in its being as a quality and habit, that he possessed before sin. For he would always rise in greater grace than he formerly possessed, because, in addition to the former grace, which he would recover in its entirety, he would possess another grace corresponding to the proper disposition by which he rises.

29. The following argument, which the holy Doctor indicates in the same place, also presses against the same opinion. The quantity of an intensifiable and remissible form must be measured according to the quantity of the disposition. But grace is an intensifiable and remissible form, and the contrition through which the penitent disposes himself for grace and rises from sin is sometimes remiss and does not equal in intensity the grace the

penitent possessed before sin. Therefore, through Penance a man does not always recover all the grace, in its being as a quality and habit, that he possessed before sin.

This is confirmed. The penitent is not in a better condition than the innocent. But God does not grant habitual grace to the innocent except according to the proportion of his present acts and dispositions. Therefore, neither does he grant it to the penitent except according to the measure of the contrition by which he rises and of the effort of his Penance.

Others, holding the opposite extreme, teach that no degree of grace is conferred upon the penitent beyond that which corresponds to the contrition through which he rises, and that he recovers none of the right to essential glory due to preceding merits. Rather, the same essential reward corresponding to the grace conferred upon him in conversion is given to him under several titles, namely, both by reason of his present disposition and in view of his antecedent merits.

Thus Báñez and certain recent Thomists teach, relying chiefly upon testimonies of St. Thomas that we shall adduce and explain below. But this opinion entirely empties the revival of merits and resolves it into a title without a reality, or into a reality consisting solely in the title.

For what benefit is it to one who merits that one reward should be given to him under several titles? Certainly, if someone had labored in another's vineyard for ten days and afterward received the wages of only one day's labor under ten different titles, he would not be judged to have been compensated condignly. Likewise, if sins following a first mortal sin were punished only by the punishment due to the first sin, though under many titles making it infinite, they would not be judged properly punished or to cause an increase of torment.

I add that the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, teaches that mortified merits revive unto eternal life. But eternal life signifies the essential reward. Therefore, the Council judges that they revive unto the essential reward, and not merely unto accidental glory.

30. Hence other Thomists, to moderate somewhat the rigor of this opinion and yet not depart from the doctrine of the Angelic Teacher, teach that merits mortified through sin indeed revive unto the essential reward, and not merely unto the accidental reward, but not according to every degree of merit that they possessed before sin. Rather, they revive according to the quantity of the present contrition or disposition through which the penitent rises.

For example, if someone before sin possessed merits as twenty and rises through contrition as four, grace in the order of grace, or the right to the

beatific vision, will be given to him as eight: four degrees on account of present contrition and four on account of preceding merits.

Thus Soto, Ledesma, Nugno, Álvarez, Candidus, Valentia, and others teach. St. Thomas openly favors them in Scriptum super Sententiis III, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 4, qla. 3, ad 2, where he says that Penance restores all mortified merits, but they need not be equal. And in Summa Theologiae III, q. 89, a. 5, ad 3, he writes: One who rises through Penance in lesser charity indeed attains the essential reward according to the quantity of charity in which he is found, and so forth.

But this would be false if mortified merits revived through remiss acts of charity according to every degree of merit they possessed before sin. For one who rises in lesser charity would attain the essential reward, or the right to it, not according to the quantity of charity in which he is found, but in a measure exceeding it, as is manifest.

Therefore, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, when mortified merits revive through remiss acts of charity, they do not revive according to every degree of merit they possessed before sin, but according to the quantity of the present contrition through which the penitent rises.

For contrition is related not only as the removal of an impediment, but also as a moral disposition for the revival of merits, or for grace in the order of grace corresponding to those merits. Heat not only removes the hardness by which water frozen through cold is prevented from flowing, but also disposes the water to be dissolved either wholly or in part. A form dependent upon the dispositions of a subject is never introduced into it except according to their proportion and measure.

Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, teaches that each one receives justifying grace *according to each one's proper disposition*.

31. You will say first: Since the contrition through which the penitent rises is not a physical, but only a moral, disposition for the revival of merits, and since this revival depends upon the mere good pleasure of God and his gratuitous will, there is no foundation for asserting that merits mortified through sin revive only according to the measure of the contrition through which the sinner rises and not according to all the degrees and the whole amplitude they possessed before sin.

I answer that various reasons or grounds of fittingness can be assigned why God willed the revival of merits to take place according to the measure of the contrition or disposition through which the sinner rises.

The first is that in the revival of merits divine mercy should not shine in such a way that no place is given to the splendor of divine justice. Justice appears to require that a sinner not be restored to his former degree of grace

and glory through any Penance whatsoever, although true, but only through Penance proportioned to that degree.

The second is that the just should not be given an occasion for tepidity and facility in sinning by seeing that the revival of preceding merits unto the whole essential reward is so easy through Penance.

The third is that the justified may thereby be induced to elicit more fervent acts of contrition and charity, through which mortified works may revive more fully, until they are restored entirely as regards every merit.

Certainly, the opinion of the Nominalists and recent authors, while consoling penitent sinners by its excessive benignity, introduces much tepidity and facility in sinning into the just. For they will not fear sin so greatly if they suppose that through any Penance whatsoever, however remiss, they will immediately recover all the former degrees of grace and glory.

The other opinion, which asserts that the penitent recovers nothing of the essential glory lost through sin, but only some great but empty title or some accidental glory, withdraws sinners from Penance and brings them to despair. For they see that the locust and caterpillar of preceding sins have wholly devoured and consumed all the harvest and abundance of their merits, leaving only the husk, or an empty title, without any hope whatever of recovering it.

Our opinion, proceeding by a middle way and asserting that preceding merits are indeed restored through Penance, but only according to the measure of the contrition and disposition of the penitent himself, so consoles penitent sinners that it also arouses them to elicit more fervent acts through which the merits mortified by sin may revive in their entirety.

32. You will say secondly: According to this opinion, merits mortified through sin do not revive fully and perfectly, but only in part and in a qualified manner. But this appears contrary to the testimonies of Scripture and the Council of Trent cited above, which seem to teach a full and perfect revival of merits. Therefore, and so forth.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. They do not revive fully and perfectly as regards God and the power of Penance: I deny the major premise. For God, considered in himself, is ready to give life to and repair all merits mortified through sin, and Penance of itself possesses sufficient power and efficacy for this.

They do not revive fully and perfectly as regards the man who does not dispose himself through intense acts of charity and Penance for the full and perfect revival of all merits: I grant the major premise.

This solution is that of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 89, a. 2, ad 1, where he says: Penance, considered in itself, possesses the power to repair all defects perfectly and even to advance a man to a higher state. But this is sometimes impeded on the part of the man, who is moved more remissly toward God and toward the detestation of sin.

33. You will say thirdly: St. Thomas says in the present a. 5, ad 3: One who rises through Penance in lesser charity indeed attains the essential reward according to the quantity of charity in which he is found; nevertheless, he will possess greater joy concerning the works done in his first charity than concerning the works done in his second charity, which pertains to the accidental reward.

And in Scriptum super Sententiis III, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4: Through his former mortified merits a man merited as much glory as the charity he possessed, but through sin he became another man and was not fully restored to his former degree. Therefore, he will not fully receive the effect of his former merits except as regards the accidental reward.

Therefore, the holy Doctor judges that merits mortified through sin do not revive totally, or according to the measure of the contrition through which the penitent rises, unto essential glory, but only unto an accidental reward.

But I deny the consequence. In these and similar passages, St. Thomas does not intend to deny that merits mortified through sin revive through Penance as regards the right they previously possessed to essential glory, according to the measure and quantity of the contrition by which the man is converted. This is clear from the words: *One who rises through Penance in lesser charity attains the essential reward according to the quantity of charity in which he is found.*

He intends only that, because this right to the essential reward is sometimes less than it was before sin, owing to the deficiency of the disposition and contrition through which the penitent rises, which is often very remiss, the penitent possesses only a right to some accidental reward for that excess and for those merits that do not revive perfectly through Penance, namely, a greater joy concerning the works done in his first charity. This remains the case unless through subsequent acts of contrition and charity he disposes himself sufficiently for the whole right he possessed to the essential reward by reason of preceding merits to be fully restored to him through Penance.

Hence these testimonies of St. Thomas do not militate against our opinion, but only against the opinion of those who teach that mortified

merits revive unto the whole extent of glory due to preceding merits independently of the effort of the present disposition.

34. You will ask when remiss merits, or merits revived remissly, receive an increase of grace in its physical being. I answer that they do not receive it in this life, but in the next, namely, at the instant of the soul's separation from the body.

For grace is not physically received in a subject except according to the proportion of that subject's dispositions. But man cannot be sufficiently disposed in this life for the increase of grace in its physical being due to remiss merits or merits revived remissly, but only in the next life. For whenever in this life a man proceeds to a more fervent act of contrition or charity, that act is not only dispositive, but also meritorious of an increase of grace, and receives the grace corresponding to itself.

Therefore, the more fervent act required for remiss merits, or merits revived remissly, to attain an increase of grace in its physical being, and which is merely dispositive for that increase but not meritorious of it, must be elicited in the next life, where all merit ceases, and consequently either at the instant of the soul's separation from the body or at the first instant of glorification.

For theologians commonly teach with St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 7, a. 11, that venial sins are remitted in the next life to just persons who die with them through an act of contrition or charity elicited by the soul at the instant of separation or upon entrance into purgatory. Although such an act cannot be meritorious or satisfactory, it can nevertheless concur toward the remission of venial sins after the manner of a condign retraction and displeasure, and by removing an impediment, as the holy Doctor teaches in the same place.

Why, then, may it not similarly be said that the soul, through that most fervent act of charity elicited at the instant of separation, disposes itself to receive the increase of grace in its physical being due to remiss merits or merits revived remissly?

Hence a certain recent author, in his *Theologia mentis et cordis*, undeservedly mocks and censures this common doctrine of the Thomists as an invention and fiction revealed nowhere and unknown to St. Thomas and his disciples.

CHAPTER IV.
On Contrition.

1. Having explained the effects of the sacrament of penance, we must next set forth the parts of which it consists. Among these, contrition holds the first place. The Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, defines it as "sorrow of soul and detestation for the sin committed, together with the resolution not to sin henceforth." In this definition three acts concurring in contrition are enumerated, namely, sorrow for sin, hatred or detestation of it, and the resolution not to sin again. Nevertheless, contrition does not formally and essentially consist in these three acts, but in sorrow for sin insofar as it is an offense against God. It consists only presuppositively in hatred or detestation of sin, from which sorrow for sin arises, just as joy arises from love; and consequently in the resolution not to sin henceforth, because such a resolution is something consequent upon contrition and, as it were, a property of it.

2. You will object: Contrition must be constituted essentially by that which first separates one from sin and is first opposed to it. But hatred first separates one from sin and is first opposed to it. Therefore, contrition consists essentially in hatred, not in sorrow.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise: That which first separates one from sin as an offense against God, to be punished by satisfaction, and is opposed to it under this aspect, I grant the major premise. That which first separates one from sin as the supreme evil and is opposed to it under this aspect, I deny the major premise. I likewise distinguish the minor premise: Hatred first separates the sinner from sin as the supreme evil, I grant the minor premise. As an offense against God, by rendering satisfaction for it, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. The solution is clear from what has been said above. For since penance is a virtue annexed to justice and distinct from charity, as was shown in Chapter II, its primary and principal act, which is contrition, is opposed to sin only presuppositively insofar as sin is against God, the supreme good, whom charity regards. Formally or essentially, however, it is opposed to sin insofar as sin is a supreme injury inflicted upon God and to be punished through satisfaction. Hence, although in the blessed there is truly and properly hatred of sin, there is not properly in them an act of contrition, because they are free from and incapable of every sorrow.

3. Contrition thus described by the Council of Trent is divided by the same Council into perfect contrition, which is simply called contrition, and imperfect contrition, which is commonly called attrition by the same sacred Synod and by theologians. The former is sorrow and detestation for sin on account of God loved supremely; the latter is detestation for sin, not on account of God loved supremely, but on account of some lower motive, which is nevertheless upright and in some way supernatural, for example, on account of fear of hell, the deformity of sin, the light proposed by faith, and the like. Hence contrition is perfect sorrow for sins committed, whereas attrition is only a certain imperfect displeasure at sin, as St. Thomas admirably declares in the Supplement, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2, in these words: "Attrition does not signify an approach to perfect contrition. Hence, among bodily things, those are said to be worn down which have been diminished in some way but have not yet been perfectly crushed; whereas they are said to be crushed when all the parts have been ground together by division into the smallest pieces. Therefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain displeasure at sins committed, but not a perfect one; contrition, however, signifies a perfect displeasure." Hence William of Paris describes penance, from which contrition arises, in this way: "Penance is the breaking and crushing of the heart, and the reduction of the old man to dust."

Concerning each kind of contrition, several celebrated difficulties and controversies arise, which are to be resolved in the following sections.

§ 1.
Whether Perfect Contrition Justifies Even Apart from the Sacrament.

4. I answer affirmatively, against some more recent authors. I prove it first from the Council of Trent cited above, which establishes this distinction between perfect and imperfect contrition: the former reconciles man to God before the sacrament of penance is actually received, although not without the desire for the sacrament included in the contrition itself; the latter, however, cannot of itself and without the sacrament bring the sinner to justification.

I prove it second: Perfect contrition always and infallibly justified under the Old Law, since at that time it was the sole and ordinary remedy for sin. Therefore it does so also under the New Law, since by instituting the sacrament of penance God did not take away from contrition the power and

efficacy that it possessed under the Mosaic Law and that was founded upon its nature.

I prove it third: Since perfect contrition is sorrow and detestation for sin on account of God loved supremely, it essentially includes charity. But charity infallibly has annexed to it the remission of all sins, since it is a perfect conversion to God as friend and, consequently, an efficacious aversion from every sin destructive of divine friendship. Hence 1 Pet. 4 says: "Charity covers a multitude of sins." And Augustine, tract. 5 on the First Epistle of John: "This commandment of Christ is called love: through this love sins are loosed." And again: "Love alone distinguishes between the children of God and the children of the devil." Likewise, in the same place he says: "If anyone finds charity in his heart, let him be secure, because he has passed from death to life." Finally, tract. 9: "Our soul," he says, "is foul through iniquity; by loving God it is made beautiful." Therefore perfect contrition immediately and infallibly brings with it the remission of all sins. Hence Isa. 30, according to the Septuagint version, says: "When you have returned and groaned, then you shall be saved." The word "then" should be noted, since it signifies that no delay intervenes between the sinner's return through the groaning of contrition and his salvation through the grace of justification conferred, as Pope Leo interprets it in epist. 91 to Theodore: "We can neither place limits upon the mercy of God nor determine times for it. With him true conversion suffers no delay in receiving pardon, as the Spirit of God says through the Prophet: When you have groaned, then you shall be saved."

5. You will object first: Christ said of Magdalene in Luke 7: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much." Therefore love preceded the remission of sins in time, and consequently the remission of sins does not occur at the same instant as love or contrition.

I answer that these words of Christ can be understood by extending them to the past, so that their meaning is: Many sins have been forgiven her because she has loved much. Or Christ confirmed in these words the remission previously accomplished at the instant of love and contrition. Thus, when in Mark 5 he said to the woman whom he had already healed from the flow of blood, "Be healed of your affliction," he did not heal her by those words, but confirmed the healing already accomplished.

6. You will object second: If contrition alone destroys sins and justifies man, why does the Council of Trent, sess. 12, c. 7, require sacramental confession in addition to contrition for the worthy reception of the Eucharist, since it is sufficient to approach it in the state of grace obtained through contrition?

I answer that, for the worthy reception of the Eucharist, the Council is not content with contrition alone in one who is conscious of mortal sin, but also requires sacramental confession. This is not because it judges the efficacy of perfect contrition for remitting sins to be uncertain, for otherwise confession would necessarily have to precede the other sacraments of the living as well. Rather, because of the supreme dignity of the Eucharist, it wished to ensure that sinners would not approach it unless they had first secured the state of grace by the safest means, namely, the sacrament of penance. For although perfect contrition justifies no less infallibly than this sacrament, it is nevertheless always more uncertain whether perfect contrition is in fact possessed than whether the sacrament of penance, in which lesser sorrow is required, is validly received.

§ 2.
On the Precept of Contrition.

7. St. Thomas expressly teaches that there is not only a divine and positive precept concerning penance and contrition, but also a natural precept, or one binding by natural law itself. In q. 84, a. 7, ad 1, he says: "It belongs to natural law that a person repent of the evils he has done, insofar as he is sorrowful that he has done them and seeks in some way a remedy for his sorrow." And in the body of the article he had said that "the matter of this sacrament preexists by nature, for by natural reason man is moved to repent of the evils he has done." Reason also supports this. First, just as by natural law we are bound to preserve the divine right inviolate, so also, when it has been violated, we are bound to repair it by penance insofar as possible. Second, just as by natural law we are bound to love God, so also to preserve his friendship and recover it when we have lost it through sin. Finally, by natural law man is bound to love his own good and provide for his spiritual necessities, and consequently to free himself through penance and contrition from sin and from the danger of eternal damnation. Certainly, if everyone is bound by the natural law to apply necessary medicine to a sick body; if, at nature's prompting, the swallow restores the sight of its young with the juice of celandine, and wounded deer seek dittany, as Jerome says on Ecclesiastes 7; and if, finally, all brute animals, when they are sick, seek by natural instinct the remedies appointed for them by the Author of nature, it plainly follows that it is no less consonant with the natural light that we apply the medicine of contrition and penance to a sick soul. Therefore, in every state of human nature that has existed from the beginning of the world

until now, that is, both under the law of nature and under the Mosaic Law, men who fell into mortal sin were always bound to an act of contrition, because an obligation arising from natural law extends to every state of human nature. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, says: "At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining the pardon of sins."

8. It must nevertheless be observed that, because under the New Law attrition together with the sacrament is equivalent to contrition and makes a man contrite who was attrite, as we shall show below, one who is in mortal sin is not bound to contrition if he is able to receive the sacrament of penance and to be justified and reconciled to God through attrition together with the sacrament.

9. Theologians commonly assign some cases in which the precept of contrition binds of itself, and others in which it binds only accidentally. First, it binds of itself at the actual or presumed point of death, because then everyone is bound, both by reason of charity toward himself and by reason of love toward God, to perform an act of perfect penance and to be perfectly reconciled to God, since no further time for repentance remains. Hence Possidius relates of Augustine that he used to say that "no one, even if conscious of no crime, ought to permit himself to depart this life without penance." Second, this precept binds of itself in a moral danger of death, not one in which only one or another person commonly dies, but one in which many commonly die, as in war, plague, and dangerous navigation, because a moral danger of death is equivalent to the final point of death. Third, it binds accidentally in many cases. The first is when a person is bound to receive some sacrament of the living, because such sacraments cannot be received except by those who are justified and, consequently, except by those who are contrite, or attrite together with confession. The second is whenever the sacraments must be administered, for then the minister is bound to conform himself to God as the principal agent, to whose instrument he is joined for the production of grace, as we explained in the treatise on the sacraments in general, Chapter VI. The third is when the precept of annual confession occurs and no confessor is available, for then a person is bound to supply the defect of the sacrament through contrition, because under the Gospel law the precept of confession has been substituted for the precept of contrition. The fourth is when some grave temptation presses which a person cannot morally overcome without contrition, for then he is accidentally bound to contrition by the precept of the virtue against which the temptation is directed. Finally, the precept of contrition binds accidentally in a case of public calamity, when it is reasonably feared that God is punishing the people for particular sins. For then everyone is bound to dispose himself

through contrition to appease divine justice, lest God punish the whole people because of his sins, just as, because of the sin of Achan alone, he punished the entire army of Israel, Josh. 7.

10. You will ask whether, at the point of death, a man is bound to elicit an act of contrition when he has access to a confessor and can receive the sacrament of penance, through which he can be justified with attrition alone. I answer that he is not bound to this by force of the precept of penance, since under the New Law a man satisfies the precept of penance by an act of attrition joined to the sacrament, as will be clear from what follows. He is, however, bound by force of the precept of charity, because by force of that precept a man is then bound to assist himself in the better and safer manner available to him, according to the saying of Gregory the Great: "No security is sufficiently great where eternity is at risk." Hence, since it is not entirely certain and indubitable that attrition alone together with the sacrament justifies, and since several theologians of considerable authority deny it, a man is then bound, at that moment when eternity is at stake, to have recourse to contrition and to use it as the most certain and safest means, so that he may assist himself in the best possible manner in the danger of eternal damnation.

§ 3.
Whether Contrition Differs Essentially from Attrition.

11. I answer affirmatively, against some more recent authors, and I prove it by a fundamental argument. Acts that regard diverse formal objects are essentially distinct. But contrition and attrition regard diverse formal objects. For the formal object of contrition is sin under the formal aspect of an injury inflicted upon God that can be compensated by satisfaction. The formal object of attrition, however, is the same sin under the formal aspect of an evil of the sinner himself, as when someone is sorrowful for sin because of fear of hell; or under the aspect of what is base and dishonorable and repugnant to right reason, as when someone is sorrowful for sin because of its baseness and foulness. Therefore, they are essentially distinct.

12. This is confirmed: Those acts differ in species which are elicited by habits diverse in species. But perfect contrition and attrition proceed from virtues diverse in species. For contrition is elicited by the virtue of penance and is its primary and principal act. Attrition arising from fear of hell or from love of eternal life proceeds from servile fear or from the virtue of hope. That which arises from the baseness of sin is elicited by the moral

virtue to which that baseness is opposed, since it belongs to the same virtue both to love the good it regards and to detest the opposite evil. For example, it belongs to the infused virtue of temperance not only to love the uprightness of temperance, but also to detest the sin of intemperance insofar as it is opposed to such uprightness. Therefore, perfect contrition and attrition differ from each other essentially and specifically.

13. Other differences follow from this essential difference. The first is that contrition necessarily extends to all sins, since all sins are offenses against God, whereas attrition does not, because it can regard sin as containing a special deformity opposed to some virtue. From this another difference arises, namely, that contrition always excludes every affection for sinning. For since it detests sins under some common aspect, it cannot retain an affection for any particular sin. It is otherwise with attrition, which, since it sometimes proceeds from a special motive against one sin, is not always opposed to every sin. Hence attrition arising from the special deformity of some sin is not sufficient to obtain the sinner's justification in the sacrament if the sinner has committed other sins diverse in species. Rather, as many acts of attrition must be multiplied as there are sins diverse in species. Yet one act of contrition always suffices for all sins, because it arises, as we have said, from a universal motive extending to all sins. From this follows another distinction between contrition and attrition. Since contrition always has the same entirely indivisible formal object, namely, sin under the formal aspect of an injury inflicted upon God, and so forth, it is always of the same species. Attrition, however, since it has several motives diverse in species, is divided into many species. One kind of attrition arises from fear of hell, another from love of eternal life, and another from the baseness of sin.

14. From these things you will understand that what the author of *Theologia mentis et cordis* says on page 61 is false, namely, that the formal object of attrition is sin as an offense against God capable of being amended through compensation and satisfaction. For if this were true, attrition would necessarily extend to all sins and would always exclude every affection for sinning, just as contrition does; and consequently any attrition whatever would suffice for obtaining the sinner's justification in the sacrament. Finally, if contrition and attrition regarded the same formal object, then just as contrition cannot be divided into several species, neither could there be attrition of diverse species. All these assertions are paradoxes in theology and entirely alien to the common judgment of theologians.

15. No more true is what the same author adds, namely, that attrition is always an act elicited by the virtue of penance. For, as we showed above,

attrition arising from the baseness of sin is elicited by that moral virtue to which such baseness is opposed. Nor is it an objection that such attrition can be a part of the sacrament of penance and dispose a person to receive the grace of this sacrament, as we shall say in the following section. For in order that some act be a part of this sacrament, it is not necessary that it be elicited by the virtue of penance; it suffices that it be commanded by it, as is clear in satisfaction. For when someone fasts at the command of his confessor in satisfaction for sins, such a fast is an act elicited by temperance and only commanded by penance. The same, with due proportion, must be said of attrition. Hence, when St. Thomas, q. 86, a. 6, ad 3, says that "an act of the virtue of penance has this property, that without it remission of guilt cannot occur," he is speaking of the remission of guilt that takes place apart from the sacrament. For that remission cannot occur without contrition, which is an act of the virtue of penance. Or, if he is speaking of the remission of guilt that takes place in the sacrament of penance, he means only that it cannot occur without an act elicited or commanded by penance.

16. It is also gathered from what has been said that attrition can never become contrition, since attrition and contrition differ essentially and specifically from each other, although through the sacrament of penance a penitent can become contrite after having been attrite. This is because attrition, as joined to such a sacrament, is equivalent to contrition; or because through this sacrament, together with sanctifying grace, he receives the infused habit of penance, from which he is denominated habitually contrite.

17. You will object: The Council of Trent calls attrition imperfect. But what is imperfect can acquire its connatural perfection, just as a boy grows and finally becomes a perfect man. Therefore, attrition can become contrition.

Father Nicolai answers this objection in his scholia on Supplement, q. 9, a. 2, by saying that attrition is not called imperfect contrition by the Council of Trent in the Jansenist sense, because of a defect merely of degree, as a boy is called an imperfect man because he does not yet have the full perfection of a man. Rather, it is called imperfect because of a defect in the essence of contrition, in which charity is actually included, just as an embryo is an imperfect man because it does not yet have human essence but is a disposition for possessing it.

§ 4.
Whether Some Act of Charity Is Required for the Sacrament of Penance, or Whether Attrition Alone Conceived from Some Supernatural Motive Suffices.

18. I answer that attrition conceived from fear of hell, from consideration of the baseness of sin, or from some other similar supernatural motive suffices. Nearly all the ancient theologians once taught this, as Gerson testifies in vol. 2, in the sermon on penance at the Lord's Supper, in these words: "Master William of Paris and others commonly say that attrition, which otherwise is not sufficient, is made sufficient by the power of the sacrament." The more recent scholastic theologians now also hold this more commonly, as Alexander VII says in the decree by which he forbade either opinion to be branded with any censure, issued on May 5, 1667. St. Thomas, the prince of scholastic theologians, also expressly teaches it in IV Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5, where he says: "In order that a man prepare himself to receive grace in baptism"—and the same applies to the sacrament of penance—"faith is prerequired, but not charity, because preceding attrition is sufficient, even if it is not contrition." Nothing clearer or more express can be said in favor of our position. Finally, the Council of Trent seems to hold the same in sess. 14, c. 4, where it says: "The imperfect contrition which is called attrition, because it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the baseness of sin or from fear of hell and punishment, if it excludes the will to sin together with hope of pardon, the holy Synod declares not only that it does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but that it is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed dwelling within, but only moving, by which the penitent, assisted, prepares for himself the way to justice. And although without the sacrament of penance it cannot of itself bring the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance."

19. Some more recent authors answer that the Council is not there speaking of attrition conceived from pure fear, since this, they say, does not exclude the will to sin, but of attrition that has mixed with it a certain initial and imperfect love, which excludes the will to sin and converts the sinner to God as the first source of justice. They illustrate and confirm this interpretation by another testimony of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, where, in treating of the dispositions by which adults are prepared to receive

baptism, it says that they are disposed to justice itself when "they begin to love God as the source of all justice."

But against this, first: In the cited place the Council assigns only two motives of the attrition of which it speaks, namely, fear of hell and horror at the baseness of sin. It makes no mention of that imperfect and initial love, which it undoubtedly ought not to have passed over in silence, but rather to have enumerated and clearly expressed, if attrition conceived from that love alone were a sufficient disposition for obtaining the grace of justification in the sacrament of penance and for excluding the will to sin. Otherwise, the doctrine it hands down concerning the dispositions required for the validity and effect of this sacrament would be altogether incomplete and deficient if it did not declare that disposition which is principal and, according to the adversaries, entirely necessary.

Against this, second: The Council is speaking of that attrition of which it immediately says that it does not make a man a hypocrite, as Luther taught. But the attrition which Luther taught makes a man a hypocrite is not that which proceeds from affective love of God or from imperfect charity, but that which arises from fear of punishments alone. Therefore, the Council is speaking of the latter, not the former.

Against this, third: Of that attrition or imperfect contrition, the Council says that "although without the sacrament of penance it cannot of itself bring the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance." But there is no sorrow arising from true charity or love of God above all things, however imperfect and remiss, that cannot, even apart from the sacrament, bring the sinner to justification. For, as we shall show below, every true charity, however small and weak, excludes every mortal sin and cannot coexist or be joined with it. Therefore, the Council of Trent is not speaking of attrition arising from imperfect and inchoate love of God, but of that which proceeds from fear of punishments alone or from consideration of the baseness of sin.

20. Nor is it an objection that the same Council, sess. 6, c. 6, among the dispositions by which sinners are gradually prepared to receive justification through baptism, enumerates the love by which they begin to love God as the source of all justice. For these words of the Council of Trent can be glossed and explained in three ways. First, some say, not without probability, that the Council is there speaking of justification that takes place apart from the sacrament through the desire for baptism, as is indicated by the words it immediately adds: "Through that penance which must be performed before baptism"; and: "While they resolve to receive baptism, to begin a new life," and so forth. Second, others answer that the love of which the Council

speaks there is not the love of charity tending toward God as to be loved supremely by reason of his goodness considered absolutely—as St. Thomas, cited above, says: "In order that a man prepare himself to receive grace in baptism, faith is prerequired, but not charity"—but the love of hope or concupiscence by which sinners begin to love God as good and propitious to themselves. This is clear from the context itself, which reads: "Understanding that they are sinners, and being usefully shaken by fear of divine justice, they turn to consider the mercy of God, are raised to hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them for Christ's sake, and begin to love him as the source of all justice." Third, it can be said that not all the acts which the Council enumerates there are dispositions essentially or indispensably required for obtaining the grace of justification in baptism. This is clear regarding fear of divine justice, by which it says sinners are usefully shaken; yet it does not say that this is necessarily required for justification, since sinners are often more strongly moved to conversion by hope of glory than by fear of hell, and by confidence in the mercy of God than by fear of his vindictive and punitive justice. Hence, although the Council there enumerates that initial and imperfect love by which sinners begin to love God as the source of all justice, it does not thereby intend that this love is an entirely necessary disposition for the justification that takes place in baptism. It wishes only to declare that such love is frequently and ordinarily found in adults when they dispose themselves for the sacrament of baptism.

As for what the adversaries add, namely, that attrition conceived from pure fear does not exclude the will to sin, we shall answer it at length in § 6, where we overthrow this principal foundation of the adversaries.

§ 5.
The Principal Foundation of Our Position is Explained.

21. The fundamental argument for our position is drawn from the nature and institution of the sacrament of penance. For it was instituted by Christ to remit sins and, consequently, to confer the first justifying grace, by which sins are immediately and formally expelled. But if it necessarily requires a subject disposed through charity, it will never confer the first justifying grace, nor will it in fact remit sins. Rather, it will presuppose that this grace has already been conferred and that sins have in fact been remitted by the power of the preceding disposition. Consequently, the priest absolving from sins will not remit them but will only declare that they have already been

remitted, which we shall show below to be erroneous. Therefore, an act of charity is not required for the sacrament of penance, but attrition conceived from fear of hell, from consideration of the baseness of sin, or from some other supernatural motive suffices. The major premise is clear. First, because baptism and penance are sacraments of the dead. But sacraments of the dead were primarily and of themselves instituted to confer the first justifying grace, which is the first life of the soul. Second, because baptism and penance do not signify an increase of grace, but only the first grace that in fact expels sins. Therefore, they primarily and of themselves effect that grace. This is declared by the words of the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union: "Through baptism we are spiritually reborn; through confirmation we are increased in grace; reborn and strengthened, we are nourished by the Eucharist; through penance we are healed from sickness." Here the Council distinguishes the Eucharist and confirmation from baptism and penance, because the former give an increase of grace, whereas the latter give the first grace. For to be spiritually reborn is not to be increased in grace, but to receive the first spiritual life. Likewise, to be healed from sickness is nothing other than to receive the grace by which the sickness existing in the soul is expelled. Certainly, if baptism and penance never give the first grace, they can no more be said to regenerate and heal by their principal and primary effect than can the other sacraments. But if they require a subject disposed through charity, they will never confer the first grace, as asserted in the minor premise. This is evident because charity apart from the sacraments destroys every sin and obtains justifying grace, as we showed in § 1, and because charity is a perfect conversion to God as friend and, consequently, an efficacious aversion from every sin destructive of divine friendship.

22. The adversaries answer that the love required for the sacrament of penance is very remiss and imperfect, and consequently does not expel sin from the soul of the penitent or confer the first justifying grace, but leaves that grace to be conferred by the sacrament of penance.

But against this: Either such imperfect love belongs to the species of charity and is a true love of friendship toward God, or it belongs to the species of another virtue, such as hope, which is the love of concupiscence by which we love and desire God as good and delightful to us. If the second is said, we have what we intended to prove, namely, that an act of charity is not required for the sacrament of penance. If the first is affirmed, it cannot be denied that such love, however remiss and imperfect, expels sin from the soul and consequently confers the first justifying grace upon it. For every charity, however weak and remiss, is, as we said above, a conversion to God as friend and consequently an efficacious aversion from every mortal sin

destructive of divine friendship. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 70, a. 4, says: "The least grace can resist any concupiscence and avoid every mortal sin committed through transgression of the commandments of the law. The least charity also loves God more than covetousness loves thousands of pieces of gold and silver."

This is confirmed: It belongs to the essence of charity that it be an inclination toward God as the last end. Hence no charity, however small, weak, and remiss, can exist without producing this effect and inclining man toward God as the last end; and consequently without excluding every mortal sin by which man turns away from God as his last end. Otherwise the same man could simultaneously be converted to God as his last end and turned away from him as his last end. Likewise, the same man could simultaneously have several last ends, namely, God, in whom through charity he would place his last end, and a creature, in which through mortal sin man places the character of the last end, as we showed against Adrian in the treatise on sins. But these things involve a manifest contradiction. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be any charity, however small and remiss, that does not exclude every mortal sin.

23. The adversaries answer that these arguments indeed efficaciously show that no habitual charity can be joined and coexist with mortal sin and consequently that it excludes mortal sin from the soul. Yet they do not prove this of actual charity, such as that which they think is required for the sacrament of penance. Consequently, actual charity does not exclude mortal sin, but leaves it to be expelled through that sacrament.

But this answer can easily be refuted. For just as through the habit of charity man remains habitually converted to God as his last end, so through an act of charity, however weak and remiss, he is actually converted to him. What the habit does habitually, the act accomplishes actually. But it is not only repugnant for a man to have several last ends habitually; it is also impossible for him to have several last ends, one of which is habitual and the other actual, as our Thomists commonly teach and as the Salamancans demonstrate in the treatise on the last end, disp. 4, dub. 2, § 4. Therefore, it is repugnant not only for habitual charity, but also for actual charity, to coexist with mortal sin; and consequently every act of true charity expels mortal sin from the soul.

This is confirmed: He who elicits an act of charity actually loves God, and consequently is loved by him, according to Prov. 8: "I love those who love me." But one who is in the state of mortal sin is hated by God, according to Wis. 14: "The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God." But it is impossible for the same man simultaneously to be loved and hated

by God. Therefore, it is also impossible for an act of charity to coexist with mortal sin in him.

This is further confirmed: He who actually loves God above all things prefers him to all creatures. But one who sins mortally prefers some creature to him, in which he places the character of his last end. Yet it involves a manifest contradiction for a man simultaneously to prefer God to all creatures and nevertheless to prefer some creature to him, as is evident in itself. Therefore, it is likewise impossible for an act of charity to exist simultaneously with mortal sin in the same man.

24. From these things you will understand that the adversaries necessarily fall either into Scylla or into Charybdis, that is, into one of two absurdities. For either they are forced to concede that the sacrament of penance never first expels sin or confers the first justifying grace, and consequently is not numbered among the sacraments instituted by Christ for souls dead in sin; or, if they wish to defend this, they are forced to fall into another absurdity, namely, that charity does not expel mortal sin from the soul but can coexist with it. The first is repugnant to the nature and institution of the sacrament of penance, as we showed above. The second destroys the nature of charity, which, since it is an inclination and conversion to God as the last end and perfect friendship with him, cannot stand together with mortal sin, which turns man away from God as the last end and makes him hostile and inimical to God. Hence Maldonatus says on Luke 8: "I think the opinion of those who hold that charity can coexist with mortal sin is not even worthy of a hearing."

§ 6.
Objections Are Solved.

25. The adversaries object first, and this is their principal foundation: A disposition sufficient for justification together with the sacrament must exclude every will to sin. But attrition arising solely from fear of punishments does not exclude every affection for sinning. Therefore, it is not a sufficient disposition for obtaining the grace of justification in the sacrament of penance. The major premise is clear. They prove the minor first from St. Augustine, who asserts in various places that one who does not sin because of fear of punishment is an enemy of justice. Hence he compares him to a wife who, fearing her husband, abstains from adultery lest she be condemned by him; and to a lion or wolf that does not seize its prey because it is driven back from it by the barking of dogs, the shouting of shepherds,

and the alarm of those nearby. Thus in sermons 15 and 19 on the words of the Apostle, where he says: "The lion comes, the lion returns; he did not seize the prey, but he did not put away his malice. Is it because he did not carry off the sheep that he came as a wolf and returned as a sheep? He came as a growling wolf and returned as a trembling wolf; yet, whether growling or trembling, he is still a wolf."

Second, they prove it from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 19, a. 9, where, according to the mind of Augustine, he says that servile fear can have the will to sin annexed to it, and therefore is not numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Third, they prove it from the common doctrine of St. Thomas and the theologians, who teach that things done from fear are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary, and consequently that fear causes what is involuntary in a certain respect and at least conditionally. This is clear in the merchant who, from fear of an imminent shipwreck, throws his goods into the sea. He has a conditional will to preserve them if danger to his life were not imminent. Similarly, they say, one who does not sin because of fear of hell virtually possesses this act: "I would wish to sin if punishment were absent."

Fourth, they argue as follows. Every will to sin is not excluded when sin pleases considered in itself and precisely apart from its circumstances. But sin considered in itself pleases one who abstains from it because of fear of hell, just as preservation of the goods considered in itself and precisely apart from the circumstances and the imminent danger of shipwreck pleases the merchant who casts them into the sea. Therefore, one who does not sin because of fear of hell retains the will to sin. Hence Augustine, epist. 144: "He vainly thinks himself victorious over sin who does not sin because of fear of punishment, because although he does not outwardly accomplish the work of evil concupiscence, nevertheless that evil concupiscence remains within as an enemy."

Finally, the adversaries argue as follows: Without love of God or a chaste love of justice, every will to sin cannot be excluded, as Augustine teaches in *Contra adversarium legis*, bk. 2, c. 7, in these words: "The desire to sin is not extinguished except by the contrary desire to act rightly, where faith works through love." And epist. 144: "He who does not sin because of fear of punishment is an enemy of justice; but he will be its friend if he does not sin because of love for it. For then he will truly fear sin. He who fears hell does not fear to sin, but to burn." He, however, fears to sin who hates sin itself as he hates hell. Therefore, attrition conceived from fear of hell does not exclude the will to sin.

26. Before answering this objection, it must be observed that it argues only against attrition conceived from fear of hell, not against attrition arising from consideration of the baseness of sin. For the latter excludes the will to sin, as is clear in one who is sorrowful that he has committed fornication and resolves henceforth to abstain from such a sin because of its deformity and baseness and because of the uprightness of the virtue of chastity. Hence this argument, which the adversaries regard as victorious and almost Achilles-like, is incomplete and deficient, since it does not prove absolutely and universally the necessity of contrition in the sacrament of penance, but only the insufficiency of a certain particular attrition, namely, that which arises from fear of hell and the punishments of the infernal regions. This being premised:

27. I answer the objection by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For the Council of Trent, cited above, manifestly supposes that there is some fear of punishments and hell which excludes the will to sin. It teaches that attrition conceived from fear of hell disposes one to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament "if it excludes the will to sin." This conditional clause would be pointless and, as dialecticians say, concern a subject that does not exist, if there were no attrition at all conceived from fear of hell which excluded or could exclude the will to sin. Hence the same Council, sess. 6, can. 8, says: "If anyone says that fear of hell, through which we abstain from sin, is a sin, let him be anathema." But one who retains the will to sin does not abstain from sin, since such an act of willing is itself a sin. Therefore, the Council of Trent holds that fear of hell can exclude the will to sin. Augustine teaches the same on Ps. 127 in these words: "Another does not fear to suffer in this land, but fears hell, with which the Lord also terrified men when the Gospel was read, where their worm will not die and their fire will not be extinguished. Men hear these things, and because they will truly happen to the impious, they fear and restrain themselves from sin. They have fear and through fear restrain themselves from sin. They fear indeed, but they do not love justice. Yet when through fear they restrain themselves from sin, a habit of justice is formed." Likewise, the same holy Father teaches in various places that fear conceived from dread of hell is good, upright, useful for salvation, and worthy of praise; indeed, that it disposes and prepares the way for charity. But if it did not exclude the will to sin, it would not possess these qualities and prerogatives, since the will to sin is evil and base, an impediment to salvation, and bars the entrance to charity, which is incompatible not only with sin but also with the will to sin. Therefore, according to Augustine's doctrine, fear conceived from dread of hell excludes, or at least can exclude, the will to sin. The minor premise is

clear. The major is supported by various testimonies of Augustine. First, in commending this fear on Ps. 127, the holy Doctor says: "Fear lest you be cast into hell: this fear is good and useful." And in sermon 18 on the words of the Apostle, speaking of fear of hell, he says: "You fear nothing better; there is nothing you ought to fear more." And tract. 9 on the First Epistle of John, explaining how this fear disposes and opens the way for charity, he compares it to the bristle by which thread is introduced: "If there is no fear," he says, "there is no way by which charity may enter. We have seen thread introduced by means of a bristle when something is sewn. The bristle enters first, but unless it goes out, the thread does not follow. So fear first occupies the mind, yet fear does not remain there, because it entered in order to introduce charity." Finally, on Ps. 140: "Unless a man begins to worship God through fear, he will not arrive at love. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Therefore, he begins with iron chains and ends with a golden necklace."

28. From these things it is manifest that Augustine is opposed to Jansen in vol. 3, bk. 5, c. 27, col. 560, where he says: "It is impossible that one who is established in the resolution to sin should, through fear of punishment alone, so change his will and detest sin as not to sin." And c. 33, col. 586: "That a resolution to live well should be conceived from fear of punishments is directly opposed to the most solid principles of Augustine by which the Pelagian heresy was overthrown." And col. 578: "He who acts from that fear" —of hell—"is not a friend of rectitude or of God, but rather bears a hostile disposition toward him."

29. This doctrine of Jansen is contrary not only to Augustine but also to reason. For efficacious fear of hell, that is, fear by the force of which a man so flees the evil of hell that he efficaciously wills all the means absolutely necessary for avoiding it, necessarily includes an efficacious will to avoid everything that leads to hell, since this is an absolutely necessary means for avoiding that evil. Therefore, it necessarily excludes every mortally sinful affection for sinning, since such an affection leads to hell. Hence:

To the first proof to the contrary, it must be said that Augustine, in the places cited by the adversaries, speaks of fear on account of punishments whose avoidance the fearful person proposes to himself as his last end. Yet this is not the fear involved in true attrition. For the penitent does not propose to himself the avoidance of the punishments of hell in that act as his last end, but only as a proximate end, because he does not positively exclude its relation to God, but merely behaves negatively or precisively with respect to that relation.

To the second proof from the authority of St. Thomas, I likewise say that in the cited place he is speaking of the first kind of servile fear, not the second. That this interpretation is legitimate is clear from the words of the holy Doctor, for he says that "servile fear can have the will to sin annexed to it." Therefore, he judges that servile fear does not always and necessarily have the will to sin annexed to it, but can sometimes exclude it, namely, when the fearful person does not propose the avoidance of the evil he fears as his last end, as occurs in the present case.

To the third, the answer is that although things done from fear often have annexed to them a contrary conditional will, as is clear from the example adduced of the merchant who, fearing shipwreck, throws his goods into the sea, this is not universally true. It is true only when the conditional affection does not impede attainment of the end for which the means is chosen from fear, as in the case of casting away goods. It is otherwise when it would impede that attainment, as it would in our case. For the avoidance and detestation of sin from fear of hell cannot be useful for escaping it unless it excludes every affection, even a conditional one, toward sin, because this affection is mortally sinful and consequently impedes escape from hell. From this it is clear that what the adversaries say is false, namely, that one who does not sin because of fear of hell implicitly and virtually possesses this act: "I would wish to sin if punishment were absent."

30. From this it is also clear that what is said in the fourth proof is false, namely, that sin considered in itself pleases one who abstains from sin because of fear of hell, just as preservation of goods considered in itself and apart from the circumstances of imminent shipwreck pleases the merchant. The reason for the difference has already been indicated. Love of the goods considered in themselves does not impede attainment of the end for which the means is chosen from fear, namely, preservation of life and avoidance of shipwreck. But affection for or complacency in sin considered in itself, since it is mortally sinful, impedes escape from hell, which is the proximate end on account of which the means, namely, avoidance of sin, is chosen from fear.

To the fifth, it must be said that when Augustine asserts that the will to sin is not excluded through fear of hell, but only through love of justice, he is speaking of fear of hell considered in itself, not as joined to the sacrament of penance, which is what we are speaking of at present. For attrition conceived from such fear, if joined to this sacrament, is equivalent to contrition and charity, and consequently excludes the will to sin no less than an act of contrition and charity does apart from the sacrament of penance.

31. You will object second with Jansen: He who is sorrowful for sins solely because of the punishments of hell ultimately rests in such fear or in

pure self-love. Therefore, he sins and acts inordinately, since it is sinful and inordinate to rest ultimately in love of self.

I answer that one who is sorrowful for sins because of the punishments of hell can ultimately rest in the self-love from which that sorrow arises in two ways. First, positively and contrarily, by excluding the relation of such love and of himself to God. Second, only negatively or precisively, by not referring that love and the act of sorrow for sins arising from it to God. I admit that one who is sorrowful for sins in the first way corrupts that act, which is good of itself, by adding an evil circumstance to it. But I deny that one who is sorrowful for sins in the second way, as is one who possesses true attrition for them solely because of fear of hell, acts in this manner and consequently acts inordinately. This can be illustrated and explained by the following example. One who elicits some act of moral virtue, such as temperance or justice, solely because of the uprightness found in the object of those virtues, without referring it through charity to God as the last end, does not sin or act inordinately, as theologians commonly teach against Michael Baius. For he does not regard such uprightness and moral goodness as the last end, but only as a proximate end; nor does he positively exclude its relation to God, toward whom it naturally tends as the source of all uprightness and goodness, but behaves merely precisively and negatively with respect to this. The same, with due proportion, must be said of fear of hell or attrition conceived from such fear.

32. The adversaries further object with certain testimonies of the holy Fathers asserting that man is never justified without charity. But it is easily answered that these must be understood of antecedent or consequent charity. For charity always either precedes the justification of the sinner, as when he is justified apart from the sacrament through acts of contrition or charity, which ultimately dispose him for justifying grace; or accompanies or follows it, as when he is justified through an act of attrition in the sacrament of baptism or penance. For then charity follows by the power of the sacrament at the completion of the words.

§ 7.
What Conditions Attrition Must Possess in Order to Dispose a Person to Obtain the Grace of Justification in the Sacrament of Penance.

33. I answer that it must possess these four conditions: it must be true, supernatural, universal, and efficacious, or exclude the will to sin. First, it must be true, and apparent or supposed attrition does not suffice. This is

manifest because attrition is the matter of the sacrament of penance, just as water is the matter of baptism. But true water is required for the matter of baptism, and apparent or supposed water does not suffice. Therefore, true attrition is likewise necessary for the validity and effect of the sacrament of penance, and apparent or supposed attrition does not suffice. Second, it must be supernatural, and consequently natural attrition that is mistakenly believed to be supernatural does not suffice. This is clear, first, because the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4, asserts that the attrition which disposes the sinner to obtain grace in this sacrament is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, which do not belong to natural attrition. Second, because the disposition must be of the same order as the form for which it disposes. Finally, because, since sin turns man away from God as a supernatural end, its retraction must in some way be a conversion to God as a supernatural end, and consequently supernatural. From this you will understand that the motive of the attrition which disposes a person to receive the effect of this sacrament must be in some way supernatural. Hence, when the Council of Trent in the place cited above says that attrition conceived either from consideration of the baseness of sin or from fear of hell and punishment disposes a person to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance, this must be understood of a baseness opposed to some supernatural uprightness and virtue, and of fear of hell and punishments revealed to us by faith and inflicted by God as supernatural author. Third, it must be universal, or extend to all mortal sins not yet confessed. This is clear because in the sacrament of penance one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Hence either as many acts of attrition must be multiplied as there are sins diverse in species, or there must be some attrition possessing a universal motive which extends to all mortal sins. Finally, it must be efficacious or exclude the will to sin. This is expressly taught by the Council of Trent in the cited passage, where, speaking of attrition conceived from consideration of the baseness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, it adds that if it "excludes the will to sin together with hope of pardon, it disposes one to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance."

CHAPTER V.
On Sacramental Confession.

Sacramental confession is the lawful accusation by a penitent of his own sins, made to a priest in order to obtain absolution from them by the power of the keys. Five things can principally be considered concerning it, namely,

its precept or obligation, minister, quality, integrity, and seal, which must be treated briefly here.

§ 1.
The Precept of Sacramental Confession.

1. We showed above, Chapter I, § 2, that sacramental confession was instituted by Christ. From this it follows that it is necessary and commanded by divine law, as the Council of Trent defines in sess. 14, can. 8, and proves in c. 5 from these words of Christ, John 20: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," and so forth. For priests would not have the power to retain the sins of the faithful if the faithful themselves did not have a command from Christ to bring their sins before them. This can also be proved from the fact that under the Gospel law the precept of confession succeeded the precept of contrition. But before the Gospel law the latter bound sinners by divine law, as was shown in the preceding chapter, § 2. Therefore, sacramental confession is likewise commanded by divine law under the Gospel law. Certainly, a thing so difficult and so repugnant to human pride as the confession of all sins, even secret and most shameful ones, could never have been introduced throughout the whole Church unless she had received through the Apostles a command of Christ concerning it. Nor is it an objection that the heretics say that Nectarius, Patriarch of Constantinople, abolished the practice of confession in his Church and that Chrysostom, his successor, disapproved it.

We answered this above, Chapter II, § 1. Nectarius did not abolish private and auricular confession, but only public confession, on the occasion of a scandal arising from the public confession of a certain woman who had gone further than was fitting in confessing and had openly accused herself of a secret crime committed with a deacon in the church. Likewise, Chrysostom disapproves only the same public confession when, in homily 5 *De paenitentia et confessione*, praising the action of Nectarius, he adds: "Let the examination of offenses take place in thought; let this judgment be without a witness; let God alone see the one confessing." Hence in homily 4 *De Lazaro* he says: "I do not compel you to come forth into the midst of the theater; I do not require witnesses." By these words he manifestly excludes only public confession. But if he sometimes also seems to exclude the priest, the Vicar of God, as in homily 30 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, where he says: "Declare your offenses, not with the tongue, but by the memory of your conscience," and in homily 8 *De paenitentia*: "Within, in your conscience,

with no one present," he is speaking of daily confession before God alone through examination of conscience and true contrition, to which he exhorts the faithful as very useful and sufficient of itself for the remission of sins, although not without the obligation of submitting those sins at the proper time to priestly judgment.

I add that Chrysostom and other holy Fathers celebrate confession with various praises, which is an evident argument that they did not disapprove it. Celebrated is that saying of Ambrose in *De paenitentia*, bk. 2, c. 6: "A humble confession of sins looses the bonds of crimes." And that of Pacian in *Paraenesis ad paenitentiam*: "Remember hell, which confession extinguishes for you." Likewise Chrysostom, homily 20 on Genesis: "Confession of sins," he says, "is the abolition of offenses." And in homily 5 he had said before: "By confession sins are washed away and assurance of salvation is given." Finally, celebrated and commonly repeated is that saying of Augustine: "Confession is the salvation of souls, the disperser of vices, the restorer of virtues, and the conqueror of demons. What more? It closes the mouth of hell and opens the gates of paradise." In the same sense that saying of Ambrose on Luke 22 must be understood: "Tears wash away the offense which shame prevents one from confessing by voice."

2. Sacramental confession is also necessary by ecclesiastical law, as is clear from the chapter *Omnis utriusque sexus*, on penance and remission, taken from the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in which annual confession is expressly commanded in these words: "Every faithful person of either sex, after reaching the years of discretion, shall faithfully confess all his sins at least once a year to his own priest," and so forth. This precept is a determination of the divine precept regarding the time for confession. Therefore, it binds under mortal sin and is of itself distinct from the precept of communicating at Easter, and consequently binds of itself and independently of it. Hence, one who was legitimately prevented for a year from receiving the Eucharist would nevertheless be bound to sacramental confession. Conversely, one who at Easter had no consciousness of mortal sin would not be bound to confess, although he would be bound to communicate. Those, however, who are then conscious of mortal sin are indeed bound to confess before communicating, but they are not bound to this by force of the precept of annual confession, supposing that they confessed at Christmas or at some other time of the year, but by force of the divine precept forbidding anyone to presume to approach the Eucharist unworthily.

3. This precept is not satisfied by an invalid confession, since such a confession is not commanded but forbidden by the Church. It is, however,

satisfied by a valid but unformed confession, which we shall show below to be possible. For the precept concerning a thing is fulfilled when everything required for the essence of the commanded thing is applied. But in a valid confession, although unformed, everything belonging to the essence of sacramental confession is applied; otherwise it would not be valid. Therefore, through it the ecclesiastical precept of annual confession is fulfilled. This is confirmed: The end of a precept does not fall under the precept. But the grace to be received through the sacrament, the privation of which renders the sacrament unformed, is the end of the precept of sacramental confession. Therefore, it does not fall under the precept.

§ 2.
The Minister of Sacramental Confession.

4. It is certain by faith that only a priest is the minister of sacramental confession. This was defined in the Council of Constance against Wycliffe, in the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union, and in the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 10, where it is said that these words of Christ, John 20, "Whose sins you shall forgive," were spoken to priests alone, and that the power of forgiving sins was granted to them alone. Reason also supports this. First, because it was fitting that only those should have power over the mystical body of Christ who possess power over the true body of Christ, and such are priests alone. Second, because the sacrament of penance is conducted in the manner of a judgment, and therefore absolution from sins is a judicial act. But it is not fitting that everyone should be a judge in a well-ordered commonwealth, since a judicial act requires many things that cannot easily be found in everyone, such as knowledge, prudence, zeal for justice, and so forth. Therefore, neither is it fitting that everyone should be a minister of sacramental confession.

5. From this you will understand that jurisdiction is plainly necessary in the minister of confession, not only for licit but also for valid absolution from sins, since the nature and character of a judgment require that sentence be pronounced only over subjects. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 7: "Because the nature and character of a judgment require that sentence be pronounced only over subjects, it has always been held in the Church of God, and this Synod confirms as most true, that an absolution is of no effect when a priest pronounces it over one concerning whom he possesses neither ordinary nor delegated power."

6. You will object: Every priest, by the force of his ordination and of those words which the bishop pronounces in the person of Christ, "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," and so forth, receives the power of absolving from sins. Therefore, jurisdiction is not required for him to absolve from them.

I answer that every priest then receives the physical power, or power of order, to absolve from sins, but not the moral power, or power of jurisdiction.

7. You will insist: The physical power, or power of order, for absolving from sins consists in the priestly character. But before the bishop pronounces the aforesaid words, the priest has already been marked with the priestly character, since it is imprinted through contact with the chalice and the pronouncement of the words, "Receive the power of offering sacrifice to God." Therefore, before the bishop pronounces the words, "Receive the Holy Spirit," the priest possesses the physical power, or power of order, for absolving from sins. Consequently, by force of those words he does not receive physical power for absolving from sins, but moral power, which is the very power of jurisdiction.

I answer that the physical power for absolving from sins does not consist in the priestly character, but in a certain modal and intrinsic greater perfection and extension of that character, by reason of which the character is a physical power not only over the true body of Christ, for consecrating it, but also over the mystical body of Christ, or over the penitent faithful, for causing in them through sacramental absolution the grace that remits sins. Although the priest receives the priestly character through contact with the chalice and the pronouncement of the words, "Receive the power of offering sacrifice to God," he nevertheless receives that extensive mode of greater power only through the pronouncement of the words, "Receive the Holy Spirit," and so forth.

8. From this you will understand the notable distinction found between the power of jurisdiction in the tribunal of penance for absolving from sins and the power of jurisdiction in the external forum possessed by a judge for exercising judicial acts. The latter does not necessarily presuppose another physical power as its foundation. The former, however, does presuppose one, namely, the priestly character together with the real and intrinsic mode of extension over the mystical body of Christ already explained. Hence those who lack the priestly character cannot be deputed by the Church to exercise the office of confessor and absolve from sins, although they can be deputed to exercise judicial acts of the external forum.

9. You will object: Cyprian, epist. 13, speaking of the lapsed, says that, in the absence of a presbyter, "they can also make confession of their offense before a deacon."

I answer that by the name "confession" he does not mean sacramental confession and the pardon of sins in the internal forum, which is an act of the priestly character, but their remission in the external forum and with respect to canonical punishments. Since this is not an act of order but of jurisdiction, it can be committed by the bishop to a deacon in the absence of a presbyter.

§ 3.
The Quality of Sacramental Confession.

10. Concerning the quality of sacramental confession there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians as to whether there can be a sacramental confession which is valid yet unformed, that is, which possesses everything required for the essence and validity of the sacrament and nevertheless lacks its effect, namely, grace and the remission of sins.

I answer that this can sometimes occur. For since an effect is outside the essence of its cause, the cause can sometimes fail to produce it because of some indisposition in the subject, as is clear in fire, which does not always in fact produce heat because of an indisposition in the subject. Therefore, there seems to be no repugnance in sacramental confession possessing everything required for the validity of the sacrament and nevertheless accidentally failing to produce grace because of some defect or indisposition in the penitent. For example, if someone who has four mortal sins declares three of them in confession and possesses attrition for them that is indeed supernatural but arises from a motive of their particular deformity, while through inculpable inadvertence he does not declare the other and consequently is not sorrowful for it, such a confession will be valid and nevertheless unformed. First, that it is valid is clear because the omission of some sin through inculpable ignorance or inadvertence does not render confession invalid. For although it is then not materially integral, it is formally integral, as will be clear from what follows. That it is unformed, or lacks its effect, which is the remission of sins, seems no less certain, because in confession one sin is not remitted without another. But in the proposed case the sin that the penitent does not declare through inculpable inadvertence is not remitted. Therefore, neither are the others which he reveals in confession remitted. The major premise is clear. The minor is

proved: Sin is never remitted unless a person has formal or virtual sorrow for it. But in the proposed case the penitent has neither formal nor virtual sorrow for the omitted sin. He does not have formal and explicit sorrow, as is clear, since he does not think of it. Neither does he have virtual and implicit sorrow, because sorrow for a sin arising from a motive special to it, for example, sorrow for adultery arising from its special baseness, is not virtual sorrow for sins of a diverse character, such as theft or homicide. But the penitent in the proposed case is sorrowful for the three sins only from a particular motive and from their special baseness. Therefore, he does not have virtual and implicit sorrow for the fourth.

11. You will object: Sins inculpably forgotten are remitted in the sacrament of penance although confession does not extend to them. Therefore, they can likewise be remitted although attrition does not extend to them, and consequently, in the proposed case, the confession will be not only valid but also formed. Especially because the penitent then places no obstacle to sacramental grace; otherwise he would sin, since he is bound by divine precept not to impede the effect of the sacrament and consequently not to place an obstacle to it.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. A notable distinction is found between the integrity of confession and the integrity of attrition. For the integrity of confession is required only by precept, not by necessity of means. Hence whenever the penitent satisfies that precept, the confession remains formally integral. Interior penance, however, is a means required of itself for the remission of sin. Hence if it does not extend to some sin, that sin is not remitted, because a means necessary of itself is not applied to it. To what is added, I say that although in the proposed case the penitent places no positive obstacle to sacramental grace and therefore does not sin, he nevertheless places a negative obstacle to it, namely, the absence of an extension of attrition to that sin of which he is inculpably unaware. For this reason he does not receive sacramental grace, and consequently his confession in that case is valid yet unformed.

§ 4.
The Integrity of Sacramental Confession.

12. With regard to the integrity of confession, two things are certain and indubitable among theologians, and two others uncertain and disputed. First, it is certain that formal integrity is always necessary for the validity of confession, and consequently the penitent is bound to declare in confession

each and every sin, both as to species and number and as to circumstances changing the species, unless some most grave and urgent cause excuses him. This is defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5. Reason also supports it. First, because in this sacrament sins are remitted in the manner of a judgment, by means of the accusation of the penitent and the sentence of the judge. But the sentence of the judge presupposes an integral confession of sins. Therefore, so does sacramental confession. Second, the confessor in this sacrament has not only the character of a judge but also that of a physician. But a physician cannot wisely prescribe medicine unless he has examined all the illnesses of the sick person. Therefore, neither can a priest prescribe salutary penance to the penitent unless he knows each and every one of his sins. Third, the precept of confession was, by Christ's institution, substituted for the precept of contrition. But contrition does not destroy sins unless the sinner detests them all. Therefore, neither does confession, unless all are declared and subjected to the keys of the Church.

13. Second, it is certain that material integrity is not always necessary for the validity of confession or for receiving the sacramental fruit, but that there are many causes excusing from it. The first is forgetfulness, namely, when someone, after employing sufficient diligence, does not remember some sin. The second is physical inability, as when the penitent, having lost the power of speech or fallen unconscious, cannot complete his confession; for then he must be absolved after one sin has been heard. The third is moral impossibility, as in a case where the penitent cannot distinctly confess all his sins without grave harm to himself, the confessor, or some third party.

14. You will object: In no case whatsoever is it lawful to divide the sacrament of the Eucharist by consecrating one matter without the other, for example, bread without wine. Therefore, neither may sacramental confession be divided.

I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that, since sacramental confession is a moral and human act, the precept concerning its integrity must be measured according to moral possibility and the rules of prudence. But the sacrament of the Eucharist does not have any human act for its matter or form, and consequently the precept concerning its integrity must be understood absolutely and without limitation.

15. These two things are certain and indubitable among theologians. But it is disputed first whether, for the integrity of confession, it is necessary to declare circumstances that notably aggravate within the same species. I answer affirmatively, against several more recent authors who hold the opposite. The fundamental reason is that, since the sacrament of penance was instituted in the manner of a judgment, sacramental confession must be

such that from it the priest can rightly judge the gravity of the crimes and preserve equity in imposing penances, as the Council of Trent teaches in sess. 14, c. 5. But the priest can accomplish neither unless circumstances notably aggravating the sins are declared to him in confession. Therefore, they must be declared in confession. The major premise is clear; the minor is proved. Incest with one's own sister or mother is incomparably graver than incest with one's own granddaughter or cousin, and yet it is not distinct in species from the latter but only notably aggravates it within the same species, because according to the common opinion, which St. Thomas indicates in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 154, a. 9, ad 2, all sins of incest are of the same character and species. Likewise, theft of a thousand gold pieces is beyond comparison graver than theft of one gold piece, and yet the quantity of the theft is not a circumstance changing the species but only aggravating within the same species, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3. In what way, then, will the priest be able to judge rightly how gravely someone has sinned if he does not know whether the penitent committed incest with his own mother or sister, or only with a granddaughter or cousin, and if he does not know whether he stole a thousand gold pieces or only one? And how will he be able to impose a fitting penance upon him if the penitent does not declare those circumstances notably aggravating within the same species? Especially since these circumstances sometimes add greater malice than those which change the species. For example, the theft of a hundred thousand gold pieces or the killing of a hundred thousand men absolutely contains greater malice than the theft of one gold piece or the killing of one man in a church. I add that, if the penitent were free to declare or not declare such circumstances in confession, neither the bishop nor the Supreme Pontiff could reserve to himself a sin notably aggravated within the same species, for example, incest with one's mother or sister, as they often do, without reserving incest with a granddaughter or cousin. The consequence is proved: The Church never reserves to herself, nor can she reserve, venial sins or mortal sins otherwise duly confessed, because such sins are not necessary but free matter of confession. Therefore, if circumstances notably aggravating within the same species were likewise free matter of confession, the Church could not reserve to herself any sin by reason of a circumstance notably aggravating it within the same species.

16. You will object: Man is not bound to something concerning which no precept exists. But no divine or ecclesiastical precept exists concerning the confession of circumstances notably aggravating within the same species. Therefore, the faithful are not bound to it. Hence the Council of Trent, sess.

14, c. 5, when doctrinally defining which circumstances must be explained in confession, mentions only those that change the species; and St. Thomas, IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 3, a. 2, q. 5, says: "Others say that only those circumstances must necessarily be confessed which draw the sin into another genus and species of mortal sin; and this is more probable."

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. A divine precept exists concerning the confession of those circumstances, following from the institution of this sacrament. For since it was instituted by Christ in the manner of a judgment, whatever is required in order that the priest may rightly judge the gravity of the crimes falls under divine precept. Hence, since an explanation of circumstances notably aggravating within the same species is necessary in order that the confessor may form a right judgment concerning the gravity of the crimes, as has already been shown, it falls under divine precept. As for the Council of Trent, it must be said that it explicitly mentioned only those circumstances which change the species because it did not wish to define the controversy among theologians concerning the others which do not vary the species. Yet the reason it gives for why circumstances changing the species must be explained implicitly shows that the others which notably aggravate within the same species must also necessarily be declared, as is clear from what has been said above. I add that the Council teaches that sins must be confessed not only as to species but also as to number. But a sin possessing a notably aggravating circumstance is sometimes virtually multiple, as is clear in the theft of a thousand gold pieces, which is equivalent to a thousand thefts of one gold piece, and in hatred lasting for a whole year, which is equivalent to and virtually contains several acts of hatred, because continuation of a sin is a certain virtual distinction and multiplication of the sin. Hence the Catechism of the same Council, on the sacrament of penance, § *Sed quoniam*, teaches that not only all sins, but also circumstances that greatly increase or diminish the gravity of the sin, must be explained in confession.

As for St. Thomas, it must be said that in the cited place he wishes to exclude from the obligation of confession only those circumstances which do not very notably aggravate within the same species, such as the circumstance of a feast day or the dignity of the person, for example, if the one who committed the sin is a bishop, abbot, or general of an order, but not circumstances notably aggravating within the same species. This is clear from the reason he adduces, for he says that only circumstances changing the species must necessarily be confessed "because venial sins are not necessary matter of confession, but only mortal sins, which possess in some way an infinite quantity."

17. The second difficulty and controversy is whether the penitent can and must, for the integrity of his confession, reveal the person of an accomplice if he cannot otherwise explain his sin. I answer affirmatively, because in the sacrament of penance the penitent has a right to accuse himself integrally. Therefore, he also has a right to disclose the accomplice if he cannot otherwise accuse himself integrally or make his confession integral. Nor is it valid to say that the penitent cannot defame his neighbor before the confessor for the sake of the integrity of his confession. First, because the revelation of an accomplice in confession is not a defamation of him except materially, just as he is not defamed when his sin is revealed for his own benefit and correction, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 73, a. 2. Second, because the accomplice, by voluntarily making himself a partner of the penitent in the crime, also voluntarily subjected himself, insofar as lay within him, to the knowledge of the judge concerning that crime, because he voluntarily made himself a circumstance of that offense. From this you will understand that, if a brother committed incest with his sister with her willing consent, he can and must explain that circumstance in confession and disclose to the confessor the person and crime of his sister. It is otherwise if he violated a sister who did not consent, because in the first case the sister is an accomplice in the crime and a partner in the offense, but not in the second. Hence it then suffices that the brother who used force against his sister say that he committed incest with a blood relative and used force against her, without explaining the circumstance of the person.

§ 5.
The Seal of Confession.

18. The confessor is bound to preserve the seal of confession by a threefold precept: natural, divine, and human. By a natural precept, because it belongs to natural law to preserve a secret committed to oneself; by a divine precept, because confession, which is of divine law, would without secrecy be excessively odious and consequently morally impossible; finally, by a human or ecclesiastical precept, because the Church most strictly commands that the seal of confession be preserved and punishes its violators with the gravest penalties, as is clear from the canon *Sacerdos*, *De paenitentia*, dist. 1. From this it follows that a priest violating the seal of confession commits three sins: first, detraction, by defaming his neighbor; second, infidelity, by

not preserving the secret; third, sacrilege, by acting against the reverence and signification of this sacrament.

19. The obligation of the seal of confession is so strict that it is not lawful to violate it even in danger to the common good, in any necessity whatever, or to avoid any scandal whatever, as is stated in the aforesaid canon. The first reason is that revelation of the secret of confession is not a means ordained to assist human necessities and dangers. Second, what is intrinsically evil can never be adopted as a means for procuring some good or avoiding another evil, for evils must not be done that goods may result or that other evils may be avoided. But to violate the seal of confession is intrinsically evil, both because it is a violation of the natural law commanding that a secret be preserved, and because it is contrary to the signification of the sacrament of penance. For this sacrament signifies the remission of sins, which is a certain covering and concealment of sins performed by God, according to Ps. 31: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered." Therefore, violation of the seal of confession can never be lawful under the pretext of procuring some good or avoiding some evil or scandal. Third, because if it were ever lawful to violate the seal of confession, the sacrament of penance, which is the greatest good of the Christian commonwealth, would be entirely destroyed, since it would be rendered odious, as we said above.

20. You will object: The precept concerning the integrity of confession is no less of divine law than the precept of preserving its secrecy, and yet in several cases it is lawful to make a confession that is not integral, as is clear from the preceding section. Therefore, it will likewise be lawful in some extraordinary cases to reveal the secret of confession.

I answer that not every integrity of confession is of divine law, but only that which is within the power of the penitent. Hence this always binds, and no case can be assigned in which it is lawful for the penitent not to make a formally integral confession, although several can be adduced in which he is not bound to make a materially integral confession. I add that there is this difference between the precept of confession and the precept of not revealing the secret of confession: the first is affirmative, and therefore, although it always binds, it does not bind at every moment, but cases can occur in which its obligation ceases. The second, however, is negative, and consequently binds always and at every moment and in every case, with no exception whatsoever, since such is the nature of negative precepts. From these things:

21. It is gathered first that the confessor cannot, in explaining his own sin in confession, reveal the sin of another heard in confession, because the

precept of the seal is stricter than the precept concerning the integrity of confession. For it is not lawful to violate the seal of confession even to avoid death, whereas much lesser harms and dangers excuse from the precept of the integrity of confession.

22. It is gathered second that it is not lawful for a priest to perform any action which by its nature expresses a sin heard in confession, because this would be to reveal the confession, not by word but by deed. It is nevertheless lawful for him to perform all those actions which of themselves are indifferent to signifying a sin confessed or not confessed, and which, even after consideration of all the circumstances, can be performed from other motives. Hence, if a priest knew through confession that poisoned wine had been prepared for him to celebrate Mass, he could abstain from celebrating by feigning some sudden illness. Prelates, however, cannot use knowledge acquired through confession for external governance, for Clement VIII most strictly prohibited this by a decree issued on May 26, 1593.

23. It is gathered third that one who finds a paper on which are written sins of a penitent not yet confessed is not bound by the seal, but only by natural secrecy, because such sins have not yet been subjected to the keys of the Church. Hence, if that paper contains some crime tending to the harm of the commonwealth, he is bound to reveal it, since natural secrecy does not bind to the detriment of the public good. If, however, the paper had already been handed to the confessor and had accidentally fallen from his hands, then one who found it would be bound by the seal of confession, because in that case the sins contained in it would have been manifested to the confessor and consequently subjected to the keys of the Church.

CHAPTER VI.
On Sacramental Absolution.

Concerning sacramental absolution, four difficulties must briefly be resolved here. The first is whether all these words, "I absolve you from all your sins, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," which are assigned by the Councils of Florence and Trent as the form of the sacrament of penance, belong to its essence, or whether these words alone, "I absolve you," are essential to sacramental absolution.

1. I answer that these words alone, "I absolve you," suffice for the essence and validity of sacramental absolution. First, the invocation of the most holy Trinity is not necessarily required for it, but is left to the

discretion of the priest, as St. Thomas says in q. 84, a. 3. Hence the same reasoning does not apply to the form of this sacrament as to the forms of baptism and confirmation, in which the expression of the most holy Trinity is necessary, because baptism introduces man into the faith, whose principal mystery is the Trinity, and confirmation strengthens him for its confession. Second, that the word "all" need not necessarily be added is clear both because it is not included in the Roman Ritual issued by command of Paul V, and because the penitent cannot be absolved from one mortal sin unless he is absolved from all, while absolution is often not given from venial sins, since the penitent does not repent of them and is not bound to repent of them. Third, that the phrase "from sins" does not belong to the essence of absolution is proved because, although the words "I absolve you" are of themselves indifferent to signifying absolution from sins or from censures, nevertheless, when they are pronounced over a penitent confessing his sins in the administration of the sacrament of penance, they possess from that circumstance the property of signifying absolution from sins rather than from censures. Finally, that the form of absolution is not sufficiently expressed by the word "I absolve" alone, but that the pronoun "you" must be added, is clear because the form must signify and express that the absolution falls upon this particular person who has offended, has been accused and convicted, is penitent, and has confessed these particular sins. Hence the word "you" belongs no less to the essence of the form of the sacrament of penance than to the forms of baptism and confirmation. It remains, therefore, that the essential form of absolution is preserved in the words "I absolve you," with the pronoun "I" omitted, since it is understood in the first-person verb "absolve." For these words sufficiently signify the principal effect of this sacrament, which is release from the bonds of sins.

2. You will object: The Councils of Florence and Trent, in assigning the form of this sacrament, say that it consists in these words, "I absolve you," and so forth. Therefore, they judge that some of the following words belong essentially to the form of sacramental absolution.

I deny the consequence. They added "and so forth" either in order to abstract from the controversies of theologians who think that other words also belong to the essence of this form, or to signify that the following words are not to be omitted although they are not essential. Certainly, if they had judged them to be essential, they would not have omitted the few words "from your sins," since they expressed the entire form of baptism although it is longer.

3. From these things you will understand that sacramental grace remitting sins is produced at the extrinsically terminating instant of the

words "I absolve you," since then the essential signification of sacramental absolution is complete, and the sacraments cause grace when their essential signification is complete. Thus, according to those who think that only the words "This is the chalice of my blood" belong to the essence of the consecration of the chalice, the blood of Christ is placed under the species of wine at the extrinsically terminating instant of those words and before the following words, "which shall be poured out for you and for many," and so forth, have been pronounced by the priest.

4. The second difficulty is whether a form of absolution pronounced deprecatively is valid. I answer negatively, against Morinus and Launoy. For, as the Council of Trent says, sess. 14, c. 6, sacramental absolution has the manner of a judicial act exercised by the priest. But the sentence of a judge ought not to be expressed deprecatively, but indicatively or imperatively, as is clear in human judgments. Therefore, neither should sacramental absolution.

This is confirmed: Absolution is an act of one possessing authority, whereas deprecation is the act of a suppliant. Hence one who supplicates shows that he does not possess the power of absolving but expects the grace of absolution from another. Therefore, a deprecative form is incompatible with an absolving form. I add that, if a form of absolution pronounced deprecatively were valid, the penitent would be absolved from sins when the priest pronounced these words: "May the almighty and merciful Lord grant you absolution and remission of all your sins," since in them an express prayer is made for absolution and remission of sins. Thus, through the words "I absolve you," the priest would not truly absolve the penitent from sins but would only declare him already absolved from them. This openly conflicts with the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 9, where it says: "If anyone says that the sacramental absolution of the priest"—which it teaches in c. 3 to be contained in the words "I absolve you"—"is not a judicial act, but the bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been forgiven, let him be anathema."

5. The objections of the adversaries are very slight. First, what they allege is not true, namely, that the Greeks absolve only deprecatively. That this is false is clear from Arcudius, who accurately and extensively discusses the Greek forms of absolution in *De sacramentis*, bk. 4, c. 3, where he reports none that does not contain some proposition bearing the authority of a judicial sentence, although it has certain prayers joined before and after, just as does the customary form of the Latin Church.

Nor is it an objection that in the canon *Multiplex*, *De paenitentia*, dist. 1, it is said that the indulgence of God cannot be obtained except through the

supplications of priests. This must be understood of the prayer that precedes sacramental absolution, as St. Thomas interprets it in q. 84, a. 3, ad 2. For the Pontiff calls the sacrament of penance "supplications" from the deprecative prayer which precedes absolution. It is not unusual for sacraments to receive names from accidental rites, as is clear in the sacrament of penance itself, which is called "the imposition of hands," although this does not belong to the necessity of the sacrament.

Nor is the example adduced from the sacrament of Extreme Unction, whose form is expressed in the manner of a prayer, valid. For, as St. Thomas reasons in opusc. 22, c. 1, in this sacrament, besides the salvation of the soul, bodily health is sought; and because it is not always expedient for this to be conferred, it is asked for by prayer. In the sacrament of penance and the other sacraments, however, something spiritual is conferred which is always expedient to confer. Hence the form of the sacrament of penance, and of the other sacraments except Extreme Unction, ought not to be expressed in the manner of a prayer.

6. The third difficulty, related to the preceding, is whether through these words, "I absolve you," the priest truly absolves the penitent from guilt and the debt of eternal punishment, or only declares him absolved from sins. I answer that he truly absolves him and does not merely declare him absolved. The Council of Trent expressly teaches this in sess. 14, can. 9, in these words: "If anyone says that sacramental absolution is not a judicial act, but the bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been forgiven to the person confessing," and so forth, "let him be anathema." St. Thomas asserts the same in opusc. 22, c. 1, and proves it from various testimonies of Scripture. Likewise, Richard of St. Victor writes in *De potestate ligandi et solvendi*, c. 21: "There exists an opinion of certain persons so frivolous that it seems more worthy of laughter than refutation. For they think that a priest does not possess the power of loosing, but only of showing that persons have been loosed. But did the Lord say: What you shall show to have been loosed shall be loosed? They say that priests do not possess the power of forgiving sins, although the Lord says this, and they say they possess the power of showing that sins have been forgiven, although the Lord does not say this."

7. Reason also supports this, for the sacraments of the New Law effect what they signify. But the sacrament of penance, principally by reason of its form, signifies the remission of sins. Therefore, principally by reason of its form, it confers that remission; and consequently, through the words "I absolve you," the priest truly absolves the penitent from sins and does not merely declare him loosed from them.

This is confirmed: Baptism causes grace cleansing from the stains of sins because the words "I baptize you" signify it. But the words "I absolve you" no less clearly signify grace remitting sins. Therefore, they likewise confer it upon those sufficiently disposed.

I add that, if priests of the New Law did not truly absolve from sins but only declared the penitent absolved, they would not differ from the priests of the Old Law. For the latter possessed the power of discerning leprosy from non-leprosy and declaring who truly was or was not a leper. Hence Chrysostom, *De sacerdotio*, c. 6: "It was permitted to the Jewish priests to cleanse bodily leprosy—or, to speak more truly, not even to cleanse it, but to show that it had been cleansed. But to our priests it has been granted, not with respect to bodily leprosy but to stains of the soul, not, I say, merely to prove that they have been cleansed, but entirely to cleanse them."

8. Nor is it an objection that St. Jerome, commenting on Matt. 16, "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven," seems to equate the priests of the Gospel with those of the Old Law in this respect: just as the latter did not cleanse lepers but judged them to be clean, so priests of the Gospel do not justify or cleanse sinners but show them to be clean. For there he compares priests of the Gospel with those of the Old Law only in this: just as the latter could not distinguish between leprosy and leprosy according to their own will, but only according to the merits of the case, so neither should nor can priests of the Gospel judge sins according to their own pleasure, so that they might condemn the innocent or absolve the wicked, but only according to each person's disposition.

9. Nor is it an objection that Augustine, Gregory, and other holy Fathers say that priests loose no one unless he has first been brought to life by God, just as the Apostles did not loose Lazarus unless he had first been raised by Christ. For, as St. Thomas says in the cited opuscule, c. 2, this must be understood not of perfect vivification through sanctifying grace, but of imperfect vivification through exciting grace, which begins the life of the soul through some supernatural act to which it moves and excites the sinner. The sinner comes forth, as Lazarus came from the tomb, that is, he withdraws from sin through a certain sorrow and detestation and approaches the priest in order to disclose himself through confession. St. Augustine approves this interpretation in tract. 49 on John and elsewhere.

10. From what has been said, it is gathered that the true meaning of the words "I absolve you from your sins" is this: I confer upon you grace which of itself remits sin or releases from the bonds of sins. For the form thus understood is verified not only when the penitent approaches the sacrament of penance with attrition alone and in the state of mortal sin, but also when

he is absolved from sins already validly confessed and remitted. For in these cases he receives grace which of itself remits sin, although it does not then actually remit sins, just as one who accidentally receives first grace in the Eucharist receives it in the manner of nourishment, although it accidentally then confers the first spiritual life upon the soul.

11. The fourth difficulty is whether absolution can be given in writing or to an absent person. I answer negatively to both parts. First, that absolution cannot be given in writing seems manifest both because, according to the Councils of Florence and Trent, words are the form of every sacrament of the New Law, from which law they except only the sacrament of matrimony, in which gestures and signs can supply the place of words; and because, since the sacrament of penance was instituted in the manner of a judgment, the sentence of absolution must, as in other solemn judgments, be pronounced by the human voice.

12. That absolution cannot be given to an absent person is clear from the words of the form, "I absolve you," for the word "you" is expressly directed to a present person according to Christ's institution, just as in the Eucharist the words "This is my body" are directed to present matter. Hence, just as a priest cannot consecrate absent bread, so neither can he absolve an absent penitent.

But you will ask whether at least confession can be made to an absent priest by letters or through a messenger. I answer negatively. For in the canon *Quem paenitet*, *De paenitentia*, dist. 1, from the book *De vera et falsa paenitentia*, it is said: "The Lord commanded those to be cleansed to show their faces to the priests," teaching that "sins must be confessed in bodily presence, not manifested through a messenger or in writing." Clement VIII also determined this on June 20, 1602, condemning this proposition: "It is lawful sacramentally to confess by letter or through a messenger to an absent confessor and to obtain absolution from that same absent confessor." When Suarez answered that this condemnation should be understood only in the conjunctive sense, not divisively and separately, and therefore only of absolution and not of confession, Paul V on July 14, 1605, declared that this interpretation could not stand and ordered it to be expunged from the books of Suarez, which he later confirmed by two other decrees.

13. Nor is what some say valid, namely, that the aforesaid confession made to an absent confessor was condemned by both Pontiffs as illicit but not as invalid. For if confession made to an absent person by letter or messenger were valid, it would also be lawful in some urgent case, namely, in extreme necessity of salvation, when every valid means is lawful because of the supreme danger of eternal damnation. This would be so if a dying man

could not otherwise obtain salvation because he could neither have a priest present nor reasonably hope that he would possess contrition. Hence, if someone could validly confess to an absent person, this could not in such a case be prohibited by human power, even pontifical power, to the detriment of eternal salvation. Since, therefore, Clement VIII most strictly and under pain of excommunication reserved to himself prohibits putting into practice in any manner or case whatever the opinion asserting that it is lawful to confess to an absent person by letter or messenger, it is manifest that he judges such a confession invalid, and not merely illicit.

14. Nevertheless, a difficult argument is objected. If a dying man sends for a priest, or says before witnesses that he desires a confessor, or even merely gives signs of contrition, and afterward, if overcome and no longer able to speak or give any sign of contrition, a priest comes to him, the priest can and must absolve him, as is contained in the Ritual of Paul V and as is the common practice of the Church. Yet the penitent does not then confess in the presence of the priest, but has previously confessed in his absence. Therefore, confession can be made to an absent priest.

Authors answer this objection in two ways. Many hold that it is altogether required that, when the priest has reached the dying man, at least those present testify in the presence of both that the penitent had asked for a confessor by voice or gestures and had given signs of contrition. For then, they say, the penitent confesses before the priest through those present as through interpreters. But if the priest merely hears through a messenger while absent and on the way that the dying man had asked for a confessor, and there are none present who can testify to this, he cannot sacramentally absolve him. They prove this not only from the aforesaid decree of Clement VIII, but also from epist. 91 of Leo the Great to Theodore and from the Fourth Council of Carthage, c. 67, where it is said that the testimony of those standing by can assist a dying man so that he may be absolved by a priest.

Others think that, even if the arriving priest has no testimony from those standing by, nevertheless, if he has heard from a messenger that the dying man asked for a confessor and gave signs of contrition, he can and must absolve him. For, they say, this is contained in the Ritual of Paul V, where the Pontiff prescribes that a penitent who before death manifested a desire to confess, either by himself or through others, is to be absolved by the arriving priest. To the decree of Clement VIII, they answer that in such a decree the Pontiff does not include the case of supreme necessity, but speaks of confession regularly made by one who can confess before a priest. For just as a confession lacking material integrity is accidentally valid, although of itself it ought by divine law to be integral, so confession of itself ought by

divine law to be made before a priest; yet accidentally, when the penitent cannot speak and no priest is present, confession made before witnesses while the priest is not yet present suffices.

16. [**sic**] Each solution is probable. The first, however, seems more probable and more conformable to the aforesaid decree of Clement, as well as to the cited Council of Carthage, which requires the testimony of those present in order that the dying man may be absolved by the priest. Nor is what is reported from the Ritual of Paul V decisive. For when the Pontiff prescribes that a dying man who before death manifested a desire to confess either by himself or through others must be absolved, by "others" those standing by must be understood, not messengers who merely report this to the priest and are not present when he reaches the sick man. For the latter cannot act as interpreters of the sick man in the way that those standing by can.

17. The opinion of James Baius, Bauny, Tamburini, Caramuel, Theophilus Raynaud, and other recent casuists, however, lacks all probability. They teach that a dying man can be absolved although he gives no sign of contrition or desire for absolution, provided he lived piously and was not forgetful of his salvation. Since the sacrament of penance was instituted in the manner of a judgment, it cannot be completed without some accusation of oneself, which is an essential part of it and without which the priest cannot pronounce a juridical sentence in the tribunal of penance.

This is confirmed from the decrees of the Councils and Pontiffs cited above, who, when they establish that absolution is to be given to a dying man, always expressly add: if he has given signs of penance by himself or through others. Indeed, Paul V says in his Ritual: "Let the priest diligently consider when and to whom absolution is to be conferred, denied, or deferred, and let him not absolve those who are incapable of such a benefit, such as those who give no signs of sorrow."

As for what some object, that Clement VIII gave conditional absolution to someone falling from the roof of St. Peter's Basilica and giving no sign of sorrow, Cardinal de Lugo, after carefully examining the matter, says that it is a fable.

18. Nor is it an objection that Augustine, *De adulterinis coniugiis*, bk. 2, c. 26, seems to favor the aforesaid opinion, for he says: "Therefore, catechumens placed at the end of this life, if they are so overcome by sickness or some accident that, although still living, they cannot request baptism for themselves or answer questions, may be assisted by those to whom their already known will regarding the Christian faith is manifest, so that they may be baptized in the same manner as infants are baptized, whose

will has not yet appeared." And c. 28: "The same reason that applies to baptism applies also to reconciliation, if perhaps the danger of life's end overtakes the penitent. For Mother Church ought not to wish them to depart this life outside her ark of peace." To this it is answered that Augustine is there treating of an adulterer who made confession and asked for absolution, which was deferred to him. Likewise, it is certain that he is there treating of a catechumen and adulterer who asked for baptism, which was deferred to him. For he says in the same place: "I think that not only other catechumens, but even those who, being joined to living spouses, retain adulterous unions, although we do not admit them to baptism while they remain bodily healthy in these unions, should nevertheless be baptized if, having despaired of life and being penitent within themselves, they lie unable to answer for themselves, so that this sin also may be taken away with the others by the washing of regeneration."

CHAPTER VII.
On Sacramental Satisfaction.

A twofold satisfaction is owed to God for a sin committed. One is for the guilt insofar as it is an offense against God, for an injury inflicted upon a person is repaired through satisfaction, not restitution. The other is for punishment, not eternal punishment, which is remitted together with the guilt, but temporal punishment, into which eternal punishment is, as it were, commuted by God when the guilt is remitted. The first satisfaction is made through the act of contrition. The second is made through acts imposed by the priest in the sacrament of penance, and is therefore called sacramental. It is defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 8, as "an action by which in the sacrament of penance we render to God some compensation for sin according to the sentence of the priest."

1. That satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of penance is clear from the Council of Florence in the Decree of Union and from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 3. Reason also supports this, for this sacrament, as we have often said, was instituted in the manner of a judgment. But every judgment consists of the accusation of the guilty party, the sentence of the judge, and the punishment of the same guilty party. Therefore satisfaction, which is the punishment of the penitent, is a part of the sacrament of penance.

It is not, however, an essential part but an integral part. First, because punishment of the guilty party does not belong to the essence but only to the integrity of a judgment and is, as it were, its extrinsic completion.

Second, because satisfaction presupposes that the sacrament is already essentially perfect and complete, since it presupposes the production of grace, which is the effect of the sacrament. I add that, if satisfaction were an essential part of this sacrament, it would follow that a dying man deprived of every sense would be incapable of the sacrament of penance, since he cannot fulfill any satisfaction.

2. Satisfaction has three effects, namely, the remission of temporal punishment remaining from sins already forgiven, certain supernatural helps for avoiding sins more easily in the future, and an increase of habitual grace.

3. The first two effects are clear because the sacraments of the New Law effect by the work worked what they signify. But sacramental satisfaction signifies the remission of punishment remaining from forgiven sins and a greater facility in avoiding sins in the future, which arises from the helps of grace. Therefore, by the work worked it causes such remission of punishment and those supernatural helps for avoiding sins more easily in the future.

The third effect is expressly taught by St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2, where he says: "Satisfaction confers grace insofar as it is in the resolution, and increases it insofar as it is in the execution, as baptism does in adults." Reason also supports this. Every part of a sacrament concurs in signifying sanctifying grace and consequently in causing it. But satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of penance. Therefore, it signifies and causes sanctifying grace. Hence, since it cannot produce first grace because it presupposes that first grace has been produced through confession and absolution, it must at least cause an increase of grace by the work worked. Nor is it an objection that satisfaction is only an integral part of the sacrament of penance. For just as confession and absolution, because they are essential parts of the sacrament of penance, produce by the work worked the grace essential to that sacrament, so satisfaction, because it is an integral part, must cause a degree of perfection of the same grace which completes it, and consequently an increase of it.

4. You will object: Therefore, a penitent who performs the imposed penance while in mortal sin sins mortally by placing an obstacle to sanctifying grace.

I deny the consequence. For although sacramental satisfaction confers a new degree of grace by the work worked, nevertheless, precisely because such a degree is not the grace essential to the sacrament of penance, but only its completion and integral perfection, one who places an obstacle to such a degree does not sin mortally. Only one who places an obstacle to the essential grace does so.

5. From these things it is gathered first that, after hearing the confession, the priest is bound to impose upon the penitent a satisfaction commonly called penance, and the penitent is bound to accept and fulfill it, because both confessor and penitent are bound to make the sacrament of penance integral. Hence it is false that, as some say, the confessor and penitent can defer payment of the punishment to the next life. Although this is absolutely true when only the natural law is considered, it is not true under the New Law and given the institution of the sacrament of penance, in which judgment concerning sins and the punishments to be undergone for them has been given to priests, and a command has been given to penitents to undergo the punishments imposed for them.

6. It is gathered second that the priest is bound to impose a penance in some way proportioned to the gravity and number of the crimes, unless a reasonable cause excuses him, because in the tribunal of penance he exercises three functions or offices. He is not only the minister of this sacrament, but in addition acts as judge and physician. As minister, he must make the sacrament integral and consequently impose some satisfaction upon the penitent, since satisfaction is an integral part of this sacrament. As physician, he must cure the wounds of the penitent and consequently impose a salutary penance suited to healing the illnesses of the soul. As judge, he must preserve equity and therefore impose a penance fitting and proportioned to the gravity and number of the crimes. I said "unless a reasonable cause excuses him," because for a reasonable cause the confessor can sometimes impose a lighter penance, as when the penitent is oppressed by grave sickness, will gain a plenary indulgence, or is in danger of being deterred from confession or failing to fulfill the imposed penance. Hence Gerson, in *Regulae morales*, the chapter on penance, says that it is safer to lead those who have confessed into purgatory with a small penance which is willingly undertaken and more probably fulfilled than to cast them into hell with a great one which will not be fulfilled. And Cajetan, in the *Summa*, under "Satisfaction," says that a very small satisfaction should be given to a weakly disposed penitent, so that the small fire may be nourished by straw placed upon it and not suffocated by logs piled over it.

7. It is gathered third that one person cannot satisfy for another insofar as satisfaction is a part of the sacrament, although he can insofar as it is compensation for punishment owed because of another's sin.

The first part is clear because the Councils define that the acts of the penitent are the material parts of the sacrament of penance. Therefore, satisfactory acts elicited by another are not suitable matter of this sacrament.

The second part is likewise no less certain, because one person can endure punishment for another so that the latter may be freed from an equal punishment. For just as in the natural body the members assist one another, one labors for another, and the goods of one are common to the whole body, so also the members of a moral body, such as all the faithful, especially the just who are united by the bond of charity, communicate their goods to one another. This is gathered from Ps. 118: "I am a companion of all who fear you," and from the article of the Apostles' Creed, "the communion of saints." Among the goods which, according to the mind of the Church, can be communicated to one another are the satisfactions of the just. Thus the satisfactions of Christ are applied to us through sacrifice and the sacraments, and the satisfactions of the saints through indulgences. Therefore, one just person can order his satisfactions so that they may benefit another. In this sense St. Chrysostom, Anselm, Theophylact, and St. Thomas understand the words of the Apostle, Col. 1: "I complete what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ in my body, for his body which is the Church."

8. Some ask here what conditions are required for satisfying. But the resolution of this question can easily be had from what was said in the treatise on grace. The same conditions are required for satisfying for the punishment owed because of mortal sin as are required for meriting eternal life condignly, namely, on the part of the one satisfying, the state of grace and of the wayfarer; and on the part of the satisfactory work itself, that it be free, good, and supernatural. It is further required that the satisfactory work be laborious and penal. In this the satisfactory act is principally distinguished from the meritorious act, in which the power of meriting is taken principally from the goodness of the act, not from the labor or penal character of the work. Finally, in order that a work be satisfactory, acceptance on God's part is required, or his will to remit the debt of punishment in view of such a work. For since punishments undertaken in satisfaction for the temporal punishment owed because of forgiven sins are much lighter and of another character than the punishments of purgatory owed according to a just law, God is not bound in justice to accept them, especially because, as absolute Lord, he can demand our satisfactory works under many other titles. Hence, in order that they may benefit us by satisfying for the punishments of purgatory, divine acceptance is required, or the will to remit those punishments in view of such works.

Although all works possessing the aforesaid conditions are satisfactory, three are commonly enumerated which are especially satisfactory and to which all the others are in some way reduced, namely, prayer, fasting, and

almsgiving. For satisfaction is principally ordered to two things, namely, compensation for the offense and medicine for sins, and these three kinds of works are most suitable for each. They are suitable for the first because, since there are in us three kinds of goods, namely, goods of the soul, body, and fortune, through prayer we subject the goods of the soul to God, which we ought not so much to take away from ourselves, since they make us pleasing to God, as to submit to him. The other two kinds of goods, which are sometimes harmful to us, we ought to take away from ourselves: the goods of fortune through almsgiving, and the goods of the body through fasting or other mortifications comprehended under the name of fasting. They are suitable for the second because these three kinds of good works uproot the three roots of sins in us. Prayer, by which we subject ourselves and all our possessions to God, restrains pride; fasting restrains concupiscence of the flesh; and almsgiving restrains concupiscence of the eyes, or avarice.

CHAPTER VIII.
On the Sacrament of Extreme Unction.

We fittingly treat this sacrament at the end of this treatise because, according to the Council of Trent, the sacrament of Extreme Unction is, as it were, the completion and consummation of the sacrament of penance. For as the latter wipes away sins, so the former wipes away the remnants of sins. Five things concerning this sacrament must briefly be explained here, namely, its existence, essence, effects, subject, and minister.

§ 1.
The Existence and Institution of This Sacrament.

1. That Extreme Unction, which is customarily administered in the Church to the sick who are in danger of death, is a true sacrament of the New Law is clearly gathered from Jas. 5, where it is said: "Is anyone among you sick? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith shall save the sick man, and the Lord shall raise him up, and if he is in sins, they shall be forgiven him." In these words James manifestly describes the rite of this sacrament by designating its matter, namely, anointing; its form, namely, prayer; its minister, namely, the priest; its subject, namely, the sick person;

and its effect, namely, relief, that is, strengthening against the difficulties then occurring, and the remission of sins. Hence it is lawful to argue from this passage as follows: A sensible sign permanently instituted with a promise of grace to be conferred through it is a true sacrament. But Extreme Unction as employed in the Church possesses these three conditions. Therefore, it is a true sacrament. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved from the aforesaid words of James. First, by them Extreme Unction is declared to be an external and sensible sign when it is said, "Anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord." Second, its constant and permanent institution is declared when it is said absolutely, "Is anyone among you sick?" That these words, without limitation of time, were spoken to all Christians of either sex is clear from what precedes and follows, which pertains no less to us than to those then living, nor is there any indication of a restriction to those then present alone. Third, the promise of grace to be conferred through that rite and sensible external sign is contained in the same passage when it adds: "If he is in sins, they shall be forgiven him," for sins are not forgiven except through the infusion of grace. Hence Innocent I, epist. 1 to Decentius, expressly teaches that this Unction is a sacrament. Origen, Augustine, Chrysostom, and before them Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem*, bk. 1, also mention it in these words: "Christ did not reject the water with which he washes his own, nor the oil with which he anoints his own, nor the mixture of honey and milk with which he nourishes his own as infants, nor the bread by which he represents his own body." In these words he mentions baptism, Extreme Unction, and the Eucharist.

2. This sacrament was instituted by Christ and only promulgated by St. James, as the Council of Trent declares in sess. 14, c. 1. But when it was instituted by him is not certain, and authors hold various opinions concerning it. Some think that Christ instituted it in Mark 6, when he sent the Apostles to preach with the power of healing the sick through the sacred anointing of oil. Others say that it was instituted by Christ on the night of the Supper, when he ordained the Apostles as priests, who alone are the ministers of this sacrament. But it is much more probable that this sacrament was not instituted by Christ before his resurrection. First, because this sacrament presupposes in the minister the power of forgiving sins, which Christ did not confer upon the Apostles until after his resurrection, when he said to them, John 20: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." Second, because, since the sacrament of Extreme Unction completes and consummates the sacrament of penance, it was not fitting that it should be instituted before the latter. Hence it is more probable that the sacrament of Extreme Unction was

instituted by Christ together with and subsequently to the sacrament of penance.

§ 2.
The Matter and Form of This Sacrament.

3. The remote matter of this sacrament is olive oil, as is clear from the words of James, "anointing him with oil," which the Council of Florence says must be olive oil. For oil properly and simply so called, such as that prescribed by the Apostle, signifies by the force of the word and in common usage only oil expressed from the fruit of olive trees, just as by the name "wine" only grape wine is understood.

Such oil must be blessed by a bishop, as the same Council of Florence and the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 1, teach. But if you ask whether such blessing is essential or merely accidental, I answer that it is indeed essential to this sacrament that the oil be blessed in some way by a bishop, since the Councils of Florence and Trent expressly assert this. It is not, however, required for the essence of this sacrament that it be blessed immediately by a bishop; it suffices that it be blessed by him mediately, that is, through a priest by his commission. For the Greeks, by most ancient custom, administer the sacrament of Extreme Unction with oil blessed by a simple priest by commission of the bishop, as Arcudius testifies in *De sacramentis*, bk. 5, c. 2. Clement VIII approved this custom, warning in the instruction on the rites of the Greeks contained in vol. 3 of the *Bullarium*, fol. 47, that their presbyters are not to be compelled to receive oil blessed by a bishop, because, according to the most ancient custom of the Eastern Church, presbyters can, with the permission and commission of the bishop, bless the oil of the sick.

4. From these things it follows that the proximate matter of this sacrament is anointing with the aforesaid oil. "For the anointing," says the Council of Trent in the cited passage, "most aptly represents the grace of the Holy Spirit by which the soul of the sick person is invisibly anointed." I add that the proximate matter of a sacrament is the use or application of the remote matter. But oil is applied to the sick person in no other way than through anointing. Therefore, anointing is the proximate matter of this sacrament, just as washing is the proximate matter of baptism. It is not necessary by the necessity of the sacrament that the anointing be made in the form of a cross, as in confirmation, because in this sacrament the recipient is not anointed, as in confirmation, as a soldier of Christ prepared

to bear and confess his Cross before tyrants, but only as a sick person in order to recover health.

5. The anointings of the five senses are essentially necessary, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 32, a. 6, and as is clear from the common judgment and practice of the Church, which everywhere and constantly employs the anointings of the five senses and diligently provides that, if the priest fails before completing them, another supply the omitted anointings, so that the five sources and roots of all sins may thus be healed.

The form of this sacrament, according to the Councils of Florence and Trent, consists in these words: "Through this holy anointing and his most gracious mercy, may the Lord forgive you whatever you have sinned through sight," and similarly for the other senses. From these words it is clear that the form of this sacrament is deprecative. Whether this belongs to it essentially, so that an indicative form would not suffice, is a difficulty and controversy among theologians, some affirming and others denying that it is essential. The opinion of those affirming it nevertheless seems more probable and is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, q. 29, a. 8. It can be supported by three reasons or congruities which he assigns in the same place. The first is that this sacrament is conferred upon the dying, who, since they are deprived of their own strength, need prayers. The second is that this sacrament is given only to those who are about to depart from the forum of this Church into the forum of the other life and rest in the hand and mercy of God alone. Consequently, they must be commended to God, into whose forum they pass, and divine mercy must be implored for them by prayer. The third is that through this sacrament we pray for the sick person to receive an effect which it is not always expedient to confer upon him, namely, bodily health. Hence it had to be asked from God deprecatively through this sacrament.

6. You will object: The Churches of Milan and Venice formerly used this indicative form: "I anoint you with sanctified oil, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, that, prepared for battle in the manner of an anointed soldier, you may be able to overcome the powers of the air." Therefore, a deprecative form is not essential to this sacrament.

I answer that this form is not indicative but deprecative. For when it says, "That, prepared in the manner of an anointed soldier"—namely, by the help and favor of God—"you may be able to overcome the powers of the air," this must be understood optatively, as though it said: I anoint you with sanctifying oil, desiring that by divine help you may be able to overcome the powers of the air.

§ 3.
The Subject and Minister of This Sacrament.

7. Only baptized adults who are sick are capable of this sacrament.

The first is clear because baptism is the door to the other sacraments. The second is clear because this sacrament was instituted to remove the remnants of actual sins, which are not present in infants. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 32, a. 4, ad 2, says that "this sacrament is not given against the remnants of original sin except insofar as they have in some way been strengthened through actual sins. Hence it is given principally against actual sins," as is clear from the form itself, "which do not exist in children." From this it follows, against Suarez, that, if there were some adult who had never actually sinned, either before or after baptism, as was the case with the Blessed Virgin, he would be incapable of this sacrament, since it was instituted in the manner of a spiritual medicine presupposing the sickness and wound of sin, and in its form it is said: "May God forgive you whatever you have sinned through sight," and so forth. I add that the sacrament of Extreme Unction, according to the Council of Trent, completes and consummates the sacrament of penance and consequently presupposes a subject capable of the latter. But if there were an adult who, like the Blessed Virgin, had never actually sinned either before or after receiving baptism, he would be incapable of the sacrament of penance, as theologians commonly teach concerning the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, he would also be incapable of the sacrament of Extreme Unction.

8. You will object: One who does not have original sin is capable of receiving the sacrament of baptism, as is clear in the Blessed Virgin, who was baptized by Christ although it is piously believed that she did not contract original sin. Therefore, similarly, although someone had not actually sinned before or after receiving baptism, he would nevertheless be capable of receiving the sacrament of Extreme Unction.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that baptism was instituted not only as a remedy for original sin, but also as the door to all the other sacraments. Hence, even if someone did not have original sin, he would nevertheless have to be baptized so that he might become a member of Christ and the Church and access to the other sacraments might be opened to him, as St. Thomas teaches in IV Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, in these

words: "One sanctified in the womb must be baptized in order to acquire the character by which he is numbered among the people of God and, as it were, deputed to receive the divine sacraments." But the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not a door to the other sacraments, but only a spiritual remedy and medicine against the remnants of sins. Hence one who had committed no sin would be incapable of this sacrament.

9. Finally, that only the sick are capable of Extreme Unction is clear from the words of James: "Is anyone among you sick?" and from the judgment and practice of the Church, as well as from the reasoning of St. Thomas here, q. 32, a. 1, where he argues as follows: "This sacrament is a certain spiritual healing signified after the manner of bodily healing. Therefore, this sacrament ought not to be conferred upon those to whom bodily healing is not applicable, namely, the healthy." Indeed, it ought not to be administered to all the sick, but only to those who, according to the judgment of prudent persons, are in moral danger of death. For, as the same holy Doctor says in the following article: "This sacrament is the final remedy which the Church can confer, as immediately disposing a person for glory."

10. Although this sacrament does not imprint a character and is numbered among those which can be repeated, it is nevertheless not to be repeated except in diverse illnesses, or if, in the same illness after health has been entirely recovered, danger of death is incurred again through a relapse, as the Council of Trent teaches in sess. 14, c. 2, on Extreme Unction.

11. The minister of this sacrament is a priest alone, as is clear from the same Council of Trent and from the practice of the Church, which has never committed the administration of this sacrament to anyone other than a priest. A fitting reason can be given: since Extreme Unction consummates and completes penance, it is fitting that it can be administered by no others than those whose office it is to administer the sacrament of penance, namely, priests. Only the pastor, however, or another by his commission, confers it licitly. Except the case of necessity, in which every priest is bound by charity to confer it upon one who asks for it or probably needs it.

§ 4.
The Effects of This Sacrament.

12. The proper and more principal effect of Extreme Unction is not the remission of mortal sins omitted from confession through inadvertence, or committed by the sick person after confession and Communion, as Bellarmine, Amicus, and others among the more recent authors think. The

reason is that Extreme Unction is a sacrament of the living, as theologians commonly teach when they assign only two sacraments for those dead by the death of sin, namely, baptism and penance. But sacraments of the living do not primarily and of themselves cause first grace or the remission of sins, but only consequently and accidentally, as is clear in the Eucharist and confirmation. Therefore, the same is true of Extreme Unction. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 30, a. 1, after saying that man is strengthened through this sacrament against the weakness left by sin, adds: "But because this strength is caused by grace, which does not coexist with sin, it therefore consequently removes any sin, whether mortal or venial, which it finds with respect to guilt, provided no obstacle is placed on the part of the recipient, as was also said above concerning the Eucharist and confirmation."

This is confirmed: The sacrament of Extreme Unction has the character of a spiritual medicine. But a sacrament instituted in the manner of a spiritual medicine is not primarily and of itself instituted for the remission of mortal sin or for removing the defect by which spiritual life is lost, because, just as bodily medicine presupposes bodily life, so spiritual medicine presupposes spiritual life. Therefore, the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not primarily and of itself instituted for the remission of mortal sin, but only secondarily and accidentally, as St. James seems to indicate by this conditional manner of speaking: "If he is in sins, they shall be forgiven him."

13. The remission of venial sins is likewise not the proper, primary, or principal effect of this sacrament, as others think. For, as St. Thomas reasons in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 64, a. 1, ad 3: "The infusion of grace is not required for the destruction of venial sin. Hence, since grace is infused in every sacrament of the New Law, no sacrament of the New Law is directly instituted against venial sins."

14. Therefore, the primary and proper effect of this sacrament is an increase of habitual grace possessing a special right to helps of actual grace, by which the sick person is comforted and strengthened against the weakness in doing good left partly by preceding sins and partly by illness, and for overcoming the temptations of the devil occurring in that final struggle.

15. This is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 2, where it says that the reality and effect of this sacrament "is the grace of the Holy Spirit, whose anointing wipes away offenses, if any remain to be expiated, and the remnants of sin, and relieves and strengthens the soul of the sick person by arousing in him great confidence in divine mercy. Thus relieved, the sick person more easily bears the inconveniences and labors of sickness and

more easily resists the temptations of the devil lying in wait for his heel," and so forth. The matter of this sacrament, namely, the anointing with oil, rightly signifies this, since by anointing with oil members weakened by illness and the sinews are strengthened and reinforced, and athletes are anointed with oil to prepare themselves for combat and struggle.

Reason also supports this. The proper effect of this sacrament is to remove the remnants of sins. But by the remnants of sins nothing else can be understood than the aforesaid weakness and debility in doing good and resisting the temptations of the devil occurring in that final struggle. Therefore, the proper effect of this sacrament will be grace strengthening and comforting against such weakness. The minor premise is proved: By the remnants of sins cannot be understood sins committed by the sick person after confession and Viaticum, as the adversaries think. Therefore, by them only the aforesaid weakness must be understood. The consequence is clear, for scarcely anything else can be conceived that could be called a remnant of sins. The antecedent is shown as follows. If something is called the remnant of another, it is not sufficient that it succeed it, but it is further required that it be a part or effect of it. For example, night succeeds day and day succeeds night, and yet night cannot be called the remnant of day, nor day the remnant of night. Conversely, the portions of food remaining from a meal are called remnants of the meal; bones, the head, and other parts of the bodies of the saints are called their relics; likewise, weakness, debility, emaciation, and pallor left by illness are called remnants of the illness because they are its effects. But sins committed by the sick person after confession and Viaticum do not stand in relation to other sins remitted of themselves through confession or accidentally through Viaticum as parts to a whole or as effects to a cause, since they often possess no affinity or connection with them, but are entirely disparate and independent of the others. Therefore, they cannot be called remnants of preceding sins, but ought rather to be called new and distinct sins.

16. You will object first: Remnants ought to be of the same character and species as those things of which they are remnants; otherwise they are called not so much remnants as refuse. For example, bran left from flour is not properly called a remnant of flour but refuse. But weakness or debility in acting well and resisting the temptations of demons at the point of death, left partly by preceding sins and partly by illness, is not of the same character and species as preceding sins. Therefore, such weakness and debility cannot be called remnants of preceding sins.

I answer by denying the major premise. It is false that remnants must always be of the same character and species as those things of which they are

remnants. For, as we said above, weakness, debility, pallor, and emaciation left by illness are properly called remnants of the illness, and yet they are not the illness, but only its effects. Likewise, concupiscence or the tinder of sin, proneness to evil, and difficulty in doing good are called remnants of original sin, although they are not sins but only effects of original sin. The same, with due proportion, must be said of the weakness and debility in acting well left in the sick person by preceding sins.

17. You will object second: That is the primary and proper effect of a sacrament which is directly and expressly signified by the words of the form. But the words of the form of this sacrament, "May God forgive you whatever you have sinned," do not of themselves and directly signify special helps by which the sick person is strengthened against the aforesaid weakness and the temptations of the devil, but the remission of sins. Therefore, this remission is the primary and proper effect of this sacrament, not comfort and strength against the aforesaid weakness. Hence the Council of Trent cited above enumerates the former before the latter, and in the proemium to the doctrine on the sacrament of Extreme Unction calls it "the consummation of penance."

I answer first that a similar argument must be solved by the adversaries, since in the form of the Churches of Milan and Venice no mention is made of the remission of sins, but only of the aforesaid strength and comfort. For it reads: "I anoint you with sanctifying oil, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, that, prepared for battle in the manner of an anointed soldier, you may be able to overcome the powers of the air."

I answer second by denying the minor premise. For sometimes an effect is signified by the name of its cause because the cause virtually contains it. Hence, just as in Rom. 7 the Apostle calls the tinder left by original sin "sin," so in the form of this sacrament, when it says, "Whatever you have sinned," the remnants of preceding sins are signified under the name of the offense, or the weakness and debility of the soul concerning the exercise of virtue, caused especially by preceding offenses. The optative verb "may forgive" asks not only indulgence and remission of sins, but also strength and comfort against the weakness and debility left by them.

As for the Council of Trent, it must be said that it first enumerates the remission of sins among the effects of this sacrament, before the aforesaid comfort, because it wished first to mention the effect common to this and the other sacraments of the living, which is accidentally to remit sins forgotten or invincibly unknown, before mentioning the effect proper and special to it. It called the sacrament of Extreme Unction "the consummation

of penance" because it removes the remnants of sins which remain after guilt and punishment have been remitted through the sacrament of penance.

18. Besides the two effects of this sacrament already explained, one of which belongs to it of itself and the other accidentally, there is a third, less principal and secondary effect, namely, a certain relief of bodily illness and sometimes the perfect recovery of health. Hence the anointing by which the Apostles in Mark 6 bodily healed the sick was a figure and preamble of this sacrament. This effect, however, is not conferred infallibly by God, but only when he judges that recovery of bodily health is expedient for the salvation of the soul.

§ 5.
Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine.

19. From what has been said it is gathered first that it is proper to this sacrament finally to dispose man for entrance into glory, since through the helps already explained it assists him in resisting the temptations of demons and strengthens him to persevere in good when death is imminent, reinforces hope, and, as the Council of Trent says, arouses great confidence in divine mercy. Hence, just as baptism is called the sacrament of faith and the Eucharist the sacrament of love, so Extreme Unction can rightly be called the sacrament of hope.

20. It is gathered second that Extreme Unction is one sacrament with an indivisible specific unity. For the unity of a sacrament must be taken from the unity of the end to which it is ordered by Christ's institution. But although in Extreme Unction there are several partial anointings and several partial forms, they are nevertheless ordered to one end and one effect, namely, the removal of all the remnants of sins arising from the senses and weighing down the soul. Therefore, it is one sacrament with an indivisible specific unity, just as the Eucharist, which consists of two species and two partial forms, is nevertheless one sacrament in species because these are ordered to one end, namely, one complete spiritual refreshment.

21. It is gathered third that, just as in the other sacraments three things must be distinguished, one which is the reality alone, another which is the sacrament alone, and another which is the reality and sacrament together, so also in this sacrament. Hence, in this sacrament the reality alone is grace; the sacrament alone is the extreme anointing itself, or rather the composite of the anointings and words; the reality and sacrament together is spiritual gladness of soul. For this gladness is signified by the external symbol and at

the same time signifies the further sanctity of soul which this spiritual gladness of soul is ordered to cause. Nor is it an objection that the Eucharist also causes devotion and gladness in the soul. For since it has the character of a banquet, it causes them in the manner of spiritual refreshment and inebriation. But this sacrament, since it was instituted in the manner of a spiritual medicine, causes them in the manner of a spiritual anointing offered to the soul, gladdening it and strengthening it against the temptations of the devil and against spiritual weakness caused by preceding sins and the presence of illness, as we explained above.

22. It is gathered fourth that this sacrament can be defined or described as follows: Extreme Unction is a sacred and efficacious sign of grace, consisting in the anointing of the sick under the prescribed form of words, instituted by Christ for the health of soul and body. This definition has been sufficiently explained by what has been said above.

TREATISE VI.
ON THE SACRAMENT OF HOLY ORDERS.

Having considered those sacraments which perfect man in relation to himself, it remains for us to treat those which perfect him in relation to the community: first, the sacrament of Holy Orders, by which the power of exercising public and hierarchical acts in the Church is conferred upon him; and then the sacrament of matrimony, by which he is disposed toward bodily propagation according to the law of God and Christ.

CHAPTER I.
Holy Orders in General.

1. It is certain by faith that Holy Orders, or ordination, by which the ministers of the Church are initiated and consecrated, is truly and properly a sacrament. For so it is defined by the Councils of Florence and Trent, sess. 23, can. 3, and it is manifestly gathered from 2 Tim. 1: *I admonish you to rekindle the grace of God which is in you through the imposition of my hands.* These words signify that Timothy was ordained by a certain sensible rite, namely the imposition of hands, which conferred grace and was therefore instituted by Christ and remains in the Church. But these three things suffice for the nature of a sacrament: that it be a sensible ceremony, that it be permanently instituted, and that grace be infallibly conferred in its use and exercise. Therefore Holy Orders, or the ordination by which the

ministers of the Church are initiated, has the true nature of a sacrament. This is so manifest that Calvin, overcome by the aforesaid testimony of the Apostle, was at last compelled to admit that the priesthood is a true sacrament. For in book 4 of the *Institutio Christianae Religionis*, c. 19, n. 28, he writes: *As regards the true office of the priesthood, which has been commended to us by the mouth of Christ, I willingly assign it that place. For there is a ceremony, first taken from Scripture, and then one which Paul testifies is neither empty nor superfluous, but a faithful symbol of spiritual grace.* And in n. 31 he adds that what he had said, namely that there are only two sacraments, Baptism and the Eucharist, must be understood of those sacraments which are common to all the faithful. Hence the French Calvinists, who in article 35 of their Confession deny that ordination is a true sacrament, openly disagree not only with the Church but even with Calvin himself, their leader and standard-bearer. He also contradicts the holy Fathers, especially Augustine, who manifestly teaches that ordination is a sacrament in book 2 of *Contra epistulam Parmeniani*, c. 13, where, speaking of Baptism and ordination, he says: *Each is a sacrament, and each is given to man by a certain consecration: the former when he is baptized, the latter when he is ordained.* And below: *Let the Donatists themselves explain how the sacrament of the baptized cannot be lost, while the sacrament of the ordained can be lost. For if each is a sacrament, as no one doubts…why is the latter lost? Why is the former not lost? No injury should be done to either sacrament.*

Reason also supports this. For since through ordination men become the executors and ministers of the sacred mysteries, it was fitting that in it they should receive grace by which they might be made fit to exercise so great an office. For when God destines a creature for some office, he makes it fit to exercise that office not merely by an extrinsic ordering, but by an intrinsic power. This is evident in the natural order, in which God adapts the natures of things, through intrinsic powers and inclinations, to attain the ends for which he destines them.

2. The heretics object: A sacrament is of itself ordered to the sanctification of its recipients. But Holy Orders is not of itself ordered to the sanctification of its recipients, but rather to the sanctification of others, since it perfects man in relation to the community. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

This is easily answered. Although Holy Orders is not of itself ordered primarily to the sanctification of the recipient, it is nevertheless ordered to it secondarily, since the worthy administration of the sacraments cannot exist without grace sanctifying the minister himself. Hence St. Ambrose, speaking of the dignity of the priesthood, says: *Man imposes the hand; God bestows*

grace. And the Council of Florence, in the decree of Eugene, says that the effect of this sacrament is *an increase of grace, so that one may be a suitable minister*. It may therefore be defined or described as follows: Holy Orders, or ordination, is a sacred ceremony by which the power of exercising some spiritual ministry is conferred, together with sanctifying grace for duly and fittingly fulfilling it.

Just as three things are customarily distinguished in the other sacraments, namely that which is the sacrament alone, that which is the reality alone, and that which is the reality and sacrament together, so also these three are found in this sacrament. The sacrament alone is the external thing and sensible ceremony employed in ordination. The reality alone is the sanctifying grace conferred through it. The reality and sacrament together is the character, which is signified by the external and sensible thing and itself signifies sanctifying grace.

CHAPTER II.
The Individual Orders in Particular.

3. It was becoming and fitting that there should be several Orders in the Church. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 37, a. 1: A multiplicity of Orders was introduced into the Church for three reasons. First, to commend the wisdom of God, which shines forth most fully in the ordered distinction of things, both natural and spiritual. This is signified by the Queen of Sheba, who, seeing the order of those who ministered to Solomon, had no spirit left in her, being overcome with admiration at his wisdom. Second, to relieve human weakness, since everything pertaining to the divine mysteries could not be accomplished by one man without a great burden; and therefore different Orders are distinguished for different offices. Third, that a broader way of advancement might be given to men, while many are distributed among different offices, so that all may be God's fellow workers, than which nothing is more divine, as Dionysius says.

4. It was also fitting and becoming that the multiplicity of Orders in the Church should be reduced to the number seven. For, as the same holy Doctor reasons in the same place, a. 2, there ought to be as many Orders in the Church as there are special ministries to be exercised concerning that which is most august of all within her, namely the sacrament of the Eucharist. These ministries are seven: the ministry of consecrating the Eucharist, which belongs to priests; the ministry of dispensing the Eucharist and immediately presenting its matter to the priest, which belongs to

deacons; the ministry of preparing the matter in sacred vessels, which belongs to subdeacons; or in non-sacred vessels and presenting it to the subdeacon, which belongs to acolytes; the ministry of excluding those who are not even remotely capable, and do not wish to become capable, of receiving the Eucharist, namely unbelievers, which belongs to doorkeepers; the ministry of instructing those who wish to become capable, such as catechumens, which belongs to the reader; and finally, the ministry of removing the impediment which some, although sufficiently instructed, suffer through the power of the demon, as do the possessed, which belongs to exorcists.

5. Of these Orders, the first three, namely the priesthood, diaconate, and subdiaconate, are called major because they establish a man in a higher degree of power; and they are called sacred in a special sense because they have annexed to them the vow of continence, by which those initiated into them are consecrated to God in a more special and permanent manner. The other four are called minor and non-sacred for the contrary reason.

It is certain by faith that the priestly Order is truly and properly a sacrament. This was defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 23, can. 2 and c. 1, and follows necessarily from what was said in the preceding chapter. For if some ecclesiastical ordination is truly and properly a sacrament, then, since the priestly Order is the chief of all and the end to which all the other inferior Orders are referred, it must certainly be properly a sacrament. Nearly all hold the same concerning the diaconate, except Durandus and Cajetan. This is evident from the fact that in Acts 6 it was conferred by the Apostles through the imposition of hands, as was the priesthood, and among the Latins it is conferred with this form: *Receive the Holy Spirit*, etc. These words manifestly declare that in the ordination of a deacon the grace of the Holy Spirit is conferred, as Anastasius II says in epistle 2 to Emperor Anastasius. Hence St. Jerome, in *Contra Vigilantium*, c. 1, expressly calls the diaconate *a sacrament of Christ*. Theologians very commonly teach the same, although with less certainty, concerning the subdiaconate, since it likewise causes sanctifying grace. This is evident from the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene, where, after assigning the matters, forms, and ordinary minister of the diaconate and subdiaconate, it adds that the effect of this sacrament is an increase of grace. Therefore it judges that not only the diaconate but also the subdiaconate confers sanctifying grace and, consequently, is a sacrament.

The same also appears more probable concerning the minor Orders. First, because they imprint a character, since they cannot be repeated, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 35, a. 2. Hence the Church takes every care that

those who have been promoted by a leap to the Order of subdiaconate without previously receiving the minor Orders should receive them. She certainly would not do this if those Orders were not true sacraments instituted by Christ and imprinting a character, but merely certain ministries or offices introduced by the Church. Second, because the Council of Florence, after saying that Holy Orders is a sacrament, that its matter is the thing handed over by the bishop in ordination, and that its form consists in the words by which that thing is handed over, and after declaring this by name in the priestly Order, the diaconate, and the subdiaconate, adds that the same must be understood concerning the remaining Orders. It therefore judges that the matter and form of a sacrament are also found in them and, consequently, that they have the true and proper nature of a sacrament, just as the others do. Similarly, the Council of Trent, sess. 23, c. 2, says: *From the very beginning of the Church, the names of these Orders and the proper ministries of each are known to have existed.* It therefore judges that they were instituted not by the Church, but immediately by Christ himself, and consequently that they are true sacraments, as are the diaconate and subdiaconate.

6. You will say, first: If the subdiaconate were a sacrament and an Order instituted by Christ, no one could ascend to the major Orders, and to the highest of them, which is the episcopate, without first receiving it. But many were raised to the episcopate without previously receiving the subdiaconate, as Peter Arcudius reports in book 9 of *De sacramentis*, c. 9, and John Morinus, priest of the Congregation of the Oratory, in *De sacris Ecclesiae ordinationibus*, part 3, exercise 11, c. 3. Therefore the subdiaconate is not a sacrament, and much less are the minor Orders, which are inferior to it.

I answer that this argument would prove not only that the subdiaconate, but even that the diaconate itself, is not a sacrament. For the same Morinus, in the place cited, reports from the testimonies of the ancients several examples of saints who, omitting the diaconate, were promoted to the priesthood and episcopate in the primitive Church. Hence it must be said, if those examples are true, that Christ dispensed in the primitive Church so that, for the various causes and necessities then arising, one could ascend to the major Orders and to the highest, which is the episcopate, without first receiving the inferior Orders and the subdiaconate. Or this must be understood not of an omission of the inferior Orders as regards the reception of the character, but only as regards their exercise and ministry. For sometimes in the primitive Church certain holy men were promoted to the priesthood or episcopate before they could exercise the ministries and offices of the minor Orders, the diaconate, and the subdiaconate, because the necessity of certain churches then required it.

7. You will say, second: Neither the Apostles nor the Fathers nearest to their times made any mention of the acolyte, nor is this Order admitted by the Greeks. Therefore not all the minor Orders are sacraments instituted by Christ.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For Pope Cornelius, in his epistle to Fabius of Antioch, mentions forty-two acolytes who existed in the Catholic Church in his time. And St. Jerome, on the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, says that the epistle was sent through Onesimus the acolyte. Other Fathers rarely mentioned that Order because, in the primitive Church, owing to the small number and scarcity of persons, the office of acolyte was customarily supplied by deacons or subdeacons ministering at the altar. The same must be said of the Greek Church. For, as Arcudius reports in book 6 of *De sacramentis*, c. 9, among the Greeks the office of exorcist was exercised by priests, that of acolyte by the subdeacon or reader, and that of doorkeeper by the subdeacon.

8. You will say, third: If not only the priesthood, but also the diaconate and subdiaconate, as well as the four minor Orders, are sacraments instituted by Christ, there will be not merely seven sacraments, but thirteen. I deny the consequence. For although each of the seven Orders is a sacrament, nevertheless, because all the Orders inferior to the priesthood tend toward it as toward the principal ministry, and are ordered as toward their end to the due and fitting consecration of the body of Christ, they can, by reason of the unity of order which they possess among themselves and of the end toward which they tend, be called the one sacrament of Holy Orders. Thus, in the final chapter of the preceding treatise, we said that Extreme Unction is one indivisibly unified sacrament, because, although it contains several anointings and partial forms, they are nevertheless ordered to one end and one effect, namely the removal of all the remnants of sins.

9. You will ask whether the first tonsure is an Order and a sacrament. I answer negatively with St. Thomas, here, q. 40, a. 2, where he assigns this reason: In every Order which participates in the true nature of a sacrament, some special spiritual power is conferred upon the ordained. But in the first tonsure no such power is conferred, for clerics are not thereby deputed to any offices of divine worship which cannot be exercised by laymen, but only to chanting the divine praises, for which no special power is required. Therefore the clerical tonsure is not an Order, but a certain most fitting disposition and preparation for Orders.

Several reasons are commonly assigned for this ceremony. The chief is that given by Isidore in book 2 of *De ecclesiasticis officiis*, c. 4, where he says that clerics are tonsured so that they may understand that they must cut

away superfluous cares, which are signified by the hairs, being certain superfluous excretions of the head. St. Gregory also indicates this reason in the *Moralia*, saying: *To shave the head is nothing other than to cut superfluous thoughts away from the mind.* This tonsure is circular and in the form of a crown because, as the holy Doctor says in the question cited, a. 1, a crown is the sign of a kingdom, and the circular figure is the symbol of perfection. But those who are assigned to the divine ministries obtain a royal dignity and must be perfect in virtue. With this agrees that excellent saying of St. Antoninus: *To serve God is to reign.*

10. Moreover, those who have been tonsured are called clerics from the Greek word κλῆρος, which signifies a lot or portion, because they have chosen God as their lot or portion. Hence can. Clericus, 12, q. 1, states: Let the cleric who serves the Church of Christ first interpret his own designation and, having set forth the definition of his name, strive to be what he is called. For if κλῆρος in Greek is called "lot" in Latin, they are therefore called clerics either because they are of the lot of the Lord, or because the Lord is the lot, that is, the portion, of clerics. But he who is either himself the portion of the Lord or has the Lord as his portion must conduct himself in such a way that he both possesses the Lord and is possessed by the Lord.

CHAPTER III.

The Essential Matter and Form of the Priesthood and Diaconate.

We are not treating here of the matter and form of the subdiaconate and the minor Orders, because there is almost no controversy concerning them among theologians, but only of the essential matter and form of the priesthood and diaconate. Concerning these there is a grave and celebrated difficulty: whether the imposition of hands is essentially required for them, or whether the handing over of the instruments alone, together with the corresponding form of words, constitutes the whole essence of the ordination of priests and deacons. For its resolution:

1. I say: The handing over of the instruments alone, together with the corresponding form of words, constitutes the whole essence of the ordination of priests and deacons. Nevertheless, the imposition of hands is not a ceremony altogether accidental to priestly ordination, but pertains to its integrity.

The first part is proved, first, from the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene, where it is said: *The matter of Holy Orders is that by whose handing*

over the Order is conferred, as the priesthood is conferred by presenting the chalice with wine and the paten with bread. By these words it assigns as the matter of the priesthood only the presentation of the chalice with wine and the paten with bread. And shortly afterward, in giving its form, it says: *The form of the priesthood is this: Receive the power of offering sacrifice.* It therefore judges that the imposition of hands is neither the total nor a partial matter of the priesthood, and that there is no other form than these words: *Receive the power of offering sacrifice.*

Second, the same part is proved by reason. The priestly character is imprinted before the imposition of hands. Therefore the imposition of hands does not belong to the essence of priestly ordination. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, q. 37, a. 5, where he concludes: *Therefore, in the very giving of the chalice under the determinate form of words, the priestly character is imprinted.* Second, it is proved by reason. In presenting the chalice, the bishop pronounces these words: *Receive the power of offering sacrifice*, etc. This power is the priestly character itself. Therefore, since those words must immediately be true and have the effect which they signify, the priestly character is imprinted in the very handing over of the chalice, before the imposition of hands.

This is confirmed. The newly ordained priests, before hands are imposed upon them with the words, *Receive the Holy Spirit*, etc., pronounce the words of consecration together with the bishop. But this would not be permitted unless they already possessed the power of consecrating the body and blood of Christ and, consequently, the priestly character, which is nothing other than such a power. Therefore, before the imposition of hands with the words, *Receive the Holy Spirit*, newly ordained priests possess the priestly character.

2. The second part of the conclusion, which asserts that the imposition of hands does not belong to the essence of the Order of diaconate, is proved, first, from the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene, where, after the words cited above, *The priesthood is conferred by presenting the chalice with wine and the paten with bread*, it immediately adds: *The diaconate by the giving of the book of the Gospels*, making no mention whatever of the imposition of hands. Therefore it judges that the imposition of hands does not belong to the essence of the Order of diaconate.

Reason also supports this. For only that rite belongs to the essence of the ordination of a deacon through which the ministry peculiar to him is signified. But through the imposition of hands and the corresponding words no ministry peculiar to the deacon is signified: not through the imposition of hands, as is evident, nor through the words pronounced over him by the

pontiff: *Receive the Holy Spirit for strength and for resisting the devil and his temptations*, since these words are general and can apply to any ordination. Therefore the imposition of hands and the words corresponding to it do not belong to the essence of the ordination of a deacon.

3. Finally, the third part of the conclusion, asserting that the imposition of hands is not a ceremony altogether accidental to priestly ordination, but pertains to its integrity, is shown as follows. The power to absolve from sins pertains to the integrity of the priesthood. But through the imposition of hands performed by the bishop at the end of Mass, while he pronounces these words: *Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them*, the priest receives the power of forgiving sins, since such a power is signified through these words. Therefore such an imposition of hands pertains to the integrity of priestly ordination.

The minor premise is evident. The major also appears certain, for the priesthood consists of different offices, just as a body is made complete by several members, namely the office of sacrificing and the office of absolving from sins. The first is the principal office, and therefore, when the power of exercising it is given, the priestly character is imprinted, as we showed in the first part of the conclusion. The second is less principal, and therefore, when the power of absolving from sins is given to a priest, no character is imprinted, but a certain mode of greater perfection and extension is superadded to the character already imprinted, as we explained in the preceding treatise, c. 5, § 2.

4. You will object, first, against the first and second parts of the conclusion: The matter of the priesthood and diaconate is not now different from what it was formerly at the beginning of the Church and from what it now is among the Greeks. Otherwise such Orders would now be specifically different from those which were conferred in the time of the Apostles and are now conferred in the Greek Church. But in the time of the Apostles and at the beginning of the Church, priests and deacons were ordained through the imposition of hands alone, as is evident from Acts 14 and 2 Tim. 1. The Greek Church has preserved this rite until the present, as Arcudius explains at length from new and ancient Euchologia in book 6 of *De sacramentis*, c. 2. Therefore the imposition of hands alone is the matter of the priesthood and diaconate, and not the presentation of the instruments, or the contact with the chalice or the book of the Gospels.

I answer that the matter of the priesthood and diaconate among the Latins is indeed materially and entitatively different from what now exists among the Greeks and formerly existed at the beginning of the Church, but it is not formally and significatively different. For Christ did not determine

the matter and form of the sacrament of Holy Orders specifically, but instituted them only generically: namely, that some sensible sign signifying the power conferred should be employed in place of matter, and words sufficiently expressing that same power should be employed in place of form.

This is found in both the Latin and Greek Churches. Hence each preserves all the essentials instituted by Christ, although the determination of the sensible and material sign signifying the aforesaid power differs among the Greeks and Latins, and even within the Latin Church itself according to different times, namely the time of the Apostles and the present. Hence the priesthood and diaconate conferred in the time of the Apostles, or now conferred in the Greek Church, do not differ essentially from ours, but only accidentally. For although they have different matters and forms, that diversity is not formal, but merely material, because they are ordered to signifying and causing the same effect, and the unity or diversity of a sign is derived from the specific unity or diversity of the thing signified.

5. This solution and doctrine can be explained and illustrated by two examples. Formerly, in the sacrament instituted under the law of nature for children, for the removal of original sin, no determinate matter was specifically appointed by God, but only generically, under the character of a sensible sign professing divine worship and religion. Likewise, in the new law, in the sacrament of matrimony, the signs were indeed determined by Christ according to their formal character or signification, insofar as he determined that they should signify a certain thing, namely the mutual consent of those contracting, but not in particular and according to their material character. Under this aspect he left them to the common usage and will of the contracting parties.

The same must be said, with due proportion, of the sacrament of Holy Orders: Christ instituted and determined its matter according to its formal character, namely that it should determinately signify that a certain ecclesiastical power is here and now conferred upon the one ordained. He did not, however, determine it according to its material character, but left it to the power of the Church to signify the conferral of this power through the handing over of this or that thing.

6. You will object, second: That which is sensible and causative of grace belongs essentially to the nature of a sacrament. But the imposition of hands in the ordination of priests is a sensible sign and productive of some grace, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 37, a. 5, and as is evident from the words of St. Ambrose cited above: *Man imposes the hand, and God bestows grace.* Therefore

the imposition of hands in the ordination of priests belongs essentially to the nature of the sacrament.

I answer that the major premise is not universally true. Satisfaction in the sacrament of Penance is something sensible and causative of some grace, and yet it does not belong to the essence, but only to the integrity, of that sacrament. The same must be said of the imposition of hands performed in the ordination of priests. Although it is a sensible sign causing an increase of grace, it does not follow that it is an essential part of such ordination; it is enough that it belong to its integrity, as we taught in the third part of our conclusion.

CHAPTER IV.

The Minister and Subject of the Sacrament of Holy Orders.

7. It is certain that the bishop alone is the ordinary minister of the sacrament of Holy Orders. This was openly defined by the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugene and by the Council of Trent, sess. 23, can. 7. Reason also supports it, for the bishop alone is the ruler and hierarch of the Christian commonwealth, or the prince of the sacraments. But it pertains to the prince and ruler alone to confer and distribute offices and ministries. Therefore it pertains to the bishop alone to confer Orders.

But there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians whether a simple priest, by commission of the Supreme Pontiff, can be an extraordinary minister of this sacrament and validly confer either major or minor Orders. I answer that he can confer the minor Orders and the subdiaconate, but not the priesthood or the diaconate. For these two Orders have an immediate relation to the true body of Christ, since the priesthood is ordered to confecting the body and blood of Christ, while the diaconate is ordered to distributing the blood of Christ, as was customary in the primitive Church, and to carrying the body of Christ in the pyx or on the paten, as deacons now customarily do. Although the power of the Supreme Pontiff over the mystical body of Christ is greater than that of other priests, it is not greater over Christ's natural and true body. St. Thomas uses this reasoning here, q. 38, a. 1, ad 1.

8. You will say, first: In former times chorepiscopi customarily conferred the Order of diaconate and priesthood, provided that they had received permission from the bishop of the city, as is gathered from the Council of Antioch, c. 10, and the Council of Ancyra, c. 15. But they were merely simple

priests, as Pope Damasus teaches in epistle 5. Therefore the power of ordaining priests and deacons can be entrusted to a simple priest.

I answer with Bellarmine that formerly there were two kinds of chorepiscopi. Some were true bishops and were like those now called auxiliary bishops, who are titular bishops of other sees; the aforesaid councils speak of these. Others were only priests who, as vicars of the bishop, dwelt in larger and walled towns, although they had received from the bishop a certain commission over the other priests, such as deans now possess. Pope Damasus speaks of these in the epistle cited.

9. You will say, second: Innocent VIII granted the abbots of the Cistercian Order the faculty of conferring upon their monks the Order of diaconate and subdiaconate. Vásquez says that he read this privilege in a certain ancient codex entitled *Collecta Bullarum Ordinis Cisterciensis*. Therefore a simple priest can, by commission of the Supreme Pontiff, confer at least the Order of diaconate.

I answer, first, from Nuño, here, q. 38, a. 1, that Master Victoria says that he saw such a document, and that no mention of the Order of diaconate was made in it, but only of the subdiaconate. But whatever may be the truth of this, I answer, second, that if such a privilege truly emanated from the Apostolic See, which is very uncertain, the pontiff acted according to the opinion which he judged more probable.

10. As regards the subject of the sacrament of Holy Orders, it is certain that women are not capable of it. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 39, a. 1, the sacrament of Holy Orders signifies eminence of rank. But no eminence of rank can be signified in the female sex, because woman has the state of subjection.

Nor is it an objection that in the primitive Church there were subdeaconesses, deaconesses, priestesses, and bishopesses. These names were given to women who, before sacred ordination, had married men who later became subdeacons, deacons, priests, or bishops, and who, after the ordination of their husbands, were separated from them by mutual consent, as is evident from the Council of Auxerre, can. 21.

11. It is also evident that only the baptized are capable of the sacrament of Holy Orders, since Baptism is the gateway to all the other sacraments. But a difficulty can arise whether children before the use of reason can be validly ordained. Durandus calls this into doubt in IV Sent., dist. 25, q. 2. Theologians commonly teach that they can, with St. Thomas here, q. 39, a. 2, where he proves it by this reasoning: Sacraments which consist not in an act but in a power can be conferred before the recipients perform the act. Thus Baptism and Confirmation can be conferred without an act on the part of

the child to be baptized or confirmed because they consist in a power. By contrast, Penance and matrimony cannot be conferred without an act of the penitent or the contracting party because they consist in an act, or because an act belongs to their essence, such as contrition and confession in the sacrament of Penance and consent in matrimony. But the sacrament of Holy Orders consists not in an act but in a power, as is evident from its definition. Therefore it can be conferred before the recipient performs the act, and consequently upon a child, although he is incapable of consent.

Nevertheless, when such a child had reached the years of discretion, he would not be bound to persevere in the Order conferred upon him in infancy, but could renounce it and contract matrimony, since the Church could not bind him to the vow of continence independently of his will.

12. Finally, it is certain that bigamists are incapable of Orders, as is evident from the Apostle in 1 Tim. 3 and Titus 1, and from canon 17 of the Apostles, where it is stated: *If anyone after Baptism has entered a second marriage, he cannot be a bishop, priest, or deacon, or belong at all to the number of those who serve in the sacred ministry.*

The reason or fittingness is that through sacred Orders a cleric is espoused to the Church. Through this espousal he expresses the union of the Divine Word with human nature and of Christ with the Church, which is one. A bigamist cannot represent this because bigamy destroys the unity of one with one by dividing the flesh among several. This incapacity or irregularity is not of divine law but of ecclesiastical law, since the Supreme Pontiff can dispense from it. Martin I dispensed a bigamist so that he might become a subdeacon, and Pope Lucius made another bigamist Archbishop of Palermo.

13. By the same ecclesiastical law the solemn vow of chastity is annexed to sacred Orders, and fittingly so. For two things chiefly pertain to the office of sacred ministers: to sacrifice and to devote themselves to prayer or contemplation. The use of matrimony is no slight impediment to these two acts. As regards the first, since the sacrifice of the altar is most august and holy, it is fitting that those who offer it or minister to it should possess an eminent purity and holiness of mind and body. As regards the second, the conjugal act dulls the edge of the mind and turns and distracts the soul from prayer and the contemplation of divine things. Hence the Apostle in 1 Cor. 7 counsels spouses to practice continence for a time so that they may devote themselves more fully to prayer.

Furthermore, if those who under the old law ate the loaves of proposition were required to be free from women, as stated in 1 Sam. 21; if those who were about to eat the paschal lamb were commanded to gird their

loins, that is, to subdue the pleasures of the flesh, as St. Gregory explains in homily 22 on the Gospels; and finally, if the priests who ministered by turns in the tabernacle were required throughout the whole time of their service to remain absent from their homes and wives, as is gathered from 1 Chron. 24 and Luke 1, how much more must our priests, perpetually devoted to the sacred ministry and daily handling with their hands the Son of the Virgin, the Bridegroom of virgins, and the fountain of all purity, observe perpetual continence? Thus Innocent I rightly argues in epistle 9 to Victricius, Bishop of Rouen.

14. This law of continence to be observed by sacred ministers was continuously preserved in the Roman Church, although the vow of chastity was not always annexed to the subdiaconate, because it was not always numbered among the sacred Orders. This is evident from can. *Nullus in Episc.*, dist. 60, where Urban II says: *By sacred Orders we mean the diaconate and priesthood, for the primitive Church is read to have possessed these alone*—understand, as sacred Orders.

In the Greek Church, however, such a law was abrogated, and sacred ministers were permitted to have wives and live with them, as is evident from the Sixth Synod, can. 13, where it is said: Since we have learned that it has been handed down as a canon in the Roman Church that those who are to be promoted to the diaconate or priesthood must profess that they will no longer be joined to their wives, we, preserving the ancient canon of apostolic perfection and order, will that the lawful marriages of men in sacred Orders remain henceforth firm and stable, in no way dissolving their union with their wives or depriving them of mutual relations at a fitting time. Therefore, if anyone is found worthy to be ordained subdeacon, deacon, or priest, let him in no way be prohibited from being admitted to such grace if he lives with a lawful wife. Nor shall it be demanded of him at the time of ordination that he profess that he will abstain from lawful relations with his wife.

The Greeks preserve this custom even to the present time with the permission of the Roman Church, and they are prohibited from relations with their wives only during the time when they are to serve at the sacred altars. Greek bishops, however, do not live with the wives whom they had married before sacred ordination, as is evident from canon 12 of the same Synod. Indeed, the Greeks now ordinarily elect to the episcopate only one who is either a professed religious or observes perpetual chastity and has no wife.

CHAPTER V.
The Episcopate.

It is certain by faith that bishops are by divine law superior to priests in dignity and power. This was defined by the Council of Constance in the bull of Martin V, in which all the errors of John Wycliffe are condemned, and by the Council of Trent, sess. 23, c. 4 and can. 7. St. Thomas proves this in several ways here, q. 40, a. 4. But the reason which he adduces in the argument *on the contrary* is sufficient. He reasons thus: The divine mysteries ought to be more orderly than human affairs. But the order of human offices requires that in every office one person be placed over the others as the head of that office, just as a commander is placed over soldiers and an architect, who is called the master of the work, over inferior craftsmen. Therefore the order of the ecclesiastical hierarchy likewise requires that someone be placed over priests as the prince of priests, and this is the bishop.

Hence Dionysius says in book 5 of De ecclesiastica hierarchia: The order of pontiffs is first, and it purifies, illuminates, and perfects. Beneath it, the order of priests purifies and illuminates, but does not perfect, while the order of ministers only purifies.

15. Against this is objected a difficult passage of St. Jerome, by which he seems to signify that bishops are superior to priests not by divine law, but only by the constitution and custom of the Church. For on Titus 1, concerning the words, And appoint priests in every city, he writes: A priest is the same as a bishop, and before schisms arose in religion through the instigation of the devil and it was said among the people, "I am of Apollo," and "I am of Cephas," the churches were governed by the common counsel of the priests. But after each one began to regard those whom he had baptized as his own and not Christ's, it was decreed throughout the whole world that one chosen from among the priests should be placed over the rest, to whom the whole care of the Church should pertain, and thus the seeds of schism should be removed. And below: We have adduced this to show that among the ancients priests and bishops were the same. Therefore, just as priests know that by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who has been set over them, so bishops should know that they are greater than priests more by custom than by the truth of the Lord's ordinance.

I answer that when St. Jerome says that bishops are greater than priests more by the custom and ordinance of the Church than by the truth of the Lord's disposition, he is not speaking of the episcopate as regards the power of Order. For he manifestly acknowledges that bishops are by divine law superior to priests in this power in his commentary on Titus 1, where he says: *What does a bishop do, except ordination, which a priest does not also do?* That is, which a priest cannot also do. Rather, he speaks of the power of jurisdiction or the governance of the Church.

St. Jerome judged that this preeminence of jurisdiction belongs to bishops not by divine law but only by ecclesiastical law, and this is partly true. For bishops do not receive the power of jurisdiction immediately from Christ, as they receive the power of Order and the character, but have it from the Supreme Pontiff, to whom it belongs to place them over churches and to assign and divide dioceses among them as he judges expedient for the good of the Church.

16. Concerning the episcopate there is a celebrated difficulty and controversy whether it is an Order distinct from the priesthood. Durandus and Cajetan hold the affirmative position, and some modern authors follow them. The negative position, however, is not only expressly taught by St. Thomas, but also by nearly all the older theologians, who are followed by almost innumerable modern authors, as Valerian de Flavigny, Doctor and Fellow of the Sorbonne, demonstrates in the short work which he published in defense of the thesis of Louis de Clèves, Bachelor of the Sorbonne. That thesis asserted that the episcopate, insofar as it is considered apart from the priesthood or distinguished from it, does not have the nature of a sacrament. It therefore appears more probable that the episcopate is not an Order distinct from the priesthood, but an extension of the priesthood and its most excellent complement.

This is proved, first, by the reason indicated by St. Thomas here, q. 40, a. 5, and in *In IV Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum*, dist. 24, q. 4, ad 4. The distinction of Orders is taken according to the relation which they have to the Eucharist, to which they are ordered as to their end, as is evident in the priesthood, diaconate, subdiaconate, and four minor Orders. But the episcopate implies no relation to the Eucharist other than that implied by the priesthood, for a bishop cannot consecrate it more perfectly than a simple priest. Therefore the episcopate is not an Order distinct from the priesthood.

It does not avail to say that the episcopate implies an indirect relation to the Eucharist which the priesthood does not, since, in addition to the power of consecrating the Eucharist, in which it agrees with the priesthood, it has

the power of transmitting that power to others and of consecrating and ordaining the ministers of the Eucharist. This answer does not avail, for it would follow that the episcopate is an Order inferior to the priesthood and less noble than it, since that indirect relation to the Eucharist, or power of consecrating its ministers, is less perfect than the direct relation to it, or the power of consecrating it, than which nothing more excellent or divine is given in the supernatural order.

17. It is proved, second: If the episcopate were an Order specifically distinct from the priesthood, would it be equal to it, superior to it, or inferior? That they should be equal is impossible under the law by which diverse essences of things can no more be of equal perfection than diverse numbers can be equal, since the whole nature of equality consists in sameness. Nor can the episcopal character be superior to the priestly character, since the power over the natural body of Christ, which is proper to the priesthood, excels the power over the mystical body which the episcopate adds. Nor is it fitting that it should be inferior, since the episcopate is, as it were, the summit of the priesthood, and the bishop occupies the supreme degree of the priesthood. Therefore, and so forth.

18. It is proved, third: If the episcopate is an Order really distinct from the priesthood, it will contain the priesthood virtually or eminently, just as the priesthood eminently contains the inferior Orders. Therefore, just as the priesthood is valid when conferred without the preceding Order of diaconate, as is gathered from c. *Tuae litterae*, concerning a cleric ordained by a leap, so the episcopate would be valid if conferred without the preceding priesthood. Consequently, a deacon consecrated bishop without first becoming a priest could exercise priestly functions, such as consecrating the body of Christ and absolving from sins, although he was not a priest, which is absurd.

19. You will say: Episcopal consecration causes grace and confers a character distinct from that which is imprinted in the conferral of the priesthood. Therefore it is an Order distinct from the priesthood.

I answer by granting the first part of the antecedent and denying the consequence. For episcopal consecration to cause grace, it is not necessary that it be a sacrament or an Order distinct from the priesthood; it is sufficient that it be a certain most excellent complement of the priesthood. Thus, through the ceremony by which the power of absolving from sins is conferred upon an already ordained priest, an increase of grace is conferred, although that ceremony is not a sacrament distinct from the priestly consecration performed in the contact with the chalice, but only a certain complement and extension of the priesthood.

Hence the second part of the antecedent must be denied. Episcopal consecration does not confer a new character, but only completes and extends the priestly character and renders it powerful to confect two sacraments which a simple priest, precisely by virtue of his ordination, cannot confect, namely Confirmation and Holy Orders. Likewise, to remain with the same example, through the ceremony by which an already ordained priest is given the power of absolving from sins, no character distinct from that imprinted through contact with the chalice is conferred, but only a certain mode of greater perfection and extension is added to it, by reason of which he becomes capable of forgiving sins, as we explained in the treatise on Penance, c. 5, § 2.

TREATISE VII.
ON THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY.

Since the sacrament of matrimony can be considered in two ways, namely as an office of nature and as elevated by the institution of Christ to the being of a sacrament, it must be treated briefly in this treatise under both considerations. But because, as the Apostle testifies, that which is animal comes before that which is spiritual, it must first be discussed as an office of nature, and then as having the nature of a sacrament. Moreover, because betrothals are, as it were, the beginning of a future marriage and a moral disposition toward it, some points concerning them must first be briefly set forth.

CHAPTER I.
Betrothals.

1. Betrothals are *a mutual promise of future marriage*. So it is stated in law 1 of the Digest, concerning betrothals. The phrase *future marriage* is used to distinguish betrothals from matrimony, which is a contract expressed by words concerning the present, whereas betrothals are contracted by words concerning the future, such as, "I shall take you as my wife," and, "I shall take you as my husband."

The phrase *mutual promise* is added because an intention or simple will does not suffice for betrothals, since this does not suffice to induce an

obligation. Rather, a promise, or a will to bind oneself, is necessarily required, and it must be mutual on the part of each contracting party. For since matrimony essentially includes a mutual present handing over and acceptance by each party, and cannot be effected otherwise, the promise of future matrimony essentially includes the mutual promise and acceptance of each, and cannot validly be promised by one unless the other promises in return.

2. An external promise alone does not suffice for the validity of betrothals, since it is not a true promise if the intention of promising is absent. Nor does an internal promise alone suffice. Although a man can be bound by an internal act before God, who searches hearts, he cannot be bound to another man, who considers external things alone, except in a human manner, and consequently unless his promise is expressed by some external sign.

It is not, however, necessary for betrothals that the promise or consent be expressed by words or other determinate signs. These or those signs suffice, provided that they are apt sufficiently to express the internal consent and will to the other party. Hence, in some places, the placing of a ring on the finger of the bride, the hanging of a necklace around her neck, the handing over of earnest money, or the offering of the bride's hand at the request of the bridegroom suffices for betrothals. Indeed, even the silence of the bridegroom and bride can suffice, namely when parents, tutors, or guardians standing in place of parents contract betrothals for children who are either under or over the age of puberty, while the children are present and do not object.

3. Although clandestine marriages, that is, those performed without the presence of the parish priest and two or three witnesses, are invalid under the new law of the Council of Trent, clandestine betrothals are not. For in the new decree of Trent issued against clandestine marriages, no mention is made of betrothals. Whatever is not expressed in a new law is left subject to the disposition of the old law, as Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian say in law *Praecipimus*, in the Code concerning appeals. Therefore no prohibition regarding betrothals is derived from the new decree of Trent, especially since there is no connection between the clandestinity of marriage and that of betrothals. Clandestine betrothals can very well be contracted even if the marriage must be celebrated publicly.

4. Nevertheless, a clandestine marriage invalid under the law of Trent does not have the force of betrothals, as the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals interpreting the Council of Trent declared concerning sess. 24, c. 1: A marriage contracted without observing the form of the Council of Trent,

and so forth, is not resolved into betrothals concerning the future, in such a way that the parties can be compelled to contract marriage according to the form of the Council.

The same must be said of a fictitious and simulated marriage. Since consent is absent in such a case, it cannot have the nature of betrothals, which do not subsist without consent.

5. Likewise, after the Council of Trent, conditional betrothals do not become absolute through subsequent clandestine intercourse. The reason is that conditional betrothals do not become absolute unless the condition is fulfilled or removed, if it depends upon the will of the contracting party alone. Although under the ancient law, before the Council of Trent, the condition was considered to be removed through subsequent intercourse because such intercourse was then lawful and regarded as conjugal, nevertheless, since such intercourse is now not admitted as conjugal and can be exercised only with a fornicatory disposition, being invalid for contracting matrimony, the condition cannot be regarded as removed through it. Consequently, betrothals contracted under that condition will still remain conditional.

6. The age determined by both laws for betrothals is seven years. For at that time man begins to possess some prudence concerning the future and consequently begins to be capable of promising certain things for the future, especially those toward which nature inclines, such as matrimony, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 43, a. 2.

Nevertheless, sometimes precociousness can supply for age, and consequently betrothals can be valid before the age of seven. For if precociousness supplies for age in relation to matrimony, as is evident from c. 9, concerning the betrothals of minors, where Alexander III says of them: *If they are so near the required age that they could be joined by carnal intercourse, they ought not to be separated on account of their lesser age if one has consented to the other, since precociousness appears to have supplied for age in them*, then it can all the more supply for age in relation to betrothals. For since betrothals are not of such great importance as matrimony and can be dissolved for many reasons, whereas matrimony is indissoluble, there is an equal or greater reason why precociousness should supply for age in betrothals than in matrimony.

7. Although different ages are assigned in law to males and females for contracting matrimony, namely the fourteenth year for males and the twelfth for females, no different ages are assigned for contracting betrothals. St. Thomas gives the reason for this in the article cited, ad 1, where he reasons: At the time of the marriage contract, not only a disposition on the

part of the use of reason is required, but also a disposition on the part of the body, so that it may be a time suitable for generation. Since a girl reaches the point of being fit for the act of generation in her twelfth year, while a boy does so at the end of his second seven-year period, as the Philosopher says in book 9 of De animalibus, whereas they acquire the use of discretion, which alone is required in betrothals, at the same time, one age is determined for both in betrothals, but not in matrimony.

8. When no term for contracting matrimony is fixed in the betrothals, they do not begin to bind immediately upon being contracted, but only when one of the contracting parties demands the fulfillment of the promise and the celebration of the marriage. This is common to every debt for the payment of which no certain day is fixed: the debtor is not bound to pay it unless requested by the creditor, according to law *Debitores praesentes* in the Code concerning pledges, together with the gloss.

Hence, when rule 14 of law in the Sixth states, *In all obligations in which no day is set, the debt is due on the present day*, it must be understood as meaning when the creditor requests it. Otherwise a loan would be useless if from the first day it bound the borrower to repay it.

9. Various causes are commonly assigned by which betrothals can be dissolved. First, they are dissolved by mutual consent, c. *Praeterea* 2, concerning betrothals. For every contract which is by its nature dissoluble, such as the contract of betrothal, can be dissolved by the same causes through which it can validly be made. But the contract of betrothal is made by the mutual consent of the contracting parties. Therefore it can also be dissolved by their mutual consent.

10. Second, a subsequent marriage dissolves betrothals previously contracted with another, since the bond of matrimony is stronger than the bond of betrothals. Nevertheless, the man who marries another woman is bound, after his wife's death, to marry his former betrothed, because a stronger supervening bond and impediment does not extinguish the prior obligation, but only suspends it.

Thus, if I promised Peter a field which I afterward handed over to Paul, and Paul later bequeathed the same field to me by testament, I would be bound to restore it to Peter by reason of the promise, since a thing promised and accepted always cries out for the one to whom it was promised. Likewise, the person of the bridegroom, promised to the bride through the contract of betrothal and alienated through marriage to another, must, once he again becomes free, be restored to the former bride to whom he had been promised through betrothals.

11. Third, betrothals are dissolved through fornication because the promise of betrothal always implicitly includes the condition that the bridegroom or bride has not sinned against the law of matrimony. The reason is the same in this respect for the bridegroom and the bride, because, as Panormitanus rightly says in c. *Quemadmodum*, concerning oaths, n. 4, as regards violation of the faith of betrothal, the bridegroom and bride are judged equally.

But if both the bridegroom and the bride have committed fornication, their offenses are not thereby compensated, as they are between adulterous spouses. Rather, the fornicating bridegroom can dismiss the fornicating bride, because unequal offenses do not admit of compensation. But the bridegroom and bride are not guilty of equal offenses in committing fornication, since, in relation to matrimony, the fornication of the bride is a far graver crime than that of the bridegroom. For there is a greater mark of disgrace attached to a bridegroom who takes a fornicating bride as his wife than to a bride who marries a fornicating bridegroom.

Hence there is a different reason regarding fornication committed by betrothed persons and adultery committed by spouses. In adultery, conjugal fidelity is considered, and this is equally violated by husband and wife, since each has equally bound himself or herself by matrimony to preserve it. But in fornication committed by betrothed persons, not only the violation of the fidelity promised through betrothals is considered, but also the disgrace resulting from it to the parties. As we have said, this disgrace is much greater when it is derived from the bride's fornication against the bridegroom than from the bridegroom's fornication against the bride.

12. If you ask whether the fornication of a bride or bridegroom differs from simple fornication and belongs to another species of lust, I answer that it belongs reductively to the species of adultery, just as betrothals are reduced to matrimony and are, as it were, its beginning.

13. Fourth, betrothals are dissolved by entrance into religious life on the part of the one who remains in the world, because by the very fact that one of the betrothed enters religious life, that person renounces the betrothals. Therefore the other thereby remains free from the obligation.

But as regards the one who enters religious life, the betrothals are not dissolved if that person does not make profession there but returns to the world. St. Thomas indicates this here, q. 43, a. 3, ad 1, where, giving the reason why betrothals are dissolved through entrance into religious life, he says: *Because it is a spiritual death of the soul*, namely by reason of profession, through which the religious dies to the secular life. He therefore judges that

entrance into religious life which is not followed by profession does not dissolve the betrothals on the part of the one entering.

Reason also supports this. Since betrothals bind the contracting parties by justice, it must not be asserted that they are freed from such an obligation unless there is an express law or manifest reason which frees them. But no manifest reason can be assigned on the part of the one entering religious life, but only on the part of the one remaining in the world, namely the notable change of state and person made in the other. Nor is there any law. For chapter 2, concerning the conversion of spouses, which is alleged by some, speaks of profession and of a ratified marriage. No consequence valid for proof can be drawn from this to betrothals, because in matters of this kind, which depend upon the disposition of positive law, it is not permissible to argue from one case to another unless it is evident that such was the legislator's intention, which is not so in the present matter.

Therefore betrothals are not dissolved on the part of the one entering religious life if that person makes no profession there but returns to the world; they are dissolved only on the part of the one who remains in the world.

14. Fifth, a simple vow of chastity dissolves betrothals on the part of both contracting parties, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 53, a. 1, ad 1, and proves by this reason: When two incompatible bonds concur, the stronger must prevail. But the bond even of a simple vow of chastity is incompatible with betrothals, as is evident, since both cannot be observed, and it is stronger because it binds one to God, whereas betrothals bind one only to a human being. Therefore it prevails over betrothals and, when supervening upon them, dissolves them.

Sixth, betrothals are dissolved when one of the parties departs without the consent of the other into a distant region and remains absent for a long time. In c. *De illis*, concerning betrothals, the gloss requires an absence of three years.

They are also dissolved by a supervening impediment, for example a new affinity between the betrothed parties arising from fornication with a blood relative of one of the parties in the first or second degree; by a supervening notable and lasting illness or deformity, such as leprosy, paralysis, or the loss of an eye or the nose, c. *Quemadmodum*, concerning oaths; and by the emergence of deadly enmities between the parties, because coercions frequently produce disastrous results, c. *Requisivit*, concerning betrothals. Finally, causes which suffice for obtaining a separation between spouses suffice all the more for dissolving betrothals.

CHAPTER II.
Matrimony as an Office of Nature.

Since matrimony is a contract between a man and a woman for the generation of offspring, several things are required for its integrity and constitution: the mutual consent of the man and woman manifested by an external sign; the mutual handing over of one's body to the other; and what follows from this, the mutual right and power of each over the body of the other to use it for every use conceded by the marital law; the mutual obligation of each to render the conjugal debt according to justice; and finally, a certain union or bond of the souls of both spouses, resulting from their mutual obligation and binding each spouse never to dissolve it as long as they live, according to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 7: *A woman is bound by the law for as long as her husband lives.*

Matrimony formally and essentially consists in such a bond. It cannot formally consist in the mutual consent of the man and woman, since that consent is the efficient cause of matrimony and consequently cannot be its formal cause, for the formal cause is intrinsic, while the efficient cause is numbered among the extrinsic causes. Nor can it consist in the mutual right of each spouse over the body of the other or in the mutual obligation to render the conjugal debt. First, because such a right and obligation cease through the adultery of one spouse or through entrance into religious life by common consent, while the bond of consummated matrimony remains. Second, because, as we shall say below, there was a true marriage between the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph, although the obligation of rendering the conjugal debt was perpetually impeded.

15. You will say: Matrimony formally consists in that by the presence of which it is present and by the removal of which it is removed. But when the mutual consent of the spouses and the right which each thereby acquires over the body of the other are present, matrimony is present, and when they are removed, matrimony is removed. Therefore matrimony formally consists in such consent and right.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Matrimony formally consists in that by the presence of which it is present as by its formal and constitutive principle: I grant the major. It consists in that by the presence of which it is present merely as by its radical and foundational principle: I

deny the major. I distinguish the minor premise in the same way and deny the consequence.

Thus, when generation is present, paternity is present in the one generating, and when generation is removed, paternity is removed, not because paternity formally consists in generation, but because it depends upon generation as its foundation. Likewise, when the mutual consent of the spouses and the right which each thereby acquires over the body of the other are present, matrimony is present, and when they are removed, matrimony is removed, not because it formally consists in them, but because it depends upon them radically and foundationally.

16. From this you will understand that matrimony, as an office of nature, is rightly defined thus: Matrimony is the marital union of a man and woman, maintaining an indivisible partnership of life. For the phrase marital union rightly explains that permanent and indissoluble bond in which matrimony formally consists.

It is rightly divided, as a subject is divided according to its accidents, into legitimate, ratified, and consummated marriage. A marriage is called legitimate when it is established by legitimate consent between persons not impeded. Such is marriage even among the unbaptized, and such formerly existed under the law of nature and the Mosaic law. A marriage is called ratified when it is sealed by the sacrament of faith, or exists between baptized persons, and therefore obtains greater firmness and indissolubility, c. *Quanto*, concerning divorce. It is called consummated when it has been completed by the addition of carnal intercourse.

17. Matrimony not only proceeds from the inclination and instinct of nature by which man is naturally inclined to preserve his species, but also falls under a natural precept, since it is a means altogether necessary for the end chiefly intended by nature, namely the propagation of the human race. God declared this precept to our first parents in Gen. 1 when he said to them: *Increase and multiply, and fill the earth.* He joined a blessing to this declaration to signify that it had been pronounced by him out of love for the human race, whose propagation he willed.

Hence Augustine says in book 14 of De civitate Dei, c. 22: We in no way doubt that to increase and multiply according to the blessing of God is a gift of marriage. For the blessing of God itself was joined to this work.

Although this precept bound each individual at the beginning of the world and after the Flood, when the human race had not yet been sufficiently propagated, nevertheless, after sufficient propagation had taken place, it no longer binds individuals. Indeed, it does not bind the commonwealth or its rulers to compel some to marry, since men are of

themselves sufficiently inclined toward matrimony. Hence St. Jerome, responding to Jovinian, says: *You will say: If all are virgins, how will the world continue? Do not fear that all will become virgins. Virginity is difficult and therefore rare.*

18. You will ask whether polygamy, or a plurality of wives under one husband, is opposed to the end of matrimony and consequently contrary to the law of nature.

I answer that it is not opposed to the primary end of matrimony, but only to its secondary end. So teaches St. Thomas here, q. 65, a. 1, where he says: A plurality of wives neither entirely removes nor in any way impedes the first end of matrimony, since one man suffices to impregnate several wives and to educate the children born of them. But although it does not entirely remove the secondary end, it greatly impedes it, because peace cannot easily exist in a family where several wives are joined to one husband. For one husband cannot suffice to satisfy several wives according to their desires; and also because the participation of several persons in one office causes strife, as among the ancient philosophers with one another, and likewise among several wives of one husband.

By these words the holy Doctor both teaches and proves each part of our answer. He proves the first because one man can not only impregnate several wives, but also sufficiently provide for the education and formation of the children who may be born of them. But the first end of matrimony consists precisely in those two things. Therefore polygamy is not opposed to the primary end of matrimony.

He proves the second because the secondary end of matrimony includes both a remedy against concupiscence, which the wife of a husband joined to several wives cannot always use according to her desire, and the peace and tranquility of domestic government, which can be preserved only with difficulty under a plurality of wives. The frail female sex is afflicted by jealousy, and it cannot happen that the affections of the husband are not directed more toward one wife than toward another. Hence Sarah in Gen. 21 could not tolerate Hagar in the household, and Rachel in Gen. 30 envied Leah on account of her fertility.

I add that equal rights between husband and wife are not preserved in polygamy. For each wife hands over the full dominion of her body to the husband, while the husband does not hand over the full dominion of his body to each wife. Hence the contract is not just, since it does not preserve the laws of justice on each side.

19. You will say: Most holy men under the old law had several wives at the same time, such as Abraham, who had Sarah and Hagar, Gen. 16; Jacob,

who had Leah and Rachel, Bilhah and Zilpah, Gen. 29 and 30; and Elkanah, who had Hannah and Peninnah, 1 Sam. 1. Therefore polygamy is not opposed to the law of nature or to the secondary end of matrimony.

I deny the consequence, because God dispensed these men concerning polygamy or a plurality of wives. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 65, a. 2: Since the good of offspring is the principal end of matrimony, when the multiplication of offspring was necessary, the impediment which could arise in relation to the secondary ends had to be disregarded for a time. The precept prohibiting a plurality of wives is ordered to removing that impediment.

Such a dispensation was made only after the Flood. St. John Chrysostom gives the reason in homily 56 on Genesis: before the Flood, the extremely long life of men made the marriage of one man with one woman sufficient for the necessary propagation of the human race. Afterward, because life was far shorter, *it was permitted to have relations with two or three or more wives, so that the human race might be propagated* and the defect of longer life supplied by the multitude of wives.

This dispensation ceased under the evangelical law, in which polygamy is entirely unlawful, as the Council of Trent defines, sess. 24, can. 2. This is also evident from the fact that matrimony under the new law has a nobler and more excellent end than under the law of nature and the Mosaic law, namely the signification of the union of Christ with the Church. Polygamy is opposed to this signification because it destroys the unity of the flesh and divides it among several.

CHAPTER III.

Matrimony as Having the Nature of a Sacrament.

Matrimony among Christians has this privilege over marriages under the law of nature and the Mosaic law: it is not merely a civil contract or a sacrament in the broad and improper sense, but is also a sacrament strictly and properly so called. It so represents the union between Christ and the Church that it also possesses a participation in it through sanctifying grace.

Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 1, says: Since, therefore, matrimony under the evangelical law excels the marriages of the ancients through the grace of Christ, our holy Fathers, the councils, and the tradition of the universal Church have always rightly taught that it is to be numbered among the sacraments of the new law.

Indeed, since concupiscence is inflamed and reason overwhelmed in the use of matrimony, it was fitting that a sacrament should be instituted to temper concupiscence in that act. Likewise, if Christ conferred a special grace upon the priests of the new law for generating spiritual children, which God had not conferred upon the priests of the old law, why should we deny that a closely similar grace was conferred upon spouses for generating and piously educating carnal children, and for fittingly bearing and exercising the other burdens and duties of matrimony?

Finally, since Christ in Matt. 19 abolished repudiation and restored matrimony to the indissolubility and monogamy which it possessed from the beginning, it was fitting that he should join his grace to it for overcoming the difficulties arising from complete indissolubility and perpetual monogamy. Otherwise, if such grace were lacking from Christian marriage, the yoke of matrimony under the evangelical law would be far more intolerable than under the Mosaic law. For formerly, in order to restrain the unbridled conduct of a wife, it was lawful to dismiss her by a bill of repudiation or to marry another together with her. Now neither is lawful, since Christ under the evangelical law abolished both the bill of repudiation and polygamy.

20. Although this sacrament, considered precisely as a sign of grace, is the least of all, nevertheless, as a speculative sign and symbol of sacred realities, it surpasses all the others. For it signifies a threefold most sacred union: the union of God with the soul, which he espouses to himself through faith and charity; the union of Christ with the Church, which, cleansed by his blood and made glorious by the removal of stains, he makes his bride; and the union of the Divine Word with human nature, which he joined to himself by an indissoluble covenant through the hypostatic union.

Hence St. Thomas, on Eph. 5, lect. 10, commenting on the words of the Apostle, This is a great sacrament, says: It should be noted here that four sacraments are called great: Baptism, by reason of its effect, because it removes guilt and opens the gate of paradise; Confirmation, by reason of its minister, because it is conferred only by pontiffs and not by others; the Eucharist, by reason of its content, because it contains the whole Christ; and matrimony, by reason of its signification, because it signifies the union of Christ and the Church.

When this sacrament was instituted by Christ is entirely uncertain, and authors hold various opinions concerning it. Some say that matrimony was elevated by Christ to the nature of a sacrament at the first moment of the Incarnation. *For then*, says St. Gregory in homily 36 on the Gospels, *God the Father made a marriage for God his Son, when he joined human nature to him in*

the womb of the Virgin, when he willed God, who existed before the ages, to become man at the end of the ages.

Others say that it was instituted when Christ honored the wedding at Cana of Galilee by his presence. Hence Cyril of Alexandria, in book 1 of In Joannem, c. 2, asking why Christ, the lover of virginity, the Son of the Virgin, and the Bridegroom of virgins, willed to be present at the wedding in Cana, gives this as the chief reason: That he might sanctify the beginning of our birth as regards the flesh. For the weakness received by the propagation of the flesh required that he who was restoring the whole nature of man to a better and happier state should not only bless men already born, but should also prepare grace for those who were to be born and consecrate their entrance into this mortal life both by the authority of a miracle and by the presence of his majesty.

Others judge that Christ instituted this sacrament when, abolishing the law of repudiation, he recalled matrimony to its original indissolubility and unity in Matt. 19. For, they say, it was fitting that grace should then be joined to it for overcoming the difficulties arising from complete indissolubility and perpetual monogamy.

Others, finally, place the institution after the Resurrection, during those forty days in which Christ appeared to the Apostles and spoke of the kingdom of God, that is, of the state of the Church militant, as St. Gregory explains in homily 12 on the Gospels, and instructed them concerning the confecting and administration of all the sacraments individually.

21. In this sacrament, as in the others, three things must be distinguished: that which is the sacrament alone, that which is the reality alone, and that which is the reality and sacrament together.

First, that which is the sacrament alone in matrimony is the external and sensible expression of internal consent. For in every sacrament, that is the sacrament alone which is a sensible sign in itself and by reason of which all the other things are perceived. But the sensible expression of interior consent is perceived in itself, and by reason of it the union of the spouses and all the other things belonging to matrimony are sensible.

Second, according to St. Thomas in IV Sent., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5, the reality of the sacrament in matrimony is twofold. One is both caused and signified, namely sacramental grace itself. The other is signified but not caused, namely the union of Christ with the Church, which matrimony does not cause but only signifies.

Finally, the marital union, or that bond which follows from the matrimonial contract, is in matrimony the reality and sacrament together, because it is both a sign and something signified. It is signified by the

contract, and at the same time, as expressed through the contract, it signifies the sacramental grace given to the spouses and the union of Christ with the Church and with his humanity.

The ministers of this sacrament are the contracting parties themselves, not the priest who blesses them and pronounces the words, *I join you together.* The reason is that Christ, in instituting this sacrament, did nothing other than elevate the matrimonial contract, valid under natural and civil law, into a sacrament conferring grace. Consequently, he willed that the ministers of this sacrament should be the same as the ministers of the natural and civil contract which is its foundation. But the ministers of such a contract are the contracting parties themselves, who through mutual consent mutually bind themselves to hand over their bodies to one another. Therefore they themselves are also the ministers of the sacrament of matrimony, and not the priest who gives them the nuptial blessing.

Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 1, on reform, affirms that clandestine marriages performed in the absence of a priest and without any words pronounced by him were valid as long as the Church had not rendered them invalid. And the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals appointed to interpret this Council declared to the Bishop of Salamanca that it does not pertain to the substance of matrimony that the parish priest pronounce any words.

Likewise, St. Thomas in IV Sent., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1, says: *The words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, but not the priestly blessing, which is a certain sacramental.* He repeats the same in dist. 28. Hence, when elsewhere he appears to teach that priests are the ministers of this sacrament and that the words which they pronounce are its form, he is not speaking of the minister and form as regards the substance, but as regards solemnity and the accidental ceremonies required by precept of the Church.

22. Nor does it avail to say that every sacrament must necessarily have a sacred minister. That this is false is evident from Baptism, which can be validly, and in many cases lawfully, administered by laymen and even by pagans, as we explained in the treatise on Baptism. Hence, just as a layman in the state of mortal sin who baptizes a child in extreme necessity does not sin mortally, as theologians commonly teach, neither do persons contracting matrimony in mortal sin, if they are considered as ministers of this sacrament. It is otherwise if they are considered as recipients of the sacrament.

23. Concerning the matter and form of this sacrament there is no small disagreement among the Doctors. But the more probable opinion teaches

that the same words or signs of the spouses by which they express their mutual consent are matter and form in relation to one another under different considerations. Insofar as through them the spouses mutually hand over their bodies, they have the nature of matter; but insofar as through them they accept the handing over of bodies mutually made to one another, they have the nature of form.

The reason *a priori* is that matrimony, as a contract, does not differ from other civil contracts, nor does it, as a sacrament, have matter and form different from itself as a contract. But in civil contracts, the handing over, as performed through a sensible sign, has the nature of matter, while acceptance, expressed in words, has the nature of form. Therefore the same is true in matrimony.

The major premise is evident. The minor is shown thus: That which is determinable has the nature of matter, while that which determines has the nature of form. But the handing over has the character of something determinable and is completed and perfected through acceptance, which acts in the manner of something determining. Therefore, in civil contracts, the handing over performed through a sensible sign has the nature of matter, while acceptance has the nature of form.

24. You will say: Since the spouses themselves are the ministers of this sacrament, as we showed above, if their handing over has the nature of matter, the material and efficient causes will coincide in the same persons, which seems absurd.

I answer that there is no difficulty in the material and efficient causes coinciding in the same persons in this sacrament. Indeed, the nature of a contract appears to require this when the contracting parties hand themselves over. This is evident from the example of one who sells himself to another as a slave. He would at the same time be the seller and the thing sold, and consequently the efficient and material cause of that contract. The same, with due proportion, must be said of the spouses celebrating the contract and sacrament of matrimony. Under different relations, they simultaneously have the character of the efficient and material causes of that contract and sacrament.

25. You will ask, first, whether a marriage contracted between absent persons through proxies is a true sacrament.

I answer affirmatively. A marriage valid as a natural and civil contract is a sacrament among the faithful, because Christ the Lord, in instituting the sacrament of matrimony, did not change the nature of the matrimonial contract, but only elevated it to the supernatural being of a sacrament. But a marriage contracted between absent persons through proxies is valid as a

natural and civil contract. For since the proxies stand in place of the principals with full power to contract, what the proxies do is regarded as done by the principal contracting parties. Hence, just as a perfect matrimonial contract results from the mutual consent of both spouses, so also it results from the mutual consent of both proxies. Therefore a marriage contracted between absent persons through proxies is a true sacrament.

26. You will say, first: The Council of Trent, sess. 24, on reform, c. 1, appears to require the presence of the contracting parties for the nature of matrimony. For it says that the parish priest must question the man and the woman and, after questioning them and understanding their consent, say: *I join you together.* Therefore a marriage contracted between absent persons through proxies is not a true sacrament.

I deny the consequence. Since proxies are substituted in place of the contracting parties, they can be questioned by the parish priest concerning the consent of those parties. Once the consent of the contracting parties has been expressed, the parish priest can truthfully say, *I join you together*, because, although those over whom those words are to be pronounced are physically absent, they are nevertheless morally present, which suffices for the nature of a civil contract and, consequently, for the nature of a sacrament among the faithful.

From this you will understand the difference between this sacrament and the others. Since Baptism, for example, and Penance are not contracts, they require that the presence of the subject expressed by the words, *I baptize you*, and, *I absolve you*, be physical. Hence neither Baptism nor absolution can be conferred upon an absent person. By contrast, since the sacrament of matrimony consists in a contract, it requires only moral presence between the contracting parties, and consequently it can be validly received by absent persons.

Nor is there any difficulty in admitting that a man and woman who perhaps are sleeping at the time when their proxies contract on their behalf should receive grace while asleep. This is evident in one who has had the will to receive Baptism or to suffer martyrdom. If he is baptized in his sleep or killed out of hatred for the faith, he will receive grace while asleep; and if he is in the state of sin, he will be justified if, before giving himself to sleep, he elicited an act of attrition, as theologians commonly teach.

27. From this it is gathered that, just as marriage between absent persons contracted through proxies is valid not only as a contract but also as a sacrament, so also is marriage contracted through letters, because letters stand in place of the contracting parties, just as proxies do. Hence law

Mulieres in the Digest, concerning the rite of marriage, states: *It is established that a woman can marry an absent man through his letters or messenger.*

Therefore, if a man writes to a woman that he not only presently hands over to her the dominion of his body, but also from that moment accepts the handing over of her body as soon as it has been made before the parish priest and witnesses, and the woman writes back to the man in like manner that she wills to take him as her husband and to accept the handing over of his body as soon as her reply has been read before the parish priest and witnesses, then, when both letters have been read, the marriage is perfected both as a contract and as a sacrament.

28. You will ask, second, whether in the matrimony of the faithful the nature of the contract can be separated from the nature of the sacrament. I answer that this can be done. For if the faithful who contract matrimony do not intend to confect a sacrament, it will not be a sacrament because of the lack of the intention required in the ministers, who in this sacrament are none other than the contracting parties themselves, as was shown above. Nevertheless, it will not lose its binding force as a natural and civil contract, since Christ, in elevating matrimony to the nature of a sacrament, did not take from it the natural and civil obligation which, as a natural and civil contract, it had previously possessed by reason of the reciprocal consent of the contracting parties. Therefore in such a marriage the nature of the contract will be separated from the nature of the sacrament.

Nevertheless, this is not lawful: first, because it cannot be done without irreverence toward the sacrament; and second, because Christians are bound to contract according to the Christian custom and rite and not to place an obstacle before the sacramental grace which Christ has joined to matrimony.

29. You will ask, third, whether, if a member of the faithful married an unbaptized unbeliever with a dispensation of the pontiff, such a marriage would be a sacrament, at least on the part of the faithful spouse.

I answer that it would not. For just as, in order that a marriage be valid as a contract, free consent is required on the part of both spouses, so, in order that it be valid as a sacrament, intention and ministry are required on the part of both, since the contracting parties themselves are the ministers of this sacrament. But an unbaptized unbeliever cannot be a legitimate minister of matrimony as a sacrament, since the confecting of a sacrament no less than its reception requires the baptismal character for validity. Therefore the marriage of one of the faithful with an unbaptized unbeliever cannot be a sacrament.

The same must be said of a marriage contracted between members of the faithful when one contracting party intends the sacrament but the other

does not. For just as matrimony is indivisibly one contract, so also it is indivisibly one sacrament. Consequently, just as it cannot be defective on one side as a contract, neither can it be defective on one side as a sacrament.

30. You will ask, fourth, whether a marriage validly contracted by unbelievers becomes a sacrament when they are converted to the faith and baptized, especially if a new consent is then added, expressed by some sensible sign, with the intention of doing what Christ instituted and the Church does.

I answer negatively. An intention following upon a previously completed contract cannot cause that which was not a sacrament to begin to be one, especially since the nature of the sacrament is annexed to the coming-to-be of the marriage and not to its completed state. Thus Baptism consists in the performance of the washing and the pronouncing of the words. Hence, just as one who washed a child and pronounced the words without intending to baptize him would not confect the sacrament, even if, after completing the washing and pronouncing the words, he then formed such an intention, so likewise, if spouses do not have the intention of confecting the sacrament when they contract, they do not confect it, even if the intention of confecting it later supervenes. For then they do not effect a new marriage, but only ratify and confirm the preceding one.

Since each spouse has already perfectly transferred dominion of his or her body to the other and has in reality handed it over through marital intercourse, no new contract can be made concerning the same bodies which could serve as the foundation of a new sacrament. Thus, if one attempted to make a new contract of sale concerning a thing already validly sold and handed over to another, nothing would be effected because of the lack of matter capable of a new sale and purchase.

CHAPTER IV.
The Consent Required for Matrimony.

1. It is certain that consent is required for matrimony insofar as it is a contract, since the matrimonial contract formally includes the consent of both spouses, and such consent causes that bond or obligation in which, as we said above in c. 2, the essence of matrimony consists. Hence Pope Nicholas says in can. *Sufficiat*, 27, q.: *If consent alone is lacking in a marriage, all other things are in vain.*

It is also evident that the consent of both spouses is required for matrimony as a sacrament. First, because the sacrament is founded upon the

contract; hence, if consent is necessary for the contract, it will also be necessary for the sacrament. Second, because no sacrament is perfected without the will and intention of the minister. But the contracting parties are the ministers not only of the civil contract but also of the sacrament of matrimony, as was shown above. Therefore, without their consent, the sacrament of matrimony cannot be perfected, at least according to the ordinary law.

I said *at least according to the ordinary law*, because by his absolute power God can supply for consent and, without awaiting the consent of the spouses, transfer dominion of the woman's body into the power of the man and conversely. For he is the absolute lord of the human body and of the whole man, and has greater power over the bodies of the spouses than the spouses themselves. Nor does he have dominion only over bodies, but also over minds and hearts, and therefore he can excite and cause in their hearts the mutual love and service necessary for the education of offspring.

It is probable that God used this power in the marriage of Hosea and the fornicating woman, and this is indicated by St. Thomas in I-II, q. 100, a. 8, ad 2, in these words: Hosea, approaching a fornicating woman or an adulterous woman as his wife, did not commit adultery or fornication, because he approached one who was his own according to the command of God, who is the author of the institution of matrimony.

No human power, however, whether civil or ecclesiastical, can effect the bond of matrimony without the consent of the spouses. For although ecclesiastical and secular princes have dominion over the bodies of certain persons, namely those whom they can deprive of life and all goods because of crimes, they do not have dominion over their minds and hearts so as to be able to excite and cause in them the mutual love necessary for the conjugal bond, as God can.

2. These points having been established, the conditions required for matrimonial consent to be valid must be briefly explained.

First, such consent must be true. Hence, if it is fictitious on the part of one contracting party, the marriage is null, as is evident from c. *Tua nos*, concerning betrothals. The reason is, first, that without true consent there can be no true contract, in which matrimony is founded. Second, matrimony, as we said above, is a certain bond of mutual and perpetual love. But mutual love cannot exist without true affection and consent. Therefore neither can matrimony.

Hence, in such a case, for the marriage to become valid, the person who contracted fictitiously must truly contract and change the fictitious consent into a true one. Nor does this alone suffice to revalidate the marriage. A new

consent of the other spouse, who contracted sincerely, is also required, expressed by some external sign. Clement VIII so defined when, as Comitolius testifies in book 1 of *Responsa moralia*, resp. 5, q. 1, he was asked whether, in the case where a woman had contracted fictitiously, it would suffice for revalidating the marriage that she should give true consent and manifest it through some external sign. He answered that a new consent of both spouses was necessary before the parish priest and witnesses, the husband first being warned of the nullity of the marriage. But to avoid scandal, he dispensed so that they might contract secretly with one another by renewing their consent, and he legitimated the offspring born of such a marriage.

Second, matrimonial consent must be fully deliberate, that is, made with advertence of itself sufficient for mortal sin, because prudent judgment considers such deliberation necessary for a person to impose upon himself a grave obligation, such as the matrimonial bond.

Third, it must be expressed by some external sign. First, because matrimony is a human contract, which essentially requires internal consent expressed through an external sign and practically directed to another in a human, that is, sensible, manner. Second, because it is a sacrament, and the nature of a sacrament requires that it be a sensible sign.

Fourth, it must be free from coercion or fear. Consequently, if consent is extorted by grave fear, or fear capable of influencing a steadfast man, the marriage is invalid, not by natural law but by ecclesiastical law. Although it is more probable that every contract, and therefore even matrimony, is valid by natural law in such a case, positive law has nevertheless specially invalidated this contract, as is evident from c. *Cum locum* 14 and c. *Veniens* 15, concerning betrothals, and c. 2, *De eo qui duxit*, etc. The reason which moved the Church to this was that, since the bond of matrimony is perpetual and indissoluble, she willed its celebration to be so free and voluntary that no one should be compelled to it by the force and injustice of another. For the same reason she invalidates solemn religious vows made under fear capable of influencing a steadfast man.

From this it is gathered that marriages contracted under grave fear among unbelievers are valid, as are clandestine marriages, provided that no civil law among them invalidates such marriages, since they are not subject to the laws of the Church invalidating them.

Fifth, explicit consent to intercourse is not required for the essence and validity of matrimony. Implicit consent suffices, namely consent directed toward transferring dominion of one's own body in relation to the conjugal act. So teaches St. Thomas here, q. 48, a. 1, where he says: To consent to

matrimony is the same as implicitly, but not explicitly, consenting to carnal intercourse. For it must be understood only as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, because the power of carnal intercourse, to which consent is given, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power of using one's own thing is the cause of its use.

And in III, q. 29, a. 2, he asserts that the marriage of the Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was complete in every respect because each consented to conjugal intercourse—that is, to the conjugal bond—but not explicitly to carnal intercourse, except under the condition that it should please God.

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, for validly contracting matrimony it is not necessary that the spouses explicitly consent to carnal intercourse and will to exercise it. They may have the contrary intention and a vow never to exercise it, as the Blessed Virgin had. The reason is that carnal intercourse does not belong to the essence of matrimony, but is only the use of the power received through it. But power can be separated from use, and the power for an act can be received without any will ever to exercise it, indeed even with an express contrary will. Therefore explicit consent to intercourse does not belong to the essence of matrimony.

3. This reason is confirmed and further illustrated by the following example. Just as a twofold dominion is customarily distinguished over land, one proper and direct, the other useful as regards usufruct, and direct dominion can be separated from useful dominion and one handed over without the other, as happens when a lord gives a field to a vassal in fief or emphyteusis, for then the lord retains direct and supreme dominion for himself and transfers the usufruct or useful dominion to the vassal or usufructuary; so in matrimony direct dominion over the body of each spouse can be distinguished from useful dominion as regards the use of intercourse, and one can be separated from the other by mutual agreement between the spouses. They may grant direct dominion over their bodies while denying useful dominion as regards the use of intercourse, either for a time or perpetually.

In this manner the Blessed Virgin conducted herself toward St. Joseph, her spouse. She gave him only direct dominion over her body, not useful dominion or usufruct of her body as regards intercourse; rather, by mutual agreement, each retained this for himself or herself. There are many other examples of holy spouses who preserved virginity inviolate in marriage: Eleazar and Delphina, Edward the Confessor, King of England, and Edith, Emperor Henry and Cunegund. Greek histories also celebrate the marriage of Emperor Marcian and Pulcheria, entered into after each had pledged mutual continence.

4. From what has been said you will understand that, although the marriage celebrated between the Blessed Virgin and St. Joseph lacked a certain accidental perfection, namely conjugal intercourse and an unimpeded right to it, it was nevertheless substantially perfect, since it lacked nothing of those things required for the substance of matrimony: neither the handing over of bodies nor direct dominion over them, although by mutual consent this dominion was separated from useful dominion as regards the use of intercourse and even from explicit consent to it.

Hence St. Augustine, in book 1 of De nuptiis et concupiscentia, c. 11, acknowledges the threefold good of matrimony in that most holy union: Every good of marriage was therefore fulfilled in those parents of Christ: offspring, fidelity, and sacrament. We acknowledge the Lord Jesus himself as the offspring; fidelity, because there was no adultery; sacrament, because there was no divorce.

Furthermore, that marriage was most perfect in its own kind, since it most perfectly attained the end for which it was ordained by God. This end was not the reception of offspring through mutual intercourse, but the protection and education of the offspring formed in the womb of the Blessed Virgin by the operation of the Holy Spirit; as well as the concealment of the highest mystery and the preservation and protection of the chastity, reputation, honor, and entirely intact virginity of the Blessed Virgin.

This wonderfully commends the excellence and dignity of this most holy marriage. For whereas other marriages are ordered to the loss and destruction of the virginity of the spouses, this marriage, by a wondrous disposition of God, was instituted to preserve and protect it. A certain author beautifully expressed this by the likeness of an elm shading a vine and protecting it from the heat of the sun, with this motto added: *It protects; it does not make fruitful.*

5. Finally, considering the nature of the thing alone and setting aside ecclesiastical or civil legislation, clandestine consent is sufficient for the validity of matrimony, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 45, a. 5. He proves this from the fact that present consent between legitimate persons effects matrimony, while the other things pertain only to solemnity and are employed so that the marriage may be celebrated more fittingly.

Nevertheless, the Council of Trent, sess. 24, concerning the reform of matrimony, invalidated clandestine marriages in these words: Those who shall attempt to contract matrimony otherwise than in the presence of the parish priest, or another priest with the permission of the parish priest or ordinary, and two or three witnesses, the holy Synod renders entirely

incapable of contracting in this manner and decrees such contracts to be invalid and null, as by the present decree it invalidates and annuls them.

Concerning this decree there is a grave difficulty: how could the Church invalidate marriages made by clandestine consent and cause clandestine consent, which before the Council of Trent was sufficient matter and form of matrimony, no longer to be sufficient matter and form? For the Church does not have the power to change the matters and forms of the sacraments, since this belongs to the power of excellence which is in Christ, as we explained in the treatise on the sacraments in general.

It is answered that the Church could invalidate clandestine marriages in two ways. First, indirectly and mediately, by rendering the persons incapable of contracting, as the Council of Trent indicates in the aforesaid decree. Second, directly and immediately, by rescinding and invalidating matrimonial contracts made by clandestine consent. For since the Church is a commonwealth well ordered by Christ, she was required to possess the power of regulating the contracts of her subjects, and therefore could establish certain conditions without which such contracts would be invalid.

In this she did not change the matter or form of the sacrament of matrimony formally considered, for the matter and form of the sacrament of matrimony, even after the decree of Trent, is a legitimate contract, just as it was before. She changed it only materially, namely by causing the clandestine contract which was previously legitimate no longer to be legitimate and consequently no longer capable of elevation to the dignity of a sacrament.

Similarly, if someone possessed the power of changing water into wine, he could change the matter of the sacrament of Baptism materially, that is, by causing the thing which was true natural water no longer to be natural water and consequently no longer to be matter of the sacrament of Baptism. He would not change it formally, because it would always remain true that true and natural water is the matter of the sacrament of Baptism instituted by Christ.

6. You will ask, first, whether a marriage is valid if the parish priest is unwillingly and forcibly present at it.

I answer affirmatively. The Sacred Congregation of Cardinals interpreting the Council of Trent declared this in 1593 in these words: The Congregation of the Council judged that a marriage contracted before the parish priest and witnesses is valid, unless some other impediment exists, although the parish priest was unwillingly present and was summoned by the contracting parties for another reason than to be present at the marriage.

7. You will ask, second, whether marriages celebrated without banns are clandestine.

I answer negatively, provided that they are celebrated before the parish priest and two or three witnesses. The same Congregation of Cardinals likewise declared this in these words: *The Congregation judged that a marriage contracted without the preceding announcements is not invalid unless some other impediment exists.*

Nevertheless, those who contract marriage without the preceding banns, without dispensation or a legitimate excusing cause, sin gravely, because the matter is grave and the Council of Trent most strictly commands that such announcements precede the celebration of the marriage.

From what has been said it is gathered that clandestine marriages, that is, those performed without the presence of the parish priest and two witnesses, are valid if contracted in places in which the constitution of Trent has not been received, even if the contracting parties are travelers, and even if they deliberately went there in order to contract validly, as Sánchez, Pontius, and others teach.

Likewise, if two persons contracting clandestinely belong to different parishes, in one of which the decree of Trent has been promulgated but not in the other, the marriage is valid if celebrated in the parish in which the decree has not yet been received, as the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals declared concerning c. 1 of the decree on the reform of matrimony.

CHAPTER V.
The Indissolubility of Matrimony.

8. Indissolubility belongs to matrimony under three titles.

First, from its institution. For in instituting matrimony in the state of innocence, God gave a precept concerning its indissolubility, as is evident from the words of Gen. 2: For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and adhere to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh. Christ signified in Matt. 19 that these words were spoken by God and promulgated to posterity through Adam, when he referred them not to Adam but to God, as Augustine explains in book 9 of De Genesi ad litteram, where he says: Although Scripture testifies that these words were spoken by the first man, the Lord nevertheless declared in the Gospel that God had spoken them, so that from this we might understand that, because of the ecstasy which had preceded in Adam, he was able to speak this divinely as a prophet.

Similarly, the Council of Trent, sess. 24, at the beginning, says: *The first parent of the human race, moved by the Divine Spirit, proclaimed the perpetual and indissoluble bond of matrimony* when he said: *This now is bone of my bones*, etc. Shortly afterward it adds that Christ confirmed the firmness of that same bond, proclaimed so long before by Adam, in the words of Matt. 19: *Therefore, what God has joined, let man not separate.*

Therefore the divine precept concerning the indissolubility of matrimony, from which a dispensation had been granted through the bill of repudiation during the Mosaic law, was restored by Christ under the evangelical law to its original force. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 7: *I command, not I, but the Lord, that the wife not depart from her husband; but if she departs, let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. And let the husband not dismiss his wife*, etc.

9. Second, matrimony is indissoluble by natural law because it is by its nature ordered to the fitting generation and education of offspring. The indissolubility of marriage is required for this, since without it the education of offspring would easily be neglected and the mutual love between the spouses, necessary for the ends of matrimony, would be diminished.

Hence, as St. Thomas notes in book 3 of *Summa contra Gentiles*, c. 123, those birds for the education of whose offspring the work of both parents is required remain together until the offspring is perfectly reared and trained so that it can provide for its own necessities.

10. Third, under the evangelical law matrimony is indissoluble under a special title, namely because it was elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament signifying the twofold, most firm and entirely indissoluble union of the Word with human nature and of Christ with the Church.

Because consummated matrimony signifies those two unions more perfectly than ratified matrimony does, it also possesses a greater indissolubility. For ratified but not yet consummated matrimony can be dissolved in a certain case, namely when one of the spouses makes profession in an approved religious institute before consummation, as we shall say below. But consummated matrimony cannot be dissolved under the evangelical law in any case whatever.

11. Whether under the Mosaic law it could be dissolved through a bill of repudiation, with God dispensing from the law of nature, is a controversy among theologians. Many judge that the bill of repudiation was not permitted by Moses as lawful, but was tolerated for avoiding graver evils, just as brothels are permitted by rulers. According to this opinion, the Jews sinned in dismissing their wives, and the matrimonial bond was not dissolved through the bill of repudiation. Consequently, if the dismissed

women took new husbands, this was not a new and true marriage, but adultery. Thus teach the Master of the Sentences, St. Bonaventure, Estius, Sylvius, and others, whom St. Jerome appears to favor in his commentary on Matt. 19, concerning the words, *Moses because of the hardness*, etc.

Others teach that under the Mosaic law, with God dispensing from the natural law, the Jews were permitted to repudiate their wives not only without punishment but also lawfully, so that they did not sin in repudiating them and the conjugal bond was dissolved through the bill of repudiation. Thus teach St. Thomas in his commentary on Matt. 19, Albert the Great, Durandus, Paludanus, Bellarmine, Sánchez, and others, more commonly and more probably.

For Deut. 24 says: *If a man takes a wife and she does not find favor before his eyes because of some uncleanness, he shall write a bill of repudiation and give it into her hand, and dismiss her from his house*, etc. These words and those which follow openly signify a legal permission and power granted to the husband to repudiate his wife and to the repudiated wife to marry another. They do not signify merely the toleration of an unlawful act for avoiding a greater evil. Therefore, through the law of repudiation the Jews were permitted to dismiss their wives not only without punishment but also lawfully.

Hence nowhere in the whole of Scripture is it read that those who repudiated their wives while observing the manner prescribed by Moses were rebuked, or that the marriages of repudiated women with other men were condemned or regarded as adulteries.

Nor is it an objection that the law prohibiting a repudiated woman who had married another from being received again by her former husband after the death of the second gives this reason for the prohibition: *Because she has been polluted and made abominable before the Lord*. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 67, a. 4, ad 5, the repudiated woman who married another is called polluted and abominable before the Lord legally, in the manner in which under the same Mosaic law one who touched a dead body or a leper was called unclean, not with the uncleanness of guilt, but with that of a certain legal irregularity.

Nor does it avail that Christ says in Matt. 19 that Moses permitted the Jews to dismiss their wives because of *the hardness of their hearts*. By these words he signifies only that the hardness of their hearts was the occasion of the permission. He does not intend to say that the permission itself was not a true and positive concession to dismiss a wife, but merely a toleration for avoiding graver evils.

12. Although matrimony under the evangelical law is indissoluble under the three titles explained above, there are nevertheless two cases in which it can be dissolved by a special dispensation of Christ, granted in favor of the faith or of the religious state.

The first occurs when, of two unbelieving spouses, one is converted to the faith and the other does not wish to live peacefully with the convert and without injury to the Creator. In that case it is lawful for the spouse converted to the faith to leave the unbeliever and, if desired, to enter another marriage.

Innocent III so defines in c. Quanto, concerning divorce, where he says: If one of two unbelieving spouses is converted to the Catholic faith, while the other is unwilling to live with the convert either at all, or without blasphemy against the divine name, or without seeking to draw the convert into mortal sin, the convert can, if desired, enter a second marriage.

This privilege, conceded by Christ in favor of the faith and the Christian religion, is deduced from the words of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 7: If any brother has an unbelieving wife and she consents to live with him, let him not dismiss her. But if the unbeliever departs, let him depart, for the brother or sister is not subject to servitude in such matters.

According to the common explanation of the Doctors, the final words signify that, if the unbelieving spouse spontaneously withdraws out of hatred for the Christian religion, the faithful spouse is not subject to servitude so as to be required to remain unmarried, but can marry another. This must be said all the more if the unbeliever remains with the faithful spouse but with injury to the Creator and spiritual harm to the converted spouse, because this is worse than departure.

But if the unbeliever is unwilling to be converted, yet is prepared to live peacefully with the one converted to the faith and without injury to the Creator, the convert cannot, according to St. Thomas here, q. 59, a. 5, enter a second marriage. For Christ did not concede this privilege to converted unbelievers except in favor of the faith, which in that case is not endangered.

13. The second case occurs when one of the spouses, before consummation of the marriage, enters a religious institute approved by the Church and makes profession in it. The bond of a ratified and unconsummated marriage is then dissolved by a special privilege of Christ conceded in favor of the religious state, as is evident from the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 6, where it is stated: *If anyone says that a ratified but unconsummated marriage is not dissolved by the solemn religious profession of one of the spouses, let him be anathema.*

Innocent III had previously defined this in c. Ex parte secunda, concerning the conversion of spouses, where he declares: Before the marriage has been consummated through carnal intercourse, one of the spouses is permitted, without consulting the other, to enter religious life, so that the one remaining can from that time lawfully be joined to another.

Alexander III asserts the same in c. *Verum* and c. *Ex publico*, under the same title, and grants the wife, and the same must be held of the husband, a period of two months during which she is not bound to consummate the marriage, but may deliberate whether she wishes to enter religious life. After this period has elapsed, the spouses are bound mutually to render the debt if it is demanded.

No reason for this privilege can be assigned other than the will of Christ, dispensing in favor of religious life from the natural and evangelical law concerning the indissolubility of matrimony. St. Thomas nevertheless gives this fittingness in IV Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, qu. 2, in the body: Before carnal intercourse, there is only a spiritual bond between the spouses; but afterward there is also a carnal bond between them. Therefore, just as after carnal intercourse matrimony is dissolved by bodily death, so before carnal intercourse it is dissolved by entrance into religious life, because religious life is a certain spiritual death by which one, dying to the world, lives to God.

14. You will ask, first, whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a ratified but unconsummated marriage and dissolve its bond.

I answer that the affirmative opinion is probable because of the deeds of certain pontiffs who dispensed in ratified marriages; nevertheless, the negative opinion appears more probable.

First, because if the Supreme Pontiff cannot, as all admit, dispense from the prohibition of polygamy either before or after consummation of the marriage, much less can he dispense from indissolubility. For dissolubility is more opposed to the nature and end of matrimony than polygamy, because to dissolve a marriage is altogether to destroy it, since it consists essentially in a bond, whereas to add a second wife to the first does not altogether destroy it.

15. Second, the chief reason which moves the adversaries to assert that Christ left the Supreme Pontiff the power of dispensing in a ratified marriage is that this appears expedient for the public good of the Church and the spiritual salvation of souls. But this reason would also prove that the Pope received from Christ the power of dispensing from the prohibition of polygamy and in consummated marriage, because the public good of the Church could likewise appear to require that the pontiff be able to dispense in those cases.

For example, a Christian prince might have married a barren wife, and unless he left heirs to the kingdom, another prince who was an unbeliever or heretic would succeed him. Therefore the principal foundation of the contrary opinion collapses. Hence several learned and pious pontiffs judged that opinion less probable and constantly refused to reduce it to practice and to dispense in a ratified marriage, as is reported of Innocent VIII, Adrian VI, and Pius V.

16. You will ask, second, whether the matrimonial bond is dissolved because of the adultery of one spouse.

I answer negatively. The Council of Trent defines this in sess. 24, can. 7, in these words: If anyone says that the Church errs when she has taught, according to the evangelical and apostolic doctrine, that the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved because of the adultery of one of the spouses, and so forth, let him be anathema.

Reason also supports this. For if the marital bond were dissolved through adultery, the adulterous spouse would thereby open for herself the way to a second marriage. Consequently, the one dismissed because of adultery would be in a better condition than an innocent spouse who was dismissed, which is absurd.

17. Nor is this opposed by the words of Christ in Matt. 19: *Whoever dismisses his wife, except because of fornication, and marries another, commits adultery.* Through this exception, *except because of fornication*, Christ did not intend to signify that one who dismisses his wife because of fornication and marries another does not commit adultery.

For, as Jansen of Ghent and others rightly noted, the exception does not affect the whole sentence, but only its first part, and produces this meaning: *Whoever dismisses his wife*—which is not lawful except because of fornication —*and marries another, commits adultery.*

If you object that separation as regards the marital bed can take place for causes other than fornication and, consequently, that the exception of fornication must be understood not of separation as regards the bed but as regards the bond, I answer by denying the consequence. Although there are other causes of separation as regards the bed, Christ there mentioned fornication alone because, since it entails a division of flesh from flesh, it is a cause directly and of itself opposed to matrimony, whereas other causes are opposed only accidentally to conjugal society. They do not divide it under a special title, but under a title common to every society.

18. But if someone contends that the aforesaid exception refers to the whole sentence of Christ, those words can be interpreted with Blessed Martial, disciple of St. Peter, in epistle 2 to the people of Toulouse, c. 9, as

follows: Whoever dismisses his wife, unless he does so because of fornication, commits adultery; and whoever marries another commits adultery. The former commits adultery through the adultery of another, by giving his wife an occasion of committing adultery; the latter commits adultery through his own act, by knowing one who is not his own wife.

This conforms to the other words of Christ in Matt. 5: Everyone who dismisses his wife, except for the cause of fornication, causes her to commit adultery; and whoever marries a woman who has been dismissed commits adultery.

19. From this you will understand that the practice of the Greeks, who dissolve marriages because of fornication, deserves correction. Hence in the Acts of the Council of Florence it is related that, after the definition of faith had been issued and confirmed by the signatures of all the bishops of the Church, Eugene IV, Supreme Pontiff, addressed the Greeks as follows:

By God's favor, brothers, we are united in faith. Since, therefore, by the hidden judgments of God I am the head among you who are members, and must in some manner admonish and instruct you by counsels concerning those things which appear to strengthen piety and our Church, I propose certain matters to you as brothers and as teachers of the Churches. First, I say that everyone complains about the dissolution of marriages, and this requires correction, etc.

The prelates answered this point: *We dissolve marriages not without just causes.* In various other questions the Greeks gave satisfaction, but not in two, one of which was their practice, in no way approved by the Church, of customarily dissolving marriages in the case of adultery.

CHAPTER VI.
On the Impediments to Marriage.

Some impediments to marriage are called merely prohibitive, because they prevent a marriage from being contracted lawfully, but do not invalidate it once contracted. Others are called diriment, not because they dissolve a marriage already made and validly contracted, as the terms themselves seem to signify, for it is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter that the bond of a marriage contracted between the faithful but not yet consummated is dissolved by religious profession alone, but because they cause marriage to be contracted not only unlawfully but also invalidly. This twofold class of impediments must be treated briefly here.

§ 1.
On Prohibitive Impediments.

1. Twelve prohibitive impediments are commonly enumerated. Some arise from natural or positive law, and others from crime. Five belong to the first class and are contained in these verses:

The Church's prohibition, likewise the forbidden season,
And catechism, betrothal, and add also a vow:
They prevent marriages from being made, but permit those made to stand.

The first prohibitive impediment, therefore, is *the Church's prohibition*, that is, a prohibition imposed by an ecclesiastical superior. It may be either general and common to all the faithful, such as the prohibition against contracting marriage without prior banns or a dispensation from them, or particular, as when a person is, for a just cause, individually prohibited from marrying.

The second is *the forbidden season*, that is, a certain time of year during which the Church forbids marriages to be celebrated.

The third is *catechism*, that is, the spiritual kinship arising from catechesis or instruction in the faith, which is customarily given before baptism. For from this there is contracted a certain imperfect spiritual kinship, which is an impediment to marriage. Nevertheless, many think that this impediment was abolished by the Council of Trent, sess. 24, *De matrimonio*, c. 2, where it is expressly decreed that spiritual kinship is not contracted in baptism except between the sponsors and the baptized person and that person's father and mother, and likewise between the minister of baptism and the baptized person and the latter's father and mother. It makes no mention whatever of catechism or of one who acts as sponsor in catechism.

The fourth impediment is *betrothal*, or a promise of future marriage made to someone. For one who has contracted a betrothal with one woman cannot, without mortal sin, marry another unless, for a just cause, he dissolves the promise made to the first.

The fifth is a simple vow of religious life or chastity, or of receiving sacred orders, or of not entering marriage. Such a vow prevents the person who made it from contracting marriage lawfully, but not from contracting it validly. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae*, Suppl., q. 53, a. 1: *A simple vow is only a promise. But a thing merely promised to another still remains*

under the dominion of the one promising it, and can validly, although unlawfully, be given by him to someone else.

2. The other seven prohibitive impediments, which arise from crime, are enumerated in these verses:

Incest, the abduction of another's betrothed, the killing of a wife,
The reception of one's own child, the killing of a priest,
Or if one undergoes solemn penance, or takes a nun:
These prohibit the marriage to be contracted.

The sixth prohibitive impediment, therefore, is *incest*. Although it invalidates marriage between those who committed it, as we shall say in § 3, it does not invalidate marriage with others, but merely prohibits it.

The seventh is *the abduction of another's betrothed*. This crime also belongs to those for which marriage was forbidden under the ancient law, as is clear from cap. *Statutum*, 27, q. 8, where it is said: *It was decreed by the sacred council*, namely the Council of Toledo, or rather of Rheims, from which that chapter was taken, *that if anyone abducts another man's betrothed, he is to be punished with public penance and is to remain without hope of marriage.* After the Council of Trent, this impediment not only prohibits the contracting of marriage, but also invalidates a marriage contracted, or renders it null, as we shall say below.

The eighth is *the killing of a wife*, that is, uxoricide. If it is committed with the intention of proceeding to another marriage, it is a diriment impediment, as will appear below. But if it is committed from hatred, anger, or vengeance, it is merely prohibitive. For one who kills his wife is deprived of the hope of marriage, cap. *Interfectores*, cap. *Quicumque*, and cap. *Admonemus*, 33, q. 1. What we have said of uxoricide must likewise be said of the killing of a husband, because, as Paludanus rightly says, IV, dist. 37, q. 2, a law established for one correlative extends to the other whenever the same reason applies to both. But the same reason applies to the killing of a husband as to the killing of a wife. Therefore the Church punishes both crimes with the same penalty of perpetual deprivation of marriage.

The ninth is *the reception of one's own offspring*. This occurs when one or both spouses receive their own child from the sacred font for the purpose of defrauding the marriage, that is, with the intention of depriving the other spouse of the marital debt by reason of the spiritual affinity thereby arising between them. As punishment for this fraud, the offender is rendered incapable, after the death of the spouse, of proceeding to another marriage, as is clear from can. *De eo*, 30, q. 1.

The tenth is the killing of a priest, as is clear from can. Presbyterum, De poenitentia et remissione, where it is said: One who kills a priest and is

convicted of that crime shall, until the last moment of his life, be deprived of the military belt and shall remain without hope of marriage.

The eleventh is public and solemn penance. While this continued, marriage was formerly forbidden to penitents, as is clear from canon 21 of the Second Council of Arles and from cap. *Antiquis*, 33, q. 2.

The twelfth and final prohibitive impediment is a sacrilegiously attempted marriage with a nun, as is stated in cap. Hi ergo, 27, q. 1, where it is decreed that those who, knowingly and to the injury of Christ, have been joined in marriage to women consecrated to God, are to be separated according to the severity demanded by Christian zeal; that permission to be bound by the marital bond is never to be granted to them; and that, as long as they live, they are to afflict themselves greatly with the lamentations of penance. Consequently, they are to abstain from every marriage throughout their whole lives, since, as we saw above, marriage could not be entered while public and solemn penance continued. Several of these impediments no longer remain in force, but have been abrogated by contrary custom.

§ 2.
On Diriment Impediments.

3. The impediments that invalidate marriage, or render it null, are fourteen and are contained in these verses:

Error, condition, vow, kinship, crime,
Disparity of worship, force, Orders, a prior bond, public propriety,
If you are related by affinity, or if perhaps you cannot consummate,
If the presence of the pastor and of two witnesses is lacking,
Or if the woman has been abducted and not restored to a place of safety:
These prohibit marriages from being joined and invalidate those already made.

The first diriment impediment, therefore, is *error* concerning the identity of the person, or concerning other things essentially belonging to marriage. Such error removes consent to the essentials of marriage and consequently invalidates it and renders it null, as also occurs in other contracts, in which an error concerning the substance of the contract renders it null by natural law, as when someone sells barley for wheat, brass for gold, or glass for a precious stone. Hence, if someone contracts with Martha while thinking that she is Mary, the marriage is null by natural law itself. It is otherwise if the error does not concern the substance, but only a quality of the person, for example, if one thinks that one is marrying a

beautiful, noble, or wealthy woman who is in fact deformed, ignoble, and poor. Nevertheless, if the error concerning a quality redounds to an error concerning the person, which occurs when the quality is directly intended together with the person, it invalidates the marriage. For example, if a woman contracts with someone whom she believes to be a prince, intending both the person and the dignity together as one integral and total object, the marriage is invalid if he is not in fact a prince.

The second is condition, meaning the state of servitude. For if someone believes that he is contracting with a free woman, but contracts with a slave woman, the marriage is null by civil and canon law, as is clear from Authenticum, De nuptiis, § Si vero decretum, and from cap. Si quis ingenuus, 29, q. 2, c. 1. St. Thomas gives the reason in Summa Theologiae, Suppl., q. 52, a. 1, where he says: In the contract of marriage, one spouse is bound to the other to render the marital debt. Therefore, if the one who binds himself is incapable of rendering it, ignorance of this incapacity in the person to whom the obligation is made destroys the contract. Now, just as a person is rendered incapable of rendering the debt by impotence to consummate, so that he cannot render it at all, so also by servitude he is rendered incapable of rendering it freely. Therefore, just as unknown impotence to consummate impedes marriage, although it does not do so if it is known, so the condition of servitude impedes marriage.

The third is *a vow*. By this is understood a solemn religious vow, which not only prohibits the contracting of marriage, but also invalidates it and renders it null, as was defined by Alexander III in cap. *Meminimus*; by Innocent III in cap. *Finali*, *Qui clerici vel voventes*; by Boniface VIII in cap. unico, *De voto*, in VI; and most recently by the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 9.

There is, however, a difficulty and controversy among theologians as to whether it invalidates marriage by natural law or only by human ecclesiastical law. But the more probable opinion seems to be that of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae*, Suppl., q. 52, a. 2; II-II, q. 88, a. 11; *Quodlibeta* III, a. 18; and *Quodlibeta* X, a. 11, where he teaches that a solemn religious vow has, by natural law or by its own nature, the power to invalidate a marriage contracted. He proves this by the following argument. Natural law dictates that one who has once given something entirely to another, and whose gift has been accepted by that other, cannot afterward deliver the same thing to someone else. But by a solemn religious vow, the one making the vow gives himself entirely to God and delivers his body to him for perpetual continence, and this gift and surrender are accepted by God through religious superiors. Therefore natural law dictates that he cannot

deliver his body to another in marriage for a use contrary to the vow by which he gave and delivered it to God.

4. Nor is the claim of Martinon, disp. 74, sect. 3, n. 34, of any force, namely, that although religious profession contains a certain surrender of oneself, it does not contain an absolute surrender naturally incompatible with marriage. For, just as a voluntary or purchased slave is not so delivered to his master that he is deprived of his natural right to enter marriage, even against his master's will, so one professed in an approved religious institute does not so deliver himself to God and to religion that, as far as the nature of the thing is concerned, he cannot validly, although unlawfully, contract marriage.

This answer, I say, is of no force. For even if religious profession does not imply an absolute surrender of oneself to God and to religion, it nevertheless implies the surrender of oneself to live chastely. But the surrender of oneself to live chastely is by its nature incompatible with marriage, since marriage is the surrender of oneself for carnal union. Therefore religious profession implies a surrender naturally incompatible with marriage and consequently has the power to invalidate it by natural law or by its own nature, and not merely by positive ecclesiastical law.

This is confirmed because a solemn vow of chastity is annexed to the clerical state by ecclesiastical law alone. The Pope can therefore, while leaving a cleric in his clerical state, dispense him so that he may contract marriage, or may use a marriage already contracted, as is clear in the case of Greek priests who, by the Church's dispensation, make use of a marriage entered before sacred ordination. Therefore, likewise, if a solemn religious vow had the power to prohibit the contracting of marriage and invalidate one contracted, not by its own nature but solely by the constitution of the Church, the Pope could remove this power from a solemn vow by removing the ecclesiastical precept while nevertheless leaving the vow in its subject. Consequently, he could bring it about that a monk, while remaining a monk, might marry and have a wife and children in the monastery. This is openly contrary to Innocent III in cap. *Cum ad monasterium*, *De statu monachorum*, where he says: *The renunciation of property, like the observance of chastity, is so annexed to the monastic rule that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant permission contrary to it.*

5. You will object first: Boniface VIII, when asked by the Bishop of Béziers what vow ought to be called solemn and effective for invalidating marriage, answers in cap. unico, De voto et voti redemptione, in VI: Since the solemnity of a vow was introduced solely by the constitution of the Church, whereas the bond of marriage is from God himself, that vow must

be called solemn which is solemnized by the reception of sacred Orders or by profession in an approved religious institute. Here the Pontiff expressly asserts that the solemnity of a vow is from the constitution of the Church alone and that in this it differs from the bond of marriage, which is immediately from God himself.

I answer that the solemnity of a vow is twofold. One is substantial and consists in the surrender of oneself, made into the hands of a superior, for the observance of the things promised, and in the acceptance made by that superior in the name of God. The other is accidental and ceremonial, consisting in the manner and ceremonies with which, by the Church's ordinance, that surrender and acceptance are made. In the cited passage, the Pontiff is not speaking of the first solemnity of a vow, but only of the second.

Nor is it of any force to say that from accidental solemnity it cannot be determined what vow ought to be called solemn and effective for invalidating marriage. For although this cannot be gathered and determined from it *a priori* and as from a cause, it can nevertheless be determined *a posteriori* and as from a sign, since the Church does not customarily employ for simple vows those ceremonies and accidental solemnities that are employed for solemn vows.

6. You will say: If the Supreme Pontiff were to decree that the vows made in some approved religious institute were not solemn, they would in fact not be solemn. Therefore not only the accidental but also the substantial solemnity of solemn vows depends upon the Church and consequently is not of divine law, but only of ecclesiastical law.

I deny the consequence. Although the Church can bring it about that a marriage which was formerly true and legitimate is no longer such, by imposing certain conditions without which it is not valid, as is clear in clandestine marriages, which were rendered invalid by the Council of Trent, it cannot be concluded from this that the substance and essence of marriage depend upon the will of the Church rather than upon the institution of Christ. Likewise, although a solemn vow depends upon the Church as regards certain conditions, for example, that it be made at a certain age, in a religious institute, and into the hands of a certain superior, so that it is not valid without them, it does not follow that the substance itself of a solemn vow is not of divine law and consequently independent of the Church.

7. You will object second: The Supreme Pontiff cannot dispense in matters belonging to natural law. But he has sometimes dispensed religious persons under profession so that they might contract marriage, as is clear from various histories. For we read in certain authors that a dispensation was once granted to a certain King of Aragon who had been a monk, and also

to a King of Poland, as seems to be established from an epitaph of his said to be at Dijon in the monastery of St. Benignus, whose words are: *Here lies the illustrious and devout lord, formerly Duke of Poland, who, after being a monk of this monastery for many years, was dispensed by the Pope in order to assume the kingdom of Poland. He died in the city of Strasbourg, wishing to be buried here, in the year of the Lord 1328, on 1 May.* Therefore a solemn religious vow invalidates marriage not by natural law, but only by positive ecclesiastical law.

To this objection, conceding the major premise, I deny the minor premise. In answer to its proof, I say first that these histories are fabulous, or at least highly doubtful, as was shown at length in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*. Second, even granting that they are true, I say that the aforesaid permissions or concessions were not true dispensations, but rather declarations that the vow of chastity did not bind in the aforesaid cases, and indeed was not properly a vow, since it did not concern the better good.

Thus Maldonado says in the Tractatus de Sacramentis, on the impediment of a vow, q. 3: Certain cases may arise in which the Church does not indeed dispense from a solemn vow, but, by an equitable interpretation, declares that the person who made the vow is not bound by it. For there is a general rule, gathered from divine and natural law, that a vow concerning a lesser good yields to a vow concerning a greater good. And since it must not be left to the private judgment of each person whether some good that may arise is greater than the observance of perpetual chastity, to which he has bound himself by a solemn vow, but this must be left to the judgment of the whole Church, the Pontiff can declare that in such a case the person is not bound to observe the vow. We must believe that this is what one Pope did with the King of Aragon and another with the King of Poland, because they judged the public good of the whole kingdom to be more excellent than the private good of one monk. But this is not properly a dispensation, for a dispensation occurs when the vow remains intact and someone is freed from its obligation.

Thus Maldonado, who by these words overturns the principal foundation of the other theologians of the Society and clearly resolves the argument that they regard as decisive.

§ 3.
Other Diriment Impediments Briefly Explained.

8. The fourth diriment impediment is *kinship*, which is threefold: carnal, spiritual, and legal. Carnal kinship, which is also called consanguinity, that is, mutual unity of blood, is defined by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae*, Suppl., q. 54, a. 1, as *a bond between persons descending from the same stock, contracted through carnal propagation*.

Spiritual kinship is that which arises from spiritual generation, which occurs through the sacrament of Baptism or Confirmation, and it is twofold. The first is in the manner of paternity between the minister of Baptism or Confirmation, who stands as father, and the baptized or confirmed person, who stands as child. The second is in the manner of co-parenthood between the minister of Baptism or Confirmation and the parents of the baptized or confirmed person. This same twofold spiritual kinship is also contracted by godfathers and godmothers who raise the child from the sacred font or act as sponsors for the confirmed person.

No spiritual kinship is contracted through the other sacraments, although through the sacrament of Penance something similar to spiritual kinship arises, as is stated in cap. *Omnis*, 30, q. 1. For this reason, some think that a sin of lust between a confessor and a penitent possesses a special malice, as a kind of spiritual incest or sacrilege against the reverence due to the sacrament.

Finally, legal kinship is defined as a relationship arising from the adoption of someone as a child. By ecclesiastical and civil law it invalidates marriage, for cap. unico, *De cognatione legali*, says: *If a woman begins to be my sister by adoption, as long as the adoption continues, marriage cannot exist between me and her.*

9. To calculate the degrees of consanguinity easily, three rules must be observed from St. Thomas, a. 2 of the cited question.

The first is: In the direct ascending line, there are as many degrees as there are persons descending from one stock, excluding the stock itself. For example, a father and son are indeed two persons, but, the father being excluded, the son remains in the first degree. Thus not only a father and son, but also a brother and sister, are consanguineous to one another in the first degree; and a grandfather and a grandson through his son are in the second.

The second rule is this: In the equal collateral line, persons are as many degrees distant from each other as each is distant from the common stock. Hence the children of two brothers are in the second degree of consanguinity, because they are two degrees distant from their grandfather, who is their common stock.

The third rule is: In a transverse or collateral but unequal line, collaterals are distant from each other in the degree in which the more remote person is distant from the common stock. Hence, if that person is three degrees distant, they are in the third degree of consanguinity.

The degrees of consanguinity are counted in this manner in canon law. Civil law differs from canon law in that it counts as many degrees in the collateral line as there are persons on both sides. Therefore, since a brother and sister are two persons, it places them in the second degree, and first cousins in the fourth, because the cousins and their parents, proceeding from one stock, together constitute four persons. Then, in the unequal transverse line, it places a grandson and great-grandson in the fifth degree, because of the corresponding number of persons or generations on both sides.

Canon law, however, counts only the generations on one side descending from the common stock, and therefore places brothers and sisters in the first degree and first cousins in the second. The reason for this difference between canon and civil law is given by Alexander III in can. *Ad Sedem*, 35, q. 5. Canon law considers degrees of consanguinity in relation to contracting marriage, which cannot be contracted except between two persons, and therefore counts those two terminal persons together in one degree. Civil law, however, considers such degrees in relation to inheritance, so that it may be transferred from one person to another, and therefore assigns a separate degree to each person.

10. The fifth diriment impediment is *crime*. By this is understood, first, the killing of the other spouse, which prevents the surviving spouse from marrying the perpetrator of the killing if the survivor conspired with that person to bring about the death, or if the survivor had previously committed adultery with that person, even without a conspiracy to cause death.

Second, by crime is understood adultery committed with a promise of future marriage to the adulteress after the death of one's own wife, or with a present contract of marriage entered with her, although null, as is clear from cap. Finali, De eo qui duxit, where it is said: If anyone, while his wife is living, pledged his word that he would marry another woman, or contracted with her in fact, and if he knew her carnally neither before nor afterward while his lawful wife survived, then although penance must be imposed on both of

them because they sinned gravely in this matter, the marriage which he contracted with her after his wife's death is not to be dissolved. It ought not, however, to be tolerated if, either before or afterward, while his wife was living, he had defiled that woman by adultery.

Here the Pontiff requires the conjunction of two things in order for this impediment to be incurred, namely adultery and a pledge to contract marriage after the death of one's wife, or a present contract with the woman whom one desires to take as wife. Hence, if these are separated from each other, and there is adultery without any pledge to contract, or a pledge to contract without adultery and carnal union, this impediment is not incurred.

11. The sixth diriment impediment is *disparity of worship*, namely, when a baptized person enters marriage with an unbaptized person, or conversely. Such a marriage is null by the ancient tradition and custom of the Church.

The first reason for invalidating it was the danger of abandoning the faith. For who can doubt, says Tertullian in Ad uxorem II, that faith is daily effaced by intercourse with an unbeliever? Evil conversations corrupt good morals; how much more a shared life and inseparable companionship?

The second reason was the difficulty of educating the children born of the marriage well and devoutly.

The third was the perpetual occasion for discord between the spouses because of the diversity of religion. *For how can charity agree if faith disagrees?* as Ambrose rightly says in *De Abraham* I, c. 9.

The seventh diriment impediment is *force*, or coercion opposed to the freedom necessary for the validity of marriage, concerning which we spoke above in Chapter III.

The eighth is *Orders*, which must be understood of sacred Orders. By ecclesiastical law, sacred Orders invalidate a subsequent marriage, as is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 24, can. 9, but not by natural law, as does a solemn vow made in an approved religious institute. Hence, although the Supreme Pontiff cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by religious profession, he can dispense from one solemnized by the reception of sacred Orders. St. Thomas gives the reason for this distinction in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 88, a. 11. The vow of chastity is annexed to sacred Orders not essentially, but solely by the constitution of the Church. This arises because in such a vow there is only an imperfect surrender, since it is directly and principally ordered only to ministering at the altar. The vow of chastity is, however, essentially annexed to the religious state, because in that state a perfect surrender is made.

The ninth diriment impediment is *a prior bond*, that is, the bond of an earlier marriage. While it continues, a second marriage is invalid by divine

law, because, as was shown above, polygamy and repudiation were abolished by Christ under the law of the Gospel, and marriage was restored to monogamy and indissolubility, as it was in the beginning when it was instituted by God in the earthly paradise.

The tenth is *public propriety*, which is a certain relationship arising from betrothal and causes one betrothed person to be unable to contract marriage with the blood relatives of the other. For it is equitable and consonant with propriety that, since marriage is begun in betrothal, one who has entered a betrothal with a woman should be unable to be joined in marriage to her blood relatives. This prohibition, however, does not extend beyond the first degree, according to the Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 3.

The eleventh is *affinity*, which is a connection or relationship arising from carnal union between a woman and the blood relatives of the man with whom she has been united, and likewise between a man and the female blood relatives of the woman with whom he has been united. Affinity arising from lawful or marital union extends to the fourth degree inclusively. That arising from unlawful union extends only to the second degree inclusively, according to the Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 4, *De reformatione matrimonii*, which restricted the ancient law under which such affinity extended to the fourth degree.

If affinity precedes marriage, it invalidates the marriage by ecclesiastical law, or renders it null. But if it arises after a marriage has already been contracted, as sometimes occurs through unlawful union with the spouse's blood relatives in the first or second degree, the marriage is not dissolved by it, but only its use is impeded. The person who had the incestuous union is deprived of the right to request the marital debt, unless a dispensation has first been obtained, which the bishop can grant. Nevertheless, that person is not deprived of the ability to render the debt, lest the innocent party be punished for the crime of the other.

12. This impediment is not of natural law, but of ecclesiastical law. Hence the Church can dispense from it, as she has frequently done, even in the first degree of affinity. Alexander VI dispensed Henry VIII, King of England, so that he might marry Catherine, the wife of his deceased brother Arthur. Clement VII, after consulting theologians and canonists from the universities of nearly all Europe, declared this dispensation lawful and valid. Likewise, Innocent X dispensed Casimir, King of Poland, so that he might marry Maria Gonzaga, Princess of Mantua, the wife of his deceased brother.

The Church has never, however, dispensed in the first degree of affinity in the direct line, so that a stepson might have his stepmother as wife, a stepdaughter her stepfather, a father-in-law his daughter-in-law, or a mother-

in-law her son-in-law. Because a certain indecency appears in these marriages, no Catholic has ever attempted to enter them or requested a dispensation from the Apostolic See. Hence many think, not improbably, that such marriages are invalidated by natural law.

The twelfth diriment impediment is impotence to consummate. For by natural law a contract is null by which someone binds himself to something that he cannot carry out and provide. If, however, it is doubtful whether this impotence is perpetual or only temporary, the marriage is not dissolved, but the Church grants the spouses a period of three years to test the matter. If that time passes without result, the impotence is judged perpetual, and the marriage can be dissolved, or declared invalid.

13. In addition to these twelve impediments invalidating marriage, two others were added by the Council of Trent, namely clandestinity and abduction. For in sess. 24, decree *De reformatione matrimonii*, c. 1, it decreed that henceforth a marriage could not be contracted except in the presence of the pastor and of two or three witnesses. This was treated at length above in Chapter III when discussing clandestine consent. Likewise, in c. 6 of the same decree, it determines that no marriage can exist between the abductor and the abducted woman as long as she remains in the abductor's power.

14. To complete this Treatise, you will ask whether kings and supreme princes have the power to invalidate marriages not only insofar as they are civil contracts, but also insofar as they possess the character of a sacrament, or to prevent certain marriage contracts from attaining sacramental dignity.

I answer that they cannot do this directly and in itself, but they can do so indirectly and incidentally.

The reason for the first part of this resolution is clear. Since the laws of princes are purely human and political, they cannot directly and in themselves reach matters belonging to divine or ecclesiastical law, such as the sacraments.

The second part is established by the following reason. Christ willed that only those marriage contracts that are lawful and legitimate be raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and not those that are illegitimate, unlawful, or contrary to divine or human laws. But kings and supreme princes can bring it about by their laws that certain marriage contracts which were formerly lawful and legitimate become unlawful and illegitimate. Therefore they can, at least indirectly and incidentally, bring it about that such contracts do not attain sacramental dignity, but lack and are deprived of it.

The major premise is clear. The minor premise is proved from St. Thomas in Scriptum super Sententiis IV, dist. 34, q. unica, a. 1, ad 4, where he says: Marriage, insofar as it is an office of nature, is established by natural

law; insofar as it is a sacrament, it is established by divine law; and insofar as it is an office of the community, it is established by civil law. Therefore, under any of the aforesaid laws, a person can be rendered incapable of contracting marriage lawfully.

Again, in Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 78, he reasons as follows: It must be considered that when something is ordered to diverse ends, it must have diverse principles directing it to those ends, because an agent must be proportioned to its end. Human generation is ordered to many things: to the perpetuity of the species; to the perpetuity of some political good, such as the people in a city; and also to the perpetuity of the Church, which consists in the gathering of the faithful. Hence such generation must be directed by diverse authorities. Insofar as it is ordered to the good of nature, which is the perpetuity of the species, it is directed to its end by nature, which inclines it to this end, and thus it is called an office of nature. Insofar as it is ordered to the political good, it is subject to the ordinance of civil law. But insofar as it is ordered to the good of the Church, it must be subject to ecclesiastical governance.

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, a marriage contract can be rendered illegitimate and unlawful not only by natural or ecclesiastical law, but also by the civil law of a prince prohibiting it. Hence, just as marriage contracts contrary to natural law, for example because they are unwilling and coerced, or contrary to ecclesiastical law, for example because they are clandestine, are not raised to the dignity of a sacrament, neither are those which depart from the laws of princes and are invalidated or prohibited by them.

This is confirmed. Since the Church does not have power over the matter or form of the sacraments, clandestine marriages could have been invalidated by the Council of Trent and prevented from possessing sacramental character only because the Council could render them unlawful and illegitimate, although they had previously been lawful and legitimate, as we explained above in Chapter IV. Therefore, if secular princes can bring about the same result, they cannot be denied the power to prevent, at least indirectly and incidentally, certain marriage contracts from attaining the character and dignity of a sacrament.

This is further confirmed. When the foundation is destroyed, the structure built upon it must likewise be destroyed. But the basis and foundation of the sacrament of marriage is a valid and lawful marriage contract, since Christ willed that this contract alone be raised to sacramental dignity. Therefore, if kings and supreme princes can destroy such a foundation and render a particular marriage contract invalid and

unlawful, they can incidentally and indirectly prevent a marriage contract from attaining sacramental character and dignity.

15. It must nevertheless be observed that Christian princes never, or only very rarely, make use of such power, either because they voluntarily ceded its use to the Church, as Peter Soto says in *De matrimonio*, lect. 4, or, as others hold, because the Church reserved the use of such power to herself for just causes.

From this another celebrated controversy among theologians and jurists can easily be resolved, namely, whether the marriages of children under paternal authority, entered without the father's consent and prohibited and invalidated by an ordinance issued by Henry III, King of France, at the Estates of Blois, a. 40, possess sacramental character or lack and are deprived of it. It must be said that, notwithstanding such an edict or ordinance, those marriages do not lack sacramental character.

The reason is that laws bind only according to the will and intention of the legislator, as we showed in the Treatise on Laws. Henry III, who enacted this law, and his successors, who approved and confirmed it, did not will that these marriages be rendered invalid and null with regard to their sacramental character. Rather, they restricted and intended the entire declaration of nullity and invalidity to remain within the limits of certain merely civil effects or penalties. Thus, such children under paternal authority were not to be admitted to the civil actions of the forum that might arise from the force of marriage contracts and agreements, and the children born of such a union were to be regarded as illegitimate both with regard to honors and with regard to succession.

16. That this is the true intention and meaning of this royal ordinance or constitution is clear, both because, as we have said, Christian princes never, or only very rarely, make use of the power they possess to invalidate marriage contracts with regard to their sacramental character, and also from what is contained in the third volume of the acts and decrees of the French clergy.

It is there related that, when His Most Christian Majesty Louis XIII caused his public edict of January 1629 to be promulgated, renewed in it the aforesaid article 40 of the Edict of Blois, and commanded ecclesiastical judges in article 29 to judge marriage cases in conformity with it, the Gallican clergy, then holding their assembly in Paris, humbly addressed the King in these words:

The King is most humbly petitioned to consider the great importance of this article, which requires an explanation for the resolution of two difficulties. The first is that the words "marriage validly or invalidly

contracted" are to be understood only in relation to the civil contract and in no way in relation to the spiritual contract of the sacrament. The second is that ecclesiastics are not to be bound to judge according to the articles of this Edict and of the Edict of Blois, but according to the sacred canons and ecclesiastical decrees, which are the sole rule and norm for the judgment of ecclesiastics. For they cannot and ought not to borrow from laymen the jurisdiction which they possess from God alone concerning spiritual matters. It is therefore necessary to remove these words from the article: "And ecclesiastical judges shall be bound in causes of this kind to judge the marriage according to the norm of this article."

In response to this humble petition, His Most Christian Majesty entrusted the duty of replying to the Great Chancellor of the kingdom and to certain select officers of the Privy Council. They replied in writing in these words:

The remonstrance of the clergy concerning the first difficulty was resolved as follows: These words, "marriages validly or invalidly contracted," are to be explained only in relation to the civil contract as adjudicated by lay judges. The second difficulty likewise appeared just and consonant with reason.

17. All that I have written in this *Manuale* I humbly submit to the judgment of the Roman Church, and with these words of St. Bernard, in his letter to the people of Lyons, I bring this work to an end:

May what I have said be understood as said without prejudice to the supreme Wisdom, and especially to the authority and examination of the Roman Church. To her I reserve this entire matter, as also everything else of this kind, ready to amend by her judgment anything in which I may think otherwise.

I add with Peter Damian:

If we have erred in anything, we gladly approach the teaching authority of Peter to be corrected, and we do not fear the reproach of truth. For this is that craftsman's workshop over which he who was called the carpenter's son, the Son of God, presides. To its standard every coin is rightly brought back, and according to the line of its rectitude whatever has anywhere been distorted is reformed.

THE END.

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Translated by Osvaldo R.