



Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

Thomistic Manual of Theology 2

A Brief Course of Thomistic Theology

Translated by Osvaldo R.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

FR. JEAN-BAPTISTE GONET, O.P.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

A BRIEF COURSE OF THE WHOLE OF
THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

TOME II.

I. ON BEATITUDE. II. ON THE VOLUNTARY. III. ON HUMAN
ACTS. IV. ON VIRTUES. V. ON SINS. VI. ON THE LAWS

LATIN PRINTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
ASSOCIATES, IN ANTWERP, BELGIUM

1726

This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P., of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose defense this indefatigable Thomist consecrated his labors, that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To Saint Thomas Aquinas
and His School.

August 1, 2026.

Oswaldo A. R. | Gpt 5.6
Translator.

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TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE
FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

APPROBATION
Of the Faculty of Theology of the Academy of Bordeaux.

W e, the undersigned Chancellor, Doctors of Theology, and Professors of the Academy of Bordeaux, have diligently examined the book entitled *Manuale Thomistarum*, published by the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Preachers, Professor and Senior Professor of the same Academy. We have found that it contains absolutely nothing contrary or discordant with orthodox faith and Christian morals. On the contrary, as a genuine offspring most worthy of the genius of its Author, who is always like himself, consistent with himself, and most steadfast in explaining and defending the difficulties of the most sacred and angelic doctrine, we have judged that it should be committed to the press as soon as possible. Given at Bordeaux on 16 May 1678.

JOHN FONTENELLE, Chancellor.
FRANCIS ARNALDUS, Augustinian.
ANGELUS LATRIE, Carmelite.
PETER LAHAYE, Doctor of Theology.

APPROBATION

T he Reverend Father Gonet had published the immense Shield of Thomistic Theology against its new assailants. But because those assailants were not men who, experienced in the contests of disputation, hurled dangerous blows or greatly formidable weapons, he reduced the Shield, and in place of the immense Shield recently published by him he now fashions against those same assailants a little shield, and a very brief one. Yet its brevity detracts nothing from it; rather, its power is increased, for it is stronger insofar as the weight of its propositions and the arguments concerning its subject matter cohere more closely, are not separated by longer distances, but are joined at nearer intervals. Thus one may say with Tertullian: As much as it is compressed in words, so much is it expanded in meanings. Let the old proverb, therefore, be dismissed: A good book always makes a bad compendium. For this Compendium involves no loss. It is clear despite its brevity, solid despite its subtlety, most worthy of its Author's reputation, and so complete in every respect that it seems to have nothing of a compendium except the title. Thus I judge at Béziers on 19 December 1679.

JULIAN JOSEPH GOURGAS,
Doctor of Sacred Theology and Canon Law of Paris.

LICENSE
Of the Most Reverend Father General.

W e, Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Master General and servant of the entire Order of Friars Preachers: greetings.

By the tenor of these presents and by the authority of our office, we grant you, Reverend Father Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Friars Preachers, former Provincial of the Province of Toulouse and Senior Professor at the Academy of Bordeaux, license and faculty to commit the *Manuale Thomistarum* to print, provided that the work shall have been approved by three Professors of Theology appointed by the Very Reverend Father Provincial of the Province of Toulouse, and provided that all other requirements of law are observed. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. In testimony of which, etc. Given at Rome on 31 July 1677.

Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Master of the Order. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. ANTONINUS CLOCHE, Master and Associate.

COMMISSION
Of the Very Reverend Father Provincial.

We, Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Prior Provincial and servant of the Province of Toulouse of the Order of Friars Preachers, by the tenor of these presents appoint and establish the Reverend Fathers John Leonard Geay, Prior of Béziers, Louis Bancel, and Jerome de Grasse, Professors of Sacred Theology, as censors of the book entitled *Manuale Thomistarum*, which the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, formerly public Professor at the University of Bordeaux, intends to publish. Given at Valence on 29 October 1679. In testimony of which, we have signed these presents with our own hand and fortified them with the seal of our office.

Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Provincial as above. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. JOHN LAPEIERE, Associate.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Leonard Geay, Professor of Sacred Theology and Prior of the Convent of Béziers. The Shield of Thomistic Theology shone forth from God, so that all the mountains of the Church might gleam with its extraordinary brilliance. Yet just as the sun, when first rising, illuminates the summits of mountains, and in its progress does not disdain to flood the lowliness of the valleys with the rays of its light, so the Author of the Shield, after illuminating the minds of more eminent Doctors with his solar Shield, now hastens by means of his Theological Manual to enlighten even the weaker scholastics. Indeed, in this Manual all the mysteries of Scholastic Theology are seen reduced, as it were, to a compact whole, but with such order, solidity, brevity, and clarity that one may deservedly say of the Disciple's Manual what is commonly proclaimed of the Master's Summa: The style is brief, the eloquence pleasing, the doctrine lofty, clear, and firm. Let this Theological Manual, therefore, come forth into the light. Let it come forth for the relief of Masters, for the consolation of Disciples, and for the more convenient use of all students. Let this Theological Manual be worn by the hands of all. Just as all the sacred Doctors spoke through the mouth of the one St. Thomas, so now, in this Manual, may all Professors of Sacred Theology explain in the Schools the conclusions of the Summa Theologiae through the mouth of one most wise disciple of St. Thomas. These are my wishes, this my judgment, this the vote that I willingly add to this Manual. Given at Béziers on 20 November 1679.

Fr. JOHN LEONARD GEAY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Prior of the
Convent of Béziers of the Order of Friars Preachers.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Bancel, of the Order of Preachers, Aggregate Doctor and Perpetual Professor of Sacred Theology in the School of St. Thomas at the University, Examiner for the Diocese and the entire Legation of Avignon, and also General Definitor of the Province of Toulouse of the same Order.

I have always admired the works of our Very Reverend Father Gonet, a Doctor celebrated everywhere. For he has brought the whole of Theology into the light with such clarity that he seems to have written it with the rays of the sun. With such care and industry has he collected within it the choicer testimonies of the Holy Fathers and the more solid and subtle arguments of the Doctors, which are scattered throughout the books of others, that it may with perfect justice be said: he who knows Gonet knows the whole. Only this could still have been desired: that the Author himself should reduce his works to a compendium for the greater convenience of all students. This he has successfully accomplished in his Manual, in which I do not doubt that nothing will be found contrary to faith or good morals, since it is nothing other than the doctrine itself of his Shield of Thomistic Theology. Let this work, therefore, most complete in every respect, come forth before the public, so that all may

Handle it by night and handle it by day.
At Avignon on 6 December 1679.

Fr. LOUIS BANCEL, of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION

*Of the Reverend Father Jerome de Grasse, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.*

The Shield of Thomistic Theology, comprised in five volumes, was published some years ago by the Very Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, to the great benefit of the whole theological discipline. This excellent work, in every respect consonant with the holy faith, remarkable for its profound and solid doctrine, and delightful for the most abundant flowers of the Holy Fathers scattered throughout it, has been eagerly embraced and honored not only privately by all sacred Professors, but also by the most celebrated sacred Academies of all Europe. This Theological Manual was forged by the labor of the same Author. Being commanded to judge it by the Very Reverend Father Antoninus Massoulié, Provincial of the Province of Toulouse of the Friars Preachers, I would say nothing other than that this Theological Manual is the true and genuine epitome of the Theological Shield. In it, purity of doctrine, in complete agreement throughout with the faith and oracles of the Holy Apostolic See, choice and elegance of propositions, and the flowers of the Holy Fathers, which shine more diffusely throughout the Theological Shield, shine in the Manual more narrowly and compactly indeed, but also more preciously. Thus I judge at Avignon on 3 December 1679.

Fr. JEROME DE GRASSE, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

EULOGY

Let the most learned men of Europe heap innumerable praises upon GONET. Let the Spaniards proclaim his profundity, the Italians his charm, the Germans admire his labor, and the French his clarity. Let others, finally, extol the various gifts of his genius with various encomiums. For my part, and insofar as a sober man may do so, I shall praise his modesty and reserve. The rarer this virtue is among the more learned, the more praiseworthy it is in this most learned man, in whom it is found in the highest degree. By this principal ornament of the soul, and by his other riches of genius, he is most like the Angelic Thomas. GONET may therefore be called, not inelegantly, the Second Hope of the Great Order of Preachers. It was not enough for him, through his marvelous clarity, to illuminate the minds of all more brightly than the sun; by this Epitome he enables all students to become theologians in a short time. Restrain yourself, Very Reverend Father: you are distinguished by excessive clarity, and labor too much to write Theology in a laconic style. By your lucid discourse you disclose to all the hidden mysteries of this science; by this brevity of speech you open them to all as though in a single glance. You were easy to understand; you will be easier still. Finally, your Manual will be in the hands of all. Yet proceed, I beg you, Reverend Father. The knowledge of God can never become known too much or too quickly. Hail, therefore, new light of Thomistic Theology; hail, Thomas of our Age, most humble son of Dominic and richest heir of his virtue; unconquered Opponent of the Innovators, pillar of the Order, glory of your native land, honor of your people, and glory of the Christian world.

CHARLES LEPUL, Doctor of Both Laws, Royal Counselor,
and Assessor of Annual Taxes.

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SECOND PART¹ OF THE MANUALE THOMISTARUM.

— PROOEMIUM —

Dionysius, in c. 4 of the book *De divinis nominibus*, wisely teaches that the love of God effects a circular motion, or a wonderful circle, when God pours forth his beneficence outside himself upon created things and most sweetly entices and draws us to himself by the charms of his goodness. For he is the Principle and End of all things, so that, having gone forth from him through creation, we may return to him through Beatitude, which Pico della Mirandola accordingly defines as the return of the intellectual creature to its principle. Hence, after St. Thomas in the First Part of his *Summa Theologiae* considered God as he is in himself, one and triune, and as the Principle of all created things, he immediately contemplates him as the ultimate End of the rational creature. He treats of Beatitude and of the means conducive to its attainment, namely, human acts; the virtues and gifts in general; the vices and sins opposed to them, since there is one science of contraries; laws;

¹ Part Two of the *Manuale Thomistarum*, owing to its length, is here divided by the present translator into two tomes, T2 and T3, for publication; in the original Latin it forms a single continuous part. T2, comprising the first half of Part Two, treats of beatitude, the voluntary and the involuntary, human acts, the virtues in common, sin, and law. T3, comprising the second half of Part Two, treats of grace, together with the two appendices added to the treatise on grace by Gonet himself in this revised edition, followed by the theological virtues and the cardinal virtues.

Second Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

grace; and the virtues in particular, both theological and moral. We too shall discuss these matters in this second part of our Manual, with whatever brevity and clarity we can, in the following treatises.

TREATISE I.
ON BEATITUDE.

Before disputing about beatitude, which is the true and ultimate end of man, we have judged that some matters concerning the ultimate end in general must first be set forth.

CHAPTER I.
On the Ultimate End of Man in General.

We omit here many matters concerning an end in general that are customarily treated in philosophy, so that we may proceed to more useful matters and resolve three difficulties concerning the ultimate End.

§ 1.

Which Actions of Man Are for the Sake
of an End, or Effects of the End?

1. It must first be noted that actions proceeding from man are of two kinds. Some are called *actions of man*, and others *human actions*. The former are produced by man but are nevertheless common to him and to beings devoid

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of reason. The latter are those proper to man insofar as he is man, or those belonging to man insofar as he differs from brute animals. Now man differs from brutes in acting in two ways. First, he differs with respect to the substance of the work, because he elicits immaterial and intellectual operations of which brutes are not capable. Second, he differs with respect to the mode of acting, because he moves himself not only physically and vitally, as brutes do, but also morally, with indifference as regards acting, with freedom, and with dominion over his acts. Hence actions proceeding from man can be called human in two ways: with respect to their substance and with respect to their mode. In the first way, all operations proceeding from the intellectual grade, even those preceding every deliberation of reason, are called human. In the second way, only free or deliberate actions are so called. From this you will understand that four kinds of actions can be distinguished in man. Some are human neither with respect to their substance nor with respect to their mode of operation, but are purely brutish and animal, such as bodily actions that do not proceed from the deliberation of reason. Others are human with respect to their substance but not their mode, such as all necessary acts of understanding and willing. Others, on the contrary, are human with respect to their mode but not their substance, such as acts of eating and drinking and other bodily actions performed with the deliberation and command of reason. Finally, others are human both with respect to their substance and their mode, such as all free acts of understanding or willing.

2. It must secondly be noted that there are several acts elicited by the will. Some concern an end to be obtained, such as simple volition and intention; others concern an end already obtained, such as fruition; and others concern means conducive to the end, such as choice and use. There is no difficulty or controversy among theologians concerning the last of these, for it is manifest that they are for the sake of the end, or effects of the end, since the will chooses the means and uses them in order to attain the end. The difficulty concerns only the first two, which concern an end to be obtained or one already obtained. Hence:

3. I say first that the acts by which the will tends toward an end not yet obtained, such as simple volition and intention, are effects of the end. Theologians commonly teach this against Vasquez and Lorca, who hold that an end exercises its causality only with respect to acts concerning the means, and not with respect to those concerning the end.

4. The conclusion is proved first from St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 2, where he says: *Just as the influence of the efficient cause is to act, so the influence of the final cause is to be sought or desired*. By these words he openly teaches

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that the causality of an end consists in its being sought or desired, or in its moving and enticing the appetite to love it. But the goodness of the end moves and entices the will not only to choose and use the means, but also to love and desire the end itself. Therefore not only the choice and use of the means, but also the love or volition of the end, is an effect of that end.

5. It is proved secondly. Love, or the simple volition of an end—and the same must proportionately be said of intention—is an act of the will efficiently produced by it. Therefore it is truly and properly for the sake of an end. The consequence is proved because everything that terminates the causality of an efficient cause must also terminate the causality of an end, since the end is the first of all causes and an intellectual agent does not act unless moved by an end.

6. I say secondly that the act of delight and rest in an end already attained, which is called fruition, is not properly for the sake of an end.

This is proved first from St. Thomas here, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1, where he teaches that delight is not for the sake of another as a final cause, but as a formal or objective cause. There he is not speaking of objective delight, which is not numerically distinct from the end, as some interpret him, but of formal delight, since he is speaking of that which is the repose of the appetite in the good.

7. Reason also supports this, for since delight or rest naturally follows upon the possession of the end and is, as it were, its corollary and completion, it is not numerically distinct from the end. Therefore, just as an end is not for the sake of an end and is not its own effect, neither is delight or fruition. Hence fruition is not rigorously a human act, but the terminus and completion of human acts. The same must be said of beatific love, since it is not in man's free power, nor does man move and apply himself to it through the deliberation of reason and the choice of the will, but is specially moved and applied to it by God. Therefore it should be called not so much a human act as the fruit and crown of all human acts.

8. You will object first against the first conclusion: To be done for the sake of an end is to be done from love of the end. But the first volition is not produced from love of the end, since it is the first love of the end. Therefore it is not produced for the sake of the end and consequently is not an effect of the end.

9. I answer with the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca that, just as when accidents are said to act in the power of the substance—for example, heat in the power of fire—this makes the construction intransitive, as Cajetan says, because the meaning is not that they act through some superadded power flowing from the substance and passing into the

accidents themselves, but that they act through themselves insofar as they are powers flowing from the substance and subordinated to it; so likewise, when the first volition is said to be produced from love of the end, this must be understood intransitively, because that volition is itself the love of the end, and not transitively, as though it presupposed another love.

10. You will object secondly: Only human acts are for the sake of an end. But the simple volition and intention of an end are not human acts. Therefore they are not for the sake of an end. The minor premise is proved: *Those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will*, as the Holy Doctor says here, a. 1. But the simple volition and intention of an end do not proceed from the deliberation of reason, for just as consultation concerns not the end but the means, so also does deliberation. Therefore the simple volition and intention of an end are not properly human acts.

11. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. In proof of the minor, I say with Conrad that deliberation is commonly used in two ways. It is used either properly and strictly for that which is required for the choice of means and presupposes the intention of the end, or broadly and commonly for that which is required for acting morally well or badly, for which the ability to discern between good and evil is sufficient. St. Thomas must be understood as speaking of the latter when he says that those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will, and not of the former.

12. I add that even the indeliberate and necessary acts of the will or intellect can in some way be called human, not absolutely and without qualification, but in a qualified respect, namely, causally and initiatively. Although they are not deliberate acts, they are nevertheless the principle and beginning of deliberation. Thus the movement of the heart is vitally initiatory, though not consummately so, because although the animal does not yet perfectly move itself in that movement, it is nevertheless the beginning of life, or of the actions in which the animal moves itself.

13. You will object thirdly against the second conclusion: St. Thomas here, a. 1, says that all human actions are for the sake of an end. But fruition, or delight in an end attained, is a human action. Therefore it is for the sake of an end.

14. I answer first by denying the minor premise, for, as we said above, fruition is not rigorously a human act, but the terminus and completion of human acts.

I answer secondly that St. Thomas must be understood as speaking of human actions that are distinguished from the end and are numerically distinct from it. Fruition, however, or delight and rest in an end already

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attained, is not numerically distinct from the end, but is, as it were, its completion and corollary. Hence, just as an end is not for the sake of an end, neither is the act of fruition, delight, or rest in an end already attained.

15. You will say: Everything that has an efficient cause also has a final cause, since an efficient cause does not act unless moved by an end. But fruition is an act of the will efficiently produced by it. Therefore it has a final cause and consequently is for the sake of an end.

16. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Everything that has an efficient cause has a final cause, provided it is not itself the end, I grant; if it is itself the end, I deny. An end as an end does not have a final cause. For example, if someone placed the character of the ultimate end in contemplation, that act would have an efficient cause but not a final cause, because it would itself be the end.

17. You will insist: The will delights in an attained end for the sake of that end. Therefore the delight of the will resting in the end is for the sake of the end.

18. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. If the expression “for the sake of” signifies a formal cause, I grant it; if it signifies a final cause, I deny it. This is St. Thomas’s solution in the place cited above.

§ 2.

Whether Whatever Man Wills, He Wills for the Sake of the
Formal Ultimate End, or Beatitude in General.

19.¹ I say first: In all that man wills and does, he does not formally intend the formal or general ultimate end, that is, beatitude in general; nevertheless, he does intend it interpretatively and virtually.

The first part is evident, for experience establishes that the will often acts and loves particular goods when the intellect is not formally thinking about beatitude. The second is shown as follows. A man is judged interpretatively to will something when he seeks something that by its nature is ordered to it, although he is not then thinking about it. For example, one who gives alms for the moral goodness of mercy, while thinking nothing about God or beatitude, is judged interpretatively to act for the sake of God and beatitude, because the morally good thing expressly intended is by its nature referred to God and is a means by which we tend toward beatitude. But a particular good is by its nature ordered to the formal

¹ So numbered ‘10.’ in the original.

ultimate end and to beatitude in general, since it is, as it were, a certain beginning and participation of it. Therefore, when man seeks particular goods, he interpretatively wills the formal ultimate end, or beatitude in general. Hence the holy Fathers and philosophers often say that man seeks everything he seeks so that he may be happy and blessed. This is so true that St. Augustine says in his tract *De Epicureis et Stoicis*, c. 3: *He who is evil would not be evil unless he hoped thereby to be happy.* And in sermon 13 on Ps. 8 he says: *To be happy is so great a good that both the good and the evil desire it. It is no wonder that the good are good in order to attain it; what is astonishing is that even the evil are evil in order to be happy. For everyone who is given over to lust, and is corrupted by luxury and fornication, seeks beatitude in that evil.*

20. The third part, which asserts that in all man wills and does he intends beatitude not only interpretatively but also virtually, is proved as follows. From the volition of the ultimate end in general, or beatitude, there remains in the will a power for seeking a proximate end and particular goods. Therefore it seeks them virtually for the sake of the ultimate end. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, a. 6, ad 3, where he says: *The power of the first intention, which concerns the ultimate end, remains in every appetite for any thing, even though the ultimate end is not actually being considered.* And in IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, q1a. 2, ad 6, he says: *The desire for beatitude is virtually present in every desire, as a cause in its effect.* Reason also supports this. Since the intention of the ultimate end in general, or beatitude, is the volition of the general end, its influence must extend, at least virtually, to all secondary volitions, just as the influence of the first and most universal efficient cause extends universally to all effects. The influence of the general end must extend no less widely than that of the universal efficient cause.

21. You will say that it follows from this that there is no idle act. For an idle act is said to be one that lacks an end or is ordered to no end. But if every human action concerns beatitude in general, there will be none that lacks an end or is not ordered to some end. Therefore none will be idle.

22. I deny the inference. In proof of it, I say that a human act is not called idle because it is not ordered to the formal ultimate end, or beatitude in general, but because it lacks some particular and intermediate end appointed by the one acting.

23. I say secondly: In every human operation man acts, at least virtually, for the sake of some material ultimate end, or some ultimate end in particular, whether true or apparent. Our Thomists commonly teach this, and it follows evidently from what was said in the preceding conclusion. Since intention is an efficacious appetite for an end and regards it as future

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and to be obtained, it cannot bear upon something common that is altogether abstracted from a subject, but only upon something common as existing in a subject in which it can really exist, or is thought capable of existing. Therefore, whenever man intends the formal ultimate end, or good as such and beatitude in general, he in fact wills some ultimate end in particular, applying the character of good as such, or of beatitude in general, to some particular thing, namely, to God or a creature, or to a morally good, useful, or delightful good. Nevertheless, by an inefficacious affection of simple complacency, he can bear upon the character of good as such and beatitude in general abstracted from every subject.

§ 3.

Whether the Will Can Simultaneously Intend Several Total and Adequate Ultimate Ends.

24. I say first that the will cannot efficaciously seek two total and adequate ultimate ends. St. Thomas teaches this here, a. 5, and theologians teach it commonly.

It is proved first by the argument St. Thomas gives in the argument *on the contrary*. An adequate and total ultimate end must have total dominion over the will. But it is impossible for there to be two ends that totally dominate the will and to which the will is totally subjected and rendered service, according to the words of Christ in Matt. 7: *No one can serve two masters*. Therefore there cannot be several total and adequate ultimate ends.

25. It is proved secondly by another argument given in the body of the same article. It belongs to the character of an ultimate end absolutely speaking that it be a perfect good satisfying the whole appetite of man. But if there were two ultimate ends absolutely speaking, neither would be a perfect good, because each would lack what the other possessed; nor would either satisfy man's whole appetite, since he would seek something else beyond each one. Therefore there cannot be two ultimate ends absolutely speaking.

26. It is proved thirdly. It belongs to the character of an ultimate end absolutely speaking that all things be ordered to it, while it is not ordered to another. But it is impossible for there to be two goods of this kind, for one would either be ordered to the other or not. If it were ordered, it would be a subordinate good and not the ultimate end. If it were not ordered to the other, the other would not be the ultimate end, since it would not subject all things to its ordering. Therefore there cannot be two ultimate ends absolutely speaking. Hence the Gentiles who invented many gods divided

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among them the character of first cause and ultimate end, worshipping one for bestowing one good and another for other goods: Mars for military affairs, Apollo for knowledge, Venus for generation, Ceres for the fruitfulness of the earth. According to their whim, they subjected and subordinated one of these gods to another. Hence Tertullian, in the *Apologeticum*, beautifully mocks the superstition of the Romans in choosing gods: *Among you, divinity is weighed according to human judgment. Unless a god pleases man, he will not be a god; man must now be propitious to God.*

27. I say secondly that someone can tend toward two adequate ultimate ends if he tends toward one efficaciously and absolutely, but toward the other inefficaciously and in a qualified respect. Martinez, Ildephonsus, and others of our Thomists teach this and prove it by two examples. The first is when someone existing in mortal sin performs a morally good work, for example, gives alms to a poor man from the motive of mercy. By such an act he tends toward God as an ultimate end, because almsgiving rightly performed, and every moral good, derives from God as the author of nature and of moral goodness, and by its nature tends and makes man tend toward God as the natural ultimate end. Yet this occurs inefficaciously and in a qualified respect, since through such an action he does not abandon the creature, or his own private good, to which he has been converted as to an ultimate end through mortal sin. The other example is when someone existing in grace sins venially. Through venial sin he tends toward a creature as an ultimate end, yet inefficaciously, because such a tendency toward a creature is not sufficient to turn him away from God, whom he regards through charity as his ultimate end. Therefore he then has two ultimate ends, one willed inefficaciously and the other efficaciously.

28. Nor is what the author of *Theologia mentis et cordis* says true, namely, that the ultimate end of a sinner acting well and of a just man sinning venially is beatitude in general, which we incessantly seek in every act. Since man's appetite always tends toward a good, and a good implies existence or at least an order to existence, it cannot efficaciously bear upon something common as altogether abstracted from a subject, but only upon something common as existing in a subject in which it can really exist or is thought capable of existing. Hence whenever man intends the formal ultimate end, or beatitude in general, he wills some ultimate end in particular, applying the character of happiness or the ultimate end to some thing or things, namely, to God or a creature, or to a morally good, useful, or delightful good, as we showed in the preceding section.

29. You will object first against the first conclusion: A man who sins mortally places his ultimate end in a creature, as theologians commonly

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teach against Adrian. But man can commit various mortal sins, even disparate ones, from habit, such as fornication, theft, and pride, and consequently can inordinately love various creatures. Therefore he can have several ultimate ends absolutely speaking.

30. I answer that the ultimate end of one who sins mortally is the sinner himself, or his own private good, to which he orders everything he wills. The creature for whose sake he sins mortally is only a proximate end toward which he tends and from which his act receives its species. Hence, although the proximate end can be multiple, he cannot therefore have several ultimate ends absolutely speaking. This is St. Thomas's solution in *IV Sentences*, dist. 42, q. 2, a. 1, where he says: *The ultimate end in the love of changeable goods is man himself, for whose sake he seeks all other things. Therefore, if the root of sin is taken on the part of the sinner himself, it will be one; but if it is taken on the part of the things the sinner seeks for his own sake, there will be many.* We shall treat this more fully in the Treatise on Sins.

31. You will object secondly against the second conclusion: It belongs to the character of an ultimate end that it be the supreme good satisfying the appetite, and that all other things be ordered to it. Therefore it is impossible for there to be two ultimate ends, even though one is sought inefficaciously. The consequence is evident, because if one contains everything desirable, it leaves nothing in the other to be sought; and if all things must be ordered to one, the other also is ordered to it and therefore cannot be an ultimate end, as we argued above.

32. I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. It is impossible for there to be two ultimate ends existing in reality, I grant; in man's apprehension, I deny. Thus the existence of one ultimate end is incompatible with the existence of another ultimate end, because this would destroy the essence of an ultimate end, whose character requires that it be the supreme good satisfying the appetite and that all other things be ordered to it. But the apprehension of an ultimate end is not incompatible with the apprehension of another imperfect ultimate end, because an apprehension is not so efficacious that it cannot coexist with an imperfect contrary apprehension, especially when those cognitions belong to different orders and one is practical while the other is purely speculative, as happens in the present case. For one who sins mortally judges practically that a changeable good is the ultimate end, but speculatively that God is the ultimate end. From this you will understand the *a priori* reason why man cannot have two ultimate ends efficaciously willed, but can have two if one is sought efficaciously and the other inefficaciously. Two efficacious volitions require two practical judgments concerning the desirability of each end, and

these judgments are incompatible; but for two volitions, one efficacious and the other inefficacious, two judgments suffice, one practical and the other speculative, and these have no incompatibility or opposition between them.

CHAPTER II.

On Objective Beatitude.

1. It is manifest that our objective beatitude consists in no created good, but in God alone. First, because the ultimate end and the first principle correspond to one another. But to be the first principle belongs to God alone. Therefore so does being the ultimate end. Hence in Revelation he is called the Alpha and Omega, the Principle and the End. Secondly, objective beatitude is a good perfectly satisfying man and consequently both faculties existing in his soul, namely, the intellect and the will. But God alone can satisfy man's intellect as regards the knowledge of truth and his will as regards the fruition of good. Therefore our objective beatitude consists in him alone. The major premise is certain, and the minor is manifest in both its parts. The object of the intellect is universal truth, and the object of the will is universal good. But universal truth and goodness are found in God alone, not in any creature, which has only participated truth and goodness ordered to God, who is the source of all truth and goodness. Therefore he alone can satisfy man's appetite as regards the knowledge of truth and the fruition of good. Hence Augustine says in *De moribus Ecclesiae*, c. 8: *God is for us the sum of goods; God is our supreme good. We must not remain below him or seek beyond him, for the former is dangerous and the latter nonexistent.*

2. The same truth can be further declared and illustrated by passing through the individual created goods, which are of three kinds: goods of the soul, which are virtues and sciences; goods of the body, which are health, strength, beauty, and pleasure; and goods of fortune, which are riches, honors, dignities, and the like. It can be shown that our beatitude can consist in none of these goods. Beginning, then, with the goods of fortune, which are least of all, it is manifest that they are not man's objective beatitude, since they are purely external, inferior to man, and serve him for sustaining life. Nor do they satisfy man's appetite, according to Sir. 9: *The covetous man is not filled with money*, and according to Bernard: *The heart of man is no more satisfied with gold than the body with air*. I add that beatitude is a good to be enjoyed through possession, whereas riches are good not through possession but through being poured out, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 2, a. 1.

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3. The same must be said of honors, dignities, and secular power, for these goods too are purely external and do not satisfy the hunger of the human heart, but sharpen it. Moreover, they are perishable and transitory. Many Supreme Pontiffs are examples, since they could not number even a complete month, and some not even a complete week, of their pontificate. Thus Stephen II is said to have held the pontificate for four days, Urban VII for seven, Boniface VI for fifteen, Celestine IV for seventeen, Sisinnius for twenty, Marcellus II for twenty-one, Damasus II for twenty-three, Pius III for twenty-six, and Leo XI for twenty-seven, and to have completed it in so brief a span. Hence Bernard, writing to Eugene and impressing upon him this brevity of the pontificate, says in epistle 237: *In all your works remember that you are a man, and let the fear of him who takes away the spirit of princes always be before your eyes. How many deaths of Roman Pontiffs have you seen with your own eyes in a short time? Let your predecessors themselves most certainly and swiftly warn you of your departure, and let the brief time of their rule announce to you the fewness of your days.*

4. It is also certain that beatitude cannot consist in any good of the body, because these goods are common to men and brutes, and are often found more perfectly in brutes than in men, such as longer life, firmer health, greater strength, and sharper senses. The same must be said of bodily pleasures. Hence Seneca says in *De brevitate vitae*, c. 9: *Why do you mention pleasure to me? I seek man's good, not the good of the belly, which is roomier in cattle and beasts.* And he adds in epistle 74: *They use food more greedily, they are not equally wearied by sexual intercourse, and they possess greater and more even strength.* It would follow that they are much happier than man. I add that beatitude must exclude all evils. Bodily pleasures do not expel all evils, but are rather mingled with many bitter things. Hence Hugh of St. Victor beautifully says: *Pleasure has honey in its mouth, gall in its heart, and a sting on its back.* Boethius has these verses in book III of *De consolazione philosophiae*:

*All pleasure has this nature:
It drives those enjoying it with stings.
Like the flying bees,
When it has poured forth pleasant honey,
It flees, and with a most tenacious bite
Wounds the hearts it has struck.*

5. Finally, it is no less evident that man's objective beatitude does not consist in goods of the soul, namely, sciences and virtues. Natural sciences inflame rather than extinguish the soul's thirst and natural desire for knowledge, because their objects are not the supreme good and do not

contain the first truth. Moreover, in learning them there is the greatest labor and affliction of spirit, according to Eccles. 1: *In much wisdom there is much indignation, and he who adds knowledge adds labor also.* The virtues and their operations are ordered to something else: for example, the operations of justice to preserving peace among men, and acts of fortitude to victory and peace. The same holds of the other moral virtues, all of which are ordered to preserving the mean in the internal passions and propriety in external works. Therefore they cannot be man's happiness, which cannot be ordered to a further end. Hence Augustine says in *De Epicureis et Stoicis*, c. 8: *It is not the virtue of your soul that makes you happy, but he who gave you virtue.* And in *De civitate Dei* XXII, c. 3: *The reward of virtue will be he who gave virtue.* Elsewhere, comparing the sects of the Epicureans and Stoics with Christians, he says: *Epicurus says: "It is good to enjoy my flesh." The Stoic says: "It is good to enjoy my mind." But the Christian says: "It is good for me to adhere to God."*

6. These things having been presupposed, the celebrated question and controversy among theologians concerning man's objective beatitude must be briefly resolved: namely, whether God as one is sufficient to beatify us, so that, if by an impossibility he were not seen as triune, man's beatitude would nevertheless remain.

7. I answer negatively, against Scotus, Suarez, Molina, and other more recent authors. The fundamental reason is that, for the vision of God to be beatific, it must terminate at him as he is in himself. But if, by an impossibility, the divine essence were seen without the Persons, the vision of God would not terminate at him as he is in himself. Therefore it would not be beatific. The minor premise is certain, for God as he is in himself is not only one but also triune. The major is proved first from 1 John 1: *When he appears, we shall be like him*—namely, in beatitude—*because we shall see him as he is.* The causal expression *because* must be weighed, for it signifies that the cause or *a priori* reason why the vision of God is beatific is that it terminates at him as he is in himself. Secondly, the same major is proved thus. For the knowledge of God to be perfectly beatific, it must be intuitive and not purely abstractive. But intuitive knowledge of God must terminate at him as he is in himself. For intuitive knowledge is distinguished from abstractive knowledge in this: abstractive knowledge apprehends the object proportionately to the capacity of the intellect and distinguishes it, not as it is in itself, but only in relation to that intellect; intuitive knowledge, however, sees and beholds the object as it is in itself in reality. Thirdly, the same major is shown as follows. For the vision of God to be beatific, it must perfectly satisfy and quiet the appetite. But unless it terminates at God as he

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is in himself and as he subsists in three Persons, it will not perfectly satisfy or quiet the appetite. Therefore, for it to be beatific, it must terminate at God as he is in himself and as he subsists in three Persons. The major is evident, and the minor is proved. One who sees a nature desires to see the mode in which it subsists and is not at rest until he sees it. But the divine nature subsists in three Persons. Therefore, unless the vision of God terminates at the divine nature as subsisting in three Persons, it will not perfectly satisfy and quiet the appetite of the blessed. I add that the blessed, in seeing the essence, connaturally desires to see the properties necessarily connected with that essence. But the personal properties are so necessarily connected with the essence that they belong to the quidditative concept of the Divinity, as we demonstrated in the Treatise on the Trinity. Therefore the blessed, in seeing the essence, connaturally desires to see them, and consequently his appetite cannot be perfectly satisfied unless he sees them. I further add that our beatitude is a participation of divine happiness. But God would not be perfectly blessed if, by an impossibility, he knew himself as one but not as triune, because such knowledge would not be most perfect, since it would be neither intuitive nor comprehensive. Therefore likewise, if God were known by us as one and not as triune, such knowledge would not be our beatitude. Hence John 17 says: *This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.* Here the Father and the Son are assigned as the object of eternal life or happiness. Since they love one another with infinite love, they cannot be seen as they are in themselves unless the Holy Spirit is also seen, who is the fruit and terminus of this mutual and infinite love.

8. You will object first: The essence of beatitude consists in the vision and attainment of the supreme good. But if the divine essence were seen, even though the Persons were not seen, man would see and attain the supreme and infinite good, since the relations add no goodness or perfection to the essence, as we taught in the Treatise on the Trinity. Therefore, if the essence were seen without the Persons, our beatitude would remain.

9. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. The essence of beatitude consists in the vision and attainment of the supreme good in the mode in which it is in itself, I grant; without such a mode, I deny. Under the same distinction applied to the minor, I deny the consequence. The solution is evident from what was said above. The vision of God is not beatific merely under the concept of a vision and attainment of the supreme good, but under the concept of a vision and attainment of God as he is in himself, because under this concept alone is it intuitive knowledge and quieting of the appetite of the blessed, as was shown above. Hence, just as in the

opinion of our adversaries an abstractive knowledge of the quiddity and essence of God would not be beatific because, although it would be knowledge of the supreme good, it would not be knowledge of him as he is in himself; so in our position the vision of the divine essence without the Persons would not be beatific, because although it would terminate at the supreme good, it would not terminate at it as it is in itself, since in fact the divine nature subsists and exists in three Persons.

10. You will object secondly: The divine relations do not belong to the essence of the formal and primary object of our beatitude. Therefore, even if they were not seen, our beatitude would nevertheless remain. The consequence seems manifest. The antecedent is taught by our Thomists in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision, and is evident because the beatific vision is a participation of the divine act of understanding and consequently has the same formal and primary object. But the formal and primary object, both motive and terminative, of the divine act of understanding is the divine essence as virtually distinguished from the attributes and relations, as was shown in the Treatise on God's Knowledge, c. 1. Therefore the same holds of the beatific vision.

11. I answer by denying the antecedent. Although the relations are not, by reason of themselves, the formal and primary object of our beatitude, neither are they a secondary object; rather, they belong to the primary object as its essential modes. Hence it is impossible for the divine essence to be seen without the Persons or for the essence of beatitude to remain when they are not seen, just as a colored body cannot be seen by the bodily eye unless it is extended and figured, because the common sensible must modify the proper sensible.

12. You will say: The divine relations do not belong to the quiddity of God as first principle, even as essential modes of that principle; otherwise the Trinity of Persons could be naturally known from creatures. Therefore neither do they belong to his essence as ultimate end and our objective beatitude, even as its essential modes. The antecedent is evident. The consequence is proved because God is the ultimate end and first principle of creatures under the same aspect.

13. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and its proof. Although that which is the first principle is also the beatifying ultimate end, it is nevertheless not constituted as beatifying by the same aspect by which it is constituted as first principle. For it is constituted as first principle by omnipotence or creation, which belongs to God according to himself as conceived prior to the relations and Persons. But it is constituted as the beatifying ultimate end by the vision of his essence as it is

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in itself. Hence, since the essence cannot be seen as it is in itself without the relations and Persons in which it subsists and exists, they belong to the essence and quiddity of God insofar as he has the character of the beatifying ultimate end, as its essential modes.

CHAPTER III.

On the Essence of Formal Beatitude.

1. Having explained objective beatitude, it remains for us to explain formal beatitude, which is its possession or attainment, and to explain in what act it essentially consists, or through what operation the blessed possess God as the supreme good and the beatifying ultimate end.

§ 1.

Matters to Be Presupposed for the Resolution of
This Most Celebrated Question.

¹Four or thereabouts must be presupposed, which are unanimously received by almost all theologians of this age. The first is that man cannot be beatified through God's uncreated vision united to him. The fundamental reason is that formal beatitude is a vital operation by which the blessed lives in second act, according to John 17: *This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true God*. But it is impossible for the blessed to live in second act through God's uncreated vision. Therefore it is also impossible for him to be formally beatified through it. The major premise is certain, and the minor is proved. Actual life must belong to the living being intrinsically, either through identity, as occurs in God, who lives in second act through an act altogether identical with himself, or through effective procession from that living being, as occurs in created actual life. But the divine act of understanding cannot belong intrinsically to a created intellect in either of these ways, since in each case the greatest imperfection would be implied. Therefore it is altogether impossible for a created intellect to be constituted as living in second act through it.

2. It must secondly be presupposed that beatitude does not consist in a special indwelling of God in the essence of the soul, by which the soul is substantially sanctified, deified, and in some way transformed into God, as glowing iron into fire and a transparent body into light, as Henry of Ghent

¹ no. 1.

teaches in *Quodlibeta* XIII, q. 12. This proposition is proved as follows. Since God is not present to things except through operation, as we showed in the Treatise on the Attributes, c. 9, he cannot have a special presence and indwelling in the essence of the soul except by producing or conserving in it some supernatural form or quality. This can be none other than sanctifying grace, which alone resides in the essence of the soul. But this indwelling is not formal beatitude; otherwise all the just would be blessed. Therefore beatitude does not consist in God's indwelling in the essence of the soul.

3. This is confirmed. Through formal beatitude we attain, possess, and hold God, and hence the blessed are called comprehensors. But through God's operation and indwelling in the soul, we do not hold and possess God; rather, he holds and possesses us, as is evident of the indwelling of immensity by which God is present to individual things. For through it God contains all things and bears them by the word of his power, as the Apostle says in Heb. 1. Therefore formal beatitude does not consist in God's indwelling in the essence of the soul.

4. It must thirdly be presupposed that formal beatitude consists not in anything after the manner of first act, but in an actual operation. This is proved by the following argument of St. Thomas here, q. 3, a. 2. Formal beatitude is man's ultimate perfection. But man's ultimate perfection is not first act, but operation and second act. Therefore formal beatitude consists in an operation. The major is certain, for if beatitude were not man's ultimate perfection, it would not perfectly satisfy his appetite, since he would still seek a further perfection. The minor also seems certain: first, because first act is ordered to second act, which is contrary to the character of ultimate perfection; and secondly, because, since God is purest act and devoid of all potentiality, man is more assimilated to him through operation and second act than through a habit or first act, and consequently attains a greater perfection.

5. We presuppose fourthly that this operation in which formal beatitude consists is elicited by the blessed himself and effectively proceeds from him. Indeed, it implies a contradiction for the blessed to see God through an action not elicited by himself but immediately produced by God.

6. The first part, which is against the Nominalists, is certain from what was said in the first supposition. The operation in which formal beatitude consists is a vital act. But it belongs to the character of a vital act that it proceed from an intrinsic and vital principle. Therefore the operation in which formal beatitude consists is in fact elicited by the blessed himself, and he is not merely passive with respect to it. I add that, even granting that by absolute power it could be produced by God alone, it nevertheless cannot be

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denied that man would be beatified more sweetly and connaturally through a form effectively caused by himself than through a form merely received in him. But we must always, and especially with regard to the blessed, ascribe to God what is sweeter and more conformable to the natures of things, unless the opposite is revealed or impossible, because, as Wis. 8 says: *She reaches mightily from end to end and disposes all things sweetly*. Therefore, since it is not impossible for the blessed effectively to cause formal beatitude, nor has it been revealed that he does not cause it, we are bound to assert that he concurs actively in it and is not merely passive.

7. Nor is it valid to say that it belongs to the character of a reward that it proceed from the one rewarding alone. This is true of an objective reward, that is, of the thing given as a reward, but false of a formal reward, that is, the attainment and possession of the reward. Since this is our action, it must proceed effectively from us. Nor is there any difficulty in granting that man beatifies himself in a qualified respect, namely, insofar as he produces the vision in which his beatitude formally consists. Thus he is said to sanctify himself in 1 John 3: *He who has this hope in him sanctifies himself*, because he effectively concurs in the acts disposing him to justification. Nevertheless, man cannot be said absolutely to beatify himself, because for this to be true he would have to be the cause of those things required for beatitude itself, namely, the light of glory and the union of the divine essence as an intelligible species.

8. The second part of the supposition, which asserts that it implies a contradiction for the blessed to see God through an action not elicited by himself, is gathered from what was said in the first part. If the blessed were merely passive with respect to the beatific vision, he would simultaneously live and not live, which are contradictory. He would live because understanding is a vital action and the beatific vision is eternal life, as John 17 says. He would not live because it belongs to the character of a vital action that it proceed effectively from an intrinsic and vital principle. Hence it is impossible for someone vitally to move himself through a motion caused by another, or vitally to generate by a generation merely received and not elicited by himself.

9. This is confirmed. A living thing differs from a nonliving thing by this alone: the nonliving thing has a perfection in itself but not from itself, whereas a living thing not only receives it in itself but also has it from itself, either through identity, as occurs in divine actual life, or through elicitation or real procession, as occurs in created actual life. But that which merely receives a motion and does not effectively cause it has it only in itself and

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not from itself. Therefore it does not live through that motion, nor can it be constituted as living in second act by it.

10. You will say: God can by himself produce whatever he produces through a secondary cause, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 2, in these words: *It is erroneous to say that God cannot by himself produce all the determinate effects that are produced through any created cause.* But through an intellect elevated by the light of glory he can produce the beatific vision. Therefore he can also produce it without that intellect.

11. I answer that God can by himself produce whatever he produces through a secondary cause if that cause is purely efficient, but not if it is also formal. The intellect, however, is not only an efficient cause but also an extrinsic formal cause with respect to understanding, which derives its species from a vital principle. Or secondly, I answer that the major premise is true of effects that have no essential dependence upon any cause, but not of those that essentially depend upon a cause, because God cannot destroy the essences of things. The beatific vision, since it is a vital action, essentially depends upon a created intellect. An example can be given from generation, nutrition, and growth, which God cannot produce by himself alone, because, since they are essentially vital actions, they require procession from a vital generative, nutritive, and augmentative power. Similarly, a mental word, under the aspect by which it is vital and a vital terminus expressed and produced by a vitally understanding principle, cannot be supplied by God or produced without the actual concurrence of the intellect. Yet insofar as it is a most actual representation of the object, it can be supplied by him, as occurs in the beatific vision, in which the divine essence most actually represents itself to the intellect of the blessed and consequently takes the place of the word insofar as the word is the most actual representation of the object, as we explained in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision.

§ 2.

Formal Beatitude Consists Essentially Not in Several Acts,
but in One Alone; This Act Is Neither Love nor
Fruition or Delight, but the Clear Vision of God.

12. The first part of this assertion is opposed to Valencia, Suarez, and other more recent authors, who think that formal beatitude essentially includes several operations, namely, vision and love. It is proved by this fundamental argument. Formal beatitude is the first attainment of the ultimate end,

radically or causally containing the other perfections of beatitude. But this belongs to only one operation. Therefore formal beatitude consists essentially in one operation, not in many. The major is certain, for in other essences we understand the formal constituent to be that which belongs to them first and in which the remaining perfections are radically contained. This is evident in man, whose constituent is rationality, because it belongs to him first and is the root of risibility and of the other properties belonging to human nature. Therefore, since formal beatitude is placed in the attainment of the ultimate end, it must essentially consist in that to which the character of attainment first belongs and which radically or causally contains the remaining perfections accompanying the beatific state. The minor is no less certain. Between two operations of a rational nature belonging to different faculties, namely, the intellect and the will, there must necessarily be an order of priority and posteriority, since nothing is willed unless it is first known. Therefore both cannot be the first attainment of the ultimate end radically or causally containing the other perfections of beatitude. Similarly, because there is an order and subordination between rationality and risibility, and risibility presupposes rationality, it is impossible for both first to constitute the essence of man and radically to contain all the other perfections belonging to human nature.

13. Nor is what our adversaries say valid, namely, that several operations partially concur in the attainment of the ultimate end, namely, vision and love. Apart from the fact that no act of the will is an acquisition or attainment of the ultimate end, as we shall show below, even if this were granted, the whole force of our argument would remain. Since beatific love necessarily presupposes the clear vision of God and is subordinated to it, it cannot be the first attainment of God radically containing all the perfections of the blessed; this can belong to the vision alone, as will be clear below. Thus, even on this supposition, it remains true that formal beatitude consists essentially in one operation, although it includes several concomitantly or consequently. Hence many go astray in this matter by confusing the essence of beatitude with its state. Although the state of beatitude includes several operations, namely, the clear vision of God, beatific love, and fruition or delight resulting from them, the essence of beatitude is one most simple act, namely, the clear vision of God, which is the root and cause of love and delight. For if it were composed of many operations, it would not be simpler than other created things, but would be, as it were, one thing accidentally and by aggregation, which is incompatible with its supreme perfection. The more perfect any form is, the simpler it must be, as is evident in an angel: the higher and more perfect an angel is,

the simpler he must be, and the fewer and more universal the species he uses, as was shown in the Treatise on Angels.

14. The second part, which asserts that the act in which formal beatitude essentially consists is not beatific love, is proved against Scotus by the argument already indicated. Formal beatitude is the first attainment of the ultimate end. But beatific love is not the first attainment of the ultimate end: first, because it presupposes the beatific vision, through which we attain the ultimate end, as will be clear below; and secondly, because love is not an attainment of the ultimate end, which is shown in two ways. First, by a general argument, because no act of the will can be the attainment of the ultimate end. To will is a kind of seeking, and to seek is not to attain the thing sought but to be inclined and to tend toward it. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 3, a. 4: *If attainment were through an act of the will, the covetous man would attain the effect of money at once, from the beginning, when he wills to have it.*

15. Secondly, the same is proved specifically of beatific love. The love of the heavenly homeland is of the same species as the love of the state of pilgrimage. But the love of the state of pilgrimage is not the attainment of the ultimate end; otherwise wayfarers would be comprehensors. Therefore neither is the love of the heavenly homeland.

16. Nor is the answer of some disciples of Scotus valid, namely, that the love of the state of pilgrimage and that of the heavenly homeland differ in species because they are regulated by diverse cognitions. First, cognition does not specify acts of the will either as the object or as the specifying principle; rather, the apprehended goodness itself does so, with apprehension entering only as an applying condition, as our Thomists teach in philosophy. Secondly, if the love of the state of pilgrimage and that of the heavenly homeland differed in species because of the diverse cognitions regulating them, it would follow that the habit of charity in a wayfarer differs in species from the habit of charity in the comprehensors. Consequently, the charity of the state of pilgrimage would not remain but would cease in the heavenly homeland, contrary to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13: *Charity never fails.* The consequence is proved. Diverse habits in species are given in the intellect for the state of pilgrimage and the heavenly homeland, namely, faith and the light of glory, precisely because the cognition of the heavenly homeland differs in species from that of the state of pilgrimage. Therefore, if the love of the heavenly homeland similarly differs in species from the love of the state of pilgrimage, we must admit in the will diverse habits in species for the two states.

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17. Nor is what others say valid, namely, that although the love of the heavenly homeland is of the same species as the love of the state of pilgrimage, it nevertheless obtains the character of attaining the ultimate end, which does not belong to the love of the state of pilgrimage, either by reason of greater intensity, by reason of a certain consummative mode, or by reason of its individual character. The love of the Blessed Virgin while she was in the state of pilgrimage exceeded in intensity the loves of all the blessed, yet it did not have the character of attaining the ultimate end. Therefore the love of the heavenly homeland cannot obtain the character of attainment by reason of degrees of intensity. This also refutes what is added concerning a consummative mode, for a mode shares the nature of the thing whose mode it is. Hence a mode of intensity cannot be an attainment, because the entity of love whose mode it is is not an attainment. It also seems manifest that beatific love does not obtain the character of attainment from its individual character: first, because in the intellect an act that is an attainment differs in species from an act that is not an attainment, as an act of faith differs from the clear vision of God; and secondly, because in the will desire differs in species from joy, since desire concerns a good not possessed. But similarly an act of love that was the attainment of the ultimate end would require the presence of the object no less than joy does. Therefore it would differ in species from an act of love that was not an attainment of the ultimate end, and consequently the character of attaining the ultimate end could not belong to love by reason of its individual character.

18. The third part, which asserts that formal beatitude does not essentially consist in beatific fruition, seems manifest. Just as desire concerns a good that is absent and not yet possessed, so fruition or delight concerns a good already possessed. Hence it does not cause but presupposes the attainment of the end. As St. Thomas says here, a. 4: *Delight comes to the will from the fact that the end is present; it is not the case, conversely, that something is present because the will delights in it.*

19. Finally, the fourth part, affirming that formal beatitude essentially consists in the clear vision of God, follows from the preceding points. If such beatitude is one simple act, and that act is neither love nor fruition or delight, it must be the vision of God itself, for no operation other than these is found in the blessed that can have the character of formal beatitude. Hence Augustine says in *Soliloquia*, c. 36: *This is the full beatitude and entire glorification of man: to see the face of his God.* And on Ps. 90: *I do not know what great thing we shall see, when our entire reward is vision.*

20. Again, as we argued above, formal beatitude is the attainment of the ultimate end radically or causally containing the other perfections of beatitude. But the clear vision of God has these two conditions. Therefore formal beatitude essentially consists in it. The major is evident. The minor is also evident as regards the second part, for the beatific vision is the root of necessary love, supreme delight, complete impeccability, and the other perfections and properties connaturally belonging to beatitude, as will be established from what we shall say in the following chapter. It is proved as regards the first part. First, from Augustine in *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 35, where he says: *What else is it to live happily but to possess something eternal by knowing it?* By these words he openly teaches that the clear vision of God is the attainment of beatitude. Secondly, from the difference found between the intellect and the will. The intellect draws things to itself and renders them present to itself, either according to intelligible being, if the cognition is of an absent or material thing, or according to entitative being, if the cognition is of a spiritual object intimately present, such as God clearly seen. The will, however, does not draw things to itself, but rather is borne toward them, according to Augustine's words: *My love is my weight; by it I am borne wherever I am borne.* But to draw things to oneself and render them present to oneself is to attain and possess them; to be drawn, however, is to be possessed, or rather to be impelled toward the loved thing. Therefore an intellectual creature attains God through an act of the intellect, not through an act of the will. Thirdly, since grace, which imitates nature, is most orderly, it should not elevate any operation other than the most excellent and perfect operation of the rational creature to the greatest and most excellent office, namely, the attainment of the ultimate end. But the beatific vision is the most perfect operation of an intellectual creature, since it is a participation of a greater divine excellence: it participates in the divine act of understanding, which expresses in God a greater perfection than volition and the other attributes. Therefore the beatific vision is the attainment of the ultimate end. Augustine indicates this argument in the passage cited above: *Of all things, that which is eternal is most excellent; and therefore we cannot possess it except by that in virtue of which we are more excellent, namely, the mind.*

21. The same part can further be proved by this argument. Beatitude consists essentially in the operation that formally or causally satisfies every appetite of a rational creature, and hence is called the repose of desire. But the beatific vision does this. Therefore formal beatitude essentially consists in it. The major is certain from what was said above. We showed the minor at length in the digression found in *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, treatise

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on beatitude, disp. 3, at the end of a. 2, and it can be briefly explained as follows. There are four principal desires of men, by which, as by four winds, all the storms of human life are stirred up. The first is the desire for truth, common to us and the angels. The second is the desire for pleasure, common to us and brutes. The third is the desire for eternity, common to all things, which flee destruction and corruption as far as they can. The fourth is the desire for dignity and greatness, proper to men as ordered to political and civil life. But these four desires are most abundantly and perfectly fulfilled through the beatific vision. Therefore it satisfies every desire of a rational creature. The minor is proved by considering these four desires individually. First, as regards the desire for truth, the matter is so clear and evident that it scarcely needs proof. Since every blessed person sees the essence of God, which is truth itself by essence and in which all created and uncreated truths are contained in a most eminent mode, it is manifest that he abounds in every knowledge, not only of created things but also of the attributes of the Creator himself. He sees in the Word all the mysteries of our faith, this entire universe, many possible and future creatures, and finally all things pertaining to his state, as was shown in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision. Hence Gregory the Great beautifully says in *Dialogues* IV, c. 33: *What is there that they do not know, where they know him who knows all things?*

22. Secondly, as regards the desire for pleasure and delight, it is no less evident that this is perfectly satisfied through the beatific vision. According to St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 31, a. 5, three things concur in delight: a knowing or sensing faculty, an object agreeable to it, and the union of the object with the faculty. These three are found in the beatific vision in the most perfect manner. The intellect from which it is elicited is purer, higher, nobler, and, so to speak, more lively than the other cognitive faculties, and consequently much more apt for knowing. God, as the first truth and first intelligible, is the highest and noblest object. His union with the intellect is so intimate that, except for the hypostatic union, no greater or more intimate union can be given. Therefore the difference between the joy of this world and that of paradise is that the former, as small and limited, is said to enter the heart of man, while the latter, as immense and infinite, cannot be contained by the human heart. Consequently, man is better said to enter that joy than that joy to enter man's heart, according to Christ's words in Matt. 25: *Enter into the joy of your Lord*. Hence Anselm says in the *Proslogion*, c. 26: *Therefore that joy will not merely enter those who rejoice, but those who rejoice will enter wholly into the joy of the Lord. So great is the joy concerning God in the heavenly homeland that it cannot be contained within man.*

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Therefore man enters that incomprehensible joy, and that joy does not enter man as something comprehended by him.

23. Furthermore, this immense joy flows from three sources, or has three principal causes. First, the blessed rejoice in the divine good and in God's infinite happiness, for true friendship, such as charity is, rejoices in the goods of a friend. Secondly, they rejoice in their own good and in the happiness they possess, enjoying God as their own good. Thirdly, they rejoice in the goods and happiness of the other saints, among whom, as Gregory the Great says: *There will be no envy of unequal brightness, because the unity of charity will reign in all.*

24. Augustine elegantly describes this immense joy in *De spiritu et anima*, c. 64, in these words: What or how great will that joy be, where such and so great a good is found? O human heart, needy heart, inexperienced heart, broken and indeed overwhelmed by miseries, how greatly would you rejoice if you abounded in all these goods? Ask your innermost self whether it could contain its joy over so great a beatitude. But certainly, if someone else whom you loved altogether as yourself possessed the same beatitude, your joy would be doubled, because you would rejoice no less for him than for yourself. If two, three, or many more possessed the same thing, you would rejoice as much for each as for yourself, if you loved each as yourself. Therefore, in that perfect charity of innumerable blessed angels and men, where no one loves another less than himself, there will be an ineffable joy. If the heart of man will scarcely contain its joy concerning so great a good of its own, how will it be capable of so many and so great joys in that perfect happiness? There, just as each will incomparably love God more than himself and all the others with himself, so he will rejoice beyond all estimation more in God's happiness than in his own and that of all the others who are his.

25. Thirdly, the desire for eternity is fulfilled through the beatific vision. It is eternal and immutable, and is measured neither by time nor by aeviternity, but by eternity, because the principles concurring in it, namely, the light of glory and the divine essence united to the intellect of the blessed as an intelligible species, remain altogether unvaried. Hence Bernard says in sermon 31 on the Cantic: *That vision stands because the form then seen stands.* It is also eternal and will undergo no change from what was or what will be.

26. Finally, the desire for greatness is satisfied through the same vision, because through it the blessed is raised to the supreme summit of greatness and dignity and is made not only deiform but in a certain manner God, according to the words of the Prophet: *I have said: You are gods.* Just as whiteness united to a man makes him white, heat makes him hot, and

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wisdom makes him wise, so the divine essence united to the intellect of the blessed as an intelligible form renders him in some way God, if not in entitative being, at least in intentional and intelligible being. This is especially so because the intellect in some manner passes over into the thing understood, and from intellect and intelligible there is made a greater unity than from matter and form, as the Commentator on Aristotle says. Hence 1 John 3 says: *When he appears, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.* And St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 51, that *according to this vision we are assimilated to God in the highest degree.*

27. From these things it is evident that all man's desires are most fully and perfectly satisfied through the beatific vision, and consequently that formal human beatitude consists in it. St. John elegantly describes it in Rev. 22 under the symbol and figure of a most pleasant river: *He showed me a river of living water, bright as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb. In the midst of its street, and on both sides of the river, was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits and yielding its fruit each month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.* Certainly heavenly beatitude could not be described under a more fitting symbol. That river of living water, bright as crystal, is nothing other than the clear vision of God, which, like a most limpid and pure river, makes the whole city of God rejoice. That river is said to proceed from the throne of God and of the Lamb because the beatific vision takes its origin from God's power and Christ's merits; or because the joys of eternal beatitude proceed principally from the fruition of God, one and triune, and of Christ, God and man, according to John 17: *This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.* Furthermore, that heavenly river is said to be surrounded on both sides by most pleasant trees that yield their fruits each month, because the vision of God has several accompanying joys that never grow old but always appear new. Finally, not only the fruits but also the leaves of these trees are said to be for the healing of the nations, because in that heavenly beatitude nothing is useless or superfluous; all things pertaining to it are precious, useful, and delightful. Even the leaves of the tree of life, that is, the endowments of the glorious body flowing from the endowments of the soul, expel every languor and infirmity and confer perpetual incorruption and soundness, as will be clear below when we treat of the endowments of the glorious body.

§ 3.

The Principal Objections Are Solved.

28. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: Formal beatitude consists in the most perfect union with God. But that union which occurs through acts of both intellect and will, namely, vision and love, is more perfect than that which occurs through vision alone. Therefore formal beatitude does not consist in one act, but in several.

29. I answer that formal beatitude does not consist in the most perfect union with God absolutely and without qualification; otherwise it would have to consist in the hypostatic union. Rather, it consists in the most perfect union in the order of attainment. Although an act of the will adds a kind of union beyond an act of the intellect, it does not add a kind of attainment, because, as we showed above, an act of the will does not attain but only impels and inclines toward the willed object.

30. You will say first: Once attainment has been made through an act of the intellect, God still remains further attainable. But this can occur only through an act of the will. Therefore the act of the will adds not only union but also attainment. The minor is certain, and the major is proved. Through an act of the intellect God is held only under the aspect of the true. But he is also attainable under the aspect of the good, since as good he has the character of the ultimate end, which by its nature is attainable by a rational creature. Therefore, when God has been attained through the act of the beatific vision, he still remains further attainable through love. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 4, a. 8, ad 3: *The perfection of charity is essential to beatitude as regards the love of God, but not as regards the love of one's neighbor.*

31. I answer by denying the major. In proof of it, I distinguish the major: God is held only under the aspect of the true, if this means the formal aspect under which he is attained, I grant; if it means the aspect which is attained, I deny. Similarly, I distinguish the minor: God is also attainable under the aspect of the good as the aspect under which he is attained, I deny; as an aspect that is attained, I grant, and I deny the consequence. Thus, just as the intellect understands not only the character of the true but also the character of the good, of being, and all the formalities that can belong to any thing, although it understands them all under the aspect of the true as the formal aspect under which; so it attains not only the true but also the good and all the divine perfections, yet attains them all under the aspect of the

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true as the formal aspect under which. Since God is attainable only under this aspect as the formal aspect under which, although he is attainable as the object under every other aspect, he is adequately held by the intellect, and beyond its act no further attainment remains, although a further union through beatific love remains.

32. As for St. Thomas, it must be said that in the place cited he intends only to declare that the love of God is essential to beatitude consequentially, that is, it follows upon the essence of beatitude without the supposition of anything extrinsic. This differs from the love of one's neighbor, which does not follow from the essence of beatitude considered in itself, but only on the supposition that a neighbor has been created.

33. You will say secondly: It belongs to the same mobile thing to attain the end or center as to tend toward it. But man tends toward God through charity and merits beatitude. Therefore he also attains it through an act of love.

I answer that, although it belongs to the same mobile thing to attain the center or end as to tend toward it, it need not attain and possess that end through the same power and faculty through which it tends toward it. A stone tends toward the center through heaviness, which is its inclination, but is united to the center through quantity and local presence. A covetous man is moved by appetite to seek money, but grasps and seizes it with his hand. A soldier fights with his hand and receives the crown upon his head. Therefore, although merit and the tendency toward the ultimate end belong to the will, its attainment belongs to the intellect.

34. You will say thirdly: The intellect attains its object because the one understanding is made one with the object understood through its act. But one who loves is also made one through love with the object loved. Therefore the will likewise attains its object.

I answer by distinguishing the major. It attains the object because it is made one with it through assimilation, I grant; merely because it is made one in some way, I deny. Similarly, I distinguish the minor. The lover is made one with the object loved by reason of a weight and inclination toward it, I grant; by reason of likeness and identity of nature with it, I deny. I deny the consequence.

35. You will object secondly against the second part of the assertion: Formal beatitude consists in the most perfect operation of an intellectual nature. But love is more perfect than vision. Therefore formal beatitude consists in love. The major seems certain. The minor is proved in several ways. First, from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 3, where he teaches that love of things above us exceeds knowledge of them in

perfection, while knowledge of things below us surpasses love of them. Secondly, the order of Seraphim, named from the ardor of charity, is more perfect than the order of Cherubim, which is named from fullness of knowledge. Thirdly, the will is a more perfect faculty than the intellect, both because it moves the intellect as regards exercise and because it acts freely, whereas the intellect acts by way of nature. But to act freely is a more perfect mode of acting than to act necessarily. Therefore the most perfect act of the will, which is beatific love, exceeds in perfection the most perfect act of the intellect, which is the beatific vision. Fourthly, that is more perfect whose opposite is worse. But hatred opposed to charity is worse than the lack of vision. Therefore love exceeds vision.

36. I answer first by distinguishing the major. Formal beatitude consists in the most perfect operation entitatively, I deny; in the most perfect operation in the order of attainment, I grant. Similarly, I distinguish the minor: beatific love is more perfect than vision in the order of being, let that pass; in the order of attainment, I deny. I deny the consequence. The solution is evident from what was said above. Since formal beatitude is the attainment of the beatifying object, it cannot be inferred merely from the entitative excess of one operation over another that it is formal beatitude, unless it also surpasses the other in the order of attainment.

37. I answer secondly, granting the major and denying the minor. To the first proof of the minor, taken from the authority of St. Thomas, I say that he is there speaking of the love and knowledge of wayfarers, who understand higher things through species of quiddities and material things. These do not represent higher essences as they are in themselves, but through analogy and likeness to the material and corporeal things from which they are taken. It is true that knowledge thus terminated at higher things is exceeded in perfection by love of them, which bears upon them as they are in themselves. This is not true, however, of the knowledge of the heavenly homeland, especially the beatific vision, since that vision does not occur through a species and likeness of creatures, but the divine essence itself immediately takes the place of the species and intelligible form. From this the answer to the second proof is evident. A Seraph is named not from the ardor of the charity of the heavenly homeland, but from that of the state of pilgrimage; and likewise a Cherub takes his name not from the knowledge of a comprehensor but from that of a wayfarer. Hence from the excellence of the order of Seraphim above that of Cherubim it can be inferred only that the love of the state of pilgrimage exceeds the cognition of a wayfarer, not the beatific vision.

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38. To the third proof, I deny the antecedent, namely, that the will is more perfect than the intellect. As Aristotle says in *Ethica Nicomachea* X, c. 7: *The mind is the most excellent of all things within us*. To the first proof of the contrary, I say that although the will moves the intellect as regards exercise, in the order of efficient causality, it is nevertheless moved by the intellect as regards specification on the part of the object and in the order of final causality, which is a more perfect mode of acting and moving. To the second proof, I likewise say that although formal freedom is in the will alone, radical freedom is in the intellect. Hence, just as the intellect depends upon and is subordinated to the will in formal freedom, so the will is subordinated to the intellect and depends upon it as the first root of all freedom. I add that the free mode of acting is not absolutely more perfect than the natural mode of acting, but only in a qualified respect, namely, in the moral order. The mode by which God acts *ad intra*, producing the Son and the Holy Spirit, is more perfect than the mode by which he acts *ad extra*, producing creatures, yet the latter is free and the former natural.

39. To the fourth proof, granting the major, I distinguish the minor. Hatred is worse than the lack of vision in the moral order, I grant; in the physical order, I deny. From this it can only be inferred that love surpasses vision in the moral order, which we readily grant, since vision does not belong to the moral order, being devoid of freedom. It cannot be inferred that love exceeds vision in the physical order, which alone we deny.

40. You will object thirdly against the third part of the assertion: Formal beatitude does not consist in the fruition of God. But Benedict XII, in the constitution *Benedictus Deus*, says that the souls of the saints *are truly blessed through vision and fruition*. Therefore he judges that formal beatitude consists at least partially in the fruition of God. The same is gathered from St. Thomas below, q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, where he asserts that fruition is the ultimate end, not as the thing ultimately sought, but as the attainment of the ultimate end.

41. I answer that the intention of the Pontiff in that constitution was only to define that the souls of the just are truly blessed before the day of judgment. His definition did not determine whether they are blessed by an operation of the intellect, the will, or both faculties, but left this to the disputation of theologians. Hence he does not say that they are constituted essentially blessed by fruition and vision, but that they are truly blessed through vision and fruition. This can easily be explained of vision entering beatitude as its essence and of fruition as a property resulting from it. Similarly, to the authority of St. Thomas it is answered that fruition is the attainment of the ultimate end not formally, but consequently and

objectively, because it follows upon the beatific vision, which is the attainment, and has that attainment for its object. Or secondly, it can be said to be the attainment not formally but completively, because it completes and perfects the beatific vision, upon which it follows as a property.

42. You will object fourthly against the fourth part of the assertion, in which we said that formal beatitude essentially consists in the beatific vision. Formal beatitude must by itself totally and perfectly satisfy man's appetite. But the clear vision of God does not do this, since man is inclined not only to see God but also to love and enjoy him. Therefore formal beatitude does not essentially consist in the clear vision of God.

I answer that formal beatitude must by itself satisfy man's primary inclination; but it satisfies inclinations that are, as it were, secondary not formally by itself, but only causally. Man's primary inclination is the inclination to know the true, and this is formally satisfied by the clear vision of God. It satisfies the others only causally, by causing the acts through which they are satisfied, namely, beatific love and fruition.

43. You will object lastly: It belongs to the character of the ultimate end that it not be ordered to a further end, but that all things be ordered to it. But the clear vision of God is ordered to beatific love as to an end, while love is not conversely ordered to vision. For, as Anselm says in *Cur Deus homo* II: *It is a perverse order to love in order that you may understand, but the most right order is to understand in order that you may love.* Therefore formal beatitude does not consist in the clear vision of God.

44. I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. Since the clear vision of God is the essence of formal beatitude and love is its property, and since properties exist to perfect the nature whose properties they are, it follows that beatific love regards vision as an end, and not conversely that vision regards beatific love as an end. As for Anselm, it must be said that he is not there comparing love with the cognition of the heavenly homeland, but with the cognition of the state of pilgrimage. Since the latter is more imperfect than love, it is ordered to love as to its proximate end. Hence it would be a perverse order in the state of pilgrimage to love in order to understand, while it is most right to understand in order to love.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Properties of Formal Beatitude.

Having explained the essence of formal beatitude, it follows that we should explain its properties. These are principally four: love, delight, impeccability, and incorruptibility or perpetuity.

§ 1.

The First Property of Formal Beatitude:
the Happy Necessity of Loving.

1. No one doubts that the blessed who see God are necessitated, by a necessity of specification, to love him. Since no character of evil can appear in God clearly seen, the will, which is an appetite for good, can in no way hate or flee him. For the same reason, man in the state of pilgrimage is necessitated as regards specification to will good as such abstracted from the true and the apparent. The difficulty concerns necessity as regards exercise, on account of the Scotists, who contend that the exercise of beatific love is free and contingent of its nature, although from God's extrinsic providence, removing everything that could separate one from charity, it has the property of enduring forever. We assert, however, that the will of the blessed seeing God is so rapt into his love that it can neither turn aside from nor suspend the exercise of divine love. Consequently, formal beatitude, or the clear vision of God, essentially entails or accompanies the happy necessity of loving God, not only as regards specification but also as regards exercise.

2. The fundamental reason is that the will, since it is a rational appetite and follows the direction and dictate of reason, cannot cease from an act unless the intellect conceives some character of evil in that act or some character of a greater good in ceasing from it. But the blessed cannot judge either of these things concerning the love of God. Therefore he cannot cease from the act of love. The major is certain, and the minor also seems manifest. In the heavenly homeland the act of love is pleasant and easy, since charity there is, as it were, in its center, being joined to the clear vision of God and regulated by the light of glory. Nor can there be weariness or fatigue in its exercise, since it does not depend upon any bodily organ; for the vision upon which it follows does not occur through conversion to

phantasms. Nor can any nausea or disgust be found in the continuation of beatific love, because the uncreated good, being of infinite sweetness and delightfulness, so sweetly fills and delightfully satisfies that desire reigns in its fruition and the appetite for it flourishes amid satiety. Hence St. Peter says that the blessed angels, continually contemplating the Holy Spirit, desire to gaze upon him. And St. Gregory says in *Moralia in Iob* XVIII, c. 29: *When we have reached the very fountain of life, thirst and satiety will be delightfully impressed upon us at once. But necessity will be far from thirst and disgust far from satiety, because thirsting we shall be satisfied, and satisfied we shall thirst.* Finally, the clear vision of God is incompatible with an erroneous judgment by which the blessed would judge it good for him to cease loving God. Rather, it includes a contrary act by which he judges it good for him continually to adhere to God through love and never to be separated from him, so that the will cannot for even one instant turn the intellect away from that judgment.

3. You will say first: The blessed can apprehend some character of good in the lack or cessation of beatific love, namely, the exercise of freedom. Therefore they can cease from such love or interrupt its exercise.

I answer by denying the antecedent. Freedom cannot be exercised concerning the universal and infinite good, but only concerning creatures and particular and limited goods that have no necessary connection with it. Similarly, the intellect cannot exercise the faculty of discourse and reasoning concerning first principles, but only concerning conclusions virtually contained in them.

4. You will insist: Through faith God is proposed to the will as the supreme and infinite good, and yet the love regulated by faith is free. Therefore, although in the heavenly homeland God is proposed through the light of glory and clear vision as the supreme and infinite good, the love regulated by it will nevertheless be free.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Each is a light representing God as the supreme and infinite good, but one represents him clearly and as he is in himself, while the other proposes such a good obscurely and through alien species. Hence, just as the intellect is convinced by the true proposed in the first manner but not in the second, so the will is necessitated only by the supreme good clearly known.

5. You will press: Every act of a free faculty is free. But the will is a free faculty, for, as Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, c. 105: *Either it is not a will, or it must be called free.* Therefore beatific love is free, at least as regards exercise.

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This is confirmed. The same Holy Doctor says in *De Trinitate* V: *If something is voluntary, it is not necessary*. But beatific love is voluntary. Therefore it is not necessary, but free, at least as regards exercise.

6. I answer to the objection that, just as in our intellect there is a discursive character with respect to conclusions and an intellectual character without discourse with respect to principles, so in our will there is both a natural mode of acting and a free mode of acting. Augustine did not say that the will is free in every act, but only that it would not be a will if it were not free, which must be understood with respect to some acts. Or secondly, it can be said with St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 5, ad 1, that the will is always free from the necessity of coercion, because it cannot suffer force in its acts, but is not always free from the necessity of natural inclination. Beatific love enjoys the first kind of freedom, namely, freedom from the necessity of coercion, and with this it is compatible for that love to be necessary as regards both specification and exercise. This also answers the confirmation. When Augustine says, *If something is voluntary, it is not necessary*, this must be understood of the necessity of coercion, not of the necessity of natural inclination. Hence, although beatific love is voluntary, it is nevertheless necessary in this second manner. Thus the love by which God loves himself, and by which the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit, is voluntary and consequently free from the necessity of coercion; yet it is necessary by a necessity of natural inclination, not only as regards specification but also as regards exercise. We shall treat this more fully below when discussing the free voluntary.

7. You will say secondly: No object necessitates the will as regards the exercise of an act, as St. Thomas often teaches, because it belongs to an object to specify a faculty, but not to move it as regards exercise. Hence, if an object necessitates, it does so only as regards specification. Therefore even God clearly seen does not necessitate the will to exercise love.

8. I answer that St. Thomas means only that no object necessitates the will by the force and formality of an object. This is compatible with the object's necessitating it from the proper nature of the will, which, since it is both free and natural, sometimes operates as free and sometimes as natural. The former belongs to it concerning an object proposed with indifference; the latter concerning an object proposed without indifference of judgment.

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§ 2.

The Second Property of Formal Beatitude: Supreme Joy or Delight.

9. From the clear vision of God and beatific love there arises in the blessed an ineffable joy and supreme delight, so great that St. Bernard says in epistle 114: *Compared with it, every other pleasure is sorrow, every sweetness is pain, every sweet thing is bitter, every beautiful thing is foul, and finally everything else capable of giving pleasure is burdensome.* First, the blessed rejoice in the divine good considered in itself. Rev. 19 is understood of this joy: *For the Lord our almighty God has reigned; let us rejoice and exult and give glory to him.* Secondly, they rejoice in their own good and in the happiness they possess. The Royal Prophet speaks of this joy in Ps. 19 when he says: *You will fill me with joy with your countenance; delights are at your right hand forever.* The first joy or delight is elicited by charity as its secondary act, because, as St. Thomas teaches throughout *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 28, to rejoice in the good of a friend is an act and fruit of friendship and charity. Concerning the second, there is a difficulty as to what elicits it. Since it belongs to the love of concupiscence, it does not seem able to proceed from charity, which is a love of friendship. Hence Suarez and other more recent authors think that it is elicited by the habit of hope, which they say remains in the heavenly homeland. But this is manifestly contrary to St. Thomas, who teaches in many places that hope does not remain in the heavenly homeland. In this Part, q. 67, a. 4, he asks: *Whether hope remains after death in the state of glory?* He answers that it does not remain and proves this as follows. Motion ceases when the terminus is obtained. But hope has the manner of a motion tending toward beatitude and the clear vision of God. Therefore it ceases when that vision is obtained. The Apostle indicates this argument in Rom. 8: *Hope that is seen is not hope, for what a man sees, why does he hope for it?* St. Thomas teaches the same in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 18, a. 2, where he reasons thus. When that which gives the species is removed, the species is dissolved. But in the heavenly homeland that which gives the virtue of hope its species does not remain, namely, the act of hoping for eternal beatitude as to be obtained by divine assistance, since beatitude itself is possessed there. Therefore hope does not remain in the heavenly homeland.

10. Nor is what Suarez says valid, namely, that the habit of hope does not primarily and essentially concern the act of hoping for beatitude, but the act

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of concupiscent love by which one loves God as one's own good. A virtue is named from the more principal act it elicits. But the second theological virtue is called hope by all. Therefore its principal act is the act of hoping, not the concupiscent love by which one loves God as one's own good. I add that hope as a virtue corresponds to hope as a passion. But the principal act of hope as a passion is not to desire a good as one's own and agreeable, but to hope for a possible arduous good; hence it is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the irascible appetite. Therefore likewise the principal act of the virtue of hope is not the concupiscent love by which one loves God as one's own good, but the act of hoping by which future beatitude is awaited.

11. It must therefore be said that the delight by which the blessed delight in God as their own good beatifying them is elicited by the habit of charity. Since it cannot be elicited by faith or hope, which do not remain in the heavenly homeland, it follows that it is elicited by charity. I add that delight is elicited by the same habit from which arises the love that causes it. But the concupiscent love by which the blessed love God as their own good proceeds from the virtue of charity, because, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 25, a. 4, through charity we love not only God and our neighbor, but also ourselves. Therefore the delight that follows upon that love also proceeds from charity.

You will say: The concupiscent love of future beatitude and the joy following upon it do not belong to charity, but to hope, according to the Apostle in Rom. 12: *Rejoicing in hope*. Therefore in the heavenly homeland also, the concupiscent love by which the blessed love God as their own good, and the delight following upon it, are elicited not by the habit of charity but by hope.

12. I deny the consequence. The concupiscent love by which in the state of pilgrimage we seek beatitude and delight in it regards it under the aspect of a future arduous good, which is the formal object of hope. But in the heavenly homeland the love by which the blessed love beatitude and delight in it regards it as a present good already obtained. Hence it cannot be elicited by hope, which concerns an arduous and future good and consequently does not remain in the blessed, but only by charity, to which it is reduced as to the more proximate virtue, and which alone of the theological virtues remains in the heavenly homeland. Nor is it an obstacle that charity is a love of friendship, that the love of friendship regards the good of a friend, and that concupiscent love regards one's own good. One's own good is not always opposed to the good of a friend, but is sometimes subordinated to and connected with it. Hence the concupiscent love by which we love ourselves can arise, and in fact does arise, from the virtue of

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charity by which we love God and our neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited above. Therefore, since beatitude and the delight the blessed receive from it are not opposed to God and his good, but are subordinated to and connected with it, they proceed as secondary acts from the virtue of charity by which the blessed love God.

§ 3.

The Third Property of Formal Beatitude: the Happy Inability to Sin,
Arising from the Clear Vision of God and Beatific Love.

13. Scotus and the Nominalists teach that the blessed are impeccable only extrinsically, from divine providence preventing them from falling into sin. Other theologians assert that they are intrinsically impeccable and that this happy inability to sin proceeds from a twofold root or cause, namely, the clear vision of God and beatific love.

14. The beatific vision excludes the power to sin from the blessed for four reasons. First, because it most intimately and immovably joins him to the first rule of his operation, namely, his ultimate end. To sin is nothing other than to deflect and depart from the rectitude of one's rule. Hence, just as, if a craftsman's hand were itself the rule of cutting, or had such a rule inseparably joined to it, it could cut only rightly, so the will of the blessed, which is immovably joined to the rule of its operation, can operate only rightly.

15. Secondly, because it fills the entire capacity of the rational creature. Just as heaven is substantially immutable and incorruptible because the entire capacity of its matter is fulfilled by its form, so the will of the blessed is rendered immutable from good to evil, and consequently impeccable, because its entire capacity is fulfilled through the beatific vision, through which all man's desires are fully and perfectly satisfied, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Hence Isidore says in *De summo bono* I, c. 12: *Although the angels are mutable by their nature, divine contemplation does not permit them to change.*

16. Thirdly, because sin cannot be in the will unless error, ignorance, or lack of consideration precedes in the intellect, as we shall show in the Treatise on Sins. But the beatific vision excludes all these defects from the intellect. Therefore it also removes from the will the power to sin.

17. Fourthly, the will of one who sees God is related to the divine good as the will of a wayfarer is related to good in general. Hence, just as it is impossible for someone in the state of pilgrimage to act without regarding

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the character of good in general, so one who sees God cannot will anything that is not ordered to him. Consequently, he cannot sin, since the sinner seeks an object without an order to the divine good.

18. The second root from which the impeccability of the blessed arises is beatific love. Through sin man is turned away from God as ultimate end, while through charity he is converted to God as ultimate end. Therefore, since aversion from God and conversion to him cannot exist simultaneously, sin is altogether incompatible with beatific love. Hence Gregory says in *Moralia in Iob* V, c. 27: *The angelic nature is thus mutable in itself, but it overcomes its mutability by being bound through the bonds of love to him who is always the same.* And Augustine says in *De civitate Dei* XIV, c. 9: *Where the love of immutable good exists, the fear of avoiding evil, if it can be so called, is assured.*

19. You will say: The charity of the state of pilgrimage and the charity of the heavenly homeland are of the same species; indeed, the same habit of charity that existed in the state of pilgrimage remains in the heavenly homeland. But the charity of the state of pilgrimage does not exclude the power to sin. Therefore neither does the charity of the heavenly homeland.

I answer that, although charity is of the same species in the heavenly homeland and in the state of pilgrimage, it nevertheless has a diverse mode of operating. In the state of pilgrimage it is regulated by faith and obscure cognition, which does not represent God clearly and as he is in himself. In the heavenly homeland it is regulated by the light of glory and clear vision, which clearly represents God as possessing every character of good and judges that nothing is desirable unless it can be ordered to God. From this it follows that the charity of the heavenly homeland removes the power to sin, while the charity of the state of pilgrimage does not.

20. From what has been said, it is gathered first that even by God's absolute power an actual sin of commission cannot be joined with the vision and love of the blessed. The first part is evident from what was said. It is impossible for anyone to sin unless a practical judgment precedes by which it is judged that here and now something not orderable to God is to be sought. But it is impossible for such a judgment to be joined with the beatific vision, for that vision is a perfect judgment by which the blessed speculatively and practically judges that God is to be loved above all things and that all things are to be referred to him as the ultimate end. Therefore an actual sin of commission cannot, even by absolute power, coexist with the beatific vision.

21. It is no less evident that actual mortal sin cannot be joined with beatific love. As we said above, through mortal sin man is turned away from God as ultimate end and converted to a creature as ultimate end, while

charity converts man to God as ultimate end. But it is impossible for aversion from God as ultimate end and conversion to him as ultimate end to exist simultaneously. Therefore it is impossible for beatific love to exist simultaneously with actual mortal sin.

22. The same incompatibility of mortal sin with the vision and beatific love, even with reference to God's absolute power, can be demonstrated by this argument. When forms are repugnant by the nature of the thing, they cannot be joined unless God concurs by a special and extraordinary concurrence in the conjunction of both, as is evident of intense degrees of heat and cold. But God cannot concur by a special concurrence in the conjunction of mortal sin with the beatific vision and love; otherwise the sin would be attributed to him as its special author, which is repugnant to his infinite holiness. Thus, if by absolute power he prevented the heat of fire from expelling cold from water, the conservation of the cold would be reduced to him as its special author and conserver. Therefore mortal sin cannot, even by God's absolute power, be joined with the clear vision of God and beatific love.

23. It is gathered secondly that the vision and beatific love cannot by God's absolute power be joined not only with a sin of commission, but even with a sin of omission. The vision and beatific love of their nature require that they exclude or prevent not only a sin of commission but also one of omission. Hence, for them to coexist with it, there would be required not a positive concurrence of God conserving the sin of omission, but the denial of the concurrence demanded by the vision and love in order to prevent it. But by the very fact that God denied the concurrence due to them, the sin of omission would be attributed to him, as we argued above concerning a sin of commission. Therefore neither a sin of commission nor one of omission can be joined with the vision and beatific love.

24. This is confirmed. For a sin of omission there is required at least an interpretative act, that is, a foundation upon which a prudent person may judge that the will is disposed as though it willed to omit by a positive act. But, on the supposition that the will of the blessed, by virtue of love and vision, demands concurrence for avoiding a sin of omission, there is no foundation for prudently judging that it is disposed as if it willed to omit by a positive act. Rather, there would be a foundation for judging that such an omission was sought by God, who denied such concurrence. Therefore it is impossible for the vision and beatific love to be joined with a sin of omission.

25. You will say: God can impose upon the blessed a precept concerning some free act, for example, the guardianship of men. But, supposing that

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precept, the blessed can omit such an act, since even on that supposition he exercises it freely. Therefore he can sin by a sin of omission.

I answer by distinguishing the minor. Supposing that precept, the blessed can omit such an act by a physical and natural omission, I grant; by a moral and culpable omission, I deny. Or the same minor can be distinguished otherwise. The blessed can omit such an act by antecedent power and in the divided sense, I grant; by consequent power and in the composite sense, I deny. I deny the consequence. These distinctions can be explained by the example of Christ, who was free as regards exercise with respect to an act falling under a precept, yet could not sin. Although he could omit such an act insofar as omission is a pure negation of the opposite act, he could not omit it insofar as omission is the privation of that act as due. Or, although he could omit it by antecedent power and in the divided sense, he could not do so by consequent power and in the composite sense. We shall treat this fully in the Treatise on the Incarnation, when explaining the harmony of Christ's freedom with his impeccability.

26. It is gathered thirdly that habitual sin cannot by absolute power be joined with the beatific vision and love. It is impossible by any power for man simultaneously to have two ultimate ends absolutely speaking, even if he has one actually and the other habitually, as was shown above in c. 1. But the blessed who sees and loves God actually has him as his ultimate end absolutely speaking, since the beatific vision is the attainment of God as ultimate end; whereas one who is in the state of mortal sin is habitually converted to a creature as ultimate end. Therefore habitual sin cannot be joined with the beatific vision and love. Otherwise such a conjunction would be attributed to God alone as its special author, as we said above concerning sins of commission and omission.

27. I add that habitual sin, or the stain of sin, is nothing other than the privation of sanctifying grace insofar as that privation is voluntary, or caused by a preceding sinful act of the will. But such a privation is incompatible with the beatific vision and love. Therefore habitual sin, or the stain of sin, is also incompatible with them. The major will be established in the Treatise on Sins. The minor is evident, first, because no sinful act of the will can be given in the blessed from which that voluntary privation of sanctifying grace would result, as is evident from what was said above. Secondly, the vision and beatific love are vital acts with supernatural vitality. Just as vital acts of the natural order, such as understanding or willing, necessarily and indispensably presuppose in the subject from which they are elicited the radical principle of natural life, namely, the rational soul, so the vision and beatific love must necessarily and indispensably presuppose in the subject

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from which they are elicited the radical principle of supernatural life, which is nothing other than sanctifying grace, as will be established from what we shall say in the Treatise on Grace.

28. It is gathered fourthly that venial sin cannot be joined with beatific love. Although venial sin does not turn one away from God as ultimate end, it nevertheless turns one aside from him. Hence, just as an act of charity is conversion to God and mortal sin is aversion from God, so venial sin is a turning aside from him. But not only aversion from God, but also a turning aside from him, is incompatible with beatific love. Therefore not only mortal sin but also venial sin cannot coexist with beatific love. The major is certain, and the minor is proved. A love necessary not only as regards specification but also as regards exercise is incompatible not only with aversion from God but also with a turning aside from him. Since such love is continuous and never interrupted, the blessed actually refers and orders all he loves to the divine goodness as ultimate end. But beatific love is necessary not only as regards specification but also as regards exercise, as we showed in § 1. Therefore neither aversion nor even a turning aside from God is compatible with it.

§ 4.

The Fourth Property of Formal Beatitude: Its Perpetuity or Inamissibility.

29. It is certain by faith that the beatitude of the saints will be perpetual and will never cease, for in the Creed we profess that we await eternal life. In 1 Pet. 1 beatitude is called *an incorruptible, undefiled, and unfading inheritance*. Augustine says in *De Trinitate* XV, c. 8: *Life can in no way be truly happy unless it is everlasting*. But there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians as to whether this belongs to beatitude intrinsically and by the nature of the thing, or only extrinsically, from the gratuitous will of God perpetually conserving it. Scotus and Durandus think that it is perpetual from God's will alone and not intrinsically. Others say with Curiel that beatitude can be considered in two ways: under the character of beatitude and of a perfect and fully satisfying good, and under the character of vision and operation. They say that in the first way it is intrinsically inamissible and incorruptible, but not in the second. Thomists commonly teach that the beatific vision is intrinsically incorruptible both as beatitude and as vision.

30. The first is evident. It belongs to the character of formal beatitude that it perfectly fulfills and quiets the appetite of the blessed. But if the

vision, insofar as it is formal beatitude, were not intrinsically perpetual and inamissible, it would not perfectly satisfy or quiet the appetite of the blessed. Therefore the vision, insofar as it is formal beatitude, is intrinsically perpetual and inamissible. The major is evident, and the minor is proved. One of the things desired by the blessed is the perpetuity of the good he possesses; hence he would be greatly distressed if he judged that good not to be perpetual. Therefore, if the vision insofar as it is formal beatitude were not intrinsically perpetual and inamissible, it would not perfectly satisfy or quiet the appetite of the blessed.

31. Nor is it valid to say that, for the blessed to be at rest and for all distress to be removed from him, it suffices that God has decreed perpetually to conserve his beatitude and that this is known to him. It belongs to the character of formal beatitude that, by reason of itself or of what is due to it, it satisfy the appetite of the blessed and exclude all misery and distress, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore the vision, insofar as it is formal beatitude, must by reason of itself or of what is due to it be perpetual and inamissible. It is not sufficient for this to belong to it extrinsically and through God's gratuitous will in order perfectly to quiet the appetite by which the blessed desires the perpetuity of the good he possesses.

32. That the beatific vision is intrinsically incorruptible not only as formal beatitude, but also as vision and operation, is proved against Curiel. First, it belongs essentially to the vision to be formal beatitude, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore, if as formal beatitude it intrinsically requires perpetual duration, the same belongs to it insofar as it is vision. Secondly, that operation intrinsically requires perpetual duration whose principles are intrinsically invariable and incorruptible. But the principles of the beatific vision, namely, the light of glory and the divine essence united to the intellect of the blessed as an intelligible species, are intrinsically invariable and incorruptible. Therefore the beatific vision itself is also so. Thirdly, an action measured by eternity is intrinsically immutable and incorruptible, for, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 10, a. 2: *The character of eternity follows immutability, just as the character of time follows motion.* But the beatific vision is measured by eternity, as we demonstrated in the final chapter of the Treatise on the Vision of God. Therefore it is intrinsically immutable and incorruptible. Fourthly, a form perfectly fulfilling and satisfying the appetite of the blessed is incorruptible and inamissible by its nature, just as the form of the heavens is intrinsically incorruptible because it perfectly satisfies the appetite of matter and does not permit it to seek another form contrary to it. But the beatific vision

totally satisfies the appetite of the blessed and fulfills all his desires, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore it is incorruptible by its nature. Finally, St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 5, ad 3: *Something is not called corruptible because God can reduce it to nonbeing by withdrawing his conservation, but because it has in itself some principle of corruption.* Hence the heavens, angels, and rational souls are and are called incorruptible because, although through God's absolute power and the suspension of the divine conserving concurrence they can be destroyed and cease to exist, they nevertheless have in themselves no principle of corruption. Similarly, although the beatific vision can be destroyed by God's absolute power, it nevertheless has in itself no principle of corruption, since its subject, namely, the intellect, is incorruptible; the principles concurring in it, namely, the light of glory and the divine essence taking the place of an intelligible species, are likewise immutable and incorruptible; and it excludes sin, which could be a mortal cause of its destruction. Therefore it is intrinsically incorruptible. Hence Paul's vision, which was communicated to him in his rapture, was of itself and by its nature perpetual and intrinsically required to be conserved, but by God's dispensation and through a miracle it did not in fact endure. Similarly, the heavens or an angel, which are intrinsically incorruptible and require perpetual conservation, can by absolute power cease to exist.

33. You will object first: A form or operation that has a potency to nonbeing is intrinsically corruptible. But the beatific vision has a potency to nonbeing, since it can be destroyed by God. Therefore it is intrinsically corruptible.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. A form or operation that has a physical or natural potency to nonbeing is intrinsically corruptible, I grant; one that has only a logical or obediential potency to nonbeing, I deny. Applying the same distinction to the minor, I deny the consequence. Thus, for something to be called intrinsically incorruptible with respect to God, it is not enough that there be no repugnance, or a logical and obediential potency, for its being destroyed by him. Otherwise angels, the heavens, the rational soul, and the hypostatic union could be called intrinsically corruptible, since there is in them an obediential potency to nonbeing and they can be destroyed and annihilated through God's absolute power. Rather, there is required a physical potency secondarily inclined to nonbeing. A man, for example, is said to be intrinsically corruptible because the matter of which he is composed seeks other forms incompatible with the rational soul and consequently seeks the expulsion of the soul and the nonbeing of the man.

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34. You will object secondly: A form received in a subject that is not connatural but foreign is received in it amissibly or corruptibly. Thus heat is inamissible in its proper and connatural subject, namely, fire, but amissible in water because water is a subject foreign to it. But the beatific vision is in man and in an angel as in a foreign and nonconnatural subject, since the light of glory upon which it depends is connatural to no created or creatable intellect. Therefore the beatific vision exists amissibly and corruptibly in the human and angelic intellect.

I answer that the major is true when the form is not incorruptible of itself but from the condition of its subject. In that case, if it is received in a foreign subject, it exists in it corruptibly. It is otherwise when the form is incorruptible of itself and by its nature. It then not only does not participate in the corruptibility of the subject, but draws and elevates the subject to its own incorruptibility. This is evident in the substance of the Word, which, because it is incorruptible and eternal of itself and by its nature, remains incorruptible and perpetual when communicated to a foreign subject, namely, Christ's humanity, and draws that humanity to its own perpetuity and incorruption. Hence Christ never put aside the nature once assumed, even when its union was dissolved through death. Therefore, since the beatific vision is incorruptible of itself and by its nature, because its concurring principles, namely, the light of glory and the divine essence united to the intellect of the blessed as an intelligible species, are incorruptible, although it is received in a foreign and nonconnatural subject, it does not participate in the subject's mutability but rather draws it to immutable and incorruptible being. Hence, although the intellect considered in itself is measured by aeviternity, insofar as it is subjected to the light of glory and the beatific vision it is measured by participated eternity, as are the light and the vision themselves.

35. You will say: Sanctifying grace is the root of the light of glory and the beatific vision, and yet it is not intrinsically incorruptible, since it is corrupted daily through sin. Therefore, with still greater reason, the light of glory and beatific vision are not intrinsically incorruptible, for a property cannot be more incorruptible than the nature from which it flows.

I answer that, although the grace of the state of pilgrimage is not intrinsically incorruptible and does not require perpetual duration, consummated grace in the heavenly homeland is so, and this is the root of the light of glory and the beatific vision.

36. You may insist and say that grace as consummated does not intrinsically differ from the grace of a wayfarer. Therefore, if the grace of the state of pilgrimage is not intrinsically incorruptible, neither will

consummated grace in the heavenly homeland be so. I answer by denying the consequence. Although grace in the state of pilgrimage and in the heavenly homeland has the same entity and consequently, as regards its entity, intrinsically requires incorruptibility, it nevertheless has two states. In one, namely, the state of pilgrimage, it lacks not incorruptibility as regards entity, but the state of incorruptibility, because it does not fully subject created free choice to itself, but is rather subjected to it. In the other, namely, the state of the terminus, it enjoys both incorruptibility as regards entity and the state of incorruptibility, for the opposite reason: it totally and fully subjects to itself the flexibility of free choice by which it tends toward evil. Therefore, just as grace, without any intrinsic variation of entity but only through a variation of state, is the root of faith in the state of pilgrimage and of the light of glory at the terminus, so precisely through a change of state it passes from being corruptible by reason of state to the state of incorruptibility. Since it connaturally requires, so to speak, to root the light of glory, but roots faith only accidentally, as substituted for that light and as its vicar, it connaturally demands a state of incorruptibility, although it permits a state of corruptibility.

CHAPTER V.

On the Endowments and Aureoles of the Blessed.

A dowry is understood by jurists as a gift with which a bride is endowed when she is solemnly brought into the house of the bridegroom, both for the comfort and maintenance of the marriage and for the adornment of the bride herself, as is said in the law *Dos*, 1, *De iure dotium*. Hence, since in beatitude there is a perpetual union between the soul and God and a kind of spiritual marriage, endowments must be admitted in the blessed, and are in fact admitted by theologians, some on the part of the soul and others on the part of the body. These must be treated briefly here.

§ 1.

The Endowments of the Blessed Soul.

1. There are only three endowments of the blessed soul: vision, comprehension or holding, and delight. Thus St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 7, ad 1, and in the Supplement, q. 95, a. 3, and other theologians commonly agree. The reason is that the endowments of the

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heavenly homeland immediately join the soul to God and correspond to the virtues of the state of pilgrimage that immediately tend toward him. But there are only three virtues of the state of pilgrimage immediately tending toward God, namely, faith, hope, and charity. Therefore there are also three endowments of the blessed soul, namely, vision, comprehension, and delight. Vision corresponds to faith by reason of its clarity and excludes faith's imperfection, namely, obscurity. Comprehension corresponds to hope, for through it we hold God toward whom we ran through hope, and it excludes the imperfection of hope, *for what a man sees, why does he hope for it?*, as the Apostle says. Finally, delight or fruition corresponds to charity and excludes its imperfection, insofar as the object loved and desired through charity while absent in the state of pilgrimage causes delight and fruition when present and possessed in the heavenly homeland.

2. Concerning these endowments there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians as to whether they are habits or acts. Many think they are acts, others habits, and others that they imply both. But the second opinion seems more probable. First, because St. Thomas expressly teaches it in *IV Sentences*, dist. 49, q. 4, a. 2, in the body, in these words: *According to others it must be said that beatitude and an endowment really differ, so that beatitude is called the perfect operation by which the soul is joined to God, while the endowments are called habits or dispositions*, and so forth. Secondly, because of the reason the Holy Doctor indicates there. The endowments adorn and dispose the soul for spiritual union with God. But vision, comprehension, and fruition, insofar as they are operations, do not dispose it for such a union, but are the union itself. Therefore the character of an endowment belongs not to acts but to the habits of the light of glory and charity preceding them. To perceive this more clearly:

3. It must be observed that a twofold aspect or formality is found in these habits. First, they are principles of eliciting operations that either consummate beatitude or follow upon it. Under this aspect they no more assume the character of an endowment than does the consummation of marriage itself. Secondly, they elevate the soul to a certain higher state dissimilar to that of the state of pilgrimage, by reason of which it can no longer possess the imperfections of this life. Under this aspect they assume the character of an endowment, that is, an adornment, disposition, and habilitation of the bride for those divine nuptials. For example, the light of glory is not only a principle by which the vision of God is elicited, but also disposes the intellect to receive the divine essence in place of an intelligible species and so clarifies the intellect that it is incapable of any obscurity and capable only of evidence and clarity. Under this aspect it is habitually called

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vision and is called so after the manner of an endowment. Similarly, comprehension insofar as it is an endowment signifies the same habit of the light of glory, not as clarifying the intellect and disposing it to receive the divine essence as an intelligible species, but as habitually holding the vision itself, which is actual holding or comprehension. Finally, the endowment of fruition or delight is the habit of charity itself, not insofar as it is a principle of love—for under this aspect it is also found in the state of pilgrimage—but insofar as it causes beatific delight, which differs in species from love and is found only in the heavenly homeland. From this the principal arguments commonly made against the preceding position are solved.

§ 2.

The Endowments of the Glorious Body.

4. Just as at her entrance into beatitude the soul espoused to Christ receives three endowments, namely, vision, comprehension, and fruition, as was shown in the preceding section, so the body at the resurrection, when it is joined to the blessed soul, will receive four endowments or ornaments, namely, impassibility, subtlety, agility, and clarity.

5. Impassibility will exclude not only death and corruption but also every pain and every harmful or corruptive passion. It will not exclude perfective passion, such as the reception of immanent actions, even sensitive ones, and of all perfecting accidents, because only that which includes imperfection is to be removed from glorious bodies, not what includes perfection. This endowment will arise in glorious bodies from the dominion of the soul over the body, or from the full subjection of the body to the soul. Through this, the potentiality and appetite of matter will remain so fulfilled, or at least restrained and bound to the form or soul itself, that they will open or leave no place for any alteration or disposition toward another form, as St. Thomas teaches in *IV Sentences*, dist. 44, q. 2, a. 1. Or it can also be said with the same Holy Doctor, *ibid.*, a. 2, ad 1, that from the beatitude and glory of the soul some supernatural perfection or quality will flow and redound into the glorious body, by which it will be rendered apt for such subjection. This perfection or quality is called an endowment of the glorified body. Hence Augustine says in epistle 56 to Dioscorus: *God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its most full beatitude, promised to the saints at the end of time, there will redound even into the lower nature, which is the body, not the beatitude proper to one who enjoys and understands, but fullness of health, that is, the vigor of incorruption.*

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6. Subtlety will free the glorious body from all earthly concretion and grossness and will make the body, otherwise animal and earthly, as it were heavenly and spiritual, according to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 15: *An animal body is sown; a spiritual body will rise*. This does not mean that it will be changed into a spirit, as certain heretics once imagined, but that it will be perfectly subjected to the spirit and raised, as it were, to the condition of a spirit. By reason of this endowment, glorious bodies will also have the power and faculty of penetrating all other bodies, not because subtlety physically or effectively produces this effect, but only morally, insofar as at its presence and as a sign of such an endowment that penetration will be granted by God according to the will of the blessed. Thus St. Thomas teaches in the Supplement, q. 83, a. 2, where he reasons: *The necessity that two bodies be distinct in place is caused by the nature of dimensive quantity, to which place belongs of itself. But subtlety does not remove dimension from the glorious body, and therefore in no way removes from it the aforesaid necessity of being distinct in place from another body. Consequently, the glorious body will not have from its subtlety the power to exist simultaneously with another body, but it will be able to exist simultaneously with another body through the operation of divine power*. For just as Peter's body did not possess from any inherent property the power for the sick to be healed by his shadow, but this occurred by divine power for the edification of the faith, so divine power will make the glorious body able to exist simultaneously with another body for the perfection of glory. St. Thomas has similar teaching in his commentary on 1 Cor. 15, lect. 6.

7. Agility is the aptitude or power that will exist in glorious bodies to move promptly wherever the blessed will, without any fatigue whatever. As the Holy Doctor argues in the Supplement, q. 84, a. 1: Through the endowments the glorious body will be perfectly subjected to the glorified soul. But the soul is joined to the body not only as its form but also as its mover, and in each way the glorious body must be supremely subjected to the glorified soul. Hence, just as through the endowment of subtlety it is totally subjected to the soul insofar as the soul is the form of the body giving specific being, so through the endowment of agility it is subjected to the soul insofar as the soul is a mover, so that it may be ready and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul.

8. Furthermore, the agility of glorified bodies will be so great that St. Hilary, on Ps. 138, compares it to the speed of the flight of eagles: *They will take wing like eagles, receiving in the transformation of the resurrection a nature capable of flight*. Lawrence Justinian explains it by the example of a ray of the sun, which immediately reaches from the east to the furthest regions of the west. St. Anselm, in *De similitudinibus*, c. 51, says that the agility of glorious

bodies will equal that of the angels: *So great a speed will accompany us that we shall be swift eagles equal to the angels of God, who pass from heaven to earth and conversely more quickly than speech.* It must nevertheless be noted that, just as angelic motion, whether continuous or discrete, cannot occur in an instant, as was shown in the Treatise on Angels, c. 6, § 3, so neither can the local motion of a glorious body, although most rapid and swift, be instantaneous, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, a. 3. This is repugnant to the nature and quiddity of local motion, which, since it is successive and consists of prior and posterior parts, cannot occur in an instant.

9. Finally, the fourth endowment of the glorious body is clarity or luminosity, which will redound into it from the glory of the soul, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 86: *Just as the soul enjoying the divine vision will be filled with a certain spiritual clarity, so, by a certain overflowing from the soul into the body, the body itself will in its own manner be clothed with the glory of clarity.* Nor is it valid to say with certain more recent authors who hold the contrary that there is no connection between the clarity of the soul's glory and the light of the glorious body, so that the latter could be called a property of and flow from the former, since one is spiritual and the other corporeal. This is not valid because, just as there is a connection between the bodily powers flowing from the soul and the soul itself, although the soul is spiritual and those powers corporeal, such as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers; and just as there is a connection between the infused moral virtues and sanctifying grace, although grace resides in the essence of the soul while those virtues, such as temperance and fortitude, have the sensitive appetite as their subject; so there can be a connection and linkage between the clarity of the blessed soul and the light of the glorious body, and the latter can flow from the former, although one is spiritual and the other corporeal. Hence Augustine, cited above, says that *God made the soul of so powerful a nature that from its beatitude there redounds into the body fullness of health and the vigor of incorruption.* By the same reason that incorruption flows from the soul into the body, clarity also can flow from it, because just as impassibility is connected with the soul's beatitude, so also is clarity. This can be confirmed from the mystery of the Transfiguration, in which the clarity of Christ's body was derived from his divinity and from the glory of his soul, as St. Thomas teaches from Damascene in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 45, a. 2.

10. Some ask here whether clarity or luminosity will exist in blessed bodies not only according to their surface, but also according to their depth, so that these bodies will be not only luminous like mirrors, but also pervious and transparent like crystal, and consequently their internal organization

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can be perfectly seen. I answer affirmatively with St. Thomas in the Supplement, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2, where he says: *To the second it must be said that Gregory compares glorious bodies to gold because of their clarity, and to glass because they will be translucent. Hence it seems that they will be simultaneously pervious and clear.* Gregory therefore adds in *Moralia in Iob* XVIII, c. 27: *Even the harmony of the body itself will lie open to bodily eyes, and thus each will then be visible to another as he cannot now be visible to himself.* Cyril of Jerusalem likewise says in catechesis 18, near the middle: *The just will shine like the sun, like the moon, and like the brightness of the firmament. Foreseeing this unbelief of men, God gave luminous bodies to tiny worms, so that from visible things what we await might be believed. He who can give a part will also be able to give the whole; and he who made a worm shine with light will much more illuminate the just man.*

11. You will say: The individual parts of the glorious body will retain their own color, for color is required for beauty, which Augustine defines as the fitting arrangement of parts together with a certain sweetness of color. But every color causes opacity and prevents transparency and translucency. Therefore glorified bodies will not be transparent, but opaque.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. The color of a body does not prevent its transparency and translucency, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited and as experience establishes. We see a topaz simultaneously retaining a yellow color and sufficient translucency for it to be seen entirely through to the opposite side. If other colors—red, green, blue, and so forth—were within it with the same translucency, they could undoubtedly be seen. And although there were a natural repugnance to joining supreme color and light simultaneously in the same body because of the diverse dispositions they require in a subject, God can easily overcome it, as he in fact does in Christ's glorious body.

§ 3.

The Aureole of the Blessed.

12. Besides essential beatitude and the endowments of the blessed soul and glorious body that belong to all the blessed, theologians admit certain singular prerogatives belonging only to some on account of eminent acts of singular virtues. They call these aureoles, or little crowns, to distinguish them from the essential reward, which is called the golden crown.

13. St. Thomas gives the definition of an aureole in *IV Sentences*, dist. 49, q. 5, a. 5, saying that it is *a privileged reward corresponding to a privileged victory*. That is, it is a certain accidental joy the blessed receive from a victory

they have won by the power of some particular virtue. Hence a threefold aureole is assigned according to the threefold victory won by the blessed in this life, through which they perfectly triumph over three enemies: the world through martyrdom, the flesh through virginity, and the devil through teaching and preaching, expelling him from themselves and from the hearts of others. The first is the aureole of martyrs, the second of virgins, and the third of doctors.

14. The aureole of martyrdom requires, first, death actually following, or a death that would naturally have followed if it had not miraculously been prevented by God. Hence those who do not receive mortal wounds from which death would naturally follow are not called martyrs. John the Evangelist, however, was a true martyr, as the Church celebrates him, because, after being placed in a vat of boiling oil, he was miraculously delivered. Secondly, death must be endured either for the faith of Christ, for the defense of the Church, or for some virtue. For lack of this condition, one who dies in war, even against heretics, is not a martyr if he dies not for religion but for the defense of a kingdom or for some other political title. Thirdly, there is required at least a virtual will to die for Christ and to undergo martyrdom. Hence one who, while asleep, is killed by a tyrant out of hatred for the faith does not attain the aureole of martyrdom if he never had the will to die for the faith of Christ; but he does attain it if before sleeping he had the will to die for Christ's faith.

15. The aureole of virginity requires two things: incorruption of the flesh and the resolution to preserve it until the end of life, as St. Thomas teaches in *IV Sentences*, dist. 49, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1. Hence a vow to preserve virginity is not necessary for obtaining that aureole; a simple resolution is sufficient. Nor is it lost if bodily virginity is violently taken away. From this the Holy Doctor infers in the same place, ad 4, that a virgin does not lose the aureole of virginity even if, after being violated, she conceives and gives birth. If you ask whether a virgin who once departs from her resolution to preserve virginity and afterward resumes it and preserves virginity until the end of life merits that aureole, I answer affirmatively with the same Angelic Doctor in the same place, ad 1, because virginity of mind interrupted by a contrary resolution can be repaired, although bodily virginity cannot. From this Paludanus infers in *IV Sentences*, dist. 49, q. 8, a. 4, that even she who, being violated against her will, lost her bodily integrity and afterward consented to what had been done does not lose the aureole of virginity if she later resumes her resolution and preserves virginity until death. The later consent was not the cause of the prior act, and an interior change of resolution alone does not remove virginity if the resolution is again resumed and preserved.

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From this you will understand that virginity and its aureole are not lost unless these two things concur together: bodily corruption and consent to it.

16. Finally, the aureole of a doctor requires three things. First, that one actually teach, for the crown is due not to one capable of fighting but to one who actually fights. Secondly, that he teach things pertaining to salvation, for the aureole is due not to any doctrine whatever, but only to that which is directed to salvation, according to Dan. 12: *Those who instruct many unto justice shall shine like stars for perpetual eternity*. Thirdly, he must do this with a right intention, that is, for the benefit of souls and the glory of God, and not for his own glory and a vain estimation of himself. It is not required, however, that one who teaches be a prelate or hold a degree in theology, or that he teach by voice and preaching. It suffices that he do so in writing, by lecturing, or by privately and secretly instructing penitents in the confessional. Hence the aureole of a doctor is merited not only by prelates, doctors, and preachers, but also by writers, lecturers, and confessors.

TREATISE II. ON THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY.

Having completed the Treatise on Beatitude, we must treat of the means by which we attain it, namely, human acts. But since the first and general condition of human acts is that they proceed from the will, from which they are called voluntary, before discussing them in particular a brief treatise must be set forth. In it we shall treat first of the voluntary, secondly of the involuntary, thirdly of what is mixed from both, and fourthly of the free voluntary, or freedom, which is the root and foundation of all moral goodness and malice in human acts.

CHAPTER I. On the Voluntary.

§ 1.

The Definition and Division of the Voluntary.

1. The voluntary is commonly defined as *that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end*. It is said to proceed *from an intrinsic principle* to distinguish it from violent motion, which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, as is said in book II of the *Physics*. The phrase *with knowledge of the end* is added to distinguish it from natural motion, whose

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principle is indeed internal but is directed by no antecedent cognition. Hence acts of vegetation and nutrition, and all acts not subject to the command of the will, as also the first cognition of the end, which does not proceed from another cognition because it is itself the first cognition, cannot be called voluntary and consequently human, since acts of this kind are exercised even against our will. Furthermore, since there is a twofold cognition of an end—one perfect, which apprehends not only the thing that is the end but also the character of an end and the proportion of the means to it, and which belongs to man; and another imperfect, which stops at the mere apprehension of the thing that is the end and does not consider the final character, and which is found in brute animals—there is likewise a twofold voluntary: one perfect, belonging to man, and another imperfect, belonging to brute animals. Again, in man one kind of voluntary is free, proceeding from its principle in such a way that, when all things required for proceeding are posited, it can still fail to proceed. Another is necessary, proceeding in such a way that, when all prerequisites are posited, it cannot fail to proceed. This necessary voluntary is again twofold. One proceeds from an imperfection of cognition, in which manner first-prime and indeliberate movements in man are necessary. The other proceeds from the highest perfection of cognition and from an object adequate to the capacity of the faculty, and therefore objectively determining it to pursue that object. Thus beatific love is necessary, because it is regulated by the beatific vision, which removes the objective indifference of judgment and clearly represents God to the will as he is in himself.

2. There is some controversy among theologians as to whether the character of the voluntary is found more perfectly in free acts than in necessary acts of the second kind. For example, is the love by which we freely love God here more voluntary than the beatific love by which the blessed necessarily love God in the heavenly homeland? I answer negatively, against Vasquez and Lorca. The fundamental reason is that the voluntary is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. Therefore that act is voluntary in a more perfect mode which proceeds from a more intrinsic principle and from a more perfect cognition. But beatific love proceeds more intrinsically than the love of the state of pilgrimage, since it is borne toward God with the whole effort of the will, and it proceeds from a more perfect cognition, for it flows from the beatific vision, which is the most perfect cognition of the ultimate end. Therefore it is more voluntary. This is more clearly evident in the divine acts. Who would say that the necessary love by which God loves himself is not more voluntary to him than the love by which he freely loves creatures, or that the notional love by

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which the Holy Spirit is produced is less voluntary to God than the production of this universe?

3. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas sometimes says that the notional acts in God are not perfectly voluntary. He either takes “voluntary” for “free,” or speaks of the generation of the Son, which is not formally voluntary, since the Son proceeds not from the will but from the intellect, but only concomitantly voluntary, because the Father wills to generate and takes complacency in that generation, as the Holy Doctor himself explains in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 41, a. 2.

4. Nor is it an obstacle that here, q. 6, a. 2, he attributes the perfect character of the voluntary only to acts proceeding with freedom and deliberation and accompanied by praise or blame. He gives only an example of a perfect voluntary in that which is better known to us, namely, a free act. It is not permissible to infer from this that there is no perfect voluntary without freedom. Similarly, if someone says that an animal is distinguished from a plant by sensation, as we see man sensing, it cannot be inferred that only men and not brutes sense.

You will say: The free mode of acting, since it belongs to a rational nature according to the degree of perfection it has above an irrational nature, is more perfect than the necessary mode of acting. Therefore the character of the voluntary belongs to it more perfectly.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. It is more perfect than a necessary mode of acting that follows upon imperfect cognition, I grant. It is more perfect than a necessary mode of acting arising from perfect cognition, I deny. Just as the free mode of acting is proper to a rational nature insofar as it exceeds all lower natures, so also is the necessary mode of acting that follows perfect cognition, as is evident in beatific love. For that mode belongs to an intellectual creature insofar as it exceeds all lower natures.

§ 2.

Whether an Omission, in Order to Be Voluntary,
Requires an Obligation Not to Omit.

5. Alvarez, Martinez, and John of St. Thomas deny this. Cajetan, Conrad, Medina, Ildephonsus, the Salamanca theologians, Curiel, and many others affirm it. Their position seems more probable and more conformable to the mind of the Holy Doctor here, q. 6, a. 3.

For the resolution, it must be observed with the Salamanca theologians that an omission can occur in two ways: through the nonpositing of an act,

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or through the cessation and interruption of an act already begun. For example, someone can omit Mass in two ways: first, if he does not hear it at all; secondly, if he knowingly leaves the church in the middle of Mass to play or study. This being posited:

6. It must be said that an omission consisting precisely in the nonpositing of an act cannot be voluntary without an obligation not to omit, but an omission consisting in the cessation and interruption of an act already begun can be voluntary without such an obligation.

The first part is proved. For an omission to be voluntary, it must in some way be caused by the will, since it belongs to the character of the voluntary to proceed from an intrinsic principle. But an omission consisting precisely in the negation of an act cannot in any way be caused by the will unless an obligation is present. Therefore, excluding an obligation, it cannot be voluntary. The major is certain, and the minor is proved. An omission cannot be caused by the will unless it is caused either as a privation or as a negation. If it is caused as a privation, it manifestly requires an obligation, since a privation is only of a form that is due. But if it is caused as the pure negation of the omitted act, the act itself must necessarily have preceded, because negations cannot otherwise be produced and newly introduced except insofar as preexisting opposite forms are destroyed. This is evident in the negation of light, which cannot be produced except by destroying the light itself. Therefore the omission of an act cannot be caused by the will unless either the act omitted immediately preceded or an obligation not to omit is present.

7. From this the second part of the conclusion is proved. One who expels a form from a subject, by that very fact and apart from any obligation, causes the nonbeing of that form in the subject. Therefore, when the will removes and destroys a preexisting act, it causes, apart from any obligation, the nonbeing and omission of that act. Certainly, who would say that a man who is in church hearing Mass and knowingly leaves the church in the middle of Mass to play does not voluntarily omit Mass because he does this on a day on which there is no obligation, or that he has no more voluntarily omitted Mass than a meal about which he does not think? Therefore an omission consisting in the cessation and interruption of an act already begun can be voluntary without an obligation not to omit.

8. You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: The voluntary is defined as that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. But even if there is no precept, a foreseen omission proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. Since a precept sounding from outside is something merely extrinsic, it is irrelevant

to the character of an intrinsic principle. Therefore, excluding a precept, a foreseen omission is voluntary.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. Excluding a precept, an omission consisting precisely in the negation of an act cannot be caused by the will, because it cannot be caused by it except as a privation, which necessarily requires an obligation and exigency of the form. Nor is what a certain recent author says valid, namely, that thought or advertence of reason concerning the act omitted suffices for its omission to assume the character of a privation and consequently to be voluntary. A privation essentially implies an obligation or exigency of a form. But a simple thought or advertence concerning the celebration of Mass, for example, on a day on which its precept does not oblige, does not cause an obligation or exigency to hear Mass, since such thought does not dictate that Mass must be heard on that day, but only that it can be heard. Therefore such thought or advertence concerning the celebration of Mass does not suffice for its omission on a weekday to assume the character of a privation and to be voluntary. To the proof of the minor, it must be said that, although a precept is something extrinsic, it is not irrelevant to the character of the voluntary, which proceeds from an intrinsic principle. Rather, it is a necessary condition for the omission to be caused by the will and consequently to be voluntary. As we just said, an omission cannot be caused by the will unless it has the character of a privation, nor can it assume that character unless it presupposes a precept.

9. You will object secondly: What is in the power of the will is voluntary. But the omission of Mass, even if there is no precept, is in the power of the will. Therefore it is voluntary.

I answer by distinguishing the major. What is in the power of the will is voluntary in potency, I grant; actually, I deny. Granting the minor, I distinguish the conclusion according to the distinction of the major. What we have said of the voluntary must also be said of the free, which is a species of the voluntary. That which is in the power of the will with indifference and power to omit it is free in potency and in first act, but not in second act if no exercise of freedom occurs. We shall treat this more fully in the Treatise on Sins.

10. From what has been said it is inferred that an effect following upon an omission is not voluntary unless the omission itself is voluntary, and consequently unless either the act omitted immediately preceded or there was an obligation not to omit. For example, someone omits to steer a ship and the sinking of the ship follows upon this omission. Such a sinking will not be voluntary unless the one omitting is bound to direct the ship or at

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least an actual direction preceded and was interrupted. The reason is manifest. The effect in question is reduced to the will and participates in the character of the voluntary only through the omission. Hence, where the omission is not voluntary, neither will the effect be voluntary. Since, therefore, for an omission to be voluntary one of the aforesaid things is required—either an obligation concerning the omitted act or its prior existence—the same is required with still greater reason for an effect following from that omission to be voluntary.

CHAPTER II.

On the Involuntary.

1. There are four causes of the involuntary: violence, fear, concupiscence or vehement passion, and ignorance. Just as the voluntary is caused from two principles, namely, from the operating will or appetite, which is an intrinsic principle, and from directing cognition, so its opposite, the involuntary, must be caused from opposite principles. It proceeds either from the operation's arising from an extrinsic principle, as occurs in things done through violence or fear, or from cognition's being removed, bound, or disturbed, as occurs through ignorance and concupiscence or passion. But since only things done through violence are involuntary absolutely speaking, while those done through fear, concupiscence, and ignorance are mixed from the voluntary and involuntary, we shall treat here only of the first and of the others in the following chapter.

2. The violent is therefore defined by philosophers as *that which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, the patient contributing no force*. This must not be understood purely negatively, as though it sufficed for the subject upon which force is inflicted not to cooperate with the violent motion, but also positively, so that the patient positively resists and withstands the extrinsic agent. From this you will understand that the four terms *necessary*, *violent*, *coerced*, and *involuntary*, which are sometimes confused, differ from one another according to the diverse formalities they express. The necessary is so called insofar as it is opposed to the contingent or indifferent, and implies determination to one thing while excluding a faculty for the opposite. The violent includes the same necessity and determination on the part of that which suffers violence, but adds beyond the necessary that it proceed from an extrinsic principle, because nothing is violated by its proper and intrinsic principle. Yet something can occur necessarily and nevertheless proceed from an intrinsic principle, as is evident in brutes and in first-prime

movements. The coerced is almost the same as the violent, but, properly speaking, the coerced is opposed only to the spontaneous or voluntary and therefore is found only in cognizant beings, whereas the violent is found even in inanimate things, as when a stone is thrown upward. The involuntary is sometimes taken for the coerced or violent, but has a wider extension, because something can be involuntary not only by reason of violence, or because it proceeds from an extrinsic principle, but also by reason of ignorance and a defect of cognition, as we shall say in the following chapter.

3. Theologians ask here whether the human will or other created things can suffer violence from God and be coerced by him. For the resolution of this difficulty:

I say first that by no power can violence be inflicted upon the will in an act elicited by it. The reason is that every act elicited by the will is essentially voluntary, since it proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge of the end. Indeed, it is a certain actual inclination of the will. Therefore it cannot be coerced or violent, according to Anselm in *De libero arbitrio*, c. 6: *No one can will unwillingly, because he cannot, while unwilling, will to will.*

4. You will say first: The will can be necessitated by God in an elicited act, as is evident in beatific love. Therefore it can also be coerced.

I deny the consequence. For the will to be necessitated in an elicited act, it suffices that it be moved and applied to that act without indifference of judgment. But for it to be coerced, the act would have to proceed from an extrinsic principle with resistance from the intrinsic principle. This is repugnant to an act of the will, since such an act is essentially vital and is the will's actual inclination.

5. You will say secondly: God can incline a will inclined toward some object—for example, toward hatred of an enemy—toward the opposite through an efficacious motion, and transfer it from hatred to love. Therefore he can inflict violence upon it even as regards elicited acts.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. As St. Thomas argues excellently in *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 8: However greatly the will may be changed toward something, it is not said to be coerced toward it. The reason is that to will something is itself to be inclined toward it, whereas coercion and violence are contrary to the inclination of the thing coerced. Therefore, when God changes the will, he causes another inclination to succeed the preceding inclination, so that the first is removed and the second remains. Hence that toward which he induces the will is not contrary to the inclination now existing, but to the inclination that previously existed, and therefore there is neither violence nor coercion.

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6. You will say thirdly: Sin is contrary to man's natural inclination, as is said in the Treatise on Sins. Therefore, when man sins, he acts against his natural inclination and consequently suffers violence.

I answer that sin is contrary to man's inadequate and partial natural inclination, which he has as rational toward a morally good thing consonant with reason, which is the partial and inadequate object of the human will. It is not contrary to his total and adequate inclination by which he is borne toward his adequate object, namely, good in general, insofar as it abstracts from true or apparent good and from the morally good or delightful. Hence, although an act of sin can be called violent to man in a qualified respect, it cannot be so called absolutely and without qualification.

7. I say secondly that the will can suffer violence as regards acts commanded by it and elicited by other lower faculties. This is evident because the acts of the other faculties can either be exercised or impeded contrary to the inclination of the will. For example, the eyes of a man unwilling to see can be forced open. In that case the vision would not be violent with respect to the visual faculty, since it would proceed from it as from an intrinsic principle, but it would be violent with respect to the will, which would resist it. Since the will is a universal inclination tending toward the good of the whole *suppositum*, such a vision should be called violent absolutely.

8. I say thirdly that not only the will, but no creature whatever, can suffer violence from God. The reason is that what is violent absolutely is that which occurs contrary to a creature's principal inclination. But everything God does in creatures, precisely as done by him, is in accordance with their chief inclination. Therefore nothing of this kind can be called violent absolutely. The major is certain, and the minor is proved. In every creature the chief and higher inclination is to obey God, the Creator and Governor of all, either by doing what he wills it to do or by receiving whatever he wills to be done in it. Therefore all that God does or can do in creatures occurs according to their chief inclination. The consequence is evident. St. Thomas proves the antecedent in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 60, a. 5, by this argument. That which belongs to another has a greater inclination toward that to which it belongs than toward its own proper good. But every creature is a part of the universe and belongs to God. Therefore it has a greater inclination toward the good of the universe and to obey God than toward its own proper and agreeable good. The minor is certain. St. Thomas illustrates the major by the example of a hand, which naturally exposes itself to a blow for the preservation of the whole body, and of a virtuous citizen, who exposes himself to danger of death for the preservation of the whole

commonwealth. The same is evident in insensible creatures. Although a heavy thing, from its proper inclination through heaviness, tends downward, and a light thing through lightness tends upward, nevertheless, lest there be a vacuum, the heavy thing, forgetting its own heaviness, rises, and the light thing, disregarding its lightness, descends. Therefore a part is naturally more inclined toward the good of the whole than toward its own good.

This is confirmed. Every creature is naturally more inclined toward the end than toward the means, for an opposite inclination would be disordered and consequently could not be impressed upon a creature by God. But the good of the universe and the divine good are the end of the particular goods toward which creatures are inclined. Therefore creatures are more inclined toward the divine good and toward obeying God as Creator and Governor than toward their own proper and connatural good. Hence Wis. 16 says: *The fire, that the just might be nourished, even forgot its own power; for creation, serving you its Maker*, and so forth. By these words Scripture declares that when a creature is moved by God toward an effect that seems contrary to the inclination of its own nature, it in some manner forgets that inclination, subjecting it to the obediential potency by which it serves God at his command. Thus the aforesaid inclination toward resisting the effect is there, as it were, forgotten and as though it did not exist. Hence Augustine says in book XXVI *Contra Faustum*: *God, the Creator and Founder of all creatures, does nothing contrary to nature. For that is natural to each thing which is done by him from whom comes every measure, mode, and order of nature*. And St. Thomas says in *De potentia*, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: *All creatures have, as though natural to them, whatever is done in them by God. Therefore a twofold potency is distinguished in them: one natural, toward their proper operations and motions, and another called obediential, toward those things they receive from God*.

9. You will object first: God effects many things that are repugnant to the natures of things and consequently occur while they resist. Thus he detained the sun in the middle of heaven at the word of Joshua, and moved it backward in the time of Hezekiah, king of Judah. Likewise, when dividing the Red Sea and the Jordan for the passage of the children of Israel, he made the waters stand upward like a wall. Therefore he inflicts violence upon creatures.

I answer that those effects were indeed contrary to the particular inclination of those creatures and consequently were violent in a qualified respect. But because they occurred according to the universal inclination by which every creature is more inclined toward the divine good and toward obeying God as Creator and Governor of the universe than toward its own

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proper and connatural good, they cannot be called violent absolutely or contrary to nature, but beyond or above nature.

10. You will object secondly: The demons suffer violence in being bound to the fire of hell, since that binding has the character of punishment and the demons resist it as far as they can. But that binding is effected by God. Therefore God can inflict violence upon creatures.

I answer that the demons suffer violence in a qualified respect in being bound to the fire of hell, and such violence suffices for the binding to have the character of punishment. Nevertheless, they do not suffer violence absolutely and without qualification, because even in the nature and will of a demon one must admit the universal inclination to obey God as supreme Lord and Creator of that nature. This inclination is more powerful than every other inclination by which the demons resist the punishment inflicted upon them by God.

CHAPTER III.

On That Which Is Mixed from the Voluntary and the Involuntary.

§ 1.

Whether and How Things Done from Fear Are Mixed from
the Voluntary and the Involuntary.

1. I say first that things done from fear are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary. Thus St. Thomas teaches here, q. 6. He proves this conclusion first from the Philosopher and Gregory of Nyssa, who call things done through fear mixed from the voluntary and involuntary. Secondly, things done through fear are not voluntary considered in themselves; indeed, they are involuntary. But they are voluntary from fear, namely, in order to avoid the evil feared. For example, a merchant absolutely and apart from danger in a storm would be unwilling to throw his wares into the sea; yet during a storm, in order to escape the death he fears, he wills to throw them overboard and in fact does so. Therefore things done through fear are mixed from the voluntary and the involuntary. I add that in the object of an act done from fear there are found both a character of evil and a character of good, sufficient to cause refusal and volition, which are principles of the involuntary and voluntary. For example, in throwing wares into the sea there is a character of evil, as is evident, since from this the merchant incurs a very great loss; but there is also a character of good, since it is assumed as a means of preserving life or escaping the danger of death.

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2. For a fuller understanding of this conclusion, it must be observed that it is one thing for something to be done *from* fear and another for it to be done *with* fear. The expression “with” implies mere concomitance, while “from” implies causality. Something is said to be done from fear when fear is the cause of the act, so that from fear man is moved to act in that way, as when someone from fear of death throws his wares into the sea. Something is judged to be done with fear when fear is found simultaneously with the action but is not a cause moving and impelling toward it. Thus the martyrs confessed the faith with fear of death, yet not from fear, but from love of and obedience to God. Our conclusion is therefore understood of a work elicited from fear when fear is a true cause of the action, not of merely concomitant fear, since the latter does not influence the action but only accompanies it.

3. I say secondly that things done from fear are voluntary absolutely and involuntary in a qualified respect. This is also the teaching of St. Thomas in the article cited, where he reasons as follows. That which is voluntary here and now, when all the circumstances are weighed, and involuntary only considered in itself apart from the circumstances, is voluntary absolutely and involuntary only in a qualified respect. But a work done from fear is voluntary here and now when the circumstances are weighed, and involuntary considered in itself. Therefore it is voluntary absolutely and involuntary in a qualified respect. The minor is evident from the example given above of throwing wares into the sea. The major is proved from the distinction all admit between the intellect and the will. The intellect considers things in themselves and with abstraction from singular matter, while the will regards an existing object clothed with all the circumstances with which it is placed in exercise.

4. This is confirmed. That which is efficaciously and absolutely willed, but only inefficaciously and conditionally refused, is voluntary absolutely and involuntary in a qualified respect. But a work done from fear is efficaciously and absolutely willed and is only inefficaciously and conditionally refused, as is evident in the aforesaid example of throwing wares overboard. Therefore it is voluntary absolutely and involuntary only in a qualified respect.

5. You will object first against the first conclusion: When someone observes the law from fear of the punishments of hell, that observance has nothing involuntary or displeasing in it. Otherwise it would be evil and vicious, which is contrary to the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 8, and sess. 14, c. 4. Therefore things done from fear are not mixed from the voluntary and involuntary.

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I answer first that fear indeed causes something involuntary in a qualified respect when the object chosen through fear is evil in itself and has the character of something eligible only in order to avoid a greater evil, as in the example given above, where throwing wares overboard is good only because it conduces to avoiding death. But if the object chosen through fear is not evil in itself, but absolutely good, the will has no act of refusal concerning it. Hence, since the observance of the commandments is good in itself and in no way evil even apart from the danger of the pains of hell, such observance done from fear of punishment has nothing involuntary or displeasing. According to this solution and doctrine, our first conclusion is not to be understood as altogether universal, as though St. Thomas intended that the voluntary proceeding from fear could never be found without something involuntary, but rather indefinitely, because this is true in most cases.

6. But if anyone contends that St. Thomas's doctrine and conclusion are universally true without any exception or limitation, he can answer that in the observance of the law done from fear of hell alone there can be something involuntary and displeasing without the observance being evil or vicious. An action commanded can be considered in two ways: materially and in the being of the thing, or formally insofar as it is commanded and implies the application of the divine law to it. If considered in the second way, displeasure concerning it is always unlawful, because the divine law has nothing evil by reason of which it could lawfully be rejected. If considered in the first way, displeasure concerning it can be lawful, because the thing commanded can bring some labor and weariness, which, considered in itself and without reference to the divine law, can terminate a lawful displeasure. This is evident in the pain and sorrow Christ experienced in the garden of olives, not concerning the observance of the precept of dying imposed upon him by the Father, but concerning the difficulty and burden of the work commanded, taken in itself and precisely.

7. You will object secondly against the second conclusion: Marriage and a solemn vow are invalid if made from fear that would influence a steadfast man. Therefore things done from fear are not voluntary absolutely. The antecedent is certain: as regards marriage, from the chapters *Locum* and *Veniens, De sponsalibus*; and as regards a solemn vow, from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, decree on Regulars, c. 19, where it is granted that religious who made profession from fear can protest within five years and, if they prove that the profession was made from fear, it is null. The consequence also seems manifest, for every marriage and every vow that is voluntary absolutely should be valid.

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I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. In proof of the consequence, I distinguish the antecedent: Every marriage and every vow voluntary absolutely should be valid, speaking of itself and considering the natural law, I grant; accidentally and considering the disposition of positive law, I deny. The Church can establish certain conditions without which a vow or marriage is not valid, although it is voluntary absolutely. Among these is that it be made without fear. Thus in marriage the Church also establishes another condition, namely, that it be celebrated before the pastor and two or three witnesses. Therefore a clandestine marriage, although altogether voluntary, is invalid.

§ 2.

Whether Concupiscence, or Vehement Passion, Causes Something
Involuntary in a Qualified Respect, as Fear Does.

8. I answer negatively with St. Thomas here, a. 7. When he first objects to himself: Just as fear is a passion, so also is concupiscence. But fear in some way causes the involuntary. Therefore concupiscence does also, he answers: To the first it must be said that fear concerns evil, whereas concupiscence regards good. But evil is in itself contrary to the will, while good is consonant with the will. Hence fear is more disposed to cause the involuntary than concupiscence.

9. Nevertheless, this teaching of St. Thomas seems difficult and is subject to several objections. Experience establishes that many things are done through concupiscence which, taken in themselves, are repugnant to the will. Thus a covetous man spends money to obtain some pleasure, although considered in itself, apart from the order to the pleasure, he would undoubtedly will to retain the money and is greatly grieved by its expenditure. Likewise, in one acting from concupiscence or passion there are often these two considerations: "This work is good for me according to sense, because it is delightful," and, "It is evil for me according to reason, because it is contrary to the law of God." Therefore, when he consents to concupiscence or passion, he so wills to do it insofar as it is delightful to sense that he would be unwilling to do it insofar as it is contrary to reason.

10. I answer that when St. Thomas, in the article cited, following Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene, teaches that things done from concupiscence are not involuntary in a qualified respect as are things proceeding from fear, he does not intend altogether to deny that something involuntary can be mixed with what is done from concupiscence. He asserts

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only that an involuntary element of this kind is not caused by concupiscence, as in things done from fear the involuntary is caused by fear itself. The reason for the distinction given by the Holy Doctor is excellent. Since concupiscence in no respect regards evil but precisely a delightful good, it does not of itself induce one toward anything repugnant to the will. Hence, if something involuntary is mixed with things done from concupiscence, it does not arise from concupiscence itself, but comes entirely from elsewhere and accidentally. Fear, on the contrary, has as its object an evil that can be avoided only with difficulty, and therefore, in order that it may be avoided, inclines one to choose a lesser evil, which in itself is repugnant to the will and is chosen only insofar as it conduces to that end. Hence the involuntary element found in works done from fear takes its origin in some manner from fear itself and is not merely accidentally joined to it, as in things done from concupiscence.

§ 3.

Whether Ignorance Causes the Involuntary.

11. Ignorance is divided into antecedent, concomitant, and consequent ignorance. Antecedent ignorance is that which precedes the act of the will, that is, which is in no way willed. Hence it requires that the one who is ignorant employ sufficient diligence to overcome it, with the intention that, if the ignorance were removed, he would not produce the effect he produces from ignorance. For example, someone shoots an arrow into a place where a man is hidden, but he does not know that the man is concealed there and employs sufficient diligence to discover whether anyone is there, with the intention that, if he knew the man was hidden there, he would not shoot the arrow. If he strikes and kills the man, that killing is said to proceed from antecedent ignorance.

12. Concomitant ignorance is that which is related to an act of the will merely accidentally and concomitantly, and which neither moves man to act nor removes or prevents him from acting. Rather, man is so disposed that he would act equally and in the same manner if the ignorance were not present as he acts with it. For example, if someone goes about a forest for the sake of hunting and comes upon an enemy, but does not know that he is an enemy, and after first employing sufficient diligence, thinking that a beast is hiding there, shoots an arrow and kills the enemy, that killing is said to proceed from concomitant ignorance. Although he then does not know that the man

is an enemy, he is nevertheless so disposed that, if he recognized him, he would kill him.

13. Finally, consequent ignorance is that which follows upon an act of the will, or which is willed, namely, when the will wills to be ignorant of something it could and was bound to know. Ignorance can be willed in two ways. First, directly, when the will expressly wills to be ignorant of something so that it may sin more freely, according to Ps. 35: *He refused to understand so that he might act well*. This ignorance is called affected. Secondly, indirectly, when the will does not expressly will to be ignorant, but does not take care to learn what it can and is bound to know. This ignorance is called crass because it is voluntary through the carelessness of a negligent will, which in the course of time is, as it were, fattened and made gross. It is also called supine, because the idle are accustomed to lie on their backs. These things having been presupposed:

14. I say that antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary absolutely; consequent ignorance causes the voluntary absolutely and the involuntary in a qualified respect; concomitant ignorance causes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary, but what is nonvoluntary.

The first part of this assertion is evident. That which causes an effect altogether refused and repugnant to the inclination of the will causes the involuntary absolutely. But antecedent ignorance does this, as is evident in the example given above. One who shoots an arrow from antecedent ignorance kills a man whom he would have been unwilling to kill and whom he grieves to have killed. Therefore antecedent ignorance causes the involuntary absolutely.

15. The second part is shown as follows. One who wills the cause of an effect also wills in the cause the effect that will follow from it. Therefore, since consequent ignorance is willed absolutely, the effect following from it will also be willed absolutely in that ignorance and consequently will be voluntary absolutely.

16. That such ignorance causes the involuntary in a qualified respect is proved as follows. What is done contrary to some inclination of the will is involuntary in a qualified respect. But an effect proceeding from consequent ignorance is done contrary to some inclination of the will. Therefore it is involuntary in a qualified respect. The major is evident, and the minor is proved. One acting with such ignorance is so disposed while he acts that, if knowledge were present, he would not produce the effect. Hence, when the effect has been produced and knowledge arrives, he is saddened, as is evident when someone, without employing sufficient diligence and thinking he is killing a beast, kills a friend. Therefore the will acting with such

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ignorance has some inclination toward the opposite. The consequence is evident, for, as Aristotle says in *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 1: *Among those who act through ignorance, the one who repents of the deed is said to have acted unwillingly.*

17. Finally, the third part, which asserts that concomitant ignorance causes neither the voluntary nor the involuntary but the nonvoluntary, is evident from the example given above. If someone desiring the death of an enemy is walking by chance through a forest and, thinking he is killing a beast, kills his enemy, that killing of the enemy is, on the one hand, not positively involuntary, since it is in no way repugnant to the will of the killer. Neither is it positively voluntary, since the voluntary must proceed from an intrinsic principle with cognition, while the killer does not know that the enemy is hidden there, and hence the shooting of the arrow is commanded only by the will to kill a beast. Therefore such an effect is neither voluntary nor involuntary, but only nonvoluntary.

18. From these things you will understand that antecedent ignorance excuses from sin, since it removes the character of the voluntary, without which there can be no sin; that consequent ignorance accuses, since the effect following from it is willed absolutely; and that concomitant ignorance neither excuses, because it does not remove every will of sin, at least a conditional will, nor of itself accuses, because the will does not sin when it employs all due and sufficient diligence.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Free Voluntary Act.

1. Freedom is spoken of in three ways: from servitude, from coercion, and from necessity. We shall not treat here of the first or second kind of freedom, but only of the third, which is usually called freedom of choice or of indifference, concerning which Bernard excellently says in serm. 81 on the Song of Songs: *Freedom of choice is plainly something divine, shining forth in the soul like a gem in gold.*

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§ 1.

Freedom of Indifference Belongs to Man, Not Only in the State of Integral Nature and at His Creation, but Also after Adam's Fall and in the State of Corrupt Nature.

2. Both points are certain by faith. For of man considered in the first state it is said in Gen. 1: *Let us make man to our image and likeness*. The holy Fathers commonly refer this to the freedom of indifference that man received from God at his creation, as do Tertullian, Irenaeus, Damascene, and others.

Nor is it an objection that many also understand the image of God in man as his dominion over the other creatures. For it follows that one who has dominion over others must much more have dominion over himself. Hence Tertullian, *Contra Marcionem* II, c. 6: *For how could it be that man, possessing the whole world, should not reign principally in the possession of his own mind, being master of others but servant of himself?* And Novatian, *De Trinitate*, c. 1: *When He had given all things into his servitude, he says, He willed him alone to be free; for he ought also to have been free, lest the image of God should incongruously be a servant*. From this the second part also remains proved. For since the image of God was not altogether destroyed in us by original sin, freedom of indifference remained in man after Adam's fall and in the state of corrupt nature, although it was not so perfect as it had been in the state of original justice. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 5: *If anyone says that, after Adam's sin, man's free choice was lost and extinguished, let him be anathema*.

3. You will object first: St. Augustine frequently teaches that man lost free choice through sin. Therefore, he judges that man in the state of fallen nature lacks free choice as a punishment for original sin. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, c. 30, where he writes: By using free choice badly, man lost both himself and it. For just as one who kills himself certainly kills himself while living, but by killing himself ceases to live and cannot raise himself after he has killed himself, so, when sin was committed by free choice, sin became victorious and free choice was also lost. And in *De civitate Dei* XIV, c. 11: The choice of the will, he says, is then truly free when it does not serve vices and sins. Such was given by God; once lost through one's own fault, it cannot be restored except by Him who was able to give it. Likewise, in epist. 107 to Vitalis he says that through the gravity of the first sin we lost free choice for loving God.

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4. I answer that in the first two passages Augustine intends only that free choice was lost through sin as regards its state, not as regards its substance. For through sin it lost that most happy state which it possessed in Adam, in whom there was no difficulty in acting rightly, no dominion of concupiscence, no servitude of sin, no wound, but full and integral powers for doing good and avoiding sin. He clearly explains himself in this way in *Ad Bonifacium contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* I, c. 2, where he says: *Who among us says that, through the sin of the first man, free choice perished from the human race? Freedom indeed perished through sin, but that freedom which existed in Paradise, of possessing full justice together with immortality; and for this reason human nature needs divine grace.* And in II, c. 15: *We do not say, he says, that through Adam's sin free choice perished from human nature, but that in men subject to the Devil it has power for sinning; whereas it has no power for living well and piously unless man's will has been liberated by God's grace and assisted for every good of action, thought, and speech.* In the third passage, however, he does not say simply that through the sin of our first parent we lost free choice, but that we lost it for loving God. For the will of fallen man, unless repaired by grace, cannot love God above all things, even with a natural love, as we showed in the *Treatise on Grace*, c. 2.

5. You will object second: Augustine acknowledges in fallen man a necessity of sinning. Therefore, he judges that free choice for good and evil does not remain in him. The consequence is manifest. The antecedent is proved, first, from his second disputation against Fortunatus the Manichaeon, where he says: *I say that free choice of the will existed in that man who was first formed. He was so made that nothing at all could resist his will if he willed to keep God's commandments. But after he sinned by that free will, we who descend from his stock were cast into necessity.* It is also proved from Augustine's statement against Julian: *You greatly err if you either think there is no necessity of sinning or fail to understand that it is the punishment of that sin which was committed through no necessity.*

6. I answer that in these and similar passages St. Augustine is not speaking of an absolute necessity of sinning here and now, but of a certain vague and indeterminate necessity of sinning. For although man in the state of fallen nature can avoid individual mortal and venial sins distributively, he nevertheless cannot collectively avoid all mortal sins without the Savior's medicinal grace, the deprivation of which is incurred by original sin. Nor can he generally avoid all venial sins without a singular privilege and gift of grace, which was granted to the Blessed Virgin alone, as we say in the *Treatise on Grace*. Hence St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 12, ad 7, explaining Ps. 24, *Deliver me from my necessities*, says that *sins are called necessary insofar*

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as they cannot all be avoided, although each one can be avoided. This necessity of sinning in general, in the state of fallen nature before the will is healed and strengthened by divine grace, is asserted by St. Augustine in many places, especially in *Ad Bonifacium contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* III, c. 8, where he says: *Free choice, when captive, has power only for sinning; but for justice it has no power unless divinely liberated and assisted.*

7. You will object third: St. Augustine, in the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* and in many other places, most sharply attacks the two-sided power of indifference that Julian and the other Pelagians introduced into freedom, and rejects it as the foundation, source, and nest of the Pelagian heresy. Therefore, such freedom cannot be attributed to men in the state of fallen nature without manifest heresy and evident association with the Pelagians.

8. I answer that Augustine condemned the freedom of indifference admitted by Julian and the other Pelagians because they thought the will of fallen man to be in perfect equilibrium, as it had been in the state of innocence, and equally inclined toward good and evil. Consequently, they denied that free choice had been diminished and weakened through Adam's sin and, because of concupiscence, made more inclined toward a pleasurable good contrary to reason than toward an honorable good consonant with reason. St. Prosper reports this in his letter to Augustine, where, recounting the errors of the Massilians, he says: *They think that, just as a transgressor is said not to have obeyed because he was unwilling, so neither should it be doubted that a believer was devout because he willed; and that each man has as much power for good as he has for evil, and that with equal weight the mind moves itself toward vices or virtues.*

§ 2.

For the Morality of Human Acts, or for Merit and Demerit, Freedom from Coercion Does Not Suffice, but Freedom of Indifference Is Required.

9. This assertion also is certain by faith, and the contrary opinion was condemned as heretical by Innocent X. It is established from the holy Fathers, who frequently teach that, if freedom of indifference is removed, our acts are worthy neither of reward nor punishment, neither of praise nor blame. Thus Jerome, *Contra Jovinianum* II, says: *God created us with free choice, and we are drawn neither to virtues nor to vices by necessity; otherwise, where there is necessity, there is neither condemnation nor crown.* Augustine reports this statement in *De natura et gratia*, c. 5, and approves it as most

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true, most certain, and most widely known. In *De duabus animabus*, c. 11, he says that *this alone is sung by shepherds on the mountains, poets in the theaters, the unlearned in assemblies, the learned in libraries, masters in schools, prelates in sacred places, and the human race throughout the world.*

St. Thomas teaches the same in *De malo*, q. 6, a. un., in these words: *Some held that man's will moves itself by necessity toward choosing something, although they did not hold that the will was coerced, for not everything necessary is violent.* He immediately judges this opinion as follows: *This opinion, however, is heretical, for it removes the nature of merit and demerit from human acts.* And in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 24, q. 3, a. 3, he says that *the moral order begins where dominion of the will is first found.* But dominion of the will is through freedom of indifference, through which it is in the will's power to act or not to act, or to do this or that, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3, where he says that *we are masters of our acts insofar as we can choose this or that.* Therefore, freedom of indifference is the foundation of morality and consequently of the merit and demerit of human acts.

Reason also confirms this. Our acts are called moral for no other reason than because they are subject to the rules of morals and are regulated by them, just as an action is called artistic because it is subject to the rules of art. But acts that are purely spontaneous and immune only from coercion cannot be subjected to the rules of morals, nor directed and regulated by them. Therefore, neither can they be called moral. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown as follows. If a rule or law is applied to actions in order to reduce them from extremes to the rule's mean, it would be applied in vain to an action that cannot vary according to the mean and the extremes, but is of its own nature invariable and determined to one thing. But acts that are purely spontaneous and immune only from coercion are wholly invariable and determined by their nature to one thing, as is evident in beatific love and in the volition of happiness in general. Therefore, they cannot be subjected to the rules of morals, nor directed and regulated by them.

10. It must nevertheless be observed that, for acts to be moral, whether good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, freedom of contrariety or specification is not necessarily required; freedom of contradiction or exercise suffices. For by the very fact that an act is free as regards exercise and indifferent to being or not being, it can fall under the rules of morals and be directed and determined by them. Hence, while Christ was a wayfarer, He exercised meritorious and morally good acts; nevertheless, because He was intrinsically impeccable, there was in Him no freedom of contrariety toward

good and evil. Likewise, the angels merited beatitude in the first instant through an act of charity that was necessary as regards specification and free only as regards exercise, since in that instant they could not sin, as was shown in the Treatise on the Angels.

11. You will object first: St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1, says that acts are in the moral order because they are voluntary. But purely spontaneous acts, such as the volition of good as such and beatific love, are voluntary, since they proceed from an intrinsic principle with cognition. Therefore, they are in the moral order and possess moral goodness. Reason also confirms this, for if beatific love lacked moral goodness, it would lack a perfection belonging to the love of the way, and consequently would be less perfect, which seems absurd.

12. I answer that when St. Thomas says that acts are in the moral order because they are voluntary, he uses “voluntary” for “free,” as frequently occurs, and not for “spontaneous.” Hence purely spontaneous acts, such as beatific love, do not possess moral goodness. Beatific love is not thereby less perfect than the love of the way, because the same perfection, and a greater one than that which the love of the way possesses by reason of morality, is found eminently in the love of the homeland by reason of its physical entity and its necessary determination to its object. I add that beatific love does not absolutely lack moral goodness, just as it does not absolutely lack freedom. For although it necessarily terminates in God considered in Himself, it freely terminates in Him insofar as, in the exercised act, He is the reason for loving creatures; and as such it participates in morality, as will be evident from what is shortly to be said concerning Christ’s beatific love.

13. You will object second: St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 19, a. 6, and *Scriptum super Sententiis* III, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2, teaches that the act of charity by which Christ loved God while He was a wayfarer was meritorious. Therefore, he judges that freedom from necessity is not required for merit, but that freedom from coercion suffices. Hence, in the same place, ad 5, he says: *Even if Christ’s free choice were determined to one numerically, as to loving God, which He cannot fail to do, it would not thereby lose freedom or the nature of praise or merit, because it tends toward that not under coercion but spontaneously, and thus He is master of His act.*

14. I answer that in the cited passages St. Thomas intends only that Christ’s act of charity while He was in the state of a wayfarer was meritorious, not insofar as it regarded God considered in Himself, because as such it was necessary, but insofar as it terminated in the divine excellence and goodness as the reason for loving creatures, especially rational

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creatures, for whom He was to die; because as such it was free as regards exercise.

15. But you will say: Then St. Thomas wrongly assigned, in order to show the freedom of Christ's act of love, this causal reason: *Because He tends toward Him not under coercion but spontaneously*. He should instead have said that, with respect to that act as terminated in creatures, He still possesses indifference.

16. But I deny the consequence. For although spontaneity, or the negation of coercion, is not the formal reason grounding praiseworthiness and merit in Christ's love, it is nevertheless the reason permitting, in that same love as terminated in creatures, the indifference of contradiction, which is the foundation and reason of praiseworthiness and merit. For if Christ's beatific love were coerced, it could in no way be free with the freedom of contradiction, and consequently could not be meritorious. Therefore, in order that St. Thomas may preserve Christ's act of love as free with the freedom of contradiction under some consideration, and consequently as meritorious, he rightly assigns this causal reason, *because He tends toward Him not under coercion but spontaneously*, and adds, *and thus He is master of His act*. For, as I said, spontaneity, or the negation of coercion, is the reason permitting dominion and the indifference of contradiction in Christ's beatific love as terminated in creatures.

§ 3.

The Indifference of Contradiction, or the Power to Act or Not to Act,
Belongs to the Essence of Freedom, but the Indifference of
Contrariety toward Good and Evil Does Not.

17. The first part is against Jansen, who, throughout nearly the whole of *De gratia Christi*, attempts to show that freedom simply speaking essentially includes nothing but immunity from coercion together with the light and direction of reason. Thus he asserts that the will is simply free in all acts in which it operates under the direction of reason, although some are simply necessary, such as beatific love, the love by which God loves Himself, or the love by which the Holy Spirit is produced.

18. Our assertion, however, is common among theologians, both those of our school and others. It is proved first from the holy Fathers, who explain the proper essence of freedom through indifference toward contradictories and therefore compare free choice to a balance placed in equilibrium or to a hinge movable in either direction. Thus Basil, hom. on Ps. 61, says: *Within*

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each of us there is a certain balance fashioned by our Creator, by which he can weigh the natures of things and discern good from evil. Tertullian expresses this thought in *Contra Marcionem* II, c. 6, in these words: *As though the freedom and power of choice over the good, emancipated by God, were a holder of the balance.* Similarly, Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 1, teaches that man is free because he can turn a certain hinge of his will in this direction or that.

19. It is proved second from St. Thomas, who in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1, proves that man possesses free choice *because the judgment of reason is open to diverse things and is not determined to one.* This reason would be no reason at all if the freedom of our will consisted in spontaneity alone, or immunity from coercion. And in q. 19, a. 10, ad 2, in order to explain how God is free although He cannot will the evil of fault, he answers that this is no obstacle because *the divine will is open to opposites insofar as it can will this to be or not to be.* By these words he clearly has recourse to the indifference of the divine will, not to spontaneity, in order to preserve its freedom. Likewise, in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, he says: *It belongs to freedom of choice that one can perform an action or not perform it, and this belongs to God, for He can refrain from doing the good things that He does.* Here he proves indifference in order to preserve freedom of choice. Therefore, freedom, not only according to the accidental state that it has in us wayfarers, but also according to its proper formal nature common to God and men, includes indifference, or the power to act or not to act, and does not adequately consist in spontaneity alone or in the nature of the perfectly voluntary.

20. It is proved third: The nature of free choice consists in our having our acts under our power and dominion. Hence the Greeks call a free principle αὐτεξούσιον, a word signifying one who has power over himself and is master of his action. But dominion and power over our acts do not signify spontaneity and immunity from coercion alone; they also essentially require indifference and power toward opposites. Therefore, so does freedom. The major premise is established. The minor is proved from St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The former says in *De spiritu et littera*, c. 31: *Each man is said to have that in his power which he does if he wills and does not do if he does not will.* The latter says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3: *We are masters of our acts insofar as we can choose this or that.* And in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 68: *The dominion that the will has over its acts, by which it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes the determination of a power to one thing and the violence of an exterior acting cause.* But spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, does not exclude the determination of a power to one thing, but only the violence of an exterior acting cause. Therefore, dominion and

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power over our acts do not include spontaneity and immunity from coercion alone.

21. It is proved fourth: It is certain that Luther and Calvin deprived man of true freedom. But they did not deny that man's will acts spontaneously and without coercion, under the light and government of reason. Indeed, Calvin openly professes this in *Institutio Christianae Religionis* II, c. 6: *Man is said to possess free choice in this manner, because he acts by will, not under coercion.* And in *De libero arbitrio* II he says: *If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both confess and constantly assert free choice, and I regard as a heretic whoever thinks otherwise.* Therefore, man's true freedom is not preserved in spontaneity alone or immunity from coercion, but essentially includes indifference or the power to act or not to act.

22. Finally, the same part can be proved by this reasoning: Augustine frequently professes that the agreement of freedom with efficacious grace is most difficult, most obscure, and intelligible to few. But if man's true freedom consisted in spontaneity alone and were violated only by internal coercion, that difficulty would be very slight or entirely nonexistent. For nearly all theologians agree that our will cannot be coerced by God as regards acts elicited by it, as we showed in c. 2. Hence, the agreement of our freedom with efficacious grace would not only be manifest and intelligible to all, but disagreement between those extremes would be impossible and altogether unintelligible, because, as Anselm cited above says: *No unwilling man can will anything unjustly, because he cannot will that he will while unwilling.* Therefore, man's true freedom does not consist in spontaneity alone or immunity from coercion, as Jansen contends.

23. The second part of the assertion, which says that indifference of contrariety toward good and evil does not belong to the essence of freedom, but only to the accidental state that freedom has in us wayfarers who do not yet see the divine essence clearly, is proved first from Augustine, *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, fol. 150. There he rebukes Julian and the other Pelagians because they explained the essence of freedom through a power of indifference concerning good and evil, or a power able to will well and badly. From this false principle of theirs he argues against Julian as follows: *Nothing is free unless it can will two things, namely good and evil. Therefore God is not free, since He cannot will evil, and of Him you have also said that God cannot be anything but just. Is this how you praise God, by depriving Him of freedom?*

24. The same part is proved second: Indifference of contrariety toward good and evil includes a power to sin. But a power to sin does not belong to the essence of freedom. Therefore, neither does indifference of contrariety toward good and evil. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved

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first from Anselm in *De libero arbitrio*, c. 1, where he says: The power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom. It is proved second from St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 6, where he says: To will evil is neither freedom nor a part of freedom, although it is a certain sign of freedom. He explains this more fully in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 8, ad 3: Free choice is related to choosing things that are directed to the end as the intellect is related to conclusions. Now it is manifest that it belongs to the power of the intellect to proceed to diverse conclusions according to given principles; but that it proceeds to some conclusion by departing from the order of the principles arises from its defect. Hence, that free choice can choose diverse things while preserving the order of the end belongs to the perfection of its freedom; but that it chooses something by departing from the order of the end belongs to a defect of freedom. Therefore, there is greater freedom of choice in the angels, who cannot sin, than in us, who can sin.

Those words, *freedom of choice*, must be noted. They clearly declare that the Holy Doctor is not speaking of freedom from sin or from misery, as some interpret him, but of freedom from necessity, for this is what is understood by freedom of choice. Hence it is false and entirely alien to the mind of St. Thomas when Peter of St. Joseph says in the little work that he calls *Defensio S. Thomae*, disp. 2, sect. 8, that wayfarers are freer than the blessed with freedom from necessity, although the blessed are said to be freer than wayfarers both with freedom from sin and freedom from misery. This, I say, is entirely alien to the truth. For since freedom from necessity is a simply simple perfection and, as St. Bernard cited above says, *something divine shining forth in the soul like a gem in gold*, if wayfarers are freer with freedom from necessity than the blessed and comprehensors, they will be superior to them in some simply simple perfection that is found formally in God and by which an intellectual creature excels all others. Hence thieves and adulterers would surpass Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and the highest of the angels in some simply simple perfection, which seems not only absurd but also rather offensive to pious ears.

25. It is confirmed: Freedom of indifference is that eminent and singular perfection according to which man is said to have been created in the image of God, as we explained from the holy Fathers in § 1. But it is absurd to say that the image of God is more perfect in wayfarers than in the blessed and in sinners than in the saints. Therefore, it is also absurd to assert that the former are freer than the latter with freedom of indifference.

26. Jansen objects first against the first part of our assertion: The nature of free choice consists in our having our acts in our power. But purely spontaneous acts, or those immune from coercion alone, are in our power.

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Therefore, they are free, and consequently freedom is preserved in spontaneity alone. The major premise is established from what was said above. Jansen proves the minor from Augustine, especially from his assertion that what is in our power is what we do when we will, or what we do if we will, as is evident from *De libero arbitrio* II, c. 3, where he says: *We are said to have in our power that which we do when we will*. But purely spontaneous acts, immune from coercion alone, are done by us when we will. Therefore, they are in our power. Hence Jansen, *De gratia Salvatoris* VI, c. 8, near the end, says: *In Augustine's doctrine it is a paradox that an act of the will is free precisely because the will can turn aside from it and refrain from acting, although this doctrine seems astonishing to the Scholastics, and not merely moderately astonishing*.

27. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof drawn from Augustine's authority, it must be said that when the Holy Doctor says that we have in our power what we do when we will, this must be understood of something that we so do when we will that we can also do and will the opposite, and consequently of an indifferent act, not one that is purely spontaneous. This is evident from Augustine himself in *De spiritu et littera*, c. 31, where he declares: *Each man is said to have that in his power which he does if he wills and does not do if he does not will*. From this he concludes that faith is in our power because we believe if we will and do not believe if we are unwilling.

The common and customary manner of speaking also favors this. When we say that we do something when we will or if we will, it is usually understood, according to the common meaning of men, that we also refrain from doing it when we will or if we will, so that it is in our power to will or not to will, and to do or not to do, as we please. Such a manner of speaking is not used of things that occur necessarily. For example, the blessed, who necessarily love God, do not say of themselves, "We love God when we will," or, "if we will." Nor does anyone say of them: "The saints who see God love Him if they will, or when they will." Likewise, we say that God can create another world if He wills, because He can will this; but we do not say that the Father and the Son can produce the Holy Spirit if they will or when they will. For this manner of speaking signifies a power toward the opposite, which is lacking in the preceding examples.

28. What Jansen adds is also false, namely, that in Augustine's doctrine it is an unheard-of paradox that an act of the will is free because the will can turn aside from it and refrain from acting. For besides the testimonies brought forward above, the same Holy Doctor, in c. 2 of *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, which he published to reconcile freedom with grace, after citing

these words of Scripture: *He has placed fire and water before you; stretch forth your hand to whichever you will. Before man are life and death; whichever pleases him will be given to him*, adds with an exclamation: *Behold, we see the free choice of the human mind most openly expressed*. He means by those words, which manifestly signify freedom of indifference concerning good and evil. From this it is evident that the adversaries' position, which places the essence of freedom in spontaneity alone or immunity from coercion, is alien not only to Augustine's mind but also to Sacred Scripture. Hence we may rightly direct against them the words of Augustine, *Contra Julianum* III, c. 3: *Astonishing are the things you say, novel are the things you say, false are the things you say. We marvel at the astonishing, guard against the novel, and refute the false*.

29. Jansen objects second with several testimonies of Augustine and the other holy Fathers, in which they assert that coercion alone is opposed to freedom, or define and describe the essence of freedom through immunity from coercion alone. First, Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 4, says that men whom God foresees will sin are justly punished, *because by His foreknowledge God does not coerce the things that will be done*. And in *De duabus animabus*, c. 10, he defines a free will as *a movement of the mind with no one coercing it*. Likewise, St. Bernard, in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, says that free consent is one *which is not coerced or extorted*. And the Master, in *Sententiae* II, dist. 25, teaches that *choice is called free because it can desire without coercion and necessity*. Finally, St. Thomas, in the same dist., q. 1, a. 4, says: *Free choice is so called because it cannot be coerced*.

30. I answer that when St. Augustine says that men whom God foresees will sin are justly punished *because by His foreknowledge God does not coerce the things that will be done*, he does not understand that strict and rigorous violence of which philosophers and theologians speak, but uses the word for simple necessity and intends to teach that God's foreknowledge imposes no necessity upon our wills that would excuse from sin. Similarly, when he defines free will as *a movement of the mind with no one coercing it*, he does not take coercion strictly for properly so-called violence, which is incompatible with acts elicited by the will, but broadly for antecedent necessity. St. Bernard, the Master of the Sentences, and St. Thomas must be understood in the same sense.

That this interpretation is legitimate is established first from Augustine's first disputation against Fortunatus the Manichaeon, where he addresses him as follows: *How do we have sins if a contrary nature coerces us to do what we do? For one who is compelled by necessity to do something does not sin*. And in the second disputation he teaches that the Manichaeans affirmed that the

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soul is coerced to sin by a contrary nature, that is, according to his interpretation, is so enticed to sin that *there is no power to resist*. It is established second from St. Thomas, who uses the term coercion in the same sense in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 2, when he says that the intellect is coerced by the force of demonstration, that is, is necessitated to assent. And at the end of opusc. 3, c. 10, he says: *This mode is natural to man, namely, that he act freely and not under coercion, because rational powers are open to opposites*. Likewise, in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 1, corp., he says: *The necessity of coercion is that which belongs to something from an agent, as when someone is coerced by an agent so that he cannot do the contrary*. In these places the Holy Doctor manifestly uses coercion for necessity.

31. You will object third: St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 1, ad 1, says that *natural necessity does not remove freedom of the will*. He teaches the same in *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 5, from which he there infers that God freely loves Himself and the Father freely produces the Holy Spirit. Therefore, he judges that necessity is not incompatible with freedom of the will, but coercion alone is.

32. I answer that two kinds of freedom must be distinguished in us. One is freedom of complacency, spontaneity, and willing inclination. This is improperly called freedom and is freedom only in a qualified sense. For when anything is spontaneously borne toward a good connaturally suitable to itself—for example, when water flows spontaneously and without any impediment—it is said to flow freely. The other is freedom properly so called, which is named freedom of choice and includes indifference of judgment and election by the will. Therefore, when St. Thomas teaches that natural necessity is not incompatible with freedom, that God freely loves Himself, and that the Holy Spirit freely proceeds from the Father, he is speaking of the first freedom, not the second. He expressly teaches that the second excludes not only violent coercion but also necessity altogether, as is evident from *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 68, where he says in express terms: *The dominion that the will has over its acts, by which it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes the determination of a power to one thing and the violence of an exterior acting cause*.

33. You will say: St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, says that the blessed have free election concerning the vision and love of God. Therefore, he admits not only freedom of spontaneity or willing inclination, but also freedom of choice in relation to necessary acts, such as the clear vision of God and beatific love.

34. I answer that St. Thomas is not there speaking of vision and love insofar as they terminate in God considered in Himself, but insofar as they

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terminate in the divine essence as the reason for seeing or loving these or those creatures, which do not have a necessary relation to God. Under this aspect they fall under the free election of the blessed, since under this aspect they do not present a goodness that necessarily carries away their will.

35. You will object fourth against the second part of the assertion: Sacred Scripture in Sir. 15 explains man's freedom through the power of stretching forth his hand toward good and evil. Therefore, indifference of contrariety toward good and evil belongs to the nature of freedom.

36. I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. That it belongs to the nature of freedom as regards its essence and definition, I deny. That it belongs to the accidental state which freedom has in us wayfarers who are not confirmed in grace, I concede. The solution is evident from what has been said above.

§ 4.

It Does Not Belong to the Nature of a Free Agent That, When All Things
Prerequisite by Nature and Causality for Acting Have Been
Posited, It Can Refrain from Acting in the Composite Sense.

37. This is proved first by a fundamental reason: Things that are prerequisite for acting only according to the order of nature are simultaneous with the act. For priority of nature is only priority of causality and of the instant from which, not priority of time and of the instant in which. Hence, because what is, when it is, must be, it is impossible that, when all things naturally prerequisite for a free agent to operate have been posited, it can refrain from acting in the composite sense, or combine the negation of the action with them. Otherwise it could join non-act with act, and a form with its negation.

38. It is confirmed: Those things that precede an operation only by priority of nature and causality constitute the free agent as an actual principle of the operation. Hence, just as an actual principle of an operation cannot be combined with the negation of that operation, neither can those things that precede the free agent's operation only by priority of nature.

39. It is proved second: One of the prerequisites for God to operate *ad extra* is an eternal decree concerning that work, for example, concerning the creation of the world. But when such a decree is posited, God cannot refrain from acting in the composite sense; that is, He cannot combine His decree concerning the creation of the world with the world's noncreation, because this involves a contradiction on account of His immutability. Yet God created the world most freely. Therefore, to preserve freedom it is not

necessary that, when all things prerequisite by nature and causality for acting have been posited, one can refrain from acting in the composite sense.

40. It is confirmed: In the opinion of Suárez, Vásquez, and other recent authors, congruous grace is among the prerequisites for acting, and yet it cannot be combined with dissent or with the negation of action. Otherwise, divine foreknowledge, which foresaw that a man placed in these occasions and circumstances would infallibly consent, would be deceived; and the same grace would simultaneously be congruous and incongruous, which involves a contradiction. Likewise, predestination, the gift of perseverance, and confirmation in grace do not destroy freedom, yet they cannot be combined with sin and damnation. For, as St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3: *These are not incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man can be damned. But these are impossible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man is damned.*

Augustine teaches the same concerning the gift of perseverance in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 12, where he says that the gift is such that not only can men not persevere without it, but through this gift they cannot but persevere. This is the same as saying that nonperseverance cannot be combined with such a gift. Hence Petavius, vol. 1, IX, c. 7: That gift which is bestowed through Christ's merits not only gives the power to persevere if they will, but also the will by which they can; and it is such that, once it is given, they cannot but persevere, that is, they persevere certainly and, as is said in the Schools, infallibly, although they freely consent to that grace and gift, not necessarily, but in such a way that they can dissent, as the Council of Trent determines; although, so that they may will not to dissent, they are perfected by that same gift of perseverance. Therefore, it does not belong to the nature of free choice that, when all things prerequisite for acting by priority of nature and causality have been posited, it can refrain from acting in the composite sense, or combine the negation of the action with them.

41. You will object first: When philosophers say that a free agent is one which, when all prerequisites for acting have been posited, can act and not act, they undoubtedly use both expressions in the same way and judge both powers in the same way. Therefore, if a free agent, when all prerequisites for acting have been posited, can act in the composite sense, it can also refrain from acting in the same manner.

42. I answer that the antecedent is true if it is understood of prerequisites for acting with priority of duration and of the instant in which, but not if it is understood of prerequisites with priority only of causality and of the instant from which. For since these, as we said above, constitute the

free agent as an actual principle of the operation, once they are posited the free agent, properly speaking, does not have the power then to begin acting, but is in fact acting, while nevertheless retaining the power not to act, that is, not to continue the action it elicits.

43. You will object second with Fr. James Platel of the Society of Jesus, in *Synopsis cursus theologici*, vol. 2, n. 13: The Council of Trent, sess. 6, explaining the agreement of freedom with grace in c. 5, teaches that *man can cast away the inspiration* by which he is led to justification. And can. 4 defines that free choice, moved and excited by God, can dissent if it wills. The words *cast away* and *dissent* plainly indicate the composite sense. For to cast away is to relinquish something possessed or reject something offered; and to dissent is not merely to fail to consent in any manner, or to fail to consent to an excitation that does not exist, but to fail to consent to an excitation that actually exists, or to combine dissent or nonconsent with the existence of that excitation.

This is indicated still more openly by the Council of Sens in decree of faith 15, which says: *God's assistance in drawing is not such that it cannot be resisted*. And St. Thomas, *Quodlibet* I, a. 7, ad 2, says: *Because a rational power is open to opposites, God so moves the human mind toward good that it can nevertheless resist this motion*. Add that if these definitions of the councils were not understood in the composite sense, they would not oppose the errors of Luther, Calvin, and the other enemies of freedom. It is clear that these men did not deny such things in the divided sense, since they were not so foolish as to think that man, considered precisely on the part of the will and the indifference of judgment, could not absolutely exercise an act opposite to the divine excitation when the existence of the excitation was not supposed.

Furthermore, the same sense is established by this reason: Perfect freedom of indifference, such as is known to belong to fallen man, requires a proximate and unimpeded power for either alternative, by which man is said simply to be capable of either and to have such full dominion over his act that whether it is posited or not posited ultimately arises solely from his own determination. But for such a power it is necessary that, together with all absolutely antecedent prerequisites, which it is not in his power to have or not to have, man can equally combine the act or its nonexistence. Otherwise all, or nearly all, our necessary acts would be free for us, as will readily be evident to one who considers the matter.

44. I answer that when the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5, says that man can cast away divine illumination and inspiration, it is speaking of grace that excites morally. Since this grace pertains to first act and is not among the

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prerequisites for acting with priority only of nature and causality, as is physically premoving grace, it can be joined and combined with dissent.

Some interpret in the same way the other passage taken from can. 4 of the same session, and the immediately preceding words seem to favor this interpretation: *If anyone says that free choice, moved and excited by God, cooperates in nothing by assenting to God who excites and calls, etc.* These words signify calling grace, which excites only morally. Hence, when it is afterward added that *free choice can dissent if it wills*, they think this must be referred to the same exciting and calling grace. This solution seems probable if one adheres to the words and text of that canon.

But because many theologians judge that the Council's intention in that canon was to proscribe the errors of Luther and Calvin, who denied that the will freely cooperates with divine grace and retains under God's efficacious motion a power to dissent, it is more likely and probable that the Council is there speaking of God's efficacious motion and defines that free choice, as subject to such motion, retains the power of dissenting, not in the composite sense but in the divided sense. This suffices for the Council's intention and for proscribing the errors of Luther and Calvin, who, as we shall show below, denied an absolute power of dissenting in a will moved by God through efficacious assistance.

Nor is it an objection that the Council uses the word *dissent*, which seems to indicate the composite sense. It must be explained of dissent taken materially and specifically, insofar as it signifies an act contrary to that toward which God moves, not of dissent taken reduplicatively and formally, insofar as it signifies the composite sense of resistance together with grace or God's efficacious motion.

45. To the Council of Sens, besides the fact that it was not confirmed or approved by the Apostolic See, it is readily answered that the words *God's assistance in drawing is not such that it cannot be resisted* must either be understood of sufficient assistance that excites morally or be explained of a power of resisting or dissenting in the divided sense. St. Thomas must be understood and explained in the same way when he says in *Quodlibet* I that *God so moves the human mind toward good that it can nevertheless resist this motion*. For the same Holy Doctor expressly teaches in many passages cited in the Treatise on the Will of God, especially in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, that man cannot resist or dissent from God's efficacious motion in the composite sense. He says: *If God moves the will toward something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved toward it, although this is not impossible simply speaking*.

46. What the aforesaid author adds, namely, that if the preceding definition of Trent were not understood in the composite sense it would not oppose the error of Luther and Calvin, is slight and frivolous and manifestly opposed to the truth. For since those heretics teach that the divine decrees and assistances are so efficacious that they absorb all the indifference of the human will and leave in it only spontaneity, or immunity from coercion, it is evident that, consistently with that principle, they cannot admit in a will efficaciously moved by God a power of dissenting in the divided sense, since this power cannot coexist with spontaneity alone or immunity from coercion. Hence, by the very fact that the Council of Trent in the cited canon defines that such a power of dissenting remains in the moved will, it utterly overthrows the error of those heretics and confirms and establishes the agreement of freedom with efficacious grace.

47. Nor is what the same author adds of any force, namely, that Luther and Calvin were not so foolish as to think that man, considered precisely on the part of the will and the indifference of judgment, could not absolutely exercise an act opposite to the divine excitation when the existence of the excitation was not supposed. It is of no force, first, because, as we said, they thought that the efficacy of the divine motion absorbed and consumed all indifference of the will and consequently left in it no power of dissenting.

Second, although they admitted that when efficacious grace is removed and, as the adversary says, the existence of the excitation is not supposed, the will has the power to dissent, he nevertheless wrongly infers from this that they did not deny the power to dissent in the divided sense admitted by Thomists. For this power does not consist in the will's ability to refrain from acting when grace and God's motion have been removed, but not while that motion stands and remains in the will, as this recent author and other theologians of the same Society imagine and suppose. For such a composite and divided sense is plainly Calvinistic, not Thomistic.

Álvarez bears witness to this in II, resp., c. 1, n. 34: The composite sense is not that which is insinuated in the argument, namely, that when efficacious grace is in the will, the will cannot refrain from acting; for this sense was confessed by Calvin. Fr. Annat testifies to the same in *De libertate incoacta*, p. 226: Whom will the Jansenists find among the Thomists who says that a will predetermined by divine grace lacks the proximate power to dissent? Whom will they produce who interprets the distinction between the composite and divided senses in such a way that the meaning is that a will moved by God can dissent when that motion has departed and another has arrived?

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48. Finally, to the argument it is answered that although perfect freedom of indifference requires that free choice have dominion over its act and that whether the act is posited or not posited arise from its own determination, nevertheless, because such dominion is not supreme but subject and subordinate to the dominion of the first free agent and first determiner, a determination of free choice is never posited, nor can it be posited, unless the will, under the objective indifference of judgment which is the proximate root of freedom, is first by nature moved and applied by God to will and determine itself.

Nor is it necessary for freedom of choice, as the adversary says, that man, together with all absolutely antecedent prerequisites, can equally combine the act or its nonexistence. Otherwise, since the prerequisites for acting with priority only of nature and causality are simultaneous with the act, being an application to it and as it were a certain beginning of it, freedom would require that the will be able simultaneously to posit act and non-act, or to join the negation of the act with its existence and positing, which manifestly involves a contradiction.

TREATISE III.

ON HUMAN ACTS.

Having explained the general condition of human acts, namely, their character as voluntary and free, which is the foundation of their morality, it follows that we should briefly discuss them as considered both in physical being and in moral being. They can be reduced to eight principal acts, some of which regard the end and others of which concern the means.

The first is simple volition, which regards the end precisely in itself by an inefficacious appetite and simple complacency. The second is called intention, because through it the will tends toward the end as to be obtained through means. The third is counsel, which includes not only an inquiry into the means but also a judgment or sentence by which one is judged preferable to the others. The fourth is consent, by which the will takes complacency in the means discovered and approves them. The fifth is election, by which the will accepts one before the others. The sixth is command, by which the intellect, with a certain motion participated from the preceding election, intimates to the will the execution of the means. The seventh is use, by which the will applies the executive powers to the work. The eighth is the attainment of the end itself, from which results rest or delight, which is called fruition.

We must therefore treat briefly in this treatise of these eight acts, beginning with those that concern the end and proceeding to the others that concern the means.

CHAPTER I.

On the Simple Volition of the End.

1. Concerning this act there is almost no difficulty or controversy among theologians. It is evident from what has already been said that it is called simple volition because it has an altogether simple object, namely, the end taken precisely in itself; whereas the later acts either regard the end in relation to the means, as intention does, or the means with reference to the end, as election, consent, and use do, and thus do not have a simple object but one in some manner doubled.

2. It is also evident that the following distinction exists between the will taken for the volitional power and the will taken for its first act, which is simple volition: in the first sense its adequate object is good as such, abstracting from the good of the end and of the means; in the second sense it regards only the end as its adequate object. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 8, a. 2: *If we speak of the will insofar as it names a power, it thus extends both to the end and to the things directed to the end. But if we speak of the will insofar as it names an act, then, properly speaking, it concerns the end alone.*

For the will, insofar as it names an act and signifies simple volition, is borne only toward that which is the essential object of the power. Hence, because the essential object of the will is the end alone—for the things directed to the end are not good or willed for their own sake, but only through their order to the end—simple volition regards the end alone and not the means. Similarly, the first act of the intellective power, which is called understanding, does not regard conclusions but first principles. Hence the Philosopher, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 2: *The will concerns the end, but election concerns the things directed to the end.* Explaining these words in the cited article, ad 1, St. Thomas says that there *the Philosopher speaks of the will insofar as it properly names the simple act of the will, not insofar as it names the power.*

3. Third, nearly all theologians and philosophers, with the exception of the Nominalists, agree that the object of the will or simple volition is only the good, whether true or apparent, and consequently that the will cannot be borne toward evil under the aspect of evil. St. Thomas gives the reason in the same place, a. 1: appetite or appetition is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one desiring toward something. But nothing is inclined

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except toward something like itself or in some way suitable to it, and this is good. Therefore, no one desires anything except a true or apparent good. Hence Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4: *No one acts while intending evil.* And Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* I, c. 1: *Every art, every discipline, and every election seem to desire the good.* For this reason there is the ancient saying: *The good is what all things desire.*

Therefore, when someone wills evil to an enemy, he apprehends it as good for himself, and similarly grieves over his enemy's good as though it were evil for himself. Likewise, when the damned desire not to exist, they desire this as conducive to the absence of evil, or to liberation from misery and punishment; under this consideration it possesses some aspect of good. For, as St. Thomas teaches from Aristotle in the same place, a. 1, ad 3: *To lack evil has the nature of good.*

I add that, since happiness includes two things, one positive, namely, that it is the aggregate of all goods, and one privative, namely, the absence of all misery, it can be desired in two ways. First, by way of pursuing a good, which occurs when someone desires positively to possess or obtain some good. Second, by way of removing evil, as when someone desires to be free from some misery. In this second way, the damned and miserable, when they desire not to exist, seek happiness insofar as they then wish to be free from all misery.

4. You will say: The will is free with freedom of contrariety concerning good and evil. Therefore, it can indifferently will good and evil. I answer that although the will is free with freedom of contrariety in relation to any particular and limited good or evil, and consequently can indifferently will or not will it, it is not thus free concerning good and evil as such. Rather, it is determined by the Author of nature to love good as such and to hate evil as such. Therefore, the freedom of the will does not require that by an act of pursuit it can be borne toward evil under the aspect of evil; it suffices that it can will evil under the aspect of good. Hence Augustine, *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, c. 105: *The will is not to be blamed, nor should it be said either that it is not a will or that it is not free, because we so will to be happy that we not only do not will to be miserable but are entirely unable to will it.*

CHAPTER II.

On the Motive of the Will.

1. There are many motives of the will. The first is the will itself, which efficiently moves itself from potency to act. The second is the intellect,

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which moves it by proposing the object. The third is the sensitive appetite, which, because of its connection and sympathy with the rational appetite, often inclines it toward the same object. The fourth is God, who, as an extrinsic principle, efficiently moves it toward all its acts.

Concerning these motives there are three difficulties to be resolved briefly here. The first is how the intellect moves the will through the proposal of the object: whether in the genus of efficient causality, or only of final or extrinsic formal causality. The second is whether, in the first volition of the end, the will moves itself or is specially moved and applied to it by God. The third is whether the will is moved by God not only morally but also physically.

§ 1.

The First Difficulty is Resolved.

2. I say first: The apprehended object, or the intellect through apprehension of the object, moves the will in the genus of final and extrinsic formal causality, but not efficiently or as an active principle by which the will acts.

The first part is evident. The proposed object moves the will insofar as it is good. Therefore, it moves in that genus of causality in which goodness can move. But goodness moves in the genus of final causality by alluring the appetite toward love and desire of itself. Therefore, so does the apprehended object.

3. The second part is equally evident. For since the will of itself is indifferent and indeterminate to eliciting an act of this species—for example, an act of love or hatred, flight or desire—so as to produce this one rather than that, it needs some form by which it may be extrinsically determined. But this extrinsic form can be nothing other than the object proposed by the intellect. Therefore, the known object moves and determines the will in the genus of extrinsic formal causality. Hence St. Thomas, below, q. 18, a. 2, ad 2, says: *The object has in a certain manner the nature of a form insofar as it gives the species.*

4. The third part, which Cajetan, Conradus, Medina, and others of our Thomists deny, is proved by a fundamental reason. The principle by which a power acts, or the reason of acting, is intrinsic to the power that operates, since it constitutes that power intrinsically capable of acting. For example, the impressed species, which is the principle by which intellection takes place and constitutes the intellect in complete first act as capable of understanding, is received in the intellect itself. But the known object does

not intrinsically affect the will and is not received in it. Therefore, it cannot concur toward volition as an active principle by which it is elicited.

5. The common answer of the adversaries is of no force. They say that it is not necessarily required that the form and reason of acting be intrinsic to the power and inhere in it, but that it suffices for it to be in the same soul. Yet not only the radical and remote principle must be intrinsically completed, but also the proximate principle when it is powerless and incomplete in first act. Hence not only habitual grace is placed in the essence of the soul, but supernatural habits are also placed in the intellect and will so that they may elicit supernatural acts. Therefore, if the will is not of itself sufficiently powerful and in first act as regards the specification of its acts, as the adversaries say, it cannot be intrinsically completed and constituted in act by the object as a reason of acting.

6. It is confirmed: What is powerless cannot become powerful unless it is intrinsically changed, because the denomination “powerful” is intrinsic and therefore must necessarily be derived from an intrinsic form. From this principle the Thomists prove the necessity of physical premotion for operating, of the light of glory for seeing God, and of motion in an instrument for producing the effect of the principal cause. Therefore, if the will of itself is powerless to attain the specific nature of its operations, it must be intrinsically changed in order to be intrinsically capable of them. Consequently, that which is its reason of acting must be intrinsic to it and immediately received in it, not only remotely and mediately.

7. The same part can also be proved by this reasoning: That is a reason of acting to which the term produced through the action is assimilated. But the term produced through volition is not assimilated to the object, but rather to the will itself, since it is nothing other than an impulse and actual inclination toward the object, just as the will is an inclination in first act. Therefore, the object is not the reason of acting with respect to the will, but only with respect to the intellect, since the term produced through intellection, namely, the word, is assimilated to the object and is its formal likeness.

8. You will object first: In the divine persons, the Word actively influences love, for He produces the Holy Spirit together with the Father. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2: *The Son is the Word, not any word whatever, but the Word breathing forth love*. Therefore, in creatures also the word or conception of the intellect actively influences love and volition, at least as a principle by which.

The consequence is proved: The divine Word differs from a created word only in this, that the divine Word subsists of Himself, whereas the created word is an accident. But subsistence added to a cause does not vary the

genus of causality, although it varies the mode of causing. For if heat subsisted without a limiting subject, it would nonetheless heat actively just as it now does, although it would then act as that which acts because it would be subsistent, whereas now it acts only as that by which another acts. Therefore, if the Word in the divine persons actively influences love as a principle which acts, a created word must also efficiently influence love, at least as a principle by which.

9. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. First, because the divine Word, from the fact that He subsists of Himself, has an order of origin with the Holy Spirit which He would not have unless He were a productive principle of the Holy Spirit. A created word does not have this order with love. Second, because the divine Word, being infinite, uncreated, and consubstantial with the Father, has the same will and consequently the same spirative power as the Father. This does not belong to a created and finite word. It is therefore unsurprising that the divine Word produces love, whereas a created word does not.

To the proof of the consequence, it must be said that although subsistence as such does not vary the genus of causality or influence, subsistence insofar as it is divine and infinite does. For just as it makes the divine Word a person equal and consubstantial with the Father, so it causes Him actively to produce personal Love together with the Father.

10. The adversaries object second, and this is their fundamental reason: Although the will is sufficiently in act as regards the exercise of its act, because it is itself the moving principle as regards exercise, it is not of itself sufficiently in act as regards the specification of its act. Otherwise, all its acts would be of the same species, just as the will itself has one nature, in the proportional manner in which all acts of heat are of the same species because heat is of itself determined as regards the species of its action. Therefore, there must be another principle which, together with the will, causes the specification of the act. This can be nothing other than the object as actually understood, or as existing in the intellect under the character of the term of intellection. Therefore, it actively concurs toward the specification of the will's acts. Hence the Commentator, *De anima* III, says that the bath within the soul causes desire, and St. Thomas, below, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2, says that *the object of the intellective appetite is more active than the object of the sensitive appetite*.

11. I answer by denying the antecedent. The will possesses complete power not only for the substance of its acts but also for their specific character, either of itself or from habits or gifts superadded to it, in both the natural and supernatural orders. Therefore, on the part of the object or the

intellect proposing the object, no active influence is required, but only a final, objective, and extrinsic formal influence.

Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 4, says: This is the difference between intellect and will: the intellect is made actual by the fact that the thing understood is in the intellect according to its likeness; but the will is made actual, not because some likeness of the thing willed is in the will, but because the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed.

By these words he openly declares that, since cognition takes place through assimilation of the power to the object and is as it were a certain intellectual offspring proceeding from the object and the power as from male and female, it must actively proceed from the object existing within the knowing power by reason of an intelligible species. Volition, however, since it is an actual inclination and tendency toward the object and not an offspring of it, does not depend upon the object as an efficient principle by which it acts, but only as the term toward which it tends or as the extrinsic form from which it receives its species.

It therefore does not follow that all acts of the will are of the same species. First, because the will is related to its operations after the manner of an equivocal cause, which, although of one species, can produce effects diverse in species, just as light, the sun, the heavens, and similar things cause effects diverse in species. Second, for acts to be of the same species, it is not sufficient that they be produced by the same cause; it is also required that they have the same specifying form. For upward and downward motion, although sometimes caused by the same mover, are distinguished in species because they have diverse terms by which they are formally specified. But all acts of the will do not have the same specifying form; they have diverse specifying forms according to the diversity of the objects toward which they tend and upon which they depend as extrinsically specifying forms, as was shown in the proof of the second part of our conclusion.

12. To the testimonies of the Commentator and St. Thomas, it must be said that they used the word *act* or *be active* in a broad signification, insofar as it is said of any genus of cause and any causality or motion, and not strictly and in its proper signification, as it is attributed only to an efficient cause. Hence the same Holy Doctor, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 4, says that acting can be taken in three ways: first, formally, as when whiteness makes something white; second, efficiently, as when a painter makes a panel; third, finally, as when the end is said to effect something by moving the efficient cause.

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§ 2.

The Second Difficulty Is Resolved.

13. I say second: In the first volition and intention of the end, man does not move himself but is specially moved by God. This is not so, however, in every first act of any particular undertaking that occurs, although such an act also sometimes proceeds from a special instinct and motion of God.

The first part is proved: For the will to move itself in the first volition of the end elicited by man at the beginning of life, it would have to be in act with respect to that volition. But the will cannot be understood to be in act with respect to such a volition. Therefore, it cannot move itself toward it, but must be specially moved by God. The major premise is certain, for everything moves insofar as it is in act. Therefore, nothing can move itself toward that with respect to which it is not in act but in potency. The minor is evident from this: since that volition is the first of all, it presupposes no other volition through which the will would be constituted in act and reduce itself from potency to act.

14. This reason is confirmed and more fully illustrated: The will moves itself toward election of the means because it is supposed already to be in act through intention of the end. Since, therefore, no act is presupposed for the absolutely first volition of the end—for it is itself the will's first act—the will cannot move itself toward it, but must be moved by some actual extrinsic principle. Similarly, an animal moves itself in many ways through the motion of the heart, but it does not move itself toward the motion of the heart itself; rather, it is moved toward it by its generator or by the Author of nature. For since this is the first of all vital motions, it presupposes no other motion from which the animal may apply itself to it.

15. From this the second part remains proved. For at the beginning of any undertaking and in the intention of any particular end, man presupposes the first volition and intention of the end, toward which he was moved and applied by God, as well as other acts and affections of the will concerning the useful, honorable, or pleasurable good. From these he can move and apply himself toward those undertakings and toward volitions of particular goods and ends. Hence it is not necessary that he then begin through a special motion and instinct of God, as in the first act of his whole life.

16. That this nevertheless sometimes occurs, as is asserted in the third part of the conclusion, is manifest. For God sometimes moves man toward

works of which he had not previously thought, as toward searching for treasure, investigating enemies, and similar things. Hence it is said in 2 Macc. 8: *A good counsel came to them*. And in the life of St. Patrick it is related that, when he had been taken captive to Ireland, he discovered a treasure, not without divine instinct, through which benefit he restored himself to his former freedom. God also sometimes specially and suddenly moves certain persons toward faith, repentance, or other supernatural acts through operating grace, whose effects are from the will not moving itself but moved by God, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 111, a. 2. Hence in q. 9, a. 6, ad 3, he says: *God sometimes specially moves certain persons determinately to will something good, as in those whom He moves through grace*.

17. You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: God moves the will toward the first volition of the end in no other way than by applying it to elicit such an act. But He also applies it to the intention of any particular end and to the election of the means, since, according to the Thomists' position, neither the will nor any second cause can operate or proceed into act unless applied by God. Therefore, the will is not specially moved by God in the first volition of the end.

I answer that God moves and applies the will to act in two ways. First, by a certain general motion and application, by which He moves all second causes to act and reduces them from first act to second act. Second, by a certain special motion and application, by which, as a special mover and provider, He supplies the defect and impotence of some second cause. In the first way He moves the will toward the intention of any particular end and the election of the means; in the second way, toward the first volition of the end, because with respect to this the will is not in act as an applying principle.

Hence, with respect to the first volition, God does what the will does through intention of the end with respect to the election of the means. For this reason we say that He concurs toward the first volition of the end as a special mover, because He supplies what a particular cause provides in election. But He concurs toward election, or toward the intention of any particular end, only as a general mover and provider, because when He applies the will to those acts He does not supply the place of any created cause, but fulfills the office of the first cause and general mover.

18. You will object second: Man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason. Therefore, he is not specially moved by God toward the first intention of the end elicited at the beginning of moral life. The consequence is evident; otherwise, the sin would be traced back to God. For by this reason we showed in the Treatise on the Angels that the angels could not sin in the

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first instant of creation, since, because God specially moves toward the first operation, the sin would be attributed to God as its author or special mover.

The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas below, q. 89, a. 6, where he teaches that original sin can never be found together with venial sin alone. For if a man in the first instant of the use of reason turns himself toward God, he will be justified from original sin; but if he does not turn himself toward God, he will sin mortally.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. That man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason, if this is understood of the first initiating instant of attaining the use of reason, I deny. If it is understood of the terminating instant, I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence.

19. The solution is explained: Man does not begin to attain the use of reason in a single physical instant, but in a moral instant, that is, in some short interval of time, longer or shorter according as he is of quicker or slower intelligence. The reason is that he does not attain the use of reason except through a formal discourse, proceeding from confused and common cognition to distinct and particular cognition.

Now every short interval of time is bounded by two instants, begins from one, and is completed and consummated in the other. Therefore, when it is said that man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason, this must not be understood of the first instant of that interval, which is called the initiating instant of attaining the use of reason. In that instant he is related as an angel is in the instant of creation, because his intellect is applied by God to the first right dictate, from which the first act of the will infallibly follows. Rather, it must be understood of the other, terminating instant of that interval. For since the will is then supposed to be in act through the act that it elicited from God's special motion, it can through counsel and deliberation apply itself to whatever it wills and consequently can sin by turning itself toward a useful or pleasurable good discordant with reason. Similarly, an angel could sin in the second instant of creation, and in fact did sin by inordinately desiring his own excellence, because he could then deliberate fully and move himself.

§ 3.

Resolution of the Third Difficulty.

20. The third difficulty is whether the will is moved by God to act not only morally but also physically. For its resolution, it must be observed with St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 9, that because the act of the will is as it were

midway between the power and the object, a change in the act of the will can be considered either on the part of the will itself or on the part of the object.

Hence there can be two motions of the will. One is moral and objective, pertaining to the intellect and placing nothing real and physical in the will, but only alluring and inviting it extrinsically through manifestation of the goodness in the object. Augustine explains this in tract. 26 on John by the example of a sheep drawn by the sight of a green branch and of a boy incited to run by the display of an apple or nut: *You show a green branch to a sheep and draw it; nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn.*

The other motion pertains to the will itself and intrinsically changes and applies it to willing the object that allures it by its goodness and suitability. Hence this belongs to the genus of efficient causality and is called real and physical, or effective and applicative. The former, however, belongs to the genus of final causality and is usually called metaphorical or objective. For since an end does not act by a proper action but metaphorically, by alluring the will toward love of itself, it is said to move only improperly and metaphorically. This being presupposed:

21. I say third: God moves the will to operate not only morally, on the part of the object, but also physically, on the part of the power.

It is proved first from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4, where he asks whether God can move the created will. In the body of the article he distinguishes two kinds of motion, one pertaining to the object and the other to the power, and concludes that *in both ways it belongs properly to God to move the will*—understand efficaciously, as he there explains—but *especially in the second way, by inclining it inwardly*. Therefore, he judges that God moves the will not only morally and on the part of the object, but also physically and on the part of the power. Hence, in the same place, he raises against himself objections drawn from violence and injury to freedom, which he would raise in vain if he were speaking only of moral and objective motion, since there can be no doubt or suspicion that such a motion introduces violence or injures freedom.

22. It is proved second from the same Holy Doctor, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 9, where he argues: Since the act of the will is as it were midway between the power and the object, a change in the act of the will can be considered either on the part of the will itself or on the part of the object. On the part of the will, nothing can change the act of the will except what operates within the will; and this is the will itself and that which is the cause of the will's being, which according to faith is God alone. Hence God alone can transfer the inclination of the will from one thing to another as He wills.

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By these words he openly teaches that God moves the will not only on the part of the object but also on the part of the power, by really changing it and transferring it from one inclination to another. He proves this from the fact that God is the cause of the will's being and consequently can enter into it and operate within it, which belongs to no creature, not even an angelic one, according to Ezek. 44: *This gate shall be closed; it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it, because the Lord God of Israel has entered through it.*

He uses similar reasoning in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 88: Every motion of the will must proceed from an interior principle. But no created substance is joined to the intellectual soul as regards its interior things except God alone, who alone is its cause and sustains it in being. Therefore, voluntary motion can be caused by God alone. And in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 106, a. 2, corp.: On the part of the power itself, the will can in no way be moved except by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the one willing toward the thing willed. But this inclination can be changed only by Him who gave the creature the power of willing, just as a natural inclination can be changed only by the agent that can give the power from which the natural inclination follows.

This reasoning would have no force and would be altogether idle if St. Thomas were speaking only of moral motion. For purely moral and objective motion does not require entrance within the limits of the will or a real and physical change of it; and it is irrelevant to this genus of motion that God is the author and cause of the will, since angels, who are not causes of the will, can move it morally and by way of persuasion. St. Thomas himself teaches this in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 111, a. 2: *God alone can move the will efficaciously; an angel and a man can move it by way of persuasion.*

By these words he insinuates another reason for proving our conclusion. No motion pertaining to the object can in this state of the way be of itself and by its nature efficacious. Therefore, if God can move the will efficaciously, He can move it not only morally, on the part of the object, but also physically, on the part of the power. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from the same Holy Doctor, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4, corp., where he argues: Something cannot sufficiently move a mobile thing unless the active power of the mover exceeds or at least equals the passive power of the mobile thing. But the passive power of the will extends to good universally, for its object is universal good, just as the object of the intellect is universal being. Every created good, however, is a particular good; God alone is universal good. Hence He alone fills the will and sufficiently moves it as an object.

By these words he openly declares that no created good, however suitably proposed to the will, can by its own power efficaciously move and determine it to love itself, but that this belongs to the infinite and universal good alone. Hence even God, insofar as He is obscurely and enigmatically known by us wayfarers, cannot as an object efficaciously move the will, because He is not apprehended as universal good containing in Himself every nature of good. Rather, He is sometimes represented as inflicting the evil of punishment or as prohibiting some pleasurable good toward which the will is inclined; consequently the will can pursue Him with hatred or fail to love Him. Therefore, no motion pertaining to the object in this state of the way can be of itself and by its nature efficacious, or efficaciously and infallibly move the will.

23. It is confirmed: A motion with which the will's dissent cannot be combined is physical and not purely moral. But God moves the will by a motion with which the will's dissent cannot be combined. Therefore, He moves it physically and not only morally. The major premise is evident from what has already been said. The minor is proved from St. Thomas in the same place, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3: *If God moves the will toward something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved toward it.* And in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 11: *The power of the Holy Spirit infallibly accomplishes whatever He wills. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be simultaneously true: that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone toward an act of charity and that he loses charity by sinning.*

24. Our conclusion can further be confirmed by the reason insinuated by St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 8: *Just as the will can change its own act, so God can do so much more.* But the will moves and changes itself from one act to another, not only morally but also physically, without violence or injury to its freedom. Therefore, much more can God do this.

25. It is confirmed: The will can physically move and change itself from one act to another without injury to freedom by reason of the perfect dominion that it has over its free acts. But God has more perfect dominion over them, since, according to Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, c. 14: *God has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills.* Therefore, all the more can He physically move and change the will from one act to another without injury to freedom.

26. Finally, our conclusion can be proved by this reasoning: Through prevenient grace God truly and properly effects the consent and determination of our will toward good. But He cannot truly and properly effect it through moral motion alone. Therefore, He moves the will not only morally but also physically.

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The major premise is certain by faith. First, because the will as a second cause truly and properly effects its own determination and consent. Therefore, all the more does God as first cause do this. For nothing falling under the causality and efficiency of a second cause can escape the causality and efficiency of the first cause, as is evident of itself. Second, because the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5, teaches that the beginning of justification in adults must be derived from God's prevenient grace. But the beginning of justification in adults begins from the consent and determination of free choice toward good, for example, toward believing the revealed mysteries or loving God above all things. Therefore, through His prevenient grace God truly and properly effects the consent and determination of our will toward good.

The minor seems manifest. For moral motion is not true and proper efficiency, but only improper and metaphorical, and pertains more to the genus of final than of efficient causality. It moves only objectively, presenting to the will a goodness that allures it by its suitability. This is evident from the example of a boy morally moved and excited to run by the sight of an apple or an image. Who would say that this moral motion and excitation is truly and properly the efficient cause of his running? Therefore, through purely moral and objective motion God does not truly and properly effect the consent and determination of our will toward good, but only improperly. Hence Prosper, in the poem *De ingratis*, teaches that divine grace moves not only by counsels and persuasions, but inwardly changes and reforms man's mind:

*Not merely persuading through counsel and kindly exhortation,
And teaching what rule the grace of the law would possess,
But changing and reforming the mind within,
And by creative power fashioning it new from what was broken.*

27. Similarly, Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2, teaches that grace applies man's mind to acting well. This cannot belong to purely moral and objective motion, which does not apply but only excites, allures, and invites the will to act. His words are: *Who would dare to say that God lacked a manner of calling by which He might apply even Esau's mind to that faith and join his will to it, in which Jacob was justified?* And on Ps. 126: *We speak outwardly; He builds inwardly. He moves, He terrifies, He opens the intellect, He applies our sense to faith.*

Likewise, St. Bernard, near the end of *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, says that through grace God applies the will to the work and explains the work to the will. By these words he indicates both motions: the physical, when he says

that God applies the will to the work; and the moral, when he adds that He explains the work to the will, that is, shows it the suitability and goodness of the object or work, which belongs to moral motion.

Cyril of Alexandria also seems to insinuate both motions in *De adoratione in spiritu et veritate*, near the middle: Because man's nature is not very noble or sufficiently capable of escaping evil, God in a certain manner struggles together with us and seems to grant a twofold benefit: persuading by admonitions so that we may find assistance, and providing something stronger so that present and violent evil cannot prevail.

28. Therefore, just as there are two powers in man, namely, intellect and will, so, according to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, two motions or two graces are required, touching each power. On the part of the intellect, illumination and a pious thought are required; on the part of the will, motion and application, which Augustine sometimes calls *the ministration of the Spirit*. These two graces are like the two arms of God embracing the soul, of which it is said in the Song of Songs: *His left hand is beneath my head*, that is, beneath the intellect, which is the head of the soul and is illuminated through cognition. *And His right hand shall embrace me*, through His inspiration and motion, touching and inflaming the heart and affection by charity.

Many think that the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 4, insinuates both this grace and motion in the words: *If anyone says that free choice, moved and excited by God, cannot dissent if it wills, let him be anathema*. By these words the Council seems to distinguish motion from excitation and to teach that free choice is neither only physically moved by God, as Calvin asserted, nor only morally excited, as Pelagius taught, but is simultaneously physically moved and morally excited, and consequently under God's motion retains the power to dissent and therefore freedom.

29. You will object first: Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, c. 34, says that God acts through the force of persuasions so that we will and believe, whether outwardly through evangelical exhortations or inwardly through revelation. But to consent or dissent belongs to one's own will. Therefore, he admits only a motion and grace that morally excites and is subject to the will as regards its efficacy and use.

I answer that Augustine in that passage indeed presents and explains morally exciting motion and grace, and what pertains to excitation and illumination in an internal vocation. Nevertheless, he does not exclude physical motion that effects the good will, but clearly expresses it in the same place: *Certainly God also works the good willing itself in man, and in all things His mercy goes before us. But to consent to God's vocation or dissent from it,*

as I said, belongs to one's own will. By these words he openly declares that, although consenting to God's vocation belongs to one's own will, God nevertheless works the willing itself in us through grace.

Hence, in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 13, he says: We therefore will, but God works willing in us. We therefore act, but God works in us also to act according to a good will. It is beneficial for us to believe and say this. This is pious, this is true, so that the confession may be humble and submissive and the whole may be given to God. And in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 16: It is certain that we will when we will, but He causes us to will the good, of whom it is written: the will is prepared by the Lord. And in *Retractationes* I, c. 10: When I said in the book on Genesis, "Choice belongs only to the pure hearts of those who turn themselves from the love of visible things to fulfilling His precepts, which all men can do if they will," let the new Pelagian heretics not think that this was said according to their opinion. For it is altogether true that men can do this if they will; but the will is prepared by the Lord and is increased by the gift of charity so that they can.

30. You will object second: If the will were moved by God to act not only morally but also physically, it would not move itself and consequently would be merely passive with respect to its acts, which is heretical and was condemned by the Council of Trent against Luther. The consequence seems manifest, for it involves a contradiction that something be moved by another and nevertheless move itself.

31. I answer that St. Thomas proposes the same argument to himself in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4, where he asks whether God can move the created will. He answers that God can move it objectively and effectively, by inwardly inclining it. He then raises this second objection to the contrary: God cannot cause contradictories to be simultaneously true. But this would follow if He moved the will, for the will to be moved is for it to move itself and not to be moved by another. Therefore, God cannot move the will.

Behold the very same argument that the adversaries raise against us. St. Thomas answers it as follows: To the second it must be said that to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from oneself, that is, from an intrinsic principle. But that intrinsic principle can be from another extrinsic principle. Thus, to be moved from oneself is not incompatible with being moved by another. He teaches the same in *De malo*, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4: When free choice moves itself, it is not thereby excluded that it be moved by another from whom it has this very power of moving itself.

It is therefore not incompatible for free choice to be moved by God as first cause and first mover, and nevertheless as second cause and second mover to move and determine itself. Similarly, there is no contradiction in

the generation of a plant being simultaneously from the sun or heavens as first generating and altering cause, and from the earth as a second generating cause subordinated to it.

Indeed, since among movers essentially subordinated the second does not move itself unless moved by the prior, and the will in acting and moving is essentially subordinated to God as first cause and first mover, it is altogether impossible for the will to move itself unless it is first by nature moved by God and consequently pre-moved. For, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysica* IV, text 23: *The mover is prior by nature to the thing moved*. Or, as St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 149: *The motion of the mover precedes the movement of the mobile thing by reason of causality*, that is, by priority of reason and causality.

Henríquez, a celebrated theologian of the Society who was Suárez's master, therefore rightly and wisely says in *De fine hominis*, c. 6: It is not so difficult to understand, as some think, that, while preserving the exercise of our free cooperation, God, tempering the force of His concurrence, moves by efficacious assistance both physically on the part of the power and morally on the part of the object.

32. The other arguments of the adversaries, which proceed either from injury to human freedom or from violation of divine holiness, were answered in the Treatise on the Will of God, c. 4, §§ 4 and 5, where we explained the agreement of the predetermining decree and physical predetermination with human freedom and divine holiness. We therefore refer the reader to that place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

I shall relate here only the excellent reasoning of Fr. Thomas de Lemos, *De natura contingentis*, c. 7, near the end, where he proves that physical premotion does not remove freedom, and indeed that freedom cannot be more efficaciously removed than by denying such premotion. He argues as follows:

No power of a creature, however perfect, proceeds into act without a prior motion of God. Therefore, those who deny this prior motion of God say that free choice will never proceed into act. They themselves, therefore, entirely remove created freedom by denying that without which free choice will never move itself freely. The first antecedent, from which the others are plainly deduced, is the express teaching of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1, corp., where he says: "However perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature is held to be, it cannot proceed into its act unless moved by God." It is also established from that most widely known principle of philosophy: "A moved second cause moves." Therefore, if it is not moved by the first cause, it neither moves nor operates.

Hence, just as one who removed from a clock that universal and master wheel which moves the others would cause all the other wheels to cease and render them motionless, so those who remove that first, universal, and master divine motion which moves created choice thereby render created choice motionless with respect to its free operations. Therefore, the freedom of our choice can be removed and denied in no more efficacious way than by constituting it the first root of its own freedom. For if created free choice is the first root of its freedom, it is the first thing determining itself; therefore, it is not a second free agent; therefore, our freedom is entirely denied, for our freedom is essentially second freedom and cannot be first.

Again, the same author writes in *De divinis praedestinationibus*, tract. 3, c. 14: *In truth, our freedom cannot be more efficaciously denied than when things incompatible with it are granted to it. Since our freedom is essentially a second free cause, if its being second and free is removed by constituting it as the first free agent, which is incompatible with it, its freedom is manifestly removed—not only its actual freedom, as we have already said, but also its essential and potential freedom—because a kind of freedom is attributed to it which is incompatible with its essence and definition. For its essence is to be second freedom, and its definition is that it must move itself, not first, but secondarily and dependently upon another. When this is taken from it, its essence and definition are taken from it and all its freedom is denied.*

This can be shown further. It is certain that there is a first free agent and that there is a second free agent in reality, and also that freedom as such is abstracted by reason from the first and second and is said analogically of both, just as there is first being, second being, and being as such, abstracted analogically from both in the aforesaid manner. Again, it is manifest that these three freedoms have their proper natures and definitions. The definition of freedom as such in abstraction is that it can will this or that, if we are to believe our opponents. Therefore, the definition of the first free agent will be that it can first will this or that; and by the same reasoning the definition of the second free agent will be that it can secondarily and not first will this or that.

Therefore, since created choice is essentially a second free agent, its definition will be that it can secondarily will this or that. When this is denied to it by establishing that it moves itself not secondarily but first, it is evident that its definition is denied and its essence destroyed. Hence, when we defend that created choice does not move itself first and independently of another, but secondarily and with essential dependence upon the first, we defend our freedom and its essence and definition. But when, on the

contrary, those authors deny that it is moved secondarily and dependently upon the first and contend that it moves itself first, it is evident that they are the ones who deny its freedom by denying its essence and definition.

Hence, when they object that, if our choice is moved by God's efficacious will or by His predetermination or causality, its freedom is injured—an argument which they always have upon their lips—they say nothing else, if they are willing to attend, than that the freedom of choice is denied because its definition is assigned; than which nothing more impossible or absurd can be proposed.

Another subtle and excellent argument must also not be omitted. In tract. 5, in which the same author examines middle knowledge, c. 18, he turns against the adversaries that argument from injury to freedom which is as it were their Achilles, and shows that the congruous grace and motion commonly taught by them is hostile to freedom and entails its destruction. He thus formulates the argument, which he calls plainly demonstrative:

Place, time, and the temperament of the humors are plainly merely natural things. Therefore, if free choice placed under them will infallibly consent, the infallible consent of free choice has a natural connection with them. Therefore, those natural things determine free choice to consent infallibly in this manner, since, once they have been posited, it will so infallibly consent that it cannot dissent. Therefore, such a temperament will infallibly incline or determine free choice to consent. Therefore, it will be determined to consent by a merely natural and antecedent form. Therefore, the consent does not remain free.

This last consequence is manifest, because choice infallibly drawn by a merely natural and antecedent form to consent is naturally determined to consent by that natural form and thus does not consent freely. Hence the most learned School of Louvain rightly inferred that if consent of free choice has an infallible connection with that natural temperament, that consent does not occur freely. For how is freedom of choice preserved if, once a merely natural antecedent temperament efficaciously drawing choice has been posited, it cannot dissent but infallibly consents? Without doubt, this infallibility in consenting arises from that merely natural form determined to one thing, and consequently there will be no freedom in consenting.

This can be shown by a similar reason. For if, when a passion of the sensitive appetite antecedent to the free consent of the will has been posited, free choice could not dissent but would infallibly consent, that passion would not be subject to the command of reason or the freedom of the will. On the contrary, it would subject the will to itself and determine it

to consent by necessity, and thus would remove freedom from the will, as all theologians admit without contradiction in this case.

By the same reasoning, therefore, if, when a natural temperament of the humors antecedent to the will's consent has been posited, the will cannot dissent but infallibly consents, the will will be determined to consent by necessity through such a natural temperament and will consent without freedom. The consequence is evident from precisely the same reason. Who does not know that the judgment concerning a passion in the former case and a natural temperament in the latter is altogether the same, since each is a form, quality, or something merely natural, determined to one thing and efficaciously drawing the will with itself, so that the will cannot dissent from it?

It is altogether astonishing that these authors so sharply deny predetermination arising from the divine will—which wills that man infallibly and freely consent and applies proportionate free causes to this—as injurious to the freedom of choice because, once it is posited, choice cannot resist it; yet they establish another physical and merely natural predetermination from a certain natural temperament and proportion of the humors, once which is posited free choice cannot fail to consent, and do not see that our freedom is much more removed through this.

They ought to have observed that efficacious predetermination arising from the efficacy of the divine will, which wills that the will infallibly consent and applies proportionate free causes to this, does not injure freedom but causes actual freedom. It is otherwise with physical predetermination arising from a merely natural cause and from the temperament of the humors, which is a merely natural cause determined to one thing. They ought to have observed, I say, that if it is infallible that the will consents to this temperament, so that, once it is presupposed, the will cannot fail to consent, it altogether removes our freedom.

It is confirmed first: The movements of the will called first-primary are natural and not free because in them the will is not moved by reason, since they anticipate the use of reason, but is moved by a passion of the appetite or another cause that is not free but natural. Therefore, if the will must infallibly consent because it is constituted under such a temperament of the humors, it must be moved by that temperament and not by reason. Consequently, the movement of the will will anticipate reason and will not be free but necessary, like the first-primary movements.

It is confirmed second: To hold that the will will consent because it is placed under such a natural temperament, in such a place and time, is to hold that the will consents from a certain fatal necessity which altogether

removes freedom. This is proved as follows. The ancients held that fatal necessity removed freedom for this reason: they posited a certain force of the position of the stars or connection of other causes that anteceded the consent of the human will and inevitably drew it to consent, as is evident from Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, c. 1. Therefore, by altogether the same reasoning, if a certain force is now posited in place, time, and natural temperament that inevitably draws the will to consent, a certain fatal necessity is posited in those natural things no less than in the position of the stars or connection of other causes. Therefore, through this position they remove freedom as through a fatal necessity.

CHAPTER III.

On Fruition.

1. In order that it may be clearly perceived what fruition is, or in what it essentially consists, it must be observed that three things are necessary for enjoying something: to love it, to possess it, and to rejoice or take delight in it. For if someone loves but in no way possesses, he desires but does not enjoy the thing he loves. Similarly, one who loves and possesses something but takes no delight in possessing it does not enjoy it, as is evident in one who takes a bitter medicine that he desires. He is not said to enjoy it because he perceives no delight from taking it. The question, therefore, is in which of these three fruition formally and essentially consists. For its resolution:

1. [bis] I say briefly: Fruition, properly speaking, is neither the possession or attainment of a desired object nor the love of it, but the delight caused by the love and presence of the thing loved.

This is proved by the reason insinuated by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 11, a. 1. Fruition is derived from fruit, because just as fruit is what is ultimately expected from a tree and is received with a certain sweetness and delight, so fruition is the ultimate thing that we expect in an object and that we receive with a certain sweetness. These characteristics belong especially to delight and with greater right than to any other act. For delight is the ultimate thing that we expect in an object: first, indeed, we love and desire the thing; afterward, we attain it; and finally, we rest and take delight in its possession. Rest or delight itself also always has sweetness joined to it, whereas love and possession do not. Therefore, fruition consists formally in delight, not in love or attainment. Hence, when Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* I, c. 4, says that to enjoy is to adhere by love to something

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for its own sake, he is speaking in a causal, not formal, sense; for love is the cause of the delight in which fruition formally consists.

2. From this it is gathered first that perfect fruition concerns only the ultimate end. For what is expected simply and ultimately by man is the ultimate end, which totally satisfies and quiets the appetite. Nevertheless, because an intermediate end is delightful of itself and terminates a movement of the will, under this aspect it terminates some fruition and rest of the will.

3. It is gathered second that, because the ultimate end can be possessed in two ways, namely, perfectly in reality and imperfectly in hope, there can be two kinds of fruition concerning it. One is perfect, possessed in the homeland concerning God clearly seen; the other is imperfect, possessed here on the way concerning God imperfectly possessed through hope and love, of which the Apostle says in Rom. 12: *Rejoicing in hope*. These differ in species, since one is borne toward a good known by faith, hoped for, and not yet possessed, and is elicited by the virtue of hope; the other is borne toward a present and possessed good known by intuitive vision and is elicited in the homeland by the habit of charity.

CHAPTER IV.

On Intention.

1. Intention is formally an act of the will, although it presupposes an act of the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 12, a. 1, and proves by a reason drawn from the etymology of the word. To intend, as the word signifies, is to tend toward an end. But to tend toward an end belongs properly to the will.

First, because the will is borne toward things according as they exist in themselves in reality, and thus properly tends toward them as though outside itself; whereas the intellect is borne toward things insofar as they are in itself by reason of intelligible species, and therefore rather draws them to itself than tends toward them. Second, because tending toward an end belongs first and principally to the power that moves itself and all the other powers toward the end, which belongs to the will alone. Therefore, intention, formally speaking, is an act of the will.

2. That it presupposes an act of the intellect is evident, because, since nothing is willed unless previously known, the will does not tend toward an end to be obtained through means unless the intellect first proposes the end to it in relation to the means and the proportion of the means to the end.

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By reason of this presupposed act, intention is designated in Scripture by the name of an eye or light, as St. Thomas notes in the cited article, ad 1: Intention is metaphorically called an eye, not because it belongs to cognition, but because it presupposes the cognition by which the end toward which it moves is proposed to the will, just as by the eye we foresee where we must bodily tend. Hence Gilbert says excellently on the Song of Songs: If you have many eyes, close all the others after the example of an archer, and use this one by which you may look upon the beloved.

4. The formal object of intention is an end, both ultimate and nonultimate, as to be obtained through means. This is evident, first, from the common opinion of moral philosophers and theologians, for they posit in the will an act of intention concerning particular ends, such as acquiring health, making a pilgrimage, or something similar. Second, it is evident from the difference between intention and fruition. As St. Thomas observes in the same place, a. 2, ad 3, intention is related to the end after the manner of a certain motion and tendency. But motion and tendency concern not only the ultimate end or term, but also a proximate and intermediate one. Fruition, however, concerns the end after the manner of rest, which exists only when motion ceases; but motion does not cease until the ultimate term has been acquired. Hence, although true and perfect fruition concerns only the ultimate end, which is what man simply and ultimately expects, intention concerns not only the ultimate end but also particular and intermediate ends.

4. [bis] That the formal object of intention is the end as to be obtained through means is evident from the distinction between intention, simple volition, and fruition. Simple volition regards the end as absolutely good in itself; intention regards it as the reason for willing the means and insofar as it is attainable through them; fruition regards it as delightful and capable of quieting the appetite. Hence, although these three acts concern the end and have the same material object, they are distinguished in species because they regard it under the diverse formal aspects just explained. They are related as, in a stone, the appetite for the center, the actual tendency toward the center, and rest in the center, which, as is evident, are essentially distinct.

5. The holy Fathers, especially Gregory and Bernard, speak elegantly of this act. Gregory, explaining Job 38, Upon what are its bases made firm? says: The bases of each soul are its intentions. For just as a building rests upon columns and columns upon bases, so our life subsists in the virtues, and the virtues in the inward intention.

Bernard, commenting on the words of the Song of Songs, Your cheeks are beautiful like those of a turtledove, writes: Two things are required in

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intention, which we have said to be the face of the soul: the thing and the cause, that is, what you intend and for what reason. From these two beauty or deformity is judged. Thus the soul which has both of them right and chaste may deservedly and truly be told: “Your cheeks are beautiful like those of a turtledove.” But concerning one which lacks either of these it cannot be said that its cheeks are beautiful like those of a turtledove, on account of the deformity it will possess in that respect.

CHAPTER V.

On Counsel and Consent.

1. Before we discuss election, two acts that are prerequisite to it must be explained. The first is called counsel, which includes two acts of the intellect: an inquiry into the means that can assist in obtaining the end, and a judgment concerning their goodness and suitability. The first is related as a way and the second as the term, for through rational inquiry we arrive at a judgment concerning suitable means. Hence Cajetan, on *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 14, a. 1, says: *Counsel signifies a completed inquiry, that is, one extending inclusively to judgment.*

This is evident in the common counsel of many persons. For if, after difficulties have been multiplied, no judgment, deliberation, or sentence is reached, but the matter itself is deferred to another day or hour, all commonly judge and say that the counsel has not been completed.

2. Counsel, therefore, as found in men, is an inquiry and judgment of practical reason concerning means to be supplied by us when the matter is doubtful and of some importance.

In this definition or description, inquiry and judgment are the genus, because in man no judgment concerning the goodness and suitability of means is found without prior inquiry. “Of practical reason” is added because inquiries and judgments of the speculative intellect, such as mathematical consultations and demonstrations, are not counsels, as Aristotle says in *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 3.

“Concerning the means” is added because counsel does not concern the end, but only things directed to the end. For since it is a certain discourse of the practical intellect, just as discourse does not concern principles but conclusions, so counsel does not concern the end, which is related as the first principle in matters of action, but only the means conducive to its attainment. Hence Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 3: We deliberate not concerning the end but concerning things tending toward the end. Neither

does a physician deliberate whether he should heal, nor an orator whether he should persuade, nor a statesman whether he should regulate the city by good laws, nor does anyone else deliberate concerning the end. But after all have established some end, they deliberate how or through what things they can attain it.

It is then said, “to be supplied by us,” because counsel concerns only things done by us, or things subject to our care and dominion. The French, for example, do not deliberate concerning how the Indians should live or conduct business.

Finally, it is said, “when the matter is doubtful or of some importance,” because things certain and determined in some art or discipline do not fall under counsel. The grammarian, says the Philosopher in the same place, would deliberate in vain how the forms of letters are to be made, or the geometer how a triangle or circle is to be described, for these things are always done in the same manner and are determined by the art. Thus Moses in Exod. 25 did not consult skilled artisans concerning how the Tabernacle was to be made, because God had already determined this. Similarly, there is no consultation concerning trivial matters, for a prudent man is not solicitous about them because it matters little whether they are done or occur in this or that way. Hence it is said that the praetor does not concern himself with trifles.

3. I said, however, that counsel as found in men is inquiry and judgment. For just as knowledge is found in God without discourse, so counsel is found in Him without inquiry, because inquiry presupposes ignorance or doubt, which have no place in God. Hence counsel is attributed to God as regards the certainty of knowledge or judgment that in us arises from the inquiry of counsel, not as regards consultation or inquiry into the means, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, q. 14, a. 1, ad 2, and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1: *The very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God, not because of inquiry, but because of the certainty of knowledge at which those who deliberate arrive by inquiry.*

In angels, however, in whom there can be nescience, there can also be inquiry, although without discourse. Hence Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, c. 7, introduces the angels asking Jesus a question concerning the work of the flesh assumed for us, according to Isa. 63: *Who is this who comes from Edom, with dyed garments from Bozrah? This one is beautiful in His robe.* And Ps. 23: *Who is this King of glory?* Therefore, in angels counsel concerning supernatural things of which they possess nescience can include not only judgment but also inquiry, because they can doubt concerning them.

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4. The inquiry and judgment of counsel are followed by the consent of the will, which approves the proposed means and accepts them as useful and conducive to the previously intended end.

Some doubt whether such an act is distinct from election. To this difficulty I answer briefly with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3, that when the will through consent is borne toward several means, such consent is then an act really distinct from election. For consent is then prior to election, since first those several means are pleasing and afterward one is chosen from them.

But when the will is borne toward a single means, consent is not distinct from election, because it is not then determinative of one means among several. Rather, the same act is consent insofar as the will takes complacency in the proposed means, and election insofar as it prefers that means to others which are not pleasing. Hence the Holy Doctor says in the cited place: *If only one thing is found that pleases, consent and election do not differ in reality but only in reason, so that it is called consent insofar as it pleases for action, and election insofar as it is preferred to things that do not please.* Therefore, consent does not then antecede election but is intimately contained in it, nor is it regulated by a judgment other than the sentence by which the intellect judges practically that this single means must be chosen in order that the end may be obtained.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Election of Means.

1. Election is an act of the will concerning means, by which it accepts one before another in relation to the end.

It is said to be an act of the will because, although it presupposes an act of reason by which the means are compared with one another and with the intended end and it is judged which is more useful—wherefore Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 2, calls election *a pre-counseled appetite*, that is, an appetite for an object proposed through counsel and deliberated by reason—it nevertheless proceeds elicitedly and substantially from the will.

First, because the object of election is the useful good, and the will alone concerns good. Second, because election is an act of freedom, which for this reason is called the elective power, and freedom resides in the will as in its proper seat and chamber. Third, because moral virtue, which is an elective habit, is subject in the will. Therefore, so is election itself. Finally, because, as St. Thomas reasons in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 13, a. 1, when two

principles concur toward an act, one directing and the other directed and supplying the matter to be ordered, that act is not elicited by the directing power but by the directed power. This is evident in an act of fortitude or temperance referred and ordered by charity to God as the ultimate end, for that act is elicited not by the habit of charity but by fortitude or temperance. But in the election of means the will is borne toward a good ordered by reason. Therefore, such an act proceeds elicitedly and substantially from the will and only directively from the intellect.

2. It is then said that election concerns the means, not the end, because just as the intellect does not reason concerning principles but concerning conclusions, so the will does not choose the end as such, but only the means conducive to it.

I said “as such,” because just as in speculative matters what is a principle in one demonstration can be a conclusion in relation to another, as is evident in the principles of a subalternate science, which are conclusions of the subalternating science, so what is the end in one operation can be ordered to another as an end. Then election can concern it insofar as it formally has the nature of a means and only materially the nature of an end. Thus health, which a physician does not choose but presupposes as a principle of medicine, can be ordered to the exercise of virtue and spiritual salvation and under this aspect can be chosen.

3. Third, it is said that through election the will accepts one means before another, because we always choose that which the intellect, in the consultation preceding election, judges better and more suitable for attaining the end, according to Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 3: *What is established by consultation as preferable to the others is eligible*.

4. From this it is gathered first that the will cannot choose from several means one which the intellect judges less useful and less suitable for attaining the end. For since the will is a rational appetite following the guidance of reason and cognition of the intellect, it cannot pursue any object except one proposed to it by the intellect. Therefore, it cannot choose one before another unless the intellect judges that it is to be chosen before the other and is more useful and suitable for attaining the end.

5. I add that if the will chose a means judged less good, leaving aside the better, it would choose evil under the aspect of evil, which is impossible, as was shown in c. 1. The consequence is proved as follows. As Aristotle teaches in *Physica* III, c. 1, and St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1, ad 1, a mean compared with one extreme appears to be the other extreme. Thus lukewarm compared with hot appears cold, and compared with cold appears hot; gray compared with white appears black, and compared with black

appears white. Likewise, the middle string of a lyre is called grave in relation to the highest and acute in relation to the lowest. Finally, Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 3, teaches that angels are called immaterial and incorporeal in comparison with us, but material and corporeal in comparison with God.

But a lesser good is as it were a mean between a greater good and evil. Therefore, compared with the greater good it has the nature of evil. Consequently, if a man chose the lesser good known as such, leaving aside the better, he would choose evil under the aspect of evil.

6. It is gathered second that, if two means altogether equal or equally conducive to obtaining the end were proposed to the will, it could choose neither until the intellect devised in one some reason or suitability by which it excelled and outweighed the other.

For since the will, as we said, is a rational appetite following the guidance of reason and the thought of the intellect, it can never determine itself toward something proposed to it by the intellect as altogether equal and indifferent. This can be confirmed from the principle that no determinate action can proceed from an indifferent principle open to either alternative unless it is first determined by another, as the Commentator asserts in *Physica* II, text 48: *From that which is open to either alternative no action follows unless it is inclined toward one by something else.*

St. Thomas teaches the same in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 5; *Physica* II, lect. 8; and *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 2: That which is indifferently disposed toward many things does not operate one rather than another. Hence no effect follows from something contingent toward either alternative unless through something by which it is determined to one.

But when two altogether equal means are proposed to the will, it is merely indifferent and indeterminate toward them. Therefore, unless it is determined by the intellect devising in one of them some goodness and suitability by which it excels and outweighs the other, it will be able to choose neither. Hence St. Thomas, in the same q. 13, a. 6, ad 3, reduces the whole reason for choosing one before another to a diverse consideration by which something can stand out more and bend the will.

7. You will say first: When two equal means are proposed to the will, it remains free as regards exercise and specification, since such means are particular and limited goods, and the will cannot be necessitated except by good in common or by God Himself clearly seen. Therefore, since freedom consists in the elective power concerning the means, the will can choose whichever of them it prefers.

I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. That it can choose whichever of them it prefers while the practical judgment

of the equality of the means remains, I deny. That it can do so when this judgment is changed, I concede.

The solution is evident from what has been said. Although the will is free, because it is a rational appetite following the guidance of reason and cognition of the intellect, and because its whole freedom proceeds from the judgment of reason as its proximate root, it cannot operate or choose without a prior judgment of reason moving and determining it in the genus of final and extrinsic formal causality, as was shown in c. 2, § 1. Hence, just as the will does not have from its freedom the power to be borne toward the unknown, neither does it have the power to choose what the intellect represents to it by practical judgment as a lesser or equal good.

8. I add that, just as intention of the end depends upon the will, so also the practical judgment concerning the more suitable means to be chosen descends from its freedom, by which it willed to apply the intellect to deliberation concerning the means. Hence such a judgment can cease, either because the will can desist from intention of the end or because, while this intention remains, it can apply the intellect to investigate other means or to devise other reasons of goodness and suitability in means that appeared less or equally good, by which it may be moved to choose them.

Hence, even with the supposition of that practical judgment concerning the more suitable means, the will can by antecedent power and in the divided sense choose other means, although a judgment that one means is more suitable cannot stand simultaneously with the election of a lesser or equal good. Otherwise, it would not be a rational appetite, because it would not follow the guidance of reason or the practical dictate of the intellect.

9. You will say second: The will can be borne by election toward everything possessing the nature of a useful good. But the nature of a useful good is found in an equal or even lesser means. Therefore, the will can choose it.

I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. That the nature of a useful good is found in an equal or lesser means if they are considered in themselves or separately, I concede. If they are compared with another equally or more good means, I deny. For a lesser means in relation to a better assumes the nature of evil, as we showed above; an equal means in relation to an equal is indifferent because it has no reason or goodness above the other by which it is to be preferred.

10. You will say third: If two goods equal in every respect are proposed to a man—for example, two loaves or foods altogether equal in quantity, quality, proximity, and other conditions to a hungry man—he either chooses one of them, both, or neither. If the first, the point is established, for the will

will then not be determined by some greater goodness proposed to it, because none exists by supposition, but precisely by itself and its freedom. The second cannot stand, because we suppose that the hungry man is not permitted to take both loaves but only one. The third seems altogether improbable, for it seems ridiculous that the hungry man, like Tantalus, would prefer to perish in his hunger rather than reach for or choose the food prepared for him. Therefore, a man can choose one from two equal goods or means.

I answer that the hungry man will then take one of the loaves by a certain sudden movement and natural impulse, without deliberation and election in the rigorous sense. But if he wills to deliberate perfectly and consider which food is better, the will will apply the intellect to investigate in one of the means some reason of goodness, suitability, or convenience that excels the other, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, a. 6, ad 3.

If, however, after this inquiry it finds no new goodness in either, the will will be determined either by extrinsic motives, such as circumstances or other occurring occasions, or by the experience of its own freedom, which it can will to exercise concerning one rather than the other. Then the will's freedom will not pertain only to the elicitive principle of election but also to the object, and will have the nature of a motive alluring and inclining it to choose that which in its intrinsic goodness is equal and indifferent. This must be carefully observed in order to answer various objections.

11. You will ask whether, given an efficacious and absolute intention of the end, if only one means occurs for obtaining it, the will is necessitated to choose that means. I answer affirmatively and show it by two reasons.

The first can be proposed as follows: The knowledge of principles is related to knowledge of conclusions as intention of the end is related to election of the means. But when knowledge of principles is posited, it is impossible for knowledge of a conclusion not to follow when the conclusion has a necessary connection with them and the truth of the principles cannot stand if its truth does not stand. Therefore, it is also impossible for an efficacious intention of the end to stand without election of the sole means without which the end cannot be acquired.

The second reason is this: Man cannot, at least with an efficacious will, will impossibilities. But if he absolutely and efficaciously intended the end and nevertheless refused to choose the sole means without which the end cannot be obtained, he would will something impossible with an absolute and efficacious volition. Therefore, given an efficacious intention of the end, a man cannot reject the sole means but is necessitated toward it.

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12. You will say: Such necessity cannot be derived from the end, since no particular end necessarily moves the will, nor from the means itself, which also possesses only finite and limited goodness incapable of necessitating the will. Therefore, the necessity is fictitious.

I answer that this necessity arises neither from the end nor from the means taken separately, but from the necessary connection of the means with the end. Similarly, when it is said, *If Peter runs, he necessarily moves*, the necessity of this inference and consequence arises neither from Peter's running nor from his movement, which are contingent, but from the necessary connection between the antecedent and consequent, or between Peter's movement and his running.

CHAPTER VII.

On Use.

1. Besides election of the means, there is in our will an act by which it applies the other powers to operation, and this is called *active use*. Thus St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 16, aa. 1 and 4, and above in the introduction to q. 8, where he says that there are three acts by which the will is moved toward things directed to the end, namely, *to choose, to consent, and to use*.

Reason also supports this. Acts having the same material object considered under diverse formal aspects are essentially distinguished, as is evident in intention, fruition, and simple complacency. Although these concern the end, because they attain it under the diverse formal aspects explained above, they are essentially distinguished.

But election and use, although they terminate in a means, nevertheless tend toward it under diverse formal aspects. Election regards it insofar as it pertains to the order of intention and is the last thing in that order and an effect of the end. Use regards it insofar as it pertains to the order of execution and is the first thing in that order and the efficient cause of the end possessed in reality. Therefore, they are essentially distinguished.

2. It is confirmed: Intention, which is an efficacious act concerning the end, is distinguished from fruition of the same end because fruition regards it as present, while intention regards it as in some manner future. Likewise, election regards the means as in some manner future, while use regards them as present. Therefore, they are acts diverse in species.

I add that when a new difficulty presents itself, the will requires a new application and effort and consequently a new act to overcome it. But a

greater difficulty presents itself in execution than in election alone. For choosing is a merely internal act in which the will struggles only with itself and has no impediment or difficulty other than one pertaining to itself. In execution, however, it struggles not only with itself but also with the other inferior powers and exterior impediments, by which the spirit is often broken unless strengthened by the virtue of constancy and perseverance.

Hence experience shows that some men judge, deliberate, choose, and desire rightly with the greatest ease, yet fail in execution, as Bernard excellently and elegantly declares in *De consideratione* I, c. 1: How often do you will, and in vain? How often do you move but make no progress? How often do you strive, and are given no passage farther? You exert yourself but do not obtain; you labor in childbirth but do not give birth; you attempt and are swept away; and where you begin, there you fail. While you are still beginning, your strength fails you. “The children have come to the birth,” says the Prophet, “and she who is in labor has no strength to give birth.” Therefore, besides the act of election, the will needs a new act for execution, or for applying the executive powers to the work.

3. You will say first: Election is an efficacious volition of the means. Therefore, it is of itself sufficient for their execution, and active use, by which the executive powers are applied to the work, is useless.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Election is not called an efficacious volition of the means because it alone, without another act of the intellect and will, suffices for the means to be put into execution, but because it is infallibly followed by command in the intellect and use in the will, by which the power is applied to execute what was chosen, just as an efficacious intention is infallibly followed by election of the means.

4. You will say second: Through election alone the will moves and applies the intellect to elicit an act of command, which precedes active use, as will be evident from what is to be said in the following chapter. Therefore, similarly, once election is posited, the will can use the executive powers and apply them to operation without a distinct act.

I answer by granting the antecedent, which some of our Thomists deny, and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the distinction is that greater difficulty is found in executing than in commanding. Hence, although the will does not need an act distinct from election in order to apply the intellect to an act of command, it does need one to apply the executive powers to the work.

CHAPTER VIII.
On Command.

Concerning this act there are two difficulties and controversies to be resolved briefly here. The first is whether there is in man a command with respect to his own operations. The second is whether such a command, granted that it exists, is an act of the intellect or of the will.

§ 1.

There Is in Man an Act of Command with Respect
to Himself and His Operations.

1. This is proved first from St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Augustine says in *Confessiones* VIII, c. 9: The mind commands the hand to move, and the facility is so great that the command is scarcely distinguished from the service. St. Thomas writes in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 3, ad 1: The will of someone finally begins to use by executing the command of reason—sometimes the will of another, when someone commands another; sometimes the will of the one commanding, when someone commands himself.

2. It is proved second: Command is found in a prince in relation to other men subject to him. Therefore, it is found in every man in relation to his executive powers.

The consequence is proved, first, because just as a prince has dominion over his subjects, so in every man reason, joined to the will, has dominion over the other powers. Second, just as political prudence exists in a prince and has as its object the common good of the whole kingdom or republic, so in every man operating according to right reason there is personal prudence whose object is his proper and particular good. Therefore, just as a prince through political prudence commands others to do what is suitable to the common good, so reason through personal prudence commands the inferior powers to do what is suitable to the particular good.

3. It is proved third by a fundamental reason: Besides election there must be posited in the will another act called active use, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore, similarly, besides the practical judgment

antecedent to election, another act called command must be posited in the intellect, by which the will is directed in the act of using.

The consequence is proved because, since the will is a rational appetite following the direction of reason, for every elicited act of the will there necessarily corresponds in the intellect an act directing it.

4. You will say that the practical judgment preceding election, continued until execution, suffices to direct the act of use, and consequently an act of command is not required.

But to the contrary, first: Use is distinguished from election because election concerns a future means, whereas use concerns a means to be executed here and now, as we declared in the preceding chapter. Therefore, the act directing use is likewise distinguished from the act directing election.

The consequence is proved: Acts of the intellect regulating acts of the will have the same object as the acts regulated by them. Therefore, just as in the means, insofar as they have the nature of things to be chosen and executed, there is a diverse formal objective nature of utility—namely, the useful as future and as present—sufficient to specify and multiply two acts of the will, so there must be found in them a diverse objective intelligibility sufficient to multiply two acts of the intellect, namely, judgment and command.

5. To the contrary, second: The act of judgment, insofar as it is continued after election, proposes nothing to the will other than what it proposed before election. Otherwise, it would not be the same continued act but a diverse one. But before election it either proposed only the means as to be chosen or, if it also proposed them as to be executed, it proposed their execution only as future and as though distant. Therefore, after election it will represent execution only in this manner.

But an act of the intellect proposing execution to the will as future and distant is not sufficient to direct the will's use, whose object is a means to be put into execution here and now. Therefore, another act of the intellect must be posited, which can only be an act of command.

To the contrary, third: For subjects to execute what a prince judges must be done by them, a precept is necessary because of the difficulty in executing the work. Therefore, since a similar and no lesser difficulty exists within the same man in relation to his powers, so that they execute what the will chooses and the intellect judges suitable, an act of command distinct from counsel and the judgment antecedent to election must be posited in the intellect.

Hence, three virtues are posited in the intellect for these three acts: eubulia for counsel, synesis or gnome for judgment or sentence, and

prudence for precept or command, as may be seen in St. Thomas below, q. 57, a. 6, and II-II, qq. 48 and 51 throughout.

6. You will object first: Command serves either to move the inferior powers or to move the will. But it serves neither. Therefore, it is altogether useless.

The minor is proved: Since the will is a blind power and the inferior powers are not intellectual, both the will and the inferior powers are incapable of perceiving the command of reason. Therefore, command cannot serve to move either the will or the inferior powers.

7. I answer that command serves both to move the inferior powers and to move the will, but only mediately to move the inferior powers and immediately to move the will, so that it may use the inferior powers or apply them to acting. Hence the intimation of the command is made immediately to the will itself.

Nor is it an objection that the will is a blind power and devoid of cognition. Just as the eye sees for the whole body and not only for itself, so the intellect understands for all the powers. Hence, just as it is not necessary that the foot or hand see in order to be directed by the eyes, neither is it necessary that the will know in order to be directed through an act of command toward eliciting use and applying the executive powers to the work. Otherwise, the will would not only be incapable of being directed through an act of command; it could not be regulated by a judgment of reason or moved objectively by the intellect, which is absurd.

8. You will object second: An act of command moves the will toward execution of the means either as regards specification or as regards exercise. Not as regards specification, because the judgment preceding election dictates that the means are not only to be chosen but also executed, and is therefore sufficient to move the will toward execution of the means as regards specification. Nor as regards exercise, because, since the will by its nature is the first mover as regards exercise, it cannot be moved by command as regards exercise. Especially is this so because the intellect is moved by the will as regards exercise. Otherwise, there would be mutual causality and dependence between those two powers in the same genus of efficient causality, which seems impossible.

9. I answer that the intellect through an act of command moves the will both as regards specification and as regards exercise.

Although the judgment regulating election proposes the means as executable and to be chosen here and now, it does not propose them as already chosen and to be executed here and now. Hence, for this second aspect another act of the intellect is required, subsequent to election and

regulating use, which we call command, as is evident from what was said in the third proof of our assertion.

Similarly, although the will is the first mover as regards exercise and consequently moving as regards exercise belongs to it primarily and of itself, this does not prevent the same from belonging secondarily, consequentially, and through participation from the will to some act of the intellect. By parity, ordering, which is proper to the intellect, is participated by an act of the will, namely, election. Hence St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 15, says: *Election is an act of the will, not absolutely, but in relation to reason, because in election there appears what is proper to reason, namely, comparing one thing with another or preferring one; and this is found in an act of the will through the impression of reason, insofar as reason proposes something to the will not merely as useful but as more useful for the end.*

10. To what is added concerning mutual causality and dependence in the same genus of efficient causality, it must be said that, although this is impossible with respect to the same act or effect, it is not impossible with respect to diverse acts, and only the latter is found in the present case.

For through an act of election the will moves the intellect to command execution of the means. The intellect, however, through an act of command participating motive efficacy from the preceding election, moves the will as regards exercise, not toward the election itself, which is the cause of command, but toward another distinct act, namely, active use, by which the will applies the exterior powers to execution of the means.

But if you ask why the will, which is the first mover as regards exercise, cannot move itself toward such an act without the intervention of command, I answer that this arises from the fact that, although it has the power to move itself and the other powers absolutely, it does not have this power after the manner of ordering. For this belongs properly to the intellect, whose function it is to order one thing to another, as will be evident from what is said in the following section.

11. You will object third: Man cannot pray to himself. Therefore, neither can he command himself. I deny the consequence and the parity. To command belongs to a superior in relation to an inferior; to pray, on the contrary, belongs to an inferior in relation to a superior. Hence, since in man the intellect is the supreme power and has no other power superior to it, it can by command subject the inferior powers to itself, but cannot by prayer be subjected to another power superior to itself.

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§ 3.

Command Is Substantially an Act of the Intellect, but
Necessarily Presupposes an Act of the Will.

12. The first part is proved first: Command is the principal act of prudence, which is preceptive, as Aristotle teaches in *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, c. 10, saying: *Prudence is preceptive, for its end is to command what is to be done*. But prudence is in the intellect, since it is an intellectual virtue, as the same Philosopher teaches in *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, c. 5, and St. Thomas below, q. 57, a. 4. Therefore, command is substantially an act of the intellect.

13. The same part is proved second: Just as obedience belongs to an inferior, command belongs to a superior, because commanding and obeying correspond to each other. But reason or intellect is what is superior and most excellent in man, according to Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, c. 7: *The intellect is the most excellent of all things within us*. Therefore, command belongs to the intellect.

14. Third, the same part is confirmed by the reasoning of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1. To command someone is to order him toward something by intimating and declaring what he must do or omit. But ordering, intimating, and declaring belong to reason. Therefore, commanding is an act of reason.

The major premise is evident, for a superior cannot will and command something unless he orders a man toward doing it by intimating and declaring to him that he is to do it. The minor is proved as regards both parts. First, to order one thing to another is to compare one with the other. But comparison of one thing with another belongs to the practical intellect, just as inference of one thing from another belongs to the speculative intellect. Therefore, ordering belongs to the intellect. Hence Aristotle, *Metaphysica* I, c. 2, says that *it belongs to the wise man to order*, and St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 1, says that *it belongs to reason alone to direct and order*.

Finally, intimation and declaration are nothing other than a certain manifestation, explanation, and speech. But manifesting and speaking belong to the intellect, which is as it were the mouth or tongue of a spiritual substance, according to Ps. 36: *The mouth of the just shall meditate wisdom*. Therefore, so do intimating and declaring.

That command necessarily presupposes an act of the will is manifest, for it presupposes an election of the will, from which it participates freedom

and motive efficacy, or the power of moving, as we declared in the preceding section.

From this it follows that the weakness of command in us arises from the sickness and infirmity of the will, which sometimes does not fully and perfectly will the good that it does and does the evil that it does not will, as Augustine elegantly declares in *Confessiones* VIII, c. 9: The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does not. What is the source of this monstrosity? It does not will wholly and therefore does not command wholly, for it commands only insofar as it wills. The will commands, but because it does not command fully, what it commands does not occur. It is therefore not a monstrosity partly to will and partly not to will, but a sickness of the mind, because it does not rise wholly, raised up by truth and weighed down by habit.

15. From this you will understand that an act of command can be described as follows: Command is *an ordering intimation, accompanied by a certain motion, of a work to be executed.*

For command, as is evident from what has been said, includes three things or is composed of three acts: motion, direction, and intimation. It receives the first from the will, which is the first mover as regards exercise; it receives the other two from the intellect, to which it belongs to order and speak.

These two powers mutually assist each other in their operations. The intellect directs the will and determines it as regards the species of the act; the will moves the intellect and determines it as regards exercise. Some explain this excellently through the emblem of two men, one blind and the other lame. The blind man carries the lame man upon his shoulders, while the lame man directs the blind man with his eyes. As Alciatus says: *The one lends his eyes; the other lends his feet.*

16. You will object first against the first part of the assertion from testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, who sometimes seem to insinuate that command is an act of the will. Augustine says in *Confessiones* VIII, c. 9: *It is the will that commands.* St. Thomas, below, q. 17, a. 6, ad 2, proves that the first cause of sin is the will *because it commands all voluntary acts, in which alone sin is found.*

17. It is readily answered that either they are speaking of command broadly and improperly taken, insofar as it signifies the same thing as moving toward an end. In this manner charity is said to command the acts of all the virtues, insofar as from the motion of charity the acts of all other virtues are ordered toward the love of God, or toward God as supremely loved.

Or, if they are speaking of command strictly taken, of which we are now treating, they intend only that it is from the will, not substantially and elicitedly, but causally and by way of origin, because the will from intention of the end and election of the means moves the intellect to elicit an act of command.

18. You will object second: Command formally belongs to the power to which dominion belongs, since to command is the proper act of dominion and of a superior over subjects. But dominion formally resides in the will, which is called the mistress or queen of the other powers, and not in the intellect. Therefore, command is formally an act of the will.

19. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. That command belongs to the power to which dominion belongs as regards the power of moving, I deny. As regards the power of declaring by intimating and ordering, I concede. I similarly distinguish the minor premise. That dominion resides formally in the will as regards the power of moving and applying, I concede. As regards the power of declaring by intimating and ordering, I deny, and I deny the consequence.

Dominion therefore signifies two things: motive efficacy and a declarative and directive power. The first belongs to the will, which for this reason is called the mistress and queen of the other powers, since their motion as regards exercise begins from the will. The second belongs to the intellect, whose function is to order, declare, and intimate. Hence the intellect is also called king of the other powers, because it governs them through prudence.

Command, therefore, belongs substantially to the power to which dominion belongs, not as regards the power of moving but as regards the power of directing. For since it belongs to command to proceed rationally, it must not merely move and impel subjects, but govern them rationally and moderately, which is done through prudence and the direction of reason.

20. You will object third: Every act of the intellect is either simple apprehension, judgment, or discourse, for philosophers assign no other than these three operations of the mind. But command is neither simple apprehension, judgment, nor discourse. Therefore, it is not an act of the intellect but of the will.

21. Some of our Thomists answer that command belongs to the second operation of the mind and is a practical judgment subsequent to election. They call this judgment *practically practical* in order to distinguish it from the judgment regulating election, which is called simply practical.

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22. But to the contrary: Truth or falsity is found in every judgment of the intellect. But neither truth nor falsity is found in command. Therefore, command is not a practical judgment subsequent to election.

The minor is proved: When someone commands another, “Do this,” he says neither what is true nor what is false, because he does not assert that something is or is not. Hence someone is not said to command another truly or falsely, but well or badly.

23. It is therefore better to answer with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 1, ad 2, that the three operations of the mind commonly assigned by philosophers belong to the speculative intellect, whereas other distinct acts belong to the practical intellect, such as prayer and command.

24. It must nevertheless be observed that, although command is not formally a judgment, a certain judgment is virtually found in it. For it is equivalent to this judgment: “You must do this,” or, “It is expedient for you to do this.” Hence it is called a *practically practical* judgment, to distinguish it from the judgment antecedent to election. Although the latter is practically practical with respect to election, by efficaciously moving the will here and now to elicit it, it is only speculatively practical with respect to execution of the means, because it proposes only the suitability of execution after the manner of a simple enunciation, not by way of an impulsive intimation.

CHAPTER IX.

On the Morality of Human Acts in Common.

1. Since morality follows the nature or physical being of human acts, after considering them in physical being and as belonging to the order of nature, it follows that we should discuss their morality, or moral goodness and malice.

But because knowledge of a generic grade greatly assists in perfectly understanding the species contained under it, morality in common must first be treated, and we must briefly explain what it is and what it adds beyond freedom.

2. I therefore presuppose as certain that freedom is indeed the foundation of the morality of human acts, but is not formally morality itself, since freedom in human acts is understood prior to morality. For we conceive first that the intellect proposes an object with indifference and that the will tends toward it with indifference, in which freedom formally consists, before we conceive the act as possessing moral being. Indeed, the act has moral being from tending toward the object with indifference as

from an *a priori* reason, because from this it has the capacity to be measured by the rules of morals.

I add that, if there were no rule of morals, for example, no law, freedom would still be understood in acts of the will, given indifference of judgment in the intellect; nevertheless, there would be no morality in them in such a case. Therefore, morality is not formally freedom itself. Hence, when St. Thomas sometimes says that an act of the will is human insofar as it is free or insofar as it proceeds from deliberation of reason, the expression “insofar as” must be taken in a causal, not formal, sense.

3. The morality of human acts therefore consists formally in the relation of a free act to the rules of morals.

First, because the nature of morality in human acts belongs to the genus of something measurable and regulable by the rules of morals. But the measurable as such signifies an order to a measure. Second, because we must philosophize concerning moral things in the same proportional manner as concerning artificial things. But in artificial things the whole formal nature of an artifact is derived from its order to the idea and rules of art existing in the artisan’s mind. Therefore, in moral things also the whole formal nature of morality must be derived from the order or relation that human acts have to their rule or measure.

4. This relation is not one of reason but real, since it belongs to human acts independently of every fiction of the intellect. For in reality and independently of our consideration human acts are morally good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, worthy of praise or blame.

It is not, however, a predicamental relation but only a transcendental one. First, because moral goodness has a contrary, namely, moral malice, whereas a predicamental relation has no contrary. Second, because a predicamental relation regards a term as a pure term, whereas the relation to an object as subject to the rules of morals, in which the morality of human acts consists, does not regard it as a pure term but as specifying and as an extrinsic formal cause. Finally, because a predicamental relation depends upon the existence of its term and vanishes when the term ceases, whereas morality does not. For there can be a good act of complacency concerning a past good and a perverse morose delight concerning a past evil act.

5. From this you will understand the distinction between the moral being of money, for example, and the moral being of human acts. The value of money and the price of saleable things are derived directly and immediately from the human will or intellect. The morality of human acts, however, although it presupposes divine and human laws, is not immediately derived from them but from the transcendental order that such acts have to

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an object as subject to the rules of morals, which order is real and intrinsic to them.

Nor is it an objection that the object is sometimes not real or really existent. Although a predicamental order requires an existent term, a transcendental order can concern nonexistents and nonbeings. This is evident in logic, which, although a real science, concerns second intentions that place nothing real in objects. Likewise, we desire and seek dignities, honors, jurisdiction, precedence, and similar things by real acts, yet these are only denominations and beings of reason.

6. You will say: Numerically the same act, without any real change, can become evil from good, and even moral from nonmoral. This is evident in the eating of meat continued from Thursday into Friday, which without a real change becomes morally evil through the extrinsic change of time, and in a first movement which, if continued when reason becomes advertent, becomes moral from nonmoral, just as it becomes free from nonfree. Therefore, morality is not something real and intrinsic to human acts, but a mere being of reason or a purely extrinsic denomination.

I answer by denying the antecedent. When an act changes from good to evil or from nonmoral to moral, it is intrinsically changed in moral being, because it then receives a new real mode or new respect to the object. This order really inheres in human acts, as St. Thomas says concerning relation to the end in the same place, a. 4, ad 2.

7. You will insist: That order is not predicamental but only transcendental, as we said above. Therefore, it does not inhere. The consequence is evident, because a transcendental order, since it is not distinguished from its foundation as a predicamental relation is, does not inhere in a subject as the latter does.

I answer that human and moral acts include a twofold relation to an object subject to the rules of morals. One is transcendental, by which they regard it as specifying and as an extrinsic formal cause. The other is predicamental, which attains the same object after the manner of a pure term and correlative.

The first is understood prior in the object and therefore founds the other, which really inheres in human acts. St. Thomas speaks of the latter when he says that *the relation to the end inheres in the action*.

This can be explained by the example of sciences, which have a twofold relation to their object: one transcendental, by which they are specified; the other predicamental, which is the relation of something measurable to a measure, belongs to the third genus of relation, and presupposes the former

as its reason of foundation. Hence, although the first does not inhere in the subject, the second does.

CHAPTER X.

On the Species of Morality.

1. The moral genus treated in the preceding chapter is divided into two species, namely, moral goodness and moral malice.

Moral goodness consists in a transcendental respect to an object as consonant with the rules of morals, as is evidently gathered from the principles established in the preceding chapter. For since goodness is a species of morality, on the part of the genus it must include the same thing that morality includes, and consequently that mode of relation in which we placed the essence of morality. On the part of the difference, it can add nothing other than that this relation is to an object as consonant with the rules of morals. First, because by this it is distinguished from malice, which regards a discordant object. Second, because the goodness of any thing is conformity with its rule, and consequently the goodness of a human act must be conformity with the rule of such an act, which is right reason.

2. It is confirmed: Moral goodness, since it belongs to the genus of something measurable and regulable by the rules of morals, and since the measurable as such signifies an order to a measure, cannot consist in an absolute mode superadded to a human act, but only in some respect to its measure.

But this respect is not one of reason, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter. Nor is it predicamental, since it does not tend toward its term under the aspect of a pure term, but regards it as specifying and as an extrinsic formal cause, and sometimes tends toward a nonexistent object, as when someone desires a possible good. Therefore, it can only be a transcendental respect to an object as consonant with the rules of morals.

3. You will object: St. Thomas, in the same place, q. 18, a. 1, when explaining the essence of moral goodness, does not mention such a respect or relation, but places it in fullness of being, namely, that nothing required by the act's being be lacking from the human action, such as a due end, due quantity, due place, and so forth. Therefore, this goodness consists not in such a respect or relation, but in the collection of these things.

4. It is confirmed: The same Holy Doctor there compares moral goodness with natural goodness. But for goodness and perfection in natural things, nothing is necessary beyond the collection of all things required for

and due to the integrity and fullness of the thing. This is evident by induction in any natural thing, such as a man, horse, flower, and so forth, which possess goodness and perfection when none of the things necessary for their integrity and fullness is lacking. Therefore, similarly, the moral goodness of human acts consists in the collection of all things required for them, without a superadded order or relation.

5. To the objection I answer that when St. Thomas says that the moral goodness of human acts consists in fullness of being, which he places in the collection of the due object, end, and circumstances, he is not speaking in a formal but in a causal sense. He intends only that the relation to an object consonant with reason, in which moral goodness formally consists, necessarily presupposes in a moral act a due object, end, and circumstances, and equally requires them all in order that such goodness result in the act.

Hence the example that he gives from physical goodness holds in one respect but not in all. The parity consists in this: just as physical goodness requires a thing to possess all the perfections and forms due to it according to the exigency of its proper nature, and if any is lacking the thing is in that respect called evil and imperfect, so the goodness of a human action requires all things demanded by right reason, and through the defect and absence of any of them it is rendered evil and sinful.

The reason for the distinction is that in absolute things, such as a substance, the rule of goodness is not something extrinsic but the subject itself. Therefore, the whole goodness is derived from suitability to it and is nothing other than the forms themselves suitable to the subject.

But in actions whose whole being consists in an order to an object, the whole goodness is respective. Therefore, one thing is required after the manner of a term in order that such goodness result, namely, a suitable object, a right end, and due circumstances; and another thing is the goodness itself which arises in the human act from their collection and concurrence. From this the answer to the confirmation is evident.

6. From what has been said concerning moral goodness, it is readily gathered what must be said concerning moral malice, which is the other species of morality opposed to it.

Given that such malice consists in something positive, as theologians more commonly teach and as we shall show in the Treatise on Sins, it can consist in nothing other than a transcendental relation to an object as discordant with the rules of morals. For it must agree with goodness in the generic nature of morality and consequently, according to its generic grade, include that relation in which morality formally consists. In its specific

nature, however, it must be constituted through a relation to the object opposed to that which constitutes moral goodness.

Hence, since moral goodness is constituted through a relation to an object as consonant with the rules of morals, moral malice must be constituted through a transcendental order to an object as discordant and deformed in relation to them. This will be discussed more fully in the Treatise on Sins, c. 8.

7. You will ask whether acts indifferent from their object and according to their species, such as picking up a straw, gathering flowers, and similar acts, are truly moral, and consequently whether indifference is some species of morality intermediate between goodness and malice.

I answer that they can be called moral initiatively and radically, insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will and can assume morality from their end or circumstances. In this sense St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 2, a. 5, calls them moral according to their species. Nevertheless, they are not formally and completely moral, because formal and complete morality is derived from subjection to laws, which are the rules of the morality of human acts, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter.

But acts indifferent from their object and species do not fall under a law positively, but only negatively, insofar as the law does not concern itself with them and withdraws its disposition from them. This does not suffice for morality.

8. You will say: St. Thomas, below, q. 92, a. 2, says that law has three acts, namely, to prohibit, command, and permit. He adds: There are three differences of human acts. Some acts are evil from their genus, such as vicious acts, and with respect to these law has the act of prohibiting. Some acts are indifferent from their genus, and with respect to these law has the act of permitting. Therefore, some special act of law, namely, permission, concerns indifferent acts.

It is confirmed: Nothing exists in reality, whether evil, good, or indifferent, which does not fall under the eternal law, which is the first rule of all morality. Therefore, indifferent acts are subject at least to the eternal law.

9. For the solution of this argument, it must be known that permission is called an act of law both positively and negatively.

It is called a positive act in only one way, namely, when the law dispenses from something that ought to be done, for example, the recitation of the Office, fasting, and similar things which the law commands and in which a superior dispenses for a just and legitimate cause.

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It is called a negative act in four ways. First, when the law does not command what is better. Thus matrimony is called permitted because virginity is not under precept. Second, when the law does not prohibit. Thus entering a second marriage is called permitted because it is not prohibited. Third, when something does not prevent what it could prevent. Thus God is said to permit sin because He does not prevent it. Fourth, when the law does not punish some evil in order to avoid a worse one.

Therefore, when St. Thomas teaches that permitting is an act of law, he either speaks of positive permission, because the law dispenses from something that was prohibited and could not lawfully be done, and permits it—for example, eating meat during Lent or marrying a relative in the second degree. Such acts are not indifferent but good, since they conform to the dispensing law that removes from the object the deformity it would otherwise possess.

Or he speaks of a negative act, which does not suffice for morality, since morality requires an act to be positively subject to law.

10. To the confirmation, the antecedent must be distinguished. That nothing fails to fall under the eternal law insofar as it is the reason of divine providence and in relation to God, I concede. That nothing fails to fall under the eternal law insofar as it is the rule of the created will and consequently in relation to us, I deny.

The eternal law can be considered either as the reason of the divine will regulating God's own acts in the production and government of creatures, or as participated by us through the dictate of reason and applied to regulating our acts insofar as they are freely exercised by us.

In the first way, all things existing in reality fall under it, just as all things fall under divine providence and will. In the second way, only those things fall under it which are subject to man's power, insofar as reason dictates concerning them that they are to be done by man. Since reason dictates nothing concerning things indifferent in themselves, they do not under this aspect fall under the aforesaid law and consequently receive no species of morality from a relation to it.

11. From this you will understand that indifference is not a species of morality intermediate between goodness and malice, but morality is adequately divided into moral goodness and malice.

For the object of human acts from which those acts derive morality does not regard reason and the rule except by either equaling it or failing to equal it. If it equals the rule, it conforms to it; if it fails to equal it, it is deformed in relation to it. Therefore, only two kinds of objective morality can be found in the objects of human acts: conformity with the law, which specifies moral

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goodness, and deformity or deviation from the law, which constitutes moral malice.

Between these no positive mean can exist, but only a negative one through negation of both extremes, just as no mean exists between even and odd, similar and dissimilar, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, a. 8.

CHAPTER XI.

On the Principles of the Morality of Human Acts.

1. There are three principles of the morality of human acts, namely, the object, the circumstances, and the end, which must be treated briefly here.

§ 1.

The First and Specific Morality of Human Acts is Taken from the Object.

2. This is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas here, a. 2. Just as in natural things the first and specific goodness of a natural thing is taken from the form that gives it its species, so in moral matters the first and specific moral goodness must be considered from the form that gives species to the human act. But the object stands as the form giving species to the moral act. Therefore the first and specific moral goodness in human acts is taken from it. The major premise is evident; the minor is proved. Every movement and way toward a terminus regards that terminus as its proper form, because it is related to it as potency to act and as the determinable to the determinant. But an act is essentially a way and tendency toward an object. Therefore the object stands as the form giving it species.

3. This is confirmed. A human act, whether considered in moral being or in physical being, is essentially relational. Therefore it must take the first species of its morality from that which it primarily regards. But the first thing it regards is the object, for it reaches the circumstances only secondarily and consequently. Therefore it takes the first species of its morality from the object, considered not in the being of a thing, but in moral being, since diverse acts of the will, one of which is good and the other evil, can be directed toward the same object in its real and entitative being. For the same money can be the object of theft and restitution, the same food the object of gluttony and temperance, and the same married woman the object of adultery and of the conjugal act. Likewise, in the sciences the same

conclusion, insofar as it is reached and demonstrated through diverse middle terms, belongs to diverse sciences. Hence, just as the unity of the sciences is taken from the object considered not in the being of a thing but in the being of something knowable, so the first and specific morality of human acts is from the object considered not in the being of a thing, but in moral being, and as consonant or dissonant with right reason.

4. It must nevertheless be observed that, when we say that the first and specific morality of human acts is taken from the object, this must be understood of acts that are good or evil, but not of those that are indifferent as to their species. For since these concern a purely indifferent object, which is not subject to the rules of morals, they do not take their first and substantial morality from the object, but from the first circumstance that formally determines the object itself to the notion of objective good or evil. Hence the circumstance then does not have the character of a mere circumstance or accident with respect to the act, but passes in a certain way into the character of an object morally specifying it.

5. You will object, first: A human act takes the first species of its morality from that which it first regards. But the first thing it regards is the end, for the object is willed for the sake of the end, and therefore the end is willed first. Therefore a human act takes the first species of its morality not from the object but from the end. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 6, and above, q. 1, teaches that moral acts take their species from the end.

6. I answer, first, that a human act does indeed regard the end of the work, which is called the intrinsic end and coincides with the object, but not the end of the agent, which is called extrinsic, because a tendency toward this or that end of the agent is accidental to the human act. Thus, for example, alms may be given for the sake of vainglory or to make satisfaction for sins. Hence, when St. Thomas teaches that human acts take their species from the end, either he is not speaking of the first species of morality, or he is speaking of the end of the work, which is convertible with the object, and not of the end of the agent, which is distinct from it.

7. You will say: There are acts good by their species that have no goodness from their object, but only from the end to which they are ordered by the agent. For example, an act of fortitude has no goodness from its proper object, which is the endurance of suffering or death, unless there is added the extrinsic end of some more excellent virtue, such as faith or justice, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 124, a. 3. The same is evident in the act of virginity, or complete abstinence from sexual matters, which is not an act of virtue unless it is referred to the worship of God and the contemplation of heavenly things, as the same Holy Doctor

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teaches *ibid.*, q. 152, a. 3 ad 3. Therefore the first and specific goodness of human acts is taken not from the object, or the end of the work, but from the extrinsic end of the agent.

8. I answer that these acts also have their primary goodness from the object. For an act of fortitude is commendable because of the endurance of suffering, and virginity because of abstinence from all sexual acts, since in these a grave difficulty must be overcome, which virtue alone overcomes. Nevertheless, the extrinsic end of the agent is required as a condition for them to possess complete moral worth and goodness, but not as their formal reason. For a good end of the agent can be required for a good act in two ways: as a formal reason standing on the part of the object, and as a condition or extrinsic connotation. It is required as the formal object when, even with the object posited, the object has no goodness except the goodness of that end. Thus, when someone wishes to go into the country to regain his health, this going into the country by the sick man has no other moral worth than that found in the extrinsic end, namely, the recovery of health. But it stands as a condition or extrinsic connotation when the object by its nature has a special moral worth distinct from the worth of the end, though it would not possess that worth absolutely without such a condition or connotation, as occurs in the examples given.

9. You will object, second: This act, *I will to live honorably*, is singular and determinate in the moral genus, and yet its object is not determinate but most common. Therefore the specific morality of human acts is not taken from the object.

I answer that, although that object in the being of a thing is common and generic, nevertheless, insofar as it is regarded under the one motive of consonance with reason, it is one in the character of an object. In the same way, the subjects of sciences, habits, and powers, however broad and widely extended they may be, nevertheless, insofar as they are subordinated to one formal reason, possess specific unity in the character of an object.

§ 2.

Human Acts Derive Some Goodness or
Malice from the Circumstances.

10. St. Thomas proves this assertion here, a. 2, from the analogy between moral and natural things. In natural things goodness and perfection are taken not only from the form that gives species, but also from accidents. For example, in a human being goodness and beauty are taken not only from the

form, but also from shape, due proportion, and other accidents. For since every created being is potential, its whole fullness of being does not consist in its essence, as it does in God, but also in accidents added to the essence. Therefore, likewise, in human acts goodness is taken not only from the object, which stands as the form bestowing species, as was shown in the preceding section, but also from the circumstances, which are certain accidents joined to it. The *a priori* reason is that such circumstances can imply an order of agreement or disagreement with reason distinct from that implied by the object. For it is contrary to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place or in a great quantity. Therefore circumstances can cause in an act a moral goodness or malice distinct from that which proceeds from the object.

11. You will say, first: Every moral circumstance affecting the object passes into the character of the object, since it brings no goodness or malice to the act it surrounds unless it is willed. But whatever is willed is certainly an object of the will, just as everything seen is an object of sight. Therefore we wrongly distinguish goodness derived from circumstances from goodness taken from the object. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 19, a. 2, teaches that the interior act derives its goodness from the object alone.

I answer that circumstances do not pass into the character of the object when they are not willed first and immediately in themselves, but only mediately and secondarily, or as an accident and accessory that supervenes. Nevertheless, they then possess the character of an object in a certain manner, because they are contained at least within the secondary object of the will. In this sense St. Thomas says that the interior act derives its goodness from the object alone. For by the name "object" he understands not only that which the will wills directly, primarily, and immediately, but also whatever is willed by it, whether immediately or mediately, primarily or secondarily, directly or indirectly. For in whatever way something is willed, it is in some manner an object of the will.

12. You will say, second: Circumstances are for the most part extrinsic to the human act, as is evident of place and time. Therefore they cannot give it intrinsic goodness or malice. But I deny the consequence. For just as human acts derive from the object an intrinsic, specific, and essential moral goodness or malice, because although the object is extrinsic to the act, the transcendental order to it is nevertheless intrinsic to the act, so they also receive from the circumstances an intrinsic but accidental moral goodness or malice, because likewise the transcendental order that the human act expresses toward the circumstances is intrinsic to it.

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§ 3.

Human Acts Also Derive Goodness or Malice from the Extrinsic End
of the Agent, Distinct from That Which They Have
from the Object and the Intrinsic End of the Work.

13. The reason is that every human act depends upon the end and its influence, according to Matt. 6: *The lamp of your body is your eye; if your eye is single, your whole body will be full of light*, and so forth. Therefore, if the end is good, it cannot fail to impart goodness; if it is depraved, it cannot fail to infuse depravity. Hence a work good from its object, ordered to a further good end, is better and more meritorious; and conversely, a work evil from its object, referred to a further evil end, possesses greater malice and deformity. For one who fasts or preserves chastity under a vow adds, beyond the moral worth of the work, the moral worth and merit of religion; and one who steals in order to commit a sexual sin commits, in addition to the sin of theft, the sin of fornication or adultery.

14. These things are certain and undoubted among all. But the difficulty and controversy among theologians concerns that from which an act ordered to an extrinsic end has its essential species of goodness or malice: whether from the object or from the end. For the resolution it must be noted that an act ordered to an extrinsic end, for example, the willing to give alms in order to make satisfaction for sins, can be considered in two ways. It can be considered reduplicatively, insofar as it is commanded by penance and proceeds from its virtue and intention as a means chosen to make satisfaction; or specifically, insofar as it is an act of mercy regarding the moral worth of its own object, although it is commanded from elsewhere and ordered to another, further end. This being presupposed:

15. I say, first, that a commanded act, as such formally and reduplicatively, is specified not by the object but by the end of the agent.

Proof: A commanded act, precisely as such, essentially regards the end of the agent. For example, the willing to give alms, insofar as it is commanded by the virtue of penance, essentially regards the moral worth of penance and does not rest in its proximate object, namely, the moral worth of mercy. Therefore, as such, it is specified by the end of the agent. The consequence is evident, for relational things, such as human acts considered both in physical and in moral being, are specified by that which they first and essentially regard in itself. The antecedent is shown thus: A commanded act,

precisely as such, essentially regards that which the virtue by which it is commanded regards. But the virtue by which the willing to give alms in order to make satisfaction for sins is commanded, namely penance, essentially regards the end of the agent, namely satisfaction for sins. Therefore the willing of alms itself, insofar as it is commanded by such a virtue, does so as well.

16. This is confirmed. A commanded act, as such formally, is subordinated to the commanding act and is in a certain manner one and the same with it. Hence, precisely as such, it has its essential specification from that from which the commanding act derives its specification. But the commanding act is specified by the end of the agent, which it regards as its proper and immediate object. Therefore the commanded act also, formally and reduplicatively as such, takes its species from the end of the agent.

17. I say, second, that a commanded act, taken specifically, is specified not by the end of the agent but by the object, or the end of the work. For it first and immediately regards the object, but secondarily and mediately the end of the agent, as is evident in the example given. The willing to give alms, commanded by the virtue of penance, first and in itself regards the moral worth of mercy, but secondarily and accidentally tends toward the good of penance, to which it is ordered by the agent. Indeed, it does not regard such an end except as terminated at its proper object and therefore as specified by it. Hence the end of the agent is a circumstance of the commanded act considered absolutely, which is called the circumstance *why*. But human acts are not specified by circumstances, nor do they derive essential goodness or malice from them, but only accidental goodness or malice, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section. I add that, if commanded acts were specified by the end of the commander, all the actions of a just man who has referred himself and all his works to God through charity would be essentially of the same species, namely charity. Thus the just man would never exercise acts of the other virtues, and consequently those virtues would be idle and superfluous in him. This is absurd, for charity would then be not the form but the expulsion, not the crown but the ruin, of the other virtues.

18. From these things you will understand that, when a comparison is made between the two species found in a commanded act, that which is taken from the object is essential, while the other, which is taken from the end, is accidental. For, as we were just saying, ordination to the end of the agent stands as a circumstance, comes accidentally to the act, and can be present or absent from it. But the order to the object is invariable and can never be separated from the act.

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19. You will say, first: Aristotle, *Ethica* V, c. 1, teaches that one who steals in order to commit adultery is more an adulterer than a thief. Therefore he judges that act to be more in the species of adultery than of theft, and consequently that the latter species is not so essential.

I answer that one who steals in order to commit adultery is said to be more an adulterer than a thief, not because the act of stealing takes its species from the lustful end, but because the commanding act is more principal, and the person acting in this way is more disposed toward lust than toward the property of another that he steals. Add that the Philosopher can be understood and explained as speaking of the commanded act precisely as such, and as it is such formally and reduplicatively. For considered in this way, it is specified not by the object but by the end of the agent, as was shown in the first conclusion.

20. You will say, second: Many sins have their essential species from the end alone and not from the object. For St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 110, a. 2, distinguishes diverse species of lies from diverse ends. If someone utters a lie with the intention of amusing himself or another, it is called a jocose lie; if with the intention of helping his neighbor, an officious lie; if with the intention of harming him, a pernicious lie. Likewise, if someone utters an injurious word with the intention of depriving his neighbor of honor, it is an insult; if with the intention of dissolving friendship, tale-bearing; if with the intention of putting the hearer to confusion, mockery. Therefore human acts have their essential species from the end of the agent, not from the object.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. Many sins have their essential species from the end insofar as it has precisely the character of an end: I deny this. Insofar as it redounds upon the object itself and causes an intrinsic diversity in it: I concede this. For it can happen that an end which appears to be extrinsic and to belong to the agent is in reality intrinsic and belongs to the work, as occurs in the examples given. For because the object and intrinsic end of a lie is to speak falsely with the intention of deceiving, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 110, it is plain that the intention belongs to the object of the lie. Hence to speak falsely with the intention of deceiving in jocose matter constitutes a jocose lie; in officious matter, an officious lie; in pernicious matter, a pernicious lie. The same must proportionately be said of the other sins of the tongue, such as detraction, tale-bearing, discord, and so forth.

CHAPTER XII.

Whether the Same Act of the Will Can Simultaneously and
at the Same Time Possess Diverse Species of Morality,
and Be Good from Its Object and Evil from Its End, or
Conversely Evil from Its Object and Good from Its End.

1. I answer negatively with St. Thomas here, q. 19, a. 7 ad 2, where he says: *One who wills to give alms in order to obtain vainglory wills what is of itself good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil; hence his will is evil.* And in II Sent., dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4 ad 4: *When someone wills to give alms for the sake of vainglory, there is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from everything contained in it.* Reason also counsels this. For although the object of this act, “I will to give alms for the sake of vainglory,” is materially and in the being of an entity good, nevertheless formally, in the being of an object, and as terminating and specifying that act, it is not good but evil. This is because it has the character of a means ordered to an evil end, namely vainglory, and hence is not conformed but deformed to the dictate of right reason and prudence. For prudence and right reason dictate that good must be done well, and that for good to be done badly, or from an evil motive, is not good. It is also because the circumstance of an evil end then passes into the character of the specifying object, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 5 ad 4, and therefore destroys the specific goodness that was to have been taken from the object. Hence, when the desire for vainglory is removed, the case is compared to what is said in Luke 12: *For just as a little leaven corrupts the entire mass of flour into which it is cast and soon stains the whole mixture with its flavor, so too, when hypocrisy has once imbued a soul, it will defraud it of all sincerity and truth of the virtues,* as the Venerable Bede says in *In Lucam*, bk. IV, c. 52.

2. These reasons prove not only that an act cannot be at once good from the object and evil from the end, but also that it cannot be evil from the object and good from the end, as when someone steals in order to give alms. For if malice taken from the end of the agent or from another circumstance infects the whole act and destroys its goodness, much more will that malice which is derived from the object, and which is principal and essential, do the same and likewise destroy all the act’s moral goodness. Further, just as it is contrary to the dictate of prudence to choose some good means for an evil end, so it is contrary to prudence to adopt an evil means for obtaining a good

end, because evils must not be done so that goods may result. Likewise, in one who gives alms for the sake of vainglory, the alms, insofar as they are the matter and instrument of vainglory, are not a good object but an evil one, for they are vitiated by the end and drawn into its species. So too, in one who steals in order to give alms, the end is not good but evil, because it is the cause of stealing and the reason for choosing an evil means; hence it is vitiated by the means and drawn into its species. Therefore, just as the first act is wholly evil and not mixed from goodness and malice, so is the second. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 19, a. 7 ad 3: *Whether the will is directed toward what is evil in itself under the aspect of good, or toward good under the aspect of evil, the will will always be evil.*

3. You will object, first: In natural things the same subject can retain goodness in one respect and be evil in another. For example, the same man can have beautiful eyes and a deformed nose, or be diseased in his feet but not in his hands. Likewise, among artifacts the same work can be beautiful and conformed to the rules of art in one part, but deformed, distorted, and disconformed to the rules of art in another. Therefore, likewise, the same human action will be able to be mixed from moral goodness and malice, and to be at once good from the object and evil from the end of the agent, or conversely evil from the object and good from the end of the agent. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 4, after enumerating in the body of the article the fourfold goodness of an act, says in the reply ad 3: *Nothing prevents an action possessing one of the aforesaid kinds of goodness from lacking another; and in this way it can happen that an action which is good according to its species or its circumstances is ordered to an evil end, or conversely. Yet an action is not simply good unless all the kinds of goodness concur.* In these words he openly seems to teach that a human action can have one moral goodness, such as from the object, and nevertheless lack other kinds of goodness that are taken from the end or circumstances, and therefore be at once good and evil. Hence in II Sent., dist. 36, single q., a. 5, at the end of the body, he says: *It can happen that an act has goodness from its matter and nevertheless is done badly because of undue circumstances.*

I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that in natural and artificial things the evil of one part does not infect or destroy the goodness of another. Hence the goodness that is the essence can stand together with an accidental evil, and the goodness of one part with the evil of another. But in moral matters the malice arising from the end or circumstances infects the whole act and destroys all its goodness; and much more does the malice arising from the object destroy the goodness of the end. Thus it is

impossible for goodness from the object to stand together with malice from the end, or goodness from the end with malice from the object. Hence, when St. Thomas says that an action possessing one goodness, such as from the object, can lack another, namely from the end, and be rendered sinful by this defect, the word “possessing” does not produce a composite sense, as though the action preserved such goodness simultaneously with such a defect. Rather, it gives a divided sense and signifies only that, as far as depended upon itself, the act would have possessed such goodness had malice from the end not supervened and prevented it. In the same way, if it were said that one possessing health can suffer a disturbance of the humors, this would not be true in the composite sense, as though, when the disturbance is actually present, health were truly present; it would be true only in the divided sense, because health would then be present as far as the other principles are concerned, had the disturbance not occurred. The other passage taken from the second book of the *Sentences* must be understood and explained in the same way.

4. You will object, second: When the precept of assisting a needy person placed in extreme or grave necessity binds, one who gives alms for the sake of vainglory fulfills the precept. Therefore such an act is good from the object, although evil from the end, and consequently mixed from moral goodness and malice. The consequence is evident, for since the precept concerns a good act, it cannot be fulfilled except through a good act, at least from the object.

This is confirmed. If such an act were evil from the object, it would have a twofold malice: one from the end, namely vainglory, and another from the depraved object, namely vitiated almsgiving. But this cannot be said, for otherwise one who gave alms for the sake of vainglory would commit two sins, which seems absurd. Therefore such an act is not evil from the object.

5. To the objection I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence. For the proof of the consequence it must be said with St. Thomas below, q. 100, a. 9, that laws differ in two ways. Some concern human acts precisely as to their substance and physical entity, or, what amounts to the same, as to their material objective goodness, such as those commanding that aid be given to the needy, that Mass be heard, and the like. Others concern the end and manner of the aforesaid acts, and consequently their formal moral worth and goodness. Of this kind are those that dispose concerning the interior rectitude of man and those things that belong to the direction of the heart and to justification itself and interior purity, such as believing, hoping, loving, repenting, not committing adultery in the heart, not coveting another’s property, and so forth. Therefore laws that concern

only the substance of an act, such as that which commands assistance to the needy, can be fulfilled by an act possessing no formal goodness, provided it concerns good matter or a materially good object. Hence this argument proves only that the object of this act, *I will to give alms for the sake of vainglory*, is materially good and good in its effects; it does not show that it is formally good and good in the character of a specifying object.

6. To the confirmation I answer that some judge there to be a twofold malice in that act, one of vitiating vainglory and another of vitiated almsgiving. For then, they say, true almsgiving does not remain, but it becomes the matter of vainglory and the instrument of pride. Hence Augustine in his Rule, or Epistle 109, says that *pride lies in wait for good works so that they may perish*. Chrysologus, speaking of hypocrisy, says: *With cruel art it slays virtues by the sword of virtues, destroys fasting by fasting, empties prayer by prayer, and profanes mercy by an appearance of mercy*. Yet it is more likely and probable that the malice is not doubled there and that there is no other malice distinct from pride or vainglory, which vitiates that entire act in the manner of corrupted leaven, which corrupts the whole mass of flour into which it is cast, or of a moth, which consumes the whole cloth from which it is born. Hence Christ said in Matt. 6: *If your eye is evil, your whole body will be dark*. The holy Fathers understand by the eye the intention of the end, which, if it is evil, renders the entire action evil and dark and excludes from it every light of goodness.

7. You will say: Just as the intention of the end, if evil, renders an action evil, so, if good, it renders the action good even if the action is evil from its object. Therefore an act evil from its object will be able to be good from its end. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from various testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers, in which acts evil and sinful in themselves are excused by a good end, as is evident both of lying and of homicide. For in Gen. 20 Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister, and yet he did not sin, as Augustine says in *Contra Faustum*, bk. XII, c. 34, and Chrysostom in *Homiliae in Genesim*, hom. 52, because he said this to save his own life. Jacob lied to his father, pretending that he was his firstborn, Esau, and yet he can be excused only because of his good intention, namely, because he said this to obtain his father's blessing. Judith lied to Holofernes in several matters, and nevertheless seems not to have sinned, because she did this to save her people. Likewise, the Egyptian midwives lied to Pharaoh, but do not seem to have sinned because they did so to prevent the slaughter of the infants. Hence it is said in Exod. 1 that God dealt well with the midwives, and it is evident that God does not reward sins. The same is proved of homicide. In Exod. 2 Moses killed the Egyptian by his own

authority and is excused by his good intention of freeing his neighbor. In Judg. 16 Samson killed himself with many Philistines by shaking the pillars of the temple; yet he did not sin, because he did this out of zeal for God, in order to kill the Philistines who were enemies of God's people. Hence he is numbered by the Apostle among the saints in Heb. 11. Blessed Apollonia also, enkindled by the fire of the Holy Spirit, cast herself into the flames, as her history relates. St. Ambrose also writes in *De virginibus*, bk. III, that the virgin Pelagia cast herself headlong into a river lest she be violated by a pursuing soldier. St. Augustine relates in *De civitate Dei*, bk. I, c. 16, that some holy women laudably did the same in time of persecution to escape attackers upon their chastity.

8. I answer by denying the antecedent. For the intention of a good end never excuses the malice of an evil choice, because evils must not be done so that goods may result. Hence it is not lawful to lie for any good end, such as protecting the life of one's neighbor or avoiding some grave harm, as theologians commonly teach against Cassian, who in *Collationes*, XVII, c. 18, seems to approve the opinion of Abbot Joseph, who says: *When some grave danger threatens from confessing the truth, recourse must then be had to the refuge of lies*. As to those things brought forward from Scripture to excuse lying, I say, first, that Scripture recounts the lies of many, but does not approve or excuse them. Hence, when the midwives lied to Pharaoh, they were not rewarded by God for that lie, but for the fear they had toward God, because of which they refused to kill the infants of the Hebrews, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 110, a. 3 ad 2, and as is evident from Exod. 1: *Because the midwives feared God, he built houses for them*.

9. Second, I say that Abraham did not lie when he said that Sarah was his sister, because she was his sister on her father's side, although not on her mother's side, as is said in Gen. 20. This does not mean that she was begotten by the same proximate father though not by the same mother, as though she were his sister of the whole blood but not of the same womb, as Cajetan and some more recent authors think. Rather, she was born from the same father, namely Terah, through his son Haran, Sarah's father, as Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, rightly observed on Gen. 20. From this he infers that marriages between an uncle and niece were indeed lawful in Abraham's time, but not marriages between brother and sister.

10. It must also be said of Jacob that he did not lie when he said to his father, *I am Esau your firstborn*. First, because Esau's rights of primogeniture were owed to him by right, and thus he called himself Esau not in person but in right, just as John was called Elijah not in person but in spirit. Second, because he spoke prophetically and in a mystical sense, in order to signify

that the younger people, namely the Gentiles, was to be substituted in place of the elder, namely the Jews. Hence St. Thomas says in the place cited, in reply ad 3: *In Sacred Scripture the deeds of some are presented as examples of perfect virtue, and it must not be thought that they lied. Those things in their words that appear to be lies must be understood as having been spoken figuratively and prophetically.*

11. Judith also spoke to Holofernes with great caution and prudence, and wished to deceive him by certain equivocations, but not by lies. Thus she said that she would lead him through the midst of Jerusalem and that not one dog would bark against him. For she truly was going to bring him through the midst of Jerusalem, but dead, not alive, by carrying his head, and so forth. But if perchance she lied in some word, she is praised not for that, but for her charity and affection for the salvation of her people.

12. To what is said concerning the homicide committed by Moses, the reply is that, if Moses is to be excused in killing that Egyptian, either he did it by divine inspiration, God then giving him authority for it, or he did it for the just defense of his neighbor, because he saw his brother or neighbor being unjustly afflicted and oppressed by the Egyptian, and there was no other way to defend him except by killing the aggressor.

13. Finally, as to what is added concerning Samson, it must be said that he did this at the prompting of the Holy Spirit and therefore lawfully, as St. Augustine teaches in *De civitate Dei*, bk. I, cc. 21 and 26, and St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 64, a. 5 ad 4. The same must be said of St. Apollonia when she cast herself into the flames, and of those holy women who killed themselves or cast themselves into a river in time of persecution in order to escape attackers upon their chastity, as the Holy Doctor teaches in the same place.

14. You will ask whether the same act can simultaneously have two species of goodness or two species of malice. I answer affirmatively. For the moral goodness and malice of an act are taken from conformity or deformity with reason. But one and the same act can be conformed or deformed to reason in two mutually diverse ways. It can have conformity or deformity with reason on the part of the object that it immediately regards and on the part of the end to which it is ordered. For when someone gives alms to make satisfaction for sins, there is in that act an object, namely the relief of another's misery, which is of itself consonant with reason; and there is an end, namely satisfaction for sins, which is likewise honorable and conformed to reason. Similarly, when someone steals in order to fornicate, a twofold deformity is found in that act: one from the object, namely the property of another that is taken, and another from the end to which it is ordered,

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namely fornication. Therefore the same act can simultaneously have two species of goodness or two species of malice.

This is confirmed. The same act can proceed from distinct virtues, from one elicitedly and from another commandingly, as is evident in martyrdom, which, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 124, a. 2 ad 2, *is an act of charity as commanding, but of fortitude as eliciting*. Therefore it can have its special goodness from each. The consequence is evident, for an act cannot belong to any virtue unless it attains the object under that virtue's formal reason, in which special goodness and moral worth are necessarily included.

15. You will say: When someone wills to fast or give alms in order to make satisfaction for sins, he does not desire such a work for its own sake, but as a means to penance. But a means, precisely as such, does not have the character of an honorable good, which belongs only to the end, but only of a useful good. Therefore such an act does not have moral worth or moral goodness from the object it immediately regards, but only from the extrinsic end to which it is ordered, and consequently enjoys not a twofold but only a single goodness.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For fasting or almsgiving, willed or performed in order to make satisfaction for sins, is desired both for itself proximately and immediately, by reason of its own moral worth and goodness, and for something else, namely penance, to which it is ordered by the agent. Hence it has the character neither of a pure means nor of a pure end, but of an end and a means together, or an intermediate end. It is an honorable good by reason of itself and a useful good by reason of its ordination to penance. Consequently, it has a twofold species of moral goodness: one from the object toward which it immediately tends, and the other from the extrinsic end to which it is ordered. The first is essential to it, while the other is accidental, as was shown in the preceding chapter, § 3.

CHAPTER XIII.

On the Indifference of Human Acts to Moral Goodness or Malice.

1. It is certain that there are human acts indifferent by their species. For human acts take their species from the object, as was shown above, c. 11, § 1. Hence, just as those acts are called good by their species that tend toward an object good in itself, and those evil that regard an evil object disconformed to reason, so those are called indifferent by their species that concern an object of itself indifferent to good or evil, as being in itself neither consonant

nor dissonant with reason. It is evident that there are many acts of this kind. Walking, lifting a straw, going into the country, gathering flowers, and the like do not have goodness or malice from their object, but are indifferent to both. Hence they can be rendered morally worthy by a good end and vitiated by an evil end, according to Augustine in *De sermone Domini in monte*, bk. II: *There are certain intermediate deeds that can be done with a good or evil intention, concerning which it is rash to judge.* The sole difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, is whether there can be an indifferent act not only in species and in relation to its object, but also in the individual, all the circumstances and accidents necessarily accompanying it having been weighed.

2. I answer negatively with St. Thomas here, a. 9. I prove it, first, by the reason he adduces in the body of the article. Although an act may not have from its species and object that it is good or evil, nevertheless, because the moral goodness or malice of human acts depends not only upon the object but also upon circumstances, which are as certain accidents of those acts, every individual act must have some circumstance by which it is contracted to good or evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end. For if the end that the agent formally or virtually intends is honorable, then even if the object is indifferent, the act will be morally good, as when someone goes into the country for the sake of honorable recreation. But if the end is not honorable, the act will by that very fact be morally evil, because by the very fact that the act does not have a good and honorable end, it is evil. *For since it belongs to reason to order*, says the Holy Doctor, *an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, is by that very fact repugnant to reason and has the character of evil.* Augustine teaches the same in *Contra Julianum*, bk. IV, c. 3, in these words: *When a man does something in which he does not appear to sin, if he does not do it for the reason for which he ought to do it, he is proved to sin.* And below: *Whatever good is done by a man, if it is not done for the reason for which true wisdom commands it to be done, although it may appear good by its function, it is a sin by reason of its improper end.* Therefore an act indifferent by its species or object cannot be indifferent in the individual or in its exercise, but must necessarily be morally good or evil.

3. The adversaries reply that a man is not bound to add a good and honorable end to an act indifferent from its object, but can exercise it for pleasure alone or for the convenience of nature. For, they say, it seems excessively rigorous to oblige a man always to add a right and honorable end in all his actions, especially those that belong to the convenience of nature and the preservation of the individual. Otherwise men would continually sin,

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at least venially, since such actions continually occur and men do not remember to refer them to a good and honorable end.

4. But against this, first: Whenever a man acts with the counsel and deliberation of reason, he is bound to act as a man, and consequently according to the exigency and inclination of rational nature. Therefore he is bound to act in relation to the good of reason, or the honorable good, which is the end of such a nature. Otherwise he does not act as a man but as an animal and is likened to unreasoning beasts, in whom there is no understanding. Hence the royal Prophet said in Ps. 9: *Appoint, O Lord, a lawgiver over them, that the nations may know that they are men.* That is: Send, O Lord, your Word and wisdom from heaven, that he may teach the nations and sinful men, who live after the manner of brutes, attending only to delectable and sensible good, to act in conformity with human nature, to follow the rules of right reason and prudence, and to pursue the honorable good consonant with reason.

5. Against this, second: Since operations are not for the sake of pleasures, but conversely pleasures are for the sake of operations, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 4, a. 2 ad 2, one who chooses an operation for the sake of pleasure and acts for the sake of pleasure alone acts inordinately and sins by overturning the order of nature, as will be more evident from what will be said below. Therefore it is false and wholly alien to the principles of moral philosophy to say, as the adversaries do, that a man can exercise acts indifferent from their object for the sake of pleasure alone or the convenience of nature as his end. For the sensitive and animal part, as inferior, must always be subject and subordinated to the higher rational part and be directed and regulated by it, and therefore delectable good must be referred to honorable good. An actual reference to honorable good is not, however, necessarily required, but a virtual reference suffices. Hence, although one approaching the table does not think of preserving life, but only of the pleasure of food, he does not sin on that account, because he wills such pleasure at least virtually for the sake of the operation that preserves life, and thus does not desire it inordinately. *For this very fact, that someone acts in an orderly way for the sustenance or repose of his body, is ordered in him to the good of virtue*, as St. Thomas says here, a. 9 ad 3. From this it is evident that his opinion is not excessively rigid and austere, nor does it impose an unbearable yoke or an inextricable labyrinth upon scrupulous consciences, as the adversaries slanderously claim.

6. From these things the reasoning of St. Thomas can be further illustrated and confirmed, and proposed again in this form. Whenever a man acts with the counsel and deliberation of reason, he intends some end.

Therefore such an end is either an honorable or a delectable good. For the useful, precisely as such, since it is not desirable for its own sake but only for the sake of something else which it serves as a means, cannot have the character of an end. If the end is an honorable good, the act will be morally good and consonant with reason. But if it is a purely delectable good, the act will be evil and dissonant with reason, because, as we have shown, it is intrinsically evil and disconformed to reason to rest in delectable good as an end.

7. You will object, first: There are some operations ordered in themselves only to delight, such as seeing something beautiful to delight the eyes, smelling an odor to delight the nostrils, and music to refresh the ears. Therefore at least these can lawfully be exercised for pleasure alone.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For no operation is ordered to pleasure alone as to its ultimate end, but always tends beyond it to an end convenient and useful to nature. Thus the sight of something beautiful and the hearing of sweet harmony are finally ordered to arousing the spirits that serve for exercising human operations. The smelling of an odor is ordered to strengthening the brain, and so of the rest.

8. You will object, second: There is no precept obliging a man to refer all his actions to an honorable good consonant with reason whenever he acts with the counsel and deliberation of reason. Therefore the reasoning of St. Thomas rests upon a false principle. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: If such a precept existed, it would be either positive or natural. It is not the first, since it is not evident from Scripture; nor the second, because it belongs to none of the precepts of the Decalogue, in which the natural precepts are contained. Therefore, and so forth.

I answer by denying the antecedent, and to its proof I say that such a precept is natural. For just as natural agents are determined by the Author of nature to their proper acts through natural inclination, so a free agent is determined through laws and precepts. But we see that natural agents receive from the Author of nature an inclination to tend through all their acts toward the proper ends consonant with their natures. Therefore the rational and free agent also had to have a precept and law to tend through all his deliberate acts toward the good consonant with rational nature, which is the honorable good. For it belongs no less to the Author of nature to give free agents a moral determination for all their acts, which is through precept, than to give natural agents a natural determination, which is through natural inclination. From this it is evident that such a precept is natural. Authors hold various opinions concerning the precept among the ten of the Decalogue to which it is reduced. Some judge that it is to be

reduced to the precept of the love of God, for by reason of this precept we are bound to love God above all things, to hold him as our ultimate end, and consequently to refer all our actions to him, at least mediately, which is done by ordering them to some honorable end. Others say that, just as there is a natural precept not to squander money, so there is one not to waste time idly or uselessly occupy the powers of the soul or body in vain and idle works.

9. Yet I judge it truer or more probable that, just as there are certain truths that do not belong in themselves to the object of faith but are as preambles to it, such as that God exists and that God is one, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1, so there are certain natural precepts that are not contained in the precepts of the Decalogue but are as preambles to them. Such is the precept of loving oneself, to which is reduced the precept not to act without a reasonable end. For man, because he is rational and lives an intellectual life elevated above the life of brutes, must love his own dignity and act as a man, and not be likened to unreasoning beasts, as was shown and emphasized above.

10. You will object, third: There is an act indifferent according to its species. Therefore there is also one indifferent as to the individual. The consequence seems evident, because there is no species that does not have, or at least cannot have, some individual.

I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence, because, as we noted above, an act according to its species is considered only according to the order to the object by which it is specified. Since that object is often neither good nor evil in itself, it imparts to the act neither goodness nor malice, but only specific indifference. But an act in the individual is considered as clothed with all its circumstances, the chief of which is the end. If the end is honorable, it causes moral goodness in the act; but if it lacks moral worth, it introduces moral malice into it. To the proof of the contrary it must be said that, although the species that belongs absolutely to a human act is found in some individual, nevertheless that which belongs to it under a certain precision and condition, by which it attains or is conceived to attain the object without circumstances, cannot descend to individuals. For circumstances are found in the individual, without which individuation does not occur. But indifference to goodness and malice does not belong absolutely to human acts, but only under a certain precision and reduplication, namely insofar as they regard only the object and abstract from circumstances.

Two Corollaries Most Worthy of Observation.

11. From what has been said it is gathered, first, that the opinion of Escobar, tract. 2, exam. 2, n. 102, is false and wholly alien to the principles of moral philosophy. He asserts that it is no sin to eat and drink to satiety for pleasure alone, and cites John Sánchez in support of this opinion. For it is evident from what was said above that the pleasures of the senses are not desirable in themselves by a rational creature, but only by reason of the honorable good of which they are an enticement and, as it were, a seasoning placed by provident and sagacious nature in operations necessary for the preservation of the individual or species, so that brutes, which cannot apprehend honorable good, might be drawn by delectable good. Hence to intend the pleasures of the senses primarily and principally, or as an end, is the nature of a brute and a vice in man, according to Augustine in *De peccato originali*, c. 40: *So great is man's excellence in comparison with the beast that what is vice in man is nature in a beast.* Hence Cicero in his books *De officiis* and *Tusculanae disputationes* concludes that *bodily pleasure is not sufficiently worthy of the excellence of man, and it belongs to every question of duty always to keep before one's mind how greatly human nature excels cattle and the other beasts, which perceive nothing but pleasure.* Seneca, in *De vita beata*, c. 10, rebuking one of the swine from the herd of Epicurus, says: *You embrace pleasure; I restrain it. You enjoy pleasure; I use it.* And in Epistle 88: *Temperance*, he says, *commands pleasures; some it hates and drives away, others it regulates and reduces to a healthy measure, and it never approaches them for their own sake.* What shame it is that after the faith theologians have not reached the point attained by philosophers before the faith! Therefore we may address to Escobar and Sánchez what Augustine said to Julian, who likewise defended sensual pleasure: *I beseech you, let not the philosophy of the Gentiles be more honorable than our Christian philosophy.* Hence among the propositions recently condemned by our Most Holy Pope Innocent XI is this one: *To eat and drink to satiety without necessity, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm one's health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its acts.*

12. It is gathered, second, that another opinion of John Sánchez is false and opposed to good morals. In disp. 23, n. 25, he contends that to have pleasure alone as the end among married persons is not even a venial sin. But if it is a sin and disorder in a rational creature to elicit actions belonging to the preservation of the individual for the sake of pleasure alone as an end, it will also be a sin, at least venial, for married persons to exercise the act

ordered to the propagation of the species for the sake of pleasure alone as an end. Hence Augustine says in *De bono coniugali*, c. 6: *Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generation has no fault, but intercourse for the satisfaction of concupiscence, even with one's spouse, has venial fault because of fidelity to the marriage bed.* And c. 7: *To render the conjugal debt is no crime, but to exact it beyond the necessity of generation is a venial fault.* Likewise, in *Contra Julianum*, bk. II, c. 10, he says that married persons contract something for which they must daily say, *Forgive us our debts*, when they exceed the measure necessary for generation for the sake of pleasure alone. Gregory the Great has similar words in *Moralia*, bk. XII, c. 17, elsewhere c. 20, where he writes: *Married persons are without fault in intercourse only when they unite not to satisfy lust but to receive offspring.* And in *Regula pastoralis*, pt. III, admonition 28: *Married persons must be admonished, he says, to remember that they were joined for the sake of receiving offspring, and, when they serve immoderate intercourse and transfer the act of propagation to the use of pleasure, to consider that, although they do not go outside marriage, they nevertheless transgress the rights of marriage within marriage itself.* Hence they must be admonished by frequent exhortations to lament that they defile the beautiful form of union by mingled pleasures. Finally, St. Thomas in IV Sent., dist. 31, q. 2, a. 2, in the body, says: *Married persons unite without any sin in only two ways, namely for the sake of procreating offspring and of rendering the debt; otherwise there is always at least venial sin.* Hence among the sixty-five propositions recently proscribed by Innocent XI, this holds the ninth place: *The conjugal act exercised for pleasure alone is entirely free of every fault and venial defect.*

13. You will say: Matrimony was instituted as a remedy for concupiscence. Therefore the conjugal act exercised to avoid fornication, or to calm concupiscence, is free of every fault, even venial.

St. Thomas replies in the place cited, ad 2: If someone intends through the act of marriage to prevent fornication in his spouse, there is no sin, because this is a certain rendering of the debt, which belongs to the good of fidelity. But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, there is some excess there, and according to this it is a venial sin. Nor was matrimony instituted for this except according to indulgence, which concerns venial sins. St. Bonaventure teaches the same in IV Sent., dist. 31, a. 2, q. 2 ad 1, in these words: It must be said that one who has intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication intends to avoid it either in himself or in the other. If in the other, by rendering the debt, this is pure justice, it is fidelity, and it is one of the goods of marriage; therefore it is rightly excused from every fault. But one who has intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication in himself always sins venially in this. Each Holy Doctor derived this doctrine from

Augustine, cited above, who asserts that intercourse with one's own spouse for the sake of satisfying concupiscence has venial fault.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Exterior Act Does Not Add Intrinsic Moral Goodness or Malice beyond the Interior Act, but Possesses Only Extrinsic Goodness or Malice Derived from the Commanding Act of the Will.

1. This truth is gathered from many testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers, according to which the will is reckoned before God as the deed. For in Gen. 22 God said to Abraham, who did not sacrifice his son but was prepared to do so: *Because you have done this thing and have not spared your only-begotten son for my sake, I will bless you.* Chrysostom says there, hom. 47: *As far as the will was concerned, the Patriarch had stained his right hand with blood and had offered the perfect sacrifice; therefore the Lord praises the just man as though the sacrifice had been completed in reality.* Likewise, in Mark 12 and Luke 21 Christ preferred the two small coins cast into the treasury by the poor widow to the great alms of the rich, because he regarded not the external work but the affection of a pure heart. *When the Lord saw the widow,* says Cyprian in *De opere et eleemosynis*, *he examined her work not from her wealth but from her disposition, considering not how much she gave but from how much, and said that this widow cast more than all the others into the gifts of God.* From this Gregory the Great concludes in *Homiliae in Evangelia*, hom. 5, that *before the eyes of God the hand is never empty of a gift if the treasury of the heart is filled with good will.* Finally, the same Savior, in Matt. 5, to indicate that the interior consent of the will has the same malice as though the elicited act had taken place, says: *Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.* Hence Augustine in *De libero arbitrio*, c. 3: *If someone lacks the opportunity to lie with another man's wife, yet it is somehow evident that he desires this and would do it if the opportunity were present, he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the deed itself.*

2. Reason also supports this. Moral goodness and malice are founded in freedom. Hence intrinsic moral goodness or malice can exist only where there is intrinsic freedom. But in the exterior act of the executive power there is no intrinsic freedom, but only extrinsic freedom, as philosophers teach. Therefore neither is there intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but only extrinsic goodness or malice derived from the commanding act of the will. Hence an exterior act, which is the mere execution of the interior act of the will, does not add goodness or malice simply to it in relation to essential

reward or punishment, but only in a qualified respect and in relation to accidental reward or punishment, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 3, in these words: *The exterior act adds nothing to essential reward, for one who has a perfect will to do something good merits as much as if he did it; and if he performs one act, he merits as much as if he performed many, provided the will remains equally perfect. But he is ordered to accidental reward through the goodness belonging to the exterior act in itself, and therefore the exterior act adds something to accidental reward.* This is clearly evident in the act of martyrdom. Those who are martyrs by will alone can merit an equal or greater essential reward than those who actually suffer for Christ, if they elicit equal or more fervent acts of charity. Nevertheless, they do not enjoy the accidental reward called the aureole, because that is owed only to the exterior suffering itself, or the actual endurance of death, in which there is a special difficulty to which a certain accidental reward corresponds.

3. Against our assertion, the disciples of Scotus object, first, with the celebrated testimony of Augustine taken from *De Trinitate*, bk. XIII, c. 5, where the Holy Doctor says: *By an evil will alone each person becomes miserable, but he becomes more miserable through the power by which the desire of the evil will is fulfilled.* In these words he admits that an exterior act fulfilling an evil desire adds greater misery beyond the desire itself, and consequently greater malice.

But the reply is easily made from the principles already established: the sinner becomes more miserable through the exterior act, not because a new essential malice accrues from it, but because of the accidental malice and the various disadvantages that the exterior act brings with it, which without doubt render the sinner more miserable than he would be through the will to sin alone. For by an evil exterior act the senses are further blunted and the exterior powers rendered more prone to evil. It also frequently generates scandal and incurs excommunication, irregularity, or an obligation of restitution, none of which are induced by the interior act alone.

4. You will object, second: The interior and exterior acts are forbidden by distinct precepts. The ninth and tenth precepts of the Decalogue concern interior acts alone, namely the coveting of another's wife and property, while fornication and theft, which are the corresponding exterior acts, are forbidden by the sixth and seventh precepts. Therefore this is a sign that the exterior act adds a new malice beyond the interior act. Otherwise we would not be bound to express the external act in confession, such as homicide or adultery, but it would suffice to say that we had an interior desire to kill or commit adultery, which the common practice of the Church condemns.

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I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence. Diverse precepts concerning the aforesaid interior and exterior acts are not established because there is a diverse malice in them or because they belong to diverse vices. Rather, because the coveting of another's property and of sexual things is, in this state of corrupted nature, more connatural and frequent to man than the desires of other forbidden acts, it was fitting that it be forbidden by a special precept, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 122, a. 6 ad 4. Otherwise someone could easily have persuaded himself that to covet another's property or wife was not a sin, provided the act did not follow, as certain heretics asserted. That this heresy had prevailed among the Jews is gathered from the words of Christ cited above: *Everyone who looks at a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.*

5. As to what is added concerning the obligation to express the external act in confession, the inference must likewise be denied. For although the exterior act has no intrinsic and formal malice to add beyond the interior act, nevertheless, because it is the substantial completion of the interior act, and because from both there is made one moral act in a determinate species of malice, such as theft or adultery, it must be declared in confession, so that the complete species of the sin may be explained.

CHAPTER XV.

On the First Rule of the Moral Goodness and Malice of Human Acts, Namely the Eternal Law or the Divine Will.

1. There are two rules of the goodness and malice of human acts, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 71, a. 6. The first is proximate and intrinsic and exists in man, namely the dictate of our reason or conscience, which we shall treat in the following chapter. The other is remote and extrinsic and exists in the divine mind, namely the eternal law, which is the very reason of God directing all creatures to their end. Cicero acknowledged this law in *De legibus*, bk. I, where he says: *The opinion of the wisest men was that law was neither devised by human ingenuity nor constituted by some decree of peoples, but was something eternal that ruled the whole world by the wisdom of commanding and forbidding.* To this law is reduced the divine will, which, since it is rectitude itself and holiness itself by essence, must be the measure to which all rectitude of human life is conformed, according to Augustine on Ps. 32: *He has an upright heart who wills what God wills.* Hence theologians ask here

whether man is bound to conform himself in all things to the divine will. For the resolution:

2. It must be noted from St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 7: Two things must be considered in the object of the will. One is as material, namely the thing willed itself; the other is as formal, namely the reason for willing, which is the end. Thus, in the object of sight, color is as material, while light is as formal, because through it color becomes actually visible. Accordingly, on the part of the object of the divine will a twofold conformity can be found: one on the part of the thing willed, as when man wills something that God wills; the other on the part of the reason for willing, or the end, as when someone wills something for the reason for which God wills it, and so forth. The latter is called conformity in the formal thing willed; the former is called conformity in the material thing willed. This being presupposed:

3. I say that man is bound in all things to conform himself to the divine will in the formal thing willed, but not in the material thing willed. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 19, a. 10, and *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 8, and theologians commonly.

The first part is proved. To conform oneself to the divine will in the formal thing willed is to conform oneself to it in the common and general reason for which God acts, which is the common good of the whole universe insofar as such a good is ordered to God and his glory as its end. But the human will cannot honestly and rationally differ from the divine will in this, as is evident. Therefore man is bound to conform himself to the divine will in the formal thing willed, at least negatively, that is, not positively to disagree with it in such a thing willed.

4. That man is not always bound to conform himself to it in the material thing willed, or in every object willed by God, is evident from the fact that God, by the general will of the first cause and universal provider, wills many things that it is neither praiseworthy nor lawful for us to will, such as wars, plagues, fires, the death of parents, and the like. These things, as referred to the common order of the universe or the manifestation of divine justice, are good, but are relatively evil for us, since the common order of the universe or divine justice does not belong to us. Hence Augustine says in the *Enchiridion*, c. 101: *Sometimes a man with a good will wills something that God does not will, as when a good son wills his father to live, while God with a good will wills him to die.*

5. This is confirmed. If someone sees his father die in heresy or mortal sin and consequently be damned, he sees from the work itself that this is the will of God, for otherwise it would not happen in this way. But it is not good and praiseworthy for the son to will his father's eternal damnation. Rather,

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by charity and filial devotion he is bound to will and procure eternal salvation for him. Therefore it is not always good and praiseworthy to agree with the divine will in the material thing willed.

6. You will say: We ask in the Lord's Prayer that God's will be done on earth as it is in heaven. But in heaven the blessed conform themselves to the divine will not only in the formal thing willed but also in the material. Therefore wayfarers on earth must do the same.

I answer that these words of the Lord's Prayer, *Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven*, must either be understood of the preceptive will, so that through them we ask God that on earth we may obey the divine precepts in all things, as the blessed in heaven always obey God in all things, as St. Thomas explains from Augustine in the *Catena aurea* on these words, and in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 83, a. 9 ad 1, and I, q. 19, a. 11; or, if the discourse concerns the will of God with respect to any thing willed, they signify only that we must conform ourselves to the divine will in every thing willed, not according to itself and absolutely, but insofar as it stands under the order to the end to which God orders it, and that we must will the order of the divine will to be fulfilled in all things. The fact that in the fatherland all are conformed to the divine thing willed, even materially, is due to the perfection of that state, in which, once God's will is known, they act only according to eternal and higher reasons and under the motive by which God wills those things. Hence they take complacency in the death and damnation of parents, in the permission of sins, and in the whole sequence of the reprobation of others revealed to them by God, according to Ps. 57: *The just man will rejoice when he sees vengeance; he will wash his hands in the blood of the sinner*. But for us, who act according to particular and temporal reasons, it is lawful to will the opposite, and indeed we are often bound to do so, as is evident from what was said above.

CHAPTER XVI.

On the Other Rule of the Goodness and Malice of Human Acts, Namely Conscience.

1. Conscience, which according to St. Bernard is, as it were, knowledge of the heart, can be defined or described thus: Conscience is *an act of the practical intellect, namely a judgment dictating concerning the goodness and malice of those things that are to be done by us here and now*. It is called, first, an *act*, for it is not a habit, as Scotus thought. This is because we can act well without a habit, but not without conscience; and also because conscience is often put

aside and changed from good to evil or conversely, whereas powers, since they are properties of the soul, are invariable and inseparable. I add that the proper functions of conscience, which are to testify, bind, urge, accuse, and gnaw or rebuke, consist in an act and not in a habit. Therefore conscience itself is an act. It is called, second, an *act of the intellect*, and not of the will, as Durandus opines, both because the acts mentioned belong to the intellect and because the holy Fathers assert things of conscience that can belong only to an act of the intellect. For it is called by Tertullian *the natural tablet on which each reads the work of the law within himself*; by Damascene, the law of the intellect promulgated to the will; by Origen, *the correcting spirit and instructor of the soul*; by Basil, *the natural tribunal of the soul*; by Chrysostom, *an incorrupt judge*; by Gregory the Great, *a most faithful witness*. It is added that conscience is an *act of the practical intellect*, not of the speculative intellect, because it does not rest in the contemplation of a work to be done, but urges man toward good or withdraws him from evil and moves the lower faculties to the work. Finally, it is said that conscience is *a judgment dictating concerning the goodness and malice of those things that are to be done by us here and now*, because knowledge or consideration of the moral goodness and malice of human acts in common belongs to moral science, not to conscience. Hence St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 17, a. 2: *Conscience adds to knowledge the application of knowledge to a particular act*. From this you will understand that knowledge and conscience stand to one another as understanding and speaking. For just as speaking is understanding with a certain mode, namely by expressing the concept or producing a word, so conscience is knowledge with a certain mode, namely application to a work.

2. Conscience is commonly divided by theologians into certain, doubtful, probable, and erroneous. The reason for this division is deduced from the definition of conscience itself. For since conscience is a judgment dictating to the will what is to be done, conscience can be understood in as many ways as the intellect conducts itself in judging the moral worth of a work. Sometimes the intellect delivers a certain and determinate judgment concerning the goodness or malice of an object, and then conscience is certain. At other times it remains uncertain and suspended, adheres to neither part of a contradiction, and suspends judgment, and then conscience is doubtful. To this is reduced a scrupulous conscience, because, just as a doubtful conscience suspends judgment because of apparent reasons, a scrupulous conscience does so because of the slightest and sometimes ridiculous reasons. Sometimes the intellect judges determinately in favor of some opinion because it appears likely, but nevertheless fears the opposite, and then conscience is probable or opinative. Finally, if the intellect judges

of the object otherwise than it is in reality, calling good evil and evil good, then conscience is erroneous.

3. Bernard speaks elegantly of a good conscience in *De conscientia*, cc. 7 and 8, where he says: A good conscience is the title of religion, the temple of Solomon, a field of blessing, a garden of delights, a golden couch, the joy of angels, the ark of the covenant, the treasure of the King, the court of God, the dwelling of the Holy Spirit, a book sealed and closed and to be opened on the day of judgment. A conscience is good when it has purity in the heart, truth in the mouth, and rectitude in action. It is clean when it is neither justly accused concerning the past nor unjustly delighted concerning the present. It is pure when God imputes to it neither its own sins, because it did not commit them; nor the sins of others, because it did not approve them; nor negligence, because it did not remain silent; nor pride, because it persevered in humility.

4. You will ask, first, whether the will acting against an erroneous conscience that has not been put aside always sins. I answer affirmatively. The reason is that the will is not borne toward an object except as proposed and judged by reason. Therefore, if through error a good object is judged evil and the will is borne toward it, the will has without doubt sinned. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 19, a. 5: The will is not borne toward the good except insofar as it is proposed by reason. Hence, if it is proposed by reason as evil, the will is borne toward it as evil, not because it is evil in itself, but because it is accidentally evil from reason's apprehension. And *Quodlibet IX*, a. 5: An error by which something that is not mortal is believed to be mortal binds, through conscience, to mortal sin. Finally, in his lecture on Rom. 14, lect. 2, he argues thus: An act is judged according to the will of those acting, while the will is moved by the thing apprehended. Hence the will tends toward what the apprehensive power represents to it, and according to this the action is qualified or specified. If someone's reason judges something to be a sin and the will is borne toward doing it, it is evident that the man has the will to commit a sin, and thus his exterior action, which is informed by the will, is a sin. For the same reason, if someone judges what is a venial sin to be a mortal sin, and while this conscience remains he does it, it is evident that he chooses to sin mortally, and thus his action is a mortal sin by reason of his choice. The same is asserted in canon law, can. *Omnes*, 28, q. 1, where it is said: Everything done against conscience builds toward hell. Ambrose, or Ambrosiaster, on the words of the Apostle, Everything that is not from faith is sin, says: Everything that is done, even if in itself and of itself it is good, is nevertheless a sin if it is not done from faith, that is, if it is done against conscience, so that we believe it to be evil. Likewise, St. Bernard

writes in *De praecepto et dispensatione*, c. 14: Therefore, whether you judge the evil you happen to do to be good, or judge the good you perform to be evil, each is a sin.

5. You will say, first: For an act to be good, it suffices that it be conformed to the eternal law. Therefore, although through an erroneous conscience something is believed to be evil, if it is nevertheless consonant with the eternal law, it is not a sin.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For the eternal law is neither derived into us nor promulgated to the will except through reason. Hence an act of the will, to be good, must be conformed not only to the eternal law but also to reason.

You will say, second: The precept of an inferior does not bind when it proposes something against the precept of a superior. Therefore erring reason, proposing something against the precept of God, does not bind.

I answer that the precept of an inferior does not bind when it proposes something known to be contrary to the precept of a superior; but it does bind when what it proposes is believed to be the precept of the superior. For, as the Holy Doctor says here, a. 5 ad 1: *If someone believed the precept of a proconsul to be the precept of the emperor, by despising the precept of the proconsul he would despise the precept of the emperor.*

6. You will ask, second, whether it is lawful to act with a conscience practically doubting the goodness or malice of an act. I answer negatively, because one who acts with a doubtful conscience exposes himself to the danger of doing what is in itself evil and a sin. Hence one who acts in this way does not act according to the laws of prudence and friendship, the former of which dictates that one must not act where the moral worth of the object is not established, while the latter prescribes that a friend must not do anything that can offend his friend. Therefore one who acts in this manner is plainly shown to love the work he performs more than God, to the transgression of whose law he exposes himself by acting. Hence St. Thomas says in *Quodlibet* VIII, a. 13: *One who is led into a certain doubt by a conflict of opinions, if he holds several benefices while the doubt remains, commits himself to danger and thus without doubt sins, as loving a temporal benefice more than his own salvation.* Cajetan says in the last treatise of vol. I of the *Opuscula*, reply 13, final doubt: *If application to the work fluctuates concerning moral rectitude and deviation, there is a scruple of conscience, against which one acts unlawfully and incurs moral deviation.*

7. I said that it is not lawful to act with a conscience practically doubting, because someone can lawfully act with a conscience speculatively doubtful, provided it is practically certain concerning the moral worth of the work he

proposes to do here and now. For the rule of the will is not speculative knowledge, which rests in the truth of the object alone, but practical knowledge, which weighs the quality of all the circumstances. Because an object that appears doubtful when considered in itself and speculatively can, from the concurrence of circumstances, become practically certain, someone can act with a speculatively doubtful conscience, provided it is practically certain. For example, if a sick priest, after considering the nature of the illness from which he suffers, speculatively doubts whether he may cease from the canonical hours, he can, when the counsel of a physician or confessor is added, become practically certain that this is lawful for him and with a safe conscience abstain from reciting the divine office.

8. You will ask, third, whether, in doubtful matters and in a conflict of probable opinions, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion favoring liberty when another more probable opinion favoring the precept is present.

I answer negatively, with many theologians and casuists, both ancient and recent, most illustrious for piety and learning. Thus teach St. Antoninus, pt. I, tit. 3, § 10, rule 4; Scotus, to be cited below; Gabriel in IV Sent., dist. 15, q. 8, a. 3, doubt 2, in the third proof of the first conclusion; Sylvester under the word *Dubium*, q. 2; Conradus, *De contractibus*, tract. 7, q. 110, conclusion 1; Córdoba in his *Quaestionarium*, bk. II, q. 3; and Navarre in the Spanish *Summa*, c. 28, addition to n. 183, c. 27, as Sánchez, an advocate of the contrary opinion, cites him in *De decalogo*, bk. I, c. 9, n. 13. Likewise, among the Fathers of the Society, Bellarmine adheres to the negative opinion in an *Opusculum* to his nephew, the Bishop of Teano, whose words we shall cite below. So does Comitoli in *Responsa moralia*, bk. V, where he deservedly calls the opinion that the more probable and safer position must be followed a chapter of Christian ethics most necessary for treating and judging the remaining controversies of Christian duty. He adds that the opposite opinion is a shameful lapse by which we depart from reason, despise truth, or at least obstruct the ways of recognizing it, insult the eternal law, and imitate those criminal judges who, after hearing opposing witnesses, would wish to follow the testimony that appeared less likely. We also follow the imprudence of those who choose what is more likely evil while leaving aside a secure good. The same is clearly taught by Michael Elizalde of the same Society in his work *De recta doctrina morum*, and by Candidatus Philaethes, or Andrew White, who, as Julius Mercorus, Inquisitor of Mantua, says, *was the first to restrain in Italy the liberty in morals of our age*.

9. Among the Thomists, those who most recently took up the pen against the contrary opinion were the aforementioned Mercorus, in his book *De praxi opinionum*, where he cites more than twenty Doctors for our

opinion; Vincent Baron, who elegantly and acutely proves it in his *Theologia moralis adversus laxiores probabilistas*; and Vincent Contenson, in vol. III of his *Theologia mentis et cordis*, diss. 6, *De novello probabilitatis commento*, where he overturns probabilism by many arguments taken both from authority and reason. Finally, among canonists, Prosper Fagnani most recently wrote against the recent probabilists in explaining the chapter *Ne imitaris*, where he learnedly and copiously treats this whole matter of probability, offering twenty-six reasons for our opinion and citing several celebrated canonists in its favor. To these can be added John Cabassut, priest of the Congregation of the Oratory, who in *De iuris canonici theoria et praxi*, bk. III, c. 13, expressly teaches our opinion and cites in its favor several of the authors quoted by us.

Many reasons are commonly brought forward for it, which we have discussed at length in our dissertation on probability. Here we shall briefly present only three.

The first is this: Just as in controversies and moral difficulties arising daily we are bound to seek the truth while it is hidden and follow it when it has become evident to us, according to Sir. 32, *Before all things let a true word precede you*, so, when we cannot attain and reach it, we must embrace and choose that which appears to us nearer and closer to it. Otherwise Christianity would not be a school of truth but a den of error, if we were not bound to seek the truth and approach it as far as we can. But anyone who departs from the opinion he judges more probable in order to follow a less probable one voluntarily and by his own choice departs from what he judges to approach more closely to the truth, for the end and with the intention of adhering to the opposite position, which he judges more remote from the truth. Therefore he acts perversely and sins.

11. The second reason is taken from the difference found between one who, in a conflict of probable opinions, chooses the position he judges more probable, and one who follows the opinion he judges less probable. Since one who cannot have a perfect or evident knowledge of the truth does everything in his power to attain it by following what appears to him more probable, or more conformed or proximate to the truth, if he happens accidentally to deviate from it, that error will be invincible and inculpable and will excuse him from sin. For, as we shall show in the treatise on sins, all invincible ignorance, since it removes the voluntary without which sin cannot stand, excuses from sin. Conversely, since one who adheres to the opinion he judges less probable, and consequently more remote from the truth, does not do everything he can to attain the truth, but rather seems to despise and flee from it and to depart from it by departing from what he

judges to approach it more closely, he suffers not from invincible but from vincible ignorance, which does not excuse from sin.

12. The third reason, which is fundamental and overturns the chief foundation of the adversaries, can be proposed briefly thus: One who does not act prudently does not act rightly. But one who chooses the less probable opinion favoring liberty or concupiscence, when another favors the precept, does not act prudently. Therefore he does not act rightly but sins. The major premise is certain among all, since prudence is the rule of the goodness and malice of human acts. The minor, which the adversaries deny, is shown, first, by the reason St. Thomas indicates in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 43, a. 5, in the argument *On the contrary*, in these words: *It belongs to prudence to prefer a greater good to a lesser good. Therefore to depart from what is better belongs to imprudence.* Therefore, just as by the dictate of prudence we are bound to buy clothes that appear better or more suitable to us and are sold at a lower price, to take the medicine we judge more beneficial, or to entrust ourselves to the ship we judge better and safer, so, and much more, in moral matters, in which, as Lactantius says, *if an error is made, the whole of life is overturned*, we must follow the more probable and safer ways or opinions by the precept or dictate of prudence.

13. Chrysostom explicitly develops this reason in *Homiliae in Matthaeum*, hom. 44, where he argues thus: *If, when about to buy clothing, you go from one merchant to another and buy from the one where you find better clothes at a lower price, should not the people go around to all the teachers and inquire where the sincere truth of Christ is sold and where it is corrupted, and choose what is truer rather than clothing?* Although the Holy Doctor is not speaking there of the concurrence of a probable opinion with a more probable one, but of the concurrence of the depraved opinion of heretics with truths belonging to the Catholic faith and religion, as is evident from the words immediately preceding, his reasoning nevertheless also applies in the matter of probability that we now treat. For since prudence must prefer a greater good to a lesser, as we saw from St. Thomas, in a concurrence of several probable opinions we are bound to choose the truer, the more probable, or that which is nearer to the truth, rather than *clothing*.

14. This reason is confirmed and further illustrated. One who in temporal or bodily matters followed a less safe and less probable opinion when another safer and more probable opinion was available would act entirely imprudently and foolishly. For example, this would be true of one who took a medicine he judged less beneficial, while despising and rejecting another he thought more beneficial and more effective for restoring health; or one who entrusted himself to a ship he judged less safe and secure, while

leaving aside a safer and more secure one. Therefore, likewise, and much more, those act imprudently who undertake a work they judge more probably unlawful and who entrust the spiritual salvation of their soul to a less safe and less probable opinion, as to a ship likely to perish. They do not fear, as Hugh of St. Victor says, *to give their soul a law that they would refuse to prescribe to their body*. Hence the Gloss on c. 1, *De sententia excommunicationis*, in VI, says: *He is stupid and foolish who commits himself to danger*. John Andrew adds there: *For he approaches more closely to what is false in matters belonging to the salvation of the soul*. Therefore, since one who in moral matters chooses the less probable opinion favoring liberty when a more probable opinion supports the precept approaches more closely to what is false in matters belonging to the salvation of the soul, as we explained in the first reason, he acts not wisely and prudently but altogether foolishly and imprudently, according to the opinion of this celebrated canonist.

15. Nor is it a valid reply to say that the less probable opinion is entirely safe and secure, since one who proceeds probably proceeds safely, as the new casuists commonly teach. We shall soon show this to be false. Even if it were not false, it is nevertheless very uncertain and doubtful, since this is a question and controversy among theologians, some affirming and others denying it. Hence it is not the part of a prudent and wise man to lean upon this reed-staff and commit his salvation to so weak and wavering a principle. *For the highest matter is at stake when eternal salvation is treated*, as Bellarmine says in the passage to be cited below. Or, as Eucherius says in his exhortatory epistle to Valerian: *No reason of convenience can stand if it involves loss to a soul already wearied; and where there is loss of salvation, there assuredly is no gain*.

16. The French annals relate that Henry IV, King of the French of recent and illustrious memory, when, from a conference held at his request between Catholic Doctors and ministers of heretical depravity, he heard the heretical ministers then present admit that those who followed the Catholic faith, provided they lived piously and uprightly, walked in the way of eternal salvation, while the Catholic Doctors asserted in opposition that those who followed the doctrine of the Calvinists could not attain eternal happiness, most wisely said that it was consonant with prudent counsel for him to embrace the Catholic and Roman faith rather than persist in adhering to the Calvinist sect. For by the agreement of each party he could, by professing the faith of the Roman Church, become a possessor of future beatitude; but according to Catholic doctrine, if he did not abjure the Calvinist heresy, he could not avoid the punishment of eternal damnation. It belongs to a prudent man to follow the safer part in the matter of salvation.

17. Those who teach that we can embrace the less probable opinion do not follow the counsel of this most wise and glorious king, for they abandon the more probable and safer opinion, which all theologians confess to be certain and free from danger, while several grave Doctors judge the less probable opinion to lack security, although, in the probable judgment of some, it is a means by which salvation may be attained. Hence Cardinal Bellarmine, no less distinguished for piety than learning, writes these golden words in his *Opusculum* to his nephew, the Bishop of Teano: If someone wishes to place his salvation in safety, he must by all means seek certain truth and not regard what many say or do at the present time. If the certainty of the matter cannot be made fully evident, he must entirely follow the safer part and for no reason, at no one's command, and for no proposed temporal advantage depart to the less safe part. For the highest matter is at stake when eternal salvation is treated, and it is very easy to induce an erroneous conscience by the example of others, and in this way, without the conscience gnawing, to descend to that place where the worm does not die and the fire is not extinguished. For this reason Mutius Vitelleschi, the most wise General of the Society of Jesus, in a letter written on January 4, 1617, to the superiors of the same Society, places this in fourth position among the seven matters he earnestly commends to them: Let superiors take every care that those who teach or write make no use of this rule and norm in choosing opinions: "It can be defended. It is probable. It does not lack an author." Rather, let them embrace those opinions that are safer, that are more commonly supported by the votes of graver and more renowned Doctors, that are more conducive to good morals, and that can nourish and profit piety, not devastate and destroy it. Thus Clement Scott reports in *De potestate Pontificis in Societatem Iesu*, fol. 365, and Martínez de Prado in vol. I of his *Theologia moralis*, c. 15, p. 634.

18. The principal minor premise, which asserts that one who chooses a less probable opinion favoring liberty or concupiscence when another supports truth and the precept does not act prudently, can further be proved by the following argument, which overthrows the chief foundation of the adversaries. Prudence, since it is a practical intellectual virtue, requires at least moral certainty in its object. But one who follows the less probable opinion favoring liberty when a more probable opinion supports the precept does not have moral certainty concerning the moral worth and goodness of his operation. Therefore he does not act prudently. The major premise is evident; the minor also appears manifest. For who would dare affirm that he has moral certainty concerning the moral worth and goodness of an operation that appears to him more evil than good, and concerning which he

has this more probable and likely judgment or dictate: “This action is evil and unlawful”? But one who acts from the less probable opinion standing against the precept cannot fail to have such a judgment or dictate in the intellect, since the more probable opinion favoring the precept dictates and persuades him that it is more probable and likely that the action is evil and unlawful. Therefore one who follows the less probable opinion favoring liberty when a more probable opinion supports the precept does not have moral certainty concerning the moral worth and goodness of his operation.

19. The adversaries reply that, although one who acts from the less probable opinion favoring liberty when a more probable opinion supports the precept has this speculative judgment, *It is more probable and likely that this action is evil and unlawful*, he nevertheless simultaneously has another practical and reflex judgment that makes his conscience certain concerning the rectitude and moral goodness of his operation, namely: *One who acts probably acts prudently and safely*.

20. This reply and doctrine is the principal and almost sole foundation of the adversaries. Hence they always flee to it as to the safest refuge when pressed by the force of arguments, and by this maxim, *One who acts probably acts prudently*, as by the strongest shield, they think themselves able to repel all the weapons hurled against them. But it is not difficult to drive them from that fortress, batter down this wall, and break that straw shield entirely.

21. First, even if one who acts probably acts prudently when no other more probable opinion occurs to him, he nevertheless acts imprudently when he chooses the less probable position in the presence of a more probable one, as was shown above. *For he approaches more closely to what is false in matters belonging to salvation*, as John Andrew, cited above, says.

Second, if “less prudent” and “probable” are synonyms, then a physician will act prudently when he applies probable remedies while omitting safe and more effective ones. Then a judge will be excused who inflicts capital punishment on an accused person who is neither convicted nor confessed, who is probably suspect but more probably innocent. Innocent XI recently condemned this as erroneous. Then it will be lawful for Christians to reduce to practice all those corruptions of morals that some more recent casuists commonly teach to be probable and supported by good reasons. Certainly, who does not see that the aforesaid maxim of the probabilists, *One who acts probably acts prudently and safely*, prepares and fortifies the way to every kind of crime, that the overthrow of all religion and morality follows from it, and that almost everything is rendered lawful, since according to the recent casuists almost everything is probable? Prosper Fagnani expressly declares

this in the chapter *Ne imitaris*, where he writes: There is no doubt that every rule of morals can be overturned by liberty of opinion, not only in human but also in divine and natural precepts, since demonstrative reasons concerning them do not always occur. Hence in these times matters have been brought to such a point that there is scarcely any article in morals in which there is no diversity or contrariety of opinions. Thus in the single work of moral resolutions of Antonino Diana, printed not long ago, more than three thousand questions are numbered as collected together, with opinions and authors on each side, for the most part affirming either that both are probable, or that one is probable and the other more probable, and in almost all of them mortal sin is at issue. Therefore this doctrine of probabilities seems to foster a certain liberty of conscience, and consequently to cry out for the right hand of God and the providence of the Most Blessed Roman Pontiff, lest the poison already spread too widely creep further. Hence not undeservedly Antonio Merenda, in his treatise on this matter most recently printed, plainly affirms in the preface, p. 7, that the use of probabilities is an invention of the devil for weakening the force of the precepts. Crispin of Borgia has similar words in *Selecta moralia*, q. 9, where he says: In moral matters there is scarcely a case in which there are not two contradictory and probable opinions, and Caramuel has reduced this point to such a pitch that there is scarcely any ecclesiastical precept that cannot be evaded if we adhere to his doctrine, which he judges probable. For he contends that it is probable that anyone can follow two contradictory opinions. From this it follows that no one seems bound by the precept of fasting, hearing Mass, reciting the canonical hours, and the like. Hence among the sixty-five propositions recently condemned by Innocent XI, happily governing the Church, this is numbered third: Whenever we act with probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided we do not depart from the limits of probability, we always act prudently.

22. Third, I ask the adversaries whether the aforesaid maxim of the recent casuists, *One who acts probably acts prudently*, is certain and demonstrable, or only probable and opinative. The first cannot be said, since it cannot be proved by any evident and demonstrative reason and is denied by many most grave theologians and canonists. But if it is answered that it is only probable and opinative, as the adversaries are in reality bound to answer, it is manifest that moral certainty cannot be derived from it, removing every moral fear and doubt from the conscience and rendering it entirely certain of the rectitude of the operation. For opinion, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 79, a. 9, *signifies an act of the intellect that is borne toward one side of a contradiction with fear concerning the other*. I add

that, just as only the contingent follows from the contingent and cold from cold, so only the probable and fallible can follow from the probable and fallible. A structure resting upon a weak and wavering foundation cannot stand with certainty and security.

23. You may perhaps say that, although such a maxim is not certain and infallible intrinsically, or from intrinsic reasons and motives, but only probable and opinable, it nevertheless has moral certainty extrinsically, namely from the vote and authority of many grave theologians and casuists who assert it to be certain and promise complete security to those who follow any probable opinion. But all those theologians and casuists, granted that they are celebrated for learning, wisdom, and piety, are without doubt not of such authority in the Church as St. Augustine, the eagle of the Doctors, the summit of human genius, and the greater light of the Church. They are far inferior to him in wisdom, prudence, learning, and piety. Yet that Holy Doctor candidly professes that security given by himself is of no value before God if it disagrees with the divine law: *Behold, he says, the steward gives you security. What does it profit you if the master of the house does not accept it? I am a steward, I am a servant. Do you wish me to tell you, "Live as you please; the Lord will not destroy you"? The steward has given you security, but the security of the steward is of no value. Would that the Lord gave you security and I made you secure! For the Lord's security is valid even if I am unwilling; mine is of no value if he is unwilling.* Since, therefore, God has not promised security to those who follow any probable opinion, and since no trace of this maxim, *One who acts probably acts prudently and safely*, is found in Scripture or the holy Fathers, complete security excluding every moral fear cannot be had from the vote of recent theologians, especially since such a vote cannot elevate any opinion or maxim beyond the sphere of probability. Hence Lactantius rightly warns in bk. III, c. 13: *Let us not be carried away by anyone's authority, but rather approach the truth.* He adds: *There is no place here for rashness. The punishment of folly must be undergone for eternity if an empty person or a false opinion deceives us.*

24. I add from Cabassut in the aforementioned book *De iuris canonici theoria et praxi*: Men eminent in piety and prudence are difficult to find in that crowd of writers which, about thirty years ago, poured itself out everywhere like a most dense cloud of locusts and spread monstrous criminal opinions. Each of those authors presumed to obtain great and safely established probability for them by his vote and authority alone. Indeed, he boasted that the human race was bound to him by the broadest bond of gratitude for having removed the sins of the world, because by the weight of his authority he had rendered lawful and honorable those things formerly

considered crimes, and had transformed the narrow and arduous way leading to heaven into the broadest open plain, by which all without distinction might come to heaven without any difficulty, except only those who did not acknowledge so great a benefit and kiss these divine probabilities. Only their salvation is desperate and their damnation most certain.

Finally, that the aforesaid maxim of the recent casuists is false is clearly gathered from both the Angelic and the Subtle Doctor. The former says in *Quodlibet* IX, a. 15, that the question whether it is lawful to hold several benefices *is determined dangerously because it is ambiguous, since theologians are found to think contrary to theologians and jurists contrary to jurists*. The latter says in III Sent., dist. 25, q. 1, n. 8: *Since one who holds two contrary opinions is perplexed, he would dangerously determine himself to one unless, after diligently examining the matter, he chose the more probable one*. He is speaking there of opinions in moral matters, not speculative matters, as is evident from the preceding words: *In moral matters, when there are disputes concerning some sin*, and so forth. But these statements would be false if the aforesaid maxim, *One who acts probably acts prudently and safely*, were true. For there would be no danger in deciding or determining those questions. Whatever opinion someone chose, whether more or less probable, provided it were probable, he would act prudently and safely and be free of the danger of sinning. Therefore the aforesaid maxim plainly conflicts with the doctrinal principles of St. Thomas and Scotus.

25. Some more recent authors further prove our opinion from the claim that there can be no invincible ignorance of natural law. From this they infer that no probable falsehood dissonant with the eternal or natural law excuses from sin, even if its falsity or deformity from the eternal or natural law is invincibly unknown. But this reasoning is displeasing, both because it presupposes as certain and undoubted something disputed and controversial among theologians, namely that there can be no invincible and inculpable ignorance of natural law, concerning which we shall speak in the treatise on laws, c. 3, § 3; and because, if this reasoning were valid, it would follow that not only one who chooses the less probable opinion in the presence of a more probable one, but also one who follows the more probable and even the most probable opinion, would sin if such an opinion happened to be false and dissonant with natural law, as can happen, since false things are sometimes more probable than true things, as Aristotle says in the *Topica*. From this would follow an incredible perplexity of conscience and even a hard and unavoidable necessity of sinning here and now, as we shall explain more fully in the place cited.

Objections Are Resolved.

26. The principal objections of the adversaries have already for the most part been forestalled and remain resolved by what was said in proving our opinion. For from the third reason it is evident that the following argument, which they regard as decisive, is frivolous: One who acts prudently acts rightly. But one who follows the less probable opinion in the presence of a more probable one acts prudently and with reason, for a probable opinion is one supported by a good reason; otherwise it would not be probable. Therefore he acts rightly.

27. I say that the answer to this argument is evident from what was said above. For in the third reason we showed that one who, in the presence of several probable opinions, prefers the less probable and less safe to the more probable and safer acts most imprudently. Nor does it matter that the less probable opinion is supported by some reason, since the more probable opinion rests upon a better and more effective foundation. When the light of the more probable position arrives or appears, the light of the less probable position immediately vanishes, just as the light of the stars is hidden and disappears when the sun appears.

28. This can be explained and further illustrated from the doctrine St. Thomas hands down from Aristotle in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 50, a. 1 ad 1, where he teaches that a mean compared with one extreme appears to be the other extreme. For example, what is lukewarm, compared with hot, appears cold, and, compared with cold, appears hot. What is dusky, compared with black, is called white, and black, if compared with white. Likewise, the middle string of a lyre or harp is called low when compared with the highest and high when compared with the lowest. Finally, twilight is called day in comparison with night, and night in comparison with day. Therefore, since the less probable opinion stands midway between the improbable and the more probable, although it may appear probable in some manner compared with the improbable, it does not appear so in the presence of and compared with the more probable, especially if the latter is notably more probable. The same must proportionately be said of a less good and less effective reason compared with a better and more effective one.

29. From what has been said, another foundation of the adversaries also remains resolved. By it they prove that one who chooses the less probable and less safe opinion in the presence of a more probable and safer one is excused from sin because he suffers from invincible ignorance. That this is

false is evident, since the opinion that, by the weight of its reasons, appears to him more probable and, by removing danger, is safer and more secure, shines before him; yet, despising it, he deliberately chooses the less probable and less safe, even when it supports liberty against the law, pleasure against duty, convenience against moral worth, or rests upon less likely arguments. Hence he can deservedly exclaim with the Poet: *I see and approve the better; I follow the worse.*

30. The adversaries object, third, with this argument, which is also principal and fundamental among them: It is lawful to choose what is less good and less perfect while leaving aside what is better and more perfect, for example marriage and the secular state, and to prefer it to the clerical or religious state. Therefore it is likewise lawful to choose the less probable opinion favoring liberty while leaving aside the more probable opinion supporting the precept.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. For the state of marriage is safe even in the presence of the religious or clerical state, but the less probable opinion is not safe in the presence of the more probable, since it is not consonant with the rules of prudence, as we showed above.

31. You will say: Why is one who chooses the more probable opinion safe and free from danger of sinning, but not one who follows the less probable opinion, since the more probable opinion can be no less false and dissonant with the divine law than the less probable?

I answer that there is a notable difference between them. One who chooses the more probable opinion has this reflex and prudential judgment: *One who does everything in his power to seek the truth, if he happens not to attain it, is excused from sin by reason of invincible ignorance.* This judgment is entirely certain, as resting upon the principle, *No one sins in what he cannot avoid*, which Augustine in *De duabus animabus*, c. 11, declares to be so well known and self-evident that it is not only unknown to no one, but is proclaimed and repeated by the whole human race. *Do not*, he says, *shepherds sing these things on the mountains, and poets in the theaters, and the unlearned in gatherings, and the learned in libraries, and teachers in schools, and bishops in sacred places, and the human race throughout the world?* But one who follows the less probable opinion in the presence of a more probable one cannot have this reflex judgment, since he does not suffer from invincible ignorance, as was shown above. He has only this judgment: *One who acts probably acts prudently and safely*, which is very doubtful and uncertain and can at most be probable and opinable, as is evident from what was said above. Hence the first adheres to a most solid pillar, while the other leans upon a reed-staff or a wavering and weak foundation.

32. They object, fourth: The same reasoning seems to apply to the more probable opinion as to the safer. But we can choose the less safe opinion in the presence of a safer one, as St. Antoninus teaches, pt. I, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10, in these words: *To choose the safer way is a matter of counsel, not precept; otherwise many would have to enter religion, in which one lives more safely than in the world.* And in pt. II, tit. 1, c. 16, § 2, he wisely admonishes confessors in these words: *The safer way must always be counseled, but not commanded.* Therefore it is likewise lawful to follow the less probable opinion in the presence of the more probable.

I answer by denying the major premise. An opinion is called safer because it departs further from the danger of sinning, but more probable because it is or appears more consonant or proximate to the truth. Although we are bound to follow what appears to us more conformed or proximate to the truth when it favors a precept or virtue, we are not bound to follow what departs further from the danger of sinning if it is not consonant with truth or prudence, since prudence is the rule of human acts. Hence Ambrose says on Ps. 118: *Just as there is no wisdom without fear, so fear must not exist without wisdom.* Therefore, when some of the authors cited above say that the safer opinion must be followed in moral matters, this must be understood of a safer opinion that is also more probable and more consonant with truth and prudence, not of opinions that are less probable and less consonant with the rules of prudence. Otherwise, when someone doubted whether a thing he possessed belonged to him or another, he would be bound immediately to hand it over to the other or divide it with him, because this would be safer and more remote from the danger of sinning. Universally, all opinions teaching that certain contracts are unlawful, even if improbable or less probable, would have to be followed, as being safer and more remote from the danger of sinning. This would be an intolerable burden and would almost destroy human commerce, since there is scarcely any action or contract concerning which there is no opinion condemning it. Therefore, when of two opposing opinions one is safer but the other more probable, it is lawful to follow the more probable, which by that very fact is safe and secure. For since truth and the avoidance of error are principally required for acting rightly, greater probability in a doubtful matter must be preferred to greater security, because it approaches more closely to the goal of truth. Nevertheless, where the validity of a sacrament or the salvation of a soul is endangered, not only the more probable but also the safer part must be chosen, as theologians teach in the treatise on the sacraments.

33. They object, fifth: Since the yoke of Christ is sweet and his burden light, as is said in Matt. 11, those opinions must be followed in moral matters

that render the way to heaven smoother and easier, such as probable opinions favoring liberty. Hence Caramuel says in *Theologia regularis*, disp. 6: *The Catholic Church should be called more fortunate because it abounds in most learned men who have introduced benign opinions, since many whom the probability of an opinion saves would otherwise be damned.* Other recent authors commonly profess the same, asserting that through the cleverness and diligence of the new casuists the way of salvation is daily rendered smoother and easier, because they daily devise new probable opinions by which men can more benignly and easily be advanced to the empyrean crown.

They confirm this from the law Benignus, Digest, De legibus, and the final chapter De transactionibus, where it is said that the more benign and gentle opinion must be preferred. St. Antoninus also says, pt. I, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10: Between a severe and a benign opinion concerning precepts, the benign opinion is, other things being equal, rather to be adopted in interpretation. It is also said in the prologue of our Constitutions, letter I: The third thing that impedes the salvation of souls is excessive austerity in counsels and opinions. For men are thereby so frightened that they neglect their own salvation. Therefore, as far as possible, rigor and austerity in counsels must be relaxed and men treated benignly.

34. To the objection I answer that the yoke of Christ is indeed sweet and his burden light, but its sweetness and lightness arise from charity and the grace of Christ, which soften and mitigate it, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 98, a. 1 ad 3, not from the use, or rather abuse, and laxity of probabilities that the new casuists have introduced into the Church. Hence it is absurd to say that through their cleverness and diligence the way of salvation is daily widened. For, as Sinnichius, Doctor of Louvain, rightly says in *Saul illicitus gentis protomonarcha*, vol. I, p. 262: Human cleverness can no more add one finger of width to the path of heaven than it can add one cubit of height to the stature of men. For he who established the limits of human life, which cannot be passed, established the limits of the way to heaven, which cannot be widened. He also established the narrow limits of life, which cannot be contracted. Therefore that way remains narrow as he established it, and spacious as he established it.

35. Mercorus, Inquisitor of Mantua, adds in *De praxi opinionum limitata*, p. 492, replying to the aforesaid words of Caramuel: If the Church were to applaud this new happiness, which the author supposes, because the faithful were advanced more easily to the empyrean crown by opinion-makers, it would at the same time have to lament the unhappiness of the Church in preceding ages, in which this gate of heaven would have been closed. Hence with the great Guigo, formerly General of the Carthusians, one would have

to exclaim: O most unhappy times of the Apostles! O those men enveloped in the darkness of ignorance and worthy of every pity, who, in order to attain life, guarded such hard ways because of the words of God's lips and did not know this convenient method of ours!

36. To the confirmation I answer that, when it is said in canon law that the more benign and gentle opinion must be preferred, this must be understood when such an opinion is safe and remains within the bounds of moral worth. But a less probable opinion favoring liberty, in the presence of a more probable one supporting the precept, since it is not consonant with the rules of prudence, is neither safe nor within the bounds of moral worth. What is cited from St. Antoninus must be understood and explained in the same way. Likewise, when it is said in our Constitutions that *rigor and austerity in counsels must be relaxed as far as possible and men treated benignly*, this must be understood as far as is possible according to the laws of prudence, which is the rule of human acts. But the laws of prudence, as was shown above, forbid the choice of laxer and more benign opinions that are less probable when more probable opinions support the precept.

I add that among jurists an opinion is called benign not because it favors liberty, but because it favors a testament, marriage, religion, or a sacrament, as Sylvester explains. Or, as others interpret it, because it favors the needy, orphans, widows, and strangers.

37. They object, fifth: The opinion teaching that we are bound to follow the more probable positions in moral matters exposes the conscience to many scruples and anxieties, from which those who teach that it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion favoring liberty in the presence of a more probable opinion supporting the precept are freed. Therefore, for the peace and tranquility of conscience, this second opinion must be held in practice, even if the other is speculatively truer or more probable.

I answer by denying the antecedent. Far from exposing the conscience to scruples by following the more probable opinion, it is rather entirely freed and exempted from them, as is evident from the Clementine constitution Exivi, De verborum significatione, where the Pontiff says: In matters concerning the salvation of the soul, the safer part must be held in order to avoid grave remorse of conscience. Reason also counsels this. Rest can exist only in the sincere search for truth, and perfect security only in truth. Therefore one who embraces the part that he judges less probable and less safe, that is, nearer to falsehood than truth and nearer to sin than virtue, must necessarily be distressed by scruples and pricked and tormented by the stings of conscience. But one who follows what he believes truer, safer, and more probable is peaceful and tranquil, although not entirely secure. For he

alone enjoys true and perfect security who has followed and attained the first and eternal Truth. Hence Gregory the Great says in *Moralia*, bk. V, c. 6: When holy men overcome evils, they fear even their deeds done well, lest, while they appear to act well, they be deceived by the appearance of the action, lest the pestilent corruption of decay lie hidden beneath the appearance of a good color. For they know that, burdened by the weight of corruption, they do not know how to judge good things subtly; and when they bring before their eyes the rule of the final examination, they sometimes fear in themselves even those things they approve. They desire inward things with their whole mind, yet, trembling because of the uncertainty of their works, they do not know where they are walking. And again in the following chapter: Lest they perhaps tremble in their good works themselves, and lest they displease his eyes through some error in those same works, they devote themselves to continual lamentations. From these things it is clear that the tranquility of conscience promised by the new casuists to those following the less probable opinion is suspect and dangerous, and that the cushion or pillow they place beneath the heads of the lukewarm and negligent, that they may sleep and rest more softly in their negligences, is condemned by the Lord through the Prophet, who says: Woe to those who sew cushions under every elbow and make pillows beneath the head of every age, to capture souls. Gregory the Great, explaining these words in *Moralia*, bk. XVIII, c. 4, says: A cushion is placed so that one may rest more softly. Therefore whoever flatters those acting wickedly places a cushion beneath the head or elbow of one lying down, so that he who should have been corrected for his fault may, supported by praises, rest softly in it. He has similar words in *Regula pastoralis*, pt. II, c. 8: To place cushions beneath every elbow is to revive by flattering adulation souls falling from their rectitude and reclining in the love of this world. For it is as though the elbow or head of one lying down were received upon a cushion when the severity of correction is withdrawn from a sinner and the softness of favor applied to him, so that he may lie softly in error, struck by no harshness of contradiction.

38. You will ask, fourth, when two opinions occur in moral matter that are equally probable, or possess equal reasons, neither of which outweighs the other, which of them must be chosen and preferred.

I answer that the safer must then be chosen and preferred to the less safe. The reason is that, although in speculative matters a man can by his innate liberty determine himself to follow whichever probable opinion he wishes, in moral and practical matters he must be determined to it by prudence, which is the rule of human acts, and consequently must be moved

to it by some intrinsic or extrinsic motive of prudence. But when the opinions are equally probable, he cannot be moved and determined by an intrinsic motive or by some preponderating reason, since the reasons on each side are then equal. Therefore he must then be moved and determined by some prudent extrinsic motive, and none can be more suitable than the greater security found in one of those opinions rather than the other. Hence the celebrated rule of canon law is that *in doubtful matters the safer part must be chosen*. Therefore, when in the presence of several equally probable opinions a man doubts which he should choose and remains uncertain and suspended, as though in equilibrium and not knowing to which side he should incline, he must, in order to act prudently, incline to the safer side and choose the more secure opinion.

39. You will say: There is another rule of law which says that *in doubtful matters the condition of the possessor is better*. Therefore, since man is in possession of his liberty, in the presence of two equally probable opinions he can choose whichever he prefers and is consequently not bound to choose the safer.

I answer that this rule has place only in the matter of justice and solely in the judicial forum, not in the matter of other virtues. For in the matter of justice, possession in doubt favors the possessor insofar as it creates a presumption that the possessor is the true owner. For one who possesses for the most part possesses his own thing and right. When someone alienates a thing, he is accustomed to hand it over to the true owner, to whom dominion is transferred through alienation. Hence, when someone possesses a thing, this is a sign that he has not alienated it but possesses true dominion over it. But in the matter of other virtues, since possession does not regularly establish a presumption of truth in favor of the party possessing, possession must by no means favor it. In doubts occurring in such matters, the rule of action is to inquire on which side the presumption of truth stands, and that side must be chosen. But if no presumption stands for either side, the safer part must be chosen, as Prosper Fagnani proves by many examples and rules of law in his commentary on the chapter *Ne imitatis*.

40. You will ask, finally, whether, when diligent inquiry into the truth has been employed in moral matters and cases of conscience, and nothing certain and fully evident appears, as frequently happens in human affairs, someone can then act from a probable opinion.

I answer affirmatively against Fagnani in his commentary on the cited chapter, *De constitutionibus*, n. 59, who denies that it is lawful to hold an opinion in any moral matter, because opinion, he says, concerns an

uncertain thing and has fear of the opposite joined to it. Hence he constantly affirms that certainty is necessary in every moral action, without which no one can act without sin because of the danger to which he exposes himself, just as does everyone acting with a doubtful conscience.

41. Our resolution, however, is that of St. Thomas in *Quodlibet* VIII, a. 13, in the argument *On the contrary*, where he says: *If someone employs diligence in inquiring whether it is lawful to hold several benefices and finds nothing moving him to judge that it is unlawful, it seems that he can hold several benefices without sin.* Reason also counsels this. Men must act in a human manner and cannot be obliged to have a clear and perfect knowledge of all things. Therefore, when sufficient diligence has been employed according to the conditions of the matter and person and nothing more probable appears, a man acts prudently by conforming his conscience to a probable opinion.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated from Cajetan in the *Summa*, under the word *Opinio*, where he says: God does not require from man more than the condition of man possesses, because divine wisdom disposes all things sweetly. But the condition of man is such that in moral matters he cannot attain evidence in all things, nor possess mathematical or exact certainty concerning all things to be done. Therefore God does not require him always to act with evidence and mathematical certainty concerning the moral goodness of his action, and consequently he can follow a probable opinion when, sufficient diligence having been employed, no other more probable opinion appears to him. Hence St. Antoninus says, pt. I, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10: The certainty found in moral matter is not the certainty of evidence but probable conjecture.

42. To the foundation of Fagnani it is easily answered that one who, after employing sufficient diligence to seek the truth, acts from a probable opinion when no other more probable opinion occurs to him does not act with a conscience practically doubtful and consequently exposes himself to no danger of sinning. For he is then rendered morally certain through the reflex judgment he possesses, not the judgment upon which the new casuists rely, namely, *Because he acts probably, he acts prudently and safely*, for we showed above that such a maxim is doubtful and uncertain and is judged erroneous by several most grave theologians, but this one: *One who does everything in his power to seek the truth and cannot attain and reach it is excused from sin by reason of invincible ignorance.* This principle is altogether certain and confirmed by the almost unanimous judgment and consent of all theologians, as we shall show in the treatise on sins.

43. From these things you will understand that one must proceed cautiously in this matter of probability, neither absolutely rejecting all

probability, as some excessively severe authors do, nor denying that a man can act from a probable opinion when no more probable one occurs to him. Nevertheless, in a conflict or concurrence of several probable opinions, the more probable must be followed, especially if it is notably more probable, as was shown above.

44. One must proceed cautiously between these two rocks of Scylla and Charybdis and avoid two opposite extremes in this matter: that of those who reject all probability, and that of others who, on the contrary, embrace every probability and assert it to be a safe rule of morals, even when another opinion more probable and consequently nearer to the truth supports the opposite. For truth, as Novatian beautifully says, hangs between two errors as Christ between two thieves. Certainly, if this mean were preserved and the probability of opinions were received by all with the aforesaid moderation and tempering, uniformity and purity of morals would more easily be preserved among the faithful, and in a short time, says Gravina in his *Cherubim Paradisi, the world would be reformed, which is rushing headlong through liberty of opinion by entering the very broad way that leads to destruction*. Hence Cabassut wisely observes in the preface to the book cited above that it is difficult to judge whether the salvation of souls is more endangered by minds excessively severe or excessively indulgent. By the more indulgent, souls are led along the spacious and broad way that leads to eternal destruction; under the guiding hand of such directors the twisted serpent is led forth, and sin is conceived, brought forth, and nourished. Hence in Ezek. 13 the Lord is indignant and curses those who sew cushions beneath every elbow and make pillows beneath the head of every age, so that those whom they seduce may rest softly and pleasantly in their sins and take complacency in such directors. Isaiah rebukes these in c. 30: *They say to the seers, "Do not see," and to those who behold, "Do not behold for us the things that are right. Speak to us pleasing things; see errors for us."*

45. Yet, just as excessive indulgence is harmful, so is immoderate austerity in matters of conscience. Taking no account of human weakness and not distinguishing counsels from precepts, while it compels men toward excessively arduous things, it closes to them the way of eternal salvation that Christ had opened. It condemns those who should be saved, as St. Bonaventure says, and drives those conscious of their own weakness to despair. For it happens that miserable men, after hearing this stricter doctrine, believe or doubt that mortal fault exists where none exists; yet, overcome by the difficulty of the matter, they sin mortally from an erroneous conscience and are damned. Hence Ambrose says on Ps. 118, sermon 5: *There are among us those who have the fear of God, but not according*

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*to knowledge, establishing harsher precepts than the human condition can sustain. Fear is in them because they appear to themselves to consult discipline and demand a work of virtue. But ignorance is in them because they do not have compassion upon nature and do not consider what is possible. Therefore St. Bonaventure rightly and wisely says in *Compendium theologiae veritatis*, c. 52: A conscience that is excessively broad and one that is excessively strict must be avoided. For the first generates presumption, the second despair. Likewise, the first often calls evil good, while the second conversely calls good evil. Again, the first often saves one who should be condemned, while the second conversely condemns one who should be saved.*

TREATISE IV. ON VIRTUES IN GENERAL.

After the treatise on human acts, considered both in their physical being and in their moral being, we must discuss virtues in general, which are principles of good acts and certain habits ordered to eliciting them. Their nature, subject, species, and properties must be briefly explained here. We shall discuss the virtues in particular, both theological and moral, below.

CHAPTER I. The Nature of Virtue.

1. Several definitions of virtue are commonly given. The first is handed down by Aristotle in *Ethica Nicomachea* II, c. 4, in these words: *Virtue is a habit that makes its possessor good and renders his work good*. In this definition a twofold relation of virtue is explained: one that it has to its proper subject as its form, when it is said to make its possessor good; for virtue alone makes a man good, as Seneca shows in epistle 76. The other is the relation it has to operation as its proper effect, when it is added: *and renders his work good*.

2. The second is found in the same Philosopher, *ibid.*, where he says that *virtue is an elective habit consisting in a mean, as the wise and prudent man shall dictate*. This definition does not apply to the theological or intellectual virtues, but only to the moral virtues. For the intellectual virtues are not elective, since choice belongs only to the will. The theological virtues do not

properly require a mean, but only the moral virtues do, such as justice, temperance, and the like, which concern an object that is a mean between two extremes, namely excess and defect. Nevertheless, that mean is not understood according to the thing, but according to reason, in keeping with the requirements of the person, place, and other circumstances. For example, food that is moderate and temperate for one person is excessive and intemperate for another. Hence it is added: *as the wise and prudent man shall dictate*.

3. The third, which is gathered from the words of St. Augustine, especially in *De libero arbitrio* II, and defended by St. Thomas here, q. 55, a. 4, is as follows: *Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, and which God works in us without us*. First, *quality* is stated because quality is the supreme genus of virtue. The definition would nevertheless be more fitting if *habit*, which is the proximate genus, were placed instead of quality, as St. Thomas says in the cited passage. *Good* is added to explain the difference between virtue and vice, and other qualities that dispose a thing badly. By the expression *of the mind* the subject of virtue is designated, namely a rational power, either essentially or by participation, such as the sensitive appetite, which, insofar as it is subject to reason, participates in something of reason and is a subject of virtue, as we shall say below. By this, virtue differs from all bodily qualities, whether good or bad. By the expression *by which one lives rightly*, virtue is distinguished from qualities that are not immediately operative, such as beauty and health in bodily things, and habitual grace in spiritual things, which immediately inheres in the substance of the soul. Here *lives* signifies a vital operation. By the expression *which no one uses badly*, virtue differs from those habits and qualities that can incline toward evil or falsehood, or which someone can use either well or badly, such as opinion, human faith, character, and the like. Finally, the last words, namely *which God works in us*, apply only to virtues infused of themselves. These are distinguished from acquired virtues only in this: acquired virtues are acquired through our activity and our active concurrence in their acquisition, whereas infused virtues are produced in us without our active concurrence, although through our acts we cooperate with God dispositively toward their reception. Hence, if these final words are removed, the definition, in the manner explained, applies to every virtue, whether intellectual, theological, or moral.

4. From these things you will understand that virtue is an operative habit, and that it concurs primarily and of itself in the moral goodness of human acts and in their facility and delightfulness, but only secondarily in

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their physical entity, insofar as that entity underlies the moral goodness of the act and its facility.

The first part is evident from the first and third definitions of virtue and from St. Thomas here, q. 55, a. 2, where he concludes: *And therefore it belongs to the nature of human virtue that it be an operative habit.* Augustine teaches the same in *De bono coniugali*, where he says that virtue is *a habit by which something is done.* Hence someone aptly said that virtue is not like a lyre that no one plays, a sword that is never drawn from its sheath, or a ship that, although perfectly equipped, always remains in port, but rather like a fruitful and fertile field, than which, as Ambrose elegantly says in *De Isaac*, c. 7, *nothing is more beautiful when the crops wave, the fruits glow, clusters of grapes hang down, an olive tree bends under its berries, or the heights of mountains and the lowlands of valleys are clothed with green grass.*

5. The second part is proved as to each of its members. First, that virtue concurs primarily and of itself in the moral goodness of human acts is evident. For virtue primarily and of itself concurs in producing that for which a natural power needs it. But a natural power needs the habit of virtue in order to produce a morally good act, or to cause moral goodness in the act. For the power of itself is able to produce only the substance or physical entity of the act. Therefore such a habit concurs primarily and of itself in the moral goodness of the act.

6. That it also concurs primarily and of itself in the facility of the act is clear from the difference between the force of a higher power communicated to a lower power in a transient manner and the force communicated in the manner of a habit or complete form constituting a perfect and connatural principle of the act. The former does not remove difficulty, whereas the latter introduces facility and delightfulness joined to the moral goodness of the virtuous act, and of itself attains both.

Finally, that virtue does not of itself produce the physical entity of the same act, but does so only accidentally and secondarily, insofar as that entity underlies its moral goodness and facility, is evident from the fact that a habit of itself influences only what exceeds the powers of the faculty. But the physical entity of a virtuous act does not exceed the powers of the faculty, as is clear. For example, an act of the irascible or concupiscible power, considered according to its physical entity, signifies nothing other than a passion of the sensitive appetite, considered apart from the order of reason, and in this manner it is found in brute animals. Therefore a habit of acquired moral virtue does not of itself influence the physical entity of such an act, but does so only accidentally and secondarily, insofar as that entity underlies its moral goodness and facility.

CHAPTER II.

The Subject of the Virtues.

1. It is certain that virtues, since they are operative habits, reside not in the essence of the soul itself, but in its powers. It is also clear that virtues cannot be subjectively present in the exterior members of the body, in the vegetative powers, or in the external senses, because faculties of this kind are not indifferent to operating well or badly, but are wholly determined to one manner of operating, and consequently have of themselves no difficulty in exercising their proper operations. The theologians also commonly teach with St. Thomas, here, q. 56, a. 5, that no virtues are subjectively present in the internal senses. For since virtue, according to Aristotle, is the disposition of what is perfect toward what is best, and since perfection consists in consummation, the power that is the subject of virtue must consummate the virtuous act and not merely prepare or initiate it. Hence, since the cognition of truth, which is the good work of a cognitive power, is not consummated in the sensitive apprehensive powers, because they merely prepare and dispose for the cognition of the intellect, whose proper function is to attain truth, intellectual virtues cannot be subjectively present in them. Finally, it is acknowledged by all that the intellectual virtues, namely understanding, science, wisdom, art, and prudence, reside in the intellect: the first three in the speculative intellect, and the last two in the practical intellect insofar as it is subject to the motion of the will, whose proper function is to move the intellect and the other powers to operation as regards exercise. Only a twofold difficulty and controversy among the theologians therefore remains to be briefly resolved here. The first is whether virtues properly so called can be subjectively present in the sensitive appetite insofar as, in man, it is naturally capable of political obedience to reason. The second is whether a moral virtue must be posited in the will not only for promptly and easily attaining another's good, but also in relation to the connatural good of its own *suppositum*.

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§ 1.

Resolution of the First Difficulty.

2. I say first that the sensitive appetite of man, insofar as it is naturally capable of political obedience to reason, is a subject of virtue properly so called, such as fortitude and temperance. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 56, a. 4, in the body and in the reply to the first objection, where he says: The irascible and concupiscible powers, considered in themselves insofar as they are parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and brute animals. But insofar as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, they are proper to man. In this manner they can be the subject of human virtue. Nothing clearer or more explicit could be said in favor of our conclusion. Aristotle also supports it in *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 3, where he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the irrational parts, that is, to the concupiscible and irascible appetites, and therefore calls the subject of virtue the concupiscible power.

3. Reason also supports this. For, as St. Thomas argues in the cited passage and more extensively in *De virtutibus*, a. 4, three things are required for a power to be capable of virtue: 1^o that it be capable of being moved and regulated by a higher power; 2^o that it not be bound to one manner of operating; 3^o that it elicit a perfect work. The sensitive appetite as found in man has these three conditions. First, it is capable of being moved and directed by reason, and hence upright men moderate the passions of the sensitive appetite according to the dictate of reason. Second, it is not determined to one manner of acting, but sometimes acts according to reason and sometimes deviates and departs from it. Finally, it elicits a morally perfect and consummated work when the passions of the irascible and concupiscible powers are reduced to the mean by temperance and fortitude. Therefore it is capable of virtue, and moral virtues reside in it that moderate fears and daring amid dangers to life, and restrain immoderate pleasures in food and sexual matters.

This is confirmed: virtue must be posited where there is difficulty in attaining its object. But the will has no difficulty concerning the moderation of passions, since such moderation is a good of reason proper and proportionate to the will; only the sensitive appetite experiences this difficulty. Therefore the virtues that moderate the passions must be posited in the sensitive appetite, not in the will.

4. You will object: a power that is the subject of moral virtue must be perfectly free, since it is the principle of a free and moral act. It must also be able to choose, since virtue is defined as an elective habit. It must likewise be able to attain the morally honorable good, since this is the object of virtue. Finally, it must be regulated by prudence, which is the rule of the moral virtues. But those four conditions belong not to the sensitive appetite, but only to the will. Therefore the will alone can be the subject of the moral virtues that moderate the passions. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved in each of its parts. First, it seems evident that the first condition does not belong to the sensitive appetite. For although, as found in man, it participates in a certain freedom through its conjunction with the will, that freedom is nevertheless imperfect and qualified, and does not suffice for the nature of virtue, since an act of virtue must be free without qualification, just as it is good and honorable without qualification. It is also clear that the sensitive appetite cannot choose, since choice is an act of the will, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 13, a. 2. It is likewise clear that it cannot attain the morally honorable good, since its adequate object is sensible and bodily good. Finally, since such an appetite is regulated through sensory apprehension, it does not seem capable of being directed and regulated by prudence, which resides not in sense, but only in the intellect.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To the first proof of the minor, I say that although the sensitive appetite of man, by reason of its conjunction with the will, does not become free without qualification, but only in a qualified respect, nevertheless through the actual influx and motion of the will, by which the will applies it to operation, it intrinsically participates in perfect and sufficient freedom, so that it can be the subject of moral virtue, just as by reason of that freedom it can be the subject of vice and sin.

5. To the second proof, it must be said that the subject of the moral virtues that moderate passions must indeed be elective in some manner, but not simply and perfectly elective. For in this the moral virtues concerning passions and residing in the sensitive appetite differ from those that do not moderate passions and are subjectively present in the will: the latter are elective habits formally, directly, and immediately, because they directly and immediately effect the choice that resides in the will; the former are elective habits only by participation, indirectly, mediately, and completely: 1^o because they elicit an act of appetite in which the choice of the will and the order of reason are participated; 2^o because, by moderating the passions of the appetite that disturb due choice, they contribute indirectly and mediately to that choice; 3^o because, although they do not directly elicit

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choice itself, they nevertheless effect an act of the sensitive appetite that executes and completes it, and consequently can be called elective habits executively and completely. The Salamancans examine this doctrine and solution extensively in the treatise *De virtutibus*, disp. 2, dub. 2, § 2, and illustrate it by various texts of St. Thomas.

6. To the third proof, it must be said that although the sensitive appetite cannot attain the universal morally honorable good, nevertheless, as actually moved by the will through a certain participation in reason, it can attain a singular morally honorable good regulated by the cogitative power, just as the cogitative power itself, through its conjunction with the intellect, participates in the power of reasoning about singulars, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4.

To the last proof, the answer is likewise that, just as there is in the sensitive appetite a certain freedom participated from the will, so in the sensory apprehension by which it is directed there is a certain imperfect prudence, as it were, participated from the intellect. This can attain many circumstances of an act elicited by the appetite and consequently direct and regulate such an act.

§ 2.

Resolution of the Second Difficulty.

7. I say secondly that the will needs no superadded virtue to attain the morally honorable good of its own *suppositum*, but it does need one to attain another's good, such as rendering to each what is his own.

The first part, which some recent authors deny, is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *De virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 5, where he suggests this argument: no power needs a habit of virtue in order to attain an object in relation to which it is of itself complete, determined, and proportioned, since a habit is ordered only to ultimately completing and determining a power toward attaining an object. But the will is of itself complete, determined, and proportioned toward attaining the morally honorable good of its own *suppositum*. Therefore it does not need a superadded habit of virtue to determine it toward that good. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved: 1^o because the morally honorable good of one's own *suppositum* does not exceed the proportion of the one willing, either as to species, since it belongs to the natural order, or as to the individual, since it is not another's good, but the good of the appetitive *suppositum* itself; 2^o because, just as the will, from the fact that it is the appetite of a rational nature, is by its nature

inclined and tends toward morally honorable good as such, and therefore no virtue is posited for attaining it as such, so, from the fact that it is the appetite of this particular man, it is of itself inclined toward the morally honorable good of this *suppositum*. For just as the individual difference contracts the will so that it is numerically this will, it likewise determines its inclination toward the good of this *suppositum*.

8. From this the second part of the conclusion remains proved. For although another's natural good does not exceed the proportion of the will as to species, as a supernatural good does, it nevertheless exceeds that proportion as to the individual. For every will, from the very fact that it is rooted in this numerically distinct *suppositum*, is determined through its individual difference toward the good of its own *suppositum*, according to the saying of the Philosopher: *Good is lovable, but to each his own good is lovable*. Therefore the will needs a habit of virtue to attain another's good, even a natural good. Hence justice and the other virtues annexed or related to it are posited in the will, so that, notwithstanding the weight of self-love, it may be inclined toward another's good.

9. You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: a habit of virtue is required in a power when an act is difficult for it. But in pursuing the morally honorable good even of its own *suppositum*, the will sometimes experiences no slight difficulty, because of which it abandons that good and falls into the contrary evil. Therefore it needs a habit of virtue to attain that good.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. A habit of virtue is required in a power when the act is difficult for it of itself and because of the object: I grant the major premise. When it is difficult only accidentally and because of some extrinsic impediment: I deny the major premise. Hence, since the difficulty the will sometimes experiences in pursuing its proper and connatural morally honorable good does not arise from the surpassing excellence of the object or act, but from the immoderate passions of the sensitive appetite or other impediments on the part of the body, no habit of virtue is required in the will for easily and delightfully pursuing such a good. If any habit is necessary for this, it must be placed in the aforesaid appetite to moderate its passions, from whose immoderation the pursuit of that good is rendered difficult. Thus the virtues of fortitude and temperance are posited in the irascible and concupiscible appetites, by which their immoderate passions are restrained and moderated, as was shown in the preceding section.

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10. You will object secondly: a habit is acquired through the repetition of acts. Therefore, when virtuous acts concerning the morally honorable good of one's own *suppositum* are repeated in the will, a virtue must be generated.

I answer that the antecedent is true when the subject is capable of the habit, but not when it is incapable of it. For example, however often a stone descends, it does not acquire a habit, because it is incapable of one, since through natural gravity it is completely inclined toward descent. Likewise, natural powers, such as the vegetative and nutritive powers and the like, however often they operate, do not acquire a habit, because they are naturally determined and complete in relation to acting. The same must be said proportionately of the will with respect to the morally honorable good of its own *suppositum*, because it is of itself complete and determined toward that good, as was shown above.

11. You will object thirdly: the will is capable of a vicious habit concerning its own good. Therefore it is also capable of a virtuous habit, since contraries must concern the same subject.

Some of our Thomists answer by denying the antecedent. For, they say, just as no habit of ascending is generated in a stone, even if it is thrown upward a thousand times, because the stone has a complete natural inclination toward descent, so no vicious habit concerning one's own good is generated in the will from many repeated evil acts, because the will has a complete natural inclination toward its own morally honorable good. This inclination resists a vicious habit inclining toward the contrary no less than a perfect acquired virtue would resist it, if such a virtue were present. This solution and doctrine is not without probability.

12. It is nevertheless better and easier to grant the antecedent and deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that the will is not of itself inclined toward evil acts, whatever their object, and therefore a habit of vice is required to incline it toward them. But it is inclined by its own nature toward honorable acts concerning its own good, and consequently it cannot be inclined toward them by a habit.

13. From what has been said, you will understand the difference between the will and the intellect. Since the intellect is not by its nature sufficiently equipped in first act for the cognition of truth, but is like a blank tablet, it needs species and habits to attain any truth, even of the natural order. Hence understanding, or the habit of first principles, is posited in it for knowing first principles. On the contrary, since the will is naturally inclined and determined toward natural good, at least its own domestic good, it needs no habit of moral virtue for pursuing the morally honorable good of its own

suppositum, but only for attaining another's good and rendering to each what is his own.

CHAPTER III.

The Manifold Division of the Virtues.

1. Various divisions of the virtues are usually given, but the clearest and most concise is that pursued by the Holy Doctor here, q. 57 and the following questions, by which virtue is divided into intellectual, moral, and theological. An intellectual virtue is one that perfects the intellect in relation to the cognition of truth. A moral virtue is one that completes the will for the pursuit of morally honorable good. A theological virtue is one immediately concerned with God.

2. Intellectual virtue is subdivided into five species, called understanding, or the habit of first principles, wisdom, science, art, and prudence. The reason for this division is as follows. Since intellectual virtue perfects the intellect in relation to truth, there must be as many intellectual virtues as there are habits that infallibly attain truth. But there are only the five enumerated habits that infallibly attain truth. Therefore they alone are intellectual virtues. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Truth that can be certainly and infallibly attained by the intellect is either universal, and consequently necessary, or singular and contingent. If universal, it is either immediately attainable from the knowledge of the terms alone, as are first principles, and for these the habit of first principles is posited; or it is infallibly attainable mediately and through proper causes. If those causes are particular, science is posited; if they are the highest and universal causes, wisdom is posited. If such truth is singular, it is either something that can be made, and art is posited for attaining it, or something that can be done, and prudence is posited for attaining it.

3. Moral virtues are of two kinds. Some concern operations in which a relation of what is due or undue to another is considered, such as justice, by which what is due is rendered to one's neighbor; religion, by which what is due is rendered to God; piety, by which what is due is rendered to parents; and gratitude, by which what is due is rendered to benefactors. Others concern the passions, which they reduce to the due order of reason, such as fortitude, temperance, and the other virtues that moderate the affections and passions of the irascible or concupiscible appetite.

4. Among the moral virtues, four are principal, namely prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, which are called cardinal virtues. For, as St.

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Thomas observes in *De virtutibus cardinalibus*, a. 1, the whole order of the human condition turns upon them, and the entire course and structure of an honorable and civil life rests upon them as upon hinges.

5. Finally, besides the intellectual and moral virtues, there are others called theological, because through them we are ordered to God as our ultimate end. These are only three, namely faith, hope, and charity, because man is ordered to the ultimate end through the cognition of the intellect illuminated by the supernatural light of faith; through the movement of intention tending toward it as something possible to attain, which belongs to hope; and through a certain spiritual union by which we are in some manner transformed into that end, which is effected through charity, as St. Thomas says here, q. 62, a. 3.

CHAPTER IV.

Infused Moral Virtues.

1. We shall discuss the theological virtues and acquired moral virtues below. Hence only the infused moral virtues need to be treated here.

I say, therefore, that besides acquired moral virtues, there are others infused of themselves. Thus the theologians commonly teach, with few exceptions, following the Council of Vienne, which selected this opinion as more probable and more conformable to the sayings of the holy Fathers and theologians. The same truth is openly taught by the *Roman Catechism*, part II, under the title on baptism, n. 50, where, in enumerating the effects of baptism conferred together with grace, it says: *To this is added the most noble company of all the virtues, which are divinely infused together with grace.*

There is a twofold reason for the necessity of such virtues. The first can be proposed as follows. Man, constituted by grace in supernatural being, must be no less perfectly equipped for operating in a supernatural manner than he is in the order of nature for operating in a natural manner. For no less perfection is due to grace in its own order than is due to nature in its order. But in the order of nature man is perfected not only in relation to the ultimate end, which he has from natural synderesis and the natural rectitude of the will, but also in relation to non-ultimate ends, which he has through acquired moral virtues. Therefore, similarly, in the supernatural order he must possess both perfections. Consequently, not only theological virtues, by which man is perfected and ordered to supernatural beatitude, but also infused moral virtues, by which man is supernaturally perfected in relation to the means that lead to it, are due to the order of grace.

2. Nor is it valid to say that the gifts of the Holy Spirit suffice for attaining supernatural means. For, as will be clear below, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are posited only for operating in an extraordinary manner within the supernatural order, namely from the instinct and special motion of the Holy Spirit. Hence, besides those gifts, infused moral virtues must be admitted for operating in an ordinary manner within the supernatural order.

3. The second fundamental argument is suggested by St. Thomas in the single question *De virtutibus*, a. 10, ad 8. Virtues are multiplied and diversified according to diverse formal objects. But in the moral matter with which moral virtues are concerned, there can be two formally diverse objects, one natural and the other supernatural. Therefore two genera of moral virtues must also be distinguished, and besides natural and acquired virtues, others must be admitted that are supernatural and infused. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown as follows. The formal object of moral virtue is the mean established in human passions and operations by prudence and right reason. But such a mean can be twofold: natural, if established by natural and acquired prudence; supernatural, if established by supernatural and infused prudence. Hence St. Thomas says in the cited passage: *Infused temperance seeks the mean according to one rationale, and acquired temperance according to another. For infused temperance seeks the mean according to the rationales of the divine law, which are taken from order to the ultimate end, whereas acquired temperance takes the mean according to lower rationales, in relation to the good of the present life.* Likewise, equality in operations toward another, which is the mean of the virtue of justice, can be established either among men as citizens of the human city of this universe, endowed with natural life and reason, among whom human society and peace must be preserved, and in this manner it is the natural mean specifying acquired justice; or it can be established among men insofar as they are fellow citizens with the saints and members of God's household, endowed with supernatural light and capable of eternal beatitude, among whom peace and society must be preserved according to a higher rationale, and in this manner it is a supernatural mean and the object of infused justice. The same must be said proportionately of fortitude. For if it strengthens the appetite against the dangers of death in a natural good and according to the measure that natural reason dictates should be observed, the object of acquired fortitude is constituted, as when someone remains firm against dangers of death in defense of his country. But if it strengthens one in a supernatural good, as occurs in martyrdom, in which martyrs endure death in defense of the Christian faith, it will be the object of infused fortitude. From this you will understand that moral virtues infused of

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themselves differ specifically from acquired virtues, since they regard formally diverse objects, and the specific distinction of powers and habits is taken from the formal object.

4. You will object first: a virtue infused of itself, since it is supernatural, must have a supernatural intrinsic object and motive. But the intrinsic object and motive of temperance, for example, namely moderation in food and drink, does not exceed the order of nature, just as the matter in which it is found does not. Therefore there is no virtue of temperance infused of itself, but only an acquired virtue.

I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. Moderation as established by natural prudence and in relation to a natural end does not exceed the order of nature: I grant the minor. As established by infused prudence and in relation to a supernatural end: I deny the minor and the consequence. The solution is evident from what was said in the second argument.

5. You will object secondly: no subject can be assigned for the infused moral virtues concerned with moderating passions, such as infused temperance or fortitude. Therefore those virtues are fictitious. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Such infused virtues are not subjectively present in the will, in which neither are the acquired virtues received. Nor are they present in the sensitive appetite, because, since they are immaterial and spiritual, as being supernatural and properties of sanctifying grace, they cannot be received in a bodily subject. Therefore no subject can be assigned for those virtues.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that those infused virtues are received in the sensitive appetite, just as the acquired virtues are. For virtues are subjectively present in the power to which their proper acts belong, because virtues are given to an operative power for eliciting its proper acts. But the acts of the infused moral virtues that are primarily and of themselves concerned with passions are proper acts of the sensitive appetite, since they are moderated passions of such an appetite according to infused prudence, such as moderated daring, moderated fear, and so forth. Therefore they are subjectively present in the sensitive appetite. To the argument to the contrary it must be said that virtues infused into the sensitive appetite are formally immaterial, but bodily in a qualified respect. Hence, just as the rational soul, although immaterial and spiritual, is nevertheless received in the body because it is at the same time bodily as that by which the body lives, and bodily virtually or eminently, so the aforesaid virtues, for the same reason, can be subjectively present in the sensitive appetite. Nor is it unfitting for a form of a higher order of

perfection to be received in a lower subject, so that it may elevate, raise, and perfect it.

CHAPTER V.

The Two Principal Properties of the Moral Virtues: The Mean and Connection.

1. The first is evident from the definition of moral virtue given above, in which virtue is said to be an elective habit consisting in a mean, as the wise and prudent man shall dictate. It is also clear from the argument of St. Thomas in III Sentences, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 3, where he reasons as follows: The moral virtues concern passions and operations, which must be directed according to the rule of reason. In everything regulated, rectitude consists in conformity to the rule, for equality is a mean between greater and less. Therefore the rectitude of virtue must consist in the mean between what exceeds and what falls short of the measure of right reason.

2. It must nevertheless be observed that there is this difference between the moral virtues concerning passions and justice, which regards another's right and gives to each what is his own: the former consist in a mean of reason, whereas the latter observes not only the mean of reason, but also a mean of the thing. For the mean in the virtues concerning passions is not fixed by the nature of the thing, but only by reason, according to each person's disposition and with consideration of all the circumstances of time, place, and so forth. This is evident in temperance, for the mean of temperance is not a determinate quantity of food suited to all so that they may be temperate, but varies in different persons according to their different constitutions, and even in the same person according to different times and circumstances. Justice, however, not only observes the mean of reason by rendering what is due at the proper time and place and according to the rules of prudence, but must also establish an equality of thing to thing. There is nevertheless this difference: commutative justice establishes equality of quantity to quantity, for if someone owes one hundred, he renders one hundred; distributive justice observes only an equality of proportion to proportion, for it does not give equally to all, but to each according to his condition or merit. Thus a soldier receives proportionately as much as a tribune receives as tribune; or if one whose merit is as eight is given one hundred parts of the goods of the commonwealth, one whose merit is as four is given only fifty.

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3. From these things you will understand that there is this difference between the moral and theological virtues: the former consist in a mean and avoid excess or defect, but the latter do not. For no one can exceed in believing what God has revealed, in hoping for the beatitude He has promised us, or in loving His infinite goodness too much. For, as St. Bernard says in *De diligendo Deo*, *the measure of loving God is to love without measure*. Accidentally, however, and as regards exercise, these virtues require a certain measure or moderation, for they must be exercised according to the measure of the powers of our nature, condition, talent, and bodily constitution, and not with excessive exertion such that the body is injured or excessively weakened. Hence the same saint says in his sermon to the brothers of the Mount of God: *Although the devotion of the lover should have no limit or boundary, the action of the one acting must nevertheless have its own boundaries, limits, and rules*.

4. As regards the other property of the moral virtues, namely their connection and concatenation, it must be observed that these virtues can and must be considered either in a perfect state, when they adhere so firmly to their subject that it can easily resist everything impeding rectitude, or in an imperfect state, when they exist in their subject as a changeable disposition and do not provide a firm faculty of overcoming impediments. Therefore, when the moral virtues are said to be so necessarily connected with one another that whoever lacks one possesses none perfectly, this is understood only of those virtues according to their perfect state, not insofar as they are in an imperfect state. For experience makes it clear that many persons, not only through their natural constitution but also through the frequency of imperfect acts, are more inclined toward one virtue than another. This being presupposed:

5. The connection and concatenation of the moral virtues in perfect being is shown by a twofold argument. The first is as follows. Virtue in a perfect state inclines one to operate promptly and delightfully in its proper matter, as Aristotle teaches in *Ethica Nicomachea* IV, c. 4. But it cannot possess this unless it is connected with the other moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues in perfect being have a necessary connection with one another. The major premise is evident. The minor is established by two examples. For if someone possessed the virtue of justice, for example, but not liberality, and consequently loved money excessively, when an opportunity to acquire it arose, he would easily injure his neighbor and would render what is due to another only with great difficulty. Likewise, a woman who is chaste but avaricious or timid will scarcely be able to preserve chastity. For when money is offered or danger of death arises, she will easily

be drawn away from her resolution of chastity, either persuaded by the allurements of riches or deterred by fear of punishment.

6. The second argument is taken from St. Thomas here, q. 65, a. 1, and can be proposed as follows. There can be no moral virtue in perfect being unless perfect prudence is present, which is the rule of the moral virtues and which, as St. Bernard says in *De consideratione*, l. 1, c. 8, *sitting as a judge between pleasures and necessities, marks out fixed boundaries on both sides, assigning and providing to necessities what is sufficient and removing from pleasures what is excessive*. But there can be no perfect prudence without the fellowship of all the moral virtues. Therefore no moral virtue can be in a perfect state unless it has all the other virtues annexed to it. The major premise is evident. The minor is established by the fact that the right judgment of prudence depends upon the rectitude of the appetite, because each person judges practically about an end according to the way he is affected toward it, in accordance with the common saying: *As each person is, so the end appears to him*. But rectitude of appetite cannot be possessed without the fellowship of all the moral virtues, since the proper effect of those virtues is to rectify the appetite concerning their proper end and matter. Therefore neither can there be a right judgment of prudence. Hence Aristotle says in *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, c. 5, that temperance preserves prudence, and is therefore called *σωφροσύνη*. He gives the reason there: although a speculative judgment is not corrupted by moral depravity, the practical and prudential judgment is often corrupted by it.

7. From these things you will understand, first, that there is mutual causality and dependence between prudence and the other moral virtues, in different genera of causality. For the virtues depend upon prudence in the genus of directive and extrinsic formal causality, whereas prudence depends upon the other virtues in the genus of dispositive causality. For in order that prudence may render a right and uncorrupted judgment about all things in individual matters, the appetite must necessarily be rightly disposed concerning the ends of all the virtues, which is effected by the moral virtues themselves.

8. You will understand, secondly, that there are no partial prudences directing individual virtues, one directing temperance, for example, another fortitude, and another justice, as some think. Rather, there is one total and perfect prudence directing all the virtues and regarding all things that can be done. For prudence, in order to direct a virtue, must constitute its mean by cutting off the extremes by which it can be corrupted through excess or defect. But partial prudence does not suffice for this, since those extremes range through the matter of every virtue. This is clear from the example of a

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woman who can depart from preserving chastity and from the mean of temperance either because of pleasure alone, which is the matter of temperance itself; or because of fear of death, which is the matter of fortitude; or because of gain and the love of money, which is the matter of liberality. Therefore total and perfect prudence, which can attain and judge all these things, is required to cut them off.

9. You will object first: the Church and the Fathers commonly teach that individual just and holy persons excel in certain virtues and surpass one another. Hence Bede says that *the saints are more humbled by the virtues they do not have than they glory in the virtues they have*. Therefore they judge that the moral virtues are not connected with one another, but separable from one another.

I answer from St. Thomas in III Sentences, dist. 36, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, that this must be understood of virtues as regards their exercise, and not as regards their habits. For the saints surpass one another in diverse ways in the exercise of diverse virtues, according to what is said of each confessor: no one was found like him who kept the law of the Most High. Because of such excellence in exercise, therefore, we attribute certain special virtues to each saint and deny others, not because they lack the latter, but because they shine more brightly in the former.

10. You will insist: if a man can exercise acts of one virtue without exercising acts of the others, he can also acquire one virtue without the others, since virtues are acquired only through their proper acts. Consequently, all the virtues will not be connected and concatenated with one another.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. He can acquire one virtue without the others as regards its essence and in imperfect being: I grant this. In a perfect state: I deny it. For the perfect state of a virtue depends not only upon the acts that generate the essence of the virtue, but also upon the fellowship and company of the other virtues, by which it must be assisted so that it can easily and promptly attain the mean of reason in its proper matter. It must do so not only by withdrawing from those things that can draw it away from such a mean within its own proper matter, for which the virtue itself suffices, but also by withdrawing from those things that can draw it away absolutely and in any matter, as is clear from the examples given above. Hence Gregory the Great says in *Moralia in Iob* XXII, c. 1: *One virtue without another is either wholly nothing or imperfect. To speak of the first four virtues, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, each is perfect to the degree that it is mutually joined to the others. Separated from one another, they can in no way be perfect. For that is not true prudence which is not just, temperate,*

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and courageous; nor is that perfect temperance which is not courageous, just, and prudent; nor is that complete fortitude which is not prudent, temperate, and just; nor is that true justice which is not prudent, courageous, and temperate.

11. You will object secondly: the virtue of magnificence cannot be found in a poor man, nor virginity in a married person, since their acts cannot be exercised by them. Therefore one virtue can be possessed without another, and consequently they are not connected with one another.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that the acquisition of a virtue does not require that its exterior act be exercised, but an interior act of choice, either absolute or conditional, suffices. Hence, if a poor man elicits conditional interior acts of liberality and magnificence, he can acquire those virtues; and similarly a married person can acquire the virtue of virginity as regards its formal element, because he can have, in the preparation of his mind, the intention of preserving integrity if this were fitting for him. I add that when we said that the moral virtues have a necessary connection with one another, this must be understood of moral virtues of which the subject is capable, not of those of which it is incapable. A married person who has experienced sexual relations is not capable of virginal chastity, but only of conjugal chastity.

CHAPTER VI.

Whether Acquired Moral Virtues Can Exist without Charity and Possess the True and Essential Nature of Virtue without It.

1. Some recent authors deny this, and they have most recently been followed by the author of *Theologia mentis et cordis*, vol. IV, p. 49. Our Thomists commonly affirm it, and with them:

I say first that acquired moral virtues can exist without charity.

This is proved first from St. Thomas here, q. 65, a. 2, in the body, where he says: The moral virtues, insofar as they produce good in relation to an end that does not exceed the natural faculty of man, can be acquired through human works; and thus acquired, they can exist without charity, as they did in many among the nations. Nothing clearer or more explicit could be said in favor of our conclusion.

2. This is confirmed. When the same Holy Doctor had objected to himself in the second place, The moral virtues can be acquired from human acts. But charity is possessed only through infusion. Therefore the moral virtues can be possessed without charity, he answered: It must be said that this argument proceeds concerning acquired moral virtues. Therefore,

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according to St. Thomas, although infused moral virtues cannot exist without charity, acquired virtues can.

Reason also supports this. Infused moral virtues are necessarily connected with charity because they are properties of sanctifying grace, flowing from it and inseparable from it, and because they are regulated by infused prudence, which cannot exist without charity, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited article. But acquired moral virtues neither are properties of grace flowing from it, since they belong to the natural order and are acquired by our acts, nor are they regulated by infused prudence, but by acquired prudence. Therefore they are not connected with charity, but are separable from it.

3. I say secondly that acquired moral virtues separated from charity are true virtues.

This is proved first from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 7, in the body, where he says: If virtue is taken insofar as it is ordered to some particular end, then something can be called a virtue without charity, insofar as it is ordered to some particular good. But if that particular good is not a true good but an apparent one, the virtue ordered to that good will not be a true virtue, but a false one. Thus the prudence of the avaricious is not a true virtue, nor the justice of the avaricious, and so forth. But if that particular good is a true good, such as the preservation of the city or something of that kind, it will indeed be a true virtue, but an imperfect one, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good. By these words he suggests the fundamental argument for our conclusion. In order that a habit be a true virtue, it is required and sufficient that it tend and incline toward a good that is true and not merely apparent. But acquired moral virtues, considered in themselves and independently of charity, tend and incline man toward a good that is true and not merely apparent, namely a morally honorable good consonant with reason, which is a true good because it can be ordered to the ultimate end. Hence the same Holy Doctor says at the beginning of the same article: The secondary and, as it were, particular good of man can be twofold. One is truly good, since of itself it can be ordered to the principal good, which is the ultimate end. The other is an apparent and not a true good, because it draws one away from the final good. Therefore acquired moral virtues are true virtues independently of charity.

4. The conclusion is proved secondly. A habit can be called a true virtue if it possesses whatever is required for the essence of virtue. But acquired moral virtues, independently of charity, possess whatever is required for their essence. Therefore they can be called true virtues independently of charity. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. If these virtues,

as separated from charity, lacked anything essential, it would be order to the supernatural end, as the adversaries say. But such an order does not belong to their essence, but is a certain accidental perfection superadded to them through the command of charity. Therefore the conclusion follows. The minor is proved first from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 47, a. 6, in the body, where he says: *The end of the moral virtues is human good, and the good of the human soul is to exist according to reason.* In the reply to the first objection: *Natural reason, which is called synderesis, appoints the end for the moral virtues.* And in the reply to the third: *The moral virtues tend toward the end appointed by natural reason.* Therefore, according to St. Thomas, order to a supernatural end does not belong to the essence of acquired moral virtues, but only order to a natural end, namely morally honorable good consonant with reason. Hence the same Holy Doctor argues in the same place, a. 7: *Conformity to right reason is itself the proper end of every moral virtue. Temperance intends that man not depart from reason because of concupiscences; similarly, fortitude intends that he not depart from the right judgment of reason because of fear or daring. This end is appointed for man according to natural reason, for natural reason dictates to each person that he act according to natural reason.*

Secondly, the same minor is proved by an evident argument. Order to a supernatural end cannot belong to the essence of an entitatively natural habit or be an essential predicate of it. But acquired moral virtues are entitatively natural habits, as is evident of itself. Therefore order to a supernatural end cannot belong to their essence or be an essential predicate of them, but is only a certain extrinsic and accidental perfection that comes upon them through the command of charity.

5. The conclusion is proved thirdly by destroying the principal foundation of the contrary opinion. Charity is not the intrinsic and essential form of acquired moral virtues, but only their extrinsic and accidental form. Therefore they possess the true and essential nature of virtue independently of charity. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ad 1, where he says: *Charity is said to be the form of the other virtues, not exemplarily or essentially, but rather efficiently, insofar as it imposes form upon them all.* This form is extrinsic and accidental, namely the order to a supernatural end that comes to them through the command of charity.

Reason also supports this. If charity were the intrinsic and essential form of all moral virtues, they would not differ specifically from one another, which is more than absurd and contrary to St. Thomas here, q. 60, aa. 5 and 6, where he teaches that moral virtues are specifically distinguished

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according to the diverse objects of the passions. The consequence is evident, for things that have the same essential and intrinsic form belong to the same species, since the species is taken from the essential form. Thus, because two men possess an intrinsic and essential form of the same species, namely the rational soul, they do not differ specifically from one another. Therefore, if charity were the essential and intrinsic form of all moral virtues, those virtues would not differ specifically from one another.

6. Finally, the conclusion can be supported by this argument. Habits that elicit honorable and morally good acts in a sinner, such as assisting the needy, honoring parents, living chastely, rendering to each what is his own, and so forth, are not vices. Therefore they are true virtues, and consequently there are true virtues without charity. The consequence is evident, since every habit eliciting human and moral acts must be either a virtue or a vice, and no moral habits intermediate between vice and virtue are given. The antecedent is clear from the fact that vicious habits incline only toward sinful and morally evil acts, or acts deformed from reason. But the aforesaid acts elicited by a sinner are not evil or sinful, as the theologians commonly teach against Michael Baius and as we shall show in the treatise on grace, but are honorable and morally good, or conformable to reason. Therefore the habits that elicit them are not vices, but virtues.

7. I say thirdly that acquired moral virtues, when separated from charity, are not perfect virtues.

This is proved first. In order that a virtue be perfect, it must be ordered to the perfect good, which is the ultimate end. But acquired moral virtues, when separated from charity, are not ordered to the ultimate end, since they are ordered to it through the command of charity. Therefore they are not perfect virtues. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 7: *If the particular good toward which a habit inclines the will is a true good, such as the preservation of the city or something of this kind, it will indeed be a true virtue, but an imperfect one, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good.*

The conclusion is proved secondly. A perfect virtue makes its possessor good without qualification. But moral virtues separated from charity cannot do this, since a man deprived of grace and charity cannot be called good without qualification. Therefore moral virtues separated from charity are not perfect, although they participate in the true and essential nature of virtue, just as a boy is a true man, but not a perfect one. Likewise, the theology that is in us wayfarers possesses the true nature of science, although it is not in a perfect and connatural state, because it is not joined to the science of the blessed, or the clear vision of God, to which it is subalternated, as we explained in part I, in the proemial question.

Objections Are Solved.

8. Against the first and second conclusions the adversaries object, first, various testimonies of the Fathers asserting that sinners and unbelievers possess no true virtue. Augustine, more than others, speaks often of this in *Contra Iulianum* IV, c. 3, where he says that there are no true virtues except where there is true wisdom and charity toward God, and that for this reason there were none among the Romans and Greeks who should be judged truly wise and virtuous. Hence in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, cc. 3 and 4, he denies that conjugal chastity among pagans is a virtue in the true sense: Far be it from us, he says, to call her truly chaste who does not preserve conjugal fidelity to her husband for the sake of the true God. Those who do not beget children with this intention, will, and end, that they may transfer them from the members of the first man into the members of Christ, but as unbelieving parents glory in unbelieving offspring, do not possess true conjugal chastity, even if their observance is so great that some have intercourse, in accordance with the marriage contract, only for the sake of procreating children. Since chastity is a virtue to which the vice of unchastity is opposed, and since all virtues, even those exercised through the body, dwell in the soul, how can a body rightly be asserted to be chaste when the soul itself fornicates away from the true God?

To these things it is answered that Augustine understands by the name *true virtue* a perfect virtue that advances man toward eternal life, or, as he himself says, *that serves to deliver and beatify men*. Hence in the cited passage of *Contra Iulianum* he says: *If virtues profit man nothing for attaining the true beatitude that faith promises us through Christ, they are not true virtues*. That the same Holy Doctor nevertheless recognizes true virtues in sinners and unbelievers, that is, virtues retaining the essence and quiddity of virtue, is evident from epistle 130, where he says that Polemo's continence availed for the honorableness of this life, that is, that it was truly good within the degree of philosophical moral virtue, and he calls it a gift of God. Yet he denies that it availed for future immortality, because it lacked charity and religion toward the true God.

9. From these things many testimonies of St. Thomas that are objected against us remain explained. For when the Holy Doctor asserts in various places that without charity there are no true virtues, because they are not referred to the due end, and from this infers that among unbelievers and sinners there is neither true chastity nor true justice, he speaks of virtue that

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is true without qualification, that is, perfect virtue. This is clear from *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 7, where he says: *It will indeed be a true virtue, but an imperfect one, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good*, namely the ultimate end. Hence, when he says here, q. 65, a. 2, that acquired virtues *are virtues in a qualified respect, but not without qualification*, he does not intend to exclude from them the essence and quiddity of virtue, but only the nature and state of perfect virtue, by comparison with the theological and infused moral virtues, which possess the nature of perfect virtue. Hence he immediately adds: *For they order man well with respect to an ultimate end in some genus, but not with respect to the ultimate end without qualification*. This argument manifestly demonstrates that he is not speaking of the essence of moral virtue, but only of its perfection, which is considered according to order to the perfect good that is the ultimate end without qualification, as we explained in the third conclusion.

Finally, when the same Holy Doctor says that charity is the form of the virtues, he speaks of an extrinsic and accidental form, not an intrinsic and essential one. This is clear from the passage cited above, where he says that *charity is said to be the form of the other virtues, not exemplarily or essentially*. Otherwise, as we argued above, the moral virtues would not differ specifically from one another, because they would agree in the same essential form from which species is taken. Charity, therefore, is only an assisting and extrinsic form, which directs the other virtues in their acts toward the ultimate end and, as it were, gives them form, so that they receive the extrinsic perfection that comes to them from being referred to man's supernatural end, to which they would not be elevated without charity. Nevertheless, from their own intrinsic and connatural end, which is confined within the boundaries of nature, they possess natural honorableness and goodness underlying the supervening supernatural goodness, but they remain, as it were, without form because they are stripped of that eminent ornament that could come to them through charity.

10. A certain recent author objects secondly: all the virtues are connected and concatenated with one another, and consequently whoever possesses one possesses them all, as we showed in the preceding chapter. But all the moral virtues cannot be found in unbelievers and sinners. Therefore no true virtue whatsoever can exist in them.

I answer that the doctrine concerning the connection of the virtues must be understood of virtues in a perfect state, not of virtues considered according to their essence and in an imperfect state. In this latter manner, one can exist without the others, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 65, a. 1, in these words: *Moral virtue can be considered either as perfect or imperfect*.

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Imperfect moral virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, is nothing other than a certain inclination existing in a man toward performing some work belonging to the genus of good things. Taking moral virtues in this manner, they are not connected. Hence this argument proves only that perfect moral virtues are not found in unbelievers and sinners. It does not show that true virtues, possessing the essence and quiddity of virtue, though imperfect because of the absence of order to the ultimate end, are not found in them, as we explained in the third conclusion.

11. The same author insists: no true virtue can be found without prudence, which is the rule and measure of all the virtues. But prudence cannot exist without charity, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 65, a. 2. Therefore no true virtue can be found without charity.

I answer that no true virtue can be found without either infused or acquired prudence, and that this difference exists between infused and acquired moral virtues: the former are regulated by infused prudence, which presupposes charity, whereas the latter are regulated by natural and acquired prudence, which does not essentially presuppose charity. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 47, a. 6, ad 1: *Natural reason, which is called synderesis, appoints the end for the moral virtues.* And in the reply to the second objection: *The moral virtues tend toward the end appointed by natural reason.*

12. The adversaries object thirdly: as the sciences depend upon principles, so moral virtues depend upon ends. But it is impossible for there to be science when the intellect errs concerning principles or is ignorant of them. Therefore it is also impossible for true virtues to be found if the appetite does not possess a right affection concerning the end. But one who exists in mortal sin is turned away from God as the ultimate end, both natural and supernatural. Therefore he cannot possess true virtues.

I answer that, for the intellect to possess true science concerning an object, nothing more is required than that it be well disposed concerning the proper principles of that object, either by firmly believing them or by evidently knowing them in themselves, whatever its disposition concerning the most common principles may be. Nevertheless, without knowledge of the latter there is no perfect science, but rather the state of a disposition than of a habit. Similarly, for a true moral virtue to be acquired and preserved in the appetite, it is sufficient that the appetite be well affected toward the proper end of that virtue, although it is not converted toward the ultimate end without qualification. Without such conversion, virtue cannot be perfect or called virtue without qualification, and it has the state of a disposition rather than of a habit, since it is on the way toward corruption.

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13. From what has been said you will understand that there are three genera of virtues. Some are not true, but only apparent, because they are ordered not to a true good, but to an apparent one. Such are the prudence of the avaricious, by which they devise diverse kinds of gain; the justice of the avaricious, by which, through fear of graver losses, they refrain from taking the goods of others; the temperance of the avaricious, by which they restrain their appetite from lust because it is costly; and the fortitude of the avaricious, by which, as Horace says, *they flee poverty over sea, over rocks, and through fire*. Other virtues are true but not perfect, because they are ordered to a true but not perfect good, namely a morally honorable good, which does not possess the nature of the ultimate end, but only of an intermediate good. Of this kind are acquired moral virtues. Finally, others are not only true but also perfect virtues, because they are ordered to the ultimate end, which is a perfect good and good without qualification. Such are the theological and infused moral virtues. Virtues of the first genus are regulated not by true but by false prudence, which is called the prudence of the flesh. Those of the second genus are regulated by natural and acquired prudence. Those of the third genus are regulated by supernatural and infused prudence. The object of virtues of the first class, since it is not a true but an apparent good, cannot be ordered to God as the ultimate end, but rather turns one away from Him as the ultimate end. The object of virtues of the second class, namely morally honorable good consonant with reason, of itself and by its own nature tends toward God as an ultimate end in a qualified respect, namely as the author of natural light and morally honorable good, and of itself can be referred through the command of charity to God as the ultimate end without qualification. Finally, the object of virtues of the third class is actually referred to God as the ultimate end without qualification, or is God Himself as supernatural author and ultimate end.

CHAPTER VII.

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit.

1. That there are gifts of the Holy Spirit in us, or certain special dispositions impressed upon the soul by the Holy Spirit, by which it is disposed to be moved well and easily by Him toward extraordinary works, is clear from various passages of Scripture in which express mention is made of these gifts, and from ecclesiastical hymns in which the Holy Spirit is called *sevenfold in gift* and is said to give us the sacred sevenfold gift.

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Reason also supports this. For, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 68, a. 2, that which possesses a nature, form, or power imperfectly cannot operate of itself unless moved by another, just as the moon, in which the nature of light exists imperfectly, does not illuminate unless illuminated by the sun. But the theological and infused moral virtues imperfectly inform the rational soul. Therefore man is not so perfected by them in relation to the ultimate end that he does not always need to be moved by a certain higher instinct of the Holy Spirit, and consequently needs His gifts, which dispose the soul toward that motion. From this it is evident that these gifts are habits, not merely transient motions. For the human soul must be habitually disposed so that it may be moved connaturally by the Holy Spirit, just as through the moral virtues it is habitually disposed to be moved connaturally by reason. Therefore, just as those virtues are habits, so are the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Hence St. Thomas says in the cited question, a. 4: *The gifts are certain habits perfecting man so that he may promptly follow the instinct of the Holy Spirit, just as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they may obey reason.*

2. Some theologians nevertheless think that such gifts do not differ really from the infused virtues. But this opinion seems insufficiently probable and can be refuted by this argument. Habits that regard formally distinct objects differ really. But the infused virtues and the gifts regard formally diverse objects. The virtues regard their object as capable of being directed by the rules of infused prudence in a common and ordinary manner; the gifts regard it as capable of being directed in a higher manner, namely by a certain special inspiration and motion of the Holy Spirit beyond the rules of prudence and prior to the counsel and deliberation of reason, as will be clear from what is said below. Therefore they differ really from one another.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. Habits by which something movable is disposed to receive motion from a higher mover must differ according to the distinction and quality of the movers. But through acquired virtues man is rendered promptly movable by the light of nature; through infused virtues, by the light of grace and faith; through the gifts, by the special impulse and instinct of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the gifts must be distinguished from those virtues. The minor premise is certain. The major is clear from the fact that everything movable must be proportioned to its mover.

3. You will say: the theological and infused moral virtues likewise dispose the soul to receive the motion of the Holy Spirit. For, since man cannot elicit acts of those virtues unless the Holy Spirit moves, inspires, and illuminates him, by the very fact that they dispose and complete the powers of the soul

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for eliciting supernatural acts, they also dispose those powers to receive the motion, inspiration, and illumination of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the aforesaid argument is not valid.

To the contrary: although the theological and infused moral virtues dispose the soul to receive the motion of the Holy Spirit, they do so in a manner different from the gifts. The gifts dispose it toward a special motion of God, by which man is moved by God not through counsel and deliberation, but by divine instinct. The theological and infused moral virtues dispose it to receive a common and ordinary motion of the Holy Spirit within the supernatural order itself, through which man is naturally moved upon the supposition of the counsel and deliberation of reason. Hence St. Thomas says in q. 68, a. 1, ad 4: *Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue insofar as it proceeds from the judgment of reason, but it is called a gift insofar as it operates from divine instinct.*

4. There are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. For as the world was perfected in seven days, so the lesser world is perfected by the seven gifts of the Spirit, as St. Bonaventure says after Gregory the Great in *De septem donis*, c. 2. These are seven spiritual rays, as splendid as they are fiery, proceeding from the Sun of Justice; seven columns upon which rests the house divine Wisdom built for Herself; seven lamps of which it is said in Exod. 25: You shall make seven lamps and place them upon the lampstand; seven stars in the right hand of Christ, which St. John saw in Rev. 1; seven eyes upon one stone, of which mention is made in Zech. 3; seven locks in which Samson's strength was placed, as is stated in Judg. 16; finally, Job's seven sons, who held a banquet on each successive day. Hence Gregory says in *Moralia in Iob* XV, c. 15, elsewhere XVI: The sons hold a banquet in their houses when the individual virtues nourish the mind according to their proper manner. Hence it is well said that each did so on his own day, for the day of each son is the illumination of each virtue. Wisdom has one day, understanding another, counsel another, fortitude another, knowledge another, piety another, and fear another. He adds in l. II, c. 26, that through these seven gifts the Holy Spirit strengthens and protects the soul against all temptations and vices: Against foolishness, wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against precipitancy, counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness, piety; against pride, fear.

If you ask whether these gifts will remain in heaven, I answer that, as regards the matter with which they are now concerned, namely the works of the active life, they will not remain in heaven, for those works have no place in the state of glory. Nevertheless, they will remain, and indeed most perfectly, as regards the essence of the gifts, because man, then wholly

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subject to God, will follow the motion of the Holy Spirit most perfectly. All the gifts will also have their acts in heaven concerning those things that belong to the contemplative life, which is the blessed life. Hence Ambrose says in *De Spiritu Sancto* I, c. 20: *The city of God, that heavenly Jerusalem, is not washed by the course of any earthly river, but the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the fountain of life, of whom we are satisfied by a brief draught, appears to flow abundantly in those heavenly spirits, surging with the full stream of the seven spiritual virtues.*

TREATISE V.

ON SINS.

In this treatise we shall first discuss sin in general and explain its nature, subject, and causes. Then we shall discuss its principal species: original sin, which is transmitted from Adam to his descendants through seminal propagation; habitual sin, which remains in us after the sinful act has passed and is called the stain of sin; actual sin of commission and omission; and finally both mortal and venial sin.

CHAPTER I.

The Nature of Sin in General.

1. I say first that it belongs to the nature of every sin to be contrary to right reason and the eternal law. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 71, a. 6, where he argues as follows: A human act is morally evil because it lacks due commensuration. Every commensuration of any thing is considered by comparison with some rule, from which, if the thing departs, it will be incommensurate. The rule of the human will is twofold: one is proximate and homogeneous, namely human reason; the other is the first rule, namely the eternal law, which is, as it were, the reason of God. Therefore a morally evil act essentially implies deformity or disagreement with right reason and the eternal law. Hence sin is defined by Augustine as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law,

and consequently contrary to the natural law, which is a certain participation of the eternal law impressed upon our minds. Therefore Ambrose says in *De paradiso* V, c. 14, that such a law is not written but inborn, nor is it learned through any reading, but is expressed in each person from a certain overflowing fountain of nature.

2. I say secondly that it is essential to sin that it be an injury and offense against God. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding paragraph. For if sin is contrary to the eternal law, it cannot fail to be an injury or offense against God. Whoever knowingly and willingly transgresses a law imposed by someone truly offends the legislator himself, because he contradicts his will and denies him due subjection and obedience. Moreover, sin is opposed to God not only as supreme legislator, but also offends Him as just judge by not fearing His punishment and chastisement; as supreme and highest Lord by denying Him due service; as friend and benefactor by showing oneself His enemy and ungrateful, and by abusing His benefits; as first cause and first principle by using His concurrence for sinning; and finally as the supreme good and ultimate end, because through every mortal sin the sinner turns toward a created good as toward an ultimate end and turns away from God, the true ultimate end, in which God Himself is supremely offended.

3. You will object first against the first conclusion: lying and hatred of God are something intrinsically morally evil, not only antecedently to positive law and independently of it, but even antecedently to the natural law and indeed to the eternal law. For in that prior instant in which the divine intellect, through the knowledge of simple intelligence, knows hatred of God precisely according to its essential predicates, it truly knows it as opposed to His goodness, as turning a rational creature away from it, and as unfitting and deformed in relation to the rational creature itself. The same must be said of lying. Therefore acts evil in themselves are sins independently of the natural and eternal law and antecedently to them. Consequently, it is not essential to sin that it be contrary to the natural and eternal law.

I answer that lying, hatred of God, and other acts evil in themselves are not formally evil and sinful antecedently to the natural or eternal law, but only initiatively and fundamentally, insofar as they are of themselves and intrinsically determined to disagree with and deviate from the eternal law, and consequently from the natural law, which is a participation of it, and are naturally apt to be prohibited by it. After such prohibition they are formally and completely evil and sinful. If you ask in what this initiatory and fundamental malice consists, I answer briefly that it consists in the fact that

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acts intrinsically evil are of themselves opposed to some divine perfection: hatred of God to supreme goodness, lying to first truth, theft to supreme justice and equity. This contrariety and repugnance is the reason and foundation why God prohibits such acts through the eternal and natural law. For just as God is necessarily determined to love His divine perfections, so He is necessarily determined to hate and prohibit by eternal law whatever is contrary to them.

4. You will object secondly against the second conclusion: whatever is essential to sin comes to it from the object by which it is specified. But only the nature of moral evil or defect comes to sin from the object, whereas the nature of offense or injury comes to it from its order to the person offended, who is distinct from the object of sin. Therefore it is not essential to sin that it be an injury or offense against God.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For God is virtually included in the object of sin as legislator and as ultimate end. He is included as legislator because the object of sin is morally evil and consequently prohibited by the positive or natural divine law. He is included as ultimate end because in moral matters an object is commanded or prohibited in relation to God as the ultimate end. Hence the nature of injury or offense against God as legislator and ultimate end is virtually and implicitly included in sin insofar as it is morally evil, and cannot be perfectly prescinded from it.

CHAPTER II.

The Manifold Division of Sins.

1. Sin is first divided into original sin, which is derived from Adam and transmitted to his descendants through origin or generation, and personal sin, which is committed by the sinner's own will and is not derived from another.

2. Secondly, personal sin is divided into actual and habitual sin. The first is an evil act deformed from the rules of morals. The second consists in a certain stain that actual sin leaves in the soul and that remains there until it is removed by sanctifying grace.

3. Thirdly, actual sin is subdivided into sin of commission and sin of omission. The former consists in producing an evil act deformed from the rules of morals. The latter is the absence or privation of a due act commanded by law. The first conflicts with a negative precept by placing an

act that is commanded not to be placed. The second conflicts with an affirmative precept by neglecting an act that is commanded.

4. Fourthly, actual sins are divided into carnal and spiritual sins. Carnal sins are perfected in carnal pleasure, such as gluttony and lust, which are consummated in the pleasure of food and sexual matters. Spiritual sins are perfected in spiritual pleasure, such as pride, envy, and the like, which are consummated in the mere apprehension of something desired or obtained according to one's wish. The former have more of conversion than aversion; the latter, on the contrary, have more of aversion than conversion. Hence the latter are graver as regards guilt, but the former greater as regards adhesion. Finally, as Gregory the Great says in *Moralia in Iob* XXIII, c. 11, *carnal sins possess less guilt and greater infamy*. They possess less guilt because we are impelled toward them by more numerous and more vehement incitements, but greater infamy because they concern pleasures common to us and brute animals. Hence the proud often fall into such carnal sins by the just judgment of God, so that they may be confounded and humbled, as the same holy Pontiff observed in *Moralia in Iob* XI, c. 8, where, explaining Job 12, *He loosens the belt of kings*, he adds: *He loosens the belt of kings when, because of the guilt of pride, He destroys in them the girdle of chastity*.

5. Fifthly, some sins are against God, some against oneself, and some against one's neighbor. For a threefold order must exist in man: one in relation to the rule of the divine law, another in comparison with the rule of reason, and a third in relation to other men with whom he must live. Therefore, when someone departs from the first order and withholds from God due love or reverence, he is said to sin against God, as does the sacrilegious man, the heretic, and the blasphemer. When he deviates from the second order and does not regulate his passions by reason, he sins against himself, as does the avaricious, gluttonous, or lustful man. When he departs from the third order and does not preserve the right due to his neighbor, or offends human society to which he is naturally bound, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as do thieves, murderers, and adulterers.

6. Sixthly, sin is divided into sin of the heart, mouth, and deed. This division can be understood in two ways. First, sin of the heart can mean a sin consummated interiorly, such as heresy; sin of the mouth, one perfected by speech, such as lying; and sin of deed, one completed by an external work, such as adultery or murder. Secondly, this division can be understood as concerning diverse degrees of the same sin rather than diverse sins. For example, an angry man, from the fact that he desires vengeance, is first disturbed in his heart, secondly breaks out into insulting words, and thirdly proceeds to injurious deeds. The same is evident in lust and every other sin,

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in which there is first the conception of the heart, namely thought, then manifestation and speech, and finally external completion.

7. Finally, sin is divided into mortal and venial. Mortal sin brings death to the soul by depriving it of grace and charity and turning it away from the ultimate end. Venial sin deprives it neither of grace nor charity, but only diminishes their fervor; it does not turn the soul away from the ultimate end, but only turns it aside from that end and delays its attainment. Hence it is called venial because, in comparison with mortal sin, it is light and especially deserving of pardon.

CHAPTER III.

The Comparison of Sins with One Another.

I say first that sins are not connected with one another.

1. This is proved by an argument of St. Thomas, here, q. 73, a. 1, taken from the difference between one who sins and one who acts according to virtue. The intention of one who acts according to virtue tends toward one thing, namely that which conforms to the rule of reason prescribed by prudence. Consequently, all the virtues are connected in prudence, as we showed in the preceding treatise. But the intention of the sinner does not tend toward the same thing, but toward diverse things having no connection, because the sinner's intention is not to depart from reason, for this is not intended of itself by the agent, but to tend toward desirable goods from which vices and sins receive their species. These goods are not only diverse, but sometimes contrary to one another. Therefore vices and sins are not connected with one another, but are disparate and sometimes opposed, as avarice and prodigality. Hence, as St. Augustine observes in epistle 29, one vice is sometimes removed by another, as the love of money is removed by the love of praise or pleasure.

2. You will say: just as all virtues agree in one principle, namely the love of God, so all vices and sins are united and agree in self-love. Therefore, just as the virtues are connected with one another, so are vices and sins.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. For, as St. Thomas says in the cited article, in the reply to the third objection: The love of God gathers together, insofar as it leads man's affection from many things to one, and therefore the virtues caused by the love of God are connected. But self-love disperses man's affection among diverse things, insofar as man loves himself by desiring for himself temporal

goods, which are various and diverse. Therefore the vices and sins caused by self-love are not connected.

3. I say secondly that all sins are not equal in malice and gravity. This is against the Stoics, who, as St. Thomas reports in the cited question, a. 2, considered sin only on the part of the privation of the rectitude of reason that it implies, and, thinking that no privation admits of greater and less, said that all sins are equal. The Holy Doctor overturns this foundation by observing that there is a twofold genus of privation. One is pure and simple, consisting as it were in a completed state of corruption, as death is the privation of life and darkness the privation of light. Such a privation does not admit of greater and less, because it leaves nothing of the opposed form or habit. For someone is not less dead on the first or second day than after a year, when the body has already dissolved. Likewise, a house is not darker if a lamp is covered by several coverings than if it is covered by one covering that excludes all the light. The other privation is neither pure nor simple, but retains something of the opposed form or habit and consists more in being corrupted than in a completed state of corruption. Such is sickness, which so deprives the humors of their due proportion that something of that proportion nevertheless remains in the subject. Such a privation admits of greater and less according as more or less of the opposed habit remains. For sickness is greater or lesser according as it removes more or less of the proportion of the humors. Therefore, since sin, although formally it signifies a privation, does not belong to the first genus of privations, but to the second, because it so deprives one of due conformity to reason that it does not totally remove the order of reason, inequality in malice and gravity is found among sins.

He gives another argument in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 139, where he reasons as follows: In all things whose perfection and good consist in a certain commensuration, the farther one departs from due measure, the greater the evil. Thus health consists in the due commensuration of the humors, beauty in the due commensuration of the members, and truth in the due commensuration of the intellect or speech to the thing. It is evident that the greater the inequality in the humors, the greater the sickness; the greater the disorder in the members, the greater the deformity; and the farther one departs from truth, the greater the falsehood. But the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration, for it is a mean established between contrary vices according to the due limitation of circumstances. Therefore, the farther one departs from this harmony, the greater the malice.

4. You will ask first whether there is inequality of gravity and malice not only in sins prohibited by natural law, but also in those forbidden solely by positive law. I answer affirmatively. For they can constitute diverse species of sin. Violating a fast and working on a feast day are specifically different, although both are contrary only to positive law. But species, since they are like numbers, are unequal to one another. Therefore sins prohibited solely by positive law are also unequal.

This is confirmed. The gravity of a sin is taken from its opposition to the virtue that it destroys, and consequently, other things being equal, that sin is greater which is opposed to a more excellent virtue. But sins prohibited solely by positive law are often contrary to diverse and unequal virtues. For example, eating meat on Friday is contrary to abstinence; working on a feast day, or celebrating without sacred vestments, is contrary to religion. Therefore sins of this kind are unequal in gravity and malice.

Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas in the cited passage from *Summa contra Gentiles* seems to teach the contrary, for there he speaks of the aforesaid sins in relation to the estimation of a human judge, who considers only the material and external transgression of a precept, which can consist in something indivisible. This is clear from the words he gives there: *This argument appears to be supported by what occurs in human judgments. For if a boundary is established that someone must not cross, it makes no difference to the judge whether he has crossed it by much or little.* Hence from this testimony it can be inferred only that some sins against positive law consist in something indivisible on the part of the thing prohibited or the exterior transgression considered in human judgment, but not absolutely and according to all the other principles considered by the divine judge.

5. You will ask secondly from what source inequality in the gravity and malice of sins is taken. I answer that the essential inequality of sins is taken from the object, whereas accidental inequality is taken from circumstances that do not change the species. The first part is proved. Sin is constituted in the nature of sin or moral evil through a transcendental order and relation to the object as deformed from the rules of morals, as we shall show in chapter 8. Therefore, since according to the philosophers the constitutive and distinctive principle of a thing is the same, sins are specifically distinguished and diversified through the order and relation they possess toward specifically diverse objects. The second part is evident, for accidental inequality in sins must be taken from those things related accidentally to an act considered in moral being, which is how circumstances that do not change the species are related to it.

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From these things you will infer, first, that a sin is graver to the degree that its object is worse. Hence sins against God, such as idolatry, blasphemy, and the like, are the gravest of all. Sins against man occupy the second place, such as murder and calumny. Last are those against man's external goods, such as theft.

6. You will infer secondly, with St. Thomas here, q. 73, a. 4, that the sin opposed to a more excellent virtue is graver without qualification and according to species: 1^o because it has an object worse in the nature of an object and more repugnant to reason; 2^o because it corrupts and destroys a greater good, namely the mean of that virtue.

For a fuller understanding of this corollary and the solution of many arguments, three things must be briefly observed here, which the Salamancans examine extensively in the treatise *De peccatis*, disp. 9, dub. 4. First, when we say that the sin opposed to a more perfect virtue is graver according to its species, this must be understood of opposition according to the primary and principal object of such a virtue. For if a sin is opposed to a more perfect virtue only as regards its secondary object, it will not for that reason be graver. This is evident in hatred of one's neighbor, which, because it is not contrary to charity as charity tends toward its primary object, namely God, but only as it is directed toward its secondary object, namely one's neighbor, is not the gravest of all sins. For, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 39, a. 2, schism, although opposed to charity, is a lesser sin than unbelief.

Secondly, it must be observed that a sin opposed to an inferior virtue, if it also includes opposition to a superior virtue, can, because of this inclusion, exceed a sin opposed to the greater virtue. Hence adultery, which is opposed to chastity, is specifically graver than theft, which is opposed to justice, although justice is a more perfect virtue than chastity, because in adultery, together with opposition to chastity, opposition to justice itself is included.

Thirdly, it must be observed that the sins compared must have the same manner of opposition to virtue, so that either both are contrarily opposed to it or both are privatively opposed. Consequently, both must be sins of commission or both sins of omission. But if one is a sin of commission, which is contrarily opposed, and the other a sin of omission, which is only privatively opposed, it is very probable that, even if the latter is opposed to a more perfect virtue, it can nevertheless be less grave than the former, because this diverse manner of opposition significantly changes their gravity. Hence it can probably be said that the sin of murder, which is opposed to

justice, is specifically graver than omission of Mass, which is privatively opposed to religion, although religion is a more excellent virtue than justice.

7. You will ask thirdly whether diversity of precepts entails a specific distinction of sins. I answer negatively if this diversity is found only on the part of those commanding or prohibiting, but affirmatively if it is found on the part of the motive for commanding or prohibiting.

The first part is proved, first, by the argument of St. Thomas here, q. 73, a. 6, ad 2. The specific distinction of sins is not taken from the terminus from which of aversion, but from the terminus toward which of conversion. But a diversity of precepts found solely on the part of those commanding or prohibiting is found not on the part of the terminus toward which of conversion, but of the terminus from which of aversion. Therefore it does not entail a specific distinction of sins. The minor appears certain. For the terminus toward which of sinful conversion is that to which the sinner turns, that is, the object he desires. But the precept or law is not the object he desires, but that from which he turns away in desiring the object. Therefore a precept, or diversity of precepts, is found not on the part of the terminus toward which, but on the part of the terminus from which. The major is proved first because the specification of a thing, and consequently its distinction from all others, must be considered according to that which is intended in it of itself by nature and by the agent, and not according to what is in it accidentally. But those things in sin that are found on the part of conversion are intended of themselves by the sinner, whereas those found on the part of aversion are intended only accidentally, since no one acts intending evil, as Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4. Therefore the conclusion follows. Secondly, the same major is proved because motions are neither specified nor distinguished by the terminus from which, but by the terminus toward which, as is taught in physics. Therefore, although the terminus from which differs specifically, if the terminus toward which is of the same nature, the motions are of the same species. But those things in sin that are found on the part of aversion are related as the terminus from which, whereas those found on the part of conversion are related as the terminus toward which, as is evident. Therefore sins are constituted and distinguished by what is found on the part of conversion, not by what is found on the part of aversion.

Secondly, the same part is proved, and it is shown even more clearly that the specific distinction of sins is not taken from diversity of precepts when it is found only on the part of the principle or of the one commanding or prohibiting. Theft is in fact prohibited by civil, ecclesiastical, natural, and divine law, and nevertheless it is only one sin in species. Likewise, in the

Decalogue, theft and adultery are prohibited by precepts different from those by which the interior desire to steal and commit adultery is prohibited. Yet the desire to steal and theft do not therefore differ specifically, nor do adultery and the desire to commit adultery, since the exterior act does not add malice specifically different from the interior act. Therefore diversity of precepts found only on the part of the principle or of the one commanding or prohibiting does not introduce a specific distinction of sins.

8. That diversity of precepts does entail such a distinction when it is found on the part of the motive for commanding or prohibiting is evident, because then the laws furnish diverse formal objects, from which the formal diversity of sins arises. Hence theft in a church is specifically different from theft perpetrated elsewhere, because the Church prohibits theft in a sacred building from the special motive of religion, just as she prohibits striking a cleric from the same motive. But a lie uttered in a church is not infected with the malice of sacrilege, because it is not prohibited from the motive of religion.

9. You will object first against the first part of this resolution: St. Thomas says in *De malo*, q. 2, a. 6, that *if some acts were sins solely because prohibited, it would be reasonable for sins to differ specifically according to the difference of the precepts*. Therefore he judges that the specific distinction of sins contrary to positive law is taken not from the objects toward which they tend, but from the precepts to which they are opposed.

I answer that the Holy Doctor there speaks of precepts that are diverse not only on the part of the principle or the one commanding, but also on the part of the thing commanded or the end or motive of commanding. Hence this testimony does not militate against the first part of our resolution, but establishes and confirms the second.

10. You will object secondly: when a sin is opposed to diverse laws, diverse obligations are violated, since each law imposes its own obligation and all are violated through such a sin. Therefore there are several malices in it, for malice is nothing other than violation of a law.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For when laws differ only on the part of their principle, they do not introduce several or diverse obligations, but only one and the same obligation, which the first law imposes anew and the others confirm.

11. You will object thirdly: sin is morally evil because it signifies deformity in relation to the laws that are the rules of morals. Therefore, since it signifies deformity in relation to specifically diverse laws, it will belong to diverse species of moral malice.

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I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. Since it signifies deformity in relation to specifically diverse laws, it will belong to diverse species of malice if the distinction of laws or precepts is formal: I grant this. If it is merely material: I deny it. When the diversity of laws is found only on the part of the legislator and not on the part of the thing commanded, the end, or the motive of commanding, it is not formal, but merely material, since the laws agree in one and the same formal rationale of commanding or prohibiting, namely the same motive.

12. You will say: divine, natural, and human law always have specifically diverse motives or ends. Therefore they are always formally diverse in species. The consequence is evident from what has been said. The antecedent is proved from the fact that the end of divine law is to rectify the created will in relation to supernatural beatitude; the end of natural law is man's natural rectitude itself in relation to natural beatitude; and the end of human law is to rectify men politically, that is, in relation to the peace and tranquility of the commonwealth or community.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that those ends are only extrinsic and should be called the ends of the legislator rather than of the laws themselves. For laws or precepts to be formally distinguished, diversity of a remote and extrinsic motive does not suffice; a diverse proximate and intrinsic motive, which is called the motive of the precept and the work, is required.

13. You will object fourthly against the second part of our resolution: an act can be prohibited from specifically diverse motives and nevertheless possess only one malice. Therefore diversity of motive in precepts does not introduce specific diversity in sins. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved by two examples. The Lenten fast is commanded by the Church from the motive of religion, and nevertheless no one will say that violation of the Lenten fast possesses two specifically distinct malices. Likewise, hearing Mass on a Sunday upon which the feast of a saint falls is commanded by the Church from a twofold motive. On Sunday it is commanded from the motive of latria, through which we render worship to God; on the solemnities of saints it is commanded from the motive of dulia, through which veneration is rendered to the saints. Nevertheless, omission of Mass on a Sunday upon which the feast of a saint falls does not belong to two species of sin.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof, or first example, I say that the motive of religion is the remote motive and extrinsic end of the Church commanding the Lenten fast, not the proximate motive of the work. For diversity of motive to entail specific diversity in precepts, the motive

must be proximate and intrinsic, as we said in the solution to the preceding objection.

To the second proof or example, some answer with Navarre by granting that omission of Mass on a Sunday upon which the feast of a saint falls possesses a twofold specifically distinct malice, for the reason given in the objection. Just as, they say, blasphemy against the saints and against God is a sin with a twofold specific malice, because blasphemy against the saints is opposed to *dulia*, by which we are bound to honor them, whereas blasphemy against God is opposed to *latria*, by which we render due honor to God. It nevertheless seems more true that the hearing of Mass is commanded from the same virtue, namely *latria*, both on saints' feast days and on Sundays, and consequently that only one sin is committed in the proposed case. For just as in the Mass, even when celebrated on the solemnities of saints, sacrifice is offered not to the saints but to God, so the precept of hearing Mass on the solemnities of saints is proximately not from the motive of honor due to the saints for their own sake, but from the motive of the honor we render to the saints by reason of God dwelling in them. Consequently, failure to hear Mass on saints' feast days is contrary not to *dulia*, but to *latria*.

CHAPTER IV.

The Subject of Sins.

It is certain that the will is simply and absolutely the subject of sin, as it is also its cause, since every sin is voluntary. Hence Augustine says in *Retractationes* VII, c. 9: *The will is that by which one sins and lives rightly*. The only difficulty, therefore, is whether sin, as regards the formal malice it implies, can reside in the sensitive appetite, the intellect, and the exterior members and senses insofar as they are subject to the motion of the will. For the resolution:

1. I say briefly that sin, as regards formal malice, can be subjectively present intrinsically in the sensitive appetite and intellect, but not in the members of the body or the external senses.

The first part, which Alvarez and Curiel deny by asserting that moral malice is found intrinsically only in acts of the will, is proved by the authority and a twofold argument of St. Thomas. He gives the first here, q. 74, a. 4, and it can be briefly proposed as follows. Act and habit belong to the same power, especially if the act is immanent and is received in the power by which it is effected. But habits of vice, such as intemperance, pusillanimity,

and the like, are received in the sensitive appetite, just as temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues moderating the passions are subjectively present in it, as we showed in the treatise on virtues. Therefore acts of vice are also received in it.

2. He suggests the second argument in II *Sentences*, dist. 21, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5, where he says: *The concupiscible appetite possesses a certain freedom in man, according to which it can obey the command of reason, and thus sin can exist in the concupiscible appetite.* Hence I argue as follows. That which is capable of freedom can be the subject of sin. But the sensitive appetite as found in man, through the conjunction it has with the will, participates from it in a certain intrinsic freedom. Therefore it can be the subject of sin. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown as follows. The cogitative power, through the conjunction it has with the intellect, participates in the power of reasoning about singulars, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, in the body and ad 5. Therefore, similarly, the sensitive appetite, through the conjunction it has with the will, participates in a certain imperfect freedom. The consequence is evident from parity of reasoning. No reason for disparity can be assigned between the appetite and the cogitative power in this respect, since the appetite is related to the will, as regards conjunction and rooting in the same principle, in precisely the same manner as the cogitative power is related to the intellect. Consequently, if by reason of this conjunction and rooting the latter participates from the intellect in a certain imperfect power of judging and reasoning, there is no reason why a certain imperfect freedom should not be derived in the sensitive appetite from the conjunction it has with the will. The *a priori* reason for this is that it is general among united subordinate causes and powers that the inferior, through its conjunction with the superior, participates in something of the superior, by which it is elevated and perfected and, through this elevation, in some manner attains the superior's mode of acting. Thus the heavens, through conjunction with the moving intelligence, participate in a power of producing certain living things, although imperfect and base, which they could in no way produce of themselves, since they lack life. Thus also a phantasm, through conjunction with the agent intellect, receives a power it did not possess of itself to produce an intelligible species in the possible intellect. What wonder, then, if the sensitive appetite in man, through conjunction with the will, receives a certain ray of freedom by reason of which it can be the subject of venial sin, though not mortal sin, for which perfect freedom and disorder from the ultimate end are required? Hence the Master of the *Sentences* says in II *Sentences*, dist. 25: *If the enticement of sin is confined to the movement of sensuality alone, it is venial and very slight.*

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From these things the second part remains proved, which asserts that sin, as regards the moral malice it implies, can reside in the intellect: 1^o because the vices of imprudence, unbelief, and the like are in the intellect, in which prudence and faith reside; 2^o because in an act of command elicited by the intellect there is a certain intrinsic freedom participated from the preceding motion of the will, as was shown in the treatise on human acts.

3. The third part, which affirms that moral malice does not formally reside in the members or external senses, also remains proved from what has been said. For the malice of sin cannot intrinsically and formally reside in a subject that is not in some manner intrinsically free. But the members of the body are not intrinsically free, nor are the external senses. Therefore the malice of sin cannot reside in them. Hence St. Thomas above, q. 20, a. 3, teaches that exterior acts do not possess formal goodness or malice distinct from that which is in the act of the will. There, by the name *exterior act*, he does not understand every act commanded by the will, as Curiel and Alvarez think, but only acts of the exterior members. This is clear from the first argument of that article, where he says that *the principle of an exterior act is the power executing the movement*, which he does not deny, but admits in the solution to that argument. But the power executing movement is in the exterior members of the body.

4. You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: formal truth and falsehood reside formally in the intellect alone. Therefore moral goodness and malice are likewise subjectively present in the will alone. The antecedent is presupposed as certain from metaphysics. The consequence is proved from parity of reasoning.

I answer that formal truth and falsehood are primarily and of themselves in the intellect, but secondarily and by participation are formally in the cogitative power, because through its conjunction with the intellect the cogitative power participates in the power of judging and reasoning about singulars, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage cited above. In words and things there is truth only by extrinsic denomination. The same holds for goodness and malice. Each is primarily and of itself in the act of the will, secondarily and by participation in the act of the sensitive appetite, but in acts of the exterior members only by extrinsic denomination.

5. You will object secondly: the proper subject of moral malice is a free power. But the sensitive appetite in man does not possess intrinsic freedom. Therefore it cannot be the subject of moral malice. The major premise is evident. The minor is established first because an object must be proposed to a free power with indifference toward either alternative. But an object is not proposed to the sensitive appetite with this indifference, since it is

proposed through the imagination or cogitative power or another internal sense, and the internal senses, since they do not know universal rationales as the intellect does, cannot propose an object with indifference. Therefore the sensitive appetite in man does not possess intrinsic freedom. Secondly, if a certain intrinsic freedom sufficient for venial sin is granted to man's sensitive appetite, then such an appetite will be able to sin in this manner by using its own freedom, however much the will resists it or is impeded, which seems absurd. Thirdly, if some freedom is admitted in the sensitive appetite, no movement of sensuality, however first-first, will fail to be a venial sin, because in all of them the appetite will use the freedom that we say suffices for venial sin. The consequent is false and erroneous, as the theologians commonly teach, and as is clear from Augustine in *De civitate Dei* I, c. 25, where he says: *The less guilt there is in the body of one who does not consent to that disobedience of concupiscence, if there is no guilt in the body of one who sleeps.* Therefore the conclusion follows.

6. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For since the manner of divine providence is so to join the orders of things that the highest point of the lowest touches the lowest point of the highest, the appetite of the lower order, namely the sensitive, must in man participate in something of the perfection and freedom of the will, which is the appetite of the higher, rational order. To the first proof to the contrary, it can be answered with Gregory de Martinez that the cogitative power as found in man, by reason of the conjunction it has with the intellect, participates in something of its power and perfection, by which it is elevated to form a certain indifferent judgment, just as through conjunction with reason it participates in a certain power of imperfectly reasoning and comparing means with the end, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage cited above. Or it can be said with the Salamancans that it is not necessary for the indifference by reason of which the sensitive appetite acts freely to shine forth in the immediate presentation of its object, which is made through the cogitative power or another internal sense. It is sufficient that it shine forth in the presentation of the object of the will, which is made through the intellect. For the imperfect freedom derived in the sensitive appetite from its conjunction with the will does not require that the appetite itself be able to withdraw itself from its operation, since this is proper only to a power that is primarily and, as it were, essentially free, such as the will. It suffices that it operate with a relation and subordination to a principle by which it can be restrained, namely the will. For by this very fact it is verified that it operates freely, not with primary and, as it were, essential freedom, but with secondary and participated freedom. Since such a relation is to a free

principle as free, it cannot fail to remove the act in which it exists from the line of necessity and render it free.

To the second proof of the minor, I deny the consequence. When the will resists, the aforesaid freedom is not present in the sensitive appetite, because it is communicated to it through conjunction and subordination to the will, and that influx is impeded by the resistance and contrary act of the will.

To the third proof, I likewise deny the consequence. The imperfect freedom belonging to the sensitive appetite necessarily requires that its movements be capable of being restrained by reason, so that if reason or will lacks this power, freedom is thereby lacking in the sensitive appetite. But first-first movements, of which reason is in no manner aware, cannot be restrained by it, and therefore do not enjoy that imperfect freedom which the sensitive appetite participates from the will. Consequently, they cannot be venial sins.

7. From this you will understand that what the author of *Theologia mentis et cordis*, vol. IV, p. 757, says is false, namely that we do not speak consistently with our principles when, on the one hand, we teach against Alvarez that venial sin can exist in the appetite and sensuality even without the actual motion and command of reason and will, and, on the other hand, against Calvin and the other heretics of this age, we assert that the first-first movements of concupiscence are not venial sins, but only first-second movements. I say that this is manifestly false. For since, as we have said, the imperfect freedom belonging to the sensitive appetite requires that its movements be capable of being restrained by reason, and since this does not belong to first-first movements, it is evident that these two teachings cohere rightly: that the first-first movements of concupiscence are not venial sins, and that nevertheless venial sin can exist in the appetite and sensuality even without the actual motion and command of the will, provided its movements can be checked and restrained by reason. Thus Martinez, the Salamancans, and many other of our Thomists teach. St. Thomas appears expressly to hand down the same in *De malo*, q. 7, a. 6, in these words: *Sensuality is sometimes moved without the command of reason and will, and then sin is said to exist in sensuality. Nevertheless, the sin cannot be mortal, but only venial.* He teaches the same here, q. 74, a. 3, ad 3, and in many other places. Nor is it valid to say that St. Thomas excludes only the formal and direct consent of the will, but not virtual, indirect, and interpretative consent. For in *De veritate*, q. 25, a. 5, ad 5, he writes: *Sin is not said to exist in sensuality because of the interpretative consent of reason. For when a movement of sensuality precedes the judgment of reason, there is neither interpretative nor express consent;*

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but because sensuality is subjectable to reason, its act, although it precedes reason, possesses the nature of sin. Nothing clearer or more explicit could be said. See the Salamancans, disp. 10, dub. 2, where they treat this question extensively and learnedly in their customary manner, for it is neither possible nor expedient to linger over it longer here.

CHAPTER V.

The Internal Causes of Sin.

The internal causes of sin are three: ignorance on the part of the intellect, concupiscence on the part of the appetite, and malice on the part of the will. Concerning the last two there is no difficulty or controversy among the theologians, but concerning the first there are two celebrated difficulties that must be briefly resolved here.

§ 1.

Whether Ignorance Is a Cause of Sin, What Kind of Ignorance is
Such a Cause, and How Far It Excuses from Sin.

1. I say first that ignorance can be a cause of sin. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 76, a. 1, where he reasons as follows: According to the Philosopher, a moving cause is twofold, one of itself and the other accidentally. A cause of itself moves by its proper power, as the generator is the cause of motion in heavy and light things. An accidental cause is that which removes an impediment, or the very removal of the impediment. In this manner ignorance can be a cause of a sinful act, for it is the privation of knowledge that perfects reason, which knowledge prohibits a sinful act insofar as it directs human acts.

St. Bernard demonstrates this truth by many testimonies of Scripture in his epistle to Hugh of St. Victor, c. 5, where he attacks a certain anonymous author asserting that one can never sin through ignorance: I do not think we must labor much against the third assertion, since it bears evident falsehood upon its face. Nevertheless, care must be taken lest, if he is not answered even briefly according to his folly, he think his folly to be wisdom and more securely scatter the seedbed of discord into the ears of the foolish, so that there be no number to his foolishness. Therefore let an evident lie be refuted by a few evident testimonies of truth. Perhaps the man who asserts that one can never sin through ignorance never prays for his own ignorances, but rather mocks the Prophet praying and saying: Remember not the sins of my

youth and my ignorances. Perhaps he will also rebuke God for requiring satisfaction for a sin of ignorance. After adducing various testimonies of Scripture concerning the offering of the high priest for his own and the people's ignorance, Paul's statement that he obtained mercy because he acted in ignorance, Christ's prayer for those crucifying Him because they did not know what they were doing, and the killers of the Apostles who thought they were offering service to God, he finally concludes: Is it not sufficiently evident from these things in what great darkness of ignorance he lies who does not know that one can sometimes sin through ignorance?

Bernard had drawn this truth from Augustine, who says in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* VII, c. 36: Is ignorance no evil and therefore not to be purged? What then does that voice mean: Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances? For although sins committed knowingly are more damnable, nevertheless, if sins of ignorance were no sins, we would not read what I have recalled: Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances.

2. I say secondly that vincible ignorance is a cause of sin. This conclusion is evident: 1^o because vincible ignorance removes knowledge which, if present, would impede sin, and hence it is an accidental cause of sinning, just as one who removes a column supporting a stone is the accidental cause of the stone's movement; 2^o because, since such ignorance is willed directly or indirectly, it does not prevent the act consequent upon it from being voluntary and consequently culpable. Hence Bernard says in epistle 77: *Many things that ought to be known are not known through carelessness in learning, sloth in learning, or shame in asking, and ignorance of this kind has no excuse.* St. Thomas says here, q. 76, a. 2: *Vincible ignorance is a sin if it concerns things one is bound to know, but not if it concerns things one is not bound to know.*

3. I say thirdly that invincible ignorance, whether it concerns positive or natural law, if such ignorance of natural law can exist, concerning which see the treatise on laws, c. 3, § 3, does not cause sin, but excuses from it. This is against Jansenius in *De statu naturae lapsae* II, c. 2 and the following chapters, where he distinguishes a twofold ignorance, one of natural law and the other of positive law, and teaches that the latter excuses from sin, but not the former. His reason is that ignorance of natural law flowed from original sin and was voluntary in Adam for us, which he thinks sufficient for actual sin, but ignorance of positive law did not. Our conclusion, however, is commonly taught by the Scholastics with the Master in II *Sentences*, dist. 22, and St. Thomas here, q. 76, a. 3. Hence Luther says in his commentary on Gen. 12: *The Scholastics say that invincible ignorance renders men excusable. Such is the blindness in papal schools and churches.* Jerome Zanchi, a Lutheran-

Calvinist, says in *Tractatus theologici* I, c. 12, thesis 1: *The Scholastics are mistaken when they excuse from sin the ignorance they call invincible because it is invincible, as they say, although we can prove that it is not simply invincible, since it followed upon Adam's voluntary sin.*

The conclusion is proved first from Augustine in *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 19, where he says: You are not charged with guilt for what you unwillingly do not know, but for neglecting to seek what you do not know. By these words he openly teaches that unwilling and involuntary ignorance, such as invincible ignorance, is not imputed as guilt, but only ignorance arising from negligence in learning, which is vincible and culpable because indirectly willed in its cause. Hence St. Thomas says in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 7, ad 3: It must be said that ignorance which is wholly involuntary is not a sin. This is what Augustine says: You are not imputed with guilt if you are unwillingly ignorant. By adding, but if you have neglected to know, he indicates that ignorance has the nature of sin from preceding negligence. Hence the same Augustine, in tractate 89, explaining John 15, If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin, says that those to whom Christ did not come and to whom He did not speak have an excuse, not from every sin of theirs, but from the sin of not believing in Christ. Bernard gives similar teaching in epistle 77, saying: If He had spoken, but not to them, innocence would excuse the guilt of ignorance. Finally, Augustine says in *Quaestiones Veteris Testamenti*, as reported by Gratian in the *Decretum*, dist. 27: That ignorant man can be excused from punishment who found no one from whom he could learn. The Gloss interprets the words can be excused from punishment as follows: That is, from the sin for which punishment is due, or from eternal punishment.

4. The conclusion is proved secondly from St. Thomas, who also manifestly teaches it. Here, q. 74, a. 1, ad 2, he says: *If a defect of the apprehensive power is in no manner subject to the will, there is no sin either in the will or in the apprehensive power, as in those who possess invincible ignorance.* In q. 76, a. 1, at the end of the body, he says that *no invincible ignorance is a sin.* The word *no* excludes every invincible ignorance whatsoever, whether of positive or natural law, from the nature of sin. Likewise, in a. 3 of the same question, at the end of the body, he writes: *If there is an ignorance that is wholly involuntary, either because it is invincible or because it concerns something one is not bound to know, such ignorance wholly excuses from sin.* By these words the Holy Doctor requires two things for ignorance to be sinful: one is an obligation to acquire knowledge, the other is the power to dispel the ignorance. For if there is no duty of knowledge, the ignorance has the nature not of privation, but of mere negation and natural nescience. But if the

power of knowing is lacking, the will cannot be accused of guilt, because no one is bound to the impossible. Hence:

5. The conclusion is further proved by two fundamental arguments. The first is this. If invincible ignorance did not excuse from sin, God would command impossibilities to men, which is erroneous and was condemned by the Council of Trent. The consequence is evident. Since our will is a blind power, only that is judged to be in our power which is done by the will with full advertence of reason. Consequently, ignorance by which something is wholly unknown prevents it from being in our power. Therefore, if a man were bound to something he invincibly does not know, he would be obliged to the impossible. Hence Medina, here, q. 75, a. 2, rightly observes that invincible ignorance is not imputed to man as sin because no one is bound to the impossible.

6. The other fundamental argument can be briefly proposed as follows. That which removes voluntariness from an act and renders it simply involuntary excuses from sin. But every invincible ignorance does this. Therefore every invincible ignorance excuses from sin. The major premise is certain: 1^o because, as Augustine says in *De vera religione*, c. 14, *sin is voluntary to such an extent that it would in no manner be sin if it were not voluntary. This is so evident that no small number of the learned and no multitude of the unlearned dissents from it*; 2^o because sin is a moral human act, and it belongs to the nature of a moral and human act to be voluntary and deliberate, as St. Thomas teaches above in this part, q. 1, a. 1. Therefore this also belongs to the nature of sin. The minor is no less evident and is expressly taught by the same Angelic Doctor above, q. 6, a. 8, where, speaking of antecedent and invincible ignorance, he says: *Such ignorance causes what is simply involuntary*. This is evident from the definition of the voluntary, which is described as follows: *The voluntary is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge*. Hence, just as it is caused by two principles, namely the operating appetite, which is the intrinsic principle, and directing cognition, which carries a torch before the will, so its opposite, namely the involuntary, must be caused by opposite principles and proceed either from the operation's being from an extrinsic principle, as occurs in things done through violence or fear, or because cognition is removed, bound, or disturbed, as happens through ignorance and passion, as we examined extensively in the treatise on the voluntary and involuntary.

7. Jansenius answers that ignorance of natural law was introduced into human minds through the sin of the first parent. If he had persevered in the most happy state of innocence, men in that state would have been ignorant of nothing pertaining to natural law. Hence, since Adam's guilt is voluntary

in men because the wills of all men were in some manner contained in the will of Adam as head of the whole human race, invincible ignorance of natural law flowing and proceeding from that guilt is judged voluntary in them, and consequently evil and culpable. It is otherwise with invincible ignorance of positive law, since this does not proceed from original sin as the former does. For the enactment of a positive divine or human law depends upon the free will of the human or divine legislator. Consequently, knowledge of it is not connatural to human nature as knowledge of natural law is.

8. This solution contains the whole marrow, or rather the root, of Jansenian doctrine, and therefore it must be attacked diligently, for, as Augustine says: *To dig up and extirpate the root is the shortest course.*

First, therefore, what Jansenius says is false, namely that for invincible ignorance of natural law to be evil and culpable it suffices that it be voluntary through the will of the head of the whole human nature. For although it suffices for original guilt that it be voluntary in the head, namely Adam, it does not suffice for actual or personal sin, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in II Sentences, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 2, where he argues as follows: According as something possesses the nature of guilt, the nature of the voluntary must be found in it. Just as there is a certain good that regards nature and another that regards the person, so there is a certain guilt of nature and another of the person. Hence for personal guilt the will of the person is required, as is evident in actual guilt, which is committed through an act of the person. But for the guilt of nature, that is, original sin, nothing is required except a will in that nature, that is, in the head of that nature. Augustine teaches the same in *De duabus animabus*, c. 11, where he says: Nor can a deed rightly called my sin be justly imputed to anyone who did nothing by his own will. By these final words he openly declares that an act elicited by the sinner's own will is required for the nature of personal sin.

9. Secondly, if this doctrine of Jansenius were true, it would follow that movements of concupiscence preceding the consent of the will, and even repugnant to it, are truly and properly sins imputable to man, since the tinder of concupiscence, or the rebellion of the sensitive appetite, proceeds from original sin. But this is repugnant to the Council of Trent, sess. 5, c. 5, which says that *concupiscence cannot harm those who do not consent*, and to Augustine in *De civitate Dei* I, c. 25, where he says: *If that disobedience of concupiscence is without guilt in the body of one who sleeps, how much more is it without guilt in the body of one who does not consent.*

Thirdly, it would follow that merely negative unbelief is a sin, since it likewise proceeds from original sin. That this is false and erroneous is clear:

1^o from the bull of Pius V and Gregory XIII against Baius, in which this proposition is condemned: *Merely negative unbelief in those to whom Christ has not been preached is a sin*; 2^o from Augustine, epistle 105, where he says: *Ignorance itself is undoubtedly a sin in those who were unwilling to understand, but in those who were unable, it is a punishment of sin*; 3^o from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 1, where he expressly teaches that *if unbelief is taken according to pure negation, as in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it does not possess the nature of sin, but rather of punishment, because such ignorance followed from the sin of the first parent*.

10. Fourthly, from the same doctrine of Jansenius it would follow that whatever infants and the insane do is sinful, and that a man blind from birth acts culpably if, wishing, for example, to drive away a dog with his stick, he strikes a man whom he invincibly does not know to be present. For insanity, madness, bodily blindness, and the other miseries of the human race are effects and punishments of original sin, and flow from it as streams from a fountain, as Jansenius himself teaches in *De statu naturae purae* III, cc. 11, 14, and 15. Who does not see that this is utterly absurd?

Finally, our conclusion can be proved, and the opinion of Jansenius more strongly attacked, from another absurdity and inconvenience following from it. For if invincible ignorance never excused from sin, it would follow that one who, amid a conflict or concurrence of several probable opinions, chose not only a probable but the more probable and indeed the most probable opinion would sin if that opinion happened to be false and discordant with the eternal or natural law, because then, according to Jansenius, he would not be excused from sin by reason of invincible ignorance. But this appears not only utterly absurd, but also extremely harsh and wholly intolerable. From it would follow an incredible perplexity of conscience, and indeed a harsh and fatal necessity of sinning, whenever someone probably and in good faith judges that something must be done by him and cannot be omitted without sin, although it is illicit by natural law. For, according to the doctrine of Jansenius, he will sin by doing it, since according to him no invincible ignorance of natural law excuses from sin. He will also sin by not doing it, because he will act against conscience, which dictates to him that this must be done. Therefore he will sin whichever way he turns, whether he does it or does not do it; consequently, he will sin necessarily. We shall treat this more extensively in the treatise on laws, c. 3, § 4.

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§ 2.

Objections Are Solved.

11. You will object first with Jansenius: some deeds done from invincible ignorance are called sins in Sacred Scripture. Therefore invincible ignorance does not excuse from sin. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from various testimonies of Scripture. In Gen. 20, the action of King Abimelech, who took Sarah as his wife while invincibly ignorant that she was Abraham's wife, is called a sin. In Lev. 5, sacrifices are appointed to be offered for those who sinned through ignorance. Hence in Heb. 9 the Apostle says that once a year the high priest alone entered the tabernacle called the *Holy of Holies*, not without blood, which he offered *for his own and the people's ignorance*. Likewise, David numbers ignorances among his sins in Ps. 24, praying: *Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances*. Finally, in Luke 12 it is said that the servant *who did not know* the will of his lord *and did things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with few stripes*.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof I say that the action of King Abimelech in wishing ignorantly to take Abraham's wife in marriage is called a sin materially, because it was illicit from the nature of the thing, but not formally, because through defect of cognition and knowledge it was not culpable. Or, secondly, it can be said that the ignorance was vincible, as Henry of Ghent teaches in *Quodlibeta* XII, q. 25, in these words: *Abimelech would truly have sinned if he had known Sarah even after taking her as wife, because he did not sufficiently inquire whether she was Abraham's wife*. Hugh of Saint-Cher teaches the same in almost the same words on Gen. 20.

To the second and third proofs, I likewise say that in the old law sacrifices were appointed to be offered for those who had sinned through vincible and culpable ignorance. Hence the high priest entered once a year into the tabernacle called the *Holy of Holies* to offer blood for his own and the people's ignorances, which were in some manner voluntary and vincible. The Prophet also speaks of these when he says: *Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances*.

In the last passage the speech concerns a servant who was not wholly ignorant of his master's command, but failed to advert to it through negligence, or was ignorant of it through vincible and culpable ignorance, as the Master explains in II Sentences, dist. 22, and St. Thomas in the Catena

aurea on Luke 12, where he reports these words of Theophylact: Some object here: he who knows the will of the Lord and does not follow it is justly punished. But why is the ignorant man punished? Because, although he could have known, he was unwilling; through his sloth he himself was the cause of his ignorance.

12. You will object secondly: Augustine says in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 3: That ignorance which belongs not to those who are unwilling to know, but to those who are, as it were, simply ignorant, excuses no one in such a manner that he will not burn with everlasting fire if he did not believe because he did not hear at all what he should believe, but perhaps excuses him so that he burns more mildly. For it was not said without cause: Pour out Your wrath upon the nations that have not known You.

I answer that Augustine there speaks of vincible ignorance of the evangelical law, which he teaches does not excuse from the sin of unbelief. Thus the Master of the Sentences understands and interprets him in II Sentences, dist. 22, where he says: Ignorance is threefold. There is the ignorance of those who are unwilling to know although they can, which does not excuse, because it is itself a sin; and of those who are, as it were, simply ignorant, not resisting or proposing to know, which excuses no one fully, but perhaps so that he is punished less. Hence Augustine says to Valentinianus in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 3: Ignorance which belongs not to those who are unwilling to know, but to those who are, as it were, simply ignorant, excuses no one in such a manner that he will not burn with eternal fire, but perhaps so that he burns more mildly.

13. Several things confirm this interpretation. First, St. Augustine does not say that the ignorance belongs to those who *are simply ignorant*, but to those who are *as it were* simply ignorant. This expression *as it were* sufficiently indicates that the discussion does not concern wholly invincible ignorance. Secondly, he establishes that this ignorance excuses no one *in such a manner that he will not burn with everlasting fire, but perhaps so that he burns more mildly*. If he were speaking of invincible ignorance, he would not have added *perhaps*, for nothing is more certain than that one who sinned from invincible ignorance would at least be punished less than one who sinned from malice or from vincible and culpable ignorance. He inserted that word to indicate that he was speaking of vincible ignorance that was not affected but negligent. For the negligence from which it proceeds can sometimes be so slight that, if something evil happens to be done through it, the act can be excused to some degree and consequently punished less. Thirdly, this is confirmed by the example of the servant who did not know his lord's will, which Augustine gave before the words cited. For, as

Theophylact observed above: *The ignorant man is punished because, although he could have known, he was unwilling; through his sloth he himself was the cause of his ignorance.*

14. You will object thirdly: in the Council of Diospolis, with Pelagius present, certain chapters taken from a book of the heretic Caelestius were read, one of which was: *Forgetfulness and ignorance are not subject to sin, because they occur not according to nature, but according to necessity.* When the reading was finished, the sacred synod said: *What does the monk Pelagius, who is present, say to these chapters that have been read? For the holy synod and the holy Catholic Church of God reject them.* Thus Augustine reports in *De gestis Pelagii*, c. 19. Therefore, according to the mind of that synod, ignorance is subject to sin, or is a sin, not only when it occurs according to the will and is vincible and voluntary, but also when it occurs according to necessity and is involuntary and invincible.

I answer that when the Fathers of that synod taught that ignorance occurring according to necessity is subject to sin, or is sin, they meant only that such ignorance is called sin because it is materially sin or an effect of sin, just as concupiscence is called sin by the Apostle because it is materially sin and was inflicted as a punishment of sin, as the Council of Trent teaches from Augustine in sess. 5, can. 5. Hence St. Thomas says in *De malo*, q. 3, a. 7: Ignorance and the tinder are like the material elements in original sin, just as conversion toward a mutable good is in actual sin. That this interpretation is legitimate and accords with the mind of the Fathers of this Council is clear from the fact that, since the Pelagians denied that original sin is transmitted by generation from Adam to his descendants, they consequently denied that concupiscence and ignorance are derived from it, and said that they are natural defects and not punishments of sin, as Augustine testifies in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 11: The Pelagians say that ignorance and difficulty, that is, concupiscence and the difficulty in relation to morally honorable good that arises from it, without which no man is born, are beginnings of nature, not punishments. Therefore, in order wholly to exclude this error, the Fathers of the aforesaid synod said that ignorance is subject to sin, and indeed is sin, because it is materially sin and an effect of original sin, since it is inflicted as punishment for it. Hence Augustine says in *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 19: What someone does wrongly through ignorance, and what he cannot do rightly although willing, are called sins because they derive their origin from that sin of free will, namely Adam's sin. The preceding sin merited these consequences. For just as we call "tongue" not only the member we move in the mouth when we speak, but also that which follows upon the movement of this member, namely the formed tenor of words, according to which one

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language is called Greek and another Latin, so we call “sin” not only that which is properly called sin, for it is committed by free will and by one who knows, but also that which necessarily follows as a punishment of this sin.

§ 3.

No Sin Ever Occurs in the Will without a
Preceding Defect of the Intellect.

14. [bis] The fundamental reason is that the will is a blind power, determined by its nature to follow the guidance of the intellect. For its specifying object is true or apparent good proposed to it by the intellect. Hence, just as a blind man who was by nature determined to follow the guidance of another could not fail and wander from the road unless his guide failed and wandered, so the will cannot fail in the moral order unless some defect of error or inconsideration precedes in the intellect. Hence it is said in Prov. 22: *All who work iniquity go astray.*

This is confirmed. A certain imprudence is found in every sin. Hence sinners are called foolish and imprudent in Prov. 1, and Gregory says in *Moralia in Iob* XV, c. 23: *Every sinner was foolish in his fault.* Therefore, since it belongs to prudence to direct practical reason in relation to things to be done in man, just as art directs it in relation to things to be made, there must be in every sin some defect of practical reason, and consequently some practical error or at least some inconsideration.

I said *practical error* because it is not necessary that, whenever a man sins, some speculative error precede in his intellect. Otherwise every sinner would be a heretic, and as often as a man fell into sin, so often would he fall into heresy, which is absurd. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 20, a. 2: *He who commits fornication, by choosing fornication as a good for himself here and now, possesses a corrupt estimation in the particular, although he retains the universal true estimation according to faith, namely that fornication is a mortal sin.* If you ask in what that practical error found in every sin consists, I answer that it consists in the judgment by which the sinner practically judges that here and now some useful or pleasurable good is to be preferred to morally honorable good and the observance of the divine law. In such a judgment practical error is manifestly found, since right reason and prudence dictate the contrary.

I also said that a defect of error or inconsideration must precede in the sinner’s intellect, because if he sins by choosing something good in itself, but not with due order, he need not possess a practical error in the intellect;

some lack of advertence or inconsideration suffices, as occurred in the first sin of the angels. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 4: Mortal sin can occur in an act of free choice in two ways. In one way, from the fact that something evil is chosen, as a man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil in itself. Such a sin always proceeds from some ignorance or error; otherwise that which is evil would not be chosen as good. In another way, one can sin through free choice by choosing something good in itself, but not according to the due order, measure, or rule, as if someone chose to pray without attending to the order instituted by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but only the absence of consideration of things that ought to be considered. In this manner the angel sinned, by turning through free choice toward his own good without order to the rule of the divine will.

15. You will say: if, whenever a man sins, some defect of error or inconsideration preceded on the part of the intellect, there would be no sin from pure malice, but every sin would proceed from ignorance. But this must not be said, since the theologians commonly divide sins into three genera, namely sins from infirmity, from ignorance, and from pure malice. Therefore neither should the first assertion be admitted.

I answer by denying the consequence. Although in every sin some defect of error or inconsideration is found on the part of the intellect, a sin from infirmity or malice is nevertheless sufficiently distinguished from a sin from ignorance by the diverse evil disposition that is the cause of forming that erroneous judgment in the intellect and the evil choice in the will. In sins from ignorance, vincible and culpable ignorance is the cause of forming such a judgment and evil choice. In sins from infirmity or passion, vehement passion obscuring the intellect and drawing the will toward itself is the cause. In sins from pure malice, the cause is solely the disorder and malice of the will.

16. We would have to discuss here the external causes of sins. First, it would have to be explained how God is not the cause of sin, although He produces the whole act of sin as regards its entity and material element and, according to the Thomist position, predetermines the will toward it. Secondly, how the devil can be a cause of sin and induce others to sin. Thirdly, how one man, as a principle of generation, can transmit guilt together with nature and communicate it to his descendants through seminal propagation. But we treated the first extensively in the treatise on the will of God, c. 4, § 5, where we explained at length the harmony of divine holiness with the predetermining decree and physical predetermination toward the material element of sin. Concerning the second, there is almost

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no difficulty or controversy among the theologians. For it is certain that the devil is a cause of sin only indirectly and accidentally: 1^o in the manner of one proposing an evil object; 2^o in the manner of one persuading and enticing, when together with the presentation of the object he excites and moves the sensitive appetite through passions or the imagination, by which he renders the object very fitting and desirable and consequently draws the will toward sin. Nevertheless, he does not necessitate it, because no created and pleasurable good, however fittingly proposed to the will, can impose necessity upon it, since it cannot perfectly fulfill or fully satisfy the will, according to the saying of Bernard: *Whatever is less than God will not fill a soul capable of God.* Concerning the third, which pertains to original sin, we shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

Original Sin.

So difficult is it to comprehend the nature of original sin that Augustine himself, the eagle of the Doctors, whose most penetrating gaze pierced the more hidden mysteries of divine grace, seems to grow dim at the sight of this difficulty and to be so oppressed by its weight that, in *De moribus Ecclesiae*, c. 22, he admits himself unable to overcome it: *For nothing is better known in preaching than this ancient sin, and nothing is more hidden from understanding.* Nevertheless, following in his footsteps, we shall endeavor here to explain the existence, essence, subject, and causes of original sin.

§ 1.

The Existence of Original Sin is Defended Against the Pelagians.

1. The truth of the Catholic faith concerning the existence of original sin, which Pelagius and his disciples Celestius and Julian impiously denied in former times, seemed to Augustine of such importance that in *De peccato originali*, c. 24, he speaks as follows: *The Christian faith properly consists in the matter of two men, through one of whom we were sold under sin, and through the other are redeemed from sins.* And in *Contra Julianum* V, c. 2, he asserts that knowledge of original sin is so necessary that *those who deny it strive to overthrow the very foundations of the faith.*

Theologians endeavor to establish this fundamental truth of the Christian faith by many testimonies of Scripture, but the principal one is that of the Apostle in Rom. 5, which Augustine frequently employs against the Pelagians: *Through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death; and thus death passed into all men, in whom all sinned.* From these words the following argument may be drawn: through one man there entered into this world a certain sin that made all men sinners and subject to death. But such a sin cannot be actual sin, that is, sin committed by an actual act of the will, since infants also are subject to death and often die before they have done anything good or evil by their own will. Therefore, it is original sin.

2. The Pelagians tried to evade so clear and open a testimony of the Apostle by interpreting it as referring to the passage of Adam's sin to his descendants, not by origin, but by imitation. Augustine, however, blocks this escape in three ways in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*. First, because on that account we should rather be said to have sinned in the devil, for he sinned first and gave us an example of sinning. Second, because children are said to be stained with iniquities in their conception, before they can imitate Adam. Third, because the Apostle teaches that Adam's sin is derived to his descendants in the same way as Christ's justice is derived to the regenerated. But the latter redounds to men, not by imitation alone, but through a true regeneration in him. Therefore, Adam's sin does not pass to his descendants by imitation alone, but by origin and propagation.

3. Nor are theological reasons lacking for refuting the error of Pelagius. The first is taken from the universal redemption of Christ. For Christ is the Redeemer of all men, not only of adults, but also of infants, since he died not only for adults, but also for infants, according to the saying of Paul in 2 Cor. 5: *Christ died for all.* But redemption presupposes servitude to sin, just as medicine presupposes disease. Therefore, not only adults, but also infants, are bound by servitude to sin; not actual sin, as is evident; therefore original sin. The second reason is taken from the necessity of baptism, which was instituted as a remedy for sin and is administered to infants according to the universal custom of the Church. Therefore, sin is found in them; not actual sin, since before the use of reason they are incapable of it; therefore original sin. The third is taken from the necessity of dying and the innumerable calamities and miseries that men experience even from their cradles, according to Sir. 40: *A heavy yoke lies upon the children of Adam from the day they come forth from their mother's womb until the day of burial.* For those miseries and calamities are most certain indications of original sin, since a common punishment shows that a common fault preceded it. Hence Augustine says in *Contra secundam Juliani responsionem* I, p. 25: *In no way,*

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under the causality of one who is omnipotent and just, namely God, would so great a misery be inflicted upon human nature unless, in the two first human beings, the whole of nature had been driven by the death of sin from the happiness of paradise into this unhappiness. And on p. 26: Show that God is just, if one who does not derive original sin from Adam is born amid so evident a misery and unto so evident a misery. And on p. 27: That heavy yoke under which men are placed from their youth would not be imposed upon men by the most just God if there were no original sin. Likewise, on p. 283, he rises against Julian in these words: When you hear the Apostle speaking of that sin which is punished with justice, wake up and see that original sin is there also; for otherwise the justice of God would not impose a heavy yoke upon the very beginnings of infants, a yoke that Scripture mentions so often that, if it does not bend your neck, it will break it. Finally, in Contra Julianum V, he says that Tully, feeling the burden of this most grievous yoke, said that man was brought forth into life by nature not as by a mother, but as though by a stepmother, with a frail and weak body, and with a soul anxious in the face of troubles, abject in the face of fears, feeble in the face of labors, and prone to lusts. He saw the fact, adds the holy Doctor, but did not know the cause; for since he had not been instructed by the sacred writings, he was ignorant of original sin.

4. The Pelagians first objected to Augustine the following passage from Chrysostom's homily *Ad Neophytos*: *We baptize infants, although they are not stained with sin, so that holiness, adoption, and the brotherhood of Christ may be added to them.* Augustine answered in the places cited above that this must be understood of their own sin, contracted by a personal act, and not of another's and original sin. He adds that Chrysostom was not concerned to express this meaning, *because, when disputing in the Catholic Church, he did not think that he could be understood otherwise; he was assailed by no one on such a question and, while you, namely the Pelagians, had not yet begun your controversy, he spoke more freely.*

5. Second, Pelagius and Julian reasoned as follows, according to Augustine in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, c. 18, and *Contra Julianum* III, c. 24: The one who is born does not sin; the one who begets does not sin; the one who created him does not sin. Through what cracks, then, amid so many defenses, do you imagine that sin has entered? To this argument the holy Doctor replies elegantly and excellently in the same place: Why does he search for a hidden crack when he has a most open door? "Through one man," says the Apostle; "through the offense of one," says the Apostle; "through the disobedience of one," says the Apostle. What more does he seek? What could be clearer? What could be more insistently repeated?

Third, Julian argued as follows, according to Augustine at the beginning of *Contra Julianum* II and in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* III, c. 3: If all sins are remitted in baptism, those born of the regenerated cannot derive original sin, for parents cannot transmit to their children what they do not possess.

The holy Doctor answers this argument in Sermon 14, *De verbis Apostoli*, in these words: You wonder why a sinner is born from the seed of a just man; are you not also pleased to wonder why a wild olive grows from the seed of an olive tree? Take another comparison. Do you not observe that from a purified grain wheat is born together with chaff, although it was sown without chaff? Therefore, one who is born of a baptized man is not born just, because he does not beget him from that in respect of which he was regenerated, but from that in respect of which he was generated.

6. Fourth, he reasoned as follows: God is the cause of bodies, sexes, and their union. Therefore, sin does not follow from the generation of offspring, since otherwise it would be attributed to God. Augustine answers him in *Contra Julianum* III, c. 9: If I were to say of the offspring of adulterers that a good fruit could not come from so many evils, namely wantonness, baseness, and crime, you would rightly answer me that the man born of adulterers is not the fruit of wantonness, baseness, and crime, of which evils the devil is the author, but of bodies, sexes, and their union, of which goods God is the author. In the same way I most rightly say to you that the evil with which a man is born is not the fruit of bodies, sexes, and their union, of which goods God is the author, but of the first transgression, of which the devil is the author.

The Pelagians objected fifth: sin has its seat not in the flesh, but in the soul. But the soul is not propagated from Adam through generation, but is created by God. Therefore, neither is original sin derived from Adam.

Because of this argument, Augustine in various places inclines toward the opinion that souls are produced by propagation, that is, that they are propagated from Adam's soul, because according to that opinion the transmission of original sin from Adam can be more easily understood. But since this opinion has now been almost entirely eliminated from the schools of theologians, while the other opinion, which asserts that individual souls are created each day and infused into newly generated bodies, has been commonly received, it must be said according to the latter opinion that the soul is corrupted in the body as though in a tainted vessel. Thus, if a flower is planted in a foul place, however beautiful and elegant it may be by nature, it contracts from that place a certain defect and stain. And just as the soul, if it were united to a wounded body or one surrounded and consumed by flames,

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would immediately suffer pain, so, when it is infused into a body in which there is a certain seed of sin, because that body was propagated from Adam and is a part of a man descended from Adam, in whom nature was corrupted as in its head, root, and source, the soul is infected with sin. For the descendants of Adam, as Augustine says in Sermon 36, *De verbis Apostoli, have as yet committed no evil in the branch, but they perished in the root.... They have no evil except what they derived from the source.* We shall treat this more fully below, in § 3, where we shall explain at greater length how Adam's sin is transmitted through generation to his descendants.

§ 2.

Another Difficult Argument is Solved, and It is
Explained How Original Sin is Voluntary.

7. This argument may be briefly proposed as follows: every sin is voluntary, as is evident from Augustine in *De libero arbitrio*, where he asserts that sin is voluntary to such a degree that, if it were not voluntary, it would not be sin. But original sin cannot be voluntary in infants. Therefore, neither can it be sin. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved first because the voluntary is that which proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge. But original sin in infants does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, but from an extrinsic one, namely Adam; indeed, it is present without any knowledge, since they lack the use of reason. Therefore, it is not voluntary in them. Second, the free voluntary, of which we are speaking here, must be in the power of the will of the person to whom it is said to be voluntary, so that it may or may not be. But original sin is not in the power of infants, so that it may or may not be. Therefore, it is not voluntary or free in them. Third, if what is done by the will of another is voluntary in me, it is necessary that I have entrusted my will and my agency to him. But Adam's descendants did not transfer their own wills to him with respect to the preservation or loss of original justice, since they did not exist when Adam was created. Therefore, the privation of original justice, in which original sin consists, is not voluntary in them.

8. Some, overwhelmed and defeated by the difficulty of this argument, once said that original sin is not truly and properly sin, since it is not truly and properly voluntary. But this opinion is manifestly opposed to Scripture, which calls original sin simply sin and asserts that men are constituted sinners through it, as is evident in John 1: *Behold the Lamb of God; behold him who takes away the sin of the world.* And in Rom. 5: *Through one man sin entered*

into this world. And shortly afterward: *As through the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners.* It is also opposed to the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, which pronounces anathema upon anyone who asserts that baptism does not remove *all that has the true and proper nature of sin.* Nor is it an obstacle that Augustine says in *De civitate Dei* XVI, c. 27, that infants are born sinners, not properly, but originally, and in *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 19, suggests that original sin is not properly sin. For by proper sin he understands sin committed by one's own will and personal sin, which alone is blameworthy and capable of being revoked by repentance. Hence the same holy Doctor, in *Retractationes* I, c. 13, when explaining what he had once said, namely that the voluntary is required for sin and that something is in no way sin unless it is voluntary, says that this is true also of original sin. For this to be perceived more clearly, two points must first be briefly set down.

9. The first is that something can be called voluntary in relation to another in two ways: physically, namely in relation to that person's own will; and morally, in relation to the will of another in whom his own will is morally contained. Thus, the will of a curator or guardian is morally reckoned as the will of the ward or minor, as is evident from law *Cum plures*, § *Quae bona fide*, Digest, *De administratione et periculo tutorum*. Likewise, the wills of children below the age of puberty are judged in law to be morally contained in the will of the father, to such a degree that he can make a testament for them, not only concerning goods that they receive from the testator himself, but concerning all that they may acquire from elsewhere: law *Sed si plures*, § *Ad substitutos*, Digest, *De vulgari et pupillari substitutione*.

10. The second is that there are three kinds of sin, namely actual sin, personal habitual sin, and original habitual sin, which are voluntary neither in the same manner nor in a wholly diverse manner. Actual sin requires that it proceed actually from the will. Personal habitual sin does not require an actual influence of the will, but it is sufficient that at some time it proceeded from the will through a proper and personal act and that this act was not sufficiently revoked. Original sin, however, since it is not committed by one's own will, does not require that it be voluntary in infants in such a way that it proceeded from them by an act of their own will. It is sufficient that it belong to them by reason of the act of another's will, namely the will of the head, which is nevertheless in some manner reckoned as their will. Hence:

11. To the argument proposed at the beginning, I answer by denying the minor premise. To its first proof I say that original sin, in the manner in which it is voluntary, proceeds from an intrinsic principle with knowledge. Since it is not voluntary in us physically and through an act of our own will, but only morally, through an order to the will of Adam, it is not necessary

that it proceed from our own intrinsic principle and our own knowledge. It is sufficient that it proceed from Adam's intrinsic principle, which is also in a certain manner intrinsic to us, because Adam is the principle of human nature and our head, not only naturally, but also morally.

To the second proof, it must be said that the personally voluntary must be in the power of the proper will of the person to whom it is said to be voluntary, but the capitally voluntary need only be in the power of the will of the head, which morally contains the will of the members. Therefore, since original sin is not voluntary in infants by the will of the person, but only by the will of the head of human nature, it is not required that it be in their power to possess or not possess this defect. It is sufficient that it was in Adam's power to sin or not to sin. This is the solution of St. Thomas in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, where he says: *Since original sin is not a vice of the person precisely as a person, but belongs to the person as it were accidentally, insofar as the person possesses such a nature, it is not necessary that it be in the power of such a person to possess or not possess this defect. It is sufficient that it be in the power of someone who is the head in that nature.*

To the third proof, it must be said that for original sin to be voluntary in men by the will of the head, it is not required that they themselves transferred their will and consent to Adam regarding the preservation or loss of original justice. It is sufficient that God, in constituting him our natural and moral head, placed the wills of us all in him. For since God is the supreme lord and governor of all that belongs to us and has our wills more in his power than we ourselves do, he could by his own right and without our consent establish that Adam's will would be our will regarding the preservation or loss of original justice. This was so, not insofar as we are individual persons, but insofar as we are parts and members of the whole multitude of men receiving human nature from the first parent. For if in human and civil matters a prince and legislator can transfer the wills of many into the will of one man, so that whatever is done by him is reckoned as having been done and approved by them also, as is evident in wards and minors, whose wills, by command of the prince and disposition of the laws, are transferred into the will of a curator or guardian without even awaiting their consent, how much more is the same power found in God, the supreme Prince and legislator, who possesses a greater and more excellent dominion over our wills than any human power and than we ourselves.

12. From what has been said, it is gathered that some decree must be admitted in God by which he established that Adam's will was to be regarded as the will of his descendants with respect to the preservation or loss of

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original justice. For in order that original sin be voluntary in us by Adam's will, it is not sufficient that he be a natural head; it is also required that he be a moral head. For this the aforesaid decree was necessary, because Adam did not possess moral headship by the law of nature itself, but by divine institution, which includes such a decree. It was also necessary on Adam's part that this decree be manifested to him. Otherwise, he would have been invincibly ignorant that he was acting as the moral head of all men and consequently could not have sinned as the head of nature, but only as a particular person. From this you will infer that there was a covenant between God and Adam, such that, if he obeyed, he would not only possess original justice himself, but it would pass from him to all his descendants; but if he sinned, he would lose that justice for himself and for all his posterity. For that divine ordinance concerning whether original justice would or would not be transmitted, under the condition of fulfilling the divine command, when known and accepted by Adam, has the nature of a covenant. Hence it is called by that name in Scripture, as is evident from Hos. 6: *They, like Adam, transgressed the covenant; there they all acted treacherously*. Jerome, Cyril, Prosper, and others understand these words of the aforesaid covenant that we transgressed with Adam in paradise. This is also indicated by the words *there they all acted treacherously*, namely in paradise, where Adam transgressed. Augustine mentions this marvelous covenant of God with Adam in *De civitate Dei* XVI, c. 29, where, explaining Gen. 17, *That soul shall be cut off*, namely the one whose flesh had not been circumcised, *because he has made my covenant void*, he says: *All men in that one man dissolved the covenant of God, in whom all sinned*.

§ 3.

How is Original Sin Transmitted Through
Generation to Adam's Descendants?

13. It is certain that original sin is transmitted from Adam to his descendants through generation and seminal propagation, as the Council of Trent indicates, sess. 6, c. 3, in these words: Unless men were born propagated from the seed of Adam, they would not be born unjust, since through that propagation they contract through him, when they are conceived, an injustice proper to themselves. St. Thomas also teaches this here, q. 81, a. 1, ad 2, where he says: Through the power of the seed, human nature is transmitted from the parent to the offspring, and together with nature the infection of nature. For the one who is born becomes a sharer in the guilt of

the first parent from the fact that he receives his nature from him through a certain generative motion. The most serious difficulty, however, is how original sin can be transmitted from Adam to his descendants through the mediation of seed, which is a corporeal substance, and how the production of grace or original justice can thereby be impeded.

14. Certain ancient authors, in order to escape this difficulty, said that in human seed there is some diseased quality permanently existing in it and virtually containing and causing original sin, just as in the seed of a leper there is a certain corruption that is the principle and cause of leprosy. Thus Gregory, Richard, Henry, Almain, and others, who assert that such a quality was derived, not from Adam's sin, but from the serpent's poisonous hissing. But this opinion, or rather delirium, is commonly rejected by theologians, both because such a quality seems entirely fictitious, and because, even granting that the serpent's poisonous hissing could have caused it, it would have produced it only in Eve, with whom the serpent conversed, and not in Adam, with whom it did not speak. And granting that it had caused such a quality in Adam, from what, I ask, could it have obtained such strong and firm roots that it should remain stable throughout the course of so many years, unless God preserved it by a special concurrence? But it seems impious to attribute this to divine providence. Therefore, in order to explain the true opinion:

15. It must be observed, with Ferrariensis on *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 50, and many other Thomists, that because original justice was given to Adam not for himself alone, but under a covenant by which, if he remained in innocence, he would propagate it together with nature, by the very act of generation, to all his descendants who would descend from him by seminal propagation, there was consequently in his seed an instrumental power productive of original justice. This power was removed from him through Adam's first sin, as St. Thomas teaches in *De malo*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 9, whose words we shall cite below. Hence, just as in the state of innocence a twofold character would have to be considered in Adam's seed, one natural and as it were proper, according to which it would be the instrument of the generator in communicating nature in itself, and another supernatural or divinely superadded, according to which it would function as God's instrument in propagating original justice together with nature, so after sin there is found in that same seed of Adam and of his descendants a twofold character or office. One is natural, insofar as it functions as the instrument of generation and of the propagation of nature, for this character or perfection, like other natural things, was not lost through sin. The other is accidental and extrinsic, insofar as it is the instrument of Adam as sinner for

communicating the defect of original justice, in which, as we shall say below, original sin consists. The first belongs to it by reason of its natural and positive perfection. The second belongs to it through the privation of the aforesaid vigor productive of original justice, caused by the sin of the first parent himself. This doctrine is taken from St. Thomas in the cited question of *De malo*, where he writes: *Through the sin of the first parent, his flesh was deprived of that power by which seed could be drawn from it through which original justice would be propagated to others. Thus the defect of this power in the seed is a defect of moral corruption and a certain intention of that corruption, just as we say that the intentions of color are in the air and that the intention of the soul is in the seed. From this there is also in it a power for a like imperfection, just as there is in it a power for the production of human nature in the offspring to be generated.* In these words the holy Doctor teaches three things. The first is that in the state of innocence there was in human seed an instrumental power productive of original justice, of which the seed was deprived and stripped as a punishment for the sin of the first parent. The second is that in the state of corrupted nature, the seed, as deprived of such a power, is the instrument through which Adam transmits original sin to his descendants. The third is that the privation of the power productive of nature together with original justice is the corruption and infection of the seed and is, as it were, a certain intentional power productive of original sin, which consists in the privation of original justice. Hence, according to this doctrine of St. Thomas, it may probably be said that human seed, as originating primordially from Adam and as lacking the aforesaid vigor or instrumental power productive of original justice, is in some manner the physical instrumental cause of original sin, as the Salmanticenses teach here, disp. 14, dub. 3, § 3. For defective seed, by reason of such a privation, contains original sin in the proportional manner in which, by reason of its natural power, it contains human nature, and in which, by reason of the aforesaid vigor, it would virtually contain original justice. For since original sin is something privative and consists in the privation of original justice, as we shall say in § 5, a privative force, so to speak, suffices for producing it. For if the positive power of a cause contains the positive perfection of the effect, there is no reason why the privation of the cause's power should not contain the privative defect found in the effect, since where affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation is the cause of negation.

16. Nor is this instrumental causality and virtual containment of original sin prevented by the fact that seed is something corporeal and material. For although such a sin cannot exist in a material and corporeal thing as in a subject or as in a principal efficient cause, it can nevertheless exist there

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virtually, as in an instrumental cause, in the manner in which original justice itself was contained in Adam's seed before sin. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 81, a. 1, ad 1: Although guilt is not actually in the seed, it is nevertheless there virtually through human nature, which is accompanied by such guilt. And in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4: Although the seed does not possess the infection of guilt actually in itself, it nevertheless possesses it virtually. This is evident also from the fact that a leprous son is generated from the seed of a leper, although leprosy is not actually in the seed itself. For there is in the seed a certain defective power, through whose defect the defect of leprosy occurs in the offspring. Similarly, from the very fact that there is in the seed such a disposition as lacks the impassibility and ordination to the soul that the human body possessed in the first state, it follows that original sin is made actual in the offspring, which is capable of receiving original sin.

§ 4.

Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine.

17. Given the existence and transmission of original sin, several doubts arise that may easily be resolved from what has been said. First, therefore, it is gathered from what has been said that no other sin of the first parent except the first is derived to his descendants by origin. For only that sin of Adam is derived to his descendants which was capital. But only his first sin was capital, because only that sin corrupted nature and stripped it of original justice; Adam's other sins presupposed it already destroyed. Therefore, only Adam's first sin is derived to his descendants. This is what St. Thomas means here, a. 2, when he says that only Adam's first sin, and not his later sins, is transmitted to his descendants, because the first was a *sin of nature*, whereas the other sins were purely *personal*. That is, in the first sin Adam acted in the place of the whole of nature and was, as it were, the representative of the entire human race, whereas in the other sins he acted only in his own place and attended to his private affairs. From this it follows that the sin of Adam transmitted to his descendants was the transgression of the command in Gen. 2: *You shall not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil*, because that sin was the first by which he violated the divine command, for whose transgression God threatened death and the privation of original justice to be transmitted to all his descendants. But whether, if Adam had not violated that command and had first fallen into another sin, that sin would likewise have been transmitted to his descendants, is doubtful and

highly uncertain among theologians, some affirming it and others denying it. Nevertheless, the affirmative opinion seems preferable because of the authority of St. Thomas, who teaches it most openly in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 33, at the end of the exposition of the text, ad 2, and in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 3, ad 2, and in many other places. Reason also supports it. For the sin of transgressing the command not to eat of the forbidden tree was transmitted to Adam's descendants because through it he lost original justice. But he would have lost it through any other mortal sin, had that been the first, for original justice, as including sanctifying grace itself, was incompatible with any mortal sin. Therefore, any mortal sin committed by Adam, had it been his first, would have been transmitted to his descendants and consequently would have been the cause of original sin.

Nor is it valid to say that through any mortal sin, had it been the first, Adam would indeed have lost original justice for himself, but not for his descendants. For by the very fact that Adam would have lost original justice through the first sin, he would also have lost the vigor for communicating it to his descendants, because, as we showed above, such vigor flowed as it were from original justice itself and was annexed to it. Therefore, he would have lost original justice through the first sin not only for himself, but also for his descendants. The consequence is manifest, for to lose original justice for one's descendants is to lose the power to communicate it to them.

18. Second, it is gathered that if Adam had not sinned, but Cain had sinned, Cain's children would not have contracted original sin, because that sin would not have been capital, but personal, since Adam alone was constituted by God as the head of his posterity.

19. Third, it is gathered that if Adam had not sinned, although Eve had sinned, their descendants would not have contracted original sin, because Eve was not constituted the head of the human race as Adam was.

20. Fourth, it is gathered that if Adam had begotten children before his sin and afterward had sinned, those children generated in innocence would not have contracted original sin. For only those contract original sin who, by reason of seminal power, were contained in Adam when he actually sinned.

21. Fifth, it is gathered that if someone were miraculously formed from human flesh, as Eve was from Adam's rib, he would not contract original sin, because he would not descend from Adam by seminal propagation. Hence Adam would not be his natural head, nor consequently his moral head, since according to the order of things in fact established by God, Adam is the moral head only of those whose natural head he is.

§ 5.

Original Sin Formally and Essentially Consists in the Privation of Original Justice with Respect to Its First Effect, Insofar as that Privation is Voluntary in Us by Adam's Will.

22. Thus St. Anselm teaches in *De conceptu virginali*, c. 26, where he says: *I can understand original sin in infants through Adam's disobedience to be nothing other than nakedness of justice.* St. Thomas also teaches this in various places. For here, q. 82, a. 3, he says that *the privation of original justice, through which the will was subject to God, is the formal element in original sin.* He then concludes: *Original sin is materially concupiscence, but formally the defect of original justice.* He has similar statements in *De malo*, q. 3, a. 7, saying: *In original sin there is something formal, namely the lack of original justice.* He repeats this in q. 4, a. 2, in the body and ad 10, and in many other places that I omit for the sake of brevity.

Many reasons also commend this. The first is that original sin formally and essentially consists in that which is of itself and primarily removed by baptism, since this sacrament was instituted to destroy original guilt. But by baptism the privation of original justice is of itself and primarily removed with respect to its primary effect, since through baptism habitual grace is of itself and primarily conferred, joining the mind to God. Therefore, original sin formally consists in the privation of original justice insofar as that privation removes its primary effect, common to such justice and sanctifying grace, which is to rectify the soul and unite it to God as its last end.

The second reason is that in each thing that has the character of a constitutive principle from which, as from a root and source, the other things belonging to it flow and follow. But from the privation of original justice with respect to its first effect, namely the union of the mind with God, flow the other disorders transmitted to us through generation from Adam's sin, namely the tinder or concupiscence, the rebellion of the lower appetite against the higher, corporeal penalties such as illnesses, pains, bodily fatigue, the necessity of dying, and the other miseries that we experience daily and that are usually called wounds of nature. For since original justice, by subjecting the mind to God, was as it were a golden bridle by which the lower powers were restrained, once it was removed, the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason and of the body to the soul

necessarily perished. Therefore, the privation of original justice with respect to its first effect is the constitutive principle of original sin.

The third reason is that original sin does not formally consist in something positive, as will be evident from what is said below. Therefore, it must consist in a privation. But this can be no other than the privation of original justice with respect to its primary effect. Therefore, it formally consists in such a privation. The minor premise is proved first: original sin must consist in the privation of that form through whose introduction it can be formally expelled. But no form other than original justice can formally expel original guilt. Therefore, original sin cannot consist in the privation of any other form. The same minor is proved second: since original sin is a sin of nature, it must consist in that privation which more primarily and immediately affects nature itself. But this is the privation of original justice according to its primary effect. For just as this effect, namely the union of man with God, was immediately in the essence of the soul, which is man's proper nature, so its privation immediately and primarily affects the same nature. Therefore, this privation will be the proper and formal principle constitutive of such sin, whereas the remaining defects that are in the will and the other powers belong to it secondarily and consequently, just as the powers themselves belong to nature.

23. You will say, with Curiel, that from Adam's sin there is derived to his descendants the habitual privation of conformity to the law that he transgressed, and that this privation seems more apt than all others to constitute original sin. For since opposition and contrariety to law belong to the nature of sin, every sin must be constituted through aversion from the law, in such a way that, if it is actual sin, it is constituted through actual aversion, which is the privation of conformity in the act itself; but if it is habitual sin, as original sin is, it is constituted through habitual aversion, which is the privation of habitual conformity that ought to be possessed by the suppositum.

But against this: just as in us habitual conformity to the law is not some form or habit distinct from grace and the virtues, which remain in the one who fulfills the law and through which he is habitually disposed and prepared in mind to observe it, so also in Adam, had he observed the law, habitual conformity to it would not have been another form or habit than original justice itself and the perfections and virtues included in it, through which he would have been habitually disposed to the observance of the law. Therefore, the habitual privation of conformity to the law, whether in Adam or in his descendants, can be nothing other than the privation of original justice.

24. A fourth reason may be proposed briefly as follows: the defect of original justice in infants has the true nature of sin. Therefore, since it cannot be personal sin, we must admit that it is original sin. The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. Such a defect is not a mere negation, but a privation of justice that ought to inhere, since Adam received it not for himself alone, but to be transmitted to his descendants by the will and covenant of God, if he had persevered in the observance of the law. That defect is also unfitting to rational nature, since it removes from it a good that is fitting and consonant to it. Finally, such a defect is voluntary by the will of the first parent, in whom all our wills were contained as in their head. Therefore, it has all that is required for the nature of sin.

25. You will object first: if original sin consisted in the privation of original justice, it would not be removed by baptism, since original justice is not restored to us through baptism. But this cannot be said, since this sacrament was instituted to remove original sin. Therefore, original sin does not consist in that privation.

I answer with St. Thomas in *De malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2, that original justice is restored in baptism insofar as the higher part of the soul is united to God, through the privation of which there was the guilt of fault, but not insofar as the lower powers are subjected to reason, for from this defect arises the concupiscence that remains after baptism.

26. You will object second: the privation of original justice is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, the essence of original guilt cannot consist in it. The antecedent is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, q. 85, a. 5, where he says: *The removal of original justice has the nature of punishment, just as the removal of grace does.* Reason also commends this, for nothing is more common or more frequently repeated than that original justice was taken away from Adam and his descendants as a punishment for sin. The consequence is proved as follows: punishment presupposes fault in the subject, since punishment is inflicted because the subject is worthy of it by reason of fault. Therefore, if the privation of original justice is the punishment of original sin, it cannot formally be original guilt itself or the formal constitutive principle of it.

I answer that the privation of original justice with respect to its primary effect, which is to subject the mind to God as its last end, is not a punishment of original sin, but rather its formal constitutive principle. With respect to its secondary effects, however, which are the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower appetite to the higher, it is a punishment of original sin. For from the privation of these effects of original justice arise in

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man concupiscence, the tinder of sin, the necessity of dying, and the other penalties of this life, which are punishments and effects of original sin.

27. You will object third: our original sin must be of the same nature and species as Adam's sin, for at least the same sin in species that he committed is transmitted to us. But Adam's sin consisted not in a privation, but in something positive, for it was a sin of commission against the negative command not to eat of the forbidden tree, and a sin of commission, as we shall say below, consists in something positive. Therefore, our original sin consists not in the privation of original justice, but in something positive.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Our original sin must be of the same species as Adam's habitual sin: I grant this. As his actual sin: I deny it. I distinguish the minor premise in the same way. Adam's sin consisted in something positive: his actual sin, I grant the minor premise; his habitual sin, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. Therefore, there was in Adam a twofold sin. One was actual, from which Adam was called one who was sinning, and we, insofar as we were in him as members in their head, are said to have sinned in him. The other was habitual, which was the terminus of such an act and denominated Adam a sinner. The first was positive, like other actual sins of commission. The second was formally nothing but the privation of grace or original justice, as will be evident from what is said in the following chapter, where we shall show that habitual sin consists in the privation of sanctifying grace. Therefore, since the original sin transmitted to us is not actual, but habitual, and since we are not called persons sinning because of it, but sinners, it must be equated and assimilated rather to Adam's habitual sin, which consists in a privation, than to his actual sin, which formally implies something positive.

§ 6.

Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine.

28. From what has been said it is gathered first that the essence of original sin does not formally consist in concupiscence or the tinder inclining to sin, as Luther and Calvin teach. For through baptism everything in us that has the true and proper nature of sin is removed, as is defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, and as is evident from the words of the Apostle in Rom. 8: *There is no condemnation in those who have been reborn in Christ Jesus*. But concupiscence is not removed through baptism, but is left in the regenerated for combat, as the holy Synod teaches in the same place. Therefore, the essence of original sin cannot formally consist in

concupiscence. Hence, when the Apostle calls it sin in Rom. 7, this must be understood causally, not formally, namely because it is from sin and inclines to sin, as the same Council teaches in the cited place, following Augustine in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I, c. 23, where he says that concupiscence is called sin because it was made by sin, just as the speech made by the tongue is called the tongue and the writing made by the hand is called the hand, and just as cold is called sluggish, not because it is produced by the sluggish, but because it makes men sluggish.

29. Second, it is gathered that the opinion of Pighius and Catharinus is erroneous. They acknowledge nothing intrinsic in infants in which the essence of original sin consists, and therefore place it in Adam's actual sin insofar as it extrinsically denominates infants sinners. From this they gather that original sin is not numerically multiple, but numerically one in all infants. For the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 3, teaches that original sin is transmitted by propagation from Adam to his descendants, inheres in all, and is proper to each. And in sess. 6, c. 3, it says that men *when they are conceived contract an injustice proper to themselves*. But the sin that was in Adam has none of these characteristics. It neither inheres in his descendants nor affects them intrinsically, but only extrinsically and morally; nor is it the proper sin of each person, but one sin common to all; nor is it something transmitted through generation as through a cause. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, something distinct from Adam's sin must be admitted in which the essence of original sin consists.

This is confirmed: the same Council in the same place compares the sin and injustice that we receive from Adam through generation with the justice and holiness that we receive from Christ the Lord through the regeneration of baptism. But the latter is intrinsic to us, for each justified person possesses his own holiness, distinct from the holiness of Christ himself. Therefore, likewise, in each of those propagated from Adam there must be his own proper injustice and intrinsic sin, distinct from Adam's own sin. Nor is the saying of the Apostle in Rom. 5 an obstacle: *Through the disobedience of one many were constituted sinners*. For this must be understood causally, not formally, as is evident from the following words: *So also through the obedience of one many shall be constituted just*. For we are not formally constituted just through Christ's obedience, but only efficiently, insofar as Christ's obedience is the meritorious cause of our justification.

30. Third, it is gathered against Durandus, Rossensis, and others that the essence of original sin does not consist in liability to punishment. For the obligation to punishment or worthiness of punishment is something consequent upon fault, and is not fault itself, just as the worthiness of merit

is not the moral goodness itself of a good and honorable act, but something consequent upon it. Hence, when Augustine in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I, cc. 25 and 26, seems to place the essence of original sin in liability to punishment, he does not take liability formally for the obligation to punishment, but radically and fundamentally, for the root and foundation of such an obligation, namely for guilt itself, the stain itself, and habitual sin itself, by which the soul remains corrupted, defiled, and guilty, not merely of punishment, but of sin. This is evident from c. 16 of the same book, where, after saying that the liability of the concupiscence that remains has been removed, he adds: *For this is not to possess sin: not to be guilty of sin.* The same is evident from the example that he uses there to prove that the liability of concupiscence is removed. For he says: *If someone, for example, has committed adultery, even if he never commits it again afterward, he is guilty of adultery until its guilt is remitted by pardon.* Here it is manifest that he is speaking not of liability to punishment, but of liability to guilt. The same is most evident from *Retractationes*, c. 15, where he says: *As though the sin that we say they derive originally from Adam, that is, their being entangled in its guilt and therefore held liable to punishment, could never have existed except in the will by which it was committed when the divine command was transgressed.* Here liability to guilt is most clearly distinguished from liability to punishment, so that the former is the cause of the latter, as is evident from the words: *entangled in the guilt of sin and therefore liable to punishment.*

31. Fourth, it is gathered that original sin does not formally consist in a habit inclining the soul toward mutable good as its last end, as some of our Thomists teach.

This is proved first from St. Thomas, who acknowledges nothing else in original sin than concupiscence as the material element and the privation of original justice as the formal element. For he says here, q. 81, a. 3: *Original sin is materially concupiscence, but formally the defect of original justice.* Therefore, he judges that original sin does not formally consist in a habit inclining the soul toward mutable good. Hence in *De malo*, q. 5, a. 2, he says that *in original sin there is no conversion, but only aversion, or something corresponding to aversion, namely the destitution of the soul from original justice.* For this reason the pain of sense is not due to original sin, *but only the pain of loss, namely the lack of the divine vision.* In these words he suggests the following argument against the aforesaid opinion: if original sin consisted in a habitual conversion to a creature as the last end, the pain of sense would be due to infants for original guilt. The consequent is false, as we shall show in the following section. Therefore, the antecedent is also false. The consequence is proved because the pain of sense is due to sin by reason of conversion to a

creature, as St. Thomas teaches throughout and as will be evident from what is said below. Therefore, if in infants there is by reason of original sin a positive conversion to a creature as the last end, the pain of sense will be due to them by reason of that same sin.

32. This is proved second: Adam's sin does not now exist. Therefore, it cannot cause a habit inclining toward mutable good. Nor is it valid to say that although it does not exist formally in itself, it nevertheless exists virtually in corrupted seed, which is the instrument for producing such a habit. For nothing physical can be produced in the seed by Adam's sin through which it would be constituted an instrument for producing that habit. Such a thing would have to be either a diseased quality permanently inhering in the seed, or a fluid and rapidly passing quality, or an intentional motion subordinating the seed to Adam's sin as its principal cause. But neither can be maintained, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section. Therefore, the seed cannot concur as a physical instrument in the production of that habit inclining toward mutable good.

33. You will say that it follows from this reason that, even according to our opinion placing original sin in the privation of original justice, the seed cannot concur by way of a physical instrument in its production, whereas we taught the contrary in the preceding section. But the consequence is denied. For according to the opinion placing original sin in the privation of original justice, the superaddition of some positive power in the seed is not required for producing it, as is necessary according to the opinion placing it in a habit inclining toward mutable good. A certain privative force is sufficient, namely the defect of that vigor for communicating original justice which the seed possessed in the state of innocence, as we explained in the same place.

34. This is proved third: we must reason in the same manner concerning original habitual sin as concerning personal habitual sin, since the nature of each is the same, and no more is required to constitute original sin, which results from Adam's personal sin, than to constitute personal habitual sin, which is caused by the actual sin of other men who sin. But personal habitual sin does not consist in a habit inclining the will toward mutable good as its last end, but in the privation of sanctifying grace, insofar as that privation is voluntary by the proper will of the one who sins, as we shall show in the following chapter. Therefore, original habitual sin likewise does not formally consist in such a habit, but in the privation of original justice, insofar as this privation is voluntary by the will of the head. The arguments to the contrary will be proposed and solved in the following chapter.

35. Fifth, it is gathered that the soul is the immediate subject of original sin. For the subject of a privation is the same as the subject of the form of

which it deprives. For example, blindness is in the eye, in which the power of sight is subjected. But the soul is the immediate subject of the form of which original sin deprives, namely original justice, which, since it was not distinct from sanctifying grace, as we showed when treating the state of innocence, resided immediately in the essence of the soul, as sanctifying grace itself does. Therefore, the soul is the immediate subject of original sin.

36. You will say: the soul is not capable of guilt except through the mediation of the will. Therefore, original guilt is not received immediately in the essence of the soul. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved: sin is essentially voluntary. But everything voluntary belongs to the soul by reason of the will. Therefore, the soul is not capable of guilt except through the mediation of the will.

I answer by denying the antecedent when speaking of habitual guilt. To its proof I say that habitual sin is voluntary by way of a terminus, not by way of an act. Although the voluntary, even by way of a terminus, must belong to the soul through the mediation of the will as an efficient cause, it is nevertheless not necessary that it belong to the soul through the mediation of the will as a subject. Hence original guilt can be received immediately in the soul as in its subject.

§ 7.

Infants Who Die with Original Sin Will Indeed Lack the Beatific Vision, but
Will Suffer No Pain of Sense and No Sadness from the Pain of
Loss; Yet They Will Not Be Blessed with Natural Beatitude.

37. The first part is certain by faith, as is evident from John 3: Unless one is reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

The second part, which is against Gregory of Rimini, Driedo, and the Friar Minor Florentinus Conrius, is proved first from Innocent III, c. *Majores*, X, *De baptismo et ejus effectu*, where he says that *the punishment of original sin is the lack of the vision of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torment of perpetual Gehenna*. The first part seems altogether to be understood of the lack of the vision of God with the exclusion of the torment of Gehenna; otherwise, the same punishments would correspond to original sin as to actual sin. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

It is proved second from the holy Fathers. Nazianzen, in his oration on holy baptism, speaking of infants who die in original sin, expressly says that *they will neither be adorned with heavenly glory nor afflicted with punishments by*

the just Judge. Ambrose, in *De Abraham*, final chapter, asserts that they will possess *immunity from punishment, but not the honor of the heavenly kingdom.* Gregory of Nyssa, in his oration on infants taken away by an untimely death, says that *they will be neither in pain nor in sadness.* Finally, Augustine in *Contra Julianum* V, c. 8, otherwise c. 11, says: *Who would doubt that unbaptized infants will be in the mildest condemnation of all? Although I cannot define its kind and degree, I nevertheless dare not say that it would have been better for them not to exist than to exist there.* By these words he first teaches that they will be in the mildest condemnation of all. This would not be true if they suffered any pain of sense, for their condemnation would undoubtedly be milder and more tolerable if they were immune from all pain of sense and suffered only the pain of loss. He then indicates that the statement concerning Judas the traitor, *It would have been better for him if he had not been born,* cannot be applied to those infants. This would be false if they were tormented by the punishment of fire, for although nonexistence is not desirable in itself, since it is a pure privation of good, it is nevertheless desirable insofar as it removes torment and punishment, as St. Thomas teaches in *Supplementum*, q. 98, a. 3.

I add that the same Augustine, in *De libero arbitrio* III, c. 23, treating the same infants, says: *There is no reason to fear that, since a life can exist midway between right action and sin, the sentence of the Judge cannot also be midway between reward and punishment.* But if infants suffered the pain of loss and the pain of sense, their sentence would not be midway between reward and punishment, as is evident in itself. Therefore, according to Augustine, infants who die in original sin are punished only by the pain of loss.

38. Nor is it valid to say that Augustine considers the sentence of infants to be midway between reward and punishment because they are punished with a milder punishment than adults. This is not valid, I say, for even among adults one is punished more mildly than another, and men, speaking generally, are to be punished more mildly than demons. Yet no one will say that an adult who is to be punished with a milder punishment will have or hear a sentence midway between reward and punishment. Therefore, if infants suffered the pain of sense and the pain of loss, Augustine would wrongly assert that the sentence of infants is midway between reward and punishment.

39. The same part is proved third by this reasoning: punishment must be proportionate to fault. But the pain of sense is not proportionate to original guilt. Therefore, original guilt is not punished by the pain of sense. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown first: the pain of sense occurs through the suffering of this particular person, but original sin does not exist

through a personal will, but through the will of nature. Yet to be punished through personal suffering is not proportionate to having sinned not by one's own will, but by another's will. Therefore, the pain of sense is not proportionate to original sin. Second, original sin is not contracted by one's own will. But the pain of sense is due to sin by reason of one's own will, according to Bernard's saying in Sermon 3, *De resurrectione: Take away one's own will, and there will be no hell. Nothing will burn in hell except one's own will.* Therefore, the pain of sense is neither proportionate nor due to original sin. Third, the bitterness of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure of fault, as is evident from Rev. 18: *As much as she glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment and mourning give her.* But no pleasure is found in original sin, for pleasure follows operation, whereas original sin does not consist in an operation. Therefore, the pain of sense does not correspond to original sin or have proportion to it. Finally, in imposing the punishment due to sins, the Church imitates the order and manner prescribed by divine justice in punishing sinners. But the Church imposes no positive punishment for original sin. Therefore, she judges that sensible punishment is not proportionate to such sin and is not inflicted for it by divine justice.

40. The third part of our assertion, namely that infants who die in original sin suffer no sadness from the pain of loss, remains proved against Bellarmine, Valencia, and other recent authors by what was said in proving the preceding part. For Gregory of Nyssa, cited above, says that those infants will be neither in pain nor in sadness, and Augustine in the place cited above says that their punishment will be most mild. This would be false if they felt inner pain and sadness because of lost beatitude, since the pain felt by the damned because of lost beatitude is most grievous and greater than the sensible pain caused by the fire of hell, as St. Basil teaches in Oration 23, *De futuro iudicio*, in these words: *Aversion from God, among all the punishments expected in Gehenna, is by far more intolerable and grievous to the one punished, even if he lacks pain, than the deprivation of light is to the eye.* Finally, Augustine professes that he does not dare to assert that infants dying without baptism are afflicted with so great a punishment that it would have been better for them not to have been born. But if they felt inner pain and sadness from the loss of beatitude, it would be better for them not to exist at all, since such pain, as we have said, is most grievous and greater than the sensible pain inflicted by the pain of sense. Therefore, those infants suffer no sadness from the loss of beatitude and the pain of loss. The principal reason adduced for the preceding part also shows this. For those infants are not punished by the positive pain of sense because original sin involves no pleasure and was committed not by their own, but by another's will. But this reason has equal

force against inner sadness and pain arising from the lack of beatitude. Therefore, those infants conceive no grief or inner sadness from such a lack. I add that from the contrary opinion it follows that infants are tormented by the worm of conscience, which is absurd. The consequence is proved: if infants were saddened over lost beatitude, they would also be saddened and grieve over original guilt, although caused by another's will, without hope of its remission. But in this consists the worm of conscience of the damned. Therefore, if sadness and inner affliction over lost beatitude are admitted in infants, the worm of conscience must consequently be admitted in them as in the other damned.

41. Finally, the fourth part, which denies natural beatitude to those infants, is proved against Catharinus. He asserts that infants dying with original sin, after the day of judgment, will not only lack all pain, both internal and external, but will also be blessed and happy and will live perpetually as it were in a terrestrial paradise, full of wisdom and virtues, perhaps most content with their condition, loving and praising God with their whole heart, and finally enjoying pleasantly the conversation and revelations of angels. This fourth part of our assertion is proved, I say, and Catharinus's opinion is refuted, first because natural beatitude is incompatible with aversion from God as author of nature, just as supernatural beatitude is incompatible with aversion from God as supernatural author. But infants, by reason of original guilt, are averted from God not only as author of grace, but also as creator of nature, since original sin contains both kinds of aversion and, according to the more common opinion of theologians, one aversion cannot exist without the other, given the elevation of human nature to a supernatural end. Therefore, they are not blessed with natural beatitude.

42. The same opinion is next attacked by the following reasoning: infants who die in original sin descend into hell or limbo and will remain there perpetually in a dark and gloomy place. But natural happiness cannot coexist with habitation in such a place. Therefore, they will not be blessed with natural beatitude. The minor premise is evident. The major is proved first from Augustine in Sermon 14, *De verbis Apostoli*, where he expressly teaches that there is no middle place between the kingdom and hell. But after the judgment infants will not be in the place of the kingdom, namely the empyrean heaven. Therefore, they will be in hell or limbo, which is designated in Scripture by the name of hell, as is evident from Gen. 37, where Jacob, mourning the death of his son Joseph, said: *I shall descend mourning to my son into hell*. The same major is proved second from the fact that, according to the common opinion of theologians, the particular judgment of

each person and the universal judgment contain the same sentence. But the souls of infants dying with original sin are assigned to limbo in their particular judgment. Therefore, after the universal judgment they will remain in the same place. The same major may be commended third from the common doctrine of theologians asserting that after the universal judgment all the elements will possess their natural positions, so that fire will be above air, air above water, water above the earth, and the earth will be entirely covered by waters. For, they say, since at the beginning of the world water surrounded the whole earth, as its nature seemed to demand, and afterward was gathered by God's command into one place so that a place might remain on earth for the generation of animals and plants, when that generation ceases together with the motion of the heavenly bodies, reason itself and the nature of things demand that water return to its former place and cover the entire surface of the earth. Therefore, after the universal judgment infants will not dwell upon the surface of the earth, as Catharinus teaches, unless they are said to swim in the waters like fish, which is ridiculous, but will remain enclosed in limbo, an underground and dark place.

43. You will object first against the second part of the assertion: in the final judgment it is said to infants in Matt. 25: *Depart, accursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels*. But by the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels is understood the eternal pain of sense. Therefore, infants will suffer it. The major is proved because those words of Christ are referred to all who are to be placed on the left, namely all the reprobate. But infants will not be on the right, but on the left. Therefore, that sentence of Christ is directed not only to adults, but also to infants. Hence Augustine in Sermon 14, *De verbis Apostoli*, and in *De fide et operibus*, c. 3, affirms that infants dying without baptism will go into eternal fire. Gregory in *Moralia* VIII says that *although they have done nothing of their own, nevertheless they arrive there for torments*. Likewise, Fulgentius in *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 17: *Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that not only men already using reason, but also infants, if they pass from this world without the sacrament of baptism, are to be punished with the torment of eternal fire; for although they have not possessed the sin of their own action, they nevertheless derived the condemnation of original sin through carnal conception*.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor, namely that by the name of eternal fire the pain of sense is determinately understood. For according to the manner of speaking of Scripture, every punishment is designated by the name of fire, as Augustine teaches in *Questions on Joshua*, q. 9, and as is evident from Ps. 65: *We passed through fire*

and water, and you brought us into refreshment. Hence by this name Christ signified the pain of loss for infants and the pain of sense for adults. Augustine and Fulgentius must be understood and interpreted in the same manner when they teach that children dying without baptism are tormented by fire. For they speak metaphorically and signify the pain of loss by the name of fire. Thus teach St. Thomas in *De malo*, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, and *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; St. Bonaventure in the same distinction, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1; and the Gloss on c. *Nulla*, *De consecratione*, dist. 4. That this interpretation is legitimate is evident first because Augustine's intention was to prove against the Pelagians that infants are not to be endowed with eternal happiness. But this is sufficiently established by taking the name of fire for eternal punishment, namely the eternal pain of loss, with which eternal happiness cannot be joined. Therefore, it must be taken in this way. Second, because Fulgentius asserts that it belongs to the faith that infants dying in original sin are punished by the torment of eternal fire. But no one can assert without manifest error that it is a dogma of faith that those infants will be eternally tormented by the pain of sense; the dogma is only that they are damned and eternally punished by the pain of loss. Therefore, Fulgentius intended by the name of fire to signify the pain of loss. Hence the Gloss cited above says: *The lack of the vision of God is the punishment of fire, concerning which the canon Firmissime, taken from Fulgentius, must be understood.* Third, if Augustine is taken rigorously, he cannot be reconciled with himself, for in the other places cited above he openly teaches that infants suffer no pain of sense.

44. From this you understand that when the same holy Doctor says in Sermon 14, *De verbis Apostoli*: When the Lord judges, he will make two groups, the right and the left. To those on the left he will say, "Depart into eternal fire"; to those on the right, "Come, blessed," and so forth. No middle place has been left in which he might place infants, he must be explained, with St. Thomas cited above, as speaking of a middle place in the Pelagian sense, since they wished such infants to possess happiness somewhere outside the kingdom of heaven.

45. You will object second: since infants in this life suffer bodily miseries and pains, if after death they are immune from every pain of sense, it follows that their condition after death is better than before death. But this seems absurd. Therefore, so does the antecedent.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. For it is better to suffer all miseries while possessing an aptitude for seeing God than to lack every pain of sense without such an aptitude.

46. You will object third: venial sin, which is lighter than original sin, is punished in the next life by the pain of sense. Therefore, much more will original sin be punished by the same punishment. But I deny the consequence and the parity. For venial sin, although lighter than original sin, is nevertheless voluntary by one's own will and possesses some conversion and disordered pleasure, whereas original sin does not. Hence, since the pain of sense corresponds to one's own will and to disordered conversion and pleasure, it is not surprising that venial sin is punished in the next life by the pain of sense, but original sin only by the pain of loss.

47. You will object fourth against the third part of the assertion: every damned adult will be saddened and will feel the greatest inner pain and affliction because of lost beatitude, for such a loss or lack is their greatest evil, since it deprives them of the greatest good, namely the beatific vision. Therefore, for the same reason, the loss or lack of beatitude will likewise cause sadness and affliction in infants.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. St. Thomas assigns the reason for the difference in Scriptum super Sententiis II, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 2, in these words: Because every man who possesses the use of free choice is proportioned to attaining eternal life, since he can prepare himself for grace through which he will merit eternal life, if he falls short of it his pain will be greatest, because he loses that which it was possible for him to possess. Children, however, were never proportioned to possessing eternal life, both because it was not due to them from the principles of nature, since it exceeds every natural faculty, and because they could not possess proper acts through which they might attain so great a good. Therefore, they will feel no pain whatever over the lack of the divine vision; indeed, they will rather rejoice that they participate greatly in the divine goodness and in natural perfections.

48. You will say: although beatitude was not in the power of infants by reason of their own will, it was nevertheless possible for them by the will of their head. But this is sufficient for them reasonably to grieve over its loss. Therefore, they will have pain over lost beatitude. The minor is proved: if someone is deprived of his inheritance because of his parent's offense, he grieves no less than if he were disinherited through his own fault; and yet in the former case the inheritance was not in his power, nor was the parent's fault. Therefore, the loss of a good that was not in the subject's power causes reasonable pain.

I answer by denying the minor premise. To its proof, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that each person is intrinsically ordered to his own inheritance

and has a natural right to it. Therefore, whether one is disinherited through another's fault or one's own, one reasonably grieves. But in infants there preceded no right to glory; or if such a right preceded, it depended wholly upon an extrinsic source. Therefore, they cannot reasonably be saddened over lost beatitude, just as no wise man is afflicted because he cannot fly like a bird, or because he is not a king or emperor, since this is not due to him.

49. You will object fifth against the last part of the assertion: infants are deprived by original sin of no perfection naturally due to them, as is evident from the common axiom of theologians asserting that natural goods remained intact after sin. But natural beatitude is a perfection due to man. Therefore, infants are not deprived of it because of original guilt. Hence St. Thomas says in *De malo*, q. 5, a. 2, that *through original sin man is deprived of the right to supernatural beatitude which original justice supplied, but not of the right to natural goods*.

This is confirmed: in the general resurrection, notwithstanding original guilt, God will grant to infants who died in original sin many gratuitous gifts, such as immortality, impassibility, and the quantity or stature that they would have possessed had they reached adult age. Therefore, much less will he deny them natural beatitude.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For although natural beatitude is entitatively natural, it is not naturally possessed from principles due to human nature. Hence, in the state of pure nature, man would not attain it except by a special assistance of God, the creator of nature, as we said when treating the state of pure nature and as will be more evident from what is said in the treatise on grace. From this the answer to the testimony of St. Thomas is evident. For when the holy Doctor says that through original sin man is not deprived of *the right to natural goods*, he is speaking of goods that are natural both entitatively and as naturally possessed, that is, goods possessed from principles due to human nature. The common saying of theologians, *natural goods remained intact after sin*, must also be understood of these goods.

To the confirmation, granting the antecedent, the consequence and parity must be denied. For those gifts are not incompatible with original sin, whereas natural beatitude cannot coexist with it. For as we said above, natural beatitude implies conversion to God as author of nature, whereas original sin averts from God not only as author of grace, but also as creator of nature.

50. You will object finally: if infants departing from this life with original sin remained perpetually enclosed in limbo and bound to it after the day of judgment, they would suffer the pain of sense through their confinement to

such a place, just as demons and separated souls existing in hell or purgatory are tormented by the pain of sense through their confinement to corporeal fire. But the consequence and the parity are denied. For although those infants must be perpetually enclosed in limbo and bound to it, because they do not apprehend that place and such detention and confinement as unfitting and harmful to themselves, and consequently are neither saddened by it nor resist it, they suffer no pain of sense from it. On the contrary, since the demons and souls existing in hell or purgatory apprehend confinement to corporeal fire as harmful, contrary to their freedom, and unfitting, and consequently are greatly saddened and afflicted by it, such confinement has in them the nature of the pain of sense. This is the solution of St. Thomas in *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 1, ad 5.

51. From what has been said, you understand perfectly the state of infants who die in original sin. They are punished by no positive punishment, but only by privative punishments, namely the lack of glory and of natural beatitude, without conceiving from this any grief or sadness. After the day of judgment they will be, with respect to their bodies, complete and lacking no member, and of the same quantity or stature that they would have possessed had they reached adult age, because the works of God are perfect and the resurrection of bodies is a work of divine power. With respect to their souls, they will know some natural objects through species infused by God in the state of separation, for St. Thomas judges it improbable to deny them all knowledge, in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 2. They will also possess some knowledge of God as creator of nature, though not an entirely perfect knowledge sufficient to bless them with natural beatitude. Finally, they will love God as author of nature with a natural love, not indeed with a friendly, efficacious, and perfect love, for this cannot coexist with aversion from God as creator of nature, which is included in original sin, but with an imperfect love directed toward God insofar as he is the natural principle of being, as St. Thomas teaches in the place just cited, in the reply to the final argument.

Nor is it true that after the day of judgment infants must leave the place of hell in which they have been placed and come to this earth upon which we now dwell, as some think. For this does not accord with Sacred Scripture, which says in Eccl. 21: *Wherever the tree falls, whether to the south or to the north, there it shall remain*. Jerome, in his commentary upon that passage, and the other holy Fathers understand and commonly explain this of men who will remain perpetually in the same state in which they are found to have been placed after death as in their terminus.

CHAPTER VII.
Personal Habitual Sin.

1. Habitual sin is of two kinds. One is original, which is transmitted through generation and results in us from Adam's actual sin by which he violated God's command in the terrestrial paradise; this was treated in the preceding chapter. The other is personal, which results from an actual sin committed by us and remains in us until it is removed through contrition and the infusion of grace. It is called by St. Thomas and the other ancient theologians the *stain of sin*, after the likeness of a stain in corporeal things. For just as a body is said to be stained when, through contact and mixture with another thing, it loses its native brightness or splendor, as a garment does when soiled by mud or oil, so the soul contracts a spiritual stain when, through the disordered affection of the will, which is as it were a certain touch of the soul, it adheres to a creature and loses the brightness or splendor it possesses from the radiance of the light of divine wisdom and sanctifying grace. For each thing, just as it is perfected through union with what is nobler, is disfigured and debased through mixture with what is lower. We do not call silver impure from its mixture with gold, through which it becomes better and more precious, but from its mixture with lead or tin, through which it is infected and corrupted. Hence St. Thomas, following Augustine, rightly says in opusc. 61: *The soul, situated midway between God and creatures, is illuminated, improved, and perfected by conversion to God, and is obscured, deteriorated, and corrupted by conversion to creatures*. The difficulty, therefore, is in what this stain of sin consists. It is called *habitual sin* by more recent theologians, not because it always presupposes a produced habit of vice, but because it remains and endures for as long as it is not revoked by true repentance, as will be evident from what is said below.

2. I say first, therefore, that the stain of sin, or personal habitual sin, is not a habit inclining the will toward mutable good as its last end. This conclusion is also against those Thomists who teach that original habitual sin consists in habitual conversion to a creature, for they judge that personal habitual sin must be understood in the same manner.

The conclusion is proved first from St. Thomas in Scriptum super Sententiis IV, dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, in the argument to the contrary, where he reasons as follows: Nothing positive remains in the soul from sin except a disposition or habit, which follows upon sin on the part of the act insofar as

the act posits something. But the stain is neither a disposition caused by the act nor a habit. This is evident from the fact that a disposition and habit can be destroyed without grace through a contrary custom, whereas the stain is not removed without grace. Therefore, the stain does not posit something positive in the soul.

This is confirmed: through justification the stain of sin is wholly removed, and yet depraved dispositions and vicious habits are not wholly removed. Therefore, the stain of sin is not some depraved disposition or habit.

3. It is proved second: the last end of the sinner is his own private and proper good, as we shall show below when treating mortal sin. But no habit is constituted concerning one's own proper and private good, since the will, as the inclination of the whole suppositum, is sufficiently disposed toward such a good through itself, as was shown in the treatise on the virtues in general. Therefore, the stain of sin, or habitual sin, does not consist in a habit inclining the will toward mutable good as its last end.

It is proved third: a habit is neither generated nor destroyed except through many repeated acts, as philosophers commonly teach. But the stain of sin is caused in the soul by a single sinful act and is destroyed by a single act of charity and contrition. Therefore, it is not a habit.

4. I say second that the stain of mortal sin, or habitual sin insofar as it is mortal, is the privation of the splendor of sanctifying grace, with a relation to the preceding act of sin by which it is caused.

This is proved first from St. Thomas here, q. 86, a. 1, ad 3, where he says: The stain is not something positive in the soul, nor does it signify a mere privation; rather, it signifies a certain privation of the soul's splendor in relation to its cause, which is sin. Nothing clearer or more explicit in favor of our conclusion can be said.

5. It is proved second: that which is primarily and of itself excluded through justification is the stain of sin or habitual sin, since the justification of the impious is the remission of sins, as St. Thomas shows below, q. 113, a. 1. But that which is primarily and of itself excluded through justification is the privation of grace, since its infusion is the terminus to which justification tends, as theologians teach in the treatise on grace. Hence the holy Doctor says in the same place, a. 2, that *the remission of guilt could not be understood unless the infusion of grace were present*. Therefore, the stain of sin, or habitual sin, consists in the privation of the splendor of sanctifying grace.

6. It is proved third: a man is constituted habitually a sinner and unjust through that whose opposite constitutes him habitually holy and just, since opposite denominations must be taken from opposite forms or principles.

But sanctifying grace immediately constitutes a man habitually holy and just. Therefore, its privation immediately denominates and constitutes him habitually a sinner and unjust, and consequently his habitual sin formally and immediately consists in such a privation.

I have said that habitual sin, *insofar as it is mortal*, consists in the privation of sanctifying grace, because if we speak of habitual sin in itself, abstracting from mortal sin, it consists in the privation of conformity to law or of the rectitude of reason. For such a privation is left in the soul by every sin, but the privation of sanctifying grace is left only by mortal sin. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 1, mentions both privations when he says: *The human soul possesses a twofold splendor, of which it is deprived through sin, one from the radiance of the natural light of reason, through which it is directed in its acts, and another from the radiance of divine light, namely wisdom and grace, through which man is also perfected for acting well and becomingly.*

I have also said that the stain of mortal sin is the privation of the splendor of grace insofar as it implies a relation to the preceding act of sin by which it is caused. For in order that this stain have the nature of guilt and habitual sin, it must be moral and voluntary, and consequently must connote the act of the will by which it was caused. From this it is easily understood how, although the privation of grace is only one in each sinner, there are nevertheless specifically diverse stains in him according to the specific diversity of the sins from which they result, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited. It is similar, he says, *to a shadow, which is the privation of light caused by the interposition of some body; according to the diversity of the bodies interposed, the shadows are diversified.* From this the principal foundation of the contrary opinion is solved. That foundation is drawn from the claim that, since the privation of grace is one and of the same species in each sinner, if the stain of sin or habitual sin essentially consisted in it, habitual sin would be only one in species even after the sinner had committed many sins of diverse species. This foundation, as is evident from what has been said, is ruinous. Hence the same holy Doctor says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: *Although all kinds of mortal sins have this in common, that they remove grace, there is nevertheless not one stain of them all, but diverse stains according as the defect of grace is referred to diverse causes. Hence the defect of grace arising from an act of lust is the stain of that sin, and so with the others.*

7. You will object first against the first conclusion: after the act of sin has passed, man remains not only habitually averted from God, but also habitually converted to a creature or to his own private and proper good as his last end. But this conversion cannot occur except through a positive, morally evil habit. Therefore, after the act of sin has passed, there remains in

the sinner some morally evil habit inclining his will toward his own private and proper good as his last end, in which habitual sin consists.

This is confirmed: actual sin consists in a positive tendency toward an object discordant with the rules of morals, or in an actual conversion to mutable good as the last end, as we shall show in the following chapter. Therefore, habitual sin left and caused by actual sin must consist in a similar habitual tendency or conversion.

To the objection, granting the major premise, I deny the minor. For since the will is of itself sufficiently determined and inclined toward the common nature of its own private and proper good, just as every other power is inclined toward the common nature of its object, it does not need a habit determining and inclining it toward such a good, nor is it capable of such a habit. For the essential inclination itself supplies in a more eminent manner whatever a habit could supply.

To the confirmation, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence and the parity. Actual sin consists in a tendency toward an object discordant with the rules of morals because the first thing understood in it is the positive tendency toward a prohibited object, while the privation of grace or of the rectitude due to the act belongs to it only consequently and secondarily. But the first thing understood as remaining in the sinner after the act of sin has passed is not a habitual tendency toward a prohibited object or a habitual conversion to mutable good, but the privation of grace and charity, from which arises all the perversity found in the habitual conversion to one's own private and proper good.

8. You will object second against the second conclusion: if someone placed in purely natural conditions or in the state of pure nature were to sin gravely, he would contract a stain from such a sin. But he would not possess a privation of grace, but only its negation, since in such a state human nature would not be elevated to the order of grace. Therefore, the stain of sin, or habitual sin, does not formally consist in the privation of grace.

I answer that habitual sin in the state of pure nature would be of another nature than it now is and would consequently possess another constitutive principle, namely the privation of subjection or conversion to God as the natural last end.

9. The author of *Theologia mentis et cordis*, vol. 4, p. 846, rejects this answer, saying that it can by no means be maintained. First, because the essence of mortal sin, precisely as mortal, is an injury to divine grace, friendship, and charity. Therefore, the stain arising from that sin is the privation of that grace, friendship, and charity. Second, because in the state of pure nature man would through mortal sin contract a stain that could be

cleansed only in justification, since justification is the remission of sins; but he could not then be justified except through the infusion of grace, because no other form of justification can be assigned. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

10. But these arguments are frivolous and require no great labor to solve. To the first it is answered that although, in the state of nature elevated to the supernatural order through grace and charity, mortal sin precisely as such is an injury to divine grace, charity, and the supernatural friendship of God, it would be otherwise in the state of pure nature, since in that state there would be neither grace, nor charity, nor the supernatural friendship of God, but only love of God as author of nature and conversion to him as the natural end. Hence in that state mortal sin precisely as such would exclude only such love and conversion.

To the second I deny that, in the state of pure nature, the remission of sin and the justification of man could not take place without the infusion of habitual grace. For since the habitual sin of a man constituted in the state of pure nature and not elevated to a supernatural end would not be the privation of grace or supernatural rectitude, but only the privation of conversion to God as the natural end, it could be removed through such conversion, since a privation is removed through the form directly opposed to it. Consequently, the sinner could then be justified through an act of efficacious love of God as author of nature, together with an extrinsic favor of God pardoning the nature of the offense. Otherwise, if in the state of pure nature the infusion of habitual grace or of another supernatural gift were necessary for the remission and expulsion of sin, it would follow that the remission of sins would be impossible while man remained in that state. For through the infusion of habitual grace or of another supernatural gift, man would be removed from the state of pure nature and constituted in the state of grace. Hence, if this author's opinion were true, a man remaining in the state of pure nature would necessarily be miserable, since, once he had fallen into sin, he would have no remedy by which he might be justified and attain the natural beatitude to which he was ordered. From this it would further follow that the state of pure nature is impossible and incompatible with divine providence, since it is incompatible with the gentleness of divine providence to create man in a state in which he would necessarily be miserable and unable to attain his last end and natural beatitude. Therefore, the same author, moved by this reason, denies in vol. 5, p. 23, that the state of pure nature is possible. Why, then, does he labor here in vain to assign the formal principle through which habitual sin would be constituted in that state and the form through which a man fallen into mortal sin would be

justified? In conformity with his principles, he should have answered the proposed argument by saying that the major premise has a subject that is not supposable, since the state of pure nature is impossible.

11. From what has been said, the opinion of Scotus and the Nominalists remains refuted. They assert that the stain of sin, or habitual sin, consists in the liability or worthiness of punishment consequent upon the act of sin. For a person is not defiled and stained by sin because he is worthy of punishment; rather, he is worthy of punishment because he is infected with the stain of sin.

12. The opinion of Vásquez is also excluded by what has been said. He judges that habitual sin, or the stain, is merely an extrinsic denomination taken from the past act of sin and persisting until that act is revoked through repentance. For the stain is something intrinsic, just as the splendor of grace of which the soul is deprived is intrinsic. Hence, just as to be holy and clean arises from some intrinsic and permanent form, namely habitual grace inhering in the soul, as is certain by faith, so to be stained, unclean, and a sinner is not a merely extrinsic denomination taken from the act of sin, but an intrinsic privation affecting the soul in its own manner, just as darkness affects the air and death the body. I add that the nature of personal habitual sin is the same as that of original habitual sin. But in the preceding chapter we showed against Pighius and Catharinus that original habitual sin is something intrinsic to us, distinct from Adam's actual sin and derived from it. Therefore, personal habitual sin will likewise be something intrinsic to us, distinct from the past actual sin and not a merely extrinsic denomination taken from it.

13. From what has been said, it can also easily be gathered in what the stain of venial sin consists. It consists in a privation of the fervor of charity caused by venial sins, which does not remove the form from which the soul's comeliness and beauty arise, namely grace and charity, but obscures and as it were covers it, so that it shines and radiates less in its acts. It relates to the soul existing in grace as dust relates to a beautiful face, which is somewhat soiled by it, although its beauty is not destroyed. In this sense Pope St. Leo said in Sermon 4 for Lent: *While the care of this life is extended through various actions, it is necessary that even religious hearts be soiled by the dust of the world.*

CHAPTER VIII.
The Sin of Commission.

Having considered habitual sin, both original and personal, it follows that we should discuss actual sins: first the sin of commission, second the sin of omission, third mortal sin, and finally venial sin.

§ 1.

The Sin of Commission, in the Nature of Moral Evil, Does Not
Consist in a Privation, but in Something Positive.

Capreolus, Cajetan, and many other learned Thomists teach this opinion; and, as Lorea rightly observes, it is so common among the Doctors of Salamanca that almost the whole school seems to have sworn allegiance to it.

1. It is proved first from three principles of the doctrine of St. Thomas, from which the truth of this assertion is made manifest. The first is found here, q. 72, a. 1, where he teaches that sins are specifically distinguished, not from a privation, but from a positive order to an object discordant with law and reason. Hence, since the constitutive and the distinctive principle of a thing are the same, it is manifest according to the doctrine of St. Thomas that the constitutive principle of sin is not a privation, but a positive order to an object discordant with law and reason. Nor is it valid to say that St. Thomas is speaking there, not of the specific distinction of sins formally, but only materially with respect to malice. For in the cited question the holy Doctor treats the specification and distinction of sins as they are formally sins and within the moral genus, since he treated human acts considered in physical being above, from q. 8 to q. 18, which concerns the moral goodness and malice of human acts. Therefore, he is not rightly interpreted as speaking of the specification and distinction of sins in physical being and materially with respect to malice. Hence in the same place, a. 6, he says: *It must be said that a twofold difference is found in sins, one material and the other formal. The material difference is considered according to the natural species of the sinful acts, but the formal difference according to the order to one proper end, which is the proper object.* What could be clearer in establishing that St. Thomas is speaking altogether formally of sin and of its specification and

distinction when he asserts that this is taken from the order to the object? And certainly his treatment would have been very defective if, in explaining the principles from which the specific distinction of sins is taken, he had treated only their material distinction and not their formal distinction.

2. The second principle of the doctrine of St. Thomas is that the following difference is found between evil absolutely and moral evil: the first is constituted by a privation, the second by something positive. He teaches this in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 9; *De malo*, q. 1, ad 4; and here, q. 72, a. 9, ad 1, where he says: *Evil as such is a privation and is therefore diversified in species according to the things of which there is privation. But sin receives its species not from the privation or aversion, but from conversion to the object.* Nor can it be said that in these places St. Thomas is speaking of evil materially with respect to that in which it is founded. For according to this interpretation the difference that he establishes between evil absolutely and moral evil cannot stand, since evil absolutely is founded in good and necessarily presupposes some entity by which it is sustained, and thus materially implies something positive.

3. The third principle of the doctrine of St. Thomas is found in the cited places, where he teaches that evil in moral matters is contrarily opposed to good. But if sin and moral malice formally were a pure privation, moral good and evil would be opposed privatively and not contrarily, since form and privation do not possess contrary opposition, but privative opposition. Therefore, according to the principles of St. Thomas's doctrine, the moral malice of sin is not a pure privation.

Nor can it be answered that St. Thomas speaks of moral evil not formally, but materially with respect to malice, because by reason of that material element it is something positive and contrarily opposed to moral good. For in the cited passage from *De malo*, q. 1, he says: *An act of the will, insofar as it is borne toward evil, is properly contrary to good, and this contrariety passes from the acts into the habit, insofar as the act is assimilative of the habit.* But an act of the will, insofar as it is borne toward evil, expresses not the material, but the formal element of malice. Likewise, a vicious habit, precisely as such formally, is contrarily opposed to virtue, as the same holy Doctor teaches here, q. 71, a. 1. Therefore, he speaks of the contrariety between moral good and evil insofar as they are such formally.

4. The assertion is proved second by the fundamental reason: before the privation of rectitude, there is understood in the sin of commission a positive tendency toward an object discordant with law and reason. But this tendency, prior to the privation, is morally evil. Therefore, prior to the privation, the sin of commission is understood to be constituted in the

nature of moral evil, and consequently it is constituted as such not by a privation, but by something positive. The major premise is certain, for a privation of rectitude is understood in the sinful act because such an act tends toward an object that is evil and deformed according to the rules of morals. Therefore, a positive tendency toward an object discordant with law and reason is conceived in it prior to the privation of rectitude. The minor is proved first: every tendency is specified by its terminus and receives its specific nature from that toward which it tends. Therefore, a tendency toward an object discordant with law and reason cannot fail to receive from it a species of unfitness and discordance with that same reason and law. But this is moral malice. Therefore, the positive tendency toward an object discordant with law and reason is understood to be morally evil prior to the privation of rectitude flowing from it. The same minor is proved second: that tendency, insofar as it precedes the privation that it causes, is formally in the moral genus, since it arises from a will operating freely and under subjection to the rules of morals, and thus from a moral agent, and regards the object as prohibited by law and consequently as standing under the rules of morals. Therefore, it is contained under some species of morality. But it is not in the species of moral good, as is self-evident. Therefore, it is morally evil.

5. You will say that this tendency, insofar as it precedes the privation of rectitude, is not formally evil, but only materially or fundamentally evil, because it does not terminate at the object precisely as evil, but only at what is materially and specifically evil. For the will regards it as some useful or pleasurable good that is otherwise prohibited, but not formally as discordant with law and reason, since no one acts while regarding evil precisely as evil.

But against this: an act of the will terminated at the foundation of the privation which, according to the adversaries, formally constitutes moral malice, is not terminated at it precisely as a foundation that is objectively evil. For just as no one who intends evil operates under the aspect of evil, so no one intends the foundation of malice precisely as its foundation. Yet the tendency of the will toward the foundation receives from it the character of the foundation of formal malice prior to the privation founded upon it. Therefore, by parity of reason, although it is not terminated at the object precisely as objectively evil or as discordant with law and reason, it will nevertheless have from that object the character of being morally evil by formal malice prior to the privation consequent upon the aforesaid tendency. For although the will does not directly and formally attain the discordance or objective malice found in the object, it is nevertheless judged indirectly and interpretatively to attain and will it by the very fact that it attains and wills its cause and foundation, from which it is inseparable.

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This is confirmed: the tendency of a vicious habit toward an object discordant with law is morally evil, and yet it is not terminated at the object precisely as evil and deformed according to the rules of morals. Therefore, likewise, the tendency of a vicious and evil act toward an object discordant with law and reason will be morally evil, although it does not formally and directly attain the discordance or objective malice, nor is moved by it, but by the aspect of a useful or pleasurable good found in the object deformed according to the rules of morals.

6. From these points you will understand that the formal constitutive principle of the sin of commission is not composed of something positive and a privation, as some think, but consists adequately in something positive, namely in the aforesaid tendency of a human act toward an object as discordant with law and reason. For that tendency, as preceding the privation in nature and reason, is itself discordant and deformed according to the rules of morals, as we have shown.

§ 2.

Objections Are Solved.

7. The adversaries first object several testimonies of the holy Fathers in which they assert that sin is nothing other than the privation of good. Augustine says in *Enchiridion*, c. 11: What else is that which is called evil but the privation of good? And in c. 24: Sin is the first evil of a rational creature, that is, the privation of the first good. John Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 4: Evil is nothing other than the privation of good, just as darkness is nothing other than the absence of light. For good is spiritual light, just as evil, on the contrary, is darkness. Basil has similar statements in *Homily 9*, and Fulgentius in *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 21.

I answer that in those places the holy Fathers are either speaking of evil absolutely, which consists in a pure privation, or, if they are speaking of moral evil such as sin, they may be explained either as speaking of habitual sin, which consists only in the privation of sanctifying grace, as we showed in the preceding chapter, or as speaking of actual sin, which is a privation not formally and in itself, but causally and consequently. For upon the positive tendency of an act toward an object discordant with law and reason there follows the privation of due rectitude and, if the sin is mortal, the privation of grace.

8. The adversaries object second that the holy Fathers assert that sin is nothing. Thus Ambrose calls sin *a nothing rebellious and armed against God*.

Augustine, in Tractate 2 on John, explaining the words *And without him nothing was made*, adds: *Sin is nothing, and men are nothing when they sin*. Therefore, in the same place the holy Doctor and the other holy Fathers, in order to escape that grave difficulty concerning how God, since he is the universal cause of all things, is not the author and cause of sin, answer only by saying that sin is nothing and consequently is not caused by God, although God is the universal cause of every being. Hence in *De libero arbitrio* II, c. 20, he says: *Therefore that motion of aversion which we confess to be sin, since it is a defective motion, and every defect is from nothing: see to what it belongs, and do not doubt that it does not belong to God*.

I answer first that when Augustine and the other holy Fathers say that sin is nothing, they intend only that it is not something substantial or some subsistent nature, because they are arguing against the Manichaeans, who asserted that there are certain evil natures not made in any way by the good God. This is openly gathered from Augustine himself in *De natura et gratia*, c. 64, where, when Pelagius alleges that *John, Bishop of Constantinople, says that sin is not a substance, but an evil act*, Augustine answers: *Who denies this?* From this it is evident that Chrysostom and Augustine deny only that the sin of commission is a substance or something substantial. They do not deny, but assert, that it is a positive act. The same is evident from *De perfectione justitiae hominis*, argument 4, where, to Celestius asking *whether sin is an act or a thing*, he says: *We answer that sin is indeed said to be and is an act, not a thing*. When he there opposes thing to act, by thing he understands a subsistent nature. Consequently, he intends only that sin is not a subsistent nature, as the Manichaeans maintained, not that it is pure nothing and consists in a mere privation. This is evident from the example of limping that he adds in the same place: *Just as limping is an act, not a thing*. For it is evident that limping is something positive just as much as straight walking, although it connotes a privation of rectitude in the gait. Therefore, according to Augustine, sin consists in something positive connoting the privation of the rectitude of reason or of conformity with law. Hence in *Contra Faustum* XXII, c. 27, he defines sin through contrariety to law, saying that it is *a deed, word, or desire contrary to law*. But contrariety occurs through something positive, not through a bare privation, which is only privatively and not contrarily opposed to the form that it expels from the subject.

9. I answer second that sin is called nothing by Augustine and the other holy Fathers because it is nothing capable of terminating a right moral election. In this respect, the positive thing in which we place the essence of the sin of commission is nothing, because it cannot terminate a right moral election. This sufficed for the Fathers' intention, namely to explain how it

did not terminate God's causality. For that which cannot terminate a right moral election cannot terminate God's causality. It may also be said that sin is called nothing by the holy Fathers, and sinners are said to be reduced to nothing when they sin, because through mortal sin grace is expelled. Grace is as it were the substantial being of the supernatural order, since in that order it holds the place of substance and thus functions as substance does in the natural order. In this sense the Prophet said: *Behold, I was reduced to nothing and did not know it*, and the Apostle: *If I do not have charity, I am nothing*.

10. The adversaries object third several testimonies of St. Thomas in which he commonly teaches that evil consists in the lack, privation, or absence of good. But these must be understood and explained like the testimonies of the holy Fathers adduced above, namely either of evil absolutely, or of sin insofar as it is contained in this genus of evil, or of lack and privation causally and fundamentally. For moral evil consists in a positive form that is the foundation and cause of a privation. But when he says here, q. 89, a. 4, that the ordering of an act is a certain good and adds, *The privation of this is essentially sin itself*, he is not speaking of the sin of commission, of which alone we are now treating, but of omission, which essentially consists in the lack or privation of a due and ordered act. The Salmanticenses rightly observe this, and it is evident from the preceding words, which are as follows: *There is also a certain good which is the ordered act itself, and this also possesses its mode, species, and order, and the privation of this, namely of the act, is essentially sin itself*. Likewise, when he asserts above, q. 18, a. 1, that an act is evil *insofar as something is lacking to it from the fullness of being*, and when he says here, q. 71, a. 6, that *a human act is evil from the fact that it lacks due commensuration*, it must be said that he is speaking not in a formal sense, but only inferentially. That is, he means that it is infallibly true that an act is evil if it possesses the lack of something due or of due commensuration. This is most true, even if that lack is not the formal constitutive principle of sin. Finally, when the same holy Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 118, a. 5; q. 162, a. 6; and III, q. 86, a. 4, ad 1, teaches that aversion or the privation and corruption of good belongs formally to sin, whereas conversion to mutable good belongs materially, he does not intend that privation is the primary and constitutive principle of sin, but that it is its ultimate and completive principle, which consequently as it were formalizes conversion and the other principles found in it, and for this reason may be called formal. Thus, above in this Part, q. 18, a. 6, he calls the species of goodness or malice that an act has from its object, which is essential to it, *material*, whereas he calls that which it has from the end of

the agent, which is absolutely accidental, *formal*. And in q. 13, a. 1, he says that *if someone exercises an act of fortitude because of the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally an act of charity*. Yet in that act the specific and essential goodness is the goodness of fortitude, while the goodness of charity is absolutely accidental. Why, then, could the privative malice not likewise be called formal with respect to positive malice, although only the positive malice found in the sin of commission is essential and constitutive of the sin, while the privative malice is absolutely outside its essence?

11. You will object fourth: sin is contained under the nature of evil absolutely, and therefore is called by the holy Fathers the greatest and supreme of all evils. But evil absolutely is a privation and nonbeing, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 48, a. 1. Therefore, sin is not something positive, but a mere privation of goodness and rectitude.

I answer that two things are found in sin, namely the formal principle through which it is constituted, and the privation of rectitude, which functions as a property consequent upon that principle. By reason of the first, sin is not contained under the nature of evil absolutely, but only under the nature of evil relatively and in a qualified respect. For it is not evil absolutely, but evil for this nature, namely rational nature, to which it is unfitting, just as heat is not absolutely evil in itself, but only with respect to water, which it deprives of its natural coldness. By reason of the second, however, sin is contained under evil absolutely, because a privation, since it is nonbeing or the lack of being, cannot imply or involve any aspect of good.

12. You will say: that which is so evil and unfitting to man that it is fitting and good to no other thing is evil in every way and consequently evil absolutely. But sin, in the nature of sin, is evil for rational nature and is fitting and good to no other nature. Therefore, in the nature of sin it is evil absolutely.

I answer first by denying the major premise. For sadness and speculative error are unfitting to man in such a way that they are fitting to no other nature. They are not fitting to God, to whom they are altogether repugnant, nor to an irrational nature, to which they have no relation. Yet because they possess transcendental goodness in themselves, that is, because nothing is lacking to them of what is required for their integrity, they are not evil absolutely. Thus in the present matter, although sin in the nature of sin is fitting and good to no other nature, because it is integral in itself, it is not evil absolutely, but only relatively to rational nature.

Second, it may be said that, in order for sin in the nature of sin to be evil absolutely, it would have to be unfitting to man in such a way that it neither

explicitly nor implicitly expressed any fittingness to another nature or to man himself under any consideration. But sin, although under the explicit notion of deformity it expresses no fittingness, nevertheless under the implicit notion of entity and actuality, under which it is caused by God, is fitting to rational nature, not by moral fittingness, but by physical or metaphysical fittingness, insofar as it is its ultimate actuality and under that concept does not express the nature of disorder or deformity. Therefore, it is not evil absolutely, but evil relatively.

13. You will object fifth: if the sin of commission consists in something positive, it will be caused by God, since no real and positive being can escape divine causality. But this is repugnant to divine holiness. Therefore, so is the antecedent.

I answer first that this argument must also be solved by the adversaries. For the foundation of the privation of rectitude, precisely as such a foundation, is something positive. Therefore, if it is necessary that God cause everything positive found in the sin of commission, it will be necessary that he cause the foundation of the privation of rectitude precisely as such, and consequently the privation of rectitude itself, since the privation cannot of itself and primarily be directly caused, but results accidentally and secondarily from the positing of its foundation. The consequence is manifest. The antecedent is shown as follows: the foundation of a privation does not consist in a mere negation, because a privation cannot be founded upon a mere negation; nor does it consist in another privation, for otherwise another privation would have to be assigned as the foundation of that privation, and thus there would be a process to infinity. Therefore, the foundation of the privation of rectitude, precisely as such, is something positive.

I answer second by distinguishing the major premise. Sin will be caused by God under the aspect of positive entity: I grant this. Under the aspect of deformity: I deny it. This is not repugnant to divine holiness, because it does not follow from it that God is the cause of sin or causes it precisely as sin, but only insofar as it is a being and an act. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 79, a. 2: Sin names a being and an action together with a certain defect. That defect is from the created cause, namely free choice, insofar as it falls short of the order of the first agent, namely God. Hence this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to free choice, just as the defect of limping is reduced to the crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, by which nevertheless whatever there is of motion in the limping is caused. According to this, God is the cause of the act of sin, but is not the cause of sin, because he is not the cause of the act's existing with a defect.

14. You will say: divine causality, since it is terminated at being not through our consideration, but as it exists in reality, cannot be terminated at one formality and prescind from others identified with it. But positive deformity is really and even transcendently identified with the entity. Therefore, divine causality terminated at the entity cannot prescind from positive deformity.

This is confirmed: the human intellect has a far greater power of prescinding than divine causality. But the human intellect cannot through intellection prescind the entity of sin from its deformity, since the latter is intimately and transcendently included in it. Therefore, much less can divine causality do this.

To the objection I answer that the major premise is true when the formality identified with the entity is contained under the object of divine causality and efficiency, but not when it is not contained under that object. The deformity of sin is not contained within the object of God's causality as its entity is, because the adequate object of divine omnipotence is only that which can be reduced to God as its last end. But the deformity of sin, since it averts from God as the last end, cannot be referred to him as the last end. Consequently, God can attain the entity of sin by his causality while prescinding from its deformity, although the latter is really and even transcendently identified with the entity. Thus the soul, in moving and applying a crooked leg to walking, causes that motion insofar as it is physical and vital, yet does not produce it insofar as it is crooked and defective. For that crookedness, although identified with the vitality, or at least intimately and inseparably connected with it, is not contained within the adequate object of the locomotor power, but is reduced to the crooked and defective leg. St. Thomas uses this example in the place cited above.

15. From this the response to the confirmation is evident. Our intellect, in conceiving the entity, cannot prescind from the deformity because not only the entity, but also the deformity, is contained under the object of our intellect. For the same reason, the intellect of God cannot understand the entity while prescinding from the deformity. Yet God's will can love the entity without loving the deformity that includes the entity, because in relation to the intellect the deformity is contained within the sphere of divine intelligibility, but is not contained within the sphere of what is lovable by God. Why, then, could divine omnipotence not similarly attain the entity of sin by its concurrence and causality without attaining its deformity, since the entity is contained within the sphere of divine causality, whereas the deformity is not? But this will be explained more fully in the treatise on the will of God, c. 4, § 5, when explaining the harmony of God's holiness with the

predetermining decree and physical predetermination to the material element of sin.

CHAPTER IX. The Sin of Omission.

Having explained the sin of commission and the formal principle through which it is constituted, it follows that we should treat the sin of omission and briefly resolve and explain here some difficulties that arise concerning it and are commonly debated among theologians.

§ 1.

There Can Be No Culpable Omission Without a Preceding or
Concomitant Act That Is the Cause or Occasion of Omitting.

1. St. Thomas seems to teach this here, q. 71, a. 5, where he says: *If in the sin of omission we consider that which belongs essentially to the nature of sin, an omission sometimes exists without any act, whether exterior or interior. But if the causes or occasions of omitting are also understood in the sin of omission, an omission does not exist without some act.* By these words he clearly teaches that, although culpable omission according to its proper and essential nature does not require an act, because it essentially consists in the lack of a commanded act or in its privation, nevertheless, as considered in the individual instance and as here and now exercised, it requires an act that is its cause or occasion. Hence, when he concludes that article with the words, *It may more truly be said that some sin, namely of omission, can exist without any act*, he excludes only an act that belongs to its essence or is directly and essentially terminated at it. He does not exclude an act that is the cause or occasion of omitting, for otherwise he would openly contradict himself and teach opposing things in the same article.

Nor is it valid to say that St. Thomas is speaking there of what happens regularly and ordinarily, but not of what is absolutely possible. For there he attacks the opinion of certain authors who denied that an act is always required for the sin of omission by way of a cause. But they could not deny that such an act is regularly required according to the ordinary law, since this is opposed to evident experience; they could deny it only according to an extraordinary law and in some metaphysical case. Therefore, St. Thomas is speaking not only of moral necessity, but also of physical or metaphysical

necessity. Hence above, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3, he says: *An act of knowledge is required for the voluntary in the same manner as an act of the will.* But an act of the intellect is necessary for a voluntary and culpable omission, not merely by moral necessity, but also by physical or metaphysical necessity, since it is repugnant for anything to be voluntary without knowledge, as is evident from the definition of the voluntary. Therefore, the same is true of an act of the will.

2. Nor are efficacious reasons lacking by which the truth of our assertion may be commended. The principal and fundamental reason is taken from the nature of the voluntary, which is necessarily required for culpable omission. Hence I argue as follows: in order for an omission to be culpable and sinful, it must be voluntary not only in first act, but also in second act. But if every preceding or concomitant act of the will is excluded, it cannot be voluntary in second act, but only in potency and first act, since the voluntary in second act implies an act, as is evident from the terms, and requires some actual causality and influence of the will. Therefore, an omission, with every preceding or concomitant act of the will excluded, cannot be culpable and sinful.

3. Nor is the common answer of the adversaries valid. They say that for an omission to be culpable, it is sufficient that it be morally and interpretatively voluntary in second act, that is, according to the judgment and interpretation of a prudent man, for which no positive influence of the will is required; it is enough that a man can and ought to do something and does not do it. This answer is not valid. First, because since sin is essentially voluntary, in the same manner in which something has the nature of guilt it must have the nature of the voluntary. But the culpable omission of which we are treating possesses a sinful being not merely according to the judgment or interpretation of a prudent man, but truly and in reality, independently of the judgment of this or that person, and contains a true and real malice, although a privative one, through which it is constituted in the nature of sin. Therefore, in reality and independently of human judgment and interpretation, and consequently physically and really, and not merely morally and interpretatively, it must be voluntary. Second, that from which an omission is denominated voluntary in second act must be something existing in reality in the person omitting. But an interpretative volition is nothing existing in the person omitting in reality, but exists only in the intellect of the interpreter. Therefore, a culpable omission cannot be denominated voluntary in second act from it, but only from a physical and real act of the will preceding or accompanying it.

4. You will say that an omission is not denominated voluntary from the formal interpretation itself, which is in another's intellect, but from the foundation for such interpretation that is in the will whenever there are present the power and duty to act together with the absence of action.

But against this: of the three things mentioned, namely power, duty, and lack of operation, the third, since it is the omission itself, cannot have the character of the foundation from which the omission is denominated voluntary, as is self-evident. The first two do not suffice for the nature of a proximate foundation, because a foundation must be such that it is not separated from the omission, but infallibly entails it. But power and duty are separated from the omission and are found both in the person who omits and in the one who does not omit. Therefore, besides these three, there must be an act that is the cause of omitting in order that the omission be denominated voluntary in second act and consequently culpable.

5. A second reason, related to the preceding one, may be proposed as follows: there can be no sin without the exercise of freedom. But freedom cannot be exercised through the pure omission of an act. Therefore, a pure omission, with every preceding or concomitant act of the will excluded, cannot be a sin. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown as follows: the exercise of the will as free must be vital. But a pure negation cannot be vital. Therefore, freedom cannot be exercised through the pure negation or omission of an act. The minor seems certain, for to live in second act is to move oneself from within. But the will does not move itself through the negation of action and motion. Therefore, the negation of action is not life, but the negation of life. The major is commended first: the will as free is a vital power. Therefore, its exercise as free is an exercise of life and consequently vital. Second, the will lacking every act is as though dead, or at least asleep. Therefore, a pure negation of act cannot be vital. Third, freedom in second act is a mode or species of actual life. Therefore, every exercise of freedom in second act must be vital, for there cannot be a species without its genus or a mode without the substance of the thing of which it is the mode. Finally, there is not a twofold life in second act, one consisting in the negation of motion and the other in motion. Therefore, neither is there a twofold freedom in second act, one consisting in second act itself and the other in the negation or omission of it.

6. The adversaries answer this reason in the same manner as the preceding one, namely that the will actually sinning by a sin of omission does not live in second act physically and formally, but lives morally and equivalently, because the pure omission of an act, with respect to sinning, is equivalent to a physical act, on the supposition that the man can, ought, and

does not act. But besides the fact that it can scarcely be understood how the will actually sinning by a sin of omission is physically dead or asleep and yet morally and formally living, and physically living equivalently, this solution remains refuted by what was said against the response to the preceding reason. For since everything free is voluntary, if it is not sufficient for an omission to be culpable that it be morally and interpretatively voluntary, it will likewise not suffice that it be morally and interpretatively, or equivalently, free.

7. You will object first: in order for an omission to be voluntary and consequently culpable and sinful, it is sufficient that someone can, ought, and does not act, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 6, a. 3. Hence James 4 says: *To him who knows the good and does not do it, it is sin.* Therefore, an omission can be voluntary and culpable without any preceding or concomitant act. For this reason the same holy Doctor here, q. 71, a. 5, ad 2, says that *something is called voluntary not only because an act of the will bears upon it, but because it is in our power that it be done or not done.*

I answer that when St. Thomas and the other theologians with him teach that for an omission to be voluntary it is sufficient that a man can, ought, and does not act, the expression *does not act* is not taken purely negatively, as implying every suspension and negation of act, but privatively and morally, insofar as such a negation is caused by the will. Therefore, since the will cannot cause it unless it possesses some preceding or concomitant act, the expression *does not act* does not exclude, but implicitly includes an act of the will accompanying or preceding the omission. Hence when James 4 says, *To him who knows the good and does not do it, it is sin*, the expression *does not do it* must be understood of a negation voluntary and free in second act, for which the exercise of freedom is required, as we showed above. Similarly, when St. Thomas says that *something is called voluntary because it is in our power that it be done or not done*, he either speaks only of the voluntary in first act, or intends that something may be called voluntary in second act without a direct act immediately terminated at it. In this manner we do not deny that an omission can be voluntary and culpable, as is evident in someone who wills study, play, or hunting at a time when he is bound to attend the sacrifice of the Mass.

8. You will object second: if God, when the obligation of an affirmative command, for example the command to love God, was urgent, were to deny the will his concurrence for every positive act, since the fulfillment of this command would then be impossible, the will could in such a case fail to love God and consequently sin by a sin of omission. Yet it would then elicit no act incompatible with the fulfillment of such a command, since it is

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repugnant for the will to act without God's concurrence. Therefore, speaking metaphysically and of absolute power, it is not repugnant that there be a culpable omission without any preceding or concomitant physical act.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For although in that case the will could fail to love God, it could not sin by a sin of omission. Since the exercise of freedom must begin from a positive act, and in the proposed case no positive act would exist in the will, the negation of love would not be free and voluntary in second act, but only in first act. Consequently, it would not be moral and imputable as guilt, but purely natural and physical.

§ 2.

Other Difficulties Concerning the Sin of Omission Are Briefly Resolved.

9. You will ask first whether every work that is of itself incompatible with the observance of an affirmative command is corrupted by the malice of omission.

I answer that if such an act influences the omission by way of cause or occasion, it is corrupted by the omission and is sinful; but not if it in no way influences the omission and relates to it merely accidentally and concomitantly.

Both parts are manifest. For an act that is terminated at something influencing an omission by way of cause or occasion is consequently terminated at and influences the omission itself. Therefore, it is corrupted by it. On the contrary, an act that relates to an omission merely accidentally and concomitantly is in no way terminated at or influential upon it and consequently cannot be corrupted by it. Both may be explained by the following example. If someone omits Mass because of a desire and eagerness to study, that study is evil because, although good in itself, it is the reason and cause for willing something evil, namely the omission of Mass. But if, after a man has decided because of laziness, the labor of a journey, or some similar cause not to attend the sacred rite, he devotes himself to study at the time when the command to hear Mass is urgent, that study is not corrupted by the omission of Mass, because it in no way influences the omission, but relates to it merely accidentally and concomitantly. Hence the following general rule can be established for discerning when an act joined to an omission is its cause or occasion and when it relates to it merely accidentally and concomitantly. If works incompatible with the observance of the

command presuppose in the will a firm and efficacious decree or intention not to observe the command, they then relate to its omission merely accidentally and concomitantly, because, since they presuppose a sufficient cause of the omission, namely the aforesaid intention of the will, they do not in fact influence it. But if they do not presuppose such an intention, they influence the omission as its causes or occasions.

Observe, however, that for those works not to be judged influential upon the omission, it is required that there be no hope of changing the intention and that it be morally certain to persist. For if there is hope of revoking the intention and it is probable that it will be changed, works incompatible with the fulfillment of the command are judged to influence its omission. From this you will understand that one who near the hour of twelve, when the command to hear Mass was urgent, gives himself to sleep after a firm intention of omitting it does not sin by giving himself to sleep, because in so short a time there is no hope of changing the intention. On the contrary, a cleric sailing on a voyage, who, after a firm intention not to recite the canonical hours during the whole voyage, throws his breviary into the sea, sins mortally by throwing it away. For during the long period for which the voyage must last, he could revoke his intention and it is probable that he would change it, but by throwing away the breviary he is necessitated to omit the command even if he changes his intention. Consequently, such a casting away is a cause of the omission.

10. You will ask second whether an act that is the cause of an omission possesses two malices diverse in species, one from the omission that it causes and another opposed to the virtue from which it would proceed if it did not cause an evil omission. For example, whether study causing the omission of the sacred rite is not only contrary to religion, by which hearing Mass is commanded, but also contrary to the virtue of studiousness, which ought to regulate and moderate a disordered love of studying.

I answer that it possesses only one species of moral malice, taken from the omission that it causes. For one who omits the sacred rite because of study does not sin more than he would sin if he omitted it by remaining idle without such an act, as seems self-evident. But if he omitted the sacred rite without such an act, through mere idleness, he would commit only one sin, namely against the virtue of religion. Therefore, one who omits the sacred rite because of study likewise sins only against the virtue of religion and not against the virtue of studiousness.

11. You will say: one who omits the sacred rite because of study does so from an excessive affection for studying. But it belongs to the virtue of studiousness to correct and moderate excess in the affection for studying.

Therefore, one who omits the sacred rite because of study acts against the virtue of studiousness and not only against the virtue of religion.

I answer that excess in the affection for studying is twofold. One is within its proper matter, namely when someone studies prohibited or vain matters, or matters that surpass his own capacity. The other is not within its proper matter, but is transferred to another matter, as when someone studies and through study is impeded from observing a command belonging to the matter of another virtue. The first constitutes the vice of curiosity and is corrected by the virtue of studiousness. The second must be corrected not by studiousness, but by that virtue whose command is impeded through study. The excess of affection for studying that impedes hearing the sacred rite when the command is urgent is of this latter kind. Therefore, it is corrected not by studiousness, but by religion.

12. You will ask third whether a culpable omission occurring during sleep or drunkenness is formally a sin in itself or only the effect of sin.

I answer that it is truly a sin in itself. The reason is that, for something truly to be and be called sin and not merely an effect of sin, it is sufficient that it be indirectly voluntary and voluntary in its cause. But the omission of the sacred rite occurring in sleep is indirectly voluntary and voluntary in its cause, since we suppose that the person omitting it foresaw this when he gave himself to sleep. Therefore, it is formally a sin in itself. The minor premise is evident. The major is illustrated and commended by three examples. First, nocturnal pollution occurring during sleep, although not formally free and voluntary in itself, is nevertheless a sin when it is free and voluntary in its cause, namely in an impure thought, an immodest act, or some similar act, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 80, a. 7. Likewise, if someone voluntarily becomes drunk or gives himself to sleep, foreseeing that in drunkenness or sleep he will kill a servant, he sins not only when he posits the cause, but also when he actually kills, although he then possesses no formal freedom, because such a killing is free and voluntary in its cause. Hence, if he then kills a cleric, he remains excommunicated, as Sylvester, Paludanus, and others teach. Finally, when someone sins from vincible ignorance, the act of sin is only indirectly voluntary and voluntary in its cause, namely ignorance. Therefore, the indirectly voluntary and what is voluntary in its cause suffice for sin.

13. This is confirmed: no more of the voluntary is required for sinning than for meriting or validly receiving a sacrament. But for meriting or validly receiving a sacrament, the indirectly voluntary and what is voluntary in its cause suffice. Therefore, they also suffice for sinning. The major premise seems certain. The minor is also evident from the example of someone who

while awake possesses the intention of martyrdom or baptism, and during the night is either baptized in sleep or killed for Christ. He would truly attain the grace of baptism and the aureole of martyrdom during this happy sleep, as theologians commonly teach. Why, then, could an omission occurring during sleep or drunkenness not likewise be formally evil and sinful in itself by reason of the voluntary act that preceded it, in which it was indirectly and causally willed? For in order that such an act in fact influence an omission occurring during sleep, it is sufficient that it exist morally at the time when the omission occurs. But by the very fact that it has not been revoked, it is judged to exist morally at the time when the omission occurs. Therefore, it truly influences the omission morally and confers upon it sufficient freedom and morality for it truly and formally to be evil and sinful in itself, although it occurs during sleep or drunkenness.

14. You will say that from this reasoning and doctrine it follows that a drunk or sleeping priest could confect the sacrament of the Eucharist if before sleep or drunkenness he possessed the intention of consecrating and doing what the Church does, because such a consecration would likewise be indirectly free and voluntary and voluntary in its cause. But I deny the consequence, both because, although Christ could have elevated to the dignity of a sacrament the utterance of words voluntary only in their cause, he nevertheless did not will to do so, because of the reverence due to the sacraments; and because the sacraments must be confected by a minister possessing moral certainty concerning the due matter. But such certainty cannot exist during sleep or drunkenness. For although before sleep he left bread and wine near himself for the confection of the Eucharist, afterward, while asleep, he could apply other matter and pronounce the words over it. I add that words pronounced during sleep or drunkenness are not formally words, because they lack actual signification, but are words only materially, like words pronounced by a magpie or parrot. Consequently, they are neither suitable nor sufficient for confecting the sacrament of the Eucharist.

15. You will ask fourth whether sins of commission and omission proceeding from the same motive are of the same species.

I answer that although, considered in physical being, they are distinguished specifically and even more than specifically, for in this genus they are related as affirmation and negation and as being and nonbeing, between which there is no agreement, nevertheless, if considered in moral being, they are of the same species. Thus St. Thomas teaches here, q. 72, a. 6, where he says: *If we speak formally of the species of the sin of commission and omission, they do not differ in species, because they are ordered to the same thing and proceed from the same motive. For the avaricious man, in order to gather*

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money, both seizes and fails to give what he ought to give; and similarly, the glutton, in order to satisfy his gluttony, both eats to excess and omits the required fasts. In these words he suggests the fundamental reason for our resolution: human acts and sins receive their species from the end. Therefore, if omission and commission are ordered to the same end and proceed from the same motive, they will be of the same species in moral being. But since the end of human actions is twofold, one called the end of the work, which is intrinsic and essential to the human act, and the other called the end of the agent, which is accidental and adventitious to such an act, when omission and commission are ordered to the same end of the work, they will be of the same essential species in moral being and in the nature of sin, as occurs when they belong to the same vice. But when they are ordered to the same end of the agent, they will be of the same accidental species in moral being and in the nature of sin, as is evident if someone orders the omission of hearing the sacred rite and the commission of theft to adultery or homicide.

CHAPTER X.

Mortal and Venial Sin.

Many serious difficulties arise concerning mortal and venial sin; here we shall briefly settle and resolve them.

§ 1.

Principal Differences Between Mortal and Venial Sin.

1. I presuppose, first, as certain, that venial sin is distinguished by its very nature from mortal sin, and not merely on the part of the subject or sinner, for whom all sins are mortal if he is an unbeliever or reprobate, and all are venial if he is faithful or predestined, as Wycliffe, Luther, Calvin, and other heretics maintain. Nor does the distinction arise solely from God's mercy, by which he wills not to punish certain sins with eternal death, although of themselves all would justly be punishable by it, as Gerson and Almain once taught.

This is proved first from Scripture. For in Luke 9 Christ calls some sins specks in the eye and others beams. But specks cannot of themselves blind the eye in which they are found. Therefore some sins are light, which not only do not actually extinguish grace, the light of the soul, but cannot extinguish it; and consequently they are venial of themselves, from their

intrinsic nature and lightness. Again, in 1 Cor. 3 Paul compares certain sins committed by the just, while retaining a living adherence to Christ as their foundation, to hay and stubble placed upon the foundation, as Cyprian explains in his epistle to Antonianus, Ambrose in sermon 2 on Ps. 38, and Augustine in *De civitate Dei* l. 21, c. 26. But hay and stubble cannot of themselves destroy the foundation. Therefore neither are those sins of themselves and by their nature capable of destroying grace and charity, through which we are united to Christ as our foundation.

2. It is proved secondly by the reasoning indicated by St. Thomas here, q. 88, a. 1. Sin is a kind of infirmity of the soul. Hence, just as among bodily infirmities some are grave and cause death by removing the principle of life, while others are light and do not place life in such danger, although they dispose toward it, so among sins some are grave of themselves and by their nature, causing the spiritual death of the soul by depriving it of grace and charity, while others are light, which, although they dispose toward such an effect, cannot of themselves produce it.

Add that Gerson's position appears to have been condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII, who condemned this proposition of Michael Baius: "No sin is venial by its nature, but every sin merits eternal punishment." Hence, after this censure, such an opinion must at least be judged rash.

3. You will say: An infinite offense of itself and intrinsically merits eternal punishment, infinite in duration. But venial sin, since it is an offense against God, who is infinite, is an infinite offense. Therefore of itself and intrinsically it merits eternal punishment; and consequently it is venial not because of its intrinsic lightness, but only because of the divine law and mercy, which, by punishing it less than it deserves, does not impute such punishment to it. Hence Augustine asserts in various places that no one would be saved if judged by God without mercy.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For although venial sin is an offense against the infinite God, it is not an infinite offense, as mortal sin is, because it does not offend him absolutely by removing from him, in the sinner's affection, the character of the ultimate end, as mortal fault does. It offends him only in a qualified respect, by turning man aside from him insofar as man loves some created object outside the order of the ultimate end, as will be explained more fully below.

As to Augustine, it must be said that he means only that no one will attain eternal life without mercy, insofar as venial sins also must be remitted for someone to be saved and enter the kingdom of heaven, into which nothing unclean or defiled can enter. That he speaks in this sense is evident from *Confessiones* l. 9, final c., where he asks his readers to pray for his

deceased mother, so that, as he says, she may obtain God's mercy. But mortal sins are not remitted to the dead, but only venial sins. Therefore their remission is a certain mercy necessary for everyone to be admitted into eternal life.

4. I presuppose secondly that the distinction found in the nature of things between mortal and venial sin does not consist in mortal sin being contrary to a precept, while venial sin is contrary to a counsel, as Scotus, Gabriel, and others teach. For just as a counsel binds under no sin, so neither is acting contrary to it any sin. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 7: "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel." And shortly afterward: "If the virgin marries, she has not sinned." The reason a counsel binds under no sin is that a man is not bound in his actions to follow what is more perfect.

5. You will say: To vow or resolve to act contrary to the counsels is a sin. Therefore acting contrary to them is also a sin.

I answer that a vow contrary to the counsels is a sin because it is vain, since it lacks the due matter of a greater good, upon which every vow must be founded if it is to bind. But a resolution to act contrary to the counsels is by no means a sin. For if, according to the Apostle, a virgin does not sin by marrying, all the more will she not sin when she forms the intention of marrying.

6. With these points presupposed, the principal differences between venial and mortal sin must be briefly explained. The first and principal difference is that mortal sin includes, at least virtually, a great contempt of God, consisting in this: that a man prefers the love of a creature to the love of the Creator and, for love of that creature, does not care that he dissolves his friendship and union with God as his ultimate end. Venial sin, however, precisely because it does not dissolve friendship and union with God as the ultimate end, does not include this virtual contempt of God as the ultimate end.

7. From this difference, which will be explained more fully below, arises another assigned by St. Thomas in *De malo* q. 7, a. 1: "If charity is excluded, the sin is mortal; but if there is such a defect of rectitude that charity is not excluded, the sin will be venial." For mortal sin excludes charity because of this contempt, whereas venial sin does not, since such contempt is not included in it. From this also the designations "mortal" and "venial" are taken. For since charity, by which the soul is united to God, is as it were the form by which it lives the supernatural life, the sin that destroys charity is rightly called mortal, because it causes spiritual death in the soul. The sin that leaves charity in its subject is called venial, because it does not exclude

the principle of pardon, but leaves in the subject something by which pardon can be obtained, namely charity.

8. From this follows a third difference: mortal sin imports a defect of order to the ultimate end, or an aversion and disorder from the ultimate end; venial sin has only a disorder concerning the means to the end, while the order to the ultimate end is preserved. For since charity is that which turns or orders man to the ultimate end, it follows that the sin which excludes charity turns him away from and disorders him in relation to the ultimate end, whereas the sin which does not expel charity causes no such aversion or disorder.

9. From this distinction arises another: mortal sin induces an irreparable disorder, but venial sin does not. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 88, a. 1, the ultimate end in moral matters is like the first principle in speculative matters. Hence, just as an error concerning first principles is incorrigible or irreparable, so a sin that induces aversion from the ultimate end cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but only by divine power. By contrast, a sin that does not import disorder from the end, but only from the means, can be repaired through an intrinsic principle, namely through a right intention of the end, just as an error concerning conclusions can be corrected through right knowledge of a principle. From this arises a fifth distinction, consisting in the fact that mortal sin induces liability to eternal punishment, while venial sin merits only temporal punishment. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 87, a. 3, sin induces liability to punishment because it perverts the order of divine justice. Hence that sin merits eternal punishment which imports a disorder that is of itself irreparable and consequently eternal; but that sin merits temporal punishment which signifies a disorder intrinsically reparable, and consequently of itself transitory and temporal.

10. The final difference consists in this: mortal sin is contrary to the law, while venial sin is not properly contrary to the law, but beside or outside it. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 88, a. 1, ad 2: “One who sins venially neither does what the law prohibits nor omits that to which the law binds by a precept, but acts beside the law, because he does not observe the mode of reason intended by the law.” And in *De malo* q. 7, a. 1, ad 1: “It is commonly said that venial sin is not contrary to the law, but beside the law, because although it departs in some respect from the order of the law, it does not corrupt that order, since it does not corrupt love, which is the fullness of the law.”

This is confirmed. There are three kinds of venial sin. One is venial by its genus, which always remains venial and within its proper matter never

becomes mortal, such as an idle word. Another is venial through imperfect deliberation, such as an impure thought or a movement of unbelief preceding judgment. The last is venial through lightness of matter, such as the theft of an apple. None of these venial sins is contrary to the law. The first is not, because an idle act is of itself indifferent and merely lacks order to a good end. Nor are the second or third, because the law, since it is imposed upon free agents, is violated only by those who act freely and deliberately; and since it intends the common good, it is not violated absolutely by acts that, because of the smallness of their matter, cause no notable harm.

11. From what has been said, you will infer first that the malice of mortal sin and the malice of venial sin differ from one another essentially and specifically. For, as was shown above, the disorder and malice of mortal sin reaches the end itself and destroys it; but the disorder or malice of venial sin does not reach the end, but stops in the means themselves, which the sinner does not actually refer to the end, but only habitually, as will be said below. But disorder and malice that reaches the end differs essentially and specifically from that which stops in the means and does not reach the end. Therefore the malice of mortal sin differs essentially and specifically from the malice of venial sin.

12. You will say: Those sins are of the same species whose objects do not differ specifically. But the objects of mortal and venial sin sometimes do not differ specifically, as is evident in the object of theft, for another's property is of the same species whether it is of small or great quantity. Therefore mortal and venial sin are of the same species as sins.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Those sins whose objects do not differ specifically, formally and as objects, are of the same species: I grant the major. Those whose objects do not differ merely materially and as things: I deny the major. I similarly distinguish the minor premise. The objects of mortal and venial sin sometimes do not differ specifically, materially and as beings: I grant the minor. Formally and as objects: I deny the minor. For under this aspect their difference is considered according to the relation of disproportion to the ultimate end, which differs in character and species in an object that is mortally sinful and one that is only venially sinful. The first signifies an aversive disproportion destructive of the end itself, whereas the second does not. This diverse disproportion formally constitutes diverse objects precisely as objects, and communicates to the acts terminated in them an essential distinction as sins or moral evils.

13. You will infer secondly that venial sin does indeed dispose toward mortal sin, yet it can never be so increased in gravity that it passes into

mortal sin, nor can one mortal sin be made from many venial sins. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 88, aa. 2 and 5.

This corollary is evident in each of its parts. First, it is manifest that venial sin disposes toward mortal sin, because by neglecting venial sins a man gradually and imperceptibly becomes accustomed to contempt and transgression of the law, so that he finally falls into greater sins, according to Prov.: “He who despises small things will gradually fall.” Hence Chrysostom teaches this remarkable paradox in homily 87 on Matthew: in one respect venial sins must be guarded against with greater solicitude than mortal sins. “It sometimes seems to me,” he says, “that great sins are not to be avoided with as much care as small and contemptible ones. For the very nature of sin causes us to recoil from contemptible sins; but these, precisely because they are small, make us negligent, and while they are despised, the mind cannot rise generously to expel them. Hence, through our negligence, great sins quickly arise from small ones.”

14. That venial sin can never be so increased or aggravated that it passes into mortal sin is no less evident. For things belonging to an inferior order, however much they increase within their own species, can never attain to those belonging to a superior order. But the malice of venial sin belongs to an inferior order and is of a different species from the malice of mortal sin, since the latter turns away from and destroys the ultimate end, whereas the former does not, as is evident from what has been said. Therefore the conclusion follows.

From this the third part of the corollary also remains proved. For venial sins, however much they are multiplied, cannot turn one away from the ultimate end or induce liability to eternal punishment. Therefore they cannot constitute one mortal sin by integration, just as a line cannot arise from many points joined together.

15. You will say: Many small thefts, when multiplied, eventually constitute one mortal sin. Therefore one mortal sin can be produced from many venial sins.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For when someone commits many small thefts, one mortal sin does not result from them when joined and collected together. Rather, the final theft, by which a grave quantity of matter is reached, is a mortal sin. For although the thing stolen is in itself of small value, by connoting the preceding thefts, with which it is morally joined, the theft becomes one of a grave thing and grave harm is inflicted upon one's neighbor.

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§ 2.

One Who Sins Mortally Constitutes His Ultimate End in a Creature, at Least Virtually and Interpretatively.

16. The theologians commonly teach this against Adrian. The reason is that everyone who sins mortally loves a creature appreciatively more than God, since for its sake he despises God's will and commandment, according to John 12: "They loved the glory of men more than the glory of God." But the end is that which is loved most. Therefore one who sins mortally constitutes his ultimate end in a creature.

This is confirmed from Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* q. 30, where he places the whole perversity of human life in man enjoying what should be used and using what should be enjoyed. But according to the same holy Doctor in *De civitate Dei* l. 10, c. 10, and *De doctrina Christiana* l. 1, cc. 4 and 5, to enjoy is nothing other than to adhere to something as an ultimate end. Therefore one who sins mortally and inordinately loves some creature contrary to God's commandment adheres to it as his ultimate end. Hence in Eph. 5 avarice is called the service of idols, because, as St. Thomas observes there, lect. 3: "Idolatry occurs when honor due to God alone is given to a creature. Now a twofold honor is due to God: namely, that we constitute our end in him and that we ultimately place our trust in him. Therefore one who places these in creatures is guilty of idolatry. But the avaricious man does this, since he places his end in a created thing and also places his whole trust in it."

17. You will say: If one who sins mortally constituted his ultimate end in a creature, a man could simultaneously have several ultimate ends, since he can commit several sins having diverse and disparate objects. But this implies a contradiction, as was shown in the treatise on the ultimate end, c. 1, § 3. Therefore the former also implies a contradiction.

To this objection, which Cajetan calls "the novices' argument," I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. To its proof I say that the creature in which one who sins mortally constitutes his ultimate end is not the creature that is the object of the mortal sin, for this is only the proximate and intermediate end. Rather, it is the sinner's own private good, considered not precisely in itself, but as connoting the privation of grace and charity. Thus Cajetan above, q. 1, a. 5, where he writes: "The sinner does not constitute his ultimate end separately either in gluttony or in the apparent

good of injustice. A sign of this is that neither suffices for him. Rather, all the changeable goods to which the sinner turns are referred to one common end that is absolutely ultimate for him, namely himself, since he desires all things as contributing to his own good. Thus goods of this kind are not desired as absolutely ultimate ends, but as partial ultimate ends, namely as parts of his own good, which is absolutely his ultimate end and is intended in every mortal sin."

He took this doctrine from St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 42, q. 2, a. 1, where he says: "The ultimate end in the love of changeable goods is man himself, for whose sake he seeks other things. Therefore, if the root of sins is taken on the part of the sinner himself, it will be one; but if it is taken on the part of the things that the sinner seeks for himself, they will be many."

Reason also supports this doctrine and solution. For that is the sinner's ultimate end for the sake of which, and under the aspect of which, he desires all the particular goods he pursues. But whatever the sinner desires, he desires for himself and under the aspect of his own private good. Therefore this is the sinner's ultimate end. The major is evident. The minor is proved as follows. Since love is an inclination founded upon some nature and rooted in it, so to speak, it always tends toward a good joined and proportioned to that nature; otherwise it would not correspond to its radical principle, nor would the principle and term of that inclination be proportioned to one another. Hence, because charity is rooted in sanctifying grace, which is a participation in the divine nature and, so to speak, a certain deifying nature, it always inclines the just man toward God's own good and subjects and subordinates all his acts to the divine good. Therefore the Apostle says that "charity does not seek its own." By contrast, self-love, or an inordinate love of self, which is opposed to charity, since it proceeds from and is rooted in corrupted and vitiated nature, always tends and inclines the sinner toward his own private good, according to the words of the same Apostle: "All seek the things that are their own." Hence Aristotle in *Ethica Nicomachea* l. 9, c. 8, calls the wicked or sinners self-lovers. And Augustine in *De civitate Dei* l. 14, c. 28, teaches that just as the love of God to the point of contempt of self builds the city of Jerusalem, or of the just, so the love of self to the point of contempt of God builds the city of Babylon, or of sin.

18. I said that the ultimate end of one who sins mortally is his own private good, considered not precisely and in itself, but as connoting the privation of grace. For the ultimate end of one who sins mortally cannot be referred to God and is opposed to him. But one's own good, considered in itself, does not import such opposition or incapacity to be referred to God,

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but abstracts from either relation to or exclusion of relation to the supernatural end. Yet by connoting the privation of grace, which exists in everyone who sins mortally, it becomes altogether incapable of being referred to God and opposed to him.

From this you will understand that not all the acts existing in one who is in mortal sin are evil and sinful, nor does the sinner through all of them constitute his ultimate end in a creature. For although they all stop in his own good and none passes into the supernatural order, they do not all stop in such a good privatively, excluding grace and charity, through which one's own good can be referred to the supernatural good and to God as the ultimate end. Hence one who exists in mortal sin can elicit some upright and morally good acts, such as honoring his parents, aiding the needy, loving his friends, and so forth, as we shall say in the treatise on grace.

§ 3.

What Ultimate End is Actually Intended by One Who Sins Venially?

19. The reason for doubt is that one who sins venially cannot have God as the ultimate end of such an act, since venial sin cannot be ordered to God as the ultimate end. Nor can he have a creature as his ultimate end, for otherwise he would sin not venially but mortally, since constituting one's ultimate end in a creature is a mortal sin.

Some, so as easily to escape this serious difficulty, say that one who sins venially has no particular ultimate end, but only an ultimate end in common, namely the good that satisfies the appetite, or beatitude in common, to which all actions, whether good or evil, can actually be referred, according to Boethius, *De consolazione Philosophiae* l. 2, prose 2: "Every concern of mortals, which the labor of manifold pursuits exercises, proceeds along a diverse path, but strives to reach the one end of beatitude." Thus Father Contenson, vol. 3, p. 162.

But this position is commonly rejected by our Thomists, because in every human operation man acts for some material ultimate end, or particular ultimate end, either true or apparent, as we showed in the treatise on beatitude, c. 1, § 2. But venial sin, when committed with deliberation, is truly and properly a human action, as is evident. Therefore it has some ultimate end, not only formal and in common, namely the aspect of good as such, but also material and particular, namely that same aspect of good as

such determined and contracted to some particular good, true or apparent, and consequently either to God or to a creature.

Others think that one who sins venially has as the negatively ultimate end of his act the creature that he inordinately loves and that is the object of the venial sin. Thus Suarez, Vásquez, and the more recent authors commonly. But this manner of speaking also displeases our Thomists, because a negatively ultimate end is said to be that which is not ordered to a further end, as those authors themselves say. But the creature that one who sins venially inordinately loves and that is the object of the venial sin is often ordered to a further end, as is evident in one who steals a small coin to give alms, or who tells a slight lie to save his neighbor's life. Indeed, one who sins venially always refers the object of venial sin to his own private good, since every inclination tends toward the good proper to and perfective of the nature from which it proceeds and in which it is rooted, or of the suppositum in which such a nature exists. Therefore the creature that is the object of venial sin neither is nor can be the ultimate end, even negatively, of one who sins venially.

20. I therefore say that a just man who sins venially regards his own private good as his ultimate end, not absolutely and without qualification, but in a qualified respect and with an added limitation, namely as his merely actual end.

The first part is evident from what was said above. For since acts in a just man that are not commanded by charity have no other principle in which they are actually rooted and founded than the agent's own nature, they can have no other end to which they are actually referred than the good proper to and perfective of such a nature, or of the suppositum in which it exists. Otherwise the inclination would not correspond to its radical principle, or the principle and term of the inclination would not be proportioned to one another, as we said in the preceding section.

21. The second part, namely that such a good is not the absolutely ultimate end of one who sins venially, is evident because an absolutely ultimate end excludes every relation, both habitual and actual, to a further end. But in a just man who sins venially, his own private good is habitually referred to God through the habit of charity. Therefore it cannot be called or be his absolutely ultimate end, but only with an added qualification that diminishes its scope, namely as a merely actual end, or through the exclusion only of an actual relation to God, without exclusion of the habitual relation. This is to be ultimate only in a qualified respect.

22. But you will ask what must be said of one who is in the state of mortal sin and sins venially. For in him his own private good is not habitually

referred to God through the habit of charity. Therefore it will possess the character of an absolutely ultimate end.

I answer that even while such a person sins venially, he does not have his private good as his absolutely ultimate end, but only as ultimate in a qualified respect. For, as we said in the preceding section, it belongs to the notion of an absolutely ultimate end not only to abstract from an order to a further end, but also positively to exclude such a relation. Although one who is not in the state of grace, through mortal sin, tends toward his private good while excluding its relation to God as the ultimate end, nevertheless, when he sins venially, he tends toward his own good while merely abstracting from such a relation, and not while positively excluding it, as we explained there. Hence, although one who sins mortally constitutes his absolutely ultimate end in his own private good, one who sins only venially does not.

23. You will say: One who sins venially does not use the creature concerning which he sins and which is the object of the venial sin, because the use of creatures signifies no disorder. Therefore he enjoys it, since there is no middle between enjoyment and use, according to Augustine: “Everyone who loves something loves it either by using it or by enjoying it.” But enjoyment concerns only the ultimate end, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 11, a. 5. Therefore one who sins venially constitutes his ultimate end in the creature that he inordinately loves and that is the object of the venial sin.

I answer, even granting the antecedent, by denying the consequence. To its proof I say that between enjoyment and good use there is a middle, namely evil and unlawful use, which is properly called abuse, in which venial sin consists, as St. Bonaventure teaches in *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* II, dist. 42, a. 2, q. 1: “If you ask what venial sin is, whether it is use or enjoyment, it must be said that it is neither use nor enjoyment, but abuse. Hence, when Augustine says that everyone who loves something loves it either by using it or by enjoying it, understand use and enjoyment broadly: use for every related love, whether directly or indirectly; enjoyment for unrelated love.” This doctrine is taken from Augustine himself in *De doctrina Christiana* l. 1, c. 4, where, in addition to enjoyment and lawful use, he posits unlawful use and calls it abuse.

§ 4.

Mortal Sin, As an Offense, Contains Malice and Gravity
That Are Absolutely Infinite in the Moral Order.

24. This assertion is proved by three arguments. The first and fundamental argument is this: the gravity of an offense increases according to the measure of the dignity of the person against whom it is committed. But the person offended by mortal sin, namely God, possesses an absolutely infinite dignity. Therefore mortal sin, as an offense, possesses an absolutely infinite gravity. The minor and the consequence are evident. The major is commonly taught by Aristotle and St. Thomas and is confirmed by examples. For an injury inflicted upon a commoner is less than one inflicted upon a soldier; one inflicted upon a soldier is less than one inflicted upon a knight; and this is less than one by which a prince is offended, because a prince exceeds a knight in dignity, a knight a soldier, and a soldier a commoner. Salvian indicates this argument in *De gubernatione Dei* l. 6, c. 7: "The guilt of the offender always increases according to the dignity of the one who suffers the injury, because it is necessary that the greater the person who suffers the insult, the greater the guilt of the one who commits it. Hence we read in the law that even those who seem to have done light things contrary to the sacred commandment were nevertheless punished most severely, so that we might understand that nothing pertaining to God is to be called light, because the injury done to the divinity made great even what seemed small in guilt."

25. The common solution to this argument is that an offense does not increase arithmetically, that is, according to equality, from the dignity of the person against whom it is committed, but only geometrically, that is, according to proportion. Hence, from the fact that God, who is offended by sin, possesses an absolutely infinite dignity, it does not follow that sin as an offense possesses an absolutely infinite gravity, but only that it exceeds every offense committed against creatures and belongs to a superior order.

But on the contrary: God, when offended, communicates to the offense committed against him the gravity of a superior order precisely because he himself belongs to a superior order. But he possesses not only a dignity of a superior order, but an absolutely infinite dignity. Therefore the offense committed against him receives an absolutely infinite gravity.

This argument is confirmed and more fully illustrated. God, when offended by sin, is no less capable of giving absolute infinity to the offense inflicted upon him than of giving it superiority of order, and on the part of the offense no reason can be assigned why it should participate in the one and not in the other. Therefore the gravity of an offense committed against God not only belongs to a superior order in comparison with all offenses committed against creatures, but is also absolutely infinite.

26. You will say that the infinite person is prevented from communicating infinite gravity to the offense by the limitation of the sinner's effort. For just as an infinite object, if attained in a finite manner, does not confer infinite perfection upon an act, as is evident in the beatific vision and in an act of charity, so the divine majesty, although infinite, because it is attained by the sinner through a limited and finite act, does not transmit infinite malice and gravity into the offense committed against it.

But on the contrary: although the limitation of the effort and of the manner of tending toward the object prevents an act from deriving infinite goodness or malice in the physical order from the object or person toward which it tends, as is evident in the examples given, it does not prevent it from receiving from them infinite value or malice in the moral order, as is evident in Christ's meritorious and satisfactory acts. For although in the physical order and as beings they were finite and limited, since they proceeded from Christ's soul and its powers, which in the physical order possessed finite and limited perfection, nevertheless this physical limitation did not prevent them from deriving infinite moral dignity and value from the person of the Word, as nearly all theologians apart from Scotus teach in the treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore, likewise, the limitation of the effort and of the act's manner of tending toward the offended person will not prevent the offensive act from deriving from the offended person of infinite dignity a gravity and malice that are infinite in the moral order.

This is confirmed. The sinner's effort, or the manner of tending toward God that belongs to the offensive act, is not only finite, but also belongs to an inferior order in relation to the offended person. Yet such inferiority of order does not prevent the offended person, because he belongs to a superior order, from giving the offense a gravity of a superior order. Therefore neither can it prevent the infinite person, because he is infinite, from communicating infinite gravity to it.

27. The second argument is taken from St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 5, in the body, where he says: "It must be said that the reason why mortal sin binds one to eternal punishment can be taken from three considerations. First, on the part of the one against whom the sin

is committed, who is infinitely great, namely God. Hence an offense against him is worthy of infinite punishment, because the more worthy the person against whom one sins, the more the sin is punished.” And in the response ad 2 he says: “From the fact that one sins against the infinite, infinite punishment is due to him. But it cannot be infinite in severity, because an infinite quality cannot exist in a finite creature; it is therefore compensated by infinite duration.”

From this doctrine I draw the following argument for our position. Just as an efficient cause containing a physically infinite effect cannot fail to be physically infinite, so a cause containing a morally infinite effect cannot fail to be infinite in the moral order; otherwise the effect would exceed its principal cause in the very order in which it is a cause. But mortal sin, as an offense, efficiently and morally contains an infinite effect, since it merits infinitely severe punishment, as is evident from the words of St. Thomas just cited. Therefore, insofar as it is an offense against God, it is morally infinite, or contains absolutely infinite gravity and malice in the moral order.

This is confirmed. In the treatise on the Incarnation, the theologians conclude against Scotus that Christ’s satisfaction contains an absolutely infinite value in the moral order because it possesses satisfactory power sufficient for syncategorematically infinite faults. Therefore the power to merit syncategorematically infinite punishments establishes absolute infinity in mortal sin as an offense.

28. The third argument for our assertion is taken from the doctrine commonly given by theologians in the treatise on the Incarnation when treating Christ’s satisfaction. There they teach that the value of satisfaction increases with the dignity of the person satisfying, such that when the person is of infinite dignity, he communicates absolutely infinite value to the satisfactory act. From this they infer that Christ’s satisfaction possessed absolutely infinite value. But similarly, the gravity of an offense increases with the dignity of the person offended, as we showed in the first argument and explained by various examples. Therefore it will receive absolutely infinite gravity in the moral order from the person of infinite dignity, namely God, who is offended by sin.

29. The adversaries answer by denying the parity. For, they say, the following distinction is found between satisfaction and offense: the person satisfying is related to the satisfaction not as an object, but as its subject, which assumes the character of a moral form and consequently formally dignifies the satisfaction through itself, communicating to it satisfactory value equal to itself and therefore infinite if such a person is infinite. By contrast, the offended person is related to the injury inflicted upon him not

as its subject but only as its object. Hence he does not assume the character of a moral form in relation to it, nor does he through himself make the offense grave; consequently, the offense is not constituted infinitely grave by the infinite dignity of the offended person.

The entire probability of the contrary position consists in this distinction. Yet it rests upon a false foundation, namely that the offended person is related only as an object to the injury inflicted upon him. I show this to be false in three ways. First, from the common proverb: "Honor is in the one honoring, but injury is in the offended person." Secondly, from the difference found between sin as malice and sin as offense. For under the former consideration it is called and is an evil of the sinner; under the latter, it is called not the evil of the sinner himself, but the evil of the offended God. Therefore, as an offense, it regards God as its moral subject. Thirdly, from the common manner of speaking. For it is not the offender but the offended person who is said to suffer the offense. But the one who is said to suffer the offense is the subject of the offense. Therefore the offended person is the moral subject of the offense.

From this you will understand that just as the person of the Word, because he is the subject of the actions elicited by Christ's humanity, is in the moral order the form that dignifies those acts and constitutes them infinitely meritorious and satisfactory, so, because God is the moral subject of the offense found in mortal sin, he possesses the character of a moral form that aggravates such an offense and consequently communicates to it malice and gravity that are absolutely infinite in the moral order.

30. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 says that sin has "a certain infinity" from the infinity of the divine majesty. For he added this diminutive expression to indicate that sin is not infinite physically and as a being, but only morally, or in the moral order. Even in this order it is not infinite according to every moral aspect found in it. For it does not possess absolutely infinite malice insofar as it is man's evil, but only insofar as it is God's evil and possesses the character of an offense.

31. It is likewise no obstacle if you say that from the solution and doctrine given it follows that not only mortal sin but also venial sin possesses absolutely infinite gravity as an offense, since venial sin no less than mortal sin regards God as its moral subject and consequently receives gravity and infinity from him as from its form.

I answer that although venial sin as an offense has God as its subject, it does not receive absolute infinity from him, because, being a light offense, it is incapable of receiving infinity. For a form united to an incapable subject does not give it the effect that it is of itself able to produce, just as the

subsistence of the Word united to an irrational nature would neither sanctify that nature nor constitute a person, because such a nature is incapable of those effects.

32. Finally, it is irrelevant if you object that from our position it follows that one sin is not greater than another as an offense, which seems absurd and is the error of the Stoics refuted above in c. 3. The consequence appears manifest, because one infinite is not greater than another in the order in which it is infinite. Therefore, if mortal sin as an offense is absolutely infinite, one cannot be greater than another in this order, but all will be equal as offenses.

This objection can be answered in two ways. First, the consequence of the major premise may be denied absolutely. To its proof it can be said that although what is infinite by essence and as a being demands that it cannot be exceeded by another, what is infinite in a determinate genus can be exceeded materially by another. Thus, in the position of those who admit that an infinite according to quantity or multitude can exist, an infinite body would materially exceed an infinite surface, and an infinite surface an infinite line. And if there were an infinite multitude of men, it would be materially exceeded by the number of their fingers or hairs. Hence, since mortal sin as an offense is infinite only in a determinate genus, namely the moral order, one sin as an offense can be greater than another. St. Thomas appears to indicate this solution and doctrine in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3.

Secondly, it can be answered that, just as theologians distinguish a twofold value in Christ's meritorious actions, so a twofold gravity or malice of offense can be distinguished in mortal sin. In Christ's actions one value is objective, taken from the object, circumstances, and other sources; this is unequal according to the inequality of the objects and circumstances. The other is personal, taken from the divine person, who infinitely dignifies and, so to speak, gives value to all Christ's theandric actions that redound upon the person of the divine Word. This value was equal in all Christ's satisfactory and meritorious actions, as theologians teach in the treatise on the Incarnation.

Likewise in mortal sin, one gravity or malice of offense is taken from the object, intention, and other sources; another is derived from the infinite dignity of the person who is offended. Although the latter is equal in all mortal sins, since it is taken from the infinite person who infinitely aggravates every mortal sin, the former is unequal according to the inequality of objects and circumstances. Hence our position is far removed from the error of the Stoics, since according to it sins are absolutely unequal because they are unequal in their specific essences, even though as offenses

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they are made equal in personal gravity, explained in the manner stated, which follows upon their character as morally evil.

33. You will say: God is more offended by one sin than by another, for example by hatred or blasphemy than by theft or lust. Therefore he communicates greater gravity to one than to another, and consequently the gravity taken from the offended person is greater in one sin than in another.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. God is more offended by one sin than by another extensively: I grant the antecedent. Intensively: I deny the antecedent and the consequence. The solution is evident from what was said above. For all sins, as we said, are intensively equal in the malice taken from the infinite person who is offended, although they are unequal on the part of their object and circumstances.

From this one easily understands why God's infinite goodness does not confer infinite dignity upon the act of charity that it terminates, whereas God's infinite majesty gives an offense absolutely infinite gravity. The reason is that God's infinite goodness is related to an act of charity as its object, but the offended person is related to the injury as its moral subject. A moral subject is distinguished from an object in this respect: the subject communicates to the act everything it can communicate of itself, whereas the object communicates only in proportion to the effort of the act and the influence of the operative principle.

§ 5.

Whether Mortal Sin of Itself and from Its Intrinsic Malice
Induces Liability to Eternal Punishment.

34. I presuppose first that every sin of itself deserves a punishment proportioned to it. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 87, a. 1, whoever sins sets himself against some prescribed order under which he is contained. But it is just that one who rises against a prescribed order should be cast down by the ruler of that order to the extent that he has raised himself above it, which is to suffer punishment. Now there is a threefold order: human, natural, and divine. A creature transgresses the first by violating human law, the second by violating natural law, and the third by breaking divine law. Hence sin incurs three punishments: one determined by human law; another by natural law, which is remorse of conscience; and a third by divine law.

35. I presuppose secondly, as certain by faith, that mortal sin not remitted in this life through baptism or penance is, by divine law, to be punished in the future life with eternal punishment. Scripture declares this

in various places, especially Isa. 66, where it is said of the damned: "Their worm will not die, and their fire will not be extinguished." And Rev. 14: "They will be tormented with fire and sulfur for ever and ever."

As a type of this, the fire of the Babylonian furnace rose forty-nine cubits above the furnace, but never reached the fiftieth, which was the Jubilee year. By this it was signified, as Father Louis of Granada rightly observed, that the burning of the infernal fire would be perpetual and that the damned would never obtain indulgence or pardon of their sins. Hence Ps. 48 says of them: "They are placed in hell like sheep; death will feed upon them." Expounding these words, Bernard says in sermon 2 on the words of the Apostle: "How well it says, 'like sheep,' because, stripped of the fleece of worldly riches and harshly and closely driven down, they will be assigned naked to everlasting fires. Death will feed upon them, because they will always die to life and always live for death." For death will not uproot them by taking life away entirely, but will feed upon them while preserving the root of life, so that they may spring up again and be fed upon again and again, and forever.

36. By this the error of Origen is excluded. In *Peri Archon* l. 1, c. 6, he asserted that the punishments of the damned would not endure forever, but would finally be ended at some time through God's mercy. This error, as St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 144, "appears to have arisen from the position of certain philosophers who said that all punishments are purgative and consequently must at some time come to an end." Indeed, Gregory the Great in *Moralia in Iob* l. 34, c. 16, taught that this error was devised by the devil to withdraw sinners from penance, commenting on Job 41: "He will regard the abyss as growing old," and so forth. For he says: "Leviathan will regard the abyss as growing old because he so infatuates the hearts of the reprobate that, concerning the punishments of the coming judgment, he instills into them the belief that they will come to an end. For one regards the abyss as growing old who thinks that the punishment inflicted from above will at some time be terminated."

37. You will say: The soul of Trajan was recalled from hell by the prayers of St. Gregory the Great and consequently freed from the fires of Gehenna, as John the Deacon testifies in *Vita Sancti Gregorii* l. 2, c. 44, Damascene in the discourse on the faithful departed, St. Thomas in the Supplement, q. 73, a. 5, ad 5, St. Antoninus in part 1 of his *Chronicon*, title 7, c. 3, § 2, Vincent of Beauvais in *Speculum historiale* l. 1, c. 68, and others. Therefore the punishments of the damned will not last forever, but will at some time be ended through God's mercy.

I answer first that although the position concerning the liberation of Trajan's soul from hell is not without probability because of the authority of

the authors cited, nevertheless the opposite position, which Baronius, Bellarmine, Cano, Soto, and others embrace, appears more probable. For since God has established a general law concerning the eternal damnation of the impious who die in their impiety, it appears rash to exempt anyone from this law unless such an exception is drawn from Scripture or Tradition, through which alone God's will is made known to us. But the liberation of Trajan's soul from hell cannot be supported by any passage of Scripture or Tradition. Therefore it appears fictitious and should be asserted by no theologian who loves truth.

I add that it is unlikely that St. Gregory prayed for a most criminal pagan prince, a most savage persecutor of Christians, a most foul sodomite, and a man devoted to every form of lust, as the pagan authors themselves testify, and that God, five hundred years after his death and damnation, remitted such abominable crimes to him by a singular mercy and liberated him from hell. For God was not moved even by Abraham's prayers to spare the Sodomites while they were still living this mortal life, but required ten just men through whose merits he might grant the preservation of Sodom and Gomorrah.

Hence John the Deacon did not derive the aforesaid account of Trajan from approved acts of the life of St. Gregory, but from obscure records of certain English or Saxon churches that possess little or no credibility and authority. The discourse on the faithful departed is not by Damascene, since it contains many things entirely foreign to the truth, such as the statement that none of those who have believed in Christ will perish, which is erroneous. Finally, as to the authority of St. Thomas, which possesses greater weight and importance, it must be said that he was scarcely able, because of the scarcity of books, to examine the truth of all the histories commonly circulated in his time, nor was he bound to do so, since this is not the theologian's office. Yet because of the supposed authority of Damascene, he was unwilling to reject that history, but answered it in the most probable manner available.

I answer secondly, granting for the sake of argument, but not conceding, the antecedent, namely the history of Trajan's soul being liberated from hell by the prayers of St. Gregory, and denying the consequence. For since this would have been done according to God's extraordinary and absolute law and power, by which he can empty hell if he wills, it does not prove that, according to his ordinary law and power, the punishments of the damned will ever have or be able to have a termination and end.

With these points presupposed, the difficulty is whether mortal sin of itself and from its intrinsic malice demands eternal punishment, or whether

this belongs to it only accidentally because of a law enacted by God by which he has willed to punish it eternally. The reason for doubt is that punishment must be proportioned to fault; but eternal punishment appears to have no proportion to a mortal fault committed in a very short time and almost in an instant.

38. I nevertheless say that mortal sin of itself and from its intrinsic malice induces liability to eternal punishment.

This is proved first from the foundations established in the preceding section. For a sin containing absolutely infinite malice and gravity in the moral order of itself and from its intrinsic malice merits infinite punishment, since punishment must be proportioned to fault. But mortal sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, contains absolutely infinite malice and gravity in the moral order, as was shown there. Therefore of itself and from its intrinsic malice it merits punishment infinite at least in duration, or eternal punishment.

St. Thomas indicates this argument in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3: “Another reason can also be assigned why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because through it one sins against God, who is infinite. Hence, since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because a creature is not capable of an infinite quality, it is required that it be at least infinite in duration.”

39. It is proved secondly by another excellent argument of the same holy Doctor here, q. 87, a. 3. A sin that signifies an irreparable disorder induces liability to eternal punishment of itself and from its intrinsic malice. But mortal sin signifies an irreparable disorder. Therefore of itself and from its intrinsic malice it induces liability to eternal punishment.

The major is evident. For sin induces liability to punishment by reason of its disorder, as we explained in the first presupposition. Hence liability to punishment must remain for as long as the disorder of the fault remains; consequently, if the latter is irreparable and perpetual, the former also will be eternal and without end.

The minor, in which the difficulty lies, can be established as follows. Mortal sin turns man away from and disorders him in relation to the ultimate end, as is evident from what was said in § 1. But disorder from the ultimate end is, by its proper nature and on the part of the sinner, irreparable, because the ultimate end in moral matters is like the first principle in speculative matters, and error concerning a first principle in speculative matters is irreparable. Therefore mortal sin signifies or imports an irreparable disorder.

40. From this reasoning it follows that venial sin of itself induces liability only to temporal punishment, because it does not signify an irreparable disorder, since such disorder concerns not the end, but only the means, and can therefore be repaired by a right intention of the end, just as an error concerning conclusions can be corrected through right knowledge of a principle. Hence mortal sin is related to the soul as death, destroying the first principle of spiritual life, which is grace and union with God as the ultimate end. Venial sin is like a sickness and disease of the soul, which does not destroy the principle of spiritual life, but merely induces spiritual languor and weakness. St. Thomas gives other arguments in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 144, which may be seen there.

41. To the reason for doubt it must be said that equality between fault and punishment is not required in every respect, especially as regards duration. For in human judgments we see perpetual deprivation of life or perpetual exile frequently inflicted for a crime committed very briefly. It is sufficient that there be a proportion between liability to punishment and the disorder of the fault, such that if the latter is eternal and irreparable, the former also must be perpetual and without end.

I add that although the act of mortal sin is transitory and sometimes momentary, nevertheless the will to sin is in a certain manner eternal, insofar as one who sins and, for example, prefers pleasure to God is so disposed that, if he were always to live, he would always will to persevere in sin and perpetually enjoy such pleasure. Hence Gregory in *Dialogi* l. 4, c. 44, when Peter asks, "I would like to know how it is just that a fault committed with an end should be punished without end," answers: "This would be rightly said if the strict Judge weighed not the hearts of men, but only their deeds. For the wicked sinned with an end because they lived with an end. They would certainly have willed, if they could, to live without end, so that they could sin without end. It therefore belongs to the great justice of the Judge that those who in this life never willed to be without sin should never be without punishment."

Therefore St. Thomas here, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1, expounding other words of the same Gregory, who says that "it is just that one who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity," adds: "Someone is said to have sinned in his own eternity not only according to the continuation of an act enduring throughout the whole of his life, but because from the very fact that he constitutes his end in sin, he has the will to sin eternally."

§ 6.

Venial Sin in One Damned, If It Was Not Remitted as to Guilt in This Life, Will Accidentally Be Punished in Hell with Eternal Punishment; It Is Otherwise If It Was Remitted as to Guilt in This Life, but Not as to Punishment.

42. The first part of this assertion is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *De malo* q. 7, a. 10, in the body, and q. 5, a. 2, ad 8. It is proved by the reasoning he indicates there. Venial sins not remitted in this life are not remitted as to guilt in hell. Therefore neither are they remitted as to punishment. The consequence is evident, since liability to punishment is an effect of guilt and therefore persists for as long as the guilt remains.

The antecedent is proved, first, because the remission of any sin does not occur without some application of Christ's merits, and there is none in hell, since in hell there is no redemption, as the Church says. Secondly, one who exists at the terminus receives no remission of sin. But the damned are absolutely and totally at the terminus, since they possess neither faith nor hope. In this they differ from the souls in purgatory, who, because they possess faith and hope, which are virtues of wayfarers and do not remain in the homeland, are in a qualified respect still on the way. Hence, although venial sins are remitted to the latter both as to guilt and as to punishment, they are not remitted to the former. This is especially so because the damned are obstinate in evil and can have no displeasure with sin that would be a morally good act, but always retain a formal or virtual affection for it.

43. The second part, namely that venial sin remitted as to guilt in this life is not punished in hell with eternal punishment, but only with temporal punishment, is likewise taught by St. Thomas in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5. Although in the first response he indicates the contrary position, in the second, which he approves more strongly, he openly professes our position in these words: "Others say that the punishment for which someone remains a debtor after the guilt has been remitted will be suffered temporally in hell. Nor does it follow from this that there is redemption in hell, because a punishment that is paid is not remitted. Nor is it unfitting that, as regards something accidental, the punishment of hell should be diminished until the day of judgment, just as it is also increased."

Reason also supports this. The reason venial sin not remitted as to guilt in this life cannot be remitted as to punishment in hell is that in hell it always remains and is never erased as to guilt, and while guilt remains, liability to punishment cannot cease, as we explained in the proof of the preceding part. Therefore, if venial sin is supposed to have been remitted as to guilt in this life, there is no reason why the temporal punishment due to it cannot be paid in hell through a punishment equal to what is owed.

Nor is it an obstacle that such payment is unwilling and involuntary in the damned. For although merit or satisfactory payment requires that the punishment endured be voluntary or freely accepted, this is not required for merely paying what is owed; for that purpose equality between the punishment and the fault suffices. Hence in human affairs a guilty man who undergoes the punishment determined and prescribed by the judge pays his debt to justice, although he suffers it not freely but unwillingly.

44. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: According to the common axiom of theologians, God punishes less than is deserved and rewards beyond what is deserved. But if in hell he punished with eternal punishment venial sins of the damned that were not remitted as to guilt in this life, he would punish them not less but more than they deserve, since only temporal punishment is due to venial sin. Therefore he does not punish them in hell with punishment enduring eternally.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the consequence of the minor. God does not punish beyond what is deserved the venial sins of the damned that were not remitted as to guilt in this life, even if he punishes them with punishment enduring eternally. For although eternal punishment is not due to them of themselves, it is nevertheless due to them accidentally by reason of the subject in which they are found, which is incapable of every pardon, indulgence, or remission of sin, because it is at the terminus and no application of Christ's merits can be made to it. But a fault that is accidentally irremissible accidentally merits eternal punishment according to what is deserved. This is the solution of St. Thomas, *De malo* q. 5, a. 2, ad 8.

45. You will object secondly against the second part: The unanimous consensus of the Church teaches that in hell there is not only no redemption, but also no mitigation of punishments. But if venial sins remitted as to guilt in this life were punished in hell not with eternal but only with temporal punishment, there would be a certain remission and mitigation of punishments in the damned, for when that temporal punishment had been paid, they would not experience as much punishment as before. Therefore such sins are punished in hell with eternal punishment.

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I answer with St. Thomas in the passage cited in proof of the second part of our assertion that, although the punishment of hell is not remitted or diminished as regards anything essential, because the essential punishment of the damned is invariable, just as the essential glory of the blessed is, since both are at the terminus, nevertheless it can be diminished as regards something accidental. For just as the accidental punishment of the damned is increased, so it can also be diminished.

§ 7.

It is Impossible for Venial Sin to Exist in Anyone
Together with Original Sin Alone.

46. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 89, a. 6, where he proves it by two arguments. The first, found in the argument “on the contrary,” is taken from the unfitting consequence that would follow from the opposing position. For if someone were to die with venial and original sin, there would be no place in which he could be punished. In the limbo of children, men are punished only for original sin; only the souls of those who die in grace descend to purgatory so that, purified by that fire, they may ascend to heaven; and men are cast into hell only because of actual mortal sin.

47. Nor is what some more recent authors say valid, namely that in such a case venial sin joined to original sin would be punished in hell by a light and temporal punishment of sense. First, because, as I have said, men are cast into hell only because of actual mortal sin. Secondly, although venial sins remitted as to guilt in this life are punished in hell by temporal punishment, those not remitted as to guilt in this life are not, as is evident from the preceding section. But in the case proposed by St. Thomas, venial sin joined to original sin would not have been remitted as to guilt in this life, since a man infected by original sin is incapable of grace and of the application of Christ’s merits, without which no sin is remitted as to guilt. Therefore it would not be punished in hell by a light and temporal punishment, as those authors say.

48. The second argument, which the same holy Doctor gives in the body of the same article, can be proposed as follows. If venial sin could be found in a man together with original sin alone, this would belong to him either before the first instant of the use of reason and freedom, or in that instant itself, or immediately after that instant. None of these can be said. Therefore the conclusion follows.

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The major is evident from a sufficient enumeration. The minor is proved in each of its parts. First, it appears manifest that this cannot belong to a man before the first instant of the use of reason, because before that instant man is in possession neither of reason nor of freedom. That it cannot belong to him in the instant itself of the use of reason and freedom, or immediately afterward, is shown as follows. In the first instant of the use of reason, a child is either justified or sins mortally. Therefore in that instant, or immediately afterward, venial sin together with original sin alone cannot be found in him.

The consequence is evident. For if he is justified, he obtains through grace the remission of original sin. But if he sins mortally, the venial sin he later commits will not be joined to original sin alone. The antecedent is proved as follows. In the first instant of the use of reason, a child is bound without excuse to turn himself to God, either explicitly or at least implicitly. If he fulfills this precept, he is by that very fact cleansed from original sin in the same instant through justifying grace infused into him by God, because the love of God above all things is incompatible with this fault, just as it is incompatible with any other mortal fault. But if he does not fulfill it, he sins mortally by a sin of omission. Therefore in the first instant of the use of reason, a child is either justified or sins mortally.

49. You will say first that this argument of St. Thomas presupposes something false, namely that there is a natural precept to turn oneself to God in the first moral instant of the use of reason. For it does not appear likely or consonant with the gentleness of divine providence that God should immediately, in the very first awakening of reason, press and as it were overwhelm man with a precept that must then be fulfilled for the first time.

But it can be shown in several ways that such a precept in fact exists and was not gratuitously devised by St. Thomas. First, as soon as a law has been sufficiently promulgated to someone, he is bound to accept it and subject himself to it. For example, when the evangelical law is first proposed to someone and he sufficiently recognizes the truth of that law, he is bound to embrace it and resolve to live according to it, at least in general; unless he does so, he sins mortally, as theologians rather commonly teach in the treatise on laws.

But in the first moral instant of the use of reason, the natural law is declared to man by God through the judgment of synderesis and the natural light of reason, dictating that the morally upright good is to be pursued and preferred to the useful and pleasurable good. Hence the holy Fathers, especially Cyril, understand the words John 1, "He enlightens every man

coming into this world,” of the illumination given in the first instant of the use of reason, in which man is said then to come into the world because he then first begins to live as a man. Therefore in that instant man is bound to subject himself to such a law and to resolve to follow the morally upright good consonant with reason. This is virtually and implicitly to turn himself to God, since in the love of the morally upright good, God is virtually and implicitly contained as the author and end of that good.

50. Secondly, in that first instant man enters morally into the world and begins the path of rational and human life. Hence, just as one who begins a long journey is bound by the judgment of right reason and prudence to set some terminus before himself at its beginning, so man in that first instant must set before himself a certain rule of action and a certain fixed goal by which he may direct his operations, namely to live uprightly and in conformity with the judgment of right reason. Otherwise he would expose himself to the greatest danger of error throughout the course of his life, since a small error in the beginning is greatest at the end.

Hence Seneca, in Epistle 71, prescribing the rule of rational life, says: “Whenever you wish to know what must be done or what must be valued, look to the supreme good and to the purpose of your whole life. Whatever we do must agree with it. No one will arrange individual things unless the whole of his life has already been set before him. We sin because we all deliberate about the parts of life, but no one deliberates about the whole. One who wishes to shoot an arrow must know what he is aiming at, and then direct and govern the weapon by his hand. Our counsels go astray because they have no goal toward which they are directed. No wind is favorable to one who does not know what port he seeks.”

51. Thirdly, the angel was bound by a precept to love God and turn himself to him in the first instant of his freedom, which was the second instant of his creation and corresponds to our first moral instant. Therefore we also are bound in this first instant of ours to elicit a similar love and turn ourselves to God in the manner of which we are capable at that age, explicitly or implicitly according to the illumination then given to us by God. For the same reason applies in both cases: every rational creature, when it fully exercises dominion over its will and acts as altogether free, is bound to submit itself to its Creator and consecrate its first love to him as the first fruit of its will.

It certainly appears highly consonant with reason that God, as the author of such a creature, should require from it from that moment this payment for the benefit of creation and demand that the first fruits of the freedom he created be consecrated to himself, just as under the Mosaic law

he formerly commanded that all firstborn animals and the first fruits of every crop be offered to him.

52. Finally, all the other times assigned by the adversaries for fulfilling the precept of loving God are not as apt and fitting as that first moral instant of the use of reason assigned by St. Thomas. This will be evident by relating them from Tamburini, *In Decalogum* l. 2, c. 3, § 2, where he lists ten opinions of theologians: “The first time assigned by some is the beginning of the use of reason; the second, the end of life; the third, the whole of life taken indeterminately, so that God be loved at least once during it; the fourth, all feast days, on which we ought to devote ourselves especially to God; the fifth, the time when an adult receives baptism; the sixth, the time when someone receives the Eucharist; the seventh, perhaps when marriage is contracted; the eighth, when you receive some great benefit from God; the ninth, when you hear someone blaspheming against God; the tenth, when you are pressed by a grave temptation, especially one of hatred of God, with danger of consenting unless you turn yourself to God through love.”

It is evident, I say, that all those times are not as apt and fitting for fulfilling the precept of love as the beginning of the use of reason. What is said concerning the instant of death is commonly rejected. For since the precept of loving God was given for the right ordering of human life through the relation of our operations to God as the ultimate end, and for establishing and preserving friendship with him, it is contrary to reason that it should bind only at the end of life and that the whole span of life should lie outside such obligation.

Hence Domingo de Soto in *De iustitia et iure* l. 2, q. 3, a. 10, speaking of this opinion, says: “If you say that it is sufficient to fulfill the precept of loving God once in life, and that at the point of death, you certainly stray far from the nature of this precept. For since this precept is the preamble to all the others and, as Paul says, their end—‘the end of the commandment is charity’—it would be ridiculous to say that it is lawful to pass one’s whole life before it binds us.”

Similarly, the other opinion, which assigns the whole time of life indeterminately, is commonly rejected because a certain and determinate time in which it binds must be assigned to every determinate precept. Hence this manner of speaking does not solve the difficulty, but conceals it. The other opinions also, except the last, lack all probability, since eliciting acts of charity at the times designated by those authors—such as feast days, when baptism or the Eucharist is to be received, when the time of martyrdom approaches, or when some great benefit is received from God—is not commanded, but only counseled.

53. A difficulty can arise only concerning the last opinion, taught by Thomas Sánchez in *Summa* l. 2, c. 35. After rejecting the other manners of speaking, he teaches that the precept of charity binds only when grave temptations to hatred of God are imminent and there is danger of succumbing to them unless the person tempted elicits an act of love of God.

But the Carmelite theologians of Salamanca show in disp. 20, dub. 1, n. 5 that this manner of speaking is also insufficient. First, an obligation to an act that arises precisely because of an accidentally occurring and urgent temptation is an accidental obligation, not one that binds of itself, just as it is accidental, and does not belong to the thing of itself, that such a temptation should then occur and be incapable of being overcome in another way. But the time we seek is not one in which the precept of loving God binds accidentally, but one in which it binds of itself, because it is certain that some time must be assigned for this obligation that belongs to the precept of itself.

Secondly, such an obligation must be common to all adults and bind all of them, just as the precept itself is common and imposed upon all. But the occasion on which grave temptations to hatred of God press and danger of succumbing to them is present is not common to all adults. There are many who throughout the whole of life are troubled by no such temptations. Therefore this way does not assign a sufficient time for the aforesaid obligation.

54. From these things you will understand that St. Thomas did not invent or devise a new precept when he asserted that a child arriving at the use of reason is bound to turn himself to God. He merely determined and declared the time at which the first and most ancient of all commandments, namely charity, begins to bind: the first moral instant of the use of reason.

55. Nor is it an obstacle if you allege the weakness of that age, which does not appear suited to undertaking such an obligation. For it is easier for a child to elicit such a conversion or love in that instant, when no indisposition left by any personal sin is present, than at a later time when such an indisposition could impede the will. Hence divine providence appears to have acted more gently by restricting this precept to the first instant than if it had deferred it further.

I add that a child arriving at the years of discretion is not bound to turn himself to God except according to the illumination and knowledge of God then communicated to him. Thus, if his knowledge of God is explicit, he is bound to explicit love; if it is implicit, only to implicit love, that is, to the love of the morally upright good, in which God is virtually and implicitly contained as the author and end of that good.

56. You will say secondly: A child reaches an imperfect use of reason before a full and perfect use. For reason does not begin in man altogether suddenly, but its bonds are loosened successively and gradually through the purification of the organs and the drying of the humors. Therefore, since imperfect deliberation suffices for venial sin, as is evident in first movements of concupiscence, before the moral instant of the use of reason in which he has full and perfect discourse, or the use of reason and freedom, a child will be able to possess venial sin together with original sin alone.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. To its proof I say with Cajetan here, q. 89, a. 6: "Although less freedom in its exercise suffices for venial sin than for mortal sin, because one sins venially without full deliberation, less freedom in the faculty does not suffice, because no one sins venially without the free faculty of exercising dominion over individual movements, and this faculty does not exist without full freedom." Hence, since a child before the first moral instant of the use of reason lacks such a faculty, although perhaps he can have some imperfect use of freedom, he is then incapable of venial sin.

57. You will say thirdly: Since the first instant in which, according to St. Thomas, a child is bound to turn to God is not mathematical and altogether indivisible, but moral, containing some span of time within itself, a sufficient time can be assigned within it in which the child sins venially even with full advertence before fulfilling that precept. Therefore venial sin can be found together with original sin alone.

I answer by denying the antecedent. Although such an instant is not physical but moral and includes within itself some span of time, nevertheless during it God, through a special judgment caused in the child's intellect, declares to him the obligation of fulfilling such a precept. Since through such knowledge God presses him to deliberate about himself in relation to the proper end, if he deliberately turns aside from this to think or act upon something else, he sins mortally. Consequently, original sin is not then found in him together with venial sin alone.

58. You will say fourthly: Even if a child in the moral instant of the use of reason fulfills the aforesaid precept and orders himself to the morally upright good, he is not thereby justified and cleansed from original sin. Therefore the principal foundation upon which St. Thomas's argument rests collapses. The consequence is evident from what has been said above. The antecedent is proved because knowledge of the mysteries of faith, at least of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, is required for justification, as theologians teach in the treatises on justification and faith. Therefore, even if in the first instant of the use of reason a child turns himself explicitly

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to the good and implicitly to God as the author and end of such a good, he is not thereby justified or cleansed from original sin.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof I say that if God in his infinite mercy and providence gives to a child arriving at the use of reason efficacious assistance by which he explicitly turns himself to the morally upright good and implicitly to God as the author and end of such a good, then, in consequence of this special mercy and providence, God will either immediately enlighten him by himself concerning the aforesaid mysteries or direct to him some preacher who will instruct him concerning them.

Thus St. Thomas, *De veritate* q. 14, a. 11, ad 1, where he says that if someone brought up in the woods or among barbarous peoples, where he had heard nothing of our faith, “followed the judgment of natural reason in seeking good and avoiding evil, it must be held most certainly that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration the things necessary to be believed, or direct to him some preacher of the faith, just as he sent Peter to Cornelius in Acts 10.” But this will be treated more fully in the treatise on grace.

TREATISE VI.

ON THE LAWS.

Since, according to the Apostle in Rom. 6, knowledge of sin is obtained through the law, and sin itself is a transgression of the law, for the completion and understanding of the treatise on sins we now append the treatment of laws. In it we shall first treat laws in common and then explain their various species: eternal, natural, human, and divine law, both old and new.

CHAPTER I.

Law in General.

§ 1.

The Existence and Essence of Law.

1. We presuppose as certain and manifest the existence or necessity of laws. The very nature of intellectual creatures indicates it, for since an intellectual creature cannot be the rule of its own moral operations, it necessarily requires a superior by whom it may be directed in its operations through a certain law and norm, lest it stray from the end for which it was created. Since its nature is capable of defect and can turn aside from the end of moral

rectitude toward which it is inclined, it needs a law directing it through a certain norm to its end.

Experience itself also demonstrates the necessity and usefulness of laws, since it is evident that no commonwealth can stand without laws. Hence laws are said to be as it were the foundations upon which the commonwealth rests and adheres, and the bonds and cords by which it is constrained and perseveres firm and fixed in the good it has begun. Hence Cicero in the oration *Pro Cluentio* calls laws the sinews and blood of the commonwealth, and says that just as our bodies cannot subsist without blood and sinews, neither can a commonwealth subsist without laws. Aristotle likewise in *Rhetorica* 1. 3 asserts that the safety of the commonwealth is constituted in its laws.

2. Law consists essentially in an act of the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 90, a. 1. This is proved because it belongs to law to prescribe and command, but this belongs essentially to the intellect, as we showed in the treatise on human acts when treating the act of command.

It is also proved because law is a certain rule and measure of human acts. But ruling and measuring human acts belongs to reason, since reason is the first principle of human acts, and in every genus that which is the principle is the measure and rule of that genus. Thus unity, which is the principle of number, is the measure of all numbers; and the motion of the first heaven, which is first in the genus of motions, is the measure of all motions of inferior bodies.

3. Nevertheless, presuppositively and by connotation, law imports an act of the will. First, because it is proper to law to move subjects to do something, but the intellect alone without the will cannot move. Secondly, because law belongs not to the speculative intellect but to the practical intellect; and the practical intellect presupposes an act of the will by which it is moved and from which it participates efficacy and the power of moving.

Law therefore consists essentially in an act of command by which the ruler orders the subject to do something, declaring or announcing it to him. Or rather, it consists in something constituted through that act. For law is related to the intellect and its act as an idea is related to the artisan's intellect and art. Both are a measure, rule, and exemplar: law of conduct, and the idea of things to be made through art. But an idea is a term produced in the intellect through art. Therefore law also will be a term produced through command and its practical word.

This is confirmed. Law exists in the intellect of the ruler not only subjectively but also objectively, as what is known in the knower. For when a

ruler issues a law, he attends to and knows the law itself. Therefore law is not the act of the practical intellect, but rather the practical word itself and the term of the practical conception and command by which the ruler orders his subjects to do something.

4. Laws must be firm, stable, and enduring, and consequently in some manner perpetual. For, as we said above, they are as foundations upon which the commonwealth rests and as sinews by which it subsists. Hence jurists establish this distinction between a law and a precept made by a man: a mere precept expires upon the death of the one commanding, but a law does not, since it does not die with him, as the Abbot observed in c. *Irrefragabili*, § *Ceterum, De officio ordinarii*.

5. Laws must be enacted for the whole community. For law differs from a precept also in this respect: a precept is imposed upon one, while a law is imposed upon many, insofar as a precept is ordered to the private direction of a part, while law is ordered to the public governance of the commonwealth. Hence law is an act of political or royal prudence, which primarily and of itself regards the good of the community.

I add that law must be perpetual, as we said above. Therefore it is not imposed upon one private person, who is mortal, but upon a community, which is perpetual insofar as it endures through continual succession.

6. From this it is inferred that it belongs to the nature of law that it be for the common good and useful to it. For the power of making laws is given to men, whether by God or by the commonwealth, only for the common good. Hence Isidore says in *Etymologiae* l. 5 that “a law is written not for any private advantage, but for the common benefit of the citizens,” according to the saying of the Twelve Tables: “Let the welfare of the people be the supreme law.”

I add that law, since it has its subject in the practical intellect and is the rule of human acts, must be regulated by the first principle of practice and human acts. But the first principle in practical matters is the ultimate end and beatitude. Therefore every law must be regulated by and reduced to the ultimate end or beatitude, which is the common good. Hence natural law is ordered to natural beatitude, which is the common good proportioned to it; supernatural law is ordered to supernatural beatitude; and civil law orders men to the political beatitude of the city and kingdom, which is the common good proportioned to it and consists chiefly in the tranquility and peace of the commonwealth. Hence Plato in *Leges* l. 1 says that laws must be enacted for the sake of public peace.

7. Nor is it an obstacle that some laws appear to regard a private good, such as the natural law concerning the preservation of one’s own life and a

privilege that regards the particular good of the person in whose favor it is granted. For it is one thing to speak of the proximate matter concerning which a law operates, and another to speak of the formal motive for which it operates concerning such matter. Since law is a rule of human acts, we must distinguish these two things in law just as we distinguish them in human acts.

The natural law concerning the preservation of one's own life therefore regards the private good of a particular person as its proximate matter, but it has the common good as the motive that it primarily and of itself regards. For since every man is a part of human nature and a part is of itself ordered to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect, the good of every particular man is consequently of itself ordered to the good of the whole human nature. Hence the author and preserver of the whole nature, to whom it belongs to regard such a good, rightly commands that each person preserve his own life, so that the good of the whole nature, which can subsist only in individuals, may be preserved.

8. From this the answer is evident to what is added concerning a privilege. Although a privilege regards the private good of some person as its proximate matter, it nevertheless contributes to the common good that some should be privileged because of strenuous deeds performed in service of the commonwealth, so that others may be incited to promote the common good through diligent and arduous works. I add that a privilege, as we shall say below, does not properly possess the character of law.

9. From what has been said, it is gathered first that the power of making laws belongs to the community or commonwealth, or to one who has care of it. For law, as was just shown, is primarily and principally ordered to the common good. But to order something to the common good belongs to the community or to one who has care of it, because just as a part regards a particular good as its proportioned and proper end, so the whole community regards the common good. Therefore the making of civil laws belongs only to the community or to one who presides over and has care of it.

10. It must nevertheless be observed that legislative power resides immediately and by natural right in the community, but only mediately and by human right in a king or anyone else possessing the power to make laws. For since the power of making civil laws cannot conveniently be exercised by the whole community through itself, it is customarily transferred to one man who is the moral head of the community and supreme ruler of all the rest, if a monarchical government is instituted; or to a few of the best, if an aristocratic government is instituted; or to the many and common people, if a democratic government is instituted.

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The power of making canons and ecclesiastical laws, however, which resides in the Supreme Pontiffs and legitimately assembled councils, was communicated to them immediately not by the Church but by Christ, as was the power of governing the Church. Hence in c. *Novit*, *De iudiciis*, the Pontiff speaks of pontifical authority in this way: “Since it rests not upon a human constitution but upon a divine one, because our power is not from men but from God.”

11. It is gathered secondly that these three things—a precept, a judicial sentence, and a privilege—do not possess the true character of law.

A threefold difference is found between a simple precept and a law. The first is that, although a precept can be imposed upon the whole community, this is not necessarily required, since it can be imposed upon a particular person; but a law necessarily always regards a community of persons. The second is that a precept expires upon the death or removal of the one imposing it, but a law does not expire upon the death of the legislator, since by its nature it is perpetual. The third is that a precept can be imposed by any superior, while a law can be enacted only by one who possesses legislative power from God or the commonwealth.

12. A judicial sentence likewise differs from a law. For a law is the superior’s ordinance itself, while a judicial sentence is rather the application and execution of the law concerning a private person and event than the imposition of a law. Hence supreme legislative power in a ruler is not required to issue a judgment, but an inferior judge can issue it by authority derived from the ruler, as is evident from practice.

The reason is that, just as in artificial matters it belongs to the architect to arrange the form of a house, while it belongs to inferior craftsmen to apply it by introducing it into some singular matter, namely by shaping the wood and fitting the stones, so in moral matters it belongs to the ruler, who is the architect of government, to arrange the forms of laws for procuring the common good, while their application to singular cases and persons can belong to particular judges.

13. Finally, law differs from privilege because law always regards a plurality of persons and the common good of the commonwealth, while a privilege can regard a particular person and his particular good. Hence a privilege, according to Isidore, *Etymologiae* l. 1, c. 18, is so called as though it were a private law, or a law of private persons. This will be treated more fully below, when we discuss privileges.

14. You will ask first whether promulgation is necessary and essential to law.

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I answer that promulgation is necessarily required for a law to bind actually. Nevertheless, it is not of the essence of law or its formal character, but merely a condition necessarily required for it actually to bind subjects.

The first part of this resolution is evident. For law is related as a rule and measure of human acts, which men must follow and to which they must conform their actions. But they cannot do this unless the law becomes known to them, since the will cannot tend toward what is unknown; nor can a law become known to them except through promulgation. Therefore promulgation is necessarily required for a law to bind.

Yet promulgation is not equally required in all laws, but in diverse ways according to the nature of each. For positive divine law does not require such solemn promulgation as human law. Divine law is sometimes promulgated by internal revelation alone, as happened to many of the prophets. Human law, however, must always be promulgated through external signs and with some solemnity; thus practice has obtained both in the secular and in the ecclesiastical commonwealth.

The reason for this difference is that, since God, the institutor of divine law, is the supreme lord absolutely and in every respect, he can declare his law in whatever manner he wills and oblige men to observe it. But man, who does not possess such supreme dominion, cannot do this. Since he acts as though bearing a twofold person, public and private, a ruler must establish a law in such a way that by the manner of proposing it he signifies that he proposes it as a ruler making a law and not as a private person. This does not occur unless some public solemnity signifying it is employed.

15. You will say: Promulgation is not required for the revocation of a law. Therefore neither is it required for its institution.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For while a law is not revoked by solemn promulgation, it is morally judged to persevere with its first and legitimate promulgation and consequently to bind actually, just as, while the value of currency is not revoked by a solemn revocation declared to the subjects, it is morally judged to remain, as is evident from practice.

16. The second part, which asserts that promulgation is not of the essence of law, is taught by St. Thomas here, q. 90, a. 4, where he says that promulgation is the application of the law to those who are bound through it. But the application of a thing presupposes that the thing has already been constituted in its formal character. Therefore promulgation presupposes the essence and formal character of law as already constituted, and consequently does not constitute it.

Reason also supports this. For it suffices for the essence and character of law that it possess an aptitude to bind, because things, as the philosophers

teach, are defined through aptitude and first actuality, not through exercise and second actuality, which now exists and now does not. But a law not yet promulgated is apt to induce obligation, although it does not actually induce it until it is promulgated. Therefore it possesses the true character of law, although promulgation is a condition required for it to bind.

Yet promulgation is not a purely accidental and merely extrinsic condition, such as the approach of an agent to a patient, but an intrinsic and essential condition, since it is required by way of proposing the object to the will. Because the will is a rational appetite, that is, one following the guidance of reason and the intellect's cognition, it cannot tend toward what is unknown.

Nevertheless, for a human law to bind actually, it is not sufficient that it become known and be applied to men through any kind of knowledge, so as to answer a tacit objection. It must be applied to them through knowledge proportioned to human law, which is obtained only when the ruler has it declared and promulgated with some solemnity, as is evident from what was said above.

17. You will ask secondly whether it belongs to the nature of law that it be committed to writing.

I answer that it does not. This is evident first from Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* l. 10, final c., where he says: "It appears to make no difference whether laws are written or unwritten." Secondly, from civil law, *Institutiones, De iure naturali, gentium et civili*, § *Sed et quod principi placuit*, where it is said: "Whatever the emperor establishes by a letter or decrees after hearing a case is clearly law." There decree is divided from writing, and each is affirmed to be law.

Nevertheless, for greater perfection and so that the fitting order of establishing law may be observed, it ought to be transmitted in writing. For since law by its nature is stable, immovable, and perpetual, it connaturally requires for its own permanence that mode by which its immutability and perpetuity are better preserved and by which it is impressed more tenaciously and firmly upon men's memory. This mode is writing, as is self-evident. Hence St. Thomas says here, a. 4: "Present promulgation is extended into the future by the permanence of writing, which in a certain manner always promulgates the law."

18. From what has been said, you will understand that law is rightly defined or described by St. Thomas in the same place as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by one who has care of the community." For, as we showed above, law consists essentially in an act of

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the intellect, regards the common good, and must be enacted by one who has care of the community.

He adds that it is promulgated by him because, although promulgation is not of the essence of law, as we said above, it is nevertheless its intrinsic mode insofar as law actually binds. For the definition of something can include not only what has the character of its formal reason, but also what has the character of an intrinsic mode or condition. Thus obscurity enters the definition of faith, and the intellect's apprehension enters the definition of the object of the will.

§ 2.

What is the Division of Law?

19. Law in general is divided into divine and human law. Divine law is that which has its force immediately from God's authority, although its promulgation is not made immediately by God but through the intervention of an angel or man. Such was the old law, given by God to Moses through angels and promulgated through him, and the evangelical law, enacted by Christ and made public partly through himself and partly through the Apostles.

Human law is that which is enacted immediately by human authority, although that authority is received from God. The first legislator among men was Moses among the Hebrews, Phoroneus among the Greeks, Trismegistus among the Egyptians, Solon among the Athenians, Lycurgus among the Lacedaemonians, and Numa Pompilius among the Romans.

20. Divine law is subdivided into eternal, natural, and positive law, because God's law can be considered either as conceived from eternity, as impressed upon the intellect of every man, or as manifested through public promulgation.

Positive divine law is further subdivided into the old and the new. The first is that which God gave through the ministry of angels on Mount Sinai and through Moses to the people of Israel. The second is that which Christ, the author of the New Testament, enacted and promulgated partly through himself and partly through the Apostles. Just as the old law contained precepts of three kinds, namely moral, ceremonial, and judicial, so the new also includes three kinds of precepts, namely those of faith, the sacraments, and morals, as we shall explain more fully below when discussing the new law.

21. Human law is subdivided into ecclesiastical and civil law. The former is enacted by ecclesiastical power, such as that of the Pope and councils; the latter by secular power, such as that of kings and emperors. The first is called canon law, the second civil law.

The body of canon law is divided into the *Decretum* and the Decretals. The collector and compiler of the *Decretum* was Gratian, a monk of the Order of St. Benedict, who, after the earlier collectors of canons and decrees, constructed and composed that immense work partly from the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, partly from canons of councils, and partly from the sayings and judgments of the holy Fathers of the Church. This body was corrected and published by the authority of Gregory XIII, Supreme Pontiff.

The *Decretum* is divided into three parts. The first contains one hundred and one distinctions, in which divine and human law and those matters that concern the ordering of morals and ecclesiastical discipline are treated. The second contains thirty-six causes, and each cause is distributed into various questions. A treatise on penance is inserted into the thirty-sixth cause and is completed in five distinctions. Finally, the third part of the *Decretum*, which treats consecration, includes five distinctions.

22. As regards the Decretals, by which name rescripts or letters of the Supreme Pontiffs issued in response to petitions or reports are properly signified, they were collected by the authority of Gregory IX, Supreme Pontiff, through St. Raymond of the Order of Preachers, his chaplain and penitentiary, and divided into five books. Whenever the Decretals are cited without qualification, those of Gregory are understood by preeminence.

To these five books of the Decretals of Gregory another book of decretals was added by Boniface VIII, Supreme Pontiff, who therefore willed that it be called the Sixth Book. This volume of Boniface contains five books.

23. There are also other constitutions or decretals whose author was Clement V. They were edited and published by his successor John XXII, and are customarily called the Clementines. They are divided into five books.

To the Clementines the same Pope John added twenty constitutions, which are called *Extravagantes* because they wander and lie outside the aforesaid books of Decretals.

24. Finally, there are other constitutions issued by various Roman Pontiffs, entitled *Extravagantes communes*, which contain five books.

25. From dist. 14 to 25 Gratian assigns six principles or sources from which the whole of canon law is drawn or derived: Sacred Scripture; the traditions promulgated by the Apostles as heralds of the Gospel; the Canons of the Apostles, which do not possess as much authority as the traditions; decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs and general councils; particular councils

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confirmed by the approval of the Supreme Pontiff; and the decretal letters of the Supreme Pontiffs.

The order and division of the books of civil law collected by Emperor Justinian are as follows. When Justinian observed that Roman law, called civil law by preeminence, had grown into an immense and confused mass, he resolved to enclose it within certain shorter limits. Before his time there were three Codes containing the laws and constitutions of earlier emperors: the Gregorian, Hermogenian, and Theodosian. From these he made one, which he named after himself.

After completing the Code, Justinian turned his attention to the volumes of the ancient jurists. Their almost infinite multitude, dispersed through two thousand books, he compressed and arranged into fifty books, which are therefore called the books of the Digest, or Pandects, their name being taken from the Greek words *πάν δέχομαι*, that is, “I receive everything,” because they contain the whole science of ancient jurisprudence.

Then, so that young men desiring knowledge of the laws might have an easy and simple path by which they could advance to the most extensive science of law, Justinian had four books of Institutes composed to serve as the elements and principles of the whole law. But because many things appeared to be lacking in the earlier Code, Justinian published another, fuller and more corrected one, which he called the Code of the Repeated Reading. This is the Code we possess and use.

Finally, the same emperor gathered into one book various constitutions that he afterward promulgated during his reign. We call these constitutions sometimes the Novels and sometimes the Authentics. Therefore the whole of civil law consists and is composed of the Code, completed in twelve books; fifty books of the Digest or Pandects; four books of the Institutes; and one book of Novels.

§ 3.

The Offices, Effects, and Acts of Law.

26. There are two principal offices of law: to direct and to bind. Since law possesses the character of a rule and measure of human acts, it directs men and shows them what they ought to do or omit. For this reason it is called a light in Prov. 6: “The commandment is a lamp, and the law a light.” But since it proceeds from a superior and contains his will, it possesses the power of binding. Hence law is said to derive its name from binding, because, as St.

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Thomas says here, a. 4, “through it subjects are bound to its observance,” or, as Cassiodorus says, “because it binds our minds and makes them subject to its ordinances.”

27. The principal effect of law is to make men good, either absolutely or in a qualified respect. Divine law, especially the evangelical law, intends that a man become absolutely good, not only in his exterior work but also in his interior disposition. Natural law intends that he become good through the moral virtues proportioned to nature. Civil law intends that he become a good citizen and do those things necessary for the peace of the commonwealth. Ecclesiastical law intends that he become a good cleric who fulfills his office.

There are four acts of law: to command, prohibit, permit, and punish. For human acts are either good by their genus, evil by their genus, or indifferent by their genus or object. The first are commanded, the second prohibited, and the third permitted. And because law could not efficaciously prohibit evil acts unless it could restrain men from evil by fear of punishments, a fourth act is posited, namely punishment.

CHAPTER II.

The Eternal Law.

1. Eternal law is the plan of divine wisdom existing in God from eternity, insofar as it directs all the acts and individual movements of creatures in order to the common good of the whole universe. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 93, a. 1, where he reasons as follows.

Just as the plan of things to be made through art is called the art or exemplar of the things produced by art, so the plan of one governing the acts of his subjects possesses the character of law, provided the other conditions that we said above belong to the essence of law are observed. But God through his wisdom is the maker of all things, to which he is related as an artisan to his artifacts. He is also the governor of all acts and movements found in individual creatures. Hence, just as the plan of divine wisdom, insofar as all things are created through it, possesses the character of art, exemplar, or idea, so the plan of divine wisdom moving all things to their proper end possesses the character of law.

Thus eternal law is nothing other than the plan of divine wisdom insofar as it directs all the acts and individual movements of creatures. Or, as St. Augustine says in *De libero arbitrio* l. 1: “Eternal law is the plan existing in the

mind of God by which all things are ordered and directed through proportionate means to their ends.”

2. From this it is gathered first that eternal law differs from an idea in several ways. An idea regards a thing as creatable; eternal law regards it as governable. An idea operates as determining God to the specification of the work on the part of the object; law operates as binding him to the execution of the work. Ideas are multiplied in God because they express a relation to diverse creatures according to their proper and distinct formal characters and essences. Eternal law is one because it regards the actions and movements of all creatures under one common aspect, namely insofar as they are ordered to the common good of the universe.

3. It is gathered secondly that eternal law differs from providence. Eternal law primarily and of itself regards the common good of the universe, while providence regards the singular good of each creature. Eternal law includes in its character the power of binding, but providence does not. Again, eternal law provides in God the general rules of governance, for example that a stone tends downward and fire upward; providence, according to those rules, disposes in particular of the movements of creatures, and therefore providence has eternal law as its principle.

4. It is gathered thirdly that all laws are derived from the eternal law and flow from it as from a source. First, because the first in every genus is the cause and measure of the others. Secondly, because in every ordered series of movers the power of the second mover is derived from the first. Hence, since eternal law is the plan of governance in the supreme governor, all plans of governance found in inferior governors must be derived from eternal law.

Nevertheless, not all laws proceed from the eternal law in the same manner. Divine laws flow immediately from it; natural law through the mediation of the light of reason; and human laws through the mediation of a power communicated to rulers either immediately by God or through the consent of the commonwealth.

5. It is gathered fourthly that, since eternal law directs all the acts and individual movements of creatures, all the operations of creatures, whether rational or irrational, are subject to it. Yet there is this distinction: the actions of rational creatures are subject to eternal law as commanding and binding, while the actions by which insensible creatures and those lacking reason are directed to their ends are not subject to eternal law as formally commanding and binding, because they are incapable of obedience and obligation, but as ordering and moving them to their ends.

6. It is gathered fifthly that eternal law is truly and properly law, since it is an ordinance of reason for the common good by one who has care of the

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community, in which the character of law essentially consists, as is evident from its definition given in the preceding chapter.

Nor is it an obstacle that it was not promulgated from eternity, since from eternity there were no creatures to whom it could have been promulgated. For promulgation is only an intrinsic condition for a law actually to bind, not for it to possess the character of law and to have the power of binding in first actuality, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

It appears more probable, however, that although eternal law exercises the character and office of true law in relation to rational creatures, to whom it is made known in an intelligible manner, nevertheless in relation to irrational creatures, to whom it is made known and promulgated not in an intelligible manner but through the impression of an inclination and active principle by which they are moved to their ends, it does not exercise the character and office of true and proper law, but only of a certain providence or principle of governance. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 90, a. 1, says that law properly so called is the measure of human acts, and consequently does not appear to admit the character of true and strict law in relation to irrational creatures.

CHAPTER III.

The Natural Law.

§ 1.

What Natural Law Is.

1. Natural law is a certain judgment of natural reason, implanted in us by nature or by the Author of nature, which not only manifests good and evil but also commands.

The first part is evident. For law consists essentially in an act of the intellect, or a judgment of reason, as we showed in c. 1. Hence natural law must consist in a judgment or dictate of natural reason implanted by nature or by the Author of nature, according to the words of the Apostle: "We have the law written in our hearts." Hence Augustine says in *De sermone Domini in monte* l. 2, c. 9: "There is no soul capable of reasoning in whose conscience God does not speak. For who writes the natural law in the hearts of men except God?" And Ambrose in l. 9, epistle 71: "That law is not inscribed but inborn; it is not learned through any reading, but is expressed in each person from a certain flowing fountain of nature."

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2. The second part, namely that such a judgment not only manifests good and evil but also commands, is evident from what was said in c. 1, where we showed that law consists essentially in an act of command, since it belongs to law to prescribe or command, and law is an act of prudence, which is preceptive.

This is confirmed. Natural law is nothing other than a participation of eternal law in a rational creature, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 91, a. 2, and as will be evident from what is said below. Therefore it does not consist in a judgment that merely manifests good and evil, but one that also commands. The consequence is evident because eternal law, as such, is preceptive. Therefore what participates in it by way of law essentially participates in its power of commanding.

3. From these things it is gathered first that three things that might otherwise be thought identical must be distinguished: the law of nature, conscience, and synderesis. The law of nature is the very ordinance of the divine will impressed upon us. Synderesis is the natural light of the intellect through which we naturally know God's ordinance. Conscience is the very action of the mind by which we formally know it, or the practical judgment by which we apprehend or judge that something must or must not be done.

I add that conscience concerns some particular action, while the law of nature is a universal rule concerning things to be done and avoided in common. Conscience concerns future, present, and already completed things, while the law of nature disposes only concerning future things and does not regard what has already been done. The judgment of conscience can be erroneous, but it is repugnant to the character of true law that it be erroneous.

4. It is gathered secondly that natural law is as it were a certain part of eternal law. For eternal law extends to all creatures, rational and irrational, just as divine providence does; but natural law extends only to rational creatures, that is, to men and angels.

Hence natural law does not properly reside in brute animals. Although they possess from the Author of nature an inclination toward those things naturally fitting for them, this inclination does not operate by way of a certain direction and command, as in man, but by way of an impression, insofar as God impresses upon them intrinsic principles for acting conformably to their nature. This impression should be called natural instinct rather than natural law.

5. It is gathered thirdly that natural law is absolutely one in itself. For although the precepts of the natural law are many, they are all connected in the ultimate end of human nature to which they are ordered, and are

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radically contained in that first and most universal principle: “Good is to be done, and evil avoided,” which is one. Hence from the unity of the end and of the radical and first principle, natural law itself is said to be absolutely one.

§ 2.

What Things Belong to Natural Law?

6. In the first place, those most evident and most universal practical principles naturally known to everyone belong to natural law: “Good is to be done.” “Do not do to another what you do not wish to be done to yourself.” These should be called not so much precepts as principles of all precepts.

Secondly, all the precepts of the Decalogue belong to the same law, for they are inferred from those two principles by the natural light, as is evident concerning the worship of God, the honor of parents, the prohibitions against murder, theft, adultery, and the others. These things are not good because commanded and evil because prohibited; on the contrary, they are commanded because good and prohibited because evil and naturally unfitting.

The precept concerning the observance of the Sabbath must nevertheless be excepted, since it contains something of positive divine law and something of natural law. Insofar as it commands the worship of God, it belongs to natural law, for nature teaches and dictates that God must be worshiped because of his supreme excellence and the benefits he has bestowed. But insofar as it prescribes one determinate day rather than another, it belongs to positive divine law. For nature does not prescribe this day; God alone expressly commanded Adam and Eve to observe it because, as Scripture says, on the seventh day he rested from creation, or from every work he had accomplished.

Thus only under this aspect was it rendered obsolete through the abrogation of the old law by the evangelical law, in which Sunday, consecrated by Christ’s Resurrection, succeeded the Sabbath as the day to be observed by us.

7. Thirdly, all acts of the moral virtues belong to natural law if considered according to their generic character, or insofar as they are virtuous, but not if considered in themselves and in their proper species. Thus St. Thomas teaches here, q. 94, a. 3, where he demonstrates the first part by this reasoning:

“Whatever man is inclined toward according to his nature belongs to natural law. Now each thing is naturally inclined toward the operation fitting

to it according to its form, as fire is inclined to heat. Hence, since the rational soul is man's proper form, there exists in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason, and this is to act according to virtue. Therefore, according to this consideration, all acts of the virtues belong to natural law, for each person's own reason naturally dictates to him that he should act virtuously."

8. He proves the second part from the fact that "many things are done according to virtue toward which nature does not first incline, but which men have discovered through rational inquiry as useful for living well," as is evident in acts of commutative justice exercised in buying, selling, and other human contracts.

Both parts can be explained by this example. An act of temperance, for example, according to its generic character or by its genus, that is, insofar as it is a virtuous act, is such that nature inclines toward it, and thus it is said to belong to natural law. But that it must be exercised through abstinence from meat and the Lenten fast does not arise from natural law but from positive law, for it depends upon the will and commandment of the Church.

9. You will say: Not all sins are contrary to nature. Therefore neither do all acts of the moral virtues belong to natural law.

I answer that although not all sins are contrary to animal nature, or to the nature common to all animals, in the manner in which intercourse between males is said to be contrary to nature, nevertheless all are contrary to rational nature, that is, to reason, which is man's nature.

For a better understanding of this, it must be observed that three grades are distinguished in human nature: the living, the animal, and the rational. If it is considered according to the grade of living thing, killing oneself is said to be a sin contrary to nature, because each person, insofar as he is living, is bound to preserve his own life, according to Cicero, *De officiis* l. 1: "In the beginning, nature has given to every kind of living thing the impulse to protect itself, its life, and its body."

If human nature is considered according to the grade of animal, the abominable sins of the flesh, such as sodomy, bestiality, and masturbation, are said to be contrary to nature, because they oppose the natural inclination implanted in all animals.

Finally, if human nature is considered according to its rational grade and its proper difference by which it is separated from brute animals, all sins are said to oppose human nature, because all are contrary to reason, which is man's nature, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 71, a. 2. Nevertheless, by antonomasia, the first two kinds of sins are said to oppose nature because it

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is most abominable to commit what brute animals themselves, and indeed all living things, abhor.

§ 3.

Whether Natural Law Can Undergo Change,
Dispensation, or Interpretation.

10. I say first that natural law cannot undergo change properly so called, but only an improper change, or a change on the part of its matter.

The first part is proved as follows. A change of law properly so called occurs when the law itself is changed in itself: either because it ceases of itself, as when it was enacted for a limited time; or because it changes from just to unjust; or because it is abrogated by a superior; or because it is restricted by him through dispensation. But natural law can undergo change in none of these ways.

It cannot cease of itself, because it was not enacted for a limited time, but without a terminus. Nor can it change from just to unjust, since it commands nothing that is not intrinsically and by the nature of the thing good, and prohibits nothing that is not intrinsically and by the nature of the thing evil. It does not make a thing good or evil, but manifests it.

Nor can it be abrogated by God, because God cannot fail to command or prohibit those things that are necessary or unlawful by natural right. Hence Cicero, quoted by Lactantius in *Divinae institutiones* l. 1, c. 8, says: "There is a true law, right reason consonant with nature, diffused among all, constant and everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding and deters from fraud by prohibiting. Nothing may be added to this law, nor may anything be taken away from it, nor can it be wholly abrogated. We cannot be released from this law by the senate or by the people, nor must another expositor or interpreter be sought. There will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another hereafter, but one and the same everlasting and immutable law will contain all nations and all times."

Finally, dispensation cannot apply to natural law, as we shall say in the following conclusion. Therefore it cannot undergo change properly so called. Hence Gratian, dist. 5, c. 1, says: "Natural law obtains primacy among all laws in time and dignity. For it began with the origin of the rational creature and does not vary with time, but always remains immutable."

11. That an improper change on the part of the matter can apply to natural law is manifest. For the matter concerning which natural law operates does not always remain in the same condition, but is sometimes

varied because of occurring circumstances. From this it follows that what was of natural law afterward is not of natural law.

For example, it belongs to natural law that a deposit be returned when the deposited thing is not demanded to someone's harm. But because it can happen that it is demanded for someone's destruction, the matter of the law concerning a deposit is then changed, and consequently the law concerning the return of what is owed is improperly changed. Before, it dictated that the deposit was to be returned, namely when this circumstance was not considered; afterward it dictates the contrary by reason of such a circumstance.

Nevertheless, the formal character of natural law always remains unchanged. For it dictates only that a deposit must be returned when the due circumstances are observed, and consequently provided that what is requested does not tend to someone's harm, and not otherwise. This never varies and cannot vary, since it is intrinsically good, just as worshipping God and honoring one's parents are.

12. I say secondly that no power, either human or divine, can properly dispense in natural law by relaxing its obligation while the matter of the precept remains unchanged. It can, however, dispense improperly by changing the matter from which the law's obligation proximately arose.

The first part is proved as follows. Dispensation in natural law can be understood in only two ways. First, while the act in which dispensation is given remains unlawful, morally dishonorable, and dissonant with rational nature, such as lying or adultery. Secondly, so that through the dispensation the act ceases to be unlawful, morally dishonorable, and dissonant with rational nature. But dispensation in natural law can occur in neither way. Therefore it is repugnant that any human or divine power should properly and directly dispense in natural law.

The major is evident. The minor also appears manifest as regards the first part. For if God dispensed in natural law so that a man elicited an act which, notwithstanding the dispensation, remained unlawful, morally dishonorable, and dissonant with rational nature, he would dispense so that the man might sin and elicit an intrinsically evil act, which is repugnant to God's infinite holiness.

It is proved as regards the second part. The negative precepts of natural law prohibit only actions that are of themselves intrinsically and by their nature evil and dissonant with rational nature, such as lying, stealing, committing adultery, bearing false witness, and so forth. But a thing evil of itself and intrinsically cannot fail to be evil, because the essences of things

are invariable. Therefore a dispensation cannot cause it not to be evil by taking away its natural malice.

What we have said of the negative precepts of natural law must proportionately be said of the affirmative. For affirmative precepts of natural law bind only on those occasions in which omission of the commanded act would be intrinsically and of itself evil. Therefore this omission cannot fail to be evil, and it cannot be brought about through dispensation that its malice be removed, so that the act opposed to that omission would no longer be morally necessary.

13. The second part of the conclusion, which asserts that an improper dispensation can be given in things belonging to natural right by changing the matter from which the obligation of the law arose, is evident in the dispensation of vows. Vows belong to natural right, and yet the ecclesiastical power improperly dispenses in them, since, “when a dispensation is granted by the authority of a superior, what was contained under the vow ceases to be contained under it insofar as it is determined that in this case it is not fitting matter for a vow,” as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 88, a. 10, ad 2. The same will be more evident from what is said below.

14. I say thirdly that natural law sometimes requires declaration and interpretation. For since not all the precepts of natural law are equally evident and equally easy to understand, some require declaration and interpretation so that their true meaning can be known.

For example, the natural law commanding that a secret be kept requires some interpretation, since it does not bind in every case, namely when keeping the secret would harm the commonwealth. Similarly, in the natural law prohibiting homicide, it must be explained that it is not understood of one who kills while observing the moderation of blameless self-defense, or for another just cause. And in the natural law commanding the restoration of another’s property, it must be understood that this applies if it can be done without danger to life or reputation, which is a greater good, and without harm to the owner or another person, as when a madman demands his sword in order to kill, or a spendthrift demands his money in order to squander it.

15. You will ask whether equity has a place in natural law.

I answer negatively. For equity is an interpretation of the legislator’s intention when that intention cannot be expressly obtained from him. Hence, if the legislator himself is present and explains his intention, such an expression of his intention is not equity. But in natural law there is no need of this interpretation, because reason itself, which is the legislator that enacted and dictated the law, for example that a deposit must be returned,

dictates that it must not be returned when it is demanded to someone's harm. Therefore equity has no place in natural law.

16. You will object first against the first conclusion: A law is truly and properly changed through derogation. But natural law can be derogated from. Therefore it can be truly and properly changed.

The major is evident. The minor is proved. Civil laws derogate from natural right, as is evident in laws of acquisitive prescription and ordinary prescription, which take from the true owner what is his and transfer it into the ownership of the possessor acquiring by prescription, although it belongs to natural law and right that no one be despoiled of his own goods by another. Therefore positive law can derogate from natural law.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. For laws of acquisitive prescription and ordinary prescription do not properly derogate from the natural law commanding that no one be despoiled by another of his own goods. They merely change the matter previously subject to the law.

Natural law prohibits only that another's property be retained against the reasonable unwillingness of the owner. But since ownership of prescribed goods is transferred through the laws of prescription, the owner is not reasonably unwilling, because those laws were instituted to protect and preserve the common good, so that ownership of things might not remain uncertain for a long time and so that lawsuits might not become interminable and multiply beyond measure.

17. You will object secondly against the second conclusion: Homicide, theft, fornication, polygamy, and the dissolution of marriage are repugnant to natural law and right. But God can dispense in all these things and has in fact done so. Therefore he can dispense in natural law and right.

The major is evident. The minor is shown by various examples taken from Scripture. God dispensed with Abraham so that he might kill and sacrifice his son, Gen. 22. He likewise dispensed with the Israelites so that they might despoil Egypt and carry away with them the gold and silver vessels they had received on loan from the Egyptians, Exod. 12. He also commanded the prophet Hosea to take to himself a woman of fornication and beget from her children of fornication, Hos. 1. Finally, he dispensed with the Jews so that they might have several wives and permitted them to dismiss their wives by a bill of divorce and marry others, as is evident from Genesis, Exodus, and Deuteronomy.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. To its proof I say that in the aforesaid cases God did not properly dispense in natural law and right, but only improperly, by changing the matter and through that change withdrawing it from natural law.

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In the first example, as supreme lord of the life and death of all, he gave Abraham a right over the life of an innocent person, or willed to use Abraham as his minister and executioner. But natural law does not prohibit the killing of an innocent person in such a case.

In the second, as supreme lord of all goods, having dominion over creatures in his hand, he transferred the Egyptians' ownership to the Israelites. Or, as supreme judge, he punished the Egyptians with this penalty because of the cruelty committed against the Israelites and the sacrilegious use of those vessels, which they had applied to the worship of idols, as Augustine indicates in *Contra Faustum* l. 22, c. 7. Or, finally, he gave the Israelites the wages for their labors of which they had been defrauded by the Egyptians, as Scripture says in Wis. 10.

In the third case, God, as supreme lord of bodies, able to effect by himself what a man and woman effect through mutual legitimate consent as regards the handing over of their bodies, gave this prostitute to Hosea as his wife before he approached her, because of the mystery then represented by that deed: namely, that God himself was to assume human nature as his bride, although through the sin of our first parents and innumerable other sins it had shamefully prostituted itself and made itself like an infamous harlot.

Others nevertheless think that true and legitimate matrimonial consent intervened between Hosea and that woman before carnal intercourse, because, they say, consent is the formal cause of marriage and cannot be supplied by God. Nor is it an obstacle that such a woman is called a fornicator in Scripture. She is so called not because she was then a prostitute, but because she had previously been one. For it is not unusual in Scripture for things sometimes to retain the designation of what they formerly were.

Thus Eve, after her formation, was called bone by Adam in Gen. 2: "This now is bone of my bones," because before her formation she had been such. And the serpent produced by Moses from Aaron's rod did not cease still to be called a rod in Exod. 7: "Aaron's rod devoured their rods." In the same way, the woman given to Hosea is called a fornicator because she was such before her marriage to Hosea. The children begotten from that marriage are called children of fornications because of their mother's disgrace.

In the fourth case, which contains two parts, one concerning polygamy and the other concerning the dismissal of a wife by a bill of divorce, it must be said that God, as the author of nature to whom the rights of marriage are subject in relation to the propagation of nature and the common good of the whole species for which marriage was instituted, and as supreme lord of

bodies, divided dominion over bodies from one wife among several when he permitted the Jews to have several wives at once. He also invalidated the bond of the first marriage when he permitted them to dismiss their wives by a bill of divorce.

Hence in both cases there was merely a change of matter, not a strict dispensation from natural law. For natural law never bound so that a marriage of one with several could not occur when God so disposed concerning the right and contract of marriage. Similarly, natural law prohibits the repudiation of wives only for as long as the marriage remains undissolved; but when the bond of marriage has been dissolved, it does not prohibit the spouses from passing to other marriages.

18. You will ask whether invincible ignorance of natural law can exist.

I answer that there are three classes of precepts in natural law. Some are most universal and, as we said above, should be called not so much precepts as principles of all precepts. Such are: “Good is to be done.” “Evil is to be avoided.” “Do not do to another what you do not wish to be done to yourself.” “God is to be worshiped.” “Parents are to be honored.”

Others are deduced from these by an easy reasoning, such as the precepts not to fornicate, steal, lie, and the like.

Finally, others are deduced from the first or second only by long and difficult reasoning. Such are the precepts prohibiting certain contracts that in reality are usurious or simoniacal, although they do not evidently appear to be such, but are the subject of difficulty and controversy among the Doctors, some affirming and others denying.

Invincible ignorance can never exist concerning natural precepts of the first or second class. The first are most evident to everyone and written upon the tablets of the heart, and therefore “no one is permitted to be ignorant of them,” as Augustine says in discourse 25 on Ps. 118. The second can be deduced from the first by easy reasoning.

Although some nations are ignorant of these precepts, thinking it lawful to steal and fornicate, this ignorance is nevertheless culpable and vincible, because it arises from man’s own fault, namely from depraved custom and corrupt habits. Through these someone is led into the opinion that what is unlawful is lawful, although he would perceive and quickly judge it to be unlawful if he were not blinded by the darkness of depraved affections and did not place a culpable obstacle to divine illumination and the rays of natural law through the sins he commits against natural law.

Hence St. Thomas says in *De malo* q. 3, a. 7: “That grace is not given to someone does not have its cause in God, but in the person to whom grace is

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not given, insofar as he places an impediment to grace by turning away from the light that does not turn away from him, as Dionysius says.”

19. As regards precepts of the third class, it is highly probable that invincible and inculpable ignorance can exist concerning them. For they are neither immediately and self-evidently known to everyone nor capable of being deduced from the first or second precepts through easy reasoning, but require a long and difficult reasoning of which the uneducated and ignorant are incapable.

Hence natural law, as regards these precepts, is not declared or promulgated to everyone, since the promulgation of natural law is made through the judgment of reason and natural reasoning. Therefore, since a law possesses no power of binding unless it is applied to men through promulgation or declaration, as we explained above in c. 1, natural law does not bind everyone as regards these precepts. Consequently, invincible ignorance concerning them can exist and excuse from sin. But this is treated more fully in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, tract. on laws, disp. 3, a. 3.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Human Law.

§ 1.

On the Existence and Quiddity of Human Law.

1. Besides the natural and divine law, human laws are also necessary. St. Thomas proves this here, q. 91, a. 3, from the fact that the natural or divine law is general and embraces only certain general principles of morals that are self-evident, extending at most to those things that are deduced from those principles by necessary inference. But besides these, certain other things are necessary in a human commonwealth for its right governance and preservation. It was therefore necessary that those general principles of morals be determined more particularly by human reason, which is done through human laws. He shows the same in q. 95, a. 1, where he teaches that, for the peace and virtue of men, it was necessary that certain laws be imposed by men, by which the wicked and insolent might be restrained from vice through fear of punishment and impelled toward virtue. For, as the Philosopher says in *Politica* I, cap. 2, just as man, if perfected in virtue, is the best of animals, so, if separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. Isidore touches upon this reason in *Etymologiae* V, cap. 20, in these words: *Laws were made so that human audacity might be restrained by human fear, that*

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innocence might be safe among the wicked, and that in the wicked themselves the power of doing harm might be checked by fear of punishment. Hence, if there were no human laws restraining freedom of action, adulteries, thefts, murders, and every other crime, which would immediately overthrow the commonwealth from its foundations, would rage with impunity, according to the well-known saying of Augustine: *When justice is removed—which is established principally through human laws—what are kingdoms but great bands of robbers?*

2. Human law is *an ordinance of human reason for the common good, sufficiently promulgated by him who has care of the community.* The soundness of this definition is clear from what was said above in Chapter I, when we explained the definition of law in general. But concerning the final element there is a difficulty and controversy among theologians: what kind of promulgation does human law require in order to bind? For the resolution:

3. I say, first, that if we consider natural law alone, for either a civil or pontifical law to be deemed sufficiently promulgated, it is enough that it be published at the court. The reason is that, for promulgation sufficient by the nature of the thing, it is enough that the law be published in such a way that it can easily come to the knowledge of the subjects. But when promulgation has been made at the court, the law can easily come to the knowledge of the subjects. For, since people frequently resort and gather at the prince's seat from all the cities subject to his rule, what is done at the court can easily come to the knowledge of all. Therefore, for promulgation of a law sufficient by the nature of the thing, it is enough that it be promulgated at the court.

4. I say, second, that, considering positive civil law, imperial laws do not bind the provinces unless they are promulgated in their metropolis. Indeed, they neither have force nor bind in a province until two months after promulgation has been made there.

The first part is proved from the Authentic *Ut factae novae constitutiones*, which is Constitution 66 among Justinian's Novels, where it is decreed that new constitutions do not have force until they have been made publicly known through the metropolitan, that is, until they have been published in the metropolitan cities. Although the emperor there speaks of laws concerning wills, the Gloss nevertheless extends it to all laws and asserts this rule of the jurists: whenever the words of a rubric make complete sense and do not conflict with the body of the law, written in black letters and contained beneath the rubrics, the rubric is to be regarded as part of the text. Since, therefore, the rubric of that Authentic speaks universally of all laws, that constitution of Justinian, although it speaks only of laws concerning wills, must nevertheless be extended to all laws. Consequently,

no imperial laws bind the provinces unless they are promulgated in their metropolis.

5. From this the second part also remains proved, for that Authentic decreed that laws do not bind in a province until two months after their promulgation there, as is clear from the rubric: *That new constitutions, after their continuation, shall have force after two months.* The same is clear from a certain bull of Pius IV concerning the declaration of the time for the observance of the Council of Trent, where he says: *It has been established by common law that new constitutions obtain binding force only after a certain time.* By these words he doubtless alludes to the aforesaid Authentic, since nowhere else is anything found to have been established concerning the time at which new constitutions obtain binding force.

What we have said of imperial laws must also be said of laws enacted by princes or kings subject to the emperor, because the right of making laws that they possess was granted to them by the emperor according to the common law of the empire, and according to the manner and limitation observed by the emperors themselves.

6. I say, third, that, under common positive law and unless there is a contrary constitution or custom, the laws of princes who are not subject to the empire, such as the laws of the King of France and the King of Spain, do not require promulgation in each individual province, nor a period of two months after promulgation. Rather, it is enough that they be promulgated at the prince's court, that is, in the city where he resides, and be made known from there to other places.

This conclusion is clear, for nothing else has been established by common law that might oblige more effectively than the aforesaid Authentic of Justinian. But because it is imperial, it has no binding force in lands not subject to the empire. Therefore, and so forth.

I said, unless there is a contrary constitution or custom, because almost everywhere there is a custom or law of the kingdom that kings who possess several provinces should take care to have their laws promulgated in each province, and that otherwise those laws do not bind. In France, royal laws do not bind unless they are received by the Parlements. Hence some laws are observed at Paris that do not bind at Toulouse or Bordeaux.

7. I say, fourth, that, even under positive law, no promulgation other than that made at Rome is required for the sufficient promulgation of pontifical laws, nor is a period of two months required for those laws to obtain binding force.

This is proved from the practice and custom of the Roman court, for pontifical laws are ordinarily promulgated only at Rome, and according to

them the Auditors of the Rota, cardinals, and other pontifical judges decide cases from other provinces, although no promulgation has been made in those provinces, but only a simple publication, unless by concession or custom they enjoy the privilege that pontifical laws do not bind there unless they are promulgated or even received there, as occurs in the Kingdom of France. Likewise, those who at Rome do not observe pontifical laws immediately after promulgation, before two months have elapsed, are punished, as Navarre testifies in consil. 1, *De constitutionibus*, q. 4, n. 18. Therefore, and so forth.

This is confirmed by that most commonly received maxim: *The Pope has leaden feet, not feathered ones*. John the Monk, on cap. *In generali*, *De regulis iuris in Sexto*, and Navarre, in the aforesaid q. 4, n. 20, assert this to be true because the Pope neither ordinarily travels nor is bound to travel through the individual provinces, carrying through them the promulgation of his laws. For he is the one pastor of the entire world and the vicar of Christ in spiritual matters conducive to the salvation of souls. The faithful should therefore take greater care to become acquainted with his decrees than with temporal laws issued by secular princes.

8. You will ask whether the consent or acceptance of the people is required in order that a human law may bind.

I answer negatively, because the obligation of law arises from the subjection by which subjects are placed under their prelates and from the obedience they are bound to render them. But the force of obedience does not arise from the subject's acceptance, but from the excellence of the authority that superiors possess over subjects. For just as, in natural things, lower things had to be moved by their superiors with a certain necessity to their natural actions, as sublunary bodies are moved by heavenly bodies through the excellence of the natural power divinely communicated to them, so in human affairs inferiors must be moved by their superiors through the will according to a certain moral necessity, in which the obligation of law consists. St. Thomas teaches this in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 104, a. 5, in these words: *The obedient person is moved by the command of the one who gives the precept through a certain necessity of justice, just as a natural thing is moved by the power of its mover through natural necessity*. Therefore, the obligation of law does not depend upon the consent or acceptance of the people. Certainly, the legislator's power would be almost useless if he could not compel subjects to accept and observe a just and useful law. Indeed, unless a law compelled subjects and imposed an obligation independently of their approval and acceptance, subjects who could dissent and reject such a law would create a war just on both sides. For the prelate would justly demand

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obedience and observance of the law, while the subject would justly resist, since acceptance of the law would have been left to his judgment. But this seems absurd. Therefore, so does the antecedent claim.

This applies especially to pontifical and ecclesiastical laws. For since the Supreme Pontiff receives his power immediately from Christ, he cannot depend in its use upon the consent of the Church. Hence it seems entirely certain that the Supreme Pontiff can bind the Church by his laws independently of its consent and acceptance. Indeed, Suárez, *De legibus* IV, cap. 16, says that this cannot be denied without endangering the faith.

9. You will say: at least the civil legislator receives legislative power from the commonwealth. Therefore he makes laws in dependence upon its consent, and consequently at least civil laws are enacted under this tacit condition, that they have force if they are accepted and received by usage. Hence among the Romans laws did not bind until they had been accepted by the people, as Alexander of Aphrodisias reports in *Dierum genialium* VI, cap. 16.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For once legislative power has been transferred by the people to the prince, it belongs to him alone to make laws and bind the people by them, independently of their consent and acceptance. Nor is there any foundation for asserting that the people transferred legislative power to the prince under the condition that laws should have force if they were accepted and received by usage, especially since such a condition would greatly weaken the obedience and subordination of subjects toward superiors, which is supremely necessary for right government, as Aristotle teaches throughout the books of the *Politica*. Hence, although the Roman people may initially have transferred their power to legislators under this condition, and therefore at that time their laws did not bind until accepted by the people, nevertheless afterward the same people transferred all their power to the legislators and heads of the commonwealth, and they exercised it without any limitation.

§ 2.

On the Power of Human Law.

10. You will ask, first, whether human law can command or prohibit internal acts.

I answer that it cannot command or prohibit purely internal acts that have no connection with external acts, nor those that are connected with

them only accidentally. It can, however, command or prohibit those that are required essentially for the integrity of external acts in the moral order.

The first part of this resolution is clear, because legislative power tends primarily and essentially to the external and common government of the commonwealth. But purely internal acts are not suitable matter for human government, which is why it is commonly said that the Church does not judge internal matters. Therefore legislative power cannot extend to purely internal acts that have no connection with external acts.

From this the second part also remains proved, for internal acts that are connected with external acts only accidentally, since they are not perceptible in themselves, are not suitable matter for human government. Therefore they cannot be commanded or prohibited by human law. Thus, when human law commands the observance of fasting during Lent, it does not command an internal motive of either penance or temperance, because that motive is connected only accidentally with external fasting, since it does not matter from which honorable motive the precept of fasting is fulfilled, provided it is fulfilled from some honorable motive.

The third part, however, which many of the more recent authors deny, is established by this reason: he who has the power to command something also has the power to command that which has a necessary connection with it so that it may subsist. Therefore human law can command those acts that are required essentially for the integrity of external acts in the moral order. In this way attention is connected with vocal prayer, for there is no true external prayer considered in the moral order unless it proceeds from some interior attention. Hence the ecclesiastical precept concerning the recitation of the canonical hours binds not only to external attention and devotion but also to internal attention, as we showed at length against Caramuel in our dissertation on the probability of opinions.

11. You will ask, second, whether human laws, both civil and ecclesiastical, if they are just, have the power to bind under fault and in the forum of conscience.

I answer affirmatively, with St. Thomas here, q. 96, a. 4. This is proved by the following reason: human law, whether civil or ecclesiastical, is derived from the eternal law. Therefore it has the power to bind in the forum of conscience. The antecedent is clear from what was said above in Chapter II, corollary 3, where we showed that all laws are derived from the eternal law. The consequence is proved because what is derived from something participates in its character in its own manner, namely according to its nature. Since, therefore, it belongs to the nature of the eternal law to be able to bind a rational creature in the forum of conscience, which is why

Augustine defines sin as *a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law*, the same will also belong, in its own manner and according to its nature, to human law, whether civil or ecclesiastical.

12. You will say: the power of secular princes is merely temporal and political. Therefore it cannot extend to anything spiritual and consequently cannot bind under fault and in the forum of conscience.

I answer that the power of secular princes is called temporal by reason of its object, because in itself it concerns entirely temporal persons, things, and actions. Yet by reason of the obligation it imposes, it can be called spiritual and can bind in conscience. For although it primarily and essentially regards the temporal good of the commonwealth, and does not primarily and essentially intend to bind consciences under pain of eternal damnation, but only to command something for the advancement of that good under a temporal penalty proportioned to the attainment of its end, nevertheless by consequence, because it commands this while standing under the order of divine power and as able to bind in the forum of conscience by virtue of that power, it binds under fault and in the forum of conscience if it is just. Hence the Apostle says in Rom. 13: *He who resists authority resists the ordinance of God, and those who resist acquire damnation for themselves*. Chrysostom and other interpreters understand this there even of damnation before God.

I said, if it is just, because, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 96, a. 4, unjust human laws do not bind in the forum of conscience, except perhaps to avoid scandal or disturbance. Human laws can be unjust in three ways, he says, namely, either from their end, as when a ruler imposes burdensome laws upon subjects that do not pertain to the common utility, but rather to his own greed or glory; or from their author, as when someone makes a law beyond the power entrusted to him; or also from their form, as when burdens are distributed unequally among the multitude, even if they are ordered to the common good. Such things are acts of violence rather than laws, because, as Augustine says, that which is not just does not seem to be a law. If anyone knows how to apply these principles to particular laws, Cajetan adds, he will thereby clarify many cases of conscience concerning taxes, exactions, and similar public burdens.

13. You will ask, third, whether human laws can bind to their observance at the risk and loss of life.

I answer affirmatively. For when the public welfare is endangered unless aid is given to it at the manifest risk of the lives of some citizens, the prince or commonwealth has the power to bind subjects to expose their lives for the welfare of the commonwealth and to perform some act despite evident

danger to life. Thus, in a just war, soldiers are ordered by their commanders to take a dangerous position or make an assault at the risk and loss of life. Likewise, during a plague, prelates and magistrates can command certain priests and physicians to remain in the city so that they may assist it in so great a necessity. The reason is that every perfect community must possess the means of preserving the welfare of the whole even at the loss of one of its parts. It belongs no less to natural right that the whole preserve itself even by the destruction of a part than that the part expose itself to danger for the preservation of the whole. Hence those laws that bind citizens to expose their lives for the welfare of the commonwealth are not purely human but include something of natural right.

14. But if you ask how it can be known whether a human law binds at the loss of life, I shall answer briefly that this can be determined principally from the following rule. Whenever that which is commanded by human law contributes to the common good in such a way that observing the law is a greater common good than preserving one's own life, the law then binds even at the loss of life. But if preserving one's own life is a greater common good than observing the law, human law does not then bind at the loss of life. The reason is that the preservation of citizens' lives pertains to the common good just as the observance of law does. Therefore, unless the obligation of the law is of greater importance to the common good than the preservation of citizens' lives, the legislator cannot bind to the observance of the law at so great a loss. He would bind irrationally, since he would not order a lesser good to a greater, but a greater good to a lesser.

From this rule it follows that a Carthusian in extreme necessity arising from illness not only can lawfully abstain from meat, but is even bound to do so, because the preservation of stricter observance and discipline throughout the whole Carthusian Order is of greater importance than the life of one Carthusian. Similarly, religious of other orders can and should, from love and reverence for their rule, observe it in such a way that they refuse to be delivered from illness if it is necessary to violate the constitutions of their religious institute, and if from their violation the observance of the rule would grow considerably lukewarm and the vigor of religious discipline would be greatly diminished.

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§ 3.

Who Are Subject to Human Laws?

15. I say, first, that not only subjects but also princes and legislators are subject to their own laws as regards their directive force, though not as regards their compulsory or coercive force. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 96, a. 5, ad 3.

The first part is clear, for the head, as far as possible, must conform to the body and members of the community; otherwise there would be the greatest deformity in it, according to Augustine's saying in *Confessiones* III, cap. 8: *Every part that does not accord with its whole is deformed*. It is therefore fitting that the prince or legislator, who is the head of the commonwealth, should observe his own laws no less than the subjects. Consequently, he is subject to them as regards their directive force by the natural law itself, which dictates that it is no less contrary to reason for the head to disagree with the members than for the members to disagree with the head. Hence in law *Digna vox*, Code, *De legibus*, it is said: *It is a statement worthy of the majesty of one who reigns for the prince to profess himself bound by the laws*. And in law *Princeps*, Digest, *De legibus*: *Submit to the law, whoever you are who have enacted the law*. Similar statements are found in canon law, cap. *Justum*, dist. 9, in these words: *It is just for the prince to obey his own laws. For he then judges that his laws must be observed by all when he himself shows reverence for them*. And lest this appear to be said merely for the sake of counsel, it is added: *Princes are bound by their own laws and cannot condemn in themselves the laws they establish for their subjects, for their authority is just if they do not allow themselves what they prohibit to the people*. Finally, Ambrose speaks thus to the Emperor Valentinian in epist. 32: *What you have prescribed for others, you have also prescribed for yourself. For the emperor enacts laws that he himself first observes*.

The second part is proved from the distinction found between the directive and the compulsory or coercive force of law. The directive force regards acts as lawful, unlawful, or indifferent, while the compulsory or coercive force imposes a penalty leading to the observance of the law. But the prince cannot be compelled or punished by a penalty leading to the observance of the law, since he has no superior by whom he may be compelled, and no one can properly be compelled by himself. Therefore the prince is not subject to his own laws as regards their compulsory or coercive

force, but is free from them as regards the obligation of undergoing the penalty.

16. I say, second, that clerics are not bound by the civil laws of secular princes as regards their coercive force, though they are bound as regards their directive force and by the natural equity through which they are obliged to conform themselves to the other members of the commonwealth.

The first part is certain, since clerics are exempt from the jurisdiction of secular princes, cap. *Decernimus*, *De iudiciis*; cap. *Sancta Maria*, *De constitutionibus*; cap. *Saeculares*, *De foro competenti in Sexto*. Some think this exemption to be of divine right, and they gather this from Sacred Scripture: from the New Testament, indeed, from Christ's inference in Matt. 17, *Therefore the sons are free*, namely from laws concerning tribute; and from the Old Testament, from Gen. 47, where Joseph subjected all the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, *except the land of the priests*. Others judge that this exemption of clerics is only of human right, namely from the aforesaid constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs and the favor of secular princes. Nevertheless, this human right is supremely consonant with natural and divine right. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion in his commentary on Rom. 13, *Therefore tribute*, for there, speaking of the obligation to pay taxes, he says: *Clerics are free from this debt by privilege of princes, which indeed possesses natural equity*.

The second part is clear because clerics, notwithstanding their clerical state, are citizens and members of the commonwealth. Therefore, by natural equity and by reason of the conformity they must have with the other members of the commonwealth, they are bound to observe those civil laws of secular princes that do not derogate from clerical privileges and that concern the peace and tranquillity of the commonwealth.

17. I say, third, that those who are in another territory, whether passing through it or residing there, are not bound to observe the laws of their own territory. The reason is that the authority of jurisdiction is limited within the prince's own territory, just as the active power of natural agents is limited and confined within the sphere of their activity. Therefore, just as those agents cannot act beyond their own sphere, so neither can the prince's laws bind beyond his own territory. Hence cap. 2, *De constitutionibus in Sexto*, says that a penalty imposed by a bishop's statute is not incurred by one who outside that bishop's territory fails to observe the statute, because, it says, *one who gives judgment outside his territory is disobeyed with impunity*, as is stated in the final law of the Digest, *De iurisdictione omnium iudicum*.

18. I say, fourth, that travelers and newcomers are bound to observe the laws of the territory through which they pass. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding paragraph. For if a brief absence is enough to

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exempt travelers from subjection to the law of their own territory, from which they depart, a brief presence must also be enough to subject them to the laws of another territory through which they pass. For it is just that one who receives the benefit should also bear the burden, as is stated in rule 55, *De regulis iuris in Sexto*. Hence newcomers and travelers passing through places in which a feast is being celebrated, if they are there for the whole morning of the feast day, are bound to hear Mass, though they are not bound to remain there in order to hear it. Likewise, as long as they are there, they are bound to abstain from servile work on a feast day and from prohibited foods on a fast day. Those, however, who depart in the morning from their own territory, where fasting binds, and arrive at night in a place where fasting does not bind, may dine at night and eat meat, since one who departs is not bound to observe the laws of his own territory but may follow the favorable laws of the place through which he passes. From this you will infer that a clandestine marriage celebrated in a place where the Tridentine decree is not observed, by an inhabitant of a place where it is observed, is clear and valid. But we discuss this more fully in the treatise on marriage, Chapter III.

CHAPTER V.

On Certain Species of Human Laws.

Thus far we have spoken of human law in general. We must now discuss briefly some of its species: first, penal law; second, unwritten law, which is called custom; third, favorable law, or privileges.

§ 1.

On Penal Law.

1. Every law that expressly attaches a penalty to a command or prohibition is called penal. Of this kind are very many ecclesiastical and civil laws. Civil laws often attach temporal penalties of death, exile, scourging, and so forth. Ecclesiastical laws attach either purely spiritual penalties, such as censures and irregularities; mixed penalties, such as deprivation of office or benefice, or of active or passive voice; or finally, at times, purely temporal penalties, such as fasts, bodily mortifications, and the like.

2. Concerning this law there are three difficulties and controversies among theologians. The first is whether, when the legislator in making a

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penal law expresses nothing about an obligation under fault, the penal law binds under fault or only to the penalty. I answer that it binds not only to the penalty but also under fault, unless the legislator has expressed the contrary. For the obligation under fault follows law as a property, though one that can be prevented by the legislator. Therefore, once there is a true law, such as a penal law, an obligation under fault immediately follows unless the legislator, in making such a law, declares that he does not intend to bind under fault.

This is confirmed: human laws enacted without the threat of a penalty bind under fault, as is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore those enacted with the threat of a penalty also bind under fault. The consequence is proved because the threat does not remove the obligation under fault but indicates it. For, as Augustine says in *Retractationes* I, cap. 9: *Every punishment, if it is just, is punishment for sin and is called a penalty.*

3. You will say: every law, especially a penal law, must be interpreted favorably when nothing else is known concerning the legislator's intention. Therefore, when in a penal law the legislator does not express his intention to bind under fault, he must be judged to bind only to the penalty. The consequence seems manifest, for otherwise we would interpret the legislator's intention not favorably but in a highly burdensome manner.

I answer that although every law, especially a penal law, must be interpreted favorably, this must be done according to the nature of the law itself, not by removing it from its connatural condition. Hence, since it belongs to the connatural condition of law to bind under fault, it must be judged to bind under fault unless the legislator expresses the contrary.

4. The second difficulty is whether penal laws bind to the penalty before the judge's sentence or only after his sentence.

I answer that before the judge's sentence they bind to privative penalties, such as excommunication, irregularity, suspension, and deprivation of active and passive voice; but not to active penalties that require some executive action, for example the penalty of death, exile, or confiscation of goods.

The first part is clear, for laws that by the fact itself impose the penalties of excommunication, suspension, interdict, irregularity, deprivation of active and passive voice, and deprivation of the revenues of a benefice upon those who do not recite the office, immediately produce their effect before any sentence of a judge. The same must be said of an ecclesiastical law that, as punishment for a crime, renders certain persons incapable of marriage by the fact itself, namely adulterers who commit adultery in hope of a future

marriage or who are guilty of the death of a spouse. The marriage of such persons is invalid before any sentence.

The second part, however, which concerns active penalties, or those requiring some action of the guilty person for their execution, seems manifest. A law binding a man to execute upon himself, by his own action and before the judge's sentence, the penalty of the law seems excessively rigorous, harsh, and repugnant to nature itself, especially if the penalty to be undergone by the fact itself is grave and bitter and is not otherwise necessary for the common good of the commonwealth. It is enough for the common good if the guilty person undergoes such a penalty after the judge's sentence. Moreover, the execution of a penalty requiring some action belongs, essentially speaking, not to the guilty person but to the judge and his minister. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 62, a. 3: *As regards fault, a remedy is applied through punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge. Therefore, before a person is condemned by the judge, he is not bound to make restitution of more than he received; but after he has been condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.*

5. The third difficulty is whether one who transgresses a penal law is bound in conscience to undergo the penalty of the law after the judge's sentence.

I answer that he is bound in conscience to undergo a penalty whose execution requires an action that can more conveniently be performed by the guilty person, but not a penalty whose execution requires an action that can more conveniently be performed by the judge or his minister.

The first part seems manifest, for when someone is punished by exile or a monetary penalty, he is bound to leave the kingdom or city, or to pay the money, since this contains nothing cruel or unjust. The second part is proved because a penal sentence, like the law itself, must be interpreted favorably, since a sentence is the application of that law which, according to a common conception of the mind and a disposition of law, must be interpreted favorably. Therefore the guilty person is not bound to execute upon himself a penalty whose execution is more conveniently performed by the judge or his ministers. It is enough that he be prepared to endure it when it is inflicted by them. The consequence is clear, for otherwise we would interpret that sentence not favorably but most harshly. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2: *No one is condemned in such a way that he must inflict death upon himself, but so that he must suffer death. Therefore he is not bound to do that from which death follows, though he is bound not to resist the agent, so as to prevent himself from suffering what it is just for him*

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to suffer. Likewise, if someone is condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he takes food secretly supplied to him, because not to take it would be to kill himself.

§ 2.

On Custom.

6. Custom is *a certain right established by usages, which is received as law when law is deficient*. Hence, since law can be deficient in three ways—first, when it does not exist; second, when it is useless; third, when it is doubtful or obscure—custom is received for this threefold deficiency of law. First, where no law exists, a custom introducing law, or possessing the force of law, is received. Second, an abrogating custom takes the place of a useless law. Third, when a law is obscure or doubtful, a custom that has the force of interpreting the doubtful or obscure law takes its place. Therefore theologians teach that a lawfully introduced custom possesses a threefold force, namely that of establishing, abrogating, and interpreting law, and that it can establish a new law, abrogate an old one, and interpret a doubtful one. Hence in cap. *Cum dilectus*, *De consuetudine*, custom is called *the best interpreter of laws*.

7. Two things, however, must be briefly observed. The first is that, just as it belongs to the nature of law to command good acts, so, for a custom to possess the force of law, what it concerns must be a good act. Hence a custom concerning an unlawful or indifferent matter does not possess the force of law. From this it follows that no custom possessing binding force can be introduced against the natural law, since the law of nature commands only what is intrinsically good and forbids only what is intrinsically evil.

The second is that, since every law must proceed from the will and reason of the prince, for a custom to possess the force of law, the prince or another superior power to whom it belongs to make laws must consent to it personally or legally, that is, juridically. He is said to consent personally when he himself immediately consents, either tacitly or expressly. He is judged to consent legally or juridically when either he himself or his predecessors have at some time enacted a law by force of which such a custom is approved.

8. As regards the time necessary for a just and lawful custom, various opinions of the doctors are advanced. Passing these over for the sake of brevity, it must be said that, when a custom is introduced by the people with the prince's express consent, there is no need to wait for any determinate period. For since custom has no less force than written law, if the prince's

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consent expressed by a living declaration is added, there is no doubt that it immediately confirms the custom. Consequently, no determinate period must be awaited for its validity. But if the custom is introduced by the people with the tacit or presumed consent of the prince, the time determined by law must then be observed, because the prince is not presumed to consent until the time determined by law has elapsed, since he is presumed to wish to observe what has been established by common law. But since no certain time is found to have been determined in either civil or canon law for introducing a custom, the time required by law for prescription is judged to be required for custom. Hence, according to this rule, a custom against civil law requires ten years, and one against ecclesiastical law requires forty.

§ 3.

On Privileges.

9. A privilege is a law exempting someone from the common law and granting some private, special, and favorable right. Or, as is said in cap. *Abbate, De verborum significatione*, it is a *private law granting some special favor*. Hence, just as it does not belong to the essence of law that it be committed to writing, neither is writing necessary for the essence or validity of a privilege, but it can be established verbally just as a law can. Likewise, just as a law is permanent and does not expire at the legislator's death, neither does a privilege. Nevertheless, it differs from law in two respects. First, law regards common right, while privilege regards special right. Second, a law, as long as it remains in force, always binds the subject, while a privilege exempts the privileged person from observance of the law.

10. It is divided, first, into real and personal privilege. A real privilege is one given immediately to some thing, office, or condition distinct from the person, such as to a pious cause, a church, an estate, the clerical or religious state, the episcopal office, or the condition of wards or scholars, and so forth. A personal privilege is one given immediately to a person by reason of himself and with the intention of providing for him, as when someone is granted exemption from paying tithes, immunity from taxes, the power to absolve from reserved cases, or the power to dispense from irregularities. A real privilege is perpetual and endures with the thing, office, state, dignity, or condition to which it is attached. A personal privilege is temporary and is extinguished with the person to whom it is granted, according to the seventh

rule of law in the Sixth Book: *A personal privilege follows the person and is extinguished with the person.*

It is divided, second, into gracious, remunerative, and conventional privilege. A gracious privilege is given gratuitously, without any merits on the part of the privileged person. A remunerative privilege is given as a reward for his merits. A conventional privilege is given upon an intervening agreement or condition.

It is divided, third, into local and general privilege. The latter may be used everywhere; the former only in the place for which it was granted.

It is divided, fourth, into favorable and burdensome privilege. A favorable privilege is one that causes inconvenience to no one, such as permission to eat milk or butter during Lent. A burdensome privilege is one that, although favorable to the privileged person, is at the same time harmful or inconvenient to another, such as exemption from tolls or taxes, with an increased burden upon others.

It is divided, fifth, into affirmative privilege, by which the faculty of doing something is granted, and negative privilege, which grants the faculty of omitting something. There are several other divisions of privilege, for knowledge of which one must have recourse to those who have treated privileges expressly and at greater length.

11. You will ask, first, whether privileges, in order to benefit the privileged person, must be known to him, or whether it is enough that they have been given and signed by the prince and authentically issued at the court.

I answer that, if those privileges cannot have their effect or use before becoming known without danger of sin, they are not valid without prior knowledge, because it is more probable that the prince does not wish to give occasion for such an evil use and does not wish to dispense except for an honorable use. Hence a dispensation to contract marriage with a blood relative must become known to the parties for them to contract validly. It is not enough that the dispensation has been authentically issued, signed, or sealed at the Roman court if the parties remain ignorant of it. But privileges that can have their effect before becoming known without danger of sin have their effect before the privileged person has any knowledge of them, from the very day of their issuance and acceptance by his procurator. For, since the procurator forms one moral unit with the privileged person, as a moral instrument with the principal agent, whatever the procurator does in the name of the privileged person is judged to be done by the privileged person himself.

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12. You will ask, second, whether, when the cause of a privilege ceases, the privilege itself ceases.

I answer affirmatively. Thus the privilege of not paying tithes to a certain church that has another source from which its ministers can be supported ceases when the church no longer has a source from which they can be supported. Likewise, a privilege granted to canons so that, when absent for the sake of study, they may receive the revenues of their prebends, ceases when they cease to devote themselves to study.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Interpretation of Human Laws Through Epikeia.

1. It is sometimes lawful to act contrary to the words of a law through epikeia, or a favorable and prudent interpretation of it, namely when literal observance would be harmful to the common good and public safety, and the danger does not permit recourse to the superior. For necessity then has a dispensation annexed to it, because necessity is not subject to law. For example, there is a general law that the gates of a city are not to be opened at night. But it does not bind in the case in which auxiliary forces necessary for the city's defense arrive at night, and there is a real danger that, unless they are admitted immediately, they will be killed by the enemies besieging the city. It is also lawful to interpret a law when its literal observance tends toward notable harm. For example, the general law is that a deposit must be returned. Yet an equitable and reasonable interpretation is that it must not be returned when doing so would harm the one demanding it or some other innocent person, as when a madman demands his sword in order to kill himself or another without just cause. Likewise, it is lawful to interpret the words of a law in a case in which its observance would be excessively harsh and burdensome. For David in 1 Sam. 21 judged that the law prohibiting anyone other than priests from eating the loaves of proposition did not bind in the necessity, though not an extreme one, in which he and his companions found themselves. Similarly, the Apostles in Matt. 12 interpreted the law of the Sabbath as not binding them to refrain from plucking ears of grain in a similar necessity of eating. It cannot be doubted that this was done wisely, since Christ praised both actions in the cited passage.

2. But if you ask whether in doubtful matters it is lawful to use epikeia and interpret the legislator's intention:

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I answer that this is not lawful while the doubt remains. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 96, a. 6, ad 2: *If the matter is doubtful, one must either act according to the words of the law or consult the superior.* And in *Quodlibet* VIII, a. 13: *If anyone falls into a state of doubt between contrary opinions and, while the doubt remains, possesses several prebends, he exposes himself to danger and thus without doubt sins.* Nor is it an objection that the same holy Doctor seems to teach the opposite in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 120, a. 1, ad 3, in these words: *Interpretation has a place in doubtful matters,* and so forth. For this must not be understood of doubtful matters while a doubtful judgment remains, but when the doubt is set aside and removed by some reason judged truer or more probable. Such a judgment is sufficient for prudent action when the necessity of acting is urgent and no more certain rule can be obtained. Otherwise, since doubts arise very frequently in moral matters and particular cases, and recourse to a superior who might interpret the law is unavailable, it would be an intolerable burden exceeding the human condition if in such cases we could not follow the opinion that appears to us truer and more probable, although it might perhaps deviate from the truth. We discuss this more fully in the treatise on human acts, Chapter XVI.

CHAPTER VII.

On Dispensation from Human Laws.

1. Dispensation is a relaxation of law. Hence it differs from the interpretation of a law in that interpretation merely declares that the law does not possess binding force in some case or particular person, whereas dispensation exempts the subject from the law while its obligation still remains in force. Thus it follows that interpreting a law belongs not only to the superior but also to the subject, who through *epikeia* can declare in a particular case that the law does not bind. By contrast, no one except a superior can dispense from a law, since dispensation is an act of jurisdiction requiring superiority in the one dispensing and subjection in the one with whom he dispenses.

Although dispensation, properly and strictly understood, cannot apply to divine law, because God foresees all singular and contingent things, nor to natural law, since it is nothing other than an impression of the divine and eternal law made in our minds, it can nevertheless apply to human law. For a human legislator, however prudent, could not foresee every emerging and contingent case, according to Wis. 9: *The thoughts of mortals are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.* I add that, just as it contributes to the common good to exempt certain persons from the common law through a special privilege,

so it is fitting for the promotion of the same common good that dispensations from the same law be granted to certain persons, since a relaxation from the common law is made no less through dispensation than through privilege.

2. You will ask, first, whether it is lawful for a superior to dispense a subject from a human law without a just cause.

I answer negatively, with St. Thomas here, q. 97, a. 4, where he teaches that a superior who dispenses an inferior without cause and from mere will sins against fidelity toward the commonwealth, which entrusted him with legislative power, including the power of dispensation, so that he might use it for its good and advantage, not for its destruction and harm. He also acts against prudence by exempting from the common law one who ought not to be exempted. Likewise, he sins against justice, because exempting from a common burden one who ought not to be exempted is the vice of respect of persons opposed to distributive justice. Hence Bernard says in *De consideratione* III, cap. 4: *Where necessity prevails, dispensation is excusable. Where utility calls for it, dispensation is praiseworthy. I mean common utility, not private utility. Where neither exists, it is plainly not faithful dispensation but cruel dissipation.* Nevertheless, the inferior does not sin by using a dispensation granted by the superior without a legitimate cause, because no one sins by using his own right. But one who uses such a dispensation uses his own right by making use of the favor of dispensation granted to him. Therefore he does not sin.

3. Nor is it a valid objection to say with Father Martinon that, although one who uses such a dispensation does not sin against the human law, which ceases to bind him, he nevertheless sins against natural right, because a part that does not accord with the whole is deformed. This is not valid, I say, because although a part that disagrees with the whole without cause is deformed, one that disagrees with the whole for a cause is not. But one who uses such a dispensation does not disagree with the whole without cause, for he possesses a legitimate cause and title for not observing the law from which he has been dispensed, namely the benefit of the dispensation. Therefore he sins neither against human law nor against natural right.

4. It must nevertheless be observed that a dispensation made by the Supreme Pontiff in vows or in other matters of divine or natural right without a legitimate cause is invalid. Consequently, one so dispensed cannot use such a dispensation with a safe conscience, because the Supreme Pontiff did not receive from Christ the power to dispense from divine or natural right without a reasonable cause. Cajetan rightly observes this in his *Summa*, under the word *Dispensatio*; Sylvester, under the word *Votum* IV, q. 3; and

Soto, *De iustitia et iure*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 3. As regards matters pertaining to human and ecclesiastical right, the Supreme Pontiff can validly dispense from them by the fullness of his power, though not lawfully if no just cause for such a dispensation exists. Hence Bernard writes to Pope Eugenius in the passage cited above: *By acting thus you may be shown to possess the fullness of power, but perhaps not equally the fullness of justice. You do this because you can, but whether you also ought to do it is the question.*

CHAPTER VIII.

On the Abrogation of Human Laws.

1. Abrogation differs from invalidation, derogation, correction, and cessation of law. To invalidate a law is to prevent it from possessing binding force. To abrogate it is, after the law has obtained binding force, to remove it entirely. To derogate from it is to remove it not entirely but in part. To correct a law is to moderate it by adding or removing something. Finally, a law is said to cease when either the time for which it was enacted to bind comes to an end, or the cause for which it was enacted ceases.

2. A legislator can abrogate a law enacted by himself through the same power by which he established it. The same can be done by his successors possessing equal power, and all the more by superiors. But inferiors cannot abrogate the laws of superiors, since an inferior has no right or power over a superior or over his constitutions and laws.

Although a legislator sins by abrogating laws without any cause or utility, an abrogation made in this way is nevertheless valid, and subjects are no longer bound to observe a law so abrogated. For a law is essentially constituted by the prince's will and command. Hence, when this is removed for whatever reason, the law ceases, and consequently its obligation ceases, for where there is no law, there can be no obligation of law.

A law previously accepted can be abrogated in three ways: first, through the prince's express revocation; second, through the establishment of a new law contrary to the former one; third, through contrary custom. For just as custom possesses the power to establish a law, so it also possesses the power to abrogate it, as we said above in Chapter V, § 2.

The just causes for abrogating a human law are these. First, if its observance becomes harmful. Second, if its observance becomes incompatible with the natural or divine law. Third, if by reason of the subject or some circumstance the law becomes morally impossible to observe. Fourth, if the multitude of laws becomes excessive and it is expedient that

many of them be abrogated, so that the freedom of subjects concerning indifferent matters is not restricted too greatly.

3. You will ask whether, when the whole and entire reason for which a law was enacted ceases, the obligation of the law ceases by that fact.

I answer affirmatively, against Suárez, *De legibus* VI, cap. 9. Although he admits that, when laws command acts indifferent in themselves, such as bearing or not bearing arms, exporting grain, and similar things, they cease when the adequate end to which they are ordered is lacking, he nevertheless contends that when a law commands an act good in itself, it does not cease when the extrinsic end intended by the legislator is lacking, because, he says, the intrinsic goodness it possesses is the proximate and intrinsic end of the law. The opposite opinion, however, seems more probable, because a law binds only according to the will of the legislator by whom it is enacted, and continues its obligation only while morally the same will perseveres. But when the whole and entire reason for which he enacted the law ceases, the will to bind does not morally persevere. Therefore, when that whole reason ceases, the law no longer binds. The major premise is clear. The minor is proved. The legislator had the will to bind only in dependence upon and because of that reason, whether or not the act otherwise possessed intrinsic goodness. But when the motive reason or final cause for which we will something ceases, we cease to will it, since an act of the will cannot remain when its formal object is removed. Therefore, when the whole and entire reason for which the legislator enacted the law and willed it to bind ceases, the will to bind also ceases.

This is confirmed. If a law commands fasting once a week to placate God because of some public necessity, the obligation of fasting ceases when the public necessity ceases, although apart from that necessity fasting is an act of virtue possessing the intrinsic goodness and moral worth of temperance. Therefore, although a law commands an intrinsically good act, if the adequate cause of the law, or the whole motive reason for which it was enacted, ceases, its obligation ceases.

4. I said, when the *adequate cause* ceases, because if a law was enacted for several causes, its obligation does not cease when one cause ceases, provided that the other causes for which it was enacted do not cease. Thus, because the law of baptism was enacted not only to remove original sin but also to designate a man as belonging to the Christian religion, to distinguish him from other sects, and to render him fit and capable of receiving the other sacraments, even if the first cause ceased and original sin were removed through sanctification in the mother's womb, the law of baptism

would nevertheless still bind because of the other causes for which it was enacted.

CHAPTER IX.
On the Old Divine Law.

§ 1.

Matters Concerning the Old Law That
Are Certain Among All.

1. It is certain by faith that the old law is truly divine and was enacted immediately, not by the authority of men, but by the authority of God himself. This was defined at Trent, sess. 4, in the decree on the canonical Scriptures, where it is said: *The Catholic Church receives and venerates with equal devotion, affection, and reverence all the books of both the Old and New Testaments, since one God is the author of both.* It is also gathered openly from Scripture, for Christ in Matt. 15, speaking of the Mosaic law, calls it *the commandment of God*, when he says: *You have made the commandment of God void because of your traditions.* And the Apostle in Rom. 1 and Heb. 1 affirms that the Father of Christ was the author of the Old Testament. Reason also supports this, for, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 98, a. 2, it belongs to the same one to establish the end and to dispose the means to the end. But the evangelical law is the end of the Mosaic law, according to the saying of the Apostle in Rom. 10: *Christ is the end of the law.* Therefore the same God who is the author of the evangelical law is also the author of the Mosaic law.

It is also clear from Scripture that the old law was delivered by God to Moses through angels on Mount Sinai and was promulgated by him. For St. Stephen says of Moses in Acts 7: *This is he who was in the assembly in the wilderness with the angel who spoke to him on Mount Sinai and with our fathers, who received living words to give to us.* There is also a reason of fittingness that supports this, for, as St. Thomas says in the cited question, a. 3, the old law was imperfect and a certain disposition to the new law. Therefore it was fitting that the new law should be given by Christ the Lord, but the old law by ministers. For in ordered arts the supreme craftsman disposes through his ministers the things necessary for the work, while he himself applies its final perfection.

Third, it is certain that the old law was good and holy, as having been delivered by God, from whom nothing evil or unjust can proceed. Hence the Apostle says in Rom. 7: *The law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, just,*

and good. The commandment of the Mosaic law is there called holy because of the ceremonial precepts, just because of the judicial precepts, and good because of the moral precepts, as St. Thomas observes here, q. 99, a. 4.

2. You will say: the precepts of the Mosaic law are called *not good* in Ezek. 20. And the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 3 that *the letter kills, but the spirit gives life*, where by the name “letter” he understands the old law. And in Heb. 8 he says that the Old Testament was not free from fault. Finally, the old law permitted hatred of enemies, usury, plurality of wives, and a bill of divorce, which are evil and contrary to right reason. Therefore it was not good and holy.

I answer that, when the precepts of the old law are called *not good*, this must be understood of the ceremonial precepts. They are called not good, that is, not perfect, because they did not confer grace by which men are sanctified and cleansed from sin. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 98, a. 1, ad 1. Similarly, the old law is said by the Apostle to kill because it could not by its own power bestow the spirit of life, that is, grace, and because by prohibiting concupiscence it increased it, as Augustine explains in *De spiritu et littera*, cap. 4. When the same Paul says that the Old Testament was not free from fault, he does not use “fault” for sin but for imperfection, defect, and weakness. He intends only to signify that it was imperfect and possessed a certain defect because it did not confer grace, did not lead to perfection, and did not immediately raise its observers to eternal salvation.

To what is added concerning hatred of enemies, it must be said that this was not permitted in the old law, since Lev. 19 says: *You shall not seek revenge, nor shall you remember an injury done by your fellow citizens*. Hence when Matt. 5 says: *You have heard that it was said to those of old: You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy*, it does not signify, as some think, that hatred of enemies was ever commanded or permitted in the old law. It signifies only that the Jews, or certain rabbis, deduced that enemies in general were to be hated from the fact that God had commanded them to love their friends and to pursue and destroy certain nations as enemies. Hence it is as though he had said: *You have heard that it was said to those of old: You shall love your neighbor, and that it was deduced by an evil consequence of the rabbis and Pharisees: You shall hate your enemy. But I say to you: Love your enemies*.

To what is added concerning usury, St. Thomas answers in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 2, that usury toward foreigners was not approved or permitted in the old law, but only tolerated with impunity in the external forum and not in the internal forum, just as lesser evils are sometimes tolerated with impunity by princes and magistrates in a commonwealth in order to avoid greater ones.

Finally, to what is objected in the last place concerning plurality of wives and the bill of divorce, it must be said that God dispensed the Jews so that they might have several wives, and so that through a bill of divorce they might dismiss their wives and marry others. We discuss this fully in the treatise on marriage, Chapters I and IV.

3.¹ Fourth, it is certain that the Mosaic law, although good and holy, was imperfect in comparison with the evangelical law. For, as St. Thomas argues above, q. 91, a. 5: The perfection and imperfection of law are considered according to three things that pertain to law. First, it pertains to law that it be ordered to the common good as to its end. This good can be twofold: a sensible and earthly good, to which the old law was directly ordered, which is why immediately at the beginning of the law in Exodus the people are invited to the earthly kingdom of the Canaanites; and an intelligible and heavenly good, to which the new law orders, which is why Christ immediately, at the beginning of his preaching, invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven has drawn near, Matt. 4. Therefore Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* IV that promises of temporal things are contained in the Old Testament, which is why it is called old, while the promise of eternal life pertains to the New Testament. Second, it pertains to law to direct human acts according to the order of justice. In this also the new law surpasses the old law by ordering the interior acts of the soul, according to Matt. 5: Unless your justice abounds more than that of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore it is said that the old law restrains the hand, but the new law restrains the mind. Third, it pertains to law to lead men to the observance of the commandments. The old law did this through fear of punishments, while the new law does it through the love infused into our hearts through the grace of Christ, which is conferred in the new law but was prefigured in the old law. Therefore Augustine says against *Adimantus*, the disciple of Mani, that the brief difference between the law and the Gospel is fear and love.

§ 2.

On the Precepts of the Old Law.

4. There were three kinds of precepts in the Mosaic law: moral, ceremonial, and judicial. For its end was to direct the Jewish people and order them fittingly, both in matters that concern the natural rectitude of human reason

¹ So numbered '4.' in the original.

and in matters pertaining to divine worship and just civil government. The moral precepts were given for the first, the ceremonial for the second, and the judicial for the third. Through these three taken together, man was fittingly ordered concerning himself, God, and his neighbor. Through them, if they were rightly observed, the Jewish commonwealth was to be preserved in a happy and flourishing condition, as God had promised them in Deut. 28.

5. The moral precepts, as St. Thomas notes here, q. 100, a. 11, are divided into three classes: Some, he says, are most common and so manifest that they are like the ends of the precepts, and therefore no one can err concerning them according to the judgment of reason. Others are determinate precepts whose reason anyone, even an ordinary person, can immediately and easily perceive. Nevertheless, because in a few cases human judgment can be corrupted concerning such matters, these need to be promulgated, and these are the precepts of the Decalogue. Others are precepts whose reason is not so manifest to everyone but only to the wise. These are the moral precepts added to the Decalogue and delivered by God to the people through Moses and Aaron. But because things that are manifest are principles for knowing those that are not manifest, the other moral precepts added to the Decalogue are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue by way of a certain addition to them. For in the first precept of the Decalogue the worship of foreign gods is prohibited. To it are added other precepts prohibiting those things ordered to the worship of idols, as is stated in Deut. 18: There shall not be found among you one who purifies his son or daughter by leading them through fire, nor an enchanter, nor a sorcerer, nor one who consults spirits or diviners, nor one who seeks the truth from the dead. The second precept prohibits perjury. To it are added the prohibition of blasphemy in Lev. 14 and the prohibition of false doctrine in Deut. 13. To the third precept are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth precept, concerning the honor of parents, is added the precept of honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19: Rise before a hoary head and honor the person of the old man; and universally all precepts inducing men to show reverence to superiors or to confer benefits upon equals or inferiors. To the fifth precept, which prohibits murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and every attempt against one's neighbor, as in Lev. 19: You shall not stand against the blood of your neighbor; and also the prohibition of hatred of one's brother, according to the saying: You shall not hate your brother in your heart. To the sixth precept, which prohibits adultery, is added the precept prohibiting prostitution, according to Deut. 24: There shall be no prostitute among the daughters of Israel, nor a fornicator among the sons of Israel; and also the prohibition of vice against nature, according to Lev. 18:

You shall not lie with a male, nor shall you have intercourse with any beast. To the seventh precept, prohibiting theft, is added the precept prohibiting usury, according to Deut. 18: You shall not lend to your brother at usury; and the prohibition of fraud, according to Deut. 15: You shall not have different weights in your bag; and universally everything that pertains to the prohibition of calumny and robbery. To the eighth precept, prohibiting false testimony, is added the prohibition of false judgment, according to Exod. 23: Nor shall you in judgment follow the opinion of the many so as to deviate from the truth; and the prohibition of lying, as is added there: You shall flee from lying; and the prohibition of detraction, according to Lev. 19: You shall not be an accuser or whisperer among the people. No other precepts are added to the remaining commandments, namely the precept not to desire another's wife for intercourse and the precept not to desire any thing or possession belonging to another in order to possess it unlawfully without his consent and will, because through them all evil concupiscence is universally prohibited. Thus St. Thomas, who clearly explains the differences among the moral precepts of the old law.

6. As regards the ceremonial precepts, Genebrard, near the end of his *Chronologia*, relying upon Burgensis and other doctors, asserts that in the old law they amounted to six hundred and thirteen. Of these, two hundred and forty-eight were affirmative, corresponding to the number of members and bones in man, and three hundred and sixty-five were negative, corresponding to the number of days ordinarily counted in the year. Yet they can all be reduced to four classes. Some concerned sacrifices, of which there were three kinds in the old law: the holocaust, the peace offering, and the offering for sin. We shall explain their differences in the treatise on the cardinal virtues when we discuss religion. Others concerned sacraments, of which various kinds existed in the old law, both for laymen and for priests and ministers of the temple, such as circumcision, the Paschal Lamb, the consecration of priests, eating the loaves of proposition, washing hands and feet, shaving hair, and similar things, which St. Thomas discusses here, q. 102, a. 5. Likewise, in the old law there were certain ceremonial precepts concerning sacred things ordered to divine worship as instruments and aids. The principal of these were the Tabernacle; the Ark of the Covenant, containing the two tablets of the law, the rod of Aaron that had budded, and the golden urn with manna; the propitiatory, which was like a table of the purest gold; the table of the loaves of proposition; the altar of incense, upon which frankincense and other spices of the sweetest odor were burned; the altar of holocaust, upon which all the victims were offered; and finally various kinds of vessels, namely bowls, vials, censers, cups, cauldrons, water

jars, mortars, the lamp, and so forth. Josephus discusses these accurately in *Antiquitates* III, and Ribera in *De templo Salomonis* III. Finally, in the old law there were some ceremonial precepts concerning certain legal observances by which, according to God's decree, the Jewish people were distinguished from other nations. The principal among these were abstinence from strangled animals, blood, fat, pork, and from animals that did not have a divided hoof but one solid and undivided, or that did not chew the cud; the eating of unleavened bread, wild lettuce, and other things of this kind. St. Thomas explains their signification fully and learnedly in q. 102, a. 6. Of the same kind were these: *You shall not boil a kid in its mother's milk. You shall not plow with an ox and an ass. You shall not wear a garment woven from two materials. You shall not put on a garment woven of wool and linen. Whoever touches a dead body shall be unclean until evening.*

7. St. Thomas discusses the judicial precepts fully in qq. 104 and 105, where he reduces them to four classes. Some prescribe a determinate order of justice between the prince and the people, some among the citizens themselves, some between the people and foreigners, and finally some among members of the same household. Examples are found throughout Scripture. For example, concerning the prince, precepts are given about how he is to be appointed, how he must conduct himself toward the people, and how the people must conduct themselves toward him. Similarly, concerning the people and citizens among themselves, precepts are given concerning buying, selling, and other contracts. Concerning foreigners, precepts are given about the reception of newcomers and travelers and the manner of waging war against enemies. Finally, concerning members of a household, there are laws about husband and wife, parents and children, masters and servants, and blood relatives and relatives by marriage, including whether marriages can be contracted among them, and other matters.

8. These precepts differ from the moral precepts because the moral precepts pertain proximately to the law of nature, while the judicial precepts pertain to it very remotely, since they are only determinations of things contained generally in natural right. For example, by natural right thieves are to be punished, while by that judicial law the death penalty is inflicted upon them. They differ from the ceremonial precepts in three ways. First, because the ceremonial precepts pertained to divine worship, while the judicial precepts pertained to the observance of justice toward one's neighbor. Second, because the ceremonial precepts were primarily and essentially instituted to signify and prefigure Christ and the mysteries of the Christian religion, but the judicial precepts were not. From this follows the third difference, namely that all the ceremonial precepts have ceased and are

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indeed death-bearing, while some judicial precepts still remain—not insofar as they were prescribed by the old law, but only insofar as they have been adopted by kings and legislators for the public utility. Others are indeed dead, but not death-bearing, since they can be observed without sin, as will be clear from what is to be said in the following section.

§ 3.

Whether and When the Old Law Was Abrogated.

9. I say, first, that the old law has in fact been abrogated and has ceased to bind.

The conclusion is certain by faith and was defined by the Apostles at the Council of Jerusalem held on this question. Paul also teaches it throughout his epistles, especially in Rom. 6:14; Gal. 3:19; Eph. 2:14; and Col. 2:16.

This is confirmed from Heb. 7: *When the priesthood is transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the law also take place.* But the priesthood of the old law has been transferred into the priesthood of the new law, as the Apostle maintains throughout the whole Epistle to the Hebrews. Therefore the law itself has also been transferred into the new law and, thus abrogated, has in fact ceased to bind.

10. But if you ask why it was abrogated, I answer, first, that it was abrogated because the Old Testament was imperfect and weak. Hence the Apostle says in Heb. 7: *There is a rejection of the preceding commandment because of its weakness and uselessness, for the law brought nothing to perfection.* Second, because it was a heavy yoke. St. Peter indicated this reason for its abrogation in Acts 15, when he said: *Why do you tempt God by placing a yoke upon the necks of the disciples that neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?* Third, because it contained only figures that were fulfilled through Christ. Hence Bernard says in hom. 1 on *Missus est*: *The flower prudently falls away before the fruit, because, when the truth appeared in the flesh, the figure passed away.* Or, as Jerome says on Galatians, cap. 4: *Before the Gospel of Christ shone throughout the whole world, the legal precepts possessed their brightness. But after the greater light of evangelical grace shone forth and the Sun of justice revealed himself to the whole world, the light of the stars was hidden and their rays grew dim.* Finally, Christ, as the Apostle testifies in Eph. 2, made both one, that is, from two peoples, Gentile and Jewish, he made one fold. Therefore he had to dissolve the dividing wall of the Mosaic law that separated one people from the other and enclose both under one and the same evangelical law.

On the Laws

11. You will say: the Mosaic law is proclaimed in Sacred Scripture as destined to endure forever. Bar. 3: *This is the book of the commandments of God and the law that exists forever.*

I answer with St. Thomas here, q. 103, a. 3, ad 1, that the old law can be called eternal in two ways. First, as regards the moral precepts, which are contained partly in the Decalogue and partly in other passages of Scripture. These always have force and always will have force, since they belong to natural right. Second, even as regards the ceremonial precepts, because although these have been abrogated as regards their signification, they nevertheless still endure and will endure as regards the thing signified, namely Christ and the Christian religion. Add that the old law and its precepts are called eternal because they were established for a very long time and without a certain terminal date defined in the promulgation of the law itself. Statutes and precepts enacted in this way are commonly called perpetual, in the same sense in which all laws are said to be perpetual.

12. I say, second, that the Mosaic law did not cease before Christ's death. Theologians commonly teach this, with the exception of a few who maintain that the Mosaic law ceased before Christ's death, at the very institution of baptism, through which the obligation of circumcision ceased and consequently that of the whole Mosaic law, whose obligation was founded upon circumcision and arose from it, as Paul signifies in Gal. 5.

The conclusion is proved in several ways. First, because the Mosaic law was shadowy and figurative, and consequently did not cease until its shadows and figures had been fulfilled. But they were not fulfilled until the death and passion of Christ and until Christ, now about to expire, said: *It is consummated*. Therefore the Mosaic law did not cease before Christ's death and passion.

Second, Christ observed the law until death and commanded it to be observed. In Matt. 8 he commanded the leper whom he had healed to go to the priest and offer the gift that Moses had commanded according to the law. And in Matt. 23 he said: *The scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the chair of Moses. Therefore observe and do all things whatsoever they tell you*. Likewise, on the day before he suffered, he sacrificed the Paschal Lamb with his disciples. Therefore, before his death the Mosaic law had not ceased but still bound. Hence Luke 22 says: *The day of unleavened bread came, on which it was necessary that the Pasch be killed*, and so forth, that is, by the necessity of a precept that Christ wished to fulfill before he died.

Third, just as, when the priesthood is transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the law also take place, as the Apostle says in Heb. 7, so, while the priesthood remains, the law must remain. But the priesthood of the Mosaic

law was not transferred until Christ's passion and death. For the Apostle in Heb. 9 affirms that the first tabernacle retained its standing until the way of the saints was revealed through Christ's death. But as long as that Mosaic tabernacle retained its standing, its priesthood also retained its standing. Therefore the Mosaic law was not abrogated before Christ's death and passion.

Fourth, the Old Testament, which is the same as the law, did not cease except through the New Testament. But the New Testament did not begin to bind until after Christ's death, because a testament has no force unless the death of the testator intervenes, as Paul says in Heb. 9 and Ulpian proves in law 1 of the Digest, *De testamentis*. Therefore the Old Testament did not cease until Christ's death.

13. You will say, first, that Luke 16 says: *The law and the prophets were until John*. And Matt. 11 says: *All the prophets and the law prophesied until John*. Therefore the old law ceased when John the Baptist began to preach.

But I deny the consequence, for the meaning of these words is that the law and the prophets foretold until John that Christ was to come, while John showed that he had now come. Or the meaning is that the law and the prophets proclaimed temporal promises until John, but from then onward the kingdom of God, consisting in spiritual goods, began to be evangelized. For Christ said this in answer to the Pharisees who mocked him because he rebuked excessive attachment to riches and taught contempt for them, as though in this he disagreed with the law and the prophets, which promised temporal goods.

Third, it can be answered that those words do not signify that the old law endured only until Christ's advent and the preaching of John the Baptist, but that the law and the prophets reigned and triumphed until that time, and that the law not only existed but reigned. When John the Baptist came, the law did not immediately die, but began to grow sick, because the grace of the Gospel was already beginning to shine.

14. You will say, second: all the ceremonies of the old law regarded Christ as their final end and signified that he was to come. Therefore, as soon as Christ came, they began to be false, and consequently the old law then began to cease.

I answer that the ceremonies of the old law did not regard Christ absolutely, but as Redeemer. Therefore they were abolished not as soon as Christ was present, but as soon as he fulfilled the office of Redeemer through his death.

15. You will say, third: baptism, which is the first sacrament of the new law, was instituted by Christ before his death. Therefore the precept of

baptism began to bind before Christ's death, and consequently the precept of circumcision ceased to bind before Christ's passion.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although baptism was instituted by Christ before his death, it was not made a matter of precept until after Christ's passion and resurrection, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 66, a. 2, in these words: The necessity of using this sacrament was imposed upon man after the passion and resurrection, both because in Christ's passion the figurative sacraments were brought to an end and baptism and the other sacraments of the new law succeeded them, and also because through baptism man is conformed to Christ's passion and resurrection, insofar as he dies to sin and begins the life of new justice. Therefore it was necessary that Christ first suffer and rise before the necessity of being conformed to Christ's death and resurrection was imposed upon men. Hence, although after baptism was instituted but before Christ's death and resurrection circumcision was not necessary by necessity of means, since it was not the only means for removing original sin and baptism was sufficient for that purpose, it was nevertheless necessary by necessity of precept. For it was so incorporated into the old law as to be the sign of the faithful who professed that law. Therefore, as long as that law continued, its use was necessary by God's precept.

16. I say, third, that the Mosaic law ceased in Christ's death and resurrection themselves. This is against Scotus, Suárez, and others, who think that the legal observances were not entirely and completely extinguished until the day of Pentecost itself, on which the solemn promulgation of the evangelical law took place. It is nevertheless the teaching of St. Thomas here, q. 103, a. 3, ad 2, where he writes: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was completed in Christ's passion. Hence the Lord then said, It is consummated, as is stated in John 19. Therefore the legal observances then had to cease completely, as their truth was now consummated. As a sign of this, the veil of the temple is said to have been torn in Christ's passion, Matt. 27. Therefore, before Christ's passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the law and the Gospel ran together, because the mystery of Christ had already begun but was not yet consummated. For this reason Christ the Lord before his passion commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.

The holy Fathers teach the same. Augustine says in serm. 124, *De tempore*: *The veil of the temple is torn because the synagogue is dishonored and the ancient observance is dissolved.* Ambrose says in *In Lucam* X, cap. 25: *The veil of the temple is also torn, so that the profanation of the mysteries of the synagogue may be declared.* Caesarius says in hom. 6, *In Pascha*, near the end: *The veil of the*

temple is torn. The veil is the ornament of the tabernacle. Therefore, when grace shines forth, the Church is built and the synagogue is destroyed. Finally, Pope Leo in serm. 6, *De passione*, wittily mocks Caiaphas tearing his own garments as though Christ had blasphemed, saying that the pontiff of a law soon to perish showed by this tearing of his garments that he was soon to be stripped of the honor of his priesthood.

This is confirmed by the common agreement of Jerome and Augustine in the letters they wrote to one another concerning the legal observances. They teach that after Christ's death and resurrection the legal ceremonies were dead, that is, had lost their binding force, although Jerome thought that after Christ's death and resurrection they were not merely dead but also death-bearing, so that whoever observed them, apart from ignorance or invincible error, sinned. Therefore Scotus and Suárez dissent from them without merit and without a sufficient foundation.

17. The conclusion can also be established by four reasons. The first is this: since the Mosaic law was shadowy and figurative, it had to cease when the truth that it prefigured arrived. But through Christ's death and resurrection all the figures of the old law were fulfilled, as Christ, now about to die, signified when he said: *It is consummated*. Therefore in Christ's death and resurrection the Mosaic law ceased and was entirely abrogated. Hence Pope Leo says in serm. 7, *De passione*: *So that the shadows might yield to the body, the ancient observance is excluded by a new sacrament; victim passes into victim, blood is removed by blood, and the legal feast is fulfilled by being changed.*

The second reason is this: at the Last Supper Christ established the New Testament, which he afterward confirmed by his death and resurrection. Therefore the Old Testament, already worn out by age, had to be extinguished when the New Testament was introduced. The consequence is clear, for the force of a later testament revokes that of an earlier one whenever the later is made to revoke the earlier, as is clear in human affairs. But the New Testament was established so that the former might be revoked, as all admit and as the Apostle teaches in Heb. 10 in these words: *He removes the first that he may establish the second*. And in cap. 8: *By calling it new, he has made the former old. But that which grows old and ages is near destruction*. Therefore, and so forth.

The third reason is this: in Rom. 7 Paul infers from the fact that we have been freed from sin that we have likewise been exempted from the yoke of the law. But in Christ's death and resurrection we were freed from sin. Therefore we were also freed from the old law. Hence the same Apostle says there that, just as a woman at her husband's death is freed from the law of

marriage, so the synagogue at Christ's death was freed from the obligation of the law.

The fourth reason is taken from the saying of the Apostle in Heb. 7: *When the priesthood is transferred, it is necessary that a transfer of the law also take place.* Therefore, when the priesthood of the old law ceased, the old law itself must also have ceased, since according to Paul and the truth of the matter there was a necessary connection and concomitance between the law and the priesthood. But the priesthood of the old law ceased in Christ's death and resurrection themselves. For then the Aaronic priesthood was entirely emptied and transferred into Christ's priesthood, as is gathered from the saying of the Apostle in Heb. 9: *Christ, appearing as high priest of the good things to come, through a greater and more perfect tabernacle not made by hand, that is, not of this creation, but through his own blood, entered once into the holy places, having obtained eternal redemption.* Therefore the old law ceased in Christ's death and resurrection themselves and was entirely abrogated, even as regards its moral precepts. For although these still retain binding force, they do so not insofar as they are precepts of the Mosaic law, but insofar as they are precepts of the natural law, whose obligation is perpetual.

I said, *in Christ's death and resurrection themselves*, both because the old law was a figure and shadow not only of Christ's passion and death but also of his resurrection, and therefore before Christ's resurrection it was not yet perfectly fulfilled and consequently not entirely extinguished; and also because the priesthood of Aaron, which was proper to the old law, ought not to have been abolished until Christ's priesthood was consummated and established in perfection and indefectibility. It did not possess this until his resurrection, in which Christ himself resumed an immortal and indefectible life. Hence only then was this prophecy of David fulfilled: *You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek.* Add that the obligation of baptism, which is the foundation of the whole evangelical law, began only after Christ's resurrection, since on the very day of the resurrection Christ proposed its precept, saying to the Apostles: *Go, teach all nations, baptizing them*, and so forth. Therefore the old law ceased only then and not before.

18. The adversaries object against this conclusion: the Mosaic law did not cease before the evangelical law began to bind, since the generation of the one is the corruption of the other, according to the saying of the Apostle in Eph. 2: *Emptying the law of commandments by decrees*, that is, excluding the Mosaic law by evangelical decrees, as Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Oecumenius explain there. But the evangelical law did not begin to bind before the day of Pentecost. Therefore the Mosaic law did not cease to bind before that day. They suppose the major premise to be certain and prove the

minor thus. A law does not bind before its promulgation, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 90, a. 4. But the evangelical law was not promulgated before Pentecost. Therefore it did not begin to bind before the day of Pentecost. The minor is proved both because the Apostles did not publicly propose the Gospel to the people until Pentecost, and also because, just as the old law was not promulgated until the fiftieth day after the Jewish Passover, so the new law ought not to have been promulgated until fifty days after the Pasch or resurrection of Christ. For it was shown above, a. 2, at the end, that the promulgation of the Mosaic law was a figure of the promulgation of the evangelical law.

To this argument, which is the principal foundation of the adversaries, I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. In proof of the minor, I say that there are two kinds of promulgation of a law. One is essential and sufficient for the law, and takes place when the prince, acting as a public person, proposes and communicates it to his subjects present at the court. The other is solemn and accidental, and is ordered to removing the subjects' ignorance. It takes place when the law is published by a herald throughout the individual provinces or all the principal cities. Therefore, although the evangelical law was promulgated by the Apostles as Christ's heralds through this second kind of promulgation only on the day of Pentecost, it was nevertheless proposed and communicated by Christ to the disciples on the day of the resurrection itself in these words: *Go, teach all nations, baptizing them*, and so forth. Hence from the day of the resurrection it began to possess the force of a law binding of itself, although this promulgation was not sufficient to remove ignorance of it and consequently to render men inexcusable for its transgression. From this the answer to the first proof of the minor is clear. To the second I likewise say that the Mosaic law was promulgated with a promulgation sufficient for the nature of law from the time God gave it to Moses on Mount Sinai. For God then spoke as prince and legislator, and consequently from that time the precepts of that law enacted by God possessed the force of law. Thus its later publication by Moses to the whole people did not possess the force of a promulgation necessary for the essence of law, but only of a declaration, so that men could not be excused from its obligation by ignorance. Therefore, although that publication of the old law made by Moses was a figure of the promulgation of the evangelical law to be made by the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, it does not follow that this latter promulgation was necessary for the nature and essence of the evangelical law, but only for removing ignorance of it.

19. For the solution of another argument that could be made against our conclusion, it must be observed that, although from Christ's passion and

resurrection until the publication of the Gospel the old law was dead, so that it neither bound nor possessed binding force, it was nevertheless not entirely useless, as it is now. As long as its goodness remained and it was not death-bearing, Jewish children receiving circumcision were justified from original sin, and those who observed that law in good faith were saved. For it was fitting to the divine goodness that, as long as it tolerated that law, it should not remove its usefulness, so that it might benefit those who observed it in good faith. Hence the dispensation and permission given through the law to repudiate a legitimate wife and marry another, or to have several wives at once, remained valid for them.

§ 4.

Whether the Mosaic Law Became Death-Bearing
as Soon as It Ceased to Bind.

20. St. Jerome formerly held the affirmative part, as is clear from his letter to Augustine, which is numbered eleventh among Augustine's letters. For he distinguished only two periods: one before Christ's passion, in which the legal observances were neither dead, as lacking binding or expiatory force in their own manner, nor death-bearing, because those who observed them did not sin; and another after Christ's passion, in which they were not only dead, that is, lacking force and obligation, but also death-bearing, so that whoever observed them sinned mortally. Augustine taught the opposite in epist. 19 and 119 to Jerome, where he distinguished three periods. One was before Christ's passion, in which the legal observances were neither death-bearing nor dead. Another was after the Gospel had been published, in which the legal observances were dead and death-bearing. The third was an intermediate period, namely from Christ's passion until the publication of the Gospel, in which the legal observances were indeed dead, because they possessed no force and no one was bound to observe them, but were not death-bearing, because those converted from Judaism to Christ could lawfully observe them, provided they did not place their hope in them in such a way as to judge them necessary for salvation, as though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. St. Thomas followed Augustine here, q. 103, a. 4, ad 3, as did the theologians commonly. With them:

21. I say that the Mosaic law did not become death-bearing as soon as its obligation began to cease, but that for some time after its abrogation it was lawful to observe its ceremonial precepts, although this was not necessary.

This is proved effectively because the Apostles themselves used the ceremonies in places where the Mosaic law had already ceased to bind, after a sufficient promulgation of the evangelical law had been made. This is clear from Acts 16, where Paul circumcised Timothy, who had been born of a Gentile father; from cap. 18, where according to the custom of the Nazirites he shaved his head at Cenchreae; and from cap. 21, where, by the counsel of the Apostle James and the elders, he used a legal purification with the Jews in order to conciliate them and, having been purified with them, entered the temple. Finally, in cap. 15 of the same book, it was established at the Council of the Apostles that Christians should abstain from blood and from strangled animals, which was one of the legal ceremonies.

St. Jerome answers in the cited letter that the Apostles never truly observed the legal ceremonies after Christ's resurrection, but used them only through a certain pious simulation so that they would not scandalize the Jews and impede their conversion.

22. But if those ceremonies had then been death-bearing, as Jerome thinks, it would not have been lawful for the Apostles to use them even by simulation, because it is contrary to the profession of faith to use a superstitious rite and outwardly profess a false religion. Such was the religion of the Jews as regards those rites, if they had already become superstitious and death-bearing. Likewise, if it had been lawful for the Apostles to use the Jews' superstitious worship by simulation in order to gain them, as Jerome says, it would similarly have been lawful for them to use the superstitious worship of the Gentiles by simulation in order to convert them more easily. Even now it would be lawful to use Jewish ceremonies and simulate their faith in order to gain them, as St. Augustine rightly argues against Jerome in the cited letters. St. Thomas adds in the passage cited above: *It seems unfitting that the Apostles should conceal for fear of scandal those things that pertain to the truth of life and doctrine, and should use simulation in matters pertaining to the salvation of the faithful.*

23. The conclusion can also be established by an excellent argument from fittingness used by St. Augustine to prove that after the abrogation of the Mosaic law it was lawful for some time to observe the legal ceremonies, until the sufficient publication of the Gospel, although it was not necessary. For, he says, just as we ordinarily preserve dead men for some time before burial so that they may be given an honorable burial, so it was fitting that the legal observances, which after Christ's death could not be observed as living, should be observed as dead until the complete publication of the Gospel, so that the dead mother, the synagogue, might be buried with honor. This also prevented men from thinking, had they been immediately rejected, that the

old law was abominable like the worship of the Gentiles, which the Apostles never wished to tolerate for any period.

24. You will say: if it was lawful for some time after the abrogation of the Mosaic law to observe the legal ceremonies, Paul could not reasonably have rebuked the Apostle Peter in Gal. 2 because he used them and separated himself from the recently converted Gentiles at Antioch in order to live in the Jewish manner with the Jews who had come from James at Jerusalem. But Paul rightly rebuked Peter, who, as Gal. 2 says, was blameworthy. Therefore, after the abrogation of the Mosaic law, it was not lawful to observe the legal ceremonies.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. Peter was rightly rebuked by Paul, not because he simply used Jewish ceremonies after the abrogation of the Mosaic law, which Paul himself had often done, as we showed above, but because he used them with a certain imprudence and to the scandal of the weak, so that Christians were led by his action to think that the observance of the legal ceremonies was still necessary and were thus in some manner compelled to Judaize. This is signified by Paul's words to Peter in Gal. 2: *If you, though a Jew, live in the Gentile manner and not in the Jewish manner, how do you compel the Gentiles to Judaize?* The solution is that of St. Thomas here, q. 103, a. 4, ad 2, where he writes: *Peter did not sin in observing the legal ceremonies for a time, because this was lawful for him as one converted from Judaism. But he sinned because, in the observance of the legal ceremonies, he exercised excessive care not to scandalize the Jews, so that from this followed scandal to the Gentiles.*

25. You will ask at precisely what time the Mosaic law began to be death-bearing.

I answer that this is doubtful and uncertain. It is nevertheless highly probable, as most theologians teach, that it began to be death-bearing only about the fortieth year after Christ's death, after the Gospel had already been sufficiently promulgated by the Apostles to the Jews throughout the whole world and the temple at Jerusalem, together with the state of the Jewish commonwealth, had been overthrown by the Roman emperors. For then it was no longer necessary to show honor to the now-extinct synagogue or to exercise condescension toward Jews who had so long remained rebellious against God's call.

CHAPTER X.

On the New or Evangelical Divine Law.

1. It is certain by faith that Christ not only freed us from the old law but also instituted a new law pertaining to Christians. Many testimonies of both Testaments openly declare this, and Trent, sess. 6, can. 21, confirms it by condemning with anathema anyone who says that *Christ Jesus was given by God to men as a Redeemer in whom they should trust, but not also as a legislator whom they should obey*. Reason also supports this. For no kingdom and no perfect civil or ecclesiastical community can be fittingly governed, stably preserved, and effectively directed to its proposed end without laws, as is known by the natural light itself and by experience. Therefore, since Christ instituted the Church as a new spiritual kingdom, he had to give it laws through which it could be governed and preserved in its institution and advanced toward its proposed end, which is eternal salvation. Hence Isa. 33 says of the Messiah: *The Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king; he himself will save us*.

2. Nor is John 1 an objection: *The law was given through Moses, but grace and truth came through Jesus Christ*. This seems to signify that Moses was a legislator, but Christ was not, and that Christ made no law but only merited grace and justification for us. I answer that grace is not said to have come through Christ, while the law was given through Moses, because Christ enacted no law, but because Moses gave the Jews a bare law without grace, that is, a law commanding but not assisting, while Christ gave us a law with grace, that is, a law commanding and assisting. For this reason it is called by the Apostle *the law of the Spirit*, and by Christ *a sweet yoke and a light burden*.

3. The new law given by Christ contains precepts of three kinds, namely moral, sacramental, and precepts of faith. The difference among them is that the moral precepts, since they belong to natural right, were not instituted by Christ but only explained and vindicated from the errors in which they had become entangled through human malice. The sacramental precepts were instituted by Christ to take the place of the old ones, which he abrogated. The precepts of faith were not newly instituted, but were made clearer from what had been implicit, so that we are now bound explicitly to believe certain mysteries that in the old law were believed only implicitly. Such are the nativity, passion, and death of Christ, which were believed obscurely by the Jews but are believed expressly by Christians.

4. The old law and the new or evangelical law agree in many things and differ in many. They agree, first, because, just as the Mosaic law was promulgated on the fiftieth day after Passover, that is, on the day of Pentecost, so was the evangelical law, as is clear from Acts 2. Second, just as the former was promulgated on Mount Sinai, so the latter was promulgated on Mount Sion, according to Isa. 2: *From Sion the law shall go forth, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem*. Third, just as thunder and lightning were heard there, so here there suddenly came *a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind approaching*. Fourth, just as fire and smoke appeared there, so here there appeared *divided tongues as of fire*. Fifth, just as the Jews there were struck with fear, so here were the Apostles. Sixth, just as there an angel proclaimed the words of the Decalogue with the blast of a trumpet, so here the evangelical trumpet sounded through the mouths of the Apostles and its sound went forth into the whole world. Finally, just as two cherubim turned their faces toward the propitiatory, so the two laws, Mosaic and evangelical, turn their eyes toward Christ as toward the great propitiatory of the world. For the Jewish people who preceded Christ's coming and the Christian people who follow it were saved by the same grace of Christ and redeemed by the blood of the same immaculate Lamb. Hence Augustine says in epist. 17 to Optatus: *Since all the just, that is, true worshipers of God, whether before or after Christ's incarnation, neither lived nor live except by faith in Christ's incarnation, in whom is the fullness of grace, certainly what is written in Acts 4, There is no other name under heaven in which we must be saved, has had power to save the human race from the time it was corrupted in Adam*.

5. Those two laws differ, first, because the Mosaic law was written on tablets of stone through the ministry of angels, while the evangelical law was engraved upon the hearts of men through the Holy Spirit, according to Jer. 31: *I shall place my law within them, and I shall write it upon their hearts*. Hence Theophylact says on 2 Cor. 3: *As great as the distance between spirit and ink, and between a heart and a stone, so great is the difference between the New Testament and the law*. Augustine says in *De spiritu et littera*, cap. 17: *There the finger of God worked upon tablets of stone; here it works upon human hearts. There the law was placed outside, so that the unjust might be terrified; here it was given within, so that they might be justified*. Again, in cap. 21: *The New Testament differs from the Old in that through the New the law of God is written in the hearts of the faithful, while through the Old it was written on tablets. Nor could the law written on tablets effect in the Jews this inscription, which is justification*. Prosper, a disciple worthy of so great a master, sings in harmony with him in *Contra Collatorem*, cap. 22, in these words: *God writes the New Testament upon hearts with his finger, that*

is, with the Holy Spirit, so that, with nature reformed and renewed, they may naturally fulfill the fullness of the law and the works of charity.

6. Second, the old and new laws differ because the new law possesses Christ present as its author and institutor, who was able by perfect justice to merit and make satisfaction to God for men, and contains sacraments possessing the power to cause grace and serving as vessels that contain it. Therefore it possesses from its own resources the power to justify. The old law did not, because it lacked both. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 107, a. 1, ad 2, and St. Augustine in many places affirm that those who were acceptable to God in the Old Testament through faith belonged according to this to the New Testament, for they were not justified except through faith in Christ, who is the author of the New Testament, according to 1 Cor.: *They drank from the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ.*

From this you will understand that the old law is rightly compared to a mirror, which shows stains but does not remove them, while the new law is compared to water, which can not only reveal dirt but also wash it away. Hence in Ezek. 25 the Lord promises the faithful of the new law: *I shall pour clean water upon you, and you shall be cleansed from all your defilements.*

7. The third difference consists in this: the Old Testament was a testament of fear, while the New Testament is a testament of love. The former belonged to servants, whose disposition toward their lord is fear; the latter belongs to sons, whose disposition toward their father is love. Hence Augustine says in *Adversus Adimantum*, cap. 17: *This is the briefest and clearest difference between the two Testaments: fear and love.* Therefore, just as fear precedes love, so the Old Testament preceded the New; and just as fear prepares a place for charity, but when charity begins to dwell there, the fear that prepared its place is cast out, so the Old Testament prepared a place for the New Testament and was abrogated when the latter arrived.

8. From this follows the fourth difference. In the Old Testament the mysteries of faith, especially the Trinity and the Incarnation, were known obscurely and imperfectly; in the New they are clearly and expressly revealed. For servants do not know the counsels and secrets of the father of the household as perfectly as sons. Hence Christ said to the disciples in John 15: *I shall no longer call you servants, because a servant does not know what his lord does.* Augustine indicated this difference when he said that the Old Testament is the concealment of the New and the New is the revelation of the Old. For this reason Moses veiled his face when he spoke to the people, while Christ spoke to us with an unveiled face, as the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 3.

From this you will understand that, just as a hemisphere grows brighter the more closely the sun approaches it, so the state of the old law received

greater clarity and illumination in the knowledge of the divine mysteries in proportion to its greater proximity to Christ and the Gospel. As Pope Gregory says in hom. 16 on Ezekiel: *According to the progress of the times, the knowledge of the holy Fathers increased, and the closer they were to the coming of the Savior, the more fully they perceived the mysteries of salvation.*

9. The fifth difference between the New and Old Testaments consists in this: the New opened the gates of heaven, which the Old could not open. The Apostle declares this in Heb. 9 in these words: *Into the second tabernacle the high priest alone entered once a year, not without blood, which he offered for his own ignorance and that of the people, the Holy Spirit signifying by this that the way of the saints was not yet revealed while the first tabernacle still retained its standing.* That is, only the high priest entered the Holy of Holies, which was the innermost and most excellent part of the temple, once each year, while the other priests were prohibited from entering it. For by the closure of the innermost sanctuary and most excellent part of the temple the Holy Spirit signified that the way into heaven was closed as long as the Old Testament remained in force. But Christ, the author of the New Testament, was the first of all to penetrate heaven and open the heavenly way and gates. For this reason John saw the twelve gates of heaven standing open in Rev. 21: *Its gates shall not be closed. On the east were three gates, on the north three gates, on the south three gates, and on the west three gates.* The gates stand open toward every region of heaven because they stand open to the inhabitants of the whole world by the benefit not of the Old Testament but of the New.

Finally, passing over many other differences between the old and new laws, this is the principal and, as it were, the capital difference: the old law was the shadow and figure of the new, while the new is the perfection and fulfillment of the old. Hence Jerome says in *Adversus Pelagianos* I, cap. 9: *In the law it is promised; in the Gospel it is fulfilled. There are the beginnings; here is the perfection. In the former the foundations of works are laid; here the summit of faith and grace is placed upon them.* And Bernard, in hom. 1 on *Missus est*, teaches that, just as the fruit is the end and fulfillment of both the seed and the flowers, so Christ was the end, perfection, and fulfillment of the old law. Chrysostom, or, as others maintain, Victor of Antioch, uses another similitude when explaining Mark 4: *The earth bears fruit of itself, first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear.* He adds: *First it bears the blade in the law of nature, afterward the ears in the law of Moses, and then the full grain in the Gospel.*

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