



Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

Thomistic Manual of Theology 3

A Brief Course of Thomistic Theology

Translated by Osvaldo R.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

FR. JEAN-BAPTISTE GONET, O.P.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

A BRIEF COURSE OF THE WHOLE OF
THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

TOME III.

I. ON GRACE. II. ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.
III. ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

LATIN PRINTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
ASSOCIATES, IN ANTWERP, BELGIUM

1726

This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P., of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose defense this indefatigable Thomist consecrated his labors, that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To Saint Thomas Aquinas
and His School.

August 1, 2026.

Oswaldo A. R. | Gpt 5.6
Translator.

The right of ownership of this translation being reserved.

TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE
FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

APPROBATION
Of the Faculty of Theology of the Academy of Bordeaux.

W e, the undersigned Chancellor, Doctors of Theology, and Professors of the Academy of Bordeaux, have diligently examined the book entitled *Manuale Thomistarum*, published by the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Preachers, Professor and Senior Professor of the same Academy. We have found that it contains absolutely nothing contrary or discordant with orthodox faith and Christian morals. On the contrary, as a genuine offspring most worthy of the genius of its Author, who is always like himself, consistent with himself, and most steadfast in explaining and defending the difficulties of the most sacred and angelic doctrine, we have judged that it should be committed to the press as soon as possible. Given at Bordeaux on 16 May 1678.

JOHN FONTENELLE, Chancellor.
FRANCIS ARNALDUS, Augustinian.
ANGELUS LATRIE, Carmelite.
PETER LAHAYE, Doctor of Theology.

APPROBATION

T he Reverend Father Gonet had published the immense Shield of Thomistic Theology against its new assailants. But because those assailants were not men who, experienced in the contests of disputation, hurled dangerous blows or greatly formidable weapons, he reduced the Shield, and in place of the immense Shield recently published by him he now fashions against those same assailants a little shield, and a very brief one. Yet its brevity detracts nothing from it; rather, its power is increased, for it is stronger insofar as the weight of its propositions and the arguments concerning its subject matter cohere more closely, are not separated by longer distances, but are joined at nearer intervals. Thus one may say with Tertullian: As much as it is compressed in words, so much is it expanded in meanings. Let the old proverb, therefore, be dismissed: A good book always makes a bad compendium. For this Compendium involves no loss. It is clear despite its brevity, solid despite its subtlety, most worthy of its Author's reputation, and so complete in every respect that it seems to have nothing of a compendium except the title. Thus I judge at Béziers on 19 December 1679.

JULIAN JOSEPH GOURGAS,
Doctor of Sacred Theology and Canon Law of Paris.

LICENSE
Of the Most Reverend Father General.

W e, Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Master General and servant of the entire Order of Friars Preachers: greetings.

By the tenor of these presents and by the authority of our office, we grant you, Reverend Father Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Friars Preachers, former Provincial of the Province of Toulouse and Senior Professor at the Academy of Bordeaux, license and faculty to commit the *Manuale Thomistarum* to print, provided that the work shall have been approved by three Professors of Theology appointed by the Very Reverend Father Provincial of the Province of Toulouse, and provided that all other requirements of law are observed. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. In testimony of which, etc. Given at Rome on 31 July 1677.

Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Master of the Order. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. ANTONINUS CLOCHE, Master and Associate.

COMMISSION
Of the Very Reverend Father Provincial.

We, Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Prior Provincial and servant of the Province of Toulouse of the Order of Friars Preachers, by the tenor of these presents appoint and establish the Reverend Fathers John Leonard Geay, Prior of Béziers, Louis Bancel, and Jerome de Grasse, Professors of Sacred Theology, as censors of the book entitled *Manuale Thomistarum*, which the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, formerly public Professor at the University of Bordeaux, intends to publish. Given at Valence on 29 October 1679. In testimony of which, we have signed these presents with our own hand and fortified them with the seal of our office.

Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Provincial as above. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. JOHN LAPEIERE, Associate.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Leonard Geay, Professor of Sacred Theology and Prior of the Convent of Béziers. The Shield of Thomistic Theology shone forth from God, so that all the mountains of the Church might gleam with its extraordinary brilliance. Yet just as the sun, when first rising, illuminates the summits of mountains, and in its progress does not disdain to flood the lowliness of the valleys with the rays of its light, so the Author of the Shield, after illuminating the minds of more eminent Doctors with his solar Shield, now hastens by means of his Theological Manual to enlighten even the weaker scholastics. Indeed, in this Manual all the mysteries of Scholastic Theology are seen reduced, as it were, to a compact whole, but with such order, solidity, brevity, and clarity that one may deservedly say of the Disciple's Manual what is commonly proclaimed of the Master's Summa: The style is brief, the eloquence pleasing, the doctrine lofty, clear, and firm. Let this Theological Manual, therefore, come forth into the light. Let it come forth for the relief of Masters, for the consolation of Disciples, and for the more convenient use of all students. Let this Theological Manual be worn by the hands of all. Just as all the sacred Doctors spoke through the mouth of the one St. Thomas, so now, in this Manual, may all Professors of Sacred Theology explain in the Schools the conclusions of the Summa Theologiae through the mouth of one most wise disciple of St. Thomas. These are my wishes, this my judgment, this the vote that I willingly add to this Manual. Given at Béziers on 20 November 1679.

Fr. JOHN LEONARD GEAY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Prior of the
Convent of Béziers of the Order of Friars Preachers.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Bancel, of the Order of Preachers, Aggregate Doctor and Perpetual Professor of Sacred Theology in the School of St. Thomas at the University, Examiner for the Diocese and the entire Legation of Avignon, and also General Definitor of the Province of Toulouse of the same Order.

I have always admired the works of our Very Reverend Father Gonet, a Doctor celebrated everywhere. For he has brought the whole of Theology into the light with such clarity that he seems to have written it with the rays of the sun. With such care and industry has he collected within it the choicer testimonies of the Holy Fathers and the more solid and subtle arguments of the Doctors, which are scattered throughout the books of others, that it may with perfect justice be said: he who knows Gonet knows the whole. Only this could still have been desired: that the Author himself should reduce his works to a compendium for the greater convenience of all students. This he has successfully accomplished in his Manual, in which I do not doubt that nothing will be found contrary to faith or good morals, since it is nothing other than the doctrine itself of his Shield of Thomistic Theology. Let this work, therefore, most complete in every respect, come forth before the public, so that all may

Handle it by night and handle it by day.
At Avignon on 6 December 1679.

Fr. LOUIS BANCEL, of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION

*Of the Reverend Father Jerome de Grasse, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.*

The Shield of Thomistic Theology, comprised in five volumes, was published some years ago by the Very Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, to the great benefit of the whole theological discipline. This excellent work, in every respect consonant with the holy faith, remarkable for its profound and solid doctrine, and delightful for the most abundant flowers of the Holy Fathers scattered throughout it, has been eagerly embraced and honored not only privately by all sacred Professors, but also by the most celebrated sacred Academies of all Europe. This Theological Manual was forged by the labor of the same Author. Being commanded to judge it by the Very Reverend Father Antoninus Massoulié, Provincial of the Province of Toulouse of the Friars Preachers, I would say nothing other than that this Theological Manual is the true and genuine epitome of the Theological Shield. In it, purity of doctrine, in complete agreement throughout with the faith and oracles of the Holy Apostolic See, choice and elegance of propositions, and the flowers of the Holy Fathers, which shine more diffusely throughout the Theological Shield, shine in the Manual more narrowly and compactly indeed, but also more preciously. Thus I judge at Avignon on 3 December 1679.

Fr. JEROME DE GRASSE, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

EULOGY

Let the most learned men of Europe heap innumerable praises upon GONET. Let the Spaniards proclaim his profundity, the Italians his charm, the Germans admire his labor, and the French his clarity. Let others, finally, extol the various gifts of his genius with various encomiums. For my part, and insofar as a sober man may do so, I shall praise his modesty and reserve. The rarer this virtue is among the more learned, the more praiseworthy it is in this most learned man, in whom it is found in the highest degree. By this principal ornament of the soul, and by his other riches of genius, he is most like the Angelic Thomas. GONET may therefore be called, not inelegantly, the Second Hope of the Great Order of Preachers. It was not enough for him, through his marvelous clarity, to illuminate the minds of all more brightly than the sun; by this Epitome he enables all students to become theologians in a short time. Restrain yourself, Very Reverend Father: you are distinguished by excessive clarity, and labor too much to write Theology in a laconic style. By your lucid discourse you disclose to all the hidden mysteries of this science; by this brevity of speech you open them to all as though in a single glance. You were easy to understand; you will be easier still. Finally, your Manual will be in the hands of all. Yet proceed, I beg you, Reverend Father. The knowledge of God can never become known too much or too quickly. Hail, therefore, new light of Thomistic Theology; hail, Thomas of our Age, most humble son of Dominic and richest heir of his virtue; unconquered Opponent of the Innovators, pillar of the Order, glory of your native land, honor of your people, and glory of the Christian world.

CHARLES LEPUL, Doctor of Both Laws, Royal Counselor,
and Assessor of Annual Taxes.

Table of Contents

Secunda Pars II

Treatise VII. On Grace.

Ch. I.	On the Necessity of Grace for the Knowledge of Truth.	5
§ 1.	What Natural Truths Man Can Know with God's General Concurrence Alone.	5
§ 2.	The Objections Answered.	9
§ 3.	Internal Grace Is Necessary for Assent to Supernatural Truths.	13
Ch. II.	On the Necessity of Grace for Willing and Performing the Good.	17
§ 1.	The First Three Opinions Refuted and the Fourth Established.	18
§ 2.	The Objections Answered.	26
Ch. III.	On the Necessity of Grace for the Love of God.	34
§ 1.	The Question Resolved for Fallen Nature and Pure Nature.	34

Table of Contents

§ 2.	The Objections Answered.	38
Ch. IV.	On the Necessity of Grace for Observing the Whole Natural Law.	41
§ 1.	The Question Resolved by Three Conclusions.	41
§ 2.	The Objections Answered.	43
Ch. V.	On the Necessity of Grace for Victory over Temptations.	46
Ch. VI.	On the Necessity of Grace for Long Avoiding All Mortal Sins.	51
Ch. VII.	On the Necessity of Grace for Avoiding Venial Sins.	57
Ch. VIII.	On the Necessity of Grace for Preparing Oneself for Grace.	61
§ 1.	Both Opinions Rejected.	62
§ 2.	The Objections Answered.	67
Ch. IX.	On the Necessity of Grace for Final Perseverance.	72
§ 1.	Final Perseverance Is a Special Gift Distinct from Habitual Grace.	73
§ 2.	The Objections Resolved.	80
Ch. X.	On the Division of Grace.	84
Ch. XI.	On the Essence of Habitual Grace, or Grace Making Pleasing.	95
§ 1.	Habitual Grace Is a Permanent Supernatural Quality in the Soul.	96
§ 2.	Sanctifying Grace Is a Formal Participation in the Divine Nature.	99
Ch. XII.	The Nature and Perfection of Sanctifying Grace Further Explained.	104
Ch. XIII.	On the Cause and Production of Habitual Grace.	114
Ch. XIV.	On Divine Adoption as the First Effect of Habitual Grace.	119

Table of Contents

§ 1.	Habitual Grace Constitutes Man an Adopted Son of God.	120
§ 2.	The Objections Resolved.	123
§ 3.	Three Corollaries Worthy of Note.	125
Ch. XVI.	On the Justification of the Sinner as the Second Effect of Habitual Grace.	129
§ 1.	Sanctifying Grace Is the Formal Cause of Justification.	132
§ 2.	Sanctifying Grace Is the Only Form of Supernatural Justification.	135
§ 3.	The Objections Resolved.	137
§ 4.	A Corollary Worthy of Note.	140
§ 5.	On the Dispositions Required for Justification.	142
§ 6.	Acts of Contrition and Charity Proceed from the Grace for Which They Dispose.	145
Ch. XVI.	On the Merit of the Just as the Third Effect of Habitual Grace.	151
§ 1.	On the Conditions Required for Meriting.	151
§ 2.	Divine Reward Is an Act of Strict Distributive Justice.	155
§ 3.	The Just Condignly Merit Eternal Life through Works of Grace and Charity.	157
§ 4.	Condign Merit Requires an Actual or Virtual Relation of Charity.	160
§ 5.	Essential Beatific Reward Is Attributed to Charity Alone.	163
§ 6.	Naturally Good Works Merit Neither Condignly nor Congruously the First Grace.	166
§ 7.	Merit of First Grace, Its Increase, and Corresponding Glory.	171
§ 8.	Merit of Restoration after a Fall and of Final Perseverance.	173

Table of Contents

Appendix I.	On Heretical Errors Concerning Grace and Free Choice.	178
Ch. I.	The Pelagian Heresy.	178
§ 2.	Origin of the Pelagian Heresy.	179
§ 2.	Principal Errors of Pelagius Concerning Grace.	181
§ 3.	The Various Degrees or States of the Pelagian Heresy.	182
Ch. II.	The Semipelagian Heresy.	196
§ 1.	Origin of the Semipelagian Heresy.	196
§ 2.	Principal Doctrines of the Semipelagians.	198
Ch. III.	The Principal Authors and Followers of the Semipelagian Heresy.	209
§ 1.	Vitalis of Carthage.	209
§ 2.	Cassian.	210
§ 3.	Faustus of Riez.	211
§ 4.	Gennadius.	213
§ 5.	Sulpicius Severus.	214
§ 6.	John Chrysostom.	215
§ 7.	Vincent the Semipelagian.	216
Ch. IV.	The Predestinarian Heresy.	218
Ch. V.	Errors of the Manichaeans, Lutherans, and Calvinists on Grace and Free Choice.	223
§ 1.	Errors of the Manichaeans.	223
§ 2.	Lutheran and Calvinist Errors Concerning Free Choice.	224
§ 3.	Calvin's Errors Concerning Grace.	228
Appendix II.	On the Authority of St. Augustine in Questions of Grace.	230
Ch. I.	Commendation of St. Augustine by the Supreme Pontiffs.	230

Table of Contents

Ch. II.	Commendation of St. Augustine by the Councils.	232
Ch. III.	Commendation of St. Augustine by the Holy Fathers.	233
Ch. IV.	Commendation of St. Augustine by Illustrious Men.	236
Ch. V.	The Assault of Certain Recent Authors against Augustine Repelled.	238
Ch. VI.	Defense of Augustinian Doctrine.	242

Treatise VIII. On the Theological Virtues.

Ch. I.	The Object of Faith.	249
§ 1.	The Formal and Material Objects of Faith.	250
§ 2.	The Objections Resolved.	252
§ 3.	Corollary of the Preceding Doctrine.	256
Ch. II.	Various Conditions and Endowments of the Object of Faith.	259
§ 1.	The Universal and Particular Objects of Theological Faith.	259
§ 2.	God Cannot Lie, and Nothing False Can Underlie Faith in His Testimony.	260
§ 3.	Corollaries Worthy of Note.	264
§ 4.	Whether Infused Faith Can Accidentally Incline toward Falsity.	266
§ 5.	The Obscurity of Faith and Its Compatibility with Evidence.	269
§ 6.	The Objections Resolved.	272
§ 7.	The Mysteries of Faith Are Obscure yet Evidently Credible.	275
Ch. III.	On the Rules of Faith: Scripture and Tradition.	282
§ 1.	On Sacred Scripture.	282
§ 2.	On Tradition.	285

Table of Contents

Ch. IV.	On the Church.	290
§ 1.	On the Infallibility of the Church.	290
§ 2.	The Four Marks of the True Church Belong to the Roman Church.	292
Ch. V.	On the Supreme Pontiff.	298
§ 1.	The Primacy of St. Peter over the Other Apostles.	298
§ 2.	The Primacy of the Roman Pontiff.	303
§ 3.	On the Infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff in Matters of Faith.	306
§ 4.	A Corollary of the Preceding Doctrine.	311
Ch. VI.	On the Sacred Councils of the Church.	315
Ch. VII.	On the Internal Act of Faith.	320
§ 1.	The Internal Act of Faith Requires a Pious Motion of the Will.	320
§ 2.	The Necessity of Explicit and Implicit Faith for Salvation.	324
§ 3.	The Objections Resolved.	329
Ch. VIII.	On the External Act of Faith and Its Precept.	335
Ch. IX.	On the Habit of Faith.	340
Ch. X.	On the Subject, Causes, and Effects of Faith.	343
§ 1.	In Whom the Habit of Faith Remains or Does Not Remain.	343
§ 2.	The Objections Resolved.	346
§ 3.	On the Causes and Effects of Faith.	350
Ch. XI.	The Principal Endowments and Prerogatives of Faith.	352
Ch. XII.	On the Virtue of Hope.	356
§ 1.	On the Object of Hope.	357
§ 2.	The Objections Resolved.	362

Table of Contents

§ 3.	On the Subject of Hope.	365
§ 4.	On the Precept of Hope.	369
Ch. XIII.	On Charity.	372
§ 1.	Charity Is a True Friendship between the Human Person and God.	373
§ 2.	The Formal Object of Charity Is the Goodness of the Divine Nature.	378
§ 3.	Charity toward God and Neighbor Is One Indivisible Virtue.	381
§ 4.	On the Increase of Charity.	383
§ 5.	The Objections Resolved.	389
§ 6.	On the Perfection and Excellence of Charity above All Other Virtues.	392

Treatise IX. On the Cardinal Virtues.

Ch. I.	Prudence and Its Parts.	396
§ 1.	Definition of Prudence.	396
§ 2.	The Integral, Subjective, and Potential Parts of Prudence.	398
Ch. II.	Justice and Its Parts.	400
§ 1.	Definition of Justice.	401
§ 2.	The Integral, Subjective, and Potential Parts of Justice.	404
Ch. III.	Religion and Its Acts.	406
§ 1.	Definition of Religion.	407
§ 2.	The Internal Acts of Religion.	409
§ 3.	The External Acts of Religion.	413
Ch. IV.	The Other Potential Parts of Justice.	418
Ch. V.	Fortitude and the Four Virtues Annexed to It.	423

Table of Contents

§ 1.	Definition of Fortitude.	424
§ 2.	The Acts of Fortitude.	425
§ 3.	The Virtues Annexed to Fortitude.	427
Ch. VI.	Temperance and Its Subjective Parts.	428
§ 1.	The Material and Formal Objects of Temperance.	428
§ 2.	The Subjective Parts of Temperance.	431
§ 3.	The Potential Parts of Temperance.	438
§ 4.	The Various Species of Modesty.	441
Ch. VII.	Vices Opposed to the Cardinal Virtues and Their Annexed Virtues.	448
§ 1.	Vices Opposed to Prudence and Its Annexed Virtues.	448
§ 2.	Vices Opposed to Justice Strictly So Called.	449
§ 3.	Vices Opposed to Religion.	450
§ 4.	Vices Opposed to the Other Potential Parts of Justice.	451
§ 5.	Vices Opposed to Fortitude and Its Potential Parts.	453
§ 6.	Vices Opposed to Temperance and Its Subjective Parts.	454
§ 7.	Vices Opposed to the Potential Parts of Temperance.	459

SECOND PART¹
OF THE MANUALE THOMISTARUM.

— PROOEMIUM —

Dionysius, in c. 4 of the book *De divinis nominibus*, wisely teaches that the love of God effects a circular motion, or a wonderful circle, when God pours forth his beneficence outside himself upon created things and most sweetly entices and draws us to himself by the charms of his goodness. For he is the Principle and End of all things, so that, having gone forth from him through creation, we may return to him through Beatitude, which Pico della Mirandola accordingly defines as the return of the intellectual creature to its principle. Hence, after St. Thomas in the First Part of his *Summa Theologiae* considered God as he is in himself, one and triune, and as the Principle of all created things, he immediately contemplates him as the ultimate End of the rational creature. He treats of Beatitude and of the means conducive to its attainment, namely, human acts; the virtues and gifts in general; the vices

¹ The present tome, T3, constitutes the latter half of Part Two of the *Manuale Thomistarum*, the former half being contained in T2. On account of its considerable length, Part Two has been divided by the present translator into these two tomes for the convenience of publication, though in the original Latin it constitutes a single, continuous part. T2 treats of beatitude, the voluntary and involuntary, human acts, the virtues in common, sin, and law. T3, the present tome, treats of grace, together with the two appendices subjoined to the treatise on grace by Gonet himself in this revised edition, followed by treatises on the theological and cardinal virtues.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

and sins opposed to them, since there is one science of contraries; laws; grace; and the virtues in particular, both theological and moral. We too shall discuss these matters in this second part of our Manual, with whatever brevity and clarity we can, in the following treatises.

TREATISE VII. ON GRACE.

Since, according to Augustine, the law was given so that grace might be sought, and grace was given so that the law might be fulfilled, we fittingly append the treatise on grace to the treatment of laws. In it we shall first discuss its necessity; then we shall briefly explain its various divisions; afterward we shall treat habitual grace, which is the principal and noblest species of grace, and shall set forth its essence, properties, causes, and effects.

1. Before treating these matters, however, two points must briefly be stated here. The first is that the name grace signifies gifts bestowed freely and liberally by God. Since gifts of this kind are of three kinds, grace also has three acceptations and meanings. One is broad and improper, comprising every benefit freely and liberally granted to us by God, whether it belongs to nature or is above nature. Thus the Fathers of the Sixth Synod, action 11, in the letter to Sophronius, call the immortality of the angels grace, although it is connatural to them; and Augustine, epistles 95 and 105, observes that the creation and preservation of things can be called grace, because they are granted freely and liberally by God. Pelagius did not deny this grace; indeed, he deceived the Fathers of the Council of Palestine by conceding the necessity of grace for salutary works, while deceitfully understanding by the name grace the benefit of creation, or free choice, freely granted to us by God, as Augustine testifies in sermon 11, *On the Words of the Apostle*, c. 7, where he says of the Pelagians: *By arguing for free choice against grace, they*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

offended pious and Catholic ears. People began to recoil from them; they began to be shunned as a certain ruin; it began to be said of them that they argued against grace. They then devised this contrivance to relieve the odium: "I do not," he says, "argue against the grace of God." How do you prove that? "Precisely because," he says, "I defend free choice, I do not argue against the grace of God." See the cleverness, but it is glass: it shines as though with truth, but is shattered by vanity. Another acceptation of grace is more proper. It does not extend to every gift freely and liberally granted by God in creation, but only to certain natural gifts that were wholly undue, such as the gift of integrity in the state of integral nature, and certain special helps within the order of nature in the state of fallen nature, which are given for performing certain difficult and heroic works of the natural order, as will become clear below. The third and most proper acceptation signifies only the gifts and benefits, above everything due to nature, bestowed on us through Christ in order to our salvation. This is the proper theological consideration of grace, which we shall principally treat in this Treatise, although we shall occasionally mention grace taken in the second sense.

2. Second, it must be explained in what sense St. Thomas, in the title of *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, calls grace *an exterior principle of human acts*. Since both habitual and actual grace inhere intrinsically in the soul or its powers, it seems that he should not have called it an extrinsic principle of human acts. Hence some say that the title is corrupt and should be read differently, namely, "On the exterior principle of human acts," that is, on God insofar as he moves us through grace. It is better answered, however, that the Holy Doctor calls grace an exterior principle of human acts, not as regards inherence, but as regards its source. For although it places something in the soul, either by way of a habit, as sanctifying grace does, or by way of motion, as assisting grace does, this does not flow from the intrinsic resources of nature, but proceeds from an exterior principle, namely God, acting above every exigency of nature. Thus a stone is said to be moved by an extrinsic principle because, although the impulse inheres in it, it is caused by an exterior principle. Accordingly, God is sometimes called by St. Thomas an extrinsic agent and sometimes an intrinsic agent with respect to the will. He is called an extrinsic agent with respect to the being of the will itself, with which he is not identified. He is called an intrinsic agent with respect to it for many reasons. First, because he is intimately present within it, whereas other agents are not. Second, because the created will has an essential and intrinsic subordination to God alone, both in being and in operation. Third, because divine influence is intrinsically and essentially necessary for the created will to operate at all. Fourth, because

On Grace

God alone can operate within the will itself by changing it, as St. Thomas frequently teaches, especially in *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 8, and *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 88. Fifth and finally, because, as theologians rightly say, God is more intimate to our will than it is intimate to itself.

CHAPTER I.

On the Necessity of Grace for the Knowledge of Truth.

3. Since some truths are natural and others supernatural, in order that the necessity of grace for the knowledge of truth may appear more clearly, both must be treated here. We shall first discuss the knowledge of natural truths, that is, truths that can be deduced from first principles by an evident consequence and known from sensible things; afterward we shall discuss the knowledge of supernatural truths, which have no connection with natural principles and transcend all sensible and natural things, such as the mysteries of our faith and truths revealed by God.

§ 1.

Without a Special Help of God, and with His General Concurrence Alone,
Man Can Know Many Natural Truths, and Even Each of
Them Distributively, but Not All of Them Collectively.

4. The first part is against Vásquez, whom, among our own, Father Vincent Contenson has most recently followed in vol. 5, diss. 2, c. 1. It is nevertheless the doctrine of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1, where he says: For the knowledge of any truth whatever, man needs divine assistance, so that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. He does not, however, need, for knowing truth in every case, a new illumination added to his natural illumination, but only in certain matters that exceed natural knowledge.

5. The adversaries answer that by these words St. Thomas excludes only the necessity of a new illumination added to the natural light of the human intellect, but not the necessity of a special help of God distinct from his general concurrence.

But against this: Although St. Thomas in the cited passage asserts that man needs God's help for the knowledge of every truth, by divine help he does not understand a special gift of actual grace, but only the general concurrence of the first cause with all secondary causes. For he speaks of a

help of God common to the intellect and to other created agents, as is manifest from the fact that immediately before the cited words he compares the human intellect with other created agents as regards their need for divine assistance, which he calls a motion *to act*. But the help of God common to the intellect and other secondary causes is not special but general, as is evident. The Holy Doctor therefore asserts that the human intellect, with God's general concurrence alone, without a special gift of grace, whether actual or within the natural order, can know some natural truths.

This is confirmed. St. Thomas says that *for the knowledge of any truth whatever man needs divine assistance*. But man does not need a special help of grace, even actual grace within the natural order, for the knowledge of every truth of the natural order, for example, for the knowledge of first principles, which he has naturally implanted in him, as is evident in itself. Therefore St. Thomas is not speaking of a special help of God, but only of his general concurrence and assistance.

This is further confirmed by another testimony of the same Holy Doctor, taken from *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 5, in the argument to the contrary, where he concludes: *Therefore the intellect can possess knowledge of truth without any superadded grace*. By the words *without any grace*, he excludes the necessity of every grace, whether habitual or actual, of the natural or supernatural order, for knowing natural truths. Hence in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 93, a. 3, he says: *Men can naturally know all those things that exist virtually in first principles known through themselves*.

6. The same part can also be proved by this argument, which the Holy Doctor suggests in the cited passage. Every creature can, with God's general concurrence alone, elicit acts connatural and proportionate to itself, as the sun can illuminate, fire can heat, sight can perceive colors, and hearing can perceive sounds. Therefore the intellect likewise, with the same concurrence and without a special help of God, can know natural truths that can be deduced from first principles by evident consequence and known from sensible things, since it naturally possesses, as the Holy Doctor says, *an intelligible light which is of itself sufficient for knowing some intelligible things, namely those to knowledge of which we can come through sensible things*. Otherwise, as the same Angelic Doctor says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 5, *human nature would be more imperfect than other natures, since it would not suffice for its natural operations, and the intellect would be in a worse condition than other natural forms and powers, although it is more perfect and more active than they are, as being more immaterial*.

On Grace

7. Contenson, cited above, answers that there are two differences between the intellect and other natural forms and powers. The first is that the other natural forms and powers are not wounded by any wound, whereas the intellect remains injured by the wound of ignorance through original sin. The second is that the other forms and powers are not indifferent, but are determined to their objects, whereas the intellect is indifferent to truth and falsehood. Therefore, in order to be determined to truth rather than falsehood, it needs a special help of God within the natural order.

But against this, first: Although the natural light of our intellect was wounded or weakened through original sin, it was not totally extinguished, as is certain by faith. Therefore, with God's general concurrence alone, it can know many natural truths, at least those that are easier and self-evident, or that can be deduced from first principles by evident consequence. The consequence is clear, for a weakened light, although it cannot shine intensely, can nevertheless shine; and a sick man can take some steps, although not as a healthy man can. Likewise, the visual power, however wounded and weakened, provided it is not totally extinguished, can see many objects without a special help of God, especially those that are most visible.

This is confirmed. The human will is more wounded by original sin than the intellect, and is more indifferent to good and evil than the intellect is to truth and falsehood. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this wound and indifference, the human will in the state of fallen nature can without grace, or a special help of God, elicit many upright and morally good acts, such as honoring parents and assisting the needy, as we shall show against the aforesaid author in the next chapter. Therefore, with all the more reason, the intellect, notwithstanding the wound of ignorance inflicted through original sin and the indifference it has toward truth and falsehood, can know many natural truths with God's general concurrence alone.

I add that, just as the will, through its natural inclination, is disposed toward the morally upright good, so the intellect is naturally inclined toward truth proportionate to itself. Hence falsehood is contrary to its nature, just as sin is said to be contrary to man's natural inclination. Therefore, just as the will, by reason of its natural inclination toward the morally upright good, can naturally and without a special help of God elicit many upright and morally good acts, so also the intellect can know many natural truths.

8. That it can know each natural truth is shown by this argument. The greatest and most difficult knowledge of natural truths is that which is had of God from natural effects, since it concerns an object that is most immaterial and remote from the senses. But in the state of fallen nature the

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

divinity can naturally be known by man from creatures, as is clear from Rom. 1: *The invisible things of God are beheld by the intellect through the things that have been made*; and from Wis. 13: *From the greatness of beauty and of the creature, their Creator could be known and seen*. Therefore, with all the more reason, any other natural truth inferior to this one can be known naturally, or without a special help of God.

9. That man in the state of fallen nature cannot attain the whole collection of natural truths without grace or special help is shown against Cajetan. A weak and wounded power cannot accomplish everything that a sound and integral power can accomplish. But to attain every speculative truth, not only distributively but also collectively, is an act of a sound and integral intellectual power. Therefore the intellect of fallen man, afflicted with the wound of ignorance, cannot attain the whole collection of natural truths unless it is healed by grace or strengthened by special assistance.

This is confirmed. On account of the wound of malice, the will cannot fulfill all the precepts of the natural law taken collectively, as will become clear below. Therefore the intellect likewise, on account of the wound of ignorance, cannot know every truth collectively.

10. Cajetan answers that the wound of ignorance arising from original sin exists only in the practical intellect and not in the speculative intellect. Consequently, it does not prevent man in the state of fallen nature from attaining every speculative truth collectively, but only every practical truth, or truth ordered to action.

But against this: St. Thomas, in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 52, says that among the spiritual punishments of original guilt, the chief is the weakness of reason, from which it happens that man arrives at the knowledge of truth only with difficulty and in fact falls into error, and cannot wholly overcome bestial appetites but is involuntarily dominated by them. By these words he first places the wound of ignorance in the speculative intellect, and then in the practical intellect insofar as it cannot overcome bestial appetites. In *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3, toward the end of the body of the article, he says: Through sin reason is dulled principally in matters of action. The word principally denotes that reason is also dulled in speculative matters, although less principally. Hence in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3, he asserts that human nature is more corrupted by sin as regards the appetite for good than as regards the knowledge of truth. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the wound of ignorance arising from original sin exists not only in the practical intellect but also in the speculative intellect.

On Grace

11. The same third part of the assertion is proved secondly by this reasoning. For action there is required not only physical power, but also moral and unimpeded power, or power free from all obstacles. In fallen man there is indeed a physical power for the whole collection of truths of the natural order, because these are contained within the sphere of sensible being, which is the object proportionate to our intellect in the state of conjunction with the body. There is not, however, an unimpeded moral power, since in the state of fallen nature there are many obstacles by which it is, as it were, bound and prevented from attaining that whole collection: namely, the brevity of life, the indisposition of the body, the dullness of the senses, the rebellion and disturbance of the passions, frequent solicitude about temporal matters, and similar things. These seem to be suggested by the words of Wis. 9: *The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and an earthly habitation depresses the mind that thinks of many things*. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature cannot attain the whole collection of natural truths without a special help of God.

§ 2.

Objections Are Answered.

12. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: The holy Fathers sometimes assert that all our knowledge descends from the Father of lights, and that every truth, by whomsoever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit. Therefore they judge that no one can know any truth without a special grace of God. Hence they prayed to God to obtain it, as is clear of St. Thomas, who was accustomed to precede his studies with this form of prayer: *Ineffable Creator, who are called the true fountain of light and wisdom, pour the ray of your brightness upon the darkness of my intellect, removing from me the twofold privation and darkness of sin and ignorance, and so forth*.

I answer that either the holy Fathers are speaking of knowledge that is in some way supernatural and conducive to salvation, which we acknowledge cannot be had without grace, or they mean only that science and the knowledge of natural truths flow from God as the author of nature, through his general concurrence moving the intellect to understand truth. St. Thomas explains this in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 14, in reply to the argument to the contrary, and in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1, ad 1, in these words: *It must be said that every truth, by whomsoever it is spoken, is from the Holy Spirit, as infusing the natural light and moving one to understand and speak the truth, but not as dwelling within by grace*.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

To what is added concerning prayer, it must be said that St. Thomas and the other saints either asked God in prayer for knowledge of supernatural truths, or for the removal of obstacles so that they might know natural truths more fully, clearly, and easily. I add that we can pray for the attainment of truth when its attainment involves some fallibility and contingency, just as for the same reason we pray to obtain rain and fair weather. More will be said about this in the following chapter.

13. You will object secondly against the second part: By reason of the wound contracted through original sin, the will remained morally incapable of certain morally good works of the natural order, for example, of loving God as the author of nature or overcoming a grave temptation against natural precepts. Hence it cannot perform such works without grace or a special help within the natural order, as will become clear below. Therefore the intellect likewise, on account of the wound of ignorance, cannot know each natural truth unless strengthened by a similar assistance.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that, although both powers remained wounded through sin, they were wounded in different ways. The intellect was not wounded with respect to first principles, from which it proceeds to the knowledge of conclusions, but only with respect to extrinsic things that serve intellection, because the external senses were weakened, life was shortened, and we contracted many necessities for properly preserving it. The will, however, was wounded with respect to the end, which is the principle in practical matters, insofar as through original guilt it remained turned away from the ultimate end. It is therefore not surprising that, being intrinsically weakened in the principle of right action from which all its motion begins, it cannot perform certain morally good works of the natural order without special assistance because of their difficulty, while the intellect can nevertheless know each natural truth.

14. You will object thirdly with Cajetan against the third part of the assertion: The wound of ignorance arising from original sin does not affect the speculative intellect but only the practical intellect. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature can know all speculative truths taken collectively without special assistance. The consequence is clear from what was said above. Cajetan proves the antecedent from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3, where, assigning the powers that remained wounded through sin, he asserts that one of them is reason, *in which prudence resides*, that is, as Cajetan interprets him, reason insofar as it is subject to prudence. But reason insofar as it is subject to prudence is practical and not speculative.

On Grace

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, only the practical intellect was wounded through original sin.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that Cajetan's gloss is not good or consonant with the text. For the Holy Doctor says in the same place that the will, *in which justice resides*, was wounded; yet it is not permissible to infer from this that the will received the wound of malice only insofar as it is subject to justice. Those words do not express a reduplicative but a specificative sense. Therefore, when he says that reason, in which prudence resides, was wounded, he means only that practical reason, in which prudence resides, was principally wounded, as he expressly teaches at the end of the body of the same article in the words cited above: *Through sin reason is dulled principally in matters of action*.

15. You will object fourthly: Every creature can, with general concurrence alone, proceed to an act proportionate to its form or natural power, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1. But to know all natural truths collectively is an act proportionate to the natural light of our intellect, even in the state of fallen nature, since it has sensible being, or being knowable through species supplied by the senses, as its proportionate object. All natural truths are contained under this object, since, as we declared above, by natural truths we understand only those that can be known from the senses. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature can know all natural truths collectively.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Every creature can, with general concurrence alone, proceed to an act proportionate to its form or power by both a moral and a physical proportion: I grant the major premise. By a physical proportion alone: I deny the major premise. In the state of fallen nature, although the collection of all natural truths is proportionate to the human intellect by a physical proportion, it is not proportionate by a moral proportion, because of the many extrinsic obstacles mentioned above. By these the cognitive power in that state is bound and prevented from proceeding to an act proportionate to its power.

16. You will say: Notwithstanding those obstacles, man can know each natural truth. Therefore he can know all of them collectively, since the inference from each enumerated thing to all taken together is valid; as when it is said, this man is capable of laughter, and that man, and this other man, and so by proceeding through each one: therefore every man is capable of laughter, or all men taken collectively are capable of laughter.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. To its proof I say that the manner of arguing by ascending from each to all taken together is good when the consequent is taken in the same manner as the

antecedent, but not when it is taken in another manner. For example, if I were to say, "This horse separated from another cannot draw a carriage, nor can that horse, nor this other horse; therefore all the horses taken together and collectively cannot draw it," the reasoning would not be valid, because it would proceed from the distributive to the collective sense. Likewise, although this argument is good: "The intellect can know this, that, and this other truth, enumerating all of them distributively; therefore it can know all of them similarly distributively," nevertheless this argument is not valid: "The intellect can know this, that, and this other truth distributively; therefore it can know all of them collectively," because the same defect is committed and the argument proceeds from a distributive to a collective sense.

17. You will say again: Since the intellect is a spiritual power, the more truths it knows, the more capable it becomes of knowing others. Therefore it will finally be able to arrive at the whole collection of natural truths.

I answer that, although the intellect becomes more capable in itself of knowing other things the more it knows, it is nevertheless weakened and wearied in the things joined to it and serving it, namely the bodily senses. Consequently, because of this obstacle and the other similar obstacles listed above, it cannot attain the whole collection of natural truths.

18. You will ask whether man in the state of fallen nature can, without special assistance, know not only each speculative natural truth but also each practical natural truth.

I answer that, although the human intellect without special assistance can know each natural practical truth belonging to moral philosophy, and the principles or conclusions of that science, because the same account applies to them as to speculative truths, it cannot know every practical truth belonging to prudence. Since man in the state of fallen nature is turned away through original sin from God as both his natural and supernatural end, he cannot without grace or special assistance form this practical and prudential judgment: *Here and now God as the author of nature must be loved above all things*. This is so both because such a judgment depends upon rectitude of appetite and because it is always joined with execution and has the character of a practical command. In the state of fallen nature, however, man cannot without special assistance love God above all things even as the author of nature, as we shall show in c. 3.

On Grace

§ 3.

For Knowing Supernatural Truths and Assenting to the Mysteries of Our Faith, External Revelation Does Not Suffice, but Internal Grace Is Necessarily Required, Not Only in the Intellect but Also in the Will.

19. The first part is certain by faith against the Pelagians, who taught that, external revelation or instruction being presupposed, man could believe the mysteries of faith without a special intrinsic grace. Augustine confesses in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 3, that he held this error before his episcopate, and there refutes it by various testimonies of Scripture, especially by the Apostle's words in 1 Cor. 4: *What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?* He says that by these words he was convinced and moved to retract what he had taught before his episcopate. He also presses the Pelagians with the immediately preceding words of the same Apostle: *For who distinguishes you?* For if, he says, faith were in us from ourselves, every believer could say: "My faith, which I have not from grace but from myself, distinguishes me." He also presses them with 2 Cor. 3: *We are not sufficient to think anything from ourselves as from ourselves.* For it is less to think than to believe, since believing is thinking with assent. Therefore, if we cannot of ourselves think supernatural truths, much less can we believe them.

Reason also supports this. The assent of faith by which we assent to the aforesaid truths is supernatural, since it attains them under a supernatural motive, or supernatural formal aspect under which, namely, the light of divine revelation. Therefore it is disproportionate to the natural powers of the intellect and consequently needs an elevation and grace intrinsic to the intellect in order to be elicited.

20. That supernatural assistance is required not only in the intellect but also in the will is likewise certain by faith against the Semipelagians. Although they acknowledged with the Catholic Church that we cannot believe revealed mysteries without grace, they nevertheless maintained that the beginning of faith comes from us, namely, a pious affection for believing, or a certain disposition of credulity. This error is condemned by the Council of Orange, can. 5, in these words: *If anyone says that not only the increase but also the beginning of faith, and the very disposition of credulity, is naturally present in us and does not come through the gift of grace, he is proved an adversary of the apostolic dogmas, and so forth.*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Reason also supports this. For believing from a supernatural motive requires a pious motion or affection of the will that efficaciously moves and determines the intellect to assent to truths revealed to it. Therefore supernatural assistance is also required on the part of the will. The consequence is clear, because the will by its own powers alone cannot efficaciously move toward a supernatural act, such as believing from a supernatural motive. The antecedent is customarily proved in the treatise on faith from the fact that supernatural truths differ from natural truths in this respect: natural truths have evidence either from themselves or from a medium through which they are illuminated, and by reason of this evidence they convince the intellect and, as it were, extort assent from it, without its being necessary that the intellect be applied to such an act by the will, at least by a free application. Supernatural truths, however, have no evidence by reason of which their certitude can be penetrated by the intellect. Consequently, however much they are proposed, they do not convince the intellect or draw it to give assent, but the intellect must be specially applied by the will to such assent. Hence Augustine beautifully says in tractate 26 on John: *A person can enter the Church unwillingly, and can approach the altar unwillingly, but cannot believe unless willing.* This application is commonly called the pious motion or affection of the will. What is said in Acts 16 of a certain Lydia, a seller of purple, can be understood of it, namely, that *God opened her heart to attend to the things that were said by Paul.* There the heart signifies the will, which must first be touched and changed by God through the assistance of grace before the intellect gives assent to revealed truths.

This is confirmed. That pious affection of the will has a supernatural object. Therefore it is supernatural and consequently requires supernatural assistance as its formal principle. Both consequences are clear, for from the supernatural character of the formal object, the supernatural character of the act is rightly inferred, and from the supernatural character of the act, the supernatural character of its assistance and principle. The antecedent is proved as follows: the object willed by the pious affection is formally the act of faith itself. But that act is supernatural. Therefore that pious affection has a supernatural object.

21. You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: Augustine, in his exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, says: *That we believe is ours; but that we perform good works belongs to him who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe.* Therefore no supernatural assistance on the part of the intellect is required for believing; the external revelation of the mysteries of faith alone suffices.

On Grace

I answer that those are the words of Augustine while he was still a Semipelagian, as he himself confesses in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 3, where he says: For I did not think that faith was preceded by the grace of God, so that through it there might be given to us what we profitably asked, except insofar as we could not believe unless the proclamation of truth preceded. But I thought that, once the Gospel was preached to us, our consenting to it was our own proper act and came to us from ourselves. Several of my little works written before my episcopate sufficiently indicate this error of mine. Among them is the one you recalled in your letters, in which there is an exposition of certain propositions from the Epistle to the Romans.

22. You will object secondly with another testimony of Augustine, taken from *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 14, where, speaking of the Tyrians and Sidonians who would have believed had they seen Christ's miracles, as is said in Matthew, he adds: From this it appears that they have in their very disposition a certain naturally divine gift of understanding by which they are inclined toward faith if they either hear words or behold signs suited to their minds. By these words he seems to teach that some, through the natural gift of understanding alone and without any interior gift of grace preceding them, can be moved toward faith and believe revealed mysteries.

I answer that this passage admits of two most true interpretations. The first is that by the natural light of understanding St. Augustine does not mean something natural, but a gift naturally divine, that is, divine and supernatural by its nature, for understanding. Augustine himself, as cited by St. Thomas, explains in this way the Apostle's words, *The Gentiles naturally do the things that are of the law*, saying: *Do not be troubled because he said that they naturally do the things that are of the law, for the Spirit of grace effects this, restoring in us the image of God in which we were naturally made.*

The second interpretation, which appears more literal and more consonant with the text, is that St. Augustine is speaking there only of an objective motion toward the end. He means merely that some possess such a natural gift of understanding that the same miracles and the same external preaching of the Gospel are more suited to their natural disposition than to that of others, for moving them only exteriorly and objectively, because they attract and outwardly invite them more than others. He does not mean that this external sight of signs alone actually draws them to the end, so that they actually believe through it alone. That this is Augustine's meaning is clear from the words immediately added: *And yet, if by the higher judgment of God they have not been distinguished from the mass of perdition through the grace of*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

predestination, those divine words or deeds are not presented to them through which they could believe if they heard or saw such things.

23. You will object thirdly against the second part of the assertion: If supernatural assistance on the part of the will is required for believing, just as it is required on the part of the intellect, it follows that, just as there is placed in the intellect, besides actual assistance, a supernatural habit of faith by which it is permanently inclined toward believing, so some supernatural habit must be placed in the will by which it too is permanently inclined to command the act of faith. But this seems absurd. Therefore so does the former. The major premise seems true, since the same account applies to habit as to assistance, and to the will as to the intellect. The minor premise is supported as follows. Such a supernatural habit received in the will would be neither a theological virtue, since there are only three theological virtues, namely faith, hope, and charity, nor an infused moral virtue, because the infused moral virtues are lost through mortal sin together with the grace from which they flow. But if such a habit were given in the will, it would remain in the sinner, as faith does, since a sinner can elicit an act of unformed faith. Therefore such a habit in the will must not be admitted.

I answer first by denying the inference of the major premise. Just as, in natural matters, for performing works of art a habit is placed only in the intellect and not in the will, although both the intellect and the instruments must be moved by the will, so for assenting to revealed mysteries a habit is not to be placed in the will but only in the intellect. Although the intellect does not elicit the assent of faith unless applied by the will, it suffices that the will be elevated to this application through actual assistance. The reason for the difference between the intellect and will with respect to the act of faith is that the intellect immediately elicits the act of faith, and therefore the formal and immediate difficulty that must be overcome through a habit exists in it; the will concurs with that act only mediately and by application, and therefore does not need a habit.

I answer secondly that, even granting the inference of the major premise, the minor premise must be denied. To its proof it must be said that such a habit received in the will would be neither properly a moral virtue nor a theological virtue, but would reductively belong to the theological virtue of faith as a way and disposition toward it. Both solutions are probable, although the first appears more probable and easier. This will be treated more fully in the treatise on faith, c. 7.

CHAPTER II.

On the Necessity of Grace for Willing and
Performing the Good.

1. It is certain by faith against the Pelagians and Semipelagians that fallen man cannot, without the assistance of grace, think, will, or do anything conducive to eternal life. Scripture clearly teaches this in John 6: *No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him*; John 15: *Without me you can do nothing*; and 1 Cor. 12: *No one can say, "The Lord Jesus," except in the Holy Spirit*. The same is clear from the definitions of the Council of Orange, can. 7, and of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, cann. 1, 2, and 3. Reason also supports this. Since eternal life is something supernatural, exceeding every exigency of created and creatable nature, the means proportioned to it must be supernatural and therefore exceed all the powers of nature. The only difficulty, then, can be whether man likewise needs grace for willing and performing a moral good of the natural order, or for eliciting upright and morally good acts, such as honoring parents, assisting the needy, prudently governing the commonwealth, and rendering to each what is his; or whether the natural power of free choice, or the inclination toward the morally upright good implanted in it by nature, suffices for this, since that inclination was not wholly extinguished through original sin but only diminished and weakened.

2. Authors hold various opinions in resolving this celebrated difficulty. Some require the influence of habitual grace and the command of charity for every upright work, as does Michael Baius. Others, with Jansen, necessarily require at least the influence of Christian faith. Others hold that some actual assisting grace is necessary. Thus Gregory of Rimini and Vásquez, whom among our own Vincent Contenson follows in his *Theologia mentis et cordis*. Finally, the Thomists and others commonly teach that the powers of free choice with God's general concurrence suffice.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 1.

The First Three Opinions Are Refuted and the Fourth Is Established.

3. I say first: Habitual grace and the command of charity are not required for a moral work of the natural order.

The first part appears to be of faith, for it is manifestly gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 7, where anathema is pronounced against anyone who says that all works done before justification are truly sins. In can. 8 he is condemned who says that fear of hell is evil. But this fear is found in sinners before the grace of justification has been attained. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, not everything done by sinners before justification is evil. Hence Scripture exhorts sinners to almsgiving and other good works, which it would not do if these could not be performed by a sinner without an admixture of sin. Daniel 4 says to Nebuchadnezzar: *Redeem your sins by alms*. But sins clearly cannot be redeemed by evil works. Finally, Augustine writes in *De spiritu et littera*, c. 24: *Just as certain venial sins, without which this life is not lived, do not prevent a just man from eternal life, so certain good works, without which the life of even the worst man is found only with great difficulty, contribute nothing to eternal salvation*. By these words he openly declares that, just as human frailty, by a force altogether inescapable, frequently involves even the most just person in some venial sins, so the light of the Lord's countenance naturally implanted in man, and the inextinguishable conception of the good and equitable, continually urging the mind, frequently elicits from even the worst man some slight and easy natural good works, vitiated by no admixture of evil or wicked intention. Hence Chrysostom, homily 67 to the people: *An evil man cannot be wholly evil, but it happens that he has something good; nor can a good man be wholly good, but he is accustomed to have some sins*.

4. From these things the second part is established. Since charity is inseparable from habitual grace, if some upright and morally good work can be elicited by unjustified sinners without the influence of habitual grace, it is manifest that it can likewise be performed by them without the motion and command of charity.

I add that the moral goodness of our acts is distinguished from their supernatural goodness and merit for eternal life in this: the first, since it is purely natural, is constituted without an ordination to a supernatural end,

On Grace

solely through the conformity of the act with right reason and natural prudence; the second proceeds from the influence of grace and charity, which refers our acts to a supernatural end. Hence, although man without charity cannot elicit morally good acts of the supernatural order that merit eternal life, he can nevertheless elicit upright and morally good acts of the natural order, for example, honoring parents, obeying superiors, and assisting the needy. These acts have uprightness or moral goodness from their proximate end or object; therefore, in order to be morally good, they need not receive this goodness from an extrinsic end and the command of charity. Otherwise, if every upright and morally good work had to be performed from the motive of charity, it would follow that there is no virtue besides charity, since charity alone acts from such a motive. This is manifestly contrary to Scripture and the holy Fathers, who acknowledge and commend many other virtues in many places. More will be said about this in the treatise on the virtues in general, c. 6.

5. I say secondly: Faith is not required for eliciting an upright and morally good work with natural uprightness and goodness.

This is proved first. Some upright and morally good works are found among unbelievers. Therefore faith in the agent is not required for them, but the natural light of reason suffices. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved from Scripture, which reports in various places that some works of unbelievers were rewarded by God. Exod. 1 says that God rewarded the Egyptian midwives for the benefit they rendered to the Israelites, and built houses for them. In Ezek. 29 Nebuchadnezzar is said to have received from God the reward of his work. *From this, says Jerome, we understand that even Gentiles, if they perform any good work, do not pass without reward in the judgment of God.* Hence Augustine in *De civitate Dei* V, c. 15, asserts that God gave the Romans an extensive empire so that their virtues might have some reward in this life. But God does not reward evil and perverse works, but only good and upright works. Therefore some upright and morally good works are found among unbelievers. Thus Augustine says in *De spiritu et littera*, c. 27, that *there are certain deeds of unbelievers alien to the grace of Christ which, according to the rule of justice, we not only cannot blame, but rightly and deservedly praise.* Therefore, in epistle 130, he praises the continence of the pagan Polemo and says that it was a gift of God.

6. Jansen answers that these and similar testimonies prove only that some works of unbelievers are good by reason of their duty or object, but not by reason of their end.

But against this, first: Scripture, Jerome, and Augustine testify in the cited passages that some works of unbelievers were rewarded by God. But if

they had been good only by reason of their object and evil by reason of their end, or evil from the intention and disposition of the agent, they would not have been rewarded by God, since such works deserve not reward but punishment. Therefore Scripture and the cited Fathers judge that they were good not only by reason of their duty or object but also by reason of the agent's end.

Against this, secondly: The cited Augustine says that some works of unbelievers are so good *that according to the rule of justice they are rightly and deservedly praiseworthy*. But the rule of justice principally regards the end and intention of the agent, and judges one who performs a good act from an evil intention worthy not of praise but of blame. Therefore Augustine holds that some good works are found among unbelievers not only from the object they regard but also from the end and intention with which they are done. Nor is it an objection that the same Holy Doctor adds concerning those works of unbelievers: *Although, if it is examined for what end they are done, scarcely any are found that deserve the praise due to justice*. For the word *scarcely* does not signify that such good works are never found among unbelievers, but only that they are rarely and with difficulty found in them, because for the most part they act from some depraved motive, especially vainglory, as we shall say below.

Against this, thirdly: The same Holy Doctor in epistle 99 to Evodius asserts that some works of unbelievers are so good that they are rightly proposed for imitation. But works good only by reason of their object and evil by reason of the agent's end, since they are true sins, must not be proposed for imitation but rather for detestation. Otherwise, a man who gave alms to a needy woman with the intention of inducing her to sin would have to be proposed for imitation, which is absurd. Therefore the conclusion follows.

7. The conclusion is proved secondly from St. Thomas, who openly favors our opinion. In his commentary on Rom. 14, lect. 2, he says: When an unbeliever does some good from the dictate of reason, without referring it to an evil end, he does not sin. His work is not meritorious, however, because it is not informed by grace. In his commentary on Titus 2, lect. 4, explaining the Apostle's words, To the defiled and unbelieving nothing is clean, he adds: When a sinner does some good insofar as he is a sinner and unbeliever, the whole is sinful from its root. But if he acts from the principle of some good that he possesses, such as unformed faith or nature, it is not unclean. Likewise, in Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 10, a. 4, he asks whether every action of an unbeliever is a sin, and answers negatively. For, he says in ad 3, through unbelief natural reason is not totally corrupted in unbelievers, so that some

knowledge of truth remains in them by which they can perform some work belonging to a good kind. St. Augustine suggests the same argument in *De spiritu et littera*, c. 28: Nevertheless, because the image of God has not been so worn away in the human soul by the stain of earthly affections that no outer lineaments, as it were, remain in it, it can rightly be said that even in the impiety of his life man does or understands some things of the law.

8. The conclusion is proved thirdly by overthrowing Jansen's principal foundation. He therefore thinks that all works of unbelievers are sins because they either refer their works, good by reason of their duty or object, to the depraved end of their unbelief, or at least omit referring them to the true end, God, whom they do not know. Hence these works are evil either from the addition of a depraved end or from the omission of a due end. But both claims are false. Therefore Jansen's principal foundation collapses.

The minor premise as to its first part is clear. An unbeliever can give alms to a needy person without referring that work to his idol or to the depraved end of his unbelief, as is clear from the testimonies of St. Thomas already adduced and from the doctrine he teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, in the body: *Just as one who has faith can commit a sin in an act that he does not refer to the end of faith, whether by sinning venially or even mortally, so also an unbeliever can perform some good act insofar as he does not refer it to the end of unbelief.* And indeed, as Soto says in *De natura et gratia* I, c. 10, *if anyone can at his pleasure throw a coin into a river, why can he not give it to a poor person, without any evil circumstance, because this is upright?*

The second part of the same minor premise is shown as follows. In order that a human act be upright and morally good with natural uprightness and goodness, it is not required that it be ordered to God as the ultimate end. First, because, as we said in the preceding conclusion, the moral goodness of human acts is distinguished from their supernatural goodness and merit for eternal life in this: the first is constituted through an order and relation to the upright good consonant with reason, which of itself tends toward God as the author of the light of reason and of every morally upright good; the second is constituted through an order and relation to God as supernatural author and ultimate end simply. Second, because it is repugnant that an order to a supernatural end belong to the essence and notion of purely natural goodness, such as the moral goodness of human acts of which we are presently speaking, namely, their uprightness and conformity with reason. Finally, because the ordering of human acts to God as supernatural author and ultimate end simply proceeds only from the motion and command of charity. If this ordering were necessarily required for their uprightness and moral goodness, it would follow that not only the light of faith but also the

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

command of charity is necessarily required for the moral goodness of human acts. Consequently, fear of hell would be evil, and the acts performed by sinners before attaining grace and charity would be sins, which is erroneous and condemned by the Council of Trent, as was shown in the preceding conclusion.

I add that, if an ordination to God as ultimate end simply were necessary for the uprightness and moral goodness of our works, then, since man whenever he acts with deliberation is bound to act uprightly and morally well, and since no human and deliberate act can be indifferent in the individual, as the more common opinion of theologians teaches with the Angelic Doctor and Jansen himself acknowledges, it would follow that man, whenever he operates deliberately and in a human manner, is bound by the precept of charity and of loving God above all things. This is nearly foreign to the common opinion of theologians, for since such a precept is affirmative, it does not oblige at every moment, but at determined times. Hence Rainerius in the *Pantheologia*, under “Unbelief,” c. 3, says: *Although the act of an unbeliever does not possess the goodness derived from the ultimate end, because it is not directly for the sake of God as end, it is not for that reason a sin merely because it is not ordered in this way to God as end. For our act need not always be ordered to the end of beatitude. The reason is that affirmative precepts do not oblige at every moment, although they always oblige. Hence an act of unbelievers that is not ordered to that end need not always be a sin, but only at a time when the person is bound to refer his act to the ultimate end.* By these words he overthrows Jansen’s principal foundation.

9. I say thirdly: Man in the state of fallen nature can by the powers of nature alone elicit some morally good works, or works belonging to the uprightness of this life. Consequently, neither grace strictly taken nor a special help within the natural order is required for them, but God’s general motion and concurrence suffice.

This is proved first from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 1: *If anyone says that man can be justified before God by his works, which are done either through the powers of human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.* By these words the Council manifestly supposes that some morally good works can be performed through the powers of nature without the grace of Jesus Christ. But this cannot be understood of works good only by reason of duty or object and evil by reason of the end and intention of the agent. Therefore the Council supposes that through the powers of nature some works can be done that are good not only by reason of their object but also by reason of the agent’s end.

On Grace

The minor premise is proved. Since works good only by reason of their object and evil by reason of the agent's end and intention are true sins, as is clear of alms given to a needy woman with the intention of inducing her to sin, the heretics whose error the Council condemns in that canon were not so insane and foolish as to say that man is justified by such works, for otherwise they would have affirmed that sins are destroyed by other sins. They asserted this of works morally good both by reason of their object and by reason of the agent's end and intention. Therefore the Council supposes that such works can be performed through the powers of nature.

10. This is proved secondly from Augustine, who, as we showed in the preceding conclusion, teaches in *De spiritu et littera*, cc. 27 and 28, that unbelievers performed some good works *which according to the rule of justice we rightly and deservedly praise*. Consequently, they were good not only by reason of their duty or object but also by reason of the agent's end, since the rule of justice principally regards the end and intention of the agent, and judges one who performs a good act from an evil intention worthy not of praise but of blame, as we observed above. But Augustine judges that unbelievers performed such works by the powers of free choice alone and without grace superadded to nature. Therefore, according to his doctrine, man in the state of fallen nature can by the powers of nature alone perform some upright and good works, not only by reason of the object but also by reason of the agent's end.

The major premise is clear from what was said in the preceding conclusion. The minor premise is clear from the reason Augustine assigns in c. 28. He says that unbelievers performed those good works, praiseworthy according to the rule of justice, because the image of God has not been so worn away in the human soul by the stain of earthly affections that no outer lineaments, as it were, remain in it, so that it may rightly be said that even in the impiety of his life man does or understands some things of the law. A little later, speaking of the same unbelievers, he adds: They were men, and that power of nature was in them by which the rational soul both perceives and performs something lawful, even though that piety which transfers one to eternal life was absent.

11. It is proved thirdly from St. Thomas, who also openly favors our opinion. In *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 14, he asks, Whether free choice can tend toward good without grace? He answers: It is clear that free choice cannot attain without grace the good that is above nature, because through such a good man merits eternal life, and it is clear that man cannot merit without grace. But man can through free choice fulfill a good proportionate to human nature. That by a good proportionate to human nature he understands an

upright and moral good of the natural order, such as the giving of alms, is clear from the immediately preceding words: The act of giving alms is a good proportionate to human powers insofar as man is moved to it by a certain natural love or kindness. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, man through free choice and the powers of nature alone can give alms from a certain natural love and kindness, and consequently elicit other similar upright and morally good acts.

12. Nor can it be said that, by the words *through free choice*, the Holy Doctor excludes the necessity of sanctifying grace or a supernatural habitual gift, but not the necessity of supernatural assistance, or at least of a special help within the natural order. For St. Thomas immediately adds: *Although man can perform goods of this kind without grace that makes pleasing, he cannot perform them without God, since no thing can proceed to any operation except through divine power, because a secondary cause does not act except through the power of the first cause, as is said in the Book of Causes*. By these words he requires for such acts only God's general concurrence, by which all secondary causes are subordinated to the first in their operation, not a supernatural assistance of God or a special assistance within the natural order. Hence in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, he expressly teaches that man in the state of corrupted nature can through the power of his nature perform some particular good. By these words he excludes every special assistance distinct from general concurrence, for we do not say that man can perform through the power of his nature something for which a special assistance is required, since such assistance is purely gratuitous and in no way due to nature.

13. Nor is the claim of Vásquez valid, followed by Contenson, who adheres too closely to him in this question, that the Holy Doctor is not speaking there of moral but of natural good, because, they say, he gives as examples works done for the advantage of nature or for external governance, such as building houses and planting vineyards. Thus he concedes that without grace there can be good architects and good vine-dressers, but not good just men. This is not valid, first, because in the already cited *De veritate*, q. 24, he gives the example of almsgiving, which no one doubts is an upright and morally good work. Second, because St. Thomas, in giving the example in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, of works done for the advantage of nature or for external governance, speaks of them insofar as they are performed with deliberation. But according to St. Thomas's doctrine, no work deliberately performed is in the individual neither morally good nor morally evil, but indifferent to moral goodness or malice. Therefore he speaks of those works insofar as they belong to the moral order, not merely

On Grace

insofar as they belong to the order of nature and are performed for its advantage or utility.

14. The conclusion is proved fourthly by this argument, which the same Holy Doctor suggests in that passage. Man in the state of integrity and innocence could through his natural powers perform every moral good proportionate to his nature. Therefore, in the state of fallen nature, he can by the powers of his nature elicit at least some upright and morally good act. The consequence is clear, for man's free choice, or the natural inclination he has toward the morally upright good consonant with reason, was not totally extinguished through original sin, but only weakened and enfeebled, as the Council of Trent asserts in sess. 6, can. 5. Therefore, just as a sick man, although he cannot move perfectly with the motion of a healthy man unless healed by medicine, can nevertheless have some imperfect motion by himself, so man in the state of fallen nature can by his own powers perform some moral work of the natural order, although not every such work, which belongs to a healthy man.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated from Augustine, epistle 107 to Vitalis: *By the greatness of the first sin we lost free choice for loving God*. From these words this argument is drawn. Even with original guilt presupposed, man can love God above all things; nevertheless, because he cannot do this by the strength of nature, Augustine asserts that we lost free choice for loving God. Therefore, if fallen man could perform no morally good work of the natural order by his own powers, even though he could do so through grace, it would be true to say that by the greatness of the first sin we lost free choice for performing good.

Nor is the claim of Vincent Contenson valid, namely, that, in order for free choice to be said not to have been extinguished by the greatness of the first sin but only weakened and enfeebled, it suffices that by its own powers and without the assistance of grace it can elicit works good by reason of duty or object, although evil by reason of the agent's end. This is not valid, because such works are stained with the defilement of sin. If man in the state of fallen nature could by the powers of free choice elicit only these works, it would follow that free choice in that state is capable of nothing but sinning, and consequently that by the greatness of the first sin we lost free choice for acting well, which is contrary to the Council of Trent.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 2.

Objections Are Answered.

15. You will object first against the first conclusion: For the moral goodness of human acts, they must be referred to God. But they are referred to him through charity. Therefore the command of charity is required for the moral goodness of human acts.

I answer by denying the major premise. Although, for the supernatural and meritorious goodness of human acts, they must be referred by the agent to God through the command of charity, nevertheless, for their uprightness and moral goodness, it is not required that such a relation be intended by the agent. It suffices that the act by its nature or object be ordered to God as the author of natural light and the morally upright good, and as a particular good to the universal good; and that the one eliciting such an act not impede this ordination by ordering it to some depraved end or vitiating it by some other evil circumstance. By the very fact that the relation which the act by its nature implies toward God is not impeded, it is referred to him at least interpretatively and acquires goodness from this relation. Thus a stone by its nature tends and is borne toward the center as the term and end of its motion, unless it is violently driven upward by an extrinsic agent and by such violent impulse and retention is prevented from being united to the center, or to the place below.

16. You will object secondly against the second conclusion: No work can be good without a right intention, according to Ambrose, *De officiis* I, c. 3: *Your affection gives its name to your work*. But there can be no right intention without faith, since faith is like the eye of the mind that directs the intention. Therefore there can be no good work without faith. Hence Augustine, on Ps. 31: *Let no one count his works good before faith. Where faith was absent, a good work was absent, for intention makes the work good, and faith directs the intention*.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof it must be said with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 2, that faith directs the intention with respect to the supernatural ultimate end, but natural reason can direct the intention with respect to some connatural good. Hence Augustine in the cited passage speaks of good works of the supernatural order, not of works good only by the moral goodness of the natural order, of which alone we are presently speaking.

17. You will object thirdly: St. Augustine in *Contra Julianum* IV, c. 3, teaches that faith is required for every good work, and consequently that no work without faith is good. From this he infers that all works of unbelievers are sins, and that the virtues of the philosophers were not true virtues but vices.

I answer that these testimonies of Augustine, on which Jansen especially relies, must necessarily be softened by some favorable interpretation. For Augustine in the cited passage requires for a good work not faith of any kind, but faith working through charity, which is found neither in an unbeliever nor even in a Christian sinner. Augustine's words are: *Understand that one who does not perform good works with a good intention of faith, that is, of the faith which works through love, is wholly dark, like a body made up of those works as members; that is, he is full of the blackness of sins.* He teaches the same in many other places, especially in *De gratia Christi*, c. 26: *Where love is absent, no good work is reckoned, nor is it rightly called a good work, because everything that is not from faith is sin.* There Augustine understands the Apostle's words, *Everything that is not from faith is sin*, of faith working through charity. Yet Jansen requires for a good work not the influence of charity but only that of faith, lest he fall into the error of Michael Baius condemned by the Council of Trent. Therefore he too is bound to explain Augustine by some interpretation, as are we.

18. It must therefore be said that Augustine in the cited passage means only that no work without faith is good simply and in the fullest sense. For nothing is absolutely good for man, who is ordered to eternal glory, except what leads or conduces to it; and nothing is absolutely evil except what leads him away from it. That this interpretation is legitimate is clear from the same Holy Doctor in that place, where he says: *Know that we say only that good of man, that good will, and that good work, by which alone man can be brought to God's eternal gift and kingdom, can be conferred on no one without the grace of God, which is given through the one Mediator of God and men.* Hence in the same work, col. 10, he permits Julian to say that certain good works are done through the powers of nature, provided he admits that they are sterile with respect to eternal life.

When Augustine asserts that all works of unbelievers are sins, he means only that all works proceeding from unbelievers precisely insofar as they are unbelievers, or from an error contrary to faith, are sins, even if they are good by their object and species. For if an unbeliever preserves virginity or gives alms in honor of his gods, he undoubtedly sins, because in these acts he does not operate as a man and according to the rule of right reason, but as an unbeliever, according to the rule of his error, or from a depraved intention

conceived on the occasion of unbelief. In the same sense must be understood the Apostle's saying frequently alleged by Augustine: *Everything that is not from faith is sin*. The phrase *not from faith* must be taken not only negatively but also contrarily, so that the sense is: that which is not from faith but from unbelief is sin. St. Thomas interprets it thus in his commentary on Rom. 14, lect. 3, at the end: "*Everything that is not from faith is sin*" must be understood thus: *everything that is contrary to faith is sin, even though it seems good in its kind*.

Finally, when Augustine denies true virtues in unbelievers or ancient philosophers, by the name true virtue he understands a perfect virtue that advances man toward eternal life, or, as he says in the cited passage, *which serves to free and beatify men*. Hence he says there: *If virtues profit man nothing for attaining the true beatitude that faith has promised us through Christ, they are not true virtues*. I add that, since virtue is generated only by the repetition of good acts, and the ancient philosophers very rarely elicited good and upright acts that were not vitiated by some depraved circumstance, especially vainglory, they very rarely acquired true moral virtues. What was generated by their frequently repeated acts was not virtue but vice. Hence Jerome, epistle 4 to Rusticus: *The philosophers of the world cure vice by vice; we overcome vices through love of the virtues*.

19. You will object fourthly with Vásquez against the third conclusion from various testimonies of Scripture, councils, and Supreme Pontiffs, by which it seems to be suggested that man can perform no good work without grace. In John 15 Christ says: *Without me you can do nothing*. Augustine, weighing this passage in tractate 81 on John, adds: *Therefore, whether little or much, it cannot be done without him without whom nothing can be done*. Hence in epistle 46 to Valentine he concludes: *Understand my letter according to this faith, so that you neither deny the grace of God nor defend free choice in such a way as to separate it from the grace of God, as though without it we could in any way think or act according to God, which we altogether cannot do*. For this reason, when the Lord spoke of the fruit of justice, he said to his disciples: *Without me you can do nothing*. Likewise, the Apostle in 2 Cor. 3 declares that even the thought of good, which is the beginning of every upright act, is a gift of God: *We are not sufficient to think anything from ourselves as from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God*. Similarly, Celestine I, in his letter to the bishops of Gaul, manifestly declares the necessity of assisting grace for each good act. In c. 7 he says: *No one uses free choice well except through Christ*. In c. 8: *All the endeavors, works, and merits of the saints must be referred to the glory and praise of God, because no one pleases him except from what he himself has given*. Likewise, in c. 9: *God so works in the hearts of men and in free choice*

On Grace

itself that holy thought and every motion of a good will are from God, because through him we can do some good, without whom we can do no good. Finally, in the Council of Palestine celebrated at Diospolis, it was defined that the grace of God is necessary for each act. Pelagius himself was compelled to admit this, as Augustine reports in epistles 106 and 107. Likewise, the Second Council of Orange, can. 2, says: *There are many good things in man which man does not do, but man does no good things which God does not grant him to do.* Canon 9 says: *Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may work.* Canon 22 consecrates these words of Augustine, tractate 3 on John: *No one has of his own anything but falsehood and sin. If man has anything of truth and justice, it is from that fountain for which we must thirst in this desert.*

I answer first that the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture, councils, and Supreme Pontiffs must be understood not of morally good work universally, but of a good work conducive to the salvation of the soul and eternal life. That this interpretation is legitimate is clear first from the Second Council of Orange, can. 7: If anyone says that through the strength of nature he can fittingly think or choose any good THAT PERTAINS TO THE SALVATION OF ETERNAL LIFE, he is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel, “Without me you can do nothing,” and the Apostle’s saying, “Not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves as from ourselves,” and so forth. By these words the Council not only manifestly declares that it is speaking of a good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, but also that the two testimonies adduced above, which the adversaries object to us and regard as principal and decisive, must be understood of such a good.

This is clear secondly because the councils and Supreme Pontiffs in the cited passages intend to condemn the error of Pelagius. But Pelagius did not err in denying the necessity of grace for some morally good work of the natural order, as the adversaries are compelled to admit, lest they incur the censure of Pius V and Gregory XIII, who condemned these propositions of Michael Baius: *It is a Pelagian error to say that free choice has power to avoid any sin. He agrees with Pelagius who acknowledges any natural good, that is, a good arising from the powers of nature alone.* Therefore, when the aforesaid councils and Supreme Pontiffs say that grace is necessary for each act, they do not speak of upright and morally good acts of the natural order, but only of meritorious acts conducive to the salvation of the soul and eternal life.

This is clear thirdly because, if the aforesaid passages were understood with a universality that included upright and morally good works, our opinion would be condemned in Scripture, councils, and pontifical decrees. But it is erroneous to say that our opinion deserves any censure, as is clear

from the aforesaid propositions of Baius condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII. Therefore it will also be erroneous to assert that the passages of Scripture, definitions of councils, and decrees of Supreme Pontiffs must be understood so broadly and universally as to include upright and morally good works of the natural order. Consequently, they must be restricted to works profitable for salvation and conducive to eternal life.

20. I answer secondly that, if the aforesaid testimonies are understood of any good, even of the natural order, then grace signifies God's general assistance or concurrence necessary for action, which is included under the name of grace broadly and improperly taken, as we declared at the beginning of this Treatise. St. Thomas gives both answers and interpretations in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 and 2; *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 14, in the replies to the arguments to the contrary; and his commentary on John 15, lect. 1, where, explaining Christ's words, *Without me you can do nothing*, he adds: *Our works are either through the power of nature or through divine grace. If through the power of nature, since all motions of nature are from the Word of God, no nature can be moved to do anything without him. If through the power of grace, since he is the author of grace, it is manifest that no meritorious work can be done without him.*

21. You will say: The councils and holy Fathers cited speak in a sense contradicting Pelagius, since they condemn his errors. But he did not deny that morally good works of the natural order proceed from God as the author of nature through general concurrence, but only that they proceed from God as giver of grace through special assistance. Therefore this second answer and interpretation is not good or according to the mind of the councils and holy Fathers.

I answer that it is false that Pelagius sufficiently referred all morally good works of the natural order to God as the author of nature, or sufficiently acknowledged our dependence upon God in acting. For although he admitted that man cannot act without the immediate and simultaneous concurrence of God by which God operates with us, he denied a previous concurrence or assistance by which God acts in us without us and works so that we may work. He thought that freedom would be destroyed if man could operate nothing unless God first acted and premoved his will to action, as was shown in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, tractate on the Pelagian heresy, disp. 1, a. 2.

22. From what has been said you will understand that, when the Council of Orange said from Augustine, No one has of his own anything but falsehood and sin, either the phrase of his own must be understood as excluding general assistance; or the Council means only that falsehood and

On Grace

sin are so proper to man that they are in no way from God as author; or it uses falsehood and sin improperly and broadly for every defective act insufficient for eternal life, according to the customary manner of speaking used by the ancient Fathers. They, as Sixtus of Siena says in *Bibliotheca sancta* VI, annot. 40, called all works performed apart from the aid of divine grace not only nongood, but very frequently evil, vices, and sins, not because they believed them truly and simply evil and sinful, but because they knew that they neither profited for acquiring Christian justice nor conduced to attaining the good of eternal felicity, and therefore did not deem them worthy of being numbered among good things.

23. From this you will easily understand and explain two testimonies of St. Thomas that appear contrary to us. When the Holy Doctor, in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 136, a. 3, requires the assistance of grace for a good work of political virtue, this must not be understood of special grace but of general concurrence, which is grace commonly so called and belongs to the gift of creation. Or it can be said that he speaks of an eminent moral work, such as enduring many and most grave evils for the good of one's country; for such a heroic work special assistance is required, as will become clear below. Similarly, when the same Angelic Doctor says in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 14: *If by the grace of God we mean not some habitual gift but the mercy of God itself by which he interiorly produces a motion of the mind, then man cannot perform any good without the grace of God*, he speaks of God's general concurrence, moving and applying each creature to action. This concurrence can be called the mercy of God insofar as it removes some misery from man, namely the defect of potentiality and indetermination for action.

24. Vásquez further objects with an argument taken from prayer and thanksgiving. The Church prays to God not merely for some good works but for each of them, asks his grace for them, and after they have been performed gives thanks. But nothing is more firmly established in Augustine's doctrine than that prayer and thanksgiving are the clearest indications of divine grace.

To this it is answered first that the Church asks God for morally good works insofar as they conduce to salvation. Hence she concludes her collects *through our Lord Jesus Christ*, from whose merits she asks grace to be given to her. But every grace of the Savior tends to eternal life and salvation as its ultimate end. The same must proportionately be said of thanksgiving.

I answer secondly that, even if it were granted that the Church asks God absolutely for upright and morally good acts and gives thanks for them, it is not rightly inferred from this that grace strictly and properly taken is necessary for eliciting them. For in prayer we often ask for things that can be

had with general concurrence alone when, on the part of the event, they involve some fallibility and contingency. Thus we pray to God for rain, fair weather, and the fruits of the earth, and, when these have been obtained, give him thanks, because although they belong to general providence, they possess contingency and fallibility on the part of the event.

25. You will say: In disputing against the Pelagians, St. Augustine inferred the necessity of special grace from prayer and thanksgiving. They did not deny general grace belonging to the gift of creation, but special grace distinct from the gift of creation. Therefore, from the fact that the faithful ask God for assistance in eliciting upright and morally good acts, and give him thanks when they have elicited them, it is rightly gathered that not only general but also special assistance is required for eliciting them.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. From prayer applied to things exceeding the gift of creation and the efficacy of natural powers, the necessity of special grace is rightly inferred. In this way St. Augustine rightly proves against the Pelagians from prayer that special grace is necessary for rising from sin and acting well in order to eternal life, because these exceed natural powers. From prayer as such, however, grace strictly taken is not inferred, but grace broadly taken for any benefit of God, because prayer can be applied to things of the natural order or belonging to God's general providence when they involve some contingency and fallibility, as is clear from the examples given above.

26. Besides these arguments, Contenson objects with two others in which he places the principal strength of his opinion. The first can be briefly proposed as follows. The will of man in the state of fallen nature is not merely indifferent to good or evil, but is also more inclined to evil than to good, and more inclined to the useful or pleasurable good than to the morally upright good consonant with reason, as Prosper excellently explains in his poem *De ingratis*, c. 27:

*The will therefore remains,
Always loving something toward which it may bear itself,
And is deceived within the labyrinth, entering the winding paths
Of uncertain ways. It desires vain things, swells and fears through vanities,
And, rushing with every kind of instability, rises from wound to wound.*

27. Similarly, St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 136, a. 3, ad 1: *If human nature were integral, the inclination of reason would prevail; but in corrupted nature the inclination of concupiscence, which dominates in man, prevails.* Therefore, in order for man in the state of fallen nature to elicit upright and morally good acts, he needs the grace of God or his special

On Grace

assistance, by which he may determine himself to the morally upright good and judge practically that it must be preferred to the pleasurable good.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although in the state of fallen nature man is more inclined to evil than to good, and concupiscence dominates in him and frequently inclines and draws him to evil and vicious acts, nevertheless it does not totally destroy, but only diminishes and weakens, the inclination toward the morally upright good consonant with reason that is naturally implanted in man. Therefore he can by the powers of his nature perform some upright and morally good works and consequently can sometimes have a practical judgment by which he judges that the morally upright good must be preferred to the pleasurable, as is clear from what was said above.

28. The other argument of the same author is this: By the precept of charity we are bound to refer all our works to God as the ultimate end, at least virtually. Therefore, for the moral goodness of a work, it does not suffice that its object and proximate end possess uprightness unless the agent also intends the ultimate end, which he cannot do without grace.

I answer first that, if this argument were valid, it would prove that not only assisting grace but also faith and charity are required for the uprightness and moral goodness of our works, and consequently that all works of unbelievers and of believers existing in the state of mortal sin are sins. This is erroneous and condemned by the Council of Trent, at least with respect to works preceding justification. The inference is clear. Since man's ultimate end is supernatural, acts elicited by him cannot be ordered to it unless directed by faith and commanded by charity. Therefore, if an ordination to the ultimate end is required for their uprightness and moral goodness, the influence of faith and the command of charity will likewise be required. Thus the author, whether he wills it or not, falls into the opinions of Baius or Jansen, which we refuted above.

I answer secondly by denying the antecedent. Since the precept of charity is affirmative, although it always obliges, it does not oblige at every moment, but at certain determined times and occasions, as we reported above from Rainerius. I add that, by the very fact that the will does not refer an act good by its object, such as almsgiving, to a depraved end but rests in the precise uprightness of mercy, that act of itself and spontaneously tends toward God, the fountain and end of all uprightness, at least virtually or interpretatively, just as a stone tends toward the center unless violently driven upward by an extrinsic agent, as we declared in the answer to the first objection.

CHAPTER III.

On the Necessity of Grace for the Love of God.

1. The division of divine love into natural and supernatural is celebrated and common among theologians. Since God is the author of nature, or of goods of the natural order, and also of grace, or of goods of the supernatural order, and under both aspects is good, lovable, and knowable by the human intellect, he can under both terminate the affection of the human will. Hence, just as there is a twofold religion, one of the natural order, illuminated by the light of reason, by which God is worshiped as author of nature through acts of the same order; and another supernatural religion, illuminated by the light of faith, by which God is worshiped as author of grace through acts of faith, hope, charity, and the infused moral virtues; so there is also a twofold love of God. One is natural and acquired in its kind, regulated by the light of reason and terminated at God as author of nature. The other is supernatural and infused through itself, illuminated by the light of faith, by which God is loved by us as author of grace and as the object beatifying us with supernatural beatitude. That the latter cannot be elicited by man through his own powers and without the assistance of grace is certain by faith and defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 2. But concerning the former there is difficulty and controversy among theologians: whether fallen man, or man established in purely natural conditions, needs a special assistance in order to love God as author of nature with an efficacious love, that is, a love capable by its own force of introducing the means necessary for pleasing God and excluding everything repugnant to his friendship; or whether he can accomplish this by the powers of nature.

§ 1.

The Difficulty Is Resolved with Respect to Both Parts, or Concerning Man Considered in the State of Fallen Nature and in the State of Pure Nature.

2. I say first: Man in the state of fallen nature cannot, by the powers of free choice and with general concurrence alone, love God as author of nature efficaciously above all things. Our Thomists more commonly teach this against Scotus, Molina, and other more recent authors.

On Grace

This is proved first from St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3: *Man in the state of integral nature did not need a gift of grace superadded to natural goods in order to love God naturally above all things, although he needed God's assistance moving him to this. But in the state of corrupted nature man needs, even for this, the assistance of grace healing nature.* He had assigned the reason shortly before, drawn from the fact that the will of fallen man, existing in original or personal sin, is as though bent back upon itself and inclined toward private and proper good, which is the ultimate end of the sinner. Hence, unless healed through grace, it cannot refer the love of itself and all other things to God and love him as its own private and proper good, since this is contrary to such a bent and deviant inclination.

This is confirmed. Although a weak nature can perform some work, it cannot perform the most excellent operation that a sound and integral nature can elicit. But to love God as author of nature efficaciously is the most excellent and perfect act that human nature in the state of health and integrity could elicit through the powers of free choice, since such love virtually contains the fulfillment of the whole natural law, according to Basil, *De institutis monasticis*, c. 2: *This commandment, namely the love of God, appears to be one, but it contains within itself the power of all the commandments.* Therefore fallen and weakened man cannot through the powers of free choice love God as author of nature with efficacious love, but needs grace for this. If you ask what grace is required for eliciting such love, I answer:

3. I say secondly: For the efficacious love of God as author of nature, speaking through itself and considering the object, only a special assistance within the natural order is required. Once elevation to the supernatural state is presupposed, however, supernatural assistance is required for it accidentally and concomitantly.

The first part is clear. The love of God as author of nature is an entitatively natural act, since it regards a natural object. Therefore through itself and from the precise nature of its object it requires neither sanctifying grace nor supernatural assistance. The consequence is legitimate, for by the very fact that an act requires as its eliciting principle a supernatural form, it exceeds the faculty of nature and is consequently supernatural.

4. The second part is shown as follows. Once the elevation of human nature to the order of grace and the knowledge of God as supernatural author are presupposed, man cannot love him as author of nature unless he simultaneously loves him as supernatural end and author. Likewise, given such elevation and knowledge, there can be no aversion from God as creator of nature without aversion from God as supernatural author, nor can hatred of the author of nature be posited without terminating in some way at him

as author of grace. Therefore, since supernatural love of God through itself requires supernatural assistance, natural love, once the elevation of human nature to the order of grace is presupposed, requires it accidentally and concomitantly.

I add that not only supernatural assistance but also sanctifying grace is required for such love, through which sin, incompatible with such love, is removed and the obstacle of aversion from God as the ultimate end, both natural and supernatural, is taken away, since this aversion likewise cannot coexist with the same love. Hence St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, teaches that fallen man needs healing grace for the love of God as author of nature. That by the name healing grace he understands habitual grace is clear from the following article, where he says: *In the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfill all the divine commandments without healing grace*. But it is certain that sanctifying grace is required for fulfilling all the divine commandments, as will become clear from what is said in the next chapter.

5. You will ask whether a just man endowed with sanctifying grace needs supernatural assistance in order to love God as author of nature with efficacious love.

I answer affirmatively. Since habitual grace in this state of the way does not perfectly heal man or restore to him the natural integrity that he lost through the sin of the first parent, but leaves the rebellion of concupiscence and the struggle between the higher and lower appetites, he still needs additional strength and assistance for merit and progress in the spiritual life in order to proceed to the act of loving God as author of nature.

I add that, although the just man endowed with habitual grace lacks the obstacle of sin and aversion from God as ultimate end, nevertheless, as we have already shown, once the elevation of human nature to the order of grace is presupposed, he cannot love God as author of nature without simultaneously loving him as supernatural end and author. Therefore, since supernatural love of God in the just man through itself requires supernatural assistance, natural love requires it accidentally and concomitantly.

6. I say thirdly: A man established in pure nature could, with general concurrence alone, have loved God as author of nature with efficacious love for some brief time. He could not, however, have persevered for a long time in such love without a special assistance within the natural order.

The first part is proved first from St. Thomas, *Quodlibeta*, q. 1, a. 8, where, treating the question *whether man in the state of innocence loved God above all things*, he resolves it as follows: *I answer that, if man was made in grace, as can be gathered from the words of Basil and Augustine, this question has*

On Grace

no place, for it is manifest that one existing in grace loves God above himself through charity. But because it was possible for God to make man in purely natural conditions, it is useful to consider how far natural love could extend. Concerning this man, if he were created in purely natural conditions, he proves that he could love God above all things. First, because if he did not love God more than himself, he would love him either less than himself or equally with himself. In either case it would follow that man preferred himself by not referring himself to God. But to enjoy oneself introduces the perversity of sin, as Augustine says. Therefore the first man in the state of innocence, whom God is supposed to have created in purely natural conditions, would already have been perverted through sin, which is impossible. It follows, therefore, that he loved God above all things. Second, because God is the common good of the whole universe and all its parts. Hence every creature in its own manner naturally loves God more than itself: insensible things naturally, brute animals sensitively, and the rational creature through intellectual love, which is called dilection.

Two other arguments can be added. The first is that, since in the state of pure nature man's nature would not have been corrupted by sin but established in its purely natural conditions, man would not follow a private good contrary to reason, but could be borne toward every good connatural to himself with general concurrence. Since God is the good most connatural to man, in that state he could, with general concurrence alone, be borne toward God by natural love and love him as natural author and end, especially since in that state there would be no guilt bending the rational creature toward private good as its ultimate end.

The second argument is that man in the state of pure nature would have been bound to love God. Since no one is bound to the impossible, such love would have been possible to him. But it would not have been possible through grace, since that state would exclude it. Therefore it would have been possible through God's general concurrence. Since such love would have been most connatural to man, there is no reason why a special concurrence of God, or a special assistance within the natural order, would be required for it. Such assistance would, however, be required for long perseverance in it. For this would include a special difficulty, namely, the temptations of many vices that would occur to man in that state, and the observance of all natural commandments for a long time would require a special assistance within the natural order. From this the second part of the conclusion is established, namely, that man established in the state of pure nature could not have persevered in the natural love of God without a special assistance within the natural order.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 2.

Objections Are Answered.

7. You will object first against the first conclusion: St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 5, acknowledges in the demons a natural love of God above all things, and in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5, he likewise admits it in the souls of children existing in limbo. Therefore such love can coexist with either actual or original sin, and consequently can be elicited by the powers of nature.

I answer that there can be a twofold natural love of God. One proceeds from the will as nature, by which God is loved as the principle of being and the universal good of the whole of nature. The other proceeds from the will as a free and elective power, by which God is loved with an elective and free love as friend and universal legislator. The first is a love of concupiscence. Since the demons are necessitated to love themselves and cannot love their own being unless they love God's being, by which their own is sustained and preserved, they are necessitated to love God with a love of concupiscence. The second is a love of benevolence, by which God is loved above all things for his own sake and insofar as, being the author of nature, he is supremely lovable in himself. Therefore, when St. Thomas in the cited places admits a natural love of God above all things in the demons and in the souls of children existing in limbo, he speaks of the first love, which we acknowledge can coexist with sin and be elicited by the powers of nature alone, not of the second, of which alone we are presently speaking.

8. You will object secondly: Someone can by the powers of nature alone die for his country or parents. Therefore, with all the more reason, he can die for God as author of nature, and consequently can by the powers of nature alone love him efficaciously above all things; for Scripture testifies in John 15: *No one has greater love than that a man lay down his life for his friends.*

I answer first by denying the antecedent. Since such an act is heroic, arduous, and difficult, man in the state of fallen nature cannot elicit it by the powers of nature and free choice alone, but needs grace, or at least some special assistance within the natural order, unless perhaps such an act is performed from the motive of vainglory, as frequently happens.

I answer secondly, granting the antecedent, by denying the consequence and the parity, for two reasons of difference. The first is that God is more removed from sensible goods, which move us more strongly and

On Grace

efficaciously. The second is that the love of created goods does not require the abandonment of all mortal sins, as does efficacious love of God, which is compatible with no mortal sin, whether actual, habitual, or original.

9. You will object thirdly: The intellect can naturally know that God as author of nature must be loved above all things. Therefore the will also, which is rational appetite following the direction or dictate of reason, can by the powers of nature alone love him above every other thing.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although the intellect can speculatively arrive at such knowledge from natural principles, in the state of corruption it cannot have a practical and prudential judgment by which it judges that God must here and now be loved above all things unless assisted by special help. This is because through original sin man is more wounded in his practical than in his speculative intellect, and is more powerless for pursuing good than for knowing truth, according to the poet: *I see and approve the better things, but follow the worse.*

10. You will object fourthly against the second conclusion: If man in the state of fallen nature needed supernatural assistance to love God as author of nature, such love would not be natural but supernatural. But this cannot be said, since, because it regards a natural object, it must be entitatively natural. Therefore the former cannot be said either. The inference of the major premise seems manifest, for an act for which supernatural assistance is required is supernatural.

I answer by denying the inference of the major premise. To its proof I say that an act for which supernatural assistance is required through itself and as its eliciting principle is supernatural, but not if such assistance is required only accidentally and as removing an obstacle, as happens in the present case. Supernatural assistance is not required through itself for the efficacious love of God as author of nature, but only accidentally, by reason of the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order and the conjunction of the natural end with the supernatural end, and for removing the obstacle of sin and aversion from God as ultimate end, as we declared in the second conclusion.

11. You will object fifthly: The two arguments by which we showed above in the first conclusion that man in the state of fallen nature cannot, by the powers of free choice and with general concurrence alone, love God as author of nature efficaciously above all things, also apply to man established in purely natural conditions, and prove that even in that state he would be incapable of such love without special divine assistance. Therefore, if we wish to speak consistently, we must also assert this of him.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. The reason the will of fallen man cannot with general concurrence love God as author of nature is that it is as though bent back upon itself and inclined toward private good, according to the poet: *O souls bent toward the earth and empty of heavenly things*. Likewise, man in the state of fallen nature is incapable of such love because it is the most excellent and perfect act, since it virtually includes the fulfillment of the whole law of nature. But these two arguments apply with equal force to man established in purely natural conditions, since in that state man's will would likewise be as though bent back upon itself and inclined toward private good, and since love of God as author of nature would be the most perfect and excellent operation of that state. Therefore the conclusion follows.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof I deny that man in the state of pure nature would have had a will as bent back upon itself and inclined toward private good as he has in the state of fallen nature. It would not then have been wounded and corrupted by original sin, through which it is turned away from God and remains habitually inclined toward private good as ultimate end by reason of the fomes, which is the material element of original sin. Hence, although the act of loving God as author of nature would have been the most excellent operation of that state, nevertheless, since nature would then have been sound and connaturally inclined toward such an act, it would not have needed a special assistance within the natural order in order to elicit it, but God's general concurrence would have sufficed. From this the answer to the second proof of the antecedent is clear.

12. You will say: Since man is composed of body and soul, and of rational and sensitive appetite, it is natural to him to desire private and sensible good apart from and contrary to the order of reason. Therefore the rebellion of concupiscence, or the depraved inclination toward private and sensible good, would have belonged to him in the state of pure nature.

I answer that, although man is composed of body and soul, and of rational and sensitive appetite, nevertheless, because it belongs to the nature of the higher to rule the lower, and of the lower to obey the higher, it would have been natural to man created in the state of pure nature to possess a soul superior to the sensitive appetite, which could by natural power, although with some difficulty, moderate the lower appetite. For this belongs to the nature of what is higher. Hence St. Thomas says in *De malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2: *Just as the concupiscible power is natural to man according to his instituted nature, that is, nature not disordered and corrupted through original sin, so it is also natural to it to be subject to reason, according to what the Philosopher says in the third book of De anima, that the sensitive appetite follows the rational appetite*

On Grace

as sphere is moved by sphere. From this he infers in the same article, ad 1, that the concupiscence by which the concupiscible power is prone to be borne toward sensible pleasure apart from the order of reason is contrary to man's nature insofar as he is man, and thus belongs to original sin.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Necessity of Grace for the Observance of the Whole Natural Law.

1. It is clear from what was said in c. 2 that man in fallen nature can fulfill some precepts of the natural law without special grace. For since it was shown there that man in such a state can with general concurrence alone sometimes perform some moral good that is upright in every respect, it is manifestly gathered from this that he can also fulfill by the powers of nature alone a precept concerning such a work, for example, the precept to give alms to a person in extreme need.

It is also certain and acknowledged by all that man in every state needs grace in order to fulfill the natural precepts as regards the mode, namely, so that he may fulfill them from charity, meritoriously, and fruitfully for eternal life. Since that mode is supernatural and elevates acts of the natural virtues to a supernatural order and end, it is manifest that it cannot be placed in our acts without grace and charity, which is the form of the other virtues and gives them the principal power of meriting eternal felicity. The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, is whether man in the state of fallen nature can by the powers of free choice alone observe the whole natural law, or the whole collection of natural precepts, as regards their substance, or whether he needs grace for this, and what kind.

§ 1.

The Difficulty is Resolved by Three Conclusions.

2. I say first: Man in the state of fallen nature cannot observe the whole natural law as regards its substance without special grace.

The conclusion is manifestly gathered from what was said in the preceding chapter. First, the whole natural law includes all natural commandments, from the first to the last. But fallen man cannot without the assistance of grace observe the first of all the commandments, namely, the precept to love God as author of nature, as we showed there in conclusion 1.

Therefore he cannot fulfill the whole natural law. Second, as we said there, although a weak nature can perform some work, it cannot perform the most excellent operation that a sound and integral nature can elicit. But the most perfect work that man in the state of integrity and health could perform through the powers of nature was the observance of the whole natural law as regards its substance. As regards the mode of conduciveness to salvation, however, even in that state he needed grace, since that mode, as we said above, is supernatural. Therefore fallen man cannot by his own powers fulfill the whole natural law as regards its substance.

3.¹ I say secondly: Justifying or habitual grace is necessary in fallen man for the observance of the whole natural law.

This is proved first. It is impossible to be rightly ordered concerning the means, such as the precepts, while not being rightly ordered concerning the end, namely God, because the means are chosen for the sake of and in view of the end. But without sanctifying grace and charity no one is rightly ordered to God as ultimate end. Therefore without it no one in the state of fallen nature can observe all the natural commandments.

It is proved secondly. The precept to love God as author of nature above all things is contained under the natural law. But this cannot be fulfilled without habitual grace, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore neither can the whole natural law.

4. I say thirdly: In fallen man, for the observance of the whole natural law, besides habitual grace there is necessarily required special assisting grace. Through itself and considering the nature of the matter, this need only be special within the natural order; but once man's elevation to the supernatural order is presupposed, it must accidentally be entitatively supernatural.

The first part is proved. The moral incapacity for observing the whole natural law in fallen man existing in mortal sin arises not only from the absence of the subjection of the mind to God as ultimate end, but also from the rebellion and struggle of the lower appetite against reason. Although habitual grace subjects the mind to God as ultimate end, it does not remove the rebellion of the lower appetite against the higher, but leaves it in us for combat and merit, as the Council of Trent teaches in sess. 5, in the decree on original sin, and experience sufficiently shows. Therefore in fallen man, for the observance of the whole natural law, actual or assisting grace is necessarily required besides habitual or justifying grace.

¹ So numbered '2.' in the original.

On Grace

5. That such grace through itself and considering the nature of the matter need not be entitatively supernatural, but that it suffices for it to be special within the natural order, is clear. For the observance of the whole natural law from some natural upright motive is entitatively natural. Therefore it cannot through itself require as its proximate eliciting principle an entitatively supernatural assisting grace.

Finally, that, once the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order is presupposed, it accidentally requires such grace is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter, conclusion 2, concerning the natural love of God. The same must proportionately be said of the observance of the whole natural law.

§ 2.

Objections Are Answered.

6. You will object first against the first conclusion from Deut. 30: *This commandment that I command you today is not above you, nor is it placed far away, nor situated in heaven.* By these words Moses seems to suggest that the observance of the law he communicated to the Hebrew people in God's name was not above their natural powers.

It is easily answered that by these words Moses meant only that the observance of such a law is in man's power, not as operating through the powers of nature alone, but as moved and assisted by divine grace, which interiorly knocks at the heart while the law exteriorly sounds in the ears. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, ad 2: *Man can do nothing unless moved by God, and therefore, when man is said to do what is within him, this is said to be in man's power insofar as he is moved by God.*

7. You will object secondly from the Apostle's words in Rom. 2: The Gentiles who do not have the law naturally do the things that are of the law. By this it seems to be suggested that the Gentiles observed the natural law by the powers of nature alone. Hence Tertullian, *De corona militis*, c. 6: When the Apostle says to the Romans that the nations naturally do the things that are of the law, he indicates both a natural law and a lawful nature.

I answer that the Apostle's words can be understood of Gentiles converted to the faith and acting through nature reformed by grace, as St. Augustine interprets them in *Contra Julianum* IV, c. 3, and St. Thomas in his commentary on this passage, lect. 3. But if they are understood of Gentiles not yet converted to the faith and acting by the powers of nature alone, as Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine himself in *De spiritu et*

littera, c. 28, understand them, it must be said that the Apostle means only that Gentiles not yet converted to the faith naturally, that is, through the light and powers of nature alone, act well in some things and observe some precepts of the natural law, although they cannot fulfill the whole collection of natural precepts and the whole natural law without the assistance of grace.

8. You will say: Chrysostom, homily 5 on the Epistle to the Romans, explains the cited saying of the Apostle of Gentiles who preceded Christ's coming and the time of evangelical grace, and of the observance of the whole natural law. For he says that, obeying the law of nature, they observed everything that contributed to piety.

I answer that Chrysostom does not explain the Apostle's passage of Gentiles still detained in unbelief, but of those who, outside the Jewish people, were imbued with faith in the one God and also with at least implicit faith in the Mediator, by the aid of which divine grace they fulfilled the natural law. Here are St. Chrysostom's words: *He here calls Gentiles not those who were idolaters, but those who worshiped God and, obeying the law of nature, observed everything that contributed to piety, apart from Jewish ceremonies. Such was Melchizedek with all his people, such was Job, such were the Ninevites, and such was Cornelius.* But it is certain that Melchizedek and Job did not lack faith in the Mediator, and that the Ninevites could neither do true penance nor obtain mercy from God without implicit faith in him. Cornelius also had implicit faith, without which his prayers and alms would never have been acceptable to God, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, and III, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2. Hence Augustine in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 7, says that Cornelius *did not give alms and pray without some faith. For how did he call upon one in whom he had not believed?*

9. You will object thirdly: The precepts of the natural law taken collectively, since they are natural, do not exceed the powers of nature. Therefore grace is not necessary for fulfilling them.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. They do not exceed the powers of sound and integral nature: I grant the antecedent. They do not exceed the powers of weakened and corrupted nature: I deny the antecedent and the consequence. The solution is clear from what was said above. Although a weak and wounded nature can perform some morally good works, it cannot perform the most excellent operations that a sound and integral nature can elicit, such as the fulfillment of the whole natural law and the love of God as author of nature, which of itself entails and has joined to it the observance of all the other precepts for as long as it endures.

On Grace

10. You will object fourthly: Man in the state of fallen nature can observe each precept of the natural law without special grace. But one who can fulfill each precept can also fulfill the whole collection. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature can observe the whole collection of natural precepts without special grace.

I answer first by denying the major premise, for fallen man cannot without grace observe the first and greatest commandment of the natural law, namely, the precept to love God as author of nature.

I answer secondly, even granting the major premise, by denying the minor, whose falsity is clear from what was said above in c. 1 concerning the knowledge of natural truths, and will become more plainly clear below when we treat venial sins.

11. You will object fifthly against the second conclusion: For the observance of the whole natural law there is required grace healing the weakness of human nature wounded through original sin, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4. But habitual grace, since it is ordered not to operating but to being, does not move the powers of the soul to elicit their acts, but only sanctifies the soul and cleanses it from the stain of sin. Therefore it is not healing grace assisting operation, but justifying or sanctifying grace. Consequently, it is not required for the observance of the whole natural law, but actual or assisting grace suffices for it.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. Through original sin we contracted a twofold weakness: one in the higher part, through the aversion of the mind from God; the other in the lower part, which remained turned away from the higher. By reason of both we remained weak for acting well. Since the powers of the will for acting well concerning the means are derived from the end, or adherence to it, it follows that, when the higher part is turned away from God through sin, the powers of the will for acting well languish. Therefore, for the will to be made strong, the aversion of sin must be removed. Since this cannot be removed without habitual grace, man cannot be perfectly healed without it. Hence it can rightly be called not only justifying or sanctifying grace but also healing grace. Although it is not required directly as assisting operation, it is required as removing sin, which prevents the love by which the will is made firm for acting.

12. You will object sixthly: Man in the state of pure nature would be as weak for the observance of the whole natural law as he is in the state of original sin. But in the state of pure nature he would not need habitual grace for fulfilling the whole natural law; a special assistance within the natural

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

order would suffice for him. Therefore habitual grace is not necessary in the state of original sin for fulfilling the whole natural law.

I answer by denying the major premise. Although we formerly approved the opinion teaching that the powers of fallen man are equal to those that would have existed in man in the state of pure nature, or established in purely natural conditions, and judged it more probable, and taught it both in our *Clypeus* and in previous editions of our *Manuale*, nevertheless, after more mature examination, we now judge it less probable because of the authorities and arguments set forth in the last chapter of the treatise on man in this edition.

13. You will object finally against the third conclusion: The observance of the whole natural law is an entitatively natural work. Therefore it cannot require entitatively supernatural assistance.

I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. It cannot require entitatively supernatural assistance through itself and considering the nature of the matter: I grant this. It cannot require it accidentally and once man's elevation to the supernatural order is presupposed: I deny this.

CHAPTER V.

On the Necessity of Grace for Victory over Temptations.

1. From the principles established above it is manifestly gathered against Vásquez and Contenson that a special grace of God is not required in fallen man for victory over a light temptation from an upright natural motive. For such victory is an easy work, exceeding neither physically nor morally the powers even of weakened man. Therefore man in the state of fallen nature does not need special grace for it. The consequence is clear from what was said above. The antecedent appears certain, for no foundation can be assigned for so diminishing the powers of fallen man that he has neither a physical nor moral proportion for overcoming a light temptation, especially since he has a sufficient and proportionate power for some upright and morally good works, for example, giving alms to a person in extreme need, and consequently for fulfilling the natural precept obliging him to this and resisting the temptation that could withdraw him from its fulfillment, as is clear from what was said in c. 2 against the same authors. Hence among the propositions of Baius condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII is numbered this one: *Not only those are thieves and robbers who deny Christ, the way of truth*

On Grace

and life, but also those who say that man can resist any temptation without the assistance of his grace.

It is also commonly held by nearly all that grace is not required for overcoming a grave temptation from some depraved motive, for example, a temptation to lust from the motive of avarice or vainglory, because that act is evil from the circumstance of its end, and grace is required only for an act upright in every respect. The only difficulty, therefore, is whether a special assistance of grace is necessary for victory over a grave temptation from an upright motive. A grave temptation is one that vehemently inclines toward evil and withdraws from good by presenting some great apparent good or imminent evil. These things being premised:

2. I say briefly: Fallen man cannot overcome a grave temptation from an upright motive without a special assistance of God.

This is proved first from Scripture. The Apostle says in 1 Cor. 10: He will not permit you to be tempted above what you are able. From this Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, and others rightly infer that there are temptations surpassing at least the moral powers of free choice left to itself. Likewise, Christ said to the disciples in Matt. 26: Watch and pray, that you may not enter into temptation. But if victory over every temptation were in our power through the powers of free choice without need of grace, as the Pelagians wished, Christ should not have urged the disciples to watch and pray in order to overcome temptation, but only have exhorted them to a victory that they could obtain by their own powers. Hence Jerome, explaining these words of the Savior in *Adversus Pelagianos* II, says: According to you he should have said, "Rise and resist, for you have free choice, and together with the power granted you by the Lord you need the assistance of no other." The Council of Carthage has similar words in its synodal letter, the ninetieth among Augustine's letters, where, speaking of the Pelagians, it says: Their sacrilegious arguments necessarily entail that we ought not even to pray that we may not enter into temptation. For if these things are placed in our power by the capacity of nature and the choice of the will, who does not see that they are vainly asked of the Lord and falsely sought in prayer, since things already obtainable by the sufficient powers of our nature as constituted are requested by prayer? Nor ought the Lord Jesus to have said, "Watch and pray," but only, "Watch, lest you enter into temptation." The Council of Milevis repeats nearly the same in its synodal letter, the ninety-second among Augustine's letters.

3. It is proved secondly from Innocent I in his letter to the Council of Carthage, the ninety-first among Augustine's letters: Unless grace, implored by great prayers, descends upon us, we cannot attempt to overcome the

errors of earthly defilement and a worldly body, since not free choice but the assistance of God alone can make us equal to resisting. He provided daily remedies without which we can in no way overcome human errors. For it is necessary that, just as we overcome with his assistance, so, when he does not assist us, we are overcome. From these words this argument can be drawn. That which we can do without special grace does not necessarily fail when it is absent. Therefore, if we could be tempted yet not overcome without special grace, it would not be necessary for us to be overcome when God does not assist, the contrary of which Innocent teaches.

4. It is proved thirdly from the holy Fathers, who seriously warn that, although it belongs to us to give or deny consent to temptation, we must in no way presume upon our own strength, but must run with all humility to God's mercy. Thus Augustine in *De civitate Dei* XXII, c. 23: In this warfare, most full of labors and dangers, let victory neither be hoped for from our powers nor, when accomplished, attributed to our powers, but to the grace of him of whom the Apostle says: "Who gives victory through Christ." Bernard also says in sermon 1 for the Octave of Easter: Whenever you resist temptation, whenever you overcome the evil one, do not attribute this to your own powers; do not glory in yourself, but rather in the Lord. He treats the same at length in sermon 1 on the Psalm *Qui habitat*. Likewise Gregory the Great says in *Moralia in Job* XXIII, c. 19: Let no one esteem himself to possess any virtue even when he can do something strongly, because, if divine protection abandons him, he is suddenly overwhelmed in weakness precisely where he gloried that he stood valiantly. In book XXXVIII, c. 6, explaining Job 38, Who set its measurements, if you know?, he adds: When one acting considers these things, let him attribute nothing to his own virtue and no longer dare anything from himself while he fears the hidden judgments of God. But, considering the measures and lines stretched incomprehensibly from above, let him remain in the humility of fear all the more, the more he sees all things depend upon the power of the measurer.

5. The conclusion can also be founded on this fundamental argument, frequently suggested by us. Man remained weakened through sin, and his free choice, although not extinguished, was weakened and enfeebled with respect to moral good. Therefore, although by his own powers he can perform easy works and consequently overcome light temptations, he cannot perform arduous and difficult works or overcome grave temptations unless strengthened and assisted by a special help of God. The consequence is clear from the example of a man suffering from natural weakness. Although by his own powers and without another's aid he can perform some slight and easy motions of a healthy man, such as bending a finger, moving a

foot, and similar things, he cannot perform perfect motions, such as leaping, running, and walking about, unless assisted by another's help. The same must proportionately be said of man in the state of fallen nature: he can by his own powers perform some easy acts and certain upright and morally good works, and overcome certain light temptations, but cannot perform arduous and difficult works, such as loving God as author of nature efficaciously above all things, observing the whole natural law, overcoming grave temptations, and similar things that man in the state of sound and integral nature could perform by the powers of free choice alone. Moral weakness arising from sin must be considered in the same manner, with proportion observed, as physical and natural weakness.

6. You will say that there is a great difference between the two kinds of weakness. Physical weakness causes a diminution of the bodily members and therefore renders man incapable of the perfect motion of a healthy man. Moral weakness diminishes none of the being of the powers, since natural endowments remain integral after sin, and consequently cannot induce in fallen man an incapacity for works of the natural order, however perfect and difficult they may be.

But against this, first: If this difference were valid, it would follow that fallen man could by the powers of nature not only overcome a grave temptation but also fulfill the whole natural law, which is contrary to the common opinion of theologians.

Against this, secondly: Although through original guilt man lost none of the being of his powers, he was nevertheless despoiled of the gratuitous gifts by which the mind was subjected to God and the lower part to the higher. From this arises moral weakness and consequently incapacity and powerlessness in fallen man for arduous and difficult works of the natural order. Therefore, although through original sin man lost none of the being of his powers, he nevertheless remained morally weakened and consequently incapable of obtaining victory over a grave temptation by his own powers.

7. Finally, the conclusion can be proved by this reasoning. It is connatural to every agent to operate according to its prevailing inclination. Therefore, when under a grave temptation the inclination toward the pleasurable good contrary to reason prevails in fallen man, it will be connatural for the will to follow it and preternatural for it then to pursue the morally upright good consonant with reason. Consequently, to pursue the upright good notwithstanding such a temptation and prefer it to the pleasurable good, and to be determined to this by God contrary to what it connaturally seeks according to its then prevailing inclination, will be a special grace and benefit of God.

Nor is it valid to say that this argument would also prove that fallen man cannot overcome light temptations without grace, since through them he is likewise inclined toward a sensible and pleasurable good contrary to reason. This is not valid. Although some inclination and propensity toward the pleasurable good arises from a light temptation, nevertheless, because it is slight and weak, it can easily be overcome through reason and the natural inclination man has toward the morally upright good, without a special help of God.

8. Against our conclusion the following argument is customarily objected, which appears difficult to some. A temptation, however vehement, so long as it does not absorb the judgment of reason, does not remove from fallen man his freedom to resist it. Therefore fallen man, however gravely tempted against some precept of the natural law, can overcome that temptation without special assistance. The consequence seems legitimate, for it appears impossible that someone destitute of every special assistance should remain free to resist temptation if he cannot resist it without special assistance. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 10, aa. 2 and 3, where he expressly teaches that the human will, as long as man is in the state of the way, is necessitated as regards the exercise of the act by no object or passion whatever, however vehement, but always remains free to elicit or not elicit the act. St. Anselm asserts the same in *De libertate arbitrii*, cc. 6, 7, 9, and 10. Reason also supports this, for if a grave temptation removed freedom from the tempted man who lacked special assistance to resist it, he would not sin by consenting, since no one sins in what he cannot freely avoid.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying its consequence. In order for man to be said to be free to observe supernatural precepts and resist temptations inducing him to transgress them, it is not necessary that he be able to do this without grace and through the powers of free choice alone. It suffices that he can do it through grace, which is offered to him by God when their obligation presses or a grave temptation assails him, as the holy Fathers everywhere teach in opposing the error of Pelagius, who asserted that man would not be free if he needed God's assistance, as St. Jerome reports in his letter to Ctesiphon. Likewise, in order that a grave temptation against natural precepts leave fallen man free to resist, it is not required that, when assailed by such a temptation, he be able to resist it without special assistance. It suffices that he can resist with special assistance offered to him by God when the obligation of the natural precept is present and the grave temptation presses. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4, ad 2: *That which we can do with divine*

On Grace

assistance is not wholly impossible to us, according to the Philosopher in the third book of the Ethics: the things that we can do through friends we can in some manner do ourselves.

9. To complete this question, you will ask first whether entitatively supernatural grace is required for resisting a grave temptation against natural precepts, or whether a special assistance within the natural order suffices.

I answer that, if man resists it from some supernatural motive, entitatively supernatural grace is required. Since an act is specified by the motive from which it is elicited, an act by which someone resists a temptation from a supernatural motive must be supernatural and consequently requires entitatively supernatural grace as its principle. But if he resists such a temptation from some upright motive of the natural order, a special assistance within the natural order suffices. Since the act by which he resists is then entitatively natural, it cannot require entitatively supernatural grace as its principle. Hence in c. 3 we said that the natural love of God does not require entitatively supernatural grace as its eliciting principle, but only for reasons of fittingness, on account of its incompatibility with sin, an incompatibility not found in victory over a grave temptation.

10. You will ask secondly whether what we have said of fallen man, or man existing in the state of fallen nature, is to be understood also of a man already justified through grace.

I answer affirmatively, for in the justified man there remains the rebellion of appetite against reason, from which weakness of powers with respect to moral good arises. Hence, just as for this reason he needs special assistance for the natural love of God and for the observance of the whole natural law, so he likewise needs it for victory over a grave temptation, as will become more evident from what is said in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Necessity of Grace for Long Avoiding All Mortal Sins Contrary to the Natural Law.

1. Since it is certain by faith that man cannot fulfill supernatural precepts without grace, it is equally certain that without grace he cannot avoid those sins consisting in the transgression or omission of such precepts. The only difficulty, therefore, concerns mortal sins contrary to the natural law:

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

whether they can be avoided for a long time without grace. For the resolution:

2. I say briefly: Man in the state of fallen nature cannot by the powers of his nature avoid for a long time mortal sins contrary to the natural law, but for this requires both justifying and assisting grace.

The first part is clear from what was said above in c. 4, where we showed that fallen man cannot by the powers of his nature fulfill the whole natural law. Therefore he cannot by his own powers for a long time avoid all mortal sins contrary to that law. The consequence is clear, for man sins because he does not fulfill the precepts. Therefore, if he cannot by his own powers observe the whole natural law for a long time, neither can he by the same powers avoid for a long time all mortal sins contrary to the natural law.

3. The same truth can also be supported by the argument of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 8. Man in the state of fallen nature has many things, both intrinsic and extrinsic, provoking him to sin: namely, the rebellion of appetite, the temptation of demons, and the society of depraved men who induce us to sin by their examples and counsels. Moreover, the corruption of the earthly body and distraction concerning worldly things necessary for life impede the continual vigilance and attention of the mind required for avoiding these dangers, according to Wis. 9: *The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and an earthly habitation depresses the mind that thinks of many things*. Therefore man cannot by the powers of his nature resist them all and consequently cannot avoid all mortal sins contrary to the natural law.

4. That habitual or justifying grace is required for avoiding them is proved by the same Holy Doctor in the same place with this argument. In order for man to avoid all mortal sins for a long time, his heart must be so firmly established in God that he is unwilling to be separated from him for the sake of obtaining any good or avoiding any evil. But one who is in mortal sin and deprived of grace and charity does not have his heart so firmly established in God, but rather turned away from him and converted to a creature as ultimate end. Therefore he cannot avoid all mortal sins for a long time.

The minor premise is clear. St. Thomas proves the major in two ways. First by a similarity. Just as, when the lower appetite is not totally subject to reason, disordered motions and venial sins in those motions must occur in it, so, when reason is not subject to God and firmly established in him as ultimate end, many disorders and sins must occur in the acts of reason themselves. Hence Prosper, *De vocatione omnium gentium*, c. 2: *The mutable will that is not ruled by the immutable will approaches iniquity all the more quickly, the further it departs from his intention in action*. Chrysostom likewise,

On Grace

on Matt. 11, compares the sinner to a ship deprived of mast, sails, and rudder, exposed to certain shipwreck, and carried not where the sailor directs it but where the force of winds and storms drives it.

Second, the Holy Doctor proves the same major premise from the fact that, since in this life many evils we fear and pleasurable goods by which we are attracted occur, unless man has his heart firmly established in God, he withdraws from him to obtain goods or avoid evils, despising his precepts, and thus sins mortally.

He adds: In sudden matters man acts according to his previously conceived end and according to his preexisting habit, although through the premeditation of reason he can act contrary to the order of the previously conceived end and contrary to the inclination of the habit. But because man cannot always be engaged in such premeditation, it cannot happen that he remains for a long time without acting according to the inclination of a will disordered from God, unless he is quickly restored through grace to the due order. Hence Gregory, *Moralia in Job XXII*, c. 12: A sin that is not soon blotted out through penance draws by its own weight into another sin. This is clear from the example of David, who, after committing adultery, immediately added homicide. Indeed, since the ways of sinners, as the royal Prophet says in Ps. 34, are darkness and slipperiness, with the angel of the Lord pursuing them, they undoubtedly fall by sinning no less frequently than those accustomed to stumble who walk through slippery places in darkness and are pressed and driven by enemies pursuing them.

5. The third part of the conclusion, asserting that man in the state of fallen nature needs not only justifying but also assisting grace in order to avoid for a long time all mortal sins contrary to the natural law, is everywhere taught by the holy Fathers, especially by Augustine in *De natura et gratia*, c. 26: *Just as even the perfectly healthy eye of the body cannot see unless assisted by the brightness of light, so even a man most perfectly justified cannot live rightly unless divinely assisted by the eternal light of justice.* In *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, c. 24, he says that *no one, even renewed by the grace of baptism, is fit to overcome the snares of the devil and conquer the concupiscences of the flesh unless through the daily assistance of God he receives perseverance in good conduct.* By the name perseverance he understands not only that which lasts to the end, but also that by which someone perseveres without sin for any period, for the same Holy Doctor teaches in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 1, that this also can be called perseverance.

6. St. Thomas teaches the same part of our conclusion in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9, where he says that man established in grace needs the assistance of God for acting well and avoiding sin, not only by the

general reason that no created thing can proceed to act except through the power of divine motion, but also for a special reason, on account of the condition of the state of human nature. For although it is healed through grace as regards the mind, there nevertheless remains in it corruption and infection as regards the flesh, through which it serves the law of sin, as is said in Rom. 7. There also remains a certain darkness of ignorance, according to which, as is said in Rom. 8, we do not know what we should pray for as we ought.

7. The same Holy Doctor suggests another argument in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 68, a. 2: That which possesses some nature, form, or power imperfectly cannot operate through itself unless moved by another. Thus the sun, because it is perfectly luminous, can illuminate through itself; but the moon, in which the nature of light is imperfect, does not illuminate unless illuminated. Likewise, a physician who perfectly knows the art of medicine can operate through himself; but his disciple, who has not yet been fully instructed, cannot operate through himself unless instructed by him. But justifying grace in this state of the way is imperfectly participated by the just man. Therefore through such grace he cannot operate perfectly, perform good for a long time, and avoid sin unless moved and assisted by a special help of God.

The major premise is clear. The minor is excellently proved and illustrated by our Conrad in his commentary on a. 9 of this question, where he notes that the grace of the way has a threefold imperfection in comparison with the grace of the fatherland. The first is in its mode of operation, for the grace of the fatherland always causes an actual love of God, but the grace of the way does not. For this reason it is said in Matt. 11 that every blessed person, however least, is greater than John the Baptist, namely, with respect to the mode of operating, because John did not always actually love God as the blessed do. The second is that the grace of the way, however intense, does not according to the ordinary law perfectly heal the appetite, as does the grace of the blessed. The third is that it does not perfect reason so that it immovably adheres to the divine rule, as does the grace of the fatherland.

8. The Holy Doctor suggests another argument in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 155: Everything variable needs the assistance of some immovable mover in order to be fixed in one thing. But man is variable, both from evil to good and from good to evil. Therefore, in order that he may immovably persevere in good, he needs divine assistance. He teaches the same in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 137, a. 4: Since free choice is of itself changeable, and this is not taken away from it through the habitual grace of

On Grace

the present life, it does not belong to the power of free choice, even repaired, to establish itself immovably in good, although it is within its power to choose this. For choice frequently falls within our power, but not execution.

9. From this you will understand that the just must pray daily to obtain from God that special assistance necessary for avoiding sins and persevering in good, as the Council of Orange warns in can. 10: The assistance of God must always be implored even by the reborn and holy, so that they may be able to attain a good end or continue in a good work. The just must also give thanks to God daily that they have been preserved from sin, as Augustine elegantly declares in homily 23 among the fifty homilies: Acknowledge his grace, to whom you owe even what you did not commit. This man owes me for what he did and saw forgiven; you also owe me for what you did not commit. For there is no sin that one man has committed which another man could not commit if the ruler by whom man was made were absent. In *Confessiones* II, c. 7, he says: Let them love you, Lord, and give thanks to you, and I shall confess to your name, because you have forgiven me such great evils and my wicked works. I attribute to your grace and mercy that you dissolved my sins like ice. I attribute to your grace also every evil that I did not do, and I confess that all things have been forgiven me, both the evils that I did of my own power and those that, with you as my guide, I did not do.

10. You will object first: The reason man in the state of fallen nature cannot observe the whole law and avoid all mortal sins for a long time is that observing the whole law and avoiding all sins is the work of a healthy man and therefore cannot be performed by a weakened man, as we declared in the first proof of our conclusion. But man is healed through habitual grace, which for this reason is called healing by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4. Therefore through it he is made capable of observing the whole law and avoiding all mortal sins for a long time, and consequently does not need any further special assistance of God for this.

I answer that, although man is healed through habitual grace, he is not healed totally and adequately. As the Holy Doctor cited above says: *Although he is healed through grace as regards the mind, corruption remains in him as regards the flesh, through which he serves the law of sin.* That is, concupiscence remains, inclining toward evil and toward the pleasurable good contrary to reason. From it arise various grave temptations that draw the will toward sin. Hence, in order that the justified man may overcome them and avoid all mortal sins, he needs, beyond habitual grace, a special assistance of God by

which he is inclined toward good and the disposition of his mind, contracted from enticing desire, is changed.

11. You will say: St. Thomas, in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 62, a. 6, ad 3, speaking of habitual grace, says that *the least grace can resist any concupiscence*. Therefore through habitual grace man is totally and perfectly healed and made capable of resisting all enticements and temptations of concupiscence, and consequently of avoiding all mortal sins.

I answer that either St. Thomas is speaking there of habitual grace, not excluding but presupposing the special assistance of God, without which not even the greatest grace can for a long time resist every temptation; or he means only, as Cajetan interprets him in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9, that the least grace is sufficient of itself and by its nature to resist any concupiscence, but not insofar as it exists in such a subject, together with the struggle of appetite and the weakness of reason caused by ignorance. Thus, although the heat of boiling water overcomes its coldness, because it is not in a subject connatural to it, it is immediately expelled by the cold. Likewise, because grace in us wayfarers is not in a subject proportioned to it, but in one that is very weak and indisposed, although grace itself is stronger than concupiscence, it is nevertheless overcome and corrupted by concupiscence by reason of the subject if destitute of God's special assistance.

12. You will object secondly: According to St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 8, the reason one existing in mortal sin cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively for a long time is that he does not have his heart firmly established in God, so that he will not be separated from him for the sake of obtaining any good or avoiding any evil. But the just man through habitual grace has his heart firmly established in God as ultimate end. Therefore through it he has sufficient powers to avoid all mortal sins collectively for a long time. Hence the same Holy Doctor says there that man in the state of grace *can abstain from every mortal sin that consists in reason*.

I answer that the absence of firmness of heart in God is indeed a cause why fallen man cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively for a long time, but it is not the total and adequate cause. Besides it there is another cause of this incapacity, namely, the absence of the subordination and subjection of the lower part to the higher, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 9. Hence, since in the state of fallen nature this second cause persists in the justified man, although the first does not, he cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively, but only those that arise from the first cause, namely, the disorder of reason through aversion from God and conversion to

On Grace

a creature. The Holy Doctor means only this when he says that man in the state of grace *can abstain from every mortal sin that consists in reason*.

CHAPTER VII.

On the Necessity of Grace for Avoiding Venial Sins.

1. It is certain that man in the state of fallen nature, with the ordinary helps belonging to this state, can avoid each venial sin; otherwise he would not sin in committing it, since no one sins in what he cannot avoid. It is also clear that with the same helps he can be without venial sin for some brief period. As St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 79, a. 4, ad 2, explaining 1 John 1, *If we say that we have no sin: This must not be understood as though a man could not for an hour be without all guilt of venial sin, but because the saints do not live this life without venial sins*. The only difficulty, therefore, is whether man can through his whole life, or for a long time, avoid all venial sins collectively, or never or only rarely sin venially. For the resolution:

2. I say briefly: No one can, throughout his whole life or for some long period, with the helps annexed to habitual grace by the ordinary law, avoid all venial sins collectively. For this a special privilege is required, granted to the Virgin Mother of God alone.

The first part is certain by faith and defined in the Council of Milevis, cann. 7 and 8, and in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 23. It is contained in various testimonies of Scripture, which assert that there is no one, however great the grace with which he is adorned, who does not sometimes sin: 2 Chron. 6: *For there is no man who does not sin*; Jas. 3: *In many things we all offend*; Ps. 31: *You forgave the iniquity of my sin. For this, namely the forgiveness of sin, every holy man, not only every sinner, will pray to you*; and finally 1 John 1: *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves*. From these and similar testimonies this argument is formed. That which is contrary to the common law is a special privilege. But for a just man to avoid all venial sins collectively is contrary to the common law by which God has decreed to permit some venial sins in all the just, as is clear from the aforesaid testimonies of Scripture. Therefore no one can abstain from every venial sin collectively without a special privilege.

3. The same is clear from the holy Fathers, who everywhere teach that man, as long as he lives, cannot be immune from light sins, and that the feet, which are the affections of the soul, cannot be altogether clean while they walk in this dust. Augustine says in tractate 1 on 1 John: Man cannot, as long as he bears the flesh, be without light sins. Pope Leo says in sermon 4 for

Lent: While solicitude is extended through the various actions of this life, it is necessary that even religious hearts be soiled by worldly dust. Bernard, in sermon 1 on the Lord's Supper, weighing Christ's words, He who is washed needs only to wash his feet, adds: He is washed who has no grave sins, whose head, that is, intention, and hands, that is, operation, are clean. But the feet, which are the affections of the soul, while they walk in this dust, cannot be altogether clean, for the mind yields sometimes to vanity, sometimes to pleasure or curiosity, more than it ought, at least for an hour. For in many things we all offend. He had assigned the reason above, saying: In the fall of the first man we all fell. But we fell upon a heap of stones and into mud, and therefore we were not only soiled but also wounded and gravely bruised. We can be washed quickly, but much treatment is required for healing.

4. St. Thomas uses the same argument in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 8, where he says that man in the state of fallen nature cannot abstain from every venial sin on account of the corruption of the flesh, that is, the ulcer of concupiscence, from which matter and pus, or the corruption and stench of some sin, frequently flow until it is perfectly healed in glory through the consummated charity and grace of the fatherland. Hence Augustine in *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, c. 4: *Sin was followed by the harsh necessity of having sin until all weakness is healed and such liberty is received that, just as the will to remain in blessed life is necessary, so there is also a voluntary and happy necessity of living well and never sinning.*

5. This argument can be confirmed and illustrated as follows. In order that a just man may avoid all venial sins collectively until death or for some long period, it is necessary that the fomes of sin either be bound or extinguished. But by the force of the helps joined to grace by the common law, the fomes is neither bound nor extinguished. Therefore by the force of those helps a just man cannot avoid all venial sins collectively until death or for some long period.

The minor premise is certain, first because theologians acknowledge the binding or extinction of the fomes in the Blessed Virgin alone on account of the dignity of the Mother; and second because the rebellion of appetite remains in all the just for combat, as the Council of Trent teaches. The major premise is supported as follows. Unless the fomes of sin is extinguished or at least bound, frequent motions unconformed to reason concerning sensible things arise from the corrupted appetite and ulcer of concupiscence. But amid so many conflicts man cannot preserve himself immune from sin, for while he strives to resist one, another arises, and reason cannot maintain continual vigilance. Therefore a just man cannot for

On Grace

a long time abstain from venial sin unless the fomes is extinguished or bound.

6. From this the second part of the conclusion is established. Since in the Blessed Virgin either there was no fomes, or it was bound or totally extinguished, according to different opinions, there was likewise in her no moral incapacity for avoiding all venial sins collectively arising from the fomes. She possessed the special privilege of never sinning venially, as the Council of Trent teaches in the passage cited above, asserting that the Church has always held this.

That such a prerogative must not be extended to other saints, however eminent, is clear from the fact that an exception confirms the contrary rule. But from this general rule, No just person exists who does not sin venially, the Council of Trent excepts only the most Blessed Virgin. Therefore it includes all others, however just and holy, under that rule. Hence Augustine in *De natura et gratia*, c. 36: With this Virgin excepted, if we could gather together all those holy men and women while they lived here and ask them whether they were without sin, what do we think they would answer? Would they not cry with one voice: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us"?

7. Nevertheless, many probably and piously believe that certain saints possessed the privilege of avoiding all venial sins in some certain and determinate matter: St. John the Baptist, venial sins committed in speech, because these are especially repugnant to the office of preacher and precursor; hence the Church sings that, while still of tender years, he sought the desert lest he stain his life with even a slight word. Blessed Joseph avoided venial sins contrary to the virtue of chastity, because this befitted the spouse of the most pure Virgin. St. Gregory also reports in *Dialogi* II, c. 2, that St. Benedict never felt the rebellion of the flesh after rolling among thorns. The same is asserted of our Angelic Doctor from the time when he was girded by angels with the cincture of chastity. The Church also openly declares that he never sinned venially in the matter of pride when, celebrating his praises in his office, she sings:

*O gift of God's grace,
Surpassing every miracle,
He never felt the sting
Of deadly pride.*

8. Against the first part of the conclusion a difficult argument is customarily objected, which can be briefly proposed as follows. No one sins in what he cannot avoid, says Augustine in *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 18. But if

man in the state of fallen nature needed special assistance or a privilege for avoiding all venial sins, he could not avoid them, since God is not prepared to give such assistance or privilege to all. Therefore it could not be imputed to him as guilt that he did not avoid all venial sins.

Nor is it valid for some to say that this can be imputed to him as guilt because the incapacity for avoiding them is voluntary to him, at least in its source, by reason of the original guilt from which it was left behind. This is not valid, because, although voluntariness in the source suffices for original guilt, it does not suffice for actual guilt, as is clear in the first-first motions of concupiscence, negative unbelief, and invincible ignorance, which are not sins and are not imputed as guilt, although they arise from original sin and consequently are voluntary in their source.

Leaving this solution aside, I answer this difficult objection by saying that, in order that venial sins be imputed to man in the state of fallen nature, it is not required that God give or be prepared to give that special assistance or privilege necessary for avoiding all venial sins collectively. It suffices that he give assistance for avoiding each of them distributively, separately, and in particular. Thus St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 8, in the body: *Reason can restrain each individual motion of the sensitive appetite, and from this they possess the character of sin and voluntariness, but it cannot restrain them all.* In *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2: *Man cannot avoid all motions of this kind, namely of concupiscence, on account of the aforesaid corruption of the fomes. But it suffices for the notion of voluntary sin that he can avoid each of them.* Likewise, in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 160: *Although one who is in sin does not have it within his proper power altogether to avoid sin, he nevertheless has the power now to avoid this or that sin. Hence whatever he commits, he commits voluntarily, and thus it is not without desert imputed to him as guilt.*

9. You will say: An unjust man is bound not only to avoid each venial sin but also all of them collectively. Therefore, since no one is bound to the impossible, he must be able to avoid all venial sins collectively, at least with an assistance of grace that God is prepared to confer.

I answer that there is no precept regarding all venial sins collectively. Although Scripture commands in general that we not sin, this is commanded by reason of each sin that we are bound to avoid, because sins always present themselves for avoidance distributively and separately, not simultaneously and collectively.

10. You will insist: Man has a natural necessity of existing in some place indeterminately, together with freedom to exist in this or that determinate place. Yet he cannot be obliged not to exist in any place, and, if he were in

On Grace

fact forbidden to exist anywhere, he would not sin by existing somewhere, because of that necessity. Therefore likewise, if man in the state of fallen nature has a necessity of falling into some venial sin indeterminately, even though he can avoid any particular one, he cannot be obliged not to sin venially.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. There are two differences between that example and the matter of which we are speaking. The first is that it is necessary from the nature of the thing that man exist in some place, for this arises from the nature of a body, which cannot exist outside every place. But the necessity of falling into some venial sin does not arise from the nature of the thing or from the sins themselves, for they are of themselves capable of being avoided, but from the weakness of nature corrupted through original sin. It would be harsh to oblige man to something impossible in itself and from the nature of the thing, or to forbid him something that must necessarily and naturally happen to him; but it is otherwise with something that is not impossible in itself.

The second difference is that in the example adduced the common feature that necessitates is always joined with exercise concerning some determinate particular. Everyone in actual exercise exists in some determinate place. Thus there is a twofold necessity there, one concerning the common feature and another concerning the continual exercise of some particular. In our case, however, there is only one necessity for sinning as such, but not for existing continually in the exercise of some sin. Thus there is perfect liberty concerning each venial sin, whereas in the example adduced there is not altogether perfect liberty concerning the particulars.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the Necessity of Grace for Preparing Oneself for Grace.

1. Leaving aside the error of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, who asserted that the first assisting grace and the first vocation of God are given in view of a good work done without grace and by the powers of nature alone, as merited in strict justice or at least by fittingness, there are some Catholic Doctors who hold that the powers of nature can produce a dispositive, though not meritorious, cause of the first supernatural assistance. Thus Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, Richard, and Javellus. Others teach that, although good works of the natural order are not of themselves dispositions for the first assisting grace, nevertheless, by a law of God and a covenant made with

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Christ not to deny grace to one who does what lies within him by the powers of nature, they have an infallible connection with it. Thus Molina in the *Concordia*, disp. 10, whom many recent authors follow.

§ 1.

Both Opinions Are Rejected.

2. I say first: Man cannot by the powers of nature dispose himself, even remotely, for the first assistance of grace. Thus St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, ad 2, explains the axiom, “God does not deny grace to one who does what lies within him,” of one who does what lies within him insofar as he is moved by divine assistance. In *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 112, a. 3, in the body, he teaches that man’s preparation for obtaining grace, if considered insofar as it is from free choice, has no necessity for obtaining grace, but does have such necessity insofar as it is from God moving him. Likewise, in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 149, speaking of divine assistance moving our free choice, he concludes: Man therefore does not move himself so that he may obtain divine assistance, which is above him, but is rather moved by God to obtain it. The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the movable thing in reason and causality. Assistance is therefore not given to us because we advance toward it through good works, but rather we advance through good works because we are preceded by divine assistance. Finally, in *Quodlibeta* I, a. 7, he passes this judgment on the opposite opinion: It belongs to the error of the Pelagians to say that man can prepare himself for grace without the assistance of divine grace.

3. The same truth can be demonstrated by three arguments. The first, which the Holy Doctor gives in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, can be briefly proposed as follows. The end and principle of an effect must be proportioned in order. But the end of every disposition for grace is God, not as author of nature, but as author of grace. Therefore its principle must be God as author of grace and not as author of nature, and consequently it must proceed from free choice as assisted by divine grace.

The major premise is clear, for, as is commonly said, the order of ends and agents is the same. The minor is shown as follows. Every effect whose proximate end is supernatural has God as supernatural author for its ultimate end. But every disposition for grace has something supernatural for its proximate end, namely grace itself, for which it disposes. Therefore it regards God as supernatural author for its ultimate end.

On Grace

4. The second argument is taken from the cited passage of Summa contra Gentiles, where he reasons as follows: No particular agent can universally precede the action of the first and universal agent, because every action of a particular agent has its origin from the universal agent, just as among these lower things every motion is preceded by the motion of the heavens. But the human soul is ordered under God as a particular agent under the universal agent. It is therefore impossible for there to be any motion in it that is not preceded by divine action.

5. The third argument can be formed as follows. A disposition for a form calls for that form and is connected with it. But nothing natural can demand or be connected with a supernatural form such as grace, since it belongs to the nature of a supernatural being to exceed every exigency of nature, as is evident in itself. Therefore acts of the natural order cannot dispose for grace.

6. Several absurdities and inconveniences following from the contrary opinion can be added. First, if man disposed himself for the first assisting grace by works performed through the powers of nature, he would distinguish himself from another who did not act in this way with respect to spiritual salvation, by a distinction derived not from grace but from nature, contrary to the Apostle's words in 1 Cor. 4: *For who distinguishes you?*

Second, the beginning of justification would be taken not from the prevenient grace of Christ but from free choice, contrary to the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5. The inference is clear, for those acts elicited through the powers of nature and disposing for the first assisting grace would dispositively concur toward justification and in some manner begin it, just as one begins the generation of fire who begins to introduce the first disposition for it.

Third, if man could by the powers of nature dispose himself for the first grace and vocation, he could also merit it, at least by fittingness, which is to fall into the error of the Semipelagians. The inference is proved because every disposition of itself and by its nature expresses an order and relation to the form for which it disposes, and, being a great reason for introducing that form into the subject, carries with it some notion of debt. Hence, if such a disposition is also moral and consists in acts of free choice, some notion of merit can scarcely be separated from it. Therefore St. Prosper in *Contra Collatorem*, c. 6, reproves the author because he asserted that there are certain beginnings of faith and good will in nature, and yet denied that grace is given according to our merits. *Whether you will it or not*, he says, *you are convicted of holding that the grace of God is given according to our merits when you affirm that something precedes in men themselves on account of which they*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

obtain grace. For the faith of one asking, the piety of one seeking, and the insistence of one knocking cannot be regarded as devoid of all merit. St. Augustine uses a similar argument in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, c. 8: *If the desire for good begins through us without the grace of God, that beginning itself will be a merit to which the assistance of grace comes as though due; and thus the grace of God will not be given freely but according to our merit.*

Finally, if man disposed himself through natural works for the first vocation and the first assistance of grace, grace would not be prevenient, but would be preceded by nature and free choice; nor would it be the guide of free choice, but its attendant. Every disposition precedes the form for which it disposes and antecedently possesses priority either of time or at least of nature. St. Prosper also used this argument in the cited work, c. 39: *For if, according to them, namely the Semipelagians, free choice is taken away when it is preceded by grace, grace is also taken away when it is preceded by free choice.*

7. I say secondly: No law has been established by which God infallibly confers the assistance of grace upon a man who does what lies within him by the faculty of nature.

This is proved first from the Second Council of Orange, can. 6, where anyone is condemned who says that *without the grace of God mercy is conferred upon us while we believe, will, desire, and knock.* But mercy would be so conferred if such a law had been established. Therefore it must not be admitted.

8. You will say that the Council in that canon condemns only the error of the Semipelagians, who placed some merit and moral causality in works of nature with respect to the first grace and supernatural vocation; but it does not condemn those who, although they join grace to one who does what lies within him through the faculty of nature and the powers of free choice, nevertheless exclude all merit and moral causality from natural works with respect to divine grace.

But against this, first: The Council condemns those who assert that *mercy is conferred upon us while we believe, will, desire, and knock.* Therefore it also condemns those who assert that the assistance of grace is given from mercy, and not from justice or debt, to those who do what lies within them through the faculty of nature, and consequently those who infallibly connect grace with natural works even without merit and moral causality.

Against this, secondly: St. Prosper, cited above, inferred from the doctrine of the Semipelagians, who asserted that grace is infallibly conferred upon a man desiring, knocking, and doing what lies within him through the faculty of nature, that grace is given according to our merits. For, he says, *the faith of one asking, the piety of one seeking, and the insistence of one knocking*

On Grace

cannot be devoid of all merit. In the same way we may argue against Molina and assert that from his doctrine it follows that grace is conferred by God from merits, not gratuitously or from mercy, but from justice. For whatever is given by a law and covenant to one who acts is given from at least imperfect justice, since law and agreement establish the notion of justice, as is clear from Christ's parable in Matt. 20, in which the laborers agreed with the householder for a denarius. The householder said to one of them: *Did you not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is yours and go.* The same is clear from Rom. 4: *To one who works, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt.* Therefore, if the helps of prevenient grace are given by God according to a law, pact, or agreement to those who do everything they can through the faculty of nature, they are given to them from justice and according to debt, not according to grace and mercy.

9. You will say that such debt and obligation exist only in relation to Christ, who made such a covenant with the eternal Father, but not in relation to the man who uses the natural faculty of free choice well. Consequently, the helps of prevenient grace are given to him from mercy and not from justice, according to grace and not according to debt.

But against this: If a king, at the request of a prince or son, established a law by which he promised to give a certain city to whichever soldier in his army first entered it, certainly the one who first entered the city would make it due to himself in justice, founded on that law established at the request of the king's prince or son. Given such a law, the work would possess some proportion to the value of the city, because the law gave it that proportion, although in itself and apart from the law it did not have it. Likewise, if the eternal Father, at Christ's request and petition, established a law by which he decreed to give the helps of prevenient grace to those who do what lies within them through the faculty of nature and the powers of free choice, these helps would in some manner be due in justice to a man doing what lies within him by the powers of nature. For, given such a law, natural works, although otherwise disproportionate and of an inferior order, would possess some right to the helps of grace.

10. The conclusion is proved secondly from Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, c. 28: *Just as certain venial sins, without which this life is not lived, do not prevent a just man from eternal life, so certain good works, without which the life of even the worst man is found only with great difficulty, profit an impious man nothing for eternal salvation.* But if there were an infallible law for giving the helps of grace conducive to salvation to everyone acting well through the faculty of nature and eliciting works upright with natural uprightness, such

works would manifestly profit the impious man for eternal salvation. Therefore such a law is falsely established and contrary to Augustine.

11. It is proved thirdly. It is repugnant that Christ, the author of grace, should have merited from the eternal Father the establishment of a law by which the whole order of grace would be destroyed, or by which grace would be made not to be grace, and would not precede free choice but be preceded by it. But both follow if, by a law and covenant of God, the helps of grace are infallibly conferred upon one acting well through the powers and faculty of nature. Grace would then be given from merits, as was shown above, and consequently would not be grace but a reward. It would not precede free choice, but would rather be preceded by it, and would not be its guide but its attendant, as we said in the preceding conclusion. Therefore that law is fictitious and devised by Molina.

12. Finally, the conclusion can be supported by this reasoning. Since that law depends upon the free will of God, it cannot become known to us except from Scripture, councils, or the holy Fathers. But it has no foundation in councils or the holy Fathers; rather, the opposite is gathered from them, as we showed above concerning the Council of Orange and St. Augustine. The testimonies of Scripture by which Molina attempts to confirm or prove that law do not suggest it. Therefore such a law is established wholly without foundation.

The minor premise as to its final part is proved as follows. There are two principal testimonies of Scripture that Molina adduces to prove such a law, namely John 1: *He gave them power to become children of God*; and 1 Tim. 2: *God wills all men to be saved*. But from these testimonies it is not rightly gathered that such a law exists in God. Therefore it has no foundation in Scripture.

I prove the minor premise. First, that such a law is not gathered from the first passage is clear from Augustine in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* I, c. 3: Power is therefore given to become children of God to those who believe in him, when this very thing is given to them, that they believe in him. Unless this power is given by God, it cannot exist from free choice. He teaches the same in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 8: Therefore it is not in man's power, but in God's, that men have power to become children of God. They receive it from him, who gives pious thoughts to the human heart through which it possesses faith working through love. Hence Cajetan rightly observes in his commentary on John 1 that the Evangelist did not say, "He gave them power to make themselves children of God," but, "He gave them power to become children of God." For, he says, just as in natural things the elements have power not to move themselves upward or downward, but for earth to be moved downward and fire upward, so power has been given to

On Grace

Christ's faithful, not to make themselves children of God, for this action exceeds every created faculty, but to become children of God. This power is the gift of grace, and so forth.

I add that St. John, explaining to whom this power is conferred, adds: *To those who believe in his name*. Therefore such power is not given before the illumination of faith. Consequently, from that testimony it is not rightly inferred that one who does what lies within him through the powers of free choice has within his power the ability to become a child of God through the infallible assistance of divine grace.

That the same cannot be gathered from the second testimony is shown as follows. This law, according to Molina, is founded upon the merits of Christ. But the antecedent will to save all men contained in the aforesaid testimony precedes the merits of Christ and Christ foreseen, since, according to the more common opinion, the decree to send Christ the Redeemer proceeded from the will to save men, as we shall show in the treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore such a law is not deduced from the Apostle's words, *God wills all men to be saved*. They indicate only the sincere affection by which God in his goodness offers the helps of his grace to all men, with which it is nevertheless compatible that he sometimes deny them as punishment for some preceding sin, as was shown in the final chapter of the treatise on predestination and reprobation.

§ 2.

Objections Are Answered.

13. You will object first against the first conclusion: God commands us in Scripture to prepare ourselves for grace: 1 Sam. 7: *Prepare your hearts for the Lord*. Therefore preparation for grace is not from God but from us. The consequence seems manifest, since, just as we do not ask anyone for things that are from ourselves, so neither can God command things that are from himself.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Since preparation for grace is both from God preceding us and from man obeying and cooperating, man can ask it from God and God can command it of man. Hence Augustine's prayer in *Confessiones* X, c. 29: Give what you command, and command what you will. Likewise, in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 15: Let us remember that he who says, "Make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit," is the one who says, "I shall give you a new heart, and I shall put a new spirit within you." How then does he who says, "Make it for yourselves,"

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

say, “I shall give it to you”? Why does he command it if he himself will give it? Why does he give it if man will make it? Unless it is because he gives what he commands when he assists the one whom he commands to do it.

Therefore, when Scripture says that it belongs to man to prepare the heart, it does not exclude the assistance of God preceding and preparing the heart, but explains man’s consent and obedient cooperation. Hence the same Augustine says in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* II, c. 9: *It is written, “It belongs to man to prepare the heart, and the answer of the tongue is from the Lord,” because man prepares the heart, yet not without the assistance of God, who touches the heart.* Jerome says in his letter to Ctesiphon, c. 3: *To will and to run are mine, but even what is mine will not be mine without the continual assistance of God.* Finally, Prosper in his poem *De ingratis*, c. 25, expressly teaches that no one disposes himself for grace without grace:

*However much it is sought by anyone’s zeal and affection,
Grace itself acts and is the guide of all who come to it;
Through it one runs, and without it one does not go to it.*

14. You will object secondly: The first supernatural assisting grace needs some disposition on the part of the subject. But such a disposition cannot be supernatural, otherwise it would need another supernatural disposition, and so there would be an infinite regress. Therefore it must be natural, and consequently man can through the faculty of nature dispose himself for the first assistance of grace.

The minor premise is clear. The major is shown from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 5: *Everything elevated to something exceeding nature must be disposed by some disposition.* But the first assisting grace exceeds man’s nature. Therefore some disposition must precede his elevation to it.

I answer by denying the major premise. To its proof I say that St. Thomas’s doctrine is true when that to which the subject is elevated has the character of the term of generation and of a form complete in its order, but not when that to which it is elevated is a way to the term. Since assisting grace is not the term but the way to the term, no previous disposition is required for it. Such a disposition is, however, required for habitual grace, because it has the character of a nature terminating generation in the supernatural order. Thus in natural things dispositions are indispensably required for substantial forms, because these are principally intended through themselves and are the ultimate term of natural generation, but not for accidental forms ordered to substantial forms. This is St. Thomas’s

On Grace

solution in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 6, ad 3, and q. 112, a. 2, in the body.

15. You will object thirdly: Purely natural acts can conduce impetratorily to grace. Therefore they can also conduce dispositively. The consequence is clear from parity. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 16, in the body, where he teaches that God hears the prayer of a sinner proceeding from a good natural desire, not from justice, since the sinner does not merit this, but from pure mercy. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, natural prayer has the power of impetration before God. Hence in ad 2 he says: *Although his prayer, namely the sinner's, is not meritorious, it can nevertheless be impetratory, because merit rests upon justice, but impetration rests upon grace.*

I answer by denying the antecedent. For the same Holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 15, ad 1: *Prayer that impetrates grace that makes pleasing proceeds from some grace.* In ad 3 he says: *Prayer rests principally upon faith, not as regards the efficacy of meriting but as regards the efficacy of impetrating.* Therefore, according to St. Thomas, in order for prayer to be impetratory, it must proceed from grace. Hence, when he says that God hears the prayer of a sinner proceeding from a good natural desire, he speaks of the desire of a nature not bare, but elevated through assisting grace and founded upon faith.

16. You will object fourthly with Molina against the second conclusion: St. Thomas in *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 11, ad 1, says: If someone brought up in the forests were to follow the dictate of natural reason in seeking good and fleeing evil, it must be held with the greatest certainty that God would either reveal to him by inspiration the things necessary to be believed, or direct some preacher of the faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the assistance of divine grace is infallibly given to a man who does what he can by his own powers.

I answer that St. Thomas there speaks of a man doing what lies within him, not through the powers of bare nature, but by the power of the assistance of grace. This is clear, first, because he speaks of a man placing no obstacle to grace through the observance of the whole natural law. But the same Holy Doctor expressly teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 4, that the powers of nature do not suffice for this in the state of fallen nature, but the assistance of grace is required. Second, because he gives the example of Cornelius. But he himself teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, that Cornelius did what lay within him not through the faculty of nature alone, but as preceded by a special assistance of grace. His words will be cited below.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

I add that, whenever the same Angelic Doctor explains the axiom, “God does not deny grace to one who does what lies within him,” he says that it must be understood of one doing what lies within him not through the powers of nature but through the assistance of grace. This is clear both from the testimonies adduced at the beginning of this chapter and from his commentary on Annibald, book II, dist. 28, a. 4, ad 3: *It must be said that our power can operate nothing without God, who operates in every nature and will. Hence, when we say that something lies within us, we do not exclude the assistance of God.* In his commentary on Rom. 10, lect. 3, he says: *The very fact that someone who does what lies within him turns to God is from God moving his heart toward good.*

17. You will say: The man brought up in the forests of whom St. Thomas speaks is presupposed to be destitute of every assistance of grace, since he is presupposed to be destitute of the illumination of faith, which is the first sufficient supernatural assistance. Therefore St. Thomas speaks of a man doing what lies within him through the powers of bare nature, not through the assistance of grace.

I answer by denying the antecedent. Although such a man would not have explicit faith concerning God as supernatural author, he would nevertheless have implicit faith concerning him, and consequently would not be destitute of every supernatural assistance. The reason is that, in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, it is impossible for there actually to be conversion to God as natural author without conversion to God as supernatural author. Hence, since that man, following the dictate of natural reason in seeking good and fleeing evil, would be converted to God as author of nature, he would also be at least implicitly converted to him as supernatural author. Consequently, he would have at least implicit faith concerning him, and God in such a case would direct some preacher of the faith to him to propose explicitly the mystery of the Trinity and Incarnation and the other things necessary for salvation, as he sent Peter to Cornelius and Paul to the Macedonians.

This is St. Thomas’s solution in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, where, speaking of Cornelius, he says: He was not an unbeliever; otherwise his work would not have been acceptable to God, whom no one can please without faith. But he had implicit faith in God, once the truth of the Gospel had been manifested. Hence Peter was sent to him so that he might instruct him more fully in the faith.

18. Molina further objects with another testimony of St. Thomas, taken from *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 159: Since it lies within the power of free choice to impede or not impede the reception of divine grace, it is not

On Grace

without desert imputed as guilt to one who places an obstacle to the reception of grace. For God, insofar as it lies in him, is prepared to give grace to all, but only those are deprived of grace who place an obstacle to grace within themselves. Thus, while the sun illuminates the world, it is imputed as guilt to one who closes his eyes if some evil follows from this, although he cannot see unless preceded by the light of the sun. From these words Molina infers that, if only those who place the obstacle of guilt to the reception of divine grace are deprived of it, the assistance of divine grace is infallibly given to one who does as much as he can through the powers of nature, since by so acting he avoids the obstacle, namely sin.

But this testimony does not favor Molina, because St. Thomas there speaks of free choice as it existed in integral man, not as it exists in fallen man, as Ferrariensis notes there and as is clear from the immediately following chapter, where he says: *What has been said, that it lies within the power of free choice not to place an obstacle to grace, belongs to those in whom natural power has remained integral.*

This must not be understood of man integral with a purely natural integrity, for in fact he was not created in such a state, nor, if he were created in it, would supernatural grace be offered to him, since this offer presupposes man's elevation to the supernatural order. It must be understood of man integral with the integrity of original justice, which subjected the lower part to the higher, and the higher to God, not only as author of nature but also as author of grace. Thus Ferrariensis says in that place: *By natural power St. Thomas understands the power of free choice, which is also called the will, vitiated by no sin or disorder, as it existed in the first parent before he sinned.*

19. From this you will understand that no one can dispose himself for grace even by a negative disposition through his own powers. For someone can negatively dispose himself when he can by his own powers exclude every obstacle to the form. But man by his own powers cannot avoid every mortal sin by which a sufficient obstacle to grace is placed. Therefore he cannot negatively dispose himself for the first assisting grace. Hence St. Thomas says in his commentary on Heb. 12, lect. 2: *The very fact that someone does not place an obstacle to grace is from the grace of God.*

CHAPTER IX.

On the Necessity of Grace for Final Perseverance.

1. Perseverance may be taken in two ways: 1^o for continuance in grace over a long period, abstracting from whether it continues until death; 2^o for perseverance in grace inclusively until the end of life, or for the conjunction of grace with death, which is called final perseverance. We treated perseverance in the first sense above, in Chapter VI, where we showed that, for a just man to abstain from mortal sins for a long time and persevere in good works, he needs, besides habitual grace, a special assistance. It remains for us here to treat final perseverance, which alone, as Augustine says, gives form to merit, rewards the runner, crowns the combatant, and conducts the sailor into port. This alone, Bernard adds, bears a certain likeness of eternity: it alone is repaid with eternity, or renders man to eternity. As a symbol of this, in ancient times not only firstfruits but also tithes were offered to God, because from him comes not only the beginning of good works, signified by the firstfruits, but also perseverance in them, designated by the tithes. As a type of the same reality, Gregory the Great says in *Moralia*, lib. 1, c. 20: *Joseph, who is said to have persevered as just among his brothers until the end, alone is reported to have possessed a robe reaching to the ankles. For what is a robe reaching to the ankles except a completed action? Just as a long robe covers the ankle of the body, so a good action governs us before the eyes of God until the term of life.* Hence we are commanded through Moses to offer the head and tail of the victim, so that every good work we begin may also be completed with a persevering spirit. Hence Bernard concludes, and prudently admonishes us to persevere constantly in good: *Hold fast what you possess; join the tail of the victim to its head, and take care to make the robe already adorned by the grace of God reach to the ankles, because the beginning will profit nothing if, which may God forbid, it does not happen to persevere.*

On Grace

§ 1.

Final Perseverance Is a Special Gift of God, Distinct from Habitual Grace and Common Assistances, and Consists in the Conjunction of Grace with Death, Commanded by an Efficacious Intention of Glorification.

2. The first part of this assertion is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 13, where, following Augustine in *De bono perseverantiae*, c. 6, it calls final perseverance a great gift of God. Augustine likewise says that perseverance itself is a great gift of God by which his other gifts are preserved. By these words he declares the greatness of this gift and therefore clearly signifies that it is distinct from habitual grace and common assistances.

3. The same truth can be proved by two fundamental arguments. The first is this: habitual grace, together with the many common assistances annexed to it, is found in many who act well and persist in good even for a long time, yet who do not finally persevere, as experience sufficiently establishes. Therefore final perseverance is a special gift distinct from habitual grace and the ordinary assistances accompanying it.

4. Nor is it valid to say with Molina and other more recent authors that grace and sufficient assistances, by which all can persevere until death, are given to everyone, but that some use them well and others badly, and therefore the former persevere but the latter do not; and consequently that actual perseverance is not a gift distinct, on God's part, from grace and the assistances. This is not valid. First, because this answer openly conflicts with Augustine's doctrine in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 12, where he says: The will of the saints is so greatly enkindled by the Holy Spirit that they are able because they so will, and they so will because God works in them that they may will. For if, amid the great weakness of this life, their will were left to itself, so that with God's assistance, without which they could not persevere, they would remain if they willed, but God did not work in them that they might will, their will itself would succumb through its weakness amid so many and such great temptations. They therefore could not persevere, because, failing through weakness, they either would not will, or through the weakness of their will would not will so firmly that they could. The weakness of the human will was therefore assisted, so that it might be acted upon by divine grace unfailingly and insuperably; and thus, although weak, it would not fail or be overcome by any adversity. By these words the holy Father openly teaches that, for actual perseverance in good, even when sufficient

assistance is presupposed, without which no one could persevere, another efficacious assistance is still required, by which the will is infallibly inclined, perseverance itself is in fact bestowed, and the saints and elect are rendered nothing other than persevering. The Massilians found this doctrine so difficult that they said it brought men to a kind of despair, as Hilary of Arles testifies in his letter to Augustine in these words: They are troubled that grace is divided in such a way that the first man received, and all now receive, not perseverance itself by which he would be made to persevere, but an assistance without which he could not persevere through free choice; whereas the saints predestined by grace for the kingdom are now given not such an assistance of perseverance, but one by which perseverance itself is bestowed upon them, not only so that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but also so that through this gift they are nothing other than persevering. They are so disturbed by these words of Your Holiness that they say a kind of despair is being presented to men.

5. Second, several absurdities and incongruities follow from the foregoing answer and Molina's doctrine. For if the gift of perseverance were subjected to free choice and depended upon it for its efficacy and use, it would follow, first, that those who persevere would distinguish themselves from those who do not persevere by something proper to themselves, namely, by the good use of free choice determining and applying grace, contrary to 1 Cor. 4: *For who distinguishes you?* Consequently, they could be puffed up over their perseverance in comparison with others, as though they had not received it from God but had given it to themselves, contrary to what is added in the same place: *What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?* It would also follow that through grace God gives us only the ability to persevere, but that actual perseverance comes from free choice, and therefore that what is a lesser and less perfect good is attributed to God and grace, while what is greater and more perfect is attributed to us and to our free choice, which Augustine frequently reproves in the Pelagians. It would likewise follow that the just ought neither to ask God for actual perseverance nor to thank him for it, because, as Augustine says in epist. 107: *We do not pray to God at all, but pretend to pray, if we believe that we ourselves, and not he, bring about what we ask. We do not thank God at all, but pretend to thank him, if we do not believe that he brings about the thing for which we thank him.* That this is utterly absurd is established from the same holy Doctor, who in *De bono perseverantiae*, from c. 2 to c. 6, shows from St. Cyprian that the gift of perseverance is requested from God in every petition of the Lord's Prayer, except the petition, *Forgive us our debts*. Finally, it would follow from

the same answer that predestination is uncertain and fallible, because it rests upon a fallible means, namely, the gift of perseverance, which cannot be firm and stable if its efficacy rests upon a reed staff, that is, upon a changeable and defective cause, namely, the human will. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 13, refers the infallibility and efficacy of this gift not to God's foreknowledge, ascertaining the future consent of our will, but to the divine omnipotence which brings it about that man consents freely and infallibly. At the beginning of that chapter, which concerns the gift of perseverance, it says that such a gift can be had from no one except him who is able to establish the one who stands, so that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore the one who falls. Similarly, Augustine in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 8, clearly teaches that the gift of perseverance is independent of free choice and nevertheless bestows a free will. He says: *If you say that it belongs to man's free choice whether anyone perseveres in good or does not persevere, so that, if he perseveres, this is not because God bestows it but because the human will brings it about, what will you attempt against the words of him who says, "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail"? Will you dare to say that, even though Christ prayed that Peter's faith might not fail, it would have failed if Peter had willed it to fail, as though Peter could in any way will something other than what Christ prayed that he might will? For who does not know that Peter's faith would then have perished if the will by which he was faithful had itself failed, and that it would have remained if that same will remained? But because the will is prepared by the Lord, the prayer made for him could not be in vain.* See how the holy Doctor has recourse to God's preparation, not to his foreknowledge, to show Peter's infallible perseverance in faith.

6. The second fundamental argument proving the first part of our assertion can be formed as follows: an effect of special providence having an infallible connection with glory, and a most special gift of God, is distinct from habitual grace and the common assistances joined to it, since these, as such, are not effects of special but of general providence belonging to the supernatural order, because they are common to the reprobate and the predestined. But final perseverance is a most special and principal effect of predestination, which is special providence in the supernatural order, and it has an infallible connection with glory. For Augustine says admirably in *De cognitione verae vitae*: *The just are drawn to the supreme good by a certain chain formed from virtues and linked in this manner: first, faith embraces the soul like a circle; faith is nourished by hope; hope is held by love; love is completed by action; action is drawn by intention to the supreme good; the intention of good is closed by perseverance; and to perseverance is given God, the fountain of all goods.*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Therefore final perseverance is a special gift of God, distinct from habitual grace and common assistances.

That such a gift formally consists in the conjunction of grace with death, commanded by an efficacious intention of glorification, as is said in the second part of our assertion, is shown as follows: the gift of perseverance is formally situated in that by which those who persevere are distinguished from those who do not. But, antecedently to the attainment of glory, they are distinguished in nothing else than that such is the disposition of divine providence concerning them that they are to die in grace, although others sometimes possess more grace and more gifts of God in this life. Therefore the gift of final perseverance formally consists in a special disposition of God by which grace is conjoined with death, commanded by an efficacious intention of glorification.

7. From this you will understand, first, that the gift of final perseverance is distinct from that which is required for persevering in good for a long time. The former is a proper effect of predestination and is granted only to the predestined; the latter is not an effect of predestination but of the general providence of the supernatural order and is also given to the reprobate. Hence the Second Council of Orange, can. 10, seems to distinguish them when it says: *The saints must implore God's assistance, that they may arrive at a good end or be able to endure in a good work.*

8. You will understand, second, that the gift of final perseverance differs from the gift of confirmation in grace. The former is common to all the predestined; the latter is a most special gift, which God granted only to the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and very few others. The former neither removes nor binds the power of sinning, but only brings it about that a man does not sin mortally until the end of life and infallibly dies in grace, although absolutely speaking he can sin. The latter gives the inability to sin mortally or venially, according to the manner in which it is given. Some are so confirmed in grace that they can sin neither mortally nor venially, as was the Blessed Virgin; others, such as the Apostles, although they could sin venially, could not sin mortally.

9. You will understand, third, that the gift of perseverance must be admitted not only for those who persevere in grace for a long time before death, but also for those who die soon after receiving grace, and even for baptized infants who die before the use of reason. For it is a special grace of God that an adult should be killed immediately after receiving grace, or that a child, regenerated at the font of baptism, should die before arriving at the use of reason. This is an effect of God's special providence, disposing their death for a time at which they are in grace and not allowing them to live

longer, lest, exposed to grave temptations and subject to the changeability of free choice, they lose grace before they die, according to Wis. 4: *He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding*. Therefore, to persevere in grace until death, even for a short time, a special gift and benefit of God is required, at least an extrinsic one, or a special disposition of divine providence by which grace is conjoined with death. Hence Augustine says in *De bono perseverantiae*, c. 17: *See how foreign it is to the truth to deny that perseverance until the end of this life is a gift of God, since he himself gives this life an end whenever he wills. If he gives that end before an impending fall, he causes the man to persevere until the end. But a more wonderful and, to the faithful, more evident bounty of God's goodness is that this grace is also given to infants, whose age is not capable of obedience being given to them*. By these words he openly teaches that the gift of final perseverance is given to baptized infants who die before the use of reason.

10. You will understand, fourth, from the testimonies of Augustine cited above, that the gift of perseverance is grace efficacious of itself, which is not entrusted to free choice so as to obtain its effect by the power of free choice, but which, assisting its weakness, acts upon it unfailingly and insuperably, so that it wills what is good most invincibly and most invincibly refuses to abandon it. It not only gives the ability to do what we will, but also the willing of what we are able to do. That gift is not common to all the just, although every just man can persevere in grace once received if he wills. Hence the excuse of those who allege that they did not receive the gift of perseverance and therefore did not persevere is empty, as Augustine expressly explains in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 7, where he should be read. Thus sufficient grace for perseverance is available to all the just, namely, pious motions, excitations of the will to pray and to keep watch, so that sins may be avoided by Christian vigilance and the gift of perseverance obtained by continual prayers. Hence, when it is denied to someone, this happens as a punishment for some preceding sin, either mortal or at least venial, especially pride, as St. Augustine teaches in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, lib. 2, c. 17: *That what lay hidden should become known, and that what did not delight should become sweet, is the grace of God, which assists the wills of men. The cause why they are not assisted by it lies in themselves, not in God, whether they are predestined for condemnation because of the iniquity of pride, or whether they are to be judged and instructed against their own pride, if they are children of mercy. Therefore do not refer to God the cause of any human fault, for the cause of all human vices is pride. Nevertheless, after weighing everything, we must arrive at this conclusion: the first and radical cause of the denial of the gift of*

perseverance, or of the efficacious grace necessary for perseverance, must be confessed to be none other than original sin, which, as we showed from St. Augustine and St. Thomas in the treatise on predestination, is the motive cause of reprobation, and consequently of its effects, the principal of which is the denial of efficacious grace for final perseverance. Hence Augustine says in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 7: Those who will not persevere, and will so fall from the Christian faith and way of life that the end of this life finds them such, are undoubtedly not to be counted in that number even during the time when they live well and justly. For they are not separated from that mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and predestination of God; and therefore they were not called according to purpose, and consequently were not chosen, but were called among those of whom it was said, "Many are called," and not among those of whom it was said, "But few are chosen." And in c. 9 of the same book he says: Nor should it disturb us that God does not give perseverance itself to some of his children. Far be it that this would be so if they were among those predestined and called according to purpose, who are truly children of the promise. For while they live piously they are called children of God; but because they will live impiously and die in that same impiety, the foreknowledge of God does not call them children of God. Likewise, in *De bono perseverantiae*, c. 9, he writes: Of two infants equally bound by original sin, why is one taken and the other left? And of two impious men already advanced in age, why is one called in such a way that he follows the caller, while the other is either not called or not called in such a way? The judgments of God are inscrutable. But of two pious men, why is perseverance until the end given to one and not given to the other? The judgments of God are even more inscrutable. Yet this must be most certain to the faithful: the former is among the predestined, the latter is not. "For if they had been of us," says one of the predestined who had drunk this secret from the breast of the Lord, "they would certainly have remained with us." What does it mean that they were not of us? Were they not both created by God, both born from Adam, both made from the earth, and had they not received souls of one and the same nature from him who said, "I made every breath"? Finally, had they not both been called and followed the one calling, both been justified from impiety, and both been renewed through the laver of regeneration? But if he who undoubtedly knew what he said were to hear this, he could answer and say: These things are true; according to all these things they were of us. Nevertheless, according to another distinction they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would certainly have remained with us. What, then, is this distinction? The books of God lie open; let us not turn away our gaze. Divine Scripture cries out; let us apply our

hearing. They were not of them because they were not called according to purpose; they were not chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world; they did not obtain a lot in him; they were not predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things. For if they had been such, they would have been of them and without doubt would have remained with them. Therefore, according to Augustine, the true and first cause of the denial of the gift of perseverance, both to some infants and to many adults and just persons, is none other than their reprobation, which, in his judgment, is founded upon original sin, as is clear from epist. 105 to Sixtus, where he says: For what did he love in Jacob before he was born or had done anything good except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau before he had done anything evil except original sin? For in the former he did not love a justice which he had not yet performed, nor in the latter did he hate the nature which he himself had made good.

11. Although these teachings are Augustinian and therefore most true, one difficulty can nevertheless be raised: since original sin is remitted in the just through baptism, it does not seem that, because of it, the grace necessary for perseverance can be denied, especially since, according to the Apostle in Rom. 5 and the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, nothing deserving condemnation remains in those who are renewed through baptism in Christ Jesus.

This difficulty can be met in two ways. First, it can be said that original sin, both as to guilt and as to liability to eternal punishment, is entirely removed through baptism, and that God does not afterward impute it to the reborn as guilt or eternal punishment. Hence the Apostle and the Council of Trent mean only that nothing remains in the reborn that has the true and proper character of sin, since all of this is removed through baptism. Nevertheless, it is compatible with this that the debt of being deprived of the most efficacious actual graces, which even a just man always needs because of the corruption left by sin, in order to avoid sin, act well, and persevere in justice, is not entirely removed through baptism. Just as weakness is not removed through baptism, although iniquity is destroyed through it, as Augustine says in serm. 2, *De verbis Apostoli*. For the tinder of concupiscence remains in the reborn after baptism, as the Council of Trent teaches in sess. 5, can. 5. Therefore, just as a posthumous child is attributed to his father because he comes from him through the mediation of the seed which the father left before he died, so in the regenerate reprobate the permission of sin, abandonment by God, and denial of the gift of perseverance proceed from original sin through the mediation of a certain seed of evil, namely, the aforementioned tinder of sin, which remains in the reborn and was left by

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

original sin, although original sin itself was removed in them through baptism.

The second solution to the foregoing difficulty was delivered and explained at length in part I, treat. V, c. 3, § 3, where we showed that original sin, as an infection of nature, is indeed the motive cause of the reprobation of men, though not as an infection of the person. Hence, although the infection of the person is removed in the reborn through baptism, the infection of nature always remains in them, as is clear in concupiscence, which, since it is an effect of the infection of nature, remains in the baptized, as experience establishes. It follows that original sin, although remitted to the baptized reprobate through baptism, can be the cause of their reprobation and consequently of the denial of the gift of perseverance, or of the efficacious assistances required for perseverance.

§ 2.

Objections Are Resolved.

12. You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: to end life in grace, grace itself is sufficient, together with the assistances that follow it according to the ordinary law, and the natural causes that bring about death. Therefore another special gift is imagined without reason. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: grace with assistances of this kind is sufficient for avoiding all sins for some period within which natural causes, for example, sickness, intemperate weather, and similar things, can bring about death. Therefore these things suffice for ending life in grace.

I answer that all the things assigned are indeed sufficient to conjoin death with grace as accidental causes, but not as causes in themselves. For a cause in itself is one which, by the force of its proper causality, regards the effect of which it is called the cause in itself. But the things assigned in the objection are not ordered, by the force of their proper causality, to conjoining death with grace. Therefore, since this effect must not be called casual and fortuitous, another distinct gift must be posited, by which all the causes are so disposed and prepared that death is brought about by natural or violent causes precisely when the man exists in grace.

13. You will object, second: a man possessing grace has a right to glory, which is virtually contained in grace as fruit in seed, according to the Apostle: *The grace of God is eternal life*. Therefore the continuation of grace with glory occurs by debt and not by a special grace. Consequently,

On Grace

perseverance, which brings about the conjunction of grace with glory, is not a special gift or special providence not owed to a man possessing grace.

But I deny the consequence. Although a just man has a right to glory while he is in grace, he does not have a right to be preserved in grace until death, or to have death conjoined with grace, since, in this state, by reason of free choice, he is changeable toward good and evil. Hence that someone should be protected by God so as not to lose grace when death is at hand is a very great and most special gift, and the principal effect of predestination. Conversely, that someone be permitted to die in sin, or that sin be conjoined with death, is the final effect of reprobation, concerning which Christ said in John 8: *I go, and you will seek me, and you will die in your sin.*

14. You will object, third, against the second part of the assertion: final perseverance is a special and unowed gift and benefit. But the conjunction of grace with death is not a special gift or benefit of God. Therefore the gift of final perseverance does not formally consist in such a conjunction. The major is evident. The minor is proved: for the conjunction of grace with death, it is required only that grace be infused or preserved, and that death then occur. But the occurrence of death is natural, while the infusion or preservation of grace is a general benefit of the supernatural order belonging to the universal providence of that order. Therefore their conjunction is not a special gift or benefit of God in the supernatural order.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. To its proof I say that, although the infusion or preservation of grace, considered in itself, is a general benefit of the supernatural order, its infusion or preservation from an intention that it be conjoined with death is a special gift and benefit, because glory is infallibly annexed to this conjunction, and it proceeds from an efficacious intention of glory. Similarly, although death, considered in itself and according to the character common to all men, is not a gift of God but rather the punishment of sin, nevertheless, as it is a condition required for possessing an immutable state in grace and for obtaining glory, it is given through God's special providence and is his special benefit, as is the beatitude to which it leads. Hence Augustine says in *De civitate Dei*, lib. 13, c. 4: *God granted so much to the grace of faith that death, which is clearly contrary to life, became an instrument through which one passes to life.*

15. To complete this celebrated question, you will ask whether a special gift or assistance of God was necessary for the angels and our first parents in the state of innocence in order to persevere.

I answer affirmatively. Augustine expressly teaches in *De civitate Dei*, lib. 12, c. 9, that the good angels who persevered in the love of God received from him a greater assistance than the evil angels who fell. He says: *While the*

latter fell by an evil will, the former, more greatly assisted, attained that fullness of beatitude in which they became most certain that they would never fall from it. Nor can that greater assistance granted to the good angels be interpreted, as Jansenius contends, as the certain knowledge by which the blessed angels know that they will never fall. For, as Estius rightly says on II Sent., dist. 4, § 13: If this assistance by which the blessed angels are said to have been more greatly assisted were beatitude itself, the sense would be absurd, namely, that beatitude was conferred upon the angels so that by it they might arrive at beatitude.

Several arguments could also be adduced in confirmation of the same truth. But because we treated this in the treatise on the will of God, c. 4, § 7, the argument which St. Thomas indicates in *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 3, c. 155, will suffice here: everything changeable in itself needs the assistance of an unchangeable agent in order to be fixed in one thing. But free choice in the angels and in our first parents was mobile and changeable from good to evil, as the unhappy event sufficiently showed. Therefore, in order to be strengthened in good and persevere in it infallibly, they needed God's special assistance. Hence Augustine, in discourse 2 on Ps. 32, speaking of the good angels under the name and figure of the heavens, says: *Nor did they provide their own firmness for themselves. By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the spirit of his mouth all their power.* Gregory the Great teaches the same in *Moralia*, lib. 25, c. 8, where he says of the angels: *While some fell, others are said to have been strengthened so as to stand.*

16. You will say, first: Augustine, in *De correptione et gratia*, cc. 11 and 12, expressly teaches that Adam could persevere through free choice, and that God had left it in his choice whether he would will to persevere. But that which is brought about only by a special grace, or for which a special assistance is required, is not said to be left to choice or to be done through free choice. Therefore, according to Augustine's doctrine, Adam in the state of innocence did not need a special assistance in order to persevere. The same should proportionately be said of the angels.

I answer that when St. Augustine affirms that Adam could persevere in good through free choice, he intends only to declare the facility he possessed for persevering in good by reason of the gift of integrity, which perfectly subjected the lower part to the higher, and the higher part to God, and prevented every rebellion or disordered motion of concupiscence. Hence in c. 11 of the same work he says: He did not need the assistance which the saints implore when they say, "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind," and so forth, because in them the flesh desires against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh; and, laboring and endangered in such a combat, they ask that the power of fighting and

conquering be given to them through the grace of Christ. But he, tempted by no strife of himself against himself, enjoyed peace with himself in that place of beatitude. Hence St. Thomas, raising against himself this testimony of Augustine, which is the principal foundation of Jansenist doctrine, answers in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 137, a. 4, ad 2: Augustine says in the book *De correptione et gratia*: "It was given to the first man, not that he should persevere, but that he could persevere through free choice," because there was then no corruption that would cause difficulty in persevering. From this it is clear that Augustine in the cited passage intends only to exclude from the state of innocence the necessity of a special assistance healing the weakness of nature, such as is required in us for perseverance, but not a special assistance fixing and strengthening the changeability of free choice.

17. You will say, second: the gift of perseverance was connaturally owed to man in the state of integrity and innocence. Therefore it was not a special gift or benefit of God. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: every form not impeded in its subject is owed a concurrence toward that which it requires by its nature. But habitual grace in integral man was a form which by its nature required perseverance and firmness, and suffered no impediment in this respect, as it does in fallen man because of the rebellion of concupiscence. Therefore, by title of connaturality, an assistance for perseverance was owed to it.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, granting the major, I deny the minor. For although habitual grace in integral man did not suffer, as in fallen man, an impediment to its preservation arising from the rebellion of concupiscence, it was nevertheless exposed to an impediment consisting in the mobility and changeability of free choice, as is clear from what has been said above.

18. From what has been said thus far concerning the necessity of grace for acting well and persevering in good, you will understand that no one, however just and holy, should trust in the powers of his own free choice, but should rest solely upon the hope of heavenly grace. Hence sacrilegious is this saying of a pagan philosopher: *Let God give strength and wealth; I shall provide myself with an even spirit.* The same applies to this statement of Pelagius in his letter to Demetrias: *No one except yourself will be able to confer spiritual riches upon you. In these, therefore, you are rightly to be praised; in these you are deservedly to be preferred to others, because they can exist only from you and in you.* Hence the Pelagians are not undeservedly compared to the farmers of Egypt. For, as Seneca says: *None of the farmers in the land of Egypt looks up to heaven, because they expect the fertility of their fields not from heaven and the influence of the stars, nor from rains, but solely from the flooding of the Nile.* Their

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

entire hope, hanging upon their river as upon a divinity, rests on the soil and not on heaven, on mud and not on God, according to the poet:

*The land is content with its own goods, needing no commerce
Or Jupiter; all its confidence rests in the Nile alone.*

Not unlike them are the Pelagians, Semipelagians, and all who attribute the good of virtue and the work of salvation either to nature, philosophy, their own industry, or the powers of free choice, rather than to divine bounty or the efficacy of grace. They may be said never to raise their eyes to heaven, from which our help comes, but, clinging to muddy nature, to place all their confidence in it like the farmers of Egypt. Therefore it is said of them in Isa. 30: *Woe to the deserting children who trust in the shadow of Egypt, hoping for help in the strength of Pharaoh. Egypt is man and not God, flesh and not spirit; and the Lord will incline his hand, and the helper will fall, and the one receiving help will collapse, and all will be consumed together.*

CHAPTER X.

On the Division of Grace.

1. Grace can first be divided into uncreated and eternal grace, and created and temporal grace. The first is God's eternal love, by which he freely loved us in order to grace and glory, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 110, a. 1, in these words: *Sometimes the grace of God means God's own eternal love, according to which it is also called the grace of predestination, insofar as God gratuitously and not because of merits predestined some persons.* For it is said in Eph. 1: *He predestined us for adoption, unto the praise of the glory of his grace.* The other includes the gifts which are conferred upon us by God in time for attaining such an end. We treated the first in the treatise on predestination, in which we showed that the election of the predestined is purely gratuitous and independent of the foreknowledge of merits, and is therefore designated in Scripture by the name of lot. It remains for us here to treat the second, which is commonly divided into internal and external grace. Internal grace is that which is inwardly united to us and received in the soul of man or in its powers. External grace is that which does not intrinsically affect him but is only extrinsic. Hence to the first genus belong sanctifying grace, the moral virtues infused in themselves, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the motions of assisting grace received in the intellect or will. To the second are reduced all external causes, means, and objects by which our mind is aroused to know or love divine things, such as the preaching of the word of God, the examples of

On Grace

Christ and the saints, the reading of Sacred Scripture, miracles, and similar things, which St. Prosper describes in *De vocatione gentium*, lib. 2, c. 26, in these words: *The grace of God indeed holds the principal place in every justification, persuading by exhortations, moving by examples, terrifying by dangers, inciting by miracles*, and so forth.

2. Internal grace is divided into grace gratuitously given and grace making pleasing. The former does not in itself conduce to the sanctification and salvation of the one to whom it is given, although through it one man cooperates toward the salvation of another. The latter is referred in itself to the salvation of the recipient and is not only given gratuitously, which is common to every grace, but also makes the person pleasing and friendly to God.

3. Grace gratuitously given is further subdivided into nine species, which the Apostle enumerates in 1 Cor. 12 in these words: There are divisions of graces: to one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge according to the same Spirit; to another, faith in the same Spirit; to another, prophecy; to another, the grace of healings; to another, the working of powers; to another, the discernment of spirits; to another, kinds of tongues; to another, the interpretation of discourses.

4. St. Thomas demonstrates the sufficiency of this division here, q. 111, a. 4, and on 1 Cor. 12, lect. 2, by this outstanding and wonderful argument. Graces gratuitously given are bestowed so that a man may cooperate toward another's salvation and conversion, not by moving him inwardly, for this belongs to God alone, but only by teaching or persuading him outwardly. Three things are necessary for this: 1^o the man who is to teach another must possess fullness of knowledge concerning divine things; 2^o he must be able to prove and confirm what he teaches; 3^o he must be able to express fittingly to those whom he instructs what he must teach.

For someone to possess fullness of knowledge concerning divine things, three things are required: 1^o knowledge of what is presupposed as principles in divine knowledge; 2^o knowledge of the principal conclusions; 3^o knowledge of divine effects, from which causes must sometimes be manifested. Therefore three graces gratuitously given are necessary for fullness of knowledge concerning divine things: faith, by which the first principles are believed; wisdom, by which the principal conclusions are known; and knowledge, by which divine effects are known.

For a man to be able to confirm what he teaches concerning divine things, two things are required. The first is that he perform things which God alone can perform. These are miraculous works, which are of two kinds: they are ordered either to the health of bodies or solely to the manifestation

of divine power, such as causing the sun to stand still or to be darkened, and similar things. Therefore, so that one who teaches divine things may confirm them, two other graces gratuitously given are posited: the grace of healings and the working of powers. The second is that he be able to manifest things which God alone can know. These are two: future contingents and the hidden things of hearts. Therefore two other graces gratuitously given are posited: prophecy for knowing future contingents, and the discernment of spirits for knowing the hidden things of hearts.

Finally, so that one who must teach divine things may fittingly propose them to his hearers, the faculty of utterance is necessary, which concerns either the language or the meaning of the things to be expressed. Therefore two other graces gratuitously given are posited: kinds of tongues for the first, and the interpretation of discourses for the second. It is therefore established that only nine graces gratuitously given are to be admitted. For only three are given for fullness of knowledge: faith, for the principles; wisdom, for the principal conclusions; and knowledge, for the effects. For confirming what is taught, only four are necessary: the grace of healings, for bodily health; the working of powers, for manifesting divine power; prophecy, for future contingents; and discernment of spirits, for knowledge of the secrets of hearts. Finally, only two are required for proposing what is to be taught: kinds of tongues, for language, and the interpretation of discourses, for the meanings of propositions.

5. Of these graces gratuitously given, some remain permanently in the saints and after the manner of a habit, so that they use them at their discretion and whenever they will, such as faith, wisdom, and knowledge. Others exist in them after the manner of a motion or actual impression, which they cannot use at their discretion, but only when they are moved by God, such as prophecy and the gift of miracles. Hence Gregory, hom. 5 on Ezekiel, beautifully observes that the Holy Spirit is called both stable and mobile in Wis. 7: *Because in the hearts of the saints he always remains according to certain virtues, while according to others he comes intending to depart and departs intending to come. For in faith, hope, and charity, and in other goods without which one cannot arrive at the heavenly homeland, such as humility, justice, and mercy, he does not abandon the hearts of the perfect. But in the power of prophecy, eloquence of teaching, and the exhibition of miracles, he is sometimes present to his elect and sometimes withdraws himself.*

Christ must nevertheless be excepted from this rule. In him all the graces gratuitously given existed permanently and after the manner of a habit, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 7, for two reasons. First, because his humanity was an instrument really and hypostatically

On Grace

conjoined to the divinity. Hence it was fitting that, just as that conjunction was permanent and never to be dissolved, so also the graces gratuitously given which followed that union should exist permanently in him and after the manner of a habit. Second, because Christ was endowed with the power called the power of excellence, by reason of which he possessed dominion over all creatures and disposed of them at his discretion. Therefore, at the pleasure of his will, he could work miracles and command demons, diseases, the sea, and the winds, as is read in the Gospel.

6. Internal grace is again divided into habitual and actual grace. Habitual grace is a permanent gift of God by which man is justified and sanctified and is rendered pleasing and friendly to God. We shall treat it at length in the following chapter. Actual grace is a transient assistance which inwardly arouses or elevates man to act well as is required for salvation. Such an assistance does not formally consist in indeliberate acts of the intellect or will, as many recent authors maintain, but in some motion or transient quality impressed by God upon the powers of the soul, so as to elevate, complete, and constitute them in a first act sufficient for eliciting such acts. For, since the intellect and will do not of themselves have sufficient power to produce supernatural acts, they cannot elicit indeliberate acts of the supernatural order unless they are first, at least by priority of nature, elevated and applied to eliciting them by some motion or flowing and transient quality. Our Thomists teach this in the treatise on the assistances, and from it infer the necessity of grace physically premoving and predetermining. On this subject, what we wrote in *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, treatise on human acts, disp. 6, a. 2, § 10, may be consulted.

7. Actual grace is subdivided into operating and cooperating grace. This division is gathered from 1 Cor. 15: Not I, but the grace of God with me. Anselm says this is the same as if the Apostle had said: I labored in the good work, not I, but also I. For insofar as I was preceded solely by God's gift, not I; but insofar as I followed the gift with my will, also I. The Second Council of Orange indicates both graces in can. 9: Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us that we may work. Augustine likewise says in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 17: By cooperating, God perfects in us what he began by operating, because he begins by working that we may will, and perfects by cooperating with those who will.

8. Grace is called operating insofar as it applies the will to a holy affection or operation, and cooperating insofar as, together with the will thus applied, it produces that affection or operation. For, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 111, a. 2, grace is called operating with respect to the effect in which our mind is moved but does not move, while God alone moves. It is

called cooperating with respect to the effect in which our mind both moves and is moved. But with respect to the effect which consists in applying the will to act, the will is moved but does not move, since it is related to this effect merely passively, receiving the divine motion by which it is applied to act. With respect to the other effect, it is simultaneously moving and moved, since the operation and consent of the will are not effected by God alone but also by the will itself. Therefore actual grace is rightly called operating insofar as it applies the will to act, and cooperating insofar as, together with the will thus applied, it produces the same action and effect.

9. Operating and cooperating grace are commonly designated by various names. First, operating grace is called *prevenient*, while cooperating grace is called *subsequent*. Operating grace is called *prevenient* because it precedes all our deliberation and the good use or consent of free choice by priority either of time or nature, according to Ps. 58: His mercy will go before me. Hence Augustine says in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, lib. 4, c. 6: In all things which anyone does according to God, his mercy goes before him. Elsewhere he writes these words concerning God: God is he whom no one loves unless first preceded by him, whom no one abandons unless deceived, and whom no one possesses unless blessed. Bernard likewise says in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*: Certainly we cannot precede him who finds no one good and saves no one whom he does not first precede. Fulgentius likewise says in *De incarnatione et gratia*, c. 22: The wandering sheep can never return unless it has first been sought by the good Shepherd and carried back upon his shoulders. Therefore the good Shepherd came to seek and save the lost sheep, which cannot seek its Shepherd before it is sought by him, but is preceded by the one seeking it so that it may seek. Yet the shepherd would seek it in vain if, once sought, it could not itself seek the Shepherd. But the goodness of the Shepherd who seeks it bestows this upon it, that it also possess the will to seek its Shepherd.

Cooperating grace is called *subsequent* because the production of the work follows the application to the work. Hence Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, c. 32: Both statements are read in the sacred texts: "His mercy will go before me," and, "His mercy will follow me." He goes before the unwilling man so that he may will; he follows the willing man so that he may not will in vain. Fulgentius likewise says in *Ad Monimum*, lib. 1, c. 11: God goes before by giving man a good will; he follows the one willing well by working in him the ability to perform the good work. And again: He goes before the impious man so that he may become just; he follows the just man so that he may not become impious. He goes before the fallen man so that he may rise; he follows the one raised up so that he may not fall.

On Grace

10. Again, operating grace is called exciting, while cooperating grace is called assisting. The former is called exciting because it arouses a sinner, or a just man ceasing from good work as though oppressed by sleep, from the sleep of sin or negligence in good works, according to Rev. 3: *Behold, I stand at the door and knock*, and Eph. 5: *Arise, you who sleep, rise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you*. Augustine elegantly describes this grace, or rather this effect of operating grace, in *Confessiones*, lib. 10, c. 27: *You called and cried aloud and broke through my deafness. You flashed, shone, and drove away my blindness. You gave forth fragrance, and I drew breath and long for you. I tasted, and I hunger and thirst. You touched me, and I burned for your peace*. By these words he declares that three attributes appropriated to the three divine persons shine forth especially in the justification of a sinner. The power of the Father appears in the force and efficacy of his calling, expressed in these words: *You called and cried aloud and broke through my deafness*. The wisdom of the Son appears in the splendors by which he enlightens the mind; hence he adds: *You flashed, shone, and drove away my blindness*. The goodness of the Holy Spirit appears in the wonderful sweetness by which he attracts and draws the soul to himself, which he declares in the following words: *You gave forth fragrance, and I drew breath*, and so forth.

Cooperating grace is called assisting because it assists us in doing that to which we were aroused by God. The Church frequently asks this from God in the words of Ps. 69: *O God, come to my assistance*, and so forth. Hence Cassian says in *Collationes*, coll. 10, c. 5: *Whatever work, ministry, or journey you are undertaking, do not cease to sing this verse. Let sleep steal upon you while meditating on it, until, formed by its continual exercise, you become accustomed to sing it even in sleep. Let it be the first thing to occur to you when you awaken; let it anticipate every thought as you rise; let it lead you from your bed to the bending of your knees, and from there conduct you to every work and action*.

10. [bis] Concerning these divisions of operating grace, it should briefly be observed that they properly belong to actual grace, but can in a certain way be accommodated to habitual grace, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 111, a. 2. Grace, as we said above, is called operating when our mind is moved but does not move, and cooperating when our mind both moves and is moved. But habitual grace both sanctifies the soul in the genus of formal cause, an effect which it alone produces, and is simultaneously the principle of a meritorious work produced jointly by grace and free choice. Therefore habitual grace can in a true sense be called operating and cooperating. It can also be called prevenient and subsequent by reason of diverse effects, one of which follows another. For example, insofar as it gives supernatural being, it

is said to precede itself insofar as it moves toward a good will, operation, and perseverance.

11. Finally, the celebrated division of actual grace is into sufficient and efficacious grace. Sufficient grace is that which gives the ability to act, while efficacious grace is that which is always conjoined with the operation which it infallibly brings about. This division is taken from Augustine in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 12, where he says: *The assistances themselves must be distinguished. For one is an assistance without which something does not occur, and another is an assistance with which something occurs.* He explains this by food, without which, he says, *we cannot live, and with which we can live.* Nevertheless, when food is present, it does not bring it about that one who wills to die lives. An assistance without which something does not occur, and with which it can occur, is manifestly sufficient assistance. An assistance with which something occurs is efficacious assistance. He again manifests these assistances there in our first parent and in the elect, saying that our first parent possessed an assistance without which he could not persevere and with which he could persevere, but did not possess the assistance by which he would persevere. All the elect, however, possess the latter, since it is given to them not only that they may be able to persevere, but also that they in fact persevere and are nothing other than persevering.

Cyril mentions both in the book *De adoratione*, where he says: *God, the Savior of all, displays such kindness toward us that he assists us with efficacious help, according to what is written: "You took hold of my right hand and led me in your counsel."* For since human nature is not very noble nor sufficiently capable of escaping evil, *God in a certain way fights together with us and seems to grant a twofold benefit: persuading us by admonitions to seek assistance, and supplying another, stronger aid, so that the present and violent evil cannot prevail.* St. Thomas also seems to indicate both here, q. 112, a. 2, ad 2, in these words: *It sometimes happens that God moves a man toward some good, but not a perfect one, and such preparation precedes grace. Sometimes, however, he immediately moves him perfectly toward the good, and the man suddenly receives grace.* By these words the holy Doctor clearly acknowledges in the state of fallen nature a certain grace moving and applying to imperfect acts and preparing for perfect ones, which the Thomists call sufficient, and another moving and applying to perfect acts and effecting the sinner's perfect conversion and justification, which they call efficacious. Therefore the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is legitimate and conforms to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, as well as Augustine and Cyril.

12. Reason also supports this. Since in every nature, especially an intellectual nature, three things are distinguished, namely, being, ability, and

On Grace

operation, it is fitting to admit three kinds of grace in the supernatural order. One gives supernatural and divine being and is, as it were, the substance of that order; this is sanctifying grace, which elevates us to fellowship and participation in the divine nature, as we shall show in the following chapter. Another gives ability, or completes the power in first act; this is sufficient grace, which is called the grace of possibility. A third gives actual operation, or moves and applies the power to act and infallibly connects it with operation; this is called efficacious grace.

13. Some more recent authors, however, contend that the assistance admitted by the Thomists and called sufficient neither is nor should be called sufficient. For, they say, by the name of a sufficient means or assistance everyone commonly understands something which suffices by itself and beyond which nothing further is required for acting. But in the Thomists' position, besides the assistance they call sufficient, another is required by which the power is applied to act and reduced from first to second act. Therefore such assistance neither is nor can be called sufficient except improperly. As one recent author says, because sword and shield are necessary for fighting, a ship for sailing, food for preserving life, and colors and brush for painting, no prudent and wise man will say that a man can fight without sword and shield, sail without a ship, preserve life without food, or paint without colors and brush.

I answer, first, that this difficulty burdens not only the Thomists, but also the Fathers of the Society who defend congruous grace, as Father Martinon, a new and celebrated author of the same Society, shows in *Anti-Jansenius*, disp. 26, sect. 2, n. 35. There, assailing by various arguments the congruous grace of Suárez, Vásquez, and other theologians of the Society, he adds this in the third place: Third, if so great a motion and excitation is morally necessary for conversion, then those who receive a lesser one do not possess morally sufficient assistance. Thus all who are not converted lack assistance morally sufficient for conversion, and it is morally impossible for them to be converted. Hence that complaint would be metaphysical, not moral, and would be irrational: "What more should I have done for my vineyard that I have not done?" Isa. 5. The Jews could deservedly answer: You should have given us assistance morally sufficient, not such an assistance that no one preceded by it would be converted. How did you expect grapes from those for whom it was morally impossible not to bear wild grapes? Below, at n. 38, he says that the position teaching the necessity of congruous grace for operation falls into the two inconveniences which the Fathers of the Society object against the Thomists, namely, that it introduces necessitating grace and excludes sufficient grace. This is most manifest

concerning moral sufficiency, he says, because with such grace alone, namely, incongruous grace, it is morally impossible to act well. For that is called morally impossible which is so difficult that no one does it.

Father Lemos uses a similar argument in treat. 3, *De divinis praedestinationibus*, c. 5, at the end, to turn the proposed argument against the adversaries themselves and demonstrate that it militates equally against congruous grace and against predetermining grace. For when, he says, congruous grace is not given to a man, that is, when he is not called congruously, something necessary for the man actually to act is lacking. Therefore without it he will not possess sufficient assistance for acting. This consequence belongs to the adversaries, who say that sufficient assistance is lacking to a man when something necessary for actual operation is lacking. The antecedent is proved because, without that congruous calling, it cannot happen that the man acts well, and that calling is not within his power. For whether God calls at the time at which he foreknows that the man will act well rather than at another time is not in the man's power, but depends entirely upon God. Therefore the man does not have in his power that which is necessary for him actually to act. If it is therefore inferred from this that a man lacking physically predetermining grace does not possess sufficient assistance, it is likewise proved that one lacking congruous grace also lacks sufficient assistance. Thus either that a man be called congruously is required for his free power to act well, or it is not. If it is not required, then without that congruous calling it will be possible for the man actually to act well, and thus it will not be necessary for operation, as its defenders contend. If it is required, then something required for the free power of man to act is lacking, and that requisite, namely, that we be called in this way, is not in our power. Therefore we do not possess sufficient assistance for acting.

14. I answer, second, directly to the proposed difficulty, that grace which gives the ability to act can fittingly be called sufficient, although it does not bring about the act, for two reasons: 1^o because it sufficiently excites the will to act; 2^o because it gives the will the entire complement and all the power or sufficiency required on the part of first act, although it does not give the application, actuality, or complement pertaining to second act. That this suffices for the character and denomination of sufficient assistance is clearly gathered from both holy Doctors, Augustine and Thomas. For although Augustine, in *De gratia Christi* and *De correptione et gratia*, admits the assistance of action, or the assistance by which, which he teaches to be so necessary for acting and persevering that without it no one ever acts well or perseveres, he nevertheless acknowledges besides it the assistance of

On Grace

possibility, or the assistance without which, which he teaches in the same place to be sufficient, although another is required besides it. Therefore, according to Augustine, it does not belong to the character of sufficient assistance that it suffice by itself and that nothing else be required for acting.

Likewise, St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 106, a. 2, ad 2, that *the new law, considered in itself, gives sufficient assistance for not sinning*. There by sufficient assistance he understands habitual grace, as Conradus, Sylvius, and other interpreters teach. This is established both from the title of the article, in which he asks *whether the new law justifies*, and from the purpose at which he aims, for he intends to prove that the new law justifies because habitual or justifying grace principally belongs to it. But in St. Thomas's doctrine, for the just not to sin, to observe the divine precepts, and to elicit supernatural acts, besides habitual grace some actual and moving grace is required by which habitual grace and the supernatural and infused habits proceeding from it are applied to act and reduced from first to second act. This is clear from q. 109, a. 9, where the same holy Doctor says: *A man existing in grace does not need the assistance of grace as though he needed another infused habit, but he nevertheless needs assistance in another manner, namely, that he be moved by God to act rightly*. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, it is not required for the denomination of sufficient assistance that it so suffice by itself for operation that a man does not need another moving and applying assistance. It suffices that sufficient assistance supply all things necessary and required on the part of first act.

From this the disparity with the proposed examples is clear. Since sword and shield are necessary for fighting on the part of the power itself and complete first act, food for preserving life, a ship for sailing, and brush and colors for painting, it is no wonder that one who lacks them is not considered to possess sufficient assistances and means for those acts. By contrast, since efficacious and physically predetermining grace presupposes a power completed by sufficient assistance in first act for operation, and merely reduces it to second act, one who lacks efficacious grace can be said to be able in first act to operate, and consequently to possess sufficient assistance.

To these arguments I add the excellent and subtle reasoning of a certain recent Thomist: Reason acknowledges, and faith venerates in God, infinite power, and, what is wonderful, infinite actuality excluding all potentiality, as they say. He is wholly power, and wholly act without potentiality. The rational and free creature hangs from both and is balanced by the weight of both aspects of this majesty: it can act if it wills, and while it wills it acts. In the line of power, sufficient grace completes it; in the line of act, efficacious

grace, which is also called predetermining grace. Therefore, just as it would be the height of madness to assert that the action which exercises and perfects a power is opposed to the power, so it seems foolish to say that the affirmation of efficacious grace cannot be reconciled with the affirmation of sufficient grace, but that the latter is openly destroyed by the former.

15. From this you will understand that Louis de Montalte, when in those famous *Lettres provinciales* he mocks the Thomists because they call the assistance they admit sufficient although another is required besides it for acting, not only shows himself a stranger to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, but also presents himself as a victim to be mocked by the Thomists, according to the common proverb: *Mockers will be mocked*. Certainly, since in the aforesaid letters he continually professes himself a disciple of St. Augustine and a most vigorous defender of grace efficacious of itself, he must either reject every sufficient assistance distinct from efficacious assistance, and consequently assert that the precepts are impossible for a just man who lacks efficacious assistance, which Innocent X condemned as heretical in his new constitution, or he must confess that a just man who lacks efficacious assistance and is equipped only with sufficient assistance has a power sufficiently completed for acting, and consequently can be said truly to possess sufficient assistance for fulfilling the precepts.

16. Nor does it matter that among common people and grammarians only that is called sufficient which suffices by itself and beyond which nothing further is required for acting. For the manner of speaking of theologians is very often different from that of grammarians, because, as Augustine says in *Contra Cresconium grammaticum*, lib. 1: *When the reality is understood, one should labor less over what men have chosen to call it*. Let us therefore grant to Montalte the grammarian that the assistance admitted and called sufficient by the Thomists is not grammatically sufficient. For us theologians it is enough that it be theologically sufficient and sufficient in the Augustinian and Thomistic sense explained above.

17. Concerning the other member of this division, namely, efficacious grace, many grave difficulties would have to be resolved here, especially the celebrated controversy over the source from which the efficacy of grace is drawn: whether from God's omnipotence and the supreme dominion which he possesses over our wills, as the Thomists teach; whether from his foreknowledge ascertaining the future consent of our will, as Suárez, Vázquez, and other defenders of congruous grace maintain; or whether solely from the event, or from the consent and determination of free choice determining and applying grace, as Molina and Lessius think. But out of

On Grace

reverence for the Apostolic See, which more than once prohibited the resolution of this celebrated controversy, frequently debated in the Congregation *De auxiliis* before Clement VIII and Paul V, from being committed to print, I pass it over in silence. Obedience is better than sacrifice, and it is more useful for us to experience the unction and efficacy of grace in ourselves than to investigate where it comes from. What is lacking here concerning this celebrated controversy can nevertheless easily be supplied or gathered from what was said above concerning the gift of perseverance, and from what we wrote concerning the efficacy of the divine decrees in part I, in the treatise on the will of God.

CHAPTER XI.

On the Essence of Habitual Grace, or Grace Making Pleasing.

1. Having explained the various divisions of grace, it remains to treat habitual grace, or grace making pleasing, which is the noblest species of grace and the most resplendent radiance of all graces. By its rays the other charisms shine; by it faith gleams, hope is raised up, and charity itself is enkindled and grows fervent. By its purity we are cleansed from the dregs of sins, by its brightness we are made white, by its colors we are adorned, by its holiness we are consecrated as priests of God, by its majesty we are made equal to kings, by its seed we are begotten as children of God, and by its wholly divine power we are deified. By it we are made children of God, brothers of Christ, members of his body, instruments of the Holy Spirit, temples of the most holy Trinity, fellow citizens of the saints, members of God's household, his friends and intimates, and new creatures. Finally, as the *Roman Catechism* says: *It is a divine quality inhering in the soul, and, as it were, a certain splendor and light which removes every stain from our souls and renders the souls themselves more beautiful and splendid.* Four things concerning it must be investigated and explained here: its essence, perfection, cause, and effects.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 1.

Habitual Grace, or Grace Making Pleasing, Is a Gift Intrinsic to Man, Namely, a Supernatural Quality Permanently Existing in the Soul, and Consequently Has the Character of a Habit and Not of a Disposition.

2. The first part is certain by faith and was defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 11, against the Lutherans and Calvinists, who hold that grace is not something infused into us or existing in us, but only the extrinsic favor and benevolence of God through which the soul is pleasing to him and loved by him. This error can be refuted by various testimonies of Scripture. It is said in 2 Cor. 1: *He sealed us and gave us the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts*. In 1 John 3: *Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because his seed remains in him*. In John 4: *Whoever drinks of this water, it will become in him a fountain of water springing up into eternal life*. But a pledge entrusted, a seal impressed, a seed implanted, and a fountain of water springing from the heart openly signify something real and intrinsically inhering. Therefore Scripture, through these figures or metaphors, clearly declares that grace making pleasing is a gift intrinsic to man and inhering in him.

3. The argument indicated by St. Thomas here, q. 110, a. 1, also proves this. Through grace making pleasing, man becomes the object of God's supernatural love, since, as its very name signifies, through it he is made pleasing and acceptable to God. But for a man to become the object of God's supernatural love, he must necessarily be changed by the reception of some supernatural gift. Therefore grace making pleasing is a supernatural gift infused by God into man and received in him. The major is evident. The minor is proved from the difference found between divine and human love. Human love, since it is powerless and sterile and is not effective, does not posit but presupposes goodness in things. By contrast, divine love, since it is powerful and fruitful, and is not merely affective but effective, causes goodness in the object which it loves and, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 20, a. 2, *infuses and creates goodness in things*. Therefore, just as God, by loving creatures in the natural order, communicates natural perfections to them by which they are a fitting object of such love, so, by loving an intellectual creature in relation to a supernatural end, he causes in it through such love a certain supernatural perfection or gift by which it becomes a fitting object of this supernatural love and pleasing and

On Grace

acceptable to God in relation to eternal beatitude. Therefore we call this gift grace making pleasing.

4. You will say, first: predestination is God's special love toward the elect in relation to a supernatural end, and yet it does not always posit in them a supernatural gift, since the elect are sometimes in the state of sin and unbelief and consequently lack all supernatural gifts. Therefore it is false that some supernatural gift must be caused in men by God's supernatural love toward them.

I answer that predestination does not include God's efficacious love for every period of time, for God often hates a predestined person existing in mortal sin according to present justice, but only for some time at which he has decreed to confer grace upon the predestined person. Hence predestination confers grace for the time established by God, but not for a time at which it is not efficacious by divine decree and suspends its effect.

5. You will say, second: God's hatred posits nothing intrinsic in the man whom he hates. Therefore neither does his love posit anything in the man whom he loves.

I deny the consequence and the parity. First, because man can possess from himself that by which he is an object of God's hatred, namely, sin, but not that by which he is an object of his love, namely, good. Second, because love is an act of pursuit; therefore, if it does not presuppose good in the object toward which it tends, it must posit that good. Hatred, however, has the character of flight and withdrawal; hence it does not belong to hatred to posit something in the object, but rather to remove something from it.

6. You will say, third: the object is understood beforehand and presupposed to the act. Therefore the good which shines in creatures and is the object of divine love is presupposed to that love and is not caused by it.

I answer, first, that an object is presupposed to an act when the act is merely speculative, but not when it is practical. This is clear in the knowledge of vision, which, because it is eminently speculative and practical, does not presuppose its object but makes it, according to Gregory the Great in *Moralia*, lib. 32, c. 6: *By seeing things that do not exist, he creates them, and by seeing things that exist, he preserves them.* We treated this in the treatise on God's knowledge. But God's love toward creatures is practical and effective, *infusing and creating goodness in things*, as St. Thomas says in the passage cited above.

I answer, second, that just as intellection can be considered in two ways, namely, as the production of a word, under which concept it is called diction, and as the pure contemplation of the object in the word itself, so God's love can be considered as an efficacious and practical willing of its

object, and as having the character of simple love or complacency. Therefore, just as intellection as diction is prior to the word, but posterior as pure contemplation of the object in the word, so God's love as efficacious and practical is prior to the goodness which it communicates to creatures. But if it is considered precisely under the concept of pure love or complacency, it is not prior, and under this aspect can even be posterior, not according to its entity but according to its termination.

7. The second part, which asserts that grace making pleasing is a quality permanently existing in the soul, and consequently has the character of a habit and not of a disposition, is proved by this argument of St. Thomas here, q. 110, a. 2. God provides no less for the men whom he loves in relation to a supernatural end than for the creatures which he loves in relation to a natural good. He provides for the latter in such a way that he not only moves them to natural acts, but also bestows upon them certain forms and powers, or fixed and permanent qualities, which are principles of acts, so that they are inclined according to themselves toward such motions. This is clear in a stone, to which he gave heaviness so that it may be connaturally inclined toward the center, and in fire, to which he gave lightness so that it may be connaturally borne toward the place above. Therefore, much more must he infuse permanent and fixed forms, powers, or supernatural qualities into those whom he moves toward a supernatural end, so that through them they may promptly and sweetly be moved by him toward attaining eternal good. Consequently, grace making pleasing is a form or quality possessing fixed and permanent being.

Although in this state of the way it is accidentally variable and easily removable from its subject because of its imperfect participation and because it is not in its connatural state, nevertheless in itself and by its nature it demands to remain for a long time in its subject and to be removed from it with difficulty, because in itself it has firm and stable causes. Hence in the homeland, where it will exist in its connatural act, it will be entirely incorruptible and incapable of being lost. It will not be measured by time or aeviternity, but by participated eternity, as will the beatific vision itself. By this the objection which might be raised against this part of our assertion is answered.

On Grace

§ 2.

Sanctifying Grace Is a Formal Participation in the Divine Nature,
Not Only as Nature, but Also as Infinite.

8. The first part of this assertion is gathered from various testimonies of Scripture. In 2 Pet. 1, men are said through grace to become partakers of the divine nature. Scripture also very frequently asserts that through grace they are begotten, born, and reborn from God and adopted as his children. But since generation is the communication of nature, birth is the reception of nature, and only one who expresses and participates in the nature of his father is to be called a son, without doubt the just must be believed to enjoy through grace a participation in the divine nature. Hence Augustine, commenting in Ps. 41 on the words of the Prophet, *I said: You are gods, and all of you children of the Most High*, adds: *It is therefore manifest that he calls men gods because they have been deified by his grace, not born from his substance. For he justifies who is just through himself and not by another, and he deifies who is God through himself and not by participation in another. But he who justifies also deifies, because by justifying he makes children of God, for he gave them power to become children of God. If we have been made children of God, we have also been made gods. But this belongs to the grace which adopts, not to the nature which begets.*

9. Reason also supports this. By the divine nature we understand that primitive and fontal perfection which, according to our manner of conceiving, is in God in an eminent manner the fountain, root, and origin of the divine attributes and the principle of the divine operations. But sanctifying grace participates in such a perfection, since it is the root of charity and the other infused virtues, which are participations in the divine attributes, and the principle of operations attaining God as he is in himself as their connatural and proportionate object, namely, the intuitive vision of God and beatific love. Therefore sanctifying grace is a participation in the divine nature precisely as nature.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. To participate in something formally is to have a formal agreement with it, at least analogically. This is clear in an accident, which formally participates in the notion of being because it possesses a formal, at least analogical, agreement with substance in that notion. But sanctifying grace has such an agreement with the divine nature as nature. For just as God's nature is in an eminent

manner the root of the knowledge and love by which God knows and loves himself as he is in himself in an infinite manner, so sanctifying grace is the root of knowing and loving God as he is in himself and as he transcends the entire created and creatable order. Therefore sanctifying grace is a formal participation in the divine nature as nature. Hence Cyril says in *Thesaurus*, lib. 2, c. 2: *Those who connaturally possess the same operation as God must necessarily be of the same nature.*

It is further confirmed. Since every inclination tends toward the good proper to the nature in which it is rooted, nothing gives an inclination toward some nature unless it at least participatively possesses that nature. But charity arises from sanctifying grace, and charity is an inclination toward God as he is in himself. Therefore sanctifying grace participatively possesses in itself the divine nature as nature.

10. That it also participates in the divine nature insofar as it is infinite is proved against Alphonsus Curiel and Vincent Contenson, who deny it, and at the same time their principal foundation is overturned. For sanctifying grace to be said to participate in the divine nature as infinite, it is not required that it comprehend the entirety of God's infinity, but it suffices that some part or mode of divine infinity belong to it. But sanctifying grace comprehends in itself some part or mode of God's infinity. Therefore it participates in the divine nature as infinite. The major is evident, for to participate in a perfection is not to possess it totally and completely, but partially and inadequately, since to participate is nothing other than to take a part and leave a part, as is clear from the terms themselves.

The minor is proved as follows. Three things belong to God as infinite being. The first is to possess his own essence as a connatural object and as an intelligible form, after the manner of which he understands other things. This belongs to him insofar as he exceeds the entire order of created and creatable nature, and consequently insofar as he is infinite and possesses the whole fullness of being. The second is that he identify with himself such an object and species and the operation by which he tends toward it. The third is that he comprehend it and know it to the full extent that it is knowable. Although sanctifying grace cannot possess the latter two things in itself and communicate in them with God, the first nevertheless belongs to it, namely, possessing the divine essence as a connatural object and intelligible form, in which it communicates with God, as is clear from what was said in the treatise on the beatific vision. Therefore sanctifying grace comprehends in itself something of God's infinity, or some part of it, and consequently participates in the nature of God as infinite.

On Grace

It is confirmed. Our charity is a formal participation in God's charity as infinite. Therefore sanctifying grace is likewise a formal participation in the divine nature insofar as it is infinite. The consequence is evident, for it is no more repugnant that an infinite essence be participated than an infinite property. The antecedent belongs to St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 7, where he proves that the charity of the way can be increased without limit because *it is a certain participation in God's infinite charity*. This argument would not prove the conclusion if the holy Doctor did not intend charity to be a participation in God's infinite charity precisely insofar as it is infinite, but only according to some determinate degree. For a quality to participate in an infinite form according to a determinate degree does not establish that it can be intensified without limit; rather, it establishes that it cannot be increased beyond the degree which it participates. Thus the intellect of an angel and the substantial being of man cannot be increased without limit, because although they formally participate in God's intellect and being, which are infinite, they do not participate in them as infinite, but according to a determinate degree.

You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: sanctifying grace is called the seed of God in Scripture, as is clear from 1 John 3: *He who is born of God does not commit sin, because his seed remains in him*. But seed participates in the nature of the begetter only virtually and not formally, for it is only his instrument or a power detached from him for communicating his nature to another. Therefore sanctifying grace is not a formal but only a virtual participation in the divine nature.

I answer that sanctifying grace is not called the seed of God in relation to the divine nature, of which it is a participation, but in relation to the beatific vision, of which it is the root and which is contained in the power of grace as a tree in the power of seed, according to the Apostle: *The grace of God is eternal life*. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 3: *Grace making pleasing is related to beatitude in the same way as a seminal principle in nature is related to a natural effect*. Therefore in 1 John 3 *grace is called the seed of God*.

12. [sic] You will object, second: communication of nature does not belong to the definition of adoption of a person as a son. Therefore, although man is constituted an adopted son of God through sanctifying grace, it does not follow that through it he formally participates in the divine nature. The consequence is manifest. The antecedent is established in the adoption which occurs among men, for through it the adopted person does not receive nature from the adopter, but is merely admitted to his inheritance.

I answer that, although communication of nature does not belong to the definition of adoption among men, it is nevertheless required for the adoption by which man is adopted as a son of God. The reason for the difference is that human adoption presupposes that the adopted person is of the same nature as the adopter and possesses in himself a sufficient principle by which he is capable of receiving his inheritance. Therefore it is no wonder that nature is not communicated through that adoption. But divine adoption, since it does not presuppose in man a likeness to the divine nature or a sufficient capacity for receiving God's inheritance, must produce that likeness and capacity, and consequently confer a participation in the divine nature. More will be said below when we treat the first effect of sanctifying grace, namely, man's adoption as a son of God.

13. You will object, third, against the second part of the assertion with Father Vincent Contenson: infinity, since it is the character of divinity itself and, as it were, its proper difference, and belongs to God as he is distinguished from creatures, even supernatural ones, is undoubtedly incapable of being participated by a creature. Therefore sanctifying grace cannot be a formal participation in the divine nature insofar as it is infinite.

It is confirmed, first: for formal participation, imitation, and expression, a formal agreement and, as it were, at least an analogical copy is required, by which the participant represents the attributes of the participated perfection. But sanctifying grace does not possess likeness and formal agreement with God's nature insofar as it is infinite, since it is a created and finite being. Therefore it does not formally participate in the divine nature precisely as infinite.

It is confirmed, second: that which is formally participated by something is predicated of it. For example, because an accident analogically participates in the notion of being, being can be predicated of it. But the notion of infinite being and pure act cannot be predicated of sanctifying grace, since grace is essentially a created, finite, and potential being. Therefore sanctifying grace is not a formal participation in the divine nature insofar as it is infinite and pure act.

14. Before these arguments are resolved, it should be noted that this author writes and teaches contradictory things. In vol. 1, p. 83, he teaches that the divine nature as nature is constituted by the notion of being from itself and being by essence. In vol. 5, in the treatise on grace, p. 466, he says that *God is supernatural because he is being by essence, pure act, infinite, and unlimited*. But this supernaturalness, *since it is the distinctive character of divinity by which God is distinguished from creatures, even supernatural ones, cannot in any way be transferred to creatures or be expressed or copied by them*.

Likewise, on p. 460 of the same volume, he asserts with the Thomists that sanctifying grace is a formal participation in the divine nature. I cannot see at all how these statements can cohere and be reconciled with one another. For if God's nature is constituted by the notion of being by essence and pure act, and this notion cannot be participated by creatures, it is manifest that sanctifying grace is not and cannot be a formal participation in the divine nature, since that which is incapable of participation in God cannot in any way be participated by creatures. Conversely, if grace is a formal participation in the divine nature, and the divine nature is constituted by the notion of being from itself and by essence, or pure act, it is evident that such a notion is not entirely incapable of participation, but can in some manner be transferred to creatures and be expressed or copied by them. Hence:

15. To the proposed objection I answer by denying the antecedent. It is established from what was said in proving the second part of our assertion that, although God's infinity cannot be participated by a creature adequately and according to all the concepts and notions which it contains, it can nevertheless be participated inadequately and according to some notion or concept, namely, insofar as it gives God his own essence as a connatural object and intelligible form. This is participated by sanctifying grace, since it is the root of the beatific vision and of the union of the divine essence, as an intelligible species, with the blessed intellect suffused by the light of glory.

I add that a certain infinity of grace shines forth in other respects. First, because it has no limit to its increase. Second, because it is a principle of meriting by condignity and according to equality a reward objectively infinite, and of satisfying in some manner for mortal guilt, which is intrinsically infinite under the notion of offense, as we showed in the treatise on sins. Third, because it is the principle of charity, which, as St. Thomas says in the passage cited above, is *a certain participation in God's infinite charity*. Finally, a certain infinity of grace shines forth in this: just as God, because he is infinite of himself, suffices to fulfill every desire of the human heart, for which reason he is called by the Hebrews יִשׁוּפ, that is, *he who suffices*, so grace, since it is a participation in the divine nature and, as it were, a certain bond by which God is intimately conjoined to the soul, can satisfy all man's desires, especially when it has been consummated in the homeland through the light of glory and the clear vision of God, which fulfills and satisfies all man's desires, as was shown in the treatise on beatitude.

To the first confirmation, granting the major, I deny the minor. Sanctifying grace has this likeness and analogical agreement with God's nature insofar as it is infinite: just as God, insofar as he is infinite and

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

exceeds the entire created and creatable order, possesses his own essence as a connatural object and intelligible form, so sanctifying grace participates in both, as was shown above.

To the second confirmation I answer from St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* II, a. 3, that something can be participated by another in two ways: 1^o as a common notion by an inferior, in which way animal is participated by man, and the notion of being by an accident; 2^o as something existing outside its essence, as fire is participated by glowing iron and the light of the sun by the air. That which is participated by another in the first way can be predicated of it, as animal is predicated of man and being of an accident. But that which is participated only in the second way cannot be predicated of it, for fire is not predicated of glowing iron, nor can the light of an illuminated body be said to be the illuminating body itself. Hence, since sanctifying grace is only an accidental participation in the divine nature and is not related to it as a common and superior notion to an inferior, the formal notion of infinite being or pure act must not be predicated of it. It suffices that some notion analogically common to the divine nature and sanctifying grace be predicated of grace, namely, being a root of connaturally knowing and loving God as he is in himself.

CHAPTER XII.

The Nature and Perfection of Sanctifying Grace Are Further Explained by Certain Corollaries.

From the foundations established in the preceding chapter, certain corollaries are deduced by which the nature and perfection of sanctifying grace will be further clarified and more perfectly understood.

COROLLARY I.

*It Is Repugnant That There Be Several Species of Sanctifying Grace
Physically and Essentially Diverse from One Another.*

1. This corollary manifestly follows from what was said in the preceding chapter. Sanctifying grace, as was shown there, is a formal participation in the divine nature as nature. But God's nature, under the concept of nature, since it is most simple, can be participated in only one way, namely, after the manner of the constitutive principle and root of the divine attributes.

On Grace

Therefore sanctifying grace cannot be multiplied into several species essentially diverse from one another.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. Although God's infinite perfection can be participated in by infinitely many specifically diverse modes when no mode of participation is determined, this is otherwise when such a mode is determined. For example, although the divine intellect absolutely considered can be participated in by many specifically diverse modes and is in fact participated in by the light of glory, the blessed vision, faith, prophecy, and knowledge infused in itself, nevertheless, under the aspect by which it regards the divine essence clearly, intuitively, and as it is in itself, it can be participated in only one way: by the light of glory insofar as it exercises the character of a cognitive principle, and by intuitive vision insofar as it exercises the character of an operation or actual knowledge. For then the mode of participation is determined. Likewise, although that which in God has the character of essence can be participated in by creatures in many ways, nevertheless, if it is considered precisely under the concept and function of nature, or as it is in an eminent manner the root of the divine attributes, it can be participated in only one way, because the mode of participation is then determined and limited.

I said that it is repugnant for there to be several species of sanctifying grace *physically and essentially diverse from one another*, because there can be diverse graces distinct in moral and accidental species. For example, the grace of Christ differs morally in species from ours because it is the principle of infinite merit and satisfaction. Similarly, sacramental graces differ among themselves in accidental species because they possess diverse powers and connote diverse assistances against the diverse wounds of sins. We treat this in the treatise on the sacraments.

2. You will say: those forms are distinguished in physical and essential species from which specifically diverse properties flow. But properties specifically diverse from those which flow from our grace flow from the grace of Christ and Adam. For in Christ grace is the root of commutative justice, and in Adam of original justice and the gift of integrity, but not in us. Likewise, grace produces faith and hope in us while we are wayfarers, but in those who comprehend it produces the light of glory and the clear vision of God. Therefore these graces differ from one another in physical and essential species.

I answer that, although substantial forms from which specifically diverse properties flow are themselves of diverse species, this is not so of accidental forms, such as sanctifying grace. For, since it is proper to an accidental form to perfect the subject in which it is received according to the mode and

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

requirement of that subject, it produces diverse and sometimes specifically diverse effects according to the diversity of subjects. For example, heat as it exists in fire produces fire; as it exists in the soul and insofar as it is an instrument of the nutritive power, it produces blood and flesh; as it exists in a woman, it produces milk, and so forth. Likewise, the influences of the heavenly bodies produce various effects according to the diversity of the subjects in which they are received: in gardens they produce flowers, in vineyards grapes, in olive groves olives. And water, *although it is of one species, acts in diverse ways, whitening in the lily, reddening in the rose, and producing purple in the violet*, as Chrysostom beautifully says.

Similarly, grace, although one simple quality, produces multiple and sometimes specifically diverse effects according to the diverse capacity and requirement of the subjects in which it is received. In us it causes adoptive sonship, but not in Christ, because, since Christ is the natural Son of God, he is incapable of adoption. In us it causes penance, but in Christ, commutative justice. In Adam before the fall it was the root of original justice and the gift of integrity; after the fall it caused in him the virtue of penance. In us it produces virtues moderating the passions, but not in angels, because, since they lack passions, they are incapable of such virtues. Finally, in the state of the way it produces faith and hope, but in the homeland the light of glory, the clear vision of God, and beatific fruition.

COROLLARY II.

Sanctifying Grace Is Absolutely More Perfect than Charity, the Light of Glory, the Beatific Vision, and Every Other Supernatural Being, Although the Beatific Vision Surpasses It in the Mode of Splendor and Is More Perfect in a Certain Respect.

3. The first part of this corollary is evident from what was said above. Since supernatural beings are participations in God insofar as he exceeds the entire created and creatable order, something must be judged more perfect according as it expresses and participates in a greater perfection of God. But sanctifying grace participates in that which expresses a greater perfection of God. Therefore it is absolutely more perfect than other beings of the supernatural order. The major is evident. The minor is proved. Sanctifying grace, as we showed, participates in the divine nature under the concept and function of nature. The light of glory participates in God's eminence insofar as he exercises precisely the function of intellective power; the blessed vision insofar as he exercises the function of actual intellection; charity and the other infused habits are participations in the divine properties and

On Grace

attributes. Although all things in God are absolutely equal in perfection, because each is the whole fullness of being, they do not all express equal perfection by force of their proper line or function. But that which by force of its proper line and under its proper function expresses a greater perfection in God is nature, or the constitutive principle as such, from which the rest are virtually derived as from a most eminent root. Therefore sanctifying grace participates in that which expresses a greater perfection in God.

4. The second part, which asserts that the blessed vision is more perfect than sanctifying grace in a certain respect, namely, in the mode of splendor, is also manifest. Second act, or operation, is nobler in the mode of splendor than a habit, because it does not contain the potentiality included in a habit. But the blessed vision is second act, while sanctifying grace is a habit, as we showed in § 1. Therefore the beatific vision is more perfect than sanctifying grace in the mode of splendor. Similarly, the light of glory is more perfect than grace in a certain respect and accidentally, insofar as it is necessarily conjoined with actual operation, from which habitual grace can be separated.

5. You will say: since the state of the homeland is absolutely nobler than the state of the way, the gifts belonging to the state of the homeland are absolutely nobler than the gifts belonging to the state of the way. But the light of glory and the beatific vision belong to the state of the homeland, while sanctifying grace belongs to the state of the way. Therefore the light of glory and the beatific vision are absolutely more perfect than sanctifying grace.

I answer that some supernatural gifts belong only to the state of the homeland, such as the light of glory and the beatific vision; some belong only to the state of the way, such as faith and hope; and others belong simultaneously to the state of the way and the homeland, such as grace and charity. Although gifts belonging only to the homeland are more excellent than gifts belonging only to the way, this is not so in comparison with gifts belonging both to the way and to the homeland. Indeed, these surpass all others, at least as regards that which is the first root and foundation of all others, namely, sanctifying grace. Hence St. Thomas says below, q. 113, a. 9: *The gift of grace justifying the impious is greater than the gift of glory beatifying him.*

6. From this you will understand that the least degree of grace has greater worth and value, and is to be esteemed more highly, than all the natural goods of the whole universe. Hence Augustine says in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, lib. 2, c. 6: *Grace surpasses not only all the stars and all the heavens, but even all the angels.* St. Thomas likewise says below, q. 113, a. 9:

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

The good of grace in one person is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe. Cajetan, attentively weighing these words in his commentary on that article, writes: Always keep before your eyes by day and night that the good of grace in one person is better than the good of nature in the whole universe, so that you may continually see the condemnation threatening one who does not esteem so great a good when it is offered.

COROLLARY III.

*Sanctifying Grace So Expels Sin of Itself That it is Repugnant
for Both to Be United in the Same Subject.*

7. The first part is clearly gathered from various testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers, which openly declare the incompatibility of grace with sin, at least according to the ordinary law. It is said in 1 John 3: *Everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because his seed remains in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.* By these words he signifies that a man can neither sin actually nor be infected by any sin for as long as that divine seed, which is grace and by which he is spiritually reborn, remains in him. Likewise, grace is called light in Scripture, while sin is called darkness, as is clear from 1 Pet. 2: *He called us from darkness into his wonderful light*, that is, from sins to grace. Therefore, just as light and darkness cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject at the same time, neither can grace and sin. Hence the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 6: *What participation has justice with iniquity, or what fellowship has light with darkness?* Likewise, the holy Fathers teach that sin is the death of the soul and the destruction of spiritual life, as may be seen in Nazianzen, orat. 19, and Augustine on Ps. 32 and in serm. 5, *De verbis Domini*, where he says: *Just as the soul is the life of the body, so God, united to it through grace and charity, is the life of the soul. Just as the body expires when it gives up the soul, so the soul expires when it loses God. God lost is the death of the soul; the soul given up is the death of the body.* Therefore, just as death and life cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject at the same time, neither can grace and sin, at least according to God's ordinary law and power.

That this is repugnant even according to God's absolute power is proved, first, from the principles established in the treatise on sins. There we showed from St. Thomas that habitual sin consists in the privation of habitual grace with a relation to the preceding act of sin by which it is caused. Hence, since privatively opposed things cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject even by God's absolute power, for otherwise a form and

On Grace

its absence could exist simultaneously in the same subject, and consequently the same thing would simultaneously be and not be, it is repugnant that habitual sin and sanctifying grace be united simultaneously in the same subject. The same must proportionately be said of actual sin, since it causes habitual sin.

8. It is proved, second, by this argument: it implies a contradiction that someone simultaneously possess several total ultimate ends not subordinated to one another, for otherwise each would be both ultimate and not ultimate, as was shown in the treatise on beatitude, c. 1, § 3. But one who is endowed with grace and charity possesses God as his total ultimate end, while one who sins mortally establishes his ultimate end in a creature, as was proved in the treatise on sins, c. 10, § 2. Therefore it implies a contradiction that someone simultaneously exist in grace and sin.

9. It is proved, third, by this reasoning: since, according to the adversaries, grace by its nature removes the stain of sin, if God, using his absolute power, prevented sanctifying grace from removing it, such an effect would be attributed to God as its special author or preserver, and consequently God would be the special author or preserver of sin, which is repugnant to his infinite holiness. Similarly, because fire by its nature expels cold from water, if God miraculously and by using his absolute power prevented such an expulsion, the preservation of the cold would be reduced to him as its special author or preserver.

10. Finally, the same truth can be established by this fundamental argument: the formal effects of sanctifying grace and mortal sin are incompatible even by God's absolute power. Therefore the forms themselves from which they proceed are also incompatible. The consequence is evident, since formal effects are nothing other than the forms themselves communicated to a subject and signified concretely. Therefore in whatever way formal effects conflict with one another, the forms from which they proceed also conflict.

The antecedent is proved as follows. The formal effects of sanctifying grace are to render man a participant in the divine nature, consequently to constitute him an adopted son of God, to make him a fitting subject of divine love and friendship, and to give him a right to eternal happiness. By contrast, the formal effects of mortal sin, both actual and habitual, are to destroy in man the participation in the divine nature, render him hateful and hostile to God, deprive him of divine sonship, and consequently of a right to eternal beatitude. But effects of this kind cannot by any power belong simultaneously to the same subject, as is evident. Therefore neither can the effects of sanctifying grace and mortal sin, whether actual or habitual.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

11. Nor is it valid to say with Suárez that these effects of habitual grace are not primary but secondary, and consequently can be separated from it by God's absolute power, just as risibility can be separated from rationality, local extension from quantity, and beatific joy from the clear vision of God. This is not valid, both because some of these effects are primary, such as rendering man a participant in the divine nature and an adopted son of God, and because, although some are secondary, they are all intimately rooted in the nature of sanctifying grace, as properties are rooted in the essence from which they flow. Hence, just as one possessing rationality could by absolute power lack actual laughter, but neighing could not be present in him, so a man possessing habitual grace might perhaps by extraordinary power lack some of the enumerated effects, but it is repugnant that effects of sin privatively or contrarily opposed to them exist in him.

12. You will object, first: actual mortal sin does not expel grace physically, but only morally and demeritoriously, because it causes the sinner to deserve to be punished by God through the loss of grace and to be deprived and despoiled of it as punishment for sin. But God is not bound to inflict punishment upon one who deserves it, but can remit it according to his indulgence. Therefore, even if sin merits the withdrawal of grace, it could by divine power be united with sanctifying grace in the same subject.

I answer by denying the major. Actual mortal sin expels sanctifying grace from the soul both effectively and demeritoriously, and consequently both physically and morally. Three things can be considered in it: 1^o its character as an offense or injury inflicted upon God, and under this aspect it expels grace only demeritoriously and morally; 2^o aversion from God and conversion to a creature, which expel grace physically, not proximately and immediately, but through the mediation of the habitual conversion to a creature as ultimate end which actual sin leaves behind, for this expels charity and consequently the grace in which charity is rooted; 3^o that which actual sin causes and leaves in the soul, namely, a stain, and this proximately and immediately expels grace, as a privation expels a form. Nor is it incongruous that one and the same thing, under diverse aspects, should physically and morally, effectively and demeritoriously, expel a form.

13. You will say: granted that actual sin efficiently destroys grace, God can nevertheless impede its causality and consequently the expulsion of grace from the soul. Therefore he can bring it about that grace and sin exist simultaneously in the same subject.

I answer by denying the antecedent. God can impede only that causality which depends upon and proceeds from him. But the causality by which actual sin is said to be the cause of habitual sin neither depends upon nor

On Grace

proceeds from God, because God can be the cause neither of actual nor habitual sin, and consequently not of their causality.

14. You will object, second: one act does not necessarily expel the opposite habit, but can exist simultaneously with it in the same subject, as is clear in an act of intemperance which can coexist with the virtue of temperance, or conversely one act of temperance with the vice of intemperance. Therefore one act of sin should not necessarily expel grace, but can exist and be united with it in the same subject.

I answer, first, that, if this argument were valid, it would prove not only according to absolute power but also according to ordinary power that grace can coexist with one or another mortal sin, since a habit can coexist with a contrary act without a miracle.

I answer, second, that a habit can coexist with a contrary act when the aforementioned contradictions do not follow from their simultaneity, but not when those contradictions follow from their coexistence, as was demonstrated above to occur from the simultaneous existence of sin and grace.

15. Third, it can be said that natural and acquired habits are not necessarily expelled by one act, but supernatural and infused habits, such as sanctifying grace, are. Acquired habits depend upon the power of the subject in their production and preservation. Infused habits, however, depend as to their production and preservation upon God's action infusing and preserving them, just as light in its production and preservation depends upon the illumination of the sun. Therefore, just as light would immediately cease in the air if some obstacle were placed against the illumination of the sun, so, when even one mortal sin is placed in the soul, the habit of grace and charity immediately fails, because every mortal sin places an obstacle against its infusion and preservation.

COROLLARY IV.

Habitual Grace is Really Distinct from Charity.

16. It is proved, first: sanctifying grace is related in the supernatural order as substantial form is in the natural order. Therefore, just as substantial form, according to the more common judgment of philosophers, is really distinct from the properties and active powers of which it is the root, so sanctifying grace is distinct from the supernatural virtues which flow from it as properties from an essence. St. Thomas teaches this here, q. 110, a. 4, ad 1, in these words: *Just as the powers of the soul, which are principles of operations,*

flow from the essence of the soul, so the virtues flow from grace itself into the powers of the soul. The consequence is evident, for supernatural things, with due proportion and abstraction made from their supernaturalness, must be treated philosophically in the same way as natural things, because grace is adapted and accommodated to nature as far as possible, as theologians commonly teach. Hence, just as in the natural order substance is not immediately operative but acts through its powers, which are the immediate principle of operation, and consequently is distinct from them, so also habitual grace, which in the supernatural order performs the function of substance and nature.

17. It is proved, second, by the argument of St. Thomas here, q. 110, a. 3, which can be proposed as follows: charity presupposes habitual grace in the soul. Therefore it is really distinct from it. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Charity, since it is a virtue, disposes man fittingly according to a preexisting nature, for this belongs to the definition of virtue, as Aristotle teaches in *Physica*, lib. 7, c. 3. But it does not dispose him fittingly according to human nature precisely as human and rational, for this is proper to the moral and acquired virtues. Therefore it disposes him fittingly according to human nature as elevated to divine and supernatural being through habitual grace, and consequently presupposes that grace in the soul.

The same holy Doctor indicates another argument in *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 2, in these words: *Just as in natural things nature itself is one thing, and the inclination of nature and its motion or operation are another, so in gratuitous things grace is one thing, and charity and the other virtues another.* He illustrates this argument in the same place by observing that four things are found in every order of things: the substance or nature of the thing, its end, the inclination toward that end, and the motion or tendency toward it. For example, in a stone there is its proper nature, consisting in its being a mixed body of such a species; its end, which is rest at the center; heaviness, which is a propensity or inclination toward the center; and descent, which is motion or tendency toward it. Similarly, these four must be found in the supernatural order. Hence in that order grace holds the place of substance or nature, the beatific vision has the character of end, charity is the inclination toward it, and its motions are the operations elicited or commanded by charity, by which such an end is acquired.

18. You will object, first: in Scripture the same effects are attributed to grace and charity, for through each we are said to be justified, to live a divine and supernatural life, to become adopted children of God, and so forth. Therefore they are not really distinct, but are one and the same habit designated by diverse names insofar as it performs diverse functions.

On Grace

I answer that the same effects are attributed to grace and charity, not because they are one and the same habit, but because they are inseparably connected with one another. Similarly, the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13 attributes the effects of kindness, patience, and several other virtues to charity, not because they are one and the same habit, but because they inseparably accompany charity itself.

19. You will object, second: if grace and charity were really distinct, they could be separated from one another, at least by God's absolute power. But this cannot be said. Therefore neither can the former. The minor is proved. If a man possessed grace without charity, he would be pleasing and acceptable to God, and even his adopted son, yet would not be his friend, which seems absurd. Likewise, if charity were infused into someone without sanctifying grace, he would neither be damned, since he would have no sin, which is incompatible with charity, nor saved, because, since he would not be an adopted son of God, he would be incapable of his inheritance.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. To its first proof I say that one into whom grace was infused without charity would be a friend of God radically and remotely, because he would possess grace, to which, as a root, the principle of loving God would be due. To the second I say that the case is impossible. For although God by absolute power can separate an essence from its properties by preventing their emanation, he cannot cause a property to exist in a subject without the essence from which it flows, especially if such a property is vital. For example, although God can create a rational soul without intellect and will, he cannot produce or preserve intellect and will without a rational soul, because, since those powers are vital, they cannot exist without the vital principle in which they are rooted. Hence, since charity is a vital power of the supernatural order, it cannot exist without sanctifying grace, which is the first root of supernatural life and performs the function of nature or substance in the supernatural order.

COROLLARY V.

*Habitual Grace Is Immediately Subjected in
the Soul, Not in Its Powers.*

20. This follows manifestly from what was said above. First, that which perfects a power primarily and in itself for an ordered operation is immediately operative. But sanctifying grace is not immediately operative, as we showed in the preceding corollary. Therefore it does not reside in the powers of the soul, but in its essence.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Second, supernatural gifts which are participations in God's intellect and will are immediately received in the created intellect and will. Therefore that which is a participation in the divine nature as nature must be immediately received in the very essence of the soul.

Third, since the formal effect of a form is nothing other than the form itself as communicated to a subject, a form immediately resides in the subject to which it communicates its formal effect. But the formal effect of sanctifying grace, such as giving supernatural being and life or being the radical principle of supernatural life, belongs primarily and in itself to the soul and not to its powers. Likewise, being pleasing primarily and in itself regards not operations or powers but the subject, for because the subject is pleasing, its operations are pleasing and acceptable, according to Gen. 4: *The Lord looked upon Abel and upon his gifts*. Therefore grace itself immediately inheres in the soul and not in its powers.

Finally, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 110, a. 4: Through grace we are regenerated as children of God. But generation is terminated priorly at the essence rather than at the powers. Therefore grace is priorly in the essence of the soul than in its powers.

21. You will say: contraries must have the same subject from which they expel one another. But the subject of sin, which is contrary to grace, is not the essence of the soul but its powers. Therefore grace does not reside in the essence of the soul, but in its powers.

I answer by denying the minor. Although the subject of actual sin is a power, the subject of habitual sin and of the stain, to which grace is opposed, is the essence of the soul, as we showed in the treatise on sins.

CHAPTER XIII.

On the Cause of Habitual Grace and the Action by Which It Is Produced.

I say, first, that no creature, however perfect, not even Christ insofar as he is man, can be a principal cause of sanctifying grace.

1. It is proved, first: through the infusion of sanctifying grace the Holy Spirit is given, according to the Apostle in Rom. 5: *The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us*. But no creature, not even Christ insofar as he is man, possesses physical and principal power to give the Holy Spirit. Therefore neither does any possess the power to infuse sanctifying grace. The major is evident. The minor is proved. A gift must in some manner belong to the giver, either by identity,

On Grace

origin, or procession, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 1. But in none of these ways can the Holy Spirit belong to Christ insofar as he is man, much less to any mere creature. Therefore neither Christ as man nor any creature can principally give the Holy Spirit. Hence Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, lib. 15, c. 20: *How is he not God who gives the Holy Spirit?* St. Thomas likewise says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1: *To give grace or the Holy Spirit belongs authoritatively to Christ according as he is God, but instrumentally it also belongs to him according as he is man, insofar as his humanity was the instrument of his divinity.*

2. It is proved, second: through habitual grace we are adopted as children of God, as we shall show in the following chapter. But no creature, not even Christ insofar as he is man, can principally adopt us as children of God. Therefore no creature can give us sanctifying grace. The minor is proved. Only one who connaturally possesses a right to an inheritance can adopt another as a son. But neither Christ as man nor any mere creature connaturally possesses a right to the blessed vision, which is God's inheritance, since the blessed vision cannot be connatural to any created or creatable reality, as was proved in the treatise on the blessed vision. Therefore no creature, not even Christ insofar as he is man, can principally adopt us as children of God. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles*, lib. 4, c. 17: *To adopt as children of God cannot be the work of anyone except God.*

3. It is proved, third: to produce habitual grace in the soul is to deify it by communicating to it a physical participation in the divine nature. But to deify after the manner of a principal cause belongs to God alone, just as to ignite after the manner of a principal cause belongs only to fire or to another cause eminently containing the nature of fire, such as the sun. Therefore it belongs to God alone to produce sanctifying grace after the manner of a principal cause.

Finally, the same truth can be proved by this argument of St. Thomas here, q. 112, a. 1. A principal cause must possess greater or at least equal perfection in comparison with its effect. But no creature can surpass or equal sanctifying grace in perfection. For, since it is a formal participation in the divine nature insofar as it is infinite, as was shown in Chapter XI, § 2, it surpasses in essential perfection every created and creatable nature. Therefore no creature can be a principal cause of sanctifying grace.

4. I say, second, that sanctifying grace is neither created nor concreated, but educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

The first part of this conclusion is proved, first, from St. Thomas here, q. 113, a. 9, where he asks whether the creation of the world is a greater work of

God than the justification of the impious. He answers with a distinction that, on the part of the manner of operating, creation is a greater work than justification, since creation is from nothing, but justification is not; yet from the greatness of the thing produced, the justification of the impious is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth. But there would be no such difference if grace were produced by creation. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, sanctifying grace is not created.

5. The same part is proved, second, by Cajetan's argument: when grace ceases to exist, it is not annihilated. Therefore, when it is produced, it is not created. The antecedent is certain, both because annihilation does not in fact occur in the works of grace, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 104, a. 4, and because grace is destroyed precisely by force of its separation from its subject. But separation from a subject is not annihilation, since the subject remains. The consequence is proved as follows. According to the common teaching of philosophers, the beginning and cessation of a thing correspond to one another, so that what begins by generation ceases by corruption, and what ceases by corruption begins by generation. Similarly, what begins by creation ceases by annihilation, and conversely. Therefore, if grace does not cease by annihilation, this is a manifest sign that it is not produced by creation.

That it is also not concreated can easily be shown. That is said to be concreated which is produced by the same action by which its subject is created. Hence intellect and will are said to be produced by concreation because, since they are properties of the rational soul, they are produced by the same action by which the soul itself is produced. But sanctifying grace, since it is not a property of the soul but an accident not owed to it, is not produced by the same action by which the soul is produced, but by a different action. Therefore it cannot be said to be concreated by God in the creation of its subject.

6. From this the third part of the conclusion remains proved. For if sanctifying grace is neither created nor concreated, it must be educed from some potency of the subject in which it is received, since there is no middle between creation and education. To be created is to be produced from nothing, or without a presupposed subject. To be educed, by contrast, is not to be produced from nothing, but from a presupposed subject. But sanctifying grace cannot be educed from the natural or violent potency of its subject, namely, the soul, since it is neither connatural nor repugnant to it. Therefore it is educed from the obediential potency of the soul.

7. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: one who principally causes the ultimate disposition toward some form also principally produces

On Grace

the form itself. For example, one who principally produces heat in the eighth degree also principally induces the form of fire. But man principally causes acts of contrition or charity, which are the ultimate dispositions toward sanctifying grace. Therefore he is its principal cause.

I answer that an agent which principally produces the ultimate disposition toward some form also principally causes the form itself when that form is educed from the natural potency of the subject, but not when it is educed from the subject's obediential potency. For obediential potency is so subjected to God alone that it cannot be subjected to the dominion of any creature. But sanctifying grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul, as was shown in the second conclusion.

This can be explained by the example of human generation. A man who produces the physical dispositions for the introduction of the rational soul is not therefore the principal cause of the rational soul, because the latter is not educed from the bosom of matter but is created by God.

8. You will object, second: the intellect of the blessed concurs principally, and not only instrumentally, in the beatific vision, although that vision is entitatively supernatural and a formal participation in the divine intellection, as we taught in the treatise on the vision of God. Therefore man can likewise be a principal cause of sanctifying grace, although it is entitatively supernatural and a formal participation in the divine nature.

I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that, although the beatific vision is a supernatural operation and transcends all the powers of created and creatable nature, it nevertheless presupposes in the intellect of the blessed which elicits it the light of glory, which is of the same species and perfection as the vision. But sanctifying grace cannot presuppose in its subject a supernatural principle equal to itself in perfection by which it is produced, since it is the most perfect form of the supernatural order and is related as the root of the others.

9. You will object, third, against the second conclusion: Scripture seems in various places to teach that habitual grace is created. David, asking that grace be given to him by God in Ps. 50, says: *Create a clean heart in me, O God*. In Gal. 6 the just man is called *a new creature*. Likewise, in Eph. 2 the faithful are said to be *created in Christ Jesus*. These passages do not seem capable of explanation unless we say that habitual grace is created.

I answer with St. Thomas here, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3, that grace is said in Sacred Scripture to be created, not because according to its natural and physical being it is produced from nothing, which true creation implies, but because it is infused by God without any preceding merits of ours. This possesses a certain likeness to creation and can be called moral creation.

10. You will object, fourth: the action by which sanctifying grace is produced must be the most excellent of all actions, since such a quality surpasses every created and creatable reality in nobility and perfection, as is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter. But creation is much nobler than eduction. Therefore sanctifying grace is not educed but created.

I answer that the action by which God produces sanctifying grace must indeed be most excellent, but must also be accommodated to the condition of grace. Creation is not a production accommodated to the condition and nature of sanctifying grace, but only eduction is. For, since grace is an accident and therefore does not naturally subsist in itself, it must *inesse* and be produced from its subject. Consequently, it is educed from its potency, not its natural but its obediential potency, if it is produced connaturally. Hence the excellence of its production above the productions of other forms inferior to it is sufficiently preserved by the fact that no creature exists in whose active power, principally concurring, or in whose natural passive potency it is precontained.

11. You will object, finally: the sanctifying grace conferred upon the angels and our first parents at the very moment of creation could not be produced by eduction. Therefore at least that grace was created or concreated. The consequence is evident, for, as we said above, there is no middle between creation and eduction. The antecedent is shown as follows. For a form to be educed from a subject, it is required that it be produced by an action transmuting the subject. But the sanctifying grace conferred upon the angels and our first parents at the moment of creation could not be produced by an action transmuting the subject. Therefore it could not be educed from it. The major is commonly taught by our Thomists in philosophy. The minor seems manifest. For the transmutation of a subject requires that the subject precede the form by priority of time or at least of instant, and exist in that prior state under the privation of the form. But the subject of the grace of the angels and our first parents did not precede in any instant deprived of such a form, since they received it at the first moment of creation, according to Augustine: *God was in the angels, establishing nature and bestowing grace*. Therefore such grace was not produced by an action transmuting the subject.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I grant the major and deny the minor. To its proof I say that, although an actual transmutation of a subject requires that it precede in some instant, or in a prior state of time, deprived of the form which it receives, nevertheless, for an action productive of a form to be in itself transmutative of the subject, it suffices that it be distinct from the action by which the subject is produced and not possess an

On Grace

inviolable connection with it, as our Thomists teach in physics when treating the eduction of forms. The action by which grace was conferred upon the angels and our first parents possessed both conditions. It was distinct from the action by which the angels and our first parents were produced by God, and it did not possess an inviolable connection with that action, since sanctifying grace did not flow from the substance of the angels and our first parents after the manner of a property. Hence it was produced by an action transmutative of the subject, although accidentally it did not actually and in fact transmute it, because grace was accidentally produced at the same moment in which the subject was established, and thus the subject did not precede in any instant under the privation of grace.

CHAPTER XIV.

On the First Effect of Habitual Grace, Namely, the Adoption of Man as a Son of God.

There are three principal effects of habitual grace, which must be treated in this chapter and the two following: namely, the adoption of man as a son of God, the justification of the sinner, and the merit of the just.

1. Concerning the first, it must be presupposed as certain and held with undoubting faith that God adopts men as sons. For it is said in 1 John 3: See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called, and should be, sons of God. And in Rom. 8: The Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are sons of God. Hence Chrysologus, sermon 10: We have heard, brethren, to what height divine favor has raised us, and to what height heavenly fatherhood has exalted us. Let us believe ourselves to be sons of God; let us answer to our lineage; let us live for heaven; let us represent the Father by likeness, lest through vices we lose in him what we have obtained through grace. And sermon 70: What wonder is it if Christ made men sharers in God as sons, when he gave and adapted himself to be the Son of Man? He then transferred the nature of flesh into the divine when he brought divinity down to human nature; he then made man his coheir in heavenly things when he made himself a sharer in earthly things. Chrysostom has similar words in homily 2 on Matthew, where he says: When you hear that the Son of God is the son of David and Abraham, cease now to doubt that you also, who are a son of Adam, will become a son of God. For he would not have humbled himself so greatly unless he intended to exalt us. He was born according to the flesh that you might be born according to the spirit; he was born of a woman that you might cease to be a son of woman.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Reason also supports this. Adoption is the gratuitous assumption of an unrelated person into another's inheritance. But God gratuitously and liberally assumes, or elevates, a rational creature to beatitude, in which God's inheritance consists, and to which the creature has no right from its own nature, and so stands in relation to it as an unrelated person. Therefore, God adopts men as sons.

2. The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, concerns the form that constitutes man an adopted son of God, or that grounds adoptive divine filiation. Some think that the divinity of the Holy Spirit extrinsically united to us, or assisting us, is the form that formally gives the being of an adopted son of God, sanctifying grace concurring only as a bond. Thus Lessius, *De summo bono*, bk. 2, ch. 2. Others, with Aureolus, teach that the habit of charity is the form that produces this effect. Finally, others, with Scotus and Durandus, say that habitual grace indeed constitutes man an adopted son of God, but that it does not possess this power by reason of its own entity and perfection, but from a law and covenant of God, by which he appointed and destined that supernatural quality, of itself insufficient and disproportionate to such an effect, to produce it, and by such appointment conferred upon it sufficient value; just as money stamped with the royal seal has a definite value and estimation that it did not possess of itself.

§ 1.

The Form Constituting Man an Adopted Son of God Is Neither the Divinity of the Holy Spirit Extrinsically United to Us or Assisting Us, nor the Habit of Charity, but Habitual Grace Adequately, without Awaiting Any Extrinsic Favor.

3. The first part of this assertion is supported by two arguments. The first is this: that form constitutes man an adopted son of God which terminates man's spiritual generation. But the divinity of the Holy Spirit extrinsically united to us and assisting us is not the form terminating man's spiritual generation, or that by which man is regenerated as a son of God. Therefore, it is not the form through which man is constituted an adopted son of God. The major premise is clear, because adoptive filiation must be considered in the same way as natural filiation, with due proportion. In natural things, that which formally terminates generation causes or grounds natural filiation. The minor premise is shown as follows. The form terminating spiritual regeneration is that by which the spiritually generated term lives, just as the

form formally giving life to the term of natural generation formally terminates that generation. But the divinity of the Holy Spirit extrinsically united to us, or assisting us, is not the principle by which we live spiritually. Therefore, neither is it the formal term of spiritual generation. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2, where he says: *God is effectively the life both of the soul through charity and of the body through the soul; but formally charity is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body.* Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the divinity of the Holy Spirit extrinsically united to us, or assisting us, is not the formal principle by which we live spiritually. Reason also supports this, for the form that is the formal principle by which something lives must be united to the recipient of life either by identity or by physical information. But the divinity of the Holy Spirit cannot be united to us in either of these ways, since each mode of union implies imperfection. Therefore, it cannot be the formal principle by which we live spiritually.

4. The second argument may be proposed as follows: the form by which man is justified is the same as that by which he is constituted an adopted son of God, since, according to the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 4, our justification is *a transfer from the state in which man is born a son of the first Adam into the state of grace and of the adoption of the sons of God.* But the form by which man is justified is not purely extrinsic or assisting, but intrinsic and inhering, as we shall show in the following chapter, and as the same Council expressly defines in the same session, canon 11, in these words: *If anyone says that men are justified by the imputation of Christ's justice alone, or to the exclusion of grace and charity, which is poured into their hearts through the Holy Spirit and inheres in them, let him be anathema.* Therefore, the form by which man is constituted an adopted son of God is not purely extrinsic, and consequently is not the divinity of the Holy Spirit extrinsically united to us or assisting us, but is a form intrinsically united or inhering, namely habitual grace itself, which resides in the soul and is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit. Hence the opinion of Lessius appears less consonant with the mind and doctrine of Trent.

5. The second part of the assertion, which says that the habit of charity is not the form that constitutes an adopted son of God, but habitual grace is, is proved by the same argument as the preceding part. That form formally bestows the being of an adopted son of God which formally terminates man's spiritual generation. But the form formally terminating man's spiritual generation is not the habit of charity, but habitual grace itself. Therefore, the habit of charity does not constitute an adopted son of God. The major premise is clear from the likeness or analogy found between spiritual and

natural generation. The minor is shown as follows. Although a man generated by natural generation receives properties together with his nature, he does not formally terminate natural generation through the properties, but through human nature, which is their root. Therefore, likewise, although the just man, generated by God through spiritual generation, receives a supernatural nature and its properties, he does not formally terminate spiritual generation by reason of the properties, but by reason of a nature of the supernatural order. But habitual grace is nature in the supernatural order, while charity is its property, as was shown above. Therefore, man does not terminate spiritual generation by reason of the habit of charity, but by reason of habitual grace, which is its root.

This is confirmed, first: the formal term of spiritual generation is that by which the one generated lives spiritually in a radical manner, or which is the root of spiritual life, just as the formal term of natural generation is that by which the one generated lives naturally in a radical manner, or which is the root of natural life. But habitual grace gives life radically in the spiritual or supernatural order, whereas the habit of charity does not, as is clear. Therefore, sanctifying grace, and not the habit of charity, is the formal term of spiritual generation.

This is confirmed, second: the formal term of spiritual generation is that by reason of which man is made a sharer in the divine nature and is assimilated to God, not in some attribute, but in the divine nature. But man is not formally made a sharer in the divine nature, nor assimilated to God in nature, through the habit of charity, but through habitual grace, since habitual grace alone is a participation in the divine nature under the aspect of nature, while the habit of charity is a participation in the divine will, which is an attribute of that nature. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.

6. From what has been said, the third part of the assertion remains proved. For just as a man receiving the nature of the generator according to univocal agreement is, by the force of this reception and without anything else superadded, constituted a natural son, so by the force of receiving the divine nature according to analogical agreement, without need of anything superadded, he is constituted an adopted son of God. But habitual grace, by reason of its intrinsic entity, is a participation in the divine nature according to analogical agreement, and consequently the one receiving it is analogically like God in nature under the aspect of nature. Therefore, by the force of receiving it and without any extrinsic favor, man is constituted spiritually generated and an adopted son of God.

On Grace

§ 2.

Objections Are Solved.

7. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: the form by which the just man lives in the supernatural and divine order is that which formally bestows the being of an adopted son of God. But the divinity of the Holy Spirit, as united to the just man through grace, is the form by which he lives in the supernatural and divine order. Therefore, it is also that which formally bestows the being of an adopted son of God. The major premise is established from what was said above. The minor is supported both by various testimonies of Scripture in which the Holy Spirit is said to give life to the just: John 6: It is the Spirit who gives life; Gal. 5: If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit; and because the divinity of the Holy Spirit is life through essence and consequently sufficient of itself to give life to all things. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. IV, ch. 20, observes that at the beginning of the world the Spirit of the Lord is said to have been borne over the waters, not as though he himself were moved, but because he is the first principle of motion and life. And in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea the Church professes belief in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life. Hence Cornelius Musius also admirably observes in *De divina historia*, bk. 2, that all things are animated by spirit: Natural philosophers have their spirits in animals: first, those passing through them, and then those little bodies formed in the heart, liver, and brain, namely the natural, vital, and animal spirits. Grammarians also have their spirits, which we call accents, because they sound together with syllables as though they were their measures and tones. As vowels are the souls of words, so the accents of vowels themselves appear to be certain souls, because by their acute or grave sound the very words are formed, as though they lived, flourished, breathed, and spoke. From this a transition is made to music: the tensions and inflections, the lowerings and raisings of spirits in tones and songs are spirits by which animated music possesses such power that it can arouse love, pour in joy, and dispel fears.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. The just man indeed lives by the Spirit of God and by his divinity as an efficient cause moving him to vital acts of the supernatural order, but not as the form and radical principle of supernatural life. For, as we said above, the form that is the radical principle by which something lives must be united to the

recipient of life either by identity or by physical information, neither of which can belong to the Holy Spirit, since each mode of union implies imperfection. The foregoing testimonies of Scripture, in which the Holy Spirit is asserted to give life to the just, or the just are said to live by the Holy Spirit, must be understood in this sense. They must be taken causally, not formally, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2. Explaining the words of Deut. 30, *He is your life*, he says that *God is life effectively, but formally charity is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body*.

8. You will object, second: a son is constituted through communication of the same nature that is in the father. But the just cannot be constituted adopted sons of God through communication of a nature specifically the same as that which is in God, since the divine nature cannot be numerically multiplied. Therefore, they are constituted adopted sons of God through communication of the numerically same nature, and consequently through the divinity itself united to them through grace.

I answer that natural filiation requires communication of nature according to specific agreement, but adoptive filiation requires only communication of nature according to analogical agreement. This belongs to sanctifying grace, for since it is a formal participation in the divine nature, it must agree with it at least analogically, as is established from what was said in ch. 11, § 3.

9. You will object, third, against the second part of the assertion, from 1 John 3: *See what manner of charity the Father has given us, that we should be called, and should be, sons of God*. This seems to signify that charity is the form by which we are constituted sons of God. But it is easily answered that some effects of sanctifying grace are also attributed to charity because of the mutual connection they have with each other. Thus adoptive divine filiation is attributed to charity concomitantly and secondarily, because charity is a property that flows from grace and is inseparably joined to it.

10. You will object, fourth, against the third part of the assertion: for habitual grace to possess a right to eternal life as a reward or crown, a covenant or promise of God, or some extrinsic ordination by him, is required, as theologians teach in the treatise on merit. Therefore, likewise, for it to possess a right to eternal life as an inheritance, a covenant and ordination superadded to habitual grace is required. Consequently, apart from every extrinsic favor, habitual grace cannot cause adoptive divine filiation, since this requires a right to God's inheritance, which is eternal life.

I answer, first, that the antecedent is denied by many theologians, who think that God's extrinsic ordination, consisting in a covenant or promise, is

On Grace

not necessary for the complete notion of merit, but that the intrinsic ordination of God included in his will to give grace as a principle of meriting is sufficient.

I answer, second, granting the antecedent but denying the consequence and parity. The reason for the difference is that the meritorious right found in the works of the just informed by grace and charity is a right either of nobility, of justice, or of gratitude. The first cannot stand without a promise, while the second and third cannot subsist in a mere creature without a covenant of God superadded to the dignity of the works. For since the works of the just are owed to God under various titles, they cannot, by their own force and intrinsic value, bind God in strict justice to reward them. But the right grounded in sanctifying grace with respect to glory as an inheritance is not meritorious, but one of connaturality alone, and belongs to grace without the intervention of a promise or divine ordination; just as, by a right of connaturality, God is bound to infuse species into an angel once its creation is presupposed, to concur in the motion of the heavens once their existence is presupposed, and not to impede the sensitive outflow of passions once he produces the relevant natures.

§ 3.

Three Corollaries Worthy of Note.

11. From what has been said, it is inferred, first, that adopting a rational creature as a son is not proper to any one of the divine persons, but is common to the whole Trinity, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 23, a. 2. For God adopts a rational creature as a son insofar as he infuses spiritually generative grace into it. But the action of infusing grace, since it is a free operation and *ad extra*, is common to the whole Trinity. Therefore, so also is the adoption of a rational creature.

The same holy Doctor nevertheless observes there, in the answer to objection 3, that because adoptive filiation is a certain likeness of natural filiation, it is attributed by appropriation to the Son as exemplar; and because among men adoption belongs to the father alone, divine adoption is appropriated to the eternal Father as author. Likewise, because the same adoption is effected through grace, which is a work of divine love, it is appropriatively attributed to the Holy Spirit, who from himself infuses the grace through which we are adopted and assimilated to God. Hence Rom. 8 says: *You have received the spirit of adoption, in whom we cry, Abba, Father.*

12. It is inferred, second, that the fathers of the Old Testament who existed in grace and charity were truly adopted sons of God, although they were not in the state of sons.

The first part, which is against Petavius in *Theologica Dogmata*, on the Trinity, bk. 8, follows manifestly from the principles established above. For habitual grace, as we showed above, is the form that constitutes an adopted son of God, or that grounds adoptive divine filiation. But this grace was of the same species in the just of the Old Testament as in the just of the New Law, since it cannot be multiplied specifically, as we demonstrated above in ch. 12, § 1. Therefore, the former were no less truly adopted sons of God than the latter.

This is confirmed: the ancient Fathers existing in charity were truly justified by justification of the same nature as ours. But justification, according to the Council of Trent cited above, is a transfer from the state in which man is born a son of the first Adam into the state of grace and of the adoption of sons. Therefore, the ancient Fathers, justified through grace, were truly adopted sons of God.

13. The second part, however, namely that they were not in the state of sons, is established by the fact that the fathers of the Old Testament were led by a spirit of fear. Hence in sacred Scripture they are called servants and are said to have the spirit of servitude, as is clear in Gal. 4, Rom. 8, and frequently elsewhere. Likewise, access to the heavenly inheritance was not open to them as it is to the just of the New Law. Therefore, three grades of adoptive filiation may be distinguished. The first and most imperfect is that of the just belonging to the Old Law. The second is that of the just belonging to the New Law. The third and most perfect of all is that of the blessed who see God, who not only possess a right to God's inheritance, but actually possess it and are perfectly assimilated to God through the beatific vision. The Apostle speaks of this adoption in Rom. 8 when he says: *We ourselves, having the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, awaiting the adoption of the sons of God*, that is, the filiation of glory, which exceeds the state of adoption in this life, just as the state of adoption of the just under the New Law is more excellent than the state of adoption of the fathers of the Old Testament. Hence, just as because of this excellence the Apostle in Gal. 4 compares the state of the Old Law to a child placed under guardians and tutors, so in 1 Cor. 13, speaking of the state of the present life in comparison with the state of glory, he uses the same likeness, saying: *When I was a child, I spoke as a child*, and so forth. For just as the state of the Old Law, because of its imperfect knowledge, is like that of a child in comparison with the state of grace and truth brought about through Christ, so the state of the present

On Grace

life, in which we see through a mirror and in a riddle, is like that of a child in comparison with the state of the future life, in which there is perfect knowledge of God.

14. It is inferred, third, from the principles established above that it implies a contradiction for someone to be an adopted son of God without habitual grace. For adoptive divine filiation essentially requires at least analogical agreement with God in nature under the aspect of nature, as is established from what was said above. But it implies a contradiction for a creature to agree analogically with God in nature under the aspect of nature without habitual grace, since the essence of habitual grace consists in being a formal participation in the nature of God under the aspect of nature, as was shown in ch. 11, § 2. Therefore, it implies a contradiction for someone to be an adopted son without habitual grace.

This is confirmed: it is impossible for man to be an adopted son of God unless he is spiritually generated by God, since adoptive filiation is grounded in spiritual generation just as natural filiation is grounded in natural generation. But it is repugnant for him to be spiritually generated by God without habitual grace. Therefore, it is impossible for him to be an adopted son of God without it. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved. To be spiritually generated is to proceed as one living by spiritual life from the living God into a likeness of nature, for which it is necessary to live radically by a spiritual and divine life. But it implies a contradiction to live radically by a spiritual and divine life without habitual grace, since habitual grace is the root of vital operations of the supernatural order, namely acts of charity, the intuitive vision of God, and other supernatural acts. Therefore, it is impossible for man to be spiritually generated by God without habitual grace.

15. You will say: by his absolute power God can efficaciously will glory for a man without an efficacious will to confer habitual grace, since glory has no essential dependence upon it. But in such a case the man would be an adopted son of God. Therefore, by absolute power adoptive divine filiation is possible without habitual grace. The major premise is established. The minor is proved. Adoption is defined by theologians and jurists as *the gratuitous and liberal assumption of an unrelated person into an inheritance*. But in the proposed case, that will of God would be gratuitous and liberal, as is clear, and the man ordained to glory would be an unrelated person with respect to the inheritance of God to which he was ordained. Therefore, he would possess whatever is required for the notion of an adopted son.

This is confirmed: God could not only ordain to glory such a man to whom he denied habitual grace, but could also actually beatify him, since the

beatific vision does not depend essentially upon habitual grace. Therefore, he could adopt him as a son without habitual grace. The consequence seems manifest, for if the form conferring a right to the divine inheritance constitutes a son of God, then with greater reason the possession of the divine inheritance itself, which is the beatific vision, could constitute an adopted son of God.

I answer the objection by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof I say that when adoption is defined as *the gratuitous and liberal assumption of an unrelated person into an inheritance*, this must be understood of an assumption that affectively communicates nature, and not of a simple assumption ordaining someone to an inheritance, as is established in human and civil affairs. For one man can promise an inheritance to another without adopting him as a son. Since, therefore, in the proposed case God's will ordaining man to glory would communicate neither effectively nor affectively a participative share in the divine nature, that is, habitual grace, but on the contrary would include an efficacious will not to communicate it, the definition of adoption would not belong to such an act of willing, nor would the true notion of an adopted son belong to the man thus ordained. Hence, to the confirmation, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For just as in civil affairs the possession of an inheritance does not confer adoptive filiation, otherwise all heirs would be adopted sons, but rather the form that gives a right to the inheritance does so, namely the affective communication of nature, so in supernatural matters the possession of the divine inheritance, which is had through the beatific vision, does not constitute adoptive divine filiation. Rather, sanctifying grace itself does so, because it alone, since it is a participation in the divine nature, can be the formal term of spiritual generation, which is the foundation of adoptive filiation, as we declared above.

16. You will insist: an inefficacious and conditional will to communicate nature to the adopted person suffices for human and civil adoption. Therefore, it also suffices for divine and supernatural adoption. Hence, although in the proposed case God did not have an absolute and efficacious will to confer sanctifying grace on such a man, he could nevertheless be God's adopted son.

I answer by granting the antecedent but denying the consequence and parity. The reason for the difference is that in human adoption, a nature of the same species and proportioned to the adopter's inheritance is presupposed in the person to be adopted, and consequently also a capacity to receive such an inheritance. It is otherwise in divine adoption. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 23, a. 1: *Divine adoption has this*

On Grace

advantage over human adoption, that God makes the man whom he adopts capable, through the gift of grace, of receiving the heavenly inheritance; but man does not make the one whom he adopts capable, but rather chooses one already capable by adopting him.

17. I shall conclude this celebrated question and this chapter with this pious consideration or reflection from the Roman Catechism, in the treatise on prayer: Consider to what dignity the supreme kindness of God has raised you. He has not invited you to approach the Lord as a servant, unwilling and fearful, but has commanded you to flee to the Father as a son, willingly and confidently. Keeping this in mind, consider in turn with what zeal and devotion you ought to pray. You must take care to show yourself such as it befits a son of God to be, so that your prayer and actions may not be unworthy of the divine lineage with which the most beneficent God has willed to dignify you. Let us approach, says Chrysologus in sermon 67, where charity calls, love draws, and affection invites. Let our inmost being feel God as Father, let our voice proclaim him, let our tongue speak, let our spirit cry out, and let everything within us answer to grace, not to fear; because he who does not wish to be a judge but a father wishes to be loved, not feared. If you now believe yourself to be a son of God, he adds in sermon 71, then, according to the Prophet, wait for the Lord, act manfully, and let your heart be strengthened, so that through faith in expectation and through the virtue of patience you may attain God's inheritance. But if delayed glory afflicts you, do not grow weary, and do not succumb to the long waiting. Believe your Creditor, who has trusted you as his debtor. You have a pledge of eternal glory; do not cast it away, and the thing pledged to you will follow. The laboring reaper, says the same author in sermon 40 on the dawn, will see in the harvest what he does not see in the seed, and he will rejoice in the fruit over what he bewailed in the furrow.

CHAPTER XVI.

On the Justification of the Sinner, Which is the Second Effect of Habitual Grace.

1. Before proposing and resolving the scholastic difficulties, the two principal errors of the Lutherans and Calvinists concerning the justification of the sinner must briefly be refuted. The first asserts that in justification sins are not truly and properly remitted or destroyed, but are merely scraped away or covered by the justice of Christ imputed to us, in much the same way as a person's wounds and ulcers can be covered or concealed beneath

another's garment. This error is condemned by the Council of Trent, session 5, canon 5, and its falsity is established from various testimonies of Scripture in which sins are said to be taken away, destroyed, remitted, and sinners themselves to be cleansed, washed, laundered, and made white: John 1: *Behold him who takes away the sin of the world*; Ps. 50: *Destroy my iniquity*; Ps. 31: *Blessed are they whose iniquities are remitted*; 1 Cor. 6: *You have been washed, you have been sanctified, you have been justified*; Isa. 1: *If your sins are like scarlet, they shall be made white as snow*, and so forth. But these terms or modes of speaking in Scripture imply not merely the concealment of sins, but their true washing away, as is evident of itself. For one who was defiled with filth that he covered with a cloak or garment would ineptly be said to have been washed and cleansed. Likewise, we would incongruously say that an Ethiopian had been made white as snow or wool if he merely concealed his blackness under a white garment. Nor would sins properly be said to be wholly taken away and destroyed if they were merely scraped away like the hair of the head and afterward sprouted and returned again. Hence Augustine, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. 1, ch. 13: *We say that baptism grants the indulgence of all sins and takes away crimes; it does not scrape them away, nor are the roots of sins retained in evil flesh like hairs shaved from the head, from which sins grow again to be cut away once more*. By these words he seems to have foreseen and refuted the aforementioned error of the heretics. Likewise, in sermon 2 on Psalm 31, he solves their principal foundation, drawn from certain passages of Scripture in which sins are said to be covered by God. Explaining the words of the Psalmist, *Blessed are they whose iniquities are remitted, and whose sins are covered*, he says: *Do not understand sins to be covered as though they remain there and live while God covers them, but you do not. If you wish to cover them yourself out of shame, the physician will not cure them. The physician covers and cures; under the covering of the physician the wound is healed, but under the covering of the wounded man the wound is concealed*. By these words he teaches that God so covers the sins of men that he truly takes away and destroys them, and heals their wounds with the medicine of his grace. Reason also supports this, for the justification of the sinner, as we shall show below, is effected through the infusion of habitual grace. But habitual grace is incompatible with sin, at least according to the ordinary law, as all admit. Therefore, it is impossible that after justification sins should remain in man and merely be covered or concealed by the justice of Christ imputed to us.

2. The second error of the heretics of our time affirms that justification is not effected through the introduction of any form inhering in the soul, but through the justice of Christ alone extrinsically imputed to us. This error is

likewise excluded by the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 11, and can be refuted by three arguments.

The first is this. In Rom. 5 the Apostle compares the justice and obedience of Christ with the sin and disobedience of Adam. But the sin of Adam is really contracted by us. We are not called sinners merely because the sin of our first parent committed in the earthly paradise is imputed to us, but because in the soul of each person, when he is conceived, a real stain and iniquity is found, as we showed in the Treatise on Sins when discussing original sin. Therefore, the justice opposed to such sin and expelling it from man must not be something external and imputed, but something internal and real in the soul, since, according to the Philosopher, contraries have the same account.

This is confirmed: Christ restored to us what we lost in Adam. But in Adam we lost intrinsic justice, namely original justice, which was a form or perfection inhering in Adam's soul and which he would have transmitted to all his descendants if he had not sinned. Therefore, through justification Christ communicates to us some form or intrinsic quality from which we are denominated just.

The second argument: the justification of the sinner proceeds as from a cause from the supernatural love of God by which he loves man in relation to eternal life. But from such love some intrinsic and supernatural form is derived in man, as we showed in ch. 11, § 1. Therefore, the justification of the sinner is effected through some form or inhering quality, and not through the justice of Christ alone imputed to us.

The third argument: in justification man is adopted as a son of God. But adoptive divine filiation is effected through some intrinsic form, as we demonstrated in the preceding chapter. Therefore, so also is justification. Hence Augustine, epistle 85: *What else is justification but the beauty of the interior soul?* And in *De Trinitate*, bk. 15, ch. 8: *When nature is justified by God its Creator, it is transferred from a deformed form into a beautiful form.*

3. The arguments of the Calvinists, drawn from certain distorted passages of Scripture, are of no weight. It is no objection to this Catholic truth established at Trent that in 1 Cor. 1 Christ is said to have been made for us *justice and sanctification*. This must be understood causally, not formally, just as in the same passage Christ is said to be wisdom for us, and as in John 11 Christ says: *I am the resurrection and the life*.

What they say, however, that an injury is done to the justice of Christ if we say that we are justified through some justice intrinsic to us, is altogether absurd. Far from diminishing the justice of Christ, this rather makes the

dignity and excellence of his merits shine more brightly, if by their power an inhering justice is communicated to us through which we are formally just.

Finally, their assertion that the remission of sins is nothing other than their pardoning, and that this in turn signifies nothing other than an act of the divine will by which God wills to remit sins and apply Christ's satisfaction for our sins, is wholly foreign to the truth. For the pardoning of an offense in God does not imply a sterile and fruitless act of the divine will, but a fruitful and efficacious act producing an intrinsic form that expels sin. Hence there is this difference between God and men when they pardon an offense: man pardons an offense by a sterile and inefficacious act, whereas God does so by an efficacious and fruitful act. First, because in pardoning an offense God must make the person whose offense he remits a fitting object of his love or pardon. Man cannot do this, because human love does not place goodness in its object but presupposes it; divine love, however, does so, since it creates and infuses goodness into things. Second, because an offense is not remitted to anyone unless he retracts it. But man has from himself sufficient powers to retract an offense committed against another man, whereas he does not have sufficient powers to retract an offense committed against God. Thus the act of God pardoning man's offense must confer upon him that by which he can retract it and make some satisfaction for it. The act of a man pardoning an offense committed against another man need not do this.

4. From these points it is inferred against Calvin that the justification of the impious implies not only the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and interior renewal of man, as the Council of Trent teaches in session 6, ch. 7. For through the acquisition of sanctifying grace, which is the formal cause of justification, as we shall show in the following section, man passes from the oldness of sin to newness of life, according to Eph. 4: *Be renewed in the spirit of your mind*. Likewise, he is sanctified and cleansed, as is established from 1 Cor. 6: *You have been washed, you have been sanctified, you have been justified*. Therefore, justification implies not only the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and interior renewal of man.

§ 1.

Sanctifying Grace Is the Formal Cause of Justification,
but an Act of Contrition or Charity is Not.

5. This is commonly taught by theologians against Vásquez and Meratius, and is proved, first, from the Council of Trent, with whose mind and

doctrine the opinion of those authors appears less consonant. For in session 6, ch. 7, the Council says that there is one formal cause of our justification, namely *the justice of God, not that by which he himself is just, but that by which he makes us just*. That in its mind this justice is habitual grace alone, and not some act, is clear from the beginning of the same chapter, where it says that this justification is effected *through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts*. Likewise, in session 14, ch. 4, it says that *the movement of contrition prepares for the remission of sins if it is joined with confidence in divine mercy*. But that which disposes for the remission of sins is not itself the justifying form, since some causality and dependence, and consequently a real distinction, is found between a disposition and a form. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, an act of contrition is not the formal cause of justification.

This is confirmed: the formal cause of justification does not obtain pardon and the remission of sins by petition, but formally causes them. But an act of contrition does not formally cause pardon and the remission of sins, but merely obtains them by petition, as is established from the same Council of Trent, which says in the same place: *At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining the pardon of sins*. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.

The same truth can also be supported by two arguments. The first is this. In justification man is adopted as a son of God, as is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 4. Hence that same thing which is the formal term of the spiritual generation through which we are constituted adopted sons of God is the formal cause of the sinner's justification. But sanctifying grace alone, and not an act of charity or contrition, is the formal term of that spiritual generation, since it alone is a formal participation in the divine nature as such and performs the office of divine substance or nature in the supernatural order, as was shown in ch. 11, § 2. Therefore, habitual grace alone is the formal cause of justification.

6. The second argument may be proposed as follows. The justifying form expels sin in the genus of formal cause, just as universally every form that bestows its formal effect upon a subject expels an opposed form or privation in the genus of formal cause. For example, heat, which is the formal cause of heating, formally expels cold from water; light, which is the formal cause of illumination, formally expels darkness from the air. But an act of contrition or charity does not expel habitual sin from the soul in the genus of formal cause, because, since such sin consists in the privation of habitual grace, as we showed in the Treatise on Sins, such an act is not formally opposed to it, but is opposed only in the genus of dispositive cause, which is reduced to the genus of material cause. Therefore, such an act is not the formal cause of

justification, but sanctifying grace alone, which formally removes such a stain or habitual sin.

7. Vásquez objects against this assertion from certain testimonies of Scripture, the holy Fathers, and the Councils, by which it seems to be implied that the love of God, or perfect contrition founded upon love, is the formal cause of our justification. For Christ said of Mary Magdalene in Luke 7: *Her many sins are remitted because she has loved much*. And Augustine says in *Contra Cresconium*, bk. 2, ch. 12, that *we are cleansed from sins by the sacrifice of a contrite heart*. Likewise, the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 7, attributes justification to the charity poured into our hearts, and in session 14, ch. 4, attributes it to an act of contrition.

But these points are easily answered. Those testimonies prove only that we are justified and sanctified through love and contrition as through the ultimate disposition, not as through the formal cause of justification and sanctification. For an effect that proceeds completely from a form is also attributed to the disposition, because it proceeds from it in an inchoative manner.

8. From what has been said, it is inferred that habitual grace has from within itself and from its own nature the power of being the formal cause of justification, and not from some extrinsic favor of God. This is so both because it possesses of itself and from its nature the power to expel habitual sin, just as every positive form by its nature expels the privation opposed to it; and because by its nature it is a formal participation in the divine nature and holiness, from which it is called sanctifying. Therefore, just as the nature and holiness of God intrinsically constitute him just and holy through essence, so grace has from its nature the power to constitute a man just and holy through participation, and consequently to expel sin from the soul. In the preceding chapter we likewise said that grace has from its nature and from a power intrinsic to it, and not from the extrinsic favor of God, the power to constitute man an adopted son of God.

9. You will say: that which possesses finite goodness cannot by its own power expel or destroy a sin containing simply infinite malice. But the goodness of sanctifying grace is finite, while the malice of mortal sin in the moral genus is simply infinite, as we showed in the Treatise on Sins. Therefore, habitual grace cannot by its own power, efficacy, and intrinsic value destroy habitual sin or expel it from the soul. Rather, in addition to the infusion of habitual grace, a special and new favor of God is required by which he pardons the injury inflicted upon him through sin.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. That which possesses finite goodness cannot expel or destroy sin containing infinite malice by way

On Grace

of satisfaction: I grant the major premise. By way of a form incompatible with such sin, as habitual grace is: I deny the major premise.

§ 2.

In the State of Nature Elevated to the Supernatural Order and End, No Other Form of Justification Can Be Given than Sanctifying Grace, Although Another Can Be Given in the State of Pure Nature.

10. The first part of this assertion is proved, first, from St. Thomas, here q. 113, a. 2, where he says: *The remission of guilt cannot be understood unless the infusion of grace is present.* The holy Doctor customarily uses these words when he thinks that something implies a contradiction, because whatever does not imply a contradiction is intelligible. By the name of grace he does not mean any gratuitous gift whatever, but sanctifying grace alone, as is clear from the words immediately preceding: *The effect of divine love that is taken away through sin is the grace by which man is made worthy of eternal life.*

This is confirmed: the same holy Doctor says there in the answer to objection 1: *Although man before he sins could have existed without grace and without guilt, nevertheless after sin he cannot exist without guilt unless he possesses grace.* By these words he openly teaches that although man constituted in a state of pure nature could remain without sin and without grace, nevertheless, after he has once fallen into sin, it is impossible in the state of elevation to the supernatural order for him to be restored and rise from sin without the infusion of grace.

Reason also supports this. As we showed in the Treatise on Sins from the same Angelic Doctor, habitual sin implies a certain stain consisting in the privation of habitual grace. But the privation of any form cannot be removed, even by absolute power, except through the form of which it is the privation, as is clear in death, blindness, and darkness, which cannot be removed except through life, sight, and light. Therefore, habitual sin cannot be removed except through the infusion of habitual grace, and consequently the sinner cannot be justified otherwise. St. Thomas indicates this argument here, q. 109, a. 7, in these words: *Since the beauty of grace comes from the illumination of divine light, such beauty cannot be restored in the soul unless God illuminates it anew. Hence an habitual gift is required, which is the light of grace.*

This is confirmed: when man is justified, he is made a fitting object of God's supernatural love, and consequently pleasing and acceptable to God and his friend, indeed even his adopted son. But it is repugnant for these effects to be produced except by sanctifying grace, since this grace is the

term of God's supernatural love and the form through which man is constituted an adopted son of God, as is established from what was said above; and a formal effect cannot be possessed without its form, since it is the communicated form itself. Therefore, it implies a contradiction for man to be justified without habitual grace.

11. You will say that although, according to the ordinary way, habitual grace alone is the one form of justification, nevertheless by God's absolute power acts of contrition and charity can be the formal cause of justification.

But, first, on the contrary: in formal causes the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary power has no place, as our Thomists commonly teach. For since formal causes produce their effects through the communication of themselves alone, they cannot supernaturally effect what they cannot naturally produce. If the entity of the form is changed through something adventitious, it will not be the same form; but if it is not changed, the formal effect also remains unchanged, since that effect is nothing other than the form itself as communicated to the subject, and nothing further. Therefore, if an act of contrition or charity is not naturally suitable to be the form of justification, neither will it attain this by any supernatural power.

This is confirmed: that which is essentially a disposition to the formal effect of some form cannot, even by absolute power, be the form to whose effect it disposes. Thus, because heat is essentially a disposition to the introduction of the form of fire and to its formal effect, it cannot, even by extraordinary power and law, be the form of fire or produce the effect of the form of fire. But an act of contrition or charity is essentially a disposition to justification, as was shown in the preceding section against Vásquez and Meratius. Therefore, even by absolute power, it cannot be the formal cause of justification in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order and end. This can belong to habitual grace alone.

12. That in the state of pure nature justification would be effected without the infusion of habitual grace seems manifest, supposing that this state is possible according to God's ordinary law, as we showed in the Treatise on the Various States of Human Nature, final chapter, against Jansen, Contenson, and other recent authors who hold the contrary. This second part of our assertion is clear, I say, both because the habitual sin of a man constituted in the state of pure nature and not elevated to a supernatural end would not be the privation of grace or supernatural rectitude, but only of conversion to God as natural end. Therefore, it could be removed through such conversion, since a privation is removed through the form opposed to it. It is also clear because, if the infusion of habitual grace or of some other supernatural gift were necessary for the remission

On Grace

and expulsion of such a sin, it would follow that the remission of sins was impossible while man remained in that state, since through the infusion of habitual grace or of some other supernatural gift man would be taken out of the state of pure nature and constituted in the state of grace. The consequent must not be admitted. Therefore, neither must the antecedent. The minor premise is established because otherwise man remaining in that state would necessarily be miserable, since, once he had fallen into sin, he would have no remedy by which he could be restored and rise from that unhappy state, and consequently could not attain the natural beatitude to which he was ordained. Hence one must either say that the state of pure nature is impossible and repugnant to divine providence, since it is repugnant to the gentleness of divine providence to create or place man in a state in which he would necessarily be miserable and unable to attain his ultimate end and natural beatitude; or, if the possibility of this state is admitted, as we showed in the place cited that it must in fact be admitted, one must assert that justification in that state would be effected without the infusion of habitual grace, namely through an act of natural contrition for sins, including love of God above all things as author of nature. For since habitual sin in that state would imply only the privation of conformity to the natural law and aversion from God as natural end, an act of contrition or of efficacious love of God as author of nature, together with the extrinsic favor of God pardoning the offense, would suffice to destroy it.

§ 3.

Objections Are Solved.

13. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: grace and sin are not immediately opposed. Therefore, sin can be removed without the infusion of grace. The consequence is clear, for when two things are so related that they are not immediately opposed, one can be expelled from its subject without the introduction of the other, as is clear in heat and cold, whiteness and blackness. For the same subject can become from hot neither hot nor cold, and from white neither white nor black. The antecedent is proved. If grace and sin were immediately opposed, it would follow that, just as according to us sin cannot be removed without the infusion of grace, so grace could not be removed from man except on the supposition of some sin on his part. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The inference of the major premise is clear. The minor also seems certain, for since habitual grace depends upon God both in coming-to-be and in being

conserved, God can remove it from a sleeping man without any preceding fault on his part and destroy it by suspending his conserving concurrence.

I answer from St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 28, a. 2, ad 4, that although grace and sin, speaking absolutely, are not immediately opposed, nevertheless with respect to fallen man in the state of elevation of human nature to a supernatural end, they are immediately opposed. Hence St. Thomas says in the passage cited above: *Although man before he sinned could have existed without grace and without guilt*, namely in the state of pure nature, *nevertheless after sin*, in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, *he cannot exist without guilt unless he possesses grace*. Therefore, to the proposed argument, I deny the antecedent. To its proof I deny the minor, and to the proof of the minor I say that although God, speaking absolutely and without any supposition, can remove grace from a sleeping man even without any preceding fault on his part, this is nevertheless impossible on the supposition of God's decree ordaining and elevating human nature to the supernatural order and end. For God to elevate man to the supernatural order through an extrinsic ordination is for God to will, so far as depends upon him and unless it is prevented through man himself, to give him habitual grace, without which he cannot condignly merit eternal life. Hence, if God removed habitual grace from anyone without any fault on his part, that person would no longer remain ordained to eternal life and the supernatural end.

14. You will object, second, against the second part of the assertion: St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 28, a. 2, ad 5, says: If man had fallen only from the state of nature, nevertheless the gift of divine grace would still be required for the expiation of the infinite offense. Therefore, he thinks that if man created in pure nature sinned mortally, mortal sin could not be remitted to him without the infusion of grace.

I answer that by the gift of divine grace St. Thomas does not mean habitual grace or another entitatively supernatural gift. For since the state of pure nature excludes such gifts, it implies a contradiction for a man sinning in the state of pure nature, while remaining in the same state, to require grace or an entitatively supernatural gift for expiating an offense committed against God. The need of such gifts would extinguish the state of pure nature, since pure nature excludes the need of all supernatural gifts. Hence these words of St. Thomas must necessarily be understood and explained of a special assistance within the order of nature, without which man created in pure nature could not have loved God as author of nature, as was shown in ch. 3, and consequently could not have elicited an act of love of God as author of nature, or of natural contrition, for expiating an offense

committed against God as author of nature. Since such assistance would not be owed to the state of pure nature but granted from the gentleness of divine providence, it can rightly be called a gratuitous gift or a gift of divine grace, as is established from what was said at the beginning of this treatise, where we explained the threefold meaning and signification of grace.

Against the same part of our assertion Father Contenson argues in several ways in vol. 5, p. 490. First, he says, an act of merely natural love and contrition in the state of pure nature is not more efficacious than an act of supernatural love and contrition in the state of fallen nature. Therefore, if the latter cannot be the form of justification in the state of fallen nature, neither can the former in the state of pure nature. Second, that which is essentially a disposition to the formal effect of some form cannot be the form to whose effect it disposes; thus heat disposing to fire can never be the form of fire. But an act of contrition or charity, from its essential notion, possesses merely the character of a disposition to the form of justification. Therefore, it is impossible for such an act to be the form of justification in any state. Third, the justification of the sinner proceeds from the special love of God willing to pardon sin and remit the injury. But that singular love of God must impress something upon the sinner as its term, since divine love does not presuppose but places goodness in things, as the Angelic Doctor frequently insists. This can be nothing other than habitual grace. Therefore, in every state habitual grace is the one form of justification, and no other can be given. Finally, the form of justification must be something established and permanent in the subject. But an act of contrition or charity is essentially flowing and transient. Therefore, it is impossible for it to be the form of justification in any state. Otherwise, Vázquez and Meratius could likewise say that such acts are the very form of justification in the state of elevation of human nature to the supernatural order, and all the arguments by which we opposed those authors would collapse.

15. But these arguments are slight and prove only that an act of supernatural contrition or charity is not, and cannot be, a justifying form in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order. Hence, to the first I answer that although an act of natural contrition or love cannot of itself and from its nature be more efficacious and powerful for justification than an act of supernatural contrition and love, it can nevertheless be so accidentally and by reason of the state in which it is elicited. For if in that state nature is not elevated to the supernatural order, and consequently sin does not introduce the privation of sanctifying grace but merely of conversion to God as author of nature, as would have occurred in the state of pure nature, an act of natural contrition and love is sufficient for justification, because it can

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

expel such a privation of conversion to God as author of nature, since every privation is removed through the form opposed to it. Hence it is false that such an act in the state of pure nature would be essentially a disposition to the form of justification. From this the answer to the second argument is clear. To the third I say that the singular love by which God willed to justify a sinner in the state of pure nature would impress something upon him as its term, but not habitual grace or another gratuitous gift of the supernatural order, for the state of pure nature would exclude such gifts and be incompatible with them. Rather, it would impress a special assistance within the order of nature by which the sinner would elicit an act of conversion and natural love of God. Such assistance, as we showed above, would not be repugnant to the state of pure nature, but could stand with it. Nor is it an objection that this assistance would be transient, as also would the act of contrition and love of God as author of nature. For since in the state of pure nature the stain of sin would not consist in the privation of habitual grace or of another permanent quality or form, but merely in the privation of conversion to God as author of nature, it would be removed through a flowing assistance and a transient act of love or contrition elicited through it. From this the solution to the final argument is clear, as also the notable difference between the opinion of Vásquez and Meratius and ours. For those authors speak of the justification of man in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order, which cannot be effected through a flowing assistance or transient act, but only through habitual and permanent grace, since in that state habitual sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace.

§ 4.

A Corollary Worthy of Note.

16. From what has been said, you will understand that although among men the pardoning and remission of an offense can occur without an intrinsic change in the offender, God nevertheless cannot remit and pardon an offense to a sinner without an intrinsic change in him. This is proved by assigning three reasons for the difference. The first is that one man can remit and pardon an offense to another man through a change in himself, by eliciting a new act by which he wills no longer to be offended with him. But God, since he is intrinsically immutable, cannot remit an offense through a change in himself, but only through a change in the sinner. The second is that an offense of one man against another takes nothing away from the offender whose privation, while it remains, prevents the offense from being

On Grace

remitted. Thus, for the offense to be remitted it is not necessary to produce anything inhering in the offender, but an extrinsic pardon of the offense suffices. An offense against God, however, takes away from the offender habitual grace, conversion to God, and conformity to reason and law. While the privation of these remains, the offense against God is not remitted. Thus it is necessary that something real and inhering be produced in man by which such privation is removed and the offense remitted. The third reason is assigned by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 2, in the body, where he argues as follows: *An offense is directly opposed to grace, for someone is said to be offended with another because he repels him from his favor.... But this is the difference between the favor of God and that of man: the favor of man does not cause, but presupposes, true or apparent goodness in the person favored; but the favor of God causes goodness in the person favored, because the good will of God, which is understood in the favor of God, is the cause of every created good. Hence it can happen that a man remits an offense by which he is offended with someone without any change in the latter's will; but it cannot happen that God remits an offense to someone without a change in that person's will.*

17. You will say, first, that the special love of God by which he wills to remit guilt and pardon an offense concurs in the production of habitual grace and other supernatural gifts not from any necessity but altogether freely. Therefore, God can have this love without the infusion of grace or another supernatural gift through which the sinner is intrinsically changed.

But I deny the consequence, for the freedom of divine love cannot remove from it what belongs to its nature or essence. It belongs to the notion of God's special love to make man an object fitting to himself through the infusion of supernatural gifts, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 110, a. 1.

18. You will say, second, that in a dispensation from a vow God relaxes its bond without any intrinsic change in the one who made the vow. Therefore, he can likewise free a sinner from the guilt of fault and remit the offense without an intrinsic change in the sinner.

But I likewise deny the consequence and parity. God can relax the bond of a vow through a merely moral change in the one who made it, because the obligation of a vow depends upon two things, namely the promise of the one making the vow and God's acceptance. In vows removed by dispensation, this acceptance was not made by God except until the time when a dispensation would be requested and granted through the ministry of the Vicar of Christ or others possessing the faculty of dispensing in the Church. Hence, when that time arrives and the other conditions are present, the obligation ceases through a merely moral change in the one who made the

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

vow. But to be averted from God is not an effect depending upon some disposition of God, but upon the nature of mortal sin alone. Hence, just as blindness or death cannot be removed except through reception of the forms opposed to these privations, so being averted from God, in which consists the notion of offense or injury inflicted upon him by mortal sin, cannot be removed through a merely moral change of time or of the divine will, but only through reception of some supernatural form converting man to God as ultimate end.

§ 5.

On the Dispositions Required for Justification.

19. That dispositions are required in adults for obtaining the grace of justification is certain by faith, as is established from the Council of Trent, session 6, chs. 5 and 6. St. Thomas proves it here, q. 112, a. 3, by this argument: God moves each thing according to its mode and nature. Therefore, when he moves an adult from sin to justice, he simultaneously moves free choice to the same justice and to the fountain of justice, because an adult man by his nature and mode of operating is free; and what is free requires to be moved in such a way that it moves itself, except in first-prime movements, in which it is naturally moved only. Further, as the same holy Doctor argues in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 5, everything elevated to something exceeding its nature must be disposed by some disposition, especially when the form to which it is elevated is perfect, intended in the first place for its own sake, and the ultimate term of generation. But through justifying grace man is elevated to participation in the divine nature, which participation is above man's nature and is the ultimate term of spiritual generation. Therefore, man must be disposed to receive it, just as in natural things dispositions to substantial forms are indispensably required because these are intended in the first place for their own sake and are the ultimate term of natural generation. It remains, therefore, to explain what dispositions are required for justification, or what acts, on the part both of intellect and of will, are necessary for the justification of an adult. We treat here of justification in common, for we shall discuss that which occurs in the reception of baptism or through the sacrament of penance in the Treatise on the Sacraments. These points being presupposed:

I say, first, that faith is required for the justification of an adult, but that faith alone does not suffice for it.

On Grace

20. The first part is clear from Scripture. Heb. 10: Without faith it is impossible to please God. Mark 16: He who believes will be saved, and so forth. It is also established from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 6, where among the dispositions required for justification the act of faith is numbered first, in these words: Adults are disposed to justice itself when, aroused and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith from hearing, they are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised. And ch. 8: Faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification. Hence Augustine, sermon 20 on the words of the Apostle: The house of God is founded by believing, raised by hoping, and perfected by loving.

Reason also supports this. For, as St. Thomas argues here, a. 4, the justification of an adult requires some movement of free choice by which the mind of man is turned away from sin and converted to God. But the first approach to God is made through the knowledge of faith, according to Heb. 11: *He who approaches God must believe*. Therefore, an act of faith is required for the justification of an adult.

This is confirmed: since the will is a blind power and requires the light and direction of the intellect, it is impossible for it to be converted to God as supernatural end without a preceding act of intellect by which it knows God as supernatural end. But this act is an act of faith. Therefore, an act of faith is required for the conversion and justification of the sinner.

21. The second part, which asserts that faith alone does not suffice for justification, is defined against the heretics of our time by the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 9, and is gathered from Scripture. 1 Cor. 13: If I should have all faith, so that I could move mountains, but did not have charity, it profits me nothing. James 2: Faith without works is dead. Hence Augustine, sermon 237, *De tempore*: Attend to the very name of faith. It is called faith because what is said is done. Two syllables sound when the word faith is spoken: the first is from deed, the second from word. I ask whether you believe. You say: I believe. Do what you say, and that is faith. Bernard agrees with him in sermon 24 on the Canticle, where, explaining the words, The upright love you, he says: Why do you divide your faith from action? You destroy your faith, for faith without works is dead. You offer a dead gift. How can such discord be a peace-offering? You do not placate God, but offend him, being at variance with yourself. Nor is it strange that Cain rose against his brother, since he had first killed his own faith. He was a murderer of faith before he was a murderer of his brother. Therefore let love animate your faith and action prove it.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

The same truth can be supported by this fitting argument: man was averted from God through his will when he sinned. Therefore, for his sin to be remitted, he must be converted to God through an act of will, and consequently an act of faith does not suffice.

This is confirmed: the will was principally wounded through sin. Therefore, it is fitting that it be moved through some acts proper to itself toward justification, which is its healing.

22. Nor are these points opposed by certain testimonies of Scripture in which justification is attributed to faith without mention of works. For it is attributed to faith not as the justifying form, nor as an ultimate disposition sufficient by itself, but as the first foundation and root of the whole of justification, as the Council of Trent cited above teaches. When the Apostle says in Rom. 3, *For we judge that man is justified through faith without works*, he excludes only works of the Law or of nature done without the spirit of faith. Hence Jerome, explaining this passage and foreseeing and suppressing, as it were, the error of the Calvinists who attribute justification to faith alone, says: *Some abuse this passage for the destruction of works of justice, asserting that faith alone can suffice, although the Apostle says elsewhere: If I should have all faith, so that I could move mountains, but did not have charity, it profits me nothing.*

23. I say, second, that an act of hope is required for justification.

This is established from the Council of Trent, session 14, ch. 4, where it says that contrition, which at all times was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins committed after baptism, prepares for justification if it is *joined with confidence in divine mercy*. Later, when speaking of attrition, it says that if attrition excludes the will to sin, *with hope of pardon*, it disposes one for obtaining grace in the sacrament. Scripture also favors this. Mark 10: *Have confidence, daughter; your sins are remitted to you.* Rom. 8: *By hope we have been saved.* Reason also supports it, for since the remission of sins is not a human but a divine good and is to be hoped for from God alone, man cannot strive to obtain it unless he hopes that he will obtain it, according to Ambrose, *De paenitentia*, bk. 1, ch. 1: *No one can do penance well unless he has hoped for indulgence.*

24. I say, third, that for the justification of adults occurring outside a sacrament, in addition to an act of faith and hope, an act of contrition and charity is also required. For, as St. Thomas argues here, a. 5, justification requires that man withdraw from sin and approach or be converted to God, just as local motion requires that the movable thing withdraw from the term from which and approach the term to which. But withdrawal from sin is effected through contrition, by which we detest and hate it, while approach

On Grace

or conversion to God is effected through an act of charity, by which we approach him and are joined to him, according to Augustine: *We approach God not by bodily steps but by affections of the mind.* Therefore, an act of contrition and charity is required for the justification of an adult outside a sacrament. I have said *outside a sacrament*, because when an adult is justified by virtue of a sacrament, supernatural attrition suffices, as we shall show in the Treatise on Penance.

§ 6.

Acts of Contrition and Charity Proceed Effectively from
the Habitual Grace for Which They Dispose.

25. This is commonly taught by our Thomists, with the exception of a few recent authors, and is proved, first, from St. Thomas, who openly favors our opinion here, aa. 7 and 8. For in a. 7, in the body, he says: *The justification of the impious consists originally in the infusion of grace, for through it free choice is moved and guilt is remitted.* By these words he manifestly declares that the justification of the impious does not require a moving assistance distinct from habitual grace, but that habitual grace itself simultaneously moves free choice and remits guilt, and consequently simultaneously performs the office of a moving assistance toward acts of contrition and charity and of a form sanctifying the soul and cleansing it from the filth of sins. Hence in the following article he says that *the motion itself of God moving is the infusion of grace.* That by the name of grace he understands habitual grace, and not an actual assistance distinct from it, is manifest. First, because he speaks of the grace through which remission of guilt is effected, or which is the formal cause of justification. This is not actual but habitual grace. Therefore, he speaks of the latter, not the former. Second, because he speaks of the grace that requires dispositions in the subject, as is clear from the words immediately following: *That some form is not impressed upon a subject at once occurs because the subject is not disposed, and the agent requires time in order to dispose the subject,* and so forth. But the grace that requires dispositions in order to be received in the soul is not actual but habitual grace, as is established from the same holy Doctor here, q. 112, a. 2, where he teaches that no disposition on man's part is required for actual grace, but only for habitual grace. Therefore, he speaks of habitual grace when he says that through it both free choice is moved and guilt is remitted. Nor is it an objection that in the same place he says that *the whole justification of the impious consists originally in the infusion of grace.* For the word *originally* does

not exclude from the grace of which he speaks the notion of formal cause of justification, but signifies only that such grace is so the cause of the remission of sins that it is the root, fountain, and origin of all holiness and of all gifts and charisms found in the justified sinner.

26. The assertion can also be proved by three arguments. The first may be proposed as follows. It belongs to the nature of a vital act that it proceed from the proximate principle of life as joined to the radical principle, as is clear in all vital acts, both corporeal and spiritual, which proceed from a power joined to the soul. But acts of contrition and charity are vital acts of supernatural life, for the just man lives by faith working through love. Therefore, they proceed from the habits of charity and penance as joined to sanctifying grace, which is the radical principle of supernatural life.

The answer of Father Contenson does not avail when he says that the influence of supernatural habits can be supplied by the influence of an actual supernatural assistance, just as Paul elicited the vision of God not through the habit of the light of glory, but through an impression of light communicated transiently. This solution, I say, does not avail. For although preternaturally and by absolute power man can elicit vital acts of the supernatural order without supernatural habits, by reason of a supernatural assistance supplying their function, as occurred in the vision of St. Paul, it is nevertheless certain, as that author admits, that supernatural habits are required for operating better and more connaturally, and according to God's ordinary law and power. But the acts of charity and contrition disposing for sanctifying grace are not only vital acts of supernatural life, but are also elicited connaturally by the soul, and not preternaturally and by God's absolute power. Otherwise, the justification of a sinner would be miraculous, like the vision of St. Paul. Therefore, such acts are not elicited by man through a transient assistance, but through the habits of charity and penance as joined to sanctifying grace as the radical principle of supernatural life.

27. The second argument is briefly proposed as follows. A perfect actual inclination toward an end must presuppose, at least connaturally and according to God's ordinary way, a nature proportioned to that end. But an act of charity is a perfect actual inclination toward God as ultimate end. Therefore, for it to be elicited connaturally, as occurs in the justification of a sinner, it must presuppose sanctifying grace, which has the character of a nature proportioned to such an end.

28. The third argument is philosophical and may be formulated as follows. It is not repugnant, but connatural, for something to dispose a subject for receiving a form and nevertheless proceed from that form. Therefore, although acts of contrition and charity ultimately dispose for

sanctifying grace, they can nevertheless proceed effectively from it. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is declared and supported by various examples taken from philosophy. First, our Thomists commonly teach in the books on generation and corruption that the dispositions accompanying the form of the generated thing dispose for its reception and nevertheless proceed from it. For example, heat in the eighth degree, which is the ultimate disposition to the form of fire, flows from that form. St. Thomas manifestly asserts this in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 7, a. 1, ad 2: *The heat which was a disposition to the form of fire is an effect flowing from the form of fire already preexisting.* And q. 9, a. 3, ad 2, he says: *Through heat matter is disposed to receive the form of fire; nevertheless, when the form arrives, the heat does not cease, but remains as a certain effect of that form.* Therefore, it is not repugnant for something to dispose for receiving a form and nevertheless to be caused by it. Consequently, acts of contrition and charity can proceed effectively from the justifying grace for which they dispose. And certainly, if this occurs in natural generation, why could it not likewise occur in the spiritual generation effected in the justification of a sinner? Especially since supernatural things, with due proportion and apart from their supernatural character, must be considered in the same way as natural things; for grace, as far as possible, is tempered and accommodated to nature, as theologians everywhere teach.

29. A second example taken from philosophy is this: the organization of the body is a disposition for receiving the soul, and yet the body does not possess organic being except from the soul, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 1, and as philosophers commonly teach when explaining the definition of the soul handed down by Aristotle: *The soul is the act of an organic body*, and so forth.

30. A third example: diaphaneity or transparency is the ultimate disposition in a transparent body for receiving light, which is therefore defined by Aristotle as *the act of the transparent*. Yet such diaphaneity proceeds from light, since it is impossible for any body to be transparent except through participation in light.

31. Finally, wind entering a hall through a window is the efficient cause of the window's opening, and yet the opening of the window, as the removal of an impediment, concurs in the genus of dispositive cause toward the entrance of the wind. Therefore, it is not repugnant, but rather can occur connaturally, for something to depend upon another in the genus of efficient cause and nevertheless to be prior to it in the genus of dispositive cause. Consequently, it is not repugnant that acts of contrition and charity ultimately dispose for habitual grace and nevertheless proceed effectively

from it. For *causes are causes of one another*, as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysica* II and *Physica* II. Hence that which is the cause of another in one genus can depend upon it and be caused by it in another genus, and consequently can be simultaneously prior and posterior in different genera of cause. Thus matter is prior to form in the genus of sustaining cause, while form is posterior in the genus of assisting and informing cause. Thus walking is the efficient cause of health, and health the final cause of walking. *Thus on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the air, being purged of darkness is naturally prior to receiving light, although both are simultaneous*, as St. Thomas says here, a. 8, ad 1. Finally, corruption, according to the order of material dispositive cause, is prior to generation or the introduction of form; and yet the introduction of form is prior to the corruption and expulsion of the other form in the genera of efficient, formal, and final cause, as the same holy Doctor asserts in IV Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 4.

32. So that these points may be better understood and the principal arguments of the adversaries solved, it must briefly be observed, with Cajetan, Conrad, Ferrariensis, Alvarez, and other more celebrated Thomists, that the habitual grace infused in justification can be considered in two ways, according to which it exercises two different functions. First, as it is in the process of being infused and stands on the part of God communicating it. Second, as it has been infused and has completed being, and insofar as it stands on the part of the man receiving it. In the first way it performs the function of a moving assistance; in the second it has the character of a habit and permanent form sanctifying the soul and giving it participatively divine being, being pleasing to God, and being a fitting object of his love. Because the first function exists for the sake of the second, grace exercises the first before the second in the order of execution. Therefore, by priority originating from the source of communication, it is communicated to the soul in the character of a moving assistance before it is communicated in the character of a habit and sanctifying form, so that, being communicated first as an assistance, it may dispose the soul through acts of contrition and charity for its connatural reception as a habit. Hence St. Thomas says in the passage cited above that *through it free choice is moved and guilt is remitted*. By these words he manifestly declares that habitual grace performs both functions, that of a moving assistance and that of a sanctifying form.

33. From these points the principal arguments of the adversaries dissolve of themselves into smoke and air. Suárez objects, first: if acts of charity and contrition at the instant of justification are from grace, they presuppose it as existing, since an efficient cause causes insofar as it exists, and consequently presuppose it as united to the soul, since grace is an

accident and the existence of an accident is existence-in or inherence. Therefore, they cannot dispose the soul for receiving grace in the subject.

But from what has been said the answer is easy. I distinguish the antecedent: they presuppose grace as existing and united to the soul in the character of a moving assistance: I grant the antecedent. In the character of a habit and sanctifying form: I deny the antecedent and the consequence. For habitual grace can be united to the soul prior by nature after the manner of a moving assistance, so that through acts of contrition and charity it may ultimately prepare and dispose the soul to receive the formal effects that it bestows insofar as it has the character of a habit and sanctifying form.

34. He objects, second: habitual grace is infused into a man because he is contrite. But if contrition were elicited from the habit of grace, this causal proposition would not be true, but rather the following one: man is contrite because the habit of grace is infused into him. Therefore, the contrition through which man is ultimately disposed for justification does not proceed from the habit of grace, but from an actual assistance conferred transiently.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. Since habitual grace exercises both the function of a moving assistance and that of a sanctifying form, both causal propositions are true: the first understood of grace insofar as it has the character of a habit and sanctifying form, and the second understood of the same grace insofar as it performs the function of an assistance. Thus in the natural order the following causal propositions are true in different genera of cause: the window is opened because the wind enters the hall; the wind enters the hall because the window is opened. The soul is united to the body because the body is organic; the body is organic because the soul is united to it and informs it. The body receives light because it is transparent, and it is transparent because it receives light. The air is illuminated because it is purged of darkness, and it is purged of darkness because it is illuminated. For causes, as we said above, are causes of one another. Hence that which causes something in one genus of cause can be caused by it and depend upon it in another genus.

35. A certain recent author objects, third: through seeing and walking a man cannot dispose himself to possess eyes or feet, because such actions proceed effectively from the visual and locomotive powers. Heat also, although it can be the ultimate disposition to the form of fire, nevertheless heating cannot be, because it is effectively produced by that form. Therefore, likewise, if acts of contrition and charity proceed effectively from habitual grace, they cannot dispose for it; or if they dispose for it, they cannot proceed from it.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

I answer by granting the antecedent but denying the consequence and parity. The reason for the disparity is that seeing and walking, since they are successive actions, cannot occur in an instant. Hence they presuppose in man the locomotive and visual powers not only by priority of nature and of the initial instant, but also by priority of time and existence, or of the instant in which. Therefore, since the ultimate disposition for a form accompanies it and exists in the subject in the same instant in which the form is received in it, it implies a contradiction for man through seeing and walking to dispose himself for possessing eyes and feet. The same applies to heating with respect to fire, since it is likewise a successive and not an instantaneous action. On the contrary, since acts of contrition and charity are instantaneous and not successive actions, they are elicited by man in the same instant of justification in which grace is infused and precede grace only by priority of nature. Therefore, although they proceed effectively from grace, they can nevertheless dispose for it, not as antecedent dispositions but as concomitant ones, just as heat in the eighth degree disposes for the form of fire from which it flows, as St. Thomas says in the passage cited above.

36. The adversaries further object from certain testimonies of St. Thomas that appear opposed to our opinion. For in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 2, ad 3, the holy Doctor says that for the conversion through which someone prepares himself to possess grace, no habitual grace is required, but the operation of God converting the soul to himself. And in the present part, q. 109, a. 6, he says that for man to prepare himself for receiving the gift of habitual grace, it is not necessary to presuppose some habitual gift in the soul, because in that way there would be an infinite regress; but it is necessary to presuppose some gratuitous assistance of God inwardly moving the soul.

But these statements are easily answered. In these and similar passages St. Thomas intends only that the conversion by which someone prepares himself to possess grace does not require another habitual grace or habitual gift distinct from the sanctifying grace infused at the instant of justification, for otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Rather, that grace itself suffices insofar as, while being infused, it performs the function of a moving assistance and consequently can be called God's motion or the assistance of God moving. Hence in the passages cited above he says that *through it free choice is moved and guilt is remitted*, and that *the motion itself of God moving is the infusion of grace*. Nothing clearer or more explicit could be said in favor of our opinion. Let these points suffice concerning the justification of the sinner, which Chrysologus in sermon 72 calls *the mystery that fills the saints*

On Grace

with awe. Hence in sermon 68 he exclaims in wonder: The angels are astounded, heaven marvels, earth trembles, flesh cannot bear it, hearing cannot grasp it, the mind cannot reach it, the whole creation cannot sustain it, estimation is insufficient, and faith itself fears.

CHAPTER XVI.

On the Merit of the Just, Which Is the Third Effect of Habitual Grace.

1. That man, by operating from grace or through grace, can truly and properly, or condignly, merit something from God is established from various passages of Scripture in which it is asserted that a reward with God corresponds to the works of the just, and that glory is given by God as a just judge and as a crown of justice. In this God has certainly shown no small regard for our honor. For, as Cassiodorus elegantly says: *A crown of virtues that does not arise from labor has little praise; it can indeed possess the palm, but it does not possess glory. This is the nature of great virtues: the more a man labors, the more reward he acquires.* Nor do the merits of the just diminish the merits of Christ, as the innovators babble, but rather exalt and amplify them. For it is Christ's greatest glory that he could not only merit for himself, but also obtain for us through his merits the power to merit. Likewise, that natural causes can effect something does not diminish the infinite power and efficiency of God, but rather displays his power, insofar as he not only possesses the power of effecting, but can also make others efficient causes, while always retaining for himself the proper excellence of the first and most universal cause. These points being presupposed, two matters must principally be discussed and explained here: what conditions are required for merit, and what a man can merit for himself or others either condignly or congruously.

§ 1.

On the Conditions Required for Meriting.

2. Six conditions are required for merit. Three stand on the part of the meritorious act, two on the part of the man meriting, and the last on the part of God rewarding. These must be treated briefly here.

Three Conditions Required on the Part of the Meritorious Act.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

3. First, for an act to be meritorious it must be free, not only with freedom from coercion, but also with freedom from necessity, as Innocent X defines in his constitution and St. Thomas expressly teaches in *De malo*, q. 6, sole article, where he says that the opinion of some who held that man's will is moved by necessity to choose something, although it is not coerced to it, *is heretical, for it removes the notion of merit and demerit from human acts. What someone does from such necessity that he cannot avoid it does not appear meritorious.* Reason also supports this, for being meritorious or demeritorious is a property of a human act. But acts that are merely spontaneous and free only from coercion, but not from necessity, are not properly human acts. Therefore, neither are they meritorious or demeritorious. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved. *Those actions are properly called human that proceed from deliberate will*, as the holy Doctor says in the present part above, q. 1, a. 1. But merely spontaneous acts do not proceed from deliberate will, that is, from deliberation of reason and election of will, as is clear in beatific love and volition of good in common. Therefore, they cannot properly be called human acts. The arguments customarily made to the contrary were proposed and solved in the Treatise on the Voluntary and Involuntary, ch. 4, § 2.

Second, for an act to be meritorious before God, it must be morally good, because an evil work is worthy not of reward but of punishment. An indifferent work either does not exist in the individual, according to the more common and probable opinion, or, if an indifferent work in the individual is admitted, it is no more worthy of reward than of punishment. For if it does not merit punishment because it lacks malice, neither does it merit reward because it lacks moral goodness.

Third, for a work to be meritorious, it must be done in the service of another, namely of the one who will render the recompense or reward. For since merit regards retribution, it is necessary that retribution be expected and owed from a determinate person; what is owed by no one is exacted from no one by any right. But a reward is not owed by any person, nor can it be exacted by right from him, unless the action is directed to him and yields to his service. Therefore, for a work to be meritorious, it must be done in the service of another and yield to the good, utility, or honor of the one who will render the recompense or reward.

Two Conditions Necessary on the Part of the Person Meriting.

4. The first is the state of grace. The Council of Trent presupposes this in session 6, ch. 16 and canon 32, and it is gathered from Scripture, John 15: *As the branch cannot bear fruit unless it remains in the vine, so neither can you unless you remain in me*, namely through faith and charity, as the holy Fathers

and interpreters of Scripture commonly explain. The reason is that for condign merit of eternal life, not only the work but also the person must be proportioned to that end, and consequently elevated through sanctifying grace to the divine order and the state of friendship and divine filiation.

The second is the state of this life, as is openly gathered from various testimonies of Scripture. Eccles. 9 says: The dead have no further reward. And ch. 11: Wherever the tree falls, there it shall remain. By the fall of the tree the death of man is signified, and by its immobility and permanence it is declared that man's merit or demerit is not increased or diminished in the other life. Hence the Apostle says in Gal. 6: While we have time, let us work good toward all. And Eccles. 9: Whatever your hand is able to do, do it earnestly. For, as Jerome says on 1 Cor. 6: The present life is the time of sowing; when it has passed, the time of working is taken away. Finally, Christ himself said of himself in John 9: I must work the works of him who sent me while it is day. The night comes when no one can work. By day is understood the time of the present life, and by night death or the state after death, in which no one can work meritoriously. Hence Origen, homily 3 on Psalm 36: The Lord and Savior says: The night will come when no one can work; and he says this of that time when each person will receive punishments for his evils. He therefore calls that future time death, when no one can any longer perform any work, but each person then feeds upon the works he performed while placed here. Therefore, when the night has come, no one works. In that evil time, when sinners are afflicted by punishments, there will undoubtedly be famine for those who gathered no fruits of good work. But in that time of famine the just will be satisfied, namely from the fruits of their justice. For just as in the desert they gathered manna for six days, but on the sixth day they gathered not the measure of one day, but as much as would suffice for the next day, and each person ate on the Sabbath what he had gathered on the sixth day, so also now the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ and this time of his dispensation, which he accomplished in this world through his Passion, must be regarded as a certain sixth day. Therefore, while we are in the sixth day, let us gather manna twofold, so that it may suffice for us when the true Sabbath observance of the people of God arrives. For if we have not gathered twofold food, sufficient for us both in the present world and in the future, we shall not be satisfied in the days of famine.

5. I think no other reason for this condition can be assigned than the divine will, which disposed and ordained that reward be given to the works of this life, but not to those performed after death. Nevertheless, the end of this life was fixed at the point of death and the soul's separation from the

body in a manner highly consonant with human nature. For it is connatural to the human soul to acquire its perfection through the body and to possess in the body more occasions for meriting and fighting for the prize of beatitude. It is also fitting that intellectual creatures arrive at vision through faith and first subject their intellect to God before being elevated to see him.

What must be said concerning Enoch and Elijah, dwelling in the earthly paradise and awaiting Antichrist, whom they are to combat and destroy, whether they merit or not, is a problem probable on both sides, some affirming and others denying. I think one of these two things must necessarily be said: either those holy men do not merit from the time they were translated into the earthly paradise, because although they are mortal, they are not subject to the conditions of mortality like other men who live in a mortal body according to the common law and mode, and consequently are not properly wayfarers or comprehensors, but, as it were, *candidates for eternity*, as Tertullian says in *De resurrectione carnis*; or, if they merit from that time and their merit endures until their death, which they will suffer for Christ at the end of the world, they will then equal the Apostles and John the Baptist himself in grace and charity, and consequently will be equal to them in glory and beatitude. Nor is this surprising, since they will be the precursors, Apostles, and glorious Martyrs of Christ's second coming, who, as the same Tertullian says, *will extinguish Antichrist with their blood*. The prudent reader will judge which of these is more probable and likely.

The Condition Required for Merit on the Part of God, Namely, the Ordination of the Work to a Reward.

6. The first reason is that God is not capable of any obligation toward a creature except from his own ordination, as Augustine teaches on Psalm 83 in these words: *The Lord made himself a debtor, not by receiving but by promising*, and St. Thomas here, q. 114, a. 1, ad 3, where he says: *God does not become simply a debtor to us, but to himself, insofar as it is owed that his own ordination be fulfilled*. Therefore, for a human action toward God to induce some right to receive a reward, it requires God's ordination. Hence the same holy Doctor says in the body of the same article: *Man's merit before God cannot exist except according to the presupposition of divine ordination*.

Second, since our works are owed to God under several titles, if God did not ordain them to a reward, man could possess no right to it and consequently could not infallibly attain it. For God could accept our works under other titles by which they are owed to him, for example under the title of creation or of the supreme dominion he possesses over all creatures. Therefore, for man to be able to merit some reward before God and attain it infallibly, God must ordain his works to it. A sign of this is that the works of

On Grace

the just existing in purgatory and the free acts of the blessed, although proceeding from charity and not lacking intrinsic value, nevertheless merit nothing before God, because God has not ordained them to a reward.

§ 2.

The Retribution of Reward in God Is Not an Act of Gratitude or Fidelity,
but of Strict Justice, Not Commutative but Distributive.

7. The first part of this assertion is proved, first, from the words of the Apostle in 2 Tim. 4: *There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me on that day.* From these words the following argument can be drawn. That which is given as a crown of justice and bestowed by God as a just judge is given from justice, and not merely from gratitude or fidelity. But according to the Apostle eternal life is given by God as a crown of justice and bestowed by him as a just judge. Therefore, it is given from justice, and not merely from gratitude or fidelity. Hence St. Thomas, lect. 2 on the same passage, considering these words of the Apostle, says: *It is called a crown of justice because God will render it from his justice.* And Augustine, tractate 3 on John: *Now you demand a debt, he says, now you exact what is owed. To receive grace beforehand, he needed a merciful Father; to receive the reward of grace, he needs a just judge.*

This is confirmed from the same Apostle, Heb. 6: *God is not unjust, that he should forget your work.* But if God rendered the reward owed to meritorious works only from fidelity, then if he denied it he ought not to be called unjust, but unfaithful. Therefore, God renders the reward to our merits not from fidelity but from justice. Hence Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, ch. 2: *God is not unjust, that he should defraud the just of the reward of justice.* And *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 3: *God himself, which may it never be, would not be just if one truly just were not admitted to his kingdom, since his very kingdom is justice.*

8. The same part is proved, second, by this argument. Although that which is owed to merit can be rendered from fidelity if it was promised, or from gratitude if it is given in acknowledgment of a benefit received, nevertheless, insofar as it is owed to merit as such, namely formally as reward, crown, and recompense, it is not rendered from fidelity or gratitude. This is both because neither of those virtues formally regards this notion, and because, if what is rendered from fidelity were a reward and crown, it would follow that the Incarnation, which was given to the ancient Fathers from fidelity to the divine promises, and the remission of sins, which is given to the converting sinner from fidelity to the divine promise expressed in

Zech. 1, *Return to me, and I will return to you*, would be a reward, recompense, and crown of justice. Yet this cannot be said, since each is purely gratuitous and cannot fall under merit, at least condign merit, as will be clear below concerning the infusion of first grace. Likewise, if what is given from gratitude were a reward, the gifts we offer to God in thanksgiving would possess the notion of reward and crown, which is likewise absurd. Therefore, what is owed from merit, insofar as it is such, is rendered only from justice.

This is confirmed: from an accepted promise under the condition of an equal work there arises an obligation of true justice, as is clear in the obligation to render a denarius when an agreement has been made with laborers under the condition of working in the vineyard. Hence, since God has promised eternal life to the just under the condition of good works, which by reason of the grace and charity from which they proceed possess an equality or proportion with eternal life, as will be clear in the following section, once such a covenant or promise is presupposed there arises in God an obligation of strict justice to reward the good works of the just proceeding from grace and charity.

That such justice is not commutative but distributive is established from what was said in the Treatise on the Will of God, ch. 5, § 3, where we showed that in God there is no commutative justice toward men, but only distributive justice, and there explained the various differences found between the two. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we refer the reader to that place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

9. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, says: *To justified men who work well eternal life must be proposed as a grace mercifully promised*. But that which is given from true and strict justice cannot be called grace. Therefore, eternal life is bestowed by God upon good and meritorious works not from true and strict justice, but only from fidelity or gratitude.

I answer that eternal life is called grace either because it has its origin from the highest grace, namely God's gratuitous predestination, or because it is called grace in its root, since first sanctifying grace, which is the principle and root of the merit of eternal life, is given gratuitously and mercifully. The Council does not intend to deny that eternal life is given from justice insofar as it is the reward of good works, but expressly asserts this in the same place, adding: *and as a recompense to be faithfully rendered from God's own promise to their good works and merits; for this is that crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him after his combat and course, to be rendered to him by the just judge*. The same is gathered from the Second Council of Orange, canon 18: *A reward is owed to good works if they are done*,

On Grace

but grace, which is not owed, precedes so that they may be done. St. Prosper also elegantly explains this in *De vocatione Gentium*, bk. 2, ch. 2: *Grace is given to each person without merit, from which he may tend toward merit; and it is given before any labor, from which each person may receive a reward according to his labor.*

10. You will object, second: reward is not owed to merit from justice. Therefore, the rendering of reward is not in God an act of justice. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. If the reward of eternal life were owed from justice to the merits of men, it would follow that, if God did not reward our merits, he would do us an injury. But this must not be said, for since he is the absolute Lord of all things, he takes away nothing that is not his own and consequently does injury to no one. Hence Augustine on Psalm 70: *Who could say to him, What have you done, if he condemned the just? How great, therefore, is his mercy that he justifies the unjust?* Therefore, reward is not owed to merit from justice.

I answer by denying the antecedent when it is understood of condign merit, as it must be understood. To its proof I say that if the reward of eternal life were owed to the just from commutative justice, God would act unjustly toward us if he did not reward our merits. It is otherwise if it is owed from distributive justice, because a debt of distributive justice does not arise from the right of another against the distributor, as does a debt of commutative justice, but from natural rectitude and the law of equity itself, by which the distributor is bound to proportion reward to merits and distribute it according to each person's proportion of dignity or labor. Hence a bad distributor does not properly do an injury to the person to whom he fails to give a reward equal to his merit, but to the commonwealth whose minister he is, or to the natural law and equity that he violates, as we explained more fully in the cited place of the Treatise on the Will of God, where we also solved the objections commonly made against the second part of our assertion. It remains only to explain here what man can merit condignly or congruously.

§ 3.

Through Works Proceeding from Grace and Charity,
the Just Condignly Merit Eternal Life.

11. This is established from the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, where it is said that for those who work well to the end and hope in God, eternal life must be proposed both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God

through Jesus Christ, and as a recompense to be faithfully rendered from God's own promise to their good works and merits. And canon 32 condemns anyone who says that the justified man, through good works done by him through God's grace and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself, provided that he dies in grace.

Reason also supports this. Condign merit is distinguished from congruous merit in this, that the former possesses a certain proportion and equality, at least of proportion, with the reward, and consequently exacts it by right; while the latter possesses no equality with the reward and implies no debt of strict justice, but only a right and debt of friendship. But the works of the just, insofar as they proceed from grace and charity, possess an equality of proportion with the beatific vision. Therefore, they merit it condignly. The major premise is established. The minor is proved. Grace is the seed of glory and of the beatific vision, as is established from 1 John 3: *The seed of God remains in him*. But a seed, although less perfect than the fruit according to entity, is nevertheless equal to it according to power and proportion, because not only the fruit but the whole tree is virtually contained in the seed. Therefore, habitual grace and the works proceeding from it possess an equality of proportion with glory. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 3, ad 3: *The grace of the Holy Spirit that we possess in the present life, although not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal to it in power, like the seed of trees in which there is power for the whole tree*. For the same reason grace is called in John 4 *a fountain of water springing up into eternal life*, because a fountain has proportion to the river and indeed virtually contains the whole river. Likewise, in Eph. 1 it is called *the pledge of our inheritance*, because a pledge differs from earnest money in that earnest money is of less price and value than the thing purchased, while a pledge is worth as much as that for which it is offered. So likewise sanctifying grace is worth as much as the beatific vision, and indeed surpasses it in perfection, as was shown in ch. 11, § 3, corollary 2.

12. The holy Doctor admirably develops this argument here, a. 3, where he says that the meritorious work of a just man can be considered in two ways: in one way insofar as it proceeds from free choice, and in another insofar as it is from sanctifying grace. If it is considered according to the substance of the work and insofar as it is from free choice, it cannot condignly merit eternal life because of its very great inequality and disproportion to it. But if we speak of a meritorious work insofar as it proceeds from sanctifying grace, then it merits eternal life even condignly, because under this aspect it possesses an equal value with supernatural

beatitude. Hence, just as we see that a son born of a king and an ignoble woman, although on the mother's part he possesses no hereditary right to the kingdom, nevertheless possesses it by reason of the father, from whom he is ennobled, so likewise, although the good works of the just, insofar as they proceed from the human will, do not possess condignity and sufficient proportion with the reward of eternal life, nevertheless insofar as they are from the Holy Spirit moving and applying the will and joined to it through grace and charity, they condignly merit eternal beatitude.

13. You will object, first, from the Apostle in Rom. 8: The sufferings of this time are not worthy of comparison with the future glory that will be revealed in us. By this it seems to be signified that actions elicited by us and sufferings endured possess no proportion and condignity with the glory we expect, especially since the sufferings and operations of this life pass quickly, while glory will endure forever. Hence the same Apostle says in 2 Cor. 4 that the momentary and light burden of our tribulation works in us an eternal weight of glory. And Bernard, sermon 1 *De diversis*: The hour passes, and the punishment passes; not so the recompense, not so the reward of labor itself. It knows no change, knows no end, remains all at once, and remains forever. Punishment is drunk drop by drop, taken at intervals, and passes by small portions; but in the recompense there is a torrent of delight, the rush of a river, a torrent overflowing with joy, a river of glory, a river of peace.

I answer with St. Thomas here, a. 3, ad 1, that the Apostle speaks of the sufferings of the saints according to their substance, and not insofar as they proceed from grace and charity. Under this latter aspect they possess condignity and proportion with glory, as was shown. Nor is it an objection that they pass quickly and the beatific vision is measured by eternity, for the vision, together with its immutable and interminable duration, is contained in grace as fruit in seed. Hence Bernard, sermon 17 on the Psalm *Qui habitat: Glory is hidden, my brethren, concealed in tribulation; eternity lies hidden in this momentary thing, and a sublime and exceedingly great weight in this light burden.*

14. You will object, second: according to the common opinion of theologians, God rewards the works of the just beyond their condignity. Therefore, there is no true condignity in the works of the just for the reward of eternal life.

But I deny the consequence. That God rewards the good works of the just beyond their condignity must not be understood as though they were not worthy of the reward of eternal life, but that beyond the reward condignly owed to good works God, from mere liberality and magnificence, adds some degree of glory, so that he renders not only a full measure, by

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

which equality of reward to merit is designated, but also a measure pressed together and overflowing, by which some excess beyond equality is denoted.

§ 4.

For the Works of a Just Man to Condignly Merit Eternal Life, It
Does Not Suffice That They Be Habitually Ordained
to God through the Habit of Charity; an Actual, or at
Least Virtual, Relation of Charity Is Required.

15. This is proved, first, from the holy Fathers, who commonly teach that charity is the root of the merit of eternal life, and consequently must actually, or at least virtually, influence meritorious works. Augustine says in *De spiritu et littera*, ch. 14: The fruit is not good if it does not arise from the root of charity. Gregory, homily 27 on the Gospels: The branch of a good work possesses no greenness if it does not remain in the root of charity. Leo the Great, sermon 7 for Lent, considering Matt. 25, As long as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me, says: What is more fruitful than this work? What is happier than this humanity? It would certainly not be defrauded of its praise if, on account of our common nature alone, assistance were given by one man to another. But because what does not proceed from the fountain of faith does not attain eternal rewards, the condition of heavenly works is one thing, and that of earthly works another. Here the Pontiff requires for a heavenly work, that is, one meritorious of a heavenly reward, that it proceed from the fountain of faith: faith, I say, not unformed and dead, but living and working through love. Finally, St. Thomas in *I Sent.*, dist. 40, q. 5, a. 5, ad 6, argues as follows: For merit an altogether habitual ordination of the act to God does not suffice, because no one merits from the fact that something exists in habit, but from the fact that he actually operates. Yet it is not necessary that an actual intention ordering to the ultimate end always be joined to every action directed to some proximate end, but it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the ultimate end. And dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, he says: This is clear in the example Avicenna gives of an artisan who, if while exercising his work he always thought of the rule of his art, would be greatly impeded in his work. But just as he first considered the rules of the art, so afterward he operates, and thus the rectitude of the art is preserved in his work. Nothing clearer or more explicit can be said in favor of our assertion.

16. The same truth can be supported by three arguments. The first is this. Infidelity, or the state of mortal sin, concomitant with morally good

On Grace

works of the natural order, does not vitiate them or make them demeritorious unless it in some way informs them by referring them to an evil end, as was shown in ch. 3. Therefore, likewise, grace and charity concomitant with the good works of a just man do not dignify them or render them meritorious of eternal life unless they inform them through an actual, or at least virtual, relation to God as ultimate end.

Second: for our acts to condignly merit eternal life, they must be done in the service of God, since one of the conditions required for merit is that the act be done in the service of the one from whom the reward is exacted, as we declared in § 1. But our acts cannot be done in God's service unless they are formally, or at least virtually, ordained to him. Therefore, for condign merit of eternal life, at least a virtual relation to God as ultimate end is required.

Third: for our works to condignly merit eternal life, they must be supernatural in substance or at least in mode, because, as we said in the preceding section, works condignly meritorious must belong to the same order as the reward. But from the mere concomitance of the habit of charity, our works cannot be made supernatural in substance or mode. For this some actual or virtual influence of charity is required, by which they are elevated to the supernatural order. Therefore, for our acts to condignly merit eternal life, an actual, or at least virtual, command of charity is required. Hence when St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 2, a. 5, ad 7, says, *For those possessing charity every act is meritorious*, he does not speak of those possessing charity only habitually and without any actual or virtual influence upon the acts of other virtues, but of those possessing charity formally or virtually influencing such acts. Likewise, when the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 16, says that the good works of a justified man merit eternal life, it speaks of works proceeding from grace and charity or commanded by charity, for it says that the just man merits by works done in God. Just as when works are said to be done in the name of Christ, they are understood to be done from the motive of charity, so also when they are called done in God, it is signified that they are done from the command of charity and are at least virtually ordained to God as ultimate end.

17. You will object, first: for morally good works to be condignly satisfactory for sins, no relation or command of charity is required. Therefore, neither is it required for them to merit eternal life.

I answer, granting the antecedent, which will be treated in the Treatise on Penance, but denying the consequence and parity. The condignity of satisfaction is derived from one source, and the condignity of merit from another. For the condignity of satisfaction is taken from the equality of punishment with guilt, according to Rev. 18: *As much as she glorified herself*

and lived in delights, give her so much torment and mourning. For punishment to be equal to guilt, the command of charity is not required. But condign merit of eternal life is founded on the proportion of the act to such a reward, which our works cannot possess without the actual or virtual influence of charity. Hence St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 2, a. 5, ad 7: *The mode of charity is included under the necessity of the precept insofar as the precept is ordained to attaining beatitude, but not insofar as it is ordained to avoiding liability to punishment.*

18. From this you will understand that man can fulfill natural precepts through morally good works of the natural order, although through those works he cannot merit eternal life unless they are done from the motive of charity and at least virtually commanded by it. Hence when Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, ch. 14, says, *The commandment is not observed except from love of justice; for the fruit is not good if it does not arise from the root of charity*, this must be understood of the observance of the commandments insofar as it merits beatitude and conduces to the salvation of the soul and eternal life, not of the observance of natural precepts as to their substance. For the latter can proceed not only from the root of charity but also from love of the morally honorable good, as we declared in ch. 3.

19. You will object, second: all the acts of Christ the Lord were of infinite value precisely because they proceeded from a person of infinite dignity. Therefore, likewise, in a just man all good works will be meritorious precisely because they proceed from a person pleasing to God.

I answer, first, by denying the antecedent. In Christ only those actions were of infinite value that were reflected upon the suppositum of the Divine Word and are called theandric by theologians, not those in which the dignity of the divine suppositum was merely concomitant and material, such as Christ's eating or walking, as theologians teach in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

I answer, second, granting the antecedent but denying the consequence and parity. Since grace is a habit, it is subject to our will as to its use. Hence, if it in no way influences our works and is related to them only materially and concomitantly, it in no way dignifies them. But the person of the Word is not subject to the free use of the will, since it is substantial and the will cannot operate without the concurrence of the person. Therefore, it dignifies the works elicited by Christ according to its whole capacity, and consequently infinitely.

On Grace

§ 5.

The Essential Reward of Beatitude Is Attributed to Charity Alone,
but Only an Accidental Reward to the Other Virtues
if Their Acts Are Not Commanded by Charity.

20. This is proved, first, from Scripture, which testifies in various passages that the crown of glory and the gifts or goods of heavenly glory are promised or prepared for charity alone. James 1: Blessed is the man who endures temptation, because when he has been proved he shall receive the crown of life which God has promised to those who love him. 1 Cor. 2: Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him. This agrees with the prayer of the Church for the Third Sunday after the Octave of Trinity: O God, who have prepared invisible goods for those who love you, pour into our hearts the affection of your love, so that, loving you in all things and above all things, we may attain your promises, which surpass every desire. Finally, in Rev. 21 the angel measures the gates and wall of the heavenly Jerusalem with a golden reed, to signify that charity is the measure of essential glory and that the degrees of the light of glory are proportioned to the degrees of charity. Hence Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 46: The soul will be illuminated by the light of glory in proportion as it has adhered to charity. And St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 6: The intellect participating more in the light of glory will see God more perfectly. But he participates more in the light of glory who possesses more charity, because where charity is greater, there desire is greater; and desire in a certain way makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the desired object. Hence he who possesses more charity will see God more perfectly and will be more blessed.

21. The same truth can be proved by three arguments. The first is this. The perfection of Christian life consists essentially in charity. Therefore, the merit of the essential reward is founded in charity alone, and consequently cannot belong to any other virtue except from its motion and command. The consequence is clear, for the essential reward of heaven corresponds to the essential perfection of the way. Hence the greater one will be in beatitude, the more excellent he was in the perfection of Christian life. The antecedent is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 184, a. 1, where he argues as follows: *Each thing is called perfect insofar as it attains its*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

proper end, which is the ultimate perfection of the thing. But charity is that which unites us to God, who is the ultimate end of the human mind, because he who remains in charity remains in God and God in him, as is said in 1 John 4. Therefore, the perfection of Christian life is considered especially according to charity. Hence Augustine, De natura et gratia, ch. 42: Charity is the truest, fullest, and most perfect justice. And in the final chapter: Inchoate charity is inchoate justice; advanced charity is advanced justice; great charity is great justice; perfect charity is perfect justice. Likewise Bernard, sermon 27 on the Canticle, teaches that the greatness of the soul, or its essential perfection in the supernatural order, is to be measured from the greatness or perfection of charity: The quantity of any soul, he says, is estimated from the measure of charity it possesses, so that, for example, the one possessing much charity is great, the one possessing little is small, and the one possessing none is nothing, as the Apostle says: If I do not have charity, I am nothing.

The second argument: we merit the essential reward, which consists in enjoyment of the ultimate end, only through that by which we tend toward this end. But through charity alone do we tend toward God as ultimate end. For through the acts of acquired moral virtues we tend only toward the morally honorable good of the natural order, while through the acts of infused moral virtues we tend toward the morally honorable good of the supernatural order. Therefore, only through acts elicited or commanded by charity do we merit the essential reward.

The third argument: it is not equitable or consonant with reason that handmaids and attendants possess the same reward and crown as their mistress and queen except by her command. But charity is the mistress and queen of the other virtues, which are, as it were, her handmaids and attendants. Therefore, a special crown is owed to charity, namely essential glory, which is consequently not bestowed upon the other virtues except by its command.

22. I add that for an act to merit eternal life, it must be referred to the good of God who rewards, as is established from what was said in § 1 when explaining the conditions required for merit. But the acts of the other virtues are not referred to the divine good except by charity, which alone regards the divine good, or God as good in himself. Therefore, they are not meritorious of eternal life except by the command of charity. Consequently, unless they are commanded by charity, no essential but only an accidental reward of beatitude is given to them.

23. You will object, first: an act of faith is a disposition highly proportioned to the reward of eternal life, as St. Thomas teaches in the present part above, q. 3, a. 3, where he says that vision in heaven, in which

On Grace

beatitude formally consists, corresponds to faith in this life. The same can be said of hope, both because it is closely related to faith and because, just as clear vision in heaven corresponds to faith, so comprehension corresponds to hope, as the holy Doctor asserts in the same place. Therefore, acts of faith and hope condignly merit the beatific vision and consequently the essential reward.

I answer that an act of faith is a disposition highly proportioned to the reward of eternal life when it is formed and formally or virtually commanded by charity, but not if it is unformed and neither includes nor presupposes the command of charity. Hence, when St. Thomas says that vision in heaven corresponds to faith in this life, he speaks of formed faith commanded by charity. The same, with due proportion, must be said of an act of hope. For although hope is a theological virtue and therefore immediately attains God, it does not attain God as good in himself, but only insofar as he is our good and insofar as he is loved by us with the love of desire. Hence, for hope to attain him as he is good in himself and to be referred to his service and good, the command of charity is required.

24. You will object, second: acts of the infused moral virtues possess proportion to the essential reward of eternal life. Therefore, they merit it condignly. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is shown as follows. Every act proceeding from sanctifying grace possesses proportion to eternal life. But acts elicited from the infused moral virtues proceed from sanctifying grace. Therefore, they possess proportion to eternal life. The minor is established, for since all the infused virtues emanate from grace as properties from essence, grace itself operates through them in the same way as essence operates through its properties or powers. The major is supported by this argument: the movement of any nature possesses proportion to its end, just as the movement of heavy and light things is proportioned to their ends and brings them to the center. But the proper end of grace is eternal life, and hence in John 4 grace is called *a fountain of water springing up into eternal life*. Therefore, every act proceeding from sanctifying grace possesses proportion to eternal life.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I distinguish the major premise. Every act proceeding from sanctifying grace possesses proportion to eternal life through the command of charity: I grant the major premise. Apart from the command of charity: I deny the major premise. To its proof I likewise distinguish the major premise. The movement of any nature possesses proportion to its end if it is perfect: I grant the major premise. If it is imperfect: I deny it. But the movements of grace are imperfect and, as it were, unformed unless commanded by charity. Hence, without its motion

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

and command, they cannot efficaciously tend toward the ultimate end or consequently condignly merit eternal life. Nor is it an objection that grace is called in John 4 *a fountain of water springing up into eternal life*. This does not signify that sanctifying grace immediately and through itself tends toward eternal life and the clear vision of God, but only through charity, which is its first and principal property and the moral tendency or inclination toward the supernatural end. Likewise, in natural things heavy and light bodies do not tend toward the center through their proper nature and substance, but through gravity and lightness, which are the proximate principles of upward and downward motion.

§ 6.

Morally Good Works Proceeding from the Powers of Nature Merit the
First Assisting Grace Neither Condignly nor Congruously.

25. All theologians agree in the first part of this assertion as in a dogma of faith, against Pelagius. Since he thought that free choice sufficed for acting well and was assisted by grace only so that it could act more easily, he consequently also asserted that the first assistance of divine grace is given to us in consideration of some good work done without grace, as on account of merit not only congruous but also condign. This error was condemned in several Councils, especially those of Milevis, Palestine, and the Second Council of Orange, in which Pelagius is commanded to confess that the grace of God is not given according to our merits.

26. It can also be refuted by two arguments. The first is this. Condign merit must equal the reward in moral estimation, as is established from what was said in § 3. But such equality of works of nature to a supernatural reward is repugnant, since a thing of the natural and lower order cannot in moral estimation equal a thing of the higher order, as is manifest from the terms themselves. Therefore, it is also repugnant that natural works should condignly merit a supernatural reward.

The second argument is this. Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours. But the hypostatic union, which is the first and principal effect of Christ's predestination, was purely gratuitous and without any preceding merits, as Augustine demonstrates from various testimonies of Scripture in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 15. Therefore, likewise, the first vocation or first assistance of grace is given purely gratuitously and does not fall under the condign merit of natural works.

On Grace

The second part of the assertion, because it says that natural works do not merit the first assisting grace even congruously, is against the Semi-Pelagians or Massilians. Moderating Pelagius's heresy in some measure, they asserted that although we cannot perform any good works without God's grace, our wills must be forestalled by it so that some good work may be begun or completed. Nevertheless, they said that before grace itself there precede on our part, not indeed good works, but certain beginnings of faith and good will, in consideration of which God was moved to give the first assisting grace. Consequently, they admitted some merit, at least congruous, with respect to first grace. This error appears condemned by the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 7, where it is said that the beginning of our justification is taken from God's vocation, *by which they are called while no merits of theirs exist*, and so forth. For that negative expression appears to exclude all merit, both condign and congruous.

27. It can also be refuted from Scripture. For the Apostle says in Eph. 1 that we were called by lot and chosen for grace, and consequently without any preceding merits, occasions, or congruities. For one who is chosen by lot excludes all such antecedent considerations, as St. Thomas observes in lect. 4 on that passage, in these words: *Because lot is nothing other than the inquiry into things that occur from the divine will, and grace depends upon the divine will alone, it follows that the grace of divine election is called a lot, because God by way of lot, according to hidden providence and not from anyone's merits, calls through interior grace.*

28. Finally, the same error can be refuted by this argument. Congruous merit can be understood in two ways. First, strictly, as a friendly right to a reward, by which it is distinguished from condign merit, which implies a debt of strict justice and not merely a right and debt of friendship. Second, broadly and improperly, for any exigency of a form, whether by way of right and congruity or only by way of a connatural relation. In this way every disposition can be called congruous merit with respect to the form for which it disposes, because it connaturally requires it. But natural works cannot merit the first assisting grace in either way. They cannot do so in the first way, since a friendly right arises from sanctifying grace through charity, while natural works antecedent to justifying grace proceed from one who is God's enemy. Nor can they do so in the second way, since man through works elicited by the powers of nature cannot dispose himself for the first assistance of grace, as was shown in ch. 8. Therefore, natural works cannot merit the first assisting grace even congruously.

29. The principal motive of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians for asserting that first grace is conferred by God in consideration of a good

natural work as condign or at least congruous merit was, as is established from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, that if God by his will alone, without any cause, occasion, merit, or demerit existing on man's part, granted or denied his grace, he would be a respecter of persons and an unjust distributor of his gifts. This is repugnant to the Apostle in Rom. 2 and Eph. 6, who says: *There is no respect of persons with God.*

But this foundation can easily be overthrown. The vice of respect of persons is incurred only when that which is owed to several is conferred upon one alone. But divine grace is owed to no one, otherwise grace would not be grace. Therefore, God, in giving it to one and not to another without any preceding difference on their part, is not a respecter of persons.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 63, a. 1. But distributive justice has no place in gratuitous and undue things, such as the gifts and assistances of grace, as the holy Doctor declares in his commentary on Rom. 9, lect. 3, in these words: Distributive justice has place in those things given from a debt, for example, if someone merits a reward, so that a greater reward is given to those who labor more. But it has no place in those things that someone gives voluntarily and mercifully. For example, if someone, finding two poor men on the road, gives to one what he is able or intends to give as alms, he is not unjust but merciful. Likewise, if someone remits an offense to one of two persons who have equally offended him and does not remit it to the other, he is merciful to the first and just to the second, but unjust to neither. Since, therefore, all men are born subject to condemnation because of the sin of our first parent, those whom God frees through his grace he frees by mercy alone. Thus he is merciful to some whom he frees, but just to others whom he does not free, and unjust to neither.

This is further confirmed: without the vice of respect of persons God decreed to produce some among the many possible creatures, leaving others within the state of possibility, although on the part of those he actually produced no reason inducing him to their production preceded. Likewise, for God to unite a humanity to the Word, no merit on the part of that humanity preceded, yet because he left other human natures capable of union without such a union he did not incur this vice. Therefore, likewise, although God bestows his grace upon one and not upon another without any preceding difference on their part, he cannot be accused as a respecter of persons and an unjust distributor of his gifts. Hence St. Prosper elegantly says in *De vocatione Gentium*, bk. 2, ch. 32: *We do not dare to complain of the judgments of carnal parents when, before any examination of conduct or any*

On Grace

services of devotion, they embrace some of their children with a more indulgent affection. Among masters also there is free disposition toward servants, nor is he justly rebuked who, from a household of one condition, chooses some whom he will honor more kindly and train in liberal studies. Must one therefore complain of the most benevolent equity of the supreme Father and true Lord because in his great house all things are varied by innumerable differences?

30. Finally, how frivolous and empty this Pelagian objection is, is demonstrated by the example of infants. Some attain the grace of baptism although born of the impious, while others do not attain it although born of the just. Yet God cannot therefore be called a respecter of persons, as Augustine teaches in epistle 105 to Sixtus, and by this example presses the Pelagians: But those who make God a respecter of persons if, in one and the same cause, his mercy comes upon some while his wrath remains upon others, certainly lose all the strength of human argument in the case of infants. What cause, I ask, will they assign for one being so governed that he departs from this life baptized, while another, entrusted to the hands of unbelievers, or even of believers, expires before he is presented by them for baptism? Will they attribute this to fate or fortune? Did the infants themselves choose the unbelieving and negligent parents from whom they would be born? What shall I say of the innumerable unexpected and sudden deaths by which even the infants of religious Christians are often forestalled and cut off before baptism, while, on the contrary, infants of the sacrilegious and enemies of Christ, coming in some way into the hands of Christians, migrate from this life not without the sacrament of regeneration? What will those say here who contend that some human merits must precede so that grace may be supported, lest God be a respecter of persons? What merits preceded here? If you consider those of the infants themselves, there are none proper to either; the same common mass belongs to both. If you attend to those of the parents, they are good in the case of those whose children perished by sudden deaths without Christ's baptism, but evil in the case of those whose children attained the sacraments of the Church through some power of Christians. And why did the providence of God, which is neither subjected to fate nor hindered by chance events nor corrupted by any injustice, not provide for all the infants of his children that they should be reborn to the heavenly inheritance, while it provides for some infants of the impious? This infant, born of faithful spouses and received with the joy of his parents, is suffocated by the sleepiness of his mother or nurse and is excluded from and deprived of the faith of his own parents. That infant is born of sacrilegious adultery, exposed to a most cruel death, gathered up by the merciful kindness of strangers, baptized through their Christian

solicitude, and becomes a sharer and participant in the eternal kingdom. Let them think upon these things and consider them; let them dare here to say that God in his grace is either a respecter of persons or a rewarder of preceding merits. Likewise, in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 14, he argues as follows: God sometimes adopts as a son one whom he forms in the womb of a most impure woman, and sometimes does not will to be his son one whom he forms in the womb of his own daughter. The former, by some unknown providence, arrives at baptism; the latter, through sudden death, does not arrive. Thus God, in whose power are all things, causes one whom he formed in the dwelling of the Devil to be in fellowship with Christ, and does not will one whom he formed in his own temple to be in his kingdom. Or, if he wills it, why does he not do what he wills? For you cannot say here what you customarily say of adults: God wills it, but the infant does not will it. Certainly here, where there is no immobility of fate, no rashness of fortune, and no dignity of person, what remains except the depth of mercy and truth?

31. Another difficult argument against the second part of our assertion may be proposed in this way. The hypostatic order is more distant from the order of grace than the order of grace is from the order of nature, since the former distance is infinite, while the latter is finite. But notwithstanding this greater distance, the hypostatic order can fall under the congruous merit of acts belonging to the order of grace. For, as theologians teach in the *Treatise on the Incarnation*, the ancient Fathers congruously merited the substance, or at least the circumstances, of the Incarnation. Therefore, with greater reason, works of the natural order can congruously merit a reward belonging to the order of grace, notwithstanding the distance found between the two orders.

I answer that the major premise is true concerning entitative distance, but false concerning distance of proportion and relation. In the latter manner, the order of grace is more distant from the order of nature than the hypostatic order is from the order of grace. For since the latter two orders are contained within the genus of the supernatural order, one can terminate the relation of acts belonging to the other. On the contrary, since the orders of grace and nature are altogether diverse, one cannot be ordained to the other, but a supernatural form exceeds every exigency of nature.

32. This answer and doctrine can be illustrated by the following example. God is more distant from an intellect infused with the light of glory than a spiritual substance is from a bodily eye, and nevertheless God can be seen by an intellect infused with the light of glory, whereas a spiritual substance cannot be seen by a bodily eye. No other reason can be assigned for this than that the former greater distance is in the genus of being, not in the relation

On Grace

of power and object. The same must be said here with due proportion: the hypostatic order can be attained by the order of grace, although the order of grace cannot be attained by the order of nature, because although the hypostatic order is more distant from the order of grace than the order of grace is from the order of nature, that greater distance is nevertheless in the genus of being and not in the relation of proportion, for the reason assigned above.

§ 7.

Man Does Not Condignly Merit First Justifying Grace, but He Does Merit Its Increase and the First Glory Corresponding to First Habitual Grace.

33. The first part appears certain by faith, both because Rom. 3 says: Justified freely through his grace, and because the Council of Orange, canon 17, defines charity as a gift of God poured into our hearts without any preceding merits on our part. The Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 8, explaining the aforementioned words of the Apostle, says: We are said to be justified freely because none of those things that precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification itself.

Reason also supports this. For if man condignly merited first justifying grace, he would merit it either through works antecedent to it or through works subsequent to it. Not through antecedent works, both because works antecedent to first justifying grace are either purely natural or imperfectly supernatural, and consequently disproportionate to justifying grace, which is the most perfect form of the supernatural order; and because every work existing in sin is impeded by the indisposition and state of the subject from possessing the notion of merit before God. Nor through subsequent works. First, because merit, since it is like a certain movement and way to a reward, cannot be posterior to it. Hence man cannot merit what he already possesses, just as he cannot hope for a good he already possesses. This is treated more fully in the Treatise on the Incarnation, ch. 3. Second, because an act cannot merit the form from which it derives its whole value. Hence it is commonly said: *The principle of merit cannot fall under merit*. But acts that presuppose justifying grace in the soul and are posterior to it derive their whole dignity and meritorious value from it. Therefore, they cannot merit it. Hence Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 28, ch. 22: *Heavenly grace does not find merit in man so that it may come, but after it has come it makes merit. God, coming to an unworthy mind, makes it worthy of himself by coming, and he makes in it the merit that he rewards, who had found in it only what he might punish*.

34. That works informed by grace merit its increase is established from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 32, where it pronounces anathema upon anyone who says that the good works of a justified man do not truly merit an increase of grace. It is also established from Augustine, tractate 5 on the First Epistle of John, where he says: Charity merits to be increased, so that when increased it may merit to be perfected. This is also supported by the argument of St. Thomas here, a. 8, where he argues as follows: That falls under condign merit to which the motion of grace extends. But the motion of a mover extends not only to the ultimate term of the motion, but also to the whole progress in the motion. The term of the motion of grace is eternal life, while progress in this motion is according to the increase of charity or grace, according to Prov. 4: The path of the just is like a shining light, proceeding and increasing unto the perfect day, which is the day of glory. Therefore, the increase of grace falls under condign merit.

35. Finally, that the just merit the first glory corresponding to first habitual grace is clear from what has already been said. For since first glory is not a principle of meriting, as first grace is, but rather the term of merit, nothing prevents man through acts of contrition and charity elicited at the instant of justification from condignly meriting the first glory corresponding to first justifying grace, although he cannot condignly merit that grace through those acts. Hence St. Thomas above, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1: *One preparation of man for possessing grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace itself, and such an operation is indeed meritorious, but not of the grace already possessed, but of the glory not yet possessed.*

36. You will ask whether man through acts of contrition and charity, and the other acts by which he is disposed for justifying grace, merits it congruously.

I answer affirmatively if congruous merit is taken broadly and improperly. For through acts of charity, contrition, and other good works antecedent to justification, the sinner is disposed for first justifying grace and obtains it by petition from God. But a disposition implies a certain congruity with respect to the form for which it disposes, since it connaturally requires that form. Likewise, the petition and obtaining of a gift can be called a certain imperfect merit, according to Augustine, epistle 105: *The remission of sins itself is not without some merit if faith obtains it; for the merit of faith is not nothing.* Therefore, man through acts of contrition and charity, and the other acts by which he is disposed for justifying grace, congruously merits it if congruous merit is used broadly and improperly. It is otherwise if it is taken properly and strictly, insofar as it implies a friendly right to a reward. For acts that antecede justifying grace by way of

On Grace

disposition cannot possess such a right, since a friendly right arises from justifying grace through charity. Nor is it an objection that the act of contrition by which man is ultimately disposed for justification proceeds, according to our opinion, from habitual grace. It does not proceed from it insofar as grace has the character of a habit and sanctifying form giving participatively divine being, under which aspect it grounds perfect friendship between man and God. Rather, it is produced by grace insofar as grace is in the process of being infused and performs the function of an assistance, under which formality it does not ground a friendly right to a reward, but only moves the will to operate.

§ 8.

The Just Man Cannot Condignly Merit for Himself Restoration after a Fall or the Gift of Perseverance; nor Can He Merit Them Congruously if Congruous Merit Is Taken Strictly and Properly, although He Can if It Is Taken Broadly and Improperly.

37. The first part is proved by the argument of St. Thomas here, a. 7. Condign merit depends upon the motion of divine grace. But the motion of divine grace in the just man cannot extend to his restoration after a fall, since it is interrupted through the subsequent fall or sin. Therefore, a just man cannot condignly merit for himself restoration after a fall.

This is confirmed: if a just man could condignly merit for himself restoration after a fall, he would merit it either before he fell or after he had fallen. Neither can be said. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is manifest as to the second part, because after someone has fallen into sin and before the recovery of grace, he is incapable of condignly meriting anything from God, since he is God's enemy. It is proved as to the first part. All the merits a just man acquired for himself while he existed in grace and charity are suspended and impeded by subsequent sin. Therefore, such sin cannot be removed, nor can the fallen man be restored, by virtue of the merits he possessed before falling into sin. Sin therefore stands in relation to preceding merits as insincerity stands to a sacrament. Hence, just as insincerity is not removed by virtue of a sacrament received insincerely, but another sacrament is required to remove it, so sin, which kills and suspends preceding merits, is not removed by virtue of those merits. Thus no one while in grace can condignly merit for himself restoration after a fall.

38. That he also cannot condignly merit for himself the gift of perseverance is established from Augustine, *De bono perseverantiae*, ch. 13,

where he says: *From this it is sufficiently clear that both the grace of beginning and that of persevering to the end are given by God not according to our merits.* By these words he openly teaches that just as first prevenient grace does not fall under condign merit, neither does the gift of perseverance. Hence in ch. 2 of the same work he calls perseverance *the great gift of God by which his other gifts are preserved.* And the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 13, says that this gift *cannot be obtained from any other source than from him who is able to establish the one who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore the one who falls.*

39. Some interpreters of Scripture also observe that the predestination of the elect is like a certain golden chain by which God draws men to himself and raises them from earth to heaven, composed of the various benefits of God as though of links, namely predestination, vocation, justification, and glorification, according to the Apostle in Rom. 8: *Those whom he predestined, these he also called; those whom he called, these he justified; those whom he justified, these he glorified.* Perseverance is the golden clasp by which those links are joined together, for it joins the end to the beginning and glorification to eternal predestination. By this God draws the elect to heaven, but in mercy, according to Jer. 31: *I have loved you with everlasting charity; therefore I have drawn you in mercy,* because the gift of perseverance is bestowed upon us from God's mercy alone, not from the merits of our works.

Reason also supports this. First, as St. Thomas argues here, a. 9, in the argument *on the contrary*: if the just man could condignly merit the gift of perseverance for himself, it would follow that no just man, or at least few, would fail to obtain it, since condign merit infallibly attains its reward. Thus no one or only a few would fall short of glory, which is repugnant to Christ's words: *Many are called, but few are chosen.* Nor can it be said that many fail to obtain the gift of perseverance because through sin they place an impediment to it. For, as the holy Doctor rightly insists in the same place, the very act of sinning is opposed to perseverance. Hence, if a just man condignly merits the gift of perseverance, God would not permit him to fall into sin.

40. Second, he proves it in the body of the article by this argument: that which stands on the part of the principle of merit does not fall under merit. But the gift of perseverance stands on the part of the principle of merit, because it depends upon the motion of grace, which is the principle of every merit. Therefore, it does not fall under merit. Here, as Cajetan rightly observes, the holy Doctor does not speak of every motion of grace, but of the motion of grace insofar as it conserves grace. In this way it cannot fall under

merit, because it is a continuation of the first production and is entitatively the first production or infusion of grace itself, which cannot fall under merit since it is the principle of every merit. Likewise, no one can condignly merit his own conservation, because conservation is not an action distinct from creation, which does not fall under merit, but is creation itself continued, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 4.

41. You will say: man can condignly merit beatitude and consequently the perpetuity of glory contained in it. Therefore, with greater reason he can merit perseverance in grace, which is not as noble and perfect as perseverance in glory.

But I deny the consequence and parity, for there is a great difference between the perpetuity of glory and perseverance in grace. Perseverance in heaven stands on the part of the term of merit, while perseverance in this life stands on the part of its principle, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 9, ad 2, in these words: *Perseverance in glory is compared to the meritorious motion of free choice as its term, but perseverance in this life is not.*

The third part of the assertion, which says that a just man cannot merit for himself restoration after a fall or the gift of perseverance by congruous merit strictly and properly understood, can easily be proved from what was said in the preceding section. For, as we declared there, congruous merit strictly understood implies a friendly right to a reward, and by this it is distinguished from condign merit, which implies a debt of strict and true justice, namely distributive justice. But the just man possesses no friendly right to restoration after a fall, because through subsequent sin God's friendship with him is destroyed. Once friendship is violated and dissolved, a friendly right cannot subsist. Hence subsequent sin no less kills and suspends congruous merit strictly understood than condign merit. Therefore, just as because of this suspension and interruption the just man cannot condignly merit for himself restoration after a fall, neither can he merit it congruously if congruous merit is taken strictly and properly.

42. The same must be said of the gift of perseverance because of the argument of St. Thomas explained above. That which belongs to the principle of merit does not fall even under congruous merit, since no one can merit the principle of merit either condignly or congruously. This is clear concerning first grace, which, because it is the principle of merit, no one can merit either condignly or congruously if congruous merit is taken strictly and properly, as we demonstrated in § 6 against the Semi-Pelagians. Therefore, if the gift of perseverance belongs to the principle of merit, as was shown above, it cannot fall even under congruous merit properly understood.

43. That restoration after a fall and the gift of perseverance can fall under congruous merit broadly and improperly understood is manifest from what was said above. For a work that obtains some gift or benefit by petition and disposes for it can broadly and improperly be called congruous merit. But many just persons obtain from God through their good works and prayers restoration after a fall and the gift of perseverance, and dispose themselves to receive such gifts gratuitously and mercifully from God. Therefore, they congruously merit them if congruous merit is taken broadly and improperly. Hence Augustine must be understood of this merit when, speaking of the gift of perseverance in *De bono perseverantiae*, ch. 6, he says: *This gift of God can be merited by supplication; but once it has been given, it cannot be lost through obstinacy.* For the word *by supplication* openly declares that he speaks there of merit broadly and improperly understood, namely insofar as it signifies the same as obtaining by petition. But when St. Thomas says here, a. 7, *No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either by condign or congruous merit*, he must be understood of congruous merit strictly taken. For in his commentary on Heb. 6, lect. 3, he appears to admit some congruous merit, namely broadly and improperly understood, with respect to restoration.

44. You will ask whether a mere man can merit for another, condignly or at least congruously, first assisting or justifying grace and restoration after a fall.

I answer that he can merit neither condignly, but can merit both congruously, even when congruous merit is taken in its true and strict meaning, insofar as it implies a friendly right to a reward.

The first part of this resolution is from St. Thomas here, a. 6, where he says: *By condign merit no one can merit first grace for another except Christ alone.* He proves this by the following argument. Condign merit must be from the motion of divine grace. But God moves and ordains the works of the just only to merit eternal life or an increase of grace for themselves, because such works proceed from the grace of adoption, not from capital grace, which is found only in Christ the Lord, who alone is the head of all other men. The grace of adoption differs from capital grace in this, that the former is ordained only to sanctifying and perfecting the subject in whom it exists and does not extend to the perfection and sanctification of others. Capital grace, however, possesses a certain influence, at least moral, upon others, since it is proper to a head to influence the members joined to it, and consequently moves the subject in whom it exists to sanctify others and condignly merit grace for them. But this will be treated more fully in the Treatise on the Incarnation when we discuss Christ's capital grace. Pope Leo

indicates this argument in epistle 97, ch. 2, in these words: *Although the death of many saints was precious in the sight of the Lord, nevertheless the slaying of no innocent person was the redemption of the world. The just received crowns; they did not give them. From the courage of the faithful examples of patience arose, not gifts of justice.*

45. The second part, which asserts that a mere man can congruously merit for another first grace and restoration after a fall, with congruous merit strictly and properly understood, is also taught by St. Thomas in the cited article, in these words: By congruous merit someone can merit first grace for another, because, since a man constituted in grace fulfills God's will, it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God should fulfill the man's will in the salvation of another. By these words he declares that the works and prayers of the just possess a certain friendly right by reason of which they can congruously merit the salvation and justification of others. Hence James 5 says: Pray for one another that you may be saved, for the continual prayer of a just man avails much. The well-known saying of Augustine in his sermon on St. Stephen is also relevant: If Stephen had not prayed, the Church would not have possessed Paul; but Paul was raised up because Stephen, bowed down upon the earth, was heard.

46. What we have said of first justifying grace must also be said of restoration after a fall, both because the same reasoning applies to each and because the just man cannot condignly or properly congruously merit restoration after a fall for himself because, at the time the reward is rendered, he is not in a state capable of being rewarded, since at that time he is a sinner and God's enemy, as we declared above. But when the restoration of another is effected, the just man is at that time in a state capable of being rewarded, since at that time he remains just and God's friend, as we suppose. Therefore, although a just man cannot properly congruously merit for himself restoration after a fall, he can merit it for another.

APPENDIX I.
ON THE VARIOUS ERRORS OF HERETICS
CONCERNING GRACE & FREE CHOICE.

Since many of the things we have said in the Treatise on Grace depend entirely upon a full and perfect knowledge of what the Church formerly condemned in the Pelagians and Semipelagians, we have judged it necessary, for the perfection and completion of that treatise, to discuss briefly here the Pelagian and Semipelagian heresies, and to append to this discussion a few remarks on the errors of the Predestinarians, Manichaeans, Lutherans, and Calvinists.

CHAPTER I.
The Pelagian Heresy.

Two principal matters concerning the Pelagian heresy must be explained briefly here: namely, what was its first origin, and how many degrees or states it had.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

§ 2.

Origin of the Pelagian Heresy.

1. Some trace the first origin of this heresy back to Lucifer or Adam, and therefore call them the first patriarchs of the Pelagian heresy, as we noted in the Treatise on the Angels. For Lucifer's first sin was pride, by which he presumed that he could obtain the supreme good by himself and through his own powers, despising God's assistance, which pertains to the error of the Pelagians. Hence Bernard says in serm. 3, *De verbis Isaiae: He who presumed to sit wished to be sufficient unto himself.* And Gregory the Great, bk. 34, *Moralia*, c. 18: *Religion, instead of adhering to the principle to which it ought to adhere, desires in some manner to be its own principle.* Similarly, Adam desired likeness to God, not as regards complete equality with the Godhead, but as regards an autonomous power of acting, so that he might attain beatitude by the proper power of nature. Therefore he may not undeservedly be called the first Pelagian as well as the first parent. Hence Augustine, on Ps. 68, says that he wished to seize and, as it were, steal divinity, and thereby lost happiness. From this some fittingly observe that the Pelagian heresy is so plausible and so agreeable to corrupted nature that nearly all men are Pelagians by a virtually natural instinct unless they are corrected by faith; for the pride implanted in us and transmitted from Adam to all his descendants is altogether favorable to the Pelagian heresy.

2. Others trace the origin of this heresy to Simon Magus. For in the disputes he held with St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, at the beginning of the nascent Church, he contended that the destruction of free choice followed from the efficacy of the divine will and grace, as St. Clement relates in bk. 3 of the *Recognitiones*. Clement of Alexandria, who flourished in the year 204, also writes in bk. 5 of the *Stromata* that Basilides, Valentinus, and Marcion asserted that man could believe, act well, and be saved through the powers of nature, which is the very heresy of the Pelagians.

3. Finally, others think that Origen was the first, or at least the principal, architect of the Pelagian heresy. Jerome intimates this in the Epistle to Ctesiphon, where, addressing Pelagius, he says: *Do you also wish to know another prince of the offspring of your error? Your doctrine is a little branch of Origen.* Hence Rufinus also, a follower of Origen and translator of his doctrine from Greek, held erroneous views concerning divine grace and the liberty of choice, as is gathered from Jerome's bk. 1, *Commentarii in*

Ieremiam, where he calls Grunnius—the name by which he was accustomed to deride Rufinus—the *precursor of Pelagius*. And St. Caelestius, the associate of Pelagius, when accused at the Council of Carthage of the heresy that denies original sin, openly declared that he followed Rufinus, saying: *The holy priest Rufinus, who remained at Rome with St. Pammachius, said this*. Thus St. Augustine relates in bk. 2, *De peccato originali*, c. 3.

4. From the filth and ashes of those heretics, therefore, the Pelagian heresy sprang forth like a venomous viper; and by the midwifing hand of the Devil that twisted serpent was brought forth, which strove by its poisonous bite to extinguish the whole spirit of God's grace.

Pelagius was a Briton by nationality, as St. Augustine asserts in ep. 106 to Boniface. Hence St. Prosper describes him thus in his poem *De ingratis*:

The British serpent, filled with the gall of the ancient Dragon,
Vomited forth the doctrine in pestilential speech.

By profession, however, he was a monk, as St. Chrysostom testifies especially in ep. 4 to Olympias, where he says: *I have been deeply grieved concerning the monk Pelagius*; and Augustine in *De haeresibus*, heresy 88, and bk. 1, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, c. 16; and Isidore of Pelusium, bk. 1, ep. 314, which concerns Pelagius the monk. Cardinal Baronius, at the year 411, reports that he was one of those who dwelt in Egypt.

St. Augustine frequently affirms that he possessed an excellent and acute intellect and was eloquent in speech. This is also evident from his epistle to the virgin Demetrias, against which St. Augustine wrote another, namely ep. 143, to Juliana, the mother of Demetrias, in which he says: *It cannot be sufficiently expressed how much we desire to find in the writings of those men—which are read by many because of their acuteness and eloquence—an open confession of that grace*.

5. Finally, the same Augustine testifies in bk. 3, *De peccatorum meritis*, c. 1, that he was so upright and religious that he was regarded as a holy man and as one exceptionally advanced in the Christian virtues, in these words: A very few days later I read certain writings of Pelagius, a man who, as I hear, is holy and not a little advanced as a Christian. And in c. 3 he calls him an excellent Christian. Likewise, in bk. 2, *Retractationes*, c. 33, he affirms that the life of Pelagius was praised by many. But the holy Doctor wrote these things about Pelagius while, clothed in sheepskin, he concealed his error. After his bestial ferocity became known, however, he called him a pestilential heretic. For in the same chapter he adds: I mentioned the name of Pelagius himself not without some praise, because his life was praised by many; and I refuted those things that he did not state in his writings in his

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

own person, but set forth as things said by others, though afterward, when already a heretic, he defended them with most obstinate animosity.

Isidore of Pelusium also, in the epistle cited above, after examining the conduct of Pelagius more attentively, says that he was a wanderer who continually migrated from one monastery to another in order to enjoy and inspect everyone's tables: *The multitude of your years has brought you gray hair, and yet you have a rigid and inflexible mind, continually migrating from one monastery to another and examining and inspecting everyone's tables. Therefore, if you are a carnivorous animal and the seasoning of dishes is your concern, flatter rather those who hold public offices and frequent the kitchens of the cities; for hermits do not possess the means to receive you as you would find pleasing.* Orosius testifies to the same in the *Apologia*, where, speaking of Pelagius, he calls him one-eyed and affirms that he took somewhat more care of his skin than was fitting for a monk. Certainly the enemy of Christ's grace could not fail to be a friend of his belly, seeking with abandon the illusory delights of the flesh. He could not, I say, fail to gape after carnal foods, since he did not care to establish his heart by the grace of God; for grace, flowing from the Cross of Christ and his wounds, inspires love of the Cross and contempt for delights and pleasures.

§ 2.

Principal Errors of Pelagius Concerning Grace.

6. The principal errors of Pelagius concerning grace can be reduced to these six: 1^o that man can live without sin; 2^o that he can observe all the divine precepts without grace; 3^o that he can prepare himself for grace without the assistance of grace; 4^o that man can merit without grace; 5^o that the beginning of a good work is from us and its completion from God; 6^o that the grace of God is given according to our merits.

Pelagius derived these errors from another, by which he denied that original sin is contracted by us and derived from Adam into his descendants. From this he inferred that man's free choice had not been weakened or wounded in its natural powers, but remained sound and intact in them. From this he further deduced that it did not require any assistance of grace to give it strength for observing the divine commandments, acquiring good morals, and fulfilling justice; rather, once knowledge of these things was present, free choice itself could accomplish them all through its sound and intact powers.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Hence he denied every assistance of grace, whether efficacious or sufficient, that would give free choice any efficacious or sufficient powers. For he contended that man's choice possessed sufficient, indeed efficacious, powers for observing the divine commandments, and said that those powers remained sound and intact within it. But just as Pelagius denied the necessity of grace from his denial of original sin in the manner explained, so he deduced the denial of original sin from another prior principle, namely the liberty of choice, which he was unable to understand unless he posited it as sound, firm, and strong, without any wound from original sin, just as it had existed in the first parent before sin. Hence he inferred that free choice for good would be extinguished if it were said to have been weakened and wounded by original sin and rendered powerless to observe the divine commandments and fulfill justice. Therefore this pretext of preserving human liberty was the principal cause for which he denied both original sin and the necessity of grace.

§ 3.

The Various Degrees or States of the Pelagian Heresy.

7. Those who have examined the volumes of the holy Fathers more carefully judge that various states or degrees of the Pelagian heresy must be distinguished. The first was a kind of paganism received from the philosophers. In this state the Pelagians, making no mention of grace, said that human nature was sufficient for performing every work of virtue, observing all God's commandments, living without any sin, and finally attaining true and eternal happiness. Hence Pelagius says in c. 2 of his Epistle to the most noble virgin Demetrias: *Whenever I must speak about the formation of morals and the conduct of a holy life, I am accustomed first to display the power and quality of human nature and to show what it can accomplish, and then from this to incite the hearer's mind toward the various virtues, and so forth. For the best encouragements of the mind arise when someone is taught that he can accomplish what he desires.*

8. Augustine censures and condemns this error of Pelagius in various places. In bk. 3, *Contra Iulianum*, c. 3, he writes: This nature, which has collapsed into such great and manifest miseries, has need of Christ as liberator, cleanser, and redeemer—not of Julian, Caelestius, or Pelagius as its eulogist. And in bk. 3, *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, c. 14, he says: We must not praise the Creator in such a way that we are compelled to say—or rather are convicted of saying—that the Savior is superfluous. Let us honor

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

human nature with worthy praises and refer those praises to the glory of the Creator; but let us be grateful that he created us in such a way that we are not ungrateful because he heals us.

9. We have said, however, that this state of Pelagianism pertains more to paganism than to heresy, because the assertion that man is sufficient unto himself, once every assistance of God or another has been rejected, for every virtue, wisdom, and happiness is a pure and unadulterated dream of pagan philosophy. This is clear from the following words of Seneca in ep. 53, foreshadowing Pelagius: *There is something in which the wise man surpasses God: God is wise through the benefit of nature, not his own. Behold a great thing: to possess the weakness of man together with the security of God.* Behold, he thinks that man becomes wise through his own benefit, not through God's assistance. Hence in ep. 20 he says: *Let your thoughts tend toward this; care for this and desire this, leaving all other prayers to God: that you may be content with yourself and with the goods arising from yourself. What happiness can be nearer to God?* As though prayers for the other goods were to be left to God, but man were sufficient unto himself for acquiring the riches of the mind. Therefore he says again in another epistle that *there is one good that is the cause and foundation of the happy life: TRUSTING IN ONESELF.*

Cicero has similar things in *De natura deorum*, where he says in the person of Cotta: Because each man acquires virtue for himself, no one has ever referred it to God as something received from him. For we are rightly praised because of virtue, and rightly glory in virtue; but this would not happen if we possessed it as a gift from God and not from ourselves. Shortly afterward he adds: This is the sole judgment of mortals: fortune must be sought from God, but wisdom must be taken from oneself.

From these impure pools of profane and pagan philosophy seem to have been drawn those words of Pelagius in the Epistle to Demetrias: *Good morals can exist only in you and from you.* Augustine, weighing and correcting these words in the Epistle to Juliana, the mother of Demetrias, says that the statement, *Good morals can exist in you*, is food; but the statement, *only from you*, is poison. Innocent I, writing to the same Juliana in order to correct this depraved doctrine of Pelagius, says: *It is an act of the highest virtue to have conquered the glory of the flesh, and it is a great grace of Christ to have surpassed nobility by good morals*, teaching that good morals are possessed through the grace of Christ. Finally, St. Prosper wrote an epistle to Demetrias herself, in which he instructs her against that perverse doctrine of Pelagius.

10. The second state or degree of the Pelagian heresy was a kind of semi-paganism in which the Pelagians began to acknowledge and proclaim nature itself as grace gratuitously given. For when Pelagius fell into disrepute

among Catholics because he denied the necessity of grace, he applied a certain apparent moderation to his opinion in order to avoid odium and deceive Catholics, and began to understand free choice under the name of grace, because it had been conferred upon us gratuitously by God—that is, without any preceding merits of ours—in our very creation. He also affirmed that grace was necessary for acting well and avoiding sin insofar as, without free choice, we can neither act well nor abstain from evil.

Augustine testifies to this in serm. 11, *De verbis Apostoli*, c. 7, where he says concerning the Pelagians: By disputing against grace in favor of free choice, they rendered free choice suspect and gave offense to Catholics. They began to be abhorred; they began to be avoided as a certain ruin; people began to say of them that they disputed against grace. And they found the following invention to diminish that odium: “I do not,” he says, “dispute against the grace of God.” How do you prove this? “For this very reason,” he says, “I do not dispute against the grace of God, because I defend free choice.” Observe the acuteness, but it is made of glass: it seems to shine through vanity, but it is shattered by truth.

And below, interpreting their invention, the Pelagians say: *Because God created man and endowed him with free choice, whatever man can do by free choice is due to whose grace, if not to the grace of him who created man with that free choice?* By this liberality they understood the natural gift of liberty together with the other things necessary for acting freely that are naturally present in us, such as the faculty of deliberating and weighing reasons and motives for acting or not acting, and the natural inclination toward good and aversion from evil, as Augustine testifies in the same place and in *De haeresibus*, heresy 88, and Jerome in ep. 1 to Ctesiphon and bk. 1 of the *Dialogus contra Pelagianos*.

11. This state differs from the preceding only in name. For it proclaims entirely the same powers of nature, with this sole difference: that it sets forth the cause that gratuitously gave nature such great powers and uses the name of grace, lest it seem entirely to have disregarded grace. We have said, however, that it can be called *semi-paganism*, because even the pagan philosophers acknowledged that grace, although they did not employ the name. Hence Seneca says in ep. 90: *Who can doubt that the fact that we live is the gift of the immortal gods, while the fact that we live well is the gift of philosophy? Therefore we owe more to philosophy than to the gods by as much as the good life is a greater benefit than life itself.* Do you hear the pride exalting itself against God and above God? Yet lest he seem altogether forgetful of divine grace, as though ashamed, he corrects his arrogance by adding: *We would certainly owe more to it, had not the gods themselves bestowed philosophy.*

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

12. Pelagius did not remain long in this state and in proclaiming this merely natural grace. For when Catholics immediately understood that they were being deceived and that the same nature was again being imposed upon them under the name of grace, they mocked and condemned this confession of grace as entirely fraudulent. Therefore Pelagius, still assailed by the rebukes of the faithful and wishing to avoid them, fled to another kind of grace distinct from nature and free choice, namely the divinely transmitted law and doctrine, whose assistance he confessed man required in order to turn from evil and do good.

Hence Augustine says of the Pelagians in *De spiritu et littera*, c. 2: When they begin to be accused of asserting the grace of God in such a way that they say these things are done without divine assistance, they restrain themselves and do not dare admit this statement, because they see how impious and intolerable it is. But they say that these things are not done without divine assistance because God created man with free choice of the will and, by giving commandments, himself teaches how man ought to live. And below: When someone has become ashamed to say that we make ourselves just by ourselves, and so forth, because he sees that this cannot be believed by the faithful and pious, he turns to saying that we cannot be just without the operation of God's grace because God gave the law, instituted doctrine, and commanded good precepts.

13. Hence, in order better to establish this invention concerning the grace of law and doctrine, the Pelagians extolled the law with great praises, as the same holy Doctor testifies in bk. 4 to Boniface, c. 5, where he cites these words of Pelagius from the Epistle to Demetrias: By the law, as by a file, nature is polished and restored to its former splendor. And these: As long as the exercise of a still more recent nature retained its vigor, and the long custom of sinning had not yet drawn a kind of mist over human reason, nature was left without the law. But when nature had been excessively overwhelmed by vices and infected by a kind of rust of ignorance, the Lord applied to it the file of the law, so that by its frequent admonition it might be polished and be able to return to its own splendor.

Therefore, just as the earlier heretics divided Christ, some denying the truth of his Godhead and others the truth of his flesh, so Pelagius made his Cross void. For, as the Apostle says in Gal. 2: *If justice comes through the law, then Christ died without cause.*

14. This is the third, or rather the second, state of the Pelagian heresy, which differs from paganism and inclines toward Judaism. For at the beginning of the nascent Church many of the Jews, chief among whom was Cerinthus, held erroneous views concerning the grace of Christ and taught

that they were justified through the law, with free choice being sufficient to observe it. Against them the Apostle wrote the Epistle to the Romans, in which he explains at length the mysteries of divine grace and predestination, as Jerome seems to hold in the preface to the Epistle to the Galatians.

15. To the doctrine of the law the Pelagians added the examples of Christ and the remission of sins. In the first ages, from Adam to Moses, they said that the natural law was sufficient, because on account of the integrity of the first condition, which still persisted, the vigor of the natural law, and the unwounded liberty of choice, no other grace was needed. Later, as license and the habit of sinning gradually increased, nature, corrupted by bad education and depraved examples, required the assistance of the written law, which God gave through Moses. And since afterward that law was no longer sufficient for living piously and holily because of the excessive corruption of the human race that had become deeply rooted through the habit of sinning, Christ came as the physician of so great a disease, to heal men by his medicinal grace and to provide the remission of sins, the doctrine of the Gospel, and examples of the virtues.

Hence Augustine says in *De peccato originali*, c. 26: Therefore let us not divide the ages as Pelagius and his disciples do, saying that just men lived first under nature, then under the law, and third under grace: under nature, namely, from Adam through the long age in which the law had not yet been given; for then, they say, the Creator was known under the guidance of reason, and the manner in which one ought to live was written in hearts, not by the law of the letter but by the law of nature. But when, as they say, corrupted morals began to render discolored nature insufficient, the law was added to it, so that by the law as by a file, once the rust had been scraped away, nature might be restored to its former splendor. But afterward, when the excessive habit of sinning, as they argue, had prevailed, and the law had little power to heal it, Christ came; and as physician he himself, not through his disciples but in person, came to the aid of a most desperate disease.

16. Therefore, lest the Pelagians appear to be enemies of God's grace, they devised many kinds of grace. They called the natural choice of the will itself grace; they confessed that the law of Moses had been necessary, by which, as by a file, nature might be restored to its former splendor after its rust had been scraped away; they admitted divine doctrine and revelation, which shows us what we ought to do; and they proclaimed that the remission of sins and the examples of Christ were necessary for the right ordering of life. Hence in philosophy they were pagans, under the law Jews, Christians in name alone, and Proteus in mutability, transforming themselves into various forms in order to abolish the true grace of Christ.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

These things are certain and indubitable among all theologians. But there are certain difficulties and controversies among them that must be discussed and resolved briefly in the following questions.

17. You will therefore ask first whether Pelagius, in addition to those external graces already explained, finally admitted any interior grace, and whether a third or fourth state of the Pelagian heresy must therefore be admitted.

I answer that, after many disputes held with St. Augustine and the other holy Fathers, Pelagius finally admitted an interior grace enlightening the intellect and morally exciting the will. This is clear from Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, c. 7, where he reports the words of Pelagius: God assists us through revelation and doctrine, when he opens the eyes of our heart, when he shows us future things, when he discloses the snares of the Devil, and when he enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace. And in c. 10 he again introduces him as speaking thus: He works in us the willing of what is good, the willing of what is holy, when he inflames us—devoted to earthly desires and, like dumb animals, loving only present things—by the greatness of future glory and the attraction of rewards; when by the revelation of wisdom he awakens the astonished will to the desire of God; when he persuades us—something that elsewhere, however, he did not deserve to deny—to everything that is good.

By these final words, *something that elsewhere, however, he did not deserve to deny*, Augustine openly declares that at the beginning of his heresy Pelagius denied grace enlightening the intellect and morally exciting the will, but afterward—that is, after the Council of Palestine and the many contests held with Augustine himself and the other holy Fathers—he admitted it.

The holy Doctor nevertheless adds in the same place that Pelagius did not thereby depart from his commendation of law and doctrine, since the function and office of law and doctrine is to teach, enlighten, and show what must be done, and to exhort, persuade, and excite a man to it, but not to give the powers for acting and fulfilling the commandments, as he pursues at length throughout *De spiritu et littera*. Hence in c. 24 of the cited *De gratia Christi*, speaking of the Pelagians and refuting their doctrine, he says: *Therefore let them understand, consider, and confess that God works in the hearts of men, not through law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an interior, hidden, marvelous, and ineffable power, producing not only true revelations—as the Pelagians confessed and believed sufficient—but also good will.*

Likewise, St. Prosper in the poem *De ingratis* explicitly teaches that the true grace of Christ not only enlightens the intellect and excites the will, but also reforms and changes it interiorly, as is clear from these verses:

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

*Grace does not merely persuade and teach
By counsel and kindly exhortation, as though it possessed
Only the norm of law; it changes and reforms
The mind within, fashioning by creative power
A new vessel from one that was shattered.*

Hence William Estius, principal professor of the Academy of Douai, writes as follows in the second argument of a certain work of his on efficacious grace: Knowledge of what must be done and avoided pertains to the law. For through the law, says the Apostle, comes knowledge of sin. To the same category belong every illumination, inspiration, exhortation, conception, terror, and persuasion, both interior and exterior, so long as they do not touch the affection or soften the heart. But the proper effect of grace is love, obedience, a good will, a new heart, and a new spirit. Therefore, although Pelagius, in placing the grace of Christ in law and doctrine, did not exclude from it divine inspirations and persuasions, the Fathers did not judge him for this reason to hold a right and sincere confession of grace.

In these words he states two things worthy of note that we intend: first, that Pelagius admitted interior revelations and persuasions from God, indeed inspirations; second, that through these he did not depart from the commendation of law and doctrine.

18. You will ask second whether Pelagius admitted an assistance of possibility, that is, one by which the power to act is given to us.

I answer affirmatively. This is clear from Augustine, *De gratia Christi*, c. 3, where he says concerning Pelagius: Since he establishes and distinguishes three things by which he says that the divine commandments are fulfilled—possibility, will, and action—namely, possibility, by which a man can be just; will, by which he wills to be just; and action, by which he is just: of these three, he confesses that the first, namely possibility, was given by the Creator of nature and is not in our power, but is possessed by us even if we do not will it. But he asserts that the other two, namely will and action, are ours, and so attributes them to us that he contends that they come from no one but ourselves. Finally, he says that God's grace assists, not those two things that he says are entirely ours, namely will and action, but the thing that is not in our power and comes to us from God, namely possibility; as though those things that are ours, namely will and action, were so strong for turning from evil and doing good that they did not need divine assistance, while the thing that comes to us from God, namely possibility, were so weak that it must always be assisted by the help of grace.

And in the following chapter he introduces Pelagius as speaking thus: We distinguish these three things and divide them as though arranged in a fixed

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

order. In the first place we set the power to act; in the second, the will; in the third, the actual being. We place the power to act in nature, the will in choice, and actual being in the effect. The first, namely the power to act, properly pertains to God, who conferred it upon his creature. But the other two, namely willing and actual being, must be referred to man, because they descend from the fountain of choice. Therefore, in a good will and work the praise belongs to man—indeed, to man and to God, who gave the possibility of the will and work and always assists that possibility by the help of his grace. But the fact that man can will and accomplish the good belongs to God alone.

And shortly afterward: To embrace everything in general: that we can do, say, or think every good thing belongs to him who bestowed this power and assists this power; but that we actually do, speak, or think well belongs to us, because we can also turn all these things to evil.

And in c. 5 of the same book Augustine says concerning Pelagius: He took care to distinguish possibility, will, and action with such subtlety that whenever we read or hear him confess the assistance of divine grace, whether he places it in law and doctrine or anywhere else, we may know what he is speaking about and not hesitate by understanding him otherwise than he intends. For we must know that he does not believe that our will or action is assisted by divine aid, but only the possibility of willing and acting, which alone of these three he affirms that we possess from God. It is as though this thing that God himself placed in nature were so weak, while the other two, which he wished to be ours, were so firm, strong, and sufficient unto themselves that they needed none of his assistance. Therefore God does not assist us to will or to act, but only assists us so that we may possess the power to will and act.

Finally, the same holy Doctor in c. 47 reduces the whole controversy concerning the assistance of grace to this single point: that Pelagius must confess an assistance not only of possibility, but also of will and action. He adds: Therefore, if Pelagius confesses to us that not only possibility in man, but also the will and action themselves, are assisted by God, then, as far as I judge, no controversy concerning the assistance of God's grace remains between us.

From these things it is manifest that Augustine disputed against the Pelagians especially concerning efficacious grace. Hence he teaches such grace very openly in various places and defends it against the Pelagians.

First, he says in c. 24 of *De gratia Christi*: Therefore let the Pelagians read and understand; let them consider and confess that God works in the hearts of men, not through law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an

interior and hidden, marvelous and ineffable power, producing not only true revelations but also good wills. But grace that produces good wills by a marvelous and ineffable power does not merely excite and move morally, but is efficacious of itself.

Second, in c. 45 of the same book he speaks as follows concerning the conversion and repentance of St. Peter after his threefold denial of Christ: The Lord looked upon him, but the Lord is within. In his mercy the Lord came secretly to his aid, touched his heart, recalled his memory, visited Peter by his interior grace, and moved and led the affection of the interior man even to outward tears. Behold how God is present by assisting our wills and actions. Behold how he works in us both willing and working. Who can deny that grace efficacious of itself is signified and delineated by these words and characteristics?

Third, in bk. 1 to Boniface, c. 18, he says: How many enemies are suddenly drawn each day to Christ by the hidden grace of God! Yet no one comes unless he wills. Therefore he is drawn in marvelous ways so that he may will, by him who knows how to work within the hearts of men—not so that men may believe unwillingly, which cannot occur, but so that they may be made willing from unwilling men. Here also it is evident that the holy Doctor speaks of efficacious grace, which works within the hearts of men so that they are made willing from unwilling men.

He also speaks of it in c. 20 of the same book when he says: By the power of this most hidden and most efficacious grace, God converted the heart of King Ahasuerus and transferred it from indignation to gentleness, that is, from the will to harm to the will to favor the Jews.

He also speaks of it in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 16, when he says: It is certain that we act when we act; but he causes us to act by furnishing most efficacious strength to the will, who said: “I will cause you to walk in my justifications,” and so forth.

He likewise speaks of it in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 8: Therefore this grace, which by divine liberality is secretly bestowed upon human hearts, is rejected by no hard heart. For it is bestowed precisely so that hardness of heart may first be removed.

Finally, he says of it in c. 10 of *De gratia Christi*: Pelagius must confess this grace if he wishes not only to be called, but truly to be, a Christian.

20. You will ask third whether Pelagius admitted the grace of cooperation and joint causality.

I answer affirmatively, and prove it first from St. Jerome at the beginning of bk. 1, *Contra Pelagianos*, where he reports that Pelagius said: Whatever good I possess within myself, I have completed through his suggestion and

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

assistance. When Jerome asks him, “Is the good you do yours or God’s?” he answers: It is mine and God’s: I act, and he assists.

I prove it second from St. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, c. 32, and bk. 1, *Ad Simplicianum*, q. 2, where he clearly supposes that Pelagius taught: The Apostle therefore said, “It is not of him who wills or of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” because it comes about from both, that is, from man’s will and God’s mercy; as though he said that man’s will alone is not sufficient unless God’s mercy is also present. Therefore he supposes that Pelagius admitted the grace of cooperation and joint causality.

21. You will ask fourth whether the Pelagians finally admitted the true grace of Christ, which causes willing and working.

Some answer with Jansenius that, after Pelagius had been condemned everywhere, the Pelagians somewhat relaxed their obstinacy and admitted the true grace of Christ that causes willing and working, but adulterated and corrupted it in two ways: 1^o because they said that such grace was not given gratuitously, but on account of merit; 2^o because they affirmed that it was required not for the beginning of a good work but only for its perfection and completion. Thus at that time they began to decline toward Semipelagianism.

Hence Augustine says in bk. 2 to Boniface, c. 8: These men—he is speaking of the Pelagians—wish the desire for the good to begin in man from man himself, so that grace may follow upon the merit of this beginning in order to perfect it.

And in *De haeresibus*, heresy 88, he says: Finally, when Pelagius was rebuked by the brethren because he attributed nothing to the assistance of God’s grace, he yielded to their correction only to this extent: not that he placed grace before free choice, but that by an unfaithful craftiness he placed it after free choice, saying that grace is given to men so that they may more easily fulfill through grace those things that they are commanded to do through free choice.

22. But although from these and similar testimonies of Augustine cited by Jansenius it is manifest that, after the condemnation of their heresy under Pope Zosimus, the Pelagians began to decline toward Semipelagianism and to teach that grace is given on account of the merits of a good will and is required only for acting more easily, it nevertheless remains doubtful and uncertain whether they then admitted the true grace of Christ that causes us to will and act.

For Augustine in c. 47 of *De gratia Christi*, which he published after the condemnation of the Pelagian heresy by Pope Zosimus, as he himself says in bk. 2, *Retractationes*, c. 50, reduces the whole controversy between himself and Pelagius concerning the assistance of grace to this point: that Pelagius

confess an assistance not only of possibility, but also of will and action. He adds that if Pelagius were willing to admit such assistance, *then, as far as I judge, no controversy concerning the assistance of God's grace would remain between us.*

Augustine certainly ought not to have said this if Pelagius at that time admitted efficacious grace, which gives willing and working, though as given on account of merits and useful, but not necessary, for attaining perfection and salvation. Rather, he ought to have asserted that, if Pelagius would concede such grace as purely gratuitous and necessary for willing and working, no dispute concerning the grace of Christ would remain between them.

I add that the same holy Doctor, in *De haeresibus*, which he wrote at the end of his life and left incomplete because death overtook him, affirms that Pelagius, however variable, changeable in color, and multiform, always persisted in this: that he placed all grace in law and doctrine.

23. But you will say: What, then, was the grace that the Pelagians finally admitted and adulterated in the aforesaid ways, saying that it was given on account of merits and required only for acting more easily?

I answer that the assistance admitted by the Pelagians at that time was something beyond the law and the common knowledge of the commandments: namely, a special illumination received through a revelation of the Holy Spirit, which also affected the power and not merely the object, that is, an assistance elevating the intellect to perceive more perfectly the law and doctrine revealed by the Holy Spirit.

This is gathered from Augustine in the frequently cited *De gratia Christi*, which he published against Pelagius and Caelestius after the Pelagian heresy had been condemned by Pope Zosimus. For in c. 7, after reporting the words of Pelagius, God furnishes the assistance of his grace so that men may more easily fulfill through grace what they are commanded to do through free choice, he adds concerning the same Pelagius: And as though he had explained what grace he means, he added: "We confess that this grace exists not merely in the law, as you suppose, but also in the assistance of God."

Here he seems to posit some assistance beyond the law, or the knowledge of God's commandments, which he says is given for acting more easily. But what this assistance is and of what kind is clear from the words Augustine adds: Who would not desire him to show what grace he wishes to be understood? For this is what we especially ought to expect from him when he says that he confesses grace not only in the law. But he keeps us in suspense concerning this expectation when he adds: "Observe: God assists us," he says, "through his doctrine and revelation, when he opens the eyes of

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

our heart; when he shows us future things, lest we be occupied with present things; when he discloses the snares of the Devil; and when he enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace.”

Behold how Pelagius acknowledged the grace of interior illumination, not as simply and absolutely necessary for fulfilling the precepts of the law, but as useful for observing them better and more easily.

24. You will say again: The grace of illumination is reduced to law and doctrine, as we showed above from Augustine. But the grace Pelagius admitted after his heresy had been condemned by Pope Zosimus is not reduced to law and doctrine, since Augustine calls it *a great assistance of divine grace* and says that God must be blessed because the Pelagians finally admitted such grace. Therefore Pelagius admitted another grace distinct from the grace of illumination.

I answer that the grace of illumination is twofold. One affects the object and pertains to its sufficient presentation or application. Pelagius admitted this even before he was condemned by Pope Zosimus. The other affects the power, or intellect, by which it is strengthened and elevated to understand more profoundly the object proposed in such a manner. Pelagius admitted this only after his heresy was condemned by Pope Zosimus. Since this grace strengthens and fortifies the power, it does not pertain to the law, whose function is merely to manifest and propose the object; and therefore Augustine calls it *a great assistance of grace*.

25. You will ask fifth whether the Pelagians acknowledged habitual grace, which sanctifies and cleanses from sins.

I answer affirmatively, against Suárez. First, because Pelagius was never accused of denying such grace, and there was no dispute concerning it between the Pelagians and the holy Fathers, but only concerning actual grace, as Vásquez candidly admits in disp. 196, c. 3, n. 13, in these words: The Scholastics who thought that the dispute with Pelagius concerned the necessity of habitual grace and the remission of sins for observing the commandments fell into error through ignorance of the term and of history, supposing that by the name of grace habitual grace and the remission of sins were understood.

Second, because according to the Pelagians Baptism added some supernatural gift. For Julian says in Augustine, bk. 1, *Contra Iulianum*, c. 6: For this reason we baptize infants, even though they are not defiled by sin, so that sanctity, justice, adoption, inheritance, and brotherhood with Christ may be given or added to them, and so that they may be his members.

Lest it be said that by this sanctity conferred upon infants in Baptism Julian understood merely God’s external benevolence and favor, producing

nothing within them, he must again be heard in Augustine, bk. 1 of the *Opus imperfectum*, fol. 58, where, speaking of baptismal grace, he says: *We believe this grace to be enriched with spiritual gifts, abundant in many favors, and venerable for its virtues.* By these words Julian openly professes that baptismal grace is a supernatural gift received in the soul and adorning it with various endowments.

26. You will say: Augustine in *De gratia Christi*, c. 30, affirms that he could never find in the writings of Pelagius and Caelestius the grace by which we are justified and by which the charity of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Pelagians did not admit the gift of habitual grace.

I answer that Augustine does not say absolutely that he could not find in the writings of Pelagius and Caelestius that grace by which we are justified, and so forth, but adds: *in the manner in which it must be confessed.* For habitual grace and the infused habits flowing from it must be admitted not merely for sanctifying, cleansing, and adorning the soul, but also for impelling the soul together with its powers toward supernatural acts. The Pelagians did not admit such gifts in relation to this use, since they admitted no supernatural assistance applying free choice to action.

27. From these things the falsity of the opinion of a certain anonymous Parisian of the Congregation of the Oratory is clearly apparent. He asserts that the grace concerning which St. Augustine disputed against the Pelagians was habitual and not actual grace.

First, because Pelagius did not deny habitual grace, as we have just shown, but only actual grace, especially grace efficacious of itself, since he could not conceive how the liberty of our choice could coexist with it. Hence Pelagius said in Jerome's Epistle to Ctesiphon: *There is no free choice if it needs God's assistance.*

Second, St. Augustine treats against the Pelagians of the grace necessary to those who are justified for living rightly, just as light is necessary for healthy eyes in order to see. Hence he says in *De natura et gratia*, c. 26: *Just as the bodily eye, even if perfectly healthy, cannot see unless assisted by the brightness of light, so man, even if perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless he is divinely assisted by the eternal light of justice.* Therefore, just as light is an assisting thing that comes to the eye and does not inhere or remain within it, so the grace of which Augustine speaks in disputing against Pelagius does not remain within the soul and is not habitual, but actual.

Third, the grace that was the subject of dispute between Augustine and the Pelagians is grace given without any preceding merits or previous disposition, since it is itself the principle of merit and of every suitable

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

disposition. Hence he says in ep. 105: *Nor would this be grace if it were not given gratuitously, but were rendered as something owed.* But habitual grace can be given after certain preceding merits and dispositions, namely acts of faith, contrition, and charity preceding justification and disposing for it. Hence Augustine says in the same place: *But even the remission of sins is not without some merit if faith obtains it, for the merit of faith is not nothing.* Therefore the grace that was the subject of dispute between Augustine and the Pelagians was not habitual, but actual.

Finally, the celebrated division of grace into assistance without which something does not occur and assistance by which something occurs, which Augustine treats at length against the Pelagians in *De correptione et gratia*, manifestly declares that he is not speaking of habitual grace, but of actual grace, sufficient and efficacious. For the very name of assistance indicates actual grace rather than habitual grace. Therefore the controversy between Augustine and the Pelagians concerned the former, not the latter.

28. You will ask sixth whether the Pelagians or Semipelagians erred concerning free choice.

I answer that they erred concerning free choice in two ways.

First, because they thought that the will of fallen man remained in a perfect equilibrium, as it had been in the state of innocence, and was equally inclined toward good and evil. Therefore they said that free choice was not wounded or weakened through Adam's sin and that, by reason of concupiscence, it did not incline more strongly toward a pleasurable good contrary to reason than toward an honorable good consonant with reason. St. Prosper reports this of the Semipelagians in the Epistle to Augustine prefixed to *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, where he says that they affirmed: *Each man has as much ability for good as for evil, and the soul moves itself toward vice or virtue with equal weight.*

Second, because they defined the liberty of choice in general by indifference toward good and evil, so that they said no one was free unless he could act indifferently well or badly. This is clear from Augustine in bk. 1 of the *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum*, p. 150, where he reproves Julian and the other Pelagians because they restricted liberty taken generally to an indifferent power concerning good and evil, or one that could do both good and evil. For it would follow from this that neither God, nor the angels, nor blessed men, who cannot sin or desire or choose evil, would be free. He says: *If nothing is free unless it can will two things—that is, good and evil—then God is not free, since he cannot will evil. Yet you yourself said of him that God cannot be anything but just. Do you praise God in such a way as to take liberty away from him?*

CHAPTER II.
The Semipelagian Heresy.

Three matters concerning the Semipelagian heresy must be explained briefly here: namely, where it took its origin, what the principal doctrines of the Semipelagians were, and who were the principal authors or followers of this heresy.

§ 1.

Origin of the Semipelagian Heresy.

1. On the occasion of St. Augustine's writings against the Pelagians, two errors concerning grace, opposed to one another, arose, one in Africa and the other in Gaul. The first was that of the monks of Hadrumetum, who, as St. Augustine relates in the penultimate chapter of bk. 2 of the *Retractationes*, were divided into two parties after reading his ep. 105 to Sixtus. One party, under the leadership of Florus, said that St. Augustine proclaimed the grace of God in such a manner that he destroyed the liberty of choice and the necessity of correction. The other party fought in defense of free choice and denied the efficacy of grace in order to defend the liberty of choice.

In order to remove this dissension and resolve that discord, the holy Doctor wrote two epistles to Valentinus, the superior of the monastery of Hadrumetum, and the same number of books: one *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, and the other *De correptione et gratia*. In these he clearly showed that the efficacy of divine grace does not destroy the liberty of choice or the necessity and usefulness of correction, as he himself testifies in bk. 2, *Retractationes*, c. 66, in these words: Because of those who, when the grace of God is defended, think that free choice is taken away, I wrote the book *De gratia et libero arbitrio*. I wrote it to the monks of Hadrumetum, in whose monastery a controversy concerning this matter had arisen, so that some of them were compelled to consult me. Again, I wrote another book to the same men, which I entitled *De correptione et gratia*, when it was reported to me that someone there had said that no man should be corrected if he does not fulfill God's commandments, but prayer alone should be made for him so that he may fulfill them.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

2. But on the occasion of this second book a second error arose in Gaul, at Marseilles, almost at the very end of St. Augustine's life. For when certain priests of Marseilles and bishops of Gaul read in it what had been written concerning the purpose of the divine will and predestination, by which those to be saved are distinguished from those to perish, and concerning the efficacy of divine grace, by which our will is infallibly moved, they were greatly disturbed and scandalized. Thus the Africans, more fully instructed, laid aside their error, while the Gauls, blinded by the sight of a new light, fell into various errors.

Prosper testifies to this at the beginning of his Epistle to Augustine, where he says: Many servants of Christ who dwell in the city of Marseilles think that whatever you have argued in your writings against the Pelagian heretics concerning the calling of the elect according to God's purpose is contrary to the opinion of the Fathers and the sense of the Church. For some time they preferred to blame their own slowness rather than condemn things they did not understand, and some of them wished to request from your Beatitude a clearer and more open explanation of this matter. It then happened by the disposition of God's mercy that, when certain men had raised questions among the African brethren, you issued the book *De correptione et gratia*, full of divine authority. When this book was brought to our knowledge with unexpected timeliness, we thought that all the complaints of the opponents would be silenced, because all the questions concerning which your Holiness had to be consulted were answered in it so fully and completely that it was as though you had made a special effort to settle the matters that were disturbed among us. But when this book of your Beatitude had been read, just as those who already followed the holy and apostolic doctrine on your authority were rendered far more understanding and instructed, so those who were hindered by the obscurity of their own persuasion withdrew in still greater opposition than before.

3. Therefore the beginning of the Semipelagian heresy arose among the people of Marseilles, who for this reason were called Semipelagians, or remnants of the Pelagians, because, although they departed from the doctrine of Pelagius in many respects, they nevertheless adhered to him in some, especially in saying that the first grace and calling were given on account of the merits of a good will.

Some nevertheless think that Vitalis of Carthage began Semipelagianism in Africa. For he said that the beginning of faith came from free choice, not from the motion of grace, and was not a gift of God, but existed in us from ourselves, as will be clear below when we discuss the principal authors and followers of the Semipelagian heresy.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 2.

Principal Doctrines of the Semipelagians.

4. The principal doctrines of the Semipelagians can be reduced to two principal headings. The first concerns predestination, regarding which they erred in many ways, but especially because they contended that there was no calling of the elect according to purpose and asserted that predestination, both to grace and to glory, was not gratuitous.

For they said that God had foreknown who would give faith and obedience to his calling and would persevere, and that he had chosen those men and rejected the others. St. Prosper testifies that they held this view in the Epistle to St. Augustine, in these words: Before the foundation of the world God foreknew who would believe and who would remain in that faith, which afterward would be assisted by God's grace, and according to his foreknowledge he predestined to his kingdom those whom he foresaw would be worthy of future election after being called gratuitously, and would depart from this life with a good end.

Consequently upon this assertion, they maintained that, in determining the lot of men and predestining some to the kingdom while rejecting others, God acted from a certain conditional knowledge of merits or sins that, although they would never actually exist, would nevertheless come to be if some condition were posited, and that he took account of this in his election.

This is clear from Sts. Prosper and Hilary in their Epistles to Augustine. St. Prosper says: They subject God's election to fictitious merits to such an extent that, because past merits do not exist, they assign future merits that will never be future; and in a new kind of absurdity among them, things not to be done are foreknown, and things foreknown are not done.

Hilary writes as follows concerning the same men: When it is said to them, "Why is the Gospel preached to some, or in certain places, and not to others?" they say that this pertains to divine foreknowledge: truth was or is announced at that time, in that place, and to that person when and where it was foreknown that it would be believed, and so forth.

When they were pressed by the examples of infants, who possess no merits in view of which they might be predestined to God's kingdom and no demerits, apart from original sin, for which they might be condemned to eternal death, they answered, according to the same Prosper, that *such*

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

infants perish and are condemned as divine knowledge foresaw they would have been in more advanced years if they had been preserved to adult age.

5. From this capital error the Semipelagians deduced various corollaries as errors from errors, so that what is read concerning the body of Behemoth, or the Devil, in Job 41 might be verified: *His body is like shields cast together, compacted with scales pressing upon one another. One is joined to another, and not even a breath passes between them.*

First, therefore, they asserted that the number of the predestined was not fixed, but that some were enrolled in this order each day and others erased. Hence Prosper says: Nor do they consent that the predestined number of the elect can neither be increased nor diminished, lest exhortations possess no power to arouse the unbelieving and negligent, and lest the imposition of effort and labor be superfluous, since its application would be frustrated if election had ceased. Hilary says: Hence they likewise do not admit that the number of those to be chosen and rejected is fixed.

Second, they said that Christ died equally for all and distributed the price of his death equally to all, and that no greater benefits flowed from Christ's death into the vessels of mercy than into the vessels of wrath. Prosper says: *This is their profession: the propitiation contained in the sacrament of Christ's blood is proposed to all men without exception, so that whoever wishes to approach faith and Baptism may be saved.*

Third, they said that the distinction among men was not made by God's will alone, but by natural liberty placed under a grace that enlightened the mind but did not move the will. They said that it was as true to assert, *The faithful man obeys and becomes devout because he willed*, as to say, *The transgressor did not obey because he did not will*; and that *the soul moves itself toward vice or virtue with equal weight, possessing as much ability for good as for evil, so that God's grace supports one who seeks good, while a just condemnation receives one who pursues evil.*

Prosper explains this error of the Semipelagians in the Epistle to Augustine, and elegantly describes that general grace in c. 15 of the poem *De ingratīs*:

*You alone wish to be ungrateful, whom grace burns,
For you wish its whole work to depend upon your choice.
And because not all mortals enter the courts of life,
You think this depends upon themselves in such a way
That the entry of each man proceeds as much from his judgment
As does his failure to enter; as though in each power alike
There were peace, so that willing good were as proper
To man as willing evil.*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Fourth, they alleged that Augustine's teaching concerning gratuitous and efficacious predestination introduced a fatal necessity, furnished an occasion for negligence, tepidity, and even despair, and therefore ought not to be preached because it would give offense to many.

Prosper and Hilary report this in their Epistles to St. Augustine. St. Prosper says: This purpose of God's will, by which a distinction is said to have been made between those to be chosen and those to be rejected either before the beginning of the world or in the very creation of the human race, so that according to the Creator's good pleasure one was created for honor and another for dishonor, is said to remove from the fallen all concern for rising again and to furnish the saints with an occasion of tepidity, because in either case labor is superfluous if no rejected man can enter by any diligence and no elect man can fall away through any negligence. However they conduct themselves, nothing can happen to them other than what God has determined concerning them; and therefore no one can remain content under an uncertain hope. For if the election of the predestining God possesses one result, the intention of the one who admonishes has no purpose. Thus all diligence is removed and the virtues are destroyed if God's decrees precede human wills; and under the name of predestination a kind of fatal necessity is introduced, or else the Lord is said to be the Creator of diverse natures, if no one can be anything other than what he was made.

6. Finally, another principal and capital doctrine of the Semipelagians concerned the beginning of faith and of a good will. As Hilary reports in the Epistle to Augustine, they distinguished in our will the powers for acting well from the powers for desiring well, asking, believing, and so forth, which pertained to the beginning of a good operation.

They added that, while our will was intact before the fall, it could not merely ask and desire, but also will and act well. Therefore grace at that time assisted a man already willing and acting well, or assisted his good will. But after nature had been corrupted through original sin, they did not wish powers for acting well and willing rightly—which are operations of a healthy man—to remain in us, but only powers for desiring salvation and asking for a remedy. They said that these powers were certain seeds of the virtues naturally implanted in our soul.

And because no one can desire salvation and ask for it unless he first believes in a Savior, they therefore affirmed that the affection of belief also came from our will and preceded the grace of Christ. Thus, although a sick man does not possess the strength to walk and perform the other works of a healthy man, he can nevertheless desire health, seek a physician, and ask for medicine.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

Hence they placed these beginnings of a good will not only in the affection of belief, but also in petition, knocking, the desire for health, and similar imperfect acts. They said that these things had to be presupposed in men so that God might give grace for eliciting faith, hope, love, and other perfect acts. Thus God's grace supported only a man already desiring good, in such a way that our obedience was prior to God's grace, and God awaited our wills so that we might will to be cleansed and healed, but did not cause us through his grace to seek and desire the health of the soul.

They asserted this both lest God appear unjust and a respecter of persons by anticipating some through his grace while leaving and despising others, and lest the natural liberty of our choice and its inclination toward good appear entirely extinguished through original sin if man could not even desire and ask for his own health and implore the physician's aid.

Hence Hilary says of the people of Marseilles in the Epistle to Augustine: They maintain that it is consonant with truth and appropriate for preaching that, when an opportunity for obtaining salvation is announced to men who have been cast down and will never rise by their own powers, by the merit that they have willed and believed that they can be healed of their disease, they obtain both the increase of that faith and the effect of their whole sanctity.

7. What they said concerning the beginning of faith, they thought must likewise be said concerning perseverance in it until the end: namely, that each must equally be ascribed to the human will. St. Augustine testifies to this in *De bono perseverantiae*, c. 17, where he says: These men place the beginning of faith and perseverance in it until the end in our power in such a way that they do not think them to be gifts of God and do not think that God works our thoughts and wills so that we may possess and retain them. But they concede that he gives the other things when they are obtained from him by the faith of one who believes. And below: "But," they say, "the faith that begins from us obtains these things from God for us; and we possess the beginning of this faith and remain in it until the end as something that is ours, as though we did not receive it from the Lord."

Hence in St. Prosper they referred faith and permanence in faith to foreknowledge, not to predestination, saying: Before the foundation of the world God foreknew who would believe and who would remain in that faith, which afterward would be assisted by God's grace, and predestined them.

8. They also erred concerning perseverance in the virtues and their works. Although they confessed that it was to be numbered among God's gifts, they nevertheless did not wish any gift of perseverance to be given by which the saints and predestined would certainly and infallibly persevere, or

by which they would be nothing other than men acting well and persevering in good works, such as Augustine teaches in cc. 11 and 12 of *De correptione et gratia*.

Hilary reports this in the Epistle to Augustine, where he writes concerning the people of Marseilles: They are displeased that the grace given to the first man and the grace now given to all are distinguished in this way: that the first man received perseverance, not by which he was caused to persevere, but without which he could not persevere through free choice; while now the saints predestined by grace to the kingdom are given not such an assistance of perseverance, but one by which perseverance itself is bestowed upon them—not only so that they cannot persevere without this gift, but also so that through this gift they are nothing other than persevering men. They are so disturbed by these words of your Holiness—*De correptione et gratia*, cc. 11 and 12—that they say a kind of despair is presented to men.

From this it is clear that, although those heretics willingly admitted a sufficient assistance subject to the will, by which the will can act if it wills, they altogether rejected an assistance efficacious of itself and by its own nature, which subjects the will to itself, applies it to action, and is infallibly joined with the act, because they falsely thought that the liberty and indifference of our will could not coexist with such assistance.

9. You will ask first whether the Semipelagians, in maintaining that the beginning of faith came from us, excluded every necessity of interior grace and placed that beginning in bare nature.

I answer that three opinions of authors are found in the resolution of this difficulty.

The first is that of Jansenius in bk. 8, *De haeresi Pelagiana*, asserting that the Semipelagians excluded from the beginning of faith and of a good will only efficacious and physically prevenient grace, but not the necessity of sufficient grace that merely prevented and excited morally, because they thought the former harmed liberty and rendered correction useless, but did not think this of the latter. Our Contenson holds the same in vol. 5, *Theologia mentis et cordis*, p. 387.

The second teaches that, although some Semipelagians admitted for the beginning of faith an indifferent grace awaiting the determination of free choice, others nevertheless removed every grace entirely from it and placed it in bare nature. Thus Francis of St. Augustine Macedo, a Franciscan, in the short work entitled *Mens divinitus inspirata, Sanctissimo Patri Innocentio Papa X super quinque propositiones Cornelii Jansenii*, a. 5, where he explains the censure of the fourth proposition.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

This opinion once pleased me because of certain testimonies of the Semipelagians in which they acknowledge the necessity of divine inspiration—which signifies interior grace morally preventing and exciting—for the beginning of faith and of a good will. But after considering the matter more attentively and maturely,

I state briefly that all the Semipelagians most consistently denied the necessity of prevenient interior grace for the beginning of faith.

10. Proof: We cannot judge the errors of the Semipelagians better or more certainly than from Augustine, Prosper, and Hilary; from the Second Council of Orange, by which the Semipelagian doctrines were condemned; and from the Semipelagians themselves declaring their mind and error in their own writings and books. But the truth of our conclusion is openly gathered from these four sources. Therefore it cannot be called into doubt. The major premise is evident; the minor is declared and established in each of its parts.

First, Augustine openly declares in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 2, what he himself thought while he was still held by the Semipelagian error, in these words: I erred, thinking that the faith by which we believe in God was not a gift of God, but existed in us from ourselves. Nor did I think that faith was preceded by God's grace, except insofar as we cannot believe unless the preaching of the truth precedes; but I judged that our consenting to the Gospel preached belonged properly to us and existed in us from ourselves.

Hence the same holy Doctor, refuting the people of Marseilles in the same c. 2, first undertakes to demonstrate that faith is a gift of God. He says: Therefore we must first show that the faith by which we are Christians is a gift of God. And afterward: Let those who think that the beginning of faith comes from us and its completion from God attend here and weigh these words. And in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 17, he says that they place the beginning of faith and perseverance in it until the end in our power in such a way that they do not think them to be gifts of God and do not think that God works our thoughts and wills so that we may possess and retain them.

Therefore, according to Augustine, the Semipelagians excluded every necessity of prevenient interior grace from the beginning of faith.

Second, Prosper reports in the Epistle to Augustine that the Semipelagians thought as follows: As far as God is concerned, eternal life is prepared for all; but as far as the liberty of choice is concerned, it is grasped by those who spontaneously believe in God and receive the assistance of grace through the merit of their belief. Here the term spontaneously signifies the will as nature, destitute of every grace.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Similarly, Hilary, another disciple of Augustine, speaks thus of the Semipelagians in his Epistle to the holy Doctor: They maintain that it is consonant with truth and appropriate for preaching that, when an opportunity for obtaining salvation is announced to men who have been cast down and will never rise by their own powers, by the merit that they have willed and believed that they can be healed of their disease, they obtain both the increase of that faith and the effect of their whole sanctity. And below: They assert that, when it is said, “Believe and you will be saved,” one of these things is demanded and the other offered, so that if what is demanded has been rendered, what is offered may afterward be given. Hence they think it follows that faith must be presented by him whose nature received this power from the will of the Creator.

From these things it is clear that the Semipelagians all—for neither Prosper nor Hilary excepts any—thought that the beginning of faith and consequently the will for health remained in nature, although nature was now broken and weakened by vice.

Third, the Second Council of Orange, proscribing the Semipelagian doctrines, says in canon 5 that a man opposes the apostolic doctrines if he says that *the beginning of faith, like its increase, and the very affection of belief, are not possessed through the gift of grace but are naturally present in us*. Therefore the Council judges that the Semipelagians referred the beginning of faith in no way to grace, but to nature alone.

Fourth, the same is clear from the three principal followers of the Semipelagian heresy, namely Vitalis of Carthage—who, as we shall show below, is said to have been the first to begin Semipelagianism in Africa—Faustus of Riez, and Cassian, who were the leaders and chiefs of the Semipelagians.

Vitalis openly taught that the beginning of faith and of a good will exists in us from ourselves and from free choice, and does not proceed from prevenient grace. This is clear from ep. 107, which Augustine writes to him, where he says: If the things I hear about you are true, you do not wish the beginning of faith, or likewise the beginning of a good, that is, pious will, to be a gift of God, but contend that we possess it from ourselves, so that we begin to believe; while you consent that God, through his grace, gives the other goods of the religious life to those who are already asking, seeking, and knocking from faith.

Faustus writes in bk. 2, *De libero arbitrio*, c. 6: You see that the privilege of belief is not new in man but ancient, and that at the very beginning of the world as it came into being, man’s mind was endowed by the supreme Author with faith just as it was endowed with intellect and reason. Thus he

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

already gave his knowledge to the soul when he deigned to entrust it with his image. By these words it is manifest that he refers the good of belief to the grace of the Creator and to the features of the divine image impressed upon the human soul, and thus refers it not to grace but to nature.

Finally, Cassian says in *Collationes*, coll. 13, c. 8, under the person of Abbot Chaeremon: When God sees in us some beginning of a good will, he immediately enlightens and strengthens it, and incites it toward salvation, giving increase to what he himself planted or saw arise by our effort. Therefore Cassian likewise refers the beginning of salvation and of a good will to nature and to our effort.

Thus it is most true that all the Semipelagians denied the necessity of prevenient interior grace for the beginning of faith.

From these things you will understand that this proposition of Jansenius was justly condemned as false by Innocent X: *The Semipelagians admitted the necessity of prevenient interior grace for individual acts, even for the beginning of faith*. For although this proposition concerns a question of fact, which does not properly pertain to faith, the other proposition, which concerns right—namely, *And in this they were heretics, because they wished that grace to be such that the human will could resist or obey it*—is connected with it and necessarily presupposes it. Therefore the Pontiff could and ought to proscribe the former as false, so that he might condemn the latter as heretical.

11. You will object first: St. Augustine, speaking of certain Semipelagians in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, says: These brethren of ours have advanced so far as to confess that men's wills are preceded by God's grace, and to consent that no one is sufficient unto himself for beginning or completing any good work. Therefore at least some Semipelagians admitted the necessity of prevenient grace for the beginning of faith.

I answer that those half-corrected Semipelagians of whom Augustine speaks, although they admitted interiorly prevenient grace both for the completion and for the beginning of a good work, nevertheless did not admit it for the beginning of faith, because they denied that faith was a gift of God.

Hence, after the words cited in the objection, Augustine devotes himself entirely to proving that even the beginning of faith exists in us by God's gift: Therefore we must first show that the faith by which we are Christians is a gift of God, if we can do this more diligently than we have already done in so many and such great volumes. But now I see that we must answer them because they say that the divine testimonies we have employed concerning this matter are valid only so that we may know that we possess faith itself from ourselves, but its increase from God; as though faith were not given to

us by him, but only increased in us by him on account of the merit by which it began from us.

12. You will object second: Gennadius writes in *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, c. 19: The liberty of choice, that is, the rational will, therefore remains for seeking salvation; but God first admonishes and invites it to salvation so that it may choose, follow, or act on the occasion of salvation, that is, through inspiration. And below: Therefore we possess the beginning of our salvation from God's mercy. That we consent to the saving inspiration lies in our power. That we attain what we desire by consenting to the admonition belongs to the divine gift. That we do not fall from the gift of salvation once attained belongs to our solicitude and likewise to heavenly assistance. That we fall belongs to our power and sloth. Therefore he admitted prevenient interior grace for the beginning of salvation.

Some answer that by the name of inspiration Gennadius did not signify prevenient interior grace, but merely a moral motion placed in persuasion and admonition. For he admits only an inspiration that is an occasion of salvation and that comes from God first admonishing and inviting to salvation.

But Father Alexander answers better, as I judge, in the *Historia ecclesiastica*, century 5, diss. 4: these words were written by Gennadius when he was already recovering from the Semipelagian heresy. For he sent a book concerning his faith to Gelasius, the Roman Pontiff, as he himself asserts. It is probable that this was the very book he entitled *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, which he corrected of all the errors of the Semipelagians. Hence it is praised together with Gennadius himself by Hadrian I in his Epistle to Charlemagne. Therefore it cannot be gathered from this book what the opinion of the Semipelagians was, since in it he is by no means a Semipelagian.

13. You will object third from these words of Cassian in *Collationes*, coll. 13, c. 3, by which he openly declares that interior grace is necessary for individual acts, even for the beginnings of a good will: From these things it is manifestly gathered that the beginning not only of acts but also of thoughts is from God, who both inspires within us the beginnings of a holy will and grants the strength and opportunity to accomplish the things we rightly desire.

I answer that these words of Cassian are indeed Catholic, and that in them the necessity of interior grace even for the beginnings of a good will is manifestly signified. But he was not consistent in his own opinion and afterward in c. 13 retracted what he had taught in c. 3.

Hence St. Prosper, examining coll. 13 in *Contra Collatorem*, speaks thus of it: At the beginning of the discussion it does not depart from the piety of

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

truth and would deserve to be honored by a just commendation, had it not deviated from the rectitude it began to follow by a precipitous and sinister progress, and so forth. When, therefore, this disputant forgot the definition he had set down, he departed from his own opinion through instability and levity. For he had rightly said: "The beginning not only of acts but also of good thoughts is from God." And lest this be understood of doctrine applied outwardly, he had carefully added: "Who inspires in us even the beginning of a holy will." Catholic teacher, why do you abandon your profession? Why do you turn back toward the smoky darkness of falsehood after abandoning the most serene light of truth?, and so forth.

14. You will ask second what power of meriting grace the Semipelagians attributed to the beginning of faith and of a good will: whether merit of condignity or only of congruity.

I answer that they placed in such beginnings of faith and of a good will only the power of meriting by congruity. This is clear from Faustus and Cassian, the principal followers of the Semipelagian heresy.

The former, as Gennadius reports in his life, was accustomed to say: Whatever the liberty of choice acquires through labor for a pious reward is not properly merit, but a gift of grace. Hence he says in the Epistle to Lucidus: The fruit of our labor is a matter of duty, not merit.

Cassian says in *Collationes*, coll. 13, c. 13, that God gives his grace *under the appearance of a certain desire and labor*. In cc. 8 and 11 of the same coll., he teaches that the efforts of our will are not meritorious of grace, but are rather occasions and, as it were, handles that God takes hold of. These words signify merely a certain congruity and fittingness, not a strict and rigorous debt.

Hence the Council of Orange, proscribing that error of the Semipelagians by which they attributed to the beginning of faith and of a good will the power to merit grace, says: *If anyone says that mercy is conferred upon us when we believe, will, desire, and knock without the grace of God*, and so forth. By these words the Council openly declares that the Semipelagians did not teach that grace was given from justice to those who believe, will, desire, and knock, but only from mercy; and consequently not on account of any merit of condignity, but only of congruity.

Therefore, when St. Prosper affirms in *Contra Collatorem*, c. 16, that according to the opinion of the Semipelagians grace was given to natural works as something owed and not conferred as a gift, he speaks of a debt arising from a certain fittingness and congruity, not of a debt arising from strict and rigorous justice, such as results from perfect and condign merit.

15. You will ask third whether the Semipelagians said that election to glory is made from the forevision of merely natural works performed without any grace.

I answer that they thought election to glory depended upon the forevision of innate liberty making good use of the assistance of grace and determining it toward consent or dissent. For they contended that the liberty of the predestined was destroyed by an absolute purpose of God choosing them for glory before such forevision. In order to avoid this inconvenience, therefore, they made efficacious election to glory dependent and, as it were, suspended until God foresaw what the innate liberty of the predestined would do with the assistance of grace, rendering that assistance either efficacious or inefficacious for glory according to its innate liberty.

This is clear from Prosper's Epistle to Augustine, where he writes concerning the Semipelagians: This is their definition and profession: every man sinned when Adam sinned, and no one is saved through his own works, but through God's grace in regeneration. Nevertheless, the propitiation contained in the sacrament of Christ's blood is proposed to all men without exception, so that whoever wishes to approach faith or Baptism may be saved. Before the foundation of the world God foreknew who would believe and who would remain in that faith, in which afterward they would be assisted by God's grace; and he predestined to his kingdom those whom he foreknew would be worthy of future election after being called gratuitously and would depart from this life with a good end.

By these words he openly declares that the Semipelagians placed election and predestination to the kingdom and glory after the forevision of innate liberty making good use of the assistance of grace.

He explains and confirms this more clearly near the end of the same epistle, saying: We also ask that, by patiently bearing our inquiry, you show how the following is to be refuted. After the opinions of the earlier writers concerning this matter are reconsidered, almost all are found to have one and the same opinion: they admitted God's purpose and predestination according to foreknowledge, and said that God therefore made some vessels of honor and others vessels of dishonor because he foresaw the end of each man and foreknew what his will and action would be under the assistance of grace itself.

It is therefore manifest that the Semipelagians made election to the kingdom and glory dependent upon the foreknowledge of innate liberty acting well under the assistance of grace, making good use of such assistance from itself, and rendering it efficacious through its own liberty, so that it might thereby be worthily chosen for glory.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

Hence Faustus, in bk. 1, *De gratia et humanae mentis arbitrio*, c. 6, explaining the Apostle's words, *Not from works*, says that the works of the law are denied there, but not works done with accompanying grace, on account of which, he says, God saves and chooses for glory.

And in bk. 2, c. 3, he says: Foreknowledge foreknows what is to be done; predestination afterward decrees what is to be rendered. The former foresees merits; the latter preordains rewards. Foreknowledge pertains to power, while predestination pertains to justice; and thus, unless foreknowledge has first examined, predestination decrees nothing.

By these words he speaks openly of predestination rewarding by glory, saying that predestination to glory decrees nothing to be bestowed unless that foreknowledge of God has first examined our innate liberty making good use of the assistance of grace from itself.

Hence it is astonishing that some more recent authors, in order to distinguish themselves from the Semipelagians, say that the controversy between Catholics and the Semipelagians did not concern predestination to glory before the forevision of works to be done through free choice and grace, but only predestination to grace, since the contrary is openly established by the testimonies adduced.

CHAPTER III.

Who Were the Principal Authors or Followers of the Semipelagian Heresy?

For the completion of this Treatise and a perfect understanding of the Semipelagian heresy, it remains for us to declare who were its principal authors or followers.

§ 1.

Vitalis of Carthage.

1. Vitalis of Carthage, to whom Augustine wrote ep. 107, seems to have begun Semipelagianism in Africa and to have been, as it were, the precursor of the Semipelagians. For he said that the beginning of faith and of a good will exists in us from ourselves and from free choice, and does not proceed from the motion of grace, as the holy Doctor declares in the same epistle in these words: *If the things I hear concerning you are true, you do not wish the beginning of faith, or likewise the beginning of a good, that is, pious will, to be a gift of God,*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

but contend that we possess it from ourselves, so that we begin to believe; while you consent that God, through his grace, gives the other goods of the religious life to those who already act, seek, and knock from faith.

Behold how Vitalis said that the beginnings of faith and of a good will come from us, while the other works come from God's grace. Augustine refutes this error forcefully and vigorously in the same place by an argument taken from the prayers of the faithful, who pray to God that he convert the minds of unbelievers to faith, make them willing from unwilling men and consenting from resisting men, and give thanks to him when he converts them to faith. Thus he successfully recalled Vitalis from that error and entirely extinguished Semipelagianism as it was being born in Africa, choking it in its very source.

§ 2.

Cassian.

2. John Cassian, first a deacon of Chrysostom and afterward a priest at Marseilles in Gaul, who flourished in the year 440 and lived at Marseilles at the time when the great disturbance mentioned above arose among the people of Marseilles on the occasion of St. Augustine's *De correptione et gratia*, was one of the principal followers of the Semipelagian heresy. This is clear from *Collationes*, coll. 13, *De protectione Dei*, c. 14.

For there he teaches that the faith of the centurion, so highly praised by the Lord in the Gospel precisely because it was as faith ought to be for salvation, came solely from the natural powers of that centurion, to such an extent that he asserts it would have possessed no praise or merit *if Christ had brought forth in him the very thing that he praised.*

Likewise, in the same place he says that Abraham's faith was not inspired in him by the Lord, but was possessed through the powers of nature alone. He also teaches in cc. 7, 8, and 12 of the same conference that man can of himself will the good; and that God cherishes this good will like a flashing spark and strengthens it by his inspiration, because, he says, it profits nothing to have desired the grace of health unless the Lord, who gave the use of life itself, also brings the integrity of strength.

Cassian nevertheless differed from the other Semipelagians in this: all the others affirmed that the beginnings of faith and of a good will proceed from us, while he thought it was not necessary that they always precede grace, but asserted that divine grace or excitation was sometimes first.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

Hence he established two classes of men. Some freely came to Christ and began to will the good, and were assisted and received by grace. Others were entirely preceded by grace and possessed no liberty in those acts. As St. Prosper rightly observed in *Contra Collatorem*, c. 9, he embraced simultaneously the errors of both the Pelagians and the Manichaeans. For in saying that some men begin and are assisted by God, he was a Pelagian; but in asserting that in certain men God begins and men come without their own liberty, he was a Manichaean.

Hence it is astonishing that Vásquez, I, q. 23, disp. 89, c. 4, § Deinde de Cassiano, dares to write the following concerning certain Semipelagians: All these men, being otherwise Catholic and religious men, confessed against Pelagius and Caelestius that the grace of Christ was not only useful but also necessary for justification, perseverance, and merits of eternal life; and unless our efforts were assisted by it, not only would they attain with difficulty the thing toward which we strive, but they would also be ineffectual and empty for justification and meriting eternal life.

It is also astonishing that in c. 5 of the same place he joins Chrysostom, an excellent Doctor, with Cassian in this matter and cause, saying: *Cassian and Chrysostom speak most excellently concerning grace*. For what fellowship is there between light and darkness, and between a Catholic and outstanding Doctor and a heretic and Semipelagian against whom St. Prosper inveighs sharply throughout nearly the whole book he composed against him?

§ 3.

Faustus of Riez.

3. Faustus, who from abbot of the monastery of Lérins was made bishop of Riez, a city of Gaul, flourished around the year 480, in the period between Prosper and Fulgentius. Wishing to appear to condemn Pelagius and refute his errors, he fell into the errors of Julian and Cassian, as is clear from the two books he wrote *De gratia et libero arbitrio*.

First, he teaches with Julian that original sin is not a true fault in infants that wounds and diminishes the powers of choice, but is merely a punishment. Hence whenever he names original sin, he admits it only under this aspect, as can readily be gathered from the first book. For he spends almost the whole of the first and second chapters proving against Pelagius that death would not have existed had the sin of the first parent not existed. Since he expressly attacks Pelagius in the matter of original sin but mentions only death and never speaks of guilt, he undoubtedly followed the heresy of

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Julian, who held that not guilt but death was derived from Adam into his descendants.

Second, from this principle he infers that man's free choice was not wounded or diminished in strength, but possesses from its own natural faculty sufficient powers for desiring, seeking, and asking for salvation; and that the light sought infallibly presents itself to the man who thus desires, seeks, and asks. Hence he places the beginning of a good work in man before grace, and says that grace is infallibly given to him on account of merit, which is the very heresy of the Semipelagians. Thus he teaches in bk. 1, cc. 15, 16, and 18.

Third, he places free choice in such soundness and integrity of powers that he says it can, if it wills, observe the commandments through its innate liberty. For in bk. 1, c. 13, he infers from Sir. 15, *If you will to observe the commandments, they will preserve you: We see, therefore, that the consent of the human mind can be transferred both toward the good and toward the contrary part*. He understands this as a power man possesses from the powers of free choice alone, since he posits free choice as sound and possessing intact powers, as we have already said. Hence he acknowledges in free choice sufficient powers for loving God above all things, which is the first and greatest commandment, upon which St. Augustine everywhere teaches that the entire heresy of the Pelagians is founded.

Fourth, he explains in bk. 1, c. 11, these words of Ps. 127, *Unless the Lord builds the house, and so forth*, which the Fathers interpret of true grace, as referring to external grace, where he says: Does he build and establish the Church otherwise than through the labors and duties of priests, the powers of the Apostles, and the deaths of the martyrs?

Indeed, in c. 17 he explains these words of the Savior, *No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him*, which the unanimous sense of Catholics understands of true grace, as follows: What is it to draw, if not to preach, to excite by the consolations of Scripture, to deter by rebukes, to propose things to be desired, to threaten things to be feared, to warn of judgment, and to promise a reward?

Finally, he places predestination after foreknowledge and affirms that its certainty is derived from foreknowledge. For he says in bk. 1, c. 11: When the interpreter of free choice places everything under predestination in either direction and declares it to have been determined, he also empties the final remedies of repentance through the abrupt sense of impiety.

And in bk. 2, c. 2: They understand the predestination of God badly when they assert that the cause of human acts arises from it. Shortly afterward he adds: Therefore the general foreknowledge that remains with

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

God concerning the state of the whole world arises from power; but in relation to the state of man, the qualities and kinds of foreknowledge are changed according to the consideration of the human act.

And below he says: The genus of divine foreknowledge is derived more from the origin of the human will than the works and wills of men begin from the command and impulse of heavenly providence. Finally, in the following chapter he concludes: Unless foreknowledge has examined, predestination decrees nothing.

Pope Gelasius condemned these books of Faustus in the canon *Sancta Romana Ecclesia* and numbered them among the apocryphal books. Hence this warning of Cardinal Baronius in vol. 6, at the year of the Lord 490, is prudent and worthy of note: Since, therefore, the opinion of Faustus has everywhere been contradicted by the Catholic Church, let certain more recent authors consider the danger into which they fall when, while rising against the innovators in order to confound them, they depart from St. Augustine's teaching concerning predestination, although there is no lack of other weapons by which the heretics may be routed.

§ 4.

Gennadius.

4. Gennadius, a priest of Marseilles who lived in the time of Pope Gelasius around the year 490, is believed to have adhered to the Semipelagians and to have belonged to their sect. For in *De viris illustribus* he praises Cassian and Faustus and prefers their opinion concerning grace to Prosper's doctrine. He prefers Rufinus, priest of Aquileia, the precursor of Pelagius and architect of the Pelagian heresy—whom, as we saw above, Caelestius affirmed to have taught him that original sin was not transmitted—to Jerome.

Finally, he writes the following concerning St. Augustine: Augustine, a man renowned throughout the world for divine and human learning, intact in faith and pure in life, wrote more works than can be found. Hence, because he said many things, there happened to him what the Holy Spirit said through Solomon: "In much speaking you will not escape sin." Yet the error he contracted in extensive speech, exaggerated by his enemies, furnished a question but not a heresy.

For this reason Pope Gelasius rejects his works among the apocryphal books. Hence Baronius, at the year 433, n. 28, says that Gennadius was of the same flour as Cassian; and at the year 900, n. 45, that he was one of the Gallican priests concerning whom Prosper and Hilary complained to Pope

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Celestine because they opposed Augustine's doctrine. But he adds that through the labor of Gelasius he recovered, was raised to the episcopate of Marseilles, and departed this life orthodox and Catholic.

§ 5.

Sulpicius Severus.

5. Many also think that Sulpicius Severus, a disciple of St. Martin whose life he wrote, and bound by the closest friendship with St. Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, was infected by the leaven of the error of Marseilles. For Gennadius writes in *De viris illustribus*, c. 19: *The priest Severus, surnamed Sulpicius, a man noble by birth and letters and conspicuous for his love of poverty and humility. At the end, after enumerating his writings, he adds: In his old age he was deceived by the Pelagians, and recognizing the fault of loquacity, he maintained silence until death, so that by remaining silent he might fully amend the sin he had contracted by speaking.*

Baronius agrees at the year 431, n. 189, and interprets Gennadius in such a way that he means that Severus adhered not to all the teachings of Pelagius, but only to those received by the people of Marseilles.

But Abbot Guibert opposes this in the compendium of his *Apologia pro Severo*, where he says: I have never read anywhere except in Gennadius that Severus was seduced by the Pelagians, and I do not know whether Gennadius himself read this somewhere or learned it merely from rumor, which teaches both things done and not done.

However this may be, it is certain that Severus died orthodox and Catholic. For in the Roman Martyrology on January 29 he is numbered in the canon of the saints and is said to have been conspicuous in virtues and learning.

Some say that he was Bishop of Bourges, because Guibert, who wrote an apology for him, calls him Archbishop of Bourges. But others deny this with Baronius at the place cited, where he says: *I have found none of the ancients who calls this Severus of whom we speak a bishop, but only a priest, as Honorius also does in recounting the catalogue of illustrious men.*

Likewise, Gennadius of Marseilles, writing the events of his own time in the book cited above, calls him only a priest and says that he died as a penitent in that order.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

§ 6.

John Chrysostom.

6. Vásquez, I, disp. 91, c. 8, exerts all the powers of his intellect to show that Chrysostom and others among the Greek Fathers fell into the error of the Semipelagians. He asserts that Cassian, the disciple of Chrysostom, learned from his master the error reported above that he holds in coll. 13.

In the following chapter he sets forth several interpretations of theologians by which they attempt to explain Chrysostom's testimonies that seem to favor the Semipelagians and draw them toward a Catholic sense. He makes little of them all and strives with all his strength to overthrow them.

7. But our Sixtus of Siena rightly vindicates Chrysostom from this error, or rather calumny, in bk. 5 of the *Bibliotheca sancta*, annot. 101. There he says that John Oecolampadius, a professor of the Lutheran heresy, first imposed this error upon him. He also adduces many testimonies of this holy Doctor in which he openly admits prevenient grace and teaches that the beginnings of the knowledge of faith and salvation proceed from grace and not from bare nature.

His statement in vol. 1, hom. De Adam et Eva, is celebrated: We confess God to be the author of all good affections and works, of all pursuits and all virtues by which one tends toward God from the beginning of faith; and we do not doubt that all good merits proceed from his grace, through which it also comes about that we begin both to will and to do something good.

Many other testimonies of Chrysostom could be adduced, but this suffices for the defense of this holy Doctor, whom Anastasius, in bk. 7 of the *Hexaemeron*, called *the river of Christ*; Theodoret, in dial. 1, *the great light of the world and a Doctor most worthy of admiration*; Isidore of Pelusium, in bk. 2, ep. 42, *the eye of all the Churches*; and finally Innocent I, in ep. 30, *the honeyed tongue of the Church of Constantinople*.

I add that this holy Doctor often commends the powers and efforts of free choice, while not proclaiming the necessity and efficacy of prevenient grace in the same manner, because at every opportunity he attacked the Manichaeans, who denied free choice; but he spoke more freely because the Pelagians had not yet begun their contentions and had not yet arisen, as St. Augustine says.

§ 7.

Vincent the Semipelagian.

8. It is certain that a certain Vincent, an opponent of Augustine's doctrine, belonged to the number of the Semipelagians. Against him the replies of Prosper to the Vincentian objections are extant. But there is dispute and controversy among authors concerning who this Vincent was.

A certain author, whose name Father Alexander suppresses when citing him in the *Historia ecclesiastica*, century 5, c. 3, a. 7, § 7, thinks that the Vincent whose name is attached to the Vincentian objections was the same Vincent Victor against whom St. Augustine composed the books *De anima et eius origine*. Among the various errors for which Augustine reproved him was this one, afterward defended by the Semipelagians: *Those predestined by divine predestination can be torn away from it*.

But this opinion lacks all probability, both because the faction of the Semipelagians arose in Gaul and we read of no Semipelagians in Africa after Augustine's death, and because St. Prosper would undoubtedly have reproached this Vincent Victor for the errors into which he fell when younger, which Augustine had refuted, and for his relapse into new errors.

Others think that the author of the Vincentian objections was another Vincent mentioned by Gennadius in *De viris illustribus*, c. 80, whom he testifies was still living in his own time and joined to him by familiarity. It is probable that this relationship and familiarity arose from their zeal for the Semipelagian faction and their community of errors. Thus Cardinal Baronius in the notes to the Martyrology on May 24.

Finally, others assert that the author of the Vincentian objections was the great Vincent of Lérins, celebrated for the fame of his doctrine and sanctity, who wrote that famous book, small in size but great in the weight of its judgments and most elegant, in defense of the antiquity and truth of the Catholic faith against the profane novelties of all heresies. Thus Henry Noris, the Augustinian, in bk. 2, *Historia Pelagiana*, c. 11. Father Natalis Alexander among our authors follows him at the place cited above.

9. This opinion displeases many, especially Cardinal Baronius at the place cited above.

First, because that plainly golden book just mentioned testifies that Vincent was a most vigorous opponent of novelties.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

Second, because near the end of the second *Commonitorium* he praises the Epistle that Celestine I wrote to the bishops of Gaul in commendation of Augustinian doctrine and against the Semipelagians. By this praise he signifies that he detests the disturbances and errors of the Semipelagians and commends St. Augustine as a Doctor *always regarded by his predecessors as among the best teachers, and upon whom no rumor of sinister suspicion had ever cast an aspersion*. It seems incredible that a Semipelagian man and consequently an enemy of St. Augustine would have praised so excellent a testimony of this Pontiff.

Third, because Gennadius, in c. 94 of the aforementioned *De viris illustribus*, does not attach this blemish to Vincent of Lérins, but records that he was a most vigorous athlete against the heretics. These arguments or conjectures are undoubtedly strong, and persuade nearly all historians to assert that the author of the Vincentian objections was not this Vincent, but the other mentioned above.

Nevertheless, the opinion of Noris and Alexander does not lack probability. For the principal doctrine of the Semipelagians was that God's grace is common and is granted to those who seek, knock, and ask through the powers of nature. Vincent of Lérins taught both things in c. 37 of the first *Commonitorium*. There he says that *heretical men deceive the unwary when they assert in the assemblies of their communion that there exists some great and special and plainly personal grace of God, so that it is divinely dispensed without any labor, pursuit, or effort, even when men neither think, nor seek, nor knock*.

By these words he evidently attacks and refutes St. Augustine's doctrine concerning predestination and the gift of perseverance. Hence throughout the whole *Commonitorium* he repeatedly inculcates this one thing: *Antiquity must be held; novelty must be avoided*. This seems to have been said against St. Augustine. For it was the common refrain of the Semipelagians that Augustine, in the question of the predestination of the saints, held an opinion beyond all the Fathers, and that the things he had written in his final books ought therefore not to be defended, lest the novel error of one man be preferred to ancient truth.

Likewise in c. 11 of the first *Commonitorium*, the same author seems to inveigh against Augustine's disciples as though *under the name of another*, that is, under Augustine's name, *they were attempting to construct a heresy*. He says that *they seize upon his writings, which were issued somewhat obscurely, as though they agreed with their doctrines, so that they may not seem to have been the first or the only men to hold such opinions*. He says that they are greatly to be blamed for reviving and publishing an opinion that ought to have been

buried in silence. Finally, he says that they imitate Ham, who exposed his father's nakedness.

These and many other testimonies of Vincent of Lérins produced by the cited authors generate no slight suspicion that he was not immune from the stain of the Semipelagian error.

CHAPTER IV.

The Predestinarian Heresy.

1. Jansenius in the final chapter of bk. 8, *De haeresi Pelagiana*, earnestly contends that there never was any Predestinarian heresy. He maintains that what Sigebert and others commemorate and condemn under this name was nothing other than the true doctrine concerning gratuitous predestination held by Augustine, Prosper, Hilary, and the other defenders of grace, which the Semipelagians defamed with the mark of heresy.

James Ussher, the celebrated Irish Calvinist, had already taught the same. In 1621 he published at Dublin a book entitled *Historia Gottschalki et praedestinatianae controversiae ab eo motae*. Gilbert Mauguin holds the same in the *Confutatio fabulae praedestinatianae*, Cabassut in the *Notitia conciliorum*, and among our authors Contenson in bk. 8 of the *Theologia mentis et cordis*.

On the opposing side stand many grave authors, such as Cardinal Baronius and his abbreviator Spondanus, our Álvarez, Sirmond, Antititanensis, and Father Natalis Alexander in his *Historia ecclesiastica*, century 5, c. 5, a. 11, and diss. 5, *De praedestinatiana haeresi*.

2. This latter opinion seems truer and more probable.

It is proved first from various historians who mention this heresy. Prosper Tiro writes in the Chronicon at the twenty-third year of Honorius: The heresy of the Predestinarians, which is said to have taken its beginning from a bad understanding of Augustine's books, began to spread in these times.

Sigebert writes at the year of Christ 415: The heresy of the Predestinarians began to spread at this time. They are called Predestinarians because they asserted concerning predestination and divine grace that the labor of good works profits nothing to those who live piously if they have been predestined by God to death, and that no matter how uprightly the impious live, it does them no harm if they have been predestined by God to life. This assertion both turned the good away from good works and provoked the evil toward evil. He adds that this heresy is said to have taken its beginning from Augustine's books badly understood.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

The same heresy is mentioned by Hincmar in bk. 1, *De praedestinatione*, Arnobius the Younger in the exposition of the Psalter, Ennodius of Pavia in the Epistle to Constantius, and Gennadius of Marseilles in the appendix to St. Augustine's *De haeresibus*. To the eighty-nine heresies enumerated by Augustine himself, he added four that arose afterward, namely the Predestinarian, Nestorian, Eutychian, and Timothean heresies. This appendix is found in a codex of the Library of St. Victor at Paris.

It is proved second that the Predestinarian heresy existed from Faustus, in the preface to his books *De libero arbitrio*, addressed to Leontius, Bishop of Arles, where he writes: Blessed Pope Leontius, by assembling a council of the supreme prelates out of pastoral solicitude to condemn the error of predestination, you rendered a service to all the Churches of Gaul. But in entrusting to my weak shoulders the labor and care of arranging the things that you most learnedly brought forth in the public conference, you consulted too little, as I think, the importance of the matter and the sanctity of your reputation; and through the judgment of charity you burdened me, while through the danger of your choice you burdened yourselves.

It is proved third from the Epistle of Faustus to Lucidus, the principal follower of the Predestinarian heresy, in which he proposes to him six doctrines to be condemned and reported below, threatening to denounce him to the synod unless he strikes them with anathema and subscribes to the Epistle. He says: I retain a copy of this Epistle with me, to be produced in the assembly of the holy prelates if it should become necessary. If you are unwilling to send it back subscribed, as I have said, by your very silence you will openly prove that you still persist in error, and consequently you will compel me to expose your person in public assemblies.

According to Baronius at the year of Christ 490, the Council of Arles approved this Epistle. For in the ancient codices it is read as furnished with the signatures not only of Faustus himself, but of other distinguished bishops of Gaul, namely Auxanius, Paul, Eutropius, Pragmatius, Patientius, Euphronius, Megetius, Claudius, Leucadius, and Julian.

It is proved fourth from the written correction of Lucidus sent to the Gallican bishops, in which he abjures and condemns those six depraved doctrines according to the decree of the Council of Arles. He says: Your correction is public salvation, and your judgment is medicine. Hence I regard it as the highest remedy to shake off past errors by accusing them and to cleanse myself through a saving profession. Therefore, according to the statutes of the aforementioned Council, I condemn with you the opinion that says:

1^o That the labor of human obedience must not be joined to divine grace.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

2° That after the fall of the first man the choice of the will was entirely extinguished.

3° That Christ our Lord and Savior did not undergo death for the salvation of all.

4° That God's foreknowledge violently compels man to death, or that those who perish do so by God's will.

5° That whoever sins after having legitimately received Baptism dies in Adam.

6° That some are appointed to death and others predestined to life.

3. From this you will understand, first, in what the Predestinarian heresy principally consisted, namely in those six doctrines.

You will understand, second, that the doctrines of the Predestinarians agreed with the objections and calumnies by which the people of Marseilles defamed the doctrine of St. Augustine and his disciples. For all those propositions except the first are found in St. Prosper among the objections of the Gauls and of Vincent.

This was the sixth objection of the Gauls: *Free choice in man is nothing.*

This was the first Vincentian objection: Our Lord Jesus Christ did not suffer for the salvation and redemption of all.

This was the first chapter of the Gauls: Through God's predestination, as though by a fatal necessity, men are compelled to sins and forced toward death.

This was their second chapter: In those who are not predestined to life, the grace received in Baptism does not remove original sin.

Finally, Fulgentius testifies in bk. 1, Ad Monimum, c. 30, that the people of Marseilles objected to St. Augustine that from his doctrine it followed that some were appointed to death and others predestined to life, in these words: You are not ignorant that in the past some Gauls objected to that most splendid work of St. Augustine entitled *De praedestinatione sanctorum* that Blessed Augustine, in asserting divine predestination, said that sinners were predestined not merely to judgment but also to sin. Because a swift death overtook him, the learned and holy Prosper defended his statements with right faith and abundant speech.

Therefore the historians reported above said not without reason that the Predestinarian heresy took its beginning from Augustine's books badly understood. Nor is this astonishing: Augustine could not speak better than the Prophets, the Apostles, and the Evangelists, from whose statements, likewise badly understood and inappropriately employed, so many attempt to defend their errors. These are the words of Facundus of Hermiane in his book against Mocianus.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

4. You will object first: St. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, writes in *Contra Ioannem Erigenam*, c. 4: As for the third heresy that you assert to be contrary to the Pelagians, in which the gift of grace is preached in such a way that the liberty of choice is entirely removed, we have neither read nor heard of it. I do not know whom you wished to mark with the reproach of a third heresy, unless you mean faithful and truthful followers of the statement of Blessed Augustine that we have set forth—or rather, of all Catholics.

Florus the Master has similar things in c. 4, writing in the name of the Church of Lyons against the same John Scotus Eriugena: What is this second heresy, so unknown, new, and unheard of, which denies free choice and preaches grace alone? Unless, as it seems to us, this disputant either secretly accuses Blessed Augustine as a heretic because, according to the truth of the Scriptures, he manifestly shows and teaches that man can be saved by the grace of God alone and that human choice can contribute nothing toward eternal salvation unless it is reformed, healed, enlightened, and strengthened through that grace; or else he calls heretics those who now think and teach concerning God's grace according to Augustine's venerable and Catholic doctrine, as though they understood his statements badly.

Therefore, according to these authors, the Predestinarian heresy is fictitious and unheard of.

I answer that the followers of the Predestinarian heresy were few and of very obscure name. This is gathered from canon 25 of the Second Council of Orange, where it is stated: We not only do not believe that some have been predestined to evil by divine power, but if there are any who wish to believe so great an evil, we say anathema to them with all detestation.

The Fathers used this manner of speaking—if *there are any who wish to believe so great an evil*—because Lucidus had very few disciples or associates and companions in his heresy, and they were of extremely obscure name. Hence it is not astonishing that such a heresy escaped the notice of St. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, and of Florus the Master. Yet it did not escape the authors and historians cited above, nor the Synods of Mainz and Quierzy, which condemned the Predestinarian heresy when it revived in Gottschalk.

5. You will object second: Our opinion rests especially upon the testimony of Faustus in the Epistle to Lucidus reported above. But no faith should be placed in the testimony of Faustus, since he was a chief of the Semipelagians, especially in matters pertaining to his errors. Hence we deny all credibility to Eusebius in matters concerning the Arians and to Sozomen in matters pertaining to the Novatian heresy, because the former was an

Arian and the latter a Novatian. Therefore the principal foundation of our opinion collapses.

I answer that we do not rest upon the testimony and authority of Faustus alone, but upon the Council of Arles, which made the Epistle of Faustus its own by approving it. For in the ancient codices, as we noted above, it is furnished with the signatures not only of Faustus himself, but also of other distinguished bishops of Gaul.

Nor is it true, as some say, that the books of Faustus, which are filled with Semipelagian errors, were approved by those bishops, which would be an argument that they were Semipelagians or at least were deceived by the Semipelagian Faustus. This is entirely foreign to the truth. For, as is gathered from the Epistle of Faustus to Leontius reported above, Faustus published his books *De gratia et libero arbitrio* after the Synod of Arles, at the request of Leontius. Therefore they could not have been approved by the subscription of that Synod.

But Faustus himself exceeded the limits of the commission imposed upon him by Leontius. He not only refuted the errors of Lucidus, as he had been commanded, but also took the occasion to attack St. Augustine's doctrine concerning grace and predestination and poured out the poison of the Semipelagians throughout that whole work.

No less repugnant to the truth, indeed altogether incredible, is the assertion of others that the aforesaid Synod of Arles never existed, but was invented by Faustus—whom St. Isidore in *De viris illustribus*, c. 14, called a *man of profound craftiness*, and Cardinal Baronius called a *changeable little fox*—so that he might render odious St. Augustine's doctrine concerning grace and predestination.

For among the heresies by which the Church has hitherto been afflicted, it is most certain and constant that none has sought the protection of lies and seized it more eagerly than the Pelagian and Semipelagian heresies. Since grace and truth came through Jesus Christ, the enemies of grace are continual enemies of truth and fabricators of lies.

But, as I have said, the fabrication of this Council of Arles by Faustus appears entirely incredible. For if Faustus, writing to Leontius, had fabricated something concerning most remote events in Asia or Africa, I would not wholly reject the possibility. But that he would have invented a council celebrated at Arles when writing to Leontius of Arles, and one assembled by Leontius himself only the day before yesterday, no wise or prudent man could persuade himself.

CHAPTER V.

Errors of the Manichaeans, Lutherans, and Calvinists
Concerning Grace and Free Choice.

6. Since opposites become clearer when placed beside one another, the errors of the Manichaeans, Lutherans, and Calvinists, which are directly opposed to the errors of the Pelagians, must be described briefly here.

§ 1.

Errors of the Manichaeans.

The Manichaeans posited two eternal or coeternal principles: one good and the other evil. From this they inferred that there are two natures in man: one good, determined toward good by that good principle; the other evil, determined toward evil by the other evil principle.

Augustine teaches this in various places, especially in bk. 1 to Boniface, c. 8, in these words: The Manichaeans, as you have indicated that you know sufficiently, introduce by the sacrilegious vanity of their unspeakable error two natures, one of good and the other of evil, arising from two diverse, mutually opposed, and coeternal principles.

From this they also deduced that man possesses liberty in no manner, but performs all things, whether good or evil, from a necessity of nature: either from that good nature determined toward good, or from the evil nature likewise determined toward evil. Hence Jerome says in the prologue of the *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos*: *It belongs to the Manichaeans to condemn human nature and remove free choice.*

There were many other errors of the Manichaeans. They admitted no original sin, and therefore did not receive Baptism for cleansing it, as Augustine teaches in bk. 2 to Boniface, c. 2, where he says: *The Manichaeans say that the washing of regeneration, that is, water itself, is superfluous, and contend with profane hearts that it profits nothing.*

They also wished marriage to be evil because it is exercised with lust and the concupiscence of the flesh, which they said arose from the aforesaid evil nature. Likewise, they rejected the Old Law as evil and powerless to justify, and defamed the Fathers of the Old Testament as outstanding sinners.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

But these matters do not belong to our present purpose, because here we treat only of errors concerning grace or free choice.

§ 2.

Errors of the Lutherans and Calvinists Concerning Free Choice.

7. St. Thomas rightly observes in opusc. 19, c. 2, that this is the custom of those who err: because they cannot stand in the middle of truth, in avoiding one error they fall into the contrary one. In the same place he proves this by the examples of Arius and Sabellius, Nestorius and Eutyches, Pelagius and Manichaeus.

Hence Tertullian says excellently in *Adversus Praxean*: The Devil has emulated the truth in various ways; at times he has affected to overturn it by defending it. He claims one almighty God, Creator of the world, so that he may make a heresy even out of the one God.

The same is clear from the example of Luther and Calvin, who, in order to avoid the errors of the Pelagians, fell into the heresy of the Manichaeans. For in order to defend against the Pelagians the necessity and efficacy of divine grace, they denied free choice with the Manichaeans.

Hence the Council of Sens, celebrated against the Lutherans in the year 1528, says of Luther in its preface: Luther fell into the error of Manichaeus while he avoided Pelagius with excessive anxiety and scrupulosity. For fearing to exalt free choice with Pelagius, he attributes to God and divine grace every good work that exists in man, and nothing at all to choice. Thus Luther, in entirely removing free choice, became a Manichaean while fleeing from being a Pelagian.

The Manichaeans, Lutherans, and Calvinists nevertheless deduced the denial or extinction of free choice from different principles. The Manichaeans affirmed that it was derived from that twofold nature respectively determined toward good and evil, which we discussed in the preceding section. But the Lutherans and Calvinists refer it to original sin and to the efficacy and causality of the divine decree and of the motion flowing from it.

8. The first heresy, therefore, which is as it were the basis and foundation of the others, which the Devil breathed forth in the matter of free choice through the mouths of Luther and Calvin, who are like the two principal heads of the ancient dragon, is this: *Through original sin free choice was extinguished in us and determined toward evil, without any power or liberty*

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

for good, so that only a thing without more than a title, or a title without the reality, remained.

Thus Luther teaches in *Assertio omnium articulorum* addressed to Leo X, a. 36; in the book entitled *Operationes in Psalmos*, on Ps. 5; and in *De servo arbitrio*. Calvin teaches the same in bk. 1, *Institutio*, c. 15, n. 8, and bk. 2, c. 3, § 7.

Although Calvin agrees with Luther in this, he differs from him in that Luther asserted that free choice was extinguished through original sin in such a way that, contrary to all philosophy, he contended that it is merely passive, namely, receiving a motion or act produced by God alone.

Calvin does not assert that free choice is extinguished in such a way that it is merely passive, but wishes it to influence our operations actively, though not freely but merely spontaneously, in the manner of brute animals and as a horse is moved by a rider.

Hence he says in bk. 2 against Pighius: If liberty is opposed to coercion, I both confess and constantly assert that choice is free, and I regard as a heretic anyone who thinks otherwise—provided, I say, that it is called free in the sense that it is not compelled or violently dragged, but is drawn spontaneously without offering any resistance of its own.

9. The second heresy of the Lutherans and Calvinists in the matter of free choice is this: The liberty of man is destroyed by God's antecedent decree and by prevenient efficacious grace.

Thus Luther teaches in *De servo arbitrio*, where he argues perversely as follows: Grace is preached; therefore free choice is removed. The assistance of grace is commended; therefore free choice is destroyed. And again: As many passages as there are in the divine Scriptures that mention assistance, so many passages there are that destroy free choice.

Calvin agrees with Luther, for he says on John 6: Christ declares the grace of the Holy Spirit by which men are drawn to be efficacious, so that they believe necessarily. By these words the entire power of free choice that the Papist dreams of is utterly overthrown.

And against Pighius: He establishes that our will is strengthened so efficaciously that under the guidance of the Holy Spirit it follows necessarily.

He teaches the same in bk. 2, *Institutio*, c. 3, § 10, and in the *Antidotum* to the Council of Trent, on canon 4 of session 6.

10. From these things you will understand, first, that Luther and Calvin deny man's free choice on two grounds and for two causes: 1^o because they assert that liberty was entirely extinguished in man through original sin; 2^o because they think that man's liberty is destroyed by the antecedent divine decree and by prevenient and efficacious grace.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Should you ask how these things can cohere and be reconciled with one another—for if free choice has been entirely removed and extinguished through original sin, how can it again be removed and destroyed through the efficacious motion of grace?—I answer first that it is proper to heretics to speak with little consistency in many matters.

Second, I say that they think the liberty removed by original sin is removed still further by the efficacious motion of God.

Third, it can be said that they mean that, even if liberty had not been extinguished in man through original sin, such is the nature of God's efficacious motion that it would entirely destroy it, because by reason of its efficacy and indefectibility it necessarily infers the act for which it is given, so that no power for the opposite remains.

You will understand, second, that the heretics who denied free choice were moved to deny it by four causes, or reduced the necessity that destroys free choice to four different principles.

The pagans and Stoics reduced such necessity to fate. By the name of fate they understood an inevitable series of natural causes, and especially the influence of the heavens. Hence this was the saying of the Stoics, as St. Thomas reports in q. 6, *De malo*, a. 1: *Such is the will in men as the father of men and gods has induced*, that is, the heavens or the sun, as the holy Doctor explains in the same place.

The Manichaeans, as we declared above, reduced such necessity to a twofold nature respectively determined toward good and evil.

The Lutherans and Calvinists refer it to the two causes alleged above, namely original sin and the efficacy and causality of the divine decree and of the motion flowing from it.

Hence Calvin writes in bk. 1, *Institutio*, c. 16, sect. 8: Although we do not contend about words, we nevertheless do not receive the term “fate,” both because it belongs to that class of profane novelties that Paul teaches us to avoid and because our adversaries attempt through it to burden the truth of God with hatred. But the doctrine is falsely and maliciously imputed to us. For we do not imagine with the Stoics a necessity contained in a perpetual nexus of causes and in some entangled series contained in nature. Rather, we establish God as the judge and moderator of all things, who in his wisdom decreed from remotest eternity what he would do and now executes by his power what he decreed.

You will understand, third, that Pelagius, Luther, and Calvin, although their heresies were opposed to one another, nevertheless deduced them from the same principle, namely this: *Free choice cannot coexist with God's prevenient and efficacious motion.*

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

Pelagius argued as follows: *There is no free choice if it needs God's assistance*, as St. Jerome reports in the Epistle to Ctesiphon. Or, what is the same: God's prevenient and efficacious grace and the liberty of human choice cannot coexist. But man possesses free choice. Therefore, in order to act, he does not need God's prevenient and efficacious assistance.

On the contrary, Luther and Calvin inferred from the same principle the entirely opposite conclusion, namely that free choice does not exist. For they argued, as we saw above from Luther: God's prevenient grace, efficacious of itself, and free choice cannot coexist. But God's prevenient grace, efficacious of itself, must be posited, as is clear from Scripture and St. Augustine. Therefore free choice does not exist in man.

Here, from a Catholic antecedent joined to Pelagius's contrary and heretical consequent, they inferred the opposite of the Catholic antecedent by which Pelagius had said that free choice exists in us.

Hence concerning these heretics it may deservedly be said what Innocent III says of others, as reported in the chapter *Excommunicamus, Extra de haereticis*: they *have different faces*—since their errors are diverse and opposed to one another—but *their tails are tied together*, since they deduce their heresies from the same principle in which they are tied together, namely: *Free choice cannot coexist with God's prevenient and efficacious motion*.

11. Finally, from the things already said you will understand that the doctrine of the Thomists is directly and diametrically opposed to the errors of the Pelagians and Calvinists, since the Thomists deny that false and perverse principle, *The liberty of our choice cannot coexist with the efficacious motion of prevenient grace*, from which, as we have shown, those heretics deduced their heresies.

Indeed, with the Angelic Doctor they everywhere teach that the efficacy of the divine will is the first root of all liberty and contingency in things, as we declared at length in the Treatise on the Will of God.

Hence, just as one who overturns the foundation of a house or tears up the root of a tree immediately destroys that house or tree, so the Thomists, by denying and destroying that false principle and foundation of the Pelagian and Calvinist heresies, utterly overthrow both heresies and uproot and tear out both pestilential and venomous plants.

On the contrary, Molina, Suárez, and other more recent authors who assert or defend middle knowledge admit the aforesaid principle of the Pelagians and Calvinists, and everywhere teach and contend against the Thomists that the liberty of our choice cannot coexist with a prevenient, physical, and intrinsically efficacious motion of divine grace. Therefore, contrary to their intention, they favor the errors of Pelagius and Calvin and

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

forge and furnish weapons for those heretics to defend their errors, since they draw arguments from Molina's workshop against the Thomists in order to prove that God's prevenient grace, efficacious of itself, destroys the liberty of our choice.

Hence the Doctors of Louvain rightly observed in their censure that Molina's opinion is more suited to establishing than to overturning the heresy of the Pelagians and Calvinists. We have treated this matter at length in the *Apologia Thomistarum*, which in the new edition we placed in our *Clypeus* at the end of the Treatise on the Will of God.

§ 3.

Calvin's Errors Concerning Grace.

There are many errors of Calvin in the matter of grace, which we shall describe briefly here.

First, he asserts that the efficacious assistance of grace causes men to act with it spontaneously, but not freely, in the manner in which a beast of burden spontaneously but not freely follows the rider who leads it. Thus he teaches in bk. 2, *Institutio*, c. 3, § 7, and in the *Antidotum* to canon 5 of session 6 of the Council of Trent, where he writes: *What, then, does Augustine mean when he speaks of the liberty of the will? What he so often repeats: that men are not compelled unwillingly by God's grace, but are ruled as willing men, so that they obey and follow spontaneously.*

Hence he wishes the assistance of divine grace to be efficacious in such a way that it absorbs the indifference of the will and, by imposing the necessity of consent, consumes the power of dissent, leaving in the will only spontaneity or immunity from coercion.

Therefore he writes in the response to the first article *De occulta Dei providentia*: What the Scholastics deny concerning absolute power I not only reject, but even detest. We treated this matter at length in the aforesaid *Apologia Thomistarum*.

Second, Calvin teaches that everything must be attributed to grace in such a way that it is not within the power of our choice to obey or resist its motion. Thus in bk. 2, *Institutio*, c. 3, § 10.

Third, he teaches that, once efficacious grace is posited, man cannot fail to will and cannot dissent. Thus in bk. 3, *De libero arbitrio contra Pighium*, p. 285, and in the *Antidotum* to the Council of Trent, on canon 4 of session 6, in which this error is condemned. This is akin to the first error and is, as it were, its consequence.

On the Errors of Heretics Concerning Grace

Fourth, he teaches that the assistance of prevenient grace, by which God causes us to will and act, does indeed move the will efficaciously, but does not excite it morally. Thus in bk. 2, *Institutio*, c. 3, § 10. Bellarmine treats this in bk. 1, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 11.

Fifth, he teaches that every assistance, insofar as it comes from God, is efficacious, and that none is merely sufficient. Thus in the places just cited.

Sixth, he teaches that God's grace gives willing and working in such a way that the created will does not freely cooperate with it. Thus in bk. 2, *Institutio*, c. 3, nn. 11 and 12, where he also ridicules Catholics because they confirm the concurrence of free choice with grace from this passage of St. Paul: *I labored more abundantly than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God with me.*

He says that they were led into this error through a perverse translation in which the force of the Greek article was omitted. If it were expressed, he claims, it would produce this meaning: *Not I, but the grace of God that was present to me.* He discusses this matter at greater length in his commentary on this passage of St. Paul.

12. From these things it is clear that Calvin admitted efficacious grace moving the will spontaneously, but denied sufficient grace, morally exciting grace, and cooperating grace. Therefore he was entirely outside grace. For, as St. Prosper says in the Epistle to Demetrias, c. 7: *Unless the grace of God is received whole, it is rejected whole. For just as a man who dissents in any matter from Catholic truth is alien to the number of the faithful and the lot of the saints, so he is placed outside grace who distrusts any part of its fullness.*

It is also clear from what has been said that, according to the doctrine of Calvin and his followers, the commandments are entirely impossible for man in the state of fallen nature, since in that state they acknowledge no sufficient assistance that gives him the power to fulfill them.

Hence Melancthon says on c. 13 of the Epistle to the Romans: When the law commands us to love, it commands something just as impossible as if it ordered us to move Mount Caucasus.

APPENDIX II.
ON THE AUTHORITY OF ST. AUGUSTINE
IN QUESTIONS OF GRACE.

Since what we have said in the Treatise on grace concerning the necessity of grace, the gift of perseverance, the justification of the sinner, and the merit of the just rests chiefly upon the testimonies of Augustine, it remains, for the completion of that treatise, briefly to demonstrate how great Augustine's authority is, especially in questions of grace. Our entire discourse and commendation of Augustinian doctrine will therefore flow from four sources, as from four fountains: namely, from the pronouncements of the Supreme Pontiffs, the declarations of Councils, the testimonies of the Holy Fathers, and the praises of illustrious men.

CHAPTER I.
Commendation of St. Augustine's Doctrine from the
Pronouncements of the Supreme Pontiffs.

Augustine's doctrine, especially in questions of grace, was not so much approved as consecrated by the supreme heads of the Church.

Celestine I, in his Letter to the Bishops of Gaul, commends Augustine's writings and doctrine in these words: We have always held Augustine, a man of holy memory, in our communion on account of his life and merits; nor did any rumor of sinister suspicion ever stain him. We remember that he was

On the Authority of St. Augustine

formerly held to possess such great learning that even my predecessors numbered him among the best teachers. All, therefore, rightly held a common judgment concerning him, since he was everywhere loved and honored by all.

Leo the Great approved St. Augustine's doctrine to such an extent that he transcribed his words and sent them to the Second Council of Orange as rules of faith against the Pelagians, so that they might be subscribed and received by the bishops of that Council, as in fact occurred.

Gelasius, in the Council held with seventy bishops concerning apocryphal writings, approved all the writings delivered by the holy Father Augustine against the Pelagians on predestination and grace, while condemning the opposing opinion of Cassian and Faustus. And in his fifth Letter, addressed to the bishops of Picenum, against a certain man infected with Pelagian doctrine, who dared to censure the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Jerome, he writes as follows: *An even greater crime is added, in that, under the eyes and in the presence of the priests, he endeavored to tear apart Jerome and Augustine of blessed memory, the never-dying lights of ecclesiastical teachers, as it is written, destroying the oil of sweeter fragrance.*

Hormisdas, at the end of Epist. 67 to Possessor, says: As to free choice and the grace of God, what the Roman, that is, the Catholic Church follows and asserts can indeed be learned from the various books of blessed Augustine, and especially those addressed to Hilary and Prosper. Nevertheless, expressly formulated chapters are contained in the ecclesiastical archives; if you do not possess them and judge them necessary, we shall send them. These chapters appear to be those contained in the Letter of Celestine, which no one is unaware were drawn from St. Augustine's doctrine.

John II speaks of St. Augustine as follows in his decretal Letter to Avienus the Senator, Liberius, and Severinus: *St. Augustine, whose doctrine the Roman Church follows and preserves according to the statutes of my predecessors.*

Innocent I, in his response to the Synods of Carthage and Milevis, calls the letters of both Councils, which had been written by Augustine, full of faith and strengthened by the entire force of religion.

Boniface I, as St. Prosper relates at the end of *Contra Collatorem*, although he was most learned, nevertheless requested blessed Augustine's replies against the books of Pelagius.

Urban IV, in a diploma addressed to the University of Toulouse, says: *We, considering with how great a knowledge St. Thomas was endowed by God, how he enlightened the Order of Friars Preachers and the universal Church, and how, following in the footsteps of blessed Augustine, he adorned that same Church*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

with very many doctrines and sciences, etc. In this approbation it must be carefully considered that the Pontiff commends Aquinas on the ground that he enlightened the Church; yet he says that Aquinas enlightened the Church insofar as he followed in Augustine's footsteps. He consequently judges that St. Thomas attained mastery in the schools because he was a faithful disciple of the great Augustine. This is the highest praise and commendation of Augustine himself and of his doctrine.

Clement VIII wished all controversies concerning the helps of divine grace to be examined and resolved according to St. Augustine's doctrine as by a touchstone, as is evident from the address which he prefaced to those disputations and which is contained in the Acts of those Congregations. He says: Although I am bound to render an account of my actions to God alone, I shall nevertheless state at present the reasons on account of which I have determined to bind this entire disputation to the standard of St. Augustine concerning grace. The first is that, if, according to the testimony of St. Prosper near the beginning of his book *Contra Collatorem*, the battle line of the Catholic Church fought for grace against the Pelagians for twenty years and at last conquered under the leadership of Augustine, we must likewise acknowledge and follow the same leader in a similar cause. The second is that the same saint appears to have omitted nothing pertaining to the present controversies.... The third and final reason is that, since many Pontiffs, our predecessors, were such assertors and defenders of St. Augustine's doctrine that they wished it to be left in the Church as though by hereditary right, it is not just that I should permit it to be deprived of this inheritance.

Finally, Alexander VII, in a Brief given to the University of Louvain on August 7, 1660, calls them the unshaken and entirely safe doctrines of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the most illustrious Doctors of the Church.

CHAPTER II.

Commendation of St. Augustine's Doctrine from the Declarations of Councils.

Not only the Supreme Pontiffs, but also the sacred Councils of the Church, commended Augustine's doctrine. For the canons of the Second Council of Orange, as we noted in the preceding section, are for the most part Augustinian propositions and were even transcribed word for word from Augustine.

On the Authority of St. Augustine

The Fifth General Council, collat. 3, at the end, has the following: In all things we follow the Holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, etc., and we receive everything they set forth concerning the right faith and the condemnation of heretics.

The Eighth General Council has the following: Various Letters of Augustine of religious memory, who shone among the African bishops, were also read, signifying that heretics ought to be anathematized even after death.

The Third Council of Valence, under Emperor Lothair, writes in c. 1: We unhesitatingly submit ourselves, with reverent hearing and obedient understanding, to the Doctors who piously and rightly treat the word of God's truth, and to the most luminous expositors of Sacred Scripture, namely Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and the others resting in Catholic piety; and, according to our strength, we embrace what they wrote for our salvation. The Council is speaking of grace, predestination, and free choice.

The Eighth Council of Toledo, in canon 2, speaks of Augustine as follows: The most holy man Augustine, cautious through the acuteness of his investigation, preeminent in the art of discovery, abundant in copious assertion, graceful with the flower of eloquence, and fruitful with the fruit of wisdom, relates these things in his discourses, etc.

The Council of Florence, sess. 7, has the following: Let us now bring forward the authorities of the holy Doctors, and first that of Augustine, the most illustrious Doctor of the Latins, whom the Fifth Council consecrated.

Finally, the Fathers of the Council of Trent, in composing their definitions, transcribed not only Augustine's meaning but also his words.

CHAPTER III.

Commendation of Augustine's Doctrine from the Holy Fathers.

The Holy Fathers likewise celebrated Augustine's doctrine with extraordinary praises. Although St. Jerome had begun his Dialogues against Pelagius, after he had read Augustine's profound and heavenly writings on grace he imposed silence upon himself, judging that he should cease from this labor. Hence, at the end of the third book of the *Dialogi contra Pelagianos*, he says: *I judge that I should cease from this labor, lest that saying of Horace be addressed to me: "Do not carry wood into the forest." For either we would teach the*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

same things superfluously, or, if we wished to say something new, the better points have already been occupied by that most brilliant intellect.

St. Prosper, in the preface to *Contra Collatorem*, says of Augustine: For more than twenty years, the Catholic battle line has fought and conquered under this man's leadership against the enemies of the grace of God. I say that it conquers because it does not allow those whom it has conquered to breathe. And in his Letter to Rufinus, in the final chapter: But you, most beloved, if you truly desire to be instructed in these questions, as it is fitting that you should desire, take care to learn the disputations of blessed Augustine themselves, so that, in confessing the grace of God, you may attain the most purified and salutary understanding of evangelical and apostolic doctrine.

And again, in his poem *Contra ingratos*, c. 3, he has the following:

*Could the holy Council have reached another end,
when Aurelius was its leader and Augustine its mind?
Christ's grace, watering him from a richer horn,
gave him as a light to our age,
kindled indeed from the true light. For God is his food,
his life and rest, and his every delight;
the love of Christ is his one love, Christ alone his honor.
And while he attributes no good to himself, God becomes
all things to him, and wisdom reigns in its holy temple.
Therefore, among all who labor lest savage beasts
ravage the holy flock, his diligence was greater,
his work more eminent, and it filled the entire world.
For wherever the crafty enemy turned his step,
and through whatever hidden windings he pursued his uncertain path,
he was forestalled by this man's encounter along a thousand ways;
his snares found no entrance anywhere.
And when the rage of the ravening wolves, shut outside,
gnashed its teeth and turned its falsehoods to every art,
yet could corrupt the minds of none of the sheep,
nor trouble uncertain hearts with devious complaints,
God made this man by his mouth; from this man's mouth
rivers of books flowed throughout the whole world.
The meek and humble drink from them,
and they strive to pour streams of life-giving doctrine
into the fields of souls.*

On the Authority of St. Augustine

St. Fulgentius, *De veritate praedestinationis et gratiae* 2, c. 18, says: Blessed Augustine, clothed with power from on high, labored with the assistance of all those Fathers, that is, the Greek and Latin Fathers, yet not he, but the grace of God with him.... For, possessing the mind of Christ, he distinguished the functions and merits both of the grace of God and of human choice, always subjecting human things to divine things, and truthfully teaching that the gift of justification, the beginning of a good will, and the full effect of glorification are bestowed upon man divinely and gratuitously.... Nor did he merely triumph by obtaining victory over the enemy; he also showed posterity the order of fighting and conquering, should the conquered depravity ever strive with renewed boldness to raise its unspeakable head.

St. Paulinus, in Epist. 31 to Augustine, calls him the salt of the earth and a lamp worthily placed upon the lampstand of the Church, and calls his mouth a conduit of living water and a channel of the eternal fountain.

St. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, writes in his Letter to Hincmar and Pardulus: First and chiefly I admonish and beg your sincerity not to permit the doctrine of the most blessed Father Augustine, without any doubt the most learned of all in every respect, and in all things most harmonious with the authority of the Holy Scriptures—for no Doctor scrutinized their hidden depths more scrupulously, investigated them more diligently, discovered them more truly, expressed them more faithfully, unraveled them more luminously, held them more loyally, or defended them more firmly—to be attacked by any invention during the time of your episcopate. It was endowed with so great a gift of heavenly grace that it cannot in any way be uprooted by anyone's effort, since both the sublimity of the Apostolic See and the unity of the whole Catholic Church have approved and strengthened it with unanimous authority.

The African bishops exiled in Sardinia have the following in their synodal Letter: Above all, take care to press upon the brethren for reading the books of St. Augustine which he wrote to Prosper and Hilary.

Finally, St. Bernard, sermon 8 on the Canticle, says: St. Augustine is the most powerful hammer of heretics. And in Epist. 77 to Hugh: Believe me, I am separated with difficulty from these two pillars—I mean Augustine and Ambrose. With them I confess that I either err or understand rightly.

CHAPTER IV.

Commendation of St. Augustine's Doctrine from Illustrious Men.

Not only the Holy Fathers, but also other celebrated men distinguished for learning and piety, commend Augustine's doctrine and celebrate it with various praises.

Cassiodorus says in the *Chronica*: Augustine is the master of all branches of learning. And in *Institutiones divinarum litterarum*, c. 22: That outstanding Doctor, the most blessed Augustine, vanquisher of heretics, defender of the faithful, and bearer of the palm in celebrated contests, is concealed in some books by excessive difficulty; in others he is so very plain that he proves acceptable even to children. His clear passages are delightful, while his obscure passages grow rich, filled with great advantages.

Boethius says: Augustine the African, a man renowned for abundant learning, sound in faith and pure in life, wrote so much that it cannot even be discovered in full.

Eusebius says: Among all the eminent Doctors of the Church, Augustine is greater than all.

The Venerable Bede says: Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, the most eminent of all Doctors.

Julianus Pomerius, *De vita contemplativa* 3, c. 31: The holy bishop Augustine was vigorous in intellect, pleasing in speech, skilled in secular learning, laborious in ecclesiastical works, renowned in daily disputations, composed in all his conduct, Catholic in expounding our faith, acute in resolving questions, circumspect in overthrowing heretics, and cautious in explaining the canonical Scriptures.

Victor of Vita, speaking of Augustine's death, has the following: Then that river of eloquence, which flowed most abundantly through all the fields of the Church, was dried up by death itself; and the sweetness of that delight, offered more sweetly than before, was turned into the bitterness of wormwood.

St. Antoninus, in the second part of his *Historia*, title 8: Like the shining sun, which is called the lord of the planets and the father of light, shining above all the luminaries, so Augustine enlightened the Church, the jewel of the Doctors, the father of theologians, pleasing in speech, illuminating every subject by penetrating it.

On the Authority of St. Augustine

Blessed Jordan of Saxony, sermon 148, says that Augustine excels the other Doctors as regards the sufficiency proper to a teacher, because nothing is lacking in Augustine's books that pertains to knowledge of the divine law. Hence Volusianus, writing to Augustine, says: Ignorance of both kinds is tolerated in other priests; but when one comes to Bishop Augustine, whatever Augustine happens not to know seems lacking in the law of God.

Sixtus of Siena, in his *Bibliotheca*, under the word "Augustine," says: A man surpassing all mortals who lived before him or who have lived after him down to the present time.

Thomas Netter of Walden, speaking of St. Augustine, says: Far be it from a sober reader and Catholic expositor to entertain perverse views concerning a pillar of the Church and a foundation of truth.

Cardinal Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2, c. 11, after saying that St. Augustine's teaching concerning predestination was approved by the Church not merely once, concludes regarding it as follows: Accordingly, not merely once, but a second and a third time, the Apostolic See pronounced judgment against the remnants of the Pelagians in favor of the defenders of grace and predestination, so that this position, namely Augustine's, must now be called not the opinion of just any Doctors, but the faith of the Catholic Church.

Suárez, sixth prologue to *De gratia*, c. 6: Whatever Augustine affirms as certain concerning grace and as pertaining to dogmas of faith must be held by every wise and learned theologian, even if it is not certainly established that it has been defined by the Church.

Father Thomas de Lemos, who disputed successfully in the Congregation de Auxiliis, speaks as follows in tract. 4, *De haeresi Pelagiana*, c. 1: The supreme defender of grace after the Apostles, and the most glorious conqueror of the Pelagian heresy, was that great Father Augustine, the light of the Church, the pillar of faith, the trumpet of the Gospel, the eye of the world, the lamp of Christ, the perpetual hammer of all heretics, who, as the Church sings of him, after the Apostles shone forth first with a second grace of dispensing the word of God.

Álvarez, *De auxiliis divinae gratiae* 1, disp. 5: The Apostolic See pronounced judgment not merely once, but a second and a third time, against the remnants of the Pelagians and in favor of the defenders of grace and predestination, which Augustine drew from the sacred writings, so that his doctrine must now be called not the opinion of one particular Doctor, but the faith of the Catholic Church.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Finally, to omit all others, St. Thomas briefly summarized Augustine's principal praises in these three verses, which are contained in the sequence he composed concerning him and which is sung on his feast:

*Hail, jewel of the priests,
Tongue of Christ, voice of heaven,
Scribe of life, light of Doctors.*

These words commend Augustine and his doctrine in an extraordinary manner. For what greater praise can there be than to be called by so great and angelic a Doctor *the tongue of Christ and the voice of heaven?*

CHAPTER V.

The Blind and Rash Assault of Certain Recent Authors Against Augustine's Doctrine Is Repelled.

Although Augustine's doctrine was consecrated by the Supreme Pontiffs, approved by Councils, commended by the Holy Fathers, praised by many men distinguished alike for sanctity and learning, and authenticated, so to speak, by so many sacred seals, nevertheless, as Seneca says, *Nothing is so sacred that it does not find someone sacrilegious*. It is therefore no wonder that certain novel theologians, so that they may impose their new imaginings more freely and easily, rise against Augustine with utterly unrestrained license and so despise and belittle his doctrine concerning grace and predestination that they have not hesitated to write: *Augustine's footsteps must not be followed, and the Church would be wretched if it remained bound by Augustine's opinions*. And lest anyone think that I invent enemies for myself to strike, I shall here report the names and words of these authors.

First, Vásquez, I, q. 47, and I-II, disp. 132, c. 3, writes as follows: In this matter St. Augustine's doctrine does not satisfy me, but I judge that one must philosophize otherwise. Hence we shall rashly affirm that help is denied to some. We may ask Augustine and the others who taught this how they became certain of this divine will. For we shall easily explain the passages of Scripture. In the same place he also sufficiently insinuates that, if St. Augustine's position was not condemned in the Council of Trent, this resulted solely from the Council's moderation.

Petavius, cited by Vincent Baron in the first book of his *Apologeticus*, p. 366 in my edition, asserts the same thing, but more sharply: Not a few and not inconsiderable doctrines of Augustine are rejected by the judgment either of all theologians or of many theologians of no low rank; and the

On the Authority of St. Augustine

Council of Trent, by adding certain necessary qualifications, made Catholic not a few assertions of Augustine which are not Catholic, and which no ecumenical Synod wished to be held as Catholic.

But Mariana surpassed every limit of moderation in *De morte et immortalitate* 3, c. 8, when he was not ashamed to write: Everything said by Cassian concerning grace and free choice is defended by learned men in our age as consonant with piety and not deviating from the holy rule of faith. It would have been well for the triad of Fathers Augustine, Fulgentius, and Prosper if they were held to be as Catholic as Cassian, Faustus, and the other men of Marseilles. Vincent Contenson reports these words from Mariana in vol. 5, tract. *De gratia*, diss. 6, p. 651.

Finally, Molina, in his *Concordia*, on q. 23, a. 4 and 3, disp. 1, member 6, says that Augustine, situated under a certain mist, did not see the truth discovered by more recent theologians, and that for this reason he expounded the Scriptures so harshly. And in the final member, promoting his own inventions, which by his own confession are diametrically opposed to Augustine, he has the following: Had these matters always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor would the Lutherans have dared so shamelessly to deny the freedom of our choice on the pretext that it cannot cohere with divine grace, foreknowledge, and predestination; nor would so many of the faithful have been troubled and defected to the Pelagians because of Augustine's opinion and his contests with the Pelagians; and those remnants of the Pelagians in Gaul, of whom mention is made in the Letters of Prosper and Hilary, would easily have been extinguished.

Father Thomas de Lemos also relates, tract. 4, *De haeresi Pelagiana*, c. 1, that Molina published a book on the instruction of priests in the Spanish language, in which, tract. 3, c. 14, he says that the holy Doctor Augustine, in order to condemn the Pelagian heresy more effectively, said many things which we would now not dare to utter and which would not appear safe.

All these assertions, however, must be judged not merely false, but plainly rash. First, what Vásquez says is not free from rashness, namely, that Augustine's position concerning sufficient grace is not at all satisfactory to him. For, as we demonstrated above, and as Bellarmine and Suárez, cited above, frankly profess, Augustine's doctrine concerning grace was not merely approved, but consecrated by the Supreme Pontiffs; and his position must be called not one particular opinion, but the faith of the Catholic Church. Hence Pope Hormisdas, cited above, says: *What the Roman, that is, the Catholic Church follows and asserts concerning free choice and the grace of God can be learned from Augustine's books addressed to Hilary and Prosper.*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Similarly, what Petavius says cannot be excused from rashness: *The Council of Trent, by adding certain necessary qualifications, made Catholic not a few assertions of Augustine which are not Catholic and which no ecumenical Synod wished to be held as Catholic.* For, as the Council of Florence, sess. 7, says, the Fifth Synod consecrated Augustine's doctrine. And so far is it from being true that Trent added anything to it or changed anything in it that, on the contrary, in composing its definitions it transcribed not only Augustine's meaning but also his words. The Second Council of Orange did the same at the command of Leo I, as we noted in § 2.

Third, Mariana's words cited above should be called not so much words as monstrosities, and they appear to have been written by a Semi-Pelagian rather than by a Catholic Doctor. For, since Gelasius, in the Council held with seventy bishops, approved all Augustine's writings delivered against the Pelagians concerning predestination and grace, and condemned the opposing opinion of Cassian and Faustus, who except one infected with the errors of the Semi-Pelagians could say: Everything said in Cassian concerning grace and free choice can be defended as consonant with piety and not deviating from the holy rule of faith? Who except a disciple of Faustus or Cassian would dare to assert: It would have been well for the triad of Fathers Augustine, Fulgentius, and Prosper if they were held to be as Catholic as Cassian, Faustus, and the other men of Marseilles? Hence Lupus, Abbot of Ferrières, says in his *Collectio de tribus quaestionibus*, q. 3: The most reverend Pope Gelasius, together with seventy most learned bishops, determined which writers were or were not to be received. After approving Augustine and giving Jerome the highest praises, he rejected the aforementioned Faustus in these words: "The little works of Faustus of Riez in Gaul are apocryphal." We, therefore, following the uncorrupted understanding of the Holy Scriptures and revering the gravity of the Apostolic See, what else can we say except: let Faustus and those who think similarly be silent; let Jerome and Augustine speak with their companions, mindful of that proverb: "Let the frogs fall silent; the divine heaven thunders." Let Mariana therefore be silent and restrain his malicious tongue, lest he utter sacrilegious words against those eminent saints and Doctors of the Church, Augustine, Prosper, and Fulgentius. Surely of that author one may say what Jerome said of another: He was so insipid and foul in speech that he deserves pity rather than injury.

Fourth, Molina erred and was under a mist when he wrote these words in his *Concordia*: *Meanwhile, while Augustine, under that mist, did not attend to this*, namely, to positing predestination according to foreknowledge. According to Molina, therefore, the light of the Church was under a mist,

On the Authority of St. Augustine

and the eagle of the Doctors did not see what Molina perceived in the matter of predestination. Who could believe this of so great a Doctor, of whom Fortunatus writes in his exposition of the Lord's Prayer: *Whoever agrees with the Apostle Paul, that is, the eye of the Church, and with blessed Augustine his follower, is not ruled by the mist of ignorance.*

These words of Molina appeared so absurd and injurious to Augustine to the Fathers of the Congregation de Auxiliis that, when they were objected against Molina's defenders, they could answer nothing except that Molina intended Augustine to have been under a certain mist of the world, not of doctrine. This was unanimously mocked and rejected by all who were present, since Molina was manifestly speaking of the mist concerning predestination under which Augustine was said to have been. Father Thomas de Lemos relates this in tract. 3, *De praedestinatione*, c. 10, n. 143.

Finally, it is rash for Molina to say that, if the matters which he hands down in his *Concordia* had been given and explained, perhaps the Pelagian heresy would not have arisen, etc.; and to add in his book on the instruction of priests, written in Spanish, that Augustine, in order to condemn the Pelagian heresy more effectively, said many things which we would not now dare to utter and which would not appear safe. These assertions are plainly injurious not only to Augustine but to the whole Church, since Augustine's position concerning grace and predestination must be called the faith of the Catholic Church, as Bellarmine, cited above, says and Pope Hormisdas teaches in the Letter to Possessor which we cited in the preceding section. And Pope Celestine, in the Letter to the bishops of Gaul cited above, after approving Augustine's doctrine, adds the following against certain men who disparaged him as though he had exceeded the necessary measure: *Because certain men who glory in the Catholic name, yet remain in the condemned opinions of heretics through either depravity or ignorance, presume to object against the most pious disputants; and although they do not hesitate to anathematize Pelagius and Celestius, they nevertheless speak against our teachers as though they had exceeded the necessary measure.*

Hence the University of Louvain, in the preface to the censure it composed against those who denied Augustine's doctrine concerning grace and predestination, has the following: If, in explaining a matter of such great importance, we judge that Augustine either fell into error or did not observe a right or necessary method, not only is his authority weakened in other matters, but, as we confidently say, the Church also erred greatly and shamefully when, following his statement and judgment, she is believed to have weakened the enemies of Christ's grace and triumphed over them. Even to think this would be wicked and impious. We therefore judge that

this accusation against Augustine inflicts no small injury not merely upon him but also upon the whole Church and the Apostolic See, since in this cause the faithful did not hesitate to attribute as much to him as all attributed to Irenaeus against the Valentinians and Gnostics, to Athanasius and Hilary against the Arians, to Cyril against the Nestorians, and to Pope Leo against the Eutychians; so that St. Augustine was destined by a singular providence against the enemies of the grace of God, that under his leadership and auspices the Catholic battle line might fight and conquer.

CHAPTER VI.

Defense of Augustinian Doctrine.

Certain recent authors, both heterodox and Catholic, attempt to cast darkness upon the sun and obscure Augustine's doctrine with the clouds of certain objections. It will not be difficult for us, however, to dispel those clouds, resolve those objections, and defend Augustine's sacred doctrine completely from the blemishes and errors which those authors falsely attribute to it.

They object first that St. Augustine doubted until death concerning the creation of souls from nothing, namely, in *De Genesi ad litteram* 10, c. 11, where he gives four opinions concerning the soul's origin; in Epist. 28 to Jerome and 157 to Optatus; and finally in *Retractationes* 2, c. 56.

I answer that before the Lateran Council, which defined that souls are created by God and, in being created, infused into bodies, the Holy Fathers were very doubtful and divided in this question concerning the soul's origin. Some affirmed that it was created by God; others asserted that it was derived originally from Adam together with the flesh. This latter position was more common in the Western Church, because it more clearly explained the manner in which original sin is contracted by the soul through generation. Hence it is not surprising that Augustine inclined toward it, and that St. Jerome did not disapprove his doubt, since, when questioned by him concerning this matter, he answered: *Let each abound in his own understanding*, as Augustine himself testifies in Epist. 157. Consequently, certain men wrongly call this doubt of Augustine a blemish in his doctrine, since Isidore of Seville placed this doubt concerning the soul's origin among the rules of faith in *De officiis ecclesiasticis* 2, c. 23, and inserted among the other propositions which he proposes as to be held by faith this statement: *The soul's origin is uncertain*. And St. Gregory the Great wrote in *Epistolae* 7, epist. 53, to Secundinus: *But concerning this matter, let your charity, most dear*

On the Authority of St. Augustine

to me, know that no slight investigation concerning the soul's origin took place among the Holy Fathers. Whether the soul descends from Adam or is certainly given to each person remained uncertain, and they confessed this question to be insoluble in this life; for it is a grave question and cannot be comprehended by man. Hence Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* 1, p. 7, c. 3, indeed judges it more probable that souls are not produced by derivation but are created, and indicates that this opinion was more common in the Church in his time; he nevertheless adds that *no argument or authority ever prevailed to such an extent as to remove the doubt from the question.*

They object secondly that Augustine teaches in *De peccatorum meritis* c. 20, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* c. 13, and the second book of the unfinished work against Julian, c. 28, that reception of the Eucharist is necessary for the salvation of infants.

Augustine, however, is not speaking of the real and sacramental reception of the Eucharist, but of its mystical and spiritual reception, which consists in union and incorporation with Christ. All the sacraments are ordered to this as to their end, especially Baptism, since it is the beginning of spiritual life and is referred in a particular manner to its perfection and consummation as to an end. Fulgentius declares this to have been St. Augustine's meaning in the Letter to Ferrandus the Deacon, c. 11. After teaching that, from the Savior's statement in John 6, Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, etc., it cannot be inferred that actual Communion after Baptism is necessary for salvation, since the baptized person received the effect of the Eucharist in regeneration itself, he adds: We know that the Holy Fathers also believed and taught this without doubt. He then presents a sermon delivered by St. Augustine to infants before the altar, and finally concludes the Letter as follows: I judge, holy brother, that our disputation, confirmed by the discourse of the illustrious Doctor Augustine, leaves no room whatever for doubt that each of the faithful becomes a participant in the Lord's body and blood when in Baptism he becomes a member of Christ's body; nor is he separated from the fellowship of that bread and chalice if, before eating that bread and drinking that chalice, he departs from this world while established in the unity of Christ's body. For he is not deprived of the participation and benefit of that sacrament when he is found in the very reality which that sacrament signifies. But we treat this more fully in the Treatise on Baptism. Read the second book of the most learned Cardinal Bona, *De rebus liturgicis*, c. 19, and the *Vindiciae Augustinianae*, § 4, of the most erudite Augustinian Henry Noris.

They object thirdly that Augustine teaches in various places, especially sermon 14 on the words of the Apostle, that children dying before Baptism

are to be deprived not only of the vision of God, but are also to be tormented eternally by the fire of hell.

I answer first that Augustine speaks metaphorically in these places and signifies the pain of loss by the name of fire. For, as he himself teaches in q. 9 on Joshua, and as is evident from Ps. 66, *We passed through fire and water, and you brought us out into refreshment*, every punishment is designated by the name of fire. That this interpretation is legitimate is evident, first, because it is given by St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; by St. Bonaventure in the same place, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1; and by the Gloss on c. *Nulla*, *De consecratione*, dist. 4.

Secondly, Augustine's intention was to establish against the Pelagians that infants dying without Baptism are not to be granted eternal happiness. But this is sufficiently demonstrated if by the name of fire we understand eternal punishment, namely, the eternal pain of loss, with which eternal happiness cannot be joined. Therefore it must be understood in this manner.

Thirdly, Augustine says in *Contra Julianum* 5, c. 8, otherwise c. 11: *Who could doubt that unbaptized infants will undergo the lightest condemnation of all? Although I cannot define its nature or extent, I nevertheless do not dare to say that it would have been more expedient for them not to exist than to exist there*. By these words, first, he teaches that they will undergo the lightest condemnation of all. This would not be true if they suffered any pain of sense, for their condemnation would undoubtedly be milder and more tolerable if they were free from every pain of sense and suffered only the pain of loss. Secondly, he indicates that the statement concerning Judas's betrayal, *It would have been better for him if he had not been born*, cannot be applied to those infants. This would be false if they were tormented by the pain of fire. For although nonexistence is not desirable in itself, since it is the pure privation of good, it may nevertheless be desirable insofar as it removes torment and punishment, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae*, Suppl., q. 97, a. 1.

I answer secondly that, even if Augustine had held the opinion asserting that children dying without Baptism are tormented by the fire of hell, he should not on that account be accused of error. For this opinion is not erroneous, but possesses no slight foundation in Scripture and is very well suited to refuting the Pelagian error. Hence several Holy Fathers after Augustine taught it, namely, Fulgentius, Gregory the Great, Isidore, Prudentius of Troyes, and others, although Fulgentius went too far in asserting that this opinion pertains to faith: *Hold most firmly*, he says in *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 27, *and in no way doubt that not only men already using reason, but also infants who either begin to live in their mothers' wombs or are born from*

On the Authority of St. Augustine

their mothers and depart from this world without the sacrament of Baptism, are to be punished by the everlasting punishment of eternal fire; for although they had no sin of their own action, they nevertheless contracted the condemnation of original sin by carnal conception and birth.

Finally, Avitus of Vienne has the following verses in a poem addressed to his sister Fuscina, by which he signifies that children dying without Baptism are to be tormented in hell:

*The same grievous fate awaits them all if envious death
casts down an infant deprived of the divine font,
generating him for the harsh lot of Gehenna.
As soon as he ceases to be his mother's son,
he will belong to perdition. Then sorrowful mothers
wish they had not borne the children whom they begot only for flames.*

They object fourthly that what St. Augustine taught in *De Genesi ad litteram* 4 and *De civitate Dei* 11, c. 9, is an error, namely, that the entire universe was created by God in one instant, since Scripture in Gen. 1 openly declares that it was founded by God over the intervals of six days.

But I deny that Augustine's position, or his subtle exposition of Scripture, is erroneous. Indeed, I say that it possesses some foundation in Scripture, since it is said in Sir. 18: *He who lives eternally created all things together*. Nor is it an obstacle that Gen. 1 enumerates intervals of six days in which the world is said to have been created by God. Augustine answers in the places cited that those six days are not natural, but mystical and angelic, distinguished not on the part of the cognition, but on the part of the things known, so that the first work, as known by the angel, is the first day, and so of the others. He interprets the evening and morning of which Moses speaks as evening and morning knowledge: the latter knows things in the Word, the former outside the Word through their proper species.

This subtle explanation of Augustine must not be rejected, because it better defends Sacred Scripture from the mockery of unbelievers. Hence Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, and other lights of theology commend it. And although St. Thomas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, inclines to neither side and resolves the arguments for both opinions, as may be seen in I, q. 74, a. 2, nevertheless, in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 12, q. 1, he establishes a special article to defend the position of his master Augustine, and in a. 2 pronounces concerning it: *This opinion pleases me more*. What pleased the Angelic Doctor therefore ought not to displease us, much less to be called erroneous.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

They object fifthly that Augustine, *Contra Academicos* 1, c. 7, attributed a corporeal nature to the angels. Augustine, however, did not firmly adhere to this opinion, but, since there were various opinions among the ancient Fathers concerning this matter, suspended his judgment on the question, as is evident from *De civitate Dei* 15, c. 23, and 21, c. 10: *The demons also possess bodies of their own, as learned men have judged.... But if anyone asserts that demons have no bodies, it is not necessary to labor over this matter with an arduous investigation or contend in a contentious disputation.*

They object sixthly that Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 16, c. 9, denied that antipodes exist: It is excessively absurd to say that some men were able to sail and pass from this side to that side across the immensity of the Ocean, so that the human race might be established there also from that first man.

This ignorance, however, must be called not privative, but negative ignorance, or mere lack of knowledge, such as is found in angels. For nothing certain concerning the matter was contained either in sacred or profane writings. Certain ancient authors established the existence of antipodes solely by conjectures, whereas we now assert it more certainly, guided by the experiences and voyages of recent men. Thus no one now denies that habitable regions exist beneath the equatorial circle and in the torrid zone, although St. Thomas denied it in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 2, relying upon the authority of Aristotle, because it has now been discovered by most certain experiences and most trustworthy reports.

Pope Zachary appears to have been led by Augustine's authority to call it *perverse and wicked doctrine that another world and other men exist beneath the earth*. This is an evident argument that Supreme Pontiffs can err in questions of fact, as we shall demonstrate in the Treatise on Faith, c. 5, § 4.

Finally, Vásquez objects in I-II, q. 82, disp. 132, c. 1, that Augustine taught two doctrines in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1, c. 23, which are utterly erroneous and entirely foreign to the faith, namely, that concupiscence is original sin and that it is not entirely removed in the baptized, but merely scraped away and not imputed. These are the words of that author: Add also that Augustine, in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1, c. 23, teaches that concupiscence remains in the regenerate but is not imputed, although he had said that it is original sin. And in c. 26 he speaks as follows: "In those, therefore, who are regenerated in Christ, when they receive the remission of all sins, it is certainly necessary that the guilt of this concupiscence, although it still remains, should also be remitted, so that it is not imputed as sin, as we have said. For just as the guilt of sins which cannot remain, since when they exist they pass away, nevertheless remains and, unless they are remitted, will remain eternally, so, when the guilt of that concupiscence is

On the Authority of St. Augustine

remitted, it is removed.” He therefore judges that concupiscence is indeed sin, but that it is not imputed as sin in the regenerate, although it remains. Consequently, he appears to favor the error of those who assert that original sin is covered and not removed, scraped away but not eradicated; that it remains but is not imputed or punished. Thus Vásquez, who, as is evident, attributes two things to St. Augustine: first, that the holy Doctor asserts concupiscence to be original sin; secondly, that since it remains in the regenerate, original sin always remains in them, but is not imputed to them, and that through this he favors the error of those who say that original sin is scraped away but not removed. This is the heresy condemned at Trent, sess. 5, can. 5.

Both assertions, however, are openly false and contrary to Augustine’s mind and doctrine. The first is false because the holy Doctor says in that place that concupiscence is called sin because it was produced by sin, although in the regenerate it is no longer itself sin; just as what the tongue produces is called speech, and what the hand produces is called writing. It is likewise called sin because, if it conquers, it produces sin; just as cold is called sluggish, not because it is produced by the sluggish, but because it makes men sluggish. By these words he openly teaches that concupiscence is original sin materially or consecutively, but not formally and essentially. This is most true, is demonstrated by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 83, a. 3, and is taught by Trent, sess. 5, can. 5.

The second assertion which he attributes to Augustine, namely, that Augustine judges original sin to remain in the regenerate but not to be imputed to them, is most remote from the mind of the holy Doctor. Indeed, he asserts the contrary in the aforesaid book *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*. For he openly teaches that everything having the character of original sin and guilt is removed and entirely remitted in the baptized. In c. 22 he says: *This concupiscence, I say, which is expiated by the sacrament of regeneration alone.* And in c. 25: *Nothing therefore remains that is not remitted, since, as it is written, the Lord is merciful in all our iniquities.* And in c. 26: *In those, therefore, who are regenerated in Christ, when they receive the remission of absolutely all sins, it is certainly necessary that the guilt of this concupiscence, although it still remains, should also be remitted.* And again: *When the guilt of that concupiscence is remitted, it is removed.* With what face and with what boldness, therefore, can Vásquez assert that Augustine favors the error of those who say that original sin is not removed or eradicated in Baptism, but is merely scraped away or not imputed, when the holy Doctor expressly says in the aforesaid places that nothing remains in the baptized which is not remitted; that, with the

remission of all sins, the guilt of original fault is also remitted in them; and finally, that when the guilt of concupiscence is remitted, it is removed?

Vásquez will perhaps say that this is not inferred from those words, but from what Augustine says in c. 25 of the cited book: *The concupiscence of the flesh is remitted in Baptism, not so that it does not exist, but so that it is not imputed as sin.* Yet the plain meaning of these words, and the entirely true meaning intended by St. Augustine, is that the concupiscence of the flesh is remitted in Baptism, not so that it does not exist in itself, since it undoubtedly remains in the regenerate, but so that it is not sin and possesses no character of guilt; rather, everything in it possessing the character of guilt is entirely removed and remitted.

That this is St. Augustine's meaning is evident from the context from c. 22 through c. 26 inclusive. Hence James Granado, another distinguished theologian of the same Society, in his *Tractatus de immaculata Conceptione*, c. 1, sect. 1, says that it cannot be maintained without grave injury and manifest falsehood that Augustine favors those who contend that original sin is not removed by Baptism but is merely not imputed, since in the same place he says that nothing remains which is not remitted, that concupiscence is not sin in the regenerate, and that those who are regenerated receive the remission of absolutely all sins. Hence he rightly concludes: *Augustine therefore teaches only that concupiscence, that is, the appetite and the other powers of the soul, remains after Baptism without the subjection to reason which they possessed in the state of innocence, but that it is no longer imputed as sin, because it is no longer joined to the guilt, or original sin, which has been destroyed through Baptism.*

TREATISE VIII.

ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES.

Above, in this second part of the present *Manuale*, in order to observe St. Thomas's order, after the Treatise on human acts we discussed the virtues in common and briefly explained their nature, subject, species, and properties. Now, with the same Angelic Doctor, we attach to the Treatise on grace a Treatise on the virtues in particular, treating the theological virtues before the moral virtues. But because faith, among the theological virtues, precedes the others at least in the order of generation, just as the light of reason precedes the production of the natural virtues, we therefore rightly judge that faith must be discussed before we begin to speak of the others. And because every habit is specified by its object, in order that the nature of the habit of faith may be manifested, it must be explained what its object is.

CHAPTER I.

The Object of Faith.

1. Philosophers customarily assign a threefold object to a power or habit: namely, the formal object as the thing attained; the formal object by which, or under which; and the material object. The first is the aspect which is attained per se and by reason of itself by the power or habit, while the others are attained by reason of it. The second is the aspect under which the power or habit attains its object, or that by means of which it is terminated at the

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

object. The third comprises everything attained by such a power or habit. For example, in the visual power, the formal object as the thing attained is color, because it is perceived by the eye per se and by reason of itself. The formal object by which, or under which, is light, because sight perceives colors by means of light. The material object is every colored body, because every body affected by color can be perceived by sight. Therefore, in order that the object of faith may be clearly understood, this threefold kind of object must be briefly explained in faith.

§ 1.

The Formal Object Attained by Faith Is God Under the Aspect of First Truth in Being, and Consequently Under the Aspect of Deity; Its Formal Object Under Which Is God's Infallible Testimony; Its Material Object Comprises Everything Made Known to Us by Divine Revelation.

2. The first part is evident, both because every theological virtue, such as faith, has God himself as its formal object attained; for religion is not a theological virtue precisely because, although it regards God, it regards him not as the object attained, but only as the object to whom it renders worship. It is also evident because that is called the formal object attained by a power or habit which is attained per se and first, and in relation to which all else is regarded. But faith regards God per se and first, and considers everything it attains in relation to God, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, in these words: *The things pertaining to Christ's humanity, the sacraments of the Church, and any creatures whatever fall under faith insofar as through them we are ordered to God.* Reason also establishes this, for everything faith attains is referred to God as to the first credible object; these things are revealed, and faith attains them, so that God and his perfections may be better known. Augustine declares this excellently in *De civitate Dei* 11, c. 2, in these words: *The mind, in which reason dwells, until it becomes capable of so great a happiness, first had to be imbued and purified by faith. And so that it might walk more confidently through faith to the truth, Truth itself, God the Son of God, having assumed man without consuming God, established and founded that faith, so that man's road to God might be through the God-man.* Therefore, the formal object attained by faith is God.

3. That this belongs to God insofar as he is first truth in being is demonstrated as follows. God under different aspects is the object attained by faith and by charity. But this aspect can only be the aspect of first truth in

On the Theological Virtues

being, which differs from the aspect of supreme goodness, under which God is the object of charity. Therefore, God under the aspect of first truth in being is the formal object attained by faith. Hence Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 7: *Faith concerns simple and ever-existing truth*.

This is confirmed. Faith is a virtue existing in the intellect. Therefore, since the object of the intellect is the true, faith regards its object, namely God, under the aspect of first truth in being, and consequently under the aspect of deity. For truth in being does not add any perfection to deity, but signifies deity itself in another manner, namely, with a certain relation to intellect, just as truth in creatures does not add anything to being, but expresses the very notion of being as implying a relation to intellect. Hence Cajetan, on a. 1 here, § *For the evidence of the matter*, says that it is not different to say that God is the object of faith under the aspect of deity or under the aspect of first truth.

4. The second part, which asserts that the formal object under which faith attains its object, or its formal motive, is God's infallible testimony, is the doctrine of St. Thomas here in a. 1, where he says that faith assents to nothing except insofar as it is revealed by God. And in *De veritate*, q. 14, he asserts that *the testimony of first truth is related to faith as a principle is related to the demonstrative sciences*. Principles in the sciences, since they are like a light by which conclusions are illuminated and manifested, are the formal aspect under which, as the philosophers teach. Therefore, likewise, the infallible testimony of first truth will be the formal aspect under which in faith. This is openly gathered from Scripture, for it is said in John 3: *He who received his testimony*, namely Christ's, *has set his seal that God is truthful*; that is, by his faith he has sealed, as with a seal, his profession concerning God's truthfulness. And in 1 Thess. 2: *When you received from us the word you heard from God*, that is, our preaching concerning God, *you received it not as the word of men, but as the word of God*. By these and similar texts it is clearly signified that our faith rests upon God's infallible testimony as upon its formal motive.

5. Reason also establishes this. It pertains to the formal nature of faith in common that it rests upon the testimony of one who speaks, so that it possesses no motive for believing except the testimony and authority of the speaker. In this, the assent of faith is distinguished from scientific assent. Therefore, divine faith must rest upon divine testimony, and must be moved by it as by its formal motive to believe the truths revealed by God.

6. This is confirmed. Once the attestation of first truth is posited, and every other consideration is excluded, there exists an absolutely sufficient and most proportionate motive for assenting to the truths revealed to us, on

account of their infallible and necessary connection with that attestation. Hence, if, per impossibile, supreme truth in attesting did not belong to God, although he possessed every other infinite perfection in every genus, completely undoubting faith would not be owed to him concerning what he revealed to us, nor could such faith prudently be given. Conversely, it would be owed and could prudently be given if he possessed supreme truth in attesting, even if he lacked the other perfections. Therefore, this truth or truthfulness is the formal motive upon which divine faith rests. Hence Cassian says in *De incarnatione Domini* 4, c. 6: *God has said this; his word is the supreme reason. I set aside arguments and disputations; the person of the speaker alone is sufficient for me to believe.*

7. It must nevertheless be noted that, although faith rests upon divine truth or truthfulness as the formal motive for assenting to revealed truths, it connotes first truth in knowing, or God's supreme and infinite wisdom. For God's inability to deceive in speaking is not sufficient for his testimony to be wholly infallible; it is additionally required that he cannot be deceived in knowing. For one who can be deceived in knowing can deceive others, if not through malice, at least through ignorance. That God cannot be deceived in knowing proceeds from his supreme and infinite knowledge and wisdom, by reason of which nothing is hidden from him, and he clearly knows himself and all things in the manner in which they exist in themselves. Therefore, God's testimony cannot be the formal motive of faith unless it connotes God's supreme and infinite wisdom, which is first truth in knowing. Hence Hilary rightly says: *God alone must be believed concerning himself, because he alone knows himself.*

Finally, the third part of the assertion, concerning the material object of faith, is evident. For the material object of a power or habit is whatever falls under both its formal object attained and its formal aspect under which. But everything made known to us by divine revelation falls under the formal object attained and the formal aspect under which of faith, namely, first truth and its infallible testimony or revelation. Therefore, all these things can be called the material object of faith.

§ 2.

The Objections Are Resolved.

8. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: if the formal object attained by faith were God under the aspect of deity, faith would not be distinguished from theology, since theology likewise regards God under

On the Theological Virtues

the aspect of deity as its formal object attained. Likewise, faith would be nobler than charity, since charity regards divine goodness, which, since it is not God's essence but one of his attributes, does not express as great a perfection as deity.

But I deny both consequences. I deny the first because habits are not specified by the formal object attained except insofar as it falls under the formal aspect under which, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 1, in these words: *A different aspect of knowability causes a diversity of sciences; for the astronomer and the natural philosopher demonstrate the same conclusion, for example, that the earth is round, but the astronomer does so through a mathematical medium, that is, one abstracted from matter, while the natural philosopher does so through a medium considered in matter.* Therefore, since faith and theology alike attain God as first truth in being, but attain him in different manners—faith under formal and immediate revelation, theology under virtual and mediate revelation—they are specifically different habits, although they regard the same formal object attained. I deny the second because the nobility of a power or habit is not drawn from the nobler object considered in its being as an entity, but from the object considered formally under the aspect of object. The object of faith, considered formally under the aspect of object, is not nobler than the object of charity, because the object of charity is God's goodness as it is in itself, whereas the object of faith is deity, or first truth in being, as received in a created intellect through obscure revelation.

9. You will object secondly against the second part of the assertion: the formal aspect under which must be intrinsic to the object which it manifests. But God's testimony is extrinsic to the revealed mysteries. Therefore, it is not the formal aspect under which faith attains them.

I answer that the formal aspect under which must be intrinsic to the objects or conclusions which it manifests in the sciences, but not in faith. For the reason for assenting to conclusions demonstrated in the sciences is their own intrinsic truth and knowability, which can be known immediately and independently of anything extrinsic. But the reason for assenting to revealed truths is first truth itself revealing, which, although extrinsic to the revealed object, nevertheless possesses a necessary connection with the truth of the revealed mystery. This is sufficient for it to be the formal reason for assenting to that mystery with certainty.

10. You will say: if we assent to this truth, *God is triune*, because God has revealed it, we shall also assent to this proposition, *God has revealed it*, because of divine revelation, and assent to that revelation because of another revelation, and so there will be an infinite regress.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

But I deny the consequence. For, as St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 8, ad 2: *Divine testimony is first and principally about itself, and consequently about other things*. Therefore, just as light manifests not only other things but also itself, so divine revelation, which is the light of faith, reveals not only the divine mysteries but also itself.

11. You will object thirdly: that is the formal aspect under which of faith into which the assent we give to revealed mysteries is ultimately resolved. But the ultimate formal reason for assenting to revealed mysteries is not first truth in speaking, but first truth in being. Therefore, first truth in being, and not first truth in speaking, is the formal aspect under which of faith. The major premise appears certain. The minor is evident because, if one of the faithful is asked, “Why do you believe God when he reveals the truths of faith?” he will rightly answer, “Because God is first truth in speaking.” But if he is then asked why God is first and supreme truth in speaking, he can give no satisfactory answer except, “Because God is.” Therefore, the reason why the faithful man assents to God revealing his mysteries is ultimately resolved not into first truth in speaking, but into deity, or first truth in being.

I answer first by denying the major absolutely. For although, in discursive cognition, the formal aspect under which is taken from the principle into which the demonstrated truth is ultimately resolved, nevertheless, in simple and nondiscursive knowledge, such as the cognition of faith, as we shall say below, one may stop at some immediate reason, nor is an ascent to the first principle required.

12. I answer secondly by distinguishing the major premise. That into which the assent we give to revealed mysteries is ultimately resolved as into the reason moving to assent: I concede the major. As into the real or virtual cause of the reason which moves: I deny the major. I likewise distinguish the minor premise. The ultimate resolution of the assent we give to the mysteries is made into deity, or first truth in being, as into the reason moving to assent: I deny the minor. As into the virtual cause of the reason which moves: I concede the minor, and deny the consequence.

Thus, although color possesses an a priori reason in being, namely, the temperament of the four primary qualities, nevertheless this temperament is not the first reason or first principle specifying sight; only color itself, or the light through which it is perceived, does so, because, although such a temperament is the cause of the ultimate reason for moving, it is not itself the reason which moves. Similarly, although first truth in speaking has an a priori reason in being, namely deity, or first truth in being, nevertheless, because deity does not pertain per se to the cause of the assent, but to the cause of the reality, it is not the aspect under which specifying faith. Only

first truth in speaking is such, because it alone moves to the assent of faith. Hence, when one of the faithful, asked why he believes God revealing the mysteries of our faith, answers, "Because he is first truth in speaking," he stops there precisely as one of the faithful. If he is again asked why God is first truth in speaking, he is questioned not as one of the faithful, but as a theologian or one possessing science. Consequently, because he answers that question by saying, "Because God is," it is not rightly inferred that the reason why he believes God revealing is resolved into deity. At most it can be concluded that the reason or demonstrative medium by which he, as a theologian, possesses this truth, *God is first truth in speaking*, is deity itself, or first truth in being.

13. You will insist: the ultimate resolution of our faith as regards assent is made into the authority or testimony of the Church, not into the testimony of first truth revealing. Therefore, the formal aspect under which of faith is the Church's authority, not God's infallible testimony. The consequence is evident from what has been said. The antecedent is proved as follows. If you ask one of the faithful, "Why do you believe that God is three and one?" he will answer, "Because God has revealed it." But if you ask again, "How do you know that God has revealed it?" he will answer, "Because the Church says so." Therefore, the ultimate resolution of our faith is made into the Church's authority, not into the testimony of God revealing. Hence Augustine says in *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti*, c. 5: *I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me.*

14. On account of this objection, Michael Medina, Cardinal de Lugo, and other recent authors teach that the ultimate resolution of our faith as regards assent is made into the Church's authority, not indeed totally, but partially. This opinion, however, displeases other theologians, because it follows from it that the formal aspect under which of our faith, namely, that into which it is ultimately resolved, is something composed of the created and the uncreated, namely, of first truth speaking and of the testimony of the Church through which it speaks. This is openly repugnant to St. Thomas here in a. 1, where he says: *If we consider the formal nature of the object of faith, it is nothing other than first truth.* These words openly signify that nothing created enters, even partially, into the formal aspect under which of faith.

Reason also establishes this. If the formal object under which of our faith were partially something created, our faith would not be adequately divine; nor would we believe God on account of his authority or truthfulness alone, but also on account of the authority and testimony of a creature, namely, the Church. Likewise, faith would not be a theological virtue, since

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

both the formal object attained and the formal aspect under which of a theological virtue are something purely divine and uncreated, not something mixed from the created and uncreated, as is evident in the other theological virtues. For the formal aspect under which of hope is the divine power alone as assisting us to attain beatitude, and the formal aspect under which of charity is divine goodness alone as moving us to love God and neighbor. Therefore, likewise, divine and uncreated truth alone, as moving us to assent to the revealed mysteries, will be the formal aspect under which of our faith. Consequently, the ultimate resolution of faith as regards assent is made into that truth alone, not into the authority or testimony of the Church. The Church's testimony is related only as a condition applying and proposing divine revelation, not as a motive for assenting to revealed truths.

So also, in the doctrine of the philosophers, the presentation of the object's goodness made by the intellect to the will is merely a condition applying the formal reason of the object of love, without which the will would not love; it is not the will's formal motive for loving, even partially, for that belongs only to goodness. Hence I answer the objection by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that the ultimate resolution of our faith is made into the Church as into the rule proposing what must be believed and distinguishing it from what must not be believed, but not as into the formal reason for believing. As we have demonstrated, this formal reason cannot be something created or mixed from the created and uncreated, but is first truth in speaking alone.

Hence, when Augustine says, *I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me*, he does not intend the Church's authority to be the motive or formal reason why we believe the Gospel, but only the ordinary means by which we know what must be received as the Gospel. Consequently, from that testimony, upon which the cited authors chiefly rely, it can be gathered only that the ultimate resolution of our faith as regards the proposition and revelation of what must be believed is made into the Church herself, but not as regards assent to the revealed mysteries.

§ 3.

Corollary of the Preceding Doctrine.

15. From what has been said, the error of the heretics of this age remains refuted. They maintain that the ultimate resolution of our faith, even as regards the proposal of what must be believed, is made neither into the Church nor into Scripture alone, but into an interior inspiration of the Holy

Spirit specially assisting each of the faithful in understanding Scripture. The rule of our faith must be known and infallible. But this private spirit possesses neither of these two conditions: not the first, because at most it becomes known only to the person who possesses such a spirit; nor the second, because all the heretics of this age belonging to various sects protest that they possess and follow that spirit, yet teach contrary things among themselves and disagree in faith. It is therefore manifest that some are deceived, and that the Spirit of truth does not infallibly assist each one. Hence there is sometimes disagreement even among the Calvinists, as between Calvin and Beza concerning the beginning of John 8, which one maintains to be spurious Scripture and the other divine Scripture.

I add that this manner of proposing matters of faith is foreign to the accustomed manner and order in which God deals with his intellectual creatures. He customarily instructs them not immediately and by himself, but through others. Thus Peter was sent to Cornelius, Ananias to Paul, and Philip to the eunuch, that they might instruct them concerning matters of faith. God observes this order even among the angels, whose inferiors he instructs and illuminates through their superiors, as was demonstrated in the Treatise on Angels.

16. The heretics object: if one of the faithful believed the mysteries of our faith because the Church proposes them as to be believed, a vicious circle would be committed in the resolution of our faith. For he would believe the Church's authority because of divine revelation, and would again believe divine revelation because of the Church's authority. The same circle appears to be committed when Catholics, asked why they believe the Church, answer that her truth is greatly commended in Scripture and that she is called the pillar and foundation of truth; and when they are again asked why they believe Scripture itself, they customarily answer this question only by saying that they believe Scripture to be infallible because the Church asserts it. Therefore, in order to avoid that vicious circle, the ultimate resolution of our faith, as regards the proposal and revelation of what must be believed, must be made not into the Church herself, but into the interior inspiration of the Holy Spirit, or the private spirit of God belonging to each of the faithful for understanding Scripture.

17. But this argument can easily be turned against the heretics themselves, who truly fall into such a circle, since they do not know Scripture and its true meaning with certainty except from a private spirit, and they prove the private spirit from nothing except Scripture itself, understood in this sense by that same private spirit. Hence they fall into what Augustine reproaches against the Manichaeans in *Contra Faustum* 32,

c. 19: You see that you are acting so as to remove all authority of the Scriptures from the midst, and to make each man's own mind the authority for what he approves or disapproves in each Scripture. That is, he is not subjected to the authority of the Scriptures for faith, but subjects the Scriptures to himself; not so that something pleases him because he reads it written under sublime authority, but so that it appears rightly written because it pleases him. To what do you entrust yourself, wretched soul, weak and enveloped in carnal clouds? To what do you entrust yourself?

18. It is easy for us, however, to free ourselves from this troublesome difficulty of vicious circularity. A vicious circle is not committed when a circuit or transition from one thing to another occurs under a different aspect and in a different genus of cause. This occurs in the present case. One of the faithful believes the revealed mysteries because of divine revelation as the formal cause of believing. He believes the revelation because of the Church's authority as a condition applying it, or as the rule proposing what must be believed and distinguishing what must be believed from what must not be believed. This is reduced to the genus of directive or dispositive cause.

19. As regards the other circle which the heretics reproach against Catholics, it must be said that there is no absurdity in Scripture being received because of the Church's authority and, conversely, the Church's authority being demonstrated through Scripture. Thus Augustine says in *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti*, c. 5: *I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me.* And in *Contra Cresconium* 1, c. 3, he says that he believes the Church because Scripture demonstrates her. Hence Scripture and the Church are related as two prophets, namely Christ and John, bearing mutual testimony concerning one another. John commends Christ, by whom he in turn is commended.

We possess many examples of this mutual causality and dependence, even among natural things. Vapor is the cause of rain, and rain the cause of vapor. Clothes warm the body, and conversely. The organization of the body is a disposition for the introduction of the soul, and nevertheless depends upon the soul itself in the genus of formal cause, since the soul is defined as *the act of an organic body*. We presented several other examples in the Treatise on Grace, c. 15, § 6, which can be seen there. Nothing therefore prevents us from recognizing the Scriptures through the Church and the Church through the Scriptures, for this knowledge is derived not so much from Scripture or the Church as from divine authority. Thus, when two prophets sent by God bear mutual testimony concerning one another, that

On the Theological Virtues

testimony proceeds not so much from the prophets themselves as from God, who is present to both.

CHAPTER II.

Various Conditions and Endowments of the Object of Faith.

There are four principal conditions or endowments of the object of faith: namely, its proposal by the Catholic Church, truth, obscurity, and credibility. These must be treated briefly here.

§ 1.

Faith, Insofar as It Is Catholic and Universal, Extends Only to Those Things Generally Proposed to All by the Church, Although, as a Theological Virtue, It Can Bear upon Things Immediately Revealed by God to a Particular Person.

1. The first part is the doctrine of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2, where he says: *Our faith rests upon the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not upon any revelation made to other Doctors.* For, in order that something be believed with Catholic faith, it must be proposed through the Church and apostolic men. Hence in Eph. 2 the Catholic faith is said to be built *upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets*, that is, upon the revelations made through them in the New and Old Testaments. And David, in Ps. 86, speaking spiritually of the building of the Church, says: *Her foundations are in the holy mountains*, that is, in the rulers of the Church, or the Apostles, who are called holy mountains both because, as Cyril says, the first foundations of evangelical truth were laid in them, and because, as Augustine explains on Ps. 35, they merited to receive the first rays of the rising Gospel, by which the whole world was afterward enlightened: *When the sun rises, he says, it first illuminates the mountains with its light, and from them the light descends to the lowest places of the earth. Thus, when our Lord Jesus Christ came, he first shone upon the height of the Apostles, first enlightened the mountains, and thus his light descended to the valleys of the earth.*

2. I add that Catholic faith and the Christian religion must be proportioned to one another, since faith is the foundation of religion. But the Christian religion concerns only common worship, which is rendered to God through the use of the sacraments, such as the offering of the sacrifice

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

of the Mass, and through the other ceremonies used throughout the whole Church, by which we profess our faith. Therefore, faith also, insofar as it is Catholic and universal, concerns only truths common to the whole Church, proposed by the Prophets and Apostles.

3. That faith, as a theological virtue, can bear upon things immediately revealed by God to a particular person is evident in the angels, our first parents, and others to whom mysteries of faith were revealed not by the Church, but immediately by God, and which were nevertheless believed by infused faith and theological virtue. Hence whether divine revelation is made privately or publicly is wholly accidental to faith considered as a theological virtue; although, insofar as it is Catholic, faith extends only to those things proposed by the Church as generally to be believed by all, and not to what is revealed to a private person.

§ 2.

It Is Repugnant for God, Either by Himself or Through Another, to Lie;
Consequently, Nothing False Can Underlie Faith in God's Testimony.

4. The first part is established from Scripture, Num. 23, where it is said: *God is not as man, that he should lie, nor as the son of man, that he should change.* By these words lying is removed from God no less than change. But change is absolutely repugnant to God. Therefore lying is also repugnant to him. Hence Ambrose says in Epist. 37: *It is impossible for God to lie.* And Augustine in *De civitate Dei* 22, c. 2: *If they wish to discover something the omnipotent God cannot do, they certainly have it; I shall say it: he cannot lie.*

Reason also demonstrates this. God is first truth. But it is repugnant for first truth to lie, since a lie is a deviation from truth, and first truth cannot deviate from truth; otherwise it would fall away from itself and thus would not be first and unfailing truth. Therefore, it is repugnant for God to lie.

The statement of certain ancient theologians is absurd, namely, that although God cannot lie by his ordinary power, he can do so by his extraordinary and absolute power. For an ability to lie is not an effect, but rather a defect, of power. Hence St. Thomas says in his commentary on 2 Tim. 2, lect. 2: *God is omnipotent precisely because he cannot deny himself. For an ability to fail pertains more to impotence, since a thing's falling away from its own being results from a weakness of its proper power. For God to deny himself would be for him to fall away from himself.* For God is truth and his own act of understanding. Similarly, Ambrose, in the Letter cited, after saying that it is impossible for God to lie, adds: *This impossibility belongs not to weakness, but*

On the Theological Virtues

to power and majesty, because truth does not admit falsification, nor does God's power admit the error of fickleness.

From these statements the second part is proved, by which it is asserted that God cannot lie or attest something false through another. Since morally it is the same to lie through another and to lie personally, if God employed another as a minister for lying, the lie would be referred to God himself and attributed to him as author and principal cause.

5. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: although God is beatitude and life by essence, he can nevertheless suffer and die in the assumed nature. Therefore, likewise, although he is first truth in speaking, he will nevertheless be able to lie and deceive in the assumed nature.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. There is a great difference between falsity and lying on the one hand, and passibility and death on the other. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, all other aspects by which a creature differs from the Creator were both instituted by God's wisdom and ordered to God as to the ultimate end. But falsity, lying, and fault were not instituted by God's wisdom, nor are they ordered to God as first truth and ultimate end; rather, they turn away from him. Hence it is repugnant for a divine suppositum to assume them, even in another nature. This is especially so because, since actions, principally moral actions, belong to supposita, if God lied or sinned in the assumed nature, such a lie or sin would be attributed to the divine suppositum. We treat this more fully in the Treatise on the Incarnation, when discussing Christ's impeccability.

6. Against the second part of the assertion various testimonies of Scripture can be objected, which appear to indicate that some prophets or holy men lied or spoke falsely under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, and consequently that God can lie or assert something false, at least through ministers.

First, in 2 Kings 20 Isaiah said to King Hezekiah: *You shall die and shall not live*, and yet he survived for fifteen years. Secondly, Jonah said to the Ninevites on God's behalf in Jonah 3: *Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown*, and nevertheless that city was not overthrown. Thirdly, Abraham, when going to the sacrifice to put Isaac to death, told his servants that he would return with his son, although he was leading him to death at God's command; and, under God's inspiration, he persuaded Sarah his wife to tell King Abimelech that she was not his wife but his sister: *Say that you are my sister*. Fourthly, Jacob lied in Gen. 27 when he said to his father Isaac: *I am Esau, your firstborn*, and yet he spoke under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, as Pope Innocent defines in c. *Gaudemus, De divortii*. Fifthly, the

Egyptian midwives merited a reward when, in response to Pharaoh's complaint that they had not killed the Hebrew males as he commanded, they answered: *The Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian women, for they themselves possess knowledge of midwifery and give birth before we come to them.* Yet their pious lie was rewarded by God, as is said in Exod. 1. Sixthly, Rahab lied when questioned by the king of Jericho concerning the Israelite spies, and yet the Apostle commends her in Heb. 11. Finally, when the angel Raphael was asked by Tobit from what house and tribe he came, he answered: *I am Azariah, son of the great Hananiah.* Tobit understood these words as meaning that he came from an illustrious Israelite family: *You are from a great family,* he says.

7. To the first it is answered that, because King Hezekiah was then going to die according to the order of natural causes, Isaiah, attending precisely to those causes, could truly say to him, *You shall die and shall not live*, although he nevertheless survived afterward through extraordinary power. The solution is St. Thomas's in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2, and II-II, q. 171, a. 6, ad 2, where, with his customary depth and elevation, he reasons as follows: Divine foreknowledge regards future things under two aspects: first, according as they exist in themselves, insofar as God beholds them as present; secondly, according as they exist in their causes, insofar as he sees the order of causes to their effects. Although contingent future things, as they are in themselves, are determined to one outcome, nevertheless, as they exist in their causes, they are not so determined that they cannot occur otherwise. And although this twofold cognition is always joined in the divine intellect, it is not always joined in prophetic revelation, because the effect of an agent does not always equal its power. Hence sometimes prophetic revelation is an impressed likeness of divine foreknowledge insofar as it regards contingent future things in themselves. Such things occur as they are prophesied, as in Isa. 7: "Behold, a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes prophetic revelation is an impressed likeness of divine foreknowledge insofar as it knows the order of causes to effects. Then the event sometimes occurs otherwise than it is prophesied, and yet the prophecy is not false. For the meaning of the prophecy is that the disposition of inferior causes, whether natural causes or human acts, is such that this effect will occur. In this manner the aforesaid statement of Isaiah is understood: "You shall die and shall not live"; that is, the disposition of your body is ordered to death. And what is said in Jonah 3, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown," means: its deserts require that it be overthrown. From this the response to the second is evident. I add from the same holy Doctor, q. 174, a. 1, that there are two kinds of prophecy: one called the prophecy of

predestination, the other called the prophecy of warning. The first is always fulfilled, but not the second if the person threatened does penance, as in fact occurred among the Ninevites.

8. To the third, I deny that Abraham lied when he said: After we have worshiped, we shall return to you. For he most certainly judged that God, who had shortly before said to him, In Isaac your seed shall be called, would raise him from the dead. Hence Augustine says in the sermon on the sacrifice of Isaac: Hoping against hope, he was both leading his son to be slain and trusting that the Lord would raise him. And in *De civitate Dei* 16, c. 32: He did not doubt that the one sacrificed could be restored to him who had been given to him beyond hope. Hence the Apostle says in Heb. 11: By faith Abraham offered Isaac when he was tested, and he who had received the promises was offering his only-begotten son, to whom it was said, "In Isaac your seed shall be called," judging that God was able even to raise him from the dead. Ambrose, explaining this passage in *De Abraham* 1, c. 8, says: Abraham prophesied what he did not know. The Lord spoke through his mouth what he was preparing to do.

As to what is added concerning Sarah, I deny that Abraham lied when he told Abimelech that she was his sister. For she truly was Abraham's sister, either because she was a daughter of the same father, though not of the same mother, as Abraham himself said in Gen. 20, or, as some judge, she is called his sister because she was his niece, namely, a daughter of Haran, Abraham's brother, as we said elsewhere. St. Jerome inclines more toward this interpretation in *Quaestiones Hebraicae in Genesim* on Gen. 11, where he says that Haran, Abraham's brother, begot two daughters, Milcah and Sarah, who was also called Iscah; Nahor married Milcah, while Abraham married Sarah, both men being brothers of Haran.

9. To the fourth, I answer similarly that Jacob did not lie when he called himself the firstborn, because the rights of the firstborn belonged to him by law, and this under a twofold title, namely, by the sale and by God's decree signified to Rebecca when it was revealed to her that the elder would serve the younger. Similarly, he did not lie when he said, *I am Esau*, both because he bore Esau's person, and hence was Esau by external representation, as those who represent a person in the theater customarily speak, and because he called himself Esau not in person, but in right. Thus John was called Elijah not in person, but in spirit, and Paul says in Rom. 9 that all the faithful and believers in Christ are Israelites and children of Abraham.

I add with Augustine, *Contra mendacium*, c. 10, that Jacob then bore the figure of Christ our Lord, who was made in the likeness of sinners, just as

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Jacob, clothed in goatskins, bore the likeness of Esau. Hence Augustine adds that Jacob's words, *I am Esau*, were not a lie, but a mystery.

To the fifth, I answer that the Egyptian midwives did indeed lie, but their lie was neither praised nor rewarded by God. Their kindness toward the Hebrew children, however, was given a temporal reward and blessing by God. The same must be said of Rahab the harlot, who was praised by the Apostle not for her lie, but for her faith and for the service rendered to the Israelite spies out of fear and charity toward God. Hence Augustine says in *Contra mendacium*, c. 15: When it is written that God dealt well with the Hebrew midwives and with Rahab the harlot of Jericho, this was done not because they lied, but because they were merciful toward the men of God. Their deceit was therefore not rewarded, but their benevolence; the kindness of their mind, not the iniquity of their lie. For just as it would not be strange or absurd if God wished to forgive some evil works previously committed by them on account of later good works, so it is not surprising that, at one and the same time and in one cause, God, seeing both what was done mercifully and what was done deceitfully, rewarded the good and, on account of that good, forgave the evil. Through this the response to the sixth is evident.

To the last, I answer that the angel Raphael truly told Tobit that he was from the children of Israel, because he came from the cities of the children of Israel, that is, of the faithful, whose care had been entrusted to him by God; or because "Israel" in Hebrew means a man who sees God, and the angels see the face of the Father who is in heaven. Raphael also truly said that he was Azariah, son of the great Hananiah, because he assumed the appearance and form of Azariah and presented his person. Thus in Gen. 31 the angel truly says, *I am the God of Bethel*, because he spoke in the person of God as his legate. Thus also in Exod. 20 the angel, promulgating the Decalogue in God's place, said: *I am the Lord your God*.

10. Certain passages of Scripture which appear superficially contrary are also customarily objected against the second part of the assertion. But because they are sufficiently reconciled by interpreters, we omit them for the sake of brevity. Trinius may be consulted in index 4, vol. 3.

§ 3.

Corollaries Worthy of Note.

11. From what has been said it is gathered, first, that Origen and Cassian erred when they taught that it is lawful to lie in order to avoid a grave evil,

especially a spiritual evil. For lying is intrinsically and per se evil, as Aristotle recognized and taught by the light of nature alone in *Ethica Nicomachea* IV, calling it *in itself base and blameworthy*. Reason also demonstrates this. A lie per se and directly conflicts with the natural institution and end of speech, which was granted to intellectual natures so that they might communicate their internal concepts to one another and manifest them externally. It consequently overthrows all communication and society which, according to natural rectitude, ought to exist among rational natures.

12. It is gathered, secondly, that it is lawful for no reason to use a purely mental reservation, that is, one which is manifested in no way by any circumstances or external indications. For a purely mental reservation conflicts with the end of speech and overthrows intercourse among intellectual natures no less than a lie. We may nevertheless use a reservation when such circumstances occur that it is prudently judged inexpedient for another person to know the truth. For then, if we are questioned about something said or done, we may answer absolutely: *I did not say it; I did not do it*. The aforesaid circumstances then cause this qualification to be understood: *I know that I said or did it, but I do not know it for the purpose of telling you*. For if it were not lawful in this case to use such a reservation, there would be no manner of lawfully concealing a secret which cannot be disclosed without grave harm or inconvenience when its revelation is urged by importunate questioning. This would be no less harmful to human society than lying itself.

Hence Christ used such a reservation in Mark 13 when he said: But concerning that day or hour no one knows, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son. Hence the interlinear Gloss writes above it: For us; that is, the Son does not know the day of judgment so as to tell it to us. Nicholas of Lyra also writes there: In him are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. He therefore conceals it because it is not expedient for us to know it. Hence he says, "It is not for you to know the times which the Father has placed in his own power." In this he shows that he knows, but that it is not expedient to tell the Apostles, so that, always uncertain concerning the Judge's coming, they may live each day as though they were to be judged on the next. The Son therefore knows it for himself, but not for us, so that we may always remain watchful. Hence Hilary, cited by St. Thomas in the *Catena aurea*, says: In all the things which God says that he does not know, he is not held by ignorance; rather, it is not yet the time for speaking, or there is an ordered dispensation not to act.

13. It is gathered, thirdly, that it is not lawful to use formal amphibology or equivocation, although it is lawful to use material amphibology, since the

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

former is a species of lying, while the latter is not. Formal amphibology or equivocation occurs when there are no circumstances from which the hearer can arrive at a knowledge of the meaning or sense of the words intended by the speaker. Material amphibology occurs when there are circumstances capable of easily manifesting the sense in which an amphibolous word or proposition is used by the speaker, so that a prudent man can easily recognize it, although the hearer, through negligence in considering those circumstances, does not understand the speaker's mind.

Christ used this amphibology or equivocation when, in response to his relatives asking him to ascend to the Temple, he answered in John 7: *I will not ascend*, although he afterward ascended. From the circumstance of their request, which consisted in asking that he ascend openly to the Temple so that he might manifest himself there to the world, they could, had they attended, have sufficiently understood that Christ answered in the same sense that he would not ascend, namely, openly and publicly, but only in secret.

§ 4.

Whether Divine and Infused Faith Can Accidentally,
Given Some False Judgment, Incline toward
Falsity or Elicit a False and Erroneous Assent.

14. The first reason for doubt is that if the bishops of some province proposed as to be believed by divine faith something which was nevertheless not of faith, for example, the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, which is not certain by faith nor yet revealed to the Church, then each person among the people, especially the uneducated, would be bound to believe it. But they would not be bound to believe it with human faith, since it would be proposed to them as to be believed by divine faith. Consequently, divine faith can accidentally, given some false judgment, incline toward falsity or elicit a false and erroneous assent.

Secondly, the faith of the ancients was that Christ would be born, and this faith endured until the preaching of the Gospel. But after Christ had already been born, even before the preaching of the Gospel, it was false that Christ would be born. Therefore, falsity can accidentally underlie faith on the part of the believer.

Thirdly, one of the things pertaining to faith is that we believe the true body of Christ to be contained under the sacrament of the altar. But it can happen that the true body of Christ is not there, but only bread, namely, if

On the Theological Virtues

the priest did not possess the intention of consecrating. Therefore, faith can accidentally be borne and extended toward falsity.

15. Nevertheless, it must be said that divine and infused faith can never incline toward falsity or elicit a false and erroneous assent.

The fundamental reason, which St. Thomas indicates here in a. 3, is that no cause can influence an effect, even accidentally, unless that effect is contained in some manner under the formal object of its causality, as is established inductively in every cause. But a false or erroneous act can never be contained under the formal object of faith, namely divine revelation, since God cannot lie or reveal anything false, as was demonstrated above. Therefore, faith can never influence a false and erroneous assent or incline the intellect toward it.

This is confirmed. If the habit of infused faith could incline toward falsity and elicit a false and erroneous assent, God, who infuses it, could be a cause of falsity and error, at least mediately, just as, if the natural light and the habit of first principles inclined toward a false or erroneous assent, such error or falsity would be reduced to God as author. But this cannot be admitted. Therefore neither can the former.

This is further confirmed. Faith is an intellectual virtue. But an intellectual virtue cannot incline toward falsity, as St. Thomas teaches after Aristotle in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 3, in these words: *Only those habits are called intellectual virtues by which the truth is always spoken and never falsehood.* From this he infers in the same place that opinion and suspicion are not intellectual virtues, because they are indifferently related to truth and falsity. Therefore, faith can never incline toward falsity. Hence:

16. To the first reason for doubt, the minor premise is denied. For, in that case, the uneducated would not be bound to believe with divine faith the things proposed by the bishops as to be believed with divine faith, but with human faith alone, because, if those things were false, they would not be credible by divine faith, but only by human faith. Nor in such a case would they believe them with any faith other than human faith, namely, by a firm adherence arising from the command of the will, not from the motive of divine revelation.

If, however, they dissented from those truths which were not really but only putatively revealed, they would be heretics not formally, but only virtually and inferentially. For, judging them to be true, revealed by God, and proposed as such by the Church, by the very fact that they dissented from and rejected them they would be in a disposition, as regards its effect, not to give assent to divine testimony and the Church's proposal. Consequently,

they would be considered heretics, if not in reality, at least as regards the effect.

To the second, St. Thomas answers here in a. 3, ad 3: After Christ's birth, it pertained to the believer's faith that he believe that Christ had at some time been born; but the determination of the time in which he was born, made by one who before the promulgation of the Gospel believed that he was still to be born, did not proceed from faith, but from human conjecture. For it is possible that a faithful man should form a false judgment from human conjecture, but it is impossible for him to form a false judgment from faith.

Thus, if someone continued an act by which he wished to give alms in order to relieve a poor man's misery and, while this purpose continued, simultaneously desired vainglory, such an act as regards its substance would always proceed from mercy, but its mode would proceed from vainglory and a disordered affection. Likewise, if a Jew before Christ's birth possessed this act, *Christ will be born*, and continued it after Christ's birth, that assent, after Christ's birth, would indeed proceed from faith as regards its substance, but its mode would have to be drawn from another habit, namely, from human opinion and conjectures, which can underlie falsity.

To the third, the same holy Doctor answers in the same place, ad 4, that the believer's faith is not referred to these or those particular appearances of bread, but to the truth that Christ's true body is under the appearances of sensible bread when it has been rightly consecrated. Hence, if it has not been rightly consecrated, falsity does not on that account underlie faith.

17. Concerning this doctrine Cajetan rightly warns you to take diligent care lest, when you hear that faith does not regard these or those particular appearances, but only the truth that Christ's true body is under the appearances of sensible bread, you fall into the error of those who say that the host offered for adoration in the Church is to be adored only conditionally, namely, if it has truly been consecrated, and not absolutely. For the faithful person to be bound to adore it absolutely, it is sufficient that he possess moral certainty that it has truly been consecrated. Such certainty is sufficient for the prudential judgment which is the proximate rule directing all the moral virtues in their operations, among which religion holds the principal place. Thus the moral certainty we possess concerning our parents is sufficient to bind us to render them due honor.

On the Theological Virtues

§ 5.

The Object of Faith Must Be Obscure; Hence an Act of Faith and an Act of Science or Clear Vision Concerning the Same Object Cannot Simultaneously Exist in the Same Intellect. Evidence in the One Attesting, However, Is Compatible with Faith.

18. The first part of this assertion is evident from the words of Paul in Heb. 11: *Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the proof of things that do not appear.* By these words he clearly signifies that the object of faith must be revealed in such a way that it does not appear or is not seen. Hence the Greek has *οὐ βλεπομένων*, which signifies “things not seen.” Likewise, the same Apostle says in 1 Cor. 13 that we now see the mysteries of our faith *through a mirror and in an enigma*, which openly declares the obscurity of the divine revelation upon which faith rests.

Hence Cyril calls the mysteries of our faith *most sacred enigmas*, and the bride in Cant. 4 says that the bridegroom’s *hair is like lofty palms, black as a raven*, because the mysteries of our faith signified by it are not only most sublime and transcend every understanding of human ingenuity, but are also most obscure and enveloped in a certain sacred darkness. Therefore, just as it pertains to the nature of the object of hope that it is not possessed, so it pertains to the nature of the object of faith that it is not seen. Hence Augustine says in tract. 30 on John: *What is faith? To believe what you do not see.* And in tract. 79: *This is the praise of faith: that what is believed is not seen.*

From this the second part of the assertion is proved. It is repugnant for the same object simultaneously to be clearly and obscurely known, or simultaneously seen and not seen. But through science and the beatific vision the object is seen by intellectual vision, or clearly and intuitively known; through faith it is known obscurely and enigmatically. Therefore, it is impossible for an act of faith and an act of science or clear vision concerning the same object to exist in the same intellect. Likewise, because hope concerns beatitude and the clear vision of God not yet possessed, according to the Apostle’s words in Rom. 8, *For what a man sees, why does he hope for it?*, it is repugnant for an act of hope to be joined simultaneously with the beatific vision.

19. Nor is the assertion of certain recent authors valid, namely, that it is indeed repugnant for the same object to be simultaneously seen and not

seen, clearly and obscurely known, through the same medium, but not through different media.

It is not valid, first, because the very media causing faith and science are contradictorily opposed. Therefore, they cannot exist simultaneously in the same intellect, nor consequently can faith and science by reason of different media. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: the medium of a scientific act has as its formal effect to render the object evident in itself, while obscure revelation renders it obscure or not evident. But evident and not evident are contradictorily opposed. Therefore, the media causing faith and science imply a contradictory opposition.

Secondly, although darkness and light are caused by different causes, they nevertheless cannot exist simultaneously if they are compared with the same subject, because they are privatively opposed to one another. But scientific assent and the assent of faith likewise possess formal effects privatively or contradictorily opposed to one another, since the first renders the intellect clearly seeing and thus determines it so that it cannot dissent, whereas the second constitutes the intellect as obscurely knowing the truth and so affects it that the truth does not compel it. Therefore, they cannot exist simultaneously in the same intellect concerning the same object by reason of different media.

Thirdly, if diversity of media sufficed to remove the repugnance and incompatibility which opposed and contrary assents possess toward one another, it would follow that not only science and faith, but also faith and heresy, could exist simultaneously in the same intellect, because faith and heresy proceed from different media. But this is most absurd, since faith and error are compared with one another as light and darkness. Therefore, the former is also absurd.

20. The third part, asserting that evidence in the one attesting is compatible with faith, is proved first from St. Thomas here, q. 5, a. 1, where he says: *Only that manifestation excludes the nature of faith by which the thing principally believed is rendered apparent or seen.* But the evidence of divine testimony does not render apparent or seen the thing principally believed, for the revealed reality, notwithstanding the evidence of this testimony, remains intrinsically obscure in itself. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, evidence in the one attesting is compatible with faith.

Hence the same holy Doctor writes in the following article: If a prophet foretold in the Lord's words something future and added a sign by raising a dead man, the intellect of the observer would be compelled by this sign to know manifestly that this was spoken by God, who does not lie, although the future event foretold was not evident in itself. Hence the nature of faith

would not be removed through this. By these words he clearly teaches that faith concerning a reality spoken or revealed can coexist with a manifest utterance of God, who does not lie, and consequently with evidence in the one attesting, because through such an utterance or revelation the reality is not rendered evident in itself.

21. Reason also establishes this. Although everything revealed by God is true in itself, nevertheless a person who evidently knows something to have been revealed does not immediately see it to be true in itself. For, although what is revealed by God is true in itself, it is not known in itself, nor is its objective truth penetrated; it becomes known solely through the revelation of external testimony. From this you will understand that the object which faith believes must indeed be obscure or unseen in itself, but that the subject whom it believes can be clearly known. Consequently, evidence in the one attesting is compatible with faith.

And certainly the Blessed Virgin, since she knew that she had given birth not in the ordinary manner, but was simultaneously virgin and mother, and had received such a sign as testimony of the divinity of the Son whom she had generated, possessed evidence in the one attesting concerning Christ's divinity, and yet believed it by divine faith.

Likewise, the angels before beatitude and in the state of the way possessed faith, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited question, a. 1. Yet the supreme angel possessed evidence in the one attesting concerning the mysteries God then revealed to him. For, since he evidently knew himself to be the supreme and first of the angels, and consequently unable to be illuminated by another—for illumination belongs to a superior in relation to an inferior—he also evidently knew that God spoke immediately to him and revealed his mysteries. Therefore, in him faith coexisted with evidence of divine testimony or revelation, which is called evidence in the one attesting.

Nor is the assertion of certain authors valid, namely, that although the first of the angels saw that he was supreme among all the creatures he knew, he could nevertheless have judged that God miraculously concealed from him some superior creature through whom matters of faith were proposed to him. There was absolutely no reason why he could suspect this, since he evidently knew himself to be the supreme angel and that the cognition of another angel, if one existed, would naturally be due to him; nor did there appear any other cause by which God might be moved to deny him what was naturally due to him.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 6.

The Objections Are Resolved.

1. [sic] You will object first against the first part of the assertion: faith is a certain intellectual light. But it pertains to the nature of light to dispel darkness and obscurity. Therefore, obscurity does not pertain to the nature of faith or to its object. Hence Chrysostom says on Matthew that faith is a lamp, because, just as a lamp illuminates a house, so faith illuminates the soul.

I answer that, although faith is a certain spiritual light and a lamp of the soul insofar as it manifests to the soul the objects revealed by God, it nevertheless does not dispel every obscurity and darkness from the soul. Rather, it is a certain light mingled with obscurity, or a light mixed with darkness, similar to the pillar which led the children of Israel through the desert, which was dark on one side and luminous on the other. Hence St. Peter in his Letter calls faith *a lamp shining in a dark place*. And St. Gregory, *Moralia in Iob* 29, c. 2, compares it to dawn, because it mingles light with darkness and darkness with light, and is, as it were, the boundary between the night of this life and the day of eternity: *What are all of us in this life who follow the truth, he says, except dawn or daybreak? For we rise in the shadow of faith and yearn for the light of eternal glory. It is still dawn, because light and shadows are mutually joined.*

There are therefore three supernatural lights infused by God: the light of faith, the light of prophecy, and the light of glory. The difference among them is that the first essentially requires some obscurity and always possesses it as something annexed; the third, on the contrary, essentially requires evidence and clarity and dispels all obscurity and darkness; while the second, namely the prophetic light, is indifferently and permissively related to obscurity and evidence. For prophetic cognition is sometimes obscure and enigmatic, as it formerly was in the Prophets, according to Num. 12: *If there is a prophet of the Lord among you, I shall speak to him through a dream and vision*. At other times it is clear and evident, as in Christ, in whom there could be no obscure and enigmatic cognition, since he was simultaneously wayfarer and comprehensor. Hence, although faith neither existed nor could exist in him, the prophetic light nevertheless did, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 7, a. 8.

2. [sic] You will object secondly against the second part of the assertion: all are bound to believe that God exists, according to the Apostle's words in Heb. 11: *One who approaches God must believe that he exists and is the rewarder of those who seek him.* But many possess science and an evident demonstration of God's existence. Therefore, faith and science concerning the same object can exist simultaneously in the same intellect.

I answer by denying the major premise. For, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, God's existence, since it can be evidently known and demonstrated by natural reason, does not pertain to faith in itself, but only accidentally and in relation to those who do not possess evident knowledge of it. Hence this truth, as the holy Doctor says in the same place, is more a preamble to faith than an article of faith: *Faith*, he says, *presupposes natural knowledge, as grace presupposes nature.*

To the Apostle's passage it must be said that he speaks of God as supernatural author and rewarder in that order, not of God as author of nature. Thus St. Thomas in this part, q. 1, a. 7. Or it may be said that the Apostle's words are verified in those who do not possess an evident demonstration of God's existence. *For nothing prevents*, says the holy Doctor in the cited place from the first part, *what is demonstrable and knowable in itself from being received by someone as an object of belief when he does not grasp the demonstration.*

23. You will object thirdly: when St. Paul saw the divine essence in his rapture, he did not lose faith, since he still remained a wayfarer and faith pertains to the state and disposition of the way. Therefore, faith and the clear vision of God then existed simultaneously.

I answer that faith then remained in St. Paul as regards the habit, but not as regards the act. Consequently, the habit of faith can coexist with the clear vision of God communicated in a transient manner, but its act cannot. The solution is St. Thomas's below, q. 175, a. 3, ad 3, where he says: *Because Paul in his rapture was not blessed habitually, but possessed only the act of the blessed, it follows that the act of faith did not then exist simultaneously in him; the habit of faith nevertheless did exist simultaneously in him.*

24. You will say: if the habit of faith can coexist with the clear vision of God, it will also be able to coexist with the light of glory, without which the beatific vision cannot be elicited, as we demonstrated in the Treatise on the Vision of God. Consequently, the habit of faith will be able to exist in the blessed and comprehensors.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. It can coexist with the light of glory given by way of assistance and a transient affection: I concede. Given by way of a habit and permanent form: I deny. The light of glory conferred

upon St. Paul in his rapture was not given to him by way of a habit, but only by way of assistance and a transient affection, like the light infused into the Prophets while future things are revealed to them, as the same holy Doctor teaches in the cited place, in the response to the second objection, in these words: *The divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect except through the light of glory, which can be participated in two ways. In one way, by way of an immanent form, and thus it makes the saints blessed in their heavenly homeland. In another way, by way of a certain transient affection, as was said concerning the light of prophecy; and in this manner that light existed in Paul when he was caught up.*

25. You will insist: the incompatibility of forms opposed to one another is caused not by length of time, but by the nature of their opposition. Therefore, if the habit of faith and the light of glory cannot coexist permanently by reason of the opposition they possess toward one another, neither will they be able to coexist transiently.

I answer with Cajetan that the incompatibility of forms opposed to one another indeed arises from the nature of their opposition, but sometimes the opposition between certain things is not in actual exercise, namely, while they are in a quiescent and permanent state. Consequently, permanence is sometimes necessary for the incompatibility between them to be exercised. This is evident in a spiritual accident, which, although it is repugnant for it to be permanently subjected in a corporeal reality, can nevertheless be received in it transiently, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 62, a. 4, concerning the productive power of grace in relation to the sacraments.

26. From this you will understand that, if some demonstration were given which did not remain but affected the intellect only transiently, it would not exclude the habit of faith. Thus the clear vision of God communicated to St. Paul briefly and transiently did not expel that habit, but only bound it and prevented it from breaking forth into act, because such a demonstration would not then generate a habit of science incompatible with the habit of faith.

27. You will object finally against the third part of the assertion, in which we said that evidence in the one attesting is compatible with faith: by reason of the obscurity which it essentially requires, faith excludes every evidence and clarity. Therefore, evidence in the one attesting is incompatible with faith.

I answer that, by reason of its obscurity, faith indeed excludes evidence of the reality in itself and as regards its intrinsic principles and essential predicates; it does not exclude evidence as regards the extrinsic aspect of

being revealed, but rather requires testimony of God revealing which is established as certain. Hence St. Thomas below, q. 171, a. 5, and Cajetan in the same place teach that a prophet, while illuminated by God, is rendered certain of God's illumination and utterance and possesses evidence of it, according to 2 Sam. 23: *The mighty one of Israel, the ruler of men, has spoken to me, as the light of dawn shines in the morning when the sun rises without clouds.* Here, very appropriately, in order to indicate that this revelation is evident only in the one attesting, it is compared with the light of dawn, so as to be distinguished both from wholly clear and noonday cognition, such as the beatific vision, and from wholly obscure cognition, namely, faith alone.

28. You will say: evident cognition of God's existence possessed through science and an a posteriori demonstration from effects produced by God excludes faith. Hence those who possess an a posteriori science and demonstration of the truth *God exists* do not possess faith concerning it, as we said in the solution to the second objection. Yet effects created by God are wholly extrinsic to God's essence and existence. Therefore, likewise, evident cognition of God's testimony, which is called evidence in the one attesting, will extinguish faith concerning the reality revealed by God, although that testimony is extrinsic to it.

I answer, conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence and parity. The reason for the difference is that, since every effect exists in its cause, not formally but virtually, and God is the efficient cause of every created entity, everything possessed by every creature can be called virtually intrinsic to God. But divine revelation, although it is the efficient cause of the extrinsic being of the truths of our faith, namely, their being revealed and attested, is not the cause of their intrinsic being. Consequently, those truths cannot in any way be called intrinsic to revelation, even virtually, at least as regards the proper and intrinsic being they possess.

§ 7.

The Objects or Mysteries of Our Faith, Although Obscure in Themselves, Are Nevertheless Evidently Credible.

29. The reason is that the truth of a proposition is drawn from one source and its credibility from another. Truth is drawn from the intrinsic connection between subject and predicate, whereas credibility is drawn from extrinsic testimonies, signs, and motives which render the proposition credible or worthy of faith. But there are many extrinsic testimonies, signs, and motives which render the mysteries of our faith worthy of faith.

Therefore, they are evidently credible with moral evidence excluding every reasonable doubt concerning the contrary, according to Ps. 92: *Your testimonies have become exceedingly credible*. The major is established. The minor cannot be proved otherwise than by explaining the principal motives of credibility of the mysteries of our faith.

You have these extensively developed in Augustine's *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti*, c. 4; *De civitate Dei* 1, cc. 21–23, and 22, cc. 5–10; Eusebius throughout almost the whole work *Praeparatio evangelica*, and likewise in the other work *Demonstratio evangelica*; Arnobius, *Adversus nationes* 8; and Vincent of Lérins in his *Commonitorium*. St. Thomas also discusses them in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 6, with Ferrariensis there; Bellarmine, vol. 2 of the *Controversiae*, l. 4; and many others. We too published in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* a useful and pleasant digression in which we extensively examined twelve principal motives or arguments for the credibility of our faith. Here we shall set forth a few of them briefly and concisely.

30. The first and principal argument is drawn from the marvelous manner in which Christian faith and religion were introduced into and propagated throughout the world. This motive or argument contains several matters most worthy of admiration.

The first is the promptness or speed with which the faith of Christ was introduced and diffused throughout almost the whole world. For Paul says in Colossians that already in his time the faith of Christ bore fruit throughout the whole world. Justin Martyr, who lived at the beginning of the second century, says in the *Dialogus cum Tryphone*: *There is no race of men, whether barbarians, Greeks, those who use wagons as houses, or those who have no use of houses, among whom prayers and Eucharists are not offered to the Creator of all things in the name of Jesus who was fastened to the cross*.

Irenaeus has the same in l. 1, c. 3. Tertullian, who also flourished in the second century, says in *Adversus Judaeos*, c. 7, that the Christian faith held dominion more widely than the Roman Empire and that many places inaccessible to the Romans had been subjected to Christ. Finally, Chrysostom, in *Quod Christus sit Deus*, says that, just as God at the beginning of the world said, *Let the earth bring forth green plants*, and in a moment everything became meadow and garden, so he commanded that the Church should arise in a short time and no one could resist, and that the Synagogue with its Temple should be destroyed and no one could restore it.

31. Secondly, it is most worthy of admiration that so swift a conversion of the world and diffusion of faith throughout the whole globe was accomplished through the Apostles, that is, a few fishermen, formerly

On the Theological Virtues

uneducated and ignorant, unwarlike, poor, and contemptible; not by the power of arms, not by the protection of the great, not by the allurements of riches, pleasures, and honors, not by the force of eloquence, and, as Chrysostom says in sermon 3 for Pentecost: *Not brandishing shields, not drawing bows, not shooting arrows, not distributing money, not trusting in eloquence, etc.*

Hence in the cited book *Quod Christus sit Deus*, he reasons as follows: no one building a wall from mortar and stones, if his hands were bound, could complete the work. But the Apostles, not merely bound, but suffering innumerable things, built the Church throughout the whole world and disseminated the faith everywhere, although the power of rulers and magnates resisted, the wisdom of philosophers resisted, the eloquence of rhetoricians resisted, and finally the human senses and affections resisted. In this the supreme force and power of our faith and of Christ's Cross shines forth.

32. Another consideration within this argument is that the preaching of the Apostles subjected to the yoke of faith not only common, uneducated, and ignorant men, but also the most learned men of their age: Dionysius, Clement, Irenaeus, Justin, Arnobius, Aristides, Athenagoras, Lactantius, Tertullian, and others. These were eloquent and learned men who had formerly attacked the Christian law with all their eloquence and torn it apart with insults and mockery. Emperors, kings, and princes themselves obeyed the fishermen's doctrine, and those whom they pursued with rage they afterward followed in faith, as Augustine says beautifully in *De civitate Dei* 22, c. 7.

33. Finally, in this same argument it is marvelous that Christian faith and religion grew and were propagated amid persecutions, and, as though by a certain counteraction, surrounded and oppressed on every side, raised itself like a palm tree and became more vigorous, powerful, and majestic. Hence Justin, in the *Dialogus cum Tryphone*, compares the Church to a vine which becomes more fruitful through its own pruning. St. Leo, in sermon 1 on Peter and Paul, compares her to a most fertile field in which the individual grains that fall rise again multiplied: *The Church, he says, is not diminished by persecutions, but increased, and the Lord's field is always clothed with a richer harvest, while the grains which fall individually are born multiplied.*

Finally, Hilary says most beautifully in *De Trinitate* 4: Just as formerly, when the waters of the flood increased, the ark was borne aloft and finally, victorious over the storms, rested upon the mountains of Armenia, so in a manner not unlike this the Church flourishes while she is tried, grows while

she is oppressed, advances while she is despised, and conquers while she is struck.

34. A second argument for the credibility of our faith is drawn from the miracles performed by Christ in its testimony and confirmation. This argument possesses great weight and the greatest force, since miracles, as Chrysostom says in homily 14 on Matthew, are *pledges of divine omnipotence*, that is, works in which God's power so shines that it is evident that no creature could have accomplished them. Or, as others say, they are *seals of the Divinity*, with which God customarily seals the things he proposes for belief. Consequently, if any doctrines have been confirmed by miracles as revealed by God, it must not be doubted that they are true and divinely handed down, since miracles are the virtual testimony of God approving their truth.

The Apostle relates in Heb. 2 that the Christian faith was confirmed by many and magnificent miracles performed by Christ and his disciples: *It was confirmed in us, God bearing witness with signs and wonders, various mighty works, and distributions of the Holy Spirit*. The same is established from the four Gospels, in which the blind, mute, deaf, lame, paralytic, dropsical, and others are everywhere read to have been healed by Christ; the dead were even raised, demons expelled from bodies, seas calmed and walked upon at his command alone, and innumerable other signs and miracles were accomplished which, as St. John says, *if written individually, I do not think that the world itself could contain the books that would have to be written*. Hence Richard of St. Victor says in *De Trinitate*, c. 2, that we can say to God with complete confidence: *Lord, if what we believe is an error, we have been deceived by you, for these things have been confirmed among us by signs and wonders which could be performed by you alone*.

35. Yet, even if no miracle had been performed in confirmation of our faith, it would be no less credible. For, as St. Thomas says beautifully in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 6: It would be more marvelous than all signs if nature had been led by simple and ignoble men, without miraculous signs, to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so lofty. Cajetan, considering this passage in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 43, a. 4, says: Observe from the first book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, c. 6, that either it is conceded that Christ performed the miracles related in the Gospel, or it is not. If it is conceded, his divinity is established. If it is not conceded, it is likewise established from this greatest miracle, that, fighting against the whole world devoted to idols, he conquered without miracles.

36. The third motive or argument for the credibility of our faith is the greatest concord and agreement of the Doctors concerning its mysteries,

which effectively persuades us of their truth. For it appears wholly impossible that such diverse intellects should have agreed concerning so many dogmas unless they were directed by one supreme spirit capable of retaining human minds in unity, just as the order of the universe could not long endure amid so great a diversity of parts unless it were held together by one divine and continual spirit, as Cicero elegantly says. Likewise, in music diverse voices and tones could not converge in the perfect harmony of one song unless all were directed by one precentor and master of the choir.

Moreover, the concord among Catholic Doctors concerning the mysteries of our faith is so great that, although they belonged to diverse peoples and nations and flourished in different centuries and regions, they appear to have spoken with one mouth, according to Luke 1: *As he spoke through the mouth of the saints.*

37. All other sects are exceedingly far removed from this concord of doctrine. Tertullian says in *De anima* 2, c. 2: *You will find more diversity among the philosophers than fellowship, since even within their fellowship their diversity is discovered.* In the same city of Athens, some judged one thing and others another, and different men held different opinions. The Epicureans denied divine providence; the Stoics asserted it. Aristippus placed the supreme good in bodily pleasure; Antisthenes placed it in virtue of the soul. Indeed, Augustine, in *De civitate Dei* 19, c. 1, reports from Marcus Varro two hundred and eighty opinions concerning the supreme good. Likewise, some established one world, others several, others innumerable worlds, so that not without reason that city could have been called Babylon, that is, confusion, in which nothing was held firmly, but all things were torn apart by mutually contrary errors.

38. Nor are the heresies divided among themselves by any lesser discord and contrariety of opinions or errors, as Irenaeus noted in the case of ancient heresies in l. 1, c. 5; Tertullian in *De praescriptionibus haereticorum*, c. 42; Athanasius in his Letter to Liberius; and Epiphanius, heresy 47. In the case of recent heresies, however, it is well known how many sects sprang from Luther's heresy and how incoherently they speak in many matters.

Cochlaeus, in the work entitled *Lutherus septiceps*, reports Luther's various disagreements and contradictions with himself in almost every article of faith; and in the single article concerning the Eucharist, thirty-six were noted by Gaspar Saxo in his table against Luther. Coccius likewise reports twenty-four contradictions in Calvin. Nicholas Romeus, in the book entitled *Calvini effigies*, spectacles 9 and 10, whose title is *Calvinus sibi discolor*, demonstrates that Calvin's book of *Institutiones* is a patchwork of

contradictions, and numbers twenty principal contradictions and more than six hundred consequential ones.

39. The reason for this discord and disagreement is that heresies are founded not upon the divine spirit, but upon the human spirit, which is variable and inconstant and does not always cohere with itself. Hence Dionysius says excellently in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4: *True wisdom turns men from many opinions and gathers them into one true and uniform cognition, completing them with one unifying light.* Explaining these words, St. Thomas adds in the same place, lect. 4: *Those who know the truth agree in one opinion, but those who are ignorant are divided by various errors. For the paths of falsehood and deceit are various, while there is only one way leading to the palace of truth and wisdom.* And as Tertullian says excellently in *De spectaculis*, c. 20: *This is the integrity of truth and the fullness of the discipline due to it: not to change one's opinion and not to vary one's judgment.*

40. Another argument for the credibility of our faith can be drawn from the perpetual succession of the Roman Pontiffs. Jerome affirms in *Contra Luciferianos*, c. 9, that this is the true Church in which this apostolic succession flourishes: *One must remain in that Church which was founded by the Apostles and endures down to this day.*

Augustine also teaches this doctrine everywhere and extensively, especially in the Psalm against the party of Donatus, where he says: *Number the priests from the very See of Peter and see, in that order of Fathers, who succeeded whom. She is the rock which the proud gates of hell do not conquer.* Hence in Epist. 165 to Generosus, for this purpose he enumerates the Roman Pontiffs from Peter to Anastasius, who then occupied the See. Finally, in *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti*, c. 4, he says: *The succession of priests, from the very See of the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord entrusted the feeding of his sheep, down to the present episcopate, holds me in the Church.* If the holy Doctor asserted this concerning the continuous succession of only forty Pontiffs, who were numbered down to his time, what would he have said if he had seen it extended beyond the number of two hundred and thirty-five Pontiffs and enduring from St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, to Innocent XI, who now happily governs the Church?

41. I omit many other motives or arguments for the credibility of our faith drawn from the predictions of the Prophets, the utterances of oracles, the prophecies of the Sibyls, and the testimonies of Gentiles, Jews, and Mohammedans. These cannot fail effectively to establish the truth of our faith, since, as Novatian says in *De Trinitate*, c. 18: *A kind of proof drawn from adversaries is firm, so that truth is proved even by the enemies of truth.*

On the Theological Virtues

I cannot, however, pass over in silence what Duverdier, a French historian, relates in his compendium of Turkish history, in the life of Bayezid II. At the time, he says, when Bayezid was enjoying the delights of the peace he had concluded with the Venetians, a certain Talisman, that is, a priest of the Mohammedan sect, who had read and explained the Qur'an in the Church of Holy Wisdom for a long series of years, was one day holding the book in his hand so as to explain some of its pages to the Emperor, who was accompanied by a great multitude of people. Suddenly throwing it upon the ground, falling upon his knees, and looking toward Bayezid, he said:

"I am astonished, my lord, that a prince so learned and wise has not recognized the follies of this false lawgiver, whom you believe to be the greatest of all the prophets. Know that there is nothing divine in the laws prescribed by him; they all regard the delights of the senses, by which men may be enticed. Nor did that impostor wish controversies concerning his law to be resolved by any battle except the sword for any other reason than to prevent his deceits from becoming known. I have often compared them with the laws of the Christians, always finding a remarkable difference between their merits. I found the Christian laws founded upon a marvelous purity of life and upon entirely unshaken truth. The Mohammedan laws are nothing but obscenities and deceptions. Hence I conclude that the religion of Jesus Christ alone must be embraced."

Bayezid was the most superstitious of all princes. Consequently, scarcely had the Talisman completed these final words when he ordered him to be dragged from the church and killed immediately. Fearing, however, the publication of this report, which greatly prejudiced the glory of his sect, he most severely prohibited all who had heard the discourse from revealing anything about it to anyone. But he for whose honor that priest had undergone so courageous a death caused an Illyrian Turk who had witnessed that illustrious tragedy to speak, so that it would not remain unknown to the Christians of those regions, who were wonderfully edified by it.

Let us therefore conclude with Pico della Mirandola, *Epist. 1*: It is great obstinacy not to believe the Gospel, whose truth the blood of the martyrs proclaims, the voices of the Apostles resound, wonders prove, reason confirms, the elements declare, and demons confess. But it is far greater madness not to doubt the Gospel's truth and yet to live as though one did not doubt its falsity.

CHAPTER III.

On the Rules of Faith, and First on Scripture and Tradition.

Having explained the object of faith and its conditions or endowments, we must treat of the rules by which it is infallibly proposed. Two of these are inanimate and cannot explain their meaning by a living voice, namely, Sacred Scripture and Tradition; while three are animate and speaking, namely, the Church, the Supreme Pontiff, and Councils.

§ 1.

On Sacred Scripture.

1. That Sacred Scripture is an infallible rule of faith is acknowledged by all. For by the name Scripture is understood writing composed by the inspiration and motion of the Holy Spirit and dictated by him, according to 2 Pet. 1: No prophecy of Scripture is made by private interpretation. For prophecy was not at any time brought forth by human will, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. And 2 Tim. 3: All Scripture divinely inspired is useful for teaching. Hence we frequently read in Scripture that the Prophets testify that the Lord spoke to them: Isa. 5: Thus says the Lord of hosts. Jonah 1: The word of the Lord came to Jonah. And in Luke 2 God is said to have spoken through the mouth of his holy Prophets, who have been from the beginning. Hence Chrysostom, homil. 2 on Genesis, says that the divine Scriptures are letters and epistles written at God's dictation and sent to men. Augustine agrees with him on Ps. 90 in these words: From that city from which we are exiles, letters have come to us. These are the Scriptures, which exhort us to live well. Gregory the Great similarly says, bk. 2, epist. 40: What is Scripture, except a certain letter of almighty God to his creature? It therefore cannot be denied or called into doubt that Sacred Scripture is an infallible rule of faith. Hence Augustine, bk. 2 Contra Donatistas, c. 6, says: Let us not bring deceitful scales, in which we weigh whatever we please, saying according to our judgment that this is heavy and that light; but let us bring the divine scale from the Sacred Scriptures, as from the Lord's treasures, and in it weigh what is heavier; or rather, let us not weigh it ourselves, but acknowledge what has been weighed by the Lord.

On the Theological Virtues

2. Scripture is commonly divided into the Old and New Testaments, or into the books pertaining to the old or Mosaic law and the books pertaining to the new or Christian law. The Old Testament is the collection of those sacred books that promise the coming Redeemer, together with the precepts of the ancient law. The New Testament is the collection of those sacred books that present the promised Redeemer as now present, together with the precepts of the new law.

3. The books of the Old Testament are customarily divided into four classes: 1^o legal books, namely, the five books of Moses or the Pentateuch: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy; 2^o historical books, namely, Joshua, Judges, Ruth, Kings, Chronicles, Job, Ezra, Tobit, Judith, Esther, and Maccabees; 3^o sapiential books, such as Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus; and 4^o prophetical books, namely, the books of the four major Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, and of the twelve minor Prophets, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Micah, Obadiah, Jonah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi. Some divide the New Testament in a similar manner, referring the four Gospels to the legal books, the Acts of the Apostles to the historical books, the Epistles of Paul and the other canonical Epistles to the sapiential books, and the Apocalypse to the prophetical books. The Council of Trent, sess. 4, declares that all these books are canonical, or pertain to the certain rule of faith, with the exception of the Prayer of Manasseh, the last two books of Ezra, and the last two books of Maccabees, in these words: *If anyone does not receive as sacred and canonical these books in their entirety, with all their parts, as they have customarily been read in the Church and are contained in the old Latin Vulgate edition, let him be anathema.* The same canon of sacred books had previously been issued by the Council of Florence in the decree of Eugenius and, eleven hundred years earlier, by the Third Council of Carthage, c. 47, by Innocent I, epist. 3 to Exuperius, and by St. Augustine, bk. 2 *De doctrina christiana*, c. 8, who attended and subscribed to the aforesaid Council of Carthage. These, however, do not expressly mention Baruch, but include him under Jeremiah, because Baruch was Jeremiah's scribe, as is clear from Jer. 36. Therefore, when the ancients cite the prophecy of Baruch, they cite it under the name of Jeremiah, as Canus shows by many examples, bk. 2 *De locis Theologicis*, c. 11.

4. There are various editions of Sacred Scripture, but the Council of Trent, sess. 4, declared in these words that the Vulgate is to be regarded as authentic and consequently as a rule of faith: *The sacred and holy Synod, considering that no small benefit may accrue to the Church of God if it is made known which of all the Latin editions of the sacred books now in circulation is to be*

held as authentic, ordains and declares that this old and Vulgate edition, which has been approved in the Church itself by the long use of so many centuries, is to be held as authentic in public readings, disputations, sermons, and expositions, and that no one is to dare or presume to reject it under any pretext whatsoever. Hence, in matters of faith and morals Catholics may not appeal from it to Hebrew or Greek copies, especially because the rabbis, sworn enemies of Christians, have violated, mutilated, and corrupted the Scriptures so as to draw them to their own meaning. Moreover, if recourse always had to be made to the Hebrew or Greek sources, there would be a remarkable and confused diversity of opinions according to the differing methods of interpretation employed by translators, which are altogether diverse, as may be seen in Aquila, Theodotion, Symmachus, Sante Pagnini, Vatablus, Oleaster, Cajetan, and Malvenda. This is especially clear in the commentaries of the heretics, who not only disagree with one another but frequently disagree with themselves while preparing their editions. Hence Canus aptly says that *they do not so much translate the sacred writings from the sources as turn themselves around the sources.*

5. The holy Fathers declare the dignity and excellence of Sacred Scripture by various praises. It is called Jacob's well, from which are drawn the waters that flow toward the east, and Jacob's peeled rod, at the sight of which we produce diverse fruits of good works. It is Elijah's fiery chariot, by which we are carried into heaven to attain eternal happiness. It is Mount Zion, on which the commandments of the great King are delivered. It is the bread that God once gave to the people in the desert, containing every delight within itself. It is the Church's many-colored garment, adorned with the diverse colors of questions, by the pleasing sight of which the curiosity of the mind may be most fully satisfied. It is that great river that flowed from the place of delight and was divided into four heads, because of the fourfold sense that it contains. It is a river that is shallow and yet deep, in which, as Gregory the Great says, *a lamb walks and an elephant swims*. It is the sealed fountain mentioned in Song 4: a fountain because it flows perpetually and enters the gardens of the Church, and sealed because it contains things most difficult to understand. It is a book written within and without because of the manifold sense contained in it, and sealed with seven seals because of its exceedingly difficult interpretation. It is the sacred armory of the Church, from which Catholic Doctors and defenders of the faith draw shields, weapons, spears, swords, and other instruments of war by which they repel the audacity of heretics and blunt all their assaults. Basil compares Scripture to a most fully equipped pharmacy, which supplies medicines of every kind for every disease. Thus the Church drew from it her constancy and fortitude

On the Theological Virtues

in the age of the Martyrs; the lights of wisdom and streams of eloquence in the age of the Doctors; the bulwarks of faith and the overthrow of errors in the age of heretics. From it she learned humility and modesty in prosperity, magnanimity and patience in adversity, and fervor and diligence in tepidity. Jerome likewise says in the prologue to the Psalms: *In Scripture the infant has something to suck, the boy something to praise, the adolescent something to correct, the young man something to follow, and the old man something to anticipate. From it women may learn chastity, peoples may find piety, widows a judge, the poor a protector, and strangers a guardian. Here kings will find what they must hear and judges what they must fear. It consoles the sorrowful, moderates the joyful, soothes the angry, refreshes the poor, and gives suitable remedies to all.* Finally, Gregory the Great, bk. 20 *Moralia*, c. 1, speaks excellently of Sacred Scripture: *By use it trains the unskilled to facility, and it is loved the more, the more it is meditated upon. By humble words it assists the reader's mind, and by sublime meanings it raises it. In a certain manner it grows with its readers: it is as though recognized by unlearned readers, and yet is always found new by the learned. It surpasses all sciences and doctrines even by the very manner of its speech, because in one and the same discourse, while narrating the text, it discloses a mystery.*

§ 2.

On Tradition.

6. Besides the Scriptures, there are unwritten Traditions pertaining to the rule of faith, as is clear from 2 Thess. 2: Therefore, brethren, stand firm and hold the traditions that you have learned, whether by word or by our Epistle. On this Chrysostom says, homil. 4: From this it is evident that the Apostles did not hand down everything through an epistle, but many things also without writing, and these too are worthy of faith. Therefore, let us also regard the tradition of the Church as worthy of faith. It is a tradition; ask no more.

Other holy Fathers teach the same. Tertullian writes in *De corona militis*, c. 3: Long-standing observance, by preceding the written rule, established its standing; and if no Scripture determined it, certain custom confirmed it, which undoubtedly flowed from tradition. For how can anything be practiced unless it was first handed down? And again, c. 4: If you demand a law of Scripture for disciplines of this kind, you will find none. Tradition will be presented to you as their author, custom as their confirmer, and faith as their observer. Basil writes in *De Spiritu Sancto*, c. 27: Of the

doctrines preached in the Church, some we possess from teaching handed down in writing, while others we have received from Apostolic Tradition, delivered in mystery, that is, in secret; and both have the same force with regard to piety. Epiphanius, haer. 61, says: Tradition must be used, for not everything can be received from Divine Scripture. Damascene says, bk. 4 De fide, c. 17: The holy Apostles handed down very many things without writing. Augustine, bk. 2 Contra Donatistas, c. 7, says that many things are not found in the writings of the Apostles, and yet, because they are observed throughout the universal Church, they are believed to have been handed down and commended by the Apostles themselves. Finally, the Second Council of Nicaea, celebrated in 781, act. 7, says: We unanimously profess that we desire to retain ecclesiastical traditions, whether they have force through writing or through custom, as well as decrees. And shortly afterward: If anyone disregards a tradition of the Church having force either through writing or through custom, let him be anathema. The Council of Sens likewise says in decree 5: The breadth of Scripture is certainly immense, and its depth perpetual and incomprehensible. Yet it is destructive to labor under the error that nothing is to be admitted unless it has been drawn from Scripture. For many things were transmitted by Christ to posterity through the hands of the Apostles, by word of mouth and familiar conversation, which, although they do not appear to be expressly contained in Sacred Scripture, must nevertheless be held without wavering.

Reason also supports this. First, the word of God, which can neither be deceived nor deceive, is the infallible rule of our faith. But as regards the certainty and infallibility of the divine word, it makes no difference whether it has been inscribed in letters and writing, or uttered by the oracle of a living voice and communicated from ear to ear. It does not receive its force from ink and characters, but from God's authority. Therefore, Tradition is no less a certain and infallible rule of faith than Scripture.

7. Second, there are many articles of orthodox faith that are not clearly contained in the Scriptures, as is evident, besides countless others, from the perpetual virginity of the most blessed Mother of God, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and Christ's descent into hell, concerning which the modern heretics have no doubt. Therefore, some tradition concerning these matters must necessarily be admitted and believed with divine faith. This is also clear from Sacred Scripture itself. For how are we certain that these and not other books of the Old and New Testaments, neither more nor fewer, are to be received, except by tradition, since this is nowhere expressed in the Scriptures? How can we know that the third and fourth books of Ezra, the third and fourth books of Maccabees, the Prayer of King Manasseh

customarily appended to the books of Chronicles, the Appendix to Job, the one hundred and fifty-first Psalm of David found in Greek Psalters, the Gospel of the Nazarenes, the Epistle of Paul to Seneca mentioned by Jerome in his *Catalogus de Scriptoribus Ecclesiasticis*, and the book of the Shepherd, whose author, according to Jerome in the cited place, was Hermas, mentioned in the last chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, are not canonical books, except by tradition? Therefore, whoever admits Scripture must necessarily admit Tradition, which proposes to us this Scripture rather than another as divinely revealed, since we cannot know this from any source other than Tradition.

8. I add that it has always been customary among heretics to confirm their errors by testimonies of Scripture and to sew cushions for themselves out of Scripture to place under the elbow of every age, as Jerome says on Gal. 1. Vincent of Lérins says: You may see them flying through each and every volume of the sacred law, through the books of Moses and Kings, through the Psalms, Apostles, Gospels, and Prophets. Whether among their own people or strangers, privately or publicly, in sermons, banquets, or streets, they never produce anything of their own without also trying to shade it with words of Scripture. For they know that their stench would please no one if it were exhaled nakedly and simply; therefore they sprinkle it with the words of heavenly eloquence as with a certain perfume. Since, therefore, heretics have always abused the testimonies of Scripture and, as Augustine says, have understood good Scriptures badly, all the Fathers judged that no remedy was more effective for avoiding the contagion of errors than to cling tenaciously and immovably to the traditions of the Apostles, and by them, as by a touchstone, to test true and false doctrine and distinguish the genuine sense of Scripture from the adulterated. Hence St. Irenaeus, bk. 3 *Adversus haereses*, confounds the Gnostic heretics by traditions alone. In particular, c. 3, commending the traditions of the Roman Church, he says: Every Church, that is, the faithful from every place, must agree with this Church because of its more powerful preeminence, in which the tradition derived from the Apostles has always been preserved by those who are everywhere.

9. You will object first: Scripture forbids anything to be added to Scripture or to the word of God. Deut. 4: *You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, nor take away from it.* And in the last chapter of the Apocalypse: *If anyone adds to these things, God shall add upon him the plagues written in this book.* The holy Fathers likewise teach that God sufficiently instructs us through Sacred Scripture. Hence Tertullian says against Hermogenes: *I adore the fullness of Scripture.* And Augustine, bk. 2 *De doctrina christiana*, c. 9: *In*

those things that are openly set down in Scripture are found all those things that contain faith. Therefore, apart from Scripture, there are no unwritten traditions pertaining to faith.

I answer that when Scripture forbids anything to be added to Scripture or to the word of God, it intends only to forbid the addition of something that is not the word of God or that is contrary to it. Since traditions are not contrary to Scripture and contain the word of God, not committed to letters but expressed by a living voice and communicated from ear to ear, they are not rejected or forbidden by Scripture, but rather approved and commended, as is clear from the words of the Apostle quoted above. When the holy Fathers assert that through Scripture we are fully instructed concerning things necessary for salvation, or that it suffices for faith, they do not use the word Scripture in that strict and rigorous sense in which it comprises only the canonical books, but in a broader and more general signification, in which it includes and comprehends every revelation received by the Church as divine, whether it is written in the body of the Bible or not written but handed down by word alone. For because the principal and greater part of the divine revelations communicated to us has been inscribed and expressed in writing in the Bible itself, the holy Fathers include under the name of Sacred Scripture also the few things divinely revealed to us through Tradition.

10. You will object second: Things that pass from ear to ear are preserved with difficulty, are easily changed, and are corrupted by the injury of time unless they are committed to writing. Therefore, nothing firm can be held from traditions.

I answer that, if only human industry and care in preserving unwritten traditions were considered, it could scarcely happen that they would not suffer the defect alleged. Yet because the traditions used by the Church are preserved by the singular providence of the Holy Spirit by which the Church herself is governed, there is no more reason to fear that they will perish or be corrupted in the whole Church than that the Sacred Scriptures will do so. For if we considered human providence alone, these too could easily be corrupted or even altogether destroyed. Certainly, if God preserved the tradition of faith throughout the whole period of the law of nature without any writings, he will now preserve both the Scriptures and unwritten traditions no less easily. It is ridiculous to believe that they cannot be preserved in the hearts of the faithful with the same diligence and fidelity as if they were written on papyrus. For the writing of the Spirit of the living God is not more easily erased than writing in ink.

On the Theological Virtues

11. You will object third: Christ seems to condemn traditions in Matt. 15, where he said to the Jews: *You have made the commandment of God void because of your traditions.* And Paul says in Col. 2: *See that no one deceive you through philosophy and empty deceit, according to the tradition of men.*

I answer that Christ and the Apostle in the cited places condemn fabricated, specious traditions contrary to Scripture or right reason, such as those that the Jews observed after receiving them from the Pharisees. They do not condemn legitimate traditions, such as those that Moses and the Prophets had handed down to them. Hence nothing follows against us. True and Apostolic traditions are not to be despised merely because Christ and Paul condemned false and Pharisaic traditions.

To distinguish true traditions of the Church from false ones, three rules are established. The first is: that pertains to Apostolic Tradition for which no beginning can be found in the Catholic Church; for the fact that we find no origin for it until we reach the time of the Apostles is an argument that it proceeded from the Apostles. Augustine inculcates this rule in almost all his books against the Donatists, particularly bk. 4, c. 24, where he says: *What the universal Church holds, and what was not instituted by Councils but has always been retained, is most rightly believed to have been handed down by the authority of tradition.* And epist. 118: *Those things that we observe, not as written but as handed down, and which are observed throughout the whole world, are understood to have been commended and established either by the Apostles themselves or by plenary Councils, whose authority in the Church is most salutary.*

The second rule is: if the Fathers of the first centuries agree in preserving something and condemn its opposite as heretical, it is believed to pertain to Apostolic or ecclesiastical Tradition.

The third is: when the rulers of the Church, gathered in the Holy Spirit, with no one resisting, receive something as derived from the Apostles after mature examination of the matter, it must be believed to arise from Apostolic Tradition.

From these rules you will understand that there are three kinds of traditions. Some come immediately from Christ and are called divine; others come from the Apostles with the assistance of the Holy Spirit and are called Apostolic; others were begun either by Prelates or peoples and obtained through use and custom so as to have the force of law, and these are called ecclesiastical. The first two have the same force and certainty as the written word of God, since they rest on the same authority, namely, the infallibility of divine testimony and of the word of God, which, as we said above, does not receive its force from ink and characters but from God's authority and veracity. The third, although they are not an infallible rule of faith,

nevertheless possess great authority in the Church and cannot be denied or called into doubt without rashness.

CHAPTER IV. On the Church.

Two things concerning the Church must be briefly demonstrated here. The first is that she cannot err and is consequently an infallible rule of faith. The second is that the four marks of the true Church belong to the Roman Church, but not to the sect of the Lutherans and Calvinists.

§ 1.

On the Infallibility of the Church.

1. The Church is *the visible society of the baptized faithful under one head, Christ in heaven and his Vicar on earth, communicating with one another in the same worship*. That she cannot err and is consequently an infallible rule of faith is clear from two testimonies of Scripture. The first is found in Matt. 16, where Christ said to Peter: *You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*. By the gates of hell is signified the power and cunning of the devil, which is especially exercised in spreading heresies and errors. Therefore, by these words Christ openly indicated that no heresies would prevail against the Church founded upon the Rock. Hence Augustine, bk. 1 *De Symbolo ad Catechumenos*, c. 6: *She may be attacked, but she cannot be conquered. All heresies have gone out from her like useless branches cut from the vine, but she remains in her root, in her vine, and in her charity. The gates of hell shall not conquer her*.

The second testimony is taken from 1 Tim. 3, where the Church is called *the pillar and foundation of truth*: a pillar because she sustains and supports the truth, since she can neither think nor believe anything contrary to truth; and a foundation because, by reason of her infallibility in defining, she establishes and confirms the truth itself.

Reason also supports this. For if the Church could err in faith, such an error would redound upon Christ and the Holy Spirit, since Christ is the head of the Church and the Holy Spirit her heart, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 3, and defects in the internal actions of a body are attributed to the head or the heart. I add that Christ is the spouse of the Church, whom he espoused to himself forever through faith,

On the Theological Virtues

according to Hos. 2: *I will espouse you to myself forever, and I will espouse you to myself in faith.* But if the Church failed in faith, that marriage would certainly be dissolved. Therefore, she cannot err in faith. Hence Cyprian, *De unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 20: *The spouse of Christ cannot be adulterated; she is incorrupt and chaste. She knows one house and guards the sanctity of one chamber with chaste modesty.*

2. From this you will understand that the concordant sense of the whole Catholic Church supplies an invincible argument of infallible firmness. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 12: The custom of the Church must always be followed in all things, because the very doctrine of the Catholic Doctors has authority from the Church. Hence greater adherence must be given to the authority of the Church than to the authority of Augustine or Jerome or any Doctor whatsoever. Before him Augustine said, epist. 11: If something is practiced by the whole Church throughout the world, to dispute whether it ought to be done is a mark of the most insolent madness. Jerome agrees in *Dialogus adversus Luciferianos*, c. 4, saying: Even if the authority of Scripture did not suffice, the consent of the whole world on this point would have the force of a precept. For many other things observed in the Churches through tradition have acquired for themselves the authority of written law. The Orthodox speaker there subscribes to this statement.

3. You will object first: In Scripture and the holy Fathers the Church is compared to the moon. Therefore, just as the moon fails in brightness and suffers eclipse, so too the Church can fail in faith and fall into error.

I answer that the Church is compared to the moon not because she can fail in faith as the moon fails in brightness, but because, just as the moon is subject to change, so the Church in this life sometimes enjoys peace and sometimes suffers persecution, yet never fails. Hence Ambrose, bk. 4 *Hexameron*, c. 2: *The Church has her times of persecution and peace, for she seems to fail like the moon, but she does not fail. She can be overshadowed, but she cannot fail.* Likewise, just as the moon receives bodily light from the sun, so the Church receives the light of faith and holiness from Christ. Thus Augustine on Ps. 10: *By the moon is understood the Church, not because she has no light of her own, but because she is illuminated by the only-begotten Son of God, who is allegorically called the sun in many places of the Sacred Scriptures.* And Philo, Bishop of Carpasia, on the Song of Songs: *The Church is compared to the moon because whatever divine light she possesses, she receives from that immutable and divine Sun of justice.*

4. You will object second: After the Council of Rimini, in which the formula of faith had been altered by the fraud of the Arians, Jerome writes

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

that the Arian heresy prevailed throughout the whole world: *The whole world groaned and marveled to find itself suddenly Arian*. Therefore, the whole Church can fail in faith and lapse into error.

I answer that the Church at that time contained very many who, notwithstanding the fraud and treachery of the Arians, remained strong in the orthodox faith, such as Hilary of Poitiers and with him all Gaul, which especially supported his party. This is clear from the fact that when he returned from exile, all Gaul received him as though triumphing and exulting over the heresy, and from Jerome's statement that *Gaul, though the heretics raged, was free from monsters*. At that time the Roman clergy likewise persevered in the faith with Pope Felix, who had been substituted for Liberius after his fall, as did many others who could never be moved from the true faith either by the threats of Emperor Constantius or by the frauds of the Arians. Hence, by the words quoted, Jerome intended only to signify that many provinces had then gone over to the party of the Arians because of that infamous Council of Rimini. See Baronius for the year of Christ 358.

§ 2.

The Four Marks or Characteristics of the True Church Belong to the Roman Church, but Not to the Sect of the Lutherans and Calvinists.

5. The Council of Nicaea expressed the four marks or characteristics of the true Church in that most celebrated Creed that it issued, in these words: *I believe in one, holy, catholic, and Apostolic Church*.

The first mark of the true Church is therefore unity, which the Fathers gather from Song 6: *One is my dove and my beloved*. John 10: *There shall be one fold and one shepherd*. 1 Cor. 10: *We, though many, are one body*. Eph. 4: *One body and one spirit, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all*. Cyprian and Augustine wrote excellently on this unity in special works.

The second mark is her holiness. The true Church must be holy, not because all her members are immune from sin, for the kingdom of heaven, by which, according to St. Gregory, the present Church is understood, consists of foolish virgins as well as wise; in the Lord's field chaff is mixed with the wheat, and in the house of God vessels of gold are placed among wooden and earthen ones. Rather, she is holy because of the purity of the doctrine she professes, because of the holiness of life possessed by those who conform themselves to that doctrine, and because of the sanctity of the Sacraments and ceremonies by which she offers worship to God.

On the Theological Virtues

Third, the true Church must be catholic or universal, spread from the rising of the sun to its setting by the splendor of one faith. For, as the Roman Catechism says, the Church is not confined, as human republics or assemblies of heretics are, within the limits of a single kingdom or to one race of men; rather, she embraces in the bosom of charity all men, whether barbarians or Scythians, slaves or free. Hence Augustine, bk. 4 De Symbolo, c. 10: The Church possesses the whole dowry that she received from her husband. Every assembly of any heresy that sits in corners is a concubine, not a matron. Elsewhere he compares the congregations of heretics to branches cut off, which remain where they fall when severed, while the assembly that is the true Church lives like a vine and extends its branches everywhere. Finally, epist. 161: As was prophesied concerning the Church, we see her spread throughout the whole world. We judge that we ought not to doubt so evident a fulfillment of holy prophecy, which the Lord also confirmed in the Gospel, as did the Apostles through whom that same Church was extended as had been foretold of her. For at the beginning of the sacred Psalter it is written concerning the Son of God: The Lord said to me, You are my Son; this day I have begotten you. Ask of me, and I will give you the nations for your inheritance and the ends of the earth for your possession.

The fourth mark of the true Church is that she is Apostolic, that is, built upon the foundation of the Apostles, as is said in Eph. 2. Hence Cyril of Alexandria, explaining the words of the Prophet, *Her foundations are in the holy mountains*, says that those holy mountains are the Apostles, in whom the foundations of Gospel truth were laid. They are rightly called mountains both because of the sublimity and firmness of their doctrine and because they merited to receive the first rays of the Gospel's rising, by which the whole world was illuminated. Jerome likewise says in the *Dialogus contra Luciferianos*: *I will give you a brief and open statement of my mind: one must remain in that Church which, founded by the Apostles, endures even to this day.*

6. It is manifest that these four marks of the true Church belong to the Roman Church, that is, to that multitude of the faithful who adhere under one and the same universal Shepherd, the Roman Pontiff, the visible Vicar of Christ and legitimate successor of Peter. First, such a Church is one by reason of one and the same visible head, namely, the Pontiff seated at Rome, who is acknowledged throughout the whole Church as the supreme Shepherd of all. For by their relation to him all the faithful dispersed throughout the world are united and distinguished from all heretics and schismatics. She is also one because of the unity of the Sacraments, which the Apostle indicates in Eph. 4 under the name of baptism, the gateway of all

the Sacraments, saying: *One Lord, one faith, one baptism*; and under the name of the Eucharist, which is the consummation and completion of the other Sacraments, 1 Cor. 10: *One bread, and we, though many, are one body, all who partake of one bread and one chalice*. The unity of charity may also be added, which is indicated in Acts 4 when it is said: *The multitude of believers had one heart and one soul in the Lord*, because, as the Gloss says, *they were joined into one by the bond of charity*. Thus, in the celebrated temple at Cyzicus, all the stones were bound together by a golden thread, as Pliny reports, bk. 36, c. 15. Báñez gives an excellent reason for this unity: that which gives goodness to something, he says, also gives unity according to the Platonists. For goodness preserves and perfects the very thing in which it is; but nothing is preserved in being except insofar as it is one, for things divided and separated quickly perish and dissolve. Therefore, since charity gives goodness and perfection to the Church, it also confers unity upon her.

7. Second, the Roman Church is holy, both because of the purity of the doctrine she professes and because of the chaste temper of her morals. Thus we may rightly say with the Psalmist that the mystical wings of this most pure dove, namely, faith and morals, are silvered and gleam with the pale brilliance of gold, since she shines wonderfully both with the splendor of wisdom signified by gold and with the whiteness of morals expressed by silver. The purity of her faith and doctrine appears in this: that there is no slight offense against God or neighbor that she does not condemn, no duty of piety or virtue that she does not commend, no manner of loving God more excellent than that which she teaches, namely, with the whole heart, the whole soul, and all one's strength; no end more excellent than that to which she directs us; no necessary means for attaining it whose knowledge and use she does not teach; no motives more effective for ordering life piously and holily than those she proposes, whether from the presence of God who sees all things, from the future judgment, from the excellence of the reward and the magnitude of punishment, or from other considerations. Finally, the human mind cannot be impelled by means more effective toward all religion toward God and charity toward one's neighbor than those handed down by the doctrine of the Roman Church.

8. Her holiness and purity of morals are clear from the fact that those who live in conformity with this heavenly and most pure doctrine have appeared, and still appear, admirable and almost heavenly even to unbelievers. Thus Paul affirms of the first Christians in the Epistle to the Philippians that they shone in the midst of the Gentiles like lights in the world. Metaphrastes relates in the life of St. Lucian the Martyr that pagans were converted to the faith of Christ by the mere sight of him. Athanasius

On the Theological Virtues

writes in the life of St. Antony that, although Antony greatly desired to remain hidden and did remain hidden, he nevertheless drew to himself the eyes of the whole world by the admirable holiness of his life. Jerome testifies the same of St. Hilarion, Theodoret of Simeon Stylites, and Sulpicius of Martin. Finally, this holiness of the Roman Church is demonstrated by the almost infinite hosts of monks and the innumerable religious institutes and Orders established for no other end than to promote divine worship and the salvation of neighbors, and to imitate on earth the perpetual and indissoluble union with God clearly seen that the blessed possess in heaven. Hence, when Eudoxia, wife of Theodosius the Younger, came to Jerusalem to visit the sacred places and saw the almost innumerable monasteries over which Abbot Euthymius presided, she exclaimed in admiration: *How beautiful are your tents, O Jacob, your dwellings, O Israel!* Num. 24. Hence St. Bernard too says with wonder in serm. 1 on the Dedication: *God is truly wonderful in his Saints, not only in the heavenly but also in the earthly. In both places he has Saints, and in both he is wonderful, making the former blessed and sanctifying the latter. What greater miracle is there than when so many young men, nobles, and indeed all whom I see here are held as though in an open prison without chains, constrained by the fear of God alone? How do they persevere in the continual affliction of penance, beyond human strength, above nature, and contrary to custom? They themselves, I believe, are the miracles that we may now discover, if it were permitted to investigate separately the departure of each from Egypt and his journey through the desert, that is, his renunciation of the world, his entrance into the monastery, and his manner of life in the monastery.*

Finally, the Roman Church is holy because of the sanctity of the ceremonies instituted by her, through which she offers worship and fitting praise to God, and because of the wondrous power and efficacy of the Sacraments she possesses, especially because of the holiness of the most divine Eucharist, which St. Bernard rightly calls *the Holy of Holies and the Sacrament of Sacraments*, and by which, as St. Thomas says, opusc. 57, *sins are purged, virtues are increased, and the mind is enriched with the abundance of all spiritual gifts.*

9. Third, the Roman Church is catholic because from the city of Rome she has been spread throughout the whole world, not only in all parts of the ancient world, in Italy, Gaul, Spain, Germany, England, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Greece, Syria, and Ethiopia, but also in all four parts of the new world: in the East, in the Indies; in the West, in America; in the North, in Japan; and in the South, in Brazil, there are those who daily receive and profess the doctrine of our faith and of the Roman Church. Hence Pope Leo, in a sermon on the feast of Peter and Paul, addressing Rome, says: *Although*

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

you extended the boundaries of your empire by war over land and sea, what military labor subjected to you is less than what Christian peace has subjected. Hence Augustine, bk. Contra Epistolam fundamenti, c. 4, asserts that the very name catholic retains him within the bosom of the Roman Church: The very name of the Catholic Church holds me, a name that this Church has not without cause obtained among so many heresies, so that although all heretics wish to be called Catholics, nevertheless, when a stranger asks where the Catholics assemble, no heretic dares to point out either his own basilica or his own house.

10. Finally, the Roman Church is Apostolic because she was founded by St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, was purpled with his blood, and has persevered inviolate in the same faith that he proclaimed, without any interruption among her Pontiffs. Hence Pope and Martyr Lucius I says in an Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul and Spain: *The Roman Church is Apostolic and the mother of all Churches. She is proved never to have departed from the path of Apostolic Tradition, nor to have succumbed when corrupted by heretical novelties, according to the promise of the Lord himself: I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail.*

11. From these things you will easily understand that the four aforesaid marks of the true Church do not in the least belong to the sect of the Lutherans and Calvinists. As regards unity, it is manifest that it is not found in such a sect, since it recognizes no visible head who is an infallible interpreter of faith and whose judgment must necessarily be followed. Instead, it takes as the supreme rule of faith what seems to it an internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, that is, the private spirit of each individual, by which they profess to know the truth of divine Scripture both as to the letter and as to the meaning. This is not a firm principle of unity in faith but a fertile seedbed of dissensions and heresies, as Cyprian and Jerome rightly observed. Cyprian says in epist. 55: *Heresies have arisen and schisms been born from no other source than that the priest of God is not obeyed and one judge is not recognized for a time in the Church in the place of Christ.* Jerome says, bk. 2 *Contra Jovinianum: One is chosen from among twelve, so that, a head having been established, the occasion of schism may be removed.*

12. Holiness, both as regards the intellect and as regards the will, is also lacking in this sect, since its doctrine contains many things that are openly false and impious: namely, that God's commandments are impossible even with God's grace; that men are justified by faith alone; that no sins are imputed to those who possess faith; that God is the cause and author of sin; that the Sacrament of confession is a human invention, a torture chamber of consciences, and mere superstition. From this doctrine, so lax and so widely open to sinning freely and with impunity, countless kinds of wickedness

On the Theological Virtues

have sprung. It changed the French, previously most obedient to their king, into rebels and seditionists; it drew monks who had formerly lived with the greatest rigor into a lax manner of life; it made the continent lustful and led nuns consecrated to God by vow into sacrilegious marriages. From this you will understand the truth of Augustine's golden statement in *De vera religione*, c. 8: *Heretics arise from those men who, even if they were in the Church, would nevertheless err.*

13. It is also manifest that the name catholic or universal cannot belong to the same sect, since the doctrine of the Lutherans and Calvinists has not reached Asia, Africa, Egypt, or Greece, and much less the parts of the new world, as has the faith of the Roman Church. Hence Augustine, *De unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 3: *Individual heresies are not found in many nations in which the Catholic Church exists, but this Church, which is everywhere, is found even where they are.*

That this sect cannot be called Apostolic is no less evident, because the Lutherans and Calvinists cannot show an uninterrupted succession from the Apostles down to themselves. This was continually reproached to heretics by all the Fathers, especially by Tertullian, *De praescriptionibus*, c. 32: Let them produce the origins of their Churches; let them unfold the order of their bishops, running down through succession from the beginning in such a manner that their first bishop had as author and predecessor one of the Apostles or of the Apostolic men who persevered with the Apostles. For in this manner the Apostolic Churches present their registers: as the Church of the Smyrnaeans reports that Polycarp was appointed by John, and as the Church of the Romans presents Clement as ordained by Peter. Hence in c. 37 he rises against the heretics of his time in these words, which can rightly be applied to the Lutherans and Calvinists: Who are you? When and from where did you come? What are you doing in my property, you who are not mine? By what right, Marcion, do you cut down my forest? By what license, Valentinus, do you divert my springs? By what authority, Apelles, do you move my boundaries? Why do the rest of you sow and pasture here according to your own pleasure? The possession is mine; I have possessed it for a long time; I possessed it first. I have firm origins from the very authors to whom the property belonged. I am the heir of the Apostles. As they provided in their testament, as they committed to trust, and as they adjured, so I hold. They have always disinherited and repudiated you as strangers and enemies.

CHAPTER V.
On the Supreme Pontiff.

Three celebrated controversies against the heretics of this time, the bitterest enemies of the Supreme Pontiff and the Apostolic See, must be briefly resolved here. The first concerns the primacy of St. Peter over the other Apostles. The second concerns the primacy or supreme power of the Roman Pontiff over the whole Church. The third concerns his infallibility in defining matters or controversies pertaining to faith.

§ 1.

The Primacy of St. Peter over the Other Apostles.

1. I say first: the primacy and supreme power of governing the universal Church were granted by Christ to the singular person of Peter alone, not to the other Apostles.

This conclusion is certain by faith and is proved from two most illustrious passages of the Gospel, in one of which Christ promises the keys, that is, supreme power in the Church, to Peter, and in the other actually confers it. The first is found in Matt. 16, where Christ addresses Peter as follows: *Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood have not revealed this to you, and so forth. And I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and so forth.* These words can belong to no Apostle other than Peter. For none of them except Peter could be called Bar-Jona, or son of Jonah, since no one except him had Jonah or John as his father according to the flesh. No one except him was called Cephas, which is interpreted rock or cliff. Therefore, supreme authority over the Church, metaphorically designated by the name of the keys, was conferred upon no one other than Peter.

2. The second passage is taken from John 21, where, after the threefold profession of excellent love, Christ gave Peter what he had previously promised him in Matt. 16 for his excellent confession of faith, in these words: *Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these? Feed my sheep.* Here it is manifest, first, that these words were spoken to no one other than Peter, since Christ designates him individually by his own name and that of his

On the Theological Virtues

father and questions him three times, so that his threefold confession might answer to his threefold denial and distinguish him from all the others: *Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?* That is, more than these companions of yours, the Apostles.

Second, it is evident that by these words Christ confers upon St. Peter a special prerogative distinct from the earlier benefit of mission common to all the Apostles. This is openly gathered from the fact that before committing to Peter in general the office of feeding his sheep and lambs, Christ asked him three times whether he loved more than the others. For, as Chrysostom and Theophylact rightly note on this passage of John, and Bernard in serm. 76 on the Song of Songs, there was no reason why Christ should require greater love for a benefit common to all the Apostles and a mission already entrusted to all. Rather, he required more love from Peter because he was commending to him the thing dearest to himself, namely, the Church for which he had shed his blood, to be fed and governed.

Third, from these words it is manifestly gathered that Christ committed the universal care of the Church to Peter. For he spoke indefinitely of his sheep, not of these or those sheep, and first commended the lambs and then the sheep to him. By lambs the people are signified, and by sheep the Pastors and Fathers of the people. Hence Eusebius of Emesa, or rather Eucherius of Lyons, says in a sermon on the Nativity of John: He first committed the lambs and then the sheep to Peter, because he established him not only as a shepherd but as the Shepherd of shepherds. Peter therefore feeds the lambs and the sheep. He feeds the children and the mothers. He governs both subjects and Prelates. He is therefore the Shepherd of all, because apart from lambs and sheep there is nothing in the Church. Bernard likewise says, bk. 2 *De consideratione*, c. 8, addressing Pope Eugenius, Peter's successor: You are he to whom the keys were handed down. There are indeed other doorkeepers and shepherds of flocks, but you have inherited both names more gloriously and more distinctly than the rest. They each have their own individual flocks assigned to them, but all were entrusted to you, one flock to one shepherd. You alone are the one Shepherd of all, not only of the sheep but also of the shepherds. Do you ask how I prove this? From the word of the Lord. To whom, I do not say of the bishops, but even of the Apostles, were all the sheep committed so absolutely and without distinction? If you love me, Peter, feed my sheep. Which sheep? Those of this or that people, city, region, or kingdom? My sheep, he says. To whom is it not clear that he did not designate some but assigned all? Nothing is excepted where nothing is distinguished.

3. The other Fathers in a body assert the same privilege of the most blessed Peter. Dionysius, in an Epistle to Timothy, relates that when Peter and Paul were being led to martyrdom, Paul greeted Peter in this way: Peace be with you, Peter, foundation of the Churches, shepherd of the sheep and lambs of Christ. Ambrose, on Gal. 1, After three years I went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, says: It was fitting that he desired to see Peter, because Peter was first among the Apostles, to whom the Savior had entrusted the care of the Churches. Augustine, bk. 2 De baptismo, c. 1, speaking of Peter, says: In him the primacy of the Apostles stands forth by excellent grace. Chrysostom, homil. 55 on Matthew, calls Peter the mouth of all the Apostles and says that he presented Christ to the whole world. And in homil. 44 on Isa. 6: But what of Peter, he says, the foundation of the Church? He was the ardent lover of Christ, the one instructed by the Word, the victor over rhetoricians, the unlearned man who closed the mouths of philosophers, who dissolved Greek wisdom as though it were a spider's web, who cast his net into the sea and caught the world. Pope Leo says in serm. 3 on his elevation: From the whole world Peter alone is chosen to be placed over the calling of all the nations, over all the Apostles, and over all parts of the Church, so that although there are many priests and many shepherds among the people of God, Peter may nevertheless properly govern all whom Christ governs principally. Finally, Gregory the Great, bk. 4, epist. 32: It is evident to all who know the Gospel that the care of the whole Church was committed by the voice of the Lord to holy Peter, Prince of all the Apostles.

Reason also supports this. No one can deny or doubt that Christ instituted the best and most perfect government for the Church. But this is monarchical, as Aristotle teaches in *Ethica* VIII, c. 10, and as is clear by the natural light.

First, because of order, which shines more perfectly when one alone, on whom the care of all rests, presides and the rest are subject, than when all preside and no one is subject, as in democracy, or when many, namely, the leading citizens, rule, as in aristocracy. For although some order shines in this government because the people are subject to the leading citizens, there is no order among those leading citizens themselves, since they are altogether equal and none has power over another.

Second, because of ease of government. For a city is more easily governed by one than by many, as the Philosopher says in the cited place, both because it is easier for one man to excel in virtue than for many and because the people more easily obey one than many, whose aims are usually directed toward diverse things.

On the Theological Virtues

Third, because of attachment to the end, namely, peace and concord, which are easily secured when all will the same things and reject the same things. This occurs most agreeably when all depend upon the will and judgment of one. Hence even among those in whose states democracy prevailed, whenever some special difficulty arose or serious danger threatened, they customarily had recourse to monarchy in order to confront difficult circumstances and escape the danger threatening the republic, and they conferred full power of administration upon one. This is especially clear among the Romans. For it was their custom, when supreme necessity pressed and the Roman state was brought almost to its final peril by foreign wars or internal dissensions, to appoint a dictator and to have recourse to the government of one as the sole support of a republic in danger and already nearly falling. Hence Aristotle rightly celebrates in *Metaphysica* XII this saying of Homer: *The rule of many princes is not good; let there be one prince*. Virgil agrees in *Georgica* IV, where, if two kings should be found in a single swarm of bees, he gives farmers this salutary counsel:

*But when you have recalled both leaders from the battle line,
Give the one that seemed inferior to death, lest his wastefulness harm the hive;
Let the better reign alone in the empty court.*

4. Therefore, if there is one king among bees, one leader in flocks, one ruler among herds, one commander over the forces of soldiers, one monarch who commands a kingdom, one dictator who administers a republic, one father of a household who governs a home, and one pilot who governs a ship, why should not one Hierarch govern the one Church of Christ, which in Sacred Scripture is compared to a fold, an army, a kingdom, a ship, and a house? Hence Cyprian, epist. 40: *There is one God, one Christ, one Church, and one chair founded upon Peter by the voice of the Lord. Whoever gathers elsewhere scatters*. Jerome, bk. 2 *Contra Jovinianum*: *One is chosen from among twelve, so that, a head having been established, the occasion of schism may be removed*. And in the *Dialogus adversus Luciferianos*: *The salvation of the Church depends upon the dignity of the supreme priest. Unless a certain exceptional power, eminent above all, is given to him, there will be as many schisms in the Church as there are priests*. Finally, Bernard says in bk. 2 *De consideratione*, c. 8, that after the resurrection Christ committed his Church to one, namely, Peter: *So as to commend unity to all in one flock and one shepherd, according to the saying: One is my dove, my beautiful one, my perfect one. Where there is unity, there is perfection*.

This is confirmed first. Christ did not deny to the Church under the new law what he granted to the Synagogue under the old. But as long as the Synagogue endured, it was governed monarchically by one supreme priest,

as is clear from Deut. 17. Therefore, the Church under the new law must likewise be governed monarchically under one supreme Shepherd.

It is confirmed second. The Church militant was instituted after the likeness of the Church triumphant, as a certain image and representation of it. But in the Church triumphant, besides God and Christ, the first Angel presides, by whom the others are enlightened and perfected. Therefore, in the Church militant also, besides God and Christ, there must be admitted some monarch by whom she is governed. Consequently, the primacy or supreme power of governing the universal Church was granted to Peter alone and not to the other Apostles.

5. You will say: Cyprian, *De unitate Ecclesiae*, teaches that all the Apostles were equal in power, for he says: *The other Apostles were certainly what Peter was, endowed with an equal fellowship of honor and power*. Therefore, the primacy or supreme power of governing the universal Church was granted not only to the person of Peter but also to the other Apostles.

I answer that Cyprian intends in that place only to say that all the Apostles were equal in the office of the Apostolate. For each received from Christ the power of preaching the Gospel, binding and loosing, and performing all things necessary for the conversion of the world, through these words spoken to all together: As the Father has sent me, I also send you. Yet he does not deny that Peter was superior to the other Apostles in the dignity of universal Pastor of the Church. Rather, he asserts this in the same place in the words immediately preceding: Although Christ gives equal power to all the Apostles after his resurrection and says, As the Father has sent me, and so forth, nevertheless, to manifest unity, he established one Chair and by his authority arranged that the origin of that same unity should begin from one. The primacy is given to Peter so that one Church of Christ and one Chair may be shown.

6. From these things you will understand that Paul did not possess power and authority over the Church equal to Peter's. First, because we do not read in Scripture that Christ said to Paul: *Feed my sheep, feed my lambs*, or: *You are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church*. These things were said to St. Peter to declare the primacy and supreme power granted to him by Christ over the universal Church. Second, because, as we showed above, the government of the Church is monarchical. If there are many upon whom government rests and who possess equal power to govern, there is a departure from monarchy and an approach to aristocracy, even if they act after the manner of one. For it is clear that the senate, which is composed of the leading citizens of the republic, acts after the manner of one and nevertheless pertains to aristocracy.

On the Theological Virtues

7. You will say that all things by which Peter is signified to possess primacy and supreme power over the Church are also attributed to Paul by the holy Fathers. For Paul is said by Epiphanius, haer. 27, to have been Bishop of Rome in these words: *The first Apostles and Bishops at Rome were Peter and Paul*. He is also called a true Shepherd of the Roman Church by St. Leo, serm. 1 on Peter and Paul: *Peter and Paul were true Shepherds of the Roman Church*. Likewise, the Roman See is called the See of Paul by Gregory VII in the Roman Council, where he says that he presides over the whole world in the Chair of Paul. Peter Damian likewise says, opusc. 30, that the Roman Church is the See of the Apostles, namely, Peter and Paul. Therefore, Paul possessed power and authority over the Church equal to Peter's.

I answer that Paul is called Bishop of Rome by Epiphanius not because he possessed supreme authority over the Roman Church as Peter did, but because of the labor he devoted to founding it. Thus Clement, epist. 2 to James, calls himself Prelate of the Roman Church even while the Apostles were still alive: *I, Clement, Prelate of the Roman Church*. Peter himself is also said, even during his lifetime, to have given the keys of the Roman Church to Linus, according to the same Clement of Rome, bk. 7 *Constitutiones*, c. 46, insofar as Linus assisted Peter in the administration of external affairs, as John III says in c. 1, causa 8, q. 1. Moreover, because Paul possessed extraordinary authority, he exercised all the offices of the Pontiff at Rome and could therefore be called Bishop of the Roman Church, though for a different reason than Peter. Peter acted as ordinary Pastor, Paul as extraordinary; or Peter as Pontiff, Paul as assistant. St. Leo must be explained in the same sense when he calls Paul a Shepherd of the Roman Church, as must Gregory VII and Peter Damian when they call the Roman See the See of Paul. For since Paul was Peter's coadjutor, and in law the bishop and coadjutor are said to possess the same tribunal, c. *Romana*, de appell., Paul can be said to have sat in Peter's Chair.

§ 2.

The Primacy of the Roman Pontiff.

8. I say second: the primacy or supreme power over the whole Church granted by Christ to Peter is perpetually transmitted to his successors, the Roman Pontiffs. This conclusion is certain by faith and is established both by perpetual Tradition, by the authority of Councils, and by reason.

We have the holy Fathers as most illustrious witnesses of Tradition. Irenaeus, bk. 3, c. 3, speaking of the Roman Church, says: Every Church must

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

agree with this Church because of its more powerful preeminence. Augustine says in epist. 162 that the primacy of the Apostolic Chair has always flourished in her. Jerome says in epist. 57 to Damasus: Following no one as first except Christ, I am joined in communion with your Beatitude, that is, with the Chair of Peter. I know that the Church was built upon that Rock. Whoever eats the lamb outside this house is profane. If anyone was not in Noah's ark, he will perish when the flood reigns. And epist. 58: Supported by this protection, I cry out while the Arian madness of the world rages and the Church, torn into three parts, hastens to draw me to itself: Whoever is joined to the Chair of Peter is mine. Prosper, bk. 2 De vocatione gentium, c. 16: Although Christian grace was not content to possess the same limits as Rome, and the scepter of the Cross of Christ has already subjected many peoples whom Rome did not subdue by her arms, nevertheless, through the primacy of the Apostolic See, she was made a greater fortress of religion than a throne of power. Behold the primacy of the Roman Church declared most clearly in prose. Prosper likewise expressed it lucidly in verse in De ingratias:

*The Roman See of Peter, made the world's head
Of pastoral honor, holds by religion
Whatever it does not possess by arms.*

St. Bernard also expresses it elegantly in bk. 2 De consideratione, c. 8, where, addressing Eugenius, Bishop of Rome, he says: Come, let us investigate more diligently who you are, namely, whose person you bear for a time in the Church of God. Who are you? The great priest, the Supreme Pontiff. You are the Prince of Bishops, the heir of the Apostles; in primacy Abel, in governance Noah, in patriarchal dignity Abraham, in dignity Aaron, in authority Moses, in judgment Samuel, in power Peter, and in anointing Christ. And below: Others are called to a share of solicitude, but you to the fullness of power. The power of others is restricted within fixed limits; yours extends even over those who have received power over others. Finally, Pope and Martyr Lucius I says in an Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul and Spain: The Roman Church is Apostolic and the mother of all Churches, and she is proved never to have erred from the path of Apostolic Tradition.

9. The same truth was sanctioned and defined in many Councils. In the First Council of Nicaea, can. 39 in the Arabic collection, it is stated: According to the Scriptures and the definitions of the canons, we venerate the Bishop of the most holy and ancient Roman Church as the first and greatest of all bishops. Just as every patriarch commands all the nations of his jurisdiction and gives them laws, and as from the beginning Peter, the

On the Theological Virtues

Vicar of Christ, was set over religion, the Church, and all things pertaining to Christ, and was lord and ruler of Christian princes, provinces, and all nations, so he whose primacy is at Rome is similar to Peter and equal in authority, and possesses dominion and primacy over all the patriarchs. If anyone resists this decree and dares to oppose it, by decree of the whole Synod let him be subjected to anathema. The Lateran Council under Innocent III likewise says in c. 5: By the Lord's ordinance, the Roman Church possesses the primacy of ordinary power over all the others, as the mother and teacher of all Christ's faithful. The definition of the Council of Florence in the decree of holy union agrees with these, where, with the approval of the sacred Council, Eugenius pronounces: We define that the holy Apostolic See and the Roman Pontiff hold the primacy over the whole world; that the Roman Pontiff is the successor of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, the true Vicar of Christ, the head of the whole Church, and the father and teacher of all Christians; and that to him in blessed Peter was handed down by our Lord Jesus Christ full power to feed, rule, and govern the universal Church.

Reason also urges this. Since the kingdom of the Church is perpetual and will endure to the end of the world, it needs a perpetual prince to succeed to Peter's primacy, just as bishops and priests succeeded the other Apostles and disciples of Christ. For the Church now existing requires unity and the government of one supreme head no less than did the primitive Church governed by Peter. Therefore, if Peter possessed the primacy or supreme power over the universal Church, as was shown in the preceding conclusion, it is manifest that this power is transmitted to his successors, the Roman Pontiffs.

10. You will say: Gregory the Great, bk. 4, epist. 32, refuses to be called universal Bishop and rejects this name as profane and displaying ostentation and pride. Therefore, he judges that the Roman Pontiff does not possess primacy over the universal Church.

I answer that the name *universal Bishop* is equivocal and can be understood and used in two ways. First, so that the one called universal is understood to be the sole bishop of all Christian cities, and consequently the others are not true bishops but merely his vicars. Second, so that, while the others remain true bishops, he has care of the whole Church, but a general care that does not exclude the proper offices of the other bishops.

Therefore, when St. Gregory refuses the name universal Bishop as profane and displaying ostentation and pride, he uses the name in the first manner. This is clear from the words he adds: Because what is given to another beyond what reason requires is taken away from you. And again: Far

be from Christian hearts that blasphemous name by which the honor of all priests is taken away, while it is madly claimed by one. Likewise, bk. 7, epist. 69, to Eusebius: If one is universal, it follows that you are not bishops. Finally, breaking the swelling pride of John of Constantinople, who ambitiously claimed this name for himself, he writes in the previously cited Epistle to Emperor Maurice: Certainly, in honor of blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles, that name was offered to the Roman Pontiff by the venerable Council of Chalcedon. But none of them ever assumed this title of singularity or consented to use it, lest, while something private was given to one, all priests should be deprived of the honor due to them. Why then do we not seek the glory of this title when it has been offered to us, while another presumes to seize it for himself even when it was not offered?

§ 3.

On the Infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff
in Defining Matters of Faith.

11. I say third: the Roman Pontiff, when speaking from the Chair, is an infallible rule of faith and judge of controversies that customarily arise concerning matters of faith.

This is proved first from Innocent III, c. Quoties, causa 24, q. 1, where he says: Whenever a matter of faith is discussed, recourse must be had only to Peter, that is, to one possessing the honor and authority of his name. And in c. Majores, de baptismo et eius effectu: He understands that the greater causes of the Church, especially those touching articles of faith, are to be referred to the See of Peter who knows that the Lord prayed for Peter that his faith might not fail. Hence Bernard says in epist. 190 to Innocent, Supreme Pontiff: Every danger and scandal arising in the kingdom of God must be referred to your Apostolate, especially those that concern faith. For I judge that injuries to faith ought especially to be repaired there where faith cannot suffer failure. This is the prerogative of this See. For to whom else was it ever said: I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail? Therefore, what follows is required of Peter's successor: And you, once converted, confirm your brethren. You plainly fulfill the office of Peter, whose See you hold, if by your admonition you confirm hearts wavering in faith and by your authority crush the corrupters of faith. I judge that nothing clearer or more lucid can be produced in confirmation of our assertion.

Reason also supports it. In every well-ordered republic, besides written laws, there is some living judge whose office is to interpret the laws and

pronounce judgment according to their interpretation. Hence Deut. 17 establishes by divine law that whatever doubtful or difficult matter arises is to be referred to the priests of the Levitical race and judgment sought from them. But no one can deny or doubt that the Church and Christian republic were most excellently and wisely ordered by Christ. Therefore, besides the book of the law, which is Scripture, he provided her with some living judge having authority to settle controversies and disputes arising concerning faith. This judge can be no one other than the Roman Pontiff, legitimate successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ. Therefore, when speaking from the Chair, he must be infallible in defining matters of faith. Otherwise the firmness of faith would waver, he would be unable by his authority and definition to confirm hearts wavering in faith, and he could not fulfill Christ's command to Peter: *And you, once converted, confirm your brethren.*

12. You will object first: If, besides Scripture, we have in the Church a living rule and a living oracle by which matters of faith are clearly proposed and controversies concerning them settled, namely, the Supreme Pontiff, it follows that Scripture is useless for explaining and settling controversies of faith. Indeed, it follows that the Supreme Pontiff is above Scripture, since he judges it as to its letter or meaning.

I answer by denying both consequences. Just as supreme judges in the civil forum do not exclude written laws but presuppose and follow them, so neither Supreme Pontiffs nor Councils, although they possess supreme authority in settling controversies of faith, exclude the rule of Scripture or of divine Traditions. Rather, they use them in settling controversies of faith, because they do this not through new and private revelations but through the explanation and application of the Scriptures and divine Traditions. Likewise, just as a judge established by a prince is not above the prince's laws, although under him he possesses supreme power to judge and explain those laws, so neither Supreme Pontiffs nor Councils are to be said to be above Scripture, although they possess supreme and infallible authority and power to explain it and judge concerning its meaning.

13. You will object second: A rule of faith cannot err. But the Supreme Pontiff can err in faith. Therefore, he is not a rule of faith. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved by various examples of Roman Pontiffs who appear to have erred in their definitions.

First, Liberius, as Athanasius and Jerome testify according to Bellarmine, bk. 4 *De Romano Pontifice*, c. 9, wearied by the hardship of exile, subscribed to the condemnation of St. Athanasius made by the Arian heretics and to a formula of faith lacking the term consubstantial, which was certainly to approve heresy.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Felix, who succeeded Liberius, was also an Arian, as Jerome testifies in his catalogue of writers under Acacius, in these words: *He attained such prominence under Emperor Constantius that he appointed Felix, an Arian bishop, in the place of Liberius.*

Third, Vigilius wrote a letter to Empress Theodora in which he confirmed the heresy of the Monothelites and pronounced anathema upon those who confessed two natures in Christ, as Liberatus reports in the *Breviarium*, c. 22.

Fourth, Honorius I fell into the same Monothelite heresy, for in his letters to Sergius of Constantinople he asserted one will in Christ and forbade a different teaching. Hence he was condemned as a heretic at the Sixth Synod, act. 13, and his letters were burned; and at the Seventh Synod, in the final action, the whole Council pronounced anathema upon Honorius, Sergius, Cyrus, and the other Monothelites.

Fifth, Stephen VI and Sergius III, as Platina narrates, annulled all the acts of their predecessor Formosus. John IX, on the contrary, annulled the acts of Stephen VI and Sergius III and approved those of Formosus. Therefore, one or the other necessarily spoke falsely and erred.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor.

To the first proof concerning Liberius, I say that although he sinned gravely by subscribing to the Arian heresy and the condemnation of Athanasius, he cannot therefore be said truly to have been a heretic or to have taught heresy, because he subscribed to that heresy and condemnation unwillingly, under compulsion and driven by threats and terrors. This was not to teach heresy from the Chair, but, as a private person, to consent to it by an external sign alone in order to avoid the punishment of exile. Marcellinus acted similarly when, through fear of death, he offered incense to idols, as Nicholas I testifies in an Epistle to Michael, Emperor of the Greeks, together with the Roman Breviary and others, who say that Marcellinus was condemned for this fall at the Council of Sinuessa. Others, however, deny this and judge both the fall to have been invented and the Council of Sinuessa to be spurious and altogether fictitious. On this, Father Noël Alexandre may be consulted in his *Historia Ecclesiastica*, century 3, vol. 2, diss. 20.

To the second proof concerning Felix, I likewise say that he was never an Arian, although he communicated with the Arians during the intervening period when, while Liberius was still alive in exile, he was not the true Pontiff. But when he began to be true Pontiff, he not only abstained from communion with the Arians but also condemned Emperor Constantius as a heretic. This is clear from his tomb found in the basilica of Saints Cosmas

On the Theological Virtues

and Damian on July 20, 1582, with this inscription: *Here lies the body of St. Felix, Pope and Martyr, who condemned the heretic Constantius*, as Baronius for the year 357 and Bellarmine, bk. 4 *De Romano Pontifice*, c. 9, report. More concerning this may be seen in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

To the third proof concerning Vigilius, I say that he indeed erred by writing the letter to Empress Theodora in which he confirmed the Monothelite heresy, but that this does no harm to the authority and infallibility of the Apostolic See. First, because he did not write it as Pontiff, obliging the faithful to embrace it. Second, because he wrote it when he was not true Pontiff but an antipope. For by the intervention of Belisarius and at Theodora's command, Silverius, the true Pontiff, was expelled from the See and sent into exile, and Vigilius was intruded in his place. In order to gratify the heretical Empress by whose help and favor he had been intruded into the See, he wrote that letter. But afterward, when Silverius died and Vigilius began to teach as legitimate Pastor from the Chair of Peter, no error was noted in him. Indeed, as Platina narrates, when he was seized at Rome by Theodora's agents and taken to Constantinople to fulfill his promise to restore the heretic Anthimus to the patriarchate, from which he had been deposed by Vigilius's predecessors, he was so far from consenting to so wicked a request that he excommunicated the Empress herself together with all the other heretics. In confirmation of this there is the illustrious testimony of St. Gregory, bk. 2, epist. 36: *Pope Vigilius of venerable memory, while residing in the imperial city, pronounced a sentence of condemnation against the then Empress Theodora and the Acacians*. Hence what Augustine says of the pontiffs of the Mosaic law in epist. 166 and bk. 4 *De doctrina christiana*, c. 27, can rightly be applied to the Roman Pontiffs: *That Chair did not err, but Moses compelled them to speak good things even when they did not do good things. They acted according to themselves in their lives; but that Chair did not permit them to teach what was alien to it*. From this some gather the common saying: *So great is the force of the Chair that it compels one who thinks badly to speak well and does not permit him to teach his own things, but those of another*.

To the fourth proof I answer by denying that Honorius favored the Monothelites or ever fell into their heresy. To the proof to the contrary taken from Honorius's letters to Sergius of Constantinople, it must be taught that Sergius of Constantinople, a most wicked heresiarch notorious throughout the whole world, had accused the monk Sophronius before the Pontiff. Sophronius, an intrepid defender of Catholic doctrine who was afterward raised to the See of Jerusalem, was accused of disturbing the Christian world by asserting two wills and operations in Christ. Honorius, having a disposition accommodating itself to all circumstances, answered that the

expressions one will and two wills were to be suppressed and concluded: *There is one Christ the Lord, operating divine and human things in both natures.* He did this so as to evade, by an ambiguity of words, the importunate attacks of Sergius, who possessed great influence in the imperial court. In this, although he dissembled or concealed the truth, he nevertheless said nothing contrary to faith.

14. If you insist that Honorius in his second letter openly taught that there is only one will in Christ, in these words: *We confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ*, the answer is that Honorius was speaking there of Christ precisely as man, so that he intended only to say that there were not two conflicting wills in Christ as man, one of the flesh and the other of the spirit, because in Christ the flesh desired absolutely nothing contrary to reason. That this interpretation is legitimate is clear from the celebrated disputation between Pyrrhus and Maximus the Monk, recounted in vol. 2 of the Councils after the life of Pope Theodore. When Pyrrhus asked what Maximus thought of Honorius, Maximus answered that it was clear from a certain letter written by John IV, successor of Honorius, to the Emperor that Honorius denied two contrary wills in Christ, those of flesh and spirit, not two wills of which one was divine and the other human.

15. If you press further and say that at the Sixth General Synod, act. 13, Honorius was condemned as a heretic and his letters to Sergius burned, Baronius answers that the acts of that Synod were corrupted by rivals of the Roman Church, especially through the work of Theodore of Constantinople, a Monothelite heretic who, seeing himself condemned, arranged for the name of Honorius to be substituted in place of his own. Yet, apart from the fact that the reasons by which he attempts to establish this corruption of the Sixth Synod appear insufficiently solid, as Father Francis Combefis of our Order demonstrates at length and learnedly in a book published at Paris entitled *Historia haeresis Monothelitarum, sanctique sextae Synodi actorum vindicia*, even if such corruption of the aforesaid acts is granted, the proposed difficulty is not removed. For what can be answered concerning the Seventh Synod, which most openly condemns the same Honorius as favoring the Monothelite heresy? What can be replied concerning the Eighth Synod and the letter of Hadrian inserted in it, in which it is asserted in express words that Honorius was anathematized, since Baronius himself acknowledges that the acts of both Synods, especially the Eighth, are genuine and complete? What can be said concerning the letter of Leo II, who first confirmed the Sixth Synod after Agatho, who had convoked it, was overtaken by death, in which Leo formally says: *Honorius, who did not illuminate this Apostolic See by the doctrine of Apostolic Tradition, but attempted*

On the Theological Virtues

by profane betrayal to subvert the immaculate faith. Finally, what can be answered concerning another letter of the same Pontiff to King Erwig and the Bishops of Spain, in which he likewise condemns the memory of Honorius?

It is therefore better to answer with Cardinal Torquemada, Bellarmine, and many others that the Sixth Synod erred in the condemnation of Honorius. For although a legitimate general Council cannot err in defining dogmas of faith, it can nevertheless be liable to error in criminal questions of fact. Hence it should not seem remarkable that the Fathers of that Council, deceived by false rumors and by a failure to understand the letters of Honorius, undeservedly numbered him among the Monothelite heretics. The same must be said of the Seventh and Eighth Synods and of Leo II and Hadrian II. For they too were deceived in this question of fact by following the aforesaid Sixth General Synod.

16. From this the answer to the final proof concerning Stephen and Sergius, who annulled the acts of their predecessor Formosus, is clear. With Bellarmine and Baronius, it is similarly answered that they erred not in a question of law but of fact. For the question was whether Formosus had been legitimate Pontiff. Stephen and Sergius, judging through hatred that he had not been legitimate, annulled all his acts. John IX afterward approved those acts, declared Formosus to have been true Pontiff, and annulled the acts of Stephen.

§ 4.

A Corollary of the Preceding Doctrine.

17. From these things you will understand that the opinion of certain more recent authors is false and improbable when they teach that Councils and Supreme Pontiffs cannot err not only in matters of faith but even in questions of fact not revealed by God. For besides the examples already alleged, many others show that some Supreme Pontiffs have erred in questions of fact.

Thus John II, interpreting more favorably a proposition of certain Scythian monks that Pope Hormisdas had condemned when understood in a heretical sense, declared it to be Catholic. From this it is manifest that one or the other necessarily erred in a question of fact.

Thus no one denies that Damasus was deceived by Apollinarius and Zosimus by Caelestius in questions of fact.

Thus Leo IX, deceived by the monks of Regensburg, pronounced that the body of St. Denis had been transferred from a French abbey to Regensburg; yet France does not therefore believe herself deprived of so great a treasure.

Thus Pope Zachary, persuaded and deceived by certain cosmographers, subjected St. Virgil to anathema because he taught that there are antipodes; yet the antipodes did not therefore cease to exist.

Finally, the Supreme Pontiffs themselves in all their diplomas, decrees, grants, dispensations, and judgments concerning facts either express or imply this exception: If the petitions rest upon truth, because they rightly know that many things are very frequently suggested to them by false representation and that the human mind can both be deceived and deceive. Hence Gregory the Great says in bk. 1 Dialogi, c. 4: Why do you marvel, Peter, that we who are men are deceived? What wonder is it if we are sometimes led elsewhere by the mouth of liars, since we are not prophets? It is a serious matter that the mind of every Prelate is worn down by the multitude of cares; and when the mind is divided among many things, it becomes less attentive to each, and the more widely it is occupied, the more easily something escapes it in any one matter. Hence judgments concerning questions of fact issued by one Pontiff are sometimes rescinded, revoked, abrogated, diminished, or moderated by the same or by other Pontiffs. For, as Bernard says in epist. 108: The Apostolic See has this as a particular excellence, that it does not hesitate to revoke what it discovers to have been elicited from it by fraud rather than deserved by truth. This is a matter full of equity and worthy of praise, so that no one may profit from falsehood, especially before the holy and supreme See.

18. St. Thomas expressly teaches this opinion, namely, that Councils and Supreme Pontiffs can err in questions of fact, in *Quodlibet* IX, a. ult., where he says: *In matters pertaining to particular facts, it is possible for the judgment of the Church to err.* The most celebrated theologians subscribe to him, especially four most learned and wise Cardinals of the Church.

The first is John of Torquemada, bk. 2 *De Ecclesia*, c. 93, where he teaches that the Fathers of the Sixth Synod indeed condemned Honorius, but from false information, and consequently erred in that judgment.

The second is Baronius, who writes for the year 681, n. 39: In those matters that pertain to persons and their writings, so rigorous a judgment is not always observed. For no one doubts that in matters of fact anyone may be deceived, and then the words of Paul to the Corinthians may be used: For we can do nothing against the truth, but only for the truth.

The third is Bellarmine, who openly professes the same truth in bk. 4 *De Summo Pontifice*, c. 2, in these words: *All Catholics agree that the Pontiff, even as*

On the Theological Virtues

Pontiff and together with his council of advisers or with a general Council, can err in controversies concerning particular facts that depend principally upon the information and testimony of men. And in c. 11: A legitimate general Council cannot err in defining dogmas of faith, but it can err in questions of fact. In the same place he likewise says that the Fathers of the Seventh Synod followed the Sixth Synod and were consequently deceived through it, since the Sixth Synod was either corrupted or condemned Honorius by error. He similarly answers the letter of Hadrian in which it is asserted that Honorius was anathematized at the Sixth Synod: If we say that the acts were corrupted, it will have to be answered that Hadrian was deceived. He likewise asserts that the same answer can be given to the letter of Leo II related in the preceding section, in these words: Or certainly Leo followed the judgment of Agatho's legates so as not to disturb a matter already concluded; but we are not bound to follow one Leo rather than so many other Supreme Pontiffs, especially in a question of fact that does not pertain to faith.

Finally, Cardinal Pallavicino assumes as certain and indubitable that Councils and Supreme Pontiffs can err in questions of fact, bk. 7 *Historia Concilii Tridentini*, c. 14, and bk. 11, c. 6.

Nor could these celebrated theologians and Cardinals of the Church oppose a truth inserted into canon law as an immutable and indubitable rule. For in c. Nobis, de sententiis excommunicationis, it is said: The judgment of God always rests upon truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church sometimes follows an opinion, namely, in definitions concerning facts, which frequently happens both to deceive and to be deceived. Hence it sometimes happens that one who is bound before God is loosed before the Church, and one who is free before God is bound by an ecclesiastical sentence.

19. From what has been said you will understand that contingent facts not revealed in the Scriptures in no way pertain to the object of faith, even if they are asserted by Councils or Supreme Pontiffs. For in order that something enter the object of faith, it is essentially required that it become known through the written word of God or through continuous Tradition derived from the Apostles and Fathers down to us. This is so both because faith comes from hearing and hearing through the word of God, and because the Church does not possess new revelations but merely proposes or expounds the ancient revelations contained in Scripture or Tradition. Hence St. Thomas teaches here, q. 1, a. 7, that the articles of faith did not increase in substance through the succession of times, but only in explanation. Or, as St. Bonaventure says in III, dist. 25: *Faith could not advance as regards the multiplication of things to be believed, although it advanced as regards the*

explanation of things implicit. But singular facts newly occurring, for example, whether a particular author thought heretically, whether such was his meaning or not, and other similar matters, are contained neither in the written word of God nor in Tradition derived to us, as is self-evident. Therefore, they do not pertain to the object of faith.

This is confirmed. Falsity cannot underlie the object of faith, as we showed in c. 2. But falsity can underlie decisions of Councils or Supreme Pontiffs concerning questions of fact not revealed in Scripture, as is clear from the examples adduced above. Therefore, such decisions cannot pertain to the object of faith.

I said *a fact not revealed in Scripture*, for no one doubts that revealed facts openly expressed in the sacred pages pertain to the object of faith, because they are subject to divine revelation, which is the formal reason and motive of faith. Hence it is certain by faith not only that the doctrine of Hymenaeus and Philetus was heretical, but also that those men departed from the truth and fell into heresy, since both things are revealed in Scripture, namely, 2 Tim. 2. It is likewise certain by faith that the true Sacred Scriptures are possessed in the Catholic Church, because this has been revealed to her through Tradition. From this the principal foundations of the contrary opinion are resolved.

20. You will understand second that although authors who deny or call into controversy certain facts not revealed through Scripture or Tradition but nevertheless asserted by Councils or Supreme Pontiffs are not and cannot be called heretics, since, as we have just shown, those facts do not pertain to the object of faith, nevertheless those who, after the judgment of the universal Church has been pronounced against certain persons or their doctrine, presume to vindicate them from error cannot be excused from grave rashness. For who could tolerate Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, Luther, or Calvin now being cleared of the errors for which they were condemned by the Church, even though the ill-fated defender of these heretics were to say that he detests with his whole soul the errors attributed to them? Hence Gregory the Great, in his Epistle to John, Bishop of Constantinople, which is epist. 24 of bk. 1, after professing that he venerates the first four Ecumenical Councils no less than the four Gospels, adds: *I equally reject the persons whom the aforesaid venerable Councils reject, and I embrace those whom they venerate. For because those judgments were established by universal consent, whoever presumes either to loose those whom they bind or to bind those whom they loose destroys himself and not them. Therefore, whoever thinks otherwise, let him be anathema.*

CHAPTER VI.

On the Sacred Councils of the Church.

1. It is acknowledged by all Catholics that a general Council legitimately assembled and celebrated cannot err in defining and determining matters of faith and is consequently an infallible rule of faith. For it is said in Matt. 18: *Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them.* But a Council legitimately assembled is gathered in the name of Christ. Therefore, Christ presides in its midst by his infallible assistance. Likewise, in Acts 15 the Apostles said: *It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us, and so forth.* By these words they indicate clearly enough that the definitions of Councils are from the Holy Spirit and consequently infallible. Hence Leo the Great says in epist. 78 concerning matters defined at Nicaea and Chalcedon: *We do not dare to enter into any further discussion, not because the things fixed by so great an authority through the Holy Spirit are doubtful or infirm.* Ambrose likewise says in epist. 1: *I follow the decree of the Council of Nicaea, from which neither death nor the sword shall separate me.* Gregory the Great likewise says in bk. 1, epist. 24, that he venerates the four general Councils that preceded him, namely, Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon, as the four Gospels.

Reason also supports this. It is certain by faith that the universal Church cannot err, since she is the pillar and foundation of truth against which the gates of hell cannot prevail, as was shown in c. 4. But if a general Council legitimately assembled and celebrated were liable to error, the universal Church herself would thereby err, since such a Council represents the universal Church and the whole authority of the Church is in it. For the Supreme Pontiff, who is her visible head, is present either personally or through his legates, and the bishops, who are her more noble parts or members, are present. Hence Tertullian says in *De ieiunio contra Psychicos*, c. 11: *Councils are held from all the Churches, in which all the more important matters are treated in common. The very representation of the whole Christian name is celebrated with great veneration.* Augustine likewise says, bk. 1 *De baptismo contra Donatistas*, c. 18: *The judgment of a plenary Council is the consent of the whole Church.* Therefore, general Councils legitimately assembled and approved cannot err in defining matters of faith.

I said *legitimately assembled and approved*, because assemblies of bishops lack certain and infallible authority in their decrees unless they have been

convoked by the Roman Pontiff; nor are definitions of Councils considered complete until the decision and confirmation of the Roman Pontiff are affixed to them as the final seal. This is so first because a Council does not represent the whole Church until it has the assent of the head, without which it is mutilated and headless. Second, because every question of faith must ultimately be referred to him for whom Christ prayed that his faith might not fail and whom he commanded to confirm his brethren. Hence many Councils separated from the faith and communion of the Roman Pontiff have frequently fallen into various errors. Witness the Second Council of Antioch, at which Athanasius was condemned; the Council of Milan in the time of Liberius; the Council of Rimini of more than four hundred bishops in the time of Felix II, as is clear from Athanasius, Sulpicius Severus, and Sozomen; the Second Council of Ephesus in the time of Leo the Great, at which the impiety of Eutyches was confirmed; and finally, to omit others, the Council of Constantinople convoked against sacred images in the time of Gregory II.

2. For this reason St. Damasus despised the immense number at the Council of Rimini and opposed to so great a multitude the few orthodox bishops: No prejudice, he says in an Epistle to the Bishops of Illyricum, could be caused by the number assembled at Rimini, since it is clear that the Roman Bishop, whose decree they ought above all to have awaited, did not give his consent to such things. Pope Leo likewise says in epist. 51: Let no Councils flatter themselves because of the size of their assembly, as though what a multitude unlawfully wills cannot be rejected.

Theologians and canonists commonly make two exceptions to this doctrine. The first is if the Pope falls into heresy. Hence the Roman clergy assembled a Council against Marcellinus, who had worshiped idols. The second is in a case of schism when the right on either side is doubtful, as is most well known from the Council of Constance.

3. Moreover, general Councils legitimately assembled and approved are numbered up to the present as eighteen.

The first is the Council of Nicaea, of 318 bishops, celebrated under Pope Sylvester in the year 325 during the reign of Constantine. At it two principal controversies were defined: one concerning the celebration of Easter on the Sunday following the full moon after the March equinox, and the other concerning the divinity of Christ against the Arian heresy.

The second is the First Council of Constantinople, of 150 Fathers, celebrated under Damasus in the year of the Lord 381 in defense of the divinity of the Holy Spirit against Macedonius, who denied it.

On the Theological Virtues

The third is the First Council of Ephesus, of two hundred bishops, celebrated under Celestine I in the year of the Lord 431 against the heresy of Nestorius, who posited two persons in Christ, one human and one divine.

The fourth is the Council of Chalcedon, of 630 bishops, celebrated under Leo I in the year of the Lord 451 against the heresy of Eutyches, who asserted only one nature in Christ after the Incarnation.

The fifth is the Second Council of Constantinople, of 165 bishops, celebrated under Vigilius in the year of the Lord 553 against the then prevailing heresy of Origen and also to calm the waves of dissension by which the Church was then agitated on account of the Council of Chalcedon.

The sixth is the Third Council of Constantinople, of 289 bishops, celebrated under Pope Agatho in the year of the Lord 680 to condemn the heresy of the Monothelites, who posited a single will in Christ.

The seventh is the Second Council of Nicaea, of 350 bishops, celebrated under Hadrian I in the year of the Lord 787 against the Iconoclasts, that is, the opponents of sacred images.

The eighth is the Fourth Council of Constantinople, of 383 bishops, celebrated under Hadrian II in the year of the Lord 869 because of the tyrannical deposition of Ignatius, Patriarch of Constantinople, in whose place Photius had been substituted contrary to the sacred canons. Through the fraud and work of Photius, the Greeks began openly to think and teach against the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, which they had previously always acknowledged. They also began to pursue the Latins with mortal hatred and to avoid them as though struck with anathema because they had added to the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creed the words, *and proceeds from the Son*. Therefore, the Greeks openly separated themselves from the Romans and Latins. From that time no more general Councils were celebrated in the East, but only in the West.

The ninth is the First Lateran Council, of almost one thousand Fathers, that is, bishops and abbots, celebrated under Callistus II in the year of the Lord 1122 against the Saracens and for the recovery of the Holy Land.

The tenth is the Second Lateran Council, of about one thousand bishops and abbots, celebrated under Innocent II in the year of the Lord 1139 against the antipope Peter Leonis and in defense of the rights of the clergy.

The eleventh is the Third Lateran Council, of almost three hundred bishops, celebrated under Alexander III in the year of the Lord 1179 for the reform of the Church and against the Waldensians.

The twelfth is the Fourth Lateran Council, of 1,285 Fathers, among whom were two Eastern Patriarchs, those of Constantinople and Jerusalem, seventy archbishops, both Greek and Latin, four hundred bishops, twenty-

two abbots, and eight hundred conventual priors. It was celebrated under Innocent III, who personally presided over it, in the year of the Lord 1215, against various heresies. At this Council the term transubstantiation was approved concerning the Sacrament of the altar.

The thirteenth is the First Council of Lyons, celebrated under Innocent IV in the year of the Lord 1245 against Emperor Frederick II, who, after being summoned to the Council and refusing to attend, was judged an enemy of the Church and deprived of the Kingdom of Sicily and the Roman Empire. The recovery of the Holy Land was also treated, and St. Louis, King of France, was appointed leader of that fifth sacred expedition.

The fourteenth is the Second Council of Lyons, of almost one thousand Fathers, among whom were five hundred bishops, sixty abbots, and other lesser Prelates, celebrated under Gregory X in the year of the Lord 1274 against the errors of the Greeks. Through the work and industry of St. Bonaventure they were united and reconciled with the Latins concerning the article of the procession of the Holy Spirit. It was therefore defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from all eternity from the Father and the Son, but not as from two Spirators, but from one Spirator and principle, and not by two spirations, but by one spiration alone. For the Greeks thought that the Latins asserted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two Spirators and principles and by two spirations rather than one. This was the thirteenth reconciliation of the Greeks with the Latins, although it did not endure long, like the preceding ones.

The fifteenth is the Council of Vienne, of almost three hundred bishops, celebrated under Clement V in the year of the Lord 1311. At it the Order of the Templars, which had existed for 203 years, was suppressed and extinguished. The Beghards and Beguines were condemned, as was the doctrine teaching that the rational soul is not the form of the human body.

The sixteenth is the Council of Florence, of 141 Fathers who subscribed, besides many others who departed before the subscription, celebrated under Eugenius IV in the year of the Lord 1439. At it the Greeks were finally united with the Latins concerning five articles of faith: the procession of the Holy Spirit from both Father and Son; purgatory in a definite place and with corporeal fire; the primacy of the Roman Church and Pontiff over the whole Church; that the Latins had rightly added to the Creed, *and proceeds from the Son*; and finally, that for just reasons they consecrated with unleavened bread. At this Council the Armenians were likewise brought back to the Roman Church and received from Eugenius a decree of faith briefly containing the doctrine held by the Roman Church concerning the seven Sacraments.

On the Theological Virtues

The seventeenth is the Fifth Lateran Council, of 114 Fathers, celebrated under Julius II and Leo X in the year of the Lord 1512 and the following years, against schisms and for various other matters, the principal of which was the abrogation of the Pragmatic Sanction.

The eighteenth is the Council of Trent, attended by six Cardinals, four Legates, three Patriarchs, thirty-two archbishops, 228 bishops, five abbots, and seven Generals of Orders, celebrated under Paul III, Julius III, and Pius IV from the year 1545, in which it began, until the year 1563, in which it ended, against the heresies of the Lutherans, Calvinists, and others.

4. Besides these eighteen general Councils approved in all things by the Supreme Pontiffs, there are six others, partly confirmed and partly rejected.

The first is the Council of Sardica, assembled in the time of Julius I and Constantius, at which three hundred Western bishops subscribed to the Catholic faith, while the remaining seventy-six, who were Eastern, subscribed to the Arian faith.

The second was the Council of Sirmium under Supreme Pontiff Liberius during the reign of Constantius, at which two formulas of faith were composed, one in Greek and Catholic, the other in Latin and filled with open blasphemies. At it the heretic Photinus was also condemned, a condemnation received by the universal Church.

The third is the Council in Trullo, celebrated at Constantinople in the palace called Trullus in the time of Pope Sergius and Emperor Justinian. It is said to have been partly approved because, although Pope Sergius, then reigning, rejected it, and consequently its canons possess no force of themselves, nevertheless its eighty-second canon concerning the painting of images was afterward received by Pope Hadrian and by the Seventh General Synod.

The fourth is the Council of Frankfurt, convoked in the time of Hadrian I and Charlemagne, King of the Franks. Although it was confirmed concerning the dogma in which it defines that Christ is not the adopted Son of God, it was rejected concerning another matter in which, through error, it condemned the Seventh Synod.

The fifth is the Council of Constance, begun under John XXIII and concluded under Martin V in the time of Emperor Sigismund. Although it was approved by Martin V as regards the final sessions, it was not approved as regards the earlier ones.

The sixth and final is the Council of Basel, begun in a time of schism and continued at Basel, then concluded at Lausanne in the year 1449, at which time both the Council itself and Felix V, whom the Council had created Supreme Pontiff during the schism, submitted to Pope Nicholas V. Nothing

of this Council was approved except certain provisions concerning ecclesiastical benefices.

CHAPTER VII.

On the Internal Act of Faith.

There is a twofold act of faith: one internal, by which assent is given to truths obscurely revealed by God; the other external, which is the manifestation of some sensible sign by which the internal act of faith is declared. We shall treat the first in this chapter and the second in the following one.

§ 1.

A Pious Motion of the Will Is Required for the Internal Act of Faith,
but for This Motion No Habit of Virtue Existing
in the Will Is Required; Actual Assistance Suffices.

1. The first part is certain and undoubted among theologians, with few exceptions, and is gathered from Rom. 10: *With the heart one believes unto justice*, that is, with the will, says St. Thomas in the same place, *because one cannot believe unless willing. For the intellect of the believer is not determined to assent to the truth by necessity of reason, as is the intellect of one who knows scientifically, but by the will.* In these words he assigns the fundamental reason for this truth, which can be briefly proposed as follows: the intellect is not sufficiently determined to believe by the object proposed to it. Therefore, in order to believe, it needs the motion and determination of the will. The consequence is clear, for the intellect can be determined only by the object or by the will.

The antecedent is proved. An object does not sufficiently determine the intellect to assent unless it is seen immediately, as occurs in first principles and in things experienced, or unless it is inferred by necessary consequence from principles seen or clearly known, as occurs in scientific conclusions. But the object of faith is not evidently known by us in any of these ways, since it is a truth obscurely revealed, obscure both in itself and in its intrinsic causes and effects. Therefore, the intellect is not determined to believe by the object proposed to it.

2. The same part can further be established by this reason. The assent of faith is free not only as regards exercise, like the act of science or

understanding, but also as regards specification, that is, as assent rather than dissent. Therefore, it necessarily requires a pious motion of the will by reason of which the intellect is determined to that assent both as regards specification and as regards exercise. The consequence is clear, for every free act of the intellect, formally insofar as it is free, depends upon the will, which is the first free principle in man and the first seat of liberty, and needs its determination.

The antecedent is proved first from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, which says that those who are justified *are freely moved toward God, believing those things to be true that have been divinely revealed*. It is also proved from the holy Fathers. Ambrose says on Rom. 4: *To believe or not to believe is a matter of the will*. Augustine says in tract. 26 on John: *Anyone can enter the Church unwillingly; he can approach the altar unwillingly and receive the Sacrament unwillingly; but he cannot believe unless willing*. Finally, it is proved by reason. Even when all the motives for believing are posited, man is not necessitated merely to elicit an act concerning matters of faith, nor even to elicit assent rather than dissent. Thus, when Christ and the Apostles preached, some assented to the mysteries of our faith and others dissented, according to Acts 17: *When they had heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked, while others said: We will hear you again concerning this. But certain men adhered to him and believed*.

3. The second part of the assertion, which says that for this pious motion of the will determining the intellect to believe no habit of virtue in the will is required, but actual assistance suffices, is proved against Suárez and other more recent authors from the fact that a habit of virtue is posited only for perfect and ultimate acts, as we showed in the Treatise on the virtues in general. But the act of pious affection toward believing is neither perfect nor ultimate, since it has the character of a way and tendency toward the act of faith and precedes it as a disposition or beginning of it, as St. Thomas teaches in q. 14 *De veritate*, a. 2, ad 10. Therefore, no habit of virtue should be posited for it, but some actual assistance suffices.

I add that if such a habit were given, there would be a supernatural habit in the will before one existed in the intellect. Consequently, faith would not be the first of all the virtues in the order of generation, which is altogether foreign to the common sense of theologians. It would likewise be difficult to explain whether this virtue were theological or an infused moral virtue. It could not be reduced to the theological virtues, since it would not immediately attain God, nor to the infused moral virtues, because these presuppose infused prudence as their rule, and infused prudence presupposes charity, since without charity the due relation to the

supernatural last end is lacking, and consequently the character of supernatural prudence, as St. Thomas shows in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 65, a. 4, ad 1. But the act of the will determining the intellect to believe does not necessarily presuppose charity, since, like the act of faith, it can exist in a man deprived of habitual grace and living in mortal sin.

4. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: An unimpeded power can of itself tend toward an object sufficiently applied and proposed to it, as is clear by induction through all the powers. Therefore, likewise, if the object of belief is sufficiently proposed through motives of credibility, the intellect will be able to give assent to it, and consequently no pious motion of the will is required for the internal act of faith.

I answer that an unimpeded power tends of itself toward an object sufficiently proposed when the object altogether determines it. But this never occurs to the intellect unless the object is proposed to it so evidently that it cannot withhold assent. Since the object of faith, however sufficiently proposed through motives of credibility or through evidence in the witness, always remains so obscure in itself that, considered precisely in itself, it no more appears to be than not to be, it cannot determine the intellect to assent. Some pious motion of the will is therefore altogether required to supply the defect of evidence in the object. This does not make the object evident, but it effects what evidence would effect if present, namely, the determination of the intellect to believe rather than disbelieve.

If you ask how the will thus determines the intellect, I say that it does so insofar as it renders the intellect complacent or piously affected, just as the will itself is complacent and piously affected toward the proposed mysteries of faith. Such complacency and affection are like a weight by which the will, not necessitated but freely determined, impels and determines the intellect to consent rather than dissent.

5. You will say: The will cannot move the intellect to the specification of an act, but only to its exercise. For, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 9, a. 1, it is proper to the will to move all the powers as regards the exercise of an act, but to the intellect as regards specification. Therefore, the will cannot move and determine the intellect to assent to the mysteries of faith rather than dissent.

I answer that it is proper to the will to move and determine the intellect only as regards the exercise of an act concerning some object when the intellect itself is sufficiently determined as regards specification by that object. This occurs in scientific demonstrations, in which the object, by reason of its evidence, entirely convinces the intellect. But if the object, by reason of its lack of evidence, leaves the intellect indifferent to the species of

act, namely, assent or dissent, it then belongs to the will to determine the intellect as regards the species and consequently to move it also as regards specification. This is especially so because the intellect and will, on account of their natural sympathy and connection, in some manner communicate their proper perfections and powers to each other: the will communicates to the intellect the power of moving as regards exercise, on account of which the intellect moves the external powers through an act of command, as was shown in the Treatise on human acts; and the intellect communicates to the will the power of moving and determining as regards specification.

6. You will object second against the second part of the assertion: A habit of faith, and not merely actual assistance, is posited in the intellect because the act of faith must be elicited by us not once or twice but frequently and connaturally. But the pious affection of the will toward believing must likewise be elicited by us connaturally and frequently, namely, as often as an act of faith must be elicited. Therefore, a habit must be posited in the will for eliciting it. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 4, a. 2: *It is necessary that there be some habit both in the will and in the intellect if the act of faith is to be perfect.*

I answer by denying the causal statement in the major premise. The reason why the habit of faith is required in the intellect is not that its act must be elicited connaturally and frequently, but that it is an act perfect and ultimate in its species. Since this is not found in the pious motion, but the latter is an imperfect act and has the character of a way and beginning toward the act of faith, a habit is not required for it as for the act of faith; actual assistance suffices. Nevertheless, because such a motion must be frequently and connaturally elicited by the will, that assistance must be frequently given and be connaturally due to the habit of faith itself.

To St. Thomas it must be said that by the habit that he says exists in the will, he understands charity, by which the act of faith is perfected and formed. This clearly appears from a. 5 of the same question, where he says that formed faith is a true virtue by reason of charity, while unformed faith is not a virtue simply, because, although it possesses the perfection due on the part of the intellect, it does not possess it on the part of the will. But it is clear that the act of unformed faith does not lack a pious motion, but only charity. Therefore, by the habit that the Holy Doctor requires in the will, he understands charity alone, which is necessary for forming faith.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

§ 2.

The Internal Act of Faith Is Necessary for Justification and Salvation by Necessity of Means; Before Christ's Advent, However, Implicit Faith in Christ the Mediator Sufficed for Salvation, but After Christ's Advent and the Promulgation of the Gospel, Explicit Faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation Is Necessary for Justification and Salvation.

7. The first part is opposed to Andrew Vega, bk. 6 on the Council of Trent, cc. 17 and 20, where he teaches that the natural knowledge of God that we can attain through creatures suffices for salvation without faith and supernatural knowledge. His reason is that God can give to one possessing such knowledge supernatural assistance for eliciting an act of charity that contains faith implicitly and in desire, because one who elicits such an act is so affected and disposed that, if he knew that something had to be believed because of divine authority and revelation, he would believe it without hesitation.

This opinion, however, displeases other theologians, and rightly so.

First, because it appears to be contrary to the Apostle, who says in Heb. 11: *Without faith it is impossible to please God*. That he is speaking of supernatural faith is clear from the fact that in the same place he calls the faith that he wishes to be necessary for pleasing God *the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things not seen*, a definition that can manifestly belong only to supernatural faith. The same Apostle likewise says in Rom. 10: *With the heart one believes unto justice*, and in Gal. 3: *God justifies the nations by faith*, not because faith alone justifies, but because without faith it is impossible for anyone to be justified. Finally, Christ himself says in the last chapter of Mark: *He who does not believe shall be condemned*.

8. Second, the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, says that without faith justification has never come to anyone, and in c. 8 that faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification. Therefore, it judges faith to be necessary by necessity of means for justification and salvation. Augustine openly teaches this in serm. 38 De tempore: Faith is the beginning of human salvation. Without it no one can come to the fellowship of the children of God, because without it no one obtains the grace of justification in this world or possesses eternal life in the future.

9. Vega answers that these testimonies indeed prove faith to be necessary for justification and salvation, but either in reality or in desire. A

man who perfectly observed the natural law and invincibly did not know God as supernatural author would possess faith in desire, because he would be so prepared and disposed that, if the Gospel were announced to him, he would immediately come to his senses.

But to the contrary: although baptism in desire sometimes suffices for justification and salvation, faith in desire does not. For because baptism can presuppose faith and charity, from these can arise its desire, which supplies the place of this Sacrament when an impediment prevents its reception. The same reasoning does not apply to faith. Since faith is the first foundation of justification and salvation, there is absolutely nothing in which a desire for faith can be founded. It cannot be founded in natural knowledge, since this has no connection or relation with faith; nor in natural love of God, for the same reason; nor in an act of charity and supernatural love, because, since faith according to Trent is the root of justification, it would be repugnant for charity to be infused unless faith were presupposed. Therefore, it is absurd to say that a man who perfectly observed the natural law and invincibly did not know God as supernatural author would possess faith in desire sufficient for salvation.

Hence Bernard, epist. 77, weighing the aforesaid words of Christ in the last chapter of Mark, He who believes and is baptized shall be saved, but he who does not believe shall be condemned, adds: Carefully and vigilantly, therefore, he did not repeat: But he who is not baptized; he said only: He who does not believe shall be condemned, indicating that faith alone sometimes suffices for salvation, and that without it nothing suffices. By these words he openly declares that faith is more necessary for salvation than baptism and can in no way be supplied, although baptism can sometimes be supplied by desire for it.

The same first part of our assertion can further be established by this reason of St. Thomas here, q. 2, a. 3. The perfection and salvation of a rational creature consist in what is conferred upon it through a certain supernatural participation in the divine goodness. Therefore, to obtain them, it is necessary that the creature tend, approach, and come to God by a supernatural motion by which it turns itself to God and disposes itself toward such perfection and salvation. But such a motion cannot occur unless the affection of the will by which we tend toward God is directed through an act of faith proposing the object to which the will must turn, because, since the will is a blind power, it necessarily presupposes the direction of reason proposing the object. Therefore, a supernatural act of faith is necessary for man's salvation, and natural knowledge of God does not suffice.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

This is confirmed. Means must be suited or proportioned to the end, since the end is in some manner virtually contained in them. But our end is altogether supernatural, namely, the beatific vision. Therefore, the means by which we must attain it must likewise be supernatural. These means are knowledge and love. Therefore, they must themselves be supernatural.

10. The second part of the assertion, which says that before Christ's advent implicit faith in Christ the Mediator or Redeemer sufficed for salvation, likewise appears certain. For although some knowledge of the Incarnation was necessary for salvation in every age, because Christ is the way by which beatitude is reached and there is no other name given to men in which we must be saved, as Acts 4 says, nevertheless, according to the diversity of times and persons, the Sun of justice diffused the rays of his knowledge in different ways.

Before the state of sin Adam possessed explicit faith in Christ, not insofar as Christ was to be Redeemer and liberator from sin, but insofar as he was to be the consummator of glory, as we showed in the Treatise on the Incarnation. After sin, the greater ones, as more skilled in the doctrine of faith, hoped and believed that future liberation from sin would come through the Passion and foresaw it figured in the sacrifices divinely instituted. The lesser ones, as less instructed in faith, believed it only implicitly, enveloped beneath the veil of those sacrifices, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 2, a. 7, in these words: *The greater ones explicitly knew the signification of these sacrifices, but the lesser ones, believing under the veil of those sacrifices that they were divinely instituted, possessed a certain veiled knowledge of the future Christ.* Hence under the law of nature and the written law many could be saved, and in fact were saved, without explicit knowledge of the Incarnation, as the Holy Doctor teaches in the same place, ad 3: *If some were saved to whom revelation was not made, they were not saved without faith in the Mediator, because, although they did not possess explicit faith, they nevertheless possessed implicit faith.* And in III, dist. 25, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2, ad 3, he expressly teaches that those to whom no revelation of the future Christ had been made *were saved by implicit faith in the Redeemer, including their faith in the knowledge of God.*

11. Reason likewise urges this. Explicit faith in the Redeemer during the law of nature and the Mosaic law was not necessary for salvation by necessity of means, either essentially and by its nature or by reason of a divine decree or institution. Therefore, it was not necessary in any manner. The consequence is clear.

The antecedent, as regards the first part, appears manifest. For the love of God above all things and perseverance in it suffice of themselves for

salvation. Although faith in Christ especially inflames this love, one who approaches God believing that he exists and that he is a rewarder can nevertheless, with God's help, conceive the flame of charity and persevere in it by divine assistance.

As regards the second part, namely, that this faith was not necessary by divine decree or institution, it is proved first because this is established neither from Scripture nor from Tradition. Second, because if such faith had then been necessary for salvation by God's institution, God would have arranged for it to be preached everywhere, since he in no way fails in matters necessary for salvation. Yet this was not done, for at that time knowledge of the true God scarcely extended beyond Judea, according to Ps. 75: *God is known in Judea; his name is great in Israel.*

I add that explicit faith in the Incarnation presupposes explicit faith and knowledge of original sin or of the common fall of the human race. But under the law of nature only a few possessed explicit knowledge of this sin, since it is contained only implicitly and very obscurely in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and we have no foundation for saying that an explicit and common tradition concerning it then existed. Indeed, few among the Jews awaited the Messiah as future Redeemer and Savior of souls. They awaited him merely as a temporal king resplendent in worldly glory, and hoped from him not for spiritual but temporal goods. Even Nicodemus, although a teacher in Israel, nevertheless did not know, as is clear from the Gospel, that Christ was God.

12. Finally, the third part of the assertion, affirming that after Christ's advent and the promulgation of the Gospel explicit faith in the Trinity and the Incarnation is necessary for justification and salvation, is opposed to Suárez, de Lugo, and other more recent authors, who judge that implicit faith in those mysteries suffices for justification and salvation even after Christ's advent and the publication of the Gospel.

It is nevertheless the doctrine of St. Thomas in the article cited above, where he distinguishes the state of nature and law from the state of grace by this fact: *After the time of revealed grace, he says, both greater and lesser persons are bound to possess explicit faith concerning the mysteries of Christ.* And in III, dist. 25, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2, he writes: *After Christ's advent, because the mystery of redemption has now been fulfilled and preached corporeally and visibly, all are bound to believe explicitly; and if anyone lacked instruction, God would reveal it to him unless he remained without it through his own fault.* By these words the Holy Doctor destroys the principal foundation of the adversaries. For if under the new law faith in one God as supernatural provider sufficed for salvation, containing faith in the Mediator implicitly and in desire, as the

adversaries teach, St. Thomas would have recourse in vain to this extraordinary manner of instruction, because it would not be due or necessary for salvation, as is clear.

Hence Augustine says in *De praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 7, speaking of Cornelius, to instruct whom Peter was sent in Acts 10: *If he could have been saved without faith in Christ, Peter the architect would not have been sent to build him up.* That God acts in this way and frequently uses this extraordinary manner of instruction is clear not only from the example of Cornelius, to whom Peter was sent, but also from the history of the eunuch of Queen Candace, to whom Philip was sent to instruct and baptize him in the faith of Christ and the mystery of the Incarnation, and of Paul, who for the same reason was sent to the Macedonians in Acts 16. St. Dionysius likewise says in c. 5 *De caelesti hierarchia* that many Gentiles attained salvation through the illumination and ministry of Angels who revealed to them the mysteries of faith. St. Thomas likewise says here, a. 7, ad 3, that revelation concerning Christ was made to many of the Gentiles. In confirmation of this he relates that in the time of Emperor Constantine and his mother Helena there was found the corpse of a man to whom during life a revelation of the future Christ had been made. A golden plate was found upon his breast with this inscription: *Christ will be born of a Virgin, and I believe in him. O sun, in the time of Helena and Constantine you will see me again.*

13. The same part can further be established by this reason. Under the law of grace, after the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel, there must be a more perfect knowledge and consequently a more perfect faith in Christ the Redeemer than under the law of nature or the Mosaic law. This is demanded by the more perfect state of the law of grace, in which the veil placed over the heads of the Jews is said by the Apostle in Gal. 3 to have been removed. But in the state of the law of nature and the written law, implicit faith in Christ the Redeemer was necessary by necessity of means, as is clear from what was said in proof of the second part of the assertion. Therefore, explicit faith in Christ the Redeemer is necessary in the same manner in the state of the law of grace after the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel.

14. The same must be said of faith in the mystery of the Trinity. For, as St. Thomas argues in q. 2, a. 8: The mystery of Christ's Incarnation cannot be explicitly believed without faith in the Trinity, because the mystery of Christ's Incarnation contains that the Son of God assumed flesh, that through the grace of the Holy Spirit he renewed the world, and again that he was conceived of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, in the same manner in which the mystery of Christ's Incarnation was explicitly believed by the greater ones before Christ and implicitly and as though in shadow by the lesser

On the Theological Virtues

ones, so also was the mystery of the Trinity. Therefore, after the time of revealed grace, we are all bound to believe the mystery of the Trinity explicitly.

This is confirmed. In order that a traveler reach his destination, he must know both the place toward which he tends and the way by which he travels to it. But the destination toward which we tend through faith is the clear vision of God, one and triune, while Christ is the way by which we go to it. Therefore, to attain beatitude it is necessary that we know explicitly the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

§ 3.

The Objections Are Resolved.

15. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: Under the law of nature there was no precept of faith or of any other supernatural act. Therefore, faith is not simply and absolutely necessary by necessity of means for salvation. Hence the Apostle says in Rom. 2 that *the Gentiles who do not have the law do naturally the things that are of the law*, that is, through the natural law showing what must be done, they fulfill the things of the law. But the observance of the commandments leads to eternal life, according to Christ's words: *If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments*. Therefore, eternal life can be obtained without supernatural faith.

Moreover, the same Apostle, explaining in Heb. 11 what act of believing is necessary for salvation, says: *One who approaches God must believe that he exists and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him*. But this act is not supernatural, since that God exists and possesses providence, and consequently a will to reward good works, can be known by the natural light. Therefore, an internal act of supernatural faith is not required for justification and salvation.

I answer by denying the antecedent. The state of the natural law is not so called because in it there was no supernatural knowledge and consequently no precept of faith or of another supernatural virtue, but because it contained no such external, written, and determinate law. Rather, this law was inspired by God in Adam and transmitted and propagated orally by him to his descendants.

To the passage of the Apostle in Rom. 2, it must be said that by the words quoted he intends only to signify that some of the Gentiles naturally, that is, by the powers of nature alone, observed certain natural precepts, namely, those that are easy, for example, to honor parents, give alms, not

steal, and not commit fornication. For in the Treatise on grace it was proved that these can be observed without grace and by the powers of nature alone. He does not say that they observed all the precepts or even the more difficult ones, such as: You shall not covet, and: You shall love your God more than yourself. For supernatural assistance is necessary to fulfill these, as we showed in the same place.

But if anyone maintains that the Apostle speaks of the observance of the whole natural law, the word naturally must be explained so that the meaning is that the Gentiles fulfilled the law through nature restored by grace. Hence Augustine says in *De Spiritu et littera*, c. 27: The things of the law are done naturally, not because grace is denied by the word nature, but rather because nature has been restored through grace. And bk. 4 *Contra Julianum*, c. 3: They do them naturally because the nature by which they believe has itself been corrected in them by the grace of God.

To the other passage of the Apostle in Heb. 11, it must be said with St. Thomas here, q. 1, a. 7, that he speaks of God as supernatural author and rewarder in that order. But infused and supernatural faith is required for knowledge of the eternal and supernatural reward.

16. You will object second: Just as Heb. 11 says: *Without faith it is impossible to please God*, so John 3 says: *Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God*. Yet notwithstanding this, theologians teach that an adult can be saved without having actually received baptism when he lacks the possibility or knowledge of it. Therefore, one can likewise be saved without an act of supernatural faith when, namely, he invincibly does not know God as supernatural author.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and parity. The same reasoning does not apply to baptism and the act of faith, because baptism can be supplied by desire, which is virtually contained in an act of faith and charity. But because an act of supernatural faith is not virtually contained in natural knowledge, which is far inferior, if faith is not actually present, it can be supplied in no manner, as was explained in the preceding section.

17. You will object third: A man raised in forests or among barbarous nations, who has never heard or been able to hear anything concerning matters of faith and is consequently negatively unbelieving, will be justified and saved if he follows the direction of reason in pursuing moral good and fleeing evil, as St. Thomas teaches in q. 14 *De veritate*, a. 11, ad 1. Therefore, in some case an act of faith is not required for justification and salvation.

I answer from the same Holy Doctor in the cited place that it must be held with complete certainty that God will enlighten such a man concerning

the mysteries of faith that must necessarily be believed for justification and salvation, either by internal inspiration or through the ministry of some preacher. God in fact did this for Cornelius and the eunuch of Queen Candace, to whom he sent Peter and Philip the Deacon to instruct them in the faith.

Nor is Vega's assertion valid when he says that this mode of instruction is miraculous and consequently should not be invoked. Although it is extraordinary, it should not be called miraculous, since it is connatural to the state of grace. For just as grace connaturally presupposes on the part of the will some supernatural act that is a disposition toward justification, so on the part of the intellect it necessarily requires some supernatural knowledge directing that act of the will.

18. You will object fourth against the second part of the assertion: Christ is the Mediator of God and men and the most universal cause of salvation and justice, according to Acts 4: *There is salvation in no one else, nor is there any other name under heaven given to men in which we must be saved.* Therefore, both under the law of nature and under the written law explicit faith in the future Redeemer was necessary for salvation, through which men living under those laws or states would be incorporated into Christ and receive from him as head the influx of grace and salvation. Hence Augustine says in bk. 18 *De civitate Dei*, c. 47: *It was granted to no one to live according to God and please him unless the one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, was divinely revealed to him.* St. Thomas likewise says here in the article that in every age it was necessary in some manner to believe explicitly the mystery of the Incarnation.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although Christ is the most universal cause of salvation in the order of merit, so that no man under the state of the law of nature, the written law, or the law of grace ever attained salvation without his merits, it cannot therefore be inferred that explicit faith in him was necessary in the first and second states by necessity of means for justification and salvation. For in the state of the law of nature and the state of the written law, in order that men morally receive from the future Christ the influx of grace, it sufficed that they be morally united and incorporated into him through explicit faith in the supernatural providence of God, in which faith in the Mediator himself was implicitly contained. For through such faith we believe that God wills to assist men, free them from sins, and restore them to grace, which were the particular duties and offices of the Mediator.

Hence when Augustine says that before Christ's advent it was granted to no one to be just unless Christ had been revealed to him, this must be

understood of either explicit or implicit revelation. For just as faith in Christ can be distinguished into explicit and implicit, so can his revelation. Or it can be said with Hugh of St. Victor that Augustine is speaking of an express revelation made to the body of the Church under the law of nature or the written law, not of a revelation made to every individual person. Hence it sufficed for that state that the greater ones possess explicit faith in Christ and that the lesser ones attain implicit faith through the faith of the greater ones.

In this sense St. Thomas is to be understood when he says that in every age it was necessary in some manner to believe explicitly the mystery of the Incarnation, namely, as he explains in the body of the article, that in the time of the law of nature and the written law it had to be believed explicitly by the greater ones or teachers, but not by the lesser or less instructed, for whom implicit faith in this mystery sufficed for salvation and justification. Otherwise, the means simply necessary for salvation would have been lacking to them, which is not credible concerning so great a multitude.

19. You will object fifth against the third part of the assertion: The Apostle, explaining in Heb. 11 what things must be explicitly believed for justification and salvation, says: *One who approaches God must believe that he exists and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him.* But in these words no mention is made of Christ as Redeemer. Therefore, under the new law explicit faith in the Incarnation is not a means necessary for justification and salvation.

Hence Cornelius was justified by implicit faith in the Incarnation alone, as St. Thomas teaches in q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, and *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2.

The same Holy Doctor also asserts in q. 14 *De veritate*, a. 11, ad 1, that if a man raised in forests or among barbarous nations, who has never heard or been able to hear anything concerning matters of faith, follows the direction of reason in pursuing moral good and fleeing evil, he will be justified and saved. But such a man would not then possess explicit faith in the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity, since he had never heard anything concerning them. Therefore, under the new law a man can be justified without explicit faith in the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity.

Likewise, the same Angelic Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 6, that if a boy arriving at the first instant of the use of reason turns himself toward God by choosing to follow moral good and what is consonant with reason, he will be justified. But at such an instant he cannot be instructed concerning the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, since some time is required for this. The mode of understanding many things in a

On the Theological Virtues

single instant is not human but angelic. Therefore, that boy will then be justified by implicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation alone.

Finally, among Christians some are so uneducated and dull that they cannot apprehend the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation by a true concept and consequently cannot believe them explicitly. Therefore, at least they can be justified without explicit faith in these mysteries, otherwise they would lack sufficient assistance for salvation.

Some add that if, under the new law, explicit faith in the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation were necessary for salvation, the way to salvation in the state of grace would be narrower and more impeded, since under the law of nature and the Mosaic law implicit faith in these mysteries sufficed, whereas now explicit faith is required.

I answer with St. Thomas in II, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 4, ad 1, that in the cited place the Apostle enumerates only those things that had to be explicitly believed by every man in every state. He does not exclude that in the state of grace a man must explicitly believe in Christ the Redeemer, by whose power we are justified and glorified.

To the example of Cornelius it can first be said that under the new law explicit faith in Christ was not necessary for justification until after the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel. But in the time of Cornelius the Gospel had not yet been sufficiently promulgated to all, even in Palestine. An indication of this is that Peter was sent not only to baptize Cornelius but also to instruct him in the faith, Acts 10.

20. Second, it can be answered that Cornelius then possessed explicit faith in the Incarnation as regards its substance, which, as St. Thomas says, he had received from Jews residing in Caesarea, and that he was instructed by Peter concerning the circumstance of time, because he did not know whether it had yet been fulfilled. Hence when the same Holy Doctor says in the cited places that Cornelius possessed implicit faith in Christ and was justified with it, this must be understood of faith implicit as regards the circumstances of the Incarnation, not as regards its substance.

To the second example concerning a man raised in forests, I grant the major premise and deny the minor. For, as St. Thomas says in the place cited in the objection: If anyone raised in forests follows the direction of reason in pursuing good and fleeing evil, it must be held with complete certainty that God would either reveal to him by inspiration those things necessary to be believed or direct some preacher of the faith to him, as he sent Peter to Cornelius. From this it is clear that such a man would not be justified without explicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation, concerning which he

would be instructed either immediately by God through internal inspiration or through some preacher whom God directed to him.

To the third example or argument concerning a boy arriving at the first instant of reason, I likewise deny the minor premise. For because that instant is not physical or mathematical but moral and consequently includes some interval or duration of time, the boy can during it be instructed or enlightened concerning the mysteries of the Incarnation and Trinity, either immediately by God or through a man or Angel, and can dispose himself toward justification through explicit faith in both mysteries.

21. To the fourth, it must be said that no one is of so uneducated a mind that, if he possesses the use of reason, he cannot apprehend the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation confusedly or as regards their substance when they are sufficiently proposed to him, especially with supernatural assistance, which God does not deny. But if you maintain that there are adults who, after sufficient diligence and proposal, cannot perceive or apprehend such mysteries, I say that in this respect they are like the insane and infants, who are saved without any act of faith. The adversaries are bound to say the same concerning those who are so slow and dull that they cannot apprehend God as supernatural Author and Provider, since in their opinion explicit faith in God as supernatural Author and Provider is required for justification.

To what is added, namely, that under the new law the way to salvation would be narrowed if explicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation were required for justification and salvation, I answer by denying the consequence. Assistance for possessing such explicit faith is readily available, and grace is now given more abundantly than under the old law. Through the Incarnation man is wondrously elevated and aroused to the knowledge and love of invisible things, as we shall show in the Treatise on the Incarnation when we explain the admirable fittingnesses of this mystery.

I add that it may be granted that the new law is more burdensome than the old as regards internal acts, although it is easier by reason of grace, as St. Thomas teaches from St. Augustine in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 107, a. 4. He proves this from the fact that under the new law the internal movements of the soul are forbidden, which were not expressly forbidden to all under the old law, although they were forbidden in certain cases; yet no punishment was attached to their prohibition.

22. From what has been said you will understand that those who are wholly ignorant of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation cannot be justified and are consequently incapable of sacramental absolution until they have been sufficiently instructed concerning them. It is not required,

On the Theological Virtues

however, that they know these mysteries distinctly, for a distinct concept of them is exceedingly difficult and obscure. It suffices that they believe them as regards their substance. Thus it is sufficient to believe explicitly that the Son of God was incarnate, but it is not required to know that the union was made in the *suppositum* and not in the nature. Likewise, it suffices to believe explicitly that there is one God and three divine Persons, one of whom is the Father, another the Son, and the third the Holy Spirit. It is not necessary to know explicitly that the Son is the Word and proceeds through knowledge, or that the Holy Spirit is Love and proceeds through the will.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the External Act of Faith and the Precept Obliging to It.

Some recent authors hold that the external act of faith, or the outward confession of faith, is not elicited by faith, but is merely commanded by it. Others think that the same act of confessing the faith, considered under different aspects, pertains to different virtues. For example, they say that the chanting of the Creed in church, insofar as it is referred to divine worship, is elicited by the virtue of religion; but insofar as it is ordered to assenting to revealed truths and professing them, it proceeds from faith.

1. Nevertheless, it must be said that the external confession of faith is an act elicited by faith, but not by the other virtues, although it can be commanded by them.

The first part is taught by St. Thomas here, q. 3, a. 1, in the body, where he says: "Just as the interior conception of the things of faith is a proper act of faith, so also is their outward confession." He declares this more clearly in the reply to the third objection: "Interior faith, through love, causes all the outward acts of the virtues by commanding them through the mediation of the other virtues, not by eliciting them; but it produces confession as its proper act, without the mediation of any other virtue." From this I argue as follows: If the external confession of faith were not elicited by faith, but merely commanded by it, faith would not produce it except through the mediation of another virtue, from which it would proceed by elicitation, as is evident. But according to St. Thomas, faith itself produces the outward profession of faith without the mediation of any other virtue. Therefore it elicits it and does not merely command it.

Reason also supports this. An outward act is elicited by the virtue to whose end it is of itself and by its nature referred. But outward speech by which, for example, someone professes his inward faith is of itself and by its

nature ordered to the end of faith; for outward speech is ordered to signify what is conceived in the heart, as St. Thomas says in the cited article. Therefore the outward confession of faith is an act elicited by faith, and not merely commanded by it. The minor premise is evident, while the major is explained and proved by various examples. Fasting is an act of abstinence because it is of itself and by its nature ordered to the mortification of the flesh, which is the end of abstinence. External adoration is an act elicited by the virtue of religion because it is of itself and by its nature referred to the end of religion, which is to render God the worship due to Him because of His supreme excellence. Likewise, the outward restitution of goods taken by theft is an act elicited by justice because it is of itself ordered to the end of justice, which is to render to each person what is his own. Therefore an outward act is elicited by the virtue to whose end it is of itself and by its nature ordered.

2. From this the second part of the assertion also remains proved. The confession of faith does not tend of itself and by its nature toward the ends of the other virtues, but only accidentally and contingently. Therefore it cannot be elicited by the other virtues, but can only be commanded by them. The consequence is evident. For if pious acts were elicited by all the virtues to whose ends they are directed, a good act referred to the extrinsic ends of all the virtues would proceed from them all. Thus there would be no distinction between commanding and eliciting virtues, and the matter of all the virtues would easily be confused. Hence this rule must be established: honest outward acts are elicited by that virtue alone, and not by another, to whose end they are of themselves and by their nature ordered. For things must be judged according to what belongs to them of itself and by reason of their connatural end, not accidentally and by reason of some extraneous and adventitious end. Therefore, since the confession of faith tends of itself and by its nature toward the end of faith, but only accidentally toward the ends of the other virtues, it is produced by faith alone, although it can be commanded by religion and the other virtues. Hence Chrysostom, hom. 25 on Matthew, says: "The root of confession is the faith of the heart; confession, however, is the fruit of faith."

3. You will say: Faith exists in the intellect. Therefore it cannot immediately elicit an outward act of confession, which is an act of a material and bodily power, namely the mouth or tongue, since no virtue operates outside the subject in which it resides.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. In reply to its proof, I deny that virtues cannot operate outside the subject in which they exist. For St. Thomas, In IV *Sententiarum*, dist. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qu. 4,

expressly says that prayer is elicited as an act of latria, notwithstanding that latria, or religion, is a virtue existing in the will and not in the intellect, whose act prayer is. In dist. 17, q. 3, a. 2, qu. 7, he teaches that the confession of sins pertains by elicitation to penance, and the confession of God's benefits to latria. Yet it is evident that these confessions are made by the mouth or tongue, which is another power than that in which penance and religion reside. Why, then, could the outward confession of faith not likewise be elicited by the virtue of faith, although faith is in the intellect, while its outward confession is made by the mouth or tongue, according to the Apostle's words in Rom. 10: "With the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation"? Hence Cajetan, below, q. 81, a. 4: "Acts are attributed to a virtue as proper to it not only when they belong to the same power in which the habit of the virtue exists, but also when they belong to other powers, provided that they are not elicited through another virtue, as is evident in the acts of justice, temperance, and the opposing vices. For the proper act of justice is not only to will to render to each his own, but also outwardly to render what is his; and similarly, the act of injustice is to take what belongs to another. The act of temperance is not only to desire food moderately, but also the moderate outward consumption of it; and similarly, outward lust is an act of intemperance."

I add that just as the ebb and flow of the sea are elicited not only by the sea but also, together with it, by the heavens, because although the heavens are outside the sea, they produce in the sea the power to ebb and flow, so likewise, although the habit of faith is subject only in the intellect, it nevertheless produces in an outward power a certain power, or mode of participation in its own power, through which that outward power elicits external confession. Thus faith is said to elicit such an act together with that power, not indeed immediately, but through its own power.

4. Nor does it avail to say that faith cannot produce outside the intellect any participation in its power. For if it did so, it would effect this by means of some act of the intellect, which seems impossible, because an act, being essentially immanent, cannot produce anything outside the intellect. This does not avail, I say, because although an act of the intellect is formally immanent by its essence, it is nevertheless virtually transitive, as is evident in an act of command by which an angel moves the heavens and transforms bodies. Such an act is formally immanent and virtually transitive. "And if this is called into doubt, the doubt does not appear reasonable," says St. Thomas, opusc. 71, a. 3.

5. There are two precepts concerning the external profession of faith. One is affirmative, requiring the outward profession of faith when this is

necessary. The other is negative, forbidding the denial of faith and every outward action contrary to it. Both are clearly expressed in Matt. 10: “Everyone, therefore, who confesses Me before men, I also will confess him before My Father who is in heaven. But he who denies Me before men, I also will deny him before My Father.”

The first does not oblige the faithful to profess the faith outwardly on every occasion, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 3, a. 2: “Affirmative precepts do not bind at every moment, although they always bind; rather, they bind according to place and time, and so forth. Thus confessing the faith is not always and in every place necessary for salvation, but in some place and time, namely when the omission of this confession would withdraw the honor due to God or the benefit that ought to be afforded one’s neighbor. For example, if someone questioned about the faith were to remain silent, and from this it were believed either that he did not have the faith, or that the faith was not true, or others were turned away from the faith by his silence.” The second precept, however, binds always and at every moment. Hence a person sins gravely if he outwardly denies the faith, although he retains it in his heart. For outwardly denying the faith is intrinsically evil and a pernicious lie by which we inflict a grave injury upon the First Truth who reveals. For either we say that His testimony or revelation is not true, or at least that He has not revealed the dogmas of faith, but that they were fabricated by someone else, which is an express lie. Therefore this can never be done licitly, even to avoid death or grievous torments. Hence, according to all authors, Pope Marcellinus sinned gravely when, from fear of death, he burned incense to idols, although he retained the faith in his heart.

6. All agree on this, but there is a difficulty whether, in order to preserve one’s life or avoid some grave evil, it is at least lawful to conceal the true religion or simulate a false one. The reason for doubt is that some holy men, and others commended in Sacred Scripture, not only concealed the true religion but also simulated a foreign and false one. First, the Apostles simulated Judaism after its abrogation. For, to omit Peter, whose simulation was rebuked by Paul in Gal. 2, Paul himself circumcised Timothy because of the Jews, Acts 16, and was rebuked by no one. Indeed, at the exhortation of the Apostle James and the elders, he purified himself according to the Jewish rite and intended to offer sacrifice in order to show that he observed the Law, Acts 21. Second, Elisha permitted Naaman the Syrian to bow down with the king in the temple of Rimmon and to appear to adore the idol, 2 Kings 5. Third, Jehu pretended that he wished to worship Baal and sacrifice with his priests so that he might kill them, and this deed was praised by the Lord, 2 Kings 10.

On the Theological Virtues

Nevertheless, it must be said that it is never lawful to conceal the true religion or simulate a false one. For St. Thomas says below, q. 111, a. 1, that every simulation is a sin and differs from a lie only in this: one who lies signifies by words what is not, while one who simulates signifies the same by deeds or things. Therefore, just as a Christian who, from fear of death, signified in words that he was an idolater would sin mortally by lying against the precept of confessing the faith, so he would sin against the same precept if he signified the same by deeds or things, simulating idolatry. Hence:

7. To the first example concerning the Apostles, I answer with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 103, a. 4, ad 1, that at that time those Jewish ceremonies were still lawful for the Jewish faithful. For the Jewish Law had three states. The first extended from its promulgation until the death of Christ, and then it was living and obligatory for the Jews. The second extended from the death of Christ until the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel over a few years, and then it was dead, that is, no longer obligatory, because on the Cross Christ had said, "It is consummated." Yet it was not yet death-dealing. Therefore, for some reasonable cause, and especially to avoid scandal among the Jewish faithful, it could lawfully be observed in certain matters by the Apostles, who were Jews by nation. The third state runs from the sufficient promulgation of the Gospel, in which the Jewish Law is not only dead because it does not bind, but also death-dealing to those who observe it, because those who observe it sin mortally.

To the second, some interpreters of Scripture condemn Naaman for sinning by appearing to worship in the temple of Rimmon. They say that when Elisha told him, "Go in peace," he did not grant him permission to bow before the idol in order to support the king as he prostrated himself before it, but patiently tolerated an evil which he could neither forbid nor prevent. Others, however, hold that Naaman did not sin in this, since his bowing was done only to support the king as he bent the knee, and was not a sacred ceremony but merely an act of civil service. Nevertheless, some who saw it could accidentally have been deceived into thinking that he bowed for the sake of religion.

To the third, St. Thomas answers below, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2: "There is no need to excuse Jehu's simulation from sin or falsehood, because he was evil, since he did not depart from the idolatry of Jeroboam. Nevertheless, he is commended and temporally rewarded by God, not for his simulation, but for the zeal by which he destroyed the worship of Baal."

8. From these principles the solution can easily be given to another difficulty treated here by some authors, namely whether it is lawful to use the signs of unbelievers and assume their clothing in order to conceal our

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

faith or religion. It must be said that when certain things, by their nature or by the common usage of nations, are referred to a particular religious ceremony, so that of themselves and according to their primary institution they have no other suitable use, it is in no way lawful to use them for concealment, even to escape an evident danger of death. Examples are burning incense before an idol, genuflecting to it, receiving the Calvinist supper, or wearing clothing on which an idol is depicted. Since these things have no use among men other than a religious or ceremonial one, their use is not the concealment or dissimulation of the true faith, but a real and virtual profession of idolatry or heresy.

When, however, the clothing and signs of unbelievers have some primary, lawful, and human use, although they have been designated by a civil law to distinguish believers from unbelievers, it is lawful to use them to conceal one's faith and religion. Such use is not a profession or declaration, even virtual, of a false religion, since such clothing and signs were not instituted of themselves for the profession of religions, but were introduced only by civil law for the sake of the more convenient intercourse among followers of different religions resulting from that distinction. Consequently, the one who instituted them did not intend to impose an obligation to profess the faith by these means. Thus Christian merchants trading in the East wear a turban or headdress. Thus apostolic men journeying through the lands of unbelievers adapt themselves to the clothing and food of the unbelievers among whom they live. Thus Christian commanders and soldiers use Turkish banners so that they may overcome them by that stratagem or avoid capture if defeated by them. Thus, finally, in England, priests and religious living in hiding rightly dress in English clothing so that they may strengthen the Catholics dwelling there in the faith and administer the sacraments to them.

CHAPTER IX.

On the Habit of Faith.

1. That there is in us an infused habit of faith, given of itself for eliciting the assent of faith, is the constant teaching of all theologians and is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, where it says: "In justification itself, together with the remission of sins, a person receives all these things infused at once: faith, hope, and charity." These words cannot be understood of the acts of faith and hope, since such acts precede justification, but only of the

On the Theological Virtues

habit of faith, which the Council, in c. 15 and can. 28, says truly remains as a permanent gift in a sinner who has lost grace through mortal sin.

Reason also supports this. It is more connatural that a person in the state of a wayfarer should be constituted in a sufficient first actuality for eliciting supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity by supernatural habits and intrinsic, permanent gifts, just as he is permanently elevated to the beatific vision in heaven by the light of glory, than by extrinsic and transitory aids. We shall explain this argument more fully below when we treat the habit of charity.

It is also evident that this habit is a theological virtue. For that virtue is called theological which immediately regards God as its formal terminative object. But faith immediately regards God as its formal terminative object, as was shown in Chapter I. Therefore it is a true theological virtue.

Hence it cannot be called an intellectual virtue in the same manner as theology, because intellectual virtue requires evidence, at least radically and by aptitude, as St. Thomas teaches in III *Sententiarum*, dist. 23, q. 2, a. 3, qu. 3. Theology as it exists in us wayfarers lacks actual evidence of its object and principles accidentally and by reason of the subject. Nevertheless, by its own nature it requires conjunction with the knowledge of God and of the blessed, to which it is subalternated, and in such conjunction it has actual evidence of its principles. Therefore it is of itself and by its nature evident, at least radically and by aptitude. Faith, however, of itself and by its nature requires obscurity and excludes evidence and clarity, as was shown in Chapter II, § 5. Therefore, although theology is an intellectual virtue because it is a true science, faith is not.

2. You will say: A virtue whose subject is the intellect is an intellectual virtue. But the subject of faith is the intellect. Therefore it is an intellectual virtue.

I answer with St. Thomas in the place cited, in the reply to the first objection, that not every habit whose subject is the intellect can be called an intellectual virtue unless it perfects the intellect both with respect to its object and with respect to the mode of its act, that is, unless it attains its object with certitude and evidence. Hence, since faith is essentially obscure and without evidence, it cannot be called an intellectual virtue.

Habitual faith is divided by theologians into formed and unformed faith. Formed faith is that which is formed by grace and charity. Unformed faith is that which is without habitual grace and charity.

This division is not essential. Formed and unformed faith are distinguished only insofar as formed faith is directed to the end of charity, while unformed faith is not. Hence the whole distinction between them is

taken from something pertaining to the will. But no specific distinction between unformed and formed faith can arise from that source, since habits can be specifically distinguished only by what pertains to the habit of itself. What pertains to the will does not of itself pertain to faith, but only what pertains to the intellect, since faith is an intellectual perfection. Therefore no essential and specific distinction is found between formed and unformed faith, but only an extrinsic and accidental one. Consequently, the same habit of faith can pass from formed to unformed, and conversely from unformed to formed, without any intrinsic change in itself.

Although in natural things what is dead cannot become living and is distinguished from the living in species, the matter is otherwise in moral things. The reason for the difference is that the principle of natural life is the form of the living thing; when this ceases, a new physical form, and consequently a new species, supervenes. But in moral things the principle of life and moral dignity is a form extrinsically forming the habit, which always remains essentially the same. Therefore one and the same specific habit of faith now lives and now dies morally, according as it is or is not referred to the end of charity, which is extrinsic to it.

Nor does it avail to say that an act of unformed faith can never become formed, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in IV *Sententiarum*, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 7, qu. 3, and that the same therefore seems to have to be said of the habit. There is a great difference between the habit and the act of faith. Since an act is transitory, the same act does not remain; rather, a new one is elicited when charity begins to be participated. It is therefore not surprising that an act of unformed faith can never become formed. But a habit is permanent and by nature stable. When charity supervenes, the habit is not removed but perfected and formed. Hence it can pass from unformed to formed through the advent of charity.

3. Some ask here whether unformed faith, separated from charity, can be called a true virtue.

I answer that it can indeed be called a true virtue, but not a perfect one. The first is evident. A virtue is a habit determining and inclining a power to right operation. But unformed faith inclines and determines the intellective power to a right operation, namely to assenting to truths revealed by God. Therefore it is a true virtue.

4. That it is not a perfect virtue, or does not possess the state, mode, and perfection of a true virtue, also appears manifest. Since believing is an act of the intellect assenting to truth at the command of the will, two things are required for that act to be perfect, and consequently for the habit from which it is elicited to be perfect, or to possess the state, mode, and

On the Theological Virtues

perfection of virtue. The first is that the intellect infallibly attain the truth. The second is that it be infallibly ordered to the ultimate end, for the sake of which the will assents to the truth, or moves the intellect to assent to it. But this second perfection is lacking in unformed faith. Although its act has the due perfection on the part of the intellect, it lacks the perfection due to it on the part of the will, since in the absence of charity it is not ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore unformed faith is not a perfect virtue, or does not possess the complete state, mode, and perfection of virtue.

This can be confirmed and further illustrated from what we said in Volume III, in the Treatise on the Virtues in General, namely that acquired moral virtues without charity are true virtues, but not perfect ones. We must reason proportionately in the same manner about unformed faith and about those virtues separated from charity as they exist in sinners. We therefore refer the reader to that place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

CHAPTER X.

On the Subject, Causes, and Effects of Faith.

We are not treating here of the subject of faith as faculty, or of the power in which faith is received, for it is evident from what has been said above that faith has the intellect as its subject, insofar as the intellect is moved and determined by the will. Rather, we are treating of the subject as person, that is, the persons capable of faith, and we inquire in which subjects the habit of faith remains and in which it is destroyed.

§ 1.

The Habit of Faith Remains in Sinners Deprived of Grace and Charity, but
Not in Heretics, Demons, the Damned, or the Blessed;
It Does, However, Remain in the Souls in Purgatory.

5. The first part of this assertion is certain by faith. It is evident, first, from the Apostle's words in 1 Cor. 13: "If I should have all faith, but do not have charity, it profits me nothing." It is clearly supposed there that faith can exist without charity, and consequently remain in sinners deprived of grace and charity. It is also evident from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15, which asserts that faith is not lost through every mortal sin. Reason also supports this, because not every mortal sin is contrary to faith or destroys the formal character of its object, namely divine revelation. Therefore a person existing

in mortal sin can believe the mysteries of our faith because they have been revealed by God.

6. The second part, which is opposed to Durandus, who asserts that the habit of faith remains in heretics with respect to some part of itself, is proved first from the Apostle in 1 Tim. 1. Speaking of Hymenaeus and Alexander, who did not deny the whole faith but, as appears from 2 Tim. 2, only the article of the resurrection, he says: "They have made shipwreck concerning the faith," that is, they have lost faith totally, and consequently its whole habit. For, as Chrysostom observes there, just as one who suffers shipwreck escapes naked, having lost everything, so one who falls from faith is totally deprived of all virtues and supernatural gifts, including the habit of faith itself. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15, says that faith is lost through the sin of unbelief, just as charity is lost through any mortal sin.

The argument of St. Thomas here, q. 5, a. 3, also proves this. Faith totally perishes in someone when the formal object of faith ceases in him, because the essential species of every habit necessarily depends upon the formal character of its object. But in a heretic who disbelieves even one article of our faith, the formal object of faith perishes. This object is the First Truth insofar as it is manifested in Sacred Scripture and proposed by the Catholic Church. For the heretic does not adhere as to an infallible rule to the doctrine proposed by the Church, but believes what he wishes and rejects at his own discretion what he does not wish to believe. He firmly adheres only to his own will, or rather to a private opinion established by his own will. Therefore, in a heretic who denies one article while professing to believe all the others, faith totally perishes.

From this you will understand the difference between faith and science, and why the habit of science is not destroyed by an error concerning one part of its object, while the habit of faith is. The motive or middle term which is the reason for assenting to one conclusion is distinct from the reason for assenting to another. But there is one indivisible reason for assenting to all revealed truths, namely the First Truth as absolutely infallible in speaking. Hence one who disbelieves one article of faith denies the infallibility of the First Truth, and consequently cannot assent to the other revealed truths because of divine revelation.

7. The third part, which asserts that the habit of infused faith is not found in demons or in those of the damned who were once believers, is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, q. 5, a. 2, ad 2: "The faith which is a gift of grace inclines a person to believe through a certain affection for the good, even when it is unformed. Hence the faith which is in demons is not a gift of grace; rather, they are compelled to believe by the penetration of their

natural intellect.” In these words he indicates the fundamental reason for this part, which can be briefly proposed as follows. The habit of faith proceeds from an affection for the good and a pious motion of the will determining the intellect to assent to revealed truths, as was shown above in Chapter VII, § 1. But this pious affection and motion of the will is not found in demons and the damned. Since the will of an evil angel or a damned person remains fixed in evil through habitual obstinacy, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 64, a. 2, it is incapable of the pious affection by which it would be inclined to believe as it ought. Therefore it believes only under compulsion and because of the evidence of the signs and miracles it sees. The same holy Doctor declares this here, a. 2, ad 3, where he says that demons are displeased by the very fact “that the signs of faith are so evident that they are compelled by them to believe.” Hence Bañez rightly compares the faith of demons to the will of a merchant who, under fear of death, unwillingly and under compulsion throws his goods into the sea. Therefore the habit of infused faith is not found in demons and the damned.

8. That it also does not remain in the blessed is taught and proved by the Angelic Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 3, where he argues as follows: “Faith contains in its nature an imperfection on the part of the subject, namely that the believer does not see what he believes. Beatitude, however, contains in its nature perfection on the part of the subject, namely that the blessed person sees that by which he is made blessed. Hence it is impossible for faith to remain together with beatitude in the same subject.”

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. When the formal terminative object and formal motive of a habit are destroyed, that habit is destroyed. But in beatitude the formal terminative object and formal motive of infused faith are destroyed. Therefore the habit itself is also destroyed. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved as follows. The formal terminative object of infused faith is the First Truth not seen, while its formal motive is obscure divine revelation, as we showed in Chapter I. But in beatitude the First Truth is clearly seen in itself, and divine revelation is evident. Therefore the formal terminative object and formal motive of infused faith are destroyed in beatitude. Hence the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13 says: “We know in part, and we prophesy in part; but when that which is perfect has come, that which is in part shall be made void.” That is, when vision comes, faith will be made void.

9. The same part is proved secondly. Faith is a gift conferred on wayfarers for the state of the journey and as the foundation of hope, through which we tend toward beatitude. Therefore it would be entirely superfluous in the blessed, since they are no longer wayfarers but possessors, nor do they

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

tend toward beatitude through hope, but possess it through the clear vision of God.

From this the final part remains proved, which asserts that the habit of faith remains in souls existing in purgatory. Those souls are still on the way and tend toward the homeland, which they have not yet reached, and by hope they vehemently desire their highest good. Since they have not yet received that which is perfect, that which is in part ought not to be made void in them.

10. From these things you will understand that the habit of faith can be lost in three ways: through the sin of unbelief, through the advent of the light of glory, and through eternal damnation. It is lost in the first way by heretics, in the second by the blessed, and in the third by demons and the damned. Since faith by its nature belongs only to the wayfarer and pilgrim, it always remains with us as long as we are pilgrims away from the Lord. But when the journey is ended, it vanishes, whether in heaven, where no lamp is needed in the presence of the Sun, or in hell, because, since it is the substance of things hoped for, it cannot remain where there is no hope of good and no cessation of evil, as Hugh of Saint Victor says.

§ 2.

Objections Are Solved.

11. Against the first part of the assertion there is no difficult argument. But against the second part, which asserts that the habit of infused faith does not remain in heretics, it is first objected: A habit of virtue is not destroyed by one act of a contrary vice. For example, the virtue of temperance or justice is not corrupted by one act of intemperance or injustice; nor is the habit of science expelled by an error concerning one conclusion. Therefore, similarly, the habit of infused faith in a heretic is not destroyed by a single act of unbelief and dissent from only one article of faith. Hence a heretic who pertinaciously denies some article of faith, for example, the real presence of the body of Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, still experiences himself assenting with the same promptness and facility as before his heresy to other articles of faith, such as that God is triune, that He became incarnate, and so forth. But this promptness and facility are signs of the habit of faith still remaining in him. Some add that it is difficult to explain how the habit of infused faith is destroyed by one act of unbelief, and whether such an act concurs physically or only morally in its destruction.

On the Theological Virtues

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference between faith and temperance or justice is that faith is infused by God, while justice and temperance are acquired by one's own acts. The following difference is found between infused and acquired virtues: just as acquired virtues are obtained and, as it were, rooted in the mind only through many repeated acts, so they are not corrupted or expelled from the soul except through many contrary acts. Infused virtues, however, because they are not produced by labor but are divinely infused, are destroyed and vanish when any act contrary to them supervenes. They depart from us with the same facility with which they came into us without our effort.

As to the other example concerning science, we assigned the difference above. St. Thomas explains it here, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2: "In the different conclusions of one science there are different middle terms by which they are proved, one of which can be known without another. Therefore a person can know some conclusions of one science while being ignorant of others. But faith adheres to all the articles of faith because of one middle term, namely the First Truth proposed to us in the Scriptures according to the sound understanding of the Church. Therefore, one who falls away from this middle term entirely lacks faith."

12. Nor does it avail that one who disbelieves only one article of faith experiences himself assenting to the others with the same promptness and facility as before. That promptness and facility do not proceed from the habit of infused faith, but from an acquired habit of faith produced by the natural acts which he frequently exercised before his heresy concerning supernatural truths. He believed them with a faith human in its principle, although divine in its object. This is a certain counterfeit of faith, not a true act of faith but brass resembling gold, which introduces not the same facility but a similar one.

To what is added concerning the manner in which one act of unbelief destroys the habit of infused faith, I answer that it destroys it not only morally but also physically, not indeed immediately or in the genus of formal causality, but mediately or in the genus of efficient causality. It does so insofar as it generates a habitual disposition contrary to the disposition altogether necessary for the preservation of faith, namely a pertinacious adherence to one's own judgment. Although this pertinacity of adherence is not directly contrary to faith, it is directly opposed to the disposition without which faith cannot be preserved in its subject, namely the habitual captivity of the intellect in obedience to the sole authority of God obscurely revealing His mysteries. For it is impossible that one who pertinaciously

adheres to his own judgment should nevertheless be so subjected and made captive to God and the revealing First Truth that he can assent to revealed mysteries because of His authority and truthfulness alone. Therefore, just as one who destroys the dispositions required for the union of the soul with the body physically expels the soul, which cannot be preserved in the body without them, so every act of unbelief that carries pertinacity with it, without which there is no heresy, expels infused faith from the intellect, not formally and immediately, but efficiently and mediately.

13. It is objected secondly against the third part of the assertion, in which we said that faith does not remain in demons and the damned: Faith is lost only through the sin of unbelief. But demons and many of the damned did not fall into the sin of unbelief. Therefore the habit of infused faith remains in them. Hence St. Thomas below, q. 18, a. 3, ad 2, establishes this difference between faith and hope: hope does not remain in the damned, but faith does.

I answer by denying the minor premise. Infused and praiseworthy faith is destroyed not only through the sin of unbelief, but also through the absence of a pious affection for believing. Hence, since demons and the damned do not believe from a pious affection of the will toward the revealing First Truth, but because of the evidence of signs, grieving that they are so evident that they cannot dissent from them, infused faith does not remain in them but is destroyed by reason of this indisposition and impediment.

As to St. Thomas, I say that in the place cited he does not assert that faith, but not hope, is in the damned. Rather, he says that faith can exist in them more readily than hope, which is most true. First, because the state of damnation, in which there is not and never will dawn any hope of redemption, is more repugnant to hope of liberation than to knowledge of divine things. Second, because neither infused nor acquired hope can exist in the damned. Even natural hope tends only toward a good of the one who hopes which he apprehends as future, but no such good exists for the damned. Yet a certain faith, namely natural and acquired faith, can remain in them, as we said above of Catholics fallen into heresy, since they still believe, although in a certain manner under compulsion and because of the evidence of the signs they see. Hence it is said in James 2 that demons “believe and tremble.”

14. It is objected finally against the third part of the assertion, in which we said that the habit of faith does not remain in the blessed: The light of glory given to Paul in his rapture did not exclude the habit of faith, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 175, a. 3, ad 3. But the light of glory in St. Paul was

On the Theological Virtues

of the same nature as the light of glory bestowed upon the blessed in heaven. Therefore the light of glory bestowed upon the minds of the blessed does not expel the habit of faith, but can coexist with it in the same intellect.

It is confirmed first. Although the blessed clearly see the divine essence, they do not see in it all the mysteries of grace which pertain to the material object of faith. Therefore they retain habitual faith, at least concerning those mysteries.

It is confirmed secondly. The theology which we acquire here on the way through our acts remains in heaven, as we taught in Part I of this *Manuale*, Chapter I. Therefore faith likewise continues there, since theology depends upon faith as upon that which subalternates it and as upon the habit of its principles.

To the objection I answer that the light of glory given to St. Paul in his rapture was indeed of the same nature as the light of glory bestowed upon the blessed in heaven, but not of the same state and condition. It was not given to Paul as a permanent habit, as it is conferred upon the blessed in heaven, but as a transitory aid. Contrary forms expel one another only when they are in a perfect and permanent state, not when they exist in a wayfaring and transitory state, as we explained above, Chapter II, § 5, in reply to the third objection, from Cajetan.

To the first confirmation, granting without conceding the antecedent, which will be treated in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision, I deny the consequence. Since faith, like other habits, is specified by its formal and primary object, it cannot remain when that object is removed. Hence, if the blessed cannot retain habitual faith concerning God and those things which necessarily belong to Him, they cannot possess it concerning mysteries of grace which they do not clearly see in Him. Similarly, although they do not yet possess the glory of the body, which is a secondary object of hope, nevertheless, because they enjoy the glory of the soul and the beatific vision, which is its primary object, no place remains for the habit of hope in heaven, according to the Apostle's words in Rom. 8: "What a person sees, why does he hope for it?"

To the second, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that faith is essentially obscure and without evidence, and consequently incompatible with the clear vision of God. Theology, however, is not essentially obscure, but only accidentally so and by reason of the state of the journey. In that state it accidentally depends upon faith, which in us wayfarers takes the place of the light of glory and is, so to speak, the vicar of the knowledge of the blessed. To that knowledge our theology is of itself and by its nature subordinated in the

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

certitude and evidence of its principles. Hence it connaturally requires conjunction with it and, in such conjunction, the evidence of its principles, as we explained in the cited place of Part I.

§ 3.

On the Causes and Effects of Faith.

15. It is evident from what has been said above that the material or subjective cause of the habit of faith, or the subject in which it is received, is only the intellect of an angel or human being in the state of a wayfarer, since it does not remain either in the blessed or in the damned, as has already been shown. It is also evident that its formal cause is the object by which it is specified, namely God as the revealing First Truth. Its final cause is the salvation of the human person, of which faith is the beginning, root, and foundation, and to which it is ordered as to its proper end, according to 1 Pet. 1: “Receiving the end of your faith, the salvation of your souls.”

Finally, it is certain among all Catholics that the efficient cause of faith is God alone, by whom the habit of faith is infused and who not only reveals the truths that are to be believed, but also moves and applies the intellect by grace to assent to revealed truths. Hence Augustine on Ps. 126 says: “We speak outwardly; He builds inwardly. He builds, He moves, He opens the intellect, He applies our mind to faith.”

16. This would be the place to dispute against the Pelagians, who teach that, once external revelation or doctrine is supposed, a person can believe the mysteries of faith without a special intrinsic grace; and against the Semi-Pelagians, who, although they confessed with the Catholic Church that we cannot believe the revealed mysteries without grace, nevertheless contended that the beginning of faith is in us from ourselves, namely the pious affection for believing, or a certain inclination toward belief. But both errors were refuted by us in the Treatise on Grace, Chapter I, § 3. We therefore refer the reader to that place.

17. St. Thomas assigns two effects of faith here, q. 7, aa. 1 and 2, namely servile and filial fear, and purification of the heart, according to Peter’s words in Acts 15: “Purifying their hearts by faith.”

First, therefore, faith is a cause of servile and filial fear because, as the same holy Doctor reasons in a. 1: “Fear is a certain movement of the appetitive power. The principle of all appetitive movements is a good or evil apprehended. Hence the principle of fear and of the other appetitive movements must be some apprehension. Through faith there arises in us an

On the Theological Virtues

apprehension of certain penal evils inflicted according to divine judgment, and in this way faith is the cause of the fear by which one fears punishment from God, which is servile fear. It is also the cause of filial fear, by which one fears separation from God, or shrinks from comparing oneself with God while revering Him, insofar as through faith we have this judgment concerning God, that He is an immense and supremely exalted good, separation from whom is the worst evil, and to whom it is evil to wish to be made equal. But unformed faith is the cause of the first fear, namely servile fear, while formed faith is the cause of the second fear, namely filial fear, because through charity it causes a person to adhere to God and be subject to Him.”

18. That purification of the heart is also an effect of faith is evident, first, because faith purges the intellect of every error, and hence is called by William of Paris “the virginity of the mind.” Second, because it is the root and beginning of justification, through which a person is perfectly cleansed from sins. Finally, because, as St. Thomas reasons in a. 2 of the same question: “The impurity of each thing consists in its being mingled with baser things. Silver is not called impure because it is mixed with gold, by which it is made better, but because it is mixed with lead or tin. It is evident, however, that the rational creature is nobler than all temporal and bodily creatures, and therefore it is rendered impure by subjecting itself to temporal things through love. It is purified from this impurity by a contrary movement, namely by tending toward what is above it, that is, toward God. The first principle in this movement is faith, for one approaching God must believe, as is said in Heb. 11. Therefore the first principle of the purification of the heart is faith.”

19. From this the same holy Doctor infers in q. 8 that the gifts of understanding and knowledge correspond to the virtue of faith. For just as in bodily things transparency is the ultimate disposition for light, which is therefore defined by philosophers as “the actuality of the transparent,” so in spiritual things purity of heart is the disposition for knowledge and wisdom. For this reason St. Augustine calls wisdom “the understanding of a purified mind.” Therefore, if purification of the heart is an effect of faith, it follows that the gifts of understanding and knowledge correspond to faith.

Hence the same holy Doctor in *De spiritu et littera* says: “Do not seek to understand so that you may believe, but believe so that you may understand, for understanding is the reward of faith.” Hence also St. Thomas, a. 7 of the cited question, teaches that the sixth beatitude, namely purity of heart, to which the vision of God is promised, corresponds to the gift of understanding. For, he says, there is a twofold purity of heart. One is

preliminary and dispositive for vision, namely the purification of the heart from disordered affections, which is obtained through the virtues and gifts of the appetite. The other is, as it were, consummative, namely the purification of the soul from heresies, errors, phantasms, and false judgments. This is conferred by the gift of understanding corresponding to faith.

CHAPTER XI.

The Principal Endowments and Prerogatives of Faith.

20. There are five outstanding endowments and prerogatives of faith.

First, it is prior in the order of origin to hope, charity, and the infused moral virtues. The reason is that knowledge of the end is prior in the order of generation to the intention of that end and the choice of the means. Nothing is willed unless first known, and the will is directed in all its acts by the knowledge of the intellect. But knowledge of the supernatural end to which the human person is elevated is had through faith. Intention of that end proceeds from hope and charity, which desire God as the ultimate end, either as good in Himself or as our good. The choice of the means leading to that end is made through the infused moral virtues. Therefore faith is prior in the order of origin to hope, charity, and the infused moral virtues. Hence it is called by the holy Fathers the foundation of the whole Christian edifice, the beginning of salvation, the root of all justification, the first life of the human intellect, and the firstborn among the virtues, as we shall explain more fully below from William of Paris.

Second, faith is eminently speculative and practical. This is because it has God for its object, who is the first rule of speculation and action, as the First Truth and ultimate end. It is also because faith is a certain impression and participation of divine knowledge, which is eminently speculative and practical, as we explained in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God.

Third, faith is not discursive, but immediately assents to revealed truths. The reason is that in discourse the assent concerning a premise or principle is really distinct from the assent concerning the conclusion. But the assent of faith concerning divine revelation is not really distinct from the assent concerning the thing revealed. Therefore it is not discursive. The major premise is evident. There is no discourse in angels precisely because by one simple act they see and assent to the principle and the conclusion, as we showed in the Treatise on Angels, Chapter IX, § 2. The minor premise is also certain. By the same act by which someone assents to the thing revealed, he

On the Theological Virtues

also assents to the revelation itself, because the formal object of the assent of faith is the revealed thing taken not materially, but formally and precisely as revealed.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. The act of vision by which the eye attains color and light is one simple act, because color is only the material object of sight, while light is its formal object. Similarly, the thing revealed by God is only the material object of the act of faith, while divine revelation is its formal object. Therefore by one simple act faith believes the revealed thing and divine revelation. Consequently, it is not discursive, since discourse implies a plurality of acts and proceeds from one thing previously known to knowledge of another.

Hence faith differs from theology in this: theology formally implies discourse and proceeds from revelation that is merely virtual, whereas faith attains by one intuition divine revelation and the truths revealed by God.

21. You will say: Many times general councils or Supreme Pontiffs deduce from certain propositions believed by faith other propositions pertaining to faith, as, for example, that there are two wills in Christ from the fact that there are two natures in Him. Therefore faith sometimes reasons discursively.

I answer that such inferences are not made by faith but by theology, which deduces those conclusions from revealed principles. Hence those truths, precisely insofar as they are deduced from the principles of faith, are not articles of faith but theological conclusions. They pertain to faith only insofar as they are immediately contained in divine revelation.

Fourth, the certitude of faith surpasses the certitude of all natural sciences and even of the habit of first principles. First, because it rests upon a more infallible motive, namely divine testimony. Second, because the assent of the natural sciences and of the habit of first principles proceeds from nature moving us to it, while the assent of faith proceeds from the motion and impulse of the Holy Spirit exciting a pious motion toward belief. He is a firmer and more infallible cause than nature moving us to assent to first principles.

Hence we see that the best-known principles of the human sciences are sometimes corrected or limited by faith. In the matter of creation and in the mystery of the resurrection, these two first principles of philosophy and natural light are denied: "Nothing comes from nothing"; "There is no return from privation to habit." In the mysteries of the Trinity and the Eucharist, these two principles are limited and, as it were, reformed: "Things that are the same as one third thing are the same as one another"; "For an accident to be is to inhere in a subject."

22. It must nevertheless be observed that although the certitude of faith is greater in itself, and even as it exists in us, than the certitude of the natural sciences and of the habit of first principles, it is not greater relative to us. That knowledge is called more certain relative to us whose certitude is more connatural and proportioned to our intellect, more fully satisfies and quiets it, and more completely excludes from it movements of hesitation and doubt.

But the certitude of the natural sciences and of the habit of first principles, since it is joined with evidence and clarity, is more connatural and proportioned to our intellect, more fully satisfies and quiets it, and more completely excludes movements of hesitation and doubt than does the certitude of faith, which is joined with obscurity and lack of evidence. Hence faith requires a pious motion of the will for assenting to revealed truths, whereas the natural sciences and the habit of first principles do not require such a motion for assenting to first principles and scientific conclusions. Therefore the certitude of the natural sciences and of the habit of first principles is greater relative to us than the certitude of faith.

Hence St. Thomas here, q. 4, a. 8, asks whether faith is more certain than the habit of first principles, wisdom, and science, and concludes that “faith is absolutely more certain, but the others are more certain in a qualified respect, namely relative to us.” When he first objects to himself that faith, since it does not exclude every movement of doubt, does not seem more certain than wisdom and science, which admit no doubt concerning the things of which they treat, he answers that “this doubt does not arise from the cause of faith, but relative to us, insofar as we do not fully attain by the intellect the things of faith.” And in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1, he says: “Nothing prevents what is more certain according to its nature from being less certain relative to us because of the weakness of our intellect. Hence the doubt which occurs in some persons concerning the articles of faith does not arise from uncertainty in the thing, but from the weakness of the human intellect.”

23. Finally, faith is, as it were, a certain image and exemplar of eternity. For just as eternity encompasses and contains the past, present, and future, as we explained in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God, Chapter IV, § 3, so faith embraces in its most capacious bosom all the mysteries that are, were, or will be, and presents them to the faithful for contemplation. “What,” says Bernard, serm. 76 on the Canticle, “does faith not discover? It reaches the inaccessible, discovers the unknown, comprehends the immeasurable, apprehends the last things, and finally in a certain manner encloses eternity itself within its most capacious bosom.”

On the Theological Virtues

24. William of Paris enumerates and explains other endowments and prerogatives of faith in *De moribus*, c. 1, where he introduces faith speaking as follows:

“I am the first life of the human mind, the first light that breaks through the darkness of ignorance and unbelief. I am the light first created among the works of human re-creation and reformation, just as, according to Moses, light was first formed among the works of God. I am the pillar of light that leads the human intellect out of the Egypt of darkness and errors under my guidance. I am the first combatant in spiritual wars. I am the first to conquer the battle line of the human mind, that is, the intellective power, and, victoriously entering it first, I kill in that same citadel the first guest of God, namely human sense and the wisdom of the world, or at least reduce them to captivity.

“In this citadel I raise the banner of the King of kings, that is, the Cross of Christ, as a sign of victory and triumph. I am the way by which God enters the human mind, and therefore, where I am not present, no access lies open to God. I am the most firm pillar of truth, sustaining the human intellect. I am the argument by which human wisdom is refuted, confounded, and rendered altogether foolish. I am the helmet of salvation, protecting the head of the human mind, the intellect, against the darts of error.

“I am the first lamp in the house of God, the first torch in His temple, the morning star in the spiritual heaven, first announcing the day of grace. I am the guiding star showing the port and homeland to those sailing through the sea of this world. I am the new star which guided the Magi and led them to the house where the child Jesus was. I am the lamp by which one walks in the night of the present life, by whose light the precious drachma of prayer is sought, and by whose shining in a dark place the heavenly mysteries become accessible.

“I am the dawn of the divine and beatific vision, shining before the sun and announcing the day of eternal glory. I am the virginity of the human mind, preserving the intellect from the corruption of error. I am the silver ring on the finger of the Bridegroom, the King of heaven, that is, the seal and mark of chastity, shining with the whiteness of purity and the light of saving truth.”

CHAPTER XII.
On the Virtue of Hope.

Hope has a great affinity with faith, since faith, according to the Apostle, is the foundation and substance of things hoped for, while hope desires those immense and eternal goods which faith displays and, relying upon God's assistance, hopes to obtain them. Therefore, having completed the Treatise on Faith, it follows that we should discuss the virtue of hope and briefly explain here its object, subject, and the precept obliging us to it.

1. We suppose as certain that hope is a virtue in the strict and proper sense, whatever Durandus may have written to the contrary in III *Sententiarum*, dist. 20.

For, as St. Thomas rightly reasons here, q. 17, a. 1, a virtue in the strict sense is that which makes its possessor good and renders his work good. Therefore, wherever a good act is found, a corresponding virtue must exist from which it may be elicited readily, easily, and sweetly. But the act of hope is good and conformable to the rule of the eternal law, since it is commanded by God as supernatural author, as will be evident below when we treat the precept of hope. Therefore hope is a virtue in the strict and proper sense.

2. You will say: God cannot licitly be loved with a love of desire. Therefore neither can He be hoped for, and consequently the act of hope cannot be good and conformable to the rule of the eternal law. The second consequence is evident, and the first also seems legitimate. For hope either is itself the love of desire or supposes such love concerning the same object.

The antecedent is proved as follows. That which is loved with a love of desire is loved for the sake of something else and is ordered to that for which it is desired. Consequently, to love God in this way is to order Him to ourselves and not to enjoy Him but to use Him, in which, according to Augustine, the whole perversity of the human will consists.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I distinguish the antecedent. What is loved with a love of desire is loved for the sake of something else, when "for the sake of" signifies the end for the sake of which: I deny the antecedent. When "for the sake of" signifies the beneficiary, or the subject to be perfected through another: I grant the antecedent. To love God in this manner is not to use God or to order Him to ourselves, but to order ourselves to God as beings to be perfected by Him.

On the Theological Virtues

Thus we can tend toward something with a love of desire in two ways. First, we can desire it for our own sake, as when we desire food and drink for the preservation of our life. We confess that God can be loved in this manner only perversely, because, since He is the ultimate end of all things, He cannot be ordered to another as an end.

Second, we can love something not for our own sake, but for ourselves, in such a manner that we ourselves do not have the character of an end, but of a subject to which the thing we love is to be fittingly joined and applied. In this way it is lawful and honest to love God with a love of desire through the virtue of hope, because it is lawful and honest to love God for oneself and one's soul. Thus the eternal Father willed His Son to become incarnate for us and for our salvation, not because He willed us to be the end of His love and gift, but because He willed that mystery to result in our good, benefit, and redemption. Or, as theologians say in the *Treatise on the Incarnation*, He willed the mystery of the Incarnation for the human person, not as the end which is intended, but as the beneficiary for whom it was intended.

I add that when through hope we love God for ourselves, we do not love Him because of some benefit distinct from God that comes to us from Him. For in that manner we would love Him perversely, namely because of some created gift. Rather, we love Him because of His uncreated goodness insofar as it is applied and united to us. In this there can be no perversity, because, since such goodness is our highest good, it is lawful and praiseworthy to will that it be joined and applied to us through beatific vision and enjoyment.

§ 1.

On the Object of Hope.

3. Philosophers ordinarily assign a threefold object to a power or habit: the formal terminative object, the formal motive, and the material object attained by reason of the formal object. Therefore, in order that the object of hope may be clearly understood, the three kinds of object belonging to it must be briefly explained.

4. I say first, therefore, that the formal terminative object of theological hope is beatitude. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 17, a. 2, argues as follows: "Hope attains God by relying upon His assistance in order to obtain the good hoped for. An effect must be proportioned to its cause. Therefore the good which we ought properly and principally to hope for from God is the infinite good proportioned to the power of God assisting us. For it belongs to infinite power to lead to an infinite good. This good is eternal life, which consists in

the enjoyment of God Himself. Nothing less than God Himself ought to be hoped for from Him, since His goodness, by which He communicates goods to the creature, is no less than His essence.” And in the next question, a. 2: “Hope receives its species from its principal object. Its principal object, however, is eternal beatitude insofar as it is possible to obtain it through divine assistance.”

Reason also supports this. Hope on the way and enjoyment in the homeland have the same object and differ only as the way and the terminus. But enjoyment has the ultimate end and beatitude as its primary formal object. Therefore hope does also.

Almost all theologians agree on this. But since beatitude is twofold, namely formal and objective, they dispute which of these is the formal terminative object of hope. Some say it is formal beatitude, others objective beatitude, and still others that it is integrated and composed from both.

5. I say secondly, however, that the formal terminative object of theological hope is neither formal beatitude nor an aggregate of formal and objective beatitude, but objective beatitude, which is God, as connoting formal beatitude, or the first beatific vision, as a condition applying and uniting God’s infinite goodness to us.

The first part is proved by a fundamental argument. Hope is a theological virtue, as all confess and St. Thomas expressly teaches here, q. 17, a. 5. But if it regarded not God Himself immediately, but the beatific vision alone as its formal terminative object, it would not be a theological virtue. Therefore the conclusion follows. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved from the fact that it is not sufficient for the nature of a theological virtue to have God as a mediate object. Otherwise religion and the gift of fear would be theological virtues, which no one admits. The sole reason is that religion primarily regards something created as its object, namely the worship of God. The gift of fear, although it regards the divine eminence as its formal motive, nevertheless does not have something divine as its formal terminative object, but something created, namely the evil threatened and intended by God. Therefore, similarly, if the formal terminative object of the virtue of hope were not something divine and uncreated, but something created, namely beatific vision, hope could not be numbered among the theological virtues.

6. That the formal terminative object of hope is not an aggregate of formal and objective beatitude is proved by the same argument. A theological virtue has as its formal terminative object something purely divine and uncreated, not something mixed from created and uncreated realities. This is evident in the formal terminative object of faith and charity,

On the Theological Virtues

which is the First and uncreated Truth alone, and the supreme and infinite goodness of God. But formal beatitude, namely beatific vision, is something created, as is evident. Therefore the formal terminative object of hope is not an aggregate of formal and objective beatitude. Rather, hope primarily and immediately regards God alone as the First Truth and highest good enjoyed by the blessed through beatific vision, according to Augustine, *Confessiones* X, c. 23: “The happy life is joy in the truth, that is, joy in You, who are the Truth, my God.”

Hence St. Thomas here, a. 5, says: “The principal object of hope, insofar as it is a virtue, is God.” Certainly, as the same holy Doctor reasons in the passage quoted in the preceding conclusion, since God is of infinite power, we ought to hope from Him for something of infinite goodness. This is God Himself, not the acts of vision and enjoyment, since these are vital, created, and finite acts proceeding from us. Therefore God Himself, and not vision, is immediately and proximately hoped for.

The holy Doctor confirmed this teaching not only by doctrine, but also by his example. When Christ asked what reward he desired for his great labors in writing, he answered: “Nothing other than You, Lord.” As a certain recent author from the Society of Jesus beautifully says: “He could not choose anything greater, nor ought he to have chosen anything less; he would have written badly had he chosen otherwise.” For Augustine says in *De civitate Dei* XXII, last chapter: “The reward of virtue will be He who gave virtue, and who promised Himself, than whom nothing can be better or greater.” And on Ps. 72: “One who asks another reward from God and wishes to serve God for that reason makes what he wishes to receive more dear than Him from whom he wishes to receive it. What, then, is there no reward from God? None other than God Himself. God Himself is God’s reward.”

7. From this you will understand that a chaste desire for God, such as theological hope, loves God more than the enjoyment of God. God is infinitely more excellent than every vision and enjoyment of Him, and therefore is desired more than His vision and enjoyment, which are desired only for the sake of God. For God is desired as the good in which we wish to rest, while the vision and enjoyment of God are desired as the good by which we rest in God.

St. Thomas explains this admirably in opusc. 61, c. 3, where he assigns three differences between the love by which sweet wine is loved for the sake of pleasure and the love by which God is loved for the sake of possessing God. He reasons concerning the third difference as follows:

“Third, I desire sweet wine in order that it may delight me. In the present case, however, that is, when I desire God in order that I may enjoy

Him, the reason is the opposite. For we do not refer God's goodness to our delight, namely created beatitude, but rather conversely. The cause of the difference is evident as follows. Everything received exists in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver and not according to the mode of the thing received. Therefore, if the thing received is less noble than the receiver, it is ennobled in the receiver. Thus the species of a visible thing received in the eye is more perfect in being and nobler in the eye than in prime matter. Likewise, the sweetness of a tastable thing received in the taste is better and nobler than in its own matter. Therefore the sweetness of wine is better in the person whom it delights than in the wine. But the good must be referred to what is better and not conversely. Therefore I desire the sweetness of wine for the sake of being delighted.

"Conversely, the supreme and infinite good, which beatifies and delights the affection, is received by the affection according to the mode of the affection, namely finitely, and infinitely exceeds it. Therefore, just as a lesser good is to be referred to a greater good, so created beatitude in the soul, through the influence of uncreated beatitude and the highest good, must be referred to the supreme good which bestows that influence. Therefore the movement by which I desire God and the highest good ought to be infinitely greater than that by which I desire eternal life and my enjoyment. For I desire this latter thing for the sake of the former: the latter as the end by which I rest, the former as the end in which I rest."

8. Finally, it is manifest that objective beatitude, in order to be the formal terminative object of hope, must connote formal beatitude, namely beatific vision, as the last part of the conclusion asserts. For the highest good does not terminate movement or desire except as something to be possessed. But it is not possessed by an intellectual creature except through beatific vision, which is its attainment. Therefore beatific vision is at least connoted in the formal terminative object of theological hope as an applying condition by which God is united to us and His infinite goodness is applied to us.

9. I say thirdly that the omnipotence of God as assisting is the formal motive of theological hope. Thus St. Thomas, *De spe*, q. un., a. 1: "Just as the formal object of faith is the First Truth, so the formal object of hope is the assistance of divine power and goodness, because of which the movement of hope tends toward the goods hoped for, which are its material object." And in a. 4: "The formal object of hope, insofar as it is a theological virtue, is the divine assistance upon which it relies."

This must not be understood of a created assistance received in the will, but of uncreated assistance, which is omnipotence itself preparing and

On the Theological Virtues

conferring, or offering to us, created aids. Since hope is a theological virtue, its formal motive must be something uncreated and divine.

10. The conclusion is further proved by a fundamental argument. The formal motive of hope is that upon which hope relies as the means and reason for hoping for eternal life and the other things leading to it, just as that is the formal motive of faith which is the reason and motive for assenting to revealed truths. But that upon which the hope of beatitude relies as the means and reason for hoping is divine omnipotence as assisting, or as furnishing and offering the aids necessary for obtaining it. Therefore the omnipotence of God assisting us, or His power to assist, is the formal motive of theological hope.

This is confirmed by the same example of faith. The First Truth as revealing or testifying is the formal motive of faith because the ultimate resolution of faith is made into it. If someone is asked why he believes and is persuaded that God is triune and one in three Persons, he rightly answers: because God has said it. Similarly, the ultimate resolution of our hope is made into divine omnipotence as assisting, or as able to assist. If someone is asked why he hopes for beatitude, he rightly answers: because God is omnipotent and is prepared to assist us by His help in obtaining it. Therefore the formal motive of our hope is likewise divine omnipotence as assisting or able to assist.

It is further confirmed from the excellent connection between the object which we hope for and the object in which we hope, because of which they mutually imply one another. Since what is hoped for is God, we must hope in no one other than God, for He cannot be obtained from another. And because God is He in whom we hope, we must hope from God for nothing less than God Himself. For from so magnificent a Lord it is fitting to hope for nothing less than what He Himself is, according to God's words to Abraham in Gen. 15: "I am your exceedingly great reward." Hence Augustine on Ps. 102 says: "Raise your hope to the good of all goods. He will be your good, by whom you were made good in your kind and by whom all things were made good in their kinds."

11. I say finally that created goods which lead to beatitude are the material and secondary objects of our hope. Thus St. Thomas in the passage cited for the preceding conclusion says that "the movement of hope tends toward the goods hoped for, which are its material object."

This is also evident from the example of faith. The created objects made known to us by divine revelation are called its secondary and material objects, as we explained above in Chapter I. Therefore created goods leading to beatitude, which we hope for from God, are rightly called the material and

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

secondary objects of our hope, insofar as they fall under its formal motive, namely the omnipotence of God assisting us, or able to assist us in obtaining beatitude. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 2, ad 2: “Hope principally regards eternal beatitude. Other goods sought from God it regards secondarily in their order to eternal beatitude, just as faith principally regards God and secondarily regards the things ordered to God.”

12. From this it is inferred first that created goods which are not desired and sought from God in their order to eternal beatitude, but because of some temporal motive, are not the material and secondary objects of our hope. Similarly, created truths which are not ordered to God and to the uncreated Truth primarily believed are not and ought not to be called secondary and material objects of our faith. This is gathered from St. Thomas above, a. 1, in the body, where he says: “If we consider the things to which faith assents, its object is not only God Himself but also many other things, which nevertheless do not fall under the assent of faith except insofar as they have some order to God.”

Hence, if God revealed something temporal under a purely temporal aspect and not referred to Himself, such a revelation would not pertain to infused and theological faith, but to the gift of prophecy or to some other supernatural light communicated in a transitory manner, as the same holy Doctor teaches in III *Sententiarum*, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 1, ad 3.

§ 2.

Objections Are Solved.

14. [sic] Against the first conclusion there is no difficult argument, but against the second it is objected first: The object of hope on the way is the same as the object of delight in the homeland, for delight succeeds hope and terminates its movement or desire. But the object of delight in the homeland is not God but the vision and enjoyment of Him. Therefore neither is God the object of hope.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. As our Thomists more commonly teach in the Treatise on Beatitude, the primary object of enjoyment and delight in the homeland is God Himself, while vision is only its secondary object. The reason is that the immediate object of delight in the homeland is that which is the primary and immediate object of beatific vision. But God alone, and not the vision itself, is the primary and immediate object of beatific vision. Therefore He is also the primary and immediate object of delight in the homeland.

On the Theological Virtues

The major premise is evident. The object of an act of the will is that good which is proposed through the cognition upon which that act of the will follows. But no other cognition of the intellect exists upon which beatific delight follows except vision. Therefore the conclusion follows. The minor premise is also evident, because vision directly proposes God alone as the highest and supremely delightful good, not itself except indirectly, secondarily, and by reflection, insofar as it is in an eminent manner a cognition at once direct and reflexive. Hence, although vision itself is, as it were, a secondary and mediate object of delight in the homeland, it is not its proximate and immediate object. God Himself is.

15. You will say: That alone is the proximate and immediate object of delight in the homeland, and consequently of hope on the way, which is the proper good of the blessed person. For delights follow the nature of the love to which they pertain, while the love of desire concerns only the proper good of the one desiring. But God is not the proper good of the blessed person except by reason of beatific vision, since through that alone He is united to him. Therefore beatific vision alone is the primary and immediate object of delight in the homeland.

I answer that when it is said that God is not the good of the blessed person except by reason of beatific vision, this is true if “by reason of” denotes an applying condition, but not if it declares the formal reason and cause. For God is the good of the blessed person by reason of His infinite goodness and perfection, through which He is supremely fitting to the rational creature, although He must be applied and united to it through beatific vision, which is His attainment and possession.

16. It is objected secondly: The object of hope is a future good. But God in Himself is not future; only the vision of God is future. Therefore God is not the immediate object of hope, but only the vision of Him.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. The object of hope is a future good in such a way that futurity is the formal character of the object or pertains to it: I deny the major premise. In such a way that futurity is a condition: I grant the major and the minor, and deny the consequence.

Thus, just as being unseen is not attained by faith primarily and of itself, because it is not the formal character but only a condition or intrinsic mode in the object of faith, which is the revealing First Truth, so also futurity, or not yet being possessed, is not attained by hope primarily and of itself, but only secondarily. It is not the formal specifying character of hope, but only a necessarily required condition or an intrinsic mode of its object.

17. You will say: That by which hope differs from joy and enjoyment is its object, and not merely a condition. But hope differs from joy in this: joy or

enjoyment concerns a present and possessed good, while hope concerns a future good not yet obtained. Therefore futurity pertains to the object of hope not merely as a condition, but also as its formal character.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. That by which hope formally differs from joy is its object: I grant the major. That by which hope differs only applicatively is its object: I deny the major. Futurity and presence are not different formal characters in acts of the will, but different conditions applying a different mode of desirability and goodness. Futurity applies a good not yet possessed and to be possessed; presence applies a good already possessed.

18. It is objected thirdly: God as to be possessed is the object of hope. But He is not to be possessed except through beatific vision. Therefore beatific vision is the object of hope, or at least is included in it inadequately and partially.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. God as to be possessed is the object of hope, when “as” signifies a condition: I grant the major. When it signifies the formal character: I deny the major.

19. It is objected fourthly with Vincent Contenson: Formal and objective beatitude constitute only one total end. Therefore, since the ultimate end of the rational creature is the object of hope, the object of hope will not be objective beatitude alone, but formal beatitude also, and an aggregate or composite of both will be that object.

I deny the consequence. Although formal and objective beatitude constitute only one total end, nevertheless, because formal beatitude itself is something created and of itself ordered to objective beatitude, it does not pertain to the formal terminative object of hope. For it is contrary to the nature of a formal object to be ordered to another, and contrary to the nature of a theological virtue primarily to regard something created.

20. It is objected fifthly against the third conclusion: God as assisting implies only the character of an efficient cause. But an efficient cause does not specify, since specification is reduced to the genus of formal causality. Therefore God as assisting is not the formal motive specifying the virtue of hope.

I answer by denying the major premise. God as assisting implies both kinds of causality, efficient and extrinsic formal causality. He implies efficient causality insofar as He confers or offers the aids necessary for attaining beatitude. He implies extrinsic formal causality insofar as, by offering such aids, He moves and excites us to hope for beatitude. For the motive object of an act has the character of an extrinsic formal and specifying cause with respect to that act.

On the Theological Virtues

§ 3.

On the Subject of Hope.

21. There is no difficulty concerning the subject of hope as faculty, as it is called. It is certain among all that hope is received in the will, just as faith is received in the intellect. A doubt can remain only concerning the subject as person, namely which persons are capable of the virtue of hope. For its resolution:

I say first that hope is found in all the faithful, even though they are infected by some mortal sin other than despair.

This conclusion is evident. All the faithful can apprehend beatitude as possible for them through the assistance of God. Therefore, unless they sin by the sin of despair, hope will remain in them, since the object of hope remains, just as was said above concerning faith. Hence God willed faith and hope to remain in sinners deprived of grace, charity, and the other charisms and supernatural gifts, as two planks remaining after shipwreck, so that with their help sinners might more easily return to grace and rise from sin.

22. I say secondly that the theological virtue of hope is not found in heretics, because faith, which is the foundation of hope and “the substance of things hoped for,” as the Apostle says, is not found in them. Therefore, just as only a certain natural and acquired faith is found in heretics, as we explained in Chapter X, § 1, so in them there is only a similar hope, which is a certain natural love of desire with respect to beatitude, and a certain natural tendency or inclination toward it.

Nor is an act of despair required in heretics for the destruction of hope. The loss of the habit of faith is sufficient, because when the foundation of faith has been destroyed, the hope built upon it must collapse, just as accidents vanish when their subject perishes.

23. I say thirdly that hope does not remain in the damned, but does remain in souls existing in purgatory.

The first part is evident, first, because infused faith is not found in the damned, as was shown above in Chapter X. Therefore neither is hope, for the same reason applies to both, and faith is the foundation and rule of hope.

Second, the damned cannot apprehend beatitude as possible for them. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 18, a. 3, “it pertains to the condition of the misery of the damned that they know they can in no way avoid their damnation and attain beatitude.” Hence it is said in Job 15: “He does not

believe that he can return from darkness to light.” Therefore the damned cannot hope for beatitude. Hence Hugh of Saint Victor, *De anima* IV, describes hell as follows: “Hell is a depth without bottom, in which there is no hope of good and no cessation of evil.”

24. The second part, namely that hope remains in souls existing in purgatory, is no less evident. First, because, as we showed in Chapter X, faith remains in them, and faith is the basis and foundation of hope. Second, because beatitude is still absent from them and must be attained through the grievous torments and punishments of purgatory. It therefore has the character of an absent and arduous good and is consequently matter for hope, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited article, at the end of the body, and as others commonly teach.

Nor does it matter that those souls are certain of attaining glory. Certitude does not remove hope, but rather strengthens it, because it does not remove the arduous character of the object, although the difficulty is most certainly overcome through divine assistance and promises.

The same must be said of the souls of the patriarchs who, before the Passion of Christ, were detained in Limbo. They likewise possessed hope because they had not yet attained beatitude but awaited it from divine assistance and under the divine promise. Hence it is said of those ancient patriarchs in Wis. 3: “Their hope is full of immortality.” That is, their hope does not die but lives as long as they remain in this state.

25. I say finally that the habit of theological hope does not remain in the blessed. Thus theologians commonly teach, except for Suarez and a few others, together with St. Thomas here, a. 2, where he demonstrates our conclusion by this argument: Hope regards eternal life as future, arduous, and possible to obtain. But eternal beatitude is neither arduous nor future nor possible to obtain for the blessed, since they actually possess it. Therefore there is no hope of eternal beatitude in the blessed.

Likewise, in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 4, he asks: “Whether hope remains after death in the state of glory?” He answers that it does not remain and proves this as follows: Movement ceases when its terminus has been obtained. But hope has the character of a movement tending toward beatitude. Therefore, once beatitude is obtained, hope perishes. The Apostle indicates this argument in Rom. 8: “Hope which is seen is not hope; for what a person sees, why does he hope for it?”

26. You will say with Suarez that although there cannot be in the blessed hope concerning the beatitude of the soul, which they possess, there can nevertheless be hope concerning the beatitude of the body, which they do not yet possess.

On the Theological Virtues

But the holy Doctor effectively refutes this response and teaching here, a. 2, ad 4, where he argues as follows: “Since hope is a theological virtue having God as its principal object, the object of hope is the glory of the soul, which consists in divine enjoyment, but not the glory of the body. The glory of the body, although it has the character of something arduous in comparison with human nature, nevertheless does not have the character of something arduous for one who possesses the glory of the soul. This is both because the glory of the body is something very small in comparison with the glory of the soul, and because one who possesses the glory of the soul already sufficiently possesses the cause of the glory of the body.” He teaches the same in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 3.

From this it is evident that the habit of hope does not remain in the blessed in relation to the glory of the body which they await, because bodily glory does not have the character of an arduous good in relation to them.

It is confirmed first. A habit of virtue is posited principally because of the primary act by which it is specified, and not solely because of a secondary act when the primary act is impossible. But hoping for the glory of the soul is the primary act of hope, which is impossible in the blessed, as we have already shown, while awaiting the glory of the body is only its secondary act. Therefore the habit of hope cannot be given in the blessed merely for hoping for the beatitude of the body which they do not yet possess.

It is confirmed secondly. By theological hope all things are hoped for in their order to beatitude as the primary object of hope, as we showed in § 1, conclusion 3. But once the beatitude of the soul is possessed, the glory of the body cannot be hoped for in its order to beatitude as primarily hoped for, since that beatitude is no longer hoped for. Therefore, once the beatitude of the soul is possessed, the glory of the body cannot be hoped for by theological hope.

27. It is objected first: The gift of fear remains in the blessed, according to Job 26: “The pillars of heaven tremble and are afraid at His nod,” which St. Gregory explains of the blessed angels. Therefore the virtue of hope likewise remains in them. The consequence is proved because, just as an arduous good possible to obtain is the formal object of hope, so an arduous evil possible to avoid is the formal object of fear. Therefore, if notwithstanding this the gift of fear is found in the blessed, the virtue of hope will likewise remain in them.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. To its proof, I distinguish the antecedent. An arduous evil possible to avoid is the formal object of fear as a passion: I grant the antecedent. As a gift of the

Holy Spirit: I deny the antecedent. For the object of fear as a gift is the divine majesty and excellence as able to inflict some evil or deprive one of some good.

Hence, although fear as a passion is not in the blessed, fear as a gift of the Holy Spirit is. Nevertheless, the virtue of hope is not found in them, because in the homeland, once beatitude is attained, its formal object perishes, as is evident from what has been said above.

This solution is from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 7, a. 6, ad 1: “The evil regarded by fear does not belong to the nature of the gift of fear, but rather the eminence of that good, namely the divine good, by whose power some evil can be inflicted. Hope, however, insofar as it is a virtue, regards not only the author of the good but also the good itself insofar as it is not possessed. Therefore the virtue of hope is not attributed to Christ, who already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, but the gift of fear is.”

28. It is objected secondly: The act of awaiting the glory of the body in the blessed must be elicited by some habit; otherwise in us it would be elicited more sweetly and connaturally than in them. But in the blessed such an act cannot be elicited by any habit other than the virtue of hope. Therefore that virtue remains in them, at least in relation to the desire and expectation of bodily glory.

Some answer by denying the major premise. They say that although in us the act of desiring and awaiting bodily glory is naturally elicited by a habit, because the arduousness of the object surpasses the powers of the will, nevertheless no habit is required in the blessed for eliciting it. Since the glory of the body is derived from the soul by overflow and results according to a movement of connatural propriety, the will filled with God and rejoicing in beatific love is more than sufficiently inclined to desire and await bodily glory without a habit. This solution is not without probability.

I answer secondly, according to the common teaching of the Thomists, by granting the major premise and denying the minor. In the blessed, the desire and expectation of bodily glory are elicited by the virtue of charity. For just as St. Thomas says here, a. 2, ad 3, that “the blessed indeed hope for beatitude for others, but not by the virtue of hope, rather from the love of charity,” so likewise it must be said that the blessed desire and await bodily glory from the love of charity which they have for themselves and for the glory of their bodies.

The reason is that bodily glory can be considered both under the aspect of good and under the aspect of arduousness. The former pertains to charity, by which we desire good not only for others but also for ourselves. The latter pertains to hope, whose office is to strive toward and tend to difficult things.

On the Theological Virtues

Hence, since bodily glory, once the beatitude of the soul has been attained, no longer has the character of an arduous good, and only the character of good remains in it, the desire and expectation of bodily glory are elicited in the homeland by the blessed from charity and not from hope.

§ 4.

On the Precept of Hope.

29. It is certain that there is a precept of hope. This is openly gathered from various passages of Scripture in which people are induced to hope not merely by way of admonition or promise, but by way of command. Ps. 4: "Offer the sacrifice of justice, and hope in the Lord." Here the precept to act justly and the precept to hope are contained in the same form. Ps. 61: "Hope in Him, all you assembly of the people." Likewise, among the other commands which Timothy was to give to the rich by the Apostle's direction was the command of hope: "Command," he says, "the rich of this world not to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God." Finally, in Wis. 2 the impious are reproached because they did not hope for the reward of justice.

30. There is also a manifest argument. It is contrary to right reason not to trust in God's power and mercy, to neglect or fail effectively to pursue so great a good as eternal life offered with a certain promise, or to refuse to undertake the labor necessary for attaining it. Therefore there is a natural precept of hope by which a person is bound to hope for beatitude and all things necessary for attaining it.

Although this precept does not appear in the Decalogue, the reason is, as St. Thomas says here, q. 22, a. 1, that it is a preamble to the Decalogue no less than faith. Just as we cannot accept someone's law unless we first believe that he has authority to make laws, so also we cannot approve and will to observe that law unless we first hold with certainty that certain rewards have been proposed to those who observe it and can be firmly hoped for and awaited by all who worship Him. Therefore the precept of hope, like the command of faith, ought not to have been enumerated in the Decalogue.

31. Some ask here whether, if God revealed to someone his own damnation, he could and consequently would still be bound to hope for beatitude. This case is purely metaphysical, and consequently its resolution is entirely useless for instruction in faith or edification in morals, since God cannot by His ordinary power, but only by His absolute power, reveal to

someone his own damnation, as St. Thomas teaches in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2.

Therefore we shall not dwell upon the solution of this difficulty, but shall briefly dispose of it by answering negatively. The fundamental reason is that theological hope can concern only a good which can prudently be apprehended as future, since prudence is the rule of all the virtues. But, supposing such a revelation, a person could not prudently apprehend his salvation as future. If he gave assent to the revelation, he would immediately judge that he would never attain beatitude, since he would know that such a revelation was infallible and that the opposite of what God foreknew and decreed could never occur. If he dissented from it, he would act contrary to reason and prudence. Therefore, however he acted, he could not form a prudent judgment concerning the futurity of his salvation, but only an imprudent judgment, and consequently one wholly insufficient to regulate an act of theological hope. By this all the arguments ordinarily made to the contrary are easily solved.

32. From this it is also inferred that one to whom a revelation of his damnation had been made would not be bound to pray for efficacious aids from God for salvation. Prayer necessarily implies an act of hope, either explicit or at least implicit. Therefore, if he were not bound to hope, neither would he be bound to pray. Hence Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI, c. 24: "If the Church were certain concerning some persons who they were, namely those who, although still living this life, are nevertheless predestined to go into eternal fire with the devil, it would no more pray for them than for the devil himself." The reason is that it could no more hope for their salvation than for the devil's.

33. It is also gathered from what has been said throughout this chapter that several conditions are required on the part of the object of hope.

First, it must be good, because hope is an act of pursuit.

Second, it must be absent or future, because hope does not have the character of rest in a good already possessed, as joy does, but the character of movement and tendency toward the attainment of a good not yet possessed. Consequently, it essentially regards an absent good.

Third, it must be arduous and difficult, because, just as an evil which can be avoided without effort is not feared, so a good whose attainment is so easy that it is morally judged to be already in one's hand is not hoped for. Hence hope requires a certain elevation of the soul toward the good to which it tends, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 25, a. 1: "Hope adds to desire a certain striving and elevation toward obtaining an arduous good."

On the Theological Virtues

Fourth, it must be possible, because, since hope is an efficacious desire, it cannot tend toward the impossible.

Finally, it must be probably obtainable, because although the object is possible, if it is known with certainty that it will not be obtained, it cannot be the object of efficacious desire. Hence, as we said above, one to whom God revealed his damnation could not hope for beatitude. Although it would be possible for him by reason of the sufficient aids which God would confer or offer, he would nevertheless know with certainty that in fact he would never attain it, since divine foreknowledge and predestination can never fail or be frustrated, and consequently the opposite of what God foreknew and decreed cannot occur. Hence St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 8, ad 2, says that “although by His absolute power God could reveal someone’s damnation to him, this cannot be done by His ordained power, because such a revelation would compel him to despair.”

34. The holy Fathers speak elegantly of the theological virtue of hope and explain its various endowments and prerogatives. Zeno of Verona calls it “the glory of faith”; Hilary, “the greatest reward of faith”; Basil, “the joy and cheerfulness of faith”; Philo the Jew, “joy before joy, the beginning of future possession.” Chrysostom says: “It is the glory of endurance, the patience of happiness, the nourishment of virtues, and the triumph of labors.” Damian says: “It is that which raises fragile souls to heavenly things and lightens the weariness of expectation. What presumes upon the mercy of the Judge is kept in the palace of divine goodness.”

Hope is also, as it were, the foot of the soul, upon which the whole soul rests, by which it stands, by which it walks and advances toward happiness, and of which it is said in Deut. 11: “Every place upon which your foot shall tread shall be yours.” Hence Bernard excellently says in serm. 15 on the Psalm *Qui habitat*: “Your foot is surely your hope. Whatever distance it has advanced, it will possess, provided that it is fixed wholly in God, so that it may be firm and not waver.”

Finally, hope is the firmest support of our soul, the anchor of religion, the nourishment of faith, the vigor of the virtues, the victor over every difficulty, the staff of our pilgrimage, and the refreshment and alleviation of our labors. Augustine says on Ps. 64: “We have sent hope ahead, as an anchor, into that land,” meaning the heavenly Jerusalem, “lest, being disturbed in this sea, we suffer shipwreck. For just as we rightly say of a ship held by anchors that it is already on land, although it is tossed by the waves, so against the temptations of this pilgrimage our hope, founded in the city of Jerusalem, prevents us from being swept against the rocks.”

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

William of Paris inveighs sharply and eloquently against the vice of despair in *De moribus*, c. 3: “O despair, horrifying ruin! O depth of perdition! O abyss of hell! O intolerable insult to God! For what else is it to say, ‘I despair,’ than to say, like Cain, that my sins overcome God’s mercy? O word of everlasting reproach!”

CHAPTER XIII.

On Charity.

The foundation of the spiritual edifice having been laid, namely faith, which, as the Apostle says, is the substance of things hoped for, and the most firm wall of theological hope having been erected upon it, it remains for us to place the summit and crown upon it and to discuss charity, which is the crown and perfection of that same edifice. Augustine testifies to this in serm. 22, where he says that “the house of God is founded by faith, raised by hope, and perfected by charity.”

Faith conceives charity, hope runs toward it, while charity, having passed beyond the shadows of faith and the sighs of hope, immerses itself wholly in God so that it may happily enjoy that eternal beauty which faith displays and hope desires. Three things, therefore, must be briefly explained here concerning this most noble and excellent virtue, which is the prince and queen of the others: its essence, perfection, and increase.

1. We suppose as certain that habitual charity, by which we love God, is not the Holy Spirit Himself immediately producing in us by Himself the act of love, as the Master of the Sentences once held in *I Sententiarum*, dist. 17, but a certain quality produced and diffused by Him and inhering in the soul, according to the Apostle’s words: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit.” Here charity is distinguished from the Holy Spirit as an infused gift from the one infusing it.

Hence Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, c. 32: “The charity of God is said to be poured forth in our hearts, not the charity by which He loves us, but that by which He makes us His lovers.” Similarly, it is called “the justice of God, by which we are made just through His gift; the salvation of the Lord, by which He makes us saved; and the faith of Jesus Christ, by which He makes us faithful.”

Likewise Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, near the end, explaining John’s words, “God is charity,” adds: “Both God and God’s gift are rightly called charity. Thus charity gives charity, substance gives accident. Where it signifies the giver, it is the name of a substance; where it signifies the gift, it

On the Theological Virtues

is the name of a quality.” Nothing could be said more clearly or expressly against the Master of the Sentences.

2. Reason also supports this. As St. Thomas reasons here, q. 2, a. 1, in order that a power operate perfectly, it must be intrinsically inclined toward the act, so that by reason of such an inclination the act may be connatural to it and be elicited by it easily and sweetly. Therefore God, who sweetly moves all things toward their proper ends, has bestowed upon each thing forms or qualities by which they are inclined to those ends and move toward them connaturally, promptly, and sweetly: lightness upon fire, heaviness upon a stone, and so forth.

Therefore, similarly, in order that the will may perfectly and connaturally elicit an act of charity and tend and move promptly, easily, and delightfully toward God as its center and supernatural ultimate end, it needs some created form inhering in it. This can be nothing other than the habit of charity. For a transitory aid does not give the power to operate easily and delightfully; this can proceed only from a habit.

These things having been presupposed, the nature and essence of charity must be explained. First, against Durandus, it must be demonstrated that charity is truly and properly a friendship between the human person and God. Then we shall explain its formal object, from which its nature must principally be discovered.

§ 1.

Charity Is a True and Proper Friendship Between the Human Person and God.

3. This truth is evident first from Scripture. Wis. 7: “She is an infinite treasure to all, and those who have used it have become participants in the friendship of God.” Ps. 138: “Your friends, O God, have been exceedingly honored.” James 2: “Abraham was made the friend of God.” John 15: “You are My friends.” Luke 12: “I say to you, My friends.” In Cant. 5 the heavenly bride says of the bridegroom: “He is my friend.” And in c. 2 the bridegroom addresses her thus: “Arise, hasten, My friend.” Finally, throughout that whole book this divine friendship is so openly signified and celebrated that the book can deservedly be called the nuptial song of this sacred love and the heavenly pyre of sacred flames kindled between God and the soul.

4. The holy Fathers also support this truth. For brevity’s sake I omit most of them and shall offer only two illustrious testimonies, one from Jerome and the other from Augustine.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Jerome writes on Mic. 7: “If you wish to delight in true friendship, be the friend of God, like Moses, who spoke with God as a friend with a friend. Be a friend like the Apostles, to whom the Savior said: I will no longer call you servants, but friends.”

Augustine, *Confessiones* VIII, c. 6, introduces Nepotian speaking to a companion, a most famous courtier of the imperial palace, as follows: “Tell me, I ask you, where do we hope to arrive through all these labors of ours? What do we seek? For whose sake do we serve? Can our hope in the palace be greater than to become friends of the emperor? And through how many dangers do we arrive at a greater danger? And how long will this last? But if I will it, behold, I become a friend of God now.”

5. The same truth is established by the following argument. Only four conditions are required for true friendship.

The first is that it be a love of benevolence, not of desire, by which a person loves himself or other things. Hence Aristotle teaches that friendship is only rarely found in the elderly and the young, because the elderly refer all things to their own utility, while the young refer them to pleasure.

The second is that it be a mutual love, not hidden and concealed, but known to both parties. Thus the Philosopher teaches in *Ethica* VIII, c. 4, where he says that friendship is benevolence with reciprocal love.

The third is that it be founded upon some communication through which those who love are rendered similar in some manner, as he says in the same book, c. 7. Thus in 1 Macc. 10, Alexander, wishing to enter into friendship with Jonathan, raised him to the highest dignities. Hence it was said to him: “You are fit to be our friend, and now we appoint you today as high priest, that you may be called the king’s friend. And he sent him purple and a golden crown.”

The fourth is that it bring with it a communication of goods and counsels or secrets.

All these things are found in the mutual charity between God and the just.

First, the charity of the human person toward God is a love of benevolence, loving God for His own sake. God’s charity toward human beings likewise loves them for their own sake and loves their goods. For God wills for the just the good of eternal beatitude from complacency in them and for their sake, as will be evident from the solution of the objections.

Second, this love is mutual, according to Prov. 8: “I love those who love Me.” And John 14: “He who loves Me will be loved by My Father, and I will love him.” It is also known to both parties. Although we are not certain by divine faith that we truly love God as we ought and are reciprocally loved by

On the Theological Virtues

Him, this is nevertheless known to the just from probable and morally certain conjectures. This is sufficient for true friendship, and among human beings mutual love is commonly no better known.

Third, this mutual love is founded upon a certain communication through which human beings are in some manner similar to God, namely the communication of sanctifying grace. Since grace is a formal participation in the divine nature, as was shown in the Treatise on Grace, it makes human beings in a certain manner gods, according to the Psalmist: "I have said, you are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High."

Fourth, neither is communication of goods and secrets lacking. Through grace human beings participate in the divine beatitude, here by right and in hope, and in the homeland in reality. God also reveals His counsels and secrets to the just and mingles sacred and sweet conversations with them in prayer, as is evident in Abraham, Moses, and the Apostles, to whom Christ said in John 15: "I will no longer call you servants, but friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard from My Father I have made known to you."

6. It is objected first: True friendship properly so called exists between equals, as Aristotle teaches in *Ethica* VIII, c. 5, and St. Jerome on Mic. 7, where he says: "Friendship either receives equals or makes them equal. Where there is inequality, there is no friendship." But equality cannot exist between God and human beings. Therefore neither can friendship properly so called exist.

It is confirmed: There cannot be true and perfect friendship between a servant and a master, as Aristotle asserts in *Ethica* VIII, c. 1. But human beings are called in Scripture, and truly are, servants of God. Therefore true friendship cannot be found between them and God.

To the objection I answer that perfect equality of persons is not required for true friendship properly so called, otherwise there would be no friendship between parents and children. A certain equality or proportion between them is sufficient. This is found between God and a just human being, because through grace the latter, as is said in 2 Pet., "is made a participant in the divine nature," an adopted son of God, an heir of eternal life, and capable of divine and supernatural operations. Consequently, he receives a likeness and a certain equality with God insofar as he is constituted in the same divine order. Notwithstanding the infinite distance within that order, this suffices for a friendship, not of equality, such as is found between peers, but of supereminence, such as Aristotle admits between children and parents and between subjects and a prince in *Ethica* VIII, c. 7. In the same book, c. 16, he also teaches that the friendship of a

human being toward God is friendship toward something supremely excellent.

I add from Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, that “love is a unitive power which in a certain manner equalizes superiors with inferiors,” and conversely, “and equals with equals.” Thus love in relation to superiors is a bond by which they descend; in relation to inferiors it is a fire by which they are elevated; and in relation to equals it is a chain, so that, as he says, “they may be joined in equal fellowship.”

This is clearly evident in the friendship found between God and human beings. Through love for the human person, God humbled Himself most profoundly in the Incarnation, taking the form of a servant and being made in the likeness of human beings, as the Apostle says in Phil. 2. He so exalted human beings that He raised them in a certain manner to divine dignity. Hence Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 15: “This human nature was raised to so high and supreme an elevation that it had nowhere higher to be lifted; just as the Divinity had nowhere lower to humble Himself for our sake than, by assuming a nature with the weakness of flesh, even unto the death of the Cross.”

To the confirmation it must be said that, just as Aristotle says in *Ethica* VIII, c. 11, “there is no friendship toward a servant precisely insofar as he is a servant, but there is insofar as he is a human being,” so although human beings, precisely insofar as they are servants of God, cannot be His friends, they can be His friends insofar as they are elevated to the being of sons of God and participate in the divine nature through grace. Hence Augustine, tract. 85 on John: “Great is the condescension by which the Lord deigns to call friends those whom He knows to be servants.”

7. It is objected secondly: The love of friendship differs from the love of desire in this: the former is terminated at the good of the friend for the friend’s sake and because it is his good, while the love of desire is terminated at the good of the one loving. But God’s love cannot be terminated at the good of the rational creature for the creature’s sake and because it is the creature’s good, since He wills all things for His own sake, as is said in Prov. 16, and the adequate object, both motive and terminative, of the divine will is uncreated goodness alone, as we showed in the Treatise on the Will of God. Therefore charity between God and human beings does not possess the true nature of friendship.

8. To this difficult argument, leaving aside various solutions which obscure the difficulty more than they illuminate it, I answer by distinguishing the major premise. The love of friendship must be terminated at the good of the friend for the friend’s own sake, when “for his own sake”

On the Theological Virtues

excludes order to the ultimate end: I deny the major. When it excludes order to other particular ends: I grant the major.

I similarly distinguish the minor premise. God's love cannot be terminated at the rational creature for the creature's own sake, when "for the creature's own sake" excludes order to the ultimate end: I grant the minor. When it excludes order to other particular ends: I deny the minor and the consequence.

The reason for this teaching and distinction is that every good is ordered to the ultimate end, and its perfection consists in this ordination. Therefore the nature of friendship in God toward the rational creature is so far from being destroyed by the fact that He loves it for the ultimate end that, rather, His friendship would not be honest if He loved it without such an order.

But the rational creature is not by its nature ordered to particular ends, nor does its perfection consist in such an ordination. Hence, if Peter, for example, loves Paul in order to himself and for his own sake, since Paul's perfection does not consist in or require such an order, that love will not be honest or a love of friendship, but a love of desire. Therefore, in order that God love a rational creature with a love of friendship, it is not necessary that He fail to refer it to Himself as ultimate end. It is sufficient that He not order the good of the rational creature to other particular and intermediate ends.

9. I add that only what is loved as useful to the lover is loved with a love of desire, for such love seeks only its own things. But God does not love rational creatures as useful to Himself, according to Job 22: "What does it profit God if you are just, or what does it afford Him if your life is immaculate?" Rather, He always joins His glory to our benefits. Therefore the Church daily sings: "We give You thanks for Your great glory." Why does it not rather adore the majesty of so great a glory than give Him profound thanks for it? Because the merciful God never separates His glory from our benefit.

Hence Bernard, serm. 3 for Pentecost: "God made all things for Himself and all things for His own, but in one manner for Himself and in another for His own. He made all things for Himself by gratuitous goodness; He made all things for His elect for their benefit."

Therefore the relation of the rational creature to God is not that of a useful means conducing and ministering to divine goodness, but rather that of a means or subject receiving the influence and participation of divine goodness, as St. Thomas excellently explains in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 18: "God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as though He acquired something by His action, but as one who bestows something by His

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

action. For He is not in potency so that He could acquire something, but is perfect actuality alone, from which He can bestow something.”

Therefore the love by which God loves rational creatures is not a love of desire, which always tends toward the lover’s own utility and benefit, but a love of friendship, which intends the good, perfection, and benefit of the friend himself.

§ 2.

The Formal Object of Charity Is Not Divine Goodness as Analogically Common to Goodness Divine by Essence and Divine by Participation; Nor Is It Divine and Uncreated Goodness as Including the Essence, Attributes, and Relations, but the Goodness of the Nature Alone as Virtually Distinct from the Relations and Attributes.

10. The first part is proved against Suarez and other recent authors by three fundamental arguments.

The first is this: A theological virtue has God as its formal and primary object, not something common to God and creatures, as is evident from what was said concerning faith and hope. But charity is a theological virtue and the chief among them. Therefore its formal object is uncreated goodness, not divine goodness analogically common to created and uncreated goodness.

The second: Our charity is a formal participation in the charity by which God loves Himself. But God’s charity does not have as its formal object divine goodness analogically common to God and creatures, but divine goodness by essence alone. Therefore neither does our charity. The major premise is certain. The minor is evident from what was said in Part I, in the Treatise on the Will of God, Chapter I. There we showed that the formal motive and terminative object of the divine will, and consequently of God’s uncreated charity, is divine and uncreated goodness alone, not good in common abstracted from created and uncreated good.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated by the following example. Since the light of glory is a formal participation in the light of the divine intellect, which is specified not by creatures but by the divine essence, it is rightly inferred that the created light of glory receives its specification not from creatures but from the divine essence. Therefore, similarly, from the fact that our charity is a formal participation in the charity by which God loves Himself, and that God’s uncreated charity does not have as its formal

object divine goodness analogically common to God and creatures, it is rightly inferred that the formal object of our charity is not divine goodness as analogically common to goodness divine by essence and divine by participation, but God's uncreated goodness alone, which is divine by essence.

The third argument is this: The goodness of the ultimate end is the formal object of charity, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 4. But goodness abstracting from created and uncreated goodness is not the goodness of the ultimate end; only divine and uncreated goodness is. Similarly, the first and formal object of beatitude is not truth abstracting from created and uncreated truth, but the First and uncreated Truth alone, since all creatures are outside the formal and primary object of beatitude and pertain to its secondary and material object, as was shown in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision. Therefore divine and uncreated goodness alone is the formal object of charity.

11. From these arguments the second part of the assertion also remains proved. God's charity has the divine essence as its formal object, as the root of the attributes and relations. Therefore so also does our charity, which is a participation in it. The consequence is evident from what has been said above.

The antecedent is proved from the fact that the formal object of the divine will is the divine essence alone. Since the divine will is regulated by the divine intellect, it bears the same relation to its object as the intellect bears to its own. But the formal object of the divine intellect is the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations, as we proved by three arguments in the Treatise on the Knowledge of God, Chapter I, conclusion 2. Therefore, similarly, the formal object of the divine will is the goodness of the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations.

It is confirmed. The very same thing which under the aspect of truth is the formal object of beatitude is, under the aspect of goodness, the formal object of charity, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage cited above. But the first and formal object of beatitude is not divine truth as transcending the relations and attributes, but the truth of the divine nature alone. Since beatific vision is a participation in God's intuitive knowledge, it has the same formal and primary object as that knowledge. But the formal and primary object of the divine intellection is the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations, as our Thomists more commonly teach and as we demonstrated in the cited place of the Treatise on the Knowledge of God. Therefore, consistently with those principles, it must be

said that the uncreated goodness of the divine nature alone is the formal and primary object of charity.

12. It is objected first against the first part of the assertion: Some infused habit is possible which primarily and of itself regards divine goodness as analogically common to created and uncreated goodness, since there appears to be no contradiction in this. But such a habit would be of the same species as the virtue of charity. Therefore the formal object of charity is goodness of this kind, not uncreated goodness alone and goodness divine by essence.

I answer first by denying the major premise. If one habit were given which primarily and of itself regarded good in its whole breadth and embraced at once the uncreated and created, it would exhaust the whole capacity of the will. This is contrary to the nature of a habit, whose object is a determination and division of the object of the power.

I answer secondly, granting the major premise and denying the minor. If such a habit were given, it would be essentially and specifically diverse from charity, as having a diverse formal object.

13. It is objected secondly against the second part of the assertion: If the divine relations and attributes did not pertain to the formal and primary object of charity, they would be its material and secondary object. But this cannot be said, otherwise they would move us to love God no more than creatures do. Therefore neither can the first position be maintained.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. Just as, in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision, several of our Thomists teach that the relations and attributes are not properly secondary objects of the divine intellection, and consequently of beatific vision, but modes of the formal and primary object which intimately and transcendently contain that object in themselves, so it must be said in the present matter that they are not secondary and material objects of charity, but modes, complements, affections, or properties of its formal and primary object. They cannot be prescinded from it and transcendently include it in themselves. Consequently, within their proper order they move more toward the love of God than creatures, which are purely material and secondary objects of charity.

On the Theological Virtues

§ 3.

Charity, Insofar as It Extends to God and Neighbor,
is a Virtue of One Indivisible Species.

14. Thus St. Thomas teaches here, q. 23, a. 5, and q. 25, a. 1, where he indicates this argument: The specific unity of a habit is taken from the unity of its formal object. But although charity extends to several things to be loved, it attains them all under one formal objective character, namely uncreated goodness and goodness divine by essence, by reason of which it loves God and neighbor. Therefore it is one virtue of an indivisible species.

Likewise, although faith attains many credible things and hope extends to many things to be hoped for, nevertheless, because they attain them under the same formal motive, namely God's truthfulness and His omnipotence as assisting, they are virtues of one indivisible species.

Hence Gregory, *Moralia* VII, c. 10, speaking of the love of God and neighbor, says: "These two loves are two parts, but one whole is composed of both; two rings, but one chain; two actions, but one virtue; two works, but one charity; two merits before God, but it is impossible for one to be found without the other."

15. You will say: Although we worship and honor the saints because of God, nevertheless the virtue of *dulia* by which we honor the saints is distinguished from the virtue of *latria* by which the worship and honor due to God are rendered, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 103, a. 3, and *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 25, a. 2. Therefore, although one's neighbor is loved because of God, the charity by which we love God will be different from that by which we love our neighbor.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. Although the worship of the saints redounds to God as ultimate end, nevertheless the proper excellence of each saint is the formal motive of the worship of *dulia* rendered to him. But the goodness of God, because of which one's neighbor is loved, is the formal object or motive of that love, just as light is the formal object of sight.

Therefore, just as the vision by which light is seen and that by which color is seen because of light are the same in species, so the love by which God is loved and that by which one's neighbor is loved because of God are the same in species. Hence Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, c. 8: "From one and

the same charity we love God and our neighbor, but God for God's sake, and ourselves and our neighbor for God's sake."

16. You will ask whether habitual charity in the homeland is the same in species and even numerically as habitual charity on the way. I answer affirmatively with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 6: "Charity is not made void through the perfection of glory, but remains numerically the same." Hence the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 13 that "charity never fails."

Reason also supports this. Since the blessed have in the homeland the same habitual grace in species and number that they possessed on the way, for there is no foundation for asserting a different one, it follows that they also possess the same habitual charity, which is a coeval property of grace.

17. You will say: The same habit cannot produce acts diverse in species. But the acts of charity on the way and in the homeland differ in species. Therefore the habitual charities from which they proceed also differ.

The major premise seems certain. The minor is proved, first, because the act of charity on the way is regulated by faith and obscure knowledge, while in the homeland it is regulated by the light of glory and clear vision. But diversity of rule argues for a specific distinction in the acts regulated.

Second, the love of the way is free, while the love of the homeland is necessary. This seems sufficient to introduce a specific diversity into acts of charity.

I answer first by denying the major premise. The same habit can elicit acts diverse in species, provided they are contained under the same formal character. This is evident in the very habit of charity. The love of God and hatred of sin insofar as it is opposed to the divine good are distinguished in species, and nevertheless both are elicited by charity. Likewise, the love of God specifically considered and joy in the divine goodness and perfection as possessed by God are essentially distinguished, and nevertheless pertain to charity and proceed from it.

Therefore, similarly, although acts of love on the way and in the homeland differ in species, they can nevertheless be elicited by the same habit of charity, because, since they are contained under the same formal character of divinity, their specific distinction would be material in comparison with the habit of charity.

I answer secondly, granting the major premise and denying the minor. To the first proof of the minor I say that, since the apprehension of the intellect is not the formal character of the object of the will, but only an applying condition, as our Thomists commonly teach in philosophy, diversity of cognition is not sufficient to introduce a specific diversity into "acts of the will unless diversity of the desirable thing is joined to the

On the Theological Virtues

diversity of apprehension,” as St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 1, ad 6. That is, unless different goodness is proposed and represented to the will through the different cognitions.

Therefore, since through clear cognition in the homeland and obscure cognition on the way the same good is proposed as lovable, the act of charity on the way and in the homeland is of the same species, although the cognition by which it is regulated in those two states is diverse in species.

Hence the same holy Doctor, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 67, a. 6, objects to himself: “Habits and acts are distinguished according to objects. But the object of love is the apprehended good. Therefore, since the apprehension of the present life is one thing and the apprehension of the future life another, it seems that the same charity does not remain in both.” To this objection he answers: “Charity does not have cognition itself for its object, for in that case it would not be the same on the way and in the homeland. Rather, it has the known thing itself for its object, which is the same, namely God Himself.”

To the second proof of the minor it must be said that freedom and necessity do not distinguish acts of the will essentially, but only accidentally or modally. They are merely extrinsic denominations, as some teach, or, as others more probably hold, certain intrinsic modes of those acts. Hence, although the love of the way is free and the love of the homeland necessary, it does not follow that the acts of charity on the way and in the homeland are essentially distinguished.

§ 4.

On the Increase of Charity.

18. It is certain that habitual charity can increase as long as we are in the state of the journey. On the way there can be continual progress until the terminus is reached. Hence, since charity is the way by which we tend toward God, not by steps of the body but by affections of the mind, as Augustine says, as long as we are in this mortal life we can advance in charity.

I add with St. Thomas here, q. 24, a. 7, that no terminus can be assigned to the increase of charity in this life. It cannot be assigned by reason of the form itself, since charity is a certain participation in the infinite charity of God; nor on the part of the agent, since the cause producing charity, namely God, is of infinite power; nor on the part of the subject, since as charity increases the capacity for further increase always grows beyond it. Therefore

charity has no terminus of increase in this life, but can always grow and be increased.

Hence the Apostle in Eph. 4 desires that “we grow in charity,” and in Phil. 1: “I pray,” he says, “that your charity may abound more and more.” The holy Church asks for this increase of justice and charity when it prays, “Give us an increase of faith, hope, and charity,” as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 10.

19. All Catholics agree on this against the Beghards and Beguines, who held that charity in this life has a certain fixed terminus which it can sometimes attain and beyond which it cannot proceed further. But there are several difficulties and controversies among theologians concerning the increase of charity. Hence Goranus beautifully says in serm. 2 for the twenty-second Sunday after Pentecost: “Clerics dispute about the increase of charity, but the saints pray for the increase of charity.”

First, Durandus holds that less intense acts of charity do not merit an increase of the habit. Bañez, followed by some recent Thomists, concedes that less intense acts of charity merit by condign merit an increase of grace, charity, and glory, but says that this increase is not distinct from that which is due to acts more intense than the habit. According to him, the same degree of grace, charity, and essential glory is given by God under several titles, and at most a greater accidental glory corresponds to less intense acts.

Finally, Suarez, Vásquez, and other recent authors hold that the just so merit by condign merit an increase of grace and charity through less intense acts of charity that such an increase is conferred upon them immediately whenever a meritorious act, however less intense, is elicited.

The Thomists, however, hold that the increase of grace and charity due to less intense acts is conferred on the just only at their entrance into glory, or in the first instant of beatific vision. In that instant the soul elicits an intense act of charity by which it physically disposes itself to receive the entire increase of grace and charity due to the less intense acts elicited on the way.

20. I say first: Less intense acts of charity merit an increase of the habit of grace and charity. Thus St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 8, ad 3: “By every meritorious act a person merits an increase of grace.” And here, q. 24, a. 6, ad 1: “Every act of charity merits an increase of charity.”

It is proved first from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 10, where it teaches that the just grow in the grace by which they were justified through good works by which they observe the commandments of God and the Church. But the observance of the commandments does not require that the just operate from an act more intense than the preexisting habit. Therefore,

On the Theological Virtues

in order that they grow in grace and charity, or merit by condign merit an increase of grace and charity, it is not required that the meritorious act of that increase be more intense than the preexisting habit. Consequently, the just merit an increase of grace and charity through less intense acts of charity.

It is confirmed. In the same Council and session, can. 32, it is said: "If anyone says that the justified person does not truly merit through the good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ an increase of grace, let him be anathema." But every act of charity, even a less intense one, is a good work done by a just person through God's grace and the merit of Jesus Christ. Therefore it merits an increase of grace and charity.

21. It is proved secondly by reason. Every condition required for condign merit of an increase of grace and charity belongs to a less intense act of charity, that is, an act not equaling the intensity of the habit. It is supernatural, performed in obedience to God, proceeding from a person in grace, and elicited by charity. These alone are the conditions required for condign merit, as was shown in the final chapter of the Treatise on Grace. Therefore less intense acts of charity merit by condign merit an increase of the habit of grace and charity.

It is confirmed. An act of charity, however less intense, is meritorious of some corresponding degree of glory, as is evident from Matt. 10 and Mark 9, where it is said that one who gives a cup of cold water in the name of Christ will not be deprived of his reward. But an act of charity cannot merit some degree of glory specially corresponding to it unless it merits an increase of grace and charity, by reason of which alone a special degree of glory becomes due. For grace and charity are the whole and sole measure of glory. Therefore an act of love, however less intense, merits an increase of grace and charity.

22. Finally, the conclusion is proved from the absurdity and inconvenience following from the contrary opinion. For if the just did not merit an increase of grace and charity through less intense acts, but only through acts more intense than the habit, it would follow that one who operates less intensely would sometimes merit, while one who operates more intensely, or elicits a more fervent act of charity, would not.

For example, if charity is in one person as one, and he operates intensely as two, he will merit an increase of grace and charity. But if charity is in another as six, and he operates intensely as four or five, he will not merit an increase of grace and charity. This seems most absurd. The same act, insofar as it was performed by a holier person, would not be meritorious, but would

be meritorious insofar as it was performed by a less holy person. Consequently, a just person's greater holiness would harm him. Therefore the contrary conclusion must be held.

23. I say secondly: The same degree of grace, charity, and glory which is due to a more intense act does not correspond under different titles to less intense acts, but a distinct degree corresponds to them.

It is proved first. The Council of Trent cited above defines that the just grow in grace and charity through good works by which they observe the commandments of God and the Church, and consequently through less intense acts of charity, since the observance of the commandments does not require that a person elicit acts more intense than the habit, as we said in the preceding conclusion.

But if no degree of grace and charity distinct from that corresponding to the more intense act disposing for the increase of the habit corresponded to less intense acts, but the same degree were given under several titles, as Bañez teaches, the just person could not properly be said to grow in grace and charity through less intense acts of charity. For a form is not properly said to grow and increase unless it grows in intensity and acquires some degree which it did not previously possess, or at least acquires a right to it. Therefore some degree of grace and charity distinct from that due to a more intense act corresponds or is due to less intense acts of charity, and not the same degree as given under several titles.

24. It is proved secondly. Equality between merit and reward must be preserved, since the rendering of reward for merits is in God an act of justice, at least distributive justice. But such equality would not be preserved if the same degree of grace, charity, and glory which corresponds to a more intense act disposing for the increase of the habit corresponded under different titles to less intense acts. Rather, those acts would be defrauded of their due reward.

For example, if someone labored in another's vineyard for three days and merited twenty asses on each day, one who wished to reward the labor of those three days by paying only twenty asses, although under several titles, would not preserve the equality of justice, but would be judged to defraud the labor of two days of its reward. Therefore the same degree of grace, charity, and glory which is due to the more intense act disposing for the increase of the habit does not correspond under different titles to less intense acts, but a distinct degree does.

It is confirmed first. Several satisfactory works do not correspond to the remission of the same punishment under several titles, but to the remission of a greater punishment, as all confess. Therefore, similarly, several less

intense acts of charity do not correspond under different titles to the same degree of grace, charity, and glory which is due to the more intense act disposing for the increase of the habit, but to a distinct degree. The consequence is evident from the parity of reason. The same reason seems to apply to merit and satisfaction, since the equality of justice must be preserved no less in merit than in satisfaction.

It is confirmed secondly. Different sins are punished in hell with different particular punishments, and not with the same punishment inflicted under several titles. Therefore a distinct and particular degree of glory must correspond to several less intense acts of charity, not the same degree under several titles, since God is no less liberal in rewarding than severe in punishing.

25. I say thirdly: An increase of the habit is not immediately conferred for a less intense act of charity, but only when the person elicits a more intense act by which he disposes himself for that increase.

Thus St. Thomas expressly teaches in various places, especially *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 114, a. 8, ad 3: “By every meritorious act a person merits an increase of grace, just as he merits the consummation of grace, which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not immediately rendered, so neither is an increase of grace immediately conferred, but at its proper time, namely when someone has been sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.” And here, q. 24, a. 6, ad 1: “Every act of charity merits eternal life, not indeed to be immediately bestowed, but at its proper time. Similarly, every act of charity merits an increase of charity, but charity is not immediately increased; rather, it is increased when someone strives toward such an increase.”

In these passages the holy Doctor indicates the fundamental argument for our conclusion. A person does not obtain an increase of charity unless he is sufficiently physically disposed for it. But through less intense acts of charity he is not sufficiently disposed for an increase of the habit. Therefore an increase is not conferred immediately when a less intense act of charity is elicited.

The minor premise is certain. Since the author of grace proceeds in supernatural things after the manner of natural agents, and in supernatural things we must, as far as possible, proceed according to the mode of natural things, just as less intense natural acts do not sufficiently dispose for an increase of an acquired habit, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 51, a. 3, so neither are less intense supernatural acts sufficient dispositions for an increase of a supernatural habit.

The major premise, in which the difficulty lies, is proved as follows. The same order and proportion is observed in the increase of charity as in its infusion. Since habits are increased by the same causes by which they are produced, right reason demands that God preserve the same proportion in the growth and increase of charity and not require a lesser disposition than in its first infusion.

But grace and charity are not infused in adults, at least according to the ordinary law, except according and proportionately to their disposition, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6, c. 7: "We are called and truly are just, receiving justice in ourselves, each his own justice, according to the measure which the Holy Spirit distributes to each as He wills, and according to each person's proper disposition and cooperation." Therefore a person does not obtain an increase of charity until he has been sufficiently disposed for it.

26. You will say that there is a difference between the first infusion of grace and its increase. With respect to grace as first infused, our acts are related to it not as merits but only as dispositions, and therefore grace is infused according to their intensity. With respect to an increase, however, they have the character of merit, and therefore, although they are not proportionate dispositions, the increase is immediately conferred.

But to the contrary: A form which by its nature requires a disposed subject in order to be produced also requires a preceding disposition for its increase. For, as we said above, the increase of a form and its first production are of the same character, and a thing is increased and produced by the same causes. But grace, with respect to its production and first being, by its nature requires preceding physical dispositions, as was shown in the Treatise on Grace. Therefore it also requires preceding physical dispositions for its increase, namely acts of contrition and charity more intense than before. Consequently, although less intense acts merit an increase of grace, that increase will nevertheless not be infused by God unless a preceding disposition proportioned to it is present and an act of charity more intense than the preexisting habit is elicited.

27. I say fourthly: The increase of grace and charity due to less intense acts is not given in this life when the just person elicits a more fervent act of charity, but at the entrance into glory, or in the first instant of glorification.

The first part is proved from the fact that when a just person in this life breaks forth into a more fervent act of charity, he indeed disposes himself through that act for an increase of grace and charity and actually receives it. But at that time such an increase is given only for the more fervent act itself and corresponds adequately to it, entirely in the same way as if no less

On the Theological Virtues

intense act had preceded. Therefore the increase due to the less intense acts is not then conferred, but only that which is due to the more intense act.

28. From this the second part remains proved. Since less intense acts of charity merit by condign merit an increase of grace and charity, and condign merit is never frustrated of its reward, if a person does not receive that increase of grace and charity in this life when he elicits an act equal to or more intense than the habit, it remains only that it be given in the other life, at the entrance into glory or in the first instant of glorification.

For then the soul elicits an act of charity at least as intense as the merit of the less intense acts of the way. By that act it will be sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace and charity which it merited through the less intense acts elicited on the way. The increase of grace and charity which it will possess in that same instant will correspond to this last act, not as to a merit, since it is not an act of a wayfarer, but as to a physical disposition, just as a form is possessed in the same instant in which the disposition for it exists.

29. Nor is this asserted gratuitously and without foundation, as some object to us. Theologians commonly teach with St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 7, a. 11, that venial sins in the just who die with them are remitted in the other life through an act of contrition or charity elicited by the soul in the instant of separation or at its entrance into purgatory. Although such an act cannot be meritorious or satisfactory, it can concur in the remission of venial sins as a fitting retraction and displeasure and as removing an impediment, as the holy Doctor asserts there.

Why, then, could it not similarly be said that the soul, through a most fervent act of charity elicited in the instant of separation or glorification, disposes itself to receive the increase of grace and charity due to the less intense acts elicited on the way? This is especially so because the other life is the time for receiving the adequate reward which a person merited through preceding acts elicited on the way. Hence, if it is not conferred in this world, it must be conferred in the next.

§ 5.

Objections Are Solved.

30. It is objected first against the first conclusion: Only one who uses well what he has already received is worthy of receiving more. But one who possesses an intense habit and operates less intensely does not use it in the proper manner, because the act is not proportioned to the intensity of the

habit. Therefore through such acts he does not merit an increase of charity, but only through acts which exceed or equal the intensity of the habit.

Hence St. Thomas, In I *Sententiarum*, dist. 17, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: "Every act of charity, insofar as it is formed by such a habit, is ordered to the substantial reward, but not to an increase of the reward, nor to an increase of charity." And in II *Ad Annibaldum*, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2: "It is not necessary that every meritorious act merit an increase of grace, because the condition by which an increase of the habit follows from the act is not found in every meritorious act, but only in that act by which someone uses the grace received in proportion to its powers, so that he is in no respect lacking to the grace of God."

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. Since there is no divine or natural precept to operate according to the whole intensity of the habit, one who uses the habit less intensely uses it not in an undue, but in a due manner. He exercises an act good in every respect, that is, vitiated by no circumstance, although not as good as it would be if he used the habit adequately. He can therefore be worthy of the reward of an increase of charity, just as one who acts well by observing God's commandments merits a reward, although he does not do what is better by observing the counsels.

To the first testimony of St. Thomas I say that he means nothing other there than what we taught in the third conclusion, namely that a less intense act of charity does not merit an increase of charity to be immediately conferred. He also clearly speaks of this in the second testimony, as is evident from the words: "Because the condition by which an increase of the habit follows from the act is not found in every act."

31. It is objected secondly against the second conclusion: Christ the Lord truly merited through the acts subsequent to the one which He elicited in the first instant of His conception. Yet He did not merit anything new, but only under a new title what He had merited through the first act, as theologians teach in the Treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore true merit can likewise be preserved in the less intense acts of charity elicited by the just, although no new degree of essential glory corresponds to them, but the same degree due to more intense acts under several titles.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. Christ merited under a new title through subsequent acts the same thing which He had already merited through the first act because every act of His was infinitely meritorious. Hence through several acts He did not and could not merit more than through one, because no addition can be

On the Theological Virtues

made to the infinite precisely as infinite. This reason has no place in our merits, since they are finite. Therefore the cases are not similar.

32. It is objected thirdly against the third and fourth conclusions: The Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 16 and can. 24, teaches that the justified grow from day to day through good works, and consequently through less intense acts of charity, in the justice they have received, are further justified, and become holier. But this cannot be true unless an increase of the habit is conferred for less intense acts of charity immediately, or at least in this life. Therefore it is not deferred until the entrance into glory or the first instant of glorification.

I answer by denying the minor premise. In order that the just may be said to grow from day to day through even less intense acts in the justice they have received, to be further justified, and to become holier, it is not necessary that sanctifying grace in them be physically and actually increased and made greater in intensity. It is sufficient that it become greater morally and in the order of grace, and that they acquire a right to greater glory and charity to be conferred at the proper time.

Similarly, sinners are said to grow in injustice and become worse through less intense acts of vice, although through such acts nothing physically real is produced in them. For vicious habits, like acquired virtues, are not physically intensified or increased by less intense acts, but only by acts more intense than the habit, as theologians commonly teach.

33. You will say: If through less intense acts of charity grace is immediately increased in the order of grace, but is not increased in the order of habit and quality until the entrance into glory or first instant of glorification, it follows that in this life equality between grace in the order of grace and grace in the order of habit and quality is never preserved after a just person has elicited some less intense acts of charity.

I answer that there is no difficulty in the fact that such equality and proportion are not preserved on the way. It is sufficient that they be preserved in the homeland, where all things will be consummated and perfect.

Indeed, in Christ such equality and proportion neither is nor can be preserved. It is impossible for the grace of Christ to be infinite in the order of habit and quality, and nevertheless it was infinite in the moral order, since through it He merited by condign merit a reward infinite in the moral order, or of infinite value and price. This is treated in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

34. It is objected finally: The reward is immediately conferred for condign merit. But through less intense acts of charity the just merit by

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

condign merit an increase of the habit. Therefore it is immediately conferred upon them and is not deferred until the entrance into glory or the first instant of glorification.

I answer that the reward is immediately conferred for condign merit if the subject is disposed to receive it, but not if it is undisposed. A person is not perfectly disposed to receive the increase of charity due to less intense acts except at the entrance into glory or in the first instant of glorification, as we explained in the final conclusion.

§ 6.

On the Perfection and Excellence of Charity Above All the Other Virtues.

35. It is manifest that charity is the perfection of the moral virtues. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 23, a. 6, since the perfection of virtue consists in attaining the first rule of human acts, which is the ultimate end, the theological virtues, which immediately attain God as ultimate end, are nobler than the moral virtues, which concern only the means.

That charity likewise surpasses faith and hope in nobility and perfection is evident from the fact that it attains God in a more perfect and noble manner. For faith and hope, says the same holy Doctor there, indeed attain God insofar as from Him there comes to us either knowledge of truth or attainment of good. But charity attains God Himself so as to rest in Him, not so that something may come to us from Him.

It is confirmed. Certain imperfections are essentially joined to faith and hope: to hope, the love of desire by which God is loved insofar as He redounds to the human person's benefit; to faith, obscurity. But none of these defects is found in charity. It tends toward God insofar as He is good and supremely perfect in Himself, without regard to our benefit, and possesses no obscurity of itself. Although here on the way it is accidentally regulated by faith and obscure cognition, of itself and by its nature it requires to be regulated by the light of glory and the clear vision of God, since it is the first property of sanctifying grace, which is the root of the light of glory and the fountain of water springing up into eternal life, as is said in John 4. Therefore charity is nobler than faith and hope.

Hence Irenaeus calls it "the most eminent of all charisms," and Bernard, serm. 27 on the Canticle, asserts that the greatness of a soul is to be measured by the greatness of charity: "The size of every soul," he says, "is estimated according to the measure of charity it possesses, so that, for

On the Theological Virtues

example, one which possesses much charity is great; one which possesses little is small; and one which possesses none is nothing,” according to the Apostle: “If I do not have charity, I am nothing.”

Augustine adds in *Manuale*, c. 18, that “love alone, among all the movements, senses, and affections of the soul, is that in which the creature, although not equally, can respond to the Author or render Him a mutual return.”

Bernard explains this more fully in serm. 83 on the Cantic: “If You are angry with me, O God, shall I similarly be angry with You? Certainly not. Rather, I shall fear, tremble, and beg pardon. If He rebukes me, He will not be rebuked by me, but rather will be justified by me. Nor, if He judges me, shall I judge Him, but adore Him. He who saves me does not seek to be saved by me, nor does He in turn need to be delivered by anyone, who delivers all. If He rules, I must serve; if He commands, I must obey, and not conversely demand service or obedience from the Lord.

“Now see how differently the matter stands with love. For when God loves, He wills nothing other than to be loved, since He loves for no other reason than that He may be loved, knowing that those who love Him are made blessed by that very love.”

36. Finally, Gregory the Great, hom. 8 on Ezekiel, teaches that charity so surpasses all the other virtues that the devil fears or envies it alone in us. His words are:

“The ancient enemy does not fear chastity in us if it is without charity, because he himself is not burdened by flesh so as to be dissolved in its lust. He does not fear abstinence, because he himself does not use food, nor is he pressed by bodily necessity. He does not fear the distribution of earthly goods if charity is lacking from that work, because he himself does not need the assistance of riches. But he greatly fears true charity in us, that is, the humble love which we show to one another, and he exceedingly envies our concord, because we possess on earth what he, refusing to possess it, lost in heaven.”

Charity, therefore, is the gem of the virtues, which forms, illuminates, and perfects the others and imparts to them a singular ornament and beauty by its companionship. It is the purple garment of the bride, fitting most beautifully over the fine linen of chastity; or Joseph’s many-colored garment, adorned with the variety of all the virtues; or, if you prefer, Jacob’s garment, whose fragrance obtains the blessing of the heavenly Father.

It is the fiery chariot lifting the interior person into the spiritual Paradise; the pitch with which God coated the ark of the Church so that the waters of tribulations might not penetrate it; the mortar by which living

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

stones are joined in the spiritual edifice; the golden thread by which they are bound to one another; the heavenly glue which unites the soul to God; and that bond of perfection which by a most blessed union joins human beings both to God and to one another for God's sake and through love of Him.

It is the golden measuring rod by which the gates and walls of the heavenly Jerusalem are measured in Rev. 21, that is, by which the perfection of the light of glory and beatific vision is measured.

Finally, charity, as Bernard says in serm. 57 on the Canticle, "is a fire which consumes whatever it touches, but does not afflict; it burns sweetly and lays waste happily. It is truly a destroying coal, but it exerts the power of fire against vices in such a manner that it acts as an anointing for the soul."

Finally, according to Marsilio Ficino, charity is the coin by which God is bought and acquired by us: "God is for sale. But with what coin? With that by which He bought you: charity."

Therefore, what the sun is among the planets, fire among the elements, gold among metals, and the carbuncle among precious stones, charity is among the virtues. Hence Augustine excellently says in tract. 5 on the First Epistle of John: "I think this is that pearl for which the merchant in the Gospel is described as selling all that he possessed and buying it when he found it. This precious pearl is charity, without which whatever else you possess profits you nothing, but which, if you possess it alone, is sufficient for you."

TREATISE IX. ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES.

We treated the cardinal virtues so briefly and succinctly in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* that what we wrote there can scarcely be reduced to a compendium. Therefore, with a few omissions or additions, we shall transcribe it here almost word for word.

1. The cardinal virtues, then, are comprised under the number four, corresponding to the number of powers that are the subjects of the virtues. Prudence resides in the intellect, justice in the will, fortitude in the irascible appetite, and temperance in the concupiscible appetite. To prudence belongs the rectitude of reason itself; to justice, equality in operations relating to another; to fortitude, firmness and strength of soul against dangers and fears; and to temperance, the restraint or moderation of appetitive passions arising within us. They are called *cardinal*, either because they are the primary and principal moral virtues, or because the whole ordering of the human condition turns upon them, and the entire structure and course of an honorable and civil life rests upon them as upon hinges.

2. Moreover, the holy Fathers celebrated these virtues with distinguished praises and described them by various symbols. St. Nilus, *De oratione*, c. 1, says that they are like four portions of the divine and beloved incense. St. Gregory, *Moralia*, II, c. 3, says that they are like the four corners of a spiritual edifice. Hildebert of Le Mans, epist. 31, calls them the four wheels of Ezekiel's mystical chariot. Olympiodorus, on Ecclesiastes 1, says that they are the four cardinal winds by which the region of the soul is ventilated.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Finally, St. Ambrose, *De paradiso*, c. 3, says that they are the four streams of the fountain of the spiritual paradise. Thus, just as the fountain of the earthly paradise was divided into four heads, from which four notable rivers flowed forth—Pishon, Gihon, Tigris, and Euphrates—so these four virtues are, as it were, four streams flowing from the fountain of wisdom. He then develops at length the analogy between each of the foregoing virtues and one of those rivers. He adds that prudence was represented by Pishon because of the remarkable riches, beauty, and cultivation that it bestows upon the field of the soul; temperance by Gihon, because, just as that river surrounds the land of Ethiopia, so temperance “washes the abject body and extinguishes the fire of most vile flesh”; fortitude by the Tigris, the swiftest of rivers, because it “pierces through every resistance with a certain rapid course and is not arrested in its progress by any obstacle”; and finally justice by the Euphrates, because its name signifies fruitfulness, abundance, and joy. Justice is indeed the happy and fruitful offspring of the virtues, a remarkable abundance of every fruit of honor and integrity, nourishing every soul, and finally a perpetual and inexhaustible fountain of joy and exultation, not only for the one who possesses it, but also for others.

CHAPTER I.

Prudence and Its Parts.

§ 1.

Definition of Prudence.

Although prudence is in the intellect and consequently is, absolutely speaking, an intellectual virtue, nevertheless, because it does not remain in the intellect alone but extends to the rectification of the appetite, it is rightly distinguished from the purely intellectual virtues and placed among the moral virtues as their rule, leader, and teacher. Hence the Philosopher, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, says that prudence is “as the eye of the soul acting from virtue.” Chrysostom, on Ps. 13, calls it “the lamp of the soul, queen of thoughts, and teacher of what is good and honorable.” Maximus of Tyre, diss. 40, says that prudence directs all things in the household of the good according to the prescription of reason, no differently from a mistress of a household. He seems to have taken this from the Philosopher, who, at the end of *Magna Moralia*, I, commends prudence as a kind of architect of the virtues and artificer of wisdom, placed over the whole household of the virtues, assigning and prescribing the tasks of each, so that, after the tumult

of the affections has been restrained and all things within have been rightly ordered, it may procure leisure for wisdom as mistress to exercise her proper functions, and, once the things that might obstruct it have been cleared away, a free prospect of the highest realities. Finally, prudence, as Bernard says in *De consideratione*, I, c. 8, “sitting as a kind of judge midway between pleasures and necessities, fixes limits for each according to definite boundaries, assigning and providing to necessities what is sufficient, and taking away from pleasures what is excessive.”

3. Prudence is defined by the Philosopher, *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI, c. 5, as “right reason concerning things to be done.” Concerning this definition, it must first be observed that there can be a twofold reason concerning things to be done: one general and common, by which rules of acting well are handed down; another particular, by which it is prescribed in individual actions what here and now may lawfully, advantageously, or obligatorily be done according to right reason. The first does not belong to prudence, but to theology or moral philosophy. The second belongs to prudence, which is concerned not with universals but only with singulars.

Secondly, it must be observed that reason concerning things to be done can itself be twofold: one standing on the side of the power as an operative habit, and this is prudence; another standing as an object beheld and considered, and this is law, which is neither a virtue nor an operative habit, but is related to prudence as the artisan’s idea is related to art. For just as art perfects the artifact by beholding the idea, so prudence directs human and free acts, which are the very things to be done, by attending to the law.

Thirdly, it must be noted that by the name “things to be done” are understood, first and principally, moral things, that is, those pertaining to good conduct—from which we are called good without qualification—and conducing to a morally good, that is, honorable, end. Secondarily and less principally, certain other things are understood that pertain to the good and convenience of human life and to some manner of living well. Monastic prudence, for example, is useful not only for directing the conduct of each person toward integrity, but also for seeking certain lawful conveniences of life, avoiding inconveniences and dangers, winning the goodwill of others, avoiding offense, discerning the dispositions of others, living peaceably with them, and similar things. Hence Paul acted prudently in Acts 23 when, in order to evade the assault of the Jews conspiring to kill him, he introduced the question of the resurrection of the dead, so that by setting the Pharisees and Sadducees against each other he might break the force of both against himself. He acted prudently, I say, whether he did this from a higher and honorable end, namely, that he might preach the Gospel longer, or merely to

preserve his life. Christ likewise answered the Pharisees and Herodians most prudently: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's," in order to evade the odium they wished to stir up against him. That answer would have been prudent even if Christ had intended nothing other than to elude the cunning of the Jews.

4. The same is evident in domestic, political, and military prudence. Domestic prudence is concerned not only that the household live honorably by ensuring that all its members conform their conduct to the prescription of right reason, but also that the household fare well and conveniently in matters pertaining to food, clothing, and the other necessities of human life, according to the saying of Christ in Luke 12: "The faithful and prudent steward, whom the Lord placed over his household, to give them their measure of wheat in due season." Political prudence likewise cares not only that citizens live honorably by observing the laws, but also that they abound in the necessities of life and live together in concord and peace. Military prudence, moreover, cares not only that soldiers live honorably and exercise fortitude and the other virtues fitting to their state, but also that all other things necessary for conducting war well and attaining victory be employed, such as prudently providing supplies, seizing a favorable place, time, and opportunity for battle, and other things of this kind.

§ 2.

The Integral, Subjective, and Potential Parts of Prudence.

5. Three kinds of parts are commonly distinguished in every virtue: some are called integral, some subjective, and some potential. Integral parts are not partial habits or acts from which the essence of the virtue itself is composed, for every virtue is one simple and entirely indivisible quality. Rather, they are certain conditions, dispositions, or acts by which the work of the virtue is perfected. Subjective parts are species of the virtue, of which it is predicated essentially, as animal is predicated of man, horse, lion, and so forth. Hence everything belonging to the definition of the divided virtue must be found in each of its subjective parts. Finally, potential parts are certain less principal virtues joined to another, more principal virtue, whose definition they do not perfectly attain as subjective parts do. Nevertheless, they have a connection with it, either because they are ordered to less principal acts in the same matter, or because in their manner of proceeding and moderating the passions and acts of the appetite they resemble the proper manner of that virtue.

6. St. Thomas assigns eight integral parts of prudence in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 49, namely, memory, understanding or intelligence, docility, shrewdness, reasoning, foresight, circumspection, and caution. The first five pertain to prudence insofar as it is cognitive, taking counsel through eubulia and judging through synesis or gnome, for all of them serve perfect counsel and judgment. The last three pertain to prudence according to its principal act, which is to command or apply to operation.

7. Memory, therefore, is the recollection of past things, which contributes greatly to prudence. Understanding or intelligence signifies knowledge of present things, for in order to judge prudently it is necessary that the present state of the matter be thoroughly known to us. Docility implies an affection and readiness to learn, which also greatly assists prudence. Shrewdness serves so that a person, by investigating for himself, may quickly attain a perfect estimation of the matter. Reasoning signifies an aptitude for reasoning and for legitimately inferring one thing from another. Hence it is not taken for the reasoning power itself, but rather for its good disposition and use. Foresight implies a view of future things, or, as others maintain, the right ordering of things that are for an end. Circumspection signifies attention to everything that occurs and a comparison of what is ordered to the end with the surrounding circumstances, lest anything necessary be lacking in the work. Finally, caution implies attention to guarding against evils that can be mixed with goods.

8. The subjective parts of prudence, or its species, are two: monastic prudence, by which each person governs himself and his own acts, intending the proper good of the suppositum in order to the end of human life; and polyarchic prudence, by which a multitude is governed. The latter is subdivided into four species: regal, political, domestic, and military prudence, which St. Thomas discusses in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 50.

9. Regal prudence is the prudence of the king himself, by which he governs the city or kingdom. Political prudence is that by which people govern themselves in obeying their rulers for the sake of the common good. Domestic prudence is that which concerns the administration of the goods of a household. Finally, military prudence is that by which soldiers are directed to attack enemies or repel their assaults.

Regal prudence is again subdivided into monarchical, by which one presides over the multitude; aristocratic, by which a few great men do so; and democratic, by which many do so, as when the people govern in a commonwealth.

10. Finally, the potential parts of prudence, or those ordered to its less principal acts in service of the most principal act, are three: eubulia, synesis,

and gnome. In the practical intellect concerning things to be done, apart from universal judgments regarding the end, which synderesis rectifies, there are only three acts concerning the means: counsel, judgment, and command. Of these the most perfect is command, to which both judgment and counsel are ordered. Hence command belongs immediately to prudence itself, which among the virtues concerning means is the most perfect, as we showed more fully in the Treatise on Human Acts, disp. 11, concerning use and command. Eubulia is placed to rectify counsel and is therefore called the virtue of good counsel. To rectify judgment, two virtues are placed, namely, synesis and gnome. The first judges according to common laws and is therefore the common directive of legal justice. The second judges according to natural reason in those matters in which the common law fails; accordingly, epikeia is directed by it, which is a higher legal justice in the commonly accepted sense. St. Thomas treats these parts of prudence, or virtues annexed to it, in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 51, where he develops at length what we have considered briefly and compendiously. To treat them expressly would exceed the limits of the present undertaking.

CHAPTER II.

Justice and Its Parts.

1. Justice, the second of the cardinal virtues, is the first and most excellent among the moral virtues. Hence the Philosopher says in *Ethica Nicomachea*, V, c. 1: "Justice is the most illustrious of the virtues, and neither the evening star nor the morning star is so admirable." "Justice," says Ambrose on Ps. 35, "was born for others rather than for itself; it seeks the common advantage, not its own, and regards another's good as its own gain. Blessed and illustrious is justice, whose good profits everyone." "Justice," adds Ribadeneira in *De Principe Christiano*, II, c. 3, "first founded kingdoms, stabilized them once founded, increased and adorned them once stabilized, and bestowed upon them whatever greatness and majesty they attained. It heals the wounds of peoples, extinguishes seditions, calms embittered minds, establishes peace, opposes wars, makes kings glorious, grants security to kingdoms, and above all honors and reveres God, to whom no sacrifice can be more pleasing and no victim more acceptable than the victim of justice. By its bond heaven is joined to earth, the highest things to the lowest, and the extremities and most widely separated parts of the world to one another." Finally, as Porphyry aptly says in *De abstinentia*, III, "justice is the seasoning of all the virtues." For just as hunger, according to Socrates,

On the Cardinal Virtues

is the seasoning of every food, so justice gives grace and savor to all the virtues. We must therefore treat briefly of this illustrious and excellent virtue, whose excellence, as Philo says in *De creatione principis*, is so great “that no poet and no writer has praised it sufficiently.” First its definition must be explained, and then its parts enumerated.

§ 1.

Definition of Justice.

2. Justice is taken in two ways. First, broadly, for the collection of all the virtues, or insofar as it signifies a state perfected by the collection of all the virtues. This is called general justice. Of it Christ said in Matt. 5: “Unless your justice abounds more than that of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.” In Matt. 1 Joseph is called just, that is, perfect in every virtue or adorned with all the virtues. Hence, because grace and charity are the root of all the virtues, they frequently assume the name of justice, as is evident from Augustine, *De natura et gratia*, c. 38 and the final chapter, where he says: “Charity begun is justice begun; charity advanced is justice advanced; great charity is great justice; perfect charity is perfect justice.” We also call all who are established in grace “just” because of grace itself.

Secondly, justice is taken strictly and determinately for a particular moral virtue relating to another and establishing an equality of right between different persons. Hence it is defined by Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, V, c. 1; Cicero, *De officiis*, II, in the chapter on justice; and Ulpian, in the law *Iustitia*, Digest, *De iustitia et iure*, as “a perpetual and constant will rendering to each his right.” This definition perfectly declares the nature of justice, as St. Thomas shows in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 58, a. 1. By the words “a perpetual and constant will,” it is indicated that justice is a virtue, since it is voluntary or proceeds from choice, and firm and stable, which are the conditions of virtue as such. Indeed, it is implied that its subject is the will, in which alone among the moral virtues justice is subjectively present, as is evident from what was said in the Treatise on Virtues in General, c. 2. By the remaining words, namely, “rendering to each his right,” the proper object of justice, or the matter with which it is concerned, is indicated. The other moral virtues are principally ordered to the agent and to his own operations. Justice, however, is principally concerned with those things that relate to another as its proper matter, and regards another’s right, with a view to preserving equality, as its proper object. Hence the mean of justice is

called the “mean of the thing,” while the mean of the other virtues is called the “mean of reason.” This does not mean that justice does not also attend to the mean established by prudence, and thus to the mean of reason, but that prudence in the matter of justice establishes the mean only by equality according to the thing, so that precisely as much is rendered as is truly owed. In the matter of temperance and fortitude, however, the mean is not an equality determined by the things themselves, but one established by prudence after all the circumstances have been considered. Accordingly, it will sometimes be more, sometimes less, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another, according as the circumstances of time, place, persons, and so forth vary.

3. Moreover, the right that is the object of justice is adequately divided into natural right and positive right, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 57, a. 2. Right, or the just, is that which is equal or commensurate with another. Something can be equal to a person in two ways: either from the very nature of the thing, as when someone gives so much that he receives the same amount, and this is called *natural right*; or from some agreement, whether private or public, and this is called *positive right*. Positive right is subdivided into divine and human, and human right in turn into canon and civil right. For although among the philosophers human right is only what is called civil or temporal, because among them only an external and merely temporal polity was known, nevertheless among Christians, who acknowledge a twofold society of man corresponding to the two proximate ends toward which man can be directed, a twofold positive right must also be acknowledged, proceeding from the twofold authority intending those ends.

4. But if you ask what the law of nations is and whether it is distinguished from natural and positive right, I answer the first part of the question by saying that the law of nations is that which is common to all well-ordered nations and imposed by their consent or at least by their usage. For just as all nations, although divided into kingdoms and provinces, always possess a certain moral unity and require mutual communication, so too they require some right and laws, at least established by usage itself and extending as widely as the communication they direct. To the second question I say that the law of nations is contained under positive human right, although it participates to some extent in natural right.

5. The first part of this resolution is proved, first, from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 57, a. 3, where he expressly teaches that the law of nations is not natural right. He also indicates this clearly in I-II, q. 49, a. 5, ad 3; q. 95, a. 4; and II-II, q. 66, a. 2, ad 1.

It is proved secondly. That which depends upon the free institution of men is positive right. But the law of nations depends upon the free institution of men. Therefore it is not natural but positive right. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved from Justinian, *Institutiones*, *De iure naturali, gentium et civili*, where he says: "The law of nations is common to the whole human race, for, as usage required and human necessities arose, human nations established certain laws for themselves." The same is found in the chapter *Omnis lex*. Gaius likewise says in the law *Omnes populi*, Digest, *De iustitia et iure*: "What natural reason establishes among men is equally observed among all and is called the law of nations." Therefore the law of nations is not determined by the nature of the thing, but by human choice conforming to natural right.

Thirdly, natural right is immutable and admits of no dispensation. But the law of nations can be altered, and strictly speaking human authority can dispense from it. For although it was introduced by the law of nations that captives taken in a just war become the slaves of their captors, in fact a dispensation was made in this matter in favor of the faith when the Church decreed that Christians captured by other Christians in a just war should not become the slaves of their captors, and that the captors should not have true dominion over those captured. Therefore the law of nations is not natural but positive right.

6. The second part, which asserts that the law of nations participates to some extent in natural right, is gathered from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 95, a. 4, ad 1, where he says: "The law of nations is in a certain way natural to man insofar as he is rational, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion not very remote from its principles. Hence men readily agreed in matters of this kind." It is nevertheless distinguished from natural law, especially from what is common to all animals. Therefore, although the law of nations is contained under positive right, it nevertheless participates in natural right. Hence Báñez, on *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 57, a. 3, dub. 3, concl. 3, says that the law of nations is as it were a middle, having an affinity with both natural and positive civil right. It agrees with natural right, first, in that neither needs to be written; secondly, in that the convocation of men is not required for its promulgation, but it is accepted in every nation without a herald; thirdly, because the law of nations has the manner of natural right, since natural right is either a principle or a necessary conclusion, while the law of nations is as it were a most necessary mode by which natural right is preserved; fourthly, they agree in that both natural right and the law of nations are observed everywhere among all

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

nations, and if the contrary is done, all judge that it is done wrongly. Medina teaches similar things on *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 95, a. 4.

§ 2.

The Integral, Subjective, and Potential Parts of Justice.

7. Only two integral parts of justice are given: doing good and avoiding evil. This is not according as good and evil are taken in general, for in that sense they belong to every virtue, but insofar as good has the character of something owed to one's neighbor and evil the character of something harmful. In this way they belong to justice, and the complete function and end of justice is composed from this twofold act. For since it belongs to a perfect agent both to establish a thing and to preserve it once established, the same justice whose function it is to establish equality with another by rendering to him what is his must also preserve the equality established by avoiding and removing the evils of injustice through which it is destroyed. The first is called "doing good," the second "turning away from evil." Hence without these two the work of justice is not integral and perfect.

8. The subjective parts of justice, or its species, are three: commutative, distributive, and legal justice. The first is the justice of part to part; the second, of the whole to the parts; the third, of the parts to the whole. For since the function of justice is to establish equality between certain parties, so that each renders to the other what is owed to him, distinct species of justice arise according to the different relations of those between whom equality is established. Such a relation can be only threefold. It can be a relation of part to part, so that each gives the other what is his. This is commutative justice, to which exchanges, purchases, sales, and all contracts belong from which an obligation of one party to the other arises. Or it can be a relation of the whole to its parts, so that the whole itself renders to each part what belongs to it. This is called distributive justice, to which the distribution of rewards and common goods belongs. Both are called particular justice because they attend to the good of the parts. Finally, the foregoing relation can be that of the parts to their whole, so that each part conducts itself as the good of the whole requires and renders to the community what it owes. This is called legal justice, because it chiefly ensures that the laws remain in force and are observed, insofar as the common good itself is preserved through their observance.

Legal justice is divided into that which regards the common good and the observance of the laws by attending to the words of the law and, only

according to them, to the intention of the legislator. This retains the common name of legal justice and is directed by synesis, which is the virtue of judging according to common laws and rules. The other, setting aside the words of the law, attends only to the intention and mind of the legislator, so that in the present case, with all the circumstances considered, that may be done which the legislator would wish to be done. This is called *epikeia* and is directed by the virtue of judging above common rules, namely, *gnome*, as we said at the end of the preceding chapter.

9. Finally, the potential parts of justice are nine: religion, penance, piety, observance, gratitude, vindication, truthfulness, friendship, and liberality. The reason for this number nine can be given as follows. A virtue ordered to another can fall short of perfect justice only either because what it renders to another falls short of equality, or because it falls short of strict debt. The virtues relating to God fall short in the first way, for whatever man renders to God, he renders less than he owes. Such are religion, which renders reverence and worship to God, and penance, which offers him satisfaction for sins. Similarly, the virtues concerning one's country and parents, and persons established in some dignity or distinguished by virtue, wisdom, or another prerogative, fall short of equality. These are piety and observance, because neither to those from whom we have received our natural being, nor to those who offer us teaching and examples of virtue, can we render an equal return.

10. The virtues whose matter does not fall under strict debt, which is legal debt, but whose acts are said to be owed solely from the fittingness and integrity of virtue, which is called moral debt, fall short in the second way. In this debt there is a twofold degree. It can either be absolutely necessary, so that without it integrity of conduct cannot be preserved, or necessary only for greater perfection, without which rectitude of conduct can indeed remain, though not perfectly. What is absolutely necessary can again be considered either on the side of the one who owes, and thus truthfulness is placed, for it belongs to such a debt that a man show himself to another in deeds and words as he truly is, in which truth or veracity consists; or on the side of the one to whom something is owed, insofar as someone is recompensed according to what he has done. This occurs sometimes in goods, and for this gratitude is placed; sometimes in evils, and for this vindication is placed. For the debt necessary only for greater perfection two virtues are placed: friendship, by which a man conducts himself fittingly in words and deeds toward others with whom he lives; and liberality, by which he gives fittingly under no other title than that it is becoming for the giver himself. Hence in these two virtues the character of debt is least.

CHAPTER III.
Religion and Its Acts.

1. We treat religion more particularly and especially than the other virtues annexed to justice, both because it holds the first place among the potential parts of justice and because it is the most excellent among the moral virtues. Isidore of Pelusium, III, epist. 268, says that just as the beauty of the eyes is the most powerful part of bodily beauty, so piety or religion is the principal part of beauty in the soul. Philo, near the end of his book *De caritate*, says that all the other virtues are joined to this one and can no more be separated from it than a shadow from a body standing in the sun. He adds that through religion man is raised so high that one who is perfected in it becomes in a certain manner divine and is honored in God's own estimation no less than an entire people, attaining the dignity of a whole nation. The reason for such excellence in this virtue is that it binds man again to God through the worship due to him, after man has, as it were, been separated from God by creation. St. Thomas explains this admirably in opusc. 19, *Contra impugnantes religionem*, c. 1, where he argues as follows: "Religion, implying a repeated binding, shows that someone is bound to that to which he had first been joined and from which he first began to exist. Since every creature existed in God before it existed in itself and proceeded from him, beginning in a certain manner to depart from him according to essence through creation, the rational creature must therefore be bound again to God himself, to whom it had first been joined before it existed, so that the rivers may return to the place from which they flow."

Religion, therefore, according to St. Thomas, is named from binding again, because it in a certain manner binds men again to God; or from rereading, as Cicero maintains, because a religious person should frequently read and ponder in his heart the things pertaining to divine worship; or, as Augustine teaches in *De civitate Dei*, X, c. 4, from choosing again, because we must choose God again, whom we had lost through negligence. These things being premised, in order to understand the nature of this most excellent virtue, we must briefly explain its definition and enumerate its principal acts.

On the Cardinal Virtues

§ 1.

Definition of Religion.

2. Religion is commonly defined as “the virtue that renders due worship to God as the first principle of all things.” It is first called a virtue because it is a good habit and the principle of a praiseworthy operation. It is good and praiseworthy to worship God in a due or fitting manner. By this term superstition or false religion is excluded, which is not a virtue but a vice opposed to right reason, because it either worships a false god as true, as the Gentiles and pagans do, or, although worshipping the true God, does so not in an honorable and fitting manner, but either with superfluous ceremonies rejected by God, as the Jews do, or with ceremonies useless for the soul’s salvation and founded upon error against the faith, as the Turks, heretics, and others of that kind do. Hence the term “due” here signifies the same as fitting.

By the name “worship” is implied not only a declaration of the divine excellence, but also man’s submission or subjection to God. Worship, strictly and properly taken, adds to simple honor a certain submission on the part of the one who offers honor, so that he professes himself inferior to the one whom he honors. Hence worship can be directed only toward one who is more excellent, although honor does not require this. For this reason God honors his saints by making their excellence manifest, but he does not properly worship them, because he in no way subjects himself to such excellence.

Note also that, although submitting oneself to God seems to be proper to humility, it is not proper to humility under the same aspect under which it is attributed to religion. Humility regards such submission precisely because it befits our lowliness, so that we may contain ourselves within the limits of our condition and not be carried beyond them through self-exaltation. Religion regards it precisely as declaring and professing the divine eminence, so that through such submission we honor it.

Finally, the definition adds “as the first principle of all things,” because the honor shown to God as Father and principle of our origin belongs to the virtue of piety, while that rendered to him because of benefits received from him belongs to gratitude, which formally regards a benefit. But the worship owed to God because of his singular and infinite excellence in every genus of

perfection, by reason of which it belongs to him to be the first principle and supreme Lord of all, is offered by the virtue of religion.

Hence the material object of this virtue is worship fitting to God, consisting in internal or external actions by which we profess God's excellence through adoration, sacrifice, and so forth. Its formal object is the special integrity or conformity with right reason that consists in rendering to the supreme divine excellence the honor and worship fitting to it. This aspect distinguishes the virtue of religion from the other virtues, whether theological or moral, since they are not concerned with such a formal object and are not exercised in rendering honor to God because of his supreme excellence, but on account of other particular motives, such as his supreme truthfulness or infinite goodness.

3. From these things you understand how great is the excellence of the virtue of religion above the other moral virtues. None of them has so elevated an object as divine worship, by reason of which religion itself in a certain manner reaches God. Hence St. Thomas argues in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 81, a. 6, in the body: "Things ordered to an end derive their goodness from their order to the end. Therefore, the nearer they are to the end, the better they are. The moral virtues concern things ordered to God as their end. Religion, however, approaches God more nearly than the other moral virtues insofar as it performs acts directly and immediately ordered to divine honor. Therefore religion holds preeminence among the other moral virtues."

4. You also understand that religion is not a theological but a moral virtue. A theological virtue has God himself as its immediate object, as is evident in faith, hope, and charity. These regard and attain God immediately and as the object attained: faith as supreme truth, hope as our supreme good, and charity as the supreme good in himself and supremely lovable for his own sake. Religion, however, immediately regards something created, namely, the worship offered to God as the terminus and end for whom it is offered. The divine excellence is only the reason why such worship is owed to God, not the formal and immediate object of religion.

This can be explained and illustrated by the example of commutative justice, which one man has toward another. Just as the object of such justice is neither one's neighbor himself nor the right existing in him, but the thing owed to one's neighbor by reason of such a right, so the object of religion, which is man's justice toward God, is neither God himself nor the right he possesses by reason of his supreme excellence to be worshiped supremely by creatures, but the created worship itself owed because of that excellence.

On the Cardinal Virtues

§ 2.

The Internal Acts of Religion.

5. There are only two internal acts of religion, which St. Thomas treats in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, qq. 82 and 83. The first is devotion, which is a certain voluntary readiness for the worship and service of God. Not every will to serve God or offering of oneself to his service merits the name of devotion, but only that which is joined with readiness and fervor of spirit. Hence Scripture joins this readiness with devotion in Exod. 35, where it is said: "The whole multitude of the children of Israel went out and offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devoted mind." The holy Fathers likewise join both together, as Ambrose does in *De Cain et Abel*, I, c. 8, where, speaking of the patriarch Abraham, he says: "You may still recognize the exertions of swift devotion. He ran, it says, and took a tender and good calf, gave it to the servant, and hastened to prepare it. Everywhere there is tireless devotion, and therefore his offering was accepted."

St. Thomas proves in the cited place, q. 82, a. 2, that such devotion and readiness of soul in matters pertaining to God's service are formally and properly an act of religion, by this argument. It belongs to the same virtue both to will to do something and to have a ready will to do it, because both acts have the same object and formal motive. But to perform things pertaining to God's worship and service properly belongs to religion. Therefore it also belongs to religion to have a ready will to carry them out, which is to be devout.

6. Nor is it valid to say that this belongs much more to charity, which impels us to give ourselves wholly to God, to adhere to him, and to serve him with our whole heart, whole soul, whole mind, and all our strength. For the motive of each virtue is different. Charity intends to please God as a friend and to unite us to him as such, and it impels us to perform good works with a ready and fervent soul insofar as they are pleasing to God. Religion intends to serve God because of his supreme excellence, which is worthy of supreme worship and honor. Similarly, although hope, obedience, gratitude, and certain other virtues incline us to serve and obey God, they do so from a motive other than the special integrity found in divine worship itself, namely, because God, by reason of the supreme excellence of his nature, is worthy that we should desire to serve him with a ready soul.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

The second internal act of religion is prayer, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 3, where he argues: “It properly belongs to religion to offer reverence and honor to God. Therefore all those things through which reverence is shown to God belong to religion. Through prayer man shows reverence to God insofar as he subjects himself to him and, by praying, professes that he needs him as the author of his goods. Hence it is manifest that prayer is properly an act of religion.”

7. In order that this doctrine may be more clearly understood, and that it may be explained how prayer, which belongs to the intellect as a certain internal speech and manifestation, is properly an act of religion, which resides in the will since it is a potential part of justice, it must be observed with Cajetan on *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 81, a. 4, that St. Thomas, when assigning proper acts to the virtues, considered the identity of the virtues rather than the identity of the powers. Therefore he calls every act that regards only one virtue a proper act of that virtue, in whatever power it may be. If it regards several virtues, he calls it proper to the virtue from which the act receives its first species of goodness or vice, and consequently whose end it primarily regards.

For this reason the same holy Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 3, a. 1, says that external confession is a proper act of faith, although confession is in an external power and faith in the intellect, because the first goodness of such confession comes from faith and regards its end, not that of another virtue. In general, we attribute all external acts, whether of virtue or vice, as proper to those habits from which they receive their first species of deformity or rectitude, as eating to temperance and external sexual excess to lust, without attending to whether the act is in the same power or in a different one.

Therefore, because the first and essential goodness of prayer is wholly from religion, since it is the goodness of reverence and worship, prayer is properly called an act of religion, although it is in a distinct power. For this reason it is also called an elicited act of religion. As Báñez observes well on the cited q. 83 and Alvarez in I-II, disp. 92, an act can be called elicited by a virtue in two ways. First, properly and strictly, because it is the immediate operation of that virtue and consequently remains in the same power. Secondly, broadly, merely because no other virtue intervenes, although another power does intervene. Such an act is called elicited because it is not properly commanded. For an act properly commanded by a virtue is one performed through the mediation of another eliciting virtue, as an act elicited by humility for God’s sake is said to be commanded by charity. Therefore, wherever there is only one virtue, however it influences the act,

the act is said to proceed from it elicitedly. In this second way prayer is said to be elicited by religion; in the first way devotion is so elicited, because it exists in the will.

8. Prayer is defined as “a petition to God for fitting things.” It is subjectively in the intellect, because to pray, as regards the substance of the act, is nothing other than to order our internal concept toward God, to express, intimate, and make it known to him. This is the function of the intellect. For if someone merely desires something in the will but does not order his desire toward God by speaking intellectually to him, there will be no true prayer there, just as in external prayer the appetite for a good is not sufficient unless it is manifested by words and speech to the one to whom the prayer is directed. Hence others define prayer as follows: “Prayer is an explanation of desire before God, so that we may obtain something from him.”

9. The Apostle enumerates four things in prayer as though they were integral parts, in 1 Tim. 2: prayer, petition, supplication, and thanksgiving. For one who prays, first, approaches God. This part is called by the Apostle specifically “prayer,” and in this sense prayer is commonly defined as “an ascent or elevation of the mind to God.” Then he asks by expressing his desire, and this is called “petition” or “supplication.” Thirdly, he proposes a reason for obtaining on the part of God, namely, God’s holiness and Christ’s merits, through which we ask to be heard. This is called “obsecration.” Finally, he employs a reason for obtaining on our part, and this is “thanksgiving,” because by giving thanks for benefits received we obtain greater benefits. Thus St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 17.

10. The holy Fathers commend in a remarkable manner the dignity, efficacy, and necessity of prayer, so that they may persuade the faithful to exercise it frequently. Dionysius the Areopagite in *De divinis nominibus* depicts and shadows forth prayer by the beautiful symbol and instructive hieroglyph of a golden chain let down from heaven, drawing us to the stars and to God himself. Clement of Alexandria agrees with him in *Stromata*, VII, where, giving the reason why the first worshipers of the Christian religion prayed with hands raised toward heaven, he adds: “So that by readiness and spiritual eagerness we may attain the essence apprehended by intelligence, and, striving to raise the body from the earth together with the word, we judge that the upright and elevated soul advances in holiness through desire for better things, while with great courage we despise the bond of the body.”

11. Chrysostom, in his second discourse on prayer, teaches that just as the human body can have no movement without sinews, neither can the soul without prayer, and consequently that a soul deprived of prayer is as though

paralyzed. He says: "Just as the body is held together by sinews, runs, stands, and remains joined, so that if you cut the sinews you dissolve the whole harmony of the body, so souls are held together and joined to themselves by holy prayers and easily complete the course of piety. But if you deprive yourself of prayer, you will act as though you drew a fish from the water. For as water is life to the fish, so prayer is life to you. Through prayer you are permitted, as though from the waters, to fly upward, pass beyond heaven, and draw near to the Lord."

12. Bernard, serm. 49 on the Cantic, asserts that prayer is the wine cellar into which the Bridegroom introduces the bride, that is, the beloved soul, and where she is inebriated with the wine of devotion, which gladdens the heart, and is given drink from the torrent of delight.

Augustine says in serm. 65 *De tempore*: "The prayer of the just man is the key of heaven. Prayer ascends, and the mercy of God descends. Although the earth is low and heaven high, the Lord nevertheless hears the tongue of man if he has a clean conscience." And in serm. 22 to the brethren in the desert, wholly poured out in praise of prayer, he exclaims: "Holy prayer, pillar of the holy virtues, ladder of the soul, husband of widows, kindred of angels, foundation of faith, crown of monks, consolation of the married. Blessed is he who loves you, more blessed he who frequents you, blessed he who binds himself to you, but more blessed he who perseveres in you."

13. Finally, Cassiodorus writes the following on the verse of Ps. 140, "Let my prayer be directed as incense in your sight": "Incense is the sweet burning of an aromatic substance which, consumed upon coals, sends forth a most pleasing smoke toward the heights and soothes those who smell it with delightful sweetness. Thus the prayer of the faithful, kindled by the fire of charity, is brought before the divine sight, and is raised up all the more by the weight of humility and union. For the Lord delights in our virtues as in good odors. In the Apocalypse we read that the Lord receives holy prayer as a most sweet odor, where it is said: 'The angel stood upon the altar of the Lord, holding a golden censer in his hand, and the smoke of supplications ascended from the angel's hand in the sight of the Lord, that he might offer from the prayers of the saints.' Or, as the common text has it: 'The angel stood before the altar, holding a golden censer, and much incense was given to him, that he might offer from the prayers of all the saints upon the golden altar before the throne of God. And the smoke of the incense from the prayers of the saints ascended from the angel's hand before God.'"

On the same verse of the Psalmist, Bellarmine excellently observes that the qualities of good prayer are rightly signified by the likeness of the incense offered in the temple at God's command morning and evening, as

On the Cardinal Virtues

stated in Exod. 30. It had the following qualities. First, it was composed of four kinds of spices, namely, frankincense, galbanum, onycha, and stacte, as St. Hilary notes, from which a most sweet odor was produced. Secondly, it was offered in the noblest and innermost part of the temple, called the Holy of Holies, where the tablets of the Covenant and the golden altar were. Thirdly, it was offered by the high priest. Fourthly, it was placed upon the fire, from which smoke arose directly upward.

The four spices are the four virtues of faith, confidence, charity, and humility. From these is composed prayer most pleasing to God. Man is God's temple. "You are," says the Apostle, "the temple of God," 1 Cor. 6. But the interior part is the soul, in whose mind is the law of the Lord written by the finger of God, and in whose will is the golden altar, namely, a clean heart adorned by God's grace. The high priest is Christ, for through him as our advocate we must always pray, and therefore we conclude our individual prayers in this way: "Through our Lord Jesus Christ."

Finally, the fire that raises the most sweet smoke directly upward is fervor of desire. Right intention is therefore signified by the direct ascent, and attention by the fire. Those who pray to be seen by men turn the incense aside by the temporal breeze, so that it does not ascend directly. Those also who suffer distractions of mind do not direct their prayer as they ought, for distractions, like blasts of wind, scatter and disperse the smoke of prayer so that it does not ascend directly upward. Because it is very difficult to be free from every distraction of mind, the Prophet made mention of this matter, saying: "Let my prayer be directed as incense in your sight."

§ 3.

The External Acts of Religion.

14. Besides the two internal acts of religion already explained, there are several external acts, namely, adoration, sacrifice, oblation, vow, oath, adjuration by the divine name, and the invocation of that name in praise. We must treat these briefly here.

Adoration is defined especially as "honor shown to God by an external gesture of the body." Leaving aside the question whether there is truly and properly an adoration concluded inwardly in the mind alone, which Vázquez treats in vol. I, on *Summa Theologiae* III, disp. 93, the action to which the name of adoration was primarily applied is any exterior action performed through the body to signify internal reverence and veneration, such as genuflection, uncovering the head, inclining the body, and so forth. Although

these external acts, considered precisely in themselves, are indifferent to good and evil and therefore do not belong to religion unless they receive internal devotion, nor can they be called adoration, nevertheless the very name of adoration is not attributed to an internal act except in relation to the foregoing movements and insofar as it includes them. In the same way, the name of restitution is not attributed without qualification to the will to restore except in relation to the exterior act, or rather is attributed to the exterior act itself insofar as it stands under such a will.

15. Moreover, this obligation to worship God by external adoration is of natural right. First, because we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, and must therefore offer God a twofold adoration: spiritual adoration, consisting in the interior devotion of the mind, and bodily adoration, consisting in the exterior humiliation of the body, as the holy Doctor discusses in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 84, a. 2, in the body. Secondly, because, since men live socially, they must signify their submission toward God not only to God or the angels, but also to other men, and show themselves to be true worshipers and adorers of God. This they cannot do through purely internal and spiritual acts unknown to men.

16. Sacrifice is “the oblation of a sensible thing made to God by a lawful minister through a real change, in order to manifest his supreme dominion and our subjection.”

It is first called an “oblation,” because oblation broadly taken is a genus embracing both sacrifice and simple oblation. “Of a sensible thing” is added to exclude the internal oblation by which the mind offers itself to God. This is not properly a sacrifice, although in Scripture it is sometimes called by that name, as in Ps. 50: “A contrite spirit is a sacrifice to God.” “By a lawful minister” is added because, since sacrifice is the most excellent and public worship of God, it is fitting that it be offered only by a person designated for this by public authority, namely, a priest. “Made to God” is added because sacrifice is owed to God alone, and it is unlawful to offer worship of this kind to any creature. “Through a real change” is added because the things sacrificed must be changed in the sacrifice itself, whether by slaughter, burning, breaking, or in some other manner, so that their being offered to God as the first principle of all being, who by his supreme dominion can destroy created things, may thereby be more perfectly signified.

The remaining phrase, “in order to manifest his supreme dominion and our subjection,” is placed to declare the special character of the worship intended and offered through the act of sacrificing, namely, that we profess God to be the author of our being and the lord of life and death. By the destruction of the victim, offered as though in our place, we profess that we

owe to him whatever we are, and that it would be fitting, if necessary and if he so willed, that our whole being be spent in his honor. For, as Eusebius rightly says in *Demonstratio Evangelica*, I, final chapter, men perceived by natural reason that they owed their life to God. Yet because it was not fitting, nor did God permit, that men themselves be sacrificed, it was introduced by the law of nature that men should immolate animals or other sensible things to God in their own place, professing that they would offer their own life in the same way if necessary.

17. Sacrifice so described is divided in several ways. First, by reason of its matter, it is divided into victim or host, immolation, and libation. When it was made from animals slain or consumed, it was called a victim or host. These names were derived from enemies conquered or to be conquered and overcome, because such sacrifices were commonly offered either to obtain victory or to give thanks for victory obtained. When it was made from solid inanimate things, it was called an immolation, a name derived from the mill in which grain was ground. When it was made from liquids, it was called a libation, because wine, oil, and other liquids were poured out, that is, offered to God by being spilled.

Examples of all these differences are found in the Mosaic law. Clean animals were slain, namely, sheep, lambs, oxen, calves, kids, goats, doves, sparrows, and turtledoves. Many solid inanimate things were also offered in sacrifice, namely, bread, which was cut into pieces or partly burned, the remainder being given for the food of the priests or offerers; fine flour cooked in a pan, oven, or gridiron; salt thrown into the fire; incense burned; a sheaf of ears of grain roasted; and wheat crushed in a mill or mortar. Certain liquids also were offered by being poured out, such as blood, water, wine, and oil.

18. Secondly, by reason of the form or mode in which it was made, sacrifice can be divided into bloody and unbloody. The former was made through the shedding of blood, as in the slaughter of animals; the latter without it, as in the other oblations. There were many sacrifices of both kinds, not only under the Mosaic law, as is evident from what has been said, but also under the law of nature. Abel, Noah, and Abraham sacrificed animals by slaughtering them, Gen. 4, 8, and 15. Melchizedek, king of Salem and priest of the Most High, is said to have offered bread and wine in sacrifice, Gen. 14. This distinction among the ancient sacrifices served to represent the twofold sacrifice of Christ: one bloody sacrifice accomplished on the cross, according to which Christ can be called a priest according to the order of Aaron; the other unbloody sacrifice in the Eucharist, according to which he is called a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek.

19. Thirdly, sacrifice was formerly divided by reason of form or end into holocaust, peace offering, and sacrifice for sin. A holocaust was one in which the whole thing was burned so that, resolved into smoke, it might ascend to God. It was the most perfect sacrifice, because in it it was more expressly signified that all things belong to God. In the other two sacrifices one part was burned and another reserved for the priests or offerers. They were distinguished because the peace offering was offered for benefits received or to be received, while the sacrifice for sin was offered for its expiation.

Under the law of grace, however, all these sacrifices have ceased, and it would be superstitious to use any of them, because the most perfect victim and sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ the Lord is present, which was figured in all those legal sacrifices. The figures must therefore cease when the reality is present. Hence it is said in a certain collect of the Church: "O God, who by the perfection of one sacrifice sanctified the diversity of legal victims," and so forth.

20. Oblation, as distinguished from sacrifice, is the act by which we offer external things to God without effecting a change in them. Thus St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 86, a. 1, in the body, where he says: "The name of oblation is common to all things presented for divine worship, so that if something is presented for divine worship as something sacred that must thereby be consumed, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice. Hence Exod. 29 says: 'You shall offer the whole ram as incense upon the altar. It is an oblation to the Lord, a most sweet odor of God's victim.' And Lev. 2 says: 'When a soul offers an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, fine flour shall be his oblation.' But if it is presented in such a way that it remains intact, to be appointed for divine worship or spent for the use of the ministers, it will be an oblation and not a sacrifice."

21. Frequent mention is made in Scripture of this kind of simple oblation. In Lev. 23 the oblation of sheaves of new ears of grain is commanded. In Deut. 26 the children of Israel are ordered to take the first fruits of all their produce in a basket and bring them to the priest, who is to place them before the altar of the Lord. Heb. 5 says: "Every high priest taken from among men is appointed for men in the things that pertain to God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins." By the "gifts," which the Apostle distinguishes from sacrifices, he understands the simple oblations of first fruits and other things that were not burned or consumed in sacrifice, but were offered whole to God for the use of the priests and the temple, as Theophylact and the other Fathers explain.

22. A vow is defined by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 88, aa. 2 and 3, in the body, as "a promise made to God concerning the worship of

On the Cardinal Virtues

God himself.” It is called a promise because it is an obliging will and differs from a simple resolution, which is merely the will and determination to do something. Hence the same holy Doctor in the cited place, a. 1, compares promise with command, in that, just as someone through command obliges another over whom he has power, so through promise he obliges himself to do or omit something. For the same reason a vow is commonly called a private law that each person imposes upon himself, by which he binds himself to something.

This promise is said to be made to God. For although a vow can be made in the presence of the saints and prelates, so that reverence for them may move one to its observance, and although the promise itself can be directed immediately to them and referred to their worship and observance, as is evident in the solemn vow emitted in our Order, in which it is said: “I promise obedience to God, Blessed Mary, and Blessed Dominic,” and so forth, nevertheless this promise, insofar as it is made to the saints, does not formally have the character of a vow, but only materially, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place, a. 5, ad 3. In order that it be truly and properly a vow, another promise must be tacitly or expressly joined to it, by which we promise God that we will do what we promise to the saints. This promise made to God is the vow and belongs to religion. The promise made to the saints is not a vow of itself, but the matter of the vow, or of the other promise made to God that formally gives it the character of a vow as its matter. Hence it falls not under religion, but under *dulia*, *hyperdulia*, justice, or fidelity, as the *Salmanticenses* say when explaining the general division of all the virtues.

Thirdly, this promise is said to be made to God for the worship of God himself, because, since a vow is an act of religion and *latria*, it is an ordering of the things vowed to divine worship and service. Hence I judge that if someone, in promising perpetual chastity to God, in no way intended God’s honor but only greater temporal convenience or something else, he would not properly vow, nor would such a promise be incapable of dispensation by the bishop, as a true vow of perpetual chastity is.

23. An oath is “an attestation of the divine name, or invocation of the divine testimony, to establish credibility or confirm a promise.” Hence according to its substance it is an act of the intellect and a certain speech by which we call God as witness to confirm our truthfulness and fidelity in words and promises. Because by this invocation we profess the divine excellence, it belongs elicitedly to religion, as we said of prayer and the vow. In order that an oath be religious, however, it must observe three things: truth, justice, and judgment, according to Jer. 4: “You shall swear, ‘The Lord

lives,' in truth, judgment, and justice." Truth is required because God can testify only to what is true; justice, because he does not will that anyone be unjustly harmed by his testimony; judgment, because God's testimony is irreligiously introduced concerning a very slight matter or where there is no necessity.

24. Adjuration occurs when we beseech someone through God himself to do or omit something, so that love, fear, or reverence for God may move him efficaciously, lest otherwise he seem insufficiently to esteem God's supreme majesty, or so that we may strike into him fear of God. That this act belongs to religion is evident, because it directly contributes to God's worship. We honor God by reverently interposing his majesty, so that another may be moved by regard or fear for it.

That adjuration is a special act of religion distinct from the others cannot be doubted except with regard to two acts, namely, oath and prayer. Nevertheless, it differs from an oath because we employ an oath to bind ourselves or to confirm something through God's truthfulness and authority, while we adjure in order to bind or compel another to do or omit something through reverence or fear of the divine majesty. It differs from prayer because adjuration can be made by commanding, not by entreating, and then at least it is a special act wholly distinct from prayer. When it is made by entreating, it adds an adjuration to simple prayer.

25. The final act of religion is invocation, or the use of the divine name in praise. St. Thomas treats this in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 91, a. 1, where he teaches that the praises of the divine name are to be celebrated in hymns, canticles, and other similar ways, not in order to signify to God, who searches hearts, the opinion we have of him, but to stir our own souls and those of our hearers to love and venerate him. Although God in himself, as ineffable and incomprehensible, cannot properly be praised, but is greater than every praise, nevertheless according to the effects that proceed from him to us, we can praise him, according to Isa. 63: "I will proclaim the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord has rendered to us," as the holy Doctor explains in the cited article, ad 1.

CHAPTER IV.

The Other Potential Parts of Justice.

Besides religion, which holds the first place among the potential parts of justice, several others are commonly assigned: penance, piety, observance, obedience, gratitude, vindication, truthfulness, friendship, and liberality. St.

On the Cardinal Virtues

Thomas treats these in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, from q. 101 through q. 122, except for penance, whose treatment he reserved to q. 85 of the third part, where we also shall treat it.

1. After religion and penance, which are ordered to God, follows piety, by which due worship and duty are rendered to parents. Parents are as it were secondary gods in relation to their children, as secondary principles of their essence and life. Hence they in a certain way represent to their children God himself, who is the primary and supreme Father of all. For this reason, as Philo rightly observes in *De Decalogo*, after the precepts of the first tablet, which pertain to the worship of God, the first precept of the second tablet was established concerning the honor to be shown to parents.

Because the blood of parents is found in their blood relatives, piety also extends in some measure to relatives, as regarded under that primary and foundational right by which we are bound to our parents. It also regards one's country, because the country is in a certain way a principle of origin and because it nourishes one's parents and provides what is suitable for birth and education. Hence Hierocles says in his discourse on observance toward one's country: "By Zeus, one's country is either a kind of god or the first and greatest parent. Therefore the one who gave it its name did not rashly call it 'fatherland,' but took the word from 'father,' while giving it a feminine ending, so that it might be a mixture of both parents. This account signifies that one country must be honored equally with two parents. One's country must therefore be preferred entirely to either parent taken separately, and not even both parents together ought to be esteemed more highly, but rather judged worthy of equal honor."

2. Piety is followed by observance, by which we honor with a certain worship and reverence men who excel in some dignity. For just as we owe special service and worship to parents and country because they are principles of our natural being and education, and piety is appointed to offer this, so to superiors, because they are the authors of our governance and direction through laws, precepts, counsels, teaching, and so forth, we owe special honor, for the rendering of which observance is appointed.

Nor do we honor with the reverence of observance only persons already established in dignity by whom we are actually governed, but also all who are distinguished by virtue, wisdom, or another perfection, insofar as by reason of such perfection they are capable of directing us, fit to shine before us, and worthy that we strive to conform ourselves to their example. Accordingly, they merit honor and reverence, although not so much as those who actually bestow upon us the benefit of governance and possess authority and power

over us. We are bound more strictly to honor and observe the latter, since they actually confer upon us the benefit of governance.

Take care, however, not to think that observance regards this benefit and is rendered in compensation for it, for that belongs to gratitude. Observance regards the source of the benefit, namely, the excellence and endowment from which such a benefit proceeds or is capable of proceeding.

3. Obedience accompanies observance, for both regard a superior. There is nevertheless this difference: observance regards him as excelling, while obedience considers him as having power to oblige another to do or omit something. Hence obedience of itself regards a command as command and acts with the intention of fulfilling it. Accordingly, it is a special virtue, because although it extends to the matters of all the virtues, in them all it regards one formal aspect, namely, the command of the superior, in whose fulfillment precisely as such a special integrity shines forth beyond the integrity of the commanded thing itself.

4. The power of commanding presupposes a right and power of governing, which can arise from three sources. First, from the relation of cause and effect, for a cause naturally has power over its effect. For this reason God can command every rational creature, because he is its author, while the creature is God's work and formation. The same belongs in its own manner to parents over their children.

Secondly, this power belongs by reason of whole and part, because the part is naturally subject to and governed by the whole. In this way the commonwealth has authority and power over its individual members.

Thirdly, it arises from the relation of agent and patient, or of instrument, because it belongs to the agent to move and direct the patient, just as it belongs to the principal cause to direct its instrument. In this way the husband has power over the wife, the master over the slave, and the lord over the servant.

5. Three conditions are assigned for perfect obedience. The first is that it be blind. This does not mean that a person should not see what he carries out, for how else could he act? Nor does it mean that he should rush rashly and blindly into execution, whether the thing be honorable or unlawful, for this is far removed from one who acts from virtue and according to the rule of right reason. Rather, it means that he should not investigate the reasons for the command or the motives that induced the superior to issue it, and that it should suffice for him that whatever is commanded, provided it is not known to be unlawful, is commanded by one who holds the place of God.

Hence Gregory says in *In I Regum*, II, c. 4: "True obedience neither examines the intention of superiors nor discriminates among commands,

On the Cardinal Virtues

because one who has submitted every judgment of his life to his superior rejoices in this alone, that he performs what is commanded him. He does not know how to judge, who has learned perfectly how to obey, for he considers this alone good, that he obey commands.” Hence St. Dorotheus, near the end of doct. 1, calls obedience “undiscriminating and without any selection,” as though he called it eyeless and blind, for discretion is the eye of the mind, as Cassian notes in coll. 2, c. 2. Humbert strongly commends such obedience in *De eruditione religiosorum*, II, c. 16, where he rightly warns that one cannot become as a beast of burden before God unless, like a horse bound to turn a mill, he keeps the eyes of his senses and judgment closed, or, as Humbert himself says, brutish.

The second condition of obedience is that it be prompt in execution, so that it neither delays the command, hesitates, makes excuses, nor approaches the work slowly and sluggishly. Indeed, anticipating the command, or performing an act because it is known to please the superior even though he has not yet expressed the command, contains the most excellent exercise of obedience and is its heroic act. For just as one who anticipates payment before the appointed time elicits an act of perfect justice, so one who anticipates an order truly elicits an act of obedience, and indeed a most perfect one.

The third condition is that it be strong in undertaking the commanded work and persevering in it, and that it not recoil from obedience because of the difficulty of the matter, after the example of our Savior, who “became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,” as the Apostle says. Hence Bernard says in his sermon to the Knights Templar, c. 13: “He had such great obedience that he preferred to lose life itself, becoming obedient unto death.”

6. St. Augustine and St. Thomas seem to prefer obedience to the other moral virtues and to grant it the palm. Augustine says in *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum*, I, c. 14: “Obedience, I am persuaded, is a virtue and, so to speak, the origin and mother of all the virtues in a nature to which free choice has been given in such a way that it must nevertheless live under the power of one better than itself.” St. Thomas writes in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 104, a. 3: “Absolutely speaking, the virtue of obedience, which for God’s sake despises one’s own will, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which for God’s sake despise certain other goods.”

I nevertheless judge that these holy Doctors did not intend to prefer obedience to religion, especially since St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 81, a. 6, absolutely places religion before all the moral virtues. Rather, they

considered obedience to possess such excellence that it seems to yield only to the theological virtues and religion.

7. The sixth potential part of justice is gratitude, whose function is to acknowledge a benefit received from another and to return something to the benefactor for it, namely, thanksgiving, service, honor, or another benefit. This is consonant with reason, as St. Thomas shows in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 106, a. 3, by this argument: “Every effect naturally turns toward its cause. Hence Dionysius says in c. 1 of *De divinis nominibus* that God turns all things toward himself as the cause of all. For the effect must always be ordered to the end of the agent. It is manifest that a benefactor, as such, is the cause of the one benefited. Therefore the natural order requires that the one who has received a benefit should turn toward his benefactor through the recompense of gratitude, according to the condition of each. As was said above concerning a father, honor and reverence are owed to a benefactor as such, because he has the character of a principle.”

8. In the same place, a. 2, St. Thomas distinguishes three degrees of gratitude. The first is to acknowledge and remember the benefit. The second is to declare this in words by praising the benefactor and giving him thanks. The third is to repay something in deed or goods according to the circumstances of place, time, and other factors, whether honor and reverence, assistance, or support.

9. The seventh part is vindication, which bears a certain relation to evils received similar to that which gratitude bears to benefits, insofar as each returns a recompense. Just as gratitude renders good for good, so vindication renders evil for evil, namely, the evil of punishment for the evil of fault, in order that right order may be preserved and that what has fallen outside the order of rectitude through fault may be recalled to it through punishment. Thus God, by punishing, recalls sinners who have fallen away through sin from the most beautiful order of justice and the divine laws, so that nothing deformed may remain in the world, but all things may be beautifully arranged in their proper places and degrees. Hence Augustine says in his first discourse on Ps. 5: “Every iniquity, whether small or great, must be punished, either by the man himself punishing it or by God avenging it.”

10. It must be observed with Cajetan that this is peculiar to the virtue of vindication: the person in whom it resides cannot of himself consummate the proper action of such a virtue. Understand this of consummation including the external act, for the intrinsic goodness is possessed completely in the subject of the virtue itself. The matter of vindication is the evil of punishment, which no one can inflict by private authority. Hence the

On the Cardinal Virtues

execution of vindicative justice must be carried out only by a judge, who possesses authority to punish wrongdoers.

11. The eighth part is truth or veracity, which makes us speak the truth, or, what is the same, makes us faithfully signify ad extra the truth and knowledge conceived in the intellect, by rightly using words and signs given to us for manifesting our internal concepts and judgments to another, so that these exterior signs are conformed to them. This is called speaking the truth. In it there is a special integrity requiring a special virtue akin to justice, for this faithful manifestation is exceedingly necessary to human society and therefore owed, at least by the debt of integrity, to those with whom we live and converse. To this is reduced faith or fidelity in promises, for it is a part of truth or veracity that the deed correspond to the promise.

12. The ninth part is friendship or affability, which is the virtue by which someone conducts himself fittingly toward other men in common conversation, both in words and deeds, so that he offends no one by words or gestures and, conversely, receives the words and deeds of others without offense. Although we are not bound to this by strict debt, we are nevertheless bound by the debt of integrity, just as we are bound to speak the truth when we ought to speak.

13. The final part is liberality, which concerns riches by spending them fittingly and distributing them to others. This is not a true species of justice, but its potential part or a virtue annexed to justice, because the liberal man gives what is his and what is not owed to another except from a certain integrity or fittingness, while justice renders to another what is legally owed to him.

The act of liberality must be distinguished from the act of beneficence, charity, or mercy. Insofar as a gift is made by restraining the desire for money, lest it be loved more than is right and therefore retained, it is an act of liberality. Insofar as it is made from a good affection toward the recipient, it is an act of beneficence or charity. Insofar as it is made with the intention of relieving another's misery, it is an act of mercy.

CHAPTER V.

Fortitude and the Four Virtues Annexed to It.

1. Besides the virtues that perfect the nobler and spiritual powers of our soul, namely, the intellect and will, there are others that restrain or rectify the passions of the irascible and concupiscible appetites, lest they impede the good of reason and turn the will away from choosing and pursuing it. St.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Thomas argues admirably in his customary manner in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 123, a. 1: “It belongs to human virtue to make man good and his work according to reason. This happens in three ways. In one way, reason itself is rectified, which is done by the intellectual virtues. In another way, the rectitude of reason is established in human affairs, which belongs to justice. In a third way, impediments to establishing this rectitude in human affairs are removed. The human will is impeded in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. In one way, it is drawn by something pleasurable toward something other than the rectitude of reason requires, and this impediment is removed by the virtue of temperance. In another way, it is repelled from what is according to reason because of some difficulty that presses upon it, and for the removal of this impediment fortitude of mind is required, which resists difficulties of this kind, just as man through bodily fortitude overcomes and repels bodily impediments.”

2. Moreover, because it is more difficult to endure sorrowful things and advance toward arduous things, which fortitude accomplishes by restraining the passions concerning these objects, than to abstain from pleasurable things and enjoy them with the moderation imposed by temperance, as the Philosopher observes in *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, c. 9, fortitude is therefore placed first and temperance second. We shall treat temperance in the following chapter.

§ 1.

Definition of Fortitude.

3. Fortitude is defined from Cicero as follows: “Fortitude is the deliberate undertaking of dangers and profession of labors.” More suitably, it is defined from St. Thomas: “Fortitude is a virtue existing in the irascible appetite, restraining fear and moderating daring when dangers press.”

It is first called a “virtue” because, as the same holy Doctor shows in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 123, a. 2, fortitude is a special virtue implying a special integrity. Wherever there is a peculiar difficulty in retaining the command of reason, there we need a peculiar virtue. But in dangers of death there is a most special difficulty in conducting oneself fittingly and according to the prescription of reason, both internally and externally. Either a great fear is aroused toward flight from the evil, which it is exceedingly difficult so to restrain that it does not disturb a person and compel him to something unbecoming; or a movement of daring is aroused to repel the evil, which must also be moderated lest it rush rashly into

On the Cardinal Virtues

danger; or both affections arise with alternating movements of soul and as though in conflict with one another, and then both must simultaneously be moderated according to the rule of reason. Therefore a peculiar virtue will be needed to overcome these difficulties and moderate the foregoing movements according to reason.

Secondly, it is said to “exist in the irascible appetite,” so that fortitude may be excluded not only from the concupiscible appetite but also from the will, in which we place no virtue primarily ordered to moderating the passions of the soul. A virtue must be placed only where its good is consummated. But the good of the foregoing moderation is consummated not in the will but in the sensitive appetite, to which the passions themselves belong as acts. We treated this in the *Treatise on Virtues in General*.

Thirdly, fortitude is called “restraining fear and moderating daring,” because just as dangers separate the will from the good of reason only by arousing either excessive fear, by which they are dreaded more than is right, or excessive daring, by which they are attacked immoderately and imprudently, so fortitude strengthens the soul amid them only by reducing each passion to its due measure. Nevertheless, it belongs more to fortitude to diminish fear than daring, because it is more concerned with spurring and strengthening than with holding back and restraining. Temperance, conversely, is more concerned with holding back and restraining than with strengthening and spurring. Therefore temperance is placed in the concupiscible appetite, which especially needs a bridle because of the force and attraction of concupiscible good, while fortitude is placed in the irascible appetite, which especially needs spurs because of the difficulty of the arduous object.

4. From these things you will easily understand the material and formal object of fortitude. Its material object is twofold, one remote and the other proximate. The remote object consists in dangers and evils, especially the gravest, such as dangers of death. The proximate object consists in the affections of fear and daring concerning those dangers. The formal object of fortitude is the special integrity that shines forth in the moderation of such passions.

§ 2.

The Acts of Fortitude.

5. A twofold act is assigned to fortitude: to attack and to endure. Reason sometimes dictates that one must fight in defense of the good, so that its

assailants may be driven away and destroyed. Then there is need of a strong and prudent attack proceeding from moderated daring. At other times, and more frequently, reason dictates that one must endure patiently, so that the will's affection for the good of virtue may be manifested, an affection so great and esteeming such a good so highly that, however much it is attacked, it does not withdraw from it.

6. If you ask which of these two acts is more difficult and principal, I answer that the repression involved in enduring is more excellent. Aristotle teaches this expressly in *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, c. 9, as cited by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 123, a. 6, in these words: "The Philosopher says in *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, that fortitude is more concerned with moderating fears than daring. For it is more difficult to repress fear than to moderate daring, because danger itself, which is the object of daring and fear, of itself contributes something to the repression of daring but operates to increase fear. To attack belongs to fortitude insofar as it moderates daring. To endure, however, follows upon the repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is to endure, that is, to stand immovably in dangers, rather than to attack."

The saying of Prov. 16 agrees with this judgment: "He who rules his own spirit is better than one who conquers a city." By ruling one's spirit can suitably be understood one who through the patience of fortitude governs and restrains the movements of an impatient soul lest they break forth. Thus these words signify nothing other than that, among the functions of fortitude, patience excels attack. St. Gregory certainly understood the passage in this way in hom. 35 on the Gospels, where he writes: "It is a lesser victory to conquer cities, because what is conquered lies outside us. But what is conquered through patience is greater, because the soul itself is conquered by itself and subjects itself to itself when patience breaks it within the humility of endurance."

7. From these things you understand that the most principal act of fortitude is martyrdom, since it consists not in attacking but in enduring. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 124, a. 2, ad 3: "The more principal act of fortitude is to endure, to which martyrdom belongs, and not its secondary act, which is to attack."

On the Cardinal Virtues

§ 3.

The Virtues Annexed to Fortitude.

8. Four virtues annexed to fortitude are enumerated by St. Thomas in q. 128, sole article: magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. He took this division from Cicero, *De inventione*, II, c. 2. He reduces to these four several others enumerated by Macrobius and Andronicus. Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis*, I, places seven parts of fortitude: magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, endurance, and firmness. Andronicus also places seven virtues annexed to fortitude: eupsychia, lema—not “lenia,” as is corruptly read in many copies; the Greek word *lema* signifies in Latin confidence of soul and ready daring—magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence, and andragathia.

9. St. Thomas notes that these virtues can be considered either insofar as they concern the matter of fortitude, that is, the gravest dangers such as dangers of death, or insofar as they concern matter less difficult than that of fortitude and imitate fortitude in it. If they are considered in the first way, he holds that they are integral parts of fortitude, that is, virtues necessary for the complete function of fortitude. The first two stand on the side of attack. On the side of attack, it is first required that the brave man have a great soul for attacking great and arduous things securely, and this is magnanimity. Secondly, it is required that he not fail in carrying them out, and this is magnificence, which is the virtue productive of great works. On the side of endurance, it is first required that the soul not be broken by sorrow under the difficulty of present evils and fall away from its greatness, and this is patience. Then it is required that it not grow weary through prolonged suffering of difficulties or desist from enduring them, and this is perseverance.

10. But if these virtues are considered insofar as they concern dangers less than dangers of death, other less grave and troublesome things, and finally matters in which there is less difficulty, they are potential parts of fortitude, because they imitate it although they do not attain its full definition. Thus St. Thomas, who explains the nature of these virtues so clearly in qq. 129 and following that there is no need to remain longer upon them.

CHAPTER VI.

Temperance and Its Subjective Parts.

Temperance is the last of the cardinal virtues. The Philosopher treats it in *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, c. 10, and St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, from q. 141 through q. 170. St. Prosper also discusses it elegantly in *De vita contemplativa*, III, c. 19, where he says: “Temperance makes a man temperate, abstinent, sparing in food, moderate, chaste, silent, serious, and modest. If this virtue dwells in the soul, it restrains lusts, moderates affections, multiplies holy desires, chastises vicious ones, orders everything confused within us, strengthens what has been ordered, removes evil thoughts and implants holy ones, extinguishes the fire of lustful pleasure, kindles the soul’s tepidity with desire for future reward, composes the mind in peaceful tranquility, and always defends the whole soul from every tempest of vice.”

We shall therefore treat briefly here of this admirable and most useful virtue. First we shall explain its material and formal object, and then discuss its subjective and potential parts.

§ 1.

The Material and Formal Object of Temperance.

1. Temperance is taken in two ways. First, broadly, insofar as in every matter it places human acts in due measure. In this way it is not a special habit, but a general condition of all the virtues. Secondly, strictly, insofar as it determinately restrains the sensitive appetite in bodily desires and pleasures, which have the greatest power to draw one away from the good of reason. In this way it is a special virtue. Wherever a special integrity is found, a special virtue is required. Just as it is a special integrity that each person should be given his due and that no one should be unjustly harmed, so it is also a special integrity that a man should conduct himself rightly and moderately concerning bodily pleasures, not gratifying sense but reason. Therefore, just as justice is a special virtue, so too is temperance, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 141, a. 2.

2. The material object of this virtue is bodily pleasures, but not all of them, only those perceived from food, drink, and sexual matters, as the same holy Doctor says in the same q., a. 4, where he argues: “Temperance

concerns desires and pleasures, just as fortitude concerns fears and daring. Fortitude concerns fears and daring with respect to the greatest evils, by which nature itself is extinguished, namely, dangers of death. Therefore temperance must likewise concern desires for the greatest pleasures. Because pleasure follows upon a connatural operation, pleasures are more intense according as they follow upon operations more natural. The operations most natural to animals are those by which the nature of the individual is preserved through food and drink, and the nature of the species through the union of male and female. Therefore temperance properly concerns the pleasures of food and drink and sexual pleasures.”

2. [bis] From this he infers at the end of the same article that, because the pleasures perceived from food, drink, and sexual matters follow upon the sense of touch, the pleasures of touch are properly the material object of temperance. He took this doctrine from Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, c. 10, where he writes: “Temperance and intemperance concern pleasures of this kind, which are common also to the other animals and are therefore regarded as servile and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste. Yet intemperate persons seem to use taste little or not at all, for taste is the judgment of flavor, which those exercise who test wines or season dishes. They take little or no pleasure in these things as intemperate persons, but rather in the enjoyment itself, which is wholly effected through touch in food, drink, and what are called sexual matters. Hence a certain glutton, Philoxenus of Eryxis, wished that his throat were longer than a crane’s neck, as one who delighted in touch, about which intemperance is concerned.”

By these words the Philosopher plainly teaches that temperance properly concerns tangible things, not because it does not concern objects of taste, but because the pleasures of taste follow upon the sense of touch. This is confirmed by the wish of Philoxenus, who was more worthy to be a crane than a man and desired a crane’s neck so that food might be savory to him for a longer time.

3. It must nevertheless be observed that, although the virtue of temperance primarily and of itself concerns tangible things, it can secondarily concern the moderate pleasure of the other senses, insofar as their objects through imagination incite one toward the pleasure of touch or taste. For it belongs to the same virtue to moderate the end and the things ordered to the end. Hence some can accidentally be called intemperate because of pleasures concerning odors and sensible things other than those of touch and taste, namely, because odors, for example, sometimes have a connection with a savory or tangible object by exciting species through

which such an object is apprehended and the appetite suffused with pleasure.

In this way the Philosopher notes that brute animals are sometimes affected with pleasure from the sight or hearing of some object. Thus a lion delights when it hears the bellowing of an ox, not because the sound is pleasing to it, but because it perceives that prey and food are approaching. Conversely, even if it sees, hears, or smells the prey, if it cannot obtain it, it roars and is saddened. Similarly, although a dog seems to delight in the scent of a hare, it does not delight for the sake of the odor itself but for the sake of the food it hopes for, of which it receives awareness through the odor.

4. From what has been said it is evident that the formal object of temperance is the special integrity found in a man's moderate use, according to the prescription of reason, of the pleasures of food and sexual matters. If you ask what that prescription requires, St. Augustine answers in *De moribus Ecclesiae*, c. 21: "A temperate man should have this rule in mortal and transient things: he should love none of them and regard none as desirable for its own sake, but use them for the necessity of this life and its duties only so far as is sufficient, with the moderation of one who uses, not the affection of one who loves."

For this reason some are reproved by Clement of Alexandria in *Paedagogus*, II, c. 1, because they exist in order to eat and be filled, while others are praised because they eat in order to exist. In II, c. 7, the same Clement asserts that the measure of such pleasures is the body, just as the foot is the measure of the shoe. That is, bodily necessity is their measure, just as the necessity of the foot is the measure of the shoe.

Hence Seneca says in epist. 88: "Temperance commands pleasures, hates and drives away some, dispenses others, and directs them to a healthy measure. It never approaches them for their own sake. It knows that the best measure of desirable things is not how much you want, but how much you ought to take." St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 141, a. 6, in the body: "All pleasurable things that come into human use are ordered as to an end to some necessity of this life. Therefore temperance takes the necessity of this life as the rule of the pleasurable things it uses, so that it uses them only so much as the necessity of this life requires."

The rule of temperance in sexual matters, therefore, is that one abstain from them entirely outside lawful marriage and, within marriage, use them only insofar as right reason dictates that this is fitting for the begetting of offspring. In taking food and drink, the rule of temperance is that as much be taken as is necessary for the body's good health and the mind's suitable disposition for its functions, for this is the end for which food and drink

On the Cardinal Virtues

were instituted. Therefore neither more, nor in another manner, nor even less should be taken, unless a stronger reason for avoiding a graver evil or obtaining a greater good dictates otherwise. Thus someone may, for medicinal reasons and according to the physicians' prescription, take an abundance of various foods to induce vomiting, or drink strong wine liberally to expel some cold poison. Conversely, to make satisfaction for sins, bring the flesh more completely under control and subject it to reason, devote oneself better to contemplation, or attain other good ends, one may abstain from food and drink that would otherwise be moderate. This occurs through abstinence, which is the use of less food in quantity or quality than the rule of temperance of itself requires, and through fasting, which involves a harsher regimen and longer abstinence, consisting in abstaining from certain kinds of food and taking refreshment only once and later in the day, as received by the custom of the Church.

From these things you understand that temperance can rightly be defined or described as follows: "Temperance is a virtue that moderates the appetite concerning pleasures of touch and taste, as befits right reason, because of the special integrity found in such moderation." This definition or description has been sufficiently explained by what has been said.

§ 2.

The Subjective Parts of Temperance.

5. St. Thomas assigns four subjective parts or species of temperance in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 143: abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and purity. He says: "The species of virtues must be diversified according to the diversity of matter or object. Temperance concerns the pleasures of touch, which are divided into two genera. Some are ordered to nourishment, and in these abstinence concerns food, while sobriety properly concerns drink. Others are ordered to the generative power, and in these chastity concerns the principal pleasure of intercourse, while purity concerns the surrounding pleasures, such as those found in kisses, touches, and embraces."

Abstinence, therefore, is the virtue restraining disordered desires and pleasures in food and establishing due moderation in its use. Hence the proper act of this virtue is the withdrawal of food regulated according to reason and consisting in a man's abstaining from food as he ought, in view of the fittingness of the persons with whom he lives, his own person, and the necessity of his health.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

For this to be understood better, it must be observed that this withdrawal can occur in two ways. First, by withdrawing only what temperance does not permit and in which there would be a vicious excess through immoderation in food. This is properly called an act of temperance. Secondly, by voluntarily depriving oneself of a quantity or quality of food that temperance would permit and whose consumption would involve no excess. This is more properly called abstinence.

6. Sobriety, properly speaking, is a species of temperance concerning drink, not every drink, but one capable of causing intoxication and disturbing the brain, such as wine. In this matter due measure must be observed most carefully, because every excess of wine, even a slight one, is very harmful and blameworthy, and more so than even a greater excess of food.

I said that sobriety concerns drink capable of intoxicating, because sobriety moderates this alone, since it impedes the good of reason in a special way, namely, by disturbing the mind. Non-intoxicating drink, such as water, is not the matter of this virtue, nor can its excess be called drunkenness, which is the vice opposed to sobriety. Rather, it is opposed to abstinence and must be reduced to gluttony.

7. From these things it is evident that sobriety is a special virtue distinct from abstinence and the other species of temperance, because of the special impediment to the use of reason caused by intoxicating drink, which this virtue is ordered to remove. Add also the special difficulty involved in avoiding excess in wine, for many who abstain from immoderate food nevertheless sin by excess in wine, and men commonly find it more difficult to abstain from it.

8. St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 149, a. 4, that sobriety is indeed necessary for all, but much more for five classes of persons. First, for the young, because in them there is a greater inclination toward desires, which must be restrained through sobriety and abstinence from immoderate wine, by which the flames of lust are kindled. Secondly, for women, because of the weakness of mind that is easily disturbed by wine, from which it is easy for them to fall into unbecoming conduct. Thirdly, for the elderly, in whom reason ought to be vigorous so that they may instruct others. Fourthly, for bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should apply themselves to spiritual duties with a devout mind. Fifthly, for kings and magistrates, who must govern the people subject to them through wisdom, vigilance, and justice.

For this reason sobriety is specially commanded to all these in Scripture. To the young, in Titus 2: "Exhort the young likewise to be sober." To women,

in 1 Tim. 3: “Women likewise chaste, not slanderers, sober, faithful in all things.” To the elderly, in Titus 2: “That the aged be sober, chaste, prudent.” To bishops, in 1 Tim. 3: “A bishop must be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent,” and so forth. Finally, to kings, in Prov. 31: “Do not give wine to kings, because there is no secret where drunkenness reigns, lest perhaps they drink and forget judgments and alter the cause of the children of the poor.”

9. The third species of temperance is chastity, which moderates and restrains the affection concerning sexual pleasures, just as abstinence moderates the affection and use concerning food, and sobriety concerning drink. Hence chastity is a special virtue distinct from abstinence and sobriety, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 151, a. 2. This is proved because it concerns a very different kind of pleasure. As Aristotle says, cited there by the holy Doctor, pleasures are proportioned to the operations whose perfections they are. But operations pertaining to the use of food, by which the nature of the individual is preserved, differ greatly from operations pertaining to sexual use, by which the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which concerns sexual pleasures, is a virtue distinct from abstinence, which concerns the pleasures of food, and from sobriety, which concerns the pleasure and use of drink.

10. Chastity is divided into conjugal, widowed, youthful, and virginal. Conjugal chastity is that by which spouses observe the rule prescribed by reason in the use of sexual relations. Widowed chastity is that by which one abstains entirely from sexual relations, not for all time, but after marriage has ended. Youthful chastity is that by which the young live chastely during the time preceding marriage. Finally, virginal chastity is that by which someone throughout life preserves himself immune from the experience of every sexual pleasure.

This consists partly and materially in a certain integrity and incorruption of the flesh, and partly and principally or formally in the resolution to abstain perpetually from every sexual pleasure, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 152, a. 1, in the body and ad 1 and 2. There he also defines virginity from Ambrose, *De virginibus*: “Virginal chastity is an integrity free from corruption”; and from Augustine, *De sancta virginitate*, c. 13: “Virginity is the perpetual meditation of incorruption in corruptible flesh.” That is, it is the resolution of reason or the will, as St. Thomas explains, or a continual attention and care to preserve incorruption and avoid whatever is opposed to it. This attention and diligent, solicitous care are necessary for its preservation.

11. Note that the resolution of the will, once lost, can be repaired, just as the other infused virtues lost through sin are restored through penance. But immunity from, or inexperience of, voluntary carnal pleasure, once lost through contrary experience, cannot be repaired, even by God's absolute power, because it is impossible that one who has experienced the foregoing pleasure should become inexperienced, just as it is impossible that things already done should not have been done. Hence St. Jerome says in his epistle to Eustochium: "Although God can do all other things, he cannot restore a virgin after her fall." This is understood with regard to the foregoing immunity and inexperience, without which virginity is not preserved absolutely. Therefore, because one who has lost it once can never be called a virgin without qualification, since, in order that someone be denominated without qualification from a virtue, it is not sufficient that he possess what is formal in it, namely, the resolution of the mind, if its proper and intrinsic matter is lacking.

12. Note also with St. Thomas in the place cited above that the name "virginity" is derived from greenness. For just as something is said to be green when it has not been scorched by an abundance of heat, so those who have not experienced scorching by concupiscence through sexual pleasure and operation are called virgins, as though they persisted in their native greenness. Hence Ambrose, cited above, says that virginity is "an integrity free from corruption." He adds: "What beauty can anyone esteem greater than the grace of a virgin, who is loved by the King, approved by the Judge, dedicated to the Lord, and consecrated to God?"

By these words he attributes the most excellent beauty to virginity. The Salmanticenses give an excellent reason for this. Spiritual beauty is attributed by antonomasia to temperance and chastity. For just as bodily beauty consists in the proportion of the members together with a certain brightness of due color, so moral and spiritual beauty consists in voluntary actions being well proportioned and ordered according to the brightness and light of reason, in which integrity and temperance themselves consist. Since virginity holds the most perfect degree of chastity and integrity, it is no wonder that the most excellent beauty is attributed to it.

13. Finally, it must be noted from the doctrine handed down by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 152, a. 2, that although chastity commonly understood is a virtue through itself, that is, independently of some extrinsic end, merely because it represses unlawful pleasures and moderates lawful ones according to the prescription of reason, nevertheless virginity, in order to be virtuous, requires an extrinsic end more excellent than virginity itself, or at least than common chastity. With this end

presupposed as something connoted, complete abstinence from sexual matters, which is the matter of virginity, is rendered lawful and honorable.

The reason is that the moderate use of sexual relations is good and honorable through itself, abstracting from any extrinsic end, since it is intended by nature and serves a great good of nature, namely, preservation and propagation. Therefore chastity regarding such use possesses of itself, independently of another extrinsic end, the character of virtue. But complete abstinence from sexual relations, considered in itself and resting there, implies no integrity, because in itself it contributes nothing to nature except, so to speak, sterility, and brings no advantage. It is rendered honorable by the end to which it is devoted, namely, leisure for God or divine things, for which it is necessary to be free from earthly and temporal concerns, according to 1 Cor. 7: "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinks about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy," and so forth. Hence Augustine said in *De sancta virginitate*, c. 8: "We do not praise in virgins the mere fact that they are virgins," that is, mere sterility and lack of fecundity, "but that, dedicated to God, they are virgins through pious continence," that is, ordered to the end of religion and contemplation.

14. This is so true that in the state of innocence and original justice, had it continued, complete continence from sexual relations would not have been virtuous or praiseworthy, because it would not have been necessary for such an end, since their use would have provided no impediment to contemplation, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3. The conjugal act would then have excluded the ardor of lust, distraction and restlessness of mind, and all the cares and anxieties of begetting and educating children.

But in the state of corrupt and fallen nature in which we live, since all these things consequent upon marriage present a great impediment to divine contemplation, it is most virtuous and worthy of exceptional praise, for the attainment of such an end, to abstain entirely from sexual pleasures, even with the absence of fecundity that nature so vehemently desires, because that end is higher and a greater good than fecundity itself insofar as it depends upon this or that particular suppositum.

Hence the holy Fathers celebrate with marvelous praises and encomiums the virginity now preserved by many for devotion to the contemplation of divine things, and prefer it to the fecundity of the flesh and conjugal chastity. Augustine says in *De sancta virginitate*, c. 13: "Virginal integrity and immunity from every sexual union through pious continence are an angelic portion and a perpetual meditation of incorruption in

corruptible flesh. Let every fecundity of the flesh and every conjugal chastity yield to this.”

Cyprian says in *De disciplina et habitu virginum*, II: “Virginity is the flower of the Church’s offspring, the grace and ornament of spiritual grace, a joyful disposition, a complete and incorrupt work of praise and honor, the image of God corresponding to the holiness of the Lord, the more illustrious portion of Christ’s flock.”

Ambrose says in *De viduis*: “Virginity surpasses the condition of human nature, through which men are made like angels. Yet the victory of men is greater than that of angels, for angels live without flesh, while virgins triumph in the flesh.”

Chrysostom says in *De virginitate*, c. 11: “Do you see the beauty of virginity? It fashions for those dwelling on earth a life like that of heavenly beings. It does not permit those clothed with a body to be conquered by incorporeal hosts. It makes mortals rivals of the angels.”

Finally, St. Athanasius says in *De virginitate*, or *De meditatione*: “Great is the virtue of continence; great are the praises of glorious purity and of the virgin. O virginity, inexhaustible wealth! O virginity, temple of God and dwelling of the Holy Spirit! O virginity, beautiful pearl, unseen by the multitude and found by only a few! O continence, friend of God and proclaimed by the saints! O continence, hated by many but honored among the worthy! O continence, defeating death and hell and possessed by immortality! O continence, life of angels and crown of saints! Blessed is he who possesses you; blessed is he who remains steadfast in endurance, because he labors a little while and will rejoice greatly in you.”

15. For the greater commendation of this excellent virtue, it must be observed with William Peraldus, bishop of Lyon, in the *Summa de virtutibus et vitiis*, that the lily among other flowers is the symbol of virginity, not only because of the exceptional whiteness and beauty with which it shines, but also because, just as the lily has six white petals and certain grains like gold placed in the middle, so in virginity there are as it were six petals that serve to preserve the lily of purity.

The first is sobriety. The thorn that tears it is excess in food and drink. Gluttony and drunkenness are a path to lust, as is evident in Lot, who, after becoming drunk, committed incest. Hence the Apostle says: “Do not be drunk with wine, in which there is lust.”

The second petal of the lily of virginity is labor. The thorn that tears it is idleness and sloth, which are a path to lust, according to Ezek. 16: “This was the iniquity of Sodom your sister: pride, fullness of bread, abundance, and idleness.” Hence Chrysostom says on Matthew: “The vice of lust easily arises

On the Cardinal Virtues

from leisure and idleness.” For the definition of love is this: a passion of an idle soul. Ovid agrees with this:

“Take away idleness, and Cupid’s bow is broken.”

And again:

*“It is asked why Aegisthus became an adulterer:
The cause is plain: he was idle.”*

The third petal is rough and humble clothing. The thorn that tears it is proud and soft clothing, which incites to lust. In Num. 25 the children of Israel fornicated with the women of Moab, who had adorned themselves. And 1 Tim. 2 says: “Not with braided hair, or gold, or costly clothing,” and so forth.

The fourth is custody of the senses, especially those that show us things from a distance, namely, sight and hearing. The thorn that tears this petal is curiosity and the desire to see novelties or hear vanities, as is evident in Dinah, the daughter of Jacob, who went out to see the women of that country and was violated by Shechem, the son of Hamor.

The fifth is modesty of speech. The thorn that tears it is loquacity or obscenity of speech. Seneca says: “Abstain from foul words, because license of speech nourishes imprudence.” Prov. 7 says: “Behold, a woman met him in the attire of a harlot, talkative, and prepared to catch souls.” 1 Cor. 15 says: “Evil conversations corrupt good morals,” or evil discourses. Jerome says: “Let the virgin’s speech be prudent, modest, and rare, precious not so much through eloquence as through modesty.”

The sixth petal is flight from occasions of sin. The thorn that tears it is excessive familiarity and conversation with men. The opportunity for sin is a path to lust, as is evident in Tamar, violated by her brother Amnon because she was alone with him in the chamber, 2 Sam. 13. Gen. 19: “Do not stand anywhere around the region.” Bernard says: “Virgins who are truly virgins are always fearful and never secure, and, in order to avoid fires, they fear even things that are safe.”

17. The golden grains of the lily of virginity are the three ways of loving God distinguished by Bernard when he says: “Learn to love sweetly, to love prudently, and to love strongly: sweetly, lest you be enticed; prudently, lest you be deceived; strongly, lest you be overcome and turned away from the love of the Lord.” Or the golden grains can be understood as the various movements of divine love proceeding from different causes. God must be loved because he is creator, redeemer, rewarder, and so forth. Thus Peraldus in the cited book.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

18. The last species of temperance is purity, which is distinguished from chastity in this: chastity moderates and subjects to reason the pleasures arising from sexual union, while purity moderates and subjects to reason the pleasures surrounding such an act, such as those in immodest kisses, touches, and embraces. Hence “purity is ordered to chastity, not as a virtue wholly distinct from it, but as expressing a certain circumstance of chastity,” as the holy Doctor says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 151, a. 4.

To this virtue belongs the excellent praise of Tertullian at the beginning of *De pudicitia*: “Purity is the flower of conduct, the honor of bodies, the beauty of the sexes, the integrity of blood, the fidelity of lineage, the foundation of holiness, and the presumption of every good mind.” This agrees with the saying of Gregory Nazianzen: “Modesty in women is a lovely flower and a delightful blush.”

§ 3.

The Potential Parts of Temperance.

19. The potential parts of a virtue are those that observe in other matters, which involve less difficulty, the manner that the virtue itself establishes concerning its principal or more difficult matter. Hence, since it is proper to temperance to restrain and repress the impulses of the passions concerning pleasures of touch, which are more difficult to curb, the virtues restraining the impulses of our passions and affections concerning other matters, or moderating external actions, can be joined to it as secondary virtues and called potential parts of temperance. St. Thomas numbers four of these: continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty. Under modesty are contained several other species that must be enumerated.

20. Continence, which is placed first, is not taken here for the virtue restraining and repressing the passions concerning sexual matters, in which sense it is convertible with chastity, but for a certain habit by which the will resists the passions of the concupiscible appetite and is so strengthened in the good that, however much such passions arise and swell, it is not drawn by them against the right judgment of reason. Hence the function of this habit is not to restrain or curb the passions, as chastity does, but merely to strengthen and hold back the will so that it does not follow their commands.

From this it follows that continence is not a virtue without qualification, although it is reduced to the genus of virtue as something imperfect. It belongs to the definition of virtue to produce a perfect work and therefore to rectify its adequate principle. But in acts concerning the objects of the

passions, this principle is not only the will but also the sensitive appetite. Therefore, because continence does not perfect this appetite for right appetition, but leaves immoderate passions in it, although it strengthens and restrains the will from following them, it falls short of the definition of perfect virtue and is as it were a half-virtue, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 155, a. 1.

21. Meekness, which is also called mildness, is the virtue that so moderates the passion of anger that it does not permit it to arise except when it ought and in the measure in which it is necessary. Although anger must never be given such place that it disturbs the judgment of reason, it is nevertheless sometimes honorable and necessary to become moderately angry in the service of justice or in assistance of fortitude, which uses anger in its act of attack. Thus Christ aroused anger when, having made a scourge of cords, he drove the merchants from the temple.

Hence Aristotle says in *Ethica Nicomachea*, IV, c. 5: “He who is angry at the things at which he ought, with the persons with whom he ought, in the manner, at the time, and for as long as he ought, is praised and is meek, since meekness itself receives praise. For the meek man is one who is free from disturbance and is not led by the passions, but is angered in the way, for the reason, and for the duration that reason itself determines.”

22. Clemency is akin to meekness, and therefore some do not distinguish them. But in reality they differ, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 157, a. 1. Although both mitigate anger concerning vengeance, they do so under diverse aspects. Meekness does so insofar as it restrains a soul dominated by anger, while clemency does so insofar as leniency is fitting for a man established in authority. Hence Seneca defines it in *De clementia*, II, c. 3, as “temperance of soul in the power of avenging,” or “the leniency of a superior toward an inferior in determining punishments.”

It befits a superior not to use the whole of his power in this function, but to remit something of the punishment and punish below what is deserved, just as, conversely, it befits him in rendering a reward to add something and reward beyond strict merit. In this way human princes or judges imitate God, who rewards beyond strict merit and tends to this from his own inclination and innate goodness, but punishes below strict desert and only when provoked by our demerits and, as it were, compelled, according to Tertullian, *Adversus Marcionem*, II: “God is good from himself and just”—with vindicative justice—“because of us. God’s goodness is prior according to nature, his severity posterior according to cause. The former is proper to him, the latter accommodated; the former innate, the latter employed.”

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

From these things you understand that meekness is common to all persons, while clemency is proper to superiors and judges, upon whom the determination of punishment for an offense is incumbent. It belongs especially to a prince, whom it greatly befits to mitigate punishments and penalties benignly toward those subject to him. Hence Ovid, *Ex Ponto*, elegy 5:

“Believe me, it is a royal thing to aid the fallen,
And fitting for a man as great as your greatness.”

This virtue shone especially in Theodosius, whose kindness and clemency toward his enemies were so great that Ambrose reports the following of him in his discourse on Theodosius’s death: “He considered himself to have received a benefit when he was asked to forgive, and pardon was nearer when the disturbance of anger had been greater. What was feared in others was desired in him, namely, that he should become angry. We often saw those whom he rebuked trembling, and those convicted of crimes, when they had despaired, released from the charge. For he wished to conquer, not to punish; he was a judge of equity, not an arbiter of penalty, who never refused pardon to one who confessed.”

23. The fourth virtue annexed to temperance is modesty, named from measure, because it establishes the measure that ought to be observed in human affections and actions, in bodily gesture, and in dress and adornment, so that all these things may be conducted decently and fittingly according to the state of the person. A modest person is one who conducts himself moderately and fittingly concerning all these things and keeps the measure suited to him.

The supreme beauty of this virtue escapes no one. Ambrose excellently said in *De officiis*, I, c. 18, that modesty is “God’s portion,” that is, a part of God’s notable dwelling in man. Its beauty also breaks forth outwardly, for, as Tertullian says in *De cultu feminarum*, c. 12: “Its fullness ought to be so great that it flows from the soul into the clothing and pours forth from the conscience onto the surface, so that it may look outwardly upon what is as it were its own furnishing.”

Hence Ambrose in *De officiis* and serm. 10 on Ps. 118 excellently shows that a modest man does good even when merely seen. Introducing the likeness of an animal that heals another animal when seen by it, he demonstrates that even the sight of a rightly composed man is salutary to those who behold him.

Hence Basil, instructing a virgin in *De virginitate*, says that when she goes out in public she should show herself in dress, gait, and every movement of

On the Cardinal Virtues

the body in such a manner that those who happen to meet her, as though they beheld a living image of God, incline their faces in reverence and admiration for her holiness and, reminded of honorable virginity, return with a chaste and sober mind, each one immediately remembering God when he sees the image of one who always exercises herself in fulfilling his commandments. In brief, the affections and minds of all who behold the virgin should be transferred to the love of virtue. In agreement with this, St. Ignatius in his epistle to the Trallians calls the modesty of a prelate “a great discipline for others.”

§ 4.

The Various Species of Modesty.

24. St. Thomas distinguishes four or five species of modesty in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 160, a. 2: humility, studiousness, modesty of conduct, under which eutrapelia is reduced, and modesty of dress. The reason for this division is that, beyond the passions of desire moderated by temperance and continence, and the passions of anger restrained by meekness and clemency, there are four other things in which, although it is not so difficult to preserve the rational mean as in the passions of anger and desire, moderation and a virtue by which they are restrained are nevertheless needed.

The first is the affection of hope tending toward lofty things, which humility moderates. The second is study or the appetite for knowing, for whose moderation studiousness is appointed. The third consists in bodily movements and gestures pertaining to external conversation, both in deeds and words. In serious matters, modesty of conduct is appointed for these; in playful matters, eutrapelia. Finally, there is the external apparatus of clothing, furnishings, and similar things, whose moderation belongs to modesty of dress or external apparatus.

25. The first species of modesty, therefore, is humility, which St. Thomas defines as follows: “Humility is the virtue by which someone, considering his defect, keeps himself among the lowly according to his measure.”

It is called a “virtue” because, since it is honorable for each person to embrace what befits him and to contain himself within his proper measure, the habit by which we are inclined to this cannot fail to be a true virtue.

It is added, “by which someone, considering his defect,” because, although humility formally signifies the habitual resolution by which the affective power embraces the abasement fitting to each person, it nevertheless presupposes and implies a cognition by which someone,

considering his defects, regards himself as unworthy of esteem and honor and worthy of abasement and contempt. Hence Bernard defines it in *De gradibus humilitatis*: “Humility is the virtue by which a person, through the truest knowledge of himself, becomes vile in his own estimation.”

Finally, it is said that he “keeps himself among the lowly according to his measure,” to denote that the intrinsic matter of humility is the internal movement and affection of the soul, which humility restrains lest it tend toward its own exaltation beyond what is fitting, but contains itself within the measure owed to it according to its own merits.

26. From these things you will gather, first, against Théophile Raynaud, *De virtutibus*, VI, sect. 2, c. 16, that although humility and magnanimity restrain a man’s affection lest it tend inordinately toward lofty things, they are nevertheless distinct because they accomplish this in diverse ways, as the Salmanticenses learnedly demonstrate in their explanation of the predicamental tree, or general division of all the virtues, appended at the end of their first volume on the *Prima Secundae*.

Magnanimity, they say, does this primarily by impelling and strengthening the appetite so that, through powers received or promised by God, it may tend toward great things, and secondarily by restraining it from rising toward things disproportionate to it. Humility, conversely, primarily restrains the appetite lest it tend toward arduous and lofty things in pursuit of its own exaltation, and secondarily strengthens it lest, when it sees its own insufficiency and powerlessness, it fail excessively in the pursuit of great things through forgetfulness of divine assistance.

Hence pusillanimity, which is a vice by defect, is more opposed to magnanimity than presumption, which is by excess. Pride, which is a vice by excess, is more opposed to humility than excessive self-abasement, which is a vice by defect.

27. These virtues also differ according to their motivating and regulating principles. Magnanimity takes its motive and rule of action from what belongs to God in us. For the magnanimous man, seeing in himself great gifts of God or at least great helps promised to him, takes from them a motive and rule for performing great things, not succumbing to their arduousness because he knows that they do not exceed such gifts or helps. While he performs great things, he regards himself as worthy of great honor, not because of himself but because of what he has received from God, and despises whatever is less than such honor and praise, such as whatever can be rendered by man, as inadequate to those divine gifts.

Humility, however, takes the motive and rule of its operation from what exists in us from ourselves. Seeing that from ourselves we possess only

defect, imperfection, and fault, to which not excellence and honor but contempt and disdain are owed, it restrains the soul lest it tend toward excellence and honor as something owed to itself according to itself, and lest it flee contempt and disdain as unworthy of itself.

Hence neither of these virtues contradicts the other, although they appear to proceed in contrary ways. It is entirely consistent that the same man tend toward great things from God's gifts, which is to be magnanimous, and cast himself down among the lowest because of what is proper to himself, which is to be humble. Therefore the Apostle, who as magnanimous said, "I can do all things in him who strengthens me," as humble proclaimed, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything from ourselves, as from ourselves." Thus the Salmanticenses in the cited place.

28. You will gather, secondly, with the same authors, that although humility and religion have a great likeness and affinity with one another, because each implies a profession of the divine excellence and our subjection toward God, they nevertheless differ because what is formal and primary with respect to one is as it were material and consequent with respect to the other.

The act of religion primarily contains a testimony to the divine excellence and secondarily to our lowliness, insofar as the latter is inferred from our complete dependence upon that supreme principle. Conversely, the act of humility primarily signifies the confession of our lowliness and inferiority, while implicitly and consequently we testify to the excellence of the first principle, to whom we wholly submit ourselves as one without whose influence we would remain below nothing.

Thus the humble man submits himself to God and his excellence in order to depress himself and contain himself within his proper measure. The religious man humbles and depresses himself before God in order to exalt God's excellence and by that worship profess God's influence upon all creatures and his supreme dominion.

29. You will gather, thirdly, that there are two habits of humility in us. One restrains the passion of hope concerning one's own excellence taken absolutely and without relation to another. Its subject is the sensitive irascible appetite, in which such a passion resides. The other moderates the affection of the will concerning one's own excellence according as this must be measured primarily from subjection to God as the supremely excellent, and secondarily from subjection to others according to what they possess from God.

This is the most excellent humility, of which we have principally spoken, which we said approaches very closely to religion, and which St. Thomas

seems to prefer to the other moral virtues in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 161, a. 5, in these words: "After the theological virtues and the intellectual virtues, which regard reason, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility is more excellent than the rest."

I think this must be understood of the moral virtues concerning the passions, not of the others, especially legal justice and religion, since St. Thomas expressly excepts the former and in q. 81, a. 6, places the latter before all the moral virtues, because, he says, "religion approaches God more nearly insofar as it performs acts immediately ordered to divine honor."

Or it can be said that St. Thomas in the cited place does not prefer humility to all the other virtues as a perfection absolutely and without qualification, but only in a certain respect. For all the moral virtues mutually exceed one another under diverse aspects, so that none can be called inferior without qualification. Hence Gregory says in hom. 6 on Ezekiel: "One is the flower of the olive, because great is the virtue and reputation of preachers, who inebriate the minds of their hearers. Another is the flower of the olive tree, because sweet is the work of mercy, which refreshes and gives light in the manner of oil. Another is the flower of the rose, because marvelous is the fragrance that glows and exhales from the blood of martyrs. Another is the flower of the lily, because the pure life of the flesh comes from the incorruption of virginity. Another is the flower of the violet, because great is the virtue of the humble, who through desire occupy the last places, do not raise themselves aloft from the earth through humility, and preserve in their mind the purple of the heavenly kingdom. Another gives forth the fragrance of the ear of grain when it is brought to maturity, because the perfection of good works is prepared for the satisfaction of those who hunger for justice."

30. The holy Fathers speak elegantly of humility and extol it with various praises. They call it the first entrance of religion, the first foundation of Christian philosophy, the medicine of swelling, the guardian of the virtues, the repair of injured charity, the sublimity of the virtues, and the more splendid jewel in the adornment of the high priest.

They add that pride made a demon from an angel, while humility makes an angel from a man; that humility is the merit of charity and glory the reward of humility; that grace is a rain that flows into the valley of humility and runs down from the swelling of the hills; and finally, that humility is the least and greatest of all the virtues, because the more deeply it casts man down, the higher it raises and exalts him.

In this appears the falsity of Seneca's statement that "no one can be great in what is small." For true greatness consists in this littleness by which

someone regards himself as least. "It is exceedingly great," says Cassiodorus, "to understand one's own littleness and to be vile before the Lord, from whom comes the measure of every greatness." Or, as Chrysostom says: "Humility is never without greatness of soul, nor pride without pusillanimity." Fulgentius agrees, saying: "Just as the proud man becomes lowly by exaltation, so the humble man becomes exalted in humility."

Finally, we must conclude with Bernard, serm. 2 on the Ascension: "Through humility let us ascend to sublimity, because this is the way, and there is no other besides it. He who proceeds otherwise falls rather than ascends, because humility alone exalts and alone leads to life. Christ, since according to the divine nature he had nowhere to ascend, because nothing is beyond God, nevertheless found through descent how he might increase, coming to be incarnate, suffer, and die, lest we die eternally. Therefore God also exalted him."

31. The second species of modesty is called studiousness, from the study with which it is concerned, and it has two principal functions. The first is to restrain and moderate the desire for knowledge, by which, under the guidance of nature, we are all impelled toward knowing things and obtaining the pleasure arising from knowledge. "All men naturally desire to know," as is said at the beginning of the *Metaphysica*. Seneca in *De otio sapientis* affirms that this will be evident to everyone: "If you consult yourself, you will discover how great a desire you have to know unknown things and how you are aroused by every story. Some sail and endure the labors of the longest journey for the single reward of knowing something hidden and unknown. This draws peoples to spectacles. It compels men to scrutinize what is closed, investigate secrets, unfold antiquities, and hear the customs of barbarous nations. Nature gave us an inquisitive disposition and, conscious of her own art and beauty, begot us as spectators for so great a spectacle of things. She would lose the fruit of herself if she displayed to solitude things so great, so clear, so subtly fashioned, so brilliant, and beautiful in more than one manner."

Therefore, lest this natural desire for knowledge become greater and more ardent than is right, and carry the soul away toward attempting knowledge that is not fitting for man, studiousness must intervene to restrain the will from applying the intellect to the investigation of such things and wishing to nourish and cultivate the soul with them.

32. The other function of studiousness is to shake off the sloth and torpor by which many are withdrawn from study and impeded from knowledge of necessary things, and to arouse and impel the appetite lest it be withdrawn from study because of the labor and weariness mixed with it,

or refuse to employ sufficient diligence. Because this latter condition occurs more commonly, the virtue was named from the function of impelling rather than restraining.

33. The third species of modesty is that called modesty of conduct or external decorum, because it preserves grace and fittingness in gait, voice, composition of the countenance, and movements and gestures of the body, and moderates all exterior actions according to the prescription of right reason, so that they may befit the person both considered in himself and in relation to place, time, surrounding and present persons, and the requirements of the circumstances. For, as Sir. 19 says: “A man is known by his appearance, and a wise man is known by the expression of his face. A man’s clothing, the laughter of his teeth, and his gait declare what he is.”

34. The fourth species is eutrapelia, which in English can be called pleasantness or courteous wit, because it keeps measure in playful and humorous things, just as modesty of conduct does in serious matters. It can be defined as follows: “Eutrapelia is the virtue that preserves decorum in play,” or, “that imposes the measure of reason upon jokes and games.”

St. Thomas demonstrates the necessity of this virtue in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 168, a. 2, from the fact that, just as man needs bodily rest for the refreshment of the body because he cannot labor continuously owing to the limitation of his power, so on the part of the soul he needs rest and honorable relaxation from labor, because the power of the soul is likewise limited and proportioned to determinate actions. Therefore, when it extends itself beyond its measure into certain intellectual operations, it labors and grows weary, especially since those operations depend upon the sensitive powers and bodily organs.

Hence Statius, *Silvae*, IV:

*“Our lyre grows weary
And slackens; measured rest restores
And nourishes strength; greater is power after leisure.”*

Seneca declares the same in epist. 58 by the comparison of an engraver who refreshes eyes wearied by feeding them upon the greenness of an emerald. Nazianzen gives the example of hunters or musicians, who commonly allow the strings to rest and loosen them lest they break.

St. John the Evangelist used the same example, as is related in the *Collationes Patrum*, coll. 24, c. 21. There it is read that when some were scandalized because they found Blessed John the Evangelist playing with his disciples, he ordered one of them who was carrying a bow to draw an arrow. When he had done this several times, John asked whether he could do it

continuously. The man answered that if he did this continuously the bow would break. St. John therefore concluded that the human mind would likewise break if it were never relaxed from its tension.

It is therefore evident that rest and honorable relaxation from labor, which occur through jokes or games, are sometimes necessary because of our weakness and frailty. Accordingly, some virtue is required to establish measure and moderation in jokes and games and to prescribe the quantity and mode of honorable recreation. This moderation in jokes, games, and playful actions is effected by the virtue called eutrapelia, that is, the virtue that preserves decorum in playful things and imposes measure upon play and jokes.

Hence Plutarch aptly observed in *Quaestiones convivales*, II, q. 1, that jokes are called “salts,” because, just as foods are seasoned with salt, so the soul should be delighted by jokes and play, yet only with the moderation that is fitting, just as salt is used as seasoning, not as food.

35. The last species of modesty is called modesty of dress or external apparatus. It can be defined from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 169, a. 1, as follows: “Modesty of dress is the virtue that observes the measure and moderation of reason in bodily adornment and the arrangement of external things.”

Just as bodily movements and gestures can be well or badly disposed and therefore required a virtue to establish the measure of reason in them, so in the external use of things, insofar as it pertains to bodily adornment and dress, and to the external arrangement of house, bed, servants, and similar things, there can be excess and defect. Some virtue is therefore necessary for their due moderation, disposing all the foregoing things according to the prescription of reason. This we call modesty of dress or external apparatus.

36. The princes of the Apostles especially commend this modesty to women. Peter speaks thus of Christian women in 1 Pet. 3: “Let their adornment not be external, in the arrangement of the hair, the wearing of gold, or the putting on of garments, but the hidden person of the heart, in the incorruptibility of a quiet and modest spirit, which is rich in the sight of God. For in this way holy women formerly adorned themselves, being subject to their own husbands.”

St. Paul says in 1 Tim. 2: “Women should adorn themselves in becoming clothing, with modesty and sobriety,” that is, with fitting moderation, “not with braided hair, gold, pearls, or costly clothing, but, as befits women professing piety, through good works.”

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

Hence Ambrose says in *De institutione virginis*, c. 17: “Let modesty bind up the hair of the sacred virgin, and sobriety her continence, so that the handmaid of the virtues may accompany her, crowned with the purple veil of the Lord’s blood, carrying the mortification of the Lord Jesus in her flesh. For these are better veils, the garments of the virtues, by which fault is covered and innocence revealed.”

Elsewhere, addressing virgins, he says: “Clothe yourselves with the silk of uprightness, the linen of holiness, and the purple of modesty. Adorned in this manner, you will have God as your lover.”

CHAPTER VII.

Vices Opposed to the Four Cardinal Virtues and to the Other Virtues Annexed to Them.

Since the doctrine of contraries is the same, and opposites placed beside one another become more clearly evident, we have judged that, so that the splendor of the virtues described in the preceding articles may shine forth more brightly, we should here discuss briefly the vices opposed to them.

§ 1.

Vices Opposed to Prudence and to the Virtues Annexed to It.

1. Some vices are opposed to prudence and to the virtues annexed to it by defect, and others by excess. First, imprudence is opposed to it. This is divided into four species, namely: precipitation, which is opposed to rectitude in counsel, and therefore to eubulia; inconsideration, which is opposed to rectitude of judgment, and to synesis and gnome; inconstancy and negligence, which are opposed to the rectitude and efficacy of command, and therefore immediately to prudence itself, since prudence is preceptive and its proper act is command, as we said above in c. 1.

2. By excess, those vices are opposed to prudence which present a false appearance of prudence and sagacity, such as the prudence of the flesh, in which one lives and acts according to the flesh and judges rightly according to it, that is, according to the movements and impulses of corrupt nature toward carnal and temporal goods, with the affection that usually follows from an intense valuation of them. Cunning, by which one knows hidden ways of deceiving others. Deceit, which is the execution of cunning, whether

On the Cardinal Virtues

it is carried out by words or deeds. Fraud, which pertains more to the execution of cunning insofar as it is carried out by deeds, as when a measure is smaller than is just or money is counterfeit. Excessive solicitude for temporal things, which is an excessive occupation with acquiring or preserving them, arising from an inordinate love of possessing them or fear of losing them. And excessive solicitude for future things, especially when joined with anxiety and little confidence in divine providence. St. Thomas discusses all these in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 55.

Moreover, there are certain vices that are indirectly or obliquely contrary to prudence, because they are opposed to its causes and aids. For just as memory of past things, understanding, docility, resourcefulness or sagacity, foresight concerning future things, sound reasoning, circumspection, caution, attention, diligent care in judging rightly, and the other qualities enumerated in c. 1 greatly assist prudent judgment, so, on the contrary, forgetfulness, precipitation, inconsideration, dullness, negligence, and other defects opposed to the foregoing perfections are exceedingly harmful. St. Thomas treats these in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, qq. 53-54.

§ 2.

Vices Opposed to Justice Strictly So Called.

3. Justice strictly so called has this special characteristic, that no vice is opposed to it by excess, but only by defect, as St. Thomas teaches in *De virtutibus*, a. 13, ad 12, where he says: *The other moral virtues stand between two vices, but justice does not, although it nevertheless holds a mean in its proper matter, which pertains essentially to virtue.* And in *Scriptum super Sententiis* III, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 3, q1a. 1: *It is not necessary that the habit of justice be a mean between two malicious habits, as is said in Ethica Nicomachea V, but that it attain the mean in its own matter.* Reason also supports this. One never sins against justice by rendering another more than is owed to him, but by taking from him what is his, by not rendering what is owed to him, or by rendering less than is owed. All of this pertains to defect and not to excess. Therefore, in this matter no vice opposed to justice by excess can be found, but only one opposed by defect.

4. Legal injustice alone is therefore contrary to legal justice, and it may be called illegality. The vice opposed to distributive justice is respect of persons, namely when one distributing the common goods among the members of a community does not attend precisely to the merits or need of each person, but to the person as such, and consequently does not distribute

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

according to the merits of persons, but takes his affection for the persons themselves as the measure of distribution. All those vices or sins that inflict harm upon one's neighbor are contrary to commutative justice, whether in life, as homicide; in honor, as insult, abuse, and reproach; or in external goods, as theft, robbery, fraud, usury, and the like. St. Thomas treats these in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, qq. 64-78.

§ 3.

Vices Opposed to Religion, Which is the First Potential Part of Justice.

5. Two vices are opposed to religion, one by excess and the other by defect. The first is superstition, which is said to be opposed to religion by excess, not because it gives God more true worship than is owed to him. For it is impossible that God could be worshiped less than he deserves or with greater worship than is owed to him. Rather, whatever worship can be rendered to him by us is infinitely less than his majesty, according to Ecclus. 43: *Glorify God as much as you are able; he will still surpass it.* It exceeds, however, in the manner of worshiping, by applying to his worship something unsuitable, or by devising false or superfluous worship.

Excess in religious worship occurs in two ways. It occurs either by offering this worship to one to whom it is not fitting. This mode of superstition is called superstition on the part of the thing worshiped, and is divided into three species: idolatry, divination, and observance, under which magic is included. Or, secondly, it occurs by worshiping the true God, but in an unsuitable manner, as if someone now wished to worship God with Jewish ceremonies and sacrifices rejected by him. This mode of superstition is called the superstition of unsuitable worship, and is subdivided into the superstition of false worship and the superstition of superfluous worship.

Worship is called false either because it contains some false signification, as would Jewish ceremonies if they were now employed to signify that the Messiah is yet to come; or because it counterfeits true worship, as if someone wished to promote the honor of God by fictitious miracles; or because, under the pretext of worshiping God, he changed the substance of the sacraments, celebrated the sacrifice otherwise than Christ instituted it, and substituted a false sacrifice for the true one. Worship is called superfluous when religion is placed in certain foolish and useless practices that depart from the custom of the Church, although they do not otherwise signify a lie or falsehood. Country people and the uneducated are

On the Cardinal Virtues

especially accustomed to suffer from this vice when, apart from the received custom of the Church, they place their devotion in a fixed number of prayers, candles, visits to sacred places, circlings, and similar things, so that they believe nothing has been accomplished if that number is either lacking or exceeded. Christ reproved both vices in John 4, when he said: *God is spirit, and those who adore him must adore in spirit and in truth*. False worship is opposed to truth, while superfluous worship is opposed to spirit, because, by dwelling solely upon external things, it makes no progress toward internal worship.

The other vice opposed to religion by defect is called irreligion, and contains these six: sacrilege, by which violence or injury is inflicted upon things or persons consecrated to God or to his worship; tempting God, when someone without a just cause does or says something in order to make trial of divine power, wisdom, justice, mercy, and so forth; perjury, which is a human statement false in itself or in the judgment of the one swearing, asserted by an oath; simony, by which sacred things are unworthily handled without violence, through exchanging them for temporal things; unfaithfulness, which breaks the pledge promised to God in a vow; and blasphemy, by which divine excellence and holiness are disparaged.

§ 4.

Vices Opposed to the Other Potential Parts of Justice.

6. The other potential parts of justice are penance, piety, observance, obedience, gratitude, vindication, truthfulness, friendship, and liberality, which we discussed in c. 4.

The vice opposed to penance by defect is impenitence. Any vice opposed to it by excess has no established name, but may be called indiscreet penance.

7. Impiety strictly so called is contrary to piety by defect. In a broad sense, however, every mortal sin is called impiety, and everyone who sins mortally is called impious. By excess, an excessive and inordinate love of parents and blood relatives is opposed to piety.

There is likewise a twofold vice or sin opposed to observance. One is by defect, by which the honor owed to persons placed in positions of dignity is not rendered to them. The other is by excess, by which worship is offered to them beyond what their dignity and condition require. Those pagans suffered from this vice who rendered apotheosis, or divine worship, to

emperors and swore by their divine powers, like the flatterer who said: *And we establish altars at which men must swear by your name.*

Tertullian sharply and elegantly condemns this pernicious and sacrilegious flattery in Apologeticum, c. 33, where he says: I will not call the emperor God, either because I do not know how to lie, because I do not dare to mock him, or because he himself will not wish to be called God, if he is a man. It is in man's interest to yield to God. Let him be satisfied to be called emperor. Even this is a great name, which is bestowed by God. He who calls him God denies that he is emperor. Unless he is a man, he is not emperor. Even while triumphing in that lofty chariot, he is reminded that he is a man. Someone whispers to him from behind: "Look behind you; remember that you are a man." And indeed he rejoices all the more that he shines with such glory that a reminder of his condition is necessary. He would be less if he were then called God, because he would not truly be so called. He is greater when he is recalled lest he think himself God. Augustus, the founder of the empire, did not even wish to be called Lord, for this too is a title of God. I will certainly call the emperor lord in the ordinary manner, but not when I am compelled to call him Lord in place of God.

8. Disobedience strictly so called is contrary to obedience by defect, insofar as it proceeds from an intention of acting against a precept, and therefore from contempt for the precept and for the one commanding. Any vice opposed to obedience by excess has no proper name.

Seneca inveighs sharply against disobedience in De ira III, c. 16, saying that it advances toward its own torment and makes commands burdensome by regarding them as such, commands which it endures with contempt. Thus a wild beast tightens the snares while struggling against them. Thus birds, while trembling and trying to shake off birdlime, smear all their feathers with it. No yoke is so constricting that it does not harm the one who submits to it less than the one who resists it. There is one relief for immense evils: to endure them and submit to one's necessities. Gregory Nazianzen adds in or. 9 that, just as all terrestrial and heavenly things are together preserved by the law of obedience, so the plague of disobedience devastates the earth and, when it invaded heaven itself, shamefully laid it waste.

9. The vice contrary to gratitude by excess has no name. That which is contrary to it by defect is called ingratitude, which, as St. Bernard says in *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, serm. 5, is a *scorching wind, drying up for itself the fountain of kindness, the dew of mercy, and the streams of grace.*

Cruelty or savagery is opposed to vindication by excess, since it exceeds the measure of honorable vindication. By defect it is opposed by an

On the Cardinal Virtues

unnamed vice that may be called remissness, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3.

The vice of lying is opposed to truth or truthfulness. The malice of a lie consists in the contrariety found between an internal judgment and the words or other signs expressing it, namely when the tongue affirms what the mind denies, or conversely. Hence to lie is said to be, as it were, *to go against the mind*.

The vice of flattery is opposed to friendship by excess. By it someone conducts himself too agreeably in social life, approving everything, praising everything, and accommodating himself in all things to the will of others. By defect, contentiousness is opposed to friendship, since it disturbs social life and gives rise to quarrels and disputes.

Finally, avarice, or an excessive desire for riches, is opposed to liberality by defect. Prodigality is opposed to it by excess, since it gives more than it ought or to those to whom it ought not.

§ 5.

Vices Opposed to Fortitude and to Its Potential Parts.

10. St. Thomas numbers three vices opposed to fortitude in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, qq. 125-127: timidity or cowardice; fearlessness or absence of fear, which Aristotle calls *aphobia* in *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 7; and rashness or excessive daring. Timidity is excess in fearing dangers and grave evils, and defect in daring to face them. Fearlessness exists when someone does not fear what ought to be feared according to reason. Rashness, finally, occurs when someone exceeds in daring and blindly does what is unfitting, or does it in an unfitting manner or at an unfitting time.

11. Four vices are contrary to magnanimity, which is the first potential part of fortitude. On the part of its primary object, which is a great work, presumption is opposed to it, since presumption tends toward great things that are disproportionate and beyond the powers of the agent. On the part of its secondary object, namely honor, ambition is opposed to magnanimity, and is an inordinate appetite for honor. On the part of glory, which is the effect of honor, an inordinate appetite for glory is opposed to it and, taking its name from the object, is called empty or vainglory. Finally, on the part of the one seeking glory, because he does not refer it to the honor of God and the edification of his neighbors, pride is opposed to magnanimity. Pride is a capital vice to which St. Gregory assigns seven daughters in *Moralia in Iob* XXXI, c. 17: disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy,

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

discord, and presumption in introducing novelties. These four foregoing vices are opposed to magnanimity by excess. Pusillanimity is opposed to it by defect, since it inordinately withdraws the soul from great things proportioned to its virtue.

12. Meanness is opposed by defect to magnificence, which is the second potential part of fortitude, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 133, a. 1. The vice opposed to it by excess is called *vulgar extravagance* by Aristotle in *Ethica Nicomachea* IV, c. 2, and *wastefulness* by St. Thomas, because, like fire in a furnace, it consumes everything.

The vice contrary by defect to patience, which is the third potential part of fortitude, is impatience. If there is a vice opposed to it by excess, it has no proper name.

Finally, the vice opposed by defect to perseverance, which is the last potential part of fortitude, is called softness. This is not the softness that is a species of lust, which will be discussed below, but another kind, by which someone easily withdraws from a good work already begun because of fear of failing or because of sadness arising from the absence of pleasure. It is called *softness* because it yields to a weak motive, namely the aforesaid fear or sadness. Obstinacy is opposed to perseverance by excess, by which someone, adhering excessively to his own opinion, does not desist from what he has begun when he ought to do so.

§ 6.

Vices Opposed to Temperance and to Its Subjective Parts,
Namely Abstinence, Sobriety, Chastity, and Modesty.

13. St. Thomas places two vices opposed to temperance in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 142. One by excess, which he calls intemperance; the other by defect, which he calls insensibility or stupor, when someone so abhors and avoids the pleasures of taste and touch that he refuses to use them when, to the extent, and in the manner that right reason permits. The first vice is more common and exceedingly disgraceful, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in a. 4 of the same question, because it is especially repugnant to human excellence. For it concerns pleasures common to us and brute animals, and assimilates us to them, or renders us worse than they are, when it causes us to be overcome by such pleasures, blinds the light of reason, and dulls the human being. Hence Seneca says in *Epistulae Morales*: *There are two pleasures, those of taste and touch, which are common to human beings and beasts.*

On the Cardinal Virtues

Therefore, those who enslave themselves to these animal pleasures must be numbered among cattle.

14. The vice of gluttony is opposed to abstinence, that is, the inordinate appetite for and use of food. This vice is committed principally in five ways, enumerated by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 148, a. 1, and contained in this verse: *Too soon, too lavishly, too much, too eagerly, too fastidiously.*

For the vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways, as St. Gregory the Great says in words quoted there by St. Thomas. Sometimes it anticipates the time of need. Sometimes it seeks more sumptuous foods. Sometimes it desires that the foods to be eaten be prepared too carefully. Sometimes, by the very quantity consumed, it exceeds the measure of nourishment. Sometimes one sins through the very heat of an immense desire.

St. Thomas gives the reason for this division in the body of the same article. Gluttony implies an inordinate desire for eating. In eating, however, two things are considered: the food itself that is eaten and the act of eating it. The disorder of desire can therefore be considered in two ways. In one way, it concerns the food itself that is consumed. With respect to the substance or kind of food, someone seeks sumptuous, that is, costly foods, beyond what his condition permits, as if a common man refused to eat anything except partridges and pheasants. With respect to quality, he seeks food prepared with excessive care, as if the same man refused to eat anything unless it were seasoned with sugar. With respect to quantity, he exceeds by eating too much, namely more than nature requires or the law of abstinence permits.

In another way, the disorder of desire concerns the very consumption of food. This may be because someone anticipates the due time for eating by eating too soon. This also includes eating more frequently than is fitting, or eating in an improper place, such as in a church and during sacred rites, because he refuses to wait until he returns home. It may also be because he does not observe the proper manner of eating, as when he eats voraciously, after the manner of dogs or lions.

15. From this capital vice arise five others, which St. Thomas explains in a. 6 of the same question and, following St. Gregory, calls the daughters of gluttony: foolish joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquacity, and dullness of mind. For, he says, through immoderation in food and drink the mind is dulled because the vapors of food disturb the head. Conversely, abstinence contributes to wisdom and understanding, according to Eccles. 2: *I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind toward wisdom.*

Then, when the governance of reason has been lulled to sleep, as it were, through immoderation in food and drink, the well-fed body causes the soul to break forth into foolish joy, into disordered speech or loquacity, and into scurrility, that is, a certain jesting that arises from a defect of reason, which, just as it cannot restrain words, cannot restrain external gestures. Finally, from the same immoderation in food and drink arises uncleanness, either with respect to the disordered emission of certain superfluities and foul excretions, or specifically with respect to the emission of seed.

16. The vice opposed to sobriety is called drunkenness, that is, the immoderate use of wine or another intoxicating liquid, resulting in a violent deprivation of the use of reason. For Jerome rightly says in *Commentarii in Epistolam ad Galatas*, c. 5: *Drunkenness can arise both from wine and from other kinds of drink that are prepared in various ways. Hence it is said of St. John the Baptist: "He shall drink neither wine nor strong drink."*

Theologians commonly teach that this vice is mortal of its kind. They prove this from the fact that drunkenness contains a grave disorder, in that a human being voluntarily and violently casts himself down from the level of reason, by which he surpasses the other animals and approaches the angels and God himself, to the condition and stupidity of brute beasts. He deprives himself not only of the use of reason, but also of the proximate power of using it, so that, although awake, he cannot employ it. How grave and shameful this is Basil rightly considers in hom. 14, *In ebrietatem et luxuriam*, in these words: *In what respect, I ask, miserable man, do you differ from the brutes? Is it not by the gift of reason, which you received from God, the Creator of all, by which you were made lord and ruler of every other creature? Therefore, by depriving yourself of this light of the mind through drunkenness, you may be numbered among the irrational beasts and regarded as like them, and so forth.*

Ambrose also inveighs vehemently and elegantly against this shameful vice in *De Elia et ieiunio*, where he calls drunkenness *the nourishment of lust, the incentive to madness, and the poison of wisdom*. He says that, just as the flesh is wounded by poison, so the mind is wounded by wine, and that drunkenness is not only harmful to bodily health but also adds guilt to the mind.

17. The vice opposed to chastity is lust, which is a sin mortal of its kind and capital. It is mortal because it is gravely opposed to something exceedingly necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race, which is of greater importance than the preservation of an individual. It is capital because many other vices arise from it in the genus of final or efficient causality, on account of the intense pleasure joined to it, by which human beings are enticed to commit many other sins or fall into other

On the Cardinal Virtues

vices. These are principally the eight enumerated by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 153, a. 5, after St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob* XXXI, c. 27: blindness of mind, inconsideration, precipitation, inconstancy, self-love, hatred of God, attachment to the present world, and horror or despair concerning the future world.

St. Thomas gives the reason for this division in the same place. For when, he says, the lower powers are vehemently affected toward their objects, it follows that the higher powers are impeded and disordered in their acts. Through the vice of lust, however, the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible appetite, is vehemently affected and intensely directed toward its pleasurable object because of the vehemence of passion and pleasure. Hence it follows that through lust the higher powers, namely reason and will, are especially disordered.

There are four acts of reason or intellect in practical matters, and two acts of the will. First, it pertains to the intellect to know the good end that is to be fittingly pursued. This act is impeded by lust, which induces one to pursue illicit pleasures, according to Dan. 13: *Beauty deceived you, and desire overturned your heart*. In this respect blindness of mind is posited.

Secondly, it pertains to reason to deliberate about those things that are to be done for the sake of the end. This also is impeded by the desire of lust, which is headlong and impatient of delay, and does not permit a careful consideration of means and their comparison with the end, according to what Terence says in *Eunuchus* concerning lustful love: *A thing that in itself possesses neither counsel nor any measure cannot be ruled by counsel*. In this respect precipitation is posited, that is, the removal of counsel.

Thirdly, it pertains to reason to judge concerning things to be done. This also is impeded by lust, which turns the mind away from considering those things that contribute to right judgment, according to Dan. 13, concerning the lustful elders: *They turned away their understanding and averted their eyes, so that they might not see heaven or remember just judgments*. In this respect inconsideration is posited.

Fourthly, it pertains to reason to command action, since command is an act of reason and prudence, as the Holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1. This also is impeded by lust, insofar as a human being is prevented by the impulse of desire from carrying out what he rightly decided ought to be done. Thus Terence says in *Eunuchus* of someone who declared that he would leave his mistress: *One false little tear will restrain these words*.

Fifthly, the appetite for the end pertains to the will. Desire impedes this by drawing a person toward self-love, that is, toward such an immoderate love of his own flesh and sensuality that at last he seeks nothing other than

to please it and satisfy it through illicit pleasures, and in some manner establishes his ultimate end in them. From this also follows hatred of God, insofar as God prohibits and severely punishes pleasures so greatly desired.

Sixthly and finally, the appetite for things ordered to the end, that is, for the means suitable for attaining a good end and especially eternal beatitude, pertains to the will. This is impeded by lust, which produces attachment to the present world and horror of the future world, that is, love of the present life, in which alone a human being can enjoy the pleasures of the flesh, and a desire to remain in it always so as always to enjoy them; and horror of the future life, in which he will be deprived of them and punished with grave and eternal torments. Hence it happens that pleasure-seekers vehemently abhor death. Lust also produces despair, or rather contempt for eternal beatitude, because while a human being is excessively detained by carnal pleasures, he does not care to attain spiritual pleasures but feels disgust for them.

18. To these eight internal vices flowing from lust, Isidore adds four external vices pertaining to speech: obscene speech, scurrilous speech, or things spoken lightly and inconsiderately, jocular or witty speech, and foolish speech. For, as St. Thomas rightly observes in the place cited, ad 4, those who are devoted to sexual pleasures and whose hearts are full of shameful desires easily break forth into obscene words, for *the mouth speaks from the abundance of the heart*, Matt. 12. Because they suffer from inconsideration and precipitation of mind, they easily burst forth into words spoken lightly and without consideration, which are called scurrilous. Because they are wholly occupied in seeking pleasures, they pursue jocular or witty speech. Finally, because they suffer from blindness of mind, they frequently fall into foolish speech, especially when speaking of their pleasures, which they prefer to all other things.

19. The same Holy Doctor, in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 154, a. 1, numbers six species of lust assigned by the ancients: fornication, which is between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman; adultery, which is committed with a married woman or by a married man; incest, which is committed with a blood relative or relative by marriage; defloration, which is committed with a virgin; rape, by which violence is inflicted upon one who does not consent; and the vice against nature, which concerns those lustful acts from which generation cannot follow. This last is subdivided into masturbation, sodomy, and bestiality, which Tertullian calls monsters of lust and furies of desire. In a. 10 St. Thomas adds sacrilege, or sacrilegious intercourse, which is committed with a person consecrated to God, and reduces it to adultery, because such persons are considered to be joined to God by a certain spiritual marriage.

On the Cardinal Virtues

Jerome elegantly describes this vice in his letters in these words: Lust is the fire of hell, whose fuel is gluttony, whose flame is pride, whose sparks are corrupt conversations, whose smoke is infamy, whose ashes are uncleanness, and whose end is Gehenna. St. Bernard, in *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, constructs the chariot of lust as follows: The chariot of lust rolls upon four wheels of vice, namely gluttony of the belly, desire for intercourse, softness of clothing, and the relaxation of idleness and sleep. It is drawn by four horses: prosperity of life, abundance of possessions, bodily sloth, and false security.

20. Finally, the vice contrary to modesty is called immodesty, and is reduced to that species of lust toward whose sin it disposes. For immodest looks, touches, embraces, and kisses, with which immodesty is concerned, are lustful insofar as they dispose toward illicit intercourse or masturbation, and contain a certain beginning of these acts. Hence Eucherius, in a homily at the beginning of Lent, calls a kiss *a pledge of sin*, and adds that it is also *the bite of the Devil*. Basil similarly inveighs against it in *De vera virginitate*, where he says: *One must avoid the kisses of beautiful persons no less than the bites of venomous animals, for poison is diffused from a kiss throughout the whole body.*

§ 7¹.

Vices Opposed to the Potential Parts of Temperance.

21. There are four potential parts of temperance, or four virtues annexed to it: continence, meekness, clemency, and modesty. We explained these in the preceding chapter, § 3, and in the following section listed several species of modesty, namely humility, studiousness, modesty of conduct, eutrapelia, and modesty in clothing or external adornment.

Incontinence is therefore opposed to continence as understood here, namely as the habit by which the will resists the passions of the concupiscible appetite and is so firmly established in the good that it does not permit itself to be drawn by them against the right judgment of reason. Through the vice of incontinence, someone easily yields to the vehement passions of the concupiscible appetite, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 156, a. 1, where he adds that a human being may yield to vehement passions in two ways. First, before reason has taken counsel and deliberated maturely, because of the speed or vehemence of the passion. This incontinence is called *unrestrained*. Secondly, although he has

¹ So numbered '8.' in the original.

deliberated maturely, he nevertheless does not persist in what he decided because of the weakness of the will's resolution. This incontinence is called *weakness*. The first frequently occurs in choleric persons, who have swift movements, and in melancholic persons, whose movements are vehement. The second occurs in phlegmatic persons and in those who have a soft and effeminate temperament.

Irascibility is opposed by excess to meekness on the part of its matter. It is an excess of anger and an immoderate appetite for vengeance. This vice is numbered among the capital vices because many others arise from it, especially the six listed by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 158, a. 7, following St. Gregory the Great in *Moralia in Iob* XXX, and called by both the daughters of anger: quarrelling, swelling of the mind, insult, disordered shouting, indignation, and blasphemy.

22. Cassian writes the following concerning this vice in *Collationes* XVI, c. 7: Knowing that nothing is to be preferred to charity, so, on the contrary, nothing is to be placed after rage or anger. For all things, although they may appear useful and necessary, must nevertheless be rejected so that the disturbance of anger may be avoided.

At the beginning of the first book of *De ira*, Seneca also praises Novatus for having especially feared this passion. Not without reason, he says, you seem to me to have feared this passion above all others, since it is the foulest and most rabid of all. Some wise men have called anger a brief madness, for it is equally incapable of controlling itself, forgetful of dignity, unmindful of close relationships, obstinate and intent upon what it has begun, closed to reason and counsel, incapable of discerning what is equitable and true, and very like collapsing structures, which break upon the very thing they have crushed.

He then presents a remarkable portrait of an angry man, so that from the hideous and horrible appearance of this vice we may abhor its deformity. To know that those possessed by anger are not sane, look at their very bearing. For just as the sure signs of madmen are a bold and threatening countenance, a gloomy brow, a savage face, a hurried step, restless hands, a changed complexion, and frequent and violently drawn breaths, so the signs of angry persons are the same. Their eyes blaze and flash; the whole face is deeply reddened as blood boils up from the depths of the heart; their lips tremble; their teeth are clenched; their hair bristles and stands upright; their breathing is constrained and hissing; their joints twist against one another with a cracking sound; there are groans and bellowing, abrupt speech in scarcely articulated words, frequent clapping of hands, and stamping of the ground with the feet; the entire body is agitated and produces great threats

of anger. Foul to behold and horrible is the face of those who deform themselves and swell with rage. You cannot know whether the vice is more detestable or more deformed. Other vices may be hidden and nourished in secret. Anger displays itself and comes forth upon the face, and the greater it is, the more manifestly it boils over.

He adds in book II, c. 35: The appearance produced by no other passion is more disturbed. It has disfigured the most beautiful faces and made savage countenances out of the calmest. All beauty leaves angry persons.... What do you suppose the soul to be like within, when its image without is so foul?

Another vice opposed to meekness by defect on the part of its matter may be called lack of anger or sluggishness, because through it a human being behaves too sluggishly toward an irritating evil and does not assume the due anger needed to repel, overcome, or punish it. Such anger, as Diadochos says in *De perfectione spirituali*, c. 61, *has been given to us by our Creator as a weapon of our nature*.

Aristotle reproves this vice, writing as follows: Defect, whether it is a certain absence of anger or something else, is blameworthy. For those who are not angry at the things at which they ought to be angry, in the manner, at the time, and against the persons they ought, certainly appear to be foolish. For one who is not angry seems neither to perceive nor to feel pain, and cannot be fit to take vengeance.

23. Cruelty is opposed to clemency by excess, and excessive leniency by defect. Cruelty is an atrocity of soul in imposing punishments, abusing the legitimate power to punish. It has a cause for punishment but exceeds the proper manner. Excessive leniency is an excessive remission of punishment, wholly or in part, contrary to the good of the offender or beyond what is fitting for the example of others and for the good of the commonwealth, which requires that the guilty be punished so that others may be turned away from similar evils and due satisfaction may be made.

Cruelty differs from savagery or ferocity, according to St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 159, a. 2. Ferocity or savagery is found when someone inflicting punishments considers no fault in the person punished but punishes solely because he delights in the suffering of human beings, after the manner of wild beasts, which harm human beings in order to feed upon their bodies and not for any cause of justice, the consideration of which pertains to reason. Cruelty, however, does consider the fault in the one punished, but exceeds the measure in punishing.

A true and pious judge must therefore withdraw from both of these vicious extremes, namely cruelty and excessive leniency. When expedient, he must join just severity to clemency, and when necessary, temper severity

itself with clemency, as St. Gregory the Great rightly admonishes in *Moralia* in Iob XIX, c. 12, in these words: Some are so rigid in anger that they lose all gentleness of kindness, while others are so gentle that they lose the rights of strict government. Therefore, all rulers must always hold both, so that neither in the vigor of discipline do they abandon the kindness of meekness, nor in meekness do they abandon the stricter discipline. Thus they will neither become hardened against the compassion of piety when correcting the obstinate, nor weaken the vigor of discipline when consoling the minds of the weak. Let the vigor of discipline therefore govern meekness, and let meekness adorn vigor, so that each may be commended by the other, and neither vigor be rigid nor meekness lax.

And again in book XX, c. 8: Discipline or mercy is greatly deficient if one is maintained without the other. But rulers must possess toward their subjects both mercy, which consoles justly, and discipline, which chastises piously. Hence both wine and oil are applied to the wounds of that half-dead man who was led by the Samaritan to the inn, so that through wine the wounds might be made to smart and through oil they might be soothed. Thus everyone responsible for healing wounds must apply in wine the sting of strictness, and in oil the softness of piety. Through wine the putrid parts are made to smart; through oil the parts to be healed are soothed. Gentleness must therefore be mixed with severity, and a certain temperament must be produced from both, so that subjects are neither ulcerated by excessive harshness nor loosened by excessive kindness.

This is what was signified by the ark of the tabernacle, in which the rod was present together with the tablets and the manna. For when the Scripture of sacred knowledge is in the heart of good rulers, there must also be the rod of strictness and the manna of sweetness. Hence David also says: *Your rod and your staff have comforted me*. We are struck by the rod and supported by the staff. Therefore, if there is the strictness of a rod that strikes, let there also be the consolation of a staff that supports. Let there be love, but not a love that enervates; let there be rigor, but not a rigor that provokes bitterness; let there be zeal, but not zeal that rages immoderately; let there be piety, but not piety that spares more than is expedient.

24. Immodesty is opposed to modesty, for it observes no measure in human affections and actions. Since there are various species of modesty, there are also several vices opposed to them.

Pride is opposed by excess to humility, which is the first species of modesty. Pride is an inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, a capital vice, or rather the source and origin of all the others, and, as Cassiodorus says in *Expositio Psalmorum* on Ps. 18, *the mother of all evils, the fountain of*

On the Cardinal Virtues

crimes, and the vein of wickedness. Hence St. Gregory says in *Moralia in Iob* XXXI, c. 17: *When pride itself, the queen of vices, has fully captured a conquered heart, it immediately hands it over to the seven principal vices, as to its commanders, to be devastated, and from these arise importunate multitudes of vices.*

In *Moralia in Iob* XXIII, c. 4, and after him St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 162, a. 4, Gregory enumerates four species of pride. The first is when someone believes that he possesses a good from himself. The second is when, although he believes it was given from above, he nevertheless thinks that *he received it through his own merits*. The third is when he boasts that he possesses what he does not possess. The fourth is when, despising others, he desires to appear singular in possessing what he possesses.

Similarly, there are four things that draw the chariot of pride, as Hugh of Saint Victor rightly explains in *De clauastro animae* I, c. 6: The love of ruling, the love of one's own praise, contempt, and disobedience. Its wheels are boasting of mind and arrogance, loquacity, and levity. The spirit of pride may be the charioteer in this chariot. Lovers of the world are those carried in this chariot. The horses are unbridled, the wheels unstable, the charioteer perverse, and the one carried is weak.

The Apostle admonishes his disciple in 1 Tim. 6 to command the rich of this world not to be proud in their understanding, because riches generally produce pride. Hence Augustine says in *serm. 5, De verbis Domini*, c. 9: Every fruit, every grain, and every tree has its own worm. One worm belongs to the apple, another to the pear, another to the bean, another to the wheat. The worm of riches is pride. Therefore, command the rich of this world not to be proud in their understanding. He excludes the vice and teaches the use.

Another vice is opposed to humility by defect, namely excessive self-abasement. Humility does not incline one toward every kind of self-abasement, but toward one that is prudent, moderate, and according to right reason. A person would depart from right reason if he subjected himself to another with injury to his own state or office, and lowered himself beneath that person. This would occur if a king placed a peasant over himself, or a bishop a priest; or if a superior, through excessive self-abasement, harmed the authority and reverence necessary for governing his subjects well and keeping them in their duty.

Two vices are likewise opposed to studiousness. One by excess is called curiosity, and is an excessive desire to know or understand things that do not pertain to us to know, or that surpass our capacity, from a desire for knowledge alone. For if this is done from some other evil end, it pertains to

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

other vices whose proper ends those are. The other, by defect, is called negligence, and is a certain sluggishness and relaxation of the soul in learning those things that each person is bound to know and that belong to his responsibility.

Scurrility in words and immoderation in games and jests are opposed by excess to eutrapelia, which preserves decorum in recreation and imposes a measure upon games and jests. By defect there is opposed to it a certain excessive austerity, such as is found in those whom we call harsh and boorish, as Aristotle says in *Ethica Nicomachea* IV, c. 8, and which St. Thomas therefore calls hardness or boorishness in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 168, a. 4.

It must be noted, however, that although both extremes are vicious, excess is worse, because excessive recreation impedes the duties of human life more than does a defect of pleasure derived from recreation. Hence the Philosopher, quoted by St. Thomas in the article cited, says that *few friends should be maintained for the sake of pleasure, because a small amount of pleasure suffices for life as a seasoning, just as a small amount of salt suffices in food.*

Finally, external indecorum in bodily movements, whether in bodily bearing, gestures, or outward actions, is opposed to modesty of conduct, which is commonly called external modesty in a special sense. This indecorum is itself commonly understood in a special sense by the name immodesty. Luxury is opposed by excess to modesty in clothing or external adornment, and sordidness by defect. Hence Ambrose says in *De officiis ministrorum* I, c. 19: *Let bodily elegance be not affected but natural, simple, neglected rather than sought, and aided not by costly and dazzling garments but by ordinary ones, namely according to each person's rank, so that nothing may be lacking to honor or necessity, and nothing may be added for superfluous, curious, or excessively refined display.*

END OF THE SECOND PART.

Thomistic Manual of Theology

Jean-Baptiste Gonet's *Thomistic Manual of Theology* is a substantial synthesis of Catholic theology, distinguished by its clarity, doctrinal precision, and unwavering fidelity to the theological method of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Originally composed as a concise presentation of Gonet's larger *Shield of Thomistic Theology*, the work gathers the principal questions of scholastic theology into an ordered and accessible course. Following the structure of the *Summa Theologiae*, Gonet examines revealed doctrine through careful distinctions, formal arguments, responses to objections, and sustained engagement with Scripture, the Fathers, and the great commentators of the Thomistic tradition.

It is intended for seminarians, clergy, theologians, students of Saint Thomas, and serious readers seeking a systematic guide to traditional Catholic theology and the enduring intellectual inheritance of the Thomistic school.

Contained in this Series:

T. 1: Prima Pars

T. 2: Secunda Pars I

T. 3: Secunda Pars II

T. 4: Tertia Pars

† IHS

Translated by Osvaldo R.