



Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P.

Thomistic Manual of Theology 1

A Brief Course of Thomistic Theology

Translated by Osvaldo R.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

FR. JEAN-BAPTISTE GONET, O.P.

THOMISTIC MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

A BRIEF COURSE OF THE WHOLE OF
THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

TOME I.

I. ON GOD AS ONE. II. ON GOD AS THREE. III. ON THE
ANGELS. IV. ON MAN AND HIS NATURE.

LATIN PRINTED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
ASSOCIATES, IN ANTWERP, BELGIUM

This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, O.P., of revered memory, is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, to whose defense this indefatigable Thomist consecrated his labors, that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To Saint Thomas Aquinas
and His School.

August 1, 2026.

Oswaldo A. R. | Gpt 5.6
Translator.

The right of ownership of this translation being reserved.

TO SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE
FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

APPROBATION
Of the Faculty of Theology of the Academy of Bordeaux.

W e, the undersigned Chancellor, Doctors of Theology, and Professors of the Academy of Bordeaux, have diligently examined the book entitled *Manuale Thomistarum*, published by the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Preachers, Professor and Senior Professor of the same Academy. We have found that it contains absolutely nothing contrary or discordant with orthodox faith and Christian morals. On the contrary, as a genuine offspring most worthy of the genius of its Author, who is always like himself, consistent with himself, and most steadfast in explaining and defending the difficulties of the most sacred and angelic doctrine, we have judged that it should be committed to the press as soon as possible. Given at Bordeaux on 16 May 1678.

JOHN FONTENELLE, Chancellor.
FRANCIS ARNALDUS, Augustinian.
ANGELUS LATRIE, Carmelite.
PETER LAHAYE, Doctor of Theology.

APPROBATION

T he Reverend Father Gonet had published the immense Shield of Thomistic Theology against its new assailants. But because those assailants were not men who, experienced in the contests of disputation, hurled dangerous blows or greatly formidable weapons, he reduced the Shield, and in place of the immense Shield recently published by him he now fashions against those same assailants a little shield, and a very brief one. Yet its brevity detracts nothing from it; rather, its power is increased, for it is stronger insofar as the weight of its propositions and the arguments concerning its subject matter cohere more closely, are not separated by longer distances, but are joined at nearer intervals. Thus one may say with Tertullian: As much as it is compressed in words, so much is it expanded in meanings. Let the old proverb, therefore, be dismissed: A good book always makes a bad compendium. For this Compendium involves no loss. It is clear despite its brevity, solid despite its subtlety, most worthy of its Author's reputation, and so complete in every respect that it seems to have nothing of a compendium except the title. Thus I judge at Béziers on 19 December 1679.

JULIAN JOSEPH GOURGAS,
Doctor of Sacred Theology and Canon Law of Paris.

LICENSE
Of the Most Reverend Father General.

W e, Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Master General and servant of the entire Order of Friars Preachers: greetings.

By the tenor of these presents and by the authority of our office, we grant you, Reverend Father Fr. Jean-Baptiste Gonet of Béziers, of the Order of Friars Preachers, former Provincial of the Province of Toulouse and Senior Professor at the Academy of Bordeaux, license and faculty to commit the *Manuale Thomistarum* to print, provided that the work shall have been approved by three Professors of Theology appointed by the Very Reverend Father Provincial of the Province of Toulouse, and provided that all other requirements of law are observed. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. In testimony of which, etc. Given at Rome on 31 July 1677.

Fr. ANTHONY DE MONROY, Master of the Order. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. ANTONINUS CLOCHE, Master and Associate.

COMMISSION
Of the Very Reverend Father Provincial.

We, Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Prior Provincial and servant of the Province of Toulouse of the Order of Friars Preachers, by the tenor of these presents appoint and establish the Reverend Fathers John Leonard Geay, Prior of Béziers, Louis Bancel, and Jerome de Grasse, Professors of Sacred Theology, as censors of the book entitled *Manuale Thomistarum*, which the Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, formerly public Professor at the University of Bordeaux, intends to publish. Given at Valence on 29 October 1679. In testimony of which, we have signed these presents with our own hand and fortified them with the seal of our office.

Fr. ANTHONY MASSOULIÉ, Provincial as above. Registered, fol. 2.
Fr. JOHN LAPEIERE, Associate.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Leonard Geay, Professor of Sacred Theology and Prior of the Convent of Béziers. The Shield of Thomistic Theology shone forth from God, so that all the mountains of the Church might gleam with its extraordinary brilliance. Yet just as the sun, when first rising, illuminates the summits of mountains, and in its progress does not disdain to flood the lowliness of the valleys with the rays of its light, so the Author of the Shield, after illuminating the minds of more eminent Doctors with his solar Shield, now hastens by means of his Theological Manual to enlighten even the weaker scholastics. Indeed, in this Manual all the mysteries of Scholastic Theology are seen reduced, as it were, to a compact whole, but with such order, solidity, brevity, and clarity that one may deservedly say of the Disciple's Manual what is commonly proclaimed of the Master's Summa: The style is brief, the eloquence pleasing, the doctrine lofty, clear, and firm. Let this Theological Manual, therefore, come forth into the light. Let it come forth for the relief of Masters, for the consolation of Disciples, and for the more convenient use of all students. Let this Theological Manual be worn by the hands of all. Just as all the sacred Doctors spoke through the mouth of the one St. Thomas, so now, in this Manual, may all Professors of Sacred Theology explain in the Schools the conclusions of the Summa Theologiae through the mouth of one most wise disciple of St. Thomas. These are my wishes, this my judgment, this the vote that I willingly add to this Manual. Given at Béziers on 20 November 1679.

Fr. JOHN LEONARD GEAY, Professor of Sacred Theology and humble Prior of the
Convent of Béziers of the Order of Friars Preachers.

APPROBATION

Of the Reverend Father Bancel, of the Order of Preachers, Aggregate Doctor and Perpetual Professor of Sacred Theology in the School of St. Thomas at the University, Examiner for the Diocese and the entire Legation of Avignon, and also General Definitor of the Province of Toulouse of the same Order.

I have always admired the works of our Very Reverend Father Gonet, a Doctor celebrated everywhere. For he has brought the whole of Theology into the light with such clarity that he seems to have written it with the rays of the sun. With such care and industry has he collected within it the choicer testimonies of the Holy Fathers and the more solid and subtle arguments of the Doctors, which are scattered throughout the books of others, that it may with perfect justice be said: he who knows Gonet knows the whole. Only this could still have been desired: that the Author himself should reduce his works to a compendium for the greater convenience of all students. This he has successfully accomplished in his Manual, in which I do not doubt that nothing will be found contrary to faith or good morals, since it is nothing other than the doctrine itself of his Shield of Thomistic Theology. Let this work, therefore, most complete in every respect, come forth before the public, so that all may

Handle it by night and handle it by day.
At Avignon on 6 December 1679.

Fr. LOUIS BANCEL, of the Order of Preachers.

APPROBATION

*Of the Reverend Father Jerome de Grasse, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.*

The Shield of Thomistic Theology, comprised in five volumes, was published some years ago by the Very Reverend Father Jean-Baptiste Gonet, to the great benefit of the whole theological discipline. This excellent work, in every respect consonant with the holy faith, remarkable for its profound and solid doctrine, and delightful for the most abundant flowers of the Holy Fathers scattered throughout it, has been eagerly embraced and honored not only privately by all sacred Professors, but also by the most celebrated sacred Academies of all Europe. This Theological Manual was forged by the labor of the same Author. Being commanded to judge it by the Very Reverend Father Antoninus Massoulié, Provincial of the Province of Toulouse of the Friars Preachers, I would say nothing other than that this Theological Manual is the true and genuine epitome of the Theological Shield. In it, purity of doctrine, in complete agreement throughout with the faith and oracles of the Holy Apostolic See, choice and elegance of propositions, and the flowers of the Holy Fathers, which shine more diffusely throughout the Theological Shield, shine in the Manual more narrowly and compactly indeed, but also more preciously. Thus I judge at Avignon on 3 December 1679.

Fr. JEROME DE GRASSE, Professor of Sacred Theology and
Vicar General of the Holy Office at Avignon.

EULOGY

Let the most learned men of Europe heap innumerable praises upon GONET. Let the Spaniards proclaim his profundity, the Italians his charm, the Germans admire his labor, and the French his clarity. Let others, finally, extol the various gifts of his genius with various encomiums. For my part, and insofar as a sober man may do so, I shall praise his modesty and reserve. The rarer this virtue is among the more learned, the more praiseworthy it is in this most learned man, in whom it is found in the highest degree. By this principal ornament of the soul, and by his other riches of genius, he is most like the Angelic Thomas. GONET may therefore be called, not inelegantly, the Second Hope of the Great Order of Preachers. It was not enough for him, through his marvelous clarity, to illuminate the minds of all more brightly than the sun; by this Epitome he enables all students to become theologians in a short time. Restrain yourself, Very Reverend Father: you are distinguished by excessive clarity, and labor too much to write Theology in a laconic style. By your lucid discourse you disclose to all the hidden mysteries of this science; by this brevity of speech you open them to all as though in a single glance. You were easy to understand; you will be easier still. Finally, your Manual will be in the hands of all. Yet proceed, I beg you, Reverend Father. The knowledge of God can never become known too much or too quickly. Hail, therefore, new light of Thomistic Theology; hail, Thomas of our Age, most humble son of Dominic and richest heir of his virtue; unconquered Opponent of the Innovators, pillar of the Order, glory of your native land, honor of your people, and glory of the Christian world.

CHARLES LEPUL, Doctor of Both Laws, Royal Counselor,
and Assessor of Annual Taxes.

To Lord Hyacinthe de Serroni¹.

I had composed a Course of Thomistic Theology, MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE OF THE CHURCH AND ARCHBISHOP, which I entitled the Shield and dedicated to St. Teresa, so that, if it could not stand under its own protection, it might at least stand under another's heavenly protection. Yet because my Shield extended more widely, it was all the more exposed to the fiery darts of its enemies, and was weaker in proportion as it was more expansive. Therefore, on the advice of many students of Thomistic doctrine, I reduced the Shield, and from a Shield made a small shield; and I embraced within a compendious Manual the theological matters that had been examined in a fuller style, so that the power of the whole of Thomistic Theology, being more compressed, might more frequently prove more robust, especially under the auspices of YOUR EXCELLENCY and of that inclination toward lovers of learning which is innate in you. Among your illustrious and exceptional virtues, this inclination rises and shines as though from some lofty watchtower, so that nature seems to have begotten you for this one virtue, your will to have cultivated you for it, and fortune to have preserved you for it.

Thomistic Theology, so violently assailed, will therefore owe you the greatest benefit if you permit it to take refuge in your bosom, where, equipped and fortified with your saw, it will triumphantly break its enemies,

¹ The most illustrious prince of the Church, first Archbishop of Albi, abbot of Casa Dei, and counselor to the King.

To Lord Hyacinthe de Serroni

just as King David once put to the saw the defeated and overthrown children of Ammon. But how can Thomistic Theology fly into your bosom, where it is already known to dwell, where it put down roots many years ago and produced marvelous fruits? It can be received in the bosom of YOUR EXCELLENCY in a contracted form, where it has long been poured forth without measure. All Thomistic Theology is certainly yours, since by diligent labor you have so happily acquired it as to make it your own. It is yours, I say, for it has made you so great. I shall perhaps speak boldly, yet more truly: *this is what bestowed upon you that astonishing eloquence in public speaking, worthy of apostolic times, which Italy received with the greatest applause from your earliest years, and which our Occitania now admires, especially in public assemblies, indeed all France as well. This is what supplied you, as queen of the sciences, with the highest moderation of mind, fidelity, and integrity when you were Supreme Administrator of the armies of the Most Christian King, both among the people of Provence and among the Catalans. Finally, this is what taught you the art of arts, namely, the government of the Churches of God: first Orange, then Mende, with such success that Louis the Great, the most equitable judge of affairs, after rewarding with public offices your zeal for religion, fidelity toward your Prince, devotion toward the peoples, and the singular skill with which you govern all things, did not hesitate to promote you, a most vigilant Shepherd, to the metropolitan insignia of Albi, as the first among all, and as the head and exemplar of your successors.* See, therefore, MOST ILLUSTRIOUS ARCHBISHOP, how wisely this little shield of mine invokes the shield of your protection, and how nobly it seeks the aid of the saw of your wisdom, so that by the service of the one it may elude the repeated assaults of its enemies, and by the sharpness of the other it may saw through and crush the teeth of its detractors, and, supported by your patronage, prevail against all the ill-tempered. Farewell, MOST DISTINGUISHED OF PRELATES. May Christ preserve you safe for a very long time, for the restoration of devotion, the fostering of learning, and for me,

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE OF THE CHURCH.

Of YOUR EXCELLENCY,

The most obedient and humble client and servant,
Fr. JEAN-BAPTISTE GONET, O.P.

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FIRST PART
OF THE MANUALE THOMISTARUM¹.

— PROOEMIUM —

Seneca wisely said that there is need not of many precepts, but of effective ones, and that precepts must be scattered after the manner of seed, which, although very small, unfolds its powers when it occupies a suitable place, and from the smallest beginning spreads into the greatest fruits. Therefore, it will perhaps be a work of no small value if what we have transmitted in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, but more diffusely than can be useful to beginners in the schools, is conveniently reduced to a compendium, and the more useful matters separated from the less useful.

In this work, moreover, we shall adhere to the same method and order that St. Thomas observed in the *Summa Theologiae*. For it is an angelic order, one that imitates the movement of the angels and by which he merited for himself the name of the Angelic Doctor. Angels, says the Areopagite, are moved by a threefold motion: circular, straight, and oblique. They move circularly when they revolve around God, as the center of all creatures, in continuous and unending knowledge, and perform, as it were, a dance. They move in a straight line when they know inferior things, passing through them all by a straight course. They move obliquely, by a movement

¹ On God, one and three, and as creator of angels and men.

First Part of the Manuale Thomistarum

composed of both, when they join the knowledge of God with the knowledge of creatures.

These are the movements of heavenly and blessed minds; this is the movement of the Angelic Doctor, by which he proceeded in that golden work called the *Summa Theologiae*. For first, in the First Part, he is wholly occupied with divine things and revolves in a circular movement around that divine center, while he disputes concerning God, the attributes, and the Divine Persons. He then moves toward inferior things by a straight movement, while he discusses God as the efficient cause of things and as the end of the intellectual creature. Finally, in the Third Part, by uniting God to man and joining the knowledge of both, he moves by an oblique movement.

Observing the same order, therefore, in this *Manuale Thomistarum*, we shall treat in its First Part of God as one and three, and as Creator of angels and men. In the Second Part, we shall treat of God as the last end, and of the means leading to him. Finally, the Third Part will concern God incarnate and the institution of the sacraments. Yet lest we be accused of entering and examining the dwelling of a host without first greeting him, we judge that, before discussing these matters, some brief remarks must here be prefaced concerning the nature and qualities of Theology.

PRELIMINARY QUESTION.
ON THE NATURE AND ENDOWMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.
On the Nature of Theology.

I¹ say first that although Theology, as it exists in us wayfarers, lacks actual evidence of its principles, namely, the articles of faith, which it knows only through faith and obscure revelation, it is nevertheless truly and substantially a science. This is so, first, because it is a habit that infallibly attains truth through reasoning. But a habit that infallibly attains truth through reasoning cannot belong to any of the five intellectual virtues assigned by Aristotle other than science or wisdom. It cannot be the habit of first principles, since that habit attains truth immediately and without reasoning; nor can it be prudence or art, which concern only things to be done or made. It is so also because it suffices for the nature of science that through it the intellect firmly adhere to truth. For since truth is the end of all sciences, a science must be judged to possess its essential perfection when through it truth is infallibly attained and the intellect firmly adheres to it. Indeed, evidence is required for the perfection of science only because through it the intellect is aided in attaining truth more easily and quickly, and in having a more certain and immovable assent to truth. Therefore, if

¹ no. 1.

such certainty can be possessed without evidence, the true and essential nature of science will also be obtained without it.

Since, therefore, our Theology is certain knowledge and reasons concerning divine things with greater certainty and firmness than any natural science possesses concerning its object, because it reduces its conclusions to revealed principles that exceed every natural certainty, it is equivalently evident. Although it lacks the formal evidence that the Philosopher seems to require for the natural sciences, it nevertheless possesses virtual evidence, situated in the certainty by which it surpasses all other sciences, and radical or aptitudinal evidence, because it demands to be joined to the light of glory and to blessed knowledge, to which we shall later say it is subalternated.

2. You will say: there is no science of singular and contingent things. But Theology treats of singulars, for example, Christ, the Blessed Virgin, Antichrist, and similar persons, and of contingent things, such as sins and human acts. Therefore, it is not a science.

3. I answer that although the natural sciences cannot concern singular and contingent things, Theology can do so. For the natural sciences depend upon the light of first principles, which concern only universal and necessary things, whereas Theology depends upon the supernatural light of faith and divine revelation, which extend to singulars and contingents. See the other objections in the Shield of Thomistic Theology.

4. I say second that our Theology is subalternated to the knowledge of God and the blessed. Thus St. Thomas, here, a. 2, in the body, reasons as follows: There are two kinds of sciences. Some proceed from the natural light of the intellect, such as arithmetic, geometry, and the like. Others proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science, as perspective proceeds from principles made known by geometry, and music from principles known through arithmetic. In this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, namely, the knowledge of God and the blessed. By these words he openly teaches that our Theology is subalternated to the knowledge of God and the blessed, just as perspective is subalternated to geometry and music to arithmetic.

5. Reason also recommends this conclusion. For one science to be called subalternated to another, it is required and sufficient that it depend upon the latter for the evidence of its principles and that it add some accidental difference to the object of the subalternating science. Thus music is subalternated to arithmetic because its principles are manifested through arithmetic, and because to number, which is the object of arithmetic, it adds

the difference of being harmonious or sonorous. Likewise, the principles of our Theology, which are the articles of faith, are manifested through the knowledge of God and the blessed, and Theology adds to the object of that knowledge an accidental difference, namely, virtual revelation. For it is accidental to God as knowable that he be known through the light of glory or through the light of faith. Therefore, our Theology is properly subalternated to the knowledge of God and the blessed. From this:

6. It is gathered, first, that although Theology, as it exists in us wayfarers, is truly and substantially a science, as was shown in the preceding conclusion, it is nevertheless not a perfect science, or does not possess its perfect and connatural state. Similarly, although a child is substantially a human being, he is nevertheless not a perfect human being because he lacks the use of reason and freedom. For a subalternated science to possess its perfect and connatural state, it must be joined to the subalternating science and must receive from it actual evidence of its principles. Hence St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, says that *every science is perfected especially in the vision of the thing*. But Theology, as it exists in us wayfarers, is not joined to blessed knowledge, to which it is subalternated. Hence it does not receive from it the evidence of its principles, but accidentally depends upon faith, which takes the place of the light of glory. Therefore, Theology does not exist in its perfect and connatural state.

7. It is gathered, second, that our Theology remains in the heavenly homeland. First, this is because every subalternated science naturally demands to be joined to its subalternating science, so that it may be perfected by it and that the principles it believes may be manifested to it. It is also because our Theology is not essentially obscure, as faith is, but only accidentally, by reason of the state it possesses in us wayfarers, in which it is regulated by faith and obscure knowledge. Hence it passes from obscurity to evidence when a human being exchanges the state of a wayfarer for the state of one who has attained beatitude. In the same way, when the blessed vision supervenes, charity does not fail, according to the Apostle, but passes from being free to being necessary, because freedom does not belong to its essence, but is a certain accidental mode that belongs to it accidentally and by reason of the state of the way.

8. This is confirmed. The gifts of wisdom and knowledge, although as they exist in us wayfarers they depend upon faith and are regulated through it, nevertheless remain in the heavenly homeland, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 68, a. 4. Why, then, could our Theology not likewise remain in the heavenly homeland, although here it accidentally depends upon faith and obscure knowledge? Hence the well-known saying of Jerome

in his Epistle to Paulinus: *Let us learn on earth such knowledge as may persevere with us in heaven.*

Therefore, when the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 13 that in heaven tongues will cease and *knowledge will be destroyed*, this must not be understood of destruction as regards its substance, but only as regards the mode of obscurity and lack of evidence that it now possesses, or as regards its imperfect mode of operation, namely, through conversion to phantasms and species received from things, which now belongs to it. Both these modes of knowing will be destroyed in the heavenly homeland, because, as St. Thomas teaches upon this passage of the Apostle, conversion to phantasms will then occur not by necessity, but by choice.

9. I say third that the formal object *which is known* by Theology is God, whereas the formal aspect *under which* he is known is virtual and mediate revelation.

The first part is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas, here, a. 6. That is called the formal object *which is known* by a science which is principally sought by it and to which all the other things treated in that science are reduced. But knowledge of God is sought first and of itself in Theology, since Theology, as its name itself signifies, is a consideration or discourse concerning God and divine things. Moreover, whatever is treated in it is either God himself or is reduced to him: as properties are reduced to an essence, as in the case of the attributes; as effects to their cause, as in the case of creatures; or as means to an end, as in the case of human acts, virtues, laws, grace, the Incarnation, and the sacraments. Therefore, God is the formal object *which is known* by Theology.

10. This is confirmed from the same Holy Doctor in the same place. The object of the principles and of the entire science is the same, since the entire science is contained in its principles. But God is the object of the principles of Theology, namely, the articles of faith. For since faith is a theological virtue, it regards God as its proper object, as we shall say in the Treatise on Faith. Therefore, God is the object of Theology, not insofar as he is Savior, as Durandus maintains, nor insofar as he is Glorifier, as Gregory maintains, but according to himself, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, and as others teach almost universally. For many things are treated in Theology that indeed belong to God according to himself in the manner explained above, but not precisely as Savior or Glorifier.

11. That virtual and mediate revelation is the formal aspect *under which* Theology knows is evident from the fact that Theology is a habit distinct from faith, metaphysics, and the other natural sciences, and is, as it were, intermediate between them. But it could not be distinguished from them or

stand between them unless it possessed virtual and mediate revelation as its formal aspect *under which*. For if its formal aspect *under which* were formal and immediate revelation, it would coincide with faith, which rests upon immediate divine revelation. If, however, it did not depend upon virtual revelation and proceeded from principles known by the natural light alone, it would not be distinguished from the natural sciences, especially metaphysics, which considers God as knowable from creatures and by the natural light of the human intellect. Therefore, the formal aspect *under which* Theology knows is virtual and mediate revelation. For a better understanding of this:

12. It must be observed that something can be called revealed in two ways. First, formally and immediately, as it is revealed that God is three and that the Word is incarnate. Second, virtually and mediately, namely, when another truth is virtually contained in something immediately revealed, either as an effect in its cause or as a property in an essence, and is deduced by reasoning. In this way, in the proposition, *Christ is a man*, the proposition, *Christ is capable of laughter*, is judged to be virtually and mediately revealed. We call this virtual and mediate revelation the formal aspect *under which* Theology knows.

13. From this it is gathered, first, that true Theology does not exist in heretics. For since faith does not exist in them, neither formal nor virtual revelation exists in them. Hence their theology is only human faith or opinion, by which they assent to certain theological truths on the basis of their own judgment or the choice of their own will, but not from the motive of divine revelation; otherwise they would assent to all revealed truths.

14. It is gathered, second, that Theology is not composed of several partial habits, but is one simple habit extending to all theological conclusions. Thus St. Thomas, here, a. 3, where he indicates this fundamental reasoning: habits are distinguished and multiplied only according to the distinction of formal objects and according to the diverse aspect under which they attain them, as is the common doctrine of the Philosophers. But Theology possesses one formal object specifically, namely, God under the aspect of Deity, and one formal aspect specifically *under which* it knows, namely, virtual and mediate revelation, under which it attains all the partial objects it considers. Therefore, it is one simple habit extending to all the conclusions contained within the sphere of its object, just as faith extends to all credible things, charity to all lovable things, prudence to all things to be done, and sight to all visible things.

Therefore, although there are in Theology several different demonstrations concerning diverse partial objects, nevertheless, because

they all pertain to the same formal object and not to diverse formal objects, each demonstration does not produce its own partial habit. Rather, the first alone generates the habit of Theology; the second merely extends it to a different conclusion, and so with the others. Thus the soul is extended to inform diverse parts of matter, not by an addition to itself, but by an increase of the matter to which it is applied; or as a predicamental relation is referred to several material terms while itself remaining unchanged. From this the principal foundation of the opposing opinion is resolved.

15. I say fourth that Theology is not an entitatively supernatural habit.

This is proved by two arguments. The first is that no entitatively supernatural habit is acquired by our acts, but is immediately infused by God, as is evident by induction. For the theological virtues, the supernatural moral virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not acquired by our acts, but are immediately infused by God. But Theology is not an infused habit; rather, it is acquired by human study and labor, as experience shows and as St. Thomas expressly teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 54, a. 1, ad 2. There he establishes this difference between wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and Theology, which, as we shall say below, also has the character of wisdom: the former is possessed by infusion and descends from above from the Father of lights, whereas the latter is acquired by human study. Therefore, Theology is not an entitatively supernatural habit, but a natural one.

16. Nor is the claim of certain Recent Authors valid, namely, that it is proper and peculiar to Theology that it be entitatively supernatural and yet acquired by our acts. They argue, first, that Theology presupposes faith, by which it can be caused as by the habit of first principles. They argue, second, that there is this difference between the infused virtues and Theology: the infused virtues are properties of grace from which they flow, and consequently demand to be produced by the same action by which grace is produced; Theology, however, does not, since it is not possessed by all the just.

This response, I say, is not valid. For if, from the fact that Theology presupposes faith, it could be inferred that Theology, although entitatively supernatural, can nevertheless be acquired by our acts, by the same reasoning it could be said that all the moral virtues that are infused of themselves can be acquired by our acts. For those virtues presuppose charity, through which the will adheres to the last end, which in practical matters stands in relation to the choice of means as principles stand in speculative matters in relation to conclusions. From the same response it

would also follow that infused prudence could be acquired by our acts, since it likewise presupposes faith, in which it is virtually contained as in a seed.

What is added is also invalid. For faith and hope are infused by God and nevertheless are not properties inseparable from grace, since they are found in sinners. Therefore, from the fact that Theology is not a property of grace, it is not rightly inferred that, although entitatively supernatural, it is not infused by God but acquired by our acts.

17. The second fundamental argument for our conclusion can be briefly proposed as follows. Sciences do not derive their specification from the formal object *which is known*, except insofar as it stands under the formal aspect *under which* it is known. Hence, if the formal aspect *under which* a science knows is natural, that science cannot be entitatively supernatural. But the formal aspect *under which* Theology knows is entitatively natural. Therefore, the habit of Theology itself is also natural. The major premise is evident from the common doctrine of the Philosophers.

The minor premise is demonstrated as follows. The formal aspect *under which* Theology knows, which distinguishes it from faith and from purely human and natural sciences, is virtual revelation, as we showed in the preceding conclusion. But virtual revelation, since it includes the reasoning of the human intellect and concerns revealed principles, not precisely and formally as they are revealed, but as they stand under the natural light and skill of the human intellect, and insofar as through reasoning certain unrevealed truths can be elicited from them, is intrinsically and entitatively natural, and supernatural only extrinsically and by way of presupposition, insofar as it presupposes formally revealed principles of faith. Therefore, the formal aspect *under which* Theology knows is likewise natural.

Hence what certain Recent Authors say is false, namely, that reasoning does not pertain to the aspect *under which* Theology knows, but is merely a condition applying revealed principles, as fire is applied to combustible matter through proximity. For that which essentially distinguishes one habit from others pertains to its specification and to the formal aspect *under which* it knows. But Theology is essentially distinguished from faith through reasoning, since faith is not discursive but immediately believes the truths revealed to it by God. Therefore, reasoning pertains to the formal aspect *under which* Theology knows.

18. You will object, first: the specification of sciences is taken from their principles, as the Philosophers teach. But the principles of Theology are supernatural, for they are the articles of divine faith themselves. Therefore, Theology itself is supernatural.

19. I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor premise. The principles of Theology are supernatural formally and precisely as such: I deny this. They are supernatural materially and as specifying: I grant this. For the articles of faith, which are the principles of Theology, do not enter into a theological demonstration except insofar as they stand under the natural light and reasoning of the human intellect, through which they illuminate the theological conclusions virtually contained in them.

Hence the articles of faith can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as they are absolutely true and express an order toward the First Truth revealing; thus they are formally revealed and pertain to the habit of faith. Second, insofar as they express a relation to conclusions and unrevealed truths that can be inferred from them through the reasoning of the human intellect; under this aspect they are not formally but only virtually revealed, and they belong to the habit of Theology. Consequently, Theology is not formally and entitatively supernatural, but only radically supernatural, insofar as it presupposes the principles of faith, in which it is contained as in a seed or root, just as the natural sciences are contained in the habit of first principles. In this sense St. Thomas, here, a. 1, calls Theology revealed and divinely inspired knowledge.

20. You will object, second: the certainty of Theology, which is its essential predicate, is supernatural, for it surpasses the certainty of all natural sciences, as we shall say in the following chapter. Therefore, the habit of Theology itself is supernatural.

21. This is confirmed. Theology, as we shall show in the same place, is eminently speculative and practical. But the speculative and the practical, since they are opposite differences, cannot be united and eminently and formally contained except in a supernatural science and habit. Therefore, Theology is an entitatively supernatural habit.

22. To the objection, I answer by denying the antecedent. Just as Theology stands between faith and the natural sciences, so also does its certainty. Hence that certainty is neither purely natural, as is the certainty of the natural sciences, nor formally supernatural, as is the certainty of faith, but only virtually supernatural. For the formal aspect *under which* it is derived is not formal and immediate revelation, but only virtual and mediate revelation. Hence such certainty is indeed inferior to the certainty of faith, but superior to the certainty of all natural sciences.

23. To the confirmation, I say that the speculative and practical can be united and eminently and formally contained not only in a science that is entitatively supernatural, but also in one that is only radically supernatural. For such a science is radically and virtually contained in faith, which is

eminently and formally speculative and practical and regards an infinite object, namely, God, who, since he is the First Truth and the last end, is at once the rule of speculation and of practice. This will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

The Principal Endowments of Theology Briefly Explained.

I¹ say first that Theology is more certain than every natural habit and science. For it rests upon a firmer medium, namely, the light of divine revelation, which is more certain and more infallible than the media upon which the natural sciences rest. Hence Augustine says in *Confessiones* VII, c. 2: *I would more readily doubt that I am alive*—although this is the best-known and most sensible of all natural truths—*than that the things I have heard are true.*

2. This is confirmed. Assent to first principles and natural truths comes from nature moving us to that assent; but the assent of faith, upon which Theology rests, comes from the motion and impulse of the Holy Spirit, who arouses a pious affection toward believing, as is taught in the Treatise on Faith. But the Holy Spirit moving us to believe and assent to revealed truths is a firmer and more infallible cause than nature moving us to assent to first principles and natural truths. Therefore, Theology possesses a greater and firmer cause of its certainty than natural habits and sciences.

3. Nor is it an obstacle that a theologian sometimes experiences certain movements of doubt, both concerning the principles of faith and concerning the conclusions inferred from them, which are not experienced by one possessing natural science, whose intellect rests quietly in the truth. For these movements of a wavering mind do not arise from weakness of the motive upon which Theology rests, but from the weakness of the human intellect, which is accustomed to remain restless until it clearly beholds the truth.

Hence St. Thomas, when he first objected to himself here, a. 5, that the other sciences, concerning whose principles there can be no doubt, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose principles, namely, the articles of faith, admit of doubt, answers as follows: To the first, it must be said that nothing prevents what is more certain according to its nature from being less certain to us because of the weakness of our intellect. Hence the doubt

¹ no. 1.

that occurs in some persons concerning the articles of faith is not due to uncertainty in the thing, but to the weakness of the human intellect.

4. I say second that Theology is formally and at once eminently speculative and practical. For its formal object *which is known* is God under the aspect of Deity, and its formal aspect *under which* it knows is virtual revelation, as we showed in the preceding chapter. But from both considerations it possesses the character of being at once speculative and practical. Therefore, it is an eminently speculative and practical habit.

The minor premise is proved. Since God under the aspect of Deity is the First Truth and the last end, he is also the first rule of speculation and practice, and the first object of speculation and action. I say an object of action, not physically but morally, insofar as he can be attained as the last end through our meritorious acts.

Moreover, virtual revelation presupposes faith, which is eminently and formally speculative and practical, since it not only inheres in and rests upon the First Truth revealing, but also extends to operation and love, according to Gal. 5: *Faith works through love*. Hence *nothing so inflames the human heart with the love of God as Theology*, as Abbot Antiochus says, orat. 128. His interpreter, explaining these words, adds in the margin: *Theology engenders love of God*.

5. This is confirmed. Metaphysics is speculative because it treats of God as first principle, whereas Moral Science is practical because it treats of the last end and of the means leading to it. Therefore, since Theology performs both functions, contemplating God under the aspect of first principle and last end and treating of the means leading to him, it will be at once speculative and practical.

I add that Theology, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 3, ad 2, is a certain impression and participation of divine knowledge, which is eminently speculative and practical and concurs in the production of things not only by directing but also by effecting, as we shall show in tract. 3.

6. From these things you will understand that although the speculative and practical are differences dividing the natural sciences, they do not divide science as such, insofar as science is the highest genus comprising Theology and the natural sciences. Hence, although both cannot belong to any natural science, they can belong to Theology, which is of a higher order and occupies a middle place between faith and the purely natural sciences, as we explained in the preceding chapter. For things that are dispersed among lower realities can be united in higher realities, as the powers of seeing and hearing are united in the common sense, and the vegetative, sensitive, and

intellective powers in the rational soul. By this the principal foundation of the opposing opinion is overthrown.

7. I say third that our Theology is truly and properly wisdom. For wisdom is knowledge of things through the highest causes. Hence, within the order of an art, the craftsman who designs the form of a house is called wise and an architect in relation to the inferior craftsmen who shape the timber or prepare the stones. Within the moral order, the prudent man who orders his acts toward the last end is called wise.

But Theology judges things through the highest of all causes, namely, God, and through the highest principles, namely, the articles of faith. Therefore, it is truly and properly wisdom. Hence, just as wisdom judges all things, according to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 2, *The spiritual man judges all things*, so too does Theology. Theology not only infers conclusions from the principles and articles of faith, which is proper to science, but also judges the principles and conclusions of other sciences; and whatever is found in the other sciences that is opposed to the truth of this science is wholly condemned by it as false, as the Holy Doctor says here, a. 6, ad 2.

Therefore, Theology is like a Lydian touchstone, by contact with which truth is distinguished from falsehood, the pure from the impure, and sincere doctrine from doctrine that is corrupted and adulterated. See the other endowments and prerogatives of Theology in the Shield of Thomistic Theology, preliminary disp., a. 12.

TREATISE I.
ON THE EXISTENCE, UNITY, AND NATURE OF
GOD, AND HIS CHIEF ATTRIBUTES.

Since the existence and unity of God are the basis and foundation of everything treated in theology, before discussing the nature of God and His attributes, and before approaching other questions and difficulties, we must first consider the existence of God and His unity.

CHAPTER I.
The Existence of God.

§ 1.

Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident.

1. I say, first, that this proposition, *God exists*, is self-evident in itself. It is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas here, q. 1, a. 1. A proposition is called self-evident in itself when its predicate belongs to the essence and intrinsic notion of its subject; for since nothing is prior to the essence and quiddity of a thing, such a proposition cannot be demonstrated or made known through anything prior. But existence belongs to the essence and intrinsic notion of God, for God is His own existence, as the same holy Doctor proves in the

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following q. 3, a. 4. Therefore, this proposition, *God exists*, is self-evident in itself.

2. You will say: This proposition, *God is triune*, is not self-evident in itself, since no created intellect can know it by its own powers; and yet the Trinity of Persons belongs no less to the essence and intrinsic notion of God than existence does. Therefore, although existence belongs to the quiddity and intrinsic notion of God, it does not follow that this proposition, *God exists*, is self-evident in itself.

3. I answer by denying the antecedent, with Bañez and other Thomists, who teach that God's being triune is self-evident in itself. Nor is it an obstacle that this cannot be known by a created intellect through its own powers, for this proves only that it is not self-evident to us, not that it is not self-evident in itself. I add that, although the Trinity of Persons is not immediately knowable by a created intellect through the powers of its own nature, it can nevertheless be known immediately by that intellect when elevated by the light of glory, and in fact it is so known by the blessed. This suffices for a proposition to be self-evident in itself, as St. Thomas teaches concerning the proposition *God exists* in *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 3, in the body.

4. I say, second, that this proposition, *God exists*, is not self-evident with respect to us.

Proof: A proposition is called self-evident with respect to us when it is known by us immediately, without reasoning, and from the mere apprehension of its terms, as is evident in the first principles. But this proposition, *God exists*, is not known by us immediately, without reasoning, and from the mere apprehension of its terms; for the meaning of the term *God* is not self-evident to us, since in the present state of life we do not know Him quidditatively. Therefore, this proposition is not self-evident with respect to us, but must be demonstrated through things better known to us, namely, through creatures and through the motions of sensible and corporeal things.

5. Nor is it an obstacle that several of the holy Fathers teach that knowledge of God is naturally innate, inborn, implanted, and, as Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa*, I, c. 1, *sown within us*. For some speak of God under a certain common and confused notion, namely, under the notion of happiness in general; for since human beings naturally desire to be happy, they naturally know that some happiness exists. Others mean only that God is naturally known to us, as St. Thomas observes in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 2, because of the custom by which human beings from infancy are solicitous to hear and invoke the name of God. For custom, especially when established from the beginning, acquires the force of nature, and the things

with which the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as though they were naturally known.

6. You will object, first: We assent to this proposition, *God exists*, without reasoning and from the mere apprehension of its terms. Therefore, it is self-evident with respect to us. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved. By the name *God*, everyone understands a being than which nothing greater or better can be conceived. But without reasoning and from the mere apprehension of the terms, it is evident that a being than which nothing greater or better can be conceived exists; for if it did not exist, it would not be better than all things that can be conceived, since it would undoubtedly be much better if it necessarily existed in actuality. Therefore, without reasoning and from the mere apprehension of the terms, it is evident that God exists.

7. I answer with St. Thomas here, a. 1, ad 2, and in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 11, that although God is that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived, this is nevertheless not self-evident to everyone. For some have said that God is a body, as did the Anthropomorphites, who attributed human members to God; and yet a body is not that than which nothing better can be conceived. Indeed, those who deny that God exists necessarily conceive something greater and more excellent than God, since a being is better than a non-being. The holy Doctor adds that, even granted that everyone understands by the name *God* that than which nothing better can be conceived, it does not follow from this that what is signified by that name exists in the nature of things, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Or, as others put it, it follows only that such a name implies existence as signified, but not existence as exercised; the latter remains to be demonstrated by reasoning.

8. You will object, second: This proposition, *God is to be worshipped*, is self-evident to everyone and is a common conception of all, for it is the first principle of synderesis. Therefore, since such a proposition includes the proposition *God exists*, because what does not exist cannot be worshipped, the proposition *God exists* is also self-evident to everyone.

9. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although practical knowledge presupposes speculative knowledge, it is not necessary that, if practical knowledge is immediate, the speculative knowledge included within it must also be immediate. This principle, *parents are to be honoured*, is immediate, although we do not know immediately who our parents are, but know this through reasoning or the testimony of others. Likewise, although we do not know immediately that God exists, but know it through reasoning or the consideration of creatures, nevertheless this

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proposition, *God is to be worshipped*, is immediate and is the first principle of synderesis.

§ 2.

Atheism Is Refuted, and the Existence of God Is Demonstrated
by the Five Arguments of St. Thomas.

1. Just as David once chose five very smooth stones from the torrent to overthrow Goliath and placed them in his shepherd's pouch, as is related in 1 Sam. 17, so the holy Doctor here, a. 3, adduces five excellent arguments to demonstrate the existence of God, by which, as by five stones, the forehead of atheism is struck. The first demonstrates that one first mover must be admitted who is entirely immovable. The second demonstrates that there is one first efficient cause that is the cause of all others. The third demonstrates that there is some necessary being from which all contingent beings participate existence. The fourth demonstrates that there is some supremely perfect being according to whose approach or recession, imitation or deficiency, the perfection of other things is measured. Finally, the fifth demonstrates that there is one supreme provider and governor who governs all creatures and directs them to their ends.

2. In order that the first two arguments may be perceived more clearly and established more firmly, three things must first be stated briefly. First, it must be supposed that the first entirely immovable mover is God. For by the name *God* we understand that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived. But the first entirely immovable mover is such. Therefore, it is God. The minor premise is proved: The first entirely immovable mover must be pure act, because it must be devoid of all potentiality; for something is movable to the extent that it is in potency. Therefore, that which is in no way movable is in no way in potency, but is pure act. But that which is pure act and devoid of all potentiality must possess every imaginable perfection, because, if any perfection were lacking to it, it would be in potency to that perfection. Therefore, the first entirely immovable mover is that than which nothing greater or better can be conceived.

3. Second, it must be supposed that, in a series of movers and agents, one can be subordinated to another in two ways, namely accidentally and essentially. One is subordinated accidentally to another when it receives existence from it but does not need to await its application or influence in order to act. Thus, a son is subordinated to his father, from whom he has received existence, but does not need his father's application or influence

whenever he acts. One is subordinated essentially when it cannot act unless it is moved and applied to action by another agent to which it is subject. Thus, an instrument is essentially subordinated to the craftsman, because it is moved and acts only when moved and applied by him.

4. Third, it must be supposed that, although an infinite regress may be admitted among causes and movers subordinated accidentally, it cannot be admitted among those subordinated essentially, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 46, a. 2, ad 7, in these words: *Among efficient causes it is impossible to proceed essentially to infinity, although an accidental infinite regress among acting causes is not considered impossible. Thus, it is not impossible that a human being should be generated by a human being to infinity; but it would be impossible if the generation of this human being depended upon another human being, and upon an elemental body, and upon the sun, and so on to infinity.* Reason also supports this. For among movers subordinated essentially, the last mover does not move unless moved and applied by a prior mover, and that mover by another, and so on. Therefore, if an infinite regress were admitted among them, no motion or action could occur in inferior things unless the infinite influences and motions of superior causes and movers concurred simultaneously. Hence, since an infinity cannot be traversed, no motion or action could ever occur in inferior causes. This can be explained and illustrated by the example of a clock. If a clock contained infinitely many wheels, and each depended for its motion upon another superior wheel and could not move unless the superior wheel moved it first, no wheel could ultimately move and strike the hours; for one could never arrive at the first wheel that moved all the others, since that infinite multitude of wheels could never be traversed. These things having been premised:

5. The first argument of St. Thomas may be stated briefly as follows: There is one first mover who is entirely immovable. But that mover is God. Therefore, God exists. The minor premise is evident from the first supposition. The major premise is shown as follows: Everything that is moved is moved by another. But among movers and things moved that are subordinated essentially, an infinite regress cannot be admitted, as we showed in the third supposition. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a first mover that is immovable. The major premise is proved: That which moves is in act, for everything acts insofar as it is in act; that which is moved is in potency, and hence motion is defined in *Physica* III as *the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency*. But the same thing, under the same aspect, cannot be both in act and in potency with respect to the same form, since being in act denotes possession of the form, while being in potency denotes its absence. Therefore, the same thing, under the same aspect, cannot be

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both mover and moved; consequently, whatever is moved is moved by another.

6. The second argument of St. Thomas is formed as follows: Everything that comes to be and is caused is caused or brought about by another, so that nothing can effect or cause itself; otherwise, it would exist before it existed. For in order to effect something, it must possess existence, because what is nothing does nothing; but in order to be effected, it must not yet exist, because what already exists does not come to be, but has already come to be. But many things in this universe have been effected. Therefore, they are effected and caused by another. Hence, since among efficient causes subordinated essentially an infinite regress cannot be admitted, as was shown above, it is necessary to arrive at some first cause that can be caused by none, and consequently is a being from itself and independent, which we call God.

7. The third argument is this: There is some necessary being from which all contingent beings participate existence. But such a being is God, as is evident. Therefore, God exists. The major premise is proved: If there were no necessary being, but all things were contingent and capable of being and not being, no being would actually exist in reality. But this is contrary to sense and manifest experience. Therefore, and so forth. The implication of the major premise is proved: Things that of their own nature express only a possibility for something cannot be reduced to act except by some cause that joins the actuality to them. Thus, because air is in potency to light and water to heat, the former cannot be illuminated except by a luminous body, nor the latter heated except by something hot. Therefore, if all things were contingent and capable of being and not being, and no necessary being existed from which all existence flows, no being would actually exist in reality.

8. It is no answer to say that, although every contingent being needs to receive existence from another that reduces it from possibility to the act of existing, their entire collection does not, since it is infinite and, in an infinite multitude, the inference from each individual to all does not hold. For example, among infinitely many future revolutions of the heavens, another would occur after any one of them, but not after all; and, granted infinitely many generations from eternity, another would occur before any one of them, but not before all. This answer, I say, is of no force, although it is the principal refuge of atheists. For although in an infinite multitude the inference from the individuals to the whole does not hold in predicates taken from continuous or discrete quantity, as is evident in the examples given, it is otherwise in all other predicates, especially if they are

quidditative and essential. For because individual human beings, for example, are rational and capable of laughter, it is true to say that their whole multitude and collection is likewise rational and capable of laughter. But the inability to exist from itself, or the need to receive existence from another, is not in a contingent thing a predicate of continuous or discrete quantity, but an essential predicate belonging to it absolutely because of the limitation and imperfection of its essence, which is not a sufficient foundation for its existing. Therefore, this predicate must belong not only to contingent beings taken individually and distributively, but also to their entire collection. The inference is therefore sound: Every contingent being individually and particularly needs to receive existence from another; therefore, their entire collection does also.

9. The fourth argument: Some supremely perfect being must be admitted. But that being is God. Therefore, God exists. The minor premise is evident, for, as we have often said, by the name *God* we understand a being than which nothing more perfect or better can be conceived. The major premise is shown as follows. We see in this world that some beings are more or less good or perfect than others. Since *more* and *less* are said of diverse things according as they approach something that is such to the highest degree, as that is hotter which approaches most closely to what is hottest, there must exist in the nature of things some supremely good and perfect being that is the cause and measure of the goodness and perfection of others. For the first in every genus is the cause of the others, either an efficient cause that pours forth and distributes goodness to things, or an exemplary cause according to whose approach or recession, imitation or deficiency, the perfection of other things is measured.

10. The fifth argument of St. Thomas is taken from the government of things and from the necessity of one supreme provider and governor who orders and directs each creature to its end. For we see that things lacking knowledge act for an end, because they always, or for the most part, act in the same manner and attain their ends through suitable means. Therefore, since things lacking knowledge cannot intend an end that they do not know unless they are directed by a knowing cause, just as an arrow cannot strike its target unless directed by an archer, it is evident that in this world there is a supremely wise governor and some supreme intelligence directing all things to their ends, whom we call God. We treated this argument extensively in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, disp. 1, a. 2, and in the digression appended to it, in which we demonstrated the existence of God by seven arguments from the greater and lesser worlds, that is, from the

artful structure of the world and the marvellous composition of the human being.

11. You will ask whether there can be invincible or inculpable ignorance of the existence of God. I answer negatively, against Molina, who holds the opposite. For in Rom. 1 those who do not know God are called inexcusable, which could not be said if they were invincibly ignorant of Him; for invincible ignorance excuses from sin, as we shall show in the treatise on sins. The holy Fathers also commonly teach the same truth. Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 1: *Knowledge of God is implanted in everyone by nature, nor can anyone who uses reason be ignorant of it.* Gregory the Great, in *Moralia in Job* XVII, c. 3, explaining the words of Job, *All human beings see Him*, adds: *Every human being, by the very fact that he was created rational, ought to gather by reason that He who created him is God.* Augustine, on Ps. 74, beautifully adds: *God is everywhere hidden and everywhere manifest; no one is permitted to know Him as He is, and no one is permitted to be ignorant of Him.* Minucius Felix says in the *Octavius*: *To be ignorant of the Parent of all things is no lesser crime than to injure Him.* And St. Cyprian says in *De vanitate idolorum*: *This is the height of guilt: to refuse to acknowledge Him whom you cannot fail to know.* Jerome, in Epistle 3 to Nepotian: *The Persian, the Goth, the Egyptian, and the Turk acknowledge Him. The ferocity of beasts and the throng of warlike peoples have transformed their harsh cries into the sweet melody of His name, and one voice of the whole world proclaims: God exists.* Finally, Tertullian, in *Adversus Marcionem* I, calls the knowledge of God *the first endowment of the rational soul*; and in *Apologeticum*, c. 17, he says that the recourse we have to God in sudden emergencies is *the testimony of a soul naturally Christian.*

12. This was not unknown even to the gentile philosophers. Omitting their various testimonies, it is fitting to transcribe only the words of Plutarch: Travellers may encounter many cities without walls, without literary studies, without kings, without public halls or the use of money, cities wholly unacquainted with theatres and all gymnastic exercises; indeed, they may encounter peoples who have no houses but only huts and tents. Yet no city or town has ever existed without a God, without oaths, without prayers, and without sacrifices offered to obtain good things and avert impending evils. No one has ever seen such a city, nor could anyone see one; one might sooner behold a city without the sun than without religion.

13. Reason also supports this. First, because the precepts of the natural law cannot be invincibly unknown, as we shall show in the treatise on laws. Therefore, neither can God be invincibly unknown, since He is the author and end of such precepts. Second, if a human being could inculpably be ignorant of the true God, he could also inculpably worship a false god; and

thus he could be excused from the sin of idolatry by invincible ignorance, which is utterly absurd. Third, if a human being invincibly did not know God, none of his sins would be mortal. But this is absurd. Therefore, so is the former. The implication is proved: The nature and malice of mortal sin is taken from the injury done to God. But God cannot be injured unless He is known. Therefore, if a human being invincibly and inculpably did not know God, he would never sin mortally.

14. You will say with Molina: Knowledge of God is not immediately implanted in us by nature, like knowledge of the first principles, as was shown above, but is possessed only through reason and discourse. Therefore, since some human beings are so dull, uncultivated, and, as it were, leaden that they are incapable of demonstration and reasoning, such as those raised in forests, remote lands, or unknown mountains, in these at least there can be invincible and inculpable ignorance of the existence of God.

15. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. As we noted above, evident and demonstrative knowledge is not necessary to remove invincible ignorance; probable and conjectural knowledge suffices, or knowledge received through the testimony or instruction of others. Therefore, since in no one, however dull, are all rays of reason so extinguished that, upon seeing this universe so perfectly ordered, no thought or probable knowledge occurs to him that some supreme ruler and governor presides over it, whom he must obey by following moral good and the dictate of reason, he is bound to inquire who that ruler is and in what manner He is to be worshipped. If he neglects this, his ignorance of the existence of God will not be invincible and inculpable, but vincible and culpable. Hence, although there can be negatively unbelieving persons, that is, those who inculpably do not know the mysteries of our faith, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 1, there cannot be negatively atheistic persons, that is, those who invincibly and inculpably do not know the existence of God. For, as is said in Wis. 13, *From the greatness and beauty of creatures their Creator could be knowably seen*. And as is said in Rom. 1, *The invisible things of God are beheld, being understood through the things that have been made*, and so forth.

CHAPTER II.

The Unity of God.

1. It is the same sacrilege to deny God and to invent many gods. Therefore, after atheism has been vanquished, polytheism must be refuted, and the plurality of gods shown to be impossible against the gentiles and pagans, whose blindness and madness were so great that Hesiod admitted thirty thousand gods, according to Eusebius in *Praeparatio Evangelica* V, c. 15. Indeed, as Tertullian wittily objects against them in *Apologeticum*, c. 5, divinity was granted or denied according to human choice: *Among you, divinity is weighed according to human judgment. Unless a god pleases a human being, he will not be a god. Now the human being must become propitious to the god.*

2. To refute this error, we adduced eleven arguments in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*. Here, for the sake of brevity, we shall explain only three. The first is: God is that than which nothing better can be conceived. Therefore, He is one. The consequence is proved because that nature in which the fullness of existence is contained so eminently and unitedly that nothing exists outside it except what is derived and participated from it is better than a nature outside which something entirely independent and unparticipated is found.

3. The second is related to the preceding and may be stated as follows: By the name *God* we understand a supremely and infinitely perfect being. But it is repugnant for such a being to be multiplied. Therefore, it is also repugnant that there be a plurality of gods. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. If there were two supremely and infinitely perfect beings, would that by which they differed from each other be a perfection or an imperfection? It cannot be the second, since it is repugnant that any imperfection or defect should be found or conceived in a supremely and infinitely perfect being. Nor can it be the first, since such a being contains every imaginable perfection, and consequently no perfection can be lacking to it.

4. The third argument is: God is the supreme ruler and governor of the world. Therefore, He is one. The consequence is proved because, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 11, a. 3, things that are diverse and divided do not come together into one order unless they are directed and ordered by some one principle; for many things are better reduced to order by one than by

many. From this Aristotle infers in the *Politica* that monarchy, or rule by one, is the most perfect of all forms of government; and in *Metaphysica* XII he commends this saying of Homer: *A multitude of rulers is not good; let there be one ruler.* Rising from human to divine government, he concludes that the unity of the divine and eternal Prince is necessary, and adds that, just as the good of a household and of an army requires one leader and one head of the family, so also the good of the universe requires one ruler. Jerome reasons in the same manner when addressing Rusticus: *Among bees there is one ruler; all cranes follow one leader in an ordered formation. There is one emperor, one judge in his province, one helmsman on a ship, and in the structure of the world one craftsman and one governor.*

5. To these arguments may be added the natural instinct of human beings, who, even amid the errors of paganism, always acknowledged one God in common speech. For, as Lactantius says in *Institutiones Divinae* II, c. 1: *When they swear and when they give thanks, they name not many gods but God; so powerfully does truth itself, under the compulsion of nature, burst forth even from unwilling hearts.*

CHAPTER III.

The Constitutive Principle of the Divine Nature.

1. The question here does not concern the real and physical constitution of the divine nature, that is, the constitution of God as He really is in Himself; for in this sense all the formalities of God, whether absolute or relative, really constitute Him. This is evident because constitution so understood is through real identity. But all formalities, whether absolute or relative, that formally belong to God are really identical with Him. Therefore, they all really and physically constitute Him. Here, then, we are concerned only with the metaphysical constitutive principle of the divine nature as it is imperfectly conceived by us wayfarers in this state, after the manner of a created nature, in which some perfection or predicate is always found that is conceived first within it as the source and origin of the others, as rationality is in the human being. Therefore, in the present question we ask what, with a foundation in reality, is understood first in God and stands as the root and source of the other things, especially of the divine attributes and operations. Certainly, those who say that the divine nature is constituted by the collection of attributes do not seem to touch upon the point of this most celebrated and grave difficulty. For although that collection physically and really constitutes the divine nature, it does not constitute it formally and

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metaphysically, since the collection of attributes is not conceived first in it, but some one formality and perfection that is the root of the others. Passing over this opinion, then, three other celebrated and highly probable opinions are commonly reported. The first teaches that the divine nature is metaphysically constituted by the notion of a being from itself and through its essence. The second teaches that it is constituted by the notion of an immaterial substance that is radically intellectual. The third teaches that it is constituted by God's actual intellection. This third opinion is more common in the Thomistic school and appears more probable. Therefore:

2. I say, first, that the nature of God is not metaphysically constituted by the notion of a being from itself and through its essence. This is proved, first, from St. Thomas below, q. 13, a. 11, ad 1, where he teaches that the name *God*, with respect to the reality signified, is more proper to God than the name *He Who Is*. But this would be false if the nature of God were constituted by the notion of a being from itself and through its essence, for the name *He Who Is*, or the name *being through its essence*, would be the name of the nature and essence of God. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the nature of God is not constituted by the notion of a being from itself and through its essence. Hence, Cajetan, explaining his doctrine in the same place, says that the name *God*, with respect to the reality signified, is more proper to God than the name *He Who Is*, because Deity signifies the nature of God as though according to its ultimate specific difference, whereas the name *He Who Is* does not.

3. The conclusion is proved, second, by the fundamental argument. The notion of a being from itself, uncreated and existing through its essence, transcends every divine formality or perfection; for it is found in the attributes and relations and in everything divine, just as the notion of a created and participated being is included in everything created. But predicates transcending every divine formality or perfection cannot constitute the nature of God in the sense in which we presently speak of its constitution. Therefore, neither can the notion of a being from itself and through its essence. The major premise is evident, and the minor is shown as follows. At present we are not speaking of the constitution of the divine nature under that notion and concept by which it is distinguished from creatures, but under that notion by which it is distinguished from the attributes and other divine formalities. But predicates transcending every divine formality and perfection, although they distinguish God from creatures, do not distinguish the nature from the attributes and other divine formalities, since the nature, attributes, and other divine formalities agree in

them. Therefore, they cannot constitute the nature of God under that notion by which it is virtually distinguished from the attributes.

4. The conclusion is proved, third: The divine nature is constituted through the grade of understanding. Therefore, it is not constituted through the notion of a being from itself and through its essence, which belongs to the grade of being. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, first: The grade of understanding is more perfect than the grades of living and being, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 93, a. 2. But the divine nature is constituted through the most perfect grade of all. Therefore, it is constituted through the grade of understanding. The same antecedent is proved, second, from another doctrine taught by the holy Doctor in the same place, where he teaches that intellectual creatures alone are made to the image of God, and that in them alone the notion of the image of God is imperfectly found, because intellectual creatures alone imitate God and are assimilated to Him in intellectuality, which is, as it were, the ultimate difference of God. Cajetan teaches the same doctrine there, for he says that intellectual creatures alone are assimilated to God in what is, as it were, His ultimate difference, because they alone are assimilated to God insofar as He is intellectual. Therefore, they judge that the divine nature is constituted through the grade of understanding, not through the notion of a being from itself and through its essence.

5. This is confirmed: If the notion of a being from itself constituted the divine nature as its ultimate difference, intellectual creatures would not alone be made to the image of God, but this would belong to other creatures, indeed to all creatures, since all are like God in the grade of being. But this is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas just cited. Therefore, so is the former.

6. You will say that all creatures are not made to the image of God because, although they agree with Him in the grade of being, they do not agree in the mode of existing from themselves. But to the contrary: Because intellectuality through essence and from itself constitutes God as His ultimate difference, an intellectual creature is said to be made to the image of God because it is assimilated to Him under the notion of being intellectual, although it is not like Him in being intellectual from itself. Therefore, if the notion of a being through its essence constitutes God as His ultimate difference, non-intellectual creatures, which are like God under the notion of being, will be made to the image of God, although they are not like Him under the notion of a being from itself.

7. I say, second, that the divine nature is not constituted through the root or proximate power of understanding, but through the very act of understanding itself.

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There are two fundamental arguments for this assertion. The first, taken from the supreme purity and actuality of the divine nature, may be stated briefly as follows. Since the divine nature is most pure act and entirely free from potentiality, it must be constituted in the purest and most actual manner, and consequently through that which expresses the greater actuality within the intellectual grade. But the act of understanding is that which expresses the greater actuality within the intellectual grade; indeed, it is its ultimate actuality and stands in the intellectual order as existence stands in the entitative order, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 45, argument 2, where he says that *the act of understanding is compared to the intellect as existence is compared to essence*. Therefore, the divine nature is constituted through the act of understanding itself, not through radical intellectuality, which is as though potential to the act of understanding, nor through the power of understanding, which is conceived after the manner of first act rather than of ultimate actuality.

8. The second argument, taken from the treatise on the Trinity, is formed as follows: The divine nature is formally constituted through that which the second Person of the Trinity receives by virtue of His procession. But He receives the act of understanding itself. Therefore, this act is the constitutive principle of the divine nature. The major premise is evident because the second Person of the Trinity is constituted as Son through that which He receives from the Father by virtue of His procession, as theologians teach in the same treatise. But He cannot be constituted as Son except through the communication of the nature. The minor premise is proved: The second Person of the Trinity proceeds after the manner of a word. But the existence of a word, since it is the term of intellection, is nothing other than to be understood, or to exist through the very act of understanding. Therefore, the second Person of the Trinity, by virtue of His procession, receives the act of being understood, which in God is identical with the act of understanding.

9. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Just as God alone knows Himself perfectly, so He alone can explain His essence. But when God was asked by Moses what He was, He said in Exod. 3, as though declaring His constitutive principle, *I am Who am*, and commanded Moses to say to Pharaoh: *He Who Is has sent me to you*. Therefore, the notion of a being from itself and through its essence is the constitutive principle of the divine nature.

10. This is confirmed: The proper name of something is that which signifies the ultimate difference by which it is distinguished from other things. But the name *He Who Is* is proper to God, as St. Thomas teaches

below, q. 13, a. 11, and as Hilary elegantly explains in *De Trinitate* XIV when expounding the aforesaid words of Exodus: *I was utterly amazed at so absolute a signification of God, for nothing is understood to be more proper to God than existence*. Therefore, such a name expresses the ultimate difference by which God is distinguished from other things.

12. [sic] To the objection, I answer that by those words of Exodus God intended only to declare that by which He is principally distinguished from creatures, namely, the notion of a being from itself and through its essence, not that by which His essence differs from the attributes and is their root and origin. Yet the concept of nature as nature principally consists in this latter, for nature is defined by philosophers as *the principle of motion and rest in that in which it exists*. Therefore:

13. To the confirmation, I distinguish the major premise. The adequately proper name of something is that which signifies its ultimate difference: I grant the major premise. An inadequately proper name must signify the ultimate difference: I deny the major premise. Under the same distinction of the minor premise, I deny the consequence. For a name is adequately proper when, through what it signifies, a thing differs from all other things. A name through whose signification a thing differs from some things but not from all is proper only inadequately. Although God differs from creatures through the notion of a being from itself, His essence does not through that notion differ from the attributes and relations, because it belongs essentially to all of them. Therefore, although the name *He Who Is* is proper to God with an inadequate propriety, it is not proper with an adequate propriety. Hilary and St. Thomas must be understood in this sense, because they speak of God insofar as He is distinguished from creatures, not of the nature of God insofar as it differs from the relations and attributes.

14. From these things another argument of the adversaries is resolved. They state it as follows: The constitutive notion of something is that which is conceived first in it and through which it is distinguished from other things, since the constitutive and the distinctive are the same. But the notion of a being from itself and through its essence is conceived first in God and is that through which He is first distinguished from all other things. Therefore, it constitutes the divine nature. The first answer is that, for something to be a constitutive principle, it does not suffice that it be prior or first conceived in a thing if it stands as something transcendent or as a common predicate. Otherwise, the notion of being, or the grade of substance, living thing, or body, which are conceived in the human being before rationality, would constitute the human being. But the notion of a being from itself and through its essence stands in God as something

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uncreated and transcendent, since it is included in the essence, attributes, relations, and all the divine formalities. A second answer, granting the major premise, is to deny the minor with respect to its second part. For although the notion of an uncreated being from itself distinguishes God from creatures, it does not distinguish His essence from the attributes and relations, since it is a predicate common to and transcending them.

15. You will object further against the second conclusion: The act of understanding is essentially an operation; indeed, it is the most perfect of all operations, because through it an intellectual nature lives. But the divine nature cannot be constituted through an operation, since an operation must proceed from a principle and consequently presupposes that principle as already constituted. Therefore, the divine nature cannot be constituted through the act of understanding.

16. The defenders of our opinion answer this most difficult objection in two ways. First, the most learned Salmanticenses, in their treatise on the knowledge of God, disp. 4, doubt 2, say that although a created and finite operation, enveloped in imperfections, must proceed from a principle and presuppose it as constituted, this is not true of an uncreated and infinite operation possessing the notion of operation formally and eminently. For such an operation identifies with itself, without virtual distinction, everything pertaining to the first intellectual line, and consequently also the understanding principle itself, from which it cannot therefore be conceived, with a foundation in reality, as proceeding.

17. Second, González, disp. 36, conclusions 3 and 5, answers that God's act of understanding can be considered in two ways, namely, after the manner of an action and under the concept of subsistent actuality. Although under the first consideration it cannot constitute the nature of God, under the second it can. He explains and proves this solution and doctrine by the following example and reasoning. Although it is repugnant for a divine relation to constitute a person under the explicit concept of *esse ad*, it is not repugnant under the concept of *esse in* and of a hypostatic form belonging to the line of relation, as Thomists commonly teach in the treatise on the Trinity. Therefore, likewise, although it is repugnant for the divine intellection to constitute the nature of God under the expressed concept of proceeding from something and insofar as it is conceived after the manner of an action, it can nevertheless constitute it under the concept of subsistent actuality. The consequence is proved: It belongs no less to the concept of relation to presuppose a foundation and a person or subject than it belongs to the nature of an action to presuppose a principle. Therefore, if a divine relation, because it is subsistent, although it presupposes the person under

the explicit concept of *esse ad*, constitutes that person under the concept of *esse in* or of a hypostatic form, then likewise the divine intellection, because it is subsistent, will indeed presuppose a constituted nature under the explicit concept of proceeding from something, but not under every concept; rather, it will constitute the nature under the concept of actuality and grade.

18. From what has been said, you will understand how habitual grace is a formal participation in the divine nature. Although it does not participate in God's act of understanding insofar as that act possesses the notion of operation and actuality, under which concept and formality it is participated by the beatific vision, it nevertheless participates in that act insofar as it is, in a certain eminent manner, the root of the divine operations and attributes. Under this concept it formally possesses the notion of nature, as is evident from what was said above. For sanctifying grace is the root of knowledge and love, and from it, as properties from an essence, emanate the theological and infused virtues, which are participations in the divine attributes.

CHAPTER IV.

The Divine Attributes in General.

1. *An attribute is an absolute and necessary perfection formally existing in God and supervening upon the essence as already constituted.* In this definition, by the first two clauses free acts and relative properties are excluded from the notion of an attribute; by the third, the qualified perfections of creatures, which are not formally but only eminently in God, are excluded. Finally, by the last words it is declared that the attributes do not pertain to the constitutive principle of the divine nature, but are, as it were, its affections and properties, modifying it and drawing it into another line. They are called by the Hebrews *Sephirot*, that is, as it were, sapphires, according to Rabbi Moses in his commentaries on his first book, *Jezira*, because through them, as through sapphires, gems, and precious stones, the divine nature and substance is marvellously adorned and embellished, although they produce no composition whatsoever with it, as will be evident from what is said in the following section.

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§ 1.

By What Kind of Distinction the Divine Attributes Are Distinguished
from the Essence and from One Another.

1. Scotus and his disciples admit between the divine attributes and the essence a certain actual formal distinction, which they call a distinction from the nature of the thing, and they maintain that it precedes every operation of the intellect, as the Subtle Doctor clearly explains himself in I, dist. 8, q. 4, where he says that such a distinction *precedes the intellect in every way*. The Nominalists, placed at the opposite extreme, assert that the divine attributes are distinguished both from one another and from the essence solely by a distinction of reasoning reason, or solely through a certain connotation of created things. Thus, the same uncreated entity of God, insofar as it connotes the effects produced by it, is called omnipotence, but insofar as it connotes things objectively present to and known by it, is called wisdom or knowledge. Finally, other theologians commonly teach that the attributes are distinguished from the essence and from one another by a distinction of reasoned reason and with a foundation in reality. Some, however, maintain that this distinction is after the manner of excluding and excluded concepts, as genus is distinguished from difference; others think it is only after the manner of explicit and implicit concepts, as being is distinguished from its properties.

2. I say, first, that the divine attributes are not distinguished from one another or from the divine essence by the formal distinction, or distinction from the nature of the thing, posited by Scotus and his disciples.

3. This is proved, first: Things that are formally and really distinguished from something by the nature of the thing ought not to be predicated of it absolutely, but rather absolutely denied of it. Hence, according to the opinion distinguishing a relation from its foundation by a formal real distinction, these propositions are judged absolutely false: *Whiteness is similarity; generation is paternity*. But according to the holy Fathers, the divine attributes are predicated of the essence not only concretely but also abstractly. Therefore, they are not distinguished from it by a formal real distinction, or distinction from the nature of the thing. The major premise is certain. The minor is evident from the holy Fathers, who assert that God is not only good but goodness itself, and not only wise but wisdom itself, as St. Bernard declares in *In Cantica Canticorum*, sermon 80, and in *De*

consideratione V. Hence, when he was asked at the Council of Rheims that his propositions be written down, he said: *Let it be written with an iron pen and an adamantine point, and engraved upon flint, that the divine essence, form, nature, deity, goodness, wisdom, virtue, power, and greatness is truly God.*

4. The conclusion is proved, second: The divine attributes possess no lesser identity with the divine essence and nature than do the relations. But the relations are not distinguished from the essence by a formal real distinction. Therefore, neither are the attributes. The major premise is evident. The minor is commonly demonstrated in the treatise on the Trinity and is manifestly gathered from the Council of Florence, sessions 15, 18, 19, and 24, where it is said that *the relation is the same in reality as the nature, and they differ only according to the manner of our understanding.* Likewise, it is said that *the paternal hypostasis is joined to the substance not in reality but by reason alone.* These words manifestly exclude the Scotist distinction, since according to Scotus, cited above, that distinction precedes the intellect in every way.

5. The conclusion is proved, third: According to the Lateran Council, in the chapter *Firmiter*, God is an altogether simple substance. But He would not be such if His attributes were distinguished from the essence by a formal real distinction. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved: Just as, if there were an entitative distinction between the divine essence and its attributes, a real entitative composition would result from them, so, if they were distinguished by a formal real distinction, a real formal composition would result from them.

6. This argument is confirmed and further clarified: Composition is the union of distinct things. Therefore, just as the union of things distinguished by a real entitative distinction is a real entitative composition, so the union of things distinguished by a formal real distinction is a real formal composition.

7. The Scotists answer that it does not suffice for composition that the extremes be distinguished from each other, but it is further required that they be compared to one another as act and potency, which does not occur in the present case. But, apart from the fact that this seems entirely arbitrary, since the definition of composition says only that it is *the union of distinct things*, and since some composites exist in which the extremes do not stand as act and potency, as is evident in a composite of integral parts, by the very fact that the divine essence is posited as formally and really distinct from the attributes, it is thereby posited as formally actuable and perfectible by them. Therefore, it is thereby compared to them as potency to act and as the perfectible to the perfecting. Hence, even if this comparison were

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necessary for true composition, it would not prevent there being composition in God if His nature were formally and really distinguished from His attributes.

8. This is proved, fourth: Just as God is supremely simple, so He is supremely one and, as St. Bernard says, *most one*. But He will not be supremely one if His essence is formally distinguished by the nature of the thing and before every operation of the intellect from His attributes. Therefore, and so forth. The major premise is evident. The minor is shown as follows. Every real distinction is no less repugnant to supreme unity than every real composition is repugnant to supreme simplicity. But if there were in God any real composition from essence and attributes, however slight, God would not be supremely simple. For, as St. Bernard says in *De consideratione* V, c. 7: *That which is subject to even one form is no more simple than a virgin is one who has known even one man*. Therefore, likewise, if there were any real distinction, however slight, between the essence and attributes, God would not be supremely one.

9. The conclusion can be further supported from the fact that the formal notion of the divine essence is no less simply infinite than its entity. But the entity of the divine essence, by reason of its infinity, demands that it not be actually distinguished, before the operation of the intellect, from the entity of an attribute. Therefore, the formal notion of the nature of God, by reason of its infinity, likewise demands that, apart from an operation of the intellect, it not be distinguished from the formal notion of an attribute.

10. I say, second, that the divine attributes are distinguished from one another and from the essence by a distinction of reasoned reason.

This is proved, first: A distinction of reasoned reason is one that has a foundation in reality. But the distinction between the essence and the divine attributes, and between the attributes themselves, is such. Therefore, it is a distinction of reasoned reason. The major premise is evident, and the minor is proved. The virtual multiplicity of a thing is a sufficient foundation for the intellect to distinguish it virtually. But the divine essence and its attributes, although formally one reality on the side of the thing, are nevertheless virtually multiple, since that one reality is equivalent to several created perfections really distinct even by their genus or formal notion. For it is equivalent to the absolute and relative, communicable and incommunicable, and to the principles of understanding and willing, punishing and showing mercy. Therefore, and so forth. I said that it is equivalent to several things generically distinct in created realities, because, to found a virtual distinction among the divine perfections, it is not sufficient that the divine reality be equivalent to created perfections that are really distinct if those

perfections do not belong to different genera or, as some say, to different lines. Divine knowledge is one attribute virtually undistinguished, yet it is equivalent to all created sciences, which are really distinct from one another. Likewise, God's act of understanding is equivalent to the radical and proximate power of understanding, to the impressed species, and to the intellectual operation; yet it is not virtually distinguished from these formalities, because they belong to the same intellectual line.

12. This is proved, second: The names of the divine attributes and essence are not synonymous, as are the names *Marcus*, *Tullius*, and *Cicero*, but possess diverse notions. Therefore, although all signify the same perfection, entity, and formality, they do not signify it under entirely the same notion. Consequently, diverse objective notions in God correspond to the concepts expressed by these names. But the reason for this diversity is not taken solely from our intellect; rather, it is founded partly upon the eminence of the divine perfection and partly upon the weakness and imperfection of our intellect, which cannot conceive that perfection by one concept or consequently name it by one name, as St. Thomas excellently declares in I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 3, in these words: *The plurality of these names arises not only on the part of our intellect forming diverse conceptions of God, which are called diverse notions, but also on the part of God Himself, insofar as there is something in God corresponding to all these conceptions, namely, His full and complete perfection.* Therefore, the distinction of the attributes from one another and from the essence is not a distinction of reasoning reason but of reasoned reason.

13. I say, third, that the distinction of reasoned reason existing between the attributes and the essence, or between the attributes themselves, is not after the manner of excluding and excluded concepts, but only after the manner of explicit and implicit concepts.

14. This is proved by the fundamental argument: The divine essence cannot be conceived with a foundation in reality except as including the attributes at least implicitly, nor can one attribute be so conceived except as implicitly including the others. Therefore, between the essence and attributes, or between the attributes themselves, there cannot be, with a foundation in reality, a distinction of reason after the manner of excluding and excluded concepts, but only after the manner of explicit and implicit concepts. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. The essence of God or any of His attributes cannot be conceived, at least with a foundation in reality, except as pure act and as simply infinite, or infinite in the genus of being. But it belongs to the notion of pure act that it cannot be conceived as perfectible by the addition of another perfection or as in

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potency to it; and it belongs to the notion of that which is simply infinite, or infinite in the genus of being, that it formally includes within itself every notion of being that does not involve limitation and imperfection, for nothing can be added to the infinite in the genus in which it is infinite. It is therefore manifest that the divine essence cannot be conceived with a foundation in reality except as including at least implicitly every perfection and entity of the attributes, nor can one attribute be conceived except as implicitly including the perfection and entity of the essence and of all the other attributes.

§ 2.

The Principal Objections Are Resolved.

1.¹ You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Since a definition explains the nature of a thing, things that differ in definition must be distinguished by the nature of the thing. But the nature of God and the attributes, and the attributes themselves among one another, differ in definition. For nature is defined as that by which God is the radical principle of His operations and attributes; intellect as that by which God understands; will as that by which God loves; and similarly concerning the other attributes, whose definitions are distinct. Therefore, the nature of God and the attributes, and the attributes among themselves, are distinguished by the nature of the thing.

2. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Things that differ according to a definition given of the reality as it is in itself are distinguished by the nature of the thing: I grant the major premise. Things that differ according to a definition given of the reality not as it is in itself but as it is conceived by us must be so distinguished: I deny the major premise. Under the same distinction of the minor, I deny the consequence. The divine nature and attributes can therefore be defined in two ways: by a definition given of them as they are in themselves, in which manner they can be defined only by God, or at most by the intellect of a blessed person; or by a definition given of them, not as they are in themselves, but as they are conceived imperfectly and through extrinsic species by us wayfarers. If they were defined in the first manner, they would not have diverse definitions but one. In the second manner, however, they are defined by diverse definitions. Yet it does not follow from this that they are distinguished before the

¹ So numbered '14.' in the original

consideration of our intellect by a formal real distinction or a distinction from the nature of the thing, because, since the definition is given by us not of them as they are in themselves but as they are conceived by us, it suffices that they be distinguished by our reason in order to possess diverse definitions.

3. You will object, second: Things of which contradictory predicates are actually verified before the operation of the intellect are actually distinguished before the operation of the intellect, at least formally and by the nature of the thing. But contradictory propositions are verified of the divine intellect and divine will before the operation of the intellect, namely: The intellect is the principle of the generation of the Word; the will is not the principle of the generation of the Word. Therefore, they are actually distinguished before the operation of the intellect, at least by a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, such as Scotus and his disciples admit.

4. I answer by denying the major premise. For contradictory predicates to be actually verified of things before the operation of the intellect, it suffices that they be virtually distinguished from one another. Just as virtual heat in the sun can accomplish, apart from imperfections, everything that formal heat accomplishes in fire, so a virtual distinction can accomplish everything that an actual distinction accomplishes. For a virtual distinction is founded upon the eminence of a thing that is virtually multiple and equivalent to diverse perfections. Thus, just as the rational soul, because it is eminently vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual, confers the vegetative, sensitive, and rational grades just as effectively as would three really distinct souls to which it is equivalent, so a virtual distinction can just as effectively ground contradictory predicates as the formal distinction from the nature of the thing that Scotus admits among the divine attributes.

5. You will object, third, against the second conclusion: There is no composition of reason in God with a foundation in reality. Therefore, neither is there a distinction of reason. The antecedent is evident from what will be said in the following chapter. The consequence is proved: Even a distinction of reason seems no less opposed to the supreme unity of God than a composition of reason is opposed to His supreme simplicity. Therefore, if there can be no composition of reason in God with a foundation in reality, neither can a distinction of reason having a foundation in reality, which is commonly called a distinction of reasoned reason, be found among the divine attributes.

6. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. First, because a composition of reason is founded upon the

potentiality of an object, in which there must be two formalities or objective concepts, one of which stands to the other as potency to act and as the perfectible to the perfecting. But the distinction of reason among the divine attributes is founded upon the supreme perfection and eminence of God's uncreated entity, which is equivalent to several created perfections dispersed among inferior things, as we explained above. Second, because a composition of reason must be formed from several concepts that mutually exclude one another, since it belongs to the nature of a metaphysical part to exclude another part from its concept, as is evident in composition from genus and difference. But the distinction of reason between the divine essence and attributes, or between the attributes themselves, does not require this mutual exclusion of concepts. It suffices that one not be included explicitly in another. The same occurs in being and its properties, which differ virtually and by reasoned reason, although they mutually include one another and no perfect precision can be made between them.

7. From what has been said, it follows that the distinction of reason between the attributes and the essence is not made by the intellect of God or of the blessed, who see God as He is in Himself. For this distinction is founded partly upon the eminence of the divine entity, which is virtually multiple, partly upon the limitation of our intellect, which is unable by one act to equal the whole perfection of the divine essence, and partly upon the medium through which we know God by analogy with creatures and through species received from them. Although God knows the virtual distinction of His attributes in reality and their formal distinction in our intellect, He does not distinguish them by that reason, since by one most simple act He comprehends all things as they are in themselves, after the manner of one simple and entirely indivisible perfection. Likewise, the blessed behold God as He is in Himself by one indivisible concept, because they know Him through one most simple species, namely, the divine essence, which supplies the function both of an expressed and of an impressed species in the beatific vision. Therefore, neither God nor the blessed form within the Word a distinction of reason between the divine essence and attributes or between the attributes themselves. St. Bernard treats this argument excellently and elegantly in *De consideratione* V, c. 13, where he reasons as follows: *Because we cannot contend with the simplicity of God, while we strive to apprehend one thing, it appears to us as though fourfold. This is caused by the mirror and the enigma through which alone it is granted to us to see. But when we see face to face, we shall see Him as He is. For then the frail vision of our mind, however intensely it strains, will no longer recoil in any way or collapse into its own plurality. Rather, it will gather itself together, become united, and be conformed to His unity, or rather to*

that Unity, so that one face may answer to one face. I said that the blessed do not form within the Word a distinction of reason between the divine essence and attributes or between the attributes themselves, because it is highly probable that they can produce such a distinction outside the Word, since the knowledge of the blessed outside the Word can be multiple rather than one.

CHAPTER V.

The Simplicity of God.

1. That God is an altogether simple substance and entirely free from every composition is not only taught by faith and expressly defined by the Lateran Council cited in the preceding chapter, but is also manifestly demonstrated by reason. For, as St. Thomas reasons in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 18: In every genus, something is nobler to the extent that it is simpler, as in the genus of hot things fire is nobler because it has no admixture of cold. Therefore, that which stands at the summit of the nobility of all beings must stand at the summit of simplicity. But that which stands at the summit of the nobility of all beings we call God. Therefore, no composition can belong to Him.

2. Again, God is most pure act and entirely free from potentiality. But every composition implies some potentiality. Therefore, there is no composition in God. The minor premise is proved: Every composition is either physical, namely, from matter and form or from subject and accident; or metaphysical, namely, from essence and existence or from suppositum and nature; or logical, which is formed from genus and difference. But none of these compositions fails to imply potentiality. Matter is potency to substantial form, and the subject to the accidental form with which it composes. Likewise, an essence composing with existence must be distinguished from existence after the manner of excluding and excluded concepts, and consequently must be in potency to it. The same must be verified of a nature composing with subsistence or with a suppositum. Finally, composition from genus and difference, although it exists only through reason, must nevertheless have a foundation on the side of the known reality. But the foundation of the generic grade is potentiality in the nature denominated a genus. Therefore, every composition implies some potentiality.

3. Third, whatever is composed of several things is constituted from imperfect things, as Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* I. But nothing

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imperfect can exist in God. Therefore, neither can anything composite. Hilary elegantly expressed this argument in *De Trinitate* VII in these words: God, who is life, does not subsist as composite and lifeless; nor is He who is power composed of weaker things; nor is He who is light confined by obscure things; nor is He who is spirit capable of being formed from dissimilar things. Everything that is in Him is one.

4. The mystery of the Trinity does not prejudice this divine and supreme simplicity, although faith acknowledges in it three really distinct Persons intimately united in the same essence. Nor does the mystery of the Incarnation prejudice it, in which the Person of Christ is composed of the personality of the Word and humanity. For, as St. Thomas correctly noted in I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, in order that the three divine Persons should produce a composition with the essence, they would have to be united under the same aspect under which they are distinguished, or distinguished under the same aspect under which they are united, since composition is the union of distinct things. But the divine Persons are not united under the aspect under which they are distinguished. They are distinguished by the relations, which are not united but opposed; yet they are united in the essence, from which they are in no way distinguished. In the mystery of the Incarnation, the divine Word does not enter into composition after the manner of a material part or an informing and inhering form, for this would involve supreme imperfection, but after the manner of a term completing, actuating, and perfecting the humanity, which expresses pure perfection in Him. But we shall treat these things more extensively in the treatises on the Trinity and the Incarnation.

CHAPTER VI.

The Perfection of God.

1. St. Thomas here, q. 4, a. 2, proves by two arguments that the perfections of all things exist in God and consequently that He is supremely and infinitely perfect. The first is: Whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the efficient cause, either according to the same notion if it is a univocal agent, or in a more eminent manner if it is an equivocal agent. But God is the first efficient cause of things. Therefore, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in Him, and consequently He must be supremely and infinitely perfect. For although the perfections of creatures that presently exist, will exist, or have existed are finite and exist in some determinate number, possible creatures, which lie hidden within the divine omnipotence, and

their perfections are infinite, at least potentially and syncategorematically, as philosophers say; for after producing any creature, God can produce another more perfect, and another more perfect still, to infinity.

2. The second argument of St. Thomas may be stated briefly as follows: God is subsistent existence itself and existence through His essence, and consequently contains in Himself the whole fullness of being. Hence, in Exod. 3 He said to Moses: *I am Who am*, and is called by Nazianzen *πάντων ὄντων*. Therefore, He contains in Himself the perfections of all things. The consequence is proved because every perfection is measured according to some existence. Justice gives just existence, power gives powerful existence, and wisdom gives wise existence. Therefore, wherever the whole fullness of being and the whole breadth of existence are found, every perfection will be found. St. Bernard indicates this argument in *De consideratione* V, c. 6, in these words: *If you call God good, great, blessed, wise, or anything of this kind, all is summed up in the expression: He is. For His existence is His being all these things. If you add a hundred such things, you have not departed from existence. If you say them, you have added nothing; if you do not say them, you have taken nothing away.*

3. This is confirmed: That which is infinite in some genus contains all the perfections of that genus. For example, if infinite heat existed, it would contain every perfection of heat; if an infinite line were posited, it would occupy every length. But subsistent and unreceived existence is simply infinite and infinite in the genus of being, as we shall show below when treating the infinity of God. Therefore, it contains in itself all the perfections of all beings. Hence it is said in Ps. 49: *The beauty of the field is with Me*. Explaining these words, Augustine adds: *What is not with Him? With Him is the field, with Him the beauty of the earth, with Him the beauty of the heavens, with Him all flying things, because He is all things.*

4. Two things must nevertheless be briefly observed here. The first is that there are two kinds of perfections in created things. Some are called *simply simple*, and these are those that include no imperfection in their formal concept. Or, as Anselm says in *Monologion*, c. 14, they are *things that are better than their absence*, that is, things that it is better to possess than to lack. Of this kind are wisdom, life, intellection, and so forth. Others are called qualified perfections, and these are those that so include some imperfection in their concept that they can never be separated from it. Hence, it is not absolutely better for every being to possess them than to lack them, as in the case of being moved, reasoning discursively, and so forth. Perfections of the first kind are contained formally in God, for God is formally understanding, wise, just, and merciful. The others are contained

only eminently and apart from the imperfections they possess in creatures. Hence, Dionysius, in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 13, teaches that all things are in a certain manner affirmed and denied of God, and calls Him *πάντων θεῖον, καὶ πάντων ἀφαίρεσιν*, that is, the affirmation of all things and the removal of all things, because He eminently affirms all things as containing all things, and formally removes all things because He excludes from Himself every created and limited formal notion.

5. Second, it must be observed that all the perfections of creatures are contained in God in a much more perfect and eminent manner than animals and plants are contained in the power of the sun and other heavenly bodies. For the sun and heavenly bodies do not primarily and of themselves attain in inferior things anything except the notion of a living thing or of a corruptible body. Since this notion is potential and generic, it is not included in their ultimate differences. Thus, they contain inferior things only by a certain imperfect eminent containment extending solely to common and generic notions. But God, through His causality and omnipotence, primarily and of Himself attains in created things the notion of producible being, which primarily and of itself corresponds to the most universal cause. Therefore, since that notion is transcendent and included in all the modes and differences of creatures, God contains their perfections in a most perfect eminent manner extending not only to common and generic notions, like the eminent containment of the sun, but also to the most specific and individual notions, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 14, a. 6, where he says: *All things pre-exist in God, not only with respect to what is common to all, but also with respect to those things according to which realities are distinguished.*

6. From this you will understand that, just as time added to eternity does not increase or extend its duration, because all inferior durations are contained in it in a most eminent manner, so God and creatures together are not something more perfect, even extensively, than God alone, because the whole perfection of creatures, even numerical perfection, is most perfectly contained in God.

7. This is confirmed: Every creature, however perfect, adds nothing to the divine perfection except dependence, limitation, and imperfection. But the divine perfection cannot be increased or extended by the addition of dependence, limitation, and imperfection. Therefore, creatures added to God cannot produce anything greater or more perfect, even extensively, just as a point added to a line and an instant added to eternity do not produce something greater or increase or extend their length or duration. Hence Augustine, tractate 11 on John: *If you are without God, you will be less; if you are*

with God, God will not be greater. He is not made greater by you, but you are less without Him.

CHAPTER VII.

The Goodness of God.

1. Four kinds of goodness can be distinguished. The first is called absolute and fundamental goodness and consists in the integrity and perfection of a thing possessing everything due to it. Thus, water is called absolutely good when it possesses all the accidents and qualities due to it, for example, colour, taste, coldness, and so forth. The second is called relative or transcendental goodness and consists formally in agreement with the will, from which appetibility arises after the manner of a property, as is taught in *Metaphysica*. The third is called moral goodness and consists in rectitude of morals, and consequently coincides with holiness. Finally, the fourth may be called the goodness of beneficence or diffusion, by which someone diffuses himself into others through the bestowal of gifts and goods; for the good is diffusive of itself, as Dionysius teaches in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4. Therefore, to demonstrate clearly that God is perfectly and in every manner good, it must be proved that these four kinds of goodness belong to Him.

2. It is manifest that the first is found in God, since He is supremely and infinitely perfect and possesses all the perfections and attributes due to His nature, as is evident from what was said above. The second is no less evident, since God possesses the perfection most agreeable to Himself and is agreeable to all creatures as their efficient, exemplary, and final cause, and is agreeable to some in a special manner: to the just, as a friend; to the blessed, as the object of fruition; to the virtuous, as the exemplary cause of all justice and holiness; and to penitents, as the author of remission and grace, according to Lam. 3: *The Lord is good to those who hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him*. Moral goodness also belongs to Him, since in Him there is perfection of morals without any defect or imperfection, as St. Thomas demonstrates in his work *De moribus divinis*, and since He is *just in all His ways and holy in all His works*, as is said in Ps. 144. Finally, the goodness of diffusion and beneficence is not lacking to Him, for He is so full and superabundant in every good that, like an inexhaustible fountain, He overflows upon all creatures by a perpetual and unceasing bestowal of gifts, according to Ps. 103: *When You open Your hand, all things shall be filled with goodness*. Hence Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4: *Just as the sun, by the very fact that it exists, illuminates everything capable of receiving light in its*

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own manner, so the Good itself sends forth the rays of all goodness. This divine outpouring appears both in the internal emanations and in the external productions, in the fourfold order of nature, grace, glory, and the hypostatic union, which is the most perfect of all God's communications *ad extra*, as we shall show in the treatise on the Incarnation, c. 1, § 2.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Infinity of God.

1. That God is simply infinite and infinite in the genus of being can be proved by two *a priori* arguments and a third *a posteriori*. The first *a priori* argument is: God's existence is subsistent of itself and unreceived. Therefore, it is simply infinite. The antecedent is certain, for since God's existence is not even virtually distinguished from His essence, it cannot be received in it. The consequence is proved: That is simply infinite which lacks every terminus and every limiting principle. But subsistent and unreceived existence lacks every terminus and limiting principle. Therefore, it is simply infinite. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Only two limiting principles can exist: one material, namely, a subject receiving a form; the other formal, namely, a difference contracting a genus or a form determining the potentiality of matter to a certain species. But subsistent and unreceived existence lacks both limiting principles. Therefore, it is altogether unlimited. The minor premise is evident with respect to its first part, because, since subsistent existence is not received in any subject, it cannot have a material limiting principle. With respect to the second part, it is proved from the fact that, since existence is the ultimate actuality of a thing, it cannot be actuated by another and further actuality, and consequently cannot have any formal limiting principle. Hence, if it is unreceived and lacks a material limiting principle, it is altogether unlimited.

2. The second *a priori* argument is taken from the fact that God is a being from Himself and independent of every efficient cause. For just as every act and perfection is formally and intrinsically limited by the subject in which it is received, so it is efficiently and extrinsically limited and bounded by the cause producing it. But a being from itself has no cause. Therefore, neither does it have any limitation of perfection.

3. The third argument, *a posteriori*, is taken from creation, which requires infinite power in the creating cause. For if greater power is required in an agent to the extent that there is less potency in the subject for the effect and the eduction of the form, then where there is no potency whatsoever,

infinite power will be necessary. Therefore, since creation is the production of a thing from nothing and from no presupposed potency, it requires infinite power and might in the creator.

4. From what was said in the first and second arguments, it follows that no creature can be infinite according to its essence, since every creature possesses existence received in another and from another. From this it further follows that no creature can be possible that is infinite according to its accidents. For an infinite accident requires a subject of infinite capacity, since there must always be proportion between act and receptive potency and between the perfecting and the perfectible. Therefore, if no infinite created substance possessing infinite capacity can exist, no infinite accident will be possible either.

CHAPTER IX.

The Immensity of God.

1. St. Thomas proves here, q. 8, a. 1, that God is everywhere and intimately and substantially present to all creatures from His operation in all produced things. For God operates in all things insofar as He produces, preserves, or moves them. Therefore, God is intimately and substantially present to all things. The consequence is proved from the fact that every agent must be joined to the patient either by itself or through its power. But the power of God is the very substance of God, since there are no accidents in Him. Therefore, the substance of God itself is immediately joined to and penetrates all things. Scripture and the holy Fathers employ the same reasoning. The Apostle said to the Athenians in Acts 17: *He is not far from each one of us*, and immediately gave the reason: *For in Him we live, move, and are*. Anselm likewise says in the *Monologion*: *Since nothing can exist or be preserved without God, we are compelled to say that God is everywhere and always*. Likewise, Hugh of Saint Victor says in *De sacramentis* VII, c. 19: *Since we perceive that the effect of divine power is nowhere absent, why do we doubt that the same power of God is in all things? But if God's power is everywhere, and the power of God is nothing other than God, it is evident that God is nowhere absent*.

2. You will say: God can act through some power diffused from Himself and therefore extrinsic to and really distinct from Himself. Therefore, it is false that the power of God is the very substance of God. But to the contrary: Even if God can act and produce some effects in things through a power diffused from Himself, it is nevertheless repugnant that He should cause and preserve existence in things except through an intrinsic power really

identified with Himself. For every power diffused by God is finite, since it is caused by Him and received in some finite subject. But the power creating and preserving things is infinite, since it is productive of the whole of creatable being, and consequently is really identified with the substance of God.

3. From this you will understand the notable difference found between the contact of divine and angelic power. The contact of divine power is intimate and penetrative within things insofar as it produces and preserves existence in them, which is most intimate to them. Hence St. Thomas says in I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3: *No one enters into the essence except He who gives existence*, namely, God the Creator. But the contact of angelic power, since it does not produce and preserve existence but presupposes it in the subjects upon which it operates, is not intimate and penetrative, but extrinsic and superadded. It does not lie within the boundaries of the essence, but only within the boundaries of place and quantity.

4. You will also understand from what has been said that the argument of St. Thomas is not a posteriori but a priori, because the formal reason through which God is actually present and existing in things is His virtually transient operation by which He produces or preserves existence in them, or moves and applies them to action. Hence the same holy Doctor says in Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 68: Everything that is in a place in some manner touches it. A corporeal thing is in something as in a place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but an incorporeal thing is said to be in something according to the contact of power. But this contact occurs only through the application of power, or through a virtually transient action. Therefore, God is present and exists in things through that action. Hence Gregory the Great says in homily 8 on Ezekiel: God is everywhere and everywhere whole, because He touches all things, although He does not touch them equally. He touches some things that they may exist, but not that they may live and sense, as all insensible things. He touches some that they may exist, live, and sense, but not that they may discern, as brute animals. He touches some that they may exist, live, sense, and discern, as human and angelic nature.

5. This is confirmed: The essence of God is absolute and independent of every creature and consequently is not in a creature except insofar as He makes the creature depend upon Himself. He accomplishes this through His action by which He produces, preserves, or moves all things. Therefore, such an action is the formal reason through which He is actually present and existing in things. Hence, insofar as it is formally the reason for acting, it pertains to omnipotence; but insofar as it is the reason for attaining

creatures and penetrating into them, it constitutes the attribute of immensity.

6. This is further confirmed: God is not in things as contained by them, but rather as containing them. Hence Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 10: *He is the seat that contains, embraces, strengthens, establishes, and touches all things*, and so forth. But God contains things only by reason of His power and operation, by which He produces or preserves them in existence, according to Heb. 1: *Upholding all things by the word of His power*. Therefore, He is in things only by reason of His operation by which He produces or preserves them in existence.

7. You will say, first, that if this were true, it would follow that the attribute of immensity does not belong to God necessarily and from eternity, but freely and in time, since such an operation is free to God and belongs to Him only in time.

8. But the consequence is denied. For the attribute of immensity does not consist in God's actual presence in things, but in the aptitude and power He possesses to exist in them, or in the power of filling every existing or possible place. Therefore, since such a power and aptitude necessarily and eternally belong to God, the attribute of immensity is necessary and eternal, although God's actual presence in things is free and temporal.

9. You will say, second: Something is understood to be in a place before it operates there, for just as operation follows existence, so operation in a place follows existence in that place. Therefore, God is not formally present to a place through His operation.

10. I answer that, just as in corporeal things, although substance is prior to quantity and local presence, a corporeal substance is not in a place before quantity or local presence exists in it, because it is in place only through quantity, so likewise in spiritual beings, although absolute existence is conceived in them before operation, existence in a place is not conceived before operation, because they are in a place only through operation. Cajetan explains this excellently and learnedly below, q. 52, a. 1, and we shall expound his doctrine in the treatise on angels, c. 5, § 2.

11. From what has been said, another noteworthy corollary follows against more recent authors, namely, that God does not in reality exist positively and actually in the spaces we imagine outside the heavens, which philosophers call imaginary spaces. For God, as we have now shown, is not actually in things except through His virtually transient operation. But He performs no real operation in imaginary spaces, since no creature and no effect produced by God exists there. Therefore, He does not exist in them positively and actually, but only negatively and potentially, insofar as the

divine substance is not limited or confined within the boundaries of the universe and is able to create new worlds in those spaces that we imagine to exist above the heavens. This alone is intended by the holy Fathers when they say that God is above the heavens and outside the world and that He extends beyond this universe, as is evident from Augustine in *Confessiones* VII, c. 1, expressly teaching that the imagination by which God is conceived as extended through infinite spaces is false. God is therefore outside the world in exactly the same manner in which He was in this world before it was created. But before the world was founded, He did not inhabit empty spaces corresponding to the world; He existed only in Himself, and He was to Himself place, temple, and all things, as Tertullian says in *Adversus Praxean*, c. 5, and Minucius Felix in the *Octavius*. Hence St. Bernard says in *De consideratione* V, c. 6: *Where was God before the world was made? Where He is now. There is no reason to ask further where He was. Outside Him there was nothing; therefore, He was in Himself.* Therefore, God likewise does not actually exist in imaginary spaces. *For it is foolish*, says St. Bonaventure in I, dist. 37, q. 2, a. 3, *to say that God exists in that which is nothing.*

12. You will say that three unfitting and absurd consequences follow from our doctrine. The first is that God could be changed, because by producing a body outside the heavens He would begin to exist where He did not previously exist, namely, outside the heavens. The second is that God's substance could be divided from itself and, as it were, made discontinuous, because if God destroyed all the creatures existing between heaven and earth, He would not actually exist in that intervening body, which would be supposed to be empty. Hence, just as the two extremes, namely, heaven and earth, would be separated from one another in that hypothesis, so God's substance would be divided into two parts, one of which would be in heaven and the other on earth. The third unfitting consequence is that God could at least accidentally be moved, because to be moved accidentally is to be moved through the motion of another, as a sailor is moved through the motion of the ship. But according to our doctrine God could be moved through the motion of another by drawing this universe outside the convex sphere of the first heaven.

13. I answer that none of these unfitting consequences follows from our doctrine. The first does not follow. For just as, when God created the world in time in the space where it now exists, He was not changed by acquiring a new presence to it, but the whole change was on the side of the creature, which passed from non-being to being, so likewise, even if He now newly produced some body in imaginary spaces and became present to it according to His substance, He would not be changed in Himself, but the whole change

would be on the side of the newly produced effect. Nor does the second follow, because, although bodies cannot exist in divided places unless they are themselves divided, since they exist in place through commensuration with it, spiritual beings, which exist in place through operation, can operate at the extremes without operating in the intervening space, and therefore can exist actually at the extremes without existing in the intervening space and without being divided. But we shall treat this more extensively in the treatise on angels. Finally, the third does not follow, namely, that God could be moved accidentally through the motion of this universe. For this to be verified, it would be necessary that, just as one who exists in a ship depends locally upon the ship that is moved, so God should depend locally upon this universe as upon a definitive or circumscriptive place. For one of the conditions required for accidental motion is that the thing movable by that motion exist circumscriptively, or at least definitively, in the body through whose motion it is said to be moved locally.

CHAPTER X.

The Immutability of God.

1. St. Thomas proves here, q. 9, that God is altogether immutable by an argument that is virtually threefold, since it is taken from three attributes that are the proper foundations of divine immutability: the notion of pure act, the simplicity of God, and His infinity. These remove the three conditions, or at least some one of them, that are essentially required for true change. First, change requires potentiality, or the privation and absence of some form, which stands as the terminus from which. Second, a mutable subject capable of receiving diverse forms is required. Third, a terminus to which is necessary, or a form newly produced and received in such a subject. St. Thomas therefore proves the complete immutability of God by three arguments. First, because He is pure act and consequently lacks the privation of form that stands on the side of the terminus from which. Second, because He is most simple and consequently is a subject incapable of motion; for a movable subject must necessarily admit composition, since it must receive in itself some form that it did not previously possess. Third, because He is simply infinite and contains all perfections in Himself, so that nothing can accrue to Him anew, nor can He be moved toward any terminus or any form and perfection that He did not previously possess. Hence it is said in Jas. 1: *With Him there is no change or shadow of alteration*. Explaining these words, St. Gregory says in *Moralia in Job* XII, c. 17: *Mutability itself is a*

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shadow that would, as it were, obscure the light of God if it altered that light through any changes. But because no mutability comes upon God, no shadow of alteration interrupts His light.

2. The following words of St. Bernard in sermon 80 on the Canticum can also be referred to this attribute: God claims for Himself this marvellous and singular simplicity of His essence, so that in Him there is not one thing and another, nor one thing here and another there, nor even one thing now and another later. Remaining in Himself, He is what He has, and what He is, He is always and in one manner. In Him many things are reduced to one and diverse things to the same, so that He experiences neither plurality from the number of things nor alteration from their variety.

3. From these things you will understand that, just as there are in God three foundations of immutability, namely, the notions of pure act, simplicity, and infinity, so in every created being there is a threefold root of mutability. The first is that it comes from non-being and tends by a continual flux toward non-being. The second is that it is composite, either of matter and form, subject and accident, or essence and existence. The third is that it is finite and imperfect, so that something can always be added to or taken from it. Hence Seneca says in Epistle 58: *These things flow and exist through continual decrease and addition. None of us is the same in old age as he was in youth. No one is in the morning what he was the day before. Our bodies are swept along after the manner of rivers. Whatever you see runs on with time. Nothing that we see remains. I myself, while saying that these things are being changed, have been changed.*

4. Moreover, the human being is subject to change more than other creatures and, as someone beautifully says, is entirely spherical and prone to roll about, for although mutable by nature, he is rendered far more mutable by sin. Hence Zeno of Verona says in his sermon on patience: Every day he delights in movements and pursues variations; he thinks himself miserable if he remains himself. And Bernard says in *De interiori domo*, c. 2: I cannot adequately explain how many modes of alternation I put on through momentary disturbances, or in how many ways I am accustomed to vary myself according to the dispositions of alternating changes. At one moment I raise myself to confidence, at another I fall into distrust; now I am lifted up through constancy, now I am shaken by sudden terror. At one moment anger disturbs me, at another a mighty fury agitates me. The human being is therefore deservedly compared to the peacock, whose plumage, says Tertullian, is a garment of many colours, changing colour and varied in colour; it is never the same but always different, although it is always itself when different; finally, it changes as often as it moves.

CHAPTER XI.
The Eternity of God.

1. It is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter that God is eternal and that eternity properly belongs to Him alone. For just as time follows motion, so eternity follows perfect immutability. Hence Fulgentius says in *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 7: *Believe firmly and do not doubt in any way that, just as God is immutable, so He alone is truly eternal.* As a figure of this reality, Ezekiel saw the throne of God not in the firmament or beneath the firmament, but above the firmament, from whose uniform motion all time takes its origin. By this it was signified that God, by reason of His eternity, is above all times and before all times and lacks both beginning and end. Therefore, Tertullian says excellently in *Adversus Marcionem* I: *Living and genuine divinity is judged neither from novelty nor from antiquity, but from its own truth. If God is old, He will cease to be; if He is new, He once was not. Novelty bears witness to a beginning, and antiquity threatens an end. But God is as far removed from beginning and end as He is from time, which is the judge and measurer of beginning and end.*

2. Eternity is defined by Boethius as *the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life*. It is called a *possession* to designate its stability, for we are said to possess that which we have firmly and peacefully and from which we cannot in any way be removed. The words *whole and simultaneous* are added to distinguish it from time, whose essence does not exist wholly at once but is acquired by succession and in parts. It is added that the possession of life is *perfect* to exclude the present instant of time, which, although it exists wholly at once and lacks parts, is nevertheless not absolutely something perfect, nor is anything perfectly possessed in it. Eternity is called the possession of *life* rather than of existence because existence, as St. Thomas says here, q. 10, a. 1, ad 2, does not extend to operation as life does. Life is predicated not only of operation but also of existence in living things, because in living things to live is to exist, as is said in *De anima* III, text 37. Finally, eternity is called the possession of *interminable life* to designate that it lacks every terminus whatsoever and neither has nor can have a beginning or end. In this it is distinguished from time, which has a beginning and end, and from aeviternity, which, although it lacks an end, nevertheless has a beginning.

TREATISE II.

ON THE VISION OF GOD.

1. Four things especially must be considered in the vision of God: namely, its impossibility through the powers of nature and its possibility through the assistance of grace; the two principles concurring in it, namely the species and the light of glory; the objects at which it terminates; and the measure by which its duration is measured. These matters must be treated briefly in this treatise. Let us therefore ascend with Moses to Horeb, the mountain of God, and behold this great vision, which, as Augustine says, can be longed for, can be desired, but cannot be explained in words. Let us say with the Bride in the Song of Songs: Tell me, O you whom my soul loves, where you feed, where you lie at noon. For here you feed, says Bernard, *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, serm. 33, but not unto satiety. Nor may one lie down, but one must stand and keep watch because of the terrors of the night. Alas, there is neither clear light, nor full refreshment, nor a secure dwelling; and therefore tell me where you lie at noon. I seek your face, O Lord. Your face is noon. Noon is the clear and intuitive vision of you. O true noon, fullness of heat and light, the sun standing still, the banishment of shadows, the drying of marshes, the driving away of foul odors! O perpetual solstice, when the day will no longer decline! O noonday light! O springtime weather! O autumnal abundance! And, lest I seem to have omitted anything, O winter rest and holiday!

CHAPTER I.

On the Impossibility of the Beatific Vision through the Powers of Nature and Its Possibility through the Assistance of Grace.

1. I say first that no created or creatable intellectual nature or substance can connaturally, or through its own powers, see God as he is in himself. This is evident from Scripture, for in 1 Tim. 6 God is said to dwell in inaccessible light. These words, stated absolutely, sufficiently indicate that God, because of his supreme elevation, is invisible and inaccessible to every creature, and that the uncreated light of the divinity, that is, the essence of God, cannot of itself and through its own powers lie open and be manifest to anything other than God. Hence it is said in Isa. 6: *I saw the Lord sitting upon a lofty throne*, as though transcending the proportion and powers of every created intellect, however elevated. Dionysius also, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 1, attributes it to an elevation above nature that angelic minds see God, and says that *they are steadfastly and immovably raised toward the ray that shines upon them and, through a fitting love of the illuminations granted to them, are borne aloft as though upon wings*. Finally, Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 2, argues as follows: *Although not every creature can be blessed—for beasts, stones, wood, and the like do not attain this gift—nevertheless, the creature that can be blessed cannot be so from itself, because it was created from nothing, but only from him by whom it was created*. Since it is impossible for there to be any creature that was not made from nothing, it is evident, according to Augustine's doctrine, that there can be no creature naturally blessed in this way, and consequently none that connaturally sees God as he is in himself.

2. Reason also establishes this. As St. Thomas argues in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 52, that which is proper to a higher nature cannot belong to a lower nature except through elevation and subordination to the higher nature, just as water cannot be hot except through the action of fire upon it. But to see God as he is in himself is proper to God. Therefore, it cannot belong to any creature except through the action of God elevating it to so sublime and divine an operation. The minor premise is proved. To operate according to its proper form is proper to every agent, as is clear in fire and other agents. But to see God as he is in himself is to operate through the divine essence as through a form or intelligible species, since every other species distinct from the divine essence is impossible, or at least useless, for that vision, as will be evident below. Therefore, it is proper to God.

3. St. Thomas assigns another argument here, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 2, which may be proposed in this form: an intelligent substance or nature and an object connaturally and quidditatively understood must agree in the same degree of immateriality. But no created or creatable substance or nature can agree with God in the degree of immateriality. Therefore, it cannot connaturally see him. The minor premise is evident, for divine immateriality consists in purification not only from physical matter, which is a part of a material composite, but also from metaphysical matter, which consists in potentiality. Yet the exclusion of all potentiality, as also of all composition, is incompatible with a creature. The major premise, in which the difficulty lies, is proved by induction. There are only three degrees of immateriality. The first is that of the rational soul, which is immaterial and incorporeal in substance, but not in its manner of being, since it is the form of a body and depends upon the body in its operations. The second is that of the angelic nature, which is independent of matter and body and possesses subsistent being, yet possesses a being distinct from its essence and nature. The third and supreme degree is that of the divine nature, which is its own being and pure act, and excludes all potentiality and composition. A proportion must therefore be preserved between an intelligent nature and an object connaturally known with respect to these three degrees of immateriality, so that a nature in the lowest degree of immateriality cannot connaturally and through its own powers know one that is in a higher degree, nor can one in a higher degree know a nature that is in the supreme degree. From this it is manifestly gathered that, if the disproportion or excess in immateriality found between the rational soul and the angelic nature prevents the soul from naturally seeing an angel, with even greater reason the excess and disproportion between the divine essence and a human or angelic intellect will prevent a man or an angel from naturally seeing God.

4. You will object first against this argument: a lower angel connaturally knows a higher angel, although he possesses a lower immateriality than the higher angel. Likewise, although a separated soul possesses a lower immateriality than an angel, it can nevertheless connaturally know an angel. Finally, a created intellect imbued with the light of glory is not of the same immateriality as God, since it is not pure act as God is; and yet it sees God as he is in himself connaturally, since such a light is a participation in the divine intellectuality, which has the divine essence as its wholly connatural object. Therefore, agreement in the degree of immateriality is not always required between an intelligent nature and an object connaturally known, and thus the principal foundation of our conclusion collapses.

5. To the first objection, I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. A lower angel connaturally knows a higher angel although he possesses a lower immateriality than the higher angel specifically: I grant the antecedent. Generically and with respect to the degree itself: I deny the antecedent and its consequence. Thus, all angels agree in the degree of immateriality, because all are free from composition of matter and form, even though within this degree one angel is more perfect than another. The former is sufficient for one angel connaturally and quidditatively to know another.

6. To the second objection, I likewise deny the antecedent. For, as Bañez teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 1, dub. 2, the manner in which a separated soul knows through infused species is not connatural to it, but preternatural. Consequently, quidditatively to know angels is not connatural to it.

7. To the third objection, it must be said that, since the beatific vision does not proceed from our intellect, even when imbued with the light of glory, according to the exigency of our nature, but above that nature, it is false that an intellect illuminated by the light of glory sees God in an altogether connatural manner. For the complete connaturality of an elicitive principle with an operation does not merely require that this operation be owed to it in some manner, or that it somehow influence the operation, but that the operation proceed from it according to the exigency of its nature. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 9, a. 4, expressly teaches that the beatific vision is altogether connatural only to the divine intellect.

8. You will object secondly: by his absolute power God can make a created intellect equivalent to the composite of an intellect and the light of glory, since that composite possesses finite and limited power, and, given anything finite, God can produce another thing that is more perfect and consequently equivalent to it. But the beatific vision would be owed and connatural to such an intellect by reason of itself. Therefore, at least by his absolute power, God can produce an intellect that connaturally sees God.

9. I answer by denying the major premise. For the composite of an intellect and an actual intellection is limited and finite, and yet it is impossible for God to produce an intellect that, by reason of itself and without an intellection distinct from itself, perceives an object. Likewise, the composite of a created intellect and prophetic light is of finite and limited perfection, yet no created intellect can be given that equals it by its natural power. Otherwise there could be a creature that, naturally and apart from a revelation by God, foreknew future contingent and free events, which is contrary to Scripture and the holy Fathers, who assert that foreknowledge of future things is the most certain and principal proof of divinity.

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10. From what has been said, it is gathered that the creation of a complete substance that is supernatural involves a contradiction. For a created substance whose intellect would possess the beatific vision connaturally is impossible. But if a supernatural created substance were possible, the beatific vision would be connaturally owed to its intellect. Therefore, it involves a contradiction for such a substance to be created by God. The major premise is evident from what has been said above. The minor is proved from the fact that such a substance would be proportioned to seeing God. Therefore, the vision of God would be naturally owed to its intellect.

11. This is confirmed. If there were a supernatural created substance to which the beatific vision was connatural, the light of glory, which is one of the principles required for that vision, would have to be connaturally owed to such a substance. But this is impossible. Therefore, so is the former. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved from St. Thomas, here, a. 5, ad 3, where he says: *A disposition toward the form of fire cannot be natural except to something possessing the form of fire. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature were of the divine nature, which is impossible.* From these words the following argument can be formed. It is impossible that the ultimate disposition toward a form should be connatural except to something possessing such a form. But the light of glory is the ultimate disposition toward the divine essence as an intelligible form. Therefore, it is impossible for it to be connatural except to the one to whom it is natural to possess such a form, namely God.

12. This is further confirmed. If the light of glory were connaturally owed to such a supernatural substance, it would not be absolutely and simply supernatural. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The consequence of the major premise is proved. The nature of a being that is absolutely and simply supernatural requires that it exceed the exigency of every created and creatable nature. But if the light of glory were connaturally owed to a supernatural substance creatable by God, it would not exceed the exigency of every creatable nature. Therefore, it would not be absolutely and simply supernatural. The minor premise is evident, while the major is shown as follows. If, for something to be absolutely and simply supernatural, it were sufficient that it exceed the exigency of some nature, and it were not required that it exceed the exigency of every created and creatable nature, it would follow that the species owed to a higher angel were absolutely and simply supernatural, since they exceed the exigency of a lower angel. The consequent is false. Therefore, so is the antecedent.

13. You will object first: every accident implies an order toward some subject connatural to itself. But the connatural subject of the light of glory and of other accidents of the supernatural order can only be a supernatural created substance. Therefore, such a substance is possible. The minor premise is proved. Supernatural accidents, such as charity, the light of glory, and the like, do not regard any created substance of the natural order as their proper and connatural subject, since there must be a proportion between potency and act, and between that which perfects and that which is perfected. Nor do they regard the uncreated substance of God, since it is pure act and incapable of receiving accidents. Therefore, these accidents can have no connatural subject other than a created substance of the supernatural order.

14. I answer by denying the major premise. Although every accident implies an order toward some subject, it does not essentially regard a subject connatural to itself, as is evident in accidents drawn forth from a subject's violent potency or introduced by art. Hence philosophers commonly distinguish three receptive potencies in created things: one natural, in which accidents connatural to the subject are received; another violent, in which accidents contrary and repugnant to the subject's nature are received, as heat stands in relation to water; and finally an obediencial potency, by which every agent is subject to God for the reception of forms of the supernatural order. Supernatural accidents therefore regard a natural substance or potency, not insofar as it is natural, but insofar as it is obediencial and subject to God, or capable of receiving the influence of a supernatural agent.

15. You will object secondly: the substance of God is no less participable in the supernatural order than his wisdom. Therefore, just as there is a created, supernatural, and infused wisdom, so there is, or at least there can be, a supernatural created substance.

16. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. The substance of God is no less participable in the supernatural order by an accidental participation than is his wisdom: I grant the antecedent. By a substantial participation: I deny the antecedent and its consequence. Thus, just as created supernatural wisdom participates in the character of divine wisdom, which is a substance, although it does not participate in its substantial manner of being, so sanctifying grace is a participation in the substance of God, but an accidental participation. *For that which exists substantially in God is produced accidentally in the soul*, says the Holy Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2. Hence sanctifying grace is not a substance but an accident belonging to the genus of quality.

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17. I say secondly that a created intellect, whether human or angelic, can be supernaturally elevated to see God as he is in himself. The conclusion is certain by faith and was defined at the Council of Florence in the decree of holy union, where it is said that *fully purified souls behold clearly the triune and one God as he is in himself*. These words proscribe the error of the Armenians, who said that men are beatified in a certain brightness and splendor of God, but do not attain to the vision of his substance. The same was also asserted by certain persons mentioned by St. Gregory in *Moralia in Job* XVIII, c. 18.

18. Since the possibility of the beatific vision is supernatural, our conclusion cannot be demonstrated by evident natural reason. It can nevertheless be rendered probable by two arguments from fittingness given by St. Thomas here, a. 1. The first is this: man can attain his beatitude through the grace of God; otherwise his condition would be worse than that of other creatures, each of which can attain its end and beatitude. But according to the more common and truer opinion, man's beatitude consists in the vision of God as he is in himself, or in an act of the will that presupposes the vision of God as he is in himself. Therefore, such a vision is possible. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Man's supreme happiness consists in the most perfect union with his first principle and last end. But such a union is effected through the vision of God, or through an act of the will presupposing that vision, since one of these is man's supreme operation. Therefore, man's supreme happiness must be placed in one of them.

19. St. Thomas's second argument from fittingness is formed in this manner: *When natural effects have been seen, man desires to see their cause*. Therefore, when the effects of God have been seen, man desires to see him as he is in himself. But man's natural appetite cannot be frustrated. Therefore, the vision of God as he is in himself is possible for man when supernaturally assisted. St. Augustine suggests this argument in *Contra Julianum* IV, c. 3, where he says: *By natural instinct we would not desire to be blessed unless we could be blessed*.

20. You will object first: in Scripture God is called invisible and is said to be incapable of being seen by any man. He is also said to dwell in inaccessible light. Therefore, no created intellect can see him as he is in himself or approach his infinite light.

21. The answer is easy. When God is called invisible in Scripture and is said to be incapable of being seen by any man, this must be understood either of corporeal vision, or of intellectual vision possessed through the powers of nature, or of comprehensive vision, or finally of a vision possessed in this mortal life. For God to be called inaccessible, it is sufficient that no

creature can approach him through its natural powers, although God can grant it access to himself and make himself visible to it through the assistance of his omnipotence. Similarly, a city would not cease to be called absolutely inaccessible if no one could approach it unless the city itself willed and assisted him. Hence Anselm says excellently: *Although God is inaccessible to our powers, he is approached through his own gifts.*

22. You will object secondly: Chrysostom, *Homiliae in Joannem*, hom. 14, explaining John 1, *No one has ever seen God*, adds: *For what God is has been seen not only by no prophet, but not even by angels or archangels*, and so forth. By these words he appears to deny the blessed angels a clear vision of God. Hence it is said of them in 2 Pet. 1: *Into whom the angels desire to look.*

23. I answer with St. Thomas here, a. 1, ad 1, that Chrysostom denied the blessed angels only a comprehensive knowledge of God, not an intuitive and quidditative knowledge. For he was disputing against the Anomoeans, who asserted that God could be comprehended by a created intellect. The contrary objection made by Vásquez is invalid, namely that it is improbable that those heretics were so foolish and insane as to claim for themselves a comprehensive knowledge of God. For it is evident from Theodoret, *Haereticarum fabularum compendium* IV, c. 3, Jerome on Matt. 11, and Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* I, c. 7, that they truly reached this utterly perverse madness. On this matter, see Baronius for the year 366. Hence Chrysostom himself frequently calls them foolish and insane, and in hom. 69 to the people he openly teaches the possibility and existence of the clear and intuitive vision of God, saying: *The blessed behold the King himself, not through an entrance, not through an enigma, not through a mirror, but face to face.*

24. To the statement made of the blessed angels in 2 Pet. 1, namely that they desire to look into God, I answer that the beatific fruition enjoyed by the blessed angels is called a desire to indicate that it generates no weariness, but continual delight and joy. St. Gregory explains this excellently in *Moralia in Job* XVIII, c. 29, in these words: They desire without labor, because satiety accompanies their desire, and they are satisfied without weariness, because their very satiety is always enkindled by desire. We also will be thus when we have come to the very fountain of life: thirst together with satiety will be delightfully impressed upon us, but necessity will be far removed from this thirst and weariness far removed from this satiety, because while thirsting we will be satisfied, and while satisfied we will thirst.

25. You will object thirdly: God is more distant from a created intellect than an angel is from a bodily eye. But because of this distance, a bodily eye cannot be elevated to see an angel. Therefore, with even greater reason a created intellect cannot be elevated to see God.

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26. St. Thomas answers in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 49, q. 3, a. 1, ad 7, that God is indeed more distant with respect to entity, but not with respect to the proportional relation of potency to object. For an angel is not contained within the specifying object of bodily sight, which is the luminous or colored, whereas God clearly seen is contained under the specifying object of a created intellect, which is being insofar as it is being, as is taught in the *Metaphysica*.

27. You will say: every potency can naturally tend toward everything contained under its specifying object, for the eye can naturally see every color and hearing can perceive every sound. Therefore, if God clearly seen is contained within the specifying object of a created intellect, that intellect will be able to see God as he is in himself not only through elevation by God, but also connaturally.

28. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. A potency can naturally tend toward everything contained under its proportionate specifying object: I grant the antecedent. Under an object disproportionate to it: I deny the antecedent and its consequence. For although God clearly seen is contained within the specifying object of the human intellect, which, as we have said, is being insofar as it is being, he is nevertheless not contained under its connatural and proportionate object, which is being knowable through conversion to phantasms. Therefore, for God to be seen as he is in himself, the intellect must be elevated by God and strengthened by the light of glory. This solution is St. Thomas's in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 54, where at the very beginning of the chapter he proposes to himself a similar argument and answers it as follows: *The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of a created intellect as something altogether foreign to it, as sound is foreign to sight or an immaterial substance to sense—for the divine substance itself is the first intelligible and the principle of all intellectual knowledge—but it is beyond the capacity of a created intellect as exceeding its power, just as the excellence of sensible things is beyond the capacity of the senses. Therefore, the created intellect must be strengthened by a certain divine light so that it can see the divine essence.*

29. From what has been said, it is gathered first that a bodily eye cannot be elevated to see God, since God clearly seen is altogether outside not only the proportionate but also the specifying object of the visual or sensitive potency, which is material or corporeal being. No potency can tend beyond the extension of its specifying object; otherwise it would tend beyond its proper species and quiddity, which is impossible.

30. This is confirmed. God as he is in himself is more distant from all sensible objects than one sensible object is from another, for example, than sound is from color. But it is impossible for sound to be seen by a bodily eye.

Therefore, it is also impossible for God to be seen by it. Nor is it an obstacle that the fire of hell is elevated by God to torment demons and rational souls, which are purely spiritual beings. For it is elevated as a pure instrument, which can tend beyond its specifying object, provided that the thing upon which it acts is contained within the object of the principal agent in whose power it operates. But a potency seeing God, since it is vital, must act as a principal cause, which cannot tend beyond its own specifying object.

31. It is gathered secondly that there is in man no innate appetite for the clear vision of God. For an innate appetite is a certain inclination of nature toward a good connaturally owed to it and attainable through its own powers. But in man there is no inclination of nature toward the clear vision of God, but only an obediential potency, since that vision is neither connaturally owed to him nor attainable through the powers of nature, but is superexcellent and disproportionate, as we showed in the first conclusion. Therefore, there is in man no innate appetite for it.

32. Nor is the statement of a certain modern author in his *Theologia mentis et cordis*, p. 181, valid, namely that the human intellect can be considered in two ways: according to its specific character, and according to the common character of intellect as such, insofar as it abstracts from angelic, human, and divine intellect; and that under the former consideration it possesses no innate appetite for the beatific vision, but does possess one under the latter. Thus, he says, it is incompatible with the mole according to its ultimate difference that it should see, although under the common character of animal it requires a visual potency. Martínez regards this doctrine as probable in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 3, a. 8, dub. 2, concl. 7, and Herrera expressly teaches it in his manuscript treatise on the beatific vision. Nevertheless, it does not please other Thomists and can be briefly refuted by this argument. That which positively belongs to a common, transcendental, or generic degree cannot be incompatible with a specific degree, since everything essential to a genus descends into its species. Therefore, the character of animal cannot be contracted by a difference with which sensation is incompatible, nor can substance be contracted by something with which existing through itself is incompatible. Consequently, if an innate appetite for the clear vision of God is incompatible with the specific degree of the human intellect, it cannot belong to the common concept of intellect as such. To the example of the mole, I answer either that the character of animal does not positively require a visual potency, but merely permits it in some of its inferiors; or, if it is positively inclined toward it, that seeing is not incompatible with the mole according to its

essential difference, but only by reason of some accidental indisposition of its organ.

33. Nor does the following objection stand against the first answer: the mole is said to be blind privatively. But privation is the absence of an owed form. Therefore, the visual potency is owed to it. Yet it is not owed according to its differential character. Therefore, it is owed according to its generic character. The answer is that this is not a privation in the strict sense, but in a broad sense, for which it is sufficient that visual potency be owed to the generic degree of animal, not according to itself, but only in some of its inferiors.

34. It is gathered thirdly that through the powers of nature there cannot be in man an efficacious elicited appetite for the clear vision of God, but only an inefficacious and conditional appetite.

35. The first part is proved. An efficacious elicited appetite is one that tends toward a good attainable through one's own powers and by the force of that desire. But we cannot attain the beatific vision through the powers of nature, as we showed in the first conclusion. Therefore, neither can we possess through the powers of nature an efficacious elicited appetite for it. The second part is evident from the distinction between an efficacious and an inefficacious appetite. The former tends toward a good as actually attainable and to be obtained through determinate means; the latter tends toward the goodness of a thing considered absolutely and simply. Hence impossible things can be desired by an inefficacious and conditional appetite, as many desire to live forever, to possess infinite riches, and other things of this sort. In this inefficacious and conditional sense must be understood what St. Thomas says here, a. 1, namely that there is in man a natural desire to know the cause when he beholds the effect. Nor is it an obstacle to say that the Holy Doctor proves the possibility of the beatific vision from such an appetite, while the possibility of the thing desired cannot be concluded from an inefficacious and conditional appetite, since such an appetite frequently tends toward impossibilities. The answer is that, although an inefficacious appetite can be frustrated metaphysically, it cannot be frustrated morally when it is found in so many wise men, all of whom cannot morally, although they can metaphysically, be mistaken in the practical judgment regulating appetite. Hence the argument of St. Thomas is not demonstrative, but only an argument from fittingness. For the mysteries of our faith cannot be demonstrated, but can only be rendered persuasive by probable fittingness. In this manner, the same Holy Doctor below, q. 27, renders probable the procession of the divine Word from the fact that every intelligent being produces within itself a word and conception of the thing

understood. Likewise, in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 1, he proves the incarnation of the divine Word from the character of the highest good, to which it is connatural to communicate itself in the highest manner.

CHAPTER II.

On the Species Concurring in the Beatific Vision.

1. I say first that God is not seen by the blessed through any created impressed species; indeed, such a species is impossible.

The first part of this assertion is opposed by Giles of the Presentation, an Augustinian, who affirms not only that such a species is in fact given, but also that God cannot be seen clearly without it. The contrary is commonly taught by other theologians together with St. Thomas, whose doctrine, as Giles of Rome, of the same Order of St. Augustine, says in his *Defensorium*, a. 1, was divinely inspired and confirmed by a heavenly revelation. Nevertheless, this part is proved by a fundamental argument. A species is required in a created intellect for knowing an object because the object either is not present or united to the intellect, or is not intelligible because of its materiality. Hence in an angel no accidental impressed species is given for knowledge of himself, because his substance, since it is intimately present and united to his intellect and is altogether immaterial, supplies the function of a species, as we will show in the Treatise on Angels, c. 7. But God is supremely immaterial and consequently intelligible in the most perfect manner, and he is intimately present and united to the intellect of the blessed. Therefore, he is not seen by the blessed through any created impressed species, but the divine essence itself immediately supplies by itself the function of a species. Certainly, if created and corporeal light is not seen by the eye through any species, because it is visible through itself and intimately present to the eye, with much greater reason the uncreated and incorporeal light of the divine essence is seen by the blessed through itself and not through any created species.

2. By the same argument, the second part of the conclusion, which asserts that such a species is impossible, is first proved. For a species is a substitute for the object and a form essentially ordered to supplying some defect on the part of the object, namely either a defect of proportion with the potency or of union with it. But a defect of proportion with an intellect illuminated by the light of glory, or of union with that intellect, is incompatible with God, as is evident in itself. Therefore, a species essentially ordered to supplying either of these defects is impossible.

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3. The same part is proved secondly by an argument given by St. Thomas in *Quaestiones quodlibetales* VII, a. 1. The formal effect of an impressed species is to render the object proximately intelligible. But it is impossible that God be rendered proximately intelligible through a created form distinct from himself, since he is intelligible through himself and is even his own intelligibility, because he is supremely immaterial, just as, because he is wise through himself and is even his own wisdom, it is impossible for him to be rendered wise through created wisdom. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a created impressed species representing God as he is in himself.

4. It is proved thirdly by another argument of St. Thomas here, a. 2, which may be proposed in this form. A species and its object must be constituted in the same degree of immateriality. But no created or creatable form can possess the same immateriality as God; otherwise it would be pure act and its own being by essence, as God is. Therefore, no created or creatable form can possess the character of an impressed species quidditatively representing God.

5. This is confirmed first. Every created or creatable species is more distant from God than a sensible species is from the quiddity of a material thing, and than a species abstracted from phantasms is from the quiddity and substance of an angel. But it is impossible for the essence and quiddity of a material thing to be known through a sensible species, or for an angel to be seen quidditatively through a species abstracted from phantasms. Therefore, with even greater reason it is impossible for God to be seen quidditatively through any created species.

6. This is confirmed secondly. A species must have no less proportion to, and no less agreement in the degree of immateriality with, the thing it represents than an intellectual potency has with the object that it connaturally understands. Therefore, just as it is impossible for there to be a created intellect that connaturally sees God, because no created or creatable intellect can possess the same immateriality as God, as we showed in the preceding chapter, concl. 1, so, for the same reason and because of the same excess of immateriality and purity by which God infinitely surpasses every created and creatable form, it is impossible for there to be any created species quidditatively representing God. The objections commonly made against this argument of St. Thomas remain answered by what was said in the place cited, in the response to the first objection against the first conclusion.

7. Finally, the same second part can be rendered persuasive, and the impossibility of a created species in the beatific vision more clearly demonstrated, by another argument suggested by the Holy Doctor in *Summa*

contra Gentiles III, c. 49. A species quidditatively representing an object must possess a specific likeness and agreement with it, at least in intentional and intelligible being. But such agreement with God is incompatible with every created and creatable being. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a created species quidditatively representing God. The minor premise is certain, both because nothing can possess the same immateriality as God and because nothing can be identical with him or possess a univocal and specific agreement with him according to any real and non-fictitious being. Intentional and representative being in an intelligible species is not fictitious being or an extrinsic denomination, but a true and real intrinsic being founded upon immateriality. The major premise is shown as follows. A species is given so that the object existing outside the soul may be placed within the soul in intelligible being, and so that together with the soul it may concur in intellection by rendering the intellect fecund for the production of the word of intellection. Therefore, the species must contain the nature of the object, at least in intelligible and representative being, and consequently be assimilated to it in that being and possess a specific likeness or agreement with it. Hence St. Thomas below, q. 14, a. 1, distinguished intelligent beings from non-intelligent beings by the fact that the former can become all things and receive the forms of other things intelligibly. Likewise, in q. 55, a. 2, he taught for this reason that the nature, for example, of Gabriel cannot serve as a species for the understanding of all things, because, since it is limited, it cannot intentionally contain, or be assimilated to, all the beings of other genera. Aristotle likewise, *De anima* III, text 37, asserted for the same reason that the soul in a certain manner becomes all things, namely in intentional and representative being.

8. I say secondly that it is also impossible for there to be in the beatific vision a created word or expressed species.

This conclusion follows manifestly from the foundations established in the preceding conclusion. For since an expressed species is a more perfect and actual likeness of the object than an impressed species, and represents in second act the very thing that the impressed species represents in first act, if the first must possess the same immateriality as the object and have a specific likeness and agreement with it, at least in intentional and intelligible being, much more must the second possess these qualities. Hence, if it is impossible for there to be a created impressed species representing God as he is in himself, because no created form can possess the same immateriality as he, or be perfectly assimilated to him and possess a specific likeness and agreement with him in intentional and intelligible being, with even greater reason it will be impossible for there to be a created expressed species

quidditatively representing God. I add that, since God is pure act in the intelligible order, he is his own intelligibility not only in first act and as a moving object, but also in second act and as a terminating object. Therefore, just as the divine essence cannot be rendered proximately intelligible through any created impressed species, neither can it be rendered actually understood through a word expressed and produced by the blessed.

9. You will object first against the first conclusion: the nature of an intelligible species requires that it inhere in and inform the intellect. But because this involves imperfection, it cannot belong to the essence of God. Therefore, the divine essence cannot perform the function of a species in the beatific vision, and consequently some created impressed species is given in that vision.

10. This objection can be answered in two ways. First, by absolutely denying the major premise. For the divine essence, in relation to the divine intellect, is a true intelligible species, and yet it neither inheres in nor informs it. Likewise, the substance of an angel, according to the more common opinion of theologians, is the impressed species through which he understands himself, and yet it does not inhere, but subsists through itself. Hence Cajetan excellently observes here, a. 2, that three things can belong accidentally to an impressed species and an equal number essentially. The first thing belonging accidentally to it is that in its natural being it should be a substance or an accident, and consequently that it should inhere or subsist through itself. For in an angel, as we said, with respect to knowledge of himself, it is a substance, while in us it is an accident. The second is that it should possess natural or intentional being. In God and an angel, with respect to knowledge of themselves, it possesses the former; in us, the latter. The third thing belonging accidentally is that it should be identical with the potency in natural being or distinct from it. The first thing belonging essentially to a species is that it be a formal likeness of its object and identical with it in intentional and representative being. The second is that it possess as much immateriality as the object itself. The third is that it be identical with the intellect according to intelligible being.

11. Secondly, it may be answered that, although the divine essence cannot perform the function of a formal cause in natural and entitative being, it can nevertheless do so in intentional and intelligible being. For a physical form, such as the light of glory, stands on the side of the subject as perfecting it; consequently, it is limited and contracted by the subject, subordinated to it, and dependent upon it. An intelligible form, by contrast, does not stand on the side of the subject or intellect, but on the side of the object as its likeness. Therefore, insofar as it is intelligible, it is not

subordinated to the subject or contracted or limited by it. This is evident in a species representing human nature, which, although in entitative being, insofar as it is an accident, it is contracted or individuated by its subject, nevertheless in representative being is as universal as human nature itself, since it does not determinately represent any one singular, but the nature itself according to its entire universality. There is also another difference between a natural and an intentional form. Since a natural form tends to constitute one complete thing through its union with matter, it must necessarily be something incomplete. An intelligible form, however, is not ordered to composing a third thing from its union with the intellect, but only to perfecting and completing the intellect; and it does this better in proportion as the form perfecting and completing it is more complete and actual. Therefore, an intelligible species can be a total and complete form, and consequently the divine essence can perform its function, although it cannot perform the function of a natural form.

12. You will object secondly: the impressed species necessary for seeing God as he is in himself can be finite. Therefore, it can also be created. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. An infinite power is not required for a finite effect. But the beatific vision, toward which the impressed species concurs as a power, is something finite. Therefore, it does not require an infinite species.

13. This is confirmed. Infinity is not required in a representing species in order to represent an infinite object in a finite manner. But a quidditative species of God would not represent him in an infinite and comprehensive manner, because it would represent him to a finite intellect. Therefore, it would not have to be infinite.

14. To the objection, I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise. An infinite power is not required for a finite effect if the power stands on the side of the potency: I grant the major premise. If it stands on the side of the object as its likeness: I deny the major premise taken universally. For if the object is infinite, as God is, the likeness must be of the same nature as the object in intelligible being and must agree with it in entitative being as regards the degree of immateriality, and consequently must possess infinite perfection, as is evident from what has been said above. Alternatively, I distinguish the major premise a second way. An infinite power is not required for a finite effect as a primary and intrinsic requirement: let the major premise pass. As a secondary and consequent requirement: I deny the major premise. Having granted the minor premise, the consequent must be similarly distinguished. Thus, authors who hold that mortal sin, as an offense, contains a malice that is infinite only extrinsically

and objectively say that it primarily requires only a satisfaction possessing a similar infinity, namely an extrinsic infinity. Yet because it is impossible for there to be a satisfaction possessing such infinity unless it proceeds from an infinite person, and because, by the very fact that it proceeds from an infinite person, it cannot fail to possess intrinsic infinity, they therefore say that it secondarily requires intrinsic infinity in the satisfaction. Likewise, I say that, although the beatific vision primarily requires only an impressed species of the infinite object, nevertheless, because it is altogether impossible for such a species to exist without being intrinsically infinite in itself, since it would be of the same perfection and immateriality as the infinite object, it requires at least secondarily an intrinsic infinity in the species.

15. To the confirmation, having granted the major premise, I deny the minor. For it is impossible for there to be an impressed species quidditatively representing God that does not represent him infinitely and comprehensively. Since it would possess the same immateriality as God and would be identified with him, at least in intentional and intelligible being, it would be incompatible with it to represent God in a finite manner and consequently not to comprehend him.

16. You will object thirdly against the second conclusion: St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1, says that *every intelligent being, by the very fact that it understands, forms a word*. Therefore, he holds that the blessed produce a word in the beatific vision.

17. I answer that St. Thomas is not speaking of every intelligent *suppositum* by a complete distribution with respect to all intellections, but by an accommodated distribution, so that the meaning is that every intellectual *suppositum* forms a word in some intellection. From this he infers that even the uncreated intellectual *suppositum*, namely God, produces a word in some knowledge of himself. Although this inference is not demonstrative, it is nevertheless probable. For the mysteries of our faith, among which the production of the divine Word holds a principal place, cannot be evidently demonstrated, but only rendered probable and persuasive by fittingness.

18. You will object fourthly: a word is not distinct from intellection. But in the blessed there is necessarily a created intellection produced by them. Therefore, there is also a created word. The minor premise is evident. The major is proved. Intellection and word possess the same formal effect, namely rendering the intellect actually understanding in second act. Therefore, they are not distinct.

19. I answer by denying the major premise. For the word is the terminus of intellection, but is not the intellection itself, as our Thomists teach in

philosophy. To the proof of the contrary, I say that, although intellection and the word render the intellect actually understanding in second act, they do so in different ways. Intellection renders the intellect actually understanding in second act by way of an operation, just as heating renders heat productive of heat. The word does so by way of a terminus produced through intellection and as a medium in which intellection itself, as contemplation, beholds the object.

20. You will say: if intellection and the word are related as an action and the terminus produced by it, it follows that in the beatific vision there is a word produced by the vision itself, since it is impossible for there to be an action without a terminus distinct from itself and produced by it. Hence beatific love produces a terminus called an impulse, and the eternal Father forms the Word in the notional knowledge of the essence. Why, then, should the blessed not likewise produce a word in their vision and knowledge of the divine essence?

I answer by denying the consequence. To its proof, I say with St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 100, that, although the nature of a transitive action requires a terminus produced by it, because such an action does not exist for its own sake but for the sake of its terminus, as heating exists for the sake of the heat it produces, nevertheless this does not belong to the nature of an immanent action. For although an immanent action sometimes produces a terminus when it needs one, it does not belong to its essential concept that it possess a produced terminus distinct from itself. Since it does not exist for the sake of the terminus, but rather the terminus is ordered to it, as is evident in the word, which exists for the sake of intellection and to serve it, it produces a terminus only when it needs one. Hence, because the beatific vision does not need a word—since the divine essence itself is immediately present and united to the intellect of the blessed, not only as a principle but also as the actual terminus of intellection—no word is produced through that vision. Beatific love nevertheless produces an impulse, because the impulse, which is the terminus of the will, is not the ultimate actuality of the beloved object, but is posited so that it may completely and perfectly incline the will toward the object. Hence, however perfect the beloved object may be, an impulse of the will is still admitted. A word, however, is posited as the ultimate actuality of the understood object. Therefore, when the object is in ultimate actuality, as occurs in the beatific vision, no word is produced. The eternal Father forms the Word in the notional knowledge of the essence, not from need but from fecundity. He does not produce the Word so that the divine essence may be

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understood, but because his knowledge is fecund *ad intra* for the production of the Word.

21. You will object finally: the nature of a word requires that it always be actually known, since it is the intrinsic terminus of actual intellection. But the divine essence is not always and from eternity actually known, at least by a created intellect. Therefore, it cannot possess the character of a word or expressed species in relation to such an intellect.

22. I answer that the divine essence, considered in itself, was always actually knowable by a created intellect; that is, it always possessed of itself sufficient immateriality and actuality to terminate a created intellection and the beatific vision. Nevertheless, it was not always actually known in fact because of the absence of a connoted condition, namely a created intellect, which did not exist always and from eternity. Similarly, the divine personality, considered in itself, always terminated humanity, that is, nothing was lacking on its part for it to terminate humanity, although in fact it did not always terminate humanity because of the absence of the connoted condition, namely the humanity that was to be terminated.

CHAPTER III.

On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing God.

1. It is certain by faith that, according to the ordinary way, a created intellect needs the light of glory in order to see God. This was defined by the Council of Vienne in the Clementine constitution *Ad nostrum* against the Begards and Beguines, who thought that a created intellect could naturally see God. Reason also establishes this. A potency that by its nature is insufficient to elicit an act needs to be strengthened and elevated by some power received within it. But a created intellect, as was shown in c. 1, is of itself and by its nature insufficient and disproportionate to seeing God as he is in himself. Therefore, for this purpose it needs some superadded supernatural power, which theologians call the light of glory. Nor is it valid to say that the divine essence united to the intellect of the blessed as a species is sufficient for this purpose. For a species supplying the function of the object does not give the potency power to see the object, but presupposes that power. This is evident in one who has an injured or weak visual potency, for however perfect and efficacious the visible species of an object placed in his eye may be, his sight is neither healed nor strengthened. Therefore, the defect of power in a created intellect for seeing God cannot be sufficiently supplied by the divine essence united to it as an intelligible species.

2. This is confirmed. The disproportion in the intellect for eliciting an act of faith is not supplied by the species of the credible object alone, but the light of faith is also required. Therefore, with even greater reason, the insufficiency and disproportion in the intellect for seeing God as he is in himself cannot be supplied by the union of the divine essence alone as a species, but must necessarily be strengthened and elevated by the light of glory. This light performs two functions in the beatific vision. The first is to dispose the created intellect for union with the divine essence as an intelligible species, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 5. The second is to strengthen and elevate it for eliciting the beatific vision. This being presupposed:

3. Theologians ask here whether, by his absolute power, God can enable a created intellect to elicit the beatific vision without a created light of glory. The affirmative position is held by many modern authors. Some of them think that God can be united to a created intellect as light, just as he is united to it as a species, and through such a union render it capable of eliciting the beatific vision. Others teach that God can accomplish this through a special assistance or simultaneous concurrence. Others, however, have recourse to a certain obediential potency that is proximately and immediately active and productive of supernatural acts and effects, which they say is naturally innate in every created thing and completed through God's simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order.

4. The negative opinion, however, appears truer and more probable. Since a created intellect is intrinsically insufficient and disproportionate to eliciting the beatific vision, it cannot elicit that vision unless it is first, at least by a priority of nature, rendered intrinsically capable of and proportionate to it. But it cannot be rendered intrinsically capable of eliciting it without a created light of glory. Therefore, even by God's absolute power, it cannot elicit the beatific vision without that light. The major premise is evident, for first act is essentially presupposed to second act. Hence the celebrated rule in the *Topica*: *From act to potency the inference is excellent*. The minor premise is proved by refuting the three ways in which the opponents assert that a created intellect can be rendered capable of eliciting the beatific vision without a created light of glory. First, it appears manifest from the principles established above that God cannot be united to a created intellect as the light of glory, as he is united to it as an intelligible species. For there is a great difference between an impressed species and the light of glory. An impressed species is an intelligible form standing on the side of the object and possessing the same perfection and immateriality as the object. Hence inherence or information is not required for it, but only

agreement and likeness with the object, for inherence and information belong to the physical genus and are accidental to the intelligible genus. The light of glory, however, is a physical form standing on the side of the potency, and therefore requires inherence and information. Consequently, since the divine essence cannot inform or inhere in a created intellect, it cannot be united to it as light, but only as an intelligible species and form.

5. That a created intellect cannot be rendered capable of eliciting the beatific vision through a special assistance of God is shown as follows. Does some intrinsic power flow into the created intellect from such assistance, or is no power superadded to it? If the first is said, we have what we intend, for such a superadded power must be a participation in the divine intellectuality and consequently the light of glory. If the second is affirmed, a created intellect cannot be rendered intrinsically capable of eliciting the beatific vision through such assistance. For it is impossible that something of itself incapable of and disproportionate to eliciting an operation should be rendered capable of and proportionate to producing it unless it is intrinsically changed and consequently receives within itself some intrinsic form or power that it did not previously possess. For a cause's capacity to operate is not an extrinsic denomination, but an intrinsic one derived from some power and internal principle.

6. What we have said of God's special assistance must also be said of his simultaneous concurrence. Since such concurrence does not act upon the cause, but upon the action or effect, it does not intrinsically change the cause and consequently does not render it capable, from being incapable, of eliciting an operation of a higher order. As St. Thomas teaches in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 53, no created potency can be rendered capable of and proportionate to such an operation except through the acquisition of some new form, just as a transparent body cannot illuminate unless it is made actually luminous through a form of light newly received within it.

7. Finally, that a created intellect cannot be rendered proximately capable of eliciting the beatific vision through an obediential potency that is proximately and immediately active and productive of supernatural acts and effects and implanted in all things is briefly proved against Suárez, Meratius, and other modern authors. First, such a potency is expressly contrary to St. Thomas, who says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1: *A form cannot act beyond its natural efficacy except through some superadded form*. Likewise, in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 62, a. 4, he admits in the sacraments of the New Law an intrinsic power for producing grace, which he says is incomplete and flowing. This power would be altogether useless and superfluous if there were in the sacraments of the New Law an obediential potency productive of

grace. Hence Suárez and others who admit such a potency deny that the sacraments of the New Law are elevated through a flowing and transitory power. Secondly, if such a potency existed, it would be natural, since it would be innate by nature in every created thing, and supernatural, since it would be ordered to acts exceeding the powers of nature. Likewise, it would be finite, because it would be identified with the entity of each created thing, which is finite; and infinite, because it would be productive of every producible thing, whose number is infinite, at least potentially. For given any effect produced, another more perfect effect can be produced, and another still more perfect, without end. Thirdly, this potency destroys the entire order of grace and renders everything belonging to it altogether useless and superfluous. For it is pointless to do through many things what can be done through fewer. Therefore, if man can elicit supernatural acts through this potency and simultaneous concurrence, the infused virtues will be useless for eliciting them, the character in priests will be useless for consecrating, and the light of glory in the blessed will be superfluous for seeing God. Nor can it be said that such habits are required for operating connaturally. For since this potency is innate and natural, man would operate more connaturally through it than through adventitious forms and qualities infused by God and superadded to him.

8. You will object first: St. Thomas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 7, says: *It can be miraculously brought about that an intellect possessing only the dispositions of the wayfaring state is elevated to see God through his essence.* But the light of glory is not a disposition of the wayfaring state, but of the homeland. Therefore, St. Thomas holds that the intellect can see the divine essence without it, as St. Paul in fact saw the divine essence in his rapture. For since he was then a wayfarer, his intellect was not elevated to such a vision through the light of glory, which is granted only to those who have attained the homeland.

9. I answer that St. Thomas, when asserting that an intellect can see God without the light of glory by God's absolute power, must be understood of the light of glory communicated as a permanent habit. He does not, however, exclude the light of glory granted transiently, as it was to St. Paul when he saw the divine essence in his rapture. Hence the same Holy Doctor says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 2: *The divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect except through the light of glory, which can be participated in two ways. In one way, as an abiding form, and in this manner it makes one blessed in the homeland. In another way, as a certain transitory passion, and in this manner that light was in Paul when he was rapt.*

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10. You will say: St. Thomas, in the place cited in the objection, says: *It can be miraculously brought about that an intellect possessing only the dispositions of the wayfaring state is elevated to see God through his essence.* But the light of glory transiently communicated is not a disposition of the wayfaring state. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, God can be seen by absolute power without the light of glory, whether permanently or transiently communicated.

11. I answer that, although the light of glory transiently communicated is not positively a disposition of the wayfaring state, that is, a disposition required by that state, it is nevertheless permissively a disposition of the wayfaring state, that is, it is not incompatible with that state. In this it differs from the light permanently communicated, which is incompatible with the state of a pure wayfarer.

12. You will object secondly: the same Angelic Doctor says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 2: *It is erroneous to say that God cannot by himself produce all the determinate effects produced through any created cause.* But through the light of glory God causes a created intellect to elicit the beatific vision. Therefore, he can accomplish this by himself and perform the function of the light of glory, just as he performs the function of an intelligible species.

13. I answer that St. Thomas must be understood of the effects of a created cause that is purely efficient, not when the genus of formal causality is involved. Hence, since the light of glory concurs in the beatific vision not only as an efficient cause but also as a formal cause, God cannot cause the intellect to elicit the vision without it, just as he cannot cause a man to understand without an intellect or to live without a soul. Nor can the divine essence perform the function of the light of glory as it performs the function of an impressed species, because of the difference assigned above when refuting the opponents' first manner of speaking.

14. You will object thirdly: of two persons pulling a ship, each taken separately is incapable of and disproportionate to such a pulling, yet is rendered capable of and proportionate to it through the simultaneous concurrence of the other alone, without an intrinsic change in himself. Therefore, similarly, a created intellect can be rendered capable of eliciting the beatific vision without an intrinsic change in itself and without the infusion of the light of glory, through God's special assistance and simultaneous concurrence.

14. [bis] I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity, because of a twofold difference. The first is that, in two persons pulling a ship, their incapacity and disproportion to such a pulling arise only from the intensive excess of the effect. Hence perfect

proportion can be brought about by multiplying power or concurrence of the same species. The disproportion between a created intellect and the beatific vision, however, arises from the fact that such an operation belongs to a higher and divine order. Hence this disproportion cannot be overcome except through the addition of a form of the divine and supernatural order, namely the light of glory, communicated permanently or at least transiently. The second difference is that the two persons pulling the ship are partial causes of the pulling. The intellect and the light of glory, however, do not concur in the beatific vision as partial causes. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 70: *The same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to the divine power as though it were produced partly by God and partly by the natural agent.*

15. You will object fourthly: in God there is a most perfect and absolute dominion over every creature. Therefore, there is in creatures a perfect subjection and obediential potency to do everything God wills, and consequently for the intellect to elicit the beatific vision without the light of glory. Hence St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4: *Just as there is in a creature an obediential potency that whatever the Creator ordains may be done in it, so also there is such a potency that whatever he ordains may be done through it as a medium, which constitutes the character of an instrument.* By these words he appears to admit not only a passive obediential potency for receiving whatever God wills, but also an active one for cooperating with him in everything he wills.

16. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. The character of full and perfect dominion in God indeed requires that God be able to use creatures at will, but not that he be able to produce supernatural effects or operations through them without elevating and changing them by the reception of some supernatural form or quality, because this involves a contradiction, as is evident from what has been said above. Just as the full power of the divine dominion does not require that a creature act without an action, be capable without a potency, or know without an intellection, so it does not require that supernatural effects be produced without a supernatural power, nor consequently that an intellect elicit the beatific vision without the light of glory. Hence, to the passage of St. Thomas cited in the objection, it must be said that by those words he intended only to declare that in every creature there is a passive obediential power for receiving from God a power through which it may cooperate instrumentally with him in producing supernatural and miraculous effects. He did not intend to say that there is in a creature a proximately active

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obediential potency that requires no superadded power but only God's simultaneous concurrence, as the opponents contend.

17. You will say: if there is no active obediential potency in a created intellect for seeing God, it would not influence the beatific vision actively, but would stand in a merely passive relation to it, as water stands in relation to being heated. But the consequence and parity are denied. For heat in water presupposes no power in the water, not even a radical one, for producing heat; whereas the light of glory presupposes in a created intellect a radical and remote power for seeing God.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Inequality of the Beatific Vision.

1. It is certain that one of the blessed sees God more perfectly than another. For it belongs to a just remunerator to grant unequal rewards for unequal merits. But in this life the merits of the just are unequal. Therefore, in the homeland their rewards likewise are or will be unequal. Hence it is said in John 14: *In my Father's house there are many dwelling places*. And in 1 Cor. 15: *Star differs from star in brightness*. There the Apostle speaks of the unequal glory of bodies in the resurrection. Since this flows from essential glory, essential glory must be unequal, just as bodily glory is. Finally, the Council of Florence, in the decree on Purgatory, defines that the blessed behold God immediately, *yet according to the diversity of their merits, one more perfectly than another*. The difficulty and controversy among theologians therefore concerns the source of the inequality found in the beatific vision: whether it arises from the light of glory alone, or also from the natural perfection of a created intellect, so that a more perspicacious intellect, with an equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly than a less perspicacious one.

2. The more common and probable opinion holds that the inequality of the vision must be reduced solely to inequality in the light of glory. The reason is that the inequality of the beatific vision must be reduced to its proximate and immediate power, not to its radical and remote power, for the latter acts only according to the proportion of the proximate power and insofar as it is elevated through it. But the light of glory is the proximate power immediately influencing the beatific vision, whereas the intellect influences it only radically and remotely and is elevated through the light of glory, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore, the inequality of the beatific vision must be reduced to the light of glory, not to the perfection and natural perspicacity of a created intellect. Hence St.

Thomas says here, a. 6, ad 3: *The diversity in seeing God will arise from a diverse intellectual capacity, not indeed a natural capacity, but a glorious one.*

3. This is confirmed first. Inequality in the beatific vision arises from the fact that the divine essence is united more or less perfectly to a created intellect as an intelligible species. But the fact that the divine essence, as an intelligible form and species, is united more or less perfectly to a created intellect arises from a greater or lesser intensity of the light of glory, since this light is the ultimate disposition for such union, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 5, and not from a greater or lesser natural perfection of the created intellect. Therefore, inequality in the beatific vision arises from the greater or lesser intensity of the light of glory, not from the greater or lesser perfection of the intellect. Otherwise there would be some degree of beatitude corresponding not to grace but to nature. For the greater activity and perspicacity of a created intellect, since it belongs to the natural order, is a benefit of nature, not of grace, and proceeds from God as Creator, not as glorifier. Nor is it an obstacle that St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 10, a. 4, ad 2, that *the degrees of the divine vision are considered more according to the order of grace than according to the order of nature.* For the word “more” is not taken comparatively but exclusively, so that it means “rather,” as when Paul says of Moses: *Choosing rather to be afflicted with the people of God than to possess the passing pleasure of sin.*

4. You will object: when two causes concur in the same effect, the effect increases in perfection when either cause increases in power and activity. Thus, because the visual potency and the species of the visible object concur in bodily vision, a more perfect vision is elicited if the power and perspicacity of the potency is increased, or if a more perfect species of the object is placed within it. But not only the light of glory, but also the created intellect concurs efficiently in the beatific vision, since the intellect does not stand in a merely passive relation to it. Therefore, just as a more intense light of glory, so also a more perfect and perspicacious intellect, elicits a more perfect vision.

5. I answer that the major premise is true when the more perfect cause influences the effect essentially as more perfect, or insofar as it possesses a proximate and immediate power. It is otherwise when it concurs only according to a radical power and its greater perfection is related materially and accidentally to the effect. This occurs in the present case, since a created intellect concurs in the beatific vision not according to its natural aptitude, but according to the obediential aptitude it has for being elevated through the light of glory, which is equal in every created intellect. From this the disparity with the example cited is evident. The visual potency and the

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species proximately and immediately influence bodily vision and possess a proximate power to act, at least a partial and incomplete one. A created intellect, however, concurs only radically in the beatific vision and does not separately contribute a proximate activity and power to act, but subjects its own power to the light of glory as capable of being elevated by it. In this way, one proportionate and proximate power for the vision is constituted.

6. You will say: if this is so, a created intellect will be a mere instrument in the beatific vision, since it acts only insofar as it is elevated through the light of glory, just as an instrument acts only insofar as it is elevated by a principal cause.

7. But I deny the consequence. First, because an instrumental cause is moved by an extrinsic agent in such a way that it does not move itself from an intrinsic principle, as is evident in a saw, hammer, brush, and other artificial instruments. A created intellect, however, is not moved by God toward the beatific vision in such a way that it does not move itself from an intrinsic principle, since in that vision it operates vitally and lives eternal life, and it belongs to the nature of a vital cause operating vitally that it move itself from within, as philosophers teach in the books *De anima*. Secondly, it belongs to the nature of an instrument strictly so called that it be elevated beyond the extension of its adequate object, as is evident in baptismal water, which is elevated to produce grace, something beyond the extension of the adequate object of every created agent. A created intellect, however, although in the beatific vision it is elevated beyond the extension of its proportionate and connatural object, is nevertheless not elevated beyond the extension of its adequate and specifying object, as we explained in c. 1, concl. 2. Thirdly, an instrument strictly so called possesses neither a proximate nor a radical power for the effect of the principal cause. Water, for example, possesses no radical power to produce grace, nor does a saw possess one for cutting artistically. But a created intellect possesses at least a radical and remote power for seeing God, as is evident from what has been said above. Therefore, it does not stand as a pure instrument in relation to the beatific vision. I said “pure instrument,” because it is not unfitting to grant that a created intellect imbued with the light of glory is an instrument of God in relation to the beatific vision, improperly, in a broad manner, and according to a certain general meaning that does not exclude it from the character of a principal cause. For, as St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 5: *An instrument is spoken of in two ways. In one way, strictly, when something is moved by another in such a way that no principle of such motion is conferred upon it by the mover, as a saw is moved by a carpenter; and such an instrument is devoid of freedom. In another way, an instrument is spoken of more*

commonly as anything that moves while being moved by another, whether a principle of its own motion is within it or not.

8. From what has been said, it is gathered that the beatific visions of angels and men belong to the same species. For their diversity arises solely from diversity in the light of glory, which is a diversity of intensity. But all lights of glory belong to the same species, since they regard the same formal object, namely God as knowable as he is in himself, and tend toward him in essentially the same manner, namely clearly and finitely. Therefore, all the beatific visions of angels and men likewise belong to the same species. Nor is it an obstacle that such visions proceed not only from the light of glory but also from angelic and human intellects, which are essentially and specifically distinct from one another. For they do not proceed from these intellects by reason of their natural power, but by reason of their radical and remote obediencial potency, in which angelic and human intellects specifically agree.

CHAPTER V.

On the Object of the Beatific Vision.

1. I say first that the blessed in fact see the divine essence, the Trinity of persons, and all the attributes. Indeed, it is impossible for the divine essence to be seen without the attributes and persons being seen.

The first part of this assertion is evident from the Council of Florence in the decree of union, where it is said that *the one and triune God is seen by the blessed*, and from 1 John 3: *When he appears, we will be like him, because we will see him as he is*. But God is in himself one and triune, omnipotent, just, merciful, and so forth. Therefore, he is seen as such by the blessed. Reason also supports this. Since the beatific vision is the reward of our faith, through it we know clearly in the homeland what is obscurely revealed to us here in the wayfaring state through faith. But those things that concern the nature of God, his attributes, and the persons are obscurely revealed to us here through faith. Therefore, they are manifested to us in the homeland through direct sight and clear vision.

2. The second part, which Scotus and his disciples, as well as some modern authors, deny, is proved from the three endowments or prerogatives of the beatific vision, which is a quidditative, intuitive, and beatifying knowledge. First, it is impossible for something to be seen quidditatively as it is in itself without seeing the predicates that quidditatively belong to it as it is in itself. But the attributes and relations belong to the quiddity of the divine essence as it is in itself, as is evident concerning the attributes from

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what was said above in c. 4, and as we will show concerning the relations in the Treatise on the Trinity, c. 4, § 2. Therefore, it is impossible for the divine essence to be seen quidditatively as it is in itself without the attributes and relations being seen.

3. The same is gathered from the character of intuition. Intuitive knowledge differs from abstractive knowledge in that the latter apprehends an object proportionately to the capacity of the intellect, whereas the former sees and beholds the object as it exists in itself in reality. Therefore, since God is in himself one and triune and includes within himself the essence, attributes, and relations, it is impossible for him to be seen and intuitively known without the relations and attributes being seen. I add that intuitive knowledge does not terminate at the nature and quiddity of the object alone, but tends toward the thing as it subsists and exists in itself in reality. Hence, since the divine nature subsists and exists in three persons, it is impossible for it to be seen or intuitively known without them.

4. The same impossibility is demonstrated from the third prerogative. Beatifying knowledge must perfectly satisfy and quiet the appetite of the blessed, since beatitude is the repose and satisfaction of every desire. But if the beatific vision attained only the divine essence and did not extend to the attributes and persons of the most holy Trinity, it would not perfectly satisfy or quiet the intellect of the blessed. Therefore, it would not be perfectly beatifying knowledge. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved as follows. Since we naturally desire, upon seeing an essence, to see its properties, and upon seeing a subsistent nature, to see its manner of subsistence, while the attributes are properties of the divine essence and the relations are its manners of subsistence, if one of the blessed, upon seeing the divine essence, did not see one of its attributes or one of the divine relations, there would remain in him a desire to see that attribute or relation. Therefore, his appetite would not be fully satisfied and at rest.

5. You will object first: the divine essence is communicated to the Son through eternal generation without paternity being communicated. Therefore, it can similarly be seen in the beatific vision without paternity being seen. The antecedent is certain by the certitude of faith. The consequence is proved from the fact that the entire reason why the divine essence is communicated to the Son without paternity being communicated is their virtual distinction, which therefore appears sufficient for the essence to be seen without the relations and attributes being seen.

6. I answer by denying the consequence and its proof. The fact that the divine essence can be communicated to the Son without paternity being communicated does not arise precisely from the fact that it is virtually

distinct from paternity. Otherwise, since it is virtually distinct not only from the relations but also from the attributes, it could be communicated to the Son without the attributes being communicated. Rather, it also arises from the fact that paternity and filiation are relatively opposed as communicable realities. Hence, for the consequent and the parity to be true, it would also be necessary that they be relatively opposed as visible realities. But this is manifestly false, for otherwise the Father and the Son could never be seen together through the same vision.

7. I add that, although the essence and paternity are virtually distinguished as communicable realities, they are not so distinguished as visible realities, because in the beatific vision the divine essence performs the function of an intelligible species not only in relation to itself but also in relation to the attributes and relations, without any virtual distinction.

8. You will object secondly: a primary object can be seen without a secondary object. But the divine essence is the primary object of the beatific vision, while the attributes and relations belong only to the secondary object. Therefore, the divine essence can be seen without the relations and attributes being seen.

9. I answer first by distinguishing the major premise. A primary object can be seen without a secondary object when it has no necessary connection with it: I grant this. When they are connected and one is transcendently included in the other: I deny it. Hence, since the divine essence is necessarily connected with the relations and attributes and is intimately included in them, even if it were certain that the attributes and relations belonged to the secondary object of the beatific vision, it would nevertheless not follow that the divine essence could be seen without them.

10. I answer secondly by denying the minor premise. For the relations and attributes are not properly secondary objects of the beatific vision, but essential modes of the primary and specifying object, without which it cannot be seen, just as a proper sensible cannot be seen without a common sensible, for example, color without extension and figure. From this many theologians infer in the treatise on the Eucharist that the body of Christ cannot be seen in the Eucharist, because, although it is luminous and colored, it lacks figure and local extension.

11. I say secondly that the blessed see some of God's decrees. This is gathered from St. Bernard, *De consideratione* V, c. 4, where, speaking of the glory of the blessed, he adds: Why should the heart of God not be seen there? Why should it not be proved there what the good, pleasing, and perfect will of God is? There the depths of mercy lie open, the thoughts of

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peace lie open, the riches of salvation and the mysteries of the good will lie open.

12. Reason also establishes this. For, as we will say below, the blessed see those things that pertain to their own state, among which are some decrees of God, especially those concerning their predestination and salvation. They do not, however, see all the decrees. Otherwise, every object freely willed by God and every future thing would be known by them, which cannot be said. This is evident concerning the final day of judgment, of which it is said in Matt. 24 and Mark 13: *No one knows the final day of judgment, not even the angels in heaven.*

13. If you ask how these things are known by the blessed, I answer that some are known by them in the Word and through the light of glory, which eminently contains prophetic light, through which God's free decrees and future contingent things are revealed. Others are known outside the Word through an immediate or mediate revelation by God. For God immediately illuminates the higher angels through himself, and the lower angels through the higher, as we will show in the Treatise on Angels.

14. I say thirdly that the blessed see possible creatures in the divine essence as in a cause and a previously known medium. For the knowledge of the blessed is modeled upon the knowledge by which God knows himself, and is an imitation and participation of it. But in knowing himself, God knows possible creatures in his essence as in their cause, as we will show in the following treatise. Therefore, the blessed likewise, in seeing the divine essence, know possible creatures in it as in their cause. The same must be said proportionately of existing and future creatures, namely that they are known by the blessed in the divine essence, not considered simply in itself, but as determined through God's free decree. Hence Augustine says in *Confessiones* XIII, c. 15, that *the angels always see the face of God and read there whatever his eternal will may will.* By this it is openly indicated that creatures, even as existing or future, are seen in the Word. The arguments commonly made against this conclusion will be more suitably proposed and answered in the following treatise, when we discuss the knowledge of possible things, which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence.

15. I say fourthly that the blessed clearly and distinctly know the mysteries of our faith, the heavens, the elements, the principal parts of this universe, and the things that pertain to their own state.

The conclusion is proved by this argument. Beatitude must perfectly satisfy every just appetite of a rational creature. But one of the blessed can be considered in three ways: first, as elevated to the order of grace; secondly, as a part of the universe; thirdly, insofar as he is a particular person and was

established in a certain dignity, for example, a king, supreme pontiff, patriarch of a religious order, head of a household, and so forth. According to this threefold consideration, he desires to know diverse objects. In the first manner, he desires to know the mysteries of faith, such as grace, the light of glory, his predestination, the mystery of the Incarnation, the Eucharist, and so forth. In the second manner, he desires to know the species, natures, and principal parts of this universe, such as angels, the heavens, the elements, and so forth. In the third manner, he desires to know the things that pertain to his state. For example, St. Gregory, because he was supreme pontiff, desires to know what pertains to the present or future state of the Church; St. Dominic, what pertains to the state of his Order; and St. Louis, what pertains to the state of the kingdom of France. Therefore, through the beatific vision the blessed know the mysteries of our faith, the principal parts of this universe, and the things that pertain to their own state.

CHAPTER VI.

On the Measure of the Beatific Vision.

1. I say briefly that the beatific vision is measured neither by time, nor by aeviternity, nor by essential eternity, but by participated eternity.

2. The first part is evident. Time is the measure of successive things. But the beatific vision is wholly simultaneous, because the blessed see everything they see in the Word through the one species of the divine essence. Things that are seen through one species are seen simultaneously, not successively. St. Bernard touches upon this argument in *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum*, serm. 31, in these words: *That vision stands still, because the form by which it is then seen stands still. For it is, and it undergoes no change from what was or what will be.*

3. This is confirmed. The principles of the beatific vision, namely the light of glory and the divine essence performing the function of an intelligible species, are not measured by time, as is evident. Therefore, neither is the beatific vision itself.

4. The second part appears no less certain. Since the beatific vision is a participation in the divine intellection, it renders the soul as though deiform and operating in a divine manner, and consequently operating in a manner simpler and more immutable than that in which an angel possesses his being. Hence, since the diversity of the measures of the duration of things is taken from their diverse degrees of immutability, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 10, a. 5, the beatific vision requires to be measured by a measure

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nobler and more uniform than aeviternity, which measures the substance of angels.

5. This is confirmed. Although aeviternity is in itself immutable and wholly simultaneous, it admits some succession and some accidental variations in an angel, whether with respect to local changes or with respect to diverse acts, as we will say in the Treatise on Angels. The beatific vision, however, since it constitutes an intellectual creature in its ultimate terminus and end and in supreme beatitude, which cannot increase further, admits no succession or variation, even accidental, in its character as a vision. Hence Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, c. 16, speaking of the beatific vision, says: *Our thoughts will not be changeable, passing from some things to others and returning again, but we will see all our knowledge simultaneously in one concept.* And Bernard, *De consideratione* V, c. 13: *For then the frail gaze of our mind, however vehemently it strains, will not in any way scatter or recoil into its own multiplicity. Rather, it will gather itself, unite itself, and conform itself to the unity of that one, or rather to that unity itself.*

6. You will say: aeviternity is the measure of a thing immutable in its being but mutable according to operations joined to it. But although the beatific vision is immutable in its being, it is nevertheless mutable with respect to operations joined to it, namely the illuminations and revelations that the blessed successively receive outside the Word. For at the very beginning of beatitude they do not see everything pertaining to their state, but are gradually and successively illuminated concerning such things. Therefore, the beatific vision is measured by aeviternity.

7. I answer that, when aeviternity is said to be the measure of a thing immutable in its being but mutable according to its operations, this must be understood of operations essentially joined to it, not of operations joined to it only accidentally. The illuminations and revelations made outside the Word do not essentially pertain to the beatific vision or emanate from it, as love, fruition, and delight do, but are only accidentally connected with it. For they belong to another genus of knowledge, which theologians call infused knowledge, and which follows accidentally upon the beatific vision.

8. Finally, the third part of the conclusion, asserting that the beatific vision is measured not by essential eternity but by participated eternity, is evident from the fact that whatever is measured by essential eternity must be altogether immutable both from without and from within. For just as time follows motion, so eternity follows complete immutability. But although the beatific vision is intrinsically invariable and indefectible, it nevertheless admits mutability and defectibility from without. For by his absolute power God can destroy and change it, and can cause it to be greater

or lesser in the same subject at different times. Therefore, it is not measured by essential eternity, but by participated eternity. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 61, that *the beatific vision is a participation in eternity*. And above, q. 10, a. 5, ad 1, he says that *spiritual creatures, with respect to the vision of glory, participate in eternity*.

9. You will say: the divine essence, which performs the function of a species in the beatific vision, is measured by essential eternity. Therefore, so is the vision itself. I answer that the divine essence, as it is in itself, is measured by essential eternity, but not precisely insofar as it performs the function of a species in the beatific vision. For its concurrence in the vision begins and can cease, and it can concur at one time toward a greater vision and at another toward a lesser one. All of this implies some mutability, at least from without and in relation to God's absolute power.

TREATISE III.

ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

In this Treatise we shall discuss, first, the formal object, both motive and terminative, of the divine intellect. Second, God's knowledge concerning possible things, which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence or understanding. Third, the causality of God's knowledge. Fourth, God's knowledge concerning contingent future things. Fifth, middle knowledge, which is a great and celebrated subject of dispute.

CHAPTER I.

On the Formal Object, Both Motive and Terminative, of the Divine Intellect.

1. I say, first, that the formal and primary object of the divine intellect is not being as analogically common to created and uncreated being, but uncreated being alone.

2. This is proved by three arguments taken from St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 48. The first is: only that is known primarily and of itself by an intellect whose species the intellect uses in understanding. But the species by which God understands is the divine essence alone. Therefore, it alone can be what is primarily and of itself understood by the divine intellect, and consequently creatures cannot belong to its primary object. The minor premise is certain, for the species together with the intellect is

the principle of intellection. But nothing distinct from the divine essence can be a principle of divine intellection. Therefore, neither can it be the species by which God understands. The major premise is proved by St. Thomas as follows: *The operation is proportioned to the form that is the principle of the operation.* But the species is the form and principle of intellection. Therefore, the intellection must be proportioned to it and consequently cannot exceed it. But if one thing were primarily and of itself known by the intellection, and another primarily and of itself represented by the species, the proportion of the intellection to the species would not be preserved. Therefore, only that is primarily and of itself known by the intellect which is primarily and of itself represented to it through the species.

3. St. Thomas's second argument, which is fifth in his order, is formulated by him as follows: what is primarily and of itself understood is the perfection of the one understanding, for the intellect is perfect insofar as it understands actually, which occurs through its being one with what is primarily and of itself understood. But nothing created can be the perfection of the divine intellect. Therefore, nothing created can be primarily understood by it, and consequently its primary object cannot be being as such, analogically common to created and uncreated being.

4. The third argument, which is seventh in his order, is as follows: a power is specified by its formal and primary object, as philosophers commonly teach. But the divine intellect cannot be specified by created being. Therefore, created being cannot be its formal and primary object, nor consequently can being as analogically common to created and uncreated being. The major premise is evident. The minor premise also appears manifest, for to give specification to a power is to exercise true and proper causality upon it. But nothing created can be the true and proper cause of any divine perfection; otherwise, some divine perfection would truly and properly depend upon creatures, which is impossible. Therefore, the divine intellect cannot be specified by created being.

5. I say, second, that the relations and attributes are not the formal motive object of the divine intellect, but this belongs to the divine essence alone, as virtually distinct from them.

6. This is proved, first: since the divine act of understanding constitutes the divine nature, as was shown in Treatise I, c. 3, it presupposes nothing in God virtually prior to itself. But if the relations and attributes were the formal motive object of the divine intellect, God's act of understanding would presuppose something in God virtually prior to itself. Therefore, the relations and attributes are not the formal motive object of the divine intellect. The major premise is evident, for it belongs to the nature of a

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primary constituent to be the first thing understood in the constituted reality. The minor premise also appears manifest, for a motive object virtually distinct from the intellection is virtually prior to it. Therefore, if the relations and attributes, which are virtually distinguished from God's intellect and intellection, were the formal motive object of the divine intellect, God's act of understanding would presuppose something in God virtually prior to itself.

7. This is proved, second: volition is one of the divine attributes. But it is incompatible with divine volition to be the formal motive object of the divine intellect. Therefore, the same is true of the attributes. The major premise is evident. The minor premise is proved: the motive object of divine intellection is virtually prior to it. But God's volition cannot be virtually prior to divine intellection, since intellection is prior to volition. Therefore, it is incompatible with divine volition to be the motive object with respect to divine intellection.

8. This is proved, third, and it is shown that the divine relations are not the formal motive object of the divine intellect. That is the formal motive object of the divine intellect which is the species, or performs the function of a species by which the intellect is made fruitful for intellection. But the divine relations do not have the character of a species making the divine intellect fruitful for intellection. Therefore, neither do they have the character of a motive object with respect to it. The major premise is evident. The minor premise is proved: a species is the principle by which one understands. But the divine relations are not the principle by which divine intellection occurs. Therefore, they are not species with respect to the divine intellect. The minor premise is proved, first, regarding essential intellection, for absolute realities are prior to notional and relative realities, and consequently cannot proceed from them as from a principle. It is also proved regarding notional intellection, for the relations of filiation and spiration are not the principle by which notional intellection occurs, since the Father produces the Word; indeed, not even paternity itself is such a principle, for the Word is like the Father who speaks with respect to the principle by which he speaks, but is not like him in paternity. Therefore, paternity is not the principle by which the notional intellection occurs through which the Father produces the Word.

9. This is confirmed: if the divine relations, not only by reason of the essence but also by reason of themselves, were species by which God understands, it would follow that the character of an intelligible species is multiplied in God not only virtually but also really. But this cannot be maintained. Therefore, neither can the antecedent. The minor premise is

evident, for it seems no less unacceptable that intelligible species be really multiplied in God than that the intellect or intellection be multiplied. The consequence of the major premise is proved: those things which belong to the divine relations by reason of what they add beyond the essence and the absolute order are really multiplied. Therefore, if the character of species belongs to them by reason of what they add beyond the essence, species are really multiplied in God.

10. I say, third, that the relations and attributes do not belong to the formal, primary, and terminative object of the divine intellect, but that this object is the essence alone, as virtually distinct from them.

11. This conclusion follows from the foundations established in the preceding discussion. First, the motive and terminative objects must correspond to each other, since the same order is preserved among objects in terminating cognition as in terminating representation. Hence, because a being of reason is not represented through its own species, but through the species of a real being, in whose likeness it is fashioned, it is known by our intellect not primarily but secondarily. Nor are creatures known secondarily by God for any other reason than that they are secondarily represented through the species by which the divine intellect understands. Therefore, if the relations and attributes are not the primary motive object of the divine intellect, and this belongs to the divine essence alone as virtually distinct from them, they likewise will not be its primary terminative object, but this will belong to the divine essence alone as virtually distinct from them.

12. Furthermore, if the relations and attributes cannot be the formal motive object of the divine intellect because divine intellection, as constitutive of the divine nature, presupposes nothing in God virtually prior to itself, for the same reason they cannot be its formal terminative object. For a terminative object virtually distinct from an intellection is prior to it, since it is as it were its cause.

13. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: the more perfect a power is, the more universal its object is. Thus, the internal senses have a more universal object than the external senses; and because the common sense is preeminent among the internal senses, a more universal object corresponds to it. Likewise, because the intellect exceeds the imagination in perfection, it possesses a more universal object. Hence, since the divine intellect is the most perfect power, it must have the most universal object. But being that abstracts from created and uncreated being is more universal than uncreated being. Therefore, the formal object of the divine intellect is not uncreated being, but being as such, abstracting from created and uncreated being.

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14. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: the more perfect a power is, the more universal an object it possesses by a universality of containment and causality, I grant the major premise; by a universality of predication, I deny the major premise. Under the same distinction of the minor premise, I deny the consequence. From the fact that the divine intellect is most perfect, it follows only that its object must be more universal in containment and causality, but not in predication. For the universality of eminent containment is more perfect than the universality of predication, since the latter is founded upon potentiality, whereas the former is founded upon actuality.

15. You will object, second, against the second conclusion: the divine nature is by reason of itself a species, and consequently the motive object of the divine intellect, because it is pure act excluding all potentiality. But the attributes and relations also, by reason of themselves and as virtually distinct from the divine essence, are pure act and exclude all potentiality; otherwise, they would not be supremely perfect. Therefore, they are species by which the divine intellect understands.

16. I answer that the divine essence does not have the character of a species and motive object of the divine intellect from the common character of pure act, but because it is primordial pure act, radically containing all God's perfections, which does not belong to the relations and attributes. Therefore, just as, although an angel's nature and its properties agree in the degree of immateriality, nevertheless the nature alone is united to its intellect as a species, because it is the root of the other perfections; so also, although the attributes and relations agree with the divine nature in the character of pure act, nevertheless the nature alone is the species by which the divine intellect knows all the divine formalities, because it is the root of them all and consequently sufficient to represent them all.

17. You will object, third, against the third conclusion: divine being as such is common to the relations, the attributes, and every divine reality, but the divine essence as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations is not, since it is not predicated of them insofar as it is distinguished from them. Therefore, divine being as such must be assigned as the formal, primary, and terminative object of the divine intellect, rather than the divine essence itself as virtually distinct from the attributes and relations.

18. I answer that divine being as such is common to the relations, attributes, and every divine reality by a community of concept, just as created being as such is common to all creatures. The divine essence, however, is common to the relations and attributes by a real community, since it actually, virtually, and radically contains them. Hence, since this

containment is more perfect than the former—for what is common by a concept stands potentially toward its inferiors and is conceived as divisible and multipliable in them—the divine essence is assigned by us as the formal, primary, and terminative object of the divine intellect, and not the concept of divine being as such.

CHAPTER II.

On God's Knowledge Concerning Possible Things, Which is Called the Knowledge of Simple Intelligence.

1. All theologians hold as certain against Aureolus that God knows creatures according to the proper and particular being which they have, or can have, in themselves, and not only according to the eminent and uncreated being which they have in God. For since God's knowledge is infinitely perfect, it must extend distinctly and particularly to everything knowable; and since it is the cause of things, as we shall show in the following chapter, just as it produces them according to the proper and particular being which they have in themselves, so also it knows them. But there is a celebrated controversy among theologians concerning the manner in which God knows them: whether he knows them immediately and independently of the divine essence as previously known, or only mediately, in the divine essence as in a cause and medium previously known. Many of the more recent authors assert the first; the Thomists assert the second. Others, in order to extricate themselves more easily from this difficulty, admit both manners of knowing creatures in God.

2. I say, first, that God knows possible creatures in his essence as in a cause and medium previously known.

Dionysius expressly teaches this conclusion in c. 7 of *De divinis nominibus*, where he says that *God from himself and in himself, through the cause, has anticipatory knowledge of all things. By a single comprehension of the cause he knows all things.* And again: *Divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows all things.* St. Thomas also openly teaches it in various places, especially in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 49; also above, q. 12, a. 8, and here, q. 14, a. 6, where he proves it by this argument: no cause can be comprehended unless the effects contained within it are known in it. But God is a cause eminently containing creatures, and he comprehends himself. Therefore, in himself as in a cause he knows all creatures. The minor premise is evident. The major premise is proved: a cause is comprehended when it is known adequately and in every manner in which it is knowable. But it cannot be known

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adequately and in every manner in which it is knowable unless the effects which it virtually contains are known in it. Therefore, it cannot be known comprehensively unless the effects which it eminently or virtually contains are known in it. The major premise is evident. The minor premise is proved: a cause eminently or virtually containing certain effects can be attained as the reason for knowing them. Therefore, unless it is known in this manner, it is not known adequately and in every manner in which it is knowable.

3. This is confirmed: the knowledge which God has of creatures is wisdom. But it would not be wisdom if he did not know them in his essence as in their cause, for wisdom is knowledge of an effect through the highest cause. But the highest cause of a creature is God's essence. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

4. I say, second, that God does not know possible creatures immediately in themselves, that is, independently of the divine essence as previously seen and known; and consequently he does not know them in two manners, namely, mediately in himself and immediately in themselves. Thus St. Thomas here, a. 5, at the end of the body, where he concludes: *Therefore, it must be said that God sees himself in himself, but things other than himself he sees not in themselves, but in himself.*

5. Reason also supports this conclusion. First, because if God knew creatures immediately in themselves and independently of the divine essence as previously known, the formal and specifying object of the divine intellect would be created being, or being as such, abstracting from created and uncreated being. But this cannot be maintained. Therefore, neither can the antecedent. The consequence of the major premise is evident, for that is the formal and specifying object of an intellect which is attained by it by reason of itself, and therefore immediately. The minor premise was proved in the preceding chapter by three arguments taken from St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 48.

6. Second, God cannot know creatures except by using his essence for this purpose as an intelligible species. But by using his essence as an intelligible species, he does not know creatures immediately in themselves, but mediately in himself as the primary and previously known object. Therefore, the conclusion follows. The major premise is evident, for God cannot know creatures through a created species, both because he would be in potency to it and would be perfected by it, and because, since he knows all things from eternity, it would follow that something created, namely that species, existed from eternity. The minor premise is proved: the divine essence as a species does not primarily and immediately represent creatures. Therefore, God, in using his essence as an intelligible species, does not know

creatures immediately in themselves. The consequence is evident, because an object is known through a species in the same manner in which it is represented by that species. The antecedent, which some adversaries deny, is proved, first: an object immediately represented through a species must agree with that species in the degree of immateriality, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 12, a. 2, inferring from this principle that no created species can represent God quidditatively. But nothing created can have such an agreement with the divine essence; otherwise, it would be pure act, like God. Therefore, nothing created can be represented immediately through the divine essence as a species. Second, the representation of a species is either by reason of likeness or by reason of identity with the object. But the divine essence cannot be perfectly like any created thing, much less be identified with it. Therefore, the divine essence as a species cannot primarily represent any created thing. Third, since a species is specified by its primary or immediate object, if the divine essence as a species primarily or immediately represented creatures, it would receive its specific perfection from them, which is impossible. Therefore, the divine essence as a species does not primarily and immediately represent creatures.

7. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: the divine essence cannot have the character of a medium leading to knowledge of creatures. Therefore, God does not know them mediately in his essence as in a cause. The consequence is evident. Vázquez proves the antecedent in two ways. First, because a medium which leads to knowledge of another must bear a real relation to it and be perfectly assimilated to it; yet neither can belong to the divine essence with respect to creatures. Second, because a medium leading to knowledge of another must have a necessary connection with it; otherwise, it could not lead to certain and infallible knowledge of it, just as a probable medium does not lead to certain and scientific knowledge of a conclusion because it is not necessarily connected with it. But the divine essence does not have a necessary connection with possible creatures; otherwise, if they were destroyed, it would likewise be destroyed, which appears absurd. Therefore, it cannot be a medium leading to knowledge of them.

8. I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof, I say that although a medium of cognition and the thing known in it must bear a real relation to one another and be perfectly assimilated when both belong to the same order and agree univocally, this is not required when the medium belongs to a superior and uncreated order and they agree only analogically, as do the divine essence and creatures. For then that medium is independent of what it manifests, and it is sufficient that the manifested thing, which on

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the contrary depends upon the medium, bear a real relation to it. Certainly, since a species is the formal likeness of its primary object, it bears a greater relation to that object and must be more assimilated to it than something having the character of a previously known medium. Yet Vázquez teaches that the divine essence, without bearing a real relation to creatures or being perfectly assimilated to them, has the character of a species representing them immediately and therefore primarily. There is therefore no reason why he should deny that the divine essence, without a real relation to creatures or a complete likeness to them, can have the character of a medium in which, as previously known and as a cause virtually containing them, they are represented to God.

9. To the second proof of the antecedent, I deny the minor premise. To its proof, I say that if possible creatures were destroyed, the divine omnipotence would be destroyed, not indeed a priori and by an intrinsic argument, but a posteriori and by an extrinsic argument. The reason is that the possibility of creatures is not something actually existing in itself outside the power of the cause, and consequently cannot be destroyed except in the cause. But this possibility cannot be destroyed in the cause unless the power of producing creatures is destroyed, which is the cause itself, and consequently unless the cause itself is destroyed. From this you will understand that, without any imperfection in God, it can and must be admitted against Vázquez that God would be impossible if even a single fly were impossible; and likewise that God does not exist necessarily in any greater degree than a fly is necessarily possible.

10. You will object, second, against the second conclusion: creatures are known by God in every manner in which they are knowable; otherwise, he would not be infinite in knowing. But they are knowable not only in the divine essence as in a cause, but also immediately in themselves. In fact, they are known in both manners by the soul of Christ and by the blessed angels, in whom, following Augustine, a twofold knowledge of creatures is admitted, namely morning and evening knowledge, or knowledge in the Word and outside the Word. Therefore, God knows creatures not only in his essence as in a cause, but also immediately in themselves.

11. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: in every manner which implies no imperfection on the part of cognition, I grant the major premise; if the manner of knowing involves imperfection, I deny the major premise. Under the same distinction of the minor premise, I deny the consequence. For, as is evident from what was said above, the immediate knowledge of creatures in themselves entails in cognition the imperfection of dependence upon and specification by those creatures. From this the disparity with the

examples adduced is evident, for such imperfection is not incompatible with the created acts of the soul of Christ or with the cognition of the angels, as it is with divine cognition. The specifying object of a human or angelic intellect is not uncreated being, but being as such, insofar as it abstracts from created and uncreated being; whereas the specifying object of the divine intellect is uncreated being alone, or the divine essence alone, as was shown in the preceding chapter.

CHAPTER III.

On the Causality of God's Knowledge with Respect to Creatures.

1. No one denies that God's knowledge concurs at least directly in the production of creatures. For since God is an intellectual agent and does not proceed blindly in producing things, but makes all things in number, weight, and measure with infinite wisdom, it follows that God's knowledge shines before all his works and directs him in the production of creatures. Hence it is said in Ps. 103: *You have made all things in wisdom*; and in Prov. 3: *The Lord founded the earth in wisdom; he established the heavens in prudence*. The difficulty therefore remains whether divine knowledge concurs in producing things not only directly but also efficiently, and to which knowledge such efficient causality belongs: whether to that which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence, or to that which is called the knowledge of vision. For the resolution of this question:

2. I say, first, that God's knowledge is a cause of things, not only directly but also efficiently.

This is proved, first, from Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, c. 15, where he says: *God does not know all spiritual and corporeal creatures because they exist; rather, they exist because he knows them*. But this causality cannot be true if God's knowledge is not a productive cause of things. Therefore, according to Augustine, God's knowledge efficiently concurs in producing things.

3. Reason also supports this conclusion. First, because, as we shall show below, God produces things *ad extra* through an act of command, which proceeds from the intellect, although it presupposes a motion of the will, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1. Second, because if God's knowledge were not an efficient cause of things, it would depend upon and be measured by them with respect to truth and certitude. For a cognition which does not make its object but presupposes it depends upon that object and is measured by it with respect to truth and certitude.

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4. Nor is the answer of certain recent authors valid, when they say that God's knowledge depends upon created things as objects, but not as causes physically influencing it. For, first, this answer openly conflicts with the doctrine of St. Thomas, who says here, a. 8 ad 3: *Just as natural knowable things are prior to our knowledge and are its measure, so God's knowledge is prior to natural things and is their measure.* And below, q. 16, a. 1, he places this distinction between the divine intellect and ours: our intellect depends upon things, but the divine intellect does not; rather, things depend upon it and are called true because they are conformed to it.

5. Second, if God's knowledge depended upon created things as objects, and presupposed rather than caused certitude and truth in them, it would not in this respect be more perfect than the knowledge of angels. For since angels do not receive species from things, but possess species infused by God, their knowledge does not depend upon created things in the order of efficient causality physically influencing their intellect, as does our knowledge, which receives species from things, but only in the order of material and objective causality. Therefore, if divine knowledge depends upon and is caused by things in this second manner, it will be neither more perfect nor more independent of them than angelic knowledge.

6. Third, God's knowledge is neither less perfect nor less independent of created things than his love. But divine love neither depends upon nor is measured by the goodness and perfection existing in things, nor does it presuppose that goodness, but posits and effects it, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 20, a. 2, in these words: *God's love infuses and creates goodness in things.* Therefore, in the same manner, God's knowledge neither depends upon nor presupposes the certitude and truth existing in things, but rather effects them.

7. I say, second, that the knowledge of simple intelligence is an efficient cause of things in first act, whereas the knowledge of vision, insofar as it is free and a knowledge of approval, causes them in second act.

The first part is evident, for the knowledge of simple intelligence contains within itself the ideas of possible things and stands as an art in the mind of a craftsman, anteceding the will to produce the work, which is productive in first act of artificial works.

8. The second part, which is denied by the recent authors, is proved, first, from the holy Fathers. Augustine writes in *Confessiones* XIII, final chapter: *We therefore see the things you have made because they exist; but they exist because you see them.* Gregory says in *Moralia* XX, c. 23: *Things are not seen by him from eternity because they exist, but they exist because they are seen.* And in *Moralia* XXXII, c. 6: *For by seeing things not existing, he creates them; by*

seeing things existing, he preserves them. Since they use the verb “to see,” they clearly indicate not the knowledge of simple intelligence but the knowledge of vision.

This is proved, second, from St. Thomas, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 1 ad 5, where he says: *God’s being is not subject to the freedom of the will, as is his operative knowledge of creatures.* But the knowledge which is subject to the freedom of the divine will, or to God’s free decree, is not the knowledge of merely possible things but of future things, and is not the knowledge of simple intelligence but the knowledge of vision. Therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, the latter is the cause of creatures, not the former.

9. This is proved, third: knowledge which is the cause in second act of the futuration and existence of things must know them as future and existing. But the knowledge of simple intelligence is not cognition of things as future and existing, but only as merely possible. Therefore, it is not the cause in second act of the futuration and existence of things; rather, this causality belongs to the knowledge of vision, by which God knows future and existing things. The minor premise is expressly taught by St. Thomas here, q. 14, a. 9, in these words: *Although certain things do not now exist actually, nevertheless they either have existed or will exist, and God is said to know all these by the knowledge of vision. Other things are in the power of God or of a creature, which nevertheless neither exist nor will exist; and with respect to these God is not said to possess the knowledge of vision, but the knowledge of simple intelligence.* The major premise appears manifest, both because, just as medicine does not heal what it does not know, so art or knowledge does not cause what it does not know; and because, according to Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 10, *God made nothing unknowingly.* Yet he would have done so if the act and knowledge by which he causes the futuration and existence of things were not terminated at them as known objects, but only as effects produced through causality. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

10. Finally, the same part can be proved by this fundamental argument: God produces creatures through an act of command, according to Ps. 148: *He spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created.* But command is the knowledge of vision. Therefore, the knowledge of vision is a cause of things. The minor premise is proved: command follows the efficacious choice of things in God. But an act which presupposes efficacious choice is the knowledge of vision, and not the knowledge of simple intelligence. Therefore, command is the knowledge of vision. The minor premise is evident, for since the knowledge of simple intelligence is not free but necessary, it does not presuppose but precedes the choice and decree of the divine will. Therefore, the act which presupposes such a choice and decree is

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the knowledge of vision. The major premise, in which the difficulty lies, is shown, first, from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1, at the end of the body, where he says: *It therefore remains that commanding is an act of reason, presupposing an act of the will, by whose power reason moves through command to the exercise of an act.* Therefore, divine command presupposes the efficacious choice of things. It is proved, second, by reason: command is a practical and free act of the intellect. But every freedom of the intellect originates from and presupposes an act of the will, since the will is the first free principle and the first root of liberty. Therefore, command is an act of the intellect presupposing an efficacious choice of the will.

11. For a fuller understanding of this conclusion and the solution of several arguments, it must be carefully observed that in the second part of the conclusion I stated that the knowledge of vision is a cause of things in second act insofar as it is free and a knowledge of approval. For although intellection and speaking are one action of the intellect, which is simultaneously the production of the word and the contemplation of it, nevertheless, insofar as this action is the pure contemplation of the object and, as philosophers say, insofar as it is in a state of rest, it is not productive of the word, but presupposes it as prior in nature and reason, produced by itself insofar as it is speaking. So also, although the knowledge of approval and the knowledge of vision are one entirely undistinguished knowledge in God, which receives these diverse names according to the diverse relations it bears either to the decree which it presupposes or to the object which it beholds, nevertheless insofar as it is formally vision and is considered as purely intuitive and contemplative of its object, it is not a cause of things, but presupposes them as made in some priority of nature and reason by itself insofar as it is practical and a knowledge of approval. Hence St. Thomas says here, a. 8, at the end of the body, that God's knowledge is a cause of things *insofar as it has the will joined to it and bears the name knowledge of approval.* From this you will easily understand how God does not cause sins, although he knows them through the knowledge of vision. He does not know them through the knowledge of vision insofar as it is a knowledge of approval, because they presuppose in God no positive decree by which he wills and approves their existence or futurition, but only a permissive decree by which he wills to permit their malice and deformity.

12. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: it belongs no more to an intellective power to effect its object than it belongs to an effective power to understand its work. But an effective power does not understand its work. Therefore, neither does an intellective power effect its object.

13. I answer by distinguishing the major premise and granting it concerning an intellective power which is merely speculative, but denying it concerning an intellective power which is eminently speculative and practical. For it belongs to the latter simultaneously to understand and to effect, as is evident in our intellection, which, as we said above, simultaneously has the character of speaking and understanding with respect to the word it produces; for it produces the word by understanding it, and understands it by producing it. The same must be said proportionately of God's free knowledge, which is eminently speculative and practical.

14. You will object, second, against the second part of the second conclusion: St. Thomas says here, a. 9, that the knowledge which is a cause of things is that which, although indifferent to opposites, produces a determinate effect through the determination of the will. But the knowledge of vision is not indifferent to opposites, whereas the knowledge of simple intelligence is, namely, with respect to the production or nonproduction of creatures, and to the production of these creatures rather than others. Therefore, in the doctrine of St. Thomas, the knowledge of vision is not a cause of things, but the knowledge of simple intelligence.

15. This is confirmed: the Holy Doctor says in the same place that knowledge in God is a cause of things as the craftsman's knowledge is a cause of artifacts. But the craftsman's knowledge which is a cause of artifacts is not intuitive, since he does not behold the artifact until after it has been made and exists. Therefore, likewise, the knowledge in God which is the cause of things is not that which is called the knowledge of vision or intuitive knowledge, but that which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is abstractive.

16. I answer the objection by distinguishing the minor premise: the knowledge of vision is not indifferent to opposites after it has passed from the character of the knowledge of simple intelligence to the character of the knowledge of vision, I grant the minor premise; before it passed into that state, and while it was only the knowledge of simple intelligence, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. For the knowledge which, in the cited doctrine of St. Thomas, although indifferent to opposites, produces a determinate effect through the determination of the will, is knowledge passing from the state of simple intelligence, under which it is indifferent to opposites, to the state of the knowledge of vision, under which, through the determination of the will, it produces a determinate effect. Hence the argument does not exclude its being a cause of things insofar as it is the knowledge of vision, but only shows that before it became such through the

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determination of the will, it had to be indifferent to opposites and therefore the knowledge of simple intelligence, which we freely admit. For we acknowledge that it is numerically the same knowledge which, antecedently to the free decree of the divine will, is indifferent to the production of things and consequently is the knowledge of simple intelligence, and which nevertheless, when that decree supervenes, is determined to their production and is called the knowledge of vision.

17. To the confirmation, it must be said that God's practical knowledge agrees in something with the knowledge of a created craftsman and differs from it in many respects. They agree in this, that each concurs in the work not only directly but also efficiently. They differ, first, because a created craftsman does not operate by a bare command alone or instantaneously, but with a passage of time and with the application of active powers to passive subjects. From this it follows that his knowledge cannot intuitively regard the work while it is actually being made, but only after it has been made. God, however, produces things instantaneously and through the act of command alone, nor does he need to apply agents to passive subjects, but brings things forth from nothing. Hence his practical knowledge can intuitively regard the creatures which he produces in the same instant in which he operates. Second, God's knowledge differs from a craftsman's knowledge because the craftsman's knowledge, after the work is made, is purely speculative, since the artifact depends upon it only in being made, not in being conserved. But all created things depend upon God's practical knowledge not only in being made but also in being conserved, according to the statement of Gregory the Great cited above: *By seeing things not existing, he creates them; by seeing things existing, he preserves them.* Hence God's knowledge with respect to creatures always remains eminently and formally speculative and practical, whereas a craftsman's knowledge with respect to artifacts does not. From this you will easily understand the passage in Gen. 1 which our adversaries object against us: *God saw all the things he had made, and they were very good.* This must be understood of the knowledge of vision not insofar as it is productive, but insofar as it conserves things; for under this aspect it presupposes them as made and existing, just as conservation presupposes creation.

18. You will object, third: the knowledge of vision presupposes things as existing and future. Therefore, it does not cause their existence and futurity. The consequence is evident, for no cause presupposes its effect. The antecedent is proved with respect to both parts. First, that the knowledge of vision presupposes things as existing appears manifest from the fact that intuitive knowledge presupposes its object as already made and

existing, since it is impossible to behold things which do not exist. That it also presupposes their futurition is evident from the fact that it follows the decree of the divine will, through which things are brought from the state of mere possibility to the state of futurition.

19. I answer by denying the antecedent with respect to both parts. To the proof of the first, I say that although intuitive knowledge, when it is merely speculative, presupposes its object as already made and existing, it is otherwise when that knowledge is eminently speculative and practical. Or I grant this concerning intuitive knowledge which is measured by things, but deny it concerning intuitive knowledge which is the measure of things. The knowledge of vision is not purely speculative but also practical, nor is it measured by things, but is their measure, as was shown above. This doctrine and answer can be illustrated by several examples. In the mystery of the Trinity, the eternal Father, by seeing the Son, produces him, and by producing him, sees him. And if the vision of my eye poured forth light, as the sun pours forth its light, it would illuminate by seeing and see by illuminating. Likewise, a being of reason is the object of human cognition as actually existing in the exercise of the act, and yet is an effect of that cognition; for it is not caused through the cognition by which it is attained as possible, but through the knowledge by which it is apprehended as actually existing in the exercise of the act. Finally, our intellection, as we said above, simultaneously has the character of speaking and understanding with respect to the word which it produces, and produces it by understanding it and understands it by producing it.

20. To the proof of the second part of the antecedent, it must be said that although things are future inchoatively and incompletely by reason of the divine decree, they are not yet future totally and completely. For the immediate productive principle of things and God's executive power is not his will, but his practical intellect, which produces things *ad extra* through an act of command, as will be evident below. Hence, until such an act of command exists and is understood in God, the total and complete cause of the production and futurition of things is not yet understood, but only an inchoative and incomplete cause.

Corollaries Worthy of Note.

21. From what has been said, it is gathered, first, that this proposition, Things are future because they are known by God, is true not only in an inferential sense but also in a causal sense. For because rationality is, for example, the cause of risibility, the proposition, A man is risible because he

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is rational, is true not only in an inferential sense but also in a causal sense. Therefore, likewise, if the knowledge of vision in God is a cause of things, as we showed in the second conclusion, the proposition, Things are future because they are known by God, will be true in a causal sense, and not merely in an inferential sense. Hence the Master of the Sentences says in *Sententiae I*, dist. 38: Nor are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge. For although, if they were not future, they would not be foreknown by God, nevertheless they are not foreknown by God because they are future. For if this were so, then something external to and diverse from what is eternal would be its cause, the Creator's knowledge would depend upon creatures, and a created thing would be the cause of the uncreated. We examined this argument extensively above when proving the second part of the second conclusion.

22. But you may object with the adversaries that Justin Martyr, q. 18, *Ad Gentiles*, taught the opposite in these words: *Foreknowledge is not the cause of that which was to be future, but that which was to be future is the cause of foreknowledge*. Likewise, Origen, on Rom. 8, said that things are not future because they are foreknown by God, but rather that God foreknows them because they are future.

23. I answer, first, that these and other similar testimonies of the Fathers can be objected no less against the doctrine of our adversaries than against ours, since they teach that the knowledge of simple intelligence, as connoting God's will or decree, is the cause of things; yet the cited Fathers, and others whom they object against us, say absolutely that God's foreknowledge is not the cause of the futurity of things.

24. I answer, second, that in the cited passages the Fathers are speaking of sins, concerning which it is most true to say that they are not future because they are known and cognized by God through the knowledge of vision, as we explained at the end of the second conclusion. But if the Fathers sometimes speak not of sins but of free acts, whatever they may be, they intend only that divine foreknowledge is not their total and adequate cause in such a way that its causality prevents or excludes the free determination and cooperation of our will, or imposes any violence or coercion upon it, as St. Thomas explains in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 14 ad 1. He gives another answer to Origen's words here, a. 8 ad 1, saying that when Origen stated that things are not future because they are known by God, he must be understood as speaking of knowledge not insofar as it has the will joined to it and connotes its decree, but according to the general character of knowledge as such, to which the character of causality does not belong precisely as such. When he added that God foreknows certain things because

they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of the consequence, not according to the cause of being, that is, in a noncausal but inferential sense, as in the proposition, *Because Peter is risible, he is rational*.

25. It is gathered, second, that God's executive or productive power with respect to creatures is not virtually distinguished from his intellect and will, but is God's practical intellect itself as moved and applied by the will. For that attribute in God is immediately productive of creatures which elicits the act through which God actually produces creatures. But such an act is elicited by God's practical intellect as moved and applied by the will. Therefore, the practical intellect is the principle immediately productive of creatures, or God's executive power. The major premise is evident. The minor premise is proved: God produces creatures *ad extra* through an act of command. But command is an act elicited by the practical intellect as moved by the will. Therefore, the act by which God produces creatures *ad extra* is elicited by his intellect. The major premise is evident from various passages of Scripture in which the production of creatures is attributed to God's command. For it is said in Gen. 1: *Let light be made, and light was made*. And in Ps. 148: *He spoke, and they were made; he commanded, and they were created*. And in Matt. 8: *I will; be cleansed*. These two words are to be read separately, as St. Jerome observes. Likewise, in John 11 Christ says to the dead Lazarus: *Lazarus, come forth*. And in Matt. 8: *He commanded the winds and the sea*. On this Jerome elegantly remarks: *From this passage we understand that all creatures perceive their Creator commanding them, not according to the error of the heretics who suppose all things to be animate, but through the majesty of the Creator, by which things insensible to us are sensible to him*. The minor premise is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1, where he says that commanding is *an act of reason presupposing an act of the will, by whose power reason moves*. Reason also supports this conclusion. For command, as the Holy Doctor teaches in the same place, implies three things: intimation, ordering, and motion. The intellect possesses the first two from itself, for intimation is spiritual speech, according to the passage: *The mouth of the just man shall meditate wisdom, and his tongue shall speak judgment*. Ordering also belongs to the intellect, because it is an effect of executive prudence, and prudence is in the intellect. The third, however, it receives from the will, which is the first mover with respect to exercise. Therefore, command is an act elicited by the practical intellect as moved by the will.

26. From this you will understand that the actual production of creatures proceeds from God's art or practical knowledge, for, as we have just shown, it is an act elicited by the divine intellect. But it is not an act of

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the light of first principles, which concerns God, nor of prudence, which concerns things to be done. Therefore, it is an act of God's art or practical knowledge, which do not differ in any respect, as is evident in a created craftsman.

27. You will say: command is not an act of art or practical knowledge, but of prudence. Therefore, if God produces creatures ad extra through an act of command, their production will not be an act of God's art or practical knowledge, but of divine prudence or providence.

28. I answer that command concerning things to be done is an act of prudence, whereas command concerning things to be made is an act of art. And because the actual production of creatures concerns things to be made, it is not an act of prudence but of divine art. From this you may infer that those who virtually and attributively distinguish art from God's practical knowledge can with difficulty preserve the doctrine that the production of creatures is an act of God's practical knowledge and that this knowledge possesses in God the character of executive power.

29. Against this corollary it can be objected that St. Thomas below, q. 25, a. 1 ad 4, expressly teaches that executive power in God is virtually distinguished from his intellect and will, for he says: Power is not posited in God as something really distinct from knowledge and will, but as conceptually distinct, insofar as power implies the character of a principle executing what the will commands and to which knowledge directs.

30. I answer that, besides this response, the Holy Doctor added another, for he continues: *Or it may be said that the divine knowledge or will itself, insofar as it is an efficient principle, has the character of power.* This second solution expresses his final judgment, and therefore it should be followed more than the preceding one. This is especially so because in *Opusculum* XI, c. 3, and *Quodlibet* VI, a. 1, he expressly teaches that angels move the heavens by an efficacious conception of the intellect, or through an act of command, and consequently recognizes in them no power of local motion distinct from the practical intellect. This must be held with still greater reason concerning God, as simpler and more perfect.

31. It is gathered, third, that the knowledge of vision differs from the knowledge of simple intelligence in this: the latter concurs in producing things only directly, by a remote direction; the former concurs directly, by a proximate and immediate direction, and efficiently. For the latter concurs in producing things by way of counsel, whereas the former concurs by way of command. But counsel directs the craftsman toward making the work only remotely and mediately, whereas command directs him proximately and immediately, and also concurs efficiently in producing it, as

is evident from what was said above. Therefore, the knowledge of simple intelligence concurs in producing things in only one manner, namely directly by a remote and mediate direction, whereas the knowledge of vision concurs in two manners, namely directly by a proximate and immediate direction, and efficiently.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Knowledge of Future Contingents.

1. It is certain that God from eternity has certain and infallible knowledge of future contingents. For since he is their cause, he knows them when he produces them in time; otherwise he would act blindly and unknowingly, without providence and wisdom. Therefore, since divine knowledge is invariable, and God cannot know in time anything that he did not know from eternity, it is manifest that God had foreknowledge of all future things from eternity. Hence Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V, c. 9: *To confess that God exists and to deny his foreknowledge of future things is the most manifest insanity.* The only difficulty, therefore, and the controversy among theologians, concerns the manner or medium in which God knows them from eternity. Molina and Becanus hold that God knows them antecedently to his decree, in free and contingent causes, or in his penetration and most perfect knowledge of the human will, which they call *supercomprehension*, to distinguish divine knowledge from angelic knowledge. Although an angel comprehends the human will, he does not thereby know its future free acts, as God does. The opinion of Theophilus Raynaud approaches this position, for he asserts that by middle knowledge God knows what the created will would do in these or those circumstances if it were left to itself and could act alone without God's concurrence. Suarez and Fonseca, whom Fasolus follows, teach that God knows future contingents and our free acts in his decree, not indeed in an actual and exercised decree, as the Thomists hold, but in one that is future and to be posited in a subsequent logical moment. Others think that God knows future contingents in contradictorily opposed propositions, or through the force and law of contradiction, which requires that one proposition be determinately true and the other false. Finally, other defenders of middle knowledge, to extricate themselves more easily from this difficulty, assert that God does not know future contingents in any objective medium, but immediately in themselves and in the objective truth that, they say, they possess independently of God's decree, on the supposition of the future event. Before explaining and establishing our own

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position, these various opinions of the more recent authors must be briefly refuted.

§ 1.

All Those Opinions are Refuted.

2. I say first: future contingents, whether absolute or conditional, cannot be known certainly and infallibly by the divine intellect in free or contingent causes as they precede the divine decree or predetermination. Thus St. Thomas here, a. 13, says: *A contingent cause is open to opposites, and thus a contingent as future is not subject with certainty to any knowledge. Hence whoever knows a contingent effect only in its cause has merely conjectural knowledge of it.* By these words the Holy Doctor both taught and proved our conclusion. For just as conclusions cannot be known certainly and scientifically in a merely probable and opinative principle, but only opinatively, so future contingent effects cannot be known certainly and determinately in an indifferent and undetermined cause, but only conjecturally. But free and contingent causes, of themselves and antecedently to the divine decree or determination, are indifferent and undetermined as regards producing or not producing future contingent and free effects, and can either be extrinsically impeded from proceeding into act or determine themselves to the opposite act. Therefore, in such causes so considered, future contingents cannot be known certainly and infallibly, but only conjecturally. Hence St. Thomas, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1: *Some causes are open to either alternative, and in such causes future effects have no certainty or determination.*

3. Molina answers that, although contingent or free effects cannot be known certainly in an indifferent and undetermined cause by simple comprehension, they can be known by supercomprehension. Hence, although future contingents cannot be known certainly and infallibly by an angel in secondary causes, but only conjecturally, they can nevertheless be so known by God.

4. But against this: since comprehension by its nature requires that nothing belonging to the comprehended thing remain hidden from the knower, although supercomprehension exceeds comprehension, that excess does not concern the object, as though supercomprehension attained something in the object that comprehension does not know, but concerns the manner of knowing, insofar as what is known more obscurely through comprehension is seen more clearly through supercomprehension. Hence, from the fact that God supercomprehends the human will, one can infer

only that, antecedently to his decree, he has a more perfect and clearer conjectural knowledge of its free acts than an angel who merely comprehends it, but not that he knows those acts certainly and infallibly in the will itself. Similarly, from the fact that God not only comprehends but also supercomprehends a probable and opinative principle, it does not follow that he knows certainly and scientifically in it the conclusions virtually contained there, but only that he has a more perfect opinative knowledge of them than an angel does.

5. You will say with Molina: according to the Thomists, God knows certainly and infallibly in predetermined free causes their future free effects or acts. But causes of this kind, even as subject to divine predetermination, are indifferent; otherwise God's predetermination would remove their indifference and consequently their freedom. Therefore, future free and contingent things can be known certainly and infallibly in indifferent causes. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 67, teaches that, just as a necessary effect is certainly known from a necessary cause, so a contingent effect is certainly known from an unimpeded contingent cause.

I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor: free causes as subject to divine predetermination are indifferent with potential and privative indifference; I deny the minor. They are indifferent with actual and positive indifference; I grant the minor. I likewise distinguish the consequence: therefore free effects can be known certainly in causes indifferent with potential and privative indifference; I deny it. In causes indifferent with actual and positive indifference; I grant it.

6. The solution is explained. There is a twofold indifference of created free choice. One is potential and privative, consisting in the absence and suspension of an act; hence some call it *indifference of suspension*. The created will possesses this before it acts, not because of freedom, which is a perfection, but because of imperfection, namely because it is not pure act. The other is positive and actual, consisting in the fact that the will, while actually acting, retains the power for the opposite. Although divine predetermination does not remove this latter indifference, which belongs to the nature of freedom, it does remove the former, which is freedom's imperfection. Hence it is not surprising that God certainly and infallibly knows acts of free choice in predetermined free causes, since divine predetermination has a certain and infallible connection with the acts for which it is given. He does not, however, know them in free causes taken merely in themselves and not predetermined by God, because such causes, so considered, are undetermined as regards acting and indifferent with the indifference of suspension, or potential and privative indifference.

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7. To the passage from St. Thomas, I answer with Ferrariensis on that text that the Holy Doctor is speaking of natural causes. If these are not extrinsically impeded, they are as determined to their proper effects as necessary causes are. Hence their future effects can be certainly known in them if the absence of impediments is certainly known, as happens in God. The case is otherwise with created free choice, which, even when every extrinsic impediment is excluded, can intrinsically and indifferently act or not act. Consequently, even if the absence of every impediment is evidently known by God, he cannot infallibly know in created free choice its free acts as determinately future.

8. From what has been said, the singular opinion of Theophilus Raynaud also stands refuted. He asserts that through middle knowledge God examines what our will would do in these or those circumstances if it could act by itself and without divine concurrence. For if the created will, as joined to God's simultaneous concurrence and as subject to a motion and grace that merely morally excites it, cannot be a medium in which God certainly and infallibly knows its future free acts, as we have shown against Molina, then, a fortiori, that same will taken nakedly and in isolation, and considered without God's concurrence, cannot serve as a medium leading to certain and infallible knowledge of its future acts. I add that to inquire what a man would do if he acted by himself is the same as investigating what a man would do if he were God, since it belongs to God alone to act independently of every other and without another's aid and concurrence. But it is ridiculous to imagine that through middle knowledge God investigates what a man would do if he were God. Therefore, Theophilus's opinion appears plainly absurd. Hence a certain recent author not undeservedly exclaims with Augustine, epistle 56: *I am ashamed to refute these things, when they are not ashamed to think them. But since they have dared even to defend them, I am now ashamed not merely of them, but of the human race itself, whose ears have been able to endure them.*

9. I say second: God does not know future contingent and free things, in a logical moment prior to his decree as actually exercised, in that same decree known as future and to be posited in a subsequent logical moment.

The fundamental reason is that the divine decree, since it is measured by eternity, cannot be or be conceived with a foundation in reality as future. Futurity is repugnant to eternity, which, since it is indivisible and wholly simultaneous, knows neither past nor future; whatever is in it simply is, as Augustine says on Ps. 101.

10. Nor does it avail to say with Suarez that this argument proves that God cannot know his decree as really future, but does not demonstrate that

it cannot be known by him as virtually future. For just as there is a virtual priority in God between essence and attributes, so a virtual futurity can be admitted in the divine decrees. This does not avail, I say, because a mere priority from which is insufficient even for virtual futurity; a priority of existence and of the instant in which is necessarily required. But this cannot be found in God. Therefore, neither can virtual futurity. The minor is evident both because all things in God exist through one indivisible existence and because they mutually transcend one another and one is intrinsically included in the other. But things that exist through one existence and mutually transcend one another cannot be or be conceived as prior and posterior by a priority of existence and of the instant in which. The major is proved, first, because if a mere priority from which sufficed for virtual futurity, the Divine Word, in the prior logical moment of origin in which the Father is understood as his principle, would possess the character of something future with respect to the Father. No theologian admits this. Second, the same thing is virtually required for virtual futurity as is really required for real futurity. But for real futurity not every real priority or posteriority suffices; it is required that one thing really exist before another. This is clear from the example of the essence and properties. Although these are really distinguished from one another, and the essence is really prior to the properties as their principle, nevertheless there is no true succession between the essence and the properties, nor are the properties truly and really future with respect to the essence. They exist simultaneously with it, and the essence is not prior to them by a priority of existence and of the instant in which, but only by a priority of nature and of the instant from which. Therefore, similarly, not every priority and posteriority suffices for virtual futurity; it is required that one be prior to the other by a priority of existence and of the instant in which.

11. The conclusion can also be proved, and Suarez's opinion attacked, from the absurd and unacceptable consequence that follows from it, namely that the knowledge of absolute futures in God would be no less intermediate between free and natural knowledge than the knowledge of conditionals is according to Molina and the other defenders of middle knowledge. For if the latter is not perfectly free, but only imperfectly free, or intermediate between free and natural knowledge, as they say, because although it objectively involves God's free decree, it does not involve it subjectively and as actually exercised in God, then, since Suarez says the same about the knowledge of absolute futures, it must necessarily be concluded that this knowledge is just as intermediate between natural and free knowledge as that which concerns conditional future contingents. There would therefore

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be a twofold middle knowledge in God, one of conditionals and another of absolutes, one devised by Molina and the other by Suarez. This is absurd.

12. You will object with Suarez: in that logical moment in which God is not yet understood as having a free decree, he comprehends his essence and will. But he cannot comprehend it unless he knows in it his decrees as future in the subsequent logical moment, since comprehensive knowledge, being most perfect in every respect, must extend to everything contained in the object comprehended. Therefore, God knows his decrees as future and consequently contemplates future contingents in them as so known. This is confirmed: through the knowledge of simple intelligence God knows his decrees as possible. Therefore, he also knows them as future.

13. I answer to the objection that, although in that prior logical moment in which only his natural and necessary acts are conceived, God comprehends his essence and will through the knowledge of simple intelligence, he does not know his decrees in it as future. For since in such a logical moment the divine will is altogether indifferent and undetermined as regards the production of things, it is not a medium in which the divine decrees can be known as determinately future. As we said above against Molina, a determinate effect cannot be certainly known in an indifferent and undetermined cause.

14. To the confirmation it must be said that through the knowledge of simple intelligence God knows his decrees as possible if *possible* is taken broadly, namely as signifying that which is not absolutely repugnant. In this sense the essence of God, his attributes, the divine Persons, and everything in God can be called possible. This is not so, however, if *possible* is taken properly and strictly, as denoting that which is contained only in the power of a cause altogether indifferent and undetermined as regards its production. For this it would be necessary that God, in some logical instant in which and not merely from which, know his will as altogether indifferent and undetermined regarding the futuration or non-futuration of things. This is repugnant, as is clear from what was said above.

15. From this you will understand that, if God had from eternity created an angel who was acting, for example loving, that angel's love could not be known by him as future. It would be posterior to the angel's essence only by a posteriority from which, which, as we showed above, is insufficient even for virtual futurity. Otherwise the properties could be called future with respect to the essence, and the eternal Father could know his Word as future.

16. I say third: future contingents, whether absolute or conditional, are not known by God in contradictorily opposed propositions through the force and law of contradiction.

This is proved first. The force of contradiction does not require the truth of one proposition, for example the affirmative, rather than the other, namely the negative, but is indifferent regarding which is true, as Aristotle teaches in *Peri hermeneias* I and St. Thomas there, lect. 13, and as will be evident from what follows. But in an indifferent medium nothing determinate can be certainly known, as we showed in the first conclusion. Therefore, in contradictory propositions, future contingents cannot through the force of contradiction be known by God as determinately future or non-future. The Holy Doctor indicates this argument in *De malo*, q. 16, a. 7, in these words: *Things that are open to either alternative cannot be known determinately in their causes, but only under a disjunction, namely that they will or will not be, for in this manner they possess truth.*

17. It is proved second. The force of contradiction does not require that one proposition be determinately true and the other false in a logical moment prior to the divine decree, but at most in every real instant. Therefore, in contradictorily opposed propositions, contingents cannot through the force and law of contradiction be known as future in a logical moment prior to the decree. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. If the force of contradiction required that one proposition be determinately true and the other false in a logical moment prior to the decree, it would also require this in every conceivable prior logical moment. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The inference in the major premise appears manifest, for the force of contradictory opposition is founded on the first principle, *Everything either is or is not*, which is true in every conceivable instant and logical moment. The minor is no less certain. For if the force of contradictory opposition required that one proposition be determinately true and the other false in every conceivable prior logical moment, it would follow that contradictory propositions concerning a future contingent would be determinately true in a logical moment prior to the possibility of things, and consequently that something would be known by God as future before it was known as possible. Indeed, what is more, it would follow that such propositions would have to be verified in a logical moment prior to God's existence and his necessary predicates. From this it would further follow that something would be future by a priority of reason before God was conceived as existing, than which nothing more absurd can be said or imagined.

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18. It is proved third. If the determinate truth of future contingents, and consequently their determinate futurity, arose from the force and nature of contradictory opposition, it would not be contingent or free, but absolutely necessary, and thus all freedom and contingency of things would be removed. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The inference in the major is proved. An effect consequent upon a cause necessary by absolute necessity receives the same necessity as the cause. But the force and nature of contradictory opposition is a cause necessary by absolute necessity, since it is founded, as we said above, on the first principle, *Everything either is or is not*, than which nothing more necessary can be given or conceived. Therefore, if the determinate truth of future contingents, and consequently their determinate futurity, arose from the force and nature of contradictory opposition, it would not be free and contingent, but necessary by absolute necessity. Thus all things would occur necessarily by absolute necessity, and there would be no freedom or contingency in things.

19. From what has been said, the answer is evident to the principal foundation of the adversaries, which is taken from the force and law of contradiction, requiring that one contradictory be determinately true and the other determinately false. For in the second proof of the conclusion we showed that the force and nature of contradiction indeed require that one contradictory be determinately true and the other false in every real instant, but not in every logical and natural instant, and consequently not in a logical moment antecedent to the decree.

20. You will say: a disjunctive proposition composed of two contradictories, for example, *Peter will dispute or will not dispute*, is determinately true in a logical moment prior to the decree. But the truth of this disjunction is taken from the truth of one of its parts, and consequently its determinate truth depends upon the determinate truth of one part. Therefore, some part of the stated disjunction must be determinately true in that logical moment prior to the divine decree, and consequently can be known by the divine intellect as determinately true in that prior logical moment.

21. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. The truth of that disjunction is taken from the impossibility of its parts with respect to truth or falsity, not from the truth of the parts of which it is composed. That proposition is not only true but altogether necessary, and yet neither of the parts of which it is composed possesses necessary truth. Likewise, that proposition is not only true in a logical moment prior to the decree, but also in the logical moment of the possibility of things, since its

truth is altogether necessary and eternal, no less than this proposition: *Man is a rational animal*. Yet in such a logical moment neither of its parts is determinately true, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, the truth of such a proposition does not depend upon the truth of its parts, and consequently from the fact that it is true in a logical moment prior to the decree it is not rightly inferred that one of the parts of which it is composed must possess determinate truth in that same prior logical moment.

22. I say fourth: future contingents are not known by God in a logical moment prior to the decree in their determinate objective truth.

This is proved by a fundamental reason. In a logical moment prior to the decree there is no determinate objective truth in future contingents. Therefore, in a logical moment prior to it they cannot be known in their determinate objective truth. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. Determinate objective truth concerning a future object presupposes that very object as future. But in a logical moment prior to the decree no contingent is determinately future. Therefore, in that prior logical moment there is no determinate objective truth in future contingents. The major is evident from the common axiom: *From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is said to be true or false*. The minor, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in several ways. First, from St. Thomas here, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, where he writes: *That which now is was future before it existed, because it was in its cause so as to come to be; hence, if the cause were removed, its coming to be would not have been future. But the first cause alone is eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that the things which are were future, except insofar as it was in the eternal cause that they should be future; and that cause is God alone*. From these words I argue as follows. Something is future from eternity only insofar as it was in the first cause that it should be future. But it was not in the first cause that it should be future by reason of omnipotence considered in first act, for as such omnipotence gives only the denomination of possible. Therefore, it was in the first cause that it should be future insofar as the first cause was determined by a decree; and consequently, in a logical moment prior to that decree, nothing can be or be conceived as determinately future. Hence Augustine, *Contra Faustum* XXVI, c. 4, explaining why he confesses that he does not know whether something is future, says: *I do not know because what God's will holds concerning this matter is hidden from me. Yet this is not hidden from me: it will undoubtedly be future if God's will so holds*.

23. The same minor premise is proved second by this argument. God's decree is the first root and first principle of determinate futurity in things. Therefore, in a logical moment prior to it, contingents cannot be or be conceived as determinately future. The consequence is evident. The

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antecedent is proved. That is the first root and first principle of determinate futurition in things which first determines the first principle of their possibility. But the first thing determining the first principle of the possibility of things, namely divine omnipotence, is the divine decree. For since God is not a natural but a free agent, his omnipotence cannot be determined to act except by the free decree of his will. Therefore, the decree is the first root and first principle of determinate futurition in things.

24. The principal minor is proved third from the nature and definition of the future. The future is that which is determined in its causes to have existence in a subsequent duration. But in a logical moment prior to the decree, contingents are not determined in their causes to have existence in a subsequent duration. Therefore, in that prior logical moment they are not determinately future. The minor is evident, for the decree is the infallible determination of the first cause, upon which the determination of other causes depends and which it presupposes. The major is proved from the difference between the possible, the future, and the existent. A merely possible thing is contained within the power of a cause altogether indifferent and undetermined as regards its production. An existent thing has wholly proceeded from its causes and is placed outside dependence upon them. But a future thing, since it is intermediate between the merely possible and the existent, also stands in an intermediate manner. It is neither wholly placed outside its causes, as the existent is, nor contained only in the power of a cause altogether indifferent regarding its production, as the merely possible is. Rather, it is contained in the determination of the cause inclined and determined to give it existence in some difference of time. Hence St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 16, a. 3: *To know future things in their cause is nothing other than to know the cause's present inclination toward its effect.* And *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 12: *When it is said, "This is future," the order existing in the causes of that thing toward its production is designated.*

25. Finally, the principal minor is proved as follows. It is contradictory to understand a thing as possible without first understanding God's omnipotence, which is constituted as powerful in relation to the production of things. Therefore, it is contradictory to understand a thing as future without first understanding the divine decree. The consequence is evident, for just as the possibility of a thing expresses an order to divine omnipotence, so futurition expresses an order to the free decree from which it is derived.

26. The conclusion is proved second by overturning the principal foundation of the opposing opinion. If propositions concerning a future contingent possessed determinate objective truth in a logical moment prior

to the decree, this would be chiefly because in future time they will possess their true proposition of *inesse*. For example, according to the adversaries, this proposition, *If God calls Peter, he will consent*, is determinately true before the decree because, when the time arrives for which the consent is said to be future and the condition is posited, Peter will determinately consent. But from the truth of a proposition of *inesse* one may not infer determinate truth in a proposition concerning a future contingent in a logical moment prior to the decree, but at most for every real instant. Therefore, the principal foundation of the opposing opinion collapses. The minor is proved. If from the truth of a proposition of *inesse* one could infer determinate truth in a proposition concerning a future contingent in a logical moment prior to the decree, for the same reason one could infer that such a proposition is true, and Peter's consent future upon the condition being posited, not only in a logical moment prior to the decree, but also in the logical moment of the possibility of things and in a logical moment antecedent to divine omnipotence and God's own existence, as in the preceding conclusion we argued against those who teach that future contingents possess determinate objective truth in a logical moment prior to the decree through the force and law of contradictory opposition. But this is most absurd, as is evident. Therefore, from the truth of a proposition of *inesse* it is not permissible to infer determinate truth in a proposition concerning a future contingent in a logical moment prior to the decree.

27. Against this conclusion the adversaries object, and this is their principal foundation. That proposition is determinately true which conforms to its object. But this proposition, *Antichrist will exist*, even in a logical moment prior to the decree, conforms to its object. Therefore, in such a logical moment it is determinately true. The minor is proved. A proposition conforms to its object when the object is as the proposition declares it to be. But the object of this proposition, *Antichrist will exist*, is as it is declared by it, since Antichrist truly will possess existence in some difference of time, as is certain by faith and revealed in Scripture. Therefore, and so forth.

This is confirmed. That proposition concerning the future is determinately true which will at some time possess a true corresponding proposition concerning the present, or of *inesse*. For the truth of a proposition concerning the future must be regulated and known through its corresponding proposition of *inesse* or concerning the present. But this proposition, *Antichrist will exist*, will at some time possess a true corresponding proposition of *inesse*, for at some time it will be true to say, *Antichrist now exists*, as is certain by faith. Therefore, it is determinately true.

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28. I answer to the objection by granting the major and denying the minor. To its proof I distinguish the major. A proposition conforms to its object when the object is as the proposition declares it to be, if it possesses this from the force of the logical moment in which it is declared, or from the force of the disposition made in that logical moment; I grant the major. If it possesses this from the force of another logical moment or from the force of a disposition made in another subsequent logical moment; I deny the major. That Antichrist will possess existence in some difference of time does not arise from the force of a disposition made in a logical moment antecedent to the decree, but from the force of the decree itself, by which the divine will determined itself from eternity to produce Antichrist at some time. And since such a decree, or determination of the first cause, has been revealed in Scripture, it is not surprising that the proposition *Antichrist will exist* is now not only determinately true but also certain by faith.

29. To the confirmation I answer similarly by granting the major and distinguishing the minor. This proposition, *Antichrist will exist*, formed in a logical moment prior to the divine decree, will at some time possess its true corresponding proposition of inesse from the force of that prior logical moment and the disposition made in it; I deny the minor. From the force of a later logical moment and by reason of the divine decree determining to produce Antichrist at some time; I grant the minor. I distinguish the consequence in the same way.

30. You will say: the object of this proposition, *Antichrist will exist*, is not the determination of the first cause, for otherwise it would concern the present, not the future, but Antichrist's own existence as to be possessed in future time. Therefore, although the first cause in a logical moment antecedent to the decree is not determined to produce Antichrist, this does not prevent such a proposition from being determinately true in that prior logical moment.

31. I answer that the object of this proposition, and of other propositions concerning a future contingent, is neither the determination of the cause alone nor existence alone as to be possessed in future time, but existence as to be possessed through the force of the cause's present determination. Hence, although the decree or determination of the first or secondary cause is not the object of these propositions, it is nevertheless their foundation, first rule, and first root of the conformity that they possess with their objects, in the proportional manner in which an indifferent judgment of reason is the first rule of the will's free determination. Therefore, for a thing to be and be conceived as future in some logical moment, it is not enough that it will at some time possess existence, for this can also be verified of a

possible thing considered in the state of mere possibility. It is further required that it will possess existence through the force of the cause's present determination. This cannot be verified of Antichrist in a logical moment prior to the divine decree, since in such a logical moment the divine will is altogether indifferent and undetermined as regards his production.

§ 2.

The True Position Is Established.

32. I say fifth: God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the decree predetermining their futurition.

This is proved first from the holy Fathers. Hilary, *De Trinitate* IX, says: *The things God decreed to do, he knew in his will.* Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 10, derives certain knowledge of promised future things from God's predestination in these words: *By his predestination God foreknew the things that he himself was going to do.* And a little later: *When God promised Abraham the faith of the nations, he promised it not from the power of our will but from his own predestination. For he promised what he himself was going to do, not what men were going to do, and so forth.* From these words I derive a twofold argument. The first is this: what God is going to do, he foreknew in his predestination. But God is going to do all our actions, however free they may be, according to Isa.: *Lord, you have worked all our works for us.* Therefore, he knows them in his predestination, that is, in the decree and predefinition of his will. For Augustine and the other holy Fathers often use the term *predestination* for the decree preordaining and predefining the futurition of things, as is evident from tract. 68 on John, where he says that God *made future things by predestining them.*

33. The other argument is this: what God promises, he promises from his predestination, not from the power of our will. But God many times promises our free actions, according to Ezek.: *I will cause you to walk in my commandments.* Therefore, he promises them from his predestination and knows them in his predestination. Hence, in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 17, speaking of our good works, Augustine says: *If God foreknew that he would give them, he certainly predestined them.* This consequence or inference would not be valid if the foreknowledge of our works were not founded upon the predestination or predefinition of the divine will. It is therefore evident that, according to Augustine's teaching, God does not know our future works immediately in themselves or in their objective truth, as the adversaries teach, but in his decree. Consequently, this decree must be intrinsically

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efficacious and predetermining, because it alone, as we shall show below, can serve as a medium leading to certain and infallible knowledge of future contingents.

34. The conclusion is proved second from St. Thomas, who in many places openly favors our position. In *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, he teaches that God's knowledge with respect to future contingents is subject to the freedom of his will. But knowledge subject to the freedom of the divine will is subject to his decree and rests upon it as a medium. And in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 68, he says: *Just as God, by knowing his own being, knows the being of every thing, so by knowing his own understanding and willing, he knows every act of knowledge and will.* Nothing could be said more openly or expressly. After many other things he concludes: *The dominion that the will has over its acts, through which it is within its power to will and not to will, excludes the determination of its power to one thing and violence from an exterior acting cause, but it does not exclude the influence of a higher cause from which it has being and operation. Thus causality remains in the first cause, which is God, with respect to the movements of the will, so that God can know such movements by knowing himself.* Finally, in book III, c. 56, he says: *God knows all our volitions through the fact that he is the cause of our willing.* In these passages the Holy Doctor indicates the fundamental reason for our conclusion. For God, as we showed above in c. 2, does not know things immediately in themselves, but only in himself and in his essence as in their cause, according to Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 7: *He does not apply himself to individual things by a vision of them, but knows all things through the containment of the cause.* But since God is not a natural but a free agent with respect to creatures, he is not the cause of the futuration of things except as determined by the free decree of his will. Therefore, he does not know future contingents except in his decree, or in his essence as determined by it, just as he does not know merely possible things except in his essence as modified by the attribute of his omnipotence.

35. This reason is confirmed and further illustrated. The divine essence represents creatures as their cause. Therefore, it can be determined as representing future contingents only through that by which it is determined as their cause. But the decree alone determines it to cause them. Therefore, through the decree alone can it be determined to represent them. Hence St. Thomas, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, teaches that God does not have determinate ideas of things to be created except from the purpose of his will.

You will say that, although the foreknowledge of future things is founded upon the decree, the decree is not predetermining.

36. But against this: for something to serve as a medium leading infallibly to the knowledge of another, two things are required. The first is that it precede the other at least by a priority of nature and causality; otherwise, if it were merely concomitant, it would no more be the reason for knowing the other than the other would be the reason for knowing it. The second is that it have a necessary or infallible connection with the other; otherwise it could not certainly lead to knowledge of it. But both conditions can belong only to a predetermining decree. If the decree is indifferent, it will not have an infallible connection with the acts of the human will, because it could be equally combined with consent or dissent. If, however, it presupposes the forevision of future consent and of the determination of the human will, it does not cause that determination and consequently does not precede it by a priority of nature and causality. Therefore, only a predetermining decree can serve as a medium in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents.

37. You will object first: whenever St. Thomas treats of the knowledge of future contingents and of the medium in which God knows them, he always has recourse to their presence in eternity so that God may know them certainly, and never mentions the divine decree, as can be seen in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, and in other places to be cited below. Therefore, he holds that God does not know them in a predetermining decree. Hence some recent authors contend with Campanella that the Holy Doctor admitted neither middle knowledge nor predetermining decrees, but reduced the whole knowledge of future contingents to their presence in eternity.

I answer first by denying the antecedent. In the passage cited in the objection, St. Thomas, explaining the manner in which God knows future contingents, clearly expressed both media, saying: *God not only sees his order to the thing, from whose power the thing will be future*—here is the knowledge of future things in the decree, for he does not speak of a necessary order to future things, but a free order through the decree—*but also beholds the very existence of the thing*—here is its presence in eternity consequent upon the decree.

I answer second that, although the Holy Doctor did not formally and explicitly express such a medium, it is nevertheless deduced by manifest inference from the principle that he frequently repeats and insists upon as the principal foundation of his doctrine, namely that God knows all things in himself and in his essence as in their cause. For the divine essence or omnipotence cannot be the cause of the futurition of things or represent them as future except as modified and determined by the decree, as is

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evident from what was said above. The reason why St. Thomas, when treating of God's knowledge of future contingents and of the medium in which he knows them, very frequently has recourse to their presence in eternity is that such presence contributes to, and indeed is necessary for, God to have an invariable and intuitive knowledge of them, as will be evident from what is said in the following section.

38. You will object second: an effect cannot be certainly and infallibly known in a remote and universal cause. For example, the generation of a plant or the blossoming of a tree cannot be certainly known in the sun's motion. But the divine decree is only a remote and universal cause of future contingents. Therefore, they cannot be certainly known in the decree.

I answer by distinguishing the major. An effect cannot be certainly known in a remote and universal cause when it can be impeded by a proximate and particular cause; I grant this. When it cannot be impeded; I deny it. Since the divine decree has infinite power and efficacy, it cannot be impeded by contingent secondary causes from attaining its effect, not only as regards the substance of the effect but also as regards its mode of freedom and contingency. Hence there is a twofold notable difference between the concurrence of the sun or other universal causes and the concurrence of God, who is the first and most universal cause. The first is that, since the concurrence of the sun and of other heavenly bodies is of finite power and efficacy, it can be impeded from producing and attaining its effect. The case is otherwise with God's concurrence, since its power and efficacy are infinite. The second difference is that universal secondary causes primarily and essentially attain in their effects common or generic notions, such as those of living thing or corruptible body. Since these are potential and determinable, the concurrence of such causes is also indifferent, potential, and determinable by inferior and particular causes. But since the first and most universal cause primarily and essentially attains in all created things the notion of being and the actuality of existence, which is not potential and determinable but actual and determinative, it does not influence secondary causes through an indifferent and determinable concurrence, but rather determines and applies them to act in conformity with their nature and condition.

39. You will object third: if God knew all future contingents in the decree, he would also foreknow future sins in it. But this cannot be said, otherwise he would be the cause and author of sin. Therefore, neither can the former be said.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. God knows future sins in the positive decree by which he determines positively to

concur in the entity and physical goodness of evil acts, and in the permissive decree by which he wills to permit their malice and deformity, or to deny the efficacious help for avoiding sin. From this twofold decree sin follows infallibly. From the first decree its entity and physical goodness follow by a physical and causal consequence, just as every effect follows from its cause. From the second its malice and deformity follow, not by a physical and causal consequence, but only by a logical consequence and inference. Thus the destruction or annihilation of a creature infallibly follows upon the suspension or denial of the divine concurrence by which it is preserved in being; or the fall of a stone follows upon the removal of the column supporting it, and the corruption of meat follows upon the removal of the salt that prevents it. Although the per se cause of the stone's descent is not the removal of the column but the stone's gravity, and although the removal of the salt is not the per se cause of the meat's corruption but the mixture or conflict of the four primary qualities, the effect nevertheless follows infallibly upon the removal as upon the removal of an impediment. Likewise, although the denial of efficacious help is not the cause of sin, but rather the malice and defectibility of the human will, nevertheless, if God, for reasons hidden within his infinite wisdom and providence, abandons a man by denying efficacious help, the man will infallibly sin, according to Innocent I, epistle 25 to the Council of Carthage: *It is necessary that, if we conquer when he assists us, we should be conquered when he does not assist us.*

40. You will say: one who removes the column by which a stone is supported is considered the cause, at least moral and indirect, of the stone's fall; and one who removes salt from meat, from which removal its corruption follows, is regarded as at least the moral and indirect cause of its corruption. Therefore, likewise, God, by withdrawing from man efficacious help, upon whose denial sin infallibly follows, will be at least the moral and indirect cause of that sin.

I answer first that this argument can be turned against the adversaries, since sin no less infallibly follows upon the denial of congruous grace according to their opinion than upon the denial of grace efficacious of itself and physically predetermining according to the doctrine of the Thomists.

I answer second by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and parity. One who removes the column supporting a stone or withdraws salt from meat is sometimes bound not to withdraw it or remove the column. God, however, is never bound to give efficacious help for eliciting an act of virtue opposed to sin. For that which follows upon the lack of an action to be imputed to another, three things are required: that he be able to act, be bound to act, and fail to act, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa*

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Theologiae I-II, q. 6, a. 3. From this, in the same part, q. 79, a. 1, he infers that God cannot be called even an indirect cause of sin: *God cannot and should not be called even an indirect cause of sin. For although he does not give help which, if he gave it, would prevent men from sinning, he does all this according to the order of his wisdom and justice, since he is wisdom and justice itself. Hence the fact that another sins is not imputed to him as to the cause of sin, just as a pilot is not called the cause of a ship's sinking unless he withdraws his guidance when able and bound to guide it.* But this will be treated more extensively in the following treatise, when we explain the harmony of God's holiness with the efficacy and causality of the divine decrees.

§ 3.

Another Medium in Which God Knows Future Contingents,
Namely Their Presence in Eternity.

41. This medium cannot be perfectly understood unless the manner in which future contingents are present to God in eternity is first explained: whether they are present only objectively, by reason of foreknowledge, or also physically and really, by reason of eternity. The first is held by Scotus, Durandus, Suarez, Vasquez, and many recent authors. The second is taught by the Thomists, whom Molina, Fonseca, Granado, and Ruiz among the Fathers of the Society follow. With them,

42. I say first: future contingents are present to God from eternity not only objectively and intentionally by reason of foreknowledge, but also physically and really by reason of eternity.

This is proved first from the holy Fathers, who deny foreknowledge to God in the strict sense because nothing is future to him, but all things are present. Thus Augustine, *Ad Simplicianum* II, q. 2, reasons as follows: What is foreknowledge except knowledge of future things? But what is future to God, who transcends all times? For if he possesses the things themselves in his knowledge, they are not future but present, and thus it can no longer be called foreknowledge but merely knowledge. But if, just as in the order of temporal things, those things which are future do not yet exist before God, and he anticipates them by knowing them, then he perceives them twice: in one manner by foreknowledge of them as future, and in another manner by knowledge of them as present. Something would therefore be added temporally to God's knowledge, which is most absurd and most false. Gregory the Great teaches the same in *Moralia in Iob* XX, c. 23, in these words: How is he foreknowing, since only things that are future are

foreknown, and we know that nothing is future to God? Likewise Anselm, *De casu diaboli*, c. 21, says: God's foreknowledge is not properly called foreknowledge. For he to whom all things are present does not possess foreknowledge of future things but knowledge of present things.

43. From these testimonies of the holy Fathers I derive a threefold argument. The first is this. In the passages cited, the holy Fathers deny foreknowledge to God in the strict sense because all things are present to him. But from the fact that all things are only objectively present to God, it is not rightly proved that foreknowledge in the strict sense does not belong to him, since many things are objectively present to the minds of the prophets concerning which they nevertheless possess foreknowledge in the strict sense. Therefore, the cited Fathers hold that future things are present to God from eternity not only objectively by reason of knowledge, but also really and physically by reason of eternity.

The second argument proceeds as follows. The cited Fathers not only affirm that all things are present to God, but also absolutely deny that anything is future to God. But objective presence does not remove absolute futurity, whereas physical presence does. Therefore, the holy Fathers speak of the latter and not merely of the former.

The third argument is this. If all creatures future to us were not physically present to God in eternity, it would follow that he newly knows something in time, which Augustine regards as most absurd and false. The inference is evident, for when the thing existed, he would see it as physically present to himself, whereas before it existed, he would know it as future to himself. Therefore, he would newly know something in time and would know the same thing twice, or in two manners: *in one manner by foreknowledge of it as future, and in another manner by knowledge of it as present*, as the same Holy Doctor says in the passage cited from *Ad Simplicianum*.

44. St. Thomas employs the same reasoning in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, and in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 12, where he reasons as follows: *Since the vision of divine knowledge is measured by eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, includes the whole of time, and is not absent from any part of time, it follows that whatever is accomplished in time is seen by God not as future but as present*. Here he proves that future contingents are seen by God, or intuitively known by him, because they are present to divine eternity. Therefore, he cannot be understood as speaking of objective and intentional presence, but only of real and physical presence. First, because otherwise, since objective presence consists in being seen, by proving that they are seen because they are present he would prove the same by the same and would produce this meaning: they are seen because they are seen, which is ridiculous. Second,

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because the objective presence of an object in the mind of the knower does not suffice for intuitive knowledge; its real presence and existence are required, as we shall show below. Finally, because eternity is not an attribute belonging to knowledge but to duration, and therefore it does not cause objective but real and physical presence. Hence the same Holy Doctor, in the passage cited above from the first book of the *Sentences*, says: *Since God sees all times by one eternal and non-successive gaze, he sees all contingents in different times as present from eternity, not merely as having being in his knowledge*, and so forth. Therefore, besides the objective presence that future contingents possess in the divine mind by reason of knowledge, he recognizes another presence, real and physical, that belongs to them by reason of eternity, which encompasses every time and all its differences.

45. The conclusion can also be proved by a fundamental and a priori argument taken from the nature and perfection of eternity. Eternity is an infinite and indivisible duration that is wholly simultaneous, as is evident from its definition given by Boethius and explained by us in treatise I, the final chapter. Therefore, by reason of its infinity, eternity contains every measure of duration, namely past, present, and future; by reason of its indivisibility, it contains them all according to its whole self; and by reason of its simultaneity, it coexists from eternity, without succession, with all durations that succeed one another. Consequently, all times and all things measured by time, although succeeding one another, coexist with God from eternity in eternity. Hence Bernard says admirably in sermon 80 on the *Cantica Canticorum*: *Times pass beneath it, not for it. It does not await future things, recall past things, or experience present things*, namely through a passing experience. And Peter Damian, opusc. 36, c. 8: *All things which among us run their course by passing away or vary through the changes of times stand and immutably remain within that today of eternity. Within that today, the day on which this world received its origin is still unmoved; and within it that day is likewise already present on which the world is to be judged by the equity of the eternal Judge*.

46. The adversaries answer that from the indivisibility of eternity it can be inferred only that eternity lacks succession intrinsic to itself, not extrinsic succession taken from created things that succeed one another and coexist successively with divine eternity.

But against this: first, this answer contradicts the words of Cardinal Damian just cited and the definition of eternity given by Boethius. For if eternity does not lack extrinsic succession taken from created things that succeed one another, it will be false that all things which among us run their course by passing away or vary through changes of times stand and

immutably remain in the now of eternity. Likewise, what Boethius says will be false, namely that eternity is the *wholly simultaneous and perfect possession* of life. For from whatever source the lack of actual possession arises, whether intrinsically or from the absence of the extrinsic thing to be possessed, the notion of perfect possession is not preserved, as is evident in one who does not possess riches because the riches are absent.

Second, this solution can be attacked from the fact that, if there were a body infinite in extension, it would be simultaneously present to all other bodies, however distant from one another. Therefore, since eternity is infinite in duration, it must likewise coexist simultaneously and without even extrinsic succession with all durations, however distant in duration, and consequently with the past, present, and future.

This is confirmed. From the local distance of two bodies from each other, their distance with respect to divine immensity is not inferred. Therefore, similarly, from the succession of future things among themselves, their succession with respect to eternity cannot be inferred.

47. I say second: the real and physical presence of future contingents in eternity is necessary in order that God's knowledge of them be intuitive and invariable, but not in order that it be certain and infallible.

The first part is proved. Intuitive and abstractive knowledge differ in this, that the former terminates in an existing and really present thing, whereas the latter abstracts from the real presence and existence of the object and requires only objective or intentional presence. Consequently, prophetic knowledge, although it terminates in future things as objectively present in the prophet's mind, is not intuitive but abstractive. Hence St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 8: *Vision adds to simple knowledge something outside the genus of knowledge, namely the existence of the thing*. Therefore, since future contingents do not exist from eternity in their own duration so as to terminate God's intuitive knowledge from eternity and be known by him through the knowledge of vision, it is necessary that from eternity they be present to him in the measure of his eternity.

48. The second part is also proved. For just as, according to St. Thomas below, q. 19, a. 7, God's will would change if he began to will something that he did not previously will, so God's knowledge would change if he began to see as present to himself something that he did not previously see. But if the presence of things in eternity were excluded, God would begin in time to see as present to himself things that from eternity he had seen only as future to himself. Therefore, if that presence were excluded, God's knowledge of future things would be variable and would pass from abstractive to intuitive when the object passed from future to present, and would again return from

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intuitive to abstractive when the object passed from present to past. Hence Sir. 39 says: *He beholds the works of all flesh before him from age to age, and nothing is wonderful in his sight.* In these words Scripture, explaining why nothing is new or wonderful in the eyes of God, assigns no other reason than that *he beholds from age to age*, that is, because he sees all things as present to himself in his eternity. St. Thomas employs the same reasoning here, a. 15, ad 2: *If there were something that God previously did not know and afterward knew, his knowledge would be variable. But this cannot be, because whatever is or can be at any time, God knows in his eternity.*

Finally, the third part, asserting that the real and physical presence of future contingents in eternity is not necessary for God's knowledge of them to be certain and infallible, is evident from what was said in the preceding section. There we showed that the divine decree is the medium in which future contingents can be certainly and infallibly known. Hence, if by impossibility they did not coexist with God in eternity, they could nevertheless be known by him certainly and infallibly in his efficacious decree. This is evident in conditional futures whose condition will never be fulfilled. God certainly and infallibly knows them in the conditional decree, although they are not present to him in eternity, because they will never exist in time owing to the absence of the condition that will never be posited.

You will say: St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 67, teaches that, for a contingent to be subject to certain knowledge, it must have determinate being and be unable not to be. For if it could fail to be, knowledge could also be deceived. Hence, since a contingent as future and as contained in its causes can fail to be, the Holy Doctor infers that it cannot be certainly known as future, and consequently that, in order to terminate certain and infallible knowledge, it must be known in itself insofar as it is present in the measure of eternity.

I answer that St. Thomas there does not consider future contingents in relation to the first cause, in which, by reason of the efficacious and invariable decree, they are certainly and infallibly contained. He considers them only in relation to contingent and mutable secondary causes and insofar as they abstract from the divine decree determining and applying those causes to act. Under that aspect secondary causes cannot serve as a medium in which God certainly knows future contingents. Consequently, in relation to them no reason for the certainty of divine knowledge concerning future things can be assigned except their presence in eternity.

49. You will object first against the first conclusion: if Antichrist, for example, now existed in eternity, it would be true to say of him that he

existed from eternity. But this is contrary to the faith. Therefore, so is the former. The inference in the major appears manifest, for to exist in eternity is the same as to exist from eternity.

This is confirmed. If Antichrist existed in eternity, he would have to be produced in eternity, since existence cannot be communicated to him except through creation or production. But this cannot be said, otherwise he would be produced twice: in eternity as in a higher measure and in time as in his proper measure, in which he must at some point exist. Therefore, neither can the former be said.

For these and similar arguments to be easily dissolved, and for the root of the adversaries' error and illusion in this matter to be uncovered, it must be carefully observed that the real and physical presence of future contingents in eternity can be conceived or imagined in three ways. First, through a certain anticipated production of them in eternity, distinct from that by which they are produced in time, so that Antichrist, for example, is conceived as present in eternity because he has already been produced there and placed outside his causes. Second, through the coextension of the temporal thing itself with the whole of eternity, in almost the same way that it would be coextended with infinite time if such time existed. Third, through the coextension of eternity itself with that difference of time in which future contingents will at some point exist and be present. The first two modes are neither admitted by the Thomists nor can they be admitted by any Catholic, since Scripture testifies that nothing was produced from eternity, but that all things began in time. Hence, when we say that future contingents are really present to God in his eternity, this must be understood in the third sense and of the third mode of presence, namely through the coextension of eternity itself with that difference of future time in which they will exist in their own measure and duration.

To the objection, therefore, I answer by denying the inference in the major. It is one thing for Antichrist to exist from eternity and another for him to exist in eternity. For him to exist from eternity, his existence would have to be coextended with the whole of eternity, in almost the same way that infinite time would be coextended with it. But for him to be said to be present and existing in eternity, this is not required. It is enough that the difference of time in which he will one day exist is now contained in eternity, so that eternity, by reason of its infinity, virtually extends itself to that difference.

To the confirmation I likewise deny the inference in the major. For Antichrist to be called present and existing in eternity, it is not required that he be produced in eternity, as the adversaries imagine, but it is enough that

his production, which is future in time, be present in eternity. By reason of this temporal and future production, Antichrist is said to be present and existing in eternity, because eternity, since it is an infinite, indivisible, and wholly simultaneous measure, contains every measure and difference of duration without any succession and in one indivisible now, as we explained above.

50. You will say: an angel's aeviternity is a measure infinite toward what follows, formally indivisible, and wholly simultaneous, and yet future contingents, before they exist, are not really present to the angel in aeviternity. Otherwise, the angel would know them intuitively before they existed in their own duration. Likewise, God's immensity is no less infinite than his eternity, and yet it does not contain past or future places, but only present and actually existing places. Therefore, from the fact that eternity is an infinite measure, it does not follow that it contains temporal and successive things when they are past or future, but only when they are actually present and existing.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and parity. As regards the first, the disparity is that, although an angel's being is superior to the being of corporeal nature, it does not contain that being within itself but is disparate from it. Likewise, although aeviternity is a more excellent measure than time, it does not encompass time but is disparate from it. The case is otherwise with eternity. For just as divine being contains within itself the being of every creature, so eternity, which is the proper measure of divine being, is not only more perfect than every inferior measure but also contains them all. This can be explained by the example of universal place in relation to particular places, to which eternity is compared, and of one greater particular place in relation to other smaller particular places, to which aeviternity is analogous. A greater particular place does not necessarily contain other smaller places; Africa, for example, although greater than France, does not contain France. Likewise, although aeviternity is a greater duration than time, since it is a particular measure to which time is not essentially subordinated, it does not contain things past or future in time. On the contrary, just as universal place encompasses all particular places—for example, the highest heaven contains all bodies beneath it—so eternity, since it is not a particular but a universal measure, must really contain all inferior durations and their parts, and must do so indivisibly and without succession because it is formally indivisible and wholly simultaneous.

The reason for the disparity as regards the second is that immensity is infinite only in the order of locative power, not in the line of duration, as

eternity is. Hence, since the infinite must contain every possible perfection belonging to its own line, immensity, which is the power filling every place, must indeed contain and fill every present place and all its differences, namely above, below, near, distant, and so forth, but not past or future places. Eternity, on the contrary, must embrace in its vast and infinite bosom all the differences belonging to the line of duration, namely past, present, and future, and need not wait until temporal things themselves exist in order to contain and measure them. Hence Isidore, *De summo bono*, c. 6: *Divine eternity precedes all times, and in God nothing is believed to be past, present, or future, but all things are said to be present in him because he embraces all things in his eternity.*

51. You will object second: it is contradictory for something to exist in a higher and extrinsic measure unless it exists in its own proper and intrinsic measure. For example, it is repugnant for a body to be beneath the heavens as beneath the first containing place unless it exists in some inferior place proper and adequate to it. But Antichrist, for example, does not now exist in his proper duration and measure. Therefore, neither does he exist in the higher measure of eternity.

I answer that the major is true when the extrinsic and higher measure is finite and limited, as happens in the example given. It is otherwise if the measure is infinite and unlimited, as in the present case. Eternity is infinite in duration and, by reason of its infinity, can extend itself not only to present time but also to past and future time. Hence, for something to be contained by eternity, it is not required that it actually exist in its own measure; it is enough that it has existed or will exist.

52. You will object third: it follows from our position that Antichrist simultaneously is and is not in eternity, which is contradictory. The inference is proved. According to our principles, Antichrist really exists in eternity insofar as eternity, by reason of its infinity, contains that difference of future time in which Antichrist will one day exist. But from this it also follows that the same Antichrist is not in eternity, since eternity, by reason of the same infinity, similarly contains the difference of present time in which Antichrist does not yet exist. Therefore, according to our principles, Antichrist simultaneously is and is not in eternity. It also follows from our position that Adam and Antichrist, the creation of the world and the last judgment, mutually coexist. For just as things identical with one third thing are identical with one another, so things present to and coexisting with one third thing must be present to and coexist with one another. But according to our position, Adam and Antichrist, the creation of the world and the last

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judgment, are present to and coexist with one third thing, namely eternity. Therefore, they coexist with one another.

For the solution of these and similar arguments, it must be carefully observed that, just as the divine being, although most simple, is equivalent to many perfections that are disparate in created things and can be participated by them in different ways, so God's eternity, although indivisible and wholly simultaneous, nevertheless possesses a certain virtual breadth or parts virtually distinct by correspondence and analogy with our time. Thus we conceive eternity as possessing one virtual part corresponding to past time, another corresponding to present time, and another corresponding to future time. Some call these diverse virtual parts the diverse bosoms of eternity. This having been presupposed:

To the first I answer, first, that just as, by reason of virtual distinction, contradictory predicates can be verified of the divine attributes and relations—for example, that God insofar as he is just punishes, and insofar as he is merciful does not punish; that the Father communicates his essence to the Son and does not communicate paternity to him, as we explained in treatise I, c. 3—so the distinction of virtual parts in eternity suffices for contradictory predicates to be verified of Antichrist. Second, it can be said that these propositions, *Antichrist is in eternity* and *Antichrist is not in eternity*, are not properly contradictory, because they are not verified of eternity according to the same formal aspect, but only by reason of the diverse virtual parts that it contains and through a relation and correspondence to the diverse parts of our time. Similarly, these propositions, *God insofar as he is just punishes* and *God insofar as he is merciful does not punish; the Father communicates the essence to the Son and does not communicate paternity to him*, are not properly contradictory, because they are verified of the same uncreated entity of God insofar as it is equivalent to the absolute and relative, and to diverse perfections dispersed among inferior things.

To the second it must be said that, just as things adequately identical with one third thing are identical with one another, but things inadequately identical with one third thing are not, as is evident in the divine Persons, who, although inadequately identical in the essence, are not identical with one another, so things that coexist with and are present to one third thing adequately and totally also coexist with one another, but not things that coexist with one third thing only inadequately and not totally. Adam and Antichrist do not coexist with eternity totally and adequately, according to the whole virtual extension that it includes, but only inadequately and according to one of its virtualities. They do not coexist with eternity insofar as it is equivalent to all differences of time and contains within itself all

those bosoms and virtual parts of which we spoke above, but only insofar as it contains one virtual part corresponding to the difference of past time in which Adam existed and another corresponding to the future time in which Antichrist will exist.

53. From everything said throughout this chapter, you will understand that there are three media in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents. The first is the predetermining decree, which, by reason of its infinite power and efficacy, has a certain and infallible connection with them. The second consists in the secondary causes themselves as predetermined by God. Although secondary causes taken merely in themselves and considered in themselves cannot serve as a medium in which God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents, as we showed against Molina in § 1, they can nevertheless do so insofar as they are subject to the predetermining decree and to physical predetermination, which is the execution and causality of that decree. Hence, when St. Thomas here, a. 13, and elsewhere teaches that future contingents cannot be certainly known in secondary causes, this must be understood of secondary causes taken merely in themselves and undetermined to act, not of them insofar as they are subject to the predetermining decree and to divine motion and predetermination. For he expressly teaches in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 67, and *De veritate*, q. 12, a. 10, that God certainly knows future things in such causes. Finally, the third medium in which God knows future contingents not only certainly but also intuitively and invariably is his eternity, which by reason of its infinity, indivisibility, and simultaneity contains and measures simultaneously and in one indivisible now all differences of time and all things that successively flow and pass within them. It resembles a center which, although indivisible, is nevertheless present to every point opposite it on the circumference and to all lines drawn from the circumference to the center. Hence God, as St. Thomas says here, a. 13, ad 3, and *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 12, stands in relation to past and future things as one existing on a lofty watchtower, from which he beholds the whole road and all who pass along it. Although one traveler proceeds after another, and the later does not see the earlier, the one on the watchtower nevertheless beholds them all simultaneously and has them present to himself. Likewise, God has present to himself in the watchtower of his eternity all temporal and successive things, including past and future things, although the latter succeed the former and cannot exist simultaneously in their proper measure and duration.

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CHAPTER V.

On Middle Knowledge.

1. The Thomists commonly teach that in God there is certain and infallible knowledge of conditional futures, and this is gathered quite openly from various testimonies of Scripture in which such futures are revealed. For in 1 Sam. 23, 1 Kings 11, and Matt. 11, three conditional futures are foretold: David's being handed over into Saul's hands if he remains in Keilah; the corruption of the children of Israel if they enter among the daughters of the gentiles; and the conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians if Christ had preached among them and performed the signs and miracles that he performed among the Jews.

2. Nor does the answer of Curiel, Cornejo, Typhanius, and others avail, namely that these things are said only by human exaggeration or according to merely probable knowledge that God possessed of such futures by considering the inclination of secondary causes, which, if those conditions were posited, were of themselves more inclined to those effects than to their opposites. Hence Scripture, after the words in Matt. 11, *If in Tyre and Sidon*, and so forth, adds: *If the mighty works performed in you had been performed in Sodom, perhaps it would have remained until this day*. Here the particle *perhaps* appears to denote only probability and conjecture, not infallibility and certainty. This answer does not avail. First, because the seduction and turning away of the hearts of the children of Israel, if they entered among foreign women, is foretold as most certain in 1 Kings 11. Scripture says: *You shall not go in among them, for most certainly they will turn away your hearts*. The phrase *most certainly* signifies complete certainty and infallibility, not mere probability and conjecture. Second, Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 9, treating of the Tyrians and Sidonians, says: *But can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians, if such mighty works had been performed among them, would have been unwilling to believe, or would not have believed if they had been performed, when the Lord himself testified in advance that they would have performed works of great and humble penance if those signs of divine power had been performed among them?* Augustine therefore manifestly admits the certainty of that conditional future, namely that the Tyrians would have believed if they had seen such signs.

3. Third, St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 12, a. 10, and *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 171, a. 6, ad 2, teaches that, although sometimes only the ordering of causes toward a future thing is revealed to a prophet, God's knowledge nevertheless terminates not only in the disposition of the causes but also infallibly in the event as future or non-future. Therefore, although

conditional futures revealed in Scripture are sometimes made known to a prophet only as regards the order of their causes toward them, divine knowledge and foreknowledge must terminate not only in the order of the causes but also in the future event, or its negation, under such a condition. Consequently, conditional futures are known by God certainly and infallibly, either as determinately true or as determinately false.

Fourth, although, if conditional decrees were removed, there could be no certain and infallible knowledge of conditional futures in God, once such decrees are admitted, certain knowledge of them cannot be denied to God. For since such decrees are intrinsically efficacious, as we shall show in the following treatise, they have an infallible connection with such futures and are a most suitable medium in which certain and infallible knowledge of them is founded, as we said in the preceding chapter concerning absolute decrees. But it will be evident from what is said below that absolute decrees on the part of the subject and conditional decrees on the part of the object not only can but must be admitted in God without any difficulty. Therefore, in God there is certain and infallible knowledge of conditional futures.

4. Nor is it an obstacle that Scripture, when attributing knowledge of such futures to God, sometimes uses the word *perhaps* or *possibly*. For this does not always denote doubt or uncertainty, but sometimes the mutability of free choice or the difficulty of the thing itself. Hence Jerome on Jer. 26: *The ambiguous word “perhaps” cannot belong to the majesty of God, but Scripture speaks according to our manner of feeling, so that man’s free choice may be preserved*. I add that, even if such a word denoted some doubt or conjectural knowledge in God regarding conditional futures, this would not concern them in their relation to the divine decree, but in their relation to secondary causes, with respect to which they are called contingent. Hence from that word it could be inferred only that such futures are known conjecturally by God in relation to created causes, in which they are fallibly contained, but not in relation to his decree, in which they are contained as in a certain and infallible cause. In the same sense Augustine must be understood and explained when, in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 14, explaining Wis. 4, *He was taken away lest wickedness should alter his understanding*, he says: *This was said according to the dangers of this life, not according to God’s foreknowledge, who foreknew what was going to be, not what was not going to be*. By these words he intends only to teach that in Scripture God had revealed that future thing according to the order it bore to secondary and inferior causes, in relation to which it did not possess complete certainty and infallibility, but only probability and conjecturality. This is also the true and genuine meaning of certain Thomists who seem to attribute to God only conjectural knowledge

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of such futures. They manifestly speak of them as contained in secondary causes and in relation to those causes, not insofar as they are contained in the divine decree and in relation to it.

5. This having been presupposed, concerning which, as I have said, there is scarcely any doubt among the Thomists, the whole point of the difficulty and controversy between them and the Fathers of the Society lies in this: whether God knows conditional futures independently of the aforesaid conditional decree, and consequently in a logical moment antecedent to it, or only dependently upon it and in a logical moment subsequent to it. The defenders of middle knowledge teach the first; its opponents teach the second. As Typhanius, a distinguished theologian of the same Society and Chancellor of the Academy of Pont-à-Mousson, admits in *De ordine neque priori et posteriori*, c. 25, the latter are far superior in antiquity, number, and authority. Indeed, in the preceding chapter he says: *No other theologian before Molina ever even dreamed of middle knowledge, nor anywhere presupposed or employed it to resolve any difficulty of Scripture or Scholastic Theology.*

§ 1.

Middle Knowledge is Attacked from the Teaching
of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

6. I could produce many testimonies from St. Augustine by which middle knowledge, or knowledge of conditional futures independent of and prior to the decree, appears to be excluded. But, seeking brevity in this *Manuale*, I shall produce only those delivered by the Holy Doctor in his books *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiae*, which he wrote after receiving the letters of Prosper and Hilary, against the remnants of the Pelagians and in reply to those letters. In the first book, therefore, c. 10, he says: *By his predestination God foreknew the things that he himself was going to do.* And below: *When God promised Abraham the faith of the nations, he promised it not from the power of our will but from his own predestination; for he promised what he himself was going to do, not what men were going to do,* and so forth. Here the Holy Father excludes and entirely eliminates middle knowledge. Its defenders say that God can predict or promise who will or will not be converted because he foreknows who will obey grace offered to all. Augustine, however, teaches that God can predict or promise our acts because he has the power to produce them, not from our power but from his predestination. Again, in c. 17 of the same book he teaches that God can foreknow no future things except in the decree, by which all use of middle

knowledge is plainly forbidden. His words are: *This is the immutable truth of predestination and grace. For what does the Apostle mean when he says, "As he chose us in him before the foundation of the world"? If this was said because God foreknew that we would believe, and not because he himself was going to make us believers, the Son speaks against this foreknowledge when he says, "You did not choose me, but I chose you." They were therefore chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination through which God foreknew his own works.*

7. The adversaries answer that when Augustine teaches that God foreknows our future works in his predestination, he is speaking of absolute futures, not conditional ones. Consequently, he does not exclude middle knowledge, which is the knowledge of conditional futures before the decree or conditional predefinition of the divine will.

8. But against this, first: Augustine is there speaking of the future things concerning which Prosper and Hilary had questioned him, and which he had mentioned in his book on the six questions of the pagans. But those were conditional futures. For the question there concerned this future: *If Christ had preached among the gentiles at such a time and place, would they have believed or not?* This is evident from the aforesaid letters of Prosper and Hilary. Therefore, he is there speaking of conditional futures.

9. Second, Augustine not only teaches that predestination or a decree is required for the foreknowledge of future things, but also that God knows future things in predestination or the decree itself, as is clear from these words: *By his predestination God foreknew the things that he himself was going to do*, and these: *They were chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination through which God foreknew his own works.* But according to the opinion of the adversaries, this cannot be verified even of absolute futures. Although some of them hold that the foreknowledge of absolute futures presupposes an absolute decree in God, they nevertheless deny that it is founded upon that decree or rests upon it as a medium. They teach that God knows all future contingents, whether absolute or conditional, in secondary causes comprehended by him, as Molina and Becanus hold, or, as others more commonly maintain, immediately in themselves and in their objective truth. Therefore, they manifestly contradict Augustine and stand very far from him.

10. Third, suppose Augustine is speaking of absolute futures: if God knows absolute futures in his predestination, this is because of the dependence they have upon it. But conditional futures depend in the conditional state upon the same causes upon which absolute futures depend in the absolute state. Therefore, just as God knows the latter in his

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predestination or absolute and efficacious decree, so he contemplates the former in his predestination or conditional decree.

11. Finally, if God knows absolute futures in an absolute decree, such a decree must be infallibly and intrinsically connected with them and consequently efficacious of itself and causative of the determination of the human will. For if it were merely indifferent and awaited determination from free choice, it could not serve as a medium leading to certain and infallible knowledge of our free acts, since future effects cannot be certainly and infallibly known in an indifferent cause precisely as indifferent, as we showed above against Molina and Becanus. But once a decree intrinsically efficacious, preventing our free actions and causing the free determination of our choice, is admitted, middle knowledge entirely vanishes, since, as its defenders admit, it can stand only with an indifferent decree determinable by the created will as regards the species of the act. Therefore, even granting that Augustine in the cited passage speaks of the knowledge of absolute futures, he nevertheless manifestly excludes middle knowledge.

12. Such knowledge can also be attacked from Augustine's other book, entitled *De dono perseverantiae*. In it the Holy Doctor, replying to St. Prosper and explaining his thought and doctrine concerning the question about which Prosper had asked him in his letter, namely, *Whether the things foreknown by God are also predestined by him, so that foreknowledge rests upon the decree, or, conversely, the decree rests upon foreknowledge*, delivers two general rules from which the destruction of middle knowledge most openly follows. The first is found in c. 17, where, speaking of good works, he says: *Or perhaps are they not themselves said to be predestined? Then they are not given by God, or he did not know that he would give them. But if they are both given and he foreknew that he would give them, he certainly predestined them.* By these words the Holy Doctor openly teaches that these two, foreknowledge and predestination, stand in the same manner in God with respect to good things and, so to speak, advance with equal step. Consequently, just as there is in God foreknowledge of conditional futures, so their predestination or conditional predefinition must be admitted in him; and thus middle knowledge, which is the foreknowledge of conditional futures independent of the decree or conditional predefinition of the divine will, has no place.

13. The second general rule delivered by Augustine in c. 18 of the same book is this: when the term foreknowledge is found in Scripture or the holy Fathers and the calling of the elect is under discussion, predestination must be understood under the name of foreknowledge. His words are: For God to have predestined is for him to have foreknown what he himself was going to do. What, therefore, prevents us, when we read of God's foreknowledge in

certain interpreters of the word of God and the calling of the elect is under discussion, from understanding that same predestination? This rule would be entirely false if there were some foreknowledge investigating the futuration of things independently of the decree and prior to it, as is evident. Therefore, St. Augustine recognizes no such foreknowledge in God, and consequently no middle knowledge.

What of St. Thomas?

14. St. Thomas, Augustine's most faithful disciple, always adhered to him in all things. Therefore, middle knowledge could not have pleased St. Thomas if it displeased Augustine, nor could it have been approved by the former if it was rejected by the latter. And certainly many principles of this Angelic Doctor's teaching exist which openly conflict with middle knowledge and by which it is completely strangled and extinguished.

First, one of the principles that the Holy Doctor frequently repeats and insists upon as the principal foundation of his doctrine is that God does not know things immediately in themselves, but only in himself and in his essence as in their cause and in a medium previously known. He expressly teaches this here, q. 14, a. 5, in the body, which he concludes with these words: *It must therefore be said that God sees himself in himself, but sees things other than himself not in themselves but in himself.* He repeats the same in the reply to the first objection. And in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 49, he proves from Dionysius that God knows all things in his essence as in their cause. In c. 65, argument 5, he says: *God's knowledge concerns all things through their cause. For by knowing himself, who is the cause of all, he knows other things as his effects.* In c. 67 he extends this to future contingents, and in c. 68 to the free acts of our will, saying: *God knows all our volitions through the fact that he is the cause of our willing.* From this principle the manifest destruction of middle knowledge follows. For since the divine essence is not the cause of things except as joined to the will and as determined by a decree, because God does not act *ad extra* in the manner of nature but in the manner of a free agent, if God contemplates future contingent and free things in his essence as in their cause and in a medium previously known, it is manifest that he does not know them antecedently to his decree through middle knowledge.

15. Second, the same Holy Doctor, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, teaches that God's knowledge concerning future contingents is subject to the freedom of the divine will. He repeats this in a. 2, ad 1, in these words: *God's very act of knowing is subject to the freedom of his will.* But knowledge subject to the freedom of the divine will is subject to the divine decree and

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rests upon it as a medium, since the decree is the exercise itself of the divine will and freedom. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, God's knowledge of future contingents is founded upon the decree and rests upon it as a medium. Consequently, it is not middle knowledge, which is independent of and prior to the decree.

16. Nor does it avail to say that St. Thomas is speaking there only of the knowledge of absolute futures and not of the knowledge of conditionals. Even if this were granted, although it is not, access to middle knowledge would nevertheless be barred. For, as we said above, if the foreknowledge of absolute futures rests upon a decree, that decree must be efficacious of itself and intrinsically connected with them, and consequently must exclude middle knowledge, which presupposes an indifferent decree determinable by the human will as regards the species of the act.

Third, St. Thomas here, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1, and *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 14, ad 1, teaches that things are not known by God because they are future, but are future because they are known by God. Hence he explains the statement of Origen, *Because something is future, it is known by God*, and says that this must be understood not according to the cause of being but only according to the cause of inference. The defenders of middle knowledge unanimously deny this, and rightly, because they see their position destroyed by it. For since the knowledge of vision is not the cause of things except upon the supposition of the decree, if nothing is future except because God sees it as future, then certainly he sees nothing as future before the decree, but only after it.

17. Fourth, the same Holy Doctor, in the same q. 14 and a. 8, ad 5, teaches that God's knowledge is prior to things and is not measured by them as regards truth and certainty, but is rather their rule and measure. He says: Just as naturally knowable things are prior to our knowledge and are its measure, so God's knowledge is prior to natural things and is their measure. And in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 3: The conception of the divine intellect stands differently in relation to things from the conception of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that man's concept is not true because of itself but is called true because it agrees with things. The divine intellect, however, is the measure of things, because each thing possesses truth insofar as it imitates the divine intellect. It is evident that middle knowledge cannot stand with this principle of the Angelic Doctor. Such knowledge is not the rule and measure of the certainty and truth of conditional futures, but rather presupposes their futurity and objective truth and merely contemplates and investigates it. Therefore, middle knowledge conflicts with the principles of St. Thomas's teaching.

18. Fifth, when St. Thomas in *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 3, had objected against the certainty of predestination that predestination does not possess absolute certainty but only conditional certainty, on the hypothesis that the human will consents, he answered: *To the fourth it must be said that the secondary cause which must be presupposed to introduce the effect of predestination is itself subject to the order of predestination. Therefore, the order of predestination, although it includes the supposition of the human will, nevertheless possesses absolute certainty.* Here he openly teaches that predestination does not presuppose knowledge investigating consent, because consent itself is subject to predestination and the decree and follows upon it. But if consent is subject to the decree and predestination, it is plain that before God has a predestination or decree concerning such consent, the consent is not future and therefore cannot be foreseen as future through middle knowledge.

19. Finally, it is evident that middle knowledge cannot stand if its object is destroyed. But St. Thomas openly excludes the object of middle knowledge, namely the determinate objective truth of contradictory propositions concerning a future contingent. For in lect. 13 on c. 8 of *Peri hermeneias* I, he denies determinate truth to such propositions because a future contingent does not have determinate being in free causes. And in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, he says: *A future contingent is not determinately true before it occurs, because it does not have determinate causes.* Likewise, *De malo*, q. 16, a. 7: *Things open to either alternative cannot be foreknown determinately in their causes, but only under a disjunction, namely that they will or will not be, for in this manner they possess truth.* Therefore, middle knowledge cannot stand with the principles of St. Thomas's teaching.

§ 2.

Middle Knowledge Is Refuted by a Fundamental and a Priori
Argument Taken from the Definition of the Future.

20. This argument can be briefly proposed as follows. Before the decree and predefinition of the divine will, nothing is absolutely or conditionally future and therefore nothing can be known as such by the divine intellect. Therefore, in a logical moment prior to that decree there is in God no certain and infallible knowledge of conditional futures, which is called middle knowledge by the more recent authors. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. The future is that which is determined in its cause to have existence at a subsequent time. But before the decree and predefinition of the divine will, nothing is determined in its cause, absolutely

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or under a condition, to have existence at a subsequent time, since the decree is the determination itself of the first cause. Therefore, in that prior logical moment nothing is absolutely or conditionally future. The minor is evident. The major is proved first from St. Thomas here, q. 16, a. 7, ad 3, where he says: *Everything that exists was future before it existed because it was in its cause so as to come to be; hence, if the cause were removed, its coming to be would not have been future.* And q. 14, a. 13: *In another manner a contingent can be considered as it is in its cause, and thus it is considered as future.* Likewise, *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 12, ad 7: *When it is said, "This is future," the order existing in the causes of that thing toward its production is designated.* That order is nothing other than the determination and preparation of the causes for producing the thing, as the same Holy Doctor asserts throughout that article, especially in the reply to the seventh objection. Therefore, according to St. Thomas's teaching, the future is that which is determined in its cause to have existence at a subsequent time.

21. Reason also supports this. For a thing to be future is a real denomination, not indeed intrinsic but extrinsic, since an intrinsic denomination cannot belong to a nonexistent thing. Therefore, it must arise from some real and extrinsic form. But such a form can be nothing other than the determination of the cause toward its production. Therefore, for a thing to be future is nothing other than for it to be determined in its cause to have existence at a subsequent time. The minor is proved. Such a form cannot be the cause considered precisely as able to produce the effect, since as such it gives only the denomination of possible. Nor can it be the same cause as actually influencing the effect, for thus it gives the denomination of existent. Therefore, it can only be the same cause as determined to give the effect existence in a subsequent duration.

22. From this you will understand the falsity of what certain defenders of middle knowledge say to evade the force of this argument, namely that determination in the cause is not necessarily required for futurition, but it is enough that the thing will at some time possess existence, even if no determination toward this preceded in the cause. For if this answer and doctrine were true, it would follow that possible things conceived in the state of mere possibility could be called future. For of Antichrist, for example, conceived in the state of mere possibility, it is true to say that he will one day exist, because the first cause, in a subsequent logical moment, determined itself by the free decree of its will to give him existence at some time.

23. From this also stands refuted the evasion and novel doctrine of other recent authors, who, to extricate themselves from this argument, say that

the future imports nothing real and positive existing at the time of futuration, but only the absence of existence at that time. From this absence and the existence afterward to be possessed, futuration or the future is constituted. That this doctrine also is false is evident from the fact that, in the logical moment of pure possibility, nothing can be truly affirmed to be future for no other reason than that in such a logical moment no predicate belongs to it that distinguishes it from a merely possible thing and conflicts with the state of pure possibility. Therefore, for something to be truly affirmed to be future at the time of futuration, there must belong to it a predicate distinguishing it from a merely possible thing and conflicting with the state of pure possibility. But the absence of existence, which according to the opinion of these recent authors alone belongs to a future thing at the time of futuration, is not a predicate conflicting with the state of pure possibility or distinguishing it from the merely possible, as is evident. Therefore, besides the absence of existence, something else must be assigned at the time of futuration from which the thing is denominated future and distinguished from the merely possible. This can be nothing other than the determination of the cause to give it existence at a subsequent time.

24. You will say that, although the absence of existence is not a predicate distinguishing the thing from the merely possible, the absence of existence together with an order to the existence to be possessed can provide this distinction, since it does not belong to a thing in the state of pure possibility.

But against this: the order to the existence to be possessed does not belong to the future thing from itself but from its cause, as is evident. But it does not belong to it from the cause as indifferent and undetermined toward its production, since as such the cause gives only the denomination of possible. Therefore, it belongs to it only from the cause as determined toward its production, and consequently from the determination itself of the cause. Hence St. Thomas, in the passage cited above, teaches that the order existing in the cause toward the production of a future thing is nothing other than the determination and preparation of the causes. And St. Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, c. 9, and *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, c. 17, says that for God to make future things is nothing other than to prepare their causes. In tract. 68 on John he asserts that God *made future things by predestining them*.

25. You will say again: if the future were that which is determined in its cause, something could be future that will never be present and existent. For it could happen that a secondary cause is determined and inclined toward some effect which nevertheless will not be posited in reality, but its opposite will occur because it is impeded by another higher and more powerful cause. But this appears absurd. Therefore, so is the former.

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I answer that nothing can be said to be or can be future in relation to the first, omnipotent, and immutable cause unless it is at some time posited in time. It can, however, be future in relation to mutable and contingent secondary causes, as is gathered from Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, text 64, where he says: One who is going to walk will not walk. This is because the determination by which someone, in willing to walk, made the walk future is either changed by the will or impeded by another cause from attaining its effect. St. Thomas teaches the same in *Peri hermeneias* I, c. 8, lect. 13; *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 3; and q. 19, a. 7, ad 2, where he writes: God sometimes promises something as future according as it is contained in the order of inferior causes, for example according to the disposition of nature or merits, which nevertheless does not occur because it stands otherwise in the higher divine cause. Thus Isaiah foretold to Hezekiah: “Set your house in order, for you shall die and not live.” Yet it did not occur in that manner, because from eternity it stood otherwise in the divine knowledge and will, which is immutable.

§ 3.

Another Fundamental Argument.

26. Conditional futurity transfers the thing to which it belongs from the state of pure possibility to the state of a certain futurity. But it is contradictory for a thing to pass from the state of pure possibility to the state of any futurity except through a divine decree. Therefore, that decree must precede the conditional futurity of things, and consequently, in a logical moment prior to it, contingents cannot be or be known by God as conditionally future through middle knowledge. The major is evident, for a conditional future is intermediate between the merely possible and the absolutely future. Consequently, conditional futurity does not leave a thing in the state of pure possibility, but transfers it to the state of a certain futurity. The minor is proved in several ways. First, because that passage does not belong to the thing by reason of itself but dependently upon the influence of the first cause. But the first cause does not act except through a decree. Therefore, this passage cannot be understood except through a decree.

27. Second, conditional futurity is something real and not a mere being of reason. But every reality belonging to things belongs to them dependently upon God as acting through intellect and will, and consequently through a free decree. Therefore, conditional futurity cannot

belong to things except dependently upon the decree. Consequently, it is contradictory for a thing to pass from the state of mere possibility to the state of conditional futurity except through the decree.

28. Third, conditional futurity expresses a certain actuality that mere possibility does not express. For it expresses an order to existence as to be possessed if some condition is posited, from which that which is merely possible prescind. But this greater actuality and this order to existence under a condition cannot escape divine causality; otherwise there would be some degree of actuality and existence not proceeding from God as the first being and first act. Therefore, it must proceed from God as first cause through the free decree of his will.

29. Fourth, that which is conditionally future must regard the divine will as disposed in a different manner from that which is merely possible. But that which is merely possible regards the divine will as altogether indifferent and undetermined. Therefore, that which is conditionally future must regard it as determined through some free decree of God, not absolute but conditional.

30. Fifth, conditional futurity does not belong to a created thing from itself but in relation to the first cause. But it does not belong to it in relation to the first cause as merely able to produce it, since from the first cause so considered only the notion of the possible is derived. Therefore, it belongs to it in relation to the first cause as determined through a decree.

31. Finally, conditional futures depend no less upon a conditional decree than absolute futures depend upon an absolute decree. But nothing can pass from the state of pure possibility to the state of absolute futurity except through an absolute decree, as we demonstrated by four arguments in the fourth conclusion of the preceding chapter. Therefore, neither can conditional futures be transferred from the state of mere possibility to the state of conditional futurity except through a conditional decree.

32. The adversaries answer first that this difference exists between absolute and conditional futures: absolute futures depend upon an actual and exercised decree, or one actually existing in God, whereas conditional futures do not require a decree actually existing in the divine will, but only a decree that would exist if the condition were posited. For the existence of the cause, they say, must be proportioned to the existence of the effect. Hence, just as it is necessary to assign to an effect which exists a cause which likewise exists, so it is enough to assign to an effect which will exist a cause which will exist, and to an effect which would exist a cause which would exist. Therefore, since conditional futures neither exist nor will exist, but would exist only if the condition were posited, it is enough that there be

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assigned for them in God a decree that would exist if the condition were posited. Consequently, such a decree exists in God not really but only objectively in that prior logical moment in which he knows things as conditionally future through middle knowledge.

33. But this solution and doctrine, which is the principal refuge and hiding place of middle knowledge, can be refuted in many ways. First, that decree which the adversaries say exists objectively in the divine mind in the prior logical moment in which he knows conditional futures is not presented to the divine intellect as merely possible, since from a merely possible decree no denomination of future is derived in the effects of the divine will, but only that of possible. Nor is it presented at that time as future, since it is repugnant for God to know his decrees as future, as we showed against Suarez in the preceding chapter, § 1, conclusion 2, and as other defenders of middle knowledge admit. Therefore, in that prior logical moment it is presented to the divine intellect as present and actually exercised, since there is no intermediate state between possible, future, and present. Consequently, since the divine intellect is entirely infallible, the divine decree is truly at that time present and actually exercised in God.

Second, for a thing to be future under a condition at the time of its futurity is free to God. Therefore, at that time it must be willed by him, and consequently there must then be in him an actual and exercised decree. Both consequences are evident. The antecedent is clear from the fact that nothing is necessary with respect to God except the essences of things and their essential connections.

Third, although a possible thing is not an actually existing effect but exists only possibly, it nevertheless essentially requires omnipotence as actually existing. Likewise, absolute futures do not now exist but will exist in some difference of time, and nevertheless require in God an actual and exercised decree, as the adversaries admit. Therefore, although an effect future under a condition does not actually exist but is future under a condition, it nevertheless essentially requires a divine decree actually existing in God.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated. If, despite the fact that an absolutely future thing does not exist but will exist, it nevertheless requires a decree actually existing in God, then the same account does not apply to divine decrees as to other causes. For other causes are required for the absolute futurity of their effects only as future, whereas the divine decree is required for it as actually existing. Consequently, from the fact that other causes are required for the conditional futurity of their effects only as future under a condition, the adversaries do not rightly infer that this is

also sufficient in divine decrees. Hence, when they say that the existence of the cause must be proportioned to the existence of the effect, and consequently that it is enough to assign to an effect which will exist a cause which will exist, and to an effect which would exist a cause which would exist, a distinction must be made. When futurity is repugnant to the cause; I deny it. When it is not repugnant to the cause; let it pass. Thus, because futurity is not repugnant to divine concurrence, a future effect does not require that concurrence as present and actually existing. But, on the contrary, because futurity, even virtual futurity, is repugnant to the divine decree, as we showed above against Suarez and as other defenders of middle knowledge admit with us, future things, whether absolute or conditional, require a decree present, actual, and exercised in God.

34. You will say that, although absolute futurity is repugnant to the divine decree, conditional futurity is not.

But against this: absolute futurity is repugnant to it because absolute change is repugnant to God. But change upon the supposition of some condition is also repugnant to him. Therefore, conditional futurity is also repugnant to the divine decree. The minor is evident, for since God is entirely immutable, it is repugnant to the divine will to change under any condition whatever. The major is commonly asserted by theologians in the treatise on God's will, where they teach that, if the divine decree were absolutely future, the divine will would change because it would pass from not willing in one instant in which to willing in another.

This reason is confirmed and further illustrated. It cannot be repugnant to a conditional future to pass into an absolute future if the condition is fulfilled. But even if the condition is fulfilled, it is repugnant to the divine decrees to be absolutely future, otherwise the divine will would change. Therefore, it is also repugnant to them to be future under a condition.

35. Certain recent authors answer second by denying the major of the first argument, namely that conditional futuration transfers the thing to which it belongs from the state of pure possibility to the state of a certain futuration. For, they say, a true transition requires that the thing spend some time under the former state before it is brought to the latter. This cannot belong to future things, since futuration belongs to them from eternity. But if this solution or reasoning were valid, someone could deny that the sun, an angel, or any permanent thing created from eternity, as nothing prevents it from being created, passes from nonbeing and nothingness to being. This is absurd, since for such a transition it is enough that, according to the thing's own principles, the state of nothingness was due to the created thing and that it could have been retained in that state throughout eternity or for a

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time. But which of these conditions is lacking in any future things foreknown by God from eternity, so that the passage from possible to future would belong to them no less than the passage from nothingness to being belongs to things created from eternity? For the very same thing now said to be future could have remained under the state of the merely possible, and such a state was due to it.

§ 4.

Another Attack on Middle Knowledge, Drawn
from the Adversaries' Principles.

37. This argument can be briefly proposed as follows. Middle knowledge cannot exist in God if there can be no instant or logical moment in which contingent and free things are knowable as conditionally future before they are knowable as absolutely future. But such is the case according to the adversaries' principles. Therefore, according to those principles, middle knowledge cannot exist in God. The major is evident, for middle knowledge, which concerns conditionals, is prior to the knowledge of absolutes, since, as its defenders teach, it directs God in his absolute decrees. The minor, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. The adversaries teach that contingent and free things are conditionally future in a logical moment antecedent to the divine decree and are known as such by God through middle knowledge because contradictory propositions can be formed concerning them, one of which must be determinately true and the other false, and consequently their object determinately future or non-future. Or, as others hold, because in such a logical moment a supposition of the future event can be made, or it can be supposed that the thing will at some time exist if such or such a condition is posited. But these two causes or arguments for the truth and futurity of conditionals in a logical moment antecedent to the divine decree apply also to absolute futures. For contradictory propositions can likewise be formed concerning them, and it can be supposed that they will at some time exist. What, therefore, prevents them from enjoying the same right as conditionals and from likewise possessing determinate objective truth and futurity in that logical moment antecedent to the divine decree in which the adversaries place middle knowledge in God? Indeed, since contradictory propositions concerning conditionals are composed of simple absolute propositions, and every part is in some manner prior to the whole, contradictory propositions concerning absolute futures must be true and knowable by God before contradictory

propositions concerning conditional futures. Consequently, their objects, namely absolute futures, must possess the notion of future before conditionals, and therefore the knowledge of absolutes in God would have to precede the knowledge of conditionals if the adversaries' principles are followed. Hence Father Martinon, the most recent writer of the Society, here, disp. 9, sect. 6, n. 53, reasons as follows: *Conditional futures are no less true than things which are contingently and absolutely future. But contingently and absolutely future things are determinately true. Therefore, conditional futures are similarly determinately true.* The minor is evident from what has already been said. The major is proved: *Because there is no less a precise and immediate contradiction between these two propositions, "If Peter is placed in these circumstances, he will deny Christ," and "If he is placed in these circumstances, he will not deny Christ," than between these two: "Peter, placed in these circumstances, will deny Christ," and "Peter, placed in these circumstances, will not deny Christ." But wherever there is precise and immediate contradiction, one extreme is determinately or distinctly false and the other determinately or distinctly true. Therefore, in conditional no less than in absolute futures, one is determinately true and the other false.* By these words he expressly teaches that future contingents, both absolute and conditional, are determinately true and knowable by the divine intellect in a logical moment antecedent to the decree. Indeed, from the objective truth that he presupposes in absolute futures before the decree, he proves determinate truth in conditionals. Therefore, the adversaries' own principles entirely overthrow middle knowledge.

37. [bis] From this you will understand that such knowledge is not necessary to direct God in his absolute decrees, as its defenders teach; indeed, it is altogether useless for this purpose. For according to their principles, the knowledge of conditionals cannot be or be conceived in God prior to the foreknowledge of absolutes, as we have just shown. Nor can it be necessary or useful for preserving human freedom, since rather it entirely destroys and overturns it if the adversaries' principles are followed. I prove this by two arguments. The first is: that knowledge removes freedom which presupposes that things are future through the force and nature of contradictory opposition. But middle knowledge presupposes this. Therefore, it destroys freedom. The major is evident. Since contradictory opposition is a cause necessary by absolute necessity, as founded on the first principle, *Everything either is or is not*, than which nothing can be or be conceived as more necessary, futuration consequent upon and arising from it cannot be free or contingent, but only natural and necessary. The minor is shown as follows. The defenders of middle knowledge teach that

contradictory propositions concerning future contingents, not only conditional but also absolute, possess determinate truth or falsity by reason of contradictory opposition, as we have just shown from Father Martinon, who openly professes this with the other Doctors of the Society. Therefore, since the objective truth of future contingents presupposes their futurition, and indeed is nothing other than the very futurition of the contingent thing as presented to the divine intellect and known or knowable by it, it is manifest that, according to their principles, the determinate futurition of contingent things arises from the force and nature of contradictory opposition.

38. The other argument can be briefly proposed as follows. That knowledge removes the freedom and contingency of things which presupposes that they are future before the first principle and, as it were, first root of created contingency and freedom. But middle knowledge presupposes this. Therefore, it removes freedom. The major is evident. The minor is proved. Middle knowledge presupposes that things are future, at least conditionally, before the divine decree. But the divine decree is the first principle and, as it were, first root of the freedom and contingency of things, since it is the exercise of the first free agent; and the first in every genus is the cause and measure of the others. Therefore, middle knowledge presupposes that things are future, at least conditionally, before the first principle and first root of their freedom and contingency. Many other absurd and unacceptable consequences follow from middle knowledge: that it removes from God the dignity of first cause, first free agent, and first determiner, as well as the supreme dominion that he possesses over our wills; that it attributes to him a blind and ignorant, vague and undetermined manner of concurring with free causes; and that it prepares the way for two errors of the Semi-Pelagians. But these are treated extensively in *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, disp. 6, a. 6.

§ 5.

The Principal Objections are Solved.

39. Omitting the many testimonies of Scripture which prove only that in God there is certain and infallible knowledge of conditional futures—something we do not deny, but contend to be founded upon conditional decrees—there remains a single passage which Molina calls the *touchstone* and in which he thinks the chief strength of middle knowledge consists. It is found in Matt. 11, where Christ rebukes and reproves the unbelief of the Jews by comparison with the Tyrians, who, if they had seen the same miracles, would have given great signs of repentance. But such a reproof would have been unjust if the repentance of the gentiles in the conditional state had been known by God in an efficacious decree predetermining them to repentance on the hypothesis of Christ's preaching. For the Jews could have given the just reply that they did not repent upon seeing Christ's miracles because they did not possess such a decree preparing for them efficacious grace predetermining them to repentance, but only insufficient helps, which give merely the power to act and do not apply the will to the act, as efficacious and predetermining helps do.

40. But because this difficulty belongs to the treatise on helps, and discussion of it will recur in the following treatise when we deal with the efficacy of the divine will, I now answer briefly that the Jews were justly reproved by Christ through the example of the Tyrians and Sidonians, not only because they were equal to them in sufficient helps, which are given for the power to act, but also because they placed more obstacles in the way of efficacious graces, which are given for acting, by reason of their greater blindness, hardness, and ingratitude. Hence Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 14: *The hearts of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded or so hardened, although they would have believed if they had seen signs like those which these men, namely the Jews, saw.* The solution is that of St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 159, where he teaches that, although man cannot dispose himself for the first grace, he can nevertheless place an obstacle to receiving it and render himself more or less unworthy of it through lesser or more grievous sins. Thus, although man cannot draw the sunlight toward himself, he can impede its illumination by closing a door or window. *Although, he says, someone cannot merit or summon divine grace through a movement of free choice, he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it; and*

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since this is within the power of free choice, one who places an obstacle to the reception of grace is not undeservedly held responsible. But this is treated more extensively in the passage cited.

41. The adversaries object second with certain testimonies of the holy Fathers which appear to favor middle knowledge. Augustine, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 10, teaches that predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge, although foreknowledge can exist without predestination. Therefore, he holds that foreknowledge independent of the predestination or predefinition of the divine will can exist, and consequently middle knowledge. Hence in *Ad Simplicianum*, q. 2, he says: *God so calls the one on whom he has mercy in the manner in which he knows to be fitting for him, so that he does not reject the one calling.* And St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4, says that predestination *presupposes foreknowledge of future things*. But not of future things in the absolute state, otherwise predestination would have a meritorious cause in us. Therefore, it presupposes them in the conditional state.

To Augustine I answer that in the first testimony he is manifestly speaking of sins, which God foreknows in a permissive decree but does not predestine or decree. For he says: *By predestination God foreknew the things he himself was going to do; but he can foreknow things that he does not do, such as all sins.* In the second passage, when he says that *God so calls the one on whom he has mercy in the manner in which he knows to be fitting for him*, and so forth, this must not be understood of merely speculative knowledge independent of the decree, but of practical knowledge founded upon the decree, which through efficacious grace produces such fittingness and adaptation, according to Heb. 13: *May God make you fit in every good thing, working in you what is pleasing before him*, that is, *may he cause you to will every good*, as St. Thomas explains, lect. 3. In the same sense Cardinal Toledo, annotation 54 on Luke 5, interprets the words of Chrysostom, homilies 31 and 65 on Matthew, where, treating of the calling of Paul and Matthew, he says that *God called them when he knew that they would consent*. Toledo says that the meaning of these words is that God called them when he foreknew that he himself would work in them so that they would obey. *Unless you understand Chrysostom's teaching in this way*, he says, *I do not agree with him, but regard the contrary as entirely true.*

To the passage from St. Thomas taken from the third part, I answer that he is there speaking of things absolutely future, as is clear from the intention of the argument and its solution, by which he intends to show that Christ's predestination followed upon and presupposed the forevision of the first man's sin. But the forevision of sin presupposed by Christ's predestination is

not conditional but absolute, as is clear in the position of St. Thomas. Otherwise, it would not be true that, if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come. Nor does it follow from this that there is a meritorious cause of predestination in us. As Cajetan acutely noted there, the future things presupposed by predestination are those which are not constituted through predestination, that is, which in their being are neither elicited nor commanded by predestination. But every merit of ours is an effect constituted through predestination. Therefore, it is not presupposed as foreseen by predestination, nor is there a cause of predestination in us, even though certain absolute future things are presupposed as foreseen by predestination.

42. They object third: conditional futures whose condition will never be posited are not known by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, since that terminates only in possible and necessary things; nor through the knowledge of vision, because that concerns only things present to God in his eternity. But such future things, since they will never possess existence in time owing to the absence of a condition that will never be fulfilled, are present to God in eternity only objectively, not really. Therefore, they cannot be known by God except through middle knowledge.

I answer that those future things are known by God through the knowledge of vision, not insofar as it is formally a vision, because under this aspect it terminates only in future things as present in eternity, but insofar as it is free and approving knowledge, or insofar as it is joined to the decree of the divine will, upon which it is founded and upon which it rests as a medium. For as such it does not terminate only in future things as present in eternity, but extends to all free and contingent objects whatever they may be. It can also be said that those future things are known through the knowledge of simple intelligence. For just as there is in God a natural and necessary knowledge of vision, namely the vision of the divine essence, and another that is free, namely the intuitive knowledge of creatures in the mirror of eternity, so there is a natural knowledge of simple intelligence concerning merely possible things and a free knowledge of simple intelligence directed toward conditional futures. When St. Thomas and theologians say that the knowledge of simple intelligence is merely natural, they assert this because it is principally occupied with merely possible things, which God naturally and necessarily knows.

43. They object fourth: the holy Fathers teach that God's knowledge concerning future contingents is highly wonderful and exceeds the capacity of the human mind. But this would not be true if it were founded upon a predetermining decree, as the Thomists teach, since there is nothing

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wonderful in God's seeing his own decrees and in them the future effects infallibly connected with them. Therefore, it is independent of such a decree and consequently is middle knowledge.

44. I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. Nothing in God is more wonderful than that he contemplates nothing outside himself, but all things in his essence as in their cause and, as it were, in a most pure mirror, whether the essence is taken in itself or as determined by a decree. From this it arises that his knowledge is the cause of things and eminently speculative and practical; that it is not measured by things, but is rather their rule and measure; that it is altogether certain and infallible, as resting upon a most certain and infallible medium; and finally, that it is infinite and extends to all things, since nothing can escape God's causality. On the contrary, according to the adversaries' opinion, God's knowledge of future contingents is merely speculative and investigative, and is measured by things rather than being their rule and measure, since it does not produce but presupposes their futurition. Things are not future because they are known by God, but rather are known by him because they are future. Hence such knowledge is like that of astrologers, which does not produce but merely contemplates and investigates the conjunctions of the stars and the courses of the planets.

45. You will object fifth: no one prudently determines anything concerning an end unless he first knows the means apt and proportioned for attaining it. Hence Luke 14 says: *Which of you, wishing to build a tower, does not first consider within himself whether he has sufficient resources to complete it?* Therefore, before God efficaciously decrees our conversion, he first knows whether he will infallibly attain it through these or those means. But he cannot know this except through middle knowledge. Therefore, middle knowledge must be admitted in God.

I answer by granting the antecedent and the consequence but denying the subsumed minor. God knows the means apt and proportioned for our conversion through the knowledge of simple intelligence, by which he comprehends his omnipotence and sees that within his treasures lie infinite means or helps by which he can efficaciously and gently draw our wills to himself whenever and wherever he wills. *For who*, says Augustine, *Enchiridion*, c. 98, *could be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot convert to good the evil wills of men, whichever he wills, whenever he wills, and wherever he wills?*

§ 6.

The Arguments Commonly Made Against the Conditional
Decrees Admitted by the Thomists Are Solved.

46. Before proposing and dissolving those arguments, it must be carefully observed that a volition or decree can be called conditional in two ways. First, on the part of the subject, when the subject does not actually possess the will to do something but would possess it if some condition were posited, as if someone says: *I would wish to hunt if this were lawful for a cleric*. By this manner of speaking I do not signify that I actually possess a volition concerning hunting, but that I would possess one if hunting were lawful for a cleric. Second, on the part of the object, when there is an actual efficacious volition on the part of the one willing, but its effect is suspended until the condition is posited, upon whose occurrence it will be reduced to act, as if I say: *I will and vow to go to Rome if I recover from my illness*. In that case there is a present and efficacious will for such a pilgrimage, but the restoration of health upon which it depends as a condition is awaited. Conditional decrees of the first kind cannot exist in God, because they involve an imperfection of potentiality and suspension repugnant to God. The Thomists nevertheless teach that conditional decrees in the second manner, or on the part of the object, must be admitted in him, at least concerning those conditional futures which God testifies in Scripture that he knows and which pertain to the order of divine providence and the government of the universe. These imply no imperfection in the one willing, unlike the former kind, as St. Thomas teaches in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: *The antecedent will can be called conditional, and yet no imperfection exists on the part of the divine will, but on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken together with all the circumstances required for a right ordering toward salvation*.

47. That such decrees must be admitted in God can be proved, first, because conditional futures are more actual than merely possible things. They connote existence as to be possessed under a condition, from which connotation merely possible things prescind. Therefore, some cause of this greater actuality must be assigned. But no cause can be assigned other than a decree objectively conditional. Second, if God were not determined by his decree toward their conditional futurity, that futurity would be undetermined. Consequently, God would have falsely revealed them in Scripture as future if the condition were posited rather than as non-future,

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especially since some of them are entirely disparate and their futurition has no connection with their conditions from the nature of the thing, but only from God's good pleasure.

48. The defenders of middle knowledge rise up against these decrees in many ways and attempt to exclude and banish them under many titles: their novelty, uselessness, absurdity, and impossibility. First, they say that they are novel and devised by the Thomists, since no trace of them exists in Scripture, the holy Fathers, or St. Thomas. Second, they say that they are idle, since they contribute nothing to divine providence and the government of things. Third, they say that they are ridiculous and trifling. For it appears ridiculous to posit in God a conditional decree concerning the conversion of the Tyrians under the condition of Christ's preaching, when that condition was rendered impossible by another decree by which God absolutely determined that Christ would never preach among the Tyrians. Likewise, a promise made by a promisor under a condition that he is unwilling to fulfill is vain and derisory, as if someone said, "I will give you ten gold coins if I come on that day," while determining not to come. Fourth, they say that such decrees are impossible. First, because if God had possessed a conditional decree to convert the Tyrians, for example, on the supposition that Christ preached to them, while he had elsewhere decreed that Christ would never preach among them, he would thereby possess contrary affections altogether inconsistent with one another, which is impossible. Second, because every decree of the divine will introduces and causes some real and physical change in a creature. But conditional decrees whose condition will never be posited cannot introduce or cause any change in a creature, owing to the absence of the condition that will never be fulfilled. Therefore, they are impossible in God.

49. But these arguments are slight and require no great effort to solve. To the first I answer by denying that such decrees have no foundation in Scripture or the holy Fathers. Nothing in Scripture is more frequent than that will of God which they call his antecedent will concerning the salvation of all men, which St. Thomas, cited above, says is conditional on the part of the object. Many covenants or promises of God concerning things future under a condition which will never be fulfilled are also found in Scripture: God's will to confer original justice upon Adam's descendants if their parent and head obeyed the divine command; the covenant made with David to preserve the hereditary kingdom perpetually for his sons if they imitated their father's piety; and the eternal Father's will to send many legions of angels to the Son if he were asked. Scripture also attributes to God knowledge of certain conditional futures whose event has no connection

with the condition, such as the words of Elisha to King Joash in 2 Kings 13: *If you had struck the ground five, six, or seven times, you would have struck Syria even to its destruction.* It is evident that the devastation of Syria was not connected with that striking of the ground. Therefore, God could not assert that the devastation would be future through the force of a connection, but only through the efficacy of his decree.

50. Such decrees also have a foundation in the holy Fathers, since St. Dionysius and St. Thomas everywhere teach that God knows all things, whether possible or future, in his essence as in their cause. From this principle, which is most common in both Holy Doctors, conditional decrees are manifestly gathered. For, as we have often said, the divine essence cannot be the cause of conditional futures except as modified and determined by a conditional decree, because God is not a necessary but a free agent and works all things according to the counsel of his will, as the Apostle says. Likewise, St. Thomas below, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2, expressly asserts that God wills *that something at times be future according to an inferior cause, which nevertheless is not future according to the higher cause.* It is evident that this future thing is conditional, because it would occur unless God ordered otherwise for reasons of his providence hidden from us.

51. To the second I deny that such decrees are idle and superfluous in God. Although God has decreed to deny glory and the means efficaciously leading to it to some persons, nevertheless the antecedent will that he possesses concerning the salvation of all is not idle and superfluous, because through it means sufficient for salvation are prepared for all. Likewise, since the decrees of which we speak contribute both to God's government and providence—for it belongs to a prudent governor to hold himself prepared to do many things which nevertheless will never occur—and to transferring things from the state of mere possibility to that of conditional futurity, and to founding certain knowledge of their truth, they must not be judged idle and superfluous, and much less absurd and ridiculous, but honorable, most prudent, and worthy of the highest veneration. Although volitions and promises to do something under a condition that they are unwilling to fulfill appear absurd in particular agents, they do not in a universal provider. This is evident from the antecedent and conditional will to save all men, which God does not will to be fulfilled in all because of hidden reasons of his providence. Hence the adversaries' objections derive their force only from the narrow and lowly character of our thought, by which we conceive God as a particular agent after the manner of other agents familiar to us, and can only with difficulty rise to the providence of the most universal and ecumenical governor, restricted by no end. It belongs to this providence to

permit many defects, both physical and moral, in this universe, and to order not only diverse but even contrary things, according to Sir. 33: *Behold all the works of the Most High: two and two, and one opposed to another*. From this the answer is evident to the adversaries' third objection, by which they attempt to show the absurdity of such decrees.

52. To the final objection, which concerns their impossibility, I deny the first proof. The conditional decree that God possessed concerning the faith of the Tyrians, on the supposition that Christ preached among them, and the absolute decree by which he determined that Christ would not preach to them are no more opposed than the antecedent will concerning the salvation of all and the consequent will to save only the elect. In the following treatise we shall show that these wills possess no opposition to one another because they concern an object considered not in the same but in diverse manners.

53. To the second proof I answer with Alvarez that, when the decree is absolute, it must introduce an absolute real and physical change in the creature; but when it is conditional, it need not introduce a real change absolutely, but only under a condition. That is, it is enough that, through the force of that decree, the creature would really be changed if the condition were fulfilled.

54. You will ask whether conditional decrees must be admitted in God concerning every combination of possible things, some of which sometimes appear ridiculous and absurd, such as: *If a goat jumps, a rooster will crow. If a Turk sleeps in Constantinople, will the Pope pray in Rome?* I answer negatively. It is enough to posit conditional decrees in God concerning those futures under a condition that are revealed in Scripture or serve the order of divine providence. Concerning others, especially if they are entirely disparate, it appears unbecoming and superfluous to admit such decrees in God. It is enough that God possess a general decree by which he wills not to determine himself toward their futurity or non-futurity, and consequently to leave them in the state of mere possibility.

The adversaries' arguments proceeding from injury to human freedom or divine holiness will be more conveniently proposed and solved in the following treatise, when we treat of divine predefinitions.

TREATISE IV.
ON THE WILL OF GOD.

In this Treatise we shall consider, first, the object of the divine will; second, its freedom and its compatibility with divine immutability; third, the antecedent will of God, by which he wills all human beings to be saved; fourth, the efficacy of the divine will; fifth, certain attributes and affections pertaining to the divine will, namely, God's love, joy, justice, and mercy.

CHAPTER I.
On the Formal Motive and Terminative
Object of the Divine Will.

1. Once intellect is admitted in God, it cannot be denied that there is will in him. For just as every natural form is followed by an inclination toward a suitable good, as the form of fire is followed by an inclination toward the higher place, and the form of a stone by a propensity toward the lower place, so an intelligible form is followed by an inclination toward a good suitable to intellectual nature, which in intellectual agents is called will. Since, therefore, the most perfect intellect exists in God, the most perfect will must also be found in him. It is evident, however, from what was said in Treatise I, ch. 3, that this will does not belong to the most formal concept, or metaphysical constitution, of the divine nature, since God's nature is formally constituted by understanding, which is conceived in God prior to

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willing, because nothing is willed unless it is first known. Indeed, since the appetitive power is an inclination toward what is suitable to the nature of the one desiring, it must necessarily presuppose that nature as adequately constituted, so that it may be the rule and measure of desire. It therefore remains only to explain here what is the formal object, both motive and terminative, of the divine will.

2. I therefore say that the motive and terminative object of the divine will is divine and uncreated goodness alone, and not good in general, as abstracted from created and uncreated good.

The first part is proved, first, from St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 2, where he argues as follows: *In those things which we will for the sake of an end, the end is the whole reason for moving, and this is what properly moves the will. Hence, since God wills things other than himself only for the sake of the end, which is his goodness, it does not follow that anything other than his own goodness moves his will.* By these words the Holy Doctor both taught and proved our conclusion. For the motive object of the will is the end, because a means, precisely as a means, is willed only insofar as it leads to the end. But divine and uncreated goodness alone is the end of the divine will. Therefore, it alone is its motive object.

3. The same part is proved, second: the divine will is not moved, even partially, by created goodness. Therefore, uncreated goodness is its adequately formal motive object, and not goodness as such, abstracting from created and uncreated goodness. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proved as follows. If the divine will were moved by created goodness, even only partially, the love by which God loved a creature would be not only effective but also affective. For merely effective love of the goodness of an object does not presuppose that goodness but produces it, and therefore cannot be attracted or moved by it. But the love by which God loves a creature is not affective, but merely effective, as St. Bernard teaches in *De amore divino*, ch. 4, in these words: *You are not affected by us or toward us when you love us, but we are affected in you and toward you when we love you.* St. Thomas likewise teaches this in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 20, a. 2, where he says that *the love of God infuses and creates goodness in things.* Reason also supports this. For affective love inclines and transforms the lover into the beloved. God, by contrast, inclines and draws all things to himself, and it is incompatible with his nature that he should be transformed into a creature. Therefore, the divine will is not moved, even partially, by created goodness.

4. The second part, which concerns the terminative object, is established by this argument. That is the formal terminative object of a power which is attained by that power first and of itself, while other things are attained by

reason of it. But divine goodness alone is attained first and of itself by the will of God, while created goods are attained only by reason of it, since divine goodness is the end of all other things, according to Prov. 16: *The Lord has made all things for himself*. Therefore, divine goodness alone is the formal terminative object of the divine will.

5. The same part is proved, second. The formal object, whether motive or terminative, of a power must have perfect proportion and commensuration with that power under the aspect of object. But good as such, abstracting from created and uncreated good, does not have perfect proportion and commensuration with the divine will, since the divine will is purest act and devoid of all potentiality, whereas such good is potential and contains every aspect of being and goodness only potentially and confusedly. Therefore, good as such, abstracting from created and uncreated good, is not the formal object, whether motive or terminative, of the divine will. Rather, this object is divine and uncreated goodness alone, which, since it is purest act and contains all created and participated goodness in the most perfect and actual manner, has perfect proportion and commensuration with the divine will.

6. This is confirmed. The divine will is related to its object as the divine intellect is related to its own. But uncreated truth alone is the formal motive and terminative object of the divine intellect, as was shown in the preceding Treatise, ch. 1. Therefore, uncreated goodness alone is also the formal motive and terminative object of the divine will.

7. You will object, first, against the first part of the conclusion: our merits move the will of God to reward us. Therefore, its motive object is not uncreated goodness alone, but also the moral and created goodness found in our meritorious acts.

8. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. Our merits move the will of God as considered in themselves: I deny this. As virtually contained in divine goodness: I grant this. Should you press the objection and say that our merits, as virtually contained in divine goodness, do not possess the character of merit, I answer that as such they do not formally possess the character of merit, but they do possess it virtually. This is sufficient for divine goodness, as thus containing them, to move the will of God to exercise an act of justice concerning them as contained in itself.

9. You will object, second, against the second part of the conclusion: the formal terminative object of a power must contain all the particular objects which can be attained by that power, and must be predicated of them, as is evident from an induction through all powers and habits. But divine goodness neither contains created goodness, to which the divine will

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extends, nor is predicated of it. The notion of good as such, abstracting from created and uncreated good, does contain it and is predicated of it. Therefore, this notion, and not divine goodness, is the formal terminative object of the divine will.

10. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. It must contain all particular objects by formal or eminent containment: I grant the major. By a determinate formal containment: I deny the major. I likewise distinguish the minor premise. Divine goodness does not contain created goodness by formal containment: I grant the minor. By eminent containment: I deny the minor and the consequence. As for the further assertion that the formal object must be predicated of all material objects, it must be said that it must be predicated of them either directly or obliquely. It is not, however, always required that it be predicated of them directly, as is evident in theology, whose formal object is God, who is predicated of creatures not directly but only obliquely. For although creatures are something of God, namely, his effects, it cannot be said that they are God.

11. A difficult argument may also be raised against both parts of the conclusion, namely, that if God, in loving rational creatures, regarded only his own goodness as the end, motive, and formal term, he would love them for his own sake, and consequently would love them not with the love of friendship, but with the love of concupiscence. Since, however, this matter will return in the Treatise on Charity, we refer the resolution of this difficulty to that Treatise, lest the same things be needlessly repeated.

CHAPTER II.

On the Freedom of the Will of God and Its Compatibility with Divine Immutability.

1. Nothing is more certain by faith, or better known by the natural light of reason, than that the most perfect freedom exists in God. Yet nothing in theology is more difficult than to reconcile this freedom with divine immutability. For since freedom requires an indifference by reason of which a thing is such that it can fail to be, whereas immutability implies a necessity by reason of which a thing is such that it cannot fail to be, it is difficult to conceive how God's supreme immutability can be compatible with his supreme freedom and indifference.

2. Some attempt to resolve this difficulty by asserting that God's free act does not consist in any formality intrinsic to God, but in a purely extrinsic denomination arising from effects produced by God, or from the action by

which they are produced, which they hold to be formally transient. This opinion is attributed to Aureolus. Certain more recent authors agree with him and teach that God's free act is constituted by this, at least partially and inadequately.

3. Others, taking the opposite extreme, think that God's free act adds to God's necessary perfections a certain intrinsic perfection which, because it is free, could without any imperfection have been absent from God, or not have existed in him. This opinion is commonly attributed to Cajetan by more recent authors, but undeservedly, as Nazarius, John of St. Thomas, and others among our Thomists demonstrate. They interpret him as speaking of a defectibility not of perfection, but of pure termination, in the manner to be explained below. But whoever may be the author of that opinion, the opinion of certain more recent authors is reduced to it, or at least approaches it, since they think that God's free act adds to his necessary act a certain mode or modal reality which could have been absent from God, or could have failed to exist in his will.

4. Others, in order to extricate themselves from this difficulty more easily, have recourse to a relation of reason, asserting that God's free act is constituted by a relation of reason to existing or future creatures. Thus Vásquez and Marcus de Serra.

5. Finally, our Thomists commonly teach that God's free act adds to his necessary perfections a termination distinct by reason, which could have been absent or could have failed to exist in God. But there is a difficulty and controversy among them as to whether it could have failed to exist in God according to some intrinsic aspect and according to what it directly signifies, or only according to something extrinsic and on the part of what it signifies obliquely. Nazarius, González, and others hold that it could have been absent from God only by reason of an extrinsic connote, namely, an existing or future creature. Master Godoy, however, in disp. 48, § 5 and following, teaches that it could have been absent according to some intrinsic aspect, not indeed under the concept of perfection or being, but under the concept of pure termination. In support of this opinion he cites Suárez and Aravius. The Salamancans also defend this manner of speaking and of explaining God's freedom as probable and conformable to the mind and doctrine of St. Thomas, in disp. 7, dub. 8.

6. I say, first, that God's free decree is not constituted by anything extrinsic, namely, by the effects which God has produced *ad extra*, or by the action and causality through which he has produced them.

This is proved in several ways. First, because it is contradictory for a cause to be constituted by its effect, since it must be constituted before

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producing that effect, at least by priority of nature. But the creatures produced and the action productive of them, assuming that this action is formally transient, are effects of the decree of the divine will. For God, as the Apostle says, *works all things according to the counsel of his will*. Therefore, it is incompatible with the nature of God's free decree that it should be constituted by the effects produced by it or by the action productive of them.

7. Second, the decree to create the world, for example, belongs to God from eternity, and consequently that which constitutes this decree exists from eternity. But neither the effects caused by God nor the action by which they are caused, assuming that this action is formally transient, exist from eternity. Therefore, God's free decree cannot be constituted by them.

8. Third, the denomination of one who freely wills is intrinsic to God, and consequently arises from some intrinsic form existing in God. But neither the effects produced by God nor the transient action productive of them are within God, but outside him. Therefore, the denomination of one who freely wills cannot arise from them.

9. Finally, the divine will is indifferent not only to causing or not causing creatures, but also to willing or not willing to cause them. Therefore, God is constituted as freely willing or freely not willing by relation to an indifferent volition or nolition. But the effects caused and the action by which they are caused are not a volition. Therefore, they do not constitute God's free decree.

10. From these arguments the opinion of those more recent authors remains refuted who think that God's free decree is constituted, at least partially and inadequately, by the effects which God has produced *ad extra*, or by the action and causality through which he has produced them. For the arguments given prove that God's free decree cannot be constituted by them even partially and inadequately. First, because it is contradictory for a cause to be constituted, even partially and inadequately, by its effect, since before producing the effect it must be completely and adequately constituted. Second, because the decree to create the world belongs to God from eternity, and consequently its adequate constitutive principle exists in God from eternity. Finally, because the denomination of one who freely wills must adequately arise from some form intrinsic to God and existing in him.

11. I say, second, that divine freedom does not consist in a perfection intrinsic to God which is defectible, or which could have failed to exist in God.

This is proved, first, because if any perfection could be absent from God, he would be neither immutable nor infinitely perfect. It is proved, second,

because no perfection mixed with imperfection is to be admitted in God. But a perfection which is defectible as an entity and under the aspect of perfection implies imperfection, for the ability not to exist is the greatest imperfection. Therefore, such a perfection must not be attributed to God.

12. I say, third, that God's free act does not add to his necessary act any mode or modal entity which could have been absent from God or could have failed to exist in him. This is proved, first, because such a defectible modal entity would be imperfect, just as a defectible perfection would be, since the ability not to exist, or the ability to be nothing, is the highest degree of imperfection. It is proved, second, because it would imply the imperfection of potentiality in the divine essence. For the divine essence would be related to that entity as potency to act and as the perfectible to that which perfects it, and together with it would constitute a real composition. By the very fact that the entity belonging to this mode would be really defectible, it could not be identified with the divine essence, which is altogether indefectible.

13. I say, fourth, that God's free act is not constituted by a relation of reason to creatures.

This is proved as follows. Such a relation is taken either in its foundation or formally. If it is taken in its foundation, it remains to explain what that foundation is, whether it is something created or uncreated, intrinsic or extrinsic to God, and whether it signifies a perfection or not. Thus this opinion coincides either with the preceding opinions already refuted or with the one which we shall explain in the following conclusion. But it cannot be affirmed formally. First, because a real being, such as God's free decree, cannot be constituted by a being of reason fabricated by the intellect. Second, because that relation of reason would be formed either by God or by a creature. It would not be formed by a creature, since God is free from eternity, whereas a created intellect exists in time. Nor would it be formed by God. For would God form it by a free act or by a necessary act? Not by a necessary act, for otherwise that relation would be necessary to God and consequently could not constitute his free decree. Nor by a free act, because every free act of the divine intellect presupposes the free decree of the will as already constituted, since the freedom of the intellect arises from the freedom of the will.

I add that it seems altogether absurd that God's free decrees, which are the true and real cause of creatures, on which the whole force of divine providence and the entire order of the universe depend, and in which God's free knowledge, or knowledge of vision, is founded as in a medium, should be reduced to mere beings of reason.

14. I say, finally, that God's free act adds to his necessary act a termination toward creatures which is defectible, or capable of being absent, under the aspect of termination, but not under the aspect of perfection or being. This conclusion follows from what was said above. For since God's free act is not constituted by a purely extrinsic denomination derived from creatures, as we showed in the first conclusion, but by something intrinsic to God, which must nevertheless be defectible according to some formality because freedom and indifference of will require this, the termination of the divine will toward creatures must be defectible, or capable of being absent, according to some aspect and formality. But it cannot be defectible, or capable of being absent, under the aspect of perfection or being, as is evident from what was said in the second and third conclusions. Therefore, it must be defectible, or capable of being absent, at least under the aspect of pure termination, so that it may constitute God's free act.

15. You will say with González that this termination is defectible by reason of an extrinsic connotate, but not by reason of what it directly signifies.

But against this, first: that termination must be defectible according to that by which it constitutes God as freely willing, since defectibility belongs to the nature of freedom and indifference. But it does not constitute God as freely willing through what it signifies as a connotate, but through what it directly signifies. Otherwise, God would be constituted as freely willing by a purely extrinsic denomination derived from creatures, and not by something intrinsic to him. This would fall into the opinion of Aureolus, refuted in the first conclusion. Therefore, that termination must be defectible not only by reason of an extrinsic connotate, but also by reason of what it directly signifies.

16. Against this, second: the free decree is for God the reason for knowing existing or future creatures, as was shown in the preceding Treatise, ch. 4, § 2. From this it is permissible to argue as follows. The reason for knowing existing or future creatures must be free, and consequently defectible, under that aspect and concept under which it is the reason for knowing them. But an intrinsic formality is not the reason for knowing existing or future creatures according to what it signifies obliquely and terminatively, but according to what it signifies intrinsically and directly. Therefore, as such it must be defectible, or capable of being absent. The major premise is evident, for if the reason for knowing creatures were not free but necessary, it would not be a medium for a free and non-necessary cognition. The minor premise is also evident. For what God's decree signifies obliquely is an existing or future creature. But such a creature is not

the reason or medium of knowing, but only the thing known. Therefore, God's decree is not for him the reason for knowing creatures according to what it signifies obliquely and extrinsically, but according to what it signifies intrinsically and directly.

17. Against this, third: defectibility under the concept of intrinsic termination, without defect of being or perfection, implies no imperfection in God; and if it is admitted, the freedom of the divine volition is explained better and more easily. Therefore, it must be admitted. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, before being established from the solutions to the objections, is briefly supported as follows. A defect of perfection or being alone is an imperfection. But defectibility under the concept of pure termination implies no defect either of perfection or of being, as will be evident from what follows. Therefore, it implies no imperfection in God.

18. This is confirmed. No mutability in the divine will can be inferred from the defectibility of that intrinsic termination under the concept of pure termination. Therefore, it must be admitted. The consequence is evident, for a defectible perfection or entity is rejected from God precisely because real change or mutability in him follows from it, as we argued above. The antecedent is proved as follows. Change is a transition from non-being to being or from being to non-being, and consequently requires the advent or absence of a form under the concept of existing, and therefore under the aspect of being and perfection. Therefore, a termination which is defectible only under the concept of termination, while indefectible under the concept of being, implies no change or mutability in God. This can be explained from the mystery of the Incarnation. For because the divine subsistence exercises the function of intrinsically terminating the human nature without the addition of a new entity or perfection, even if it ceased to terminate it, it would not thereby be changed, because it would lose no entity or perfection, but would merely cease to have an exercise which it previously had.

19. From these considerations you have the solution to the exceedingly difficult problem proposed at the beginning of this chapter, and the perfect compatibility of God's freedom with his immutability. For from the fact that God's free act adds a termination toward creatures which is defectible under the aspect of termination, God's freedom and indifference, which require that a thing be such that it can fail to be, are perfectly preserved. From the fact that this termination is indefectible under the aspect of being and perfection, his supreme immutability remains intact, because change requires a transition from non-being to being or from being to non-being.

20. You will object, first: the termination of God's free act toward creatures, under the concept of termination, is a divine entity intrinsic to

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God. Therefore, if it could have been absent or could have failed to exist in God under the concept of termination, it could also have been absent under the concept of being. Or, if it could not have been absent under the concept of being, it likewise could not have been absent under the concept of termination. A similar argument can be made concerning perfection. For the termination of the divine will toward creatures signifies perfection. Therefore, if it could have been absent from God under the concept of termination, it could also have been absent under the concept of perfection.

21. To the first argument I answer that, although the termination of God's free act toward creatures, under the concept of termination, implicitly signifies the divine entity, it does not explain the concept of the divine entity, and is distinguished from it by a virtual distinction. This distinction is sufficient so that, although it is absent or can be absent under the concept of termination, it is not absent and cannot be absent under the concept of being. In the same way, although the deformity of sin implicitly includes the concept of a positive entity, nevertheless, because it does not explain that entity and is distinguished from it according to implicit and explicit signification, it is perfectly consistent that the deformity of sin should be caused by God under the concept of being without being caused by him under the concept of deformity. From this the answer to the second argument is evident. For although that termination implies perfection by reason of the uncreated entity which it transcendently includes, it does not formally express perfection under the concept of termination. Hence, although it could have been absent from God under the concept of termination, it could not have been absent under the concept of perfection.

22. You will say: the exercise of God's will as free, reducing it from first act to second act, expresses perfection. But that termination is the exercise of God's will as free, reducing it from first act to second act. Therefore, it expresses perfection.

This is confirmed. Every actuality expresses perfection. But that exercise is an actuality. Therefore, it expresses perfection.

23. To the objection I answer by distinguishing the major premise. The exercise of God's will as free, reducing it from first act to second act, expresses perfection if it is entitative: I grant the major. If it is terminative: I deny the major. I similarly distinguish the minor premise. That termination is an exercise reducing the will from first act to second act terminatively: I grant the minor. Entitatively: I deny the minor and the consequence. To the confirmation I distinguish the major in the same way. Every entitative actuality signifies or expresses perfection: I grant the major. A purely terminative actuality: I deny the major. For although this latter implicitly

includes perfection by reason of the divine and uncreated entity which it transcendentally includes, it does not formally express perfection. In the same way, a relation, under the concept of relation and as regards its aspect of towardness, does not express perfection, although it implicitly includes perfection and cannot be perfectly prescinded from it.

24. You will object, second: if the termination of the act of the divine will toward creatures does not necessarily exist in God, but can or could have been absent from him or failed to exist in him, not only according to what it signifies extrinsically and obliquely, but also as regards what it signifies intrinsically and directly, it follows that it is really distinguished from the necessary termination. For by the very fact that it can be absent, it can be really separated from it, and real separability is the greatest sign of a real distinction. It also follows that God can or could have been changed. For to be changed is nothing other than to be intrinsically otherwise than before. But if such a termination does not necessarily exist in God, but can or could have been absent from him, God can or could have been intrinsically otherwise than before. Therefore, he can or could have been changed.

25. I answer by denying both consequences. To the proof of the first, I say that separability as regards entity is required for a real distinction. But since the necessary termination and the free termination of the act of the divine will possess the same entity, they cannot be separated from one another under the concept of being, but only under the concept of termination. This can be explained and supported by the example of the relation of a father to two sons. When one son ceases to exist, the relation ceases to be terminated to him while remaining terminated to the other surviving son, without the termination toward the one, which ceases, being really distinguished from the termination toward the other, which remains, because the reality and entity of both terminations is the same.

26. To the proof of the second consequence I distinguish the major premise. To be changed is nothing other than to be intrinsically otherwise than before through the acquisition of a new form, entity, or perfection: I grant this. Through a merely new termination: I deny this. The solution is evident from what was said above and can be further illustrated by the example already given. For although the Divine Word in the Incarnation is intrinsically otherwise than before, and intrinsically becomes man, whereas previously he was not intrinsically man, nevertheless, because this does not occur through the acquisition of a new form, entity, or perfection, but only through a new termination of the human nature, which he did not previously terminate, he is not changed through the Incarnation, as we shall explain more fully in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

CHAPTER III.

On the Antecedent Will of God, by Which He
Wills All Human Beings to Be Saved.

Concerning¹ the antecedent will of God, there are several celebrated difficulties and controversies which must be briefly resolved here. The first is whether, after the fall of Adam, there is in God a general and antecedent will to save all human beings. The second is whether such a will exists in God formally and properly, or only eminently or metaphorically. The third concerns the reason why this general will to save all human beings is called antecedent. The fourth concerns the sense in which it is said to be conditional. The fifth is whether, by virtue of this will, Christ suffered and died for all, or offered and ordained his death and Passion for the salvation not only of a few, but of each and every human being. The sixth is whether sufficient helps for salvation are prepared through the antecedent will.

§ 1.

The First Four Difficulties Are Briefly Resolved.

2. I say, first, that God, by a general and antecedent will, wills to save all human beings, even after the fall of Adam. This is against Jansen in bks. 9 and 10 of *De gratia Christi Salvatoris*, where he teaches that God did indeed have such a will for each and every human being considered in the state of innocence, but not after the fall of Adam and the foreknowledge of original sin.

The conclusion is proved from the celebrated testimony of the Apostle in 1 Tim. 2: *God wills all human beings to be saved*, and so forth. It is evident there that he is speaking of human beings existing in the state of fallen nature. First, because he speaks of them as they now are, for he wills prayers and supplications to be made to God for them. Second, because in the same place he says that, to fulfill this will of God, Christ offered himself as a redemption for all. But redemption presupposes the fall into original sin.

3. Nor does the Apostle merely teach our assertion openly; he also proves it by a threefold argument, which he indicates in these words immediately following: For there is one God of all, one mediator of God and human beings, who gave himself for all. God therefore wills the salvation of

¹ no. 1.

all human beings, first, because he is the God and Lord of all, who created all equally and exercises care and providence over all. Hence Ignatius, in Epistle 6 to the Philadelphians, says that our God is the lover of all and wills all human beings to be saved, for which reason he makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and sends rain upon the just and the unjust. Second, because he is the mediator not merely of some human beings, but of all without exception. Cajetan rightly emphasizes this argument in his commentary on this passage of the Apostle, in these words: If there were several mediators between God and human beings, it might be thought that one was mediator for some and another for others. But from the fact that there is one mediator of God and human beings, for reconciling human beings to God, it belongs to that one mediator to mediate between God and all human beings. Third, because he is the redeemer of all human beings and died for all. Hence, according to the Apostle, God's antecedent will to save human beings and Christ's will to die for them are, as it were, parallel and correspond to one another.

4. I say, second, that the antecedent will by which God wills all human beings to be saved exists in God properly and formally, and not merely metaphorically or eminently.

This is proved, first: the antecedent will by which God wills all human beings to be saved is a will of good pleasure, and not merely a will of sign, as St. Thomas teaches in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 2, in these words: *Will is predicated properly of God, and this is the will of good pleasure, which is divided into antecedent and consequent will.* He asserts the same in *Super I ad Timotheum*, ch. 2, lect. 1, where, explaining the words of the Apostle, *He wills all human beings to be saved*, he reduces this will to the will of good pleasure. But the will of good pleasure is found formally and properly in God, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 11, where he says: *Will properly so called is termed the will of good pleasure, while will metaphorically so called is the will of sign.* Therefore, the antecedent will by which God wills all human beings to be saved is found properly and formally in God, and not merely metaphorically or eminently.

5. This is confirmed. In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1, the same Angelic Doctor compares the antecedent will which God has concerning the salvation of all human beings with the antecedent will by which a judge is said to will that a murderer, insofar as he is a human being, should live. In *Super I ad Timotheum*, ch. 2, lect. 1, he compares it with the antecedent will of preserving merchandise considered absolutely, which a merchant has when a storm threatens. But it is altogether certain that a pious and just judge properly and formally wills, though ineffectively, that one who is a

murderer should live insofar as he is a human being. Similarly, a merchant threatened by the danger of a storm properly and formally wills, though ineffectively, to preserve his merchandise by reason of the advantage which its preservation in itself affords. Therefore, the antecedent will which God has concerning the salvation of all human beings, although it is not efficacious with respect to all, exists in God properly and formally.

6. It is proved, second: the object of the antecedent will, namely, the salvation of all human beings considered in itself, is properly and formally willable, since under this aspect it is good and is not considered as impeding a greater good, namely, the manifestation of divine justice toward some and of divine mercy toward others. Therefore, it is willed by God properly and formally, and not merely metaphorically or eminently.

7. I say, third, that God's will is not denominated antecedent because it precedes the consent, merits, or demerits of our will and the foreknowledge of them; nor is it called consequent because it presupposes both. Rather, it is called antecedent because it concerns the good of a creature considered absolutely and precisely in itself, while it is called consequent because it is terminated to that same good as clothed with all its individual circumstances.

The first part is proved as follows. Since God's consequent will is of itself efficacious and is the cause of our consent, as we shall show in the following chapter, it precedes that consent at least by priority of nature and causality. Therefore, God's will is not denominated antecedent because it precedes our consent. The consequence is evident, for otherwise the members of the division of God's will into antecedent and consequent would be confused. Again, predestination includes the will of salvation not only antecedently but also consequentially, as St. Thomas asserts in *In I Sententiarum ad Annibaldum*, dist. 46, q. unica, a. 2, ad 1. This is also evident from the fact that otherwise predestination would not be efficacious, since it would include only an inefficacious will, such as the antecedent will. But predestination does not presuppose foreknowledge of merits, as we shall show in the Treatise on Predestination. Therefore, the consequent will is not that which presupposes foreknowledge of merits.

8. The second part of the conclusion is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1; likewise in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; and also in *Super I ad Timotheum*, ch. 2, lect. 1. It is briefly explained as follows. Since these two wills or volitions are distinguished in God only through their order to their material objects or connotes, and consequently possess the different denominations of antecedent and consequent only from them, that will which tends toward a created good

considered absolutely and in itself is rightly called antecedent; while that which is terminated to the same good as clothed with all its particular circumstances is rightly called consequent, provided that the good considered precisely in itself precedes that same good as clothed with particular circumstances. But such is the case, for this superaddition of particular circumstances is a certain accident in relation to such a good considered in itself, and therefore in some manner presupposes it. Therefore, God's will is rightly called antecedent because it concerns the good of the creature considered in itself, and consequent because it is terminated to that good as clothed with all its circumstances.

I say, fourth, that the antecedent will to save all human beings is not called conditional because it depends, as upon a condition, on the consent which God awaits from free choice, but because it implies a conditional act by which God would will the salvation of all human beings unless this were opposed to the order of his providence, the manifestation of his justice, and the general good of the whole universe. Thus St. Thomas teaches in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, where he says: *The antecedent will can be called conditional, and yet there is no imperfection on the part of the divine will, but only on the part of the thing willed, which is not taken together with all the circumstances required for the right order toward salvation.* He teaches the same in *Super I ad Timotheum*, ch. 2, lect. 1.

9. Reason also supports this. For since human beings cannot will salvation unless God wills them to will it, and unless he works the willing itself in them, as the Apostle teaches in Phil. 2, and Augustine in *Soliloquia*, ch. 24, in these words, We cannot will what is good unless you will it, it is contradictory that there should be in God a decree or volition to save human beings which depends, as upon a condition, on their consent and volition and awaits these from the human will. Hence the Church of Lyons says in the book *De defensione veritatis Sacrae Scripturae*: Certainly this is manifest in the present question: even if God generally and indifferently wills all human beings to be saved, nevertheless, in the hearts of some, by the kindness of his mercy, he himself works this same will of his, so that they too may will to be saved and may be saved. To such persons the Apostle says: Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will. In the hearts of others, by the severity of his just and hidden judgment, he does not work this saving will, but leaves them to their own choice, so that, because they refused to believe, they may be condemned by a just refusal.

10. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: St. Augustine did not understand universally the passage of the Apostle, *God wills all human*

beings to be saved, but imposed upon it three limitations. The first, which he gives in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 8, *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 14, and *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, ch. 8, is that the word *all* is not taken universally but according to an accommodated distribution, for those who are saved, so that the proposition has this meaning: God wills all who are saved to be saved, or no one is saved except one whom God wills to be saved. It is in the same way that a teacher is said to teach all the young men of a certain city, not because he instructs every one of them, but because no one is instructed except by him. The second limitation, found in the *Enchiridion*, ch. 105, and elsewhere, is that the word *all* is indeed taken universally, but with an incomplete universality, namely, for classes of individuals and not for every individual in each class. That is, it does not signify absolutely every individual human being, but every class of human beings: Jews and Gentiles, slaves and free persons, rulers and private persons, learned and unlearned, adults and children, men and women, and so forth, because some from all these conditions are predestined and saved. Thus, when it is said that every animal was in Noah's ark, the meaning is not that every individual animal existed there, but that some animals from every species did. The third limitation, found in Augustine's *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 15, and *De civitate Dei*, bk. 22, ch. 1, is that God wills, not formally but causally, all human beings to be saved by causing holy persons to will the salvation of all. Thus, when it is said in Rom. 8 that *the Holy Spirit intercedes for us with unutterable groanings*, the meaning is that he causes us to intercede; and when it is said in Gen. 22, *Now I know that you fear the Lord*, the meaning is, "I have caused this to be known." Therefore, according to Augustine, God does not have a general and antecedent will to save all human beings existing in fallen nature, but only some. Consequently, such a will must not be admitted in God. This is especially so because the Semi-Pelagians formerly had recourse to this will and cited the testimony of the Apostle which we have adduced as the principal foundation of their heresy, as may be seen in the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine.

11. I answer that St. Augustine must be understood in the cited passages as speaking of the consequent will, and not of the antecedent will. Thus the meaning of his doctrine is that the proposition of the Apostle, when understood of the consequent will which God has to save human beings, must not be taken universally, but with one of the three limitations given above. This is compatible with the proposition being capable and required to be taken universally when understood of the antecedent will, as St. John Damascene understood it in *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 24. Hence St. Thomas says in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: *According to Damascene, the words*

of the Apostle are understood of the antecedent will and not of the consequent will; but according to Augustine, they are understood of the consequent will.

As for the further objection concerning the Semi-Pelagians, it must be said that they understood and explained the antecedent will in a manner altogether different from that employed by the disciples of St. Thomas. For they said that there is a certain general and conditional will of God which awaits the foreseen and ascertained consent of free choice, and which consequently becomes consequent and efficacious through that same consent. Hence they did not admit that God pursues the elect with a more special love than the reprobate, but held that, as far as depends upon him, he equally wills salvation for both. We abhor these claims, as is evident from what was said in conclusions 3 and 4, and as will be even clearer from what will be said in the Treatise on Predestination.

12. You will object, second, against the second conclusion: St. Thomas, in the little work *De praescientia et praedestinatione*, ch. 6, says that the will which God has concerning the salvation of all human beings is a will of sign. In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1, and III, q. 21, a. 4, in the body, he also says that it should be called *velleity rather than absolute will*. Likewise, St. John Chrysostom, in Homily 1 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, calls this will a desire, saying that *God longs for our salvation in a wonderful manner and desires it vehemently*. But neither a will of sign, nor velleity, nor desire is found properly and formally in God, but only metaphorically or eminently. Therefore, neither is the antecedent will concerning the salvation of all human beings. Reason also supports this, for no inefficacious will can exist properly and formally in God. First, because according to Scripture every will of God is efficacious and is always fulfilled, as is evident from Isa. 46: *All my will shall be accomplished*, and Ps. 134: *Whatever the Lord willed, he did*. Second, because every inefficacious will which lacks its effect implies imperfection. But the antecedent will to save all human beings is inefficacious, since not all attain salvation. Therefore, it does not exist properly and formally in God.

13. To St. Thomas I answer that this little work is not by the Holy Doctor. This is gathered, first, from the fact that it is not found in the Roman edition of the works of St. Thomas, which is to be preferred to others; second, because otherwise he would manifestly contradict himself, since he expressly taught the opposite in *De veritate*, q. 23, cited above. It can also be said that, although this will, insofar as it formally exists in God, is a will of good pleasure, nevertheless, insofar as it is manifested by some exterior sign, it can be called a will of sign. St. Thomas may have considered it under this aspect in the cited little work, if it was composed by him, but nothing

follows from this against us. When he calls this will a *velleity*, he does not intend to teach that it is not in fact a will, or that it does not exist formally in God, but only that it is not a will without qualification, but a will in a qualified respect, insofar as it attains the object in itself and as prescinded from its circumstances. He clearly explains himself in this way in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 1. Alternatively, he calls such a will a *velleity* because it is not absolute but conditional. For a conditional will, in comparison with an absolute will, is customarily called a *velleity*, as the same Holy Doctor declares in *In IV Sententiarum*, dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3, in these words: *Although a complete will cannot concern the impossible, a conditional will, which is also called velleity, can indeed concern it.*

14. To St. John Chrysostom it is answered that he uses the word desire broadly and in a certain extensive signification, insofar as the most fervent love of something, even when present and possessed, is sometimes called a desire for it, as is evident from 1 Pet. 3: *Into whom the angels desire to look.*

15. To the argument added, I deny the major premise. To its first proof, I say that Scripture in the cited passages intends only to declare that every will of God which is called a will without qualification, such as the consequent will, is efficacious and is always fulfilled. This is compatible with there formally existing in God a will in a qualified respect, such as the antecedent will, which is not fulfilled, as is gathered from Matt. 23: *Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets, and so forth, how often I willed to gather your children, and you refused.*

16. To the second proof it must be said that a will can be called inefficacious in two ways: first, because of some extrinsic impediment overcoming or delaying its efficacy; second, because of the proper ordering and providence of the one who wills. An inefficacious will in the first manner is imperfect and cannot be found in God. But the same is not true of a will inefficacious only in the second manner, such as the antecedent will concerning the salvation of all human beings. For God, by his own ordering and providence, wills that it should lack its effect and be inefficacious in many, so that there may be room for the mutability and freedom of the human will and for the manifestation of his attributes.

17. You will say: granted that such a will exists formally in God, it cannot nevertheless be true and sincere. For if it were within the merchant's power to flee or calm the storm, so that his merchandise would not perish, who would believe him to have a true and sincere will for its preservation if, when the storm threatened, he neither avoided nor overcame it? Since, therefore, God possesses in the treasures of his omnipotence infinite means by which he can save all human beings, he does not seem to have a true and sincere

will to save those to whom he denies such means and helps, conferring or offering only sufficient helps.

18. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that a merchant is a private person whose task is to intend his own particular good and profit. Hence, if he does not do everything in his power to preserve his merchandise when a storm threatens, he is shown not sincerely to will its preservation. God, however, is the universal provider, whose task is to intend and provide for the common good of the universe and to permit some creatures to fail and to be frustrated of their end. Hence, together with a sincere will for the salvation of someone considered absolutely, he can permit that person to fall into sin and deny him efficacious helps for avoiding it, lest a greater good be impeded, namely, the order of divine providence, the beauty of the universe, the manifestation of the divine attributes, the adornment of justice, the splendor of mercy, and so forth.

19. You will object, third, against the third conclusion: St. John Damascene, in *De fide orthodoxa*, bk. 1, ch. 29, says that the consequent will in God takes its origin from our fault, and St. Thomas in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, expressly says that *the consequent will presupposes foreknowledge of works*. Therefore, it is rightly denominated consequent for this reason, and consequently the antecedent will is also rightly so called because it precedes that foreknowledge.

20. I answer that when St. John Damascene and St. Thomas say that the consequent will takes its origin from our fault and presupposes foreknowledge of works, they are not speaking of the consequent will taken universally and as extending both to good works predetermined by God and to evil works permitted by him. Rather, they are speaking of the consequent will taken specially, or of the punitive consequent will, which presupposes fault and takes its origin from our sin, according to the statement of Tertullian: *God is merciful from what is his own, and just from what is ours*. For in explaining the consequent will of God, they give an example involving a particular object which God wills upon the presupposition of foreseen sin, namely, the damnation and eternal punishment of the reprobate. It is not, however, necessary that everything God wills by his consequent will should presuppose sin or foreknowledge of merits or demerits. This is evident in predestination, which is a consequent will of God and yet, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, does not presuppose foreknowledge of merits.

21. You will object, fourth, against the fourth conclusion: God does not save human beings unless they will to be saved. Therefore, the antecedent

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will to save all human beings depends upon the volition of the human being which God awaits from free choice.

But I deny the consequence. For although God does not save human beings unless they will to be saved and freely consent to his calling, he does not await this volition and consent from free choice, but produces and works it in the human heart through his grace, according to Augustine in Epistle 107: *That we believe in God and live piously is not of the one who wills or of the one who runs, but of God who has mercy; not because we must not will and run, but because he himself works in us both to will and to run.*

§ 2.

The Fifth Difficulty is Resolved, Namely, Whether
Christ Suffered and Died for All.

22. I say, fifth, that Christ suffered and died for all, or offered and ordained his death and Passion for the salvation not only of a few, but of each and every human being.

The conclusion is proved, first, from these words of the Apostle in 2 Cor. 5: *If one died for all, then all died; and Christ died for all.* In this passage the Apostle proves that each and every human being died, that is, contracted in Adam the debt of dying, from the fact that Christ died for all. But absolutely all human beings distributively died in Adam and contracted in him the debt of dying. Therefore, Christ also died distributively for each and every human being, and not merely for classes of individuals, as Jansen interprets it. Nor did he die for all merely as regards the sufficiency of the price, as others say, since in this sense he could also be said to have died for the demons and the damned. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 3, defines that Christ died for all in the sense in which this was denied by Calvin. But Calvin did not deny that Christ died for all as regards the sufficiency of the price, nor that he died for some from every class and condition, for in commenting on John 17 he employs both these evasions to explain the passages of Scripture in which Christ is said to have died for all. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

23. To these are added the testimonies of the Holy Fathers, especially Augustine, who most decisively refutes Jansen. For in his commentary on Ps. 95, near the end, he says: *He will judge the world in equity, not merely a part of it, because he did not purchase merely a part. He must judge the whole because he gave the price for the whole.* In *De symbolo ad catechumenos*, bk. 2, ch. 8, he introduces Christ speaking as follows and reproaching the reprobate: *You see the wounds which you inflicted. You recognize the side which you pierced. It was*

opened both by you and for you, and yet you refused to enter. Likewise, in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 1, he proves from the testimony of the Apostle cited above that all human beings died the death of sin because Christ died for all. His words are: *One, says the Apostle, died for all; therefore all died*, showing that it would not have been possible for him to die except for the dead. From this he proved that all had died, because one died for all. Press this forcefully upon the one who refuses it: *One died for all; therefore all died*. See that he intended it as a consequence, so that all should be understood to have died if one died for all. Since, therefore, they did not all die in body, it remains that all died in sin if Christ died for all. Let no one deny this, let no one doubt it, who does not deny or doubt that he is a Christian.

24. Reason also supports the conclusion. For if Christ did not die for the salvation of each and every human being, one of the principal foundations of our faith is shaken. According to the doctrine and institution of the Church, every believer is bound to believe that Christ is his Redeemer no less than that God is his Creator, and to invoke him as such. But he cannot believe this if Christ is the Redeemer only of some, especially if he is said to be the Redeemer only of the elect, among whose number no one can believe himself to be without a special revelation, as the Council of Trent defines in sess. 6, ch. 13. Therefore, Christ is the Redeemer of all human beings and suffered and died for the salvation of all. Hence the Church frequently repeats in her more solemn prayers these words: *O God, Creator and Redeemer of all the faithful*. In ecclesiastical hymns it is said: *Jesus, Redeemer of all*. These words of St. Ambrose on Ps. 118 agree with them: *That mystical sun of justice arose for all, came for all, suffered for all, and rose again for all*.

25. I add that this doctrine concerning the general redemption accomplished by Christ not only confirms our faith, but also strengthens our hope and inflames us with charity, as the Holy Fathers expressly teach. Augustine says in *Meditationes*, ch. 14: All my hope and the certainty of my entire confidence is in the precious blood of Christ, which was poured out for us and for our salvation. And in *Sermon 5 to the Brethren*: The Son of God died for us. Be confident that you will receive his life, since you possess his death as a pledge. What life does he reserve for you when justified, he who granted you his death even when you were impious? With how certain and firm a promise does he preserve his life for the just, he who granted his death to the unjust? How, I ask, could he abandon the one redeemed and allow him to perish, when he sought the impious one in order to redeem him? He bore our evils; will he not give us his goods? The fountain of life died for us. Will he deny his life, who expended his death for us? Likewise, the Apostle teaches in 2 Cor. 5 that Christ's death and general redemption

are a great incitement to charity, in these words: The charity of Christ urges us, because if one died for all, then all died; and Christ died for all, so that those who live should now live no longer for themselves, but for him who died for them. Hence St. Bernard says in Sermon 20 on the Song of Songs: The work of our redemption altogether claims our whole love for itself. It attracts our devotion more sweetly, demands it more justly, binds it more tightly, and moves our affection more vehemently.

26. Against this conclusion, certain testimonies of Scripture can first be objected in which, when speaking of Christ's death and redemption, the word *many* is used, as in Matt. 20: *The Son of Man came to give his life as a redemption for many*. Likewise in Matt. 26: *This is my blood of the new testament, which shall be poured out for many*, and so forth. But it is answered that in these passages the blood of Christ is signified as having been poured out for many as regards efficacy, and for all as regards sufficiency, as St. Thomas interprets the passage of Matthew. Alternatively, it can be said that the word *many*, according to Augustine in the earlier work *Contra Julianum*, bk. 6, ch. 12, in the later work, bk. 2, ch. 134, and in *De civitate Dei*, bk. 20, ch. 32, is frequently used in Scripture for the word *all*, as in Dan. 12: *Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awaken*, that is, all shall rise on the day of judgment; and in Rom. 5: *If by the offense of one many died*.

27. Second, other testimonies are objected in which Christ is said not to have prayed for the reprobate, as in John 17: *I do not pray for the world, but for those whom you have given me*. That is, according to Augustine in Homilies 100 and 107 on John, not for the reprobate, but for the predestined. Hence St. Thomas, in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 21, a. 4, ad 2, says that Christ did not pray for all his crucifiers, nor even for all who were going to believe in him. But it is answered that these words do not signify that Christ in no manner prayed for the reprobate, but only that he did not pray for them in that particular prayer which he then poured forth after the Last Supper for the Apostles alone. Alternatively, he did not pray for them with an absolute prayer proceeding from his consequent will, so as to obtain for them from the Father eternal life and the means efficaciously leading to it. Hence the Holy Doctor adds after the words cited: *But only for those who were predestined to attain eternal life through him*. By these words he openly declares that he denied in Christ, with respect to all his crucifiers, only that kind of prayer which Christ offered for the elect.

28. Third, it is objected that in Heb. 9:12 Christ's redemption is called eternal. But it is easily answered that it is called eternal, not because it pertains only to the predestined, in whom alone the fruit of Christ's death is

everlasting, but because it must not be repeated, as the ancient sacrifices had to be, with which the sacrifice of Christ's death is there compared.

29. Fourth, these words of the Third Council of Valence in Gaul, ch. 4, are objected: *Christ did not die for those who died in impiety*. But the meaning of these words is that Christ did not die so that the impious already condemned to eternal punishments might be delivered from them through the benefit of the Savior. The Council does not, however, deny that while they were alive Christ's redemption and sufficient helps for salvation were offered to them.

30. Finally, Jansen objects several testimonies of Augustine in which he asserts that those alone are redeemed by Christ who are actually saved, and that no one perishes from among those whom Christ redeemed and for whom he died. It is briefly answered that the word *redeem* has two meanings. First, it signifies offering a sufficient price for the freedom of a captive, with the sincere will that such a price be applied to him. Second, it signifies actually liberating a captive from servitude. Therefore, when Augustine says that those alone are redeemed by Christ who are actually saved, or that no one perishes from among those whom Christ redeemed, he speaks of redemption not in the first sense but in the second. Prosper speaks in the same manner when, in his response to the first objection of Vincent, he says: *Those who passed through this age without faith in Christ and without the regeneration of the sacrament are strangers to redemption*. He means only that they were not redeemed in second act and as regards application. Hence in the same place he says: *Since, on account of the one nature of all and the one cause of all which was truly assumed by our Lord, all are rightly said to have been redeemed, and yet not all have been liberated from captivity, the proper effect of redemption belongs to those who are no longer vessels of the devil, but vessels of Christ*. That is, those alone are properly called redeemed who are justified and liberated from the power of the devil.

§ 3.

The Final Difficulty is Resolved.

31. I say, finally, that through the antecedent will God prepares for human beings, even in the state of fallen nature, means or helps sufficient for salvation. This is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, ch. 12, lect. 3, where he says: *God wills all human beings to be saved, and therefore grace is lacking to no one, but, as far as lies in him, he communicates himself to all*. And in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 159, he says: *God, as far as*

lies in him, is prepared to give grace to all, for he wills all human beings to be saved. That he is speaking of human beings in the state of fallen nature is openly gathered from the fact that otherwise he should have said, not that God is prepared, but that he had been prepared, to give grace to all. Finally, the same Holy Doctor, in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, speaking of God's antecedent will, says: *The effect of this will is the very ordering toward the end of salvation and those things which advance toward the end, commonly proposed to all, both natural and gratuitous.* By these words he indicates the fundamental reason for our conclusion. For through his antecedent will God orders all human beings toward the end of salvation: *The effect of this will is the very ordering toward the end of salvation*, says the Holy Doctor. Therefore, through that will he prepares for human beings means or helps sufficient for salvation. The consequence is evident. For since the end cannot be attained except through means, it is contradictory for human beings to be sufficiently ordered through the antecedent will toward the end of salvation unless through that same will means and helps sufficient for salvation are prepared for them.

32. This is confirmed. By the very fact that God, through his antecedent will, orders human beings toward salvation and a supernatural end, he obliges them to observe the supernatural precepts which are necessary means for attaining it. But a human being cannot be obliged to observe supernatural precepts without sufficient helps, for otherwise he would be obliged to the impossible, since without the help of grace he cannot fulfill supernatural precepts. Therefore, through the antecedent will God prepares for human beings supernatural helps sufficient for salvation.

33. Against this conclusion a certain more recent author objects, first: God's antecedent will concerning the salvation of all human beings is nothing other than a certain velleity which regards only human nature under the general aspect of nature and as created by God for salvation. But the will by which God prepares for human beings in the state of corrupted nature the means necessary for salvation is a true and properly so-called will, and not merely a certain velleity, and regards human beings in particular as they exist in themselves, not merely human nature under the general aspect of nature and as created by God for salvation. Therefore, through the antecedent will God does not prepare for human beings in the state of fallen nature the means or helps necessary for salvation.

34. I answer by denying the major premise as regards both its parts. First, it is false that the antecedent will is not a true and properly so-called will, although it is not a will without qualification, but a will in a qualified respect, nor an absolute but a conditional will, on account of which it is

sometimes called a velleity, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage cited above. It is also false that such a will does not regard human beings in particular as they exist in themselves. For when St. Thomas teaches that the antecedent will is that which regards human nature under the general aspect of nature, he does not intend that it regards human nature as such and as prescinded from all individuals. Rather, he intends that it regards all human beings individually and in particular insofar as they agree and share in the same nature created for salvation and ordered toward a supernatural end.

35. It is objected, second: God works in human beings those things which conduce to their salvation only through that will by which he wills them without qualification. But through the antecedent will he wills without qualification none of those things which conduce to human salvation. Therefore, through that will he works none of them. Hence St. Thomas, in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2, teaches that operation corresponds not to the antecedent will, but to the consequent will.

36. I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. Through the antecedent will God wills without qualification none of those things which conduce to human salvation efficaciously: I grant this. Inefficaciously: I deny it. I similarly distinguish the consequence. Therefore, through that will he works none of the things which conduce to human salvation efficaciously: I grant this. Inefficaciously: I deny it. For, as St. Thomas says in the passage cited above: *The effect of this will is the very ordering toward the end of salvation and those things which advance toward the end, commonly proposed to all, both natural and gratuitous*. Hence, when he teaches that operation corresponds not to the antecedent but to the consequent will, he is speaking of the principal operation and effect, such as the preparation of efficacious helps and the attainment of glory, and not of a less principal operation and effect, such as the simple ordering toward the end of salvation and the preparation of sufficient helps.

37. You will say: the same Holy Doctor compares the antecedent will to save all human beings with the will of a judge who wills without qualification that a murderer be hanged, but who would will in a qualified respect that he live, namely, insofar as he is a human being. Therefore, just as the judge, from this will by which he would will the murderer to live, prepares for him no means by which he can escape capital punishment, neither does God prepare such means. But I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that the judge is not a universal provider, as God is.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Efficacy of the Divine Will.

For the efficacy of the divine will to be perfectly understood, two celebrated controversies must be resolved here. The first is disputed between the Thomists and the defenders of middle knowledge: namely, whether the divine decrees concerning our free acts are intrinsically efficacious and predetermine the will, or are purely indifferent and await the will's determination and consent. The second is against Jansenius and his followers: namely, whether the efficacy and predetermination of the divine decrees apply not only to the state of fallen nature, but extend also to the state of innocence of angels and men.

§ 1.

The Decrees of the Divine Will Concerning Our Free Acts Are of
Themselves Efficacious and Predetermine the Will.

1. This is proved first from Scripture, for the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 4: *That no one may be puffed up for one against another beyond what is written. For who distinguishes you? What do you have that you have not received? And if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?* From these words the following argument may be drawn. If the divine decree concerning our free acts is not intrinsically efficacious and does not predetermine the human will, but is purely indifferent and determinable by it to the species of the act, the reason distinguishing one who consents from one who does not consent will not be reduced to God, but to the created will; consequently, one man will be able to become puffed up and glory against another. But this is contrary to the words of the Apostle. Therefore, so also is the former position. The inference of the major premise is proved as follows. The distinction between effects must be reduced, not to that in which their causes agree, but to that in which they differ. For because two individuals of the same species agree in their specific nature, and two species in their generic degree, they cannot be distinguished from one another by that common specific or generic nature. But consent and non-consent agree in the decree, if the decree, as it proceeds from God, is purely indifferent; and they differ only in the consent and dissent of free choice, which determines

the indifference and potentiality of such a decree to acts of diverse species. Therefore, the distinction between one who consents and one who does not consent is reduced, not to the divine decree, but to free choice.

2. This is proved secondly from the holy Fathers, who commonly teach that the question, Why is efficacious grace given to one but not to another? is altogether inscrutable and unsearchable, and cannot be resolved by the willing or unwillingness of human choice. Thus St. Prosper, *De vocatione gentium*, bk. I, last chapter, says: Therefore, the depth of that question which, following the Apostle's wonder, we confess to be impenetrable, is not resolved by the willing or unwillingness of free choice; for although an evil unwillingness is present in man, he does not possess a good willingness unless it has been given to him. Similarly, Augustine resolves the profundity of this question only by recurring to the unsearchable judgments of God, as is clear from *In Ioannem*, tract. 26, where he says: Do not presume to judge why He draws this man and does not draw another, unless you wish to err. And in *De Spiritu et littera*, c. 2: If anyone asks me why one man is persuaded in such a way that he is actually convinced, while another is not—that is, why an efficacious calling is given to one but not to another—only two answers occur to me which I am pleased to give: “O depth of riches!” and “Is there injustice with God?” Let anyone displeased by this answer seek one more learned than Augustine, but let him beware lest he find one more presumptuous.

But if God had concerning our free acts a purely indifferent decree, awaiting the determination and consent of free choice, which would determine it to the species of the act, the solution to that question would be easy. For one could readily answer, as the adversaries themselves answer, that the calling is efficacious in one but not in another because one wills to obey it and is foreseen through middle knowledge as one who will consent, while the other is not; or because one, through free choice, determines the indifference of the divine decree to an act of this species, while the other does not. Thus, if one asks why the sun together with a fig tree produces a fig, with an olive tree an olive, and with a vine clusters of grapes, the answer is easy: because the concurrence of the sun, which is of itself indifferent and undetermined, is modified in the inferior causes in which it is received and is determined by them to produce these effects rather than others. Therefore, the decrees of God concerning our free acts are not purely indifferent, but determining and intrinsically efficacious.

3. This is proved thirdly from St. Augustine, who in various places openly favors our position. In *In Ioannem*, tract. 105, he says that *God predestined all future things*, that is, predefined them. And in tract. 68: *God made future things*

by predestining them. And in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 10: By His predestination God foreknew those things which He Himself was going to accomplish. But God cannot foreknow our future acts in His predestination or decree unless that decree is of itself efficacious and causes the free determination of our will, and consequently predetermines it, as was shown in the treatise on the knowledge of God, c. 4, § 2. Therefore, St. Augustine acknowledges in God decrees concerning our free acts which are of themselves efficacious and predetermine our will.

This may be confirmed from the fact that in many places the holy Doctor acknowledges grace that is intrinsically efficacious, by which God converts human hearts when, how, and where He wills. This is especially clear from *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 8, where he says: *Therefore, this grace—namely, efficacious grace—which by divine generosity is secretly bestowed upon human hearts, is rejected by no hardened heart; for it is given precisely so that hardness of heart may first be removed.* But once grace intrinsically efficacious and infallible as it comes from God has been admitted, a decree that is of itself and intrinsically efficacious and predetermines the will must necessarily be conceded, as the adversaries confess and as is manifest in itself. Therefore, decrees intrinsically and by their own nature efficacious are according to the mind of Augustine.

4. This is proved fourthly from St. Thomas, who likewise manifestly teaches our position in many places. For in *Quodlibet* XII, a. 4, he subscribes to the position of those who say that *all things have been predetermined by divine providence*. In this sense, together with Augustine, he teaches there that it can be conceded that all things are subject to fate, provided that by the name “fate” we understand divine providence preordaining and predetermining everything in the world. He adds, however, that Catholics should not use the name *fate*, because it is not fitting for them to have names in common with the Gentiles.

But who would say that purely indifferent decrees, or decrees presupposing the foresight of our consent through middle knowledge, could be called fate? And who would dare to assert that through such decrees all things have been predetermined by divine providence, as the holy Doctor says? Therefore, no one can deny that he acknowledges in God intrinsically efficacious decrees by which He predetermines our will so that it may act freely and infallibly at the same time, both as regards the substance of the act and its free mode, as will be explained below.

Hence, in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1, resolving the argument from the authority of Damascene, who says, *God indeed foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things*, he answers that *Damascene calls the*

imposition of necessity “predetermination,” as in natural things, which are predetermined to one outcome. He answers this authority, and another from Gregory of Nyssa in *Contra Gentiles*, bk. III, c. 90, in the same manner. Therefore, he holds that a decree predetermining the will, not to one outcome in the manner of nature, but in the manner of freedom and with complete infallibility, must necessarily be admitted. Otherwise he would have explained these authorities of the Fathers in vain; indeed, he should not have interpreted them, but simply and absolutely admitted them.

5. From these things it is evident how skilled and versed in the doctrine of St. Thomas are certain recent authors who say that the name “predetermination” is new and was devised by Báñez, since the holy Doctor not only uses it in the passages cited, but also in *In I Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum*, dist. 47, q. un., a. 4, ad 4, where he says: By the will of God things are not only brought into being, but He also predetermined the mode in which the things to be produced would be produced. Hence, since the will of God is efficaciously fulfilled, things must come about, and they must come about in the same manner in which the divine will has disposed them.

Indeed, Dionysius, a disciple of Paul and the most ancient of the theologians, used the same name at the very beginning of the Church, in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5, where he writes: We call exemplars in God the substantial reasons which theologians call predefinitions, and the divine and good wills that predetermine existing things.

6. This is proved fifthly. If the decrees of the divine will concerning our free acts are not efficacious of themselves but purely indifferent, it follows that the free determination of our will to consent to the calling of divine grace is not caused by the divine will, and consequently that God is not the first cause of all things, and therefore is not God. The inference is proved as follows. The will of God cannot cause such a determination except through His decree, since, according to the Apostle, He works all things according to the counsel of His will. But through a decree of itself indifferent to consent or dissent, a determination to consent rather than dissent cannot be caused. For since the determined and the indifferent are as opposed to each other as hot and cold, white and black, just as it is repugnant for the hot to be produced by the cold or the white by the black, so it is repugnant for the determined to be produced by the indifferent. Therefore, if the decree of the divine will concerning our free acts is not of itself efficacious and predetermining, the determination of the human will will not be caused by the divine will.

7. This argument is confirmed and further clarified. I ask the adversaries: By what is a decree indifferent to consent or dissent determined to one side

rather than the other—by God or by the creature? If by the creature, then the concurrence of the creature precedes by nature the concurrence of God, since that which determines, as such, must precede what is determined, because as such it is related to it as form. Consequently, under some formality the concurrence of the creature necessarily escapes the causality of the divine decree. If by God, then His decree first determines the secondary cause by nature, and consequently is not purely indifferent but predetermining, as the Thomists teach.

Certainly, one must either admit an infinite regress in the determinations of divine concurrence and decree, which are of themselves indifferent; or concede that some actual determination of the created will is not caused by God; or, finally, say that the decree of the divine will by which it is caused is of itself determined, and therefore efficacious, toward the consent rather than the dissent of our will. Hence John of St. Thomas says excellently that this difficulty *is a deep abyss for the obstinate defenders of middle knowledge, filled with the swiftest whirlpools, which no one crosses without being swallowed up unless he is cast upon the shore of divine efficacy.*

8. This is proved sixthly. If God has concerning our free acts purely indifferent decrees which await the determination and consent of our will, it follows that He does not have as perfect and absolute a dominion over our free acts as the created will has. But this cannot be said, since according to Augustine, *De correptione et gratia*, c. 14, *God has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills.* Therefore, neither can the former be said.

The inference of the major premise is proved as follows. By reason of the perfect dominion it has over its free acts, the created will can, without injury to or destruction of its freedom, determine itself freely and initiate such a determination; nor must it presuppose or await that determination from another created cause. Therefore, if God cannot accomplish the same thing and cause such a determination to begin and proceed from the created will without injuring freedom, but must await and, as it were, beg it from free choice, He will not have as perfect and absolute a dominion over our free acts as the created will itself has. Man will have his own will more in his hand than God Himself does, which is directly contrary to the proposition of St. Augustine asserting that *God has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills.*

9. This is proved seventhly. Once decrees and assistances efficacious of themselves have been removed, the necessity of prayer—which is the principal basis and foundation of spiritual and Christian life—utterly collapses, and all our prayer becomes wholly vain and ridiculous. For what, I

ask, do the defenders of indifferent decrees and middle knowledge request from God when they ask for His grace to live well and holily? Either they ask for grace and assistance, which cannot be said, since according to them grace is ready at every instant and is granted even to the most hardened. Or do they ask for the use, application, or determination of grace? This also cannot be said, since they maintain that this does not proceed from grace and the decree of God, but is awaited from the human will.

But a petition is ridiculous, Augustine says, *when something is asked from one who is known not to give it, but which, without his giving it, lies within man's power*. Therefore, if it is within our power to make God's assistance efficacious, and its efficacy depends only upon the determination and application of our will, as the adversaries teach, it is asked from God in vain. For God will answer the petitioner: "Make grace efficacious yourself, and you will have whatever you desire."

10. I add that the indifferent decree of concurring with free causes, which the adversaries admit in God, involves many difficulties that sharply bite and sting them and from which they can extricate themselves only with difficulty. For either that decree is general and absolute—to concur in whatever man wills—as some defenders of middle knowledge teach; or it is special and conditional, namely: "I will to concur in love or hatred if the creature wills and determines itself to love or hatred," as others assert.

If the first is said, that manner of God's concurring through an indifferent concurrence and without the intention or volition of any particular act and effect, but only with the general intention of doing whatever the creature wills, will be blind, ignorant, imprudent, wandering, and confused. It will make God like fishermen who cast a net into the sea without knowing what fish they will catch and enclose in their nets.

If the second is asserted, such a decree will have a ridiculous and trifling meaning. For since, according to the adversaries, God's concurrence is nothing other than the action of the secondary cause as proceeding from God, for God to say, "I will to concur in love if the creature determines itself to love," is the same as saying, "I will to concur in love if I concur in love," or, "If I see love produced, I will produce it."

11. This is confirmed. It involves a contradiction for that without which a condition cannot be fulfilled to be promised or decreed conditionally. For if someone said to a man in darkness, "If you see this object, I will give you light," the man would mock him, since he cannot see it without light. Similarly, if someone said to a weak child incapable of lifting a weight, "If you lift it, I will help you lift it," the child would likewise mock him, since he is incapable of lifting it unless helped by another.

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But the created will, in whatever order of things it is placed, cannot will or determine itself without the actual concurrence of God, according to the words of Augustine in *Soliloquia*, c. 24: *I cannot will what is good unless You will it*. Therefore, the concurrence of God cannot be promised or decreed by God under the condition that the human will wills or determines itself.

12. Finally, indifferent decrees can be refuted by an argument drawn from the new decree of Innocent XI, whose tenor follows.

Thursday, 23 November 1679.

In the general congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, held in the Apostolic Palace on the Quirinal Hill, in the presence of our Most Holy Lord Innocent XI and the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, appointed by the Holy Apostolic See as Inquisitors General against heretical depravity throughout the whole Christian commonwealth.

When these two propositions had been reported to the aforesaid Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords: *God gives us His omnipotence so that we may use it, just as someone gives another a country estate or a book. And God subjects His omnipotence to us*, they were diligently examined, by their command, by theologians specially appointed for this purpose. After their opinions had been heard, and the matter had been reported to our Most Holy Lord and proposed before His Holiness, together with the opinions of the Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lords, Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, His Holiness decreed and commanded that both propositions be altogether prohibited, as by the present decree he condemns and prohibits them as at least rash and novel. He commands that no one henceforth, of whatever rank, order, or condition, dare to print them or cause them to be printed, or to teach or assert them in writing or even orally, under the penalties and censures contained in the Index of Prohibited Books.

Place of the fourth seal.

Francis Richard, notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition.

On 2 December 1679 the aforesaid decree was posted and published at the doors of the Basilica of the Prince of the Apostles, the Palace of the Holy Office, and the other customary and usual places of the City, by me, Francis Perrinus, courier of our Most Holy Lord the Pope and of the Most Holy Inquisition.

13. This decree appears to touch the indifferent decrees of recent authors. For many of them commonly teach and assert that men have God's omnipotence and concurrence in their power, use it at will, and determine it either to good or to evil as they please. In this sense they understand and explain the words of Isa. 43: *You have made Me serve in your sins*. They add that the concurrence of God proceeding from divine omnipotence is in us in the manner of a habit, which we use when and as we will, and which is subject to the freedom and judgment of our will.

Hence, the aforesaid decree appears to oppose such teaching and opinion, and to condemn and reprove it as rash and novel. We must therefore adhere to the ancient, true, and solid doctrine of the Thomists, who assert that God's omnipotence and His decrees, assistances, and concurrence are not in our power or subject to the judgment of our will, but rather powerfully and gently subject it to themselves; and that they are of themselves and intrinsically efficacious. Consequently, they are not determined by the created will to acting or not acting, but determine and apply it to whatever God wills, because of the supreme and absolute dominion He has over it, as we explained at length above from Augustine.

§ 2.

The Objections are Resolved.

14. You will object first: The concurrence of universal and superior causes is indifferent and is determined by particular and inferior causes to the species of the act. For example, the concurrence of the sun is determined by a fig tree to produce figs, by an olive tree to produce olives, by a vine to produce clusters of grapes, by a man to generate a man, and by a horse to produce a horse. Therefore, similarly, the decree or concurrence of the first and most universal cause is indifferent and is determined by free causes to the species of the act. Hence St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3, teaches that the influence of the first cause is modified, determined, and specified by secondary causes.

15. I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that the concurrence of universal secondary causes need not cause the determination of inferior causes as regards the species of their acts or effects. For example, the sun does not cause the determination of a plant or tree to produce fruits of this species, but presupposes that determination as implanted by nature. The concurrence of the first cause, however, since it is most universal and

extends to all things, causes the determination of free choice and does not presuppose or await it from the created will. Hence, it cannot be indifferent in the manner of the concurrence of universal secondary causes.

When St. Thomas teaches that the influence of the first cause is modified and determined by secondary causes, he means only that God tempers and accommodates His concurrence and motion to their natures, so that He moves necessary and natural causes to one outcome in the manner of nature, without leaving a power to the opposite, but moves free causes to one outcome in a free manner while leaving the power to the opposite. This is for God's concurrence and motion to be determined by secondary causes only materially and objectively, or, as others say, according to their exigency.

16. You will object secondly: St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 3, teaches that God prepares for the salvation of the predestined means which are indeed defectible of themselves, but some of which, when others fail, will obtain the effect. Just as, he says, the perpetuity of a species is preserved through the succession of many individuals, each of which is corruptible. But if an intrinsically efficacious decree predetermining the will were granted, every assistance of grace in a predestined person would have efficacy and effect. Therefore, such a decree is contrary to the mind and teaching of St. Thomas.

17. I answer that the holy Doctor is speaking there of free choice in comparison with the end of predestination. For attaining that end, it is most true that efficacy is not found in every particular assistance but in the whole collection of assistances that God prepares from His efficacious intention of glory. He does not, however, deny that every assistance of divine grace has intrinsic efficacy for the particular act for which it is given; rather, he teaches the opposite, as is gathered from the example he adduces. For if there were not in each individual of a corruptible nature an efficacy for some preservation of nature, perpetuity could not be preserved even in all the individuals. Therefore, likewise, unless there were in some assistances an efficacy of grace for the particular acts through which beatitude is attained, the attainment of the end could not be secured through them.

18. The adversaries object thirdly: From decrees intrinsically efficacious and predetermining the created will, fate is introduced into human affairs, since such decrees are no less firm, inflexible, and immutable than the constellations of the stars and the courses of the planets, in which the Gentiles formerly placed fate. Hence Lessius calls those decrees *iron and adamantine*. Therefore, they must not be admitted.

19. I answer first that the same objection was formerly made against Augustine by the Semipelagians, as is clear from St. Prosper in his letter to

Augustine. Recounting the principal complaints of the men of Marseilles against Augustine's teaching, he says that they complained that a certain fatal necessity was introduced by it. Hence Faustus, the leader of the Semipelagians, attacking Augustine's teaching while suppressing his name, says in *De libero arbitrio*, bk. X, c. 4: *Under an appearance of piety, the evil of paganism will be hidden, and under the name of grace a fatal decree will be concealed.* And in c. 12: *Let that original or fatal determination depart from here.*

I answer secondly that if by the name "fate" divine providence is understood as predefining and predetermining by its eternal and immutable decree everything in the world to occur according to the nature and condition of the causes from which they proceed—that is, free things freely and necessary things necessarily—there is no difficulty in admitting fate, although we ought not use this name, because it is not fitting for Catholics to have names in common with the Gentiles.

St. Thomas expressly teaches this in Quodlibet XII, cited above, and proves it from Augustine, who says: If anyone understands fate in this manner, let him retain the doctrine, correct his language, and say not "fate," but "the providence of God." Augustine has similar words in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. II: Nor do we assert fate under the name of grace, because we say that the grace of God is preceded by no merits of men. If some are pleased to call the most omnipotent will of God by the name of fate, we indeed approve avoiding novel expressions, but we do not care to contend over words.

20. Moreover, a great and notable difference is found between a predetermining decree and fate strictly understood, which the Gentiles formerly admitted. Their fate came from causes wholly extrinsic to the will, namely, from the stars and heavenly bodies. The predetermining decree, however, proceeds from God, who, since He is the author and principle of the will itself and has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills, does not stand as an extrinsic agent in relation to our will, but is counted among its internal causes, as will be explained more fully below.

Hence, although the fate of the Gentiles imposed necessity upon the will and removed from it the power to the opposite, a predetermining decree does not do so, but rather fosters, preserves, and strengthens that power, as will be clear from what follows. Therefore, Lessius undeservedly calls predetermining decrees *iron and adamantine*, since they are most gentle and proportioned and accommodated to the nature and condition of the secondary causes they move. The indifferent decrees which the defenders of middle knowledge attribute to God could more truly be called *glass and*

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leaden: glass because, to use Augustine's words, *they glitter with vanity but are shattered by truth*; and *leaden* because they await their impression and determination from the human will.

§ 3.

God Physically Predetermines the Will to Elicit its Free Acts.

21. This is proved first by a fundamental argument. Simultaneous concurrence does not preserve in God the character of first cause in relation to our free acts. Therefore, a previous concurrence, which the Thomists call physical predetermination, must necessarily be admitted. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved as follows. A concurrence that is indifferent as proceeding from God and must be determined by the will does not suffice for the character of first cause. But simultaneous concurrence is indifferent as proceeding from God and must be determined by the will, as the adversaries teach. Therefore, it does not suffice for the character of first cause.

The major premise is proved as follows. A concurrence in which God is subordinated to the creature more than the creature to God does not suffice for the character of first cause. But in a concurrence indifferent as proceeding from God and determined as proceeding from the will, God is subordinated to the creature more than the creature to God. Therefore, such a concurrence does not suffice for the character of first cause. The major premise is certain, for it is contrary to the perfection of the first cause to be subordinated to a secondary cause. The minor premise is shown as follows. Because the created will cannot elicit a free act without the divine concurrence, it is subordinated to God in the production of the free act, as the adversaries teach. But God cannot cause the free act without the concurrence of the will; moreover, the created will determines the divine concurrence, if it is indifferent as proceeding from God or offered to the will in an indifferent manner. Therefore, in this manner of concurring, God is subordinated to the will more than the will to God.

22. From this you understand that, for the character of first cause to be preserved in God with respect to free acts, He must concur in them by a previous concurrence determining the concurrence of the created will. This is so, first, because every cause must be prior, at least in nature and causality, to its effect. Secondly, because an indifferent concurrence cannot cause the determination of our will, just as the hot cannot be produced by the cold or the white by the black. Finally, for God as first cause to influence the free

consent of the created will, the created will must be subordinated to God in producing it. But unless it depends upon Him as determining it, it is not subordinated to Him. Therefore, neither does it depend upon Him as first cause.

The minor premise is proved as follows. That the created will cannot produce a free act without divine concurrence does not suffice for it to be subordinated to God in producing that act. Therefore, to preserve this subordination, it must depend upon God as determining its concurrence. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved as follows. God cannot produce the free act of the created will without its concurrence, and yet God is not subordinated to the created will in the production of the free act, for it is contrary to the character of first cause to be subordinated to a secondary cause. Therefore, the fact that the created will cannot produce a free act without divine concurrence does not suffice for it to elicit that act as subordinated to God, and consequently does not suffice for God to concur in it as first cause.

23. The necessity of physical predetermination with respect to the created will is proved secondly by an argument drawn from St. Thomas, In II Physicorum, lect. 8, where he reasons as follows: Just as a motive power which is open to either alternative does not pass into act unless it is determined to one by an appetitive power, so nothing that is open to either alternative passes into act unless it is determined to one by something. For that which is open to either alternative is like a being in potency, while potency is not a principle of acting, but only act. Hence, nothing follows from that which is open to either alternative unless through something else which determines it to one.

He has similar words in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 2: *That which is indifferently disposed toward many things does not perform one rather than another. Hence, no effect follows from a contingent cause open to either alternative unless through something by which it is determined to one.* But the created will is of itself an undetermined principle indifferent to either alternative and is indifferently disposed toward many things. Therefore, it will never pass into a determinate act unless it is first, at least by nature, determined by some extrinsic agent, namely God.

24. Suarez answers in *De auxiliis*, bk. II, cc. 42 and 43, that although our will is indifferent and in potency to its acts, nevertheless, because of the eminence of its power, its freedom, and the perfect dominion it has over its acts, it is virtually in act. Consequently, it does not need to be determined and reduced to act by an extrinsic agent, but can determine itself and reduce itself to act.

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25. But against this: Although the will by reason of its freedom has dominion over its acts, this dominion is not supreme and absolute, but dependent upon and subordinated to God's dominion. Therefore, although it can in its own order, as a secondary free principle and secondary mover, determine itself and reduce itself to act, it cannot accomplish this except in subordination to the first free principle and first mover, and consequently only in dependence upon His motion and determination.

Hence St. Thomas says splendidly in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 1: Man is master of his acts of willing and not willing because of the deliberation of reason, which can turn to one side or the other. But if he were also master of whether he deliberates or does not deliberate, this would have to be through a preceding deliberation; and since this cannot proceed to infinity, one must finally arrive at the point where man's free choice is moved by some exterior principle above the human mind, namely, by God.

26. You will say that this proves only that the human will must be pre-moved and predetermined by God to the volition of good in general and to the first intention of the end, from which it can afterward move and determine itself to the choice of means and to the volition of particular goods. Hence the same holy Doctor says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3: *God moves the will of man, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good; but man through reason determines himself to will this or that, which is truly good or apparently good.*

27. But against this: From an indifferent principle, insofar as it is indifferent, a determinate act cannot proceed unless that principle is first determined by another, as St. Thomas says in the passages cited above. But once the first intention of the end and the love of good in general have been posited, the will still remains indifferent to the choice of this or that means and to the volition of this or that particular good. Therefore, it still needs to be determined by God.

Hence the holy Doctor in the cited passage intends only to establish the difference between God's motion in relation to good as such and His motion in relation to particular goods. The difference consists in this: In relation to the first, God adequately applies and determines the will, while the will concurs only by eliciting the act and does not apply and determine itself. In relation to particular goods, however, the created will concurs not only by elicitation but also by application, applying and determining itself—not as the first applying and determining principle, but as the second, and consequently under the motion, application, and predetermination of God as the first mover, applying and determining principle. From this it does not

follow that the will is not predetermined by God to the volition of particular goods, but rather the opposite.

28. This is proved thirdly by an argument showing the necessity of physical predetermination in relation to supernatural acts. God through prevenient grace truly and properly produces in us the determination of the will to good—for example, to believing revealed mysteries or to loving God above all things. But He cannot accomplish this except through grace which physically predetermines. Therefore, such grace must be admitted.

The major premise is certain by faith and is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, which defines that the beginning of justification in adults must be derived from God's prevenient grace. But such a beginning starts from the determination of free choice by which an unbeliever determines himself to believe the mysteries revealed to him, or a believer determines himself to consent to his calling and to love God above all things.

The minor premise, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. Moral motion is not true and proper efficient causality, but only improper and metaphorical, and belongs more to the genus of final than efficient causality. For it moves only objectively, by presenting to the will a goodness which attracts it by its suitability. This is clear from the example of a child who is morally moved and aroused to run by being shown an apple. Who would say that this moral arousal is truly and properly the efficient cause of his running? Therefore, through grace which merely arouses morally, God cannot truly and properly produce in us the determination of the will to good, but only through grace which physically prevents and predetermines it.

29. You will say that God truly and properly causes such a determination in us through the grace of cooperation and joint efficiency, or through the simultaneous concurrence of the supernatural order, by which He influences the will's consent and determination together with the will.

But against this, first: The cited Council of Trent teaches that the beginning of our justification—and consequently the determination of the will to believe or to love God above all things, from which the beginning of justification starts—proceeds from God's prevenient grace. But the grace of cooperation and joint efficiency is not prevenient but concomitant. Therefore, the first beginning of our justification does not proceed from it.

Secondly: Simultaneous concurrence, according to the principles of the adversaries, is indifferent or offered to the will in an indifferent manner. Therefore, so far is it from truly and properly causing the determination of our will that it rather presupposes or awaits that determination from the will, so that God may determinately influence our free acts, or so that the

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indifference, suspension, and indetermination of the divine decree may be removed and resolved, as is clear from what was said in the preceding section.

§ 4.

Physical Predetermination is According to
the Mind of St. Thomas.

30. This is proved first. Once a predetermining decree has been admitted, physical predetermination cannot be denied, since it is the execution and causality of such a decree, and flows from it as a ray from the sun, a stream from a spring, and an effect from its cause. But St. Thomas admits a predetermining decree, since in *Quodlibet* XII, a. 4, he asserts that all things have been predetermined by divine providence, as is clear from what was said in § 1. Therefore, he also admits physical predetermination.

This is proved secondly. Previous concurrence and physical predetermination mean the same thing. But St. Thomas admits previous concurrence. Therefore, he also admits physical predetermination. The major premise is certain. The minor is proved from St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 3, where he says: *In the operation by which God acts by moving nature, nature does not act, but the very operation of nature is also the operation of divine power.*

By these words the holy Doctor expressly distinguishes a twofold concurrence in God. One is from God alone, without nature acting; it is therefore previous and precedes the operation of the secondary cause, at least by priority of nature. The other is identified with that operation, and this is simultaneous concurrence, which is the very operation of the secondary cause insofar as it depends upon God influencing it at the same time. Hence he adds in the same place, ad 4, that *both God and nature operate immediately, although they are ordered according to prior and posterior.*

31. This is proved thirdly. By the name “physical predetermination,” the Thomists understand nothing other than a certain flowing and transient power through which God moves and applies secondary causes to act. But St. Thomas admitted such a power. Therefore, he admitted physical predetermination.

The major premise is certain. The minor is proved from the cited passage of *De potentia*, ad 7, where the holy Doctor writes: The natural power bestowed upon natural things at their establishment inheres in them as a kind of form having established being. But that which is from God in a

natural thing so that it actually acts is like an intention alone, having a certain incomplete being, in the manner in which colors are in the air—namely, in intentional being, by reason of the species representing them—and as the power of an art is in the instrument of the craftsman.

This testimony is so manifest that the Conimbricenses, In II Physicorum, c. 7, q. 14, a. 1, candidly confess that St. Thomas there admitted a previous concurrence moving and applying secondary causes to act, which is the physical premotion or predetermination admitted by the Thomists. Their words are: Concerning the manner in which God concurs with secondary causes in their operations and effects, there presents itself the celebrated opinion of St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 7, and of his followers Capreolus, Ferrariensis, and others. They hold that all secondary causes, before they operate, receive from God a certain influx and motion which is, as it were, the intentional being of divine power, by which they are aroused to bring forth their actions, in the manner in which instruments of the arts, such as an adze and an axe, receive a previous motion from the craftsman when they are applied to accomplish a work.

Azor has similar words in Institutiones morales, bk. I, c. 21, q. 8: It is asked eighthly whether God, when He operates with nature or the will, moves and applies it to acting. St. Thomas openly says so: God not only gives forms to things, but also preserves them and applies them, and so forth. Moreover, the position of St. Thomas appears to me most true, for Augustine plainly seems to teach it.

Likewise, Pereira says in De causis, bk. VIII, c. 8: In what St. Thomas adds, that secondary causes, including our will, are moved, applied, and determined by God to act, although some theologians dissent, I nevertheless most willingly go over to that position with hands and feet.

Bellarmino writes similarly in De libero arbitrio, bk. IV, c. 16: Another method of reconciling human freedom with divine cooperation, and perhaps the more probable, follows the position of St. Thomas. He teaches that divine cooperation concurs with secondary causes, including free causes, in such a way that God has not only given them operative powers and preserves those powers, but also moves and applies them to action, as may be known from Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 70; and De potentia, q. 3, a. 7. This position is highly consonant both with Scripture, which says that in God we exist, live, and are moved, and with reason and the order which the first cause has toward secondary causes.

Finally, in the booklet *Ratio studiorum*, composed by six Fathers of the Society and printed at Rome in the College of the Society by command of the Superior General in 1586, which is given as a rule to all the Society's

lecturers, it is said in the section *On the Selection of Opinions in the Theological Faculty*: *In theology our members are to follow the doctrine of St. Thomas, as is prescribed in part IV of the Constitutions, c. 14, except in a few matters.* Afterward, explaining which are those few matters they are not bound to follow, n. 6 lists, among other things, this position of St. Thomas: *That secondary causes are properly and univocally instruments of God, and that when they operate He first influences or moves them.*

I have transcribed these words verbatim from a copy of the 1586 edition of this book preserved in our convent at Toulouse. Hence it is astonishing that some Fathers of the Society have dared to deny that these things are contained in such a book.

These testimonies openly demonstrate that previous concurrence, by which God moves and applies secondary causes to acting, is according to the mind of St. Thomas, since, as Novatian says in *De Trinitate*, c. 18, *that is a firm kind of proof which is taken from adversaries, so that truth may be proved even by the enemies of truth themselves.*

32. This is proved fourthly. According to St. Thomas, God physically moves all secondary causes. Therefore, He also physically premoves and predetermines them. The antecedent is clear from *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5; I-II, q. 109, a. 1; *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 70; and *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, where he teaches that God moves all secondary causes to their operations. This cannot be understood of moral motion, since natural causes, being without reason, are incapable of it, but only of physical motion.

The consequence is proved from the same holy Doctor in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 149: *The motion of the mover precedes the motion of the mobile in reason and cause*, that is, by priority of reason and causality. He took this doctrine from Aristotle, *Metaphysica* IV, text 23: *The mover is prior in nature to the moved.* Therefore, if God physically moves all secondary causes to operate, He physically premoves them.

33. This is proved fifthly. A motion intrinsically efficacious with which dissent cannot be composed is physically predetermining. But St. Thomas admits such a motion. Therefore, he admits a physically predetermining motion.

The major premise is certain. The minor is proved from the same holy Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 24, a. 11: The power of the Holy Spirit infallibly accomplishes whatever He wills. Hence, it is impossible that these two things should be true at the same time: that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he loses charity by sinning. And

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in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3: If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to it.

§ 5.

The Objections are Resolved.

34. The adversaries object first: St. Thomas says in In II Sententiarum, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 1: The power of the will itself, considered in itself, is indifferent to many things. But that it determinately passes into this act or that is not from another determining it, but from the will itself. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the will is not predetermined by God.

I answer with the learned Father Nicolai, in his marginal note on this passage, that the holy Doctor there denies only that the will's determinately passing into this or that act is from some other created, natural determining cause belonging to the same genus or order. He does not exclude its being from God as first agent, determining the created will subordinated to Him by a determination conformed to its connatural exigency—that is, a determination which does not necessitate it, but causes it infallibly to act freely.

35. From this you can easily understand another testimony of St. Thomas, taken from *De malo*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5: *Since the will is open to either alternative, it is determined to one by something, namely, by the counsel of reason; nor is it necessary that this be through some extrinsic agent.* For the holy Doctor intends by these words only to exclude a created extrinsic agent, not the uncreated agent who is the author and cause of the will itself and of its motion. He always excepts the latter, as is clear from *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 88; *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3; q. 105, a. 4, ad 1 and 2; and *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 9, where he says: *On the part of the will, nothing can change an act of the will except that which operates within the will; and this is the will itself and that which is the cause of the will's being, which according to faith is God alone.*

Scotus teaches the same in In IV Sententiarum, dist. 49, q. 6, § “I say, therefore”: It is contrary to the nature of the will to be determined by an inferior cause, for by that very fact it would not be superior. But it is not contrary to its nature to be determined by a superior cause, namely God.

36. The adversaries object secondly with two testimonies of St. Thomas drawn from In II Sententiarum. The first is found at dist. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: The determination of action and of the end lies within the power of free choice. Hence it retains dominion over its act, although not in the same way

as the first agent. The other is at dist. 28, q. 1, a. 1: Man would not possess free choice unless the determination of his action belonged to him, so that from his own judgment he might choose this or that.

37. But these passages do not even lightly touch physical predetermination. In the first passage, the holy Doctor intends only that the choice and determination of an action are in the power of free choice as a secondary free principle and secondary determining cause. Consequently, he does not exclude subordination to and dependence upon the motion and determination of the first free principle, but rather includes it. Hence he adds: *although not in the same way as the first agent*.

These final words openly declare that the determination of our will is not in its power in such a way that it does not also descend from the supreme power of God causing it, because the dominion which the will has over its acts is not supreme, as is that which belongs to the first agent. Hence the same holy Doctor says in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 13: *The will is said to have dominion over its act, not to the exclusion of the first cause, but because the first cause does not act upon the will in such a way as to determine it necessarily to one outcome, as it determines nature. Therefore, the determination of the act is left within the power of reason and the will*.

From this the answer to the second testimony is evident. St. Thomas intends only that man would not have free choice if the determination of his action in no way belonged to him as a secondary free principle and secondary determining cause, and if he did not have dominion over his acts—yet a dominion subject and subordinated to the supreme dominion of God, who, as Augustine says, *has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills*.

38. They object thirdly: St. Thomas says in *Quodlibet* I, a. 7, ad 2: *God moves the human mind to good in such a way that it can nevertheless resist this motion*. But if the divine motion physically predetermined the human will to a good work, the will could not resist it. Therefore, St. Thomas judges that God does not physically predetermine the human will.

I answer by denying the inference of the minor premise. The will can resist or dissent from any divine motion, but with this distinction: It can resist or dissent from a purely arousing motion which provides only sufficient assistance, both in the composite and in the divided sense, or by antecedent and consequent power. Indeed, the will in fact resists such a motion and rejects it, depriving it of the effect to which it is principally and ultimately ordered.

The will, however, never in fact resists a motion physically predetermining it and providing efficacious assistance. For such grace, as

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Augustine says, *is rejected by no hardened heart; it is given precisely so that hardness of heart may first be removed*. Nevertheless, the will can resist it in the divided sense and by antecedent power, though not in the composite sense and by consequent power. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3: *If God moves the will to something, it is impossible to posit that the will is not moved to it, although this is not absolutely impossible*.

Nor is it valid to say that if the will can resist the divine motion in the divided sense or by antecedent power, it can frustrate it of its effect and render it vain and inefficacious. For the efficacy of such a motion consists in this: that while leaving in man the power to resist it, it confers upon him the will not to resist. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8, ad 2: *From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows not only that those things occur which God wills to occur, but that they occur contingently or necessarily, because He wills them to occur in that manner*.

The other testimonies of St. Thomas which Peter of St. Joseph, the Feuillant, objects against us in the little work he calls *Defensio Sancti Thomae* are entirely free of difficulty. We have explained them in *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, treatise on human acts, disp. 6, a. 2, § 13 and following. We therefore pass them over here, lest we weary the reader.

§ 6.

The Harmony of Created Freedom with a Predetermining Decree and Physical Predetermination.

39. There are three most difficult and obscure harmonies, which may deservedly be called three most sacred enigmas: the harmony of God's freedom with His immutability; the harmony of Christ's freedom with His impeccability; and the harmony of human freedom with the efficacy of grace and the divine will.

Hence Augustine says in *De gratia Christi*, c. 47: This question, in which free choice of the will and the grace of God are debated, is so difficult to discern that when free choice is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied, while when the grace of God is asserted, free choice is thought to be removed. And in *Contra litteras Petiliani*, bk. II: If I were to propose to you the question of how God the Father draws to the Son men whom He has left in free choice, perhaps you would find it difficult to resolve. For how does He draw them if He leaves each to choose what he wills? Yet both are true, but few are able to penetrate this by understanding.

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Nevertheless, that it may be explained in some measure by what bond or glue these things are connected and joined to one another, He will grant it who, as Job says, makes harmony in the heights.

40. It must therefore be observed with St. Thomas, *In I Perihermeneias*, lect. 14, that our freedom has a twofold root. The first is extrinsic and exists in God, namely, the infinite efficacy of the divine will, which reaches both the substance and the mode of our operations. The same holy Doctor explains this at length in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 19, a. 8: *Since the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things which God wills to occur do occur, but that they occur in the manner in which God wills them to occur.*

Likewise, in *In I Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum*, dist. 47, q. un., a. 4, he says: Since the will of God is efficaciously fulfilled, things must come about, and they must come about in the same manner in which the divine will has disposed them.

41. Long before, St. Peter had used this same method of reconciling freedom. Simon Magus denied free choice because, he said, what God wills to exist exists, and what He wills not to exist does not exist. St. Peter answered him, as Clement of Rome reports in *Recognitiones*, bk. III, near the beginning: You are ignorant, Simon, and very ignorant, of the manner in which the will of God is found in each thing. For He willed some things to be such that they could not be other than He established them, and for these He appointed neither rewards nor punishments. But those things which He willed to be such that they have it in their power to do what they will, for these He established that through their acts and wills they should merit either rewards or punishments.

By these words the Apostle reduces necessity, contingency, and created freedom to the efficacy of the divine will as their first principle and, as it were, their first root.

42. The second root of created freedom is intrinsic to man and resides in him, namely, the objective indifference of judgment, as St. Thomas explains in various places. In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 1, he says: *Because the judgment of reason is disposed toward diverse alternatives and can be determined to one, man must possess free choice.* And in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2: *The will can tend toward diverse alternatives because reason can possess diverse cognitions of the good.* Likewise, in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 2, he says expressly that *the root of all freedom is established in reason.*

Reason also supports this. For since the will is a rational appetite following the cognition of the intellect and the direction of reason, it is impossible that it should be necessarily borne toward an object proposed to it by the intellect as indifferent.

43. From these things you will understand first how neither a predetermining decree nor physical predetermination removes or injures the freedom of our will. Both proceed from the first root of freedom and contingency, namely, the infinite efficacy of the divine will. Both also cause the proximate and intrinsic root of human freedom, namely, the objective indifference of judgment. For before they apply the will by nature to choosing or rejecting some object, they apply the intellect to form an indifferent judgment of reason, by which it represents that object to the will as indifferent and as a particular good which it can choose or reject.

44. You will understand secondly how a predetermining decree and physical predetermination perfect the potential freedom of our will and cause its actual freedom. Every motion accommodated to the nature of the subject it moves perfects that subject. But the motion of a predetermining decree and physical predetermination is accommodated to the nature and condition of the created will. Since the will is a rational appetite, it demands to be moved to free acts under the objective indifference of judgment, which is the proximate root of freedom.

I add that such a motion reduces the potential freedom of our will from first act to second act, and consequently removes from it a certain imperfection and defect, namely, potentiality and suspension, or the absence of act. Therefore, it perfects it.

45. That such a motion causes the will's actual freedom is clear from what has been said above. For the actual freedom of our will is nothing other than its free determination. But this is caused by a predetermining decree and physical predetermination, and not by an indifferent decree or simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above. Therefore, the actual freedom of our will is likewise caused by them. Consequently, when such a decree and predetermination are removed, actual freedom is entirely removed, since an effect cannot remain once its cause has been removed.

46. You will object first: It belongs to the nature of a free cause to determine itself to whatever it wills. Therefore, if the created will is predetermined by God, it will not be free.

I answer that, just as it does not belong to the nature of an efficient cause that it be first, but that it produce an effect, even though it is moved by another cause prior to it—as is evident in fire and the heavens—so it does not belong to the nature of a free cause that it first determine itself, but that it determine itself according to its nature. Thus, if it is the first free principle, it first determines itself independently of any other prior mover and determining cause. But if it is a secondary free principle, as is the

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created will, it determines itself secondarily and in dependence upon the motion of the first free and first determining principle.

47. You will press first: These two things conflict with one another and involve a contradiction: that the will moves and determines itself, and nevertheless is previously by nature moved and determined by God. Otherwise, the same thing would be simultaneously from itself and from another.

48. I answer that this objection was foreseen and resolved by St. Thomas. In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 4, he objects to himself: God cannot cause contradictory things to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will, for the will's being moved is its being moved by another. Therefore, God cannot move the will. He answers: To be moved voluntarily is to be moved from oneself, that is, from an intrinsic principle. But that intrinsic principle can be from another extrinsic principle. Thus, to be moved from oneself is not repugnant to being moved by another.

He teaches the same in *De malo*, q. 3, a. 2, ad 4: When free choice moves itself, it is not excluded that it is moved by another, from whom it has the very fact that it moves itself. Likewise, in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 5: Something can be moved by another in such a way that it nevertheless moves itself, and so it is with the human mind.

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, it is not repugnant for the created will to move and determine itself to acting and nevertheless to be previously by nature moved and determined by God, and consequently pre-moved and pre-determined by Him.

Reason also supports this. It is not repugnant for one action to proceed from two agents of different orders subordinated to one another. The same generation of a plant or a man is from the sun as first generator and from the plant or man as secondary generator. Therefore, likewise, the same determination of the created will can simultaneously be from God as the first free and determining principle and from the will as the secondary free and determining principle.

Indeed, the opposite involves a contradiction. For since the determination of the created will is something created, existing in reality and containing some degree of existence, it cannot escape divine causality. Since God cannot cause it through an indifferent decree or simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above, it must necessarily be caused through a pre-determining decree and through a previous and pre-determining concurrence. Therefore, it involves a contradiction for the created will to determine itself unless it is pre-determined by God.

49. You will press secondly: That which cannot cause a determining form cannot cause determination. But the will cannot cause the form determining it. Therefore, it cannot determine itself. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved as follows. The form determining the will is the efficacious decree of God. But this cannot be caused by the will. Therefore, the will cannot cause the form determining it.

50. I answer by conceding the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise: The form determining the will is the efficacious decree alone: I deny the major. It is the efficacious decree and also the act elicited by the will: I concede the major. Having conceded the minor premise, I deny the consequence.

For the will to be capable of determining itself, it is not required that it be able to cause every form determining it. It is sufficient that it can cause some such form. In our position, there is a twofold form determining the created will. One is on God's part, namely, the efficacious and predetermining decree. The other is on the part of the will itself, namely, the act elicited by it, which, since it is free and exercises the will's freedom, is also its determination. Consequently, for the created will to possess a power to determine itself, it is not required that it be able to cause God's efficacious decree. It is sufficient that it can produce its own act determining it.

51. You will object secondly: It belongs to the nature of a free agent that, once all prerequisites for acting have been posited, it can refrain from acting. But once physical predetermination has been posited, the will cannot refrain from acting. Therefore, physical predetermination destroys freedom.

I answer that if the major premise is understood of prerequisites for acting which are prior in time or in the instant in which the act occurs, then, once they have been posited, a free agent can act or not act in both the composite and divided senses. If, however, it is understood of prerequisites which are prior only by nature, or in the instant from which the act proceeds, then, once they have been posited, the free agent can indeed refrain from acting in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense.

For those things which are prerequisite to acting only according to the order of nature are simultaneous with the act, since priority of nature is not priority of existence and duration, but of dependence and causality. But it involves a contradiction for the negation of the act to be composed or joined with the act.

Therefore, since physical predetermination is among the prerequisites for acting only by priority of nature and causality and constitutes the actual principle of operation, the freedom of the will does not require that, once

predetermination is posited, it can refrain from acting in the composite sense, or compose the negation of the act with predetermination. It is sufficient that, with predetermination posited, it can refrain from acting in the divided sense—that is, that under the predetermination it retains the power not to act or not to continue the action it elicits. This is treated more fully in part II, treatise II, c. 4, § 4.

52. You will object thirdly: Every antecedent supposition, or supposition not descending from the free choice of our will, destroys the freedom of choice. But a predetermining decree and physical predetermination are antecedent suppositions which do not descend from the choice of our will. Therefore, they destroy the freedom of choice.

53. A threefold answer can be given to this argument, which is regarded by the adversaries as their chief argument and, as it were, their Achilles. First, the major premise can be denied absolutely. A supposition anteceding the free consent of our will only by priority of nature does not remove freedom but causes it; it does not destroy freedom but builds it up.

The reason is that priority of nature is priority of causality and origin. Hence, it belongs only to a cause in relation to its effect, or to an actual principle in relation to its operation. Therefore, just as a cause does not destroy or remove its effect but causes and perfects it, so a supposition anteceding the free consent of our will only by priority of nature—such as the supposition of a predetermining decree and physical predetermination—does not remove freedom but causes it; it does not injure freedom but fosters, perfects, and preserves it.

54. I answer secondly that, although every antecedent supposition arising from a created agent destroys freedom, not every supposition arising from the uncreated agent does so. A threefold disparity is found between the created and the uncreated agent.

The first is that a created agent does not possess infinite efficacy as the uncreated agent does, and consequently cannot reach both the substance and the mode of freedom in our operations.

The second is that God, since He is the first free principle and free through His essence, and since He has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills, as Augustine says, contains all created and participated freedom in the most eminent and perfect manner. A created agent does not.

The third is that created agents are wholly extrinsic to the will. God, however, since He is the author and principle of the soul and is most intimately joined to it, as though He were the soul of the soul itself and the principle in whom we live, are moved, and exist, is not properly regarded as

an extrinsic agent in relation to our will, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 88.

55. I answer thirdly by distinguishing the major premise. Every antecedent supposition which does not arise from the first root of freedom removes freedom: let the major premise pass. Every antecedent supposition which arises from the first root of freedom removes freedom: I deny the major. Distinguishing the minor premise in the same manner, I deny the consequence.

For a predetermining decree and physical predetermination arise from the first root of all freedom and contingency, namely, from the infinite efficacy of the divine will, as we explained above. Hence, just as a supposition arising from the indifferent judgment of reason does not remove freedom because that judgment is the proximate root of freedom, so neither does a supposition arising from a predetermining decree and physical predetermination.

From this you will understand that, although such a supposition is formally antecedent, it is nevertheless virtually or equivalently consequent as regards the effect of preserving freedom. For although it does not descend from the will itself, it descends from Him who has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills, and from the infinite efficacy of the divine will, which is the first root of freedom. Hence, it is reduced to the second member of the distinction given by Anselm in *Cur Deus homo*, bk. II, c. 18, namely, to consequent necessity, which does not injure freedom, as he teaches there.

Nor is the objection of a certain recent author valid, who says that it seems absurd to deny that a necessity is antecedent when its cause is antecedent, since all agree that every necessity follows the condition of its cause and is named from it. For, as dialecticians teach, the thing from which the signification of a name is imposed is one thing, and the thing to signify which the name is imposed is another. Thus, although a stone is so called from injuring the foot, not everything that injures the foot is a stone. Likewise, although antecedent necessity derives this denomination from a preceding cause, not every cause preceding free choice should or can be called antecedent necessity. Only that cause should be so called which precedes by determining the will to one outcome in the manner of nature and removing from the intellect the objective indifference of judgment, as happens in the beatific love and the volition of good in general.

56. From these things the proposed argument, by which the adversaries chiefly seek to confound us, can easily be turned back against them in this manner: A necessity equivalently consequent upon our freedom cannot

remove it. But the necessity arising from the efficacy of a predetermining decree and physical predetermination is equivalently consequent upon our freedom and consent, since it follows upon that consent as contained eminently in the divine will and omnipotence, which, as Augustine says, has the wills of men more in its power than they themselves have their own wills. Therefore, it cannot remove freedom.

You will also understand from what has been said that, although physical premotion is not in our power effectively and as regards its origin, since it is not derived from us, it is nevertheless in our power terminatively and as regards its use. For that motion terminates in the will's having the use and exercise of actual freedom and actual dominion over its acts. Hence, just as it can be called virtually or equivalently consequent, so it can equivalently be said to be in our power, by the very fact that it causes the act to which it moves and applies the will to exist within the will's power and to be subject to its dominion.

57. You will object fourthly: If grace efficacious of itself and physically predetermining is necessary for conversion, it follows that a sinner who does not receive such grace cannot be converted, and consequently is not free with respect to conversion, since it belongs to the nature of a free agent that it can act or not act.

I answer first that the same difficulty arises concerning congruous grace. For in the position of Suarez, Vasquez, and other theologians of the Society, such grace is so necessary for conversion that it is repugnant for a sinner to be converted in fact unless he is prevented by it, as Father Martinon demonstrates in *Antijansenius*, whose words we shall cite in the next section.

I answer secondly by distinguishing the inference. It follows that the sinner who does not receive such grace cannot be converted by consequent power and in conjunction with the act: I concede the inference. He cannot be converted by antecedent power separated from the act: I deny the inference.

The first power comes from efficacious and physically predetermining grace, which infallibly joins power with act and cause with effect, according to Augustine's words in *De natura et gratia*, c. 42: *When the will has been healed and assisted, possibility together with the effect arises in the saints*. But the second power does not come from such grace.

Hence, just as St. Thomas teaches in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1, that when it is said, "God cannot do anything except what He has foreknown and decreed," the statement is usually distinguished according to antecedent and consequent power—or, if the expression "cannot" is referred to the act, it is conceded, but if referred to the power, it is denied—so likewise, when it is

said that one who lacks efficacious assistance cannot operate, cannot be converted, or cannot fulfill the commandments, a distinction must be made. According to antecedent power, it must be denied. According to consequent power, it must be conceded. Or, if the expression “cannot” is referred to the act, it is true; if referred to the power, it is false. These matters are usually explained more fully in the treatise on divine assistances.

§ 7.

Another Difficult Argument is Resolved.

58. The adversaries further object with another difficult argument, which Molina calls the *touchstone* and which is one of the principal foundations of middle knowledge. We therefore touched upon it briefly in the treatise on the knowledge of God, final chapter, § 4, but reserved its full and complete resolution for this place.

It may be proposed briefly as follows. If a predetermining decree and physical predetermination, flowing from it as a stream from a spring, are altogether necessary for acting and are an application of free choice prerequisite to action, Christ would unjustly have rebuked the Jews in Matt. 11 more severely than the Tyrians because they were not converted and did not do penance. For the Jews would have a legitimate excuse and could answer the Lord Christ’s reproach and rebuke: “Why do You upbraid us by the example of the Tyrians? If You had a predetermining decree concerning us and gave us the efficacious and predetermining grace which You had decreed to give them, we too would certainly be converted and do penance as they would.”

Hence the adversaries say that our position removes the necessity of correction and renders vain the reproaches by which God in Sacred Scripture reproves His vineyard—that is, the people of Israel or the faithful soul—for failing to bear grapes and instead producing thorns or wild grapes; that is, for failing to produce the fruits of good works and instead producing evil and perverse works, as is stated in Isa. 5.

59. I answer first that the Apostle in Rom. 9 objects the same difficulty to himself. For after establishing the truth, *God has mercy on whom He wills and hardens whom He wills*, he immediately objects: *You will therefore say to me: Why does He still find fault? For who resists His will?* It is as though he said: Why does God complain of or rebuke sinners? If He willed to have mercy and not to harden—which He does, not by imparting malice, but by not bestowing grace—we would not resist.

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Behold the whole basis of the sinner's complaint of injustice: as though a sinner obstinate in evil could not be rebuked when grace efficacious by its nature has been denied to him, and rebuke were just only when a common sufficient grace is conferred upon all, which each person, by his innate freedom, renders efficacious or inefficacious. As though the most acute Apostle did not perceive this meaning, nor Augustine nor Prosper, who, as we saw above, profess that the profundity of this question cannot be resolved by the willing or unwillingness of human choice.

60. I answer secondly that the same argument was formerly proposed to St. Augustine by the Pelagians. The monks of Hadrumetum under Abbot Valentine contended that, if efficacious grace were necessary for action, the necessity of correction would be removed. Hence they said that no one should be corrected for failing to fulfill God's commandments, but that one should merely pray for him that he might fulfill them, as Augustine reports in *Retractationes*, bk. I, c. 67.

But let us hear them murmuring before the same holy Doctor in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 4: I would rightly be corrected if it were through my fault that I did not have it—namely grace—that is, if I could give it to myself or take it myself and failed to do so, or if, when He gave it, I refused to receive it. And in c. 5: Since the will itself is prepared by the Lord, why do you correct me because you see that I am unwilling to fulfill His commandments, and why do you not rather ask Him to work the willing in me?

From these things it is clear that this argument of the adversaries is not new, but most ancient and taken from the old workshop of the Pelagians. Hence a certain recent author not undeservedly exclaims: How great is the consolation of the Thomistic school: no one finds himself assailed by arguments with which the position of Augustine was not also attacked! How lamentable is the desolation and how unsafe the lot of those who hurl no other weapons against the Thomistic position than those which Augustine's adversaries formerly hurled against him! Is not the thesis of Augustine and of the Thomists the same, if the same arguments militate against both?

61. I answer thirdly that the proposed difficulty is common both to us and to the adversaries, since Suarez, Vasquez, and other more celebrated theologians of the Society admit congruous grace. Indeed, all professors of theology in that Society are bound to teach it by the prescription or decree of Claudius Aquaviva issued at Rome on 14 December 1613, as Tanner and Paul Leonard testify, and they also report the decree.

But once such congruous grace is admitted, the two difficulties objected against us follow: that God complains unjustly of sinners who are not

converted, and that they are denied grace sufficient for conversion. Father Martinon, a recent writer of the Society, shows this in Antijansenius, disp. 27, sect. 3, n. 25, where, speaking of congruous grace, he writes: If so great a motion and arousal is morally necessary for conversion, then those who receive a lesser one do not have morally sufficient assistance. Thus, those who are not converted in any way lack assistance morally sufficient for conversion, and it is morally impossible for them to be converted. Hence a complaint and reproach of this kind will become metaphysical, not moral and reasonable—which must not be said—namely: “What more ought I to have done for My vineyard that I have not done?” Isa. 5. For the Jews could deservedly answer: “You ought to have given us morally sufficient assistance, but not assistance of such a kind that with it conversion was morally impossible and no one prevented by it would be converted. How did You expect grapes from those for whom it was morally impossible not to bear wild grapes?” He has similar words in n. 28.

62. I answer fourthly by denying the inference of the major premise of the proposed difficulty. For Christ to rebuke the Jews justly by the example of the Tyrians, it was sufficient that they were equal to the Tyrians in sufficient assistances and that, because of greater ingratitude and hardening in sin, they placed more impediments than the Tyrians against efficacious assistances. For Augustine says in *De bono perseverantiae*, c. 14: *The eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their hearts so hardened, since they would have believed if they had seen the signs which these men—namely, the Jews—saw.*

The reason for the first point is that, for someone to be justly corrected and rebuked by the example of another, it is sufficient that he can do as much as the other and nevertheless does not perform the same things. But one who is equal to another in sufficient assistances, though unequal in efficacious assistances, has an equal ability. For efficacious assistances do not give the power to act or provide a power or complement of power, but only actuality and application, as I presuppose from the treatise on divine assistances.

The reason for the second point is that one is blameworthy and deserving of rebuke who through his own malice or negligence places an obstacle and impediment to divine grace. Consequently, one who places greater impediments against it than another may justly be rebuked and reproved by comparison with him.

Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 159: Although someone cannot merit or call divine grace through a movement of free choice, he can nevertheless impede himself from receiving it. For it is said in

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Job 21: “Depart from us; we do not desire the knowledge of Your ways.” And in Job 24: “They have been rebellious against the light.” And since it lies within the power of free choice to impede the reception of divine grace, it is not undeservedly imputed to one when he places an impediment against the reception of grace. For God, so far as lies with Him, is ready to give grace to all, since He wills all men to be saved; but only those are deprived of grace who place an impediment to grace within themselves. Thus, when the sun illuminates the world, blame would be imputed to one who closes his eyes, although he cannot see unless he is first illuminated by the light of the sun.

63. From these things it is evident that God deservedly reproaches His vineyard because it bears not grapes but thorns or wild grapes, or reproaches the faithful soul because it does not produce the fruits of good works. For although the vineyard lacks some cultivation necessary for it to produce fruit in fact, and the soul lacks some assistance by which it is applied to acting, that defect and deprivation nevertheless proceeds from the fault of the man himself, who through his own malice or negligence placed an impediment against divine grace.

Thus, a man situated in darkness would rightly be reproached for not seeing if someone offered him light and wished to open a window, but he impeded him. Or, to remain with the same example, if a farmer had given a vineyard all its prior cultivation and were ready to give it the last, but the vineyard refused it or placed an impediment against it, he could deservedly reproach the vineyard if it afterward produced not grapes but thorns or wild grapes.

64. From these things you understand that, since no one, however just, is free from original and actual sin, at least venial, as the Council of Trent defines in sess. 6, can. 23, there is no one who should not humbly acknowledge that, in accordance with the deserts of his sins, he can justly be abandoned by God and deprived of efficacious grace, and consequently who should not, as the Apostle admonishes, work out his salvation with fear and trembling.

Hence Pope Leo says in sermon 8 on the Epiphany: This is a cause of trembling and fear for the saints, lest, being exalted in works of piety, they be abandoned by the aid of grace and remain in the weakness of nature.

All who are truly humble must also keep continually before their eyes the excellent statement of Richard of St. Victor on this matter, in *De statu interioris hominis*, part I, c. 22: The grace which man once received before sin could not justly be withdrawn. Although he had received it without merit, he nevertheless ought not to have lost it without fault. But now it can

justly be withdrawn at every hour, because man can never be found without fault.

65. You will say first: If man through his own fault or negligence can place an impediment against efficacious and predetermining grace, he can also resist it, since to resist grace and to place an impediment against it are synonymous and signify altogether the same thing. Man will also be able by the powers of free choice to prepare himself for receiving it, or at least not to place an impediment against its reception. Thus, some flesh will be able to glory before God—the Tyrian over the Jew—because by innate freedom he rendered himself more fit to receive the assistances of grace.

But I deny both inferences. I deny the first because, just as someone can impede the entrance of a ray of sunlight into a hall by closing a window and so place an impediment against its reception, yet cannot deprive that ray, once received, of its effect or prevent it from illuminating the air, so likewise, although man through his fault or negligence can impede the reception of efficacious and predetermining grace and by his unworthiness move God to deny it, he cannot resist it once it has been received and exists in the soul by consequent power and in the composite sense, as we explained in the preceding section, or frustrate it of the effect which God efficaciously intends to produce through it. For, as the holy Doctor cited above says, *it is impossible that these two things should be true at the same time: that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he loses charity by sinning.*

The other inference is also denied, namely, that man can by the powers of free choice prepare himself for grace, or at least refrain from placing an impediment against it. For St. Thomas says in his commentary on Heb. 12, lect. 3: *The very fact that someone does not place an obstacle against grace proceeds from grace itself. Hence, if someone places an obstacle and yet his heart is moved to remove it, this is from the gift of God's grace.* He afterward adds: *Therefore, that the obstacle is removed from some is from God's mercy; that it is not removed is from justice.*

Therefore, just as a man, although by closing a window he can impede the sun's illumination, cannot draw or call the sun to himself, so likewise, although someone can impede himself from receiving grace, he cannot merit or call it, nor dispose himself to receive it by the powers of free choice alone, but only through the power of grace itself moving his heart.

66. You will say secondly: Although the solution and teaching given concerning the impediment placed against efficacious and predetermining grace through an antecedent fault can apply to the denial of such grace in the state of fallen nature, it cannot apply to its denial to the angels and to

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Adam for perseverance, since the denial of such assistance presupposed in them no antecedent fault, either actual or original.

Some of our Thomists answer that the angels and Adam lacked efficacious assistance for perseverance because of their own fault, not an antecedent but a concomitant fault, which was prior to the deprivation of efficacious assistance in the genus of material and dispositive causality.

It is not repugnant for some things to be simultaneous in time and duration and yet mutually precede one another in nature and causality. This is evident from the example of wind opening a window and entering through it into a hall. The entrance of the wind precedes the opening of the window in the genus of efficient causality, since it actively concurs in opening it. But the opening of the window is prior to the entrance of the wind in the genus of material and dispositive causality, because it disposes for the aforesaid entrance of air and wind.

Hence philosophers commonly teach that causes are mutually causes of one another, and that, although they exercise their causalities in the same instant of time, one is nevertheless prior to another in one genus and posterior in another by priority and posteriority of causality and nature. But because this solution appears more subtle than solid and has a greater foundation in the doctrine of philosophers than of the holy Fathers:

67. I answer secondly by conceding that the doctrine given above concerning the impediment against efficacious grace through an antecedent fault does not apply to the angels or to Adam. The denial to them of efficacious grace for perseverance must instead be reduced to the simple will of God and His unsearchable judgments.

The holy Fathers teach this, especially Augustine in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. XI, c. 10, where, speaking of the evil angels, he says: But God could have converted their will to good, because He is omnipotent. He certainly could have. Why, then, did He not do so? Because He did not will to do so. Why He did not will it is in His own keeping.

And in *De cantico novo*, c. 8, he teaches that God permitted the fall of Adam so that it might appear what free choice could accomplish without God's assistance: What unassisted free choice can accomplish was demonstrated in Adam himself. It suffices for evil; for good it does not suffice unless it is assisted by God.

From this you understand that the reason for the fall of Adam and the angels cannot be given by saying that the first actual grace bestowed upon them was purely sufficient and subject to their free choice as regards its efficacy and use. Rather, they needed efficacious grace to persevere. God nevertheless denied it to Adam and the angels who did not persevere

because He so willed, and because it is in His power to confer or deny it to whomever He wills. Nor can Suarez, Vasquez, and the other defenders of congruous grace give another reason why God denied congruous grace for perseverance to the angels who did not persevere.

§ 8.

The Harmony of Divine Sanctity with a Predetermining Decree and Physical Predetermination Toward the Material Element of Sin.

68. From the principles established above in treating of the efficacy of the divine decrees and physical predetermination, it follows that God from eternity predefines the material element of sin and in time physically predetermines the will toward it. For since such a material element is a created being and includes in itself some actuality and degree of existence, it cannot escape divine causality, and consequently must be subordinated to God as first cause.

But such subordination cannot be preserved through an indifferent decree or through simultaneous concurrence offered by God, as we showed there. Therefore, according to the principles established by us, a predetermining decree and physical predetermination toward the material element of sin must necessarily be admitted.

It remains only to explain here how divine sanctity can cohere and be joined with such a decree and such predetermination. To explain this harmony:

69. I say first: Without any prejudice to His infinite sanctity, God can predefine and in fact does predefine the material element of sin taken materially, that is, insofar as it is a being and a physical and vital act.

The conclusion is proved by a fundamental argument. Without prejudice to His infinite sanctity, God predefines all good acts as such, whether they are good both by moral and natural goodness or only by natural or physical goodness. But the material element of sin, taken materially, is an act good not by moral goodness but by natural or physical goodness. For under this aspect and according to its physical being, it does not belong to the moral order, and consequently does not belong to the order of moral evil, but to the order of natural and physical being, which is good by physical and natural goodness. Therefore, the material element of sin, taken materially, can be predefined by God without any injury or prejudice to His infinite sanctity.

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The adversaries answer that, although the material element of sin, taken materially and specifically, is good according to its genus or order, nevertheless, because of the inseparable connection it has with moral malice—as, for example, in hatred of God—God cannot efficaciously will and predefine it by His decree unless He also indirectly and secondarily efficaciously wills and predefines the formal element itself. Since this is repugnant to divine sanctity, the former must likewise be judged contrary to it.

But against this, first: Although some things are inseparably connected with one another, it does not follow, nor is it necessary, that a cause or power which attains one must necessarily attain the other. This is evident in the good, which, although identified with the true and even transcendently including it, is nevertheless attained by the will in such a way that the true is in no way attained by it, because the true is not the object of the will, but the good.

Therefore, likewise, although in acts intrinsically evil—for example, hatred of God—the material element of sin cannot be really separated from the formal element or moral malice, nevertheless, by the very fact that this malice is not contained within the adequate object of the divine will, while the material element or specifically considered foundation is so contained, God can by His efficacious and predefining decree attain the material element of that sin without in any way, even indirectly, attaining its formal element. This argument will be urged more strongly in the following conclusion.

70. This is confirmed. Although the material element of sin is connected with the formal element, it terminates divine complacency without the formal malice terminating it. Therefore, it can likewise terminate God's efficacious volition and predetermining decree without the formal malice terminating them.

The consequence is evident. If divine complacency terminating in the material element of sin does not necessarily pass over to the formal element, this is because the material element is contained within the object of the divine will, whereas the formal element is not. But once this reason is admitted, no reason can be assigned why the same should not be said of God's efficacious volition. Therefore, it can terminate in the material element of sin without extending to the formal element.

The antecedent is proved as follows. The material element of sin does not terminate an act of displeasure in the divine will. Therefore, it terminates divine complacency. Since the divine will cannot take

complacency in formal malice, it is true to say that the material element of sin terminates divine complacency without formal malice terminating it.

The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved as follows. The omnipotence of God truly and properly causes the material element of sin, which, since it is a created and participated being, cannot escape divine causality. Therefore, it does not terminate divine hatred and displeasure.

The consequence is manifest, both from Wis. 11: *You hate nothing of the things You have made*, and because, if the material element of sin, as caused by God's omnipotence, displeased God and terminated His hatred, it would follow that omnipotence itself, as influencing it, would also displease God and terminate His hatred. For one who is displeased with a work is also displeased with the one who influences it. Thus, because sin displeases God, the man who sins also displeases Him, according to Wis. 14: *The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God*. But it is utterly absurd to say that God's omnipotence, as influencing the material element of sin, displeases Him. Therefore, it is likewise absurd to assert that the material element of sin terminates an act of displeasure in the divine will.

This is further confirmed. Because the material element of sin is contained within the object of divine omnipotence, whereas the formal element is not, God by His omnipotence causes the material element of sin through previous concurrence without causing the formal element, as we shall show in the following conclusion. But this argument applies with equal efficacy to the will of God, since it is no less holy and no less capable of precision than His omnipotence. Therefore, the divine will can predefine the material element of sin without predefining the formal element annexed to and inseparably joined with it, and consequently without any injury or prejudice to divine sanctity.

71. I say secondly: God physically predetermines the will toward the material element of sin, or influences it through previous concurrence, without any prejudice to divine sanctity.

This is proved first. When the soul moves and applies a crooked leg to walking, it causes the movement insofar as it is physical and vital, yet does not produce it insofar as it is oblique and defective. The defect of limping is totally reduced to the crooked leg, because that defect is not contained within the adequate object of the locomotive power.

But similarly, the formal element of sin, or its moral malice, is not contained within the adequate object of God's omnipotence. Therefore, God can so apply and predetermine the human will toward the material element of sin that He nevertheless does not apply or predetermine it toward the

formal element annexed to and inseparable from it, and consequently can do so without prejudice to divine sanctity.

The major premise is evident. The minor is shown as follows. The adequate object of divine omnipotence is that which can be reduced and ordered to God as ultimate end, since the character of first principle and ultimate end are convertible. Hence it is said in Prov. 16: *The Lord has made all things for Himself*. But the formal element of sin, or its moral malice, cannot be ordered to God as ultimate end, since it is rather a departure and deviation from Him as ultimate end. Therefore, it is not contained within the adequate object of God's omnipotence.

72. This is proved secondly by an argument from the adversaries' own principles. God in fact concurs simultaneously with the created will toward the material element of sin and nevertheless does not concur with it toward formal malice; otherwise such malice would be attributed to God just as the material entity of sin is attributed to Him. Therefore, He can also premove and predetermine toward the material entity of sin without premoving and predetermining toward formal malice, and consequently without injury to divine sanctity.

The consequence is proved first because the malice and deformity of sin are much more closely connected with simultaneous concurrence than with previous concurrence. They are joined proximately and immediately to the first, but only mediately and remotely to the second. For simultaneous concurrence is the very act of the will insofar as it proceeds from God operating simultaneously, and the malice of sin is immediately joined to that act. Previous concurrence, however, is not identified with the action of the will, but is something previous to it. Hence, it is not joined to the malice and deformity of sin except through the act of the will. Therefore, if God can concur simultaneously with the created will toward the material element of sin without concurring toward its formal element, all the more can He do this through previous concurrence.

Secondly, divine omnipotence is no less capable of precision when predetermining than when concurring simultaneously with the will. Therefore, if as concurring simultaneously it attains the entity and actuality of the sinful act while abstracting from formal malice, it can likewise abstract from it in predetermining.

Thirdly, God, when simultaneously concurring toward the material element of sin, abstracts from the formal element because the latter is not contained within the sphere or adequate object of divine omnipotence. But this reason applies with equal efficacy to previous and predetermining concurrence. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.

73. The adversaries answer that this difference exists between previous and simultaneous concurrence: The latter is indifferent, and through it God does not determine the created will, but is rather determined by it. Previous and predetermining concurrence, however, is not determined by the created will, but determines it. Hence, the latter cannot make a precision, whereas the former can.

But against this, first: According to this solution and teaching, the created will determines the divine concurrence to the entity of the sinful act and nevertheless does not determine it to formal malice. Therefore, likewise, God through His concurrence can determine the created will to the entity of the same act without determining it to malice.

The consequence appears manifest. No reason can be assigned why the created will should be more capable of precision in determining the divine concurrence than divine omnipotence and the divine will in determining the concurrence of the created will. Therefore, if the created will can determine the divine concurrence to the entity of the sinful act while abstracting from malice—that is, without determining God’s concurrence to malice—God can also determine the concurrence of the created will to the entity of the act without determining it to malice, but while abstracting from it.

Secondly: Grant that God’s concurrence considered in first act—that is, the decree of concurring with free causes—is indifferent, or that God offers His concurrence to the will in an indifferent manner. Nevertheless, the actual and exercised concurrence by which He in fact influences the act of hatred of God together with the created will cannot be indifferent, since it is intimately contained in and identified with that act.

I therefore ask whether such actual and exercised concurrence attains only the entity and substance of that intrinsically evil act, or whether it also extends to its malice and deformity. If the first is said, it follows that previous concurrence can all the more abstract from the malice and deformity of the same act and attain only its substance and entity. For, as we said above, previous concurrence is more remote from the malice and deformity annexed to such an act than simultaneous concurrence is.

If the second is asserted, it follows that God through simultaneous concurrence causes the malice and deformity of sin, which is repugnant to divine sanctity.

74. To extricate themselves from these arguments, the adversaries fall into various absurdities and are forced to swallow and digest many difficulties. Some recent authors, being unable or unwilling to conceive how God can cause the material element of sin while abstracting from formal malice, have dared to recall from the ashes and tomb the long-extinct and

buried position of Durandus and Aureolus. They assert that God does not immediately cause the entity of sin and its material element, but only mediately and remotely, insofar as He gave the will the power of operating and consequently of producing the entity and actuality of the evil acts it elicits.

75. But this position is called audacity or rashness by St. Anselm in *De praescientia et libero arbitrio*: It is audacity to say that there is any being which is not from the first being. St. Thomas says in *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 37, q. 2, a. 2, that it is most closely related to a twofold error. And in *In II Sententiarum ad Hannibaldum*, dist. 37, q. un., a. 1, he says that it is heretical and contrary to reason: It is heretical to say that any being, insofar as it is being, is not from God. Nor is this contrary only to faith, but also to reason.

Similarly, Albert the Great, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 35, a. 7, says that this opinion, which had gained many of the ancients, has almost departed from the schools and is regarded as heretical by many modern authors.

Finally, Dominic Soto says in *De natura et gratia*, bk. I, c. 18, that the consent of theologians is unanimous that God causes the entity of sin which serves as the subject of its malice and deformity: The theologians do not disagree that God is the cause of the entity, as they call it, which is sin, in that kind of efficient causality by which He moves all animate and inanimate things to their natural actions.

76. Reason also supports this. As St. Thomas argues in the cited places: That which does not have being from itself cannot have operation from itself. But the entity of the man who sins does not belong to him from himself. Therefore, neither can the actual entity of sin belong to him from himself.

Furthermore, as the same holy Doctor argues in *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 37, q. 2, a. 2, in the argument to the contrary: Whatever is not the cause of the operation by which a substance is brought into being is not the cause of that substance. But through certain sinful actions, substances are brought into being, as men are generated through adulteries and fornications. Therefore, if God is not the cause of these actions insofar as they are actions, neither is He the cause of the men generated through them, which is absurd.

77. Other recent authors, taking the opposite extreme, see that if God's simultaneous concurrence is admitted to be capable of precision and to attain the entity of sin while abstracting from its malice and deformity, the same can be said of previous and predetermining concurrence. They therefore say that God through simultaneous concurrence causes not only the entity and substance of evil acts, but also their malice and deformity.

They add, however, that God does this as though unwilling and compelled, and as though drawn and determined by the human will, lest He fail in the office of first cause or violate the rights of created freedom.

78. But this answer and teaching can be refuted in many ways. First, it appears impious to assert that God, as determined by the human will, follows its fall and causes the malice and deformity of its sin, and is as though drawn by it into partnership in its crime. This manifestly appears repugnant to divine sanctity.

Thus, just as the authors of the preceding solution already refuted remove from God the character of first cause in order to defend the rights of divine sanctity, so these authors, on the contrary, in order to preserve in God the character of first cause, disfigure divine sanctity.

79. Secondly, it is repugnant for God, even as drawn and determined by the human will, to cause that which is not contained under the adequate object of His omnipotence. But the malice and deformity of sin, since it is a departure from God as ultimate end, is not contained under the adequate object of divine omnipotence, since that object is only what can be ordered to God as ultimate end, as was shown above. Therefore, it cannot be caused by God, even as drawn and determined by the human will.

Thirdly, that which is from someone only permissively is not properly said to be caused by him, as Anselm teaches in *De casu diaboli*, c. 1. This is clear because permission is only the negation of impeding, while a pure negation cannot truly cause or bestow real being. But the formal malice of sin is from God only permissively, as is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 6. Therefore, it is not caused by God, even as drawn and determined by the created will.

Fourthly, God does not cause that which He hates, according to Wis. 11: *You hate nothing of the things You have made*. But He hates the malice and deformity of sin, as is clear from Wis. 14: *The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God*. Therefore, He does not cause it.

This is confirmed. If God's omnipotence caused sin according to the formal character of malice, that omnipotence itself, as producing and influencing it, would displease God and terminate His hatred. But this cannot be said, otherwise God would hate Himself and displease Himself. Therefore, neither can the former be said.

The inference of the major premise is evident. One who is displeased with a work is also displeased with the one influencing it. Therefore, if God's omnipotence caused sin formally as such and influenced its malice and deformity, which displease God, His omnipotence would likewise displease Him and terminate His hatred.

80. Fifthly, if the malice of sin proceeded efficiently from God as first cause, it would be reduced more to God than to the man who sins. For an effect proceeding from a first and a secondary cause depends more upon the first cause than upon the secondary cause, and consequently is reduced more to the former than to the latter. The consequent is absurd and altogether injurious to divine sanctity. Therefore, so is the antecedent.

Finally, if God influenced not only the material entity of sin but also its formal malice, He could be called the cause and author of sin, which is to fall into the error of Calvin condemned by the Council of Trent. The inference is proved as follows. God is the first cause and first author of the entity and actuality of the sinful act, although, according to the doctrine of the adversaries, He does not influence it except as drawn and determined by the human will determining the indifference of the divine decree. Therefore, likewise, although He influenced the malice and deformity of the act only as drawn and determined by the created will, He could nevertheless be called the cause and author of sin.

81. From these things you understand that the Thomists reconcile God's infinite sanctity with the character and dignity of first cause and first principle better and more easily than the adversaries do.

By admitting indifferent decrees in God, the latter remove from Him the character of first cause in relation to the determination of the created will, as we showed above. Nevertheless, they do not preserve the rights of divine sanctity, since, to extricate themselves from the arguments of the Thomists, they are finally forced to assert that God, as drawn and determined by the created will, influences through simultaneous concurrence not only the entity of sin but also its malice and deformity.

The Thomists, abhorring both positions, in order to reconcile the dignity of first cause with God's sanctity, recur with St. Thomas to the infinite efficacy of the divine will and omnipotence, by reason of which God so causes the material entity of sin that He abstracts from its formal malice. The holy Doctor expressly teaches this in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 15: *Because the first cause influences the effect more than the secondary cause does, whatever perfection exists in the effect is principally reduced to the first cause; but whatever is defective must be reduced to the secondary cause, which does not operate as efficaciously as the first.*

Therefore, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, so far is it from following from the efficacy of the divine decree concerning the material element of sin that the formal malice found in the act of our will is reduced to the divine will and its causality, that rather such efficacy causes the malice

and deformity of sin to be reduced not to the first but to the secondary cause.

§ 9.

The Objections are Resolved.

82. You will object first: If God by an absolute and efficacious will predefines the material element of sin and predetermines the will toward it, it will be lawful and praiseworthy for man to will it. But this is absurd. Therefore, so is the antecedent. The inference of the major premise appears manifest, for it is lawful and praiseworthy to will everything God wills, since it is praiseworthy to conform oneself in all things to the divine will.

I answer by denying the inference of the major premise. To its proof, I say that, although it is lawful and praiseworthy to will everything God wills as special mover and provider, it is not lawful and praiseworthy to will everything He wills by the general will of the first mover and universal provider. For by this general will He wills to permit sins and to concur together with us toward their material element, as the adversaries confess. Yet it is neither praiseworthy nor lawful to will those sins, nor is it always an act of virtue to conform oneself to such a will.

83. You will object secondly: Man cannot posit the material element of sin without consequently positing the malice and deformity annexed to it. Therefore, if God by an absolute and efficacious will wills man to posit and produce such a material element, He consequently also wills him to posit the malice joined to it, and therefore wills him to sin.

I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence. That reasoning suffers from the same defect as the following arguments:

“The soul absolutely and efficaciously wills a crooked leg to be moved by a progressive motion. But a crooked leg cannot be moved by a progressive motion without limping. Therefore, the soul absolutely and efficaciously wills the crooked leg to limp.”

Likewise: “God efficaciously wills Peter to be generated by Paul. But Peter cannot be generated by Paul without contracting original sin. Therefore, God efficaciously wills Peter to contract that sin.”

A similar argument can also be formed from the principles of the adversaries. According to their principles, God by an absolute and efficacious decree wills to place a man in those occasions and circumstances in which He has foreseen through middle knowledge that he will sin. But it is impossible for the man placed in those occasions and circumstances not to

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sin; otherwise, the divine foreknowledge would be deceived and that which God foreknew would not occur. Therefore, God by an absolute and efficacious decree wills the man to fall into sin.

Therefore, just as those consequences are invalid, so is the one made in the proposed argument. The reason is that, as we showed above, things identified with or connected to one another can be distinguished not only intentionally and by cognition, but also really through volition and causality. This always occurs when, of two aspects or formalities connected to one another, one is contained within the formal object of some power or within the sphere of activity of some cause, while the other is not.

Hence, since moral malice is not contained within the formal object of God's will or within the sphere of divine causality and omnipotence, whereas its entity and actuality are so contained, God can by an absolute and efficacious will will and predefine the material element of sin under the aspect of being and act, and predetermine the will toward it, without such predefinition or predetermination extending to the malice and deformity joined to it through the defectibility of the created will.

Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 162: Every sin proceeds from some defect of the proximate agent, not from the influence of the first agent. Thus, the defect of limping proceeds from the disposition of the leg, not from the motive power, although whatever perfection of motion appears in the limping is from that power. The proximate agent of human sin is the will. Therefore, the defect of sin is from the human will, not from God, who is the first agent, although whatever pertains to the perfection of action in the sinful act is from Him.

84. You will say: To posit the material element of sin with moral defect and malice is the same as to posit it with freedom and advertence of reason. But through His predefinition God wills, and through physical predetermination causes, man to posit the material element of sin with freedom and advertence of reason. Therefore, through such predefinition and predetermination He wills and causes man to posit the material element of sin with moral defect and malice.

I answer by denying the major premise. Although freedom and advertence of reason are conditions necessarily required for human acts to be morally evil, moral malice does not consist in them. Rather, it consists either in the privation of rectitude and conformity with the law, as some hold, or, as others more probably judge, in a transcendental relation to the object as disconformed to the rules of morals.

Hence, since God by His predefinition does not will, nor by His predetermination cause, man to posit the material element of sin as

founding or connoting such a privation, or as expressing that transcendental relation, it follows that He neither wills by His predefinition nor causes by His predetermination man to posit the material element of sin with moral defect and malice. He causes only that man produce in it entity, actuality, vitality, and the other aspects belonging to the physical order and reducible to God as first principle and ultimate end.

85. You will press: Everything positive must be predefined and predetermined by God. Therefore, if the formal element of sin consists in something positive, as the more common and probable position of theologians asserts, it must be predefined and predetermined by God, and consequently caused by Him.

I answer first that the same argument can be made concerning simultaneous concurrence, since everything positive and real must be produced by God through simultaneous concurrence.

I answer secondly by distinguishing the antecedent. Everything positive must be predefined and predetermined by God under the positive aspect of entity: I concede. Under the aspect of defective deformity: I deny. This matter is treated in the treatise on sins, c. 8, § 2.

86. You will object thirdly: God cannot morally move and predetermine a man toward the material element of sin; otherwise, He would tempt, seduce, and deceive him. Therefore, neither can He physically move and predetermine him toward it. The consequence appears manifest. For since physical motion is intrinsically efficacious and stands on the side of the power, it is much greater and more vehement than moral motion, which is not efficacious of itself and only intrinsically and objectively attracts and invites the agent to operate.

I answer by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. There is a manifold difference between physical and moral motion.

The first makes a precision and remains within the physical order, whereas the second does not, but extends to the moral order and chiefly regards things belonging to that order.

The first regards only the entity and actuality of the act toward which it moves; the second regards, or ought to regard, conformity or disconformity with the law.

The first belongs to God as first cause and universal provider; the second belongs to Him as special provider and mover.

Hence, although if God morally moved a man toward the material element of sin He would tempt and deceive him, it does not follow from His physically moving and predetermining him toward such a material element

that He tempts or seduces him. It follows only that He applies him to produce the entity and actuality found in that act, which are directly and principally reduced to divine causality and omnipotence.

To the proof to the contrary, it must be said that, although physical motion is greater than moral motion intensively—that is, more powerful and efficacious—it is nevertheless lesser extensively, because it remains within the physical order and does not extend to the moral order as moral motion does.

87. I add that, if this argument were valid, it could easily be turned back against the adversaries. They teach that, although God through middle knowledge sees infinitely many occasions and circumstances in which men would not sin, but would act well and be converted, He nevertheless sometimes places them in others in which through the same knowledge He has infallibly foreseen that they will sin.

Hence I argue as follows. One who places a man in occasions of sin morally premoves and predetermines him to sin. For just as occasions of sin morally and objectively move toward sin, so one who places a man in them is judged morally to premove and predetermine him to sin. Hence it is commonly said: *Opportunity makes the thief*.

Therefore, if God sometimes places men in those circumstances and occasions in which through middle knowledge He foresaw that they would infallibly fall into sin, He tempts, seduces, and deceives them, and morally premoves and predetermines them to sin. Since this is a moral effect, or rather defect, it must be reduced to a cause moving morally, not to one physically predetermining.

88. You will say with a certain recent author: In the position of the Thomists, God predetermines the persuasions by which the devil morally moves us to sin. Therefore, He predetermines toward evil acts not only physically but also morally.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. He predetermines those persuasions insofar as they are physical and vital acts: I concede the antecedent. Insofar as they are morally evil and induce to sin: I deny the antecedent and the consequence.

For just as, in the position of the adversaries, God causes such persuasions in the demons through simultaneous concurrence insofar as they are physical and vital acts, yet is not judged to cooperate in their malice, so in our position He is not judged to move men toward sin, although through previous concurrence He produces those same persuasions in the demons insofar as they are vital and physical operations.

89. You will object fourthly: The Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 6, condemns those who say that God does not stand merely permissively toward sins and evil works. But the contrary seems to follow from our position. Therefore, our position does not seem consonant with the Council of Trent.

The minor premise is proved as follows. One who causes something from which another thing infallibly follows is not judged, nor can he be said, to stand merely permissively toward that other thing. For example, because death infallibly follows upon the infliction of a lethal wound, and blindness upon the piercing of the eyes, one who inflicts a lethal wound upon another or pierces his eyes is ineptly and abusively said merely to permit his death or blindness.

But sin follows infallibly from the predefinition and predetermination of its material element, since it is impossible for a man freely and advertently to elicit an evil and prohibited act without sinning. Therefore, once such predefinition and predetermination are posited, God cannot be said, except abusively and meaninglessly, to stand merely permissively toward sins.

This is confirmed. For God to stand permissively toward something is for Him not to impede it when He could, as St. Thomas teaches in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2, in the body and ad 3. But once it is posited that God predetermines the will toward the material element of sin—for example, hatred of God—He cannot impede its malice, since its freely produced entity cannot be separated from the malice. Therefore, neither can He be said to permit it.

90. I answer the objection by denying the minor premise. To its proof, I distinguish the major: One who causes something from which another thing infallibly follows is not judged, nor can he be said, to stand merely permissively toward that other thing, if it follows by a physical consequence and causality: I concede. If it follows only by a logical consequence and inference: I deny.

For limping infallibly follows upon the vital movement of a crooked leg. Nevertheless, the soul causing that movement is judged not to be the positive cause, but merely the permissive cause, of the defect. Since the defect is not contained within the sphere of activity of the locomotive power, it does not follow from its progressive motion by a physical consequence and causality, but only by a logical consequence and inference.

Hence, the examples adduced in the objection are not relevant. Death and blindness, since they lie within the sphere of activity of secondary causes, follow directly, by the nature of the thing, and by physical consequence, upon the infliction of a lethal wound and the piercing of the

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eyes. On the contrary, since the malice and deformity of sin do not lie within the adequate object of the divine will or the sphere of its causality, they do not result or follow from the predetermination of the will toward the material element of sin by a physical consequence and causality, but only by logical consequence and inference, as we explained in the preceding treatise, c. 4, at the end of § 2.

To the confirmation, it must be said that, although God, once the decree predetermining the will toward the material element of sin is posited, cannot in the composite sense impede its malice by joining the impediment—and consequently the negation of the malice of the act of hatred of God—with the predefinition and therefore with the positing of that material element, nevertheless, just as the will, even while eliciting that act, can in the divided sense refrain from eliciting it, so God can in the divided sense impede it from eliciting the act.

For a cause to be judged to stand merely permissively toward some defect, it is not always required that it be able to impede that defect in the composite sense or by consequent power. This is clear from the often-adduced example of the soul moving a crooked leg to walk. It is judged to permit the defect of limping, although, once the motion of the crooked leg has been posited, it cannot compose the negation of the defect of limping with that motion.

§ 10.

The Repulsion of Calvinism.

91. From what has been said throughout this chapter, it remains manifest that the position of the Thomists differs greatly from Calvin's doctrine and has no affinity with his errors.

First, as regards the causality and efficacy of the divine decrees and the assistances proceeding from them, there are two principal differences between Thomistic and Calvinist doctrine.

The first and principal difference is that Calvin, and those called strict Calvinists, teach that the divine decrees and assistances are efficacious in such a way that they absorb all indifference of the human will and, leaving only spontaneity or freedom from coercion, remove from it the proximate power of indifference. For in his *Antidoton* to canon 5 of session 6, he writes: *What, then, does Augustine mean when he speaks of freedom of the will? He means what he so often repeats: men are not forced unwillingly by the grace of God, but are governed as willing persons, so that they obey and follow spontaneously.*

The Thomists, however, so combine divine decrees and assistances, however efficacious of themselves and predetermining, with the will's actual indifference and power of dissent that these two are always joined: grace in the will, and in the same will existing under grace a sufficient power not to consent, according to St. Prosper in *De vocatione gentium*, bk. II, c. 27: *God gives the very willing by which men obey Him in such a way that He does not remove, even from those who will persevere, that mutability by which they can be unwilling.*

92. The second difference, related to and consequent upon the first, is drawn from the different understanding of the composite and divided senses.

Since Calvin and the strict Calvinists affirm that the divine decrees and assistances consume and absorb all indifference of the will and every power to dissent, they necessarily deduce from this error that the distinction between the composite and divided senses is to be understood in such a way that for the will to be unable to dissent from God moving it in the composite sense, but to be able in the divided sense, means that the will does not possess the power of dissent as long as the divine motion which excludes this power is present and perseveres in the soul, but possesses it only when that motion has departed or ceased.

The Thomists, however, since they maintain that the divine decrees and assistances govern the will in such a way as not to remove the power of resisting or dissenting, consequently assert that for the will to be unable to dissent from God moving it in the composite sense, but able in the divided sense, means this: Although actual dissent cannot be joined or composed with the divine motion, since that motion is intrinsically efficacious and consequently infallibly infers assent, the will nevertheless, even as subject to grace and moved and applied by it to acting, retains the absolute power of dissent.

Hence Alvarez says in *De auxiliis*, bk. II, response, c. 1, n. 34: The composite sense is not that insinuated in the argument, namely, that when efficacious grace is in the will, the will cannot fail to perform the act to which it is determined, but that when the motion has been removed it can fail to perform it. For this sense was devised by Calvin.

93. These two differences between Thomistic and Calvinist doctrine are so manifest that Father Annat could neither conceal nor dissemble them. In the book he published *De libertate incoacta*, p. 226, he expressed both differences in these words: Whom will the Jansenists find among the Thomists who says that a will predetermined by divine grace lacks the proximate power to dissent? Whom will they produce who interprets the

distinction between the composite and divided senses in such a way that its meaning is that the will moved by God can dissent when that motion has departed and another has arrived?

From these things you will understand how great are the conflicts in this author between his words and thoughts. First, in the book published at Toulouse in defense of middle knowledge, disp. 4, final chapter, he writes that no difference is found between the Thomists and Calvin except verbally and as regards the manner of speaking. Hence, in n. 120 he exclaims: *Is not the request of the defenders of middle knowledge just, who, after a long dispute of so many years, still ask what the real difference is between the doctrine of their adversaries and that of Calvin, precisely in the question whether or not there is in man any exercise of free choice?* Yet in the cited passage of *De libertate incoacta*, and in other passages to be cited below, he assigns the two differences already explained.

94. Secondly, the same author says in the former work, n. 95, that the method of defending freedom which Amelius received from Alvarez—namely, that the power to dissent is said to exist simultaneously with the assistance by which a man is moved to assent—belongs to Calvinism and is not according to the mind of the Council of Trent.

Yet in *Contra Baianos*, bk. IV, c. 8, § 7, n. 4, he writes: Luther and Calvin and their followers are heretics because they do not admit the free choice required by the Council of Trent, namely, that once it has been aroused by God through efficacious grace, it can nevertheless dissent. And below: It consequently follows that we must say that the proximate power of dissent was sanctioned by the Council of Trent and heretically denied by the heretics.

Likewise, in his reply to the tenth letter of Louis Montalte, he says: Catholic Doctors agree among themselves that grace efficacious of itself governs the will in such a way that it does not remove from it the power and ability to resist. Thus, these two things are composed with one another: grace in the will, and in the same will existing under grace a sufficient power not to consent. Nor do they doubt that this is the true meaning of the Council of Trent in the words: “It can dissent if it wills.”

Thirdly, in the aforesaid book published in defense of middle knowledge, when depicting a sketch of Thomistic freedom, he asserts that the Thomists require only two things for true and perfect freedom: objective indifference of judgment in the intellect, and spontaneity or freedom from coercion in the will. He says that Calvin erased nothing whatever from this sketch: *After examining everything according to the position of the adversaries*, he says in n. 111, *we have found nothing other than God’s absolute, efficacious, infallible, and*

indefeasible predefinition, from which the action of the will follows, with all coercion and violence excluded and a moderate degree of cognition presupposed.

Nevertheless, in the places already cited, he manifestly declares that the Thomists require, besides these two things, a third for the true nature of freedom, namely, the power of dissenting or not acting, which separates the Thomists from the Calvinists. Likewise, in the book he published under the name of Eugenius Philadelphus, p. 654 of the Paris edition, he says that the Thomists preserved their boundaries from confusion with the heretics by this one line, namely, the power to dissent.

95. Fourthly, the same author in the aforesaid book on middle knowledge entangles the Thomists with the Calvinists; but in the books published against the Baians and Jansenists, he separates them from the Jansenists, while nevertheless saying that the error of Jansenius and Calvin is the same. These things certainly cannot be reconciled except by denying that common principle of syllogistic art and the natural light: *Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as one another.*

I pass over many other contradictions, or conflicts between discordant words and thoughts, which are found in the aforesaid books of this author, who wrote diverse and opposite things according to the diversity of times and according as it seemed expedient for his cause and his own advantage. We treated this matter at length in *Apologia Thomistarum*, which is found in *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, vol. I, at the end of the treatise on the will of God.

Hence, we can deservedly direct toward this author the words of Tertullian in *De spectaculis*: This is the integrity of truth, the fullness of discipline owed to it, and the equality of fear and the obedience of faith: not to change one's position or vary one's judgment.

96. As regards Calvin's other error, by which he makes God the cause and author of sin, there are likewise two principal differences between Thomistic and Calvinist doctrine.

Calvin made God the author of sin under a twofold title. The first and principal is drawn from his teaching that God moves the human will to acts, whether good or evil, only spontaneously and not freely, and as a horse is moved by its rider, as is clear from what was said above.

For once it is supposed that God moves the will to evil and sinful acts by a motion which removes the will's indifference and necessitates it, it evidently follows that the malice and deformity of sin cannot be reduced to the created will, but only to God's motion. A will moved and aroused by a merely spontaneous motion, lacking actual indifference and the power to the opposite, cannot influence moral malice into its acts. Moral malice

cannot subsist without freedom of indifference and the power to the opposite, as is manifest in first spontaneous movements and indeliberate acts. Hence, if any moral malice is found in the will's acts, it must necessarily be reduced to God as its author.

The other reason why Calvin cannot avoid making God the author of sin is that he taught that God moves the human will to evil acts by a moral motion, commanding the devil to tempt, seduce, and lead men into sin, as will be clear to one reading bk. II, c. 4 of the *Institutio Christianae religionis*. For moral motion, since it is not previous as physical motion is, as we explained in the preceding section, extends not only to the entity and substance of the act, but also, at least secondarily and indirectly, to its malice and deformity.

Therefore, since the Thomists neither acknowledge mere spontaneity in a will moved and predetermined by God, nor say that God moves toward evil acts, even as physical and vital, by a moral motion, but only by a physical one, it is manifest that they differ from Calvin by the whole breadth of heaven and have no affinity or commerce with him as regards the aforesaid error by which he makes God the author of sin.

97. Nor does it matter that Calvin sometimes appears to distinguish between the entity of sin and its malice, to attribute the former to God but not the latter, and to deny that He is the author of sin. He denies this only in the sound of words, to avoid the odium of the expression, and inconsistently with his own principles. For the opposite manifestly follows from the twofold principle he admits: that God moves the will to evil acts only spontaneously and not freely, and that He commands the devil to tempt men and lead them into sin, which is to move them toward the sinful act by a moral motion.

I add, from Andrew Duval, Doctor of the Sorbonne, vol. I on the *Secunda Secundae*, p. 53, that innumerable passages formerly existed in Calvin's *Institutio Christianae religionis* in which he expressly and in formal terms said that God is the author of sins, even as regards the malice and deformity which they formally include, but that these passages were erased by the Calvinists in later editions.

Becanus also shows in *Summa Theologiae*, vol. I, c. 16, from the testimony of David Pareus, a famous Calvinist and indeed a foremost leader of the Calvinist faction in Germany, that Calvin truly made God the author of crimes, and that many Calvinists departed from Calvin in this error at which even the ears recoil.

Why, then, does Father Annat attempt in his book on middle knowledge to absolve Calvin of a crime from which even the stricter Calvinists

themselves do not absolve him? Why does he attempt to wash that Ethiopian, saying that Calvin distinguishes between the material and formal elements of sin, or between its entity and malice, attributes only the former to God and not the latter, and that *if we consider his use of words, he is sufficiently religious in taking care not to say that God is the author of sin?*

Certainly, other theologians of the Society are more sincere and cautious in this matter. They candidly confess that Calvin attributes both to God as author and makes God the author of sins.

98. From what has been said, it is clear that Master Lorca, of the Cistercian Order, spoke truly and prudently in *De gratia*, disp. 21, conclusion 2: Those go far beyond measure who with insuperable contention maintain that the physical predetermination taught by the Thomists destroys freedom and that the position asserting it differs in nothing or very little from Calvin. For since it is evident that this is the doctrine of St. Thomas and of very many ancient scholastics, there is no reason to fear that it contains any danger. Rather, it must be believed consonant with the Catholic faith. To use such censures is neither pious nor prudent.

Therefore, I do not believe that the most pious and wise Cardinal Bellarmine wrote what is read in his *Controversiae*: namely, that the position teaching efficacious grace to be a physical quality from God determining the will to will and choose the good appears to be, or is, altogether the same as the error of Calvin and Luther, or differs little from it. It is more credible and probable that those words were inserted by certain German Jesuits who supervised the printing of that book of the *Controversiae*, as we showed in *Apologia Thomistarum*.

But whatever may be the case concerning this, I oppose Baronius to Bellarmine. In a letter sent to the Lord de Villars, Archbishop of Vienne, Baronius declares that Molina's doctrine is dangerous because of its novelty, contrary to Augustine, and akin to the errors of the Pelagians or Semipelagians. I shall transcribe the letter here in full and verbatim.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST REVEREND LORD,

Forgive me for replying later than is proper to Your Lordship's letter, which I kissed as holy, pure, and orthodox in all things, and from which it is far from me to dissent even in the smallest point or particle. Only the controversy concerning Molina's books remains. I have read them, but not without disgust, since in them he displays nothing more forcefully than his opposition to St. Augustine—although he never names the saint—rebuking him for negligence and boasting that he himself is more vigilant and acute in these disputes. Who could tolerate him

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speaking in this manner without nausea? Yet he escapes like a snake and easily slips from one's hands, so that, although one may find him rash, one can hardly convict and brand him with heresy. The Church of God does not need commentators of this kind. She is accustomed to delight only in purity, candor, and splendor, since she herself has neither spot nor wrinkle. I have read him, I say, and have noted fifty or more propositions, words, and expressions which are at least akin to the errors of the Pelagians or Semipelagians, although he himself cautiously keeps within the limits of the Catholic faith, or at least protests that he does so. Nor do I think that anyone who reads them without private affection will altogether deny this. Why does the Church of God need Molina's books in order to learn what she learned so many centuries ago from so many holy Fathers, councils, and decrees? As regards our Lord Pope Clement himself, this is his intention, this his desire, and finally this his decree: that he should not depart by a finger's breadth from the footsteps of his predecessors, but should follow them most firmly. He knows plainly that so many holy Pontiffs—Innocent, Sixtus, Celestine, Hormisdas, and finally Felix, to whom the canons of the Council of Orange belong—professed and testified in their writings that the Roman Church, in those things which concern grace and free choice, has always been accustomed to follow St. Augustine. Hormisdas testifies to this in so many words in his letters, so that no other judgment is required, since the matter has already been adjudicated. He is now laboring in examining Molina's volume, concerning which the case—whether it should be rejected, corrected, or retained—is still before the judge. In my judgment, the Catholic Church does not need a work in which some things at least harsh to the ear would need correction. I have admonished my Most Reverend Fathers of the Society of Jesus not to allow their reputation to be endangered and brought into jeopardy by defending his books. God knows that I honor them all as Fathers, so that I may apply to them the words: "The reproaches of those who reproached You have fallen upon me." But I do not wish to be more lengthy. Farewell, most beloved and learned Father, a lamp to my feet whenever it happens that I must walk through darkness. God has reserved to another time the matter of placing blessed men in the number of the saints. Rome, 15 March in the year of the Lord 1603.

*Your Most Illustrious and Most Reverend
Lordship's brother and servant,
Caesar Cardinal Baronius.*

Peter Matthieu mentions this letter in *Histoire des sept années de paix*, vol. II, bk. VII, narrative 4. He says that he had seen it and reports a fragment of it, namely, the words: *I have admonished my Most Reverend Fathers of the Society of Jesus*, and so forth.

§ 11.

An Efficacious Decree and God's Previous and Predetermining
Concurrence Must Be Admitted for Both the State
of Fallen Nature and the State of Innocence.

99. This is proved first from the principles established above. In both states, the character and dignity of first and most universal cause must be preserved in God. But this cannot stand if the predetermining decree and God's previous concurrence are removed. Therefore, for both the state of fallen nature and the state of innocence, a predetermining decree and previous concurrence, or physical predetermination, must be admitted.

The major premise is certain by faith. The minor is clear from what was said above. Since an indifferent decree awaits its determination from free choice, it cannot cause that determination. Hence, if in the state of innocence God had a purely indifferent decree and only simultaneous concurrence, He was not the cause of the free determination of the will of Adam and the angels, nor consequently of the distinction between the good and evil angels. Such a distinction must be reduced not to God but to free choice, and not to grace but to nature.

100. This is confirmed. Secondary causes, in whatever state they are placed, must be subordinated to God as first cause in their operation. But the subordination of secondary causes to the first in operation cannot be preserved without God's previous concurrence and physical predetermination, as was shown in § 3. Therefore, such concurrence and predetermination must be admitted for every state of human nature.

Hence St. Thomas everywhere and constantly requires the necessity of divine premotion not only because of the weakness of our wounded nature, but also because of the indispensable dependence and subordination of every secondary cause upon the first in acting. This is clear from *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 1, where he says: It is manifest that, just as all bodily motions are reduced to the motion of a heavenly body as the first bodily mover, so all motions, both bodily and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover simply speaking, who is God. Therefore, however perfect a bodily or spiritual nature may be posited, it cannot proceed into its act unless it is moved by God.

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Hence in the following article, ad 1, he asserts that the human mind, even when healthy, does not possess dominion over its act in such a way that it does not need to be moved by God.

101. This is proved secondly from the principles established in the treatise on the knowledge of God. There we showed that God's knowledge is the cause of things, and that God contemplates all things in Himself as a cause and as the medium previously known. Consequently, He knows absolute and conditional future things as determined in His essence through an absolute or conditional decree. Thus, there is not in God a knowledge which is the condition of conditional future things, independent of and prior to the conditional decree.

But these things cannot stand if a purely indifferent decree is admitted for the state of innocence. For such a decree cannot be a medium by which determinate future things, whether absolute or conditional, are known certainly and infallibly, since in an indifferent cause, insofar as it is indifferent, a determinate effect cannot be known certainly and infallibly.

Hence, if a predetermining decree for the state of innocence is removed, God will have to know all future things belonging to that state, whether absolute or conditional, immediately in themselves and in their objective truth. Consequently, for that state there must be admitted in God a middle knowledge which directs God in His indifferent decrees and investigates the future consent of the created will of Adam and the angels.

Likewise, God's knowledge for that state will not be the cause of the futurition of things or their rule and measure, but will rather be ruled and measured by them as regards its truth and certitude. This is wholly alien to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as was shown in the same treatise.

Hence a certain recent author rightly says that those who restrict the efficacy of the divine decrees to the state of fallen nature *scatter with their left hand the stones of the Augustinian wall which they set in place with their right*.

102. Moreover, because Jansenius summons this cause before Augustine's tribunal and contends that this dispute must be decided solely by the testimonies of Augustine, several testimonies of the holy Doctor which openly favor our position must be briefly considered here. From them it will be clear how false is what the aforesaid author says in *De gratia Christi Salvatoris*, bk. VIII: that efficacious grace and physical predetermination extended to all states of human nature are most remote from Augustine's thought and cannot be proved from any testimony of his.

103. Augustine, therefore, clearly expressed the necessity and efficacy of the divine motion for every state and for all causes, both necessary and free,

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in *De Trinitate*, bk. III, c. 4: *The will of God is the first and supreme cause of all bodily forms and motions.*

He has the same doctrine in *In Ioannem*, tract. 1, explaining the words, *All things were made through Him*, and in Prosper's *Sententiae*, n. 58: *The divine will is the cause of all bodily and spiritual motions.* Here it is clear that the holy Doctor is speaking not only of bodily causes but also of spiritual motions.

Hence in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. V, he says universally: God therefore moves the whole creation by His hidden power.

And in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 20, speaking specifically of the free motion of the will, he writes: Sacred Scripture, if diligently examined, shows that not only the good wills of men—which He Himself makes good from evil wills and, once He has made them good, directs toward good acts and eternal life—but also those wills which preserve the creation of this world are so within God's power that He causes them to incline wherever and whenever He wills.

He continues in c. 21: The Almighty acts in the hearts of men even upon the movement of their wills, so that through them He may accomplish whatever He has willed to accomplish, He who knows not how to will anything unjustly.

In *De correptione et gratia*, c. 14, he confirms this by the example of Saul's election, which he says proceeded *from the most omnipotent power of God to incline human hearts wherever He wills.*

He also confirms it by the example of those who elected David king: God brought them to appoint him king. And how did He bring them? Did He bind them with bodily chains? He acted within; He held their hearts; He moved their hearts; and He drew them by their own wills, which He Himself worked in them.

He derives the reason for all these things not from the corruption of their hearts, but from God's supreme dominion over our wills, saying: *When God wills to establish kings upon the earth, He has the wills of men more in His power than they themselves have their own wills.*

All these passages are so clear and express for establishing the necessity and efficacy of God's general motion that nothing clearer or more express could be adduced, unless perhaps the passage of the same holy Doctor in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, bk. I, c. 20. Speaking of the change of King Ahasuerus from indignation to gentleness, which was an act of the natural order, he says that *God by His most hidden and efficacious power converted the king's heart and transferred it from indignation to gentleness.*

Therefore, according to Augustine, an efficacious motion of God preventing our wills is required not only for supernatural acts, but also for

operations of the natural order. Consequently, it must be admitted for every state of human nature.

104. To make this more evident and incapable of evasion by any subterfuge, other testimonies must be brought forward in which the same holy Doctor, descending to the state of integrity of the angels and our first parents, declares that efficacious grace was necessary in them.

In *De cantico novo*, c. 8, he says: *What unassisted free choice can accomplish was demonstrated in Adam himself.* Therefore, he judges that efficacious assistance for not sinning was denied to him.

Hence in sermon 11 on the words of the Apostle, speaking of the same Adam, he adds: *Falling from the potter's hand, he was broken; for He who made him was governing him.* But governance denotes a certain motion preventing and applying free choice, not a purely sufficient assistance determinable and applicable by free choice.

Likewise, in *De civitate Dei*, bk. XI, c. 19, he teaches that the distinction between the good and evil angels was from God, not from free choice: *God alone*, he says, *could distinguish them.* Hence he refers to them the Apostle's words: *What do you have that you have not received?*

But the distinction between the good and evil angels could not have proceeded from sufficient grace common to both and determinable by them as regards consent or dissent. Therefore, it must have proceeded from efficacious grace predetermining free choice to consent. Jansenius himself frequently uses this argument against those who deny efficacious and predetermining grace in the state of fallen nature.

I add that in bk. XII, c. 9, speaking of the good will by which the good angels adhered to God through love, he says that it proceeded from the assistance of grace and consequently judges that grace to have been efficacious of itself: *If they could not make themselves better than He had made them, they certainly could not possess the good will by which they were better except through the operative assistance of the Creator*, and so forth.

Finally, the celebrated passage of the same book asserts that, while the evil angels fell through an evil will, the good angels were more fully assisted, so that they attained that fullness of beatitude from which they would be most certain that they would never fall.

Here Augustine manifestly admits a greater assistance and fuller aid in the good angels who persevered than in those who fell into fault. This fuller aid can be nothing other than efficacious grace, since all had abundantly received sufficient grace.

105. Nor is the answer of Jansenius valid when he asserts that the greater assistance which Augustine says was bestowed upon the good angels and

denied to the evil was not the gift of perseverance itself or efficacious assistance for persevering, but only the greater assistance which they received from God in beatitude itself, namely, the certain knowledge by which the good angels then knew that they would never fall.

This evasion is openly contrary to the text, since Augustine says that the good angels *were more fully assisted so that they attained beatitude*, not that once they had attained beatitude they were more fully assisted.

Hence Estius says in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 4, § 13: If this assistance by which the blessed angels are said to have been more fully assisted were beatitude itself, the meaning would become inept: namely, that beatitude was bestowed upon the angels so that through it they might attain beatitude.

Jansenius nevertheless objects against our position with several testimonies of Augustine. The principal and, as it were, primary testimony is taken from cc. 11 and 12 of *De correptione et gratia*, where the holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold assistance: one which he calls “assistance without which,” and another which he calls “assistance by which”—that is, sufficient and efficacious assistance. He teaches that the first was granted to Adam in the state of innocence, but not the second, which is conferred upon the saints and predestined in the state of fallen nature repaired through grace.

106. The common answer is that Augustine is not speaking there of every grace belonging to the state of innocence, but only of that which was granted to Adam for persevering in that state and in the integrity which he had received from God in his creation. This grace was not an assistance by which he would persevere, or an efficacious assistance, but an assistance without which he could not persevere, or a sufficient assistance.

St. Thomas, Augustine’s most faithful disciple, interprets him in this way in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 10, ad 3: It must be said, as Augustine says in *De correptione et gratia*, that man in the first state received the gift through which he could persevere, but did not receive the gift that he would persevere. Now, however, through the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace through which they can persevere and, beyond this, the gift that they actually persevere. Thus, the gift of Christ is greater than Adam’s sin.

And Augustine certainly explains himself clearly in the same work, c. 12. After setting forth the two kinds of assistance, he adds: Therefore, to the first man, who had been created upright in that good, had received the ability not to sin, and could avoid abandoning that good, the assistance of perseverance was given—not an assistance by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but an assistance without which free choice could not persevere. But now to the saints predestined by God’s grace to the kingdom of God, not only is such an assistance of perseverance given, but

one of such a kind that perseverance itself is bestowed upon them: not only that without this gift they cannot persevere, but also that through this gift they cannot but persevere.

From these words it is evident that the holy Doctor is speaking there of the assistance without which one cannot persevere.

107. Yet although this interpretation is legitimate and according to Augustine's mind, it does not appear to remove the present difficulty. Other testimonies of the same holy Doctor can be brought forward from those two chapters of *De correptione et gratia*, by which he manifestly appears to exclude every efficacious grace from the state of innocence and to admit only sufficient grace, subject to the free choice of Adam and the angels as regards its efficacy and use.

There he teaches that Adam stood in the truth by his will and free choice; that *he could have remained in justice if he had willed*; and that *God left it within his choice that he should will to persevere*.

Likewise, he says there that when the evil angels fell through free choice, the good angels stood through the same free choice, which was then so free that it could will either well or badly.

Finally, he asserts that God so ordered the life of angels and men that in it He first showed what free choice could accomplish, and afterward what the benefit of grace and the judgment of justice could accomplish.

108. A twofold answer can be given to these and similar testimonies. The first is that in these passages St. Augustine did not intend absolutely and under every aspect to exclude efficacious grace from the state of innocence, but only efficacious grace insofar as it is healing and medicinal, under which aspect and formality it is required in fallen man to heal the wounds inflicted upon him by original sin.

Hence Augustine teaches only in this respect that *Adam stood in the truth by his will and free choice; that he could have remained in justice if he had willed; that God left it within his choice that he should will to persevere*, and similar statements: namely, insofar as Adam experienced no weakness of will or rebellion of the lower appetite and suffered no difficulty in acting which had to be overcome through the medicinal grace of Christ. The same must be said proportionately of the angels.

St. Thomas interprets Augustine in this way in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 137, a. 4, ad 2: Augustine says in *De correptione et gratia* that it was given to the first man, not that he would persevere, but that he could persevere through free choice, because there was then no corruption which presented a difficulty in persevering.

Estius explains him in the same way in *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 41, § 14. He adds that unless we accept this understanding of Augustine's words, which St. Thomas indicates, it will be most difficult, indeed impossible, to reconcile Augustine with himself: that is, to show how the things objected are not contrary to those which were previously brought forward from the same Augustine: namely, that the good will through which the angels adhered to the Creator was the work of God and that they could not have possessed it unless the assistance of the Creator operated; that the good angels, in order to attain beatitude, were more fully assisted than the evil angels who fell away from it; that the distinction between the good and evil angels was from God and not from free choice, and consequently not from nature but from grace; and other similar statements openly declaring the efficacy and operation of divine grace in the angels and our first parents.

109. The second answer, given by a certain recent Thomist and nearly coinciding with the preceding one, is that Augustine compares grace as required in itself for both the state of health and the state of corruption according to what I might call the proper claims of each state, and according to the condition of man as healthy or infirm.

In this sense, it is true that fallen and infirm man, because of the perpetual conflict of rebellious concupiscence, needs a most unconquerable assistance, lest amid so many and such great temptations the will itself succumb through its weakness. Nevertheless, in the healthy and integral state of innocence, man did not in itself need such assistance, but by reason of that state required only sufficient grace, although from another source—namely, from the general subordination of the secondary cause to the first—he needed an efficacious motion and previous concurrence, as Augustine teaches in the passages cited above. In those passages he admits the necessity of divine motion not only for supernatural acts but also for natural acts, and consequently by reason of the subordination of secondary causes to the first.

CHAPTER V.

On the Love of God and the Other Affections and Attributes of the Divine Will.

Having considered the freedom and efficacy of the divine will, we must briefly discuss some of its effects, and especially love, which is the first movement of the will, from which all the others arise.

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§ 1.

In God There Is Formally Love Both of His Own Goodness and of Existing and Future Creatures, but Not of Merely Possible Creatures.

1. The first part is opposed to Valentin Herice, who thinks that love properly so called is not found in God with respect to His own goodness, but only joy or complacency. For, he says, love properly so called, or love taken specifically, insofar as it is distinguished from desire or joy, requires that its object abstract from presence and absence, or from possession and non-possession. Therefore, since the divine goodness is present to God and possessed by Him in the most perfect manner, an act of the divine will terminating in it cannot properly and formally have the character of love, but only that of joy and complacency. But this foundation is frivolous. For although love abstracts from presence and absence by negative abstraction, that is, it does not essentially require presence or absence, but is indifferent to either, and in this differs from joy, which essentially regards the good as present and possessed, and from desire, which essentially requires its lack and absence, nevertheless love does not abstract from them by positive abstraction, as though it were contrary to the nature of love to terminate in the good as present and possessed. For the union and presence of the object is so far from being repugnant to love that it rather perfects and increases it. Hence the love of the blessed, although it terminates in the divine goodness as possessed, is more perfect than the love of wayfarers, which is borne toward God as not yet possessed. I add that, if the presence of the object were repugnant to love, it would follow that joy and love could never exist together, and that no one would ever rejoice in a good obtained because he loves it, but because he loved it while it was not yet possessed. Yet that this is false and absurd is evident from the fact that a good in which we rejoice begins to displease us when it begins not to be loved, and joy in it ceases when love of it ceases, as experience shows.

2. The second part, which asserts that God loves existing and future creatures, is evident, because to love is to will good. But God wills some good to existing and future creatures, namely, existence already possessed or to be possessed at some point in time. Therefore He loves them. From this the third part is also established, which denies that God loves merely possible creatures. For God wills no good to merely possible things, since He does not will to give them existence, which is the basis and foundation of all

goods. I add that, if God loved merely possible creatures, He would love them not freely but necessarily, because the goodness belonging to them would precede every free decree of the divine will. But no necessary love of creatures should be posited in the divine will, since St. Thomas and the other theologians acknowledge no necessary love in God except that by which He loves Himself, and since the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from God's natural and necessary love, is not produced from the love of creatures, as we shall show in the treatise on the Trinity. Therefore there is no love of possible creatures in God.

3. You will say, first: God loves His omnipotence. Therefore He also loves possible creatures. The consequence seems evident, for whoever loves some object also loves everything connected with it and without which it cannot exist. But God's omnipotence is connected with the possibility of creatures and cannot exist without it. Therefore, if God loves His omnipotence, He also loves possible creatures.

4. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise: whoever loves some object also loves everything connected with it, if what is connected with it is capable of being loved, I grant the major premise; otherwise, I deny it. For although God loves the sinner's repentance, He does not love the sin without which repentance cannot exist, because sin is not capable of being loved. Or, secondly, I distinguish the same major premise: whoever loves some object also loves everything connected with it *a priori* and after the manner of a cause or a contributing condition by which that object exists, I grant the major premise; if it has only a consequent and *a posteriori* connection with it, after the manner of its effect or terminus, I deny the major premise. But the possibility of creatures is not the *a priori* ground of divine omnipotence; rather, conversely, divine omnipotence is the cause and *a priori* ground of the possibility of creatures. Hence it would follow only *a posteriori* and by an extrinsic argument, as they say, that omnipotence is removed if possible creatures are removed, just as it would follow *a posteriori* that the sun is removed from the removal of illumination.

5. You will say, secondly: God wills all men to be saved, and consequently, by a simple affection and antecedent will, He loves the salvation of the reprobate. But that salvation is not future, but only possible. Therefore God loves merely possible things.

6. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For although the salvation of the reprobate is not future by a consummated and absolute futurity, it is nevertheless future by a conditioned futurity, and by one begun through the sufficient graces and helps offered to all. These are

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the seeds of salvation, through which, if the impious responded to them and did not place obstacles to efficacious helps, they would obtain it.

§ 2.

In God There Is Formally Joy or Delight, but
Not Desire, Hatred, or Anger.

7. The first part is evident, because joy or delight is the repose of the will in a willed object. But the divine will reposes supremely in its own goodness, since it finds all sufficiency in it. Therefore God supremely rejoices in Himself and delights most sweetly in Himself.

8. The second part is shown as follows. Desire concerns a good not possessed, or one that is not in our power. For we only rejoice and delight in goods possessed, nor are we judged to desire something which, although it is within our power, we do not possess; for if we desired it, we would certainly possess it. But by reason of His uncreated and infinite goodness, God contains all extrinsic and created goods, at least eminently; and by reason of His omnipotence and the perfect dominion He has over our wills, He has within His power those goods which depend upon our freedom, since, according to Augustine, by reason of that dominion He has the wills of men more in His power than they have their own. Therefore there can be no desire in Him, even in relation to goods extrinsic to Him and dependent upon our freedom.

9. The third part is taught by St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 96, where he argues as follows: *As love is related to good, so hatred is related to evil; for we will good to those whom we love, but evil to those whom we hate. Therefore, if God's will cannot be inclined toward evil, as has been shown, it is impossible for Him to hate any thing.* In these words he indicates the fundamental reason for this part. For hatred is directed toward evil in some manner under the aspect of evil. Although evil cannot be the motive of the will, which always tends toward a good, whether true or apparent, it can nevertheless be its terminative object, insofar as the will, under the aspect of a good suitable to itself, wills what is harmful and unsuitable to an enemy. But the divine will is borne only toward the goodness of God as its adequate object, both motive and terminative. Hence, when God wills to inflict punishment upon a sinner, He does not intend it as the sinner's evil, as we do when we hate someone, but insofar as the splendor of His justice and the order or beauty of the universe shines forth in it, which is certainly good. Therefore hatred properly so called is not in God.

10. You will say: Punishment, as manifesting God's justice and contributing to the beauty of the universe, is indeed good for God as just and as author of the universe, but not for the reprobate upon whom it is inflicted, since it is neither useful nor delightful to him. Therefore, although God wills it as displaying His justice and contributing to the beauty of the universe, it does not follow that He does not also will it as an evil of the sinner upon whom it is inflicted.

11. On the contrary, since God is the universal good of all things, whatever is good in relation to God is also judged to be good for every creature. Therefore eternal punishment, as manifesting divine justice, is good not only in relation to God who intends it, but also in relation to the subject upon whom it is inflicted—not according to the particular inclination he has toward his own good, but according to the universal inclination by which, as a part of the universe, he is inclined toward the good of its author.

Finally, the fourth part, which asserts that anger is not properly in God, but only metaphorically, is taught by St. Thomas here, q. 20, a. 1, ad 2, and is proved by the reason he indicates there. Anger is an appetite for vengeance, with the hope of taking vengeance, proceeding from sorrow. But sorrow is repugnant to God. Therefore anger is also repugnant to Him. Hence the same Holy Doctor says in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 89: *Anger, therefore, is far removed from God according to the nature of its species, not only because it is an effect of sorrow, but also because it is an appetite for vengeance on account of sorrow conceived from an injury inflicted.*

Nor is what Suárez says in holding the contrary of any force, namely, that it does not belong to the essential concept of anger that it arise from sorrow, but only that it be an appetite for harming another under the aspect of just vengeance. For from this it would follow that every act of vindictive justice belongs to anger, and that a judge who, with a tranquil and composed mind, punishes a murderer from the motive of vindictive justice punishes him out of anger, which is absurd.

§ 3.

In God There Is Supreme and Perfect Justice,
Not Commutative but Distributive.

12. The first part is evident both from Scripture, which everywhere grants God the attribute of justice, and also from reason. For justice is the virtue that renders to each what belongs to him. But God renders to every creature

what belongs to it, according to Dionysius, *The Divine Names*, c. 8: *He distributes to all their proper goods according to the dignity of each existing thing.* Therefore perfect justice is in God. I add that legal justice is in a prince architectonically, as in one commanding and directing, but in subjects secondarily and administratively, as in those subject and obedient to the law, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 57, a. 6. But God is the King of kings and Lord of lords, and the supreme governor of the whole universe, through whom *kings reign and lawmakers decree just things*, as is said in Prov. 8. Therefore legal justice is in Him in a higher manner than in every prince.

13. That commutative justice is not in Him is expressly taught by St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, where he says: *Commutative justice, through which equality is established between God as giver and the creature as recipient, cannot belong to God according to its proper meaning.* And here, q. 21, a. 1, he says: *Commutative justice, which directs exchanges, does not belong to God.* Reason also establishes this. For commutative justice concerns what is given and received as its proper matter. Hence commutative justice cannot exist in one who can receive nothing from another. But God can receive nothing from a creature, nor can a creature give anything to God. Therefore commutative justice cannot be in God. The major premise is evident, for to exchange is to receive what is not one's own, or what belongs to another, in return for one's own. The minor is shown as follows. To give something to another is to transfer dominion over it to him. But a creature cannot transfer to God the dominion it has over the things it possesses, both because God is incapable of the imperfect and inferior dominion found in a creature, and because all things are under God's dominion before they are offered to Him, and are far more perfectly under God's dominion than under the creature's. Indeed, our very giving and offering comes from God's help and influence. Therefore a creature can never properly give anything to God. Hence it is said in Rom. 11: *Who first gave to Him, and recompense will be made to him?* And in 1 Chr. 29: *All things are Yours, and what we received from Your hand we have given to You.* And Augustine says in *Confessiones* I, c. 4: *Who has anything that is not Yours? You repay debts while owing nothing to anyone; You forgive debts while losing nothing.*

14. This is confirmed. Since the formal object of commutative justice, by which it differs from all other virtues, is equality between what is given and what is received, it can be formally and properly found only in one between whom and another there can be equality between what is given and what is received. But there can be no such equality between God and the creature, since whatever is offered by a creature to God is owed to Him under many

titles, namely, as Creator, conservator, helper, supreme Lord, and ultimate end. Therefore commutative justice cannot be formally and properly found in God. St. Bernard indicates this reason in *De diligendo Deo*, c. 3, in these words: *If I owe my whole self for having been made, what shall I now repay for having been remade? For I was not remade as easily as I was made. In the first work He gave me to myself; in the second He gave Himself, and by giving Himself He restored me to myself. Therefore, having been given and restored, I owe myself for myself, and I owe myself twice. What shall I give to God for Himself? For even if I could repay myself a thousand times, what am I in comparison with God, who first loved us—He so great, and loving so greatly, while we are so little and of such a kind?*

15. It is further confirmed. In one who renders something from commutative justice, there must be a strict debt to render it, for one who gives something without debt and obligation gives it not from commutative justice but from liberality or fidelity. But in God there is not and cannot be any strict debt and obligation toward a creature, since strict debt implies some inferiority and dependence of the debtor upon the one to whom the debt is owed. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3: *God is not a debtor, because He is not ordered to other things, but rather other things are ordered to Him.* Therefore commutative justice toward the creature neither is nor can be in God.

16. That distributive justice in Him is also openly taught by the same Holy Doctor in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 93, where, speaking of God and His justice, he concludes: *Therefore commutative justice does not belong to Him, but only distributive justice.* And in his commentary on c. 8 of *The Divine Names*, lect. 4: *Commutative justice has no place in God, because, as is said in Rom. 12, "Who first gave to Him, and recompense will be made to him?" But distributive justice is attributed to Him, which does not observe equality of quantity, so as to give equal things to all, but equality of proportion, so as to give to each according to what is fitting.* Reason also supports this. For distributive justice signifies the greatest perfection and excellence, since it is not from equal to equal, as is commutative justice, but from a superior toward inferiors. For it belongs to a superior to distribute common goods to inferiors, to each according to his proportion, as when the father of a household gives clothing to the whole family, but not the same clothing, rather small garments to children and larger ones to adults, and thus distributes prudently. Hence such justice befits the supreme governor and prince of the world, who, as Dionysius says in the passage cited above, *distributes to all their proper goods according to the dignity of each existing thing.*

17. Tertullian excellently explains this suitable and proportionate distribution in *Adversus Marcionem* II, c. 12, in these words: *His goodness produced the world; His justice measured it.* Here the verb “measured” seems to signify that, just as music orders different tones and melodies and reduces them to their due number and proportion, so also God’s distributive justice in the creation of the world reduces all creatures to their due order and harmony by giving to each what belongs to it and making all things in weight, number, and measure. Hence he adds in the same place: *As goodness conceived all things, so justice distinguished them.*

18. I add that distributive justice does not have annexed to it the imperfections and defects found in commutative justice. First, distributive justice does not induce, as commutative justice does, a debt arising from the fact that the distributor first received something from those to whom the goods of the commonwealth are distributed, or expects something to be preserved for himself because of the distribution made. Secondly, it is not required that the distributor deprive himself of dominion over the thing he distributes. It is enough that, while retaining his own supreme dominion, he confer an inferior dominion upon those to whom it is distributed. This is evident in a prince, who can preserve distributive justice by granting common goods in fief or by an emphyteutic lease, or even by granting only their usufruct. Thirdly, the debt of distributive justice does not arise from another’s right against the distributor, but from natural rectitude and the very law of equity, by which the distributor is bound to proportion the reward to the perfection of the merits. In a human prince this debt binds through the ordinance of the natural law, which is from God. But in God Himself, who has no law imposed upon Him by another, it arises from the fact that He Himself is the law and first rule of all rectitude. Hence Anselm says in *Proslogion*, c. 10: *You are just, O Lord, not because You render to us what is owed, but because You do what befits You as the supreme good.* Finally, distributive justice is not from equal to equal, as commutative justice is, but from a superior toward inferiors, to whom he distributes the common goods of the commonwealth.

19. You will object, first, against the first part: To be a debtor to oneself destroys the proper nature of justice, which must necessarily be toward another. But God is a debtor only to Himself, and not to the creature, as is evident from what has already been said. Therefore true and perfect justice is not in Him.

20. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. To be a debtor to oneself as the terminus, or as the person to whom something must be rendered, destroys the proper nature of justice, I grant the major premise.

To be a debtor to oneself as the principle and foundation of the debt and obligation, which must nevertheless be rendered and exercised in relation to another, I deny the major premise. Distinguishing the minor premise in the same way, I deny the consequence. Thus the debt which God has toward a creature is indeed a debt toward it, but it does not arise from the creature's right and claim. It arises from God's ordinance and from the supreme rectitude and equity of the divine will, which is the supreme law and primordial rule of all equity. Hence the creature is not the creditor of such a debt, although the debt is rendered to it as its terminus.

21. You will object, secondly, against the second part: What is given by agreement and compact is given from true and strict commutative justice. But God gives the just the kingdom of heaven by an agreement and burdensome compact of laboring in His vineyard, as is evident from the parable in Matt. 21. Therefore He gives them the kingdom of heaven from true and strict commutative justice. Hence Scripture and the Fathers often say that God would be unjust if He did not give a reward to those who live holy lives. Heb. 6 says: *For God is not unjust, so as to forget your work.* And Augustine says in *Contra Julianum* V, c. 3: *God Himself, which is unthinkable, will be unjust if one who is truly just is not admitted into His kingdom.*

22. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. What is given by an agreement and compact burdening and obliging one person to another is given from true and strict commutative justice, I grant the major premise. What is given by an agreement and compact burdening and obliging one person, not to another, but to himself, I deny the major premise. When God gives something to men by an agreement and compact, God's compact and agreement with man does not cause God to be burdened by man's action and obligated to him by true and strict justice. For since such an action is under God's dominion, proceeds from His influence, and is owed to Him under infinite titles, God cannot be burdened by it, nor can a strict and rigorous obligation to reward it arise in Him, no matter what compact and promise He attaches to it. Hence, if God deprived a just man of his reward, He would be unjust, not by violating another's right, but by violating His own truth and equitable distribution. The injustice would be opposed, not to commutative justice, which cannot be in Him, but to distributive justice or architectonic legal justice, which are found in God as supreme prince and judge.

23. You will object, thirdly: Commutative justice is found in Christ in relation to God. Therefore it is also found in God in relation to Christ. The antecedent is evident from the doctrine commonly handed down by our Thomists in the treatise on the Incarnation, where they teach that Christ's

satisfaction was an act of commutative justice. The consequence is proved from the fact that commutative justice must be mutual, or found on the part of both extremes.

24. I answer by denying the consequence. To its proof I say that commutative justice must be mutual, or found on the part of both extremes, when both extremes are capable of it, but not when one of the two extremes is incapable of such justice, as happens in the present case. For God, for the reasons already given, is incapable of commutative justice. Similarly, although the relation between mother and son is mutual by its nature and is found on the part of both extremes, nevertheless there is no real relation in Christ toward His mother, because, since the *suppositum* of the Divine Word belongs to a superior and uncreated order, it cannot be really related to a creature or receive any new real relation in time.

25. You will object, fourthly, against the third part: Distributive justice regards geometrical and comparative proportion of one to another, but not the debt proper to each, as is evident from what was said above. But in bestowing natural goods and distributing rewards or punishments, God does not attend to geometrical and comparative proportion, but to the connatural requirement of each and to the due proportion of merit to reward and demerit to punishment. Therefore He does not exercise an act of distributive justice, and consequently no such justice is found in God.

26. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For although, in distributing His natural goods to creatures, rewards to the just, and punishments to sinners, God attends to the connatural requirement of each and to the due proportion of merit to reward and demerit to punishment—in which there shines forth a certain mode and likeness of commutative justice, as St. Thomas notes in IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, q1a. 1—nevertheless He simultaneously and more principally attends to geometrical equality, or comparative proportion. For what He principally intends in bestowing connatural perfections upon individual things, distributing rewards to the just, and exacting punishments from sinners, is the beauty and perfection of the universe, which consists not so much in the absolute perfection of things as in their order and proportion to one another, just as the perfection of music consists in the diversity and proportion of tones.

§ 4.

In God There Is Mercy as Regards the Effect of Relieving Another's Misery, but
Not as Regards Compassion and Sorrow over Another's Evil.

27. The first part is evident, for it supremely belongs to God to remove misery from others and to diffuse to all the goodness by which their defect and misery are excluded. Therefore effective mercy is found in God. Hence St. Thomas excellently observes here, q. 21, a. 3, that to bestow perfections upon things belongs to the divine goodness, justice, liberality, and mercy, but according to different aspects. For the communication of perfections considered absolutely belongs to goodness. Insofar as perfections are given to things by God according to their proportion, it belongs to justice. Insofar as He gives perfections to things not for His own advantage, but solely because of His goodness, it belongs to liberality. Insofar as the perfections given to things by God expel every defect, it belongs to mercy.

From this Cajetan infers, in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 30, a. 4, that mercy in God implies every simply simple perfection and the character of the purest and most perfect act. He says: From its act it appears that mercy in itself requires immunity from every misery. For if we distinguish mercy into mercy simply and mercy with respect to some particular misery, we shall find that, by the pure nature of mercy with respect to a particular misery, for example poverty, it is as such immune from poverty. By the same reasoning, mercy simply is free from every misery. And since every potentiality is a certain misery, for which reason every creature must in some manner be subject to some misery, it follows that mercy according to itself requires in itself such and so great a superiority that it be pure act and the supreme nature. For this reason it is said to be proper to God to have mercy and to manifest the omnipotence founded upon His actuality.

28. The second part is also evident, for sorrow and compassion are acts or affections of the sensitive appetite, which cannot be found in God, because everything sensible is wholly alien to Him. Hence Augustine says in *Ad Simplicianum* II, q. 2: *If you remove compassion from mercy, so that there remains the tranquil goodness of assisting and freeing from misery, some knowledge of divine mercy is thereby indicated.*

29. From this you will understand that the mystery of the Incarnation was necessary for a certain completion of divine mercy. For since the act of mercy is twofold, namely, to remove another's misery and to be affected by

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another's misery, or to suffer compassion for another's afflictions, the first indeed belongs to God by reason of His goodness and omnipotence, but the other is opposed to Him by reason of His perfect happiness and tranquility. Hence, in order that God's mercy might be completed by both acts, and that He might become perfectly merciful, it was necessary for Him to become incarnate, so that He could suffer compassion for our infirmities. As the Apostle says in Heb. 2: *He had to be made like His brethren in all things, that He might become merciful*, that is, so that nothing required for the completion of perfect mercy might be lacking in Him.

TREATISE V.

ON PROVIDENCE, PREDESTINATION, AND REPROBATION.

We shall comprise this treatise in only three chapters. First, we shall discuss the providence of God in general. Secondly, predestination, which is a part of divine providence and a certain special providence that God has concerning the predestined, by which He prepares for them the means through which they infallibly attain eternal life. Thirdly, reprobation, which is opposed to predestination, since the same science concerns opposites.

CHAPTER I.

On the Providence of God.

Before discussing predestination, or the special providence God has concerning the elect, we must briefly treat His providence in general, insofar as it extends to all creatures and to everything that occurs in the universe.

On Providence, Predestination, and Reprobation

§ 1.

In God There Is Most Perfect Providence,
Which Extends to All Things.

1. The first part can be denied by no one except an Epicurean or one who inclines toward Epicureanism, as Salvian aptly says in *De gubernatione Dei* I. First, all the arguments that demonstrate the existence of the supreme deity also prove His providence. For to assert that God exists while denying that He has any providence over the things He has made is the most manifest insanity. Hence Lactantius, in *De ira Dei*, ridicules Epicurus because he said that God exists and yet denied all providence: Epicurus, he says, said indeed that God exists, because there must be something in the world that is preeminent, excellent, and blessed; yet he denied all providence by which the world is governed. I do not see what more contradictory thing could be said. For if God exists, He is surely provident as God, nor can divinity otherwise be attributed to Him unless He both possesses the past, knows the present, and foresees the future. Therefore, when he removed providence, he denied God; but when he professed that God exists, he also conceded that providence exists. For one cannot exist or be understood without the other. This truth became so firmly established among men that they imposed a name upon God from understanding or providing. For the name **θεός**, which among the Greeks signifies God, is said to come **ἀπὸ θεάομαι**, which signifies “I consider” or “I provide,” as Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 11.

2. Secondly, as St. Thomas argues in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 75: All secondary causes, insofar as they are causes, attain to a likeness of God. But this is commonly found in causes that produce something, that they have care for what they produce, as animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care for those things of which He is the cause. Hence Ambrose says in *De officiis* I, c. 13: What worker neglects the care of his work? Who abandons and forsakes what he himself thought should be made? If it is an injury not to govern it, is it not a greater injury to have made it? For while there is no injustice in not making something, not to care for what you have made is the greatest cruelty. And Theodoret says in discourse 1 on providence: Through this affection by which He made us love our own offspring, He wished us to understand how greatly He loves His offspring, that is, the effects produced by Him.

3. Thirdly, divine providence can be demonstrated from the marvelous beauty, order, disposition, adornment, and government of this universe. Philo the Jew elegantly explains this argument in *De monarchia* IV, in these words: If someone should enter a city established by the best laws, what else would he suppose except that it is governed by the best magistrates? Therefore, when someone enters the great city, namely the world, and beholds there the temperateness of the air, the changes of the annual seasons, then the sun and moon, the governors of day and night, and the revolutions and dances of the other wandering and fixed stars and of the whole heaven, will he not reasonably, or rather necessarily, think of a father and maker, and also a ruler? Gregory Nazianzen uses the same argument in Oration 34 and gives the example of a lyre. When we hear its sweet harmony, we do not doubt that it is being played by a skilled artist. Similarly, when we contemplate the most delightful harmony of the parts of the world in their movements, we ought not to doubt that a skilled artisan, namely God, composes all these things and brings them into harmony, and that He is the supreme ruler and governor of the world.

4. A similar argument can be drawn from the perpetual conflict of the elements, which disagree with one another because of the diverse qualities of which they consist. For the order of the universe could not remain perpetual amid so great a diversity, indeed a continual conflict, of its parts, unless some supreme intelligence, with the highest counsel and wisdom, provided for that perpetuity. Athanasius explains this in his book against the Gentiles by the example of a city or army, in which peace and tranquility could not be preserved for long unless there were some prince or magistrate who kept all in their duty and provided for such peace and tranquility.

5. The second part, concerning the extension of divine providence to all creatures in particular and to everything that happens in the world, is no less certain than the preceding part. For, as St. Thomas argues here, q. 22, a. 2, since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects to an end extends as far as the causality of the agent extends. But the causality of the first agent extends to all things and reaches even to the ultimate individual differences. Therefore His providence does also. This argument proves that not only natural and necessary things, but also human and free things, are subject to divine providence, since divine causality extends no less to the latter than to the former. I add that, since the government of divine providence proceeds from the love by which God loves the things made by Him, the more greatly God loves something, the more fully it falls under His providence. But God loves men more than natural things, as is evident from the effect, because He has conferred more excellent goods upon them. Therefore He has a

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greater and special care and providence concerning them. Hence Augustine excellently says: *A hair does not perish when it is cut, although you do not feel it, and will the soul by which you feel perish? If your superfluous parts are thus governed, in what security is your living soul? Cast yourself upon God; you will fare most excellently in the One who is best.*

§ 2.

Objections are Solved.

6. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: If the world is governed by divine providence, why do so many evils and defects occur in the world? Why do so many monsters arise which are outside the intention of nature? From where come so many creatures troublesome and harmful to man, such as gnats, fleas, flies, serpents, poisons, and the like? Finally, why are just and holy men so often oppressed by miseries and afflictions, while the wicked and perverse pass their days amid good things and abound in honors, pleasures, and riches? Or, to speak with the prophet Jeremiah: *Why does the way of the impious prosper? Why is it well with all who transgress and act iniquitously?*

7. These questions, which are like so many objections against divine providence, must be answered individually. To the first, therefore, it must be said with St. Thomas here, q. 22, a. 2, ad 2, and in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 71, that although a particular provider must, as far as he can, avoid and prevent evils and defects in the things subject to his governance and providence, a universal provider must not do so. Rather, he must permit evils and defects in certain particulars for the sake of the good of the whole, toward the preservation of which he principally tends. But the evils and defects that divine providence permits to occur in created things contribute to the perfection, adornment, and beauty of the universe. Thus the beauty of a painting arises from the pleasing mixture and proportion of shadow and light and of different colors. Or the harmony of music sounds more sweetly from the consonance of different voices. Or, to use Augustine's example in *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 18, antitheta, or antitheses, are ornaments of speech and produce beauty in discourse. Or, finally, as in medicine the most excellent remedies are compounded from poisonous things suitably mixed and tempered with one another.

8. From this the answer to the second question is evident. For monsters contribute in their own manner to the adornment and beauty of the universe and serve to manifest the perfection and integrity of other things, which

shine forth more greatly by contrast with their deformity, since opposites placed beside one another become more evident. The same must be said of flies, gnats, serpents, and other imperfect animals. For these participate in some degree of goodness and perfection which, if it were lacking from the universe, would prevent it from being perfect in every manner. Isidore says in *Sententiae* I, c. 11: *If you shave away a man's eyebrow, you remove a small thing, but you bring deformity upon the whole body. So it is also in the totality of creation: if you say that the smallest worm is evil by nature, you injure the whole of creation.*

As regards poisons, they likewise contribute to the good of the universe and are useful and necessary to some creatures. For, as Ambrose says in *Hexaemeron* III, c. 9: Often the same things that are harmful to you provide harmless food for birds or wild beasts. There are creatures that live upon hemlock, and it does them no harm, because by the quality of their bodies they escape the poison of its deadly juice. Those skilled in such matters also say that hellebore is food for quails, because through a certain natural temperament of their bodies they escape the harmful force of the food.

9. Finally, to the last question, concerning the adversity of the good and the prosperity of the wicked, I say briefly that divine providence shines forth in a marvelous manner even in these, as the holy Fathers everywhere teach. Gregory says: The desires of the elect advance while they are oppressed by adversity, just as fire is pressed by the wind so that it may grow, and a wave, though it seems almost to be extinguished, is thereby strengthened all the more. Prosperity, on the contrary, as Chrysostom says, is the stepmother of virtue; it softens and breaks the human soul and dissolves it into sluggishness and torpor. Seneca also says: All things that overflow are harmful. Excessive abundance makes crops barren, branches are broken by their burden, and excessive fertility does not reach maturity. The same thing happens to souls, which immoderate prosperity shatters, and which they use not only to the injury of others, but even to their own. More on this is found in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

10. You will object, secondly, against the second part of the assertion: Providence and care for such vile and imperfect animals as gnats, flies, little worms, and the like seem unworthy of the divine majesty. Therefore such care should not be posited in God.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For the infinite majesty of God is so far from being debased by care for such vile and imperfect animals that His infinite wisdom and power shine forth more greatly in them than in other animals of immense bulk and size. Hence Pliny says in *Naturalis historia* XI, c. 2: Nature in its entirety is nowhere more fully present than in its smallest

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works. And Jerome says to Heliodorus, epistle 3: We marvel at the Creator not only in heaven and earth, in the sun and ocean, in elephants and camels, but also in the smallest animals—in ants, gnats, flies, little worms, and creatures of this kind, whose bodies we know better than their names—and we admire the same skill in them all.

§ 3.

Providence Does Not Consist Formally in an Act of the Will,
but of the Intellect, Namely, in an Act of Command
Presupposing the Choice of Means.

The first part is taught by St. Thomas here, q. 22, a. 1, ad 3, where he says: *Providence is in the intellect, but it presupposes the will of the end.*

11. Reason also establishes this. First, because providence is a part of prudence, as the same Holy Doctor teaches here, a. 1, and in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 49, a. 6. But prudence is in the intellect, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore providence is also in the intellect. Secondly, because Boethius defines providence as the ordering of things to an end. But to order one thing to another belongs to the intellect, as we shall show in the following chapter, § 2. Therefore providence does not consist formally in an act of the will, but of the intellect. The etymology of the name itself sufficiently indicates this, for to provide is the same as to see from afar the things that must be done. But seeing is not an act of the will, which is a blind power, but of the intellect.

12. That such an act is command, presupposing the intention of the end and the choice of means, is also taught by St. Thomas here, a. 1, ad 1, in these words: *To command concerning things that must be ordered to an end, of which He possesses the right reason, belongs to God, according to the saying of the Psalm, "He established a command, and it shall not pass away"; and according to this the character of providence belongs to God.* Reason also supports this. For, as we said above, providence is a part of prudence. But the principal act of prudence is command, as Aristotle teaches in *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, c. 9, saying: *Prudence is preceptive, for its end is to command what is to be done or not done.* Therefore providence consists essentially in an act of command. This will become more evident in the following chapter, where we shall show that predestination, which is a part of divine providence, consists formally and essentially in an act of command subsequent to the choice of the predestined for glory.

13. You will object, first, against the first part: Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 29: Providence is the will of God through which all existing things receive a suitable course. Therefore he holds that providence consists in an act of the will.

I answer from St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, that providence is called the will of God by Damascene because it presupposes an act of the will or virtually includes it. For the act of command in which providence formally consists presupposes the choice of the will and virtually includes it, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 17, a. 3, ad 1, in these words: *After the determination of counsel, which is a judgment of reason, the will chooses; and after the choice, reason commands that through which what has been chosen is to be done.*

14. You will object, secondly, against the second part: St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 49, a. 6, ad 3: In the right ordering to an end included in the notion of providence, there is implied the rectitude of counsel, judgment, and command. Therefore providence does not consist adequately in command, but also in counsel and in the judgment regulating choice.

15. I answer that the rectitude of counsel and judgment is implied in the ordering in which providence consists, not constitutively and formally, but virtually and presuppositively. First, because without them rectitude of command cannot subsist. Secondly, because in ordered acts of the soul, the preceding act is virtually contained in the subsequent act. Hence St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 1, near the end of the body: *In providence there is in some manner included both the will concerning the end and the knowledge of the end*, because both acts are presupposed to it.

16. You will object, thirdly: An act of command is admitted in us to move the will and the other powers as regards the execution of their acts. But it should not be admitted in God for this purpose, because in Him neither the will nor any other power is movable, since He is pure act. Therefore no such act of command exists in God.

I answer that an act of command is not posited in God, as it is in us, to move and apply an executive power to acting *ad extra*, because, as we showed in the treatise on the knowledge of God, there is in God no executive power virtually distinct from intellect and will. Rather, such an act is directed immediately to creatures themselves and commands their production, according to Gen. 1: *Let there be light*, and John 11: *Lazarus, come forth*. Therefore mobility and subjection are found not on God's part, but on the part of the creatures that are produced.

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Nor is it of any force to say that nothing is difficult for the omnipotent God, and consequently, once an efficacious decree of the futurity of things has been posited, they are produced in time, and no act of command is required for this. For although nothing is difficult in relation to God on the part of His working, nevertheless, on the part of the workable object, many things must be overcome in execution. God does not overcome these by a blind and natural impulse, but by command and providence.

§ 4.

Corollaries Worthy of Note.

17. From what has been said it is gathered, first, that God's providence is distinguished from His practical knowledge. For God's practical knowledge concerns both the end and the means, while providence concerns only the means insofar as they are ordered to the end, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 1. From this you will understand that providence is also distinguished from God's executive power, because such power is His practical knowledge, or knowledge of approval, producing things *ad extra* through an act of command, as was shown in c. 3 of the treatise on the knowledge of God.

18. It is gathered, secondly, that God's providence is distinguished from His art, because, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in the passage cited, ad 9, art regards produced things insofar as they proceed from a principle and are arranged among themselves, whereas providence regards them insofar as they are ordered to an end. I add that art is the right reason of things to be made, that is, of things proceeding from an agent into external matter. Prudence, however, of which providence is an act, is the right reason of things to be done, which are acts that do not proceed into external matter, but perfect the agent himself.

19. It is gathered, thirdly, that the eternal law is distinguished from God's providence. For the eternal law stands as the principle of providence, since it hands down the general rules and principles of things to be done, while providence disposes the movements of creatures according to those rules and orders them to their ends. Thus St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.

20. It is gathered, fourthly, that God's providence is distinguished from the divine idea. For, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage cited from *De veritate*, ad 8, an idea is the exemplary form of a thing considered absolutely

and according to its species, whereas providence is the form of a thing insofar as it is ordered to an end.

21. Some ask here whether the ordering of things to an end suffices for the nature of providence, or whether the actual attainment of the end itself is also required.

I answer that a twofold providence is distinguished in God. One is special, or predestinative, which He has concerning the salvation of the elect. The other is general, which He has not only concerning the elect but also the reprobate, through which He confers, or at least offers and prepares for them, means and helps sufficient for salvation. The first implies not only an ordering to the end but also the actual and infallible attainment of the end, because it presupposes God's efficacious and consequent will, which always and infallibly attains its effect. Hence Augustine says in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 7, speaking of the predestined: *If any of these should perish, God would be conquered by human fault. But none of them perishes, because God is conquered by nothing.* And in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 14, he thus defines predestination: *Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered.* The second, however, implies only an ordering to the end, not the actual attainment of the end itself. First, because it presupposes in God only the antecedent will, which prepares helps sufficient for salvation, but not efficacious helps. Secondly, because it belongs to the nature of a universal provider so to order things to an end that he nevertheless wills and permits some to fall away from it and not attain it. Hence St. Thomas teaches in *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 1, that general providence regards the order to the end, whereas predestination also regards the outcome and event of that order.

22. It must nevertheless be observed that, although general providence does not always and infallibly attain the end of the thing provided for, it does attain the end of the provider himself, which is the manifestation of His attributes, especially His punitive justice, in the reprobate. Hence St. Thomas says above, q. 19, a. 6: *Since the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible for the divine will not to attain its effect. Hence one who seems to depart from the divine will by sinning falls into the order of the divine will when he is punished by His justice.* In this sense must be understood what the Church sings concerning divine providence in a certain collect: *O God, whose providence is not deceived in its ordering.* For although God's general providence does not always have annexed to it the attainment of the end of the thing provided for, it always attains the end intended by the provider Himself, namely, the manifestation of the divine attributes. But more fully on this in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, tract. 4, disp. 8, a. 3.

CHAPTER II.
On Predestination.

1. The most profound and obscure mystery of predestination is commended by an excellent metaphor from the Song of Songs, where the locks of the bridegroom, which not obscurely express the counsels of the supreme Judge concerning the sons of men, are said to be *lofty as palm trees*, because they surpass every power of human intellect, and *black as a raven*, because by their obscurity they envelop our minds in darkness. Nevertheless, it must be treated briefly here, and its existence, nature, causes, and effects must be briefly explained.

§ 1.

Besides God's General Providence, Which Sufficiently Orders All Men to Salvation, There Is Predestination, or a Certain Special Providence, Which Efficaciously Orders and Transmits Some to Eternal Beatitude.

2. This truth is certain by faith, for it is gathered from various testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers which openly declare it. Rom. 8 says: Those whom He predestined, He also called. Eph. 1: He predestined us unto the adoption of the sons of God through Jesus Christ. Acts 13: As many as were preordained to eternal life believed. Elsewhere this truth is everywhere handed down under the name of election. Hence Prosper says in response 1 to the objections of the Gauls: No Catholic denies God's predestination. And in his epistle to Rufinus: To deny predestination is nothing other than to oppose grace itself. Likewise Fulgentius says in *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 35: Hold most firmly and in no way doubt that all whom God by gratuitous goodness has made vessels of mercy were predestined by God before the establishment of the world unto the adoption of the sons of God; that none of those whom God predestined to the kingdom of heaven can perish; and that none of those whom He did not predestine to life can be saved in any manner.

Reason also supports this. For if the antecedent will to save all men and general providence, by which He confers on all helps sufficient for salvation, were sufficient for the actual attainment of salvation, there would be no difference on the part of the divine will between the predestined and the

reprobate, and the whole distinction between them would proceed from free choice. Thus predestination would not be a special benefit of God. But this cannot be said. Therefore neither can the former. The consequence of the major premise is evident, for the antecedent will and general providence are equal in relation to all. The minor is evident from the Apostle in 1 Cor. 4, who says: *For who distinguishes you?* It is also evident from Augustine in *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 19, where he teaches that the distinction between the good and evil angels was from God, and says: *A distinction was made between the holy and unclean angels when it was said, "God divided the light from the darkness," for He alone could distinguish them.* This must be held with still greater reason concerning men, because, as Bernard aptly says in sermon 2 on the words of Isaiah: *Do you think He would not distinguish between clods of earth, who distinguished between the stars?*

3. It is confirmed. If someone attained salvation without predestination, or without an efficacious and absolute decree transmitting him to eternal life, the attainment of such an end would be by chance and outside God's intention, which is repugnant to His infinite wisdom and providence. God would then not act *according to the counsel of His will*, as the Apostle says, but according to the determination and purpose of the human will. Nor would He choose men, but rather would be chosen by them, contrary to Christ's words in John 15: *You have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you.*

4. It is further confirmed by the argument of St. Thomas here, q. 23, a. 1. That to which something cannot attain by the power of its own nature must be transmitted by another, just as an arrow is sent toward the target by an archer. But eternal life, which consists in the clear vision of God, is above the nature of every creature. Therefore the rational creature must be transmitted to it by God, and consequently the plan of such transmission, which is called predestination, must exist eternally in the divine mind.

5. You will say, first: If there is a predestination that determines salvation, then, if I am predestined, I shall be saved whatever I do; but if I am not predestined, I shall infallibly be damned, and all the good works I perform will be useless to me for salvation. Therefore it is better for me to await the outcome of the divine counsels and to lead a cheerful and tranquil life without any solicitude for my salvation.

I answer, first, that this argument, which the impious often employ so that they may sin more freely, and by which the scrupulous are tormented so that they may torture themselves superstitiously, militates equally against the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and against the certainty of divine predestination. Hence Augustine says in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 15: When these things are said, we ought not to be deterred from confessing the

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predestination of the saints, just as we are not deterred from confessing God's foreknowledge if someone should speak of it to the people by saying: "Whether you now live rightly or not, you will afterward be such as God foreknew you would be—good, if He foreknew you as good; evil, if He foreknew you as evil."

6. I answer, secondly, that, just as in the affairs of human life no one except a fool abandons the means useful to an end, however much God has predefined all things by His providence, and no one except a dull and stupid person reasons thus: "God knows that this field, for example, will be fertile or barren this year. If He knows it will be fertile, whether I cultivate it or not, it will yield abundant fruits for me. If He knows it will be barren, it will remain so even if I cultivate it diligently"; so also the reasoning of the proposed argument is foolish. For, as the Angelic Doctor rightly says here, a. 8: Just as natural effects are so provided for that natural causes are also ordered to those natural effects, without which those effects would not arise, so the salvation of someone is predestined by God in such a manner that whatever promotes man toward salvation also falls under the order of predestination, whether his own prayers or those of others, or other good works, or anything of this kind, without which someone does not attain salvation. Hence the predestined must strive to work well and pray, because through such things the effect of predestination is fulfilled with certainty. For this reason it is said in 2 Pet. 1: "Labor, that through good works you may make your calling and election certain." Prosper teaches similar things in *De vocatione omnium gentium* I, c. 36, where he argues as follows: Although what God has established cannot in any manner fail to occur, zeal for prayer is nevertheless not removed, nor is the devotion of free choice relaxed by the purpose of election. For the effect of God's will is so predestined to be fulfilled that through the labor of works, the persistence of supplications, and the exercises of virtues, merits may increase, and those who have done good may be crowned not only according to God's purpose but also according to their merits. Likewise Gregory the Great writes in *Dialogi* III, c. 13: They can by no means obtain things that have not been predestined, but the things holy men accomplish are so predestined that they obtain them by prayers. For the very rewards of predestination have been so disposed by the Almighty that the elect attain them through labor, so that by asking they may merit to receive what almighty God has disposed to give them.

7. You will say, secondly: Through the sufficient helps supplied to man by the antecedent will and the general providence of the supernatural order, man can be saved. Therefore predestination is not required, but such providence and antecedent will suffice.

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I deny the consequence. Predestination is not required in order that man be able to be saved, but in order that he actually be saved, just as the gift of perseverance is not necessary in order that man be able to persevere, but in order that he actually persevere. Hence Augustine says in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 1: *Certainly no one who has not persevered to the end can be said to have possessed the perseverance of which we now speak, by which one perseveres in Christ to the end.* And in c. 6: *We speak of that perseverance by which one perseveres to the end. If it has been given, one has persevered to the end; but if one has not persevered to the end, it was not given.*

§ 2.

Predestination Does Not Consist Formally in an Act of the Will,
but of the Intellect, Namely, in the Practical Judgment
Subsequent to Choice, Which Is Called Command.

8. The first part is proved, first, because predestination is the same as most perfect providence, by which the rational creature is ordered to the end of beatitude. But providence consists in an act of the intellect, as was shown in the preceding chapter, § 3. Therefore predestination does also. Secondly, because predestination is essentially the ordering of the rational creature to glory to be obtained through certain and determinate means. Hence St. Thomas, defining it, says that it is the transmission of the rational creature to glory, and in Scripture the predestined are called *preordained*. But to order belongs to the intellect, not to the will. Therefore predestination consists not in an act of the will but of the intellect. The minor is proved, first, because to order one thing to another is to compare one with another. But the comparison of one thing with another belongs to the practical intellect, just as the inference of one thing from another belongs to the speculative intellect. Therefore ordering belongs to the intellect. Secondly, because to order something to an end is the same as to direct it. But direction belongs to the intellect, not to the will, which, since it is a blind power, must be directed by another and cannot itself direct. Therefore neither can it order. Finally, because in human affairs ordering belongs to a superior. Thus a commander in an army orders what the soldiers must do, and a prince in a commonwealth orders what his inferiors must do. Therefore the ordering of things to be done by oneself belongs in man only to the supreme power, which St. Thomas teaches in many places to be the intellect. Hence Aristotle says in *Metaphysica* II, c. 2, that *it belongs to the wise man to order*.

9. The second part is also proved. Since predestination is most efficacious and altogether infallible, if it formally consists in some act of the divine intellect, it must consist in the most efficacious of all such acts. But the act of judgment preceding choice is not such; only the act of command subsequent to choice and regulating use and execution is such. Therefore predestination formally consists in an act of command. The major premise is evident. The minor is simultaneously explained and proved. Through a judgment preceding choice, the intellect judges only the suitability of the means in relation to the work. Hence that act is expressed in the indicative manner, as when it is said, "It is good to do this," or, "It is suitable to do this." It belongs to that relation which the will has toward the end by way of intention and affection, not to that by which it tends to the end by way of execution and causality. Hence it does not possess in itself efficacy for the execution of the work, except radically. For, after a judgment concerning the suitability of the means has been posited, the effect may fail to follow because of the difficulty of execution. Command, however, adds a certain intimation that the thing is to be executed, moving toward its being done, and is expressed in the imperative manner: "Do this." It belongs to the relation by which the will tends to the end by way of execution and causality. Therefore, while an efficacious command stands, it cannot happen that the operation and execution of the means do not follow. Therefore command is the most efficacious of all acts of the practical intellect, and in it are found all the things necessary to constitute the essence of predestination. For it is of itself the plan of the ordering of means to the end, since ordering belongs to the practical intellect, and it is efficacious by virtue of the preceding choice. For the preceding act of the will is virtually contained in the subsequent act. This cannot belong to the judgment preceding choice. For although that judgment is an ordering of means to the end, it lacks efficacy, which it cannot receive from a subsequent choice, because one act does not give efficacy to another unless it either influences it or virtually remains in it. For this some antecedence or priority, at least virtual, is required, which choice does not have in relation to the judgment by which it is regulated, but only in relation to the command subsequent to choice, by which use or the execution of the work is regulated.

§ 3.

Objections are Solved.

10. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: The predestined are called *elect* in Scripture. But election is an act of the will. Therefore predestination belongs to the will. Hence St. Thomas says in the opusculum *De praedestinatione*, c. 1: *Although predestination altogether presupposes an act of knowledge, it nevertheless names an act of the choosing will, and so forth.*

I answer from the same Holy Doctor, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2, that, although predestination is not the same as election, nevertheless, because it presupposes election, the predestined are therefore called elect. As for the passage drawn from the opusculum *De praedestinatione*, it must be denied that this opusculum is by St. Thomas. For it is not found among his other opuscula, nor is it counted among the works of St. Thomas in the Roman edition, which is to be preferred to the others. It is found only at the end of the first part of the Lyons edition made in 1552, where it was inserted by some scholar. Or those words, *Predestination names an act of the will*, can be interpreted as referring to a presuppositional naming and to a connotation, if they are understood of an act of the will in itself. Or they may refer to an act of the will not in itself and formally, but virtually, insofar as it is virtually contained in the act of command of the intellect, which participates efficacy from it. In the same manner certain testimonies of the holy Fathers, by which they seem to place predestination in an act of the will, must be explained. Likewise, in the Apostle's words in Rom. 9, *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*, predestination and reprobation are called love and hatred to signify that each presupposes an act of the will, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited above.

11. You will object, secondly: The concept of predestination includes not only ordering but also motion as regards execution. But to move belongs to the will, since it is the first mover as regards exercise. Therefore to predestine also belongs to the will.

I answer that to move absolutely belongs to the will, but to move by an ordinative motion, which enters the essence of predestination, does not. For such motion is from the intellect by virtue of a preceding act of the will.

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You will insist: To be volitional is so proper to the will that it can in no way be communicated to the intellect. Therefore the same is true of being motive as regards exercise.

I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that being volitional is the substance of the act of the will, whereas motive efficacy is not its substance, but a mode of it. Hence, just as freedom, although attributed to the will as to its first principle, is nevertheless communicated to an act of the intellect through its subordination to the will, because it is a certain mode of that act, so for the same reason motive efficacy is communicated to the intellect, although the character of being volitional cannot be communicated to it.

12. You will object, thirdly, against the second part: Predestination is the cause of its effects. But command subsequent to choice is not the cause of the effects of predestination, for by the force of God's efficacious decree or choice those effects are constituted as future. Therefore predestination does not consist in command subsequent to choice, but rather in the choice itself of the predestined for glory. Hence, if by an impossibility command did not follow after efficacious choice had been posited, men would still be predestined.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof I distinguish the antecedent: By the force of the decree or efficacious choice, the effects are constituted future initially and within the order of intention, I grant the antecedent; completely, and within the order both of intention and execution, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. For just as, in the opinion of those who admit in God an executive power virtually distinct from intellect and will, it does not follow from the efficacy of the choice of the divine will that the chosen thing is constituted completely future by virtue of that choice, so that the concurrence of the executive power, which is posterior to it, is unnecessary, since the choice constitutes it future only within its own order; so also in our opinion it does not follow that the concurrence of divine command is unnecessary. It follows only that command is infallibly connected with efficacious choice. Hence, if by an impossibility command did not follow after choice had been posited, men would be predestined only initially, but not formally and completely. Nor in such a case would they attain glory; glory would only be initially future, since for the execution and production of things choice or an intentional decree does not suffice. Active use, or an executive decree, is further required, and consequently a command directing it.

Other objections concern the existence of an act of command, not as it is in God, but as it is in us. They will therefore be more suitably proposed

and solved in the treatise on human acts, where we shall discuss the act of command.

§ 4.

Predestination is Not a Subjective but an Objective
Part of Divine Providence.

13. The meaning of this assertion is that divine providence is not compared to predestination as a superior to its inferior, so that it is divided into four or five attributes, namely, natural providence, general supernatural providence, predestination, reprobation, and the providence of the hypostatic order. Rather, it is compared to predestination as to a part of its adequate object, so that one and the same providence, virtually undistinguished, attains those three orders of nature, grace, and the hypostatic union, and receives different names only by reason of the diverse material objects to which it extends. Thus divine knowledge, although it is a single virtually undistinguished attribute, is nevertheless divided, according to diverse connotations and material objects, into the knowledge of simple intelligence, vision, and approval, and is designated by different names.

14. The assertion thus explained is proved by this fundamental argument. The unity or diversity of providence is taken from the ultimate end intended by the provider, and not from the particular ends of the things provided for. Otherwise there would be as many specifically distinct providences as there are particular ends of things distinct in species, and one providence would exist for animals, another for the heavens, another for men, and another for angels, which no one has ever said. But there is only one end intended by God in the providence of all things, namely, His glory and the manifestation of His attributes. Therefore there is also only one providence extending to all things belonging to the orders of nature, grace, and the hypostatic union. Likewise, one virtually undistinguished power in God extends to all producible effects, one knowledge to all knowable things, one art to all things that can be made, and one eternal law to all that God commands or prohibits.

15. You will say: There are in God several specifically diverse ideas. Therefore there are also several providences virtually distinct from one another.

I deny the consequence and the parity. For, as is gathered from St. Thomas above, q. 15, a. 2, ad 2, there is a notable difference between an idea and providence. Providence stands on the part of God providing and

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understanding, and is signified as that by which God practically understands and orders things to be done. Hence, as regards unity in the mode of attaining its proper object, it must be commensurate with the divine intellect. Consequently, just as the divine intellect is one without virtual distinction, so also is providence. An idea, however, stands on the part of the object understood and is signified as that which is understood by God. Hence, as regards unity or diversity, it is proportioned not to the intellect but to the object. Therefore, since the objects understood by God are many, there are also many ideas in the divine intellect.

16. From what has been said it is gathered, first, that the best definition of predestination is that handed down by Augustine in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 14, in these words: *The predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of benefits by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered.* By the name “foreknowledge” Augustine understands God’s practical knowledge, or knowledge of approval, resting upon the decree of the divine will, which does not presuppose but causes the existence and futurity of things, and to which belongs the act of command in which predestination essentially consists. The remaining parts declare the certainty and infallibility of the means and helps through which the predestined are brought to eternal beatitude.

17. It is gathered, secondly, that the definition of predestination drawn from St. Thomas here, a. 1, is likewise good: *Predestination is the plan of the transmission of the rational creature to the end of eternal life.* Here the first part, namely, “plan,” occupies the place of genus and denotes that predestination, like the other objective parts of God’s providence, is an act of the divine intellect. The remaining parts occupy the place of difference. First, the term “transmission” denotes the special ordering of the predestined, namely, through special helps by which he is infallibly brought to eternal life. By this it differs from general providence, even supernatural providence, through which the reprobate also are ordered to glory, but not specially or efficaciously through special helps, as are the predestined, but only generally or sufficiently through the conferral or offering of sufficient helps. Secondly, the term “rational creature” signifies the difference of predestination on the part of its subject from natural providence. For the subject of predestination is the rational creature alone, whereas the subject of providence is every creature. Thirdly, the term “to eternal life” assigns another difference, by which the predestination of men and angels, or of the purely intellectual creature, is distinguished from the predestination of Christ, or of the Man-God. For Christ’s predestination was to the *esse* of the natural Son of God, whereas the predestination of men and angels is only to eternal life and the

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clear vision of God, through which perfect adoption as a son of God is accomplished, according to the Apostle in Rom. 8: *We ourselves, having the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, awaiting the adoption of the sons of God.*

§ 5.

The Choice of the Predestined for Glory Has No Other Motive Cause
Than the Divine Goodness, and Not Foreseen Merits, Which
Are Rather the Effects Than the Motive of Predestination.

18. This assertion, which, as Bellarmine says in *De gratia et libero arbitrio* II, c. 11, *must be called not the opinion of certain doctors, but the faith of the Catholic Church*, is proved first by a twofold argument drawn from Scripture and the holy Fathers. The first is this: According to Scripture and the holy Fathers, no reason can be given why one is chosen for glory and another is not, but this must be referred to God's simple will, to His inscrutable judgments, and to the infinite depth of divine wisdom. But this would be false if the choice of the predestined for glory were made from foreseen merits as from a cause. Therefore it does not have the foreknowledge of merits as its motive cause, but only the divine goodness. The major premise is evident, first, from the Apostle in Rom. 9, where, discussing expressly the cause of our predestination, he refers it solely to the will of God who has mercy, choosing these and leaving those. To prove this he introduces the example of the twins Jacob and Esau, who, while not yet born and having done neither good nor evil, were told, not from works but from Him who calls: *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.* And shortly afterward: *I shall have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I shall show mercy to whom I show mercy.* That is, as is said more clearly in Exod. 33: *I shall have mercy on whom I will, and I shall be gracious to whom it pleases Me.* And again: *It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy.* Then, foreseeing and forestalling the complaint that those impatient with gratuitous predestination would make when they said, *Why does He still complain? For who resists His will?*, he adds by way of rebuke: *O man, who are you who answers back to God? Can the clay say to the potter who formed it, "Why have you made me thus?"* Here he refers the entire resolution of the difficulty to God's simple will. And in the following c. 11, after speaking at length of predestination according to purpose, he concludes the whole discourse with this exclamation: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments and unsearchable His ways!*

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The same major premise is evident, secondly, from Augustine in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 7, where he says: *Of two elderly impious men, why is this one taken and the other left? O incomprehensible judgments of God!* And in epistle 112, explaining the signification of the wood of the Cross, he refers to its depth the hidden reason why one is chosen and another is not. Likewise, in *Soliloquia animae ad Deum*, c. 28, which concerns the depth of God's predestination and foreknowledge, addressing God he says: *But You cleanse from among us, the sons of men, those in whom it pleased You to dwell, whom, from the inaccessible depths and secret places of the incomprehensible judgments of Your wisdom—always just, although hidden—You predestined before the world without their merits, called from the world, justified in the world, and glorify after the world.* But You do not do this for all, at which all the wise of the earth waste away in wonder. Finally, in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 12, he teaches that, concerning infants who die without baptism, one may not appeal to chance, since not even a sparrow falls to the earth without the will of the heavenly Father, nor to the negligence of parents, since often, while they hasten and the ministers are ready, the child dies. Rather, it must be attributed to the hidden will of God, who did not will that baptism should be applied to them. Hence Prosper says against c. 4 of the Gauls: *There are also among Christians so many thousands of infants who have departed this life without baptism, whom neither the planter could instruct nor the waterer assist.*

19. The same major premise is evident, thirdly, from St. Thomas here, q. 23, a. 5, ad 3, where he writes: Why He chose these for glory and reprobated others has no reason except the divine will. Hence Augustine says upon John: “Why He draws this one and does not draw another, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err.” Likewise, in natural things, that this part of matter is under this form and that part under another depends upon the simple divine will. Similarly, it depends upon the simple will of the artisan that this stone is in this part of the wall and that one in another, although the reason of the art requires that something be in this place and something in that. He teaches similar things in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 161.

20. The minor also seems manifest. For if the choice of the predestined were made from foreseen merits as from a motive cause, a reason could easily be given why one is chosen for glory and another is not, namely, because God foresaw the merits of one and the evil works of the other. Consequently, there would be no need to appeal to God's simple will and His inscrutable judgments. Hence Augustine, in *Enchiridion*, c. 98, explaining the Apostle's words, *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*, says: *If he had wished future works to be understood in this matter, whether the good works of the one or the evil works of the other, which God certainly foreknew, he would by no means have said,*

“not from works,” but would have said, “from future works,” and in this way he would have solved the question, or rather would have made no question that needed to be solved. And in epistle 105 to Sixtus he says: Who would not be amazed that this most acute insight escaped the Apostle? For he did not see this when, as though facing the objection of a question, he did not instead give that answer which is so brief, so clear, and, as these men, namely the Pelagians, think, so true and complete. Here was the place to say what they hold. But the Apostle does not say this.

20. [bis] The second argument drawn from Scripture is taken from the fact that predestination is frequently designated in Scripture by the name of lot. Eph. 1 says: *We were called by lot according to the purpose of Him who works all things according to the counsel of His will.* Col. 1: *He made us worthy to share in the lot of the saints in light.* No other reason can be given for this designation except that, just as something is said to fall to someone by lot when it occurs to him without a preceding cause or effort on his part, so no cause of predestination is found on our part, but it must be reduced solely to God’s gratuitous election. Augustine uses this argument drawn from the designation “lot” in discourse 2 on Ps. 20 to establish the gratuitous predestination of the elect. He also proves it in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 9, from the fact that in Rom. 6 eternal life is called the grace of God: *Although the Apostle could have said, and would have said rightly, “The wages of justice are eternal life,” he preferred to say, “The grace of God is eternal life,” so that we might understand from this that God leads us to eternal life not for our merits but according to His mercy.* This cannot be verified of the leading to eternal life in execution, because this is the wage of justice, and therefore to say that it is given without merits would be an error. Therefore he speaks of this leading in intention, and of the very choice of the predestined for glory, which is purely gratuitous, although glory itself must be acquired in execution through merits.

21. Our position is proved, secondly, from the same Augustine, who not only manifestly teaches God’s gratuitous predestination in the passages already cited, but also in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 7, where he says: They, namely the eleven Apostles, were chosen to reign with Christ, not as Judas was chosen for the work suited to him. Therefore, when we hear, “Have I not chosen twelve of you, and one of you is a devil?”, we ought to understand that the former were chosen through mercy and the latter through judgment. He chose the former to obtain His kingdom, and the latter to shed His blood. This is a notable testimony for our position, for it concerns election to reign and thus to glory. It also concerns election before foreseen

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merits, since he says that it was made through mercy and not through judgment, that is, not through an examination of merits.

22. Our assertion can further be established by a moral argument drawn from the effects produced among the Massilians by Augustine's doctrine on predestination. For it is evident from the epistles written to Augustine by Prosper and Hilary that the Massilians were disturbed because they thought that Augustine's doctrine on predestination introduced fate, removed freedom of choice, brought men to despair, and other such things, which our adversaries also object against us. But under what even pretended appearance could those most acute men have objected such things to Augustine if they thought that the predestination he taught presupposed foreknowledge of works or of human cooperation? It is surely madness to imagine anything of this kind concerning a predestination whose decree is in every respect placed within man's power. It is insane to believe that such complaints could have been poured forth by those who, of their own accord and with a full profession, protested in those same epistles of Prosper and Hilary that they accepted predestination according to the foreknowledge of works, that they held those to be predestined and chosen whom God foreknew would believe, and finally who expressly said in Faustus, their leader: *Unless foreknowledge has first examined, predestination determines nothing*. Therefore they thought that the predestination of those to be saved taught by Augustine preceded every foreknowledge of merits. Therefore, since Augustine, in the books he wrote in reply, did not deny that this was his doctrine, nor complain that the Massilians attributed a foreign opinion to him, it is a manifest sign that this was his position: that those predestined for glory were chosen for it by the mere will of God before the foreknowledge of merits. Hence, since Augustine's position concerning predestination is the doctrine of the whole Church and was approved by several Supreme Pontiffs, Baronius says in vol. 6, n. 32: *Let certain recent authors see at what great peril they depart from St. Augustine's position on predestination while rising against the innovators in order to refute them, since there is no lack of other weapons by which the heretics may be overthrown*.

§ 6.

The Same Truth Is Established by Three Theological Arguments.

23. The first is this: Our merits are effects of predestination. Therefore predestination is not from foreseen merits. The consequence is manifest. For if merits are effects of predestination and election, they could not have

been foreseen as certainly future before predestination and election, since an effect cannot be foreseen as future before its cause. But if before predestination they are not foreseen as future, they could not move God to predestine; for God does not predestine from the foreknowledge of possible merits, otherwise all would be predestined. The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is proved in several ways. First, from the Apostle in Eph. 1, who says that God chose us by lot *that we should be holy*. Therefore election itself influences and causes holiness and merits. Secondly, from Augustine in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 18, where, weighing and urging the Apostle's words cited above, he says: *Let us therefore consider the words of the Apostle: "As He chose us in Him, that we should be holy and immaculate." Not, therefore, because we were going to be such, but that we might be such. Surely it is certain, surely it is manifest: we were going to be such precisely because He chose us, predestining that through His grace we should be such.* Likewise, in *Contra Julianum* I, c. 3, he says: *He chose no one because he was worthy, but by choosing him He made him worthy.* Similarly, in epistle 105 to Sixtus, he says that God makes those to be chosen; He does not find them so. Thirdly, from Prosper in *De vocatione omnium gentium* II, c. 35, who says: *God gives without merits to those whom He chose that from which merits may arise.* By these words he openly teaches that merits are effects of predestination, not its motive cause. Fourthly, from St. Thomas on Rom. 9, where he says: *It is manifest that every benefit God confers upon man unto salvation is an effect of predestination. But the divine benefit extends not only to the infusion of grace but also to the use of grace.* Hence, since merits or good works proceed from the good use of grace, it is manifest, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, that they are effects of predestination. Fifthly, by reason: Merits cannot be understood as conducive to glory without the gift of perseverance. But the gift of perseverance is an effect of predestination, since it follows the intention of giving glory. Therefore merits are also effects of predestination. The minor is proved, because if the gift of perseverance did not follow but preceded predestination, it would be given through general providence and consequently would be conferred upon all, which is manifestly false and contrary to Augustine in the passages cited above in § 1, where he asserts that no one can be said to have possessed the gift of perseverance unless he persevered to the end, and consequently unless he was predestined.

24. The second argument is this: Although one who efficaciously intends to give something to another by way of reward must necessarily first foresee the latter's merits if he does not have those merits in his power, this is not so if he does have them in his power. But God has men's merits in His power, because He promises and gives these, not from the power of our will, but

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from His predestination, as Augustine teaches in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 10. Therefore, antecedently to the foreknowledge of merits, God can efficaciously intend to give men glory by way of reward and crown, obliging Himself by virtue of such an intention and will to give them the merits and good works themselves and whatever is required for meriting, according to the words already cited from Prosper: *God gives without merits to those whom He chose that from which merits may arise.*

25. From this you will understand the notable difference that exists in this matter between God and earthly kings and princes. For a prince cannot efficaciously intend to give a soldier arms or a horse as a reward unless he first foresees his merits, because he does not have the merits of soldiers, their diligence, or the good use of the horse and arms in his power. But God has men's merits and the good use of free choice in His power, as Augustine teaches in *Retractationes* I, c. 3, in these words: *Since all goods, whether great, medium, or small, are from God, it follows that the good use of free will is also from God, and this is numbered among the great goods.* Therefore, before foreseeing merits, God can efficaciously intend to give men glory by way of reward and crown, to be conferred through merits that He will give.

26. The third argument, which is the chief and fundamental one, is handed down by St. Thomas in a. 4 of this q. 23 and can be proposed briefly and clearly as follows. One who wills in an orderly manner wills the end before the means to the end. But God wills in an orderly manner. Therefore He wills the end before the means to it. But glory is the end, and merits are the means conducive to it. Therefore God wills glory before merits, and consequently election to glory is not from the foreknowledge of merits.

27. Nor is the response of some of any force, that the major premise is not true when someone wills an end for another, or when the end is intended as a reward and crown, as happens in the present case. For whether the end is intended for oneself or for another, and whether it has the character of a reward and crown or not, it must always be the reason for willing the means, since the whole goodness of the means is taken from the goodness of the end. Therefore the end is always willed and intended first.

28. Nor does the response of others avail, namely, that it is not necessary in God for an efficacious intention of the end to precede an efficacious choice of the means, but that an inefficacious volition and intention of the end suffices. For, they say, just as a father, for example, is moved by a simple and inefficacious will by which he wills his son to become a doctor or bishop to provide him with assistance for his studies, so also God can be moved by the inefficacious intention and antecedent will by which He wills to give glory to all to choose means efficaciously conducive to it. This response, I

say, is of no force, for it can be efficaciously refuted. First, because the choice of means must be proportioned to the intention of the end. Therefore the efficacious choice of an efficacious means to the end must presuppose an efficacious intention of the end, so that the due proportion may be preserved. For one would be plainly imprudent and foolish if he did not efficaciously intend some end and yet chose means efficaciously conducive to it. Secondly, choice presupposes intention no less than execution presupposes choice. But the real and efficacious execution of the end through the means necessarily presupposes an efficacious choice. Therefore an efficacious choice likewise necessarily presupposes an efficacious intention. The proposed example is of no force. A father who desires the episcopate for his son does not have it in his power, nor does he provide means efficacious for attaining it. Thus it is not surprising that the disposition of the means does not arise from an efficacious intention of the end. But God, in predestining men to glory, has both the end to be attained and the means efficaciously conducive to it, namely, men's merits, in His power, as was shown above. Hence it is repugnant that He should be moved from an inefficacious will to save men to an efficacious choice of means.

29. From these points the reply of others is refuted, who say that beatitude in common was willed by God before foreseen merits, but not beatitude in particular and as applied to some determinate person, for example Peter. For the volition of glory only in common and applied to no one in particular cannot be efficacious, but can only be a simple complacency in and love of glory, since beatitude in common, insofar as it abstracts from circumstances and particular persons, cannot be placed in act or be attained by anyone under this aspect. Therefore, if the efficacious choice of means presupposes an efficacious intention of the end and not merely a simple complacency in and love of it, as we have already shown, then before merits are willed and foreseen there must be presupposed in God an intention of beatitude in particular and as applied to determinate persons, and not only a volition of beatitude in common and as abstracting from circumstances and particular persons. Moreover, to will something first in common and afterward in particular implies imperfection, since it is a progression from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore it is repugnant that God should first will glory for men in common and afterward in particular. This is especially so because the consequent and efficacious will, such as election to glory, is not borne toward things in common, but in particular and with all their circumstances.

30. Finally, the solution of others can easily be refuted, who say that an efficacious intention of the end is presupposed to the choice of means if the

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means are not only efficacious but are also formally chosen as such, but not if, although the means are efficacious, they are nevertheless not formally loved as efficacious, which they teach happens in the present matter. First, this response destroys the decree of predestination, whose intrinsic nature is to be a preparation of efficacious means precisely as such, and of God's benefits *by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered*, as is evident from Augustine's definition handed down above. Secondly, I ask whether, when God efficaciously intends to give glory to the elect, He knows in that prior moment of intention the efficacy of the means that lead to it or not. If He does not know it, He lacks knowledge. If He does know it and yet does not choose those means as efficacious, He lacks prudence. For how does one proceed prudently if, while intending the attainment of an end that depends solely upon the efficacy of the means, he chooses means which he knows to be efficacious and yet does not will them as efficacious? In this way he manifestly exposes himself to chance and fortune and to the frustration of the end he intends. I add that the choice of the helps of grace as efficacious only with respect to their physical entity is common to the predestined and the reprobate, since sufficient helps are conferred upon the latter which, according to Molina, Lessius, and other recent authors, are not entitatively distinguished from efficacious helps. But the choice distinguishing the predestined from the reprobate cannot be common to them. Therefore it must be efficacious not only with respect to the entity of the helps, but also with respect to their efficacy and the connection they have with glory.

§ 7.

The Principal Objections are Solved.

31. First, the adversaries object with the words of the Apostle in Rom. 8: *Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son*. By these words the foreknowledge of the good use of free choice seems to be presupposed to predestination. Hence Ambrose says in *De fide* V: *He did not predestine before He foreknew; rather, He predestined the rewards of those whose merits He foreknew*. And Fulgentius says in *Ad Monimum* I: *He predestined to the kingdom those whom He foreknew would return to Him through the mercy of His prevenient help*.

I answer that, in the cited testimony of the Apostle, the word "predestined" signifies complete predestination, or the act of command in which it formally consists. But the word "foreknew" is taken for a foreknowledge which indeed precedes that act of command, but which

follows and is founded upon the efficacious choice for glory itself, which is, as it were, radical and inchoate predestination. Hence the Apostle's meaning is that those whom God, consequently upon their efficacious choice for glory, foreknew would be initially and radically conformable to the image of His Son, He completely predestined by an act of command so that they might be completely and formally conformable to the same image of His Son. Therefore from that passage it is concluded only that foreknowledge of the good use of free choice is had initially by God before the act of command in which predestination formally consists, but not before the efficacious choice for glory that precedes this act and is called predestination radically. In this sense the words of Ambrose and Fulgentius can also be explained, especially since Augustine says in *De dono perseverantiae*, c. 18: *What prevents us, when we read in some interpreters of the word of God of God's foreknowledge and the matter concerns the will of the elect, from understanding that same predestination?* That is, knowledge founded upon the decree and predetermination of the divine will.

32. They object, secondly, with a difficult testimony of Augustine taken from *Ad Simplicianum* I, q. 2, where he says: Election does not precede justification, but justification precedes election, for no one is chosen unless he already stands apart from the one who is rejected. Hence, as for the saying, "He chose us in Him before the establishment of the world," I do not see how it can be understood except as foreknowledge.

Leaving aside Bellarmine's response, that Augustine wrote the books to Simplicianus when young and afterward retracted the position concerning election to glory which he had taught in the cited passage, several of our Thomists answer that Augustine is speaking not of eternal election but of the temporal execution of election. It is true of this execution that it presupposes a distinction among those to be chosen and that it is not liberal but from justice. Yet this response can be efficaciously refuted. For after Augustine asserted that the election to glory of which he was speaking presupposed a distinction between those to be chosen and those to be rejected, he explained the Apostle's words in Eph. 1, *He chose us in Him before the establishment of the world*, of the same election, and asserted that they could be understood only as foreknowledge, because although election does not presuppose merits existing eternally in reality, it nevertheless presupposes them as foreseen eternally in the divine mind. But if he were speaking of temporal election taken for execution, this explanation could not be adapted to the Apostle's words, since the execution of election is temporal and presupposes the merits of the elect as preexisting in time. Therefore that interpretation does not agree with Augustine's text.

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33. It is better, therefore, to answer that, besides the intentional decree of glory preceding the foreknowledge of merits, there is another executive decree concerning glory which presupposes prior merits. For just as in us intention and use are two distinct acts of the will, the first of which precedes the choice of means, while the second follows it and concerns the execution of the means and of the end, so the same must be asserted of God according to our manner of understanding. Besides the choice of means belonging to the order of intention, an executive decree must be admitted in the divine will, distinct in some manner from choice. This decree is the very volition by which God efficaciously wills to execute the means through which the predestined attain glory in their proper time. What Augustine teaches in the cited passage must be understood of this decree, namely, that it presupposes justification foreseen by God in His decree and the foreknowledge of merits. In this sense other Fathers who say that the foreknowledge of merits precedes predestination can also be explained. For this is true of predestination taken for its executive decree, but not of predestination taken for the intentional decree of glory, which is entirely gratuitous and precedes the foreknowledge of merits. St. Thomas must be understood and explained in the same manner when, on Rom. 8, lect. 6, expounding the Apostle's words, *Those whom He foreknew, He also predestined*, he says that it could reasonably be said that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination if this were understood of predestination to glory, but not of predestination to grace, because this would be to posit that grace is given from our merits. For there the Holy Doctor takes predestination, not for the intentional decree of glory, which in his position precedes the foreknowledge of merits, but for its executive decree, which presupposes prior merits. He intends only to teach that this difference exists between predestination to glory and predestination to grace when considered in the order of execution: the first is not purely gratuitous, but depends upon the foreknowledge of merits; the second is purely gratuitous and independent of merits.

34. Augustine embraces this twofold intentional and executive decree in sermon 7 on the words of the Apostle, where he says: *God chose, as the Apostle says, according to His grace*—behold the liberal and gratuitous intentional decree—and *according to their justice*—behold the executive decree presupposing prior merits.

35. Reason also establishes that these two decrees must be admitted in God. For an exterior act cannot possess the moral rectitude of some special virtue unless some interior act of the will formally possesses the same rectitude. Just as liberty does not belong formally to an exterior act, neither

does moral rectitude or goodness, which is founded upon liberty and presupposes it. But the exterior conferral of glory formally possesses the rectitude of justice, as the theologians teach in the treatise on merit. Therefore there is some act of the divine will formally possessing such rectitude. Since election to glory, belonging to the order of intention, does not possess such rectitude but is purely gratuitous and liberal, an executive decree formally clothed with that rectitude must be admitted in God.

36. It is confirmed. Since merits are moral means, they cause the execution of the end only by moving the will of the one who rewards, so that he wills to confer the reward. Therefore, if the merits of the just cause the temporal execution of glory, they move the divine will and incline it toward the bestowal of glory. But the divine will cannot be moved temporally or have any motive newly in time, just as it cannot will something newly in time. Therefore it is moved eternally by merits. Since this cannot be verified of the intentional will of glory, some executive decree, distinct from the intentional decree, must necessarily be admitted in God, which presupposes foreseen merits and depends upon them as upon a motive cause. By this doctrine and the distinction of this twofold decree, not only are several testimonies of the holy Fathers explained which seem to militate against our position, but the principal foundations of the adversaries are also solved, as will be evident from what is immediately to be said.

37. They object, therefore, thirdly: Glory in execution is not conferred upon adults except as a reward for merits. Therefore God eternally decreed to confer it only from foreseen merits. The consequence is proved: Glory was not eternally willed and decreed in a manner different from that in which it is executed in time. Therefore, if in time it is conferred only dependently upon merits, it was also willed and decreed eternally only from merits as foreseen.

38. I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. God eternally decreed to confer glory only from foreseen merits by an intentional decree, I deny; by an executive decree, I grant. To the proof it must likewise be said that the intentional decree is not adequate to the execution in the mode of attaining the object; indeed, it proceeds in an opposite manner, for execution ends and terminates from the point at which intention begins. The executive decree, however, is adequate to execution. Hence it is true of the latter that glory was eternally willed through it in the manner in which it is conferred in time, but not of the former.

39. You will say, first: Something on the part of the effect must correspond to every efficacious decree of God. But in glory as conferred in reality nothing appears that corresponds to a liberal and gratuitous

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intentional decree. Therefore such a decree is repugnant, given that glory is conferred in time from merits.

40. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For something to correspond in reality to a liberal and gratuitous efficacious intentional decree, it is enough that, although the exterior conferral of glory is formally from justice and not formally liberal, it is nevertheless liberal in its root, namely, in the conferral of the first grace that initiates the merits of glory and took its origin from that gratuitous intention. From this it follows that the conferral of glory itself is virtually and radically gratuitous.

41. You will say, secondly: These two acts—"I will to give glory gratuitously" and "I will to give glory from merits and as a crown"—seem opposed and incompatible with one another. Therefore the same is true of the two decrees we admit in God, since through the first God wills to give glory gratuitously and through the second He wills to give it from merits and as a crown.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For in the first act the term "gratuitously" bears upon the act and excludes merits, not from glory as to be given, but from the motive of the will intending to give glory. In the second, the term "from merits" bears upon the object, or the thing to be given, namely, glory, which God does not will to give without merits. Hence there is no repugnance or incompatibility between the two decrees mentioned.

§ 8.

The Principal Effects of Predestination.

42. I say, first: Glorification, justification, and efficacious calling are effects of predestination. This is evident from the Apostle in Rom. 8: *Those whom He predestined, He also called; and those whom He called, He also justified; and those whom He justified, He also glorified.* The reason is that three things are required for something to be an effect of predestination: first, that it be from God as willing to give glory; secondly, that it be given solely from the intention of giving glory; thirdly, that it in fact conduce to the attainment of glory. But God in fact confers beatitude, justifies, and efficaciously calls the elect from the intention of giving him glory, to which he in fact attains. Therefore the aforesaid things are effects of predestination.

43. You will say, first: Predestination does not concern the end, but the means. Hence Augustine defines it as *the foreknowledge and preparation of means by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered.* But

glorification is the end and not a means. Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I answer that predestination immediately concerns the means, but because these efficaciously produce the end in execution, it mediately concerns the end.

44. You will say, secondly: The effects of predestination cannot be common to the reprobate and the predestined. But justification and calling are common to the elect and the reprobate, since they are granted to many of the latter. Therefore they are not effects of predestination.

I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For although calling and justification can be found in the reprobate, they are not found in them in the same manner as in the predestined. In the latter they are found with an efficacious ordering and perseverance unto the attainment of glory; in the reprobate they are found without this. Hence they are not had in the same manner.

45. I say, secondly: Grace interrupted by sin is an effect of predestination, not only as recovered through penance, but also as first conferred. For such grace efficaciously conduces to the end of predestination and influences beatitude, since because of it a new degree of glory is given to the predestined beyond the degree corresponding to the grace in which he rises again, or at least the same degree of glory is given under a new title. The theologians discuss this in the treatise on penance when treating the reviviscence of merits. Nor is it an objection to say that such grace does not avail toward the attainment of glory except as restored through penance. This is true if the term “as” denotes a required condition without which such grace does not influence glory, but not if it expresses and signifies the formal reason of such influence. For under this aspect the influence is not from penance, which stands only as removing an impediment, but from the right and proportion that sanctifying grace has in relation to glory.

46. You will say: Although some degree of glory corresponds to the grace Adam possessed in the state of innocence, and consequently it conduces to the end of predestination, nevertheless that grace, as first conferred, was not an effect of his predestination, but only as restored through penance. Therefore the same must be said of the grace first conferred upon us, interrupted by sin, and restored through penance.

47. I deny the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that, since the grace of the state of innocence did not presuppose the foreknowledge and predestination of Christ and was not given from His merits, as we shall show in the treatise on the Incarnation, it was not

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commanded by the efficacious intention of glorifying Adam, which was posterior to Christ's predestination. Hence, by virtue of its first infusion, it did not imply an order to final perseverance, but only by virtue of the restoration accomplished through Christ. The contrary occurs in our grace as first conferred. For since its first conferral is from the merits of Christ and presupposes His predestination, it is prepared in the elect from the intention of glory and by virtue of its first infusion implies an order to glory and to final perseverance.

48. I say, thirdly, that although inefficacious callings are not effects immediately elicited by predestination, they are nevertheless commanded by it and ordered to its proper end, namely, the salvation of the elect.

The first part is evident, first, because inefficacious callings and sufficient helps, since they are common to the elect and the reprobate, are from the general providence of the supernatural order. Secondly, because, since predestination according to Augustine is the preparation of benefits by which the elect are most certainly delivered, only those callings that efficaciously and most certainly conduce to its end should be numbered among the effects elicited by predestination. In this sense certain testimonies of the holy Fathers must be understood, by which they seem to assert that only efficacious and congruous callings, or callings according to purpose, are effects of predestination. For they speak of effects elicited by predestination and proceeding immediately from it. Hence they prove this part of our conclusion, but do not militate against the second part, which is established by this argument. Whatever in some manner conduces to the end of predestination can be commanded by it and proceed from it at least mediately, and is in fact commanded by it, since it belongs to a power or virtue that regards the end to command those things that in some manner conduce to it. But although inefficacious callings in the predestined do not immediately conduce to glory, they nevertheless conduce to it mediately and dispositively, insofar as they gradually soften man's heart so that he finally responds to God's call; or objectively, insofar as, when recalled to memory, they arouse thanksgiving and humility because of past resistance. Therefore they proceed from predestination at least mediately and by way of command.

49. You will say: One acts imprudently if, from an efficacious intention of the end, he commands means that he knows to be inefficacious for obtaining it. Therefore it seems unfitting that God, from an efficacious intention of beatitude, should command certain inefficacious callings which must be frustrated of their effect.

I answer that one indeed acts imprudently if, from an efficacious intention of the end, he commands means entirely inefficacious. But this is not so if from that intention he commands means efficacious in a qualified respect, although simply inefficacious for obtaining the end. Indeed, true prudence sometimes requires this, as in our case: namely, that through callings inefficacious for the perfect act, but efficacious for other less perfect acts, man's heart may gradually be softened and disposed toward perfect conversion, and his infirmity, inconstancy, ingratitude, and other things may be shown to him, on account of which he may afterward be more deeply humbled.

50. I say, fourthly, that the permission of sin in the elect is an effect of their predestination.

It is proved by this fundamental argument. What is done by God for the sake of salvation and spiritual profit is an effect of predestination. But the permission of sin—that is, the denial of efficacious help for avoiding it—in the elect is made from the intention of their salvation and for their spiritual profit. Therefore it is an effect of predestination. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved, first, from the Apostle in Rom. 8: *For those who love God, all things work together unto good.* The Gloss adds, *even sins themselves*, and St. Thomas, in lect. 8 on that passage, teaches that the sins of the predestined work together unto their good. The holy Fathers everywhere assert the same. Augustine writes in *De correptione et gratia*, c. 9: *For those who love God, all things work together unto good, so entirely all things that, even if some of them go astray and deviate, He makes this very thing profit them unto good, because they return better and more cautious.* Ambrose says in *Apologia David* I, c. 2: *Although the saints have sometimes fallen grievously as men, more from the frailty of nature than from a desire to sin, they rise again more eager to run, restoring greater contests under the spur of shame, so that their fall is judged not only to have brought no impediment but even to have multiplied incentives to greater speed.* Gregory says in *Moralia* II, c. 26: *It happens that this grace sometimes usefully withdraws itself and shows the presumptuous man how weak he is in himself. For then we truly know from where our good things come when, by seeming to lose them, we perceive that they cannot be preserved by us.* Finally, St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 79, a. 4, that *from divine mercy blindness is sometimes medicinally ordered to the salvation of those who are blinded, but this mercy is not bestowed upon all who are blinded, but only upon the predestined, for whom all things work together unto good.*

51. The same minor is proved, secondly, by reason. The permission of sin is willed by God for the sake of some good end. For Augustine says in *Enchiridion*, c. 11: *Since God is supremely good, He would in no way permit*

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anything evil to exist in His works unless He were so omnipotent and good that He could bring good even from evil. But no end of the permission of sin can be conceived which is better and more suitable to the order of divine wisdom and providence than the salvation and spiritual advancement of the elect themselves. Therefore the permission of sins in the elect is willed by God from His intention and love of this end, or is commanded by predestination.

52. You will object, first: The permission of sin is from God's general providence, to which it belongs to permit defects, whether moral or physical, in the universe, so that its order and beauty may shine forth more greatly from them. Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I deny the consequence. For, as we said in the preceding conclusion, although inefficacious callings are elicited by God's general providence, nevertheless, insofar as they conduce to the end of predestination, they are commanded by it. Likewise, although the permission of sin considered in itself, or as conducive to the beauty of the universe and the manifestation of the divine attributes, is elicited by God's general providence, nevertheless, insofar as it conduces to the good of the elect in the manner already explained, it proceeds mediately and by way of command from predestination. Consequently, it is an effect of predestination, not indeed elicited, but commanded.

53. You will object, secondly: Every effect of predestination must be a grace, and indeed a grace through Christ. But the permission of sin is not grace, but the denial of grace. Nor is it from Christ's merits, since Christ did not merit that grace should be withdrawn from the predestined, but, on the contrary, that it should be given to them for avoiding sins. Therefore the permission of sin is not an effect of predestination.

54. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. Every effect of predestination must be a grace either intrinsically and by reason of itself, or extrinsically and by reason of that to which it is ordered, I grant the major premise. It must always be a grace intrinsically and by reason of itself, I deny the major premise. Distinguishing the minor premise in the same way, I deny the consequence. For although the permission of sin, by reason of itself and intrinsically, is not grace but the absence of grace, and as such cannot be an effect of Christ's merits, nevertheless, insofar as it is extrinsically ordered to the predestined person's rising again more humbly and persevering in grace, it is extrinsically a grace and is from Christ's merits. Hence under this aspect it can be requested by us in prayer, just as it was requested by Christ, who requested from the Father every reward of His merits and all the effects of our predestination. Nevertheless, some of our Thomists say not improbably that this difference exists between Christ and us: Christ's will was not the

will that would commit the sin, and therefore He could request the permission of sin without its being inferred that He took complacency in the permitted sin. But our will is the will that will commit the sin, and therefore, if it were to ask for permission of it, it would take complacency in the sin, at least virtually and indirectly.

55. From what has been said it is gathered that the permission of sins in the reprobate is an effect of the predestination of the elect, since it conduces to their good and spiritual profit. For, as St. Thomas argues in his commentary on Rom. 8, lect. 6, just as natural evils that occur in the universe are not always ordered to the good of those to whom they occur, but nevertheless to the good of the universe, so the evil of fault, or its permission, is not always chosen for the good of the one to whom sin is permitted, but nevertheless for the good of the noblest parts of the universe, namely, the elect, according to Prov. 11: *He who is foolish shall serve the wise*, because, as the Holy Doctor says, *even the evils of sinners yield to the good of the just*.

56. I say, finally, that the substance of the predestined person is an effect of his predestination.

It is proved as follows. Whatever in some manner conduces to predestination, if it is made from the intention of glory, is an effect of predestination, at least a commanded effect. But the substance of the predestined person conduces to predestination and is also made from the intention of glory, which is the end of predestination. Therefore it is an effect of predestination, at least a commanded effect. The major premise is evident. For although, in order that something be an elicited and immediate effect of predestination, it is required that it be ordered to predestination as a means to the end, nevertheless, in order that it be a commanded and remote effect of predestination, it suffices that it conduce to predestination in some manner, provided it is made from the intention of glory, which is the end of predestination. The first part of the minor is also evident, for the substance of the predestined person is the efficient cause of the acts through which man is justified and merits glory. It is also the efficient cause of glory itself and of the beatific vision, which it produces through the intellect elevated by the light of glory. It can also be an objective motive of thanksgiving for the benefit of creation and conservation. Therefore the substance of the predestined person conduces to predestination.

57. That it is made from the intention of glory, as the second part of the minor asserts, is shown as follows. It is not intrinsically repugnant that the substance of the predestined person be made from the intention of glory. Moreover, that it be so made accords with the extension of predestination in

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providing, and manifests God's greatest love toward the elect and the special care He has for them. Therefore the substance of the predestined person is in fact made from the intention of glory. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is also manifest as regards its second part, but is proved as regards the first. First, because by virtue of the decree by which Christ was chosen to be the natural Son of God, Christ as man, who is the subject of predestination, was made, as the theologians teach in the treatise on the Incarnation when discussing Christ's predestination. Likewise, by virtue of a decree ordering man to natural beatitude, man could be made if he were created in pure nature. Therefore, by virtue of a decree efficaciously ordering him to glory, the substance of the subject ordered to glory can be made, at least by way of command. Secondly, if there were any repugnance in this, it would be principally because the substance of the predestined person, since it is the subject of glory, must be presupposed to the intention of glory and consequently cannot be made by virtue of it. But this reason is of no force. Therefore this is not repugnant. The major premise contains the principal foundation of the opposing position. The minor is shown as follows. What is prior in the genus of material cause can be posterior in the genus of final cause. Therefore, although the substance of the predestined person is the subject of glory and consequently prior to it in the genus of material cause, it can be caused by glory in the genus of final cause and consequently proceed by way of command from the intention of glory. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is explained and proved by various examples. A vital power, although it is the effective and receptive principle of its act, can nevertheless be made from the intention of that act and depend upon it in the genus of final cause. The health a physician desires for a sick person is prior to him in the genus of final cause, while the sick person for whom it is desired precedes it in the genus of material and subjective cause. Christ in the genus of final cause is prior to the human race and to the whole order of nature and grace, and hence in Col. 1 He is called *the firstborn of every creature*. Yet the human race as to be redeemed, and consequently the natural order, precedes Christ in the genus of material cause and under the aspect of the end for whom, as our Thomists commonly teach in the treatise on the Incarnation. Therefore, likewise, although the substance of the predestined person is the subject of glory, which predestination regards as its end, it can proceed from the intention of glory, or be commanded by it. The reason for all these things is that mutual causality between two things in diverse genera of cause is not repugnant. For, as philosophers commonly teach, *causes are causes of one another* and exercise mutual causality and dependence among

themselves. From this the principal foundations of the adversaries are solved, as will be evident from what is immediately to be said.

58. They object, therefore, first: The predestination of men presupposes their substance as produced, or at least as foreseen. Therefore it does not cause it. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. The substance of the predestined person is produced through natural providence. But natural providence precedes supernatural providence, just as nature precedes grace. Therefore predestination presupposes the substance of the predestined person. A similar argument can be made from the antecedent will to save all men. For this precedes predestination, or that special will by which God distinguishes the predestined from the reprobate. But that general will to save all men presupposes their substance and *esse*, since it presupposes the will to create them. Therefore predestination presupposes the substance of the predestined person as produced, or at least as foreseen.

59. These objections are easily answered from the principles already established. The antecedent will to save all men and natural providence precede predestination in the genus of material cause, but are posterior to it in the genus of final cause. This suffices for the substance of the predestined person to be an effect of predestination, as has already been shown. This is also evident in the common position of the Thomists and others, who teach that sufficient helps are effects of predestination in the predestined, notwithstanding that they are effects of common supernatural providence, which is prior to predestinative providence. Therefore, likewise, although the substance of the predestined person is an effect of natural providence, and natural providence is prior to predestination, it can nevertheless be an effect of predestination.

60. The same solution must be applied to the similar argument proposed by the adversaries, namely, that our predestination, since it is posterior to the predestination of Christ, which depends upon the foreknowledge of original sin, presupposes that sin, while original sin presupposes the substance of all the predestined. For the answer is that our predestination presupposes original sin in one genus of cause, namely the material cause, but not in every genus of cause, because it precedes such sin, or its permission, in the genus of final cause.

61. They object, secondly: In order that something be an effect of predestination, it is required that it be a means in relation to glory, as is evident in calling and justification, which are therefore called effects of predestination because they are ordered to glory as means to the end. But

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the substance of the predestined person is not a means to glory, but only its subject. Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. In order that something be an elicited effect of predestination, it is required that it be a means in relation to glory, I grant the major premise. In order that it be only an effect commanded by predestination, I deny the major premise. For this it suffices that it conduce to glory in some manner and be made from the intention of glory, as is evident from what was said above.

62. They object, thirdly: The effects of predestination must be from Christ's merits, for He merited all the effects of our predestination, as the theologians teach in the treatise on the Incarnation. But the substance of the predestined person is not from Christ's merits, for according to Augustine, epistle 105: *Christ died not for the just so that men might be created, but for the impious so that they might be justified.* Therefore it is not an effect of predestination.

63. I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. The substance of the predestined person taken merely as such and considered within the limits of pure nature is not from Christ's merits, I grant. Insofar as it is ordered to grace and glory and efficaciously transmitted to them, I deny. Hence, to the passage from Augustine, it must be said that he intends only that the generation of man considered within the limits of pure nature is not from the merits of Christ's death and Passion. He does not, however, deny that such generation, insofar as it is ordered and transmitted to grace and glory, falls under Christ's merits. I add that many things are assigned to Christ's merits for which He is nevertheless not said to have died. For Christ merited for Himself the glory of His body and the exaltation of His name. He also merited the illuminations and accidental joys of the angels, as we shall show in the treatise on the Incarnation. Yet He is not said to have died for the glory of His body and the exaltation of His name, nor for the illuminations and joys of the angels, because the term "for" denotes the principal end of Christ's death and Passion, while those things are not principal ends of His death, but only the justification and glory of the elect.

64. From what has been said it is gathered that all natural goods are commanded effects of predestination. For although they are produced through natural providence, they are nevertheless ordered through predestination to the salvation and good of the elect, according to the Apostle's words: *All things are yours, and you are Christ's, and Christ is God's.*

CHAPTER III.
On Reprobation.

1. That there is reprobation in God, or some efficacious and immutable decree by which from eternity he willed to exclude certain men and angels from glory, is certain by faith, since this is established by explicit testimonies of Scripture, especially Rom. 9. Hence the Council of Valence, can. 3, says: We confidently confess the predestination of the elect to life, and the predestination of the impious to death. St. Thomas also proves this here, q. 23, a. 3, by the following argument: Predestination is a part of providence. But it belongs to providence to permit some defect in the things subject to providence. Hence, since by divine providence men are ordained to eternal life, it also belongs to divine providence to permit some to fall short of that end; and this is called reprobation.

2. The Holy Doctor adds in *In I Sententiarum ad Annibaldum*, dist. 40, a. 3, that reprobation was necessary so that the defectibility of the human will and the necessity of grace might be perfectly manifested. For the freedom of the created will would not be perfectly manifested if man could not sin finally and die in final impenitence. Likewise, the necessity of grace is not perfectly manifested unless the necessity of the gift of final perseverance is shown; and this cannot be shown unless it is permitted that some men sin and die in sin, and consequently fall short of attaining eternal life. It was also necessary that God reprobate some so that the glory of his attributes might shine and flash forth more brightly, especially his vindicative justice in their punishment; his patience and long-suffering in enduring them for so long; and his goodness and mercy toward the elect, by which he distinguished them from the reprobate and destined them for glory. The Apostle touches upon this reason in Rom. 9 in these words: *God, willing to show his wrath, that is, his vindicative justice, and to make his power known, endured with great patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory.* Finally, this is required by the beauty of the universe, which arises from the diversity of creatures and the admixture of the good and the wicked. Paul likewise intimates this reason when he writes in 2 Tim. 2: *In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay, some indeed for honor, but others for dishonor.*

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3. As regards the essence and quiddity of reprobation, theologians commonly teach that in God it does not signify merely the negation of predestination, but a positive act. This is so, first, because the Apostle explains it in Rom. 9 by terms implying a positive act: *God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills. Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.* It is also so because, if reprobation consisted in negation alone, angels and men who are merely possible and will never exist could be called reprobate just as much as those who are knowingly condemned, since not only the latter, but also the former, are not predestined by God. I add that the more perfect manner of acting must be attributed to God. But acting through a positive act is a more perfect manner of acting than acting through the mere absence or suspension of an act. Therefore, reprobation consists in a positive act, and not merely in the negation of predestination.

4. But if you ask what that positive act is in which reprobation essentially consists, I answer that it is an act of command by which God commands the permission of sin, or the denial of efficacious grace for avoiding it, and other means efficaciously conducive to the end of reprobation, namely, the manifestation of divine justice. For reprobation is an objective part of providence, just as predestination is. But providence consists essentially in an act of command ordering means toward the attainment of the end intended by the provider, as was shown in Chapter I, § 2. Therefore, so too does reprobation. Nevertheless, it connotes and presupposes an act of the will called hatred of the reprobate, or his rejection and exclusion from glory, just as predestination similarly connotes and presupposes an act of the will called the love or election of the predestined to glory. These points having been established, it remains only for us to treat here of the causes and effects of reprobation, concerning which there are three serious difficulties and controversies to be resolved briefly.

§ 1.

Reprobation, Insofar as It Signifies Exclusion from Glory as an Undue Benefit,
Does Not Have Foreseen Demerits or Actual Sins as Its Motive; It Does,
However, Insofar as It Includes the Will to Punish and Inflict a Penalty.

5. Thus St. Thomas teaches in *In I Sententiarum ad Annibaldum*, dist. 41, q. un., a. 3, where he writes: Two wills seem to be opposed to the divine will concerning man's salvation: namely, a contradictory will, according to which God wills not to save someone; and a contrary will, according to which he wills to condemn someone. The first will does not require any reason on the

part of the thing willed, since man's salvation is not owed to human nature; for no reason is required why I do not give something to one to whom I am not bound to give it. But the will of condemnation regards a reason on the part of the condemned, since condemnation is inflicted as something owed.

The first part of this assertion is proved, first, from those words of the Apostle in Rom. 9: *When they had not yet been born or done anything good or evil, it was said, not because of works, but because of him who calls: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.* Here St. Thomas says in lect. 2 that, just as the love spoken of here pertains to God's eternal predestination, so the hatred spoken of here pertains to reprobation, by which God reprobates sinners; nor may it be said that this reprobation is temporal. This excludes the response of certain recent authors, who say that these words are not to be understood of a love pertaining to eternal predestination or of a hatred pertaining to eternal reprobation, because they suppose that Esau was not reprobated from the kingdom of heaven, but was merely excluded from a temporal inheritance.

6. But those authors attend only to temporal things and fail to notice that the Apostle elevated these words of the Prophet to a mystical and spiritual sense, and adopted them to prove that God, without injury to anyone, chose one according to his purpose for glory and willed to deny so great a benefit to others, prior to any merits or demerits on their part. Augustine pursued this meaning in ep. 105, q. 2, to Simplicianus, and frequently elsewhere. Hence it makes no difference to the present purpose whether Esau was reprobated from eternal life or merely excluded from a temporal inheritance, since the force of the Apostle's argument does not consist in this. Rather, the Apostle takes Jacob and Esau as types and figures of all the elect and the reprobate.

I add that the same Apostle, in Heb. 12, numbers Esau among sinners and the impenitent, which is no slight argument that he was excluded not only from a temporal inheritance, but also from the heavenly kingdom. Nor is it an obstacle that some, with Theophylact and Cajetan, interpret this of repentance before his father Isaac and of rejection from his blessing. For St. John Chrysostom, hom. 31 on Hebrews, St. Thomas on Heb. 12, and the other holy Fathers generally hold that Esau did not have true repentance toward God.

7. The same first part can further be supported by this argument: God is the supreme Lord of glory, and glory is owed to no man. Therefore, without injury to anyone, he can efficaciously decree to confer it upon some and deny it to others, without presupposing any merit or demerit of their own wills. The consequence is evident, because the notion of supreme dominion consists in this, that one can do whatever he wills with his own property

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without injury to anyone. Hence, because first grace is owed to no man, God can, without injury to anyone, give it to some and deny it to others, as the adversaries concede. Why, then, could the same not be said of glory? St. Thomas intimates this reason in the place cited above, and here in a. 5, ad 3, in these words: *In matters given by grace, one may at his pleasure give more or less to whom he wills, provided that he withdraws from no one what is owed, without prejudice to justice. And this is what the householder says in Matt. 20: Take what is yours and go. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?* And in *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 9, he says: *The very fact that no debt exists is a sufficient reason for not giving.*

8. The adversaries answer that, although God, as supreme Lord of glory, could absolutely have acted in this manner and denied glory to the reprobate as an undue benefit prior to any demerits on their part, he could not do so given the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order and the antecedent will by which he wills all men to be saved. For, once this elevation and will are presupposed, glory becomes due to man, not by a debt of justice or connaturality, but by a debt of fittingness.

9. But against this, first: Given this ordination and will, God can, without any unfittingness, efficaciously will to deny efficacious grace to some, without any prior demerits on their part. Therefore, likewise, even given that will and ordination, he can, without any unfittingness and without any prior demerits on men's part, will to exclude some from glory as from an undue benefit. The consequence is evident, for God is no less the Lord of glory than of efficacious grace; nor, by reason of this will and ordination, does glory become more due than efficacious grace. Therefore, just as he can, without any unfittingness, efficaciously will to deny efficacious grace to some without prior demerits on their part, so too can he deny glory to them, notwithstanding the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order and the antecedent will to save all men.

10. Against it, secondly: Granted that by reason of that elevation and antecedent will glory were due to some men vaguely and in common, it would not nevertheless be due to these or those men in particular. Therefore, granted that this elevation and will are presupposed, although God could not efficaciously will to exclude all men from glory as from an undue benefit, he could nevertheless, before any demerit, efficaciously will to deny glory as an undue benefit to these or those men in particular, even prior to foreseen demerits.

11. The second part of the assertion, which says that reprobation, insofar as it includes the will to punish and inflict a penalty, presupposes foreseen demerits and sins, is manifest. For it is repugnant to divine equity that God

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decree to punish or inflict any penalty except on account of prior fault. Hence Augustine says in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 3, ch. 8: *God is good; God is just. He can deliver without good merits because he is good; he cannot condemn without evil merits because he is just.*

§ 2.

Objections are Resolved.

12. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: The will efficaciously to exclude some from glory before their foreseen demerits seems incompatible with the antecedent will to save all men, which the Apostle asserts to be in God in 1 Tim. 2. For how does God sincerely will the salvation of those whom he excludes from salvation before any prior demerits?

13. I answer by denying the antecedent. For a pious and just judge can sincerely will the life of a man whom he nevertheless actually hands over to be hanged. Likewise, a merchant who wills to cast his merchandise into the sea when a storm arises in order to save his life truly and sincerely wills to preserve it, though with an inefficacious will of simple complacency. Again, according to the adversaries' opinion, when God gives a man sufficient help and incongruous grace for some act, he desires for him congruous and efficacious grace by simple complacency and an antecedent will, yet prior to any antecedent fault he efficaciously wills to deny it. For, in their view, the denial of first grace, or the permission of the first sin, is not a punishment for a preceding sin, but proceeds from God's simple will. Finally, God wills by an antecedent will that all infants be saved, yet, without presupposed or antecedent demerits, of which they have none, he wills to exclude some from glory, namely, those to whom he does not will the sacrament of baptism to be applied. In the same way, although he efficaciously wills to exclude some from glory insofar as it is a benefit undue to angelic and human nature, so that he may manifest himself as the supreme Lord of glory and that glory is owed to no man or angel, nevertheless, by an inefficacious desire and simple complacency bearing upon their salvation considered in itself and abstracted from the circumstances of the defectibility of free choice, the manifestation of his attributes, and the beauty of the universe explained above, he truly and sincerely desires salvation for all.

14. You will say that it at least savors of cruelty to exclude someone from the heavenly kingdom without presupposing any fault, since such exclusion is the greatest evil that can be inflicted upon man. Therefore, this must not

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be attributed to God, since Scripture commands us to think of God in goodness.

I answer, first, that this argument is easily resolved according to what will be said in the following section, where we shall show that negative reprobation, or the will to exclude the reprobate from glory, presupposes foreseen original fault and depends upon it as its motive cause.

I answer, secondly, abstracting for the present from this position, by denying the antecedent absolutely. For it is not unbecoming to divine goodness, nor does it bear any mark of cruelty, not to will to confer an undue benefit upon someone, as is evident in a king who denies someone a bishopric or another dignity not owed to him, and in God's denial of first congruous or efficacious grace, which is owed to no one. But glory is a benefit undue to human and angelic nature, even when elevated to the supernatural order, as was shown above.

15. You will object, secondly: In predestining and reprobating men and angels, we must grant God the more connatural manner of acting unless the contrary is established for us by revelation. But the more connatural manner of acting in reprobating men and angels is for God to will to exclude no one from glory before the foreknowledge of demerits; and the contrary has not been revealed in Scripture from any other source. Therefore, it must be said that God wills to exclude no one from glory before the foreknowledge of demerits.

16. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For, as I argued in the preceding chapter when treating of the gratuitous election of the predestined: just as, in attaining an end, an agent more connaturally begins from the intention of that end than from the election of the means, so, in falling short of an end, one more connaturally begins from the will of falling short of that end than from the will of falling short of the means.

17. You will object, thirdly, against the second part: A crown as a crown depends in execution upon merits no less than a penalty as a penalty depends upon demerits. But, notwithstanding that dependence, the crown can be intended before merits are foreseen, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter. Therefore, likewise, the exclusion of men from glory, insofar as it has the character of a penalty, can be intended by God before sins or demerits are foreseen.

18. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is, first, that no injury is inflicted upon anyone by the fact that election to glory, even as a crown, occurs prior to merits; but injury would be inflicted if the decree to impose a penalty preceded the foreknowledge of sin. Secondly, in the order of

intention the crown does not depend upon merits, but causes them; for, since it is a good in itself and not an occasioned good, it can be intended independently of the foreknowledge of another thing. A penalty, however, because it is an occasioned good, can neither be executed nor intended except on the occasion of foreseen fault. Hence John Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa*, bk. 2, ch. 26: *God is moved of himself to show mercy, but to punish only when our fault is presupposed*. And Tertullian says in *Adversus Marcionem*, bk. 2: *God is good of himself, but just because of us*, namely, with vindictive justice.

§ 3.

Original Sin, Insofar as It Is an Infection of Nature, Is the Motive Cause of the Reprobation of Men, but Not Insofar as It Is an Infection of the Person.

19. For the understanding and proof of this assertion, it must be carefully observed that original sin insofar as it is an infection of nature must be distinguished from original fault insofar as it is an infection of the person. Original sin insofar as it is an infection of nature is the sin by which we all sinned in Adam, which infected the whole of human nature and rendered it hateful to God. Original sin insofar as it is an infection of the person, however, is the sin by which we are infected in being born, which is contracted through seminal propagation and is removed through the sacrament of baptism. There is, therefore, in original sin both an infection of nature and an infection of the person; and the infection of nature can remain after the infection of the person has been removed. This is evident in concupiscence, which remains in us after baptism, because it is an effect of original sin insofar as it is an infection of nature, which is not removed through baptism. And lest anyone think that this distinction has been devised without foundation, the explicit testimony of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 8, a. 5, ad 1, must be cited, where he expressly presents it in these words: *It must be said that original sin in Adam, which is a sin of nature, was derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him the person corrupted nature. Through this corruption the sin of the first man is derived to his descendants, insofar as corrupted nature corrupts the person*. This being established:

20. The first part of the assertion is proved, first, from Augustine, who openly teaches this truth in various places. For throughout ep. 105, speaking of the reprobation of Esau, who was a type and figure of all the reprobate, he says: *What did God love in Jacob before he was born and had done anything good*,

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except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau before he had done anything evil, except original sin? For in the former he did not love a justice which he had not performed, nor in the latter did he hate the nature which he himself had made good. By these words he teaches most clearly that original sin was the cause of Esau's reprobation. But this cannot be understood of original sin insofar as it is an infection of the person, or of the original sin by which we are infected in being born, because there is no doubt that the remedy of circumcision was applied to Esau as well as to Jacob, and consequently original fault was removed and forgiven in both. Therefore, this must necessarily be understood of original sin insofar as it is an infection of nature, arising from the sin by which Esau and all of us sinned in Adam. Hence the same Holy Doctor teaches in various places that God reprobates men because they are from the corrupted and vitiated mass, or the mass of perdition. For in the cited epistle he says: *If they are vessels of wrath, completed for the destruction that is rendered to them as their due, let them impute this to themselves, because they were made from that mass which God deservedly and justly condemned on account of the sin of one man, in whom all sinned.* And in *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 8: *Let those who are delivered from the mass of perdition love grace; but let those who are not delivered acknowledge what is owed.* Again, in *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum ad Bonifacium*, bk. 2, ch. 7: *Where it is said, "He has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens," and that he makes one vessel for honor and another for dishonor, the good is given undeservedly and gratuitously, because he to whom it is given is from the same mass; but the evil is rendered deservedly and as a debt, because in the mass of perdition evil is not badly rendered for evil.* And again: *Evil is rendered because all are guilty, since through one man sin entered into the world.* Finally, in *De correptione et gratia*, ch. 7: *Those who did not hear the Gospel; those who, having heard it, were changed for the better but did not receive perseverance; those who, having heard the Gospel, refused to come to Christ, that is, to believe in him; and those who, because of infancy, could not believe, but could have been absolved from original guilt only through the washing of regeneration, yet died and perished without receiving it: these were not distinguished from that mass which is known to have been condemned, all proceeding from one man into condemnation.* Here he assigns one common cause of reprobation to all the reprobate, infants as well as adults, namely, the condemnation of the mass from which they were not distinguished, *all proceeding from one man into condemnation*, that is, on account of the offense of one man, in whom all sinned.

21. I add that the same Holy Doctor, in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 8; bk. 5, ch. 4; bk. 6, ch. 10; and frequently elsewhere, asserts that the will to reprobate men was a judgment of God and an act of vindicative justice. He

consequently holds that it was a punishment for some sin, which could be none other than original sin. For reprobation is accomplished in the same manner and at the same instant for all, while all men agree in nothing except original sin. Therefore, according to Augustine, the cause of the reprobation of men is the original sin by which we all sinned in Adam.

22. The same part is proved, secondly, from St. Thomas, the most faithful disciple of Augustine, who everywhere follows his footsteps and teaches the same doctrine in various places. I shall present only three of his testimonies here. The first is taken from *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 2, ad 9, where he says: *God's election, by which he chooses one and reprobates another, is rational; yet it is not necessary that merit be the reason for election, for the divine goodness is the reason in the election itself. But the reason for reprobation in all is original sin.* These words are so clear and explicit that one may well wonder why many of our Thomists refuse to subscribe to our position and dare to deny or call into doubt whether it accords with the mind and doctrine of both holy Doctors, Augustine and Thomas.

23. Nor can it be said that those holy Doctors merely mean that original sin is a sufficient cause of the reprobation of men, but not the motive that in fact moved God to reprobate them. For St. Augustine expressly teaches in the cited places that God hated original sin in Esau and that God reprobates men because they are from the mass corrupted and vitiated through the sin of the first parent. Therefore, he holds that such sin was in reality the cause and motive why God willed to exclude them from glory. Similarly, St. Thomas asserts that original sin is the cause of reprobation in precisely the same manner in which he denies that merit is the cause of predestination, for he says: *In election itself the reason is the divine goodness, but the reason for reprobation in men is original sin.* But it is manifest that he denies merit to be an actual cause influencing the predestination of men. Therefore, he also affirms that original sin is a cause actually influencing their reprobation.

24. Nor is it an obstacle that the same Holy Doctor, after the words cited, adds: *Or the very fact that there is no debt that grace should be conferred upon them.* By these words he signifies that God also wills the exclusion of the reprobate from the kingdom under the title of grace, or of an undue benefit. This is no obstacle, I say, because those two titles, namely, undue grace and owed justice, in no way conflict with one another, but are compatible. For just as the fact that something is not owed to another does not prevent him from being capable of demeriting it, so the fact that something is denied as an undue benefit does not prevent it from being denied simultaneously under another title, namely, as an owed penalty and on account of personal or original fault. This is evident in a king who can

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deny someone a bishopric or another dignity both because it is a benefit not owed to him and because he is unworthy of it on account of his own fault or that of the parents from whom he descends. Hence, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, there is a twofold motive of reprobation, or of the efficacious intention to exclude the reprobate from glory: namely, the title of undue grace, of which we treated in the preceding section, and the title of owed justice on account of original sin, of which we treat in the present section. Only the former has a place in the reprobation of the evil angels, but both are found in the reprobation of men.

25. The second testimony is found here in q. 23, a. 5, ad 3, where St. Thomas considers the whole human race as subject to condemnation for a common sin, just as he considers the entire universe of things, in this respect: just as God, willing to represent his goodness in many ways, established diverse grades of things, some of which occupy a higher and others a lower place in the universe, so, willing to represent his goodness in many ways within the human race subject to condemnation, he chose some from the condemned mass so that, by sparing them, he might represent his goodness by way of mercy; but he designated others so that, by punishing them on account of the sin of the mass, he might represent his goodness by way of justice. His words are: *Thus, therefore, let us consider the whole human race as we consider the entire universe of things. God therefore willed, with regard to some men whom he predestines, to represent his goodness by way of mercy, by sparing them; and with regard to some whom he reprobates, by way of justice, by punishing them.* And this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others. Hence I argue as follows: According to St. Thomas, reprobation is an act of vindicative justice, and consequently in the reprobate God punishes and avenges some sin. It is not actual sin, because actual sin is not the cause of reprobation as it is in the order of intention, according to the manifest position of St. Thomas, as is evident from what was said in § 1. Therefore, it is original sin. Consequently, according to St. Thomas, the reprobation of men occurs on account of the original sin by which we all sinned in Adam.

26. The third testimony is found in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1, where St. Thomas teaches that the help of grace for loving God and believing the articles of faith is denied to some as a punishment for original sin. *This help*, he says, *is mercifully given by God to all to whom it is given. But to those to whom it is not given, it is justly not given, as a punishment for preceding sin, at least original sin, as Augustine says in the book De correptione et gratia.* From this passage the following argument can be drawn: That which is the cause of the first effect of reprobation is the cause of reprobation. For predestination and reprobation can have no cause on the part of the acts of

the divine intellect and will, but only on the part of the effects that follow from them, as St. Thomas teaches here in q. 23, a. 5, in these words: *No cause of the divine will can be assigned on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be assigned on the part of the things willed, insofar as God wills one thing to exist for the sake of another.* And he adds: *Therefore, no one was ever of so insane a mind as to say that merits are the cause of divine predestination on the part of the act of predestining.* But original sin, according to the same Angelic Doctor, is the cause of the first effect of reprobation, namely, the denial of first grace for believing the revealed mysteries and loving God. Therefore, since according to St. Thomas the original sin by which we are infected in being born is forgiven through baptism, the Holy Doctor must be understood as speaking of the original sin by which we all sinned in Adam, or of original sin insofar as it is an infection of nature, and not insofar as it is an infection of the person. Hence in *In I Sententiarum ad Annibaldum*, dist. 41, q. un., a. 3: *The end of condemnation is God's justice. But the debt of condemnation on our part consists not only in the evil works of this or that person, but also in the infection of nature.* And shortly afterward he adds that reprobation has as its cause *not necessarily the foreknowledge of actions, but for this the foreknowledge of the infection of nature is sufficient.* Nothing could be said more clearly to show that the infection of nature itself, apart from the infection of the person, is punishable and a sufficient cause of the reprobation of men. Likewise, in Rom. 9, lect. 4, he says: *Human nature has a baseness from its matter, because, as Gen. 2 says, God made man from clay. But it has a greater baseness from the corruption of sin, which entered this world through one man; and therefore man is rightly compared to clay.... Likewise, God has free power, without doing any injury, to make from the same corrupted mass of the human race, as from a kind of clay, some men prepared for glory, and to leave others in misery,* that is, remaining in the condemnation owed on account of the sin of the first parent.

27. The first part of our assertion can also be supported by this argument: It is not repugnant, but rather fitting, that the reprobation of men, or the will to exclude them from glory, should occur on account of original sin. Therefore, since this position is entirely consonant with the mind and doctrine of both holy Doctors, Augustine and Thomas, as has now been shown, it must be preferred to another position which denies this. The consequence is evident, for the doctrine of St. Augustine in the matter of grace and of predestination and reprobation possesses such authority in the Church that it cannot be denied without temerity. Hence Baronius, cited in the preceding chapter, prudently warns certain recent authors how great a danger they incur when they depart from St. Augustine's position on

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predestination. I add that, if one departs even once and in any respect from Augustine's position in the matter of predestination or reprobation, his authority collapses altogether; and consequently all the arguments founded upon it to prove that grace is efficacious of itself and intrinsically, and that the election of the predestined is purely gratuitous and liberal, are utterly weakened and dissolve into smoke and air. The antecedent, as regards both its parts, is shown as follows. First, that it is not repugnant for the reprobation of men to occur on account of original sin insofar as it is an infection of the whole of human nature is proved by the fact that the foreknowledge and foresight of such sin, since it was prior in the divine mind to the predestination of Christ, or the decree of the Incarnation, as St. Thomas and his disciples teach in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 1, a. 3, also preceded the predestination of men, and consequently their reprobation, which was either posterior to predestination or simultaneous with it. Hence, since original sin places in men an unworthiness and positive enmity toward God, and renders the whole human race hateful to him, it provided God with a sufficient motive to will on its account to exclude some men from glory.

28. That this is fitting is evident from the fact that it manifests a more gentle predestination and reprobation by God, a greater mercy toward the predestined, and greater justice toward the reprobate, since the former are drawn from the mass of perdition by mercy alone, while the latter are justly left in that same mass. Hence Augustine says in *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 8: *Let those who are delivered from the mass of perdition love grace; but let those who are not delivered acknowledge what is owed.* The character of supreme dominion also shines forth in comparative reprobation, insofar as, from two persons existing in equal condemnation, or in the same mass of sin, God wills to give glory to one and exclude the other from it. In absolute reprobation, the beauty of divine justice shines forth, insofar as God wills the exclusion of the reprobate from the kingdom from the motive of punishing original fault.

29. The second part of the assertion, which says that original sin insofar as it is an infection of the person is not the cause of reprobation, is evident in the many persons in whom such sin is forgiven through baptism. For sin forgiven through baptism cannot be the cause of reprobation, since it cannot cause its first effect, namely, the denial of first grace. Otherwise, some debt of eternal condemnation would remain in the baptized, which openly contradicts the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5.

30. From this the answer is evident to the principal foundation by which many of our Thomists are moved to deny that original sin is the cause of reprobation. For if, they say, original sin were the first cause for which God

efficaciously willed to exclude the reprobate from glory, it would also be the first cause for which he efficaciously willed to permit them to fall into the actual sin for which they are condemned, and to deny them efficacious grace for avoiding it. But original sin cannot cause this permission and denial of grace, at least in baptized reprobates, in whom it was forgiven, since according to the Apostle in Rom. 5 and the Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 5, nothing deserving condemnation remains in those who are renewed through baptism. Therefore, original sin cannot be the cause of the reprobation of men.

31. But this argument indeed proves the second part of our assertion, while it in no way touches the first. Hence, granting the major premise, I distinguish the minor: Original sin cannot cause this permission and denial of grace insofar as it is an infection of the person and insofar as we are infected by it in being born: I grant the minor. Insofar as it is an infection of nature and the fault by which we all sinned in Adam: I deny the minor. I similarly distinguish the conclusion: Therefore, original sin cannot be the cause of the reprobation of men insofar as it is an infection of the person: I grant this. Insofar as it is an infection of nature: I deny it. For although original sin under the first aspect is removed through baptism, by which we are spiritually renewed, it is not removed under the other aspect. For, after the infection of the person is removed through that sacrament, the infection of nature nevertheless remains in the person, as is evident in concupiscence, which, since it is an effect of the infection of nature, remains in the baptized, as experience establishes.

§ 4.

Certain Testimonies of St. Thomas That Seem to Conflict with
Our Position Are Explained and Reconciled.

32. Certain testimonies of St. Thomas are customarily adduced in which he seems to intimate that original sin is not the cause of the reprobation of men, or of the will by which God willed to exclude some from the heavenly kingdom. First, here in q. 23, a. 3, when treating of reprobation, he teaches that it is an act of divine providence. But if it is held to occur on account of original sin, it will be an act not of providence but of vindicative justice. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the reprobation of men does not arise from original sin.

33. Secondly, in the same place, in the response ad 1, the same Holy Doctor does not explain these words of Malachi, *Esau I hated*, according to

the proper sense of the words, as true hatred taken strictly, but explains God's hatred of the reprobate as his refusal to confer upon them an undue benefit. But if reprobation occurred as a punishment for original sin, it would have the character of hatred taken strictly, since God properly hates sin and sinners, according to Wis. 14: *The impious man and his impiety are hateful to God*. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, reprobation does not occur as a punishment for original sin.

34. Thirdly, the same Angelic Doctor, in the same place, a. 5, ad 3, in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 161, and frequently elsewhere, attributes the reprobation of men, or the exclusion of some from glory, solely to God's good pleasure and mere will. Therefore, he holds that it does not occur on account of original sin.

35. These objections, however, are easily answered. To the first, it must be said that, according to St. Thomas, the reprobation of men is formally an act of providence, but on the part of its subject and as it were materially it includes an act of justice excluding them from the kingdom on account of original sin. Hence, in the same place, a. 5, ad 3, he says that God predestined some by way of mercy, by sparing them, and reprobated others by way of justice, by punishing them, as we explained in the preceding section. Therefore, just as in the act of stealing for the sake of adultery, the deformity of the theft and its formal malice exercised against justice is material with respect to the adultery, which is the end from which that act is formally specified, so too the permission of some to fall short of the end on account of original sin is formally an act of providence; while the justice involved there, excluding them from the kingdom on account of original fault, is material with respect to the specification of the act of providence.

36. To the second, I answer that St. Thomas in the cited place does not explain the words *Esau I hated* of God's hatred taken strictly, but broadly, insofar as it implies the will to deny an undue benefit. He does so both because this was sufficient to resolve the argument and because he intended there to hand down a general doctrine capable of being extended even to the reprobation of the angels. But when, in his commentary on Rom. 9, he treats specifically of the reprobation of men, he explains these words as hatred properly and strictly taken, as is evident from his words cited at the beginning of § 1.

37. To the third, the answer is taken from the same Holy Doctor in the same place, lect. 4: reprobation can be considered in two ways, namely, absolutely and comparatively. It is considered absolutely when it is asked simply, or, as he says, in general, why some are reprobated by God and what the cause of their reprobation is, without comparison to those who are

chosen. It is considered comparatively when it is asked in particular, as the same Saint says, why God reprobates this man rather than that one. Why, when all men are born subject to the same condemnation through the sin of the first parent, does he deliver some from this mass and lump and choose them for eternal life, while leaving others in that same mass and not choosing them for eternal life? Therefore, if reprobation is considered in this second manner, it has no other cause than the good pleasure of the divine will. But if it is considered in the first manner, it has a cause on the part of man, namely, original fault. The Holy Doctor's words are these: Concerning the election of the good and the reprobation of the wicked, a twofold question can be raised. One is general: why God wills to forgive some and have mercy upon some. The other is particular: why he wills to have mercy upon this man and to harden this or that man. A reason can be assigned for the first question, but no reason can be assigned for the second except God's simple will. An example of this is evident in human affairs. For if someone wishing to build had many similar and equal stones gathered together, a reason could be assigned from the end why he places some at the top and others at the bottom, because the perfection of the house which he intends to make requires both a foundation, which has stones at the bottom, and the summit of the wall, which has stones at the top. But why he places these stones at the top and those at the bottom has no other reason than that the craftsman so willed.

§ 5.

The Principal Effects of Reprobation.

38. Since the same science treats opposites, just as three conditions are required for something to be an effect of predestination—namely, that it be caused by God, that it proceed from the efficacious will to give glory, and that it lead efficaciously to that end—so, for something to be an effect of reprobation, it must be from God, must in fact lead to the end of reprobation, and must be willed and prepared by God from the intention of that end. From this principle commonly received by theologians:

39. It is inferred, first, that although sin in its formal aspect leads to the end of reprobation, namely, exclusion from glory, nevertheless, because under that aspect it cannot be willed or caused by God, it cannot be an effect of reprobation in its formal aspect. That it is an effect of reprobation in its material aspect is established by the opposite reasoning. For as such it is caused by God, and the exclusion of the creature from glory follows from it

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—not by a sequence of causality, but of inference—and consequently it can proceed from the efficacious will of such exclusion.

40. It is inferred, secondly, that the permission of original sin, insofar as it is an infection of nature and insofar as it was committed by Adam as the head of the whole of human nature, is not an effect of reprobation. The permission of the same sin insofar as it is an infection of the person and insofar as it is contracted by us, on the supposition that it is never forgiven, is nevertheless an effect of reprobation.

41. The first part is evident from what was said in § 3, for there we showed that original sin, both insofar as it is an infection of the whole of human nature and insofar as it was committed by Adam, is a cause of the reprobation of men. Therefore, under this aspect it cannot be its effect. The second part is evident from the fact that original sin, insofar as it is an infection of the person and insofar as it is contracted by us through generation, leads to the end of the reprobation of men, namely, their exclusion from glory, if it is never forgiven. And since under this aspect it is not the cause of the reprobation of men, its permission can be produced or commanded by reprobation. Therefore, under this aspect it can be, and in fact is, an effect of reprobation in those in whom such sin is never forgiven. The consequence is evident, for whatever leads to the end of reprobation is its effect, provided that it is produced or commanded by reprobation.

42. From these principles the argument by which a certain recent Thomist thinks that he has demonstrated that original sin is not the cause of the reprobation of men is easily resolved. Since God, he says, desires in an ordered manner, he intends the end before the means ordered to it. But the permission of original sin never to be forgiven is a means ordered to the end of reprobation, namely, the exclusion of men from glory, and leads to that end if it is never forgiven. Therefore, God intends to exclude men from glory before he permits original sin. Consequently, such sin is not the cause of the reprobation of men.

43. But from the principles now established this argument is easily answered by distinguishing the minor premise. The permission of original sin insofar as it is an infection of the person and insofar as it is contracted by us through generation and seminal propagation is a means ordered to the end of reprobation and leads to that end, on the supposition that it is never forgiven: I grant the minor. The permission of original sin insofar as it is an infection of the whole of nature and insofar as it was committed by Adam: I deny the minor. For the permission of original sin insofar as it was committed by Adam precedes by an order of reason the predestination of Christ, and, with still greater reason, our predestination, and consequently is

prior to reprobation, which is either simultaneous with predestination or posterior to it. Hence such permission cannot be an effect of reprobation, but is an effect of the common providence of the supernatural order. To this providence pertain certain supernatural effects, such as grace and original justice conferred upon Adam in the state of innocence, and consequently the permission of original sin insofar as it was committed by Adam.

44. It is inferred, thirdly, that the permission of an actual sin not removed through repentance is an effect of reprobation, but not the permission of one that is forgiven through repentance. For the first permission leads efficaciously to the end of reprobation, namely, the exclusion of the reprobate from glory; but the second does not, since sins once forgiven do not return through a subsequent fault, as theologians commonly teach with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 88, a. 1.

45. You will say: It can happen that a man's sin is forgiven in the sacrament of penance as regards fault, but not as regards temporal punishment, and that before the punishment is discharged he falls again into sin and dies. But in such a case, the sin already forgiven in fact leads to the end of reprobation. Therefore, its permission will be an effect of reprobation. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved as follows. The end of reprobation is the punishment to be inflicted in hell. But that sin is punished in hell, since the punishment owed for it was not discharged in this life, nor is it discharged in purgatory, where only those who die in grace are purified. Therefore, it is punished in hell, and consequently leads to the punishment of hell, which is an effect of reprobation.

46. I answer that the end of reprobation is eternal punishment, whereas that sin, forgiven as regards fault but not as regards temporal punishment, is indeed punished in hell accidentally in that case, but not eternally, as St. Thomas teaches in IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5. Therefore, its permission is not an effect of reprobation.

47. You will press: If the punishment of that sin came to an end in hell, there would then be some remission in hell, and consequently some redemption in hell, and thus what the Church says would be false: *In hell there is no redemption*. But I deny the consequence, because, as the Holy Doctor says in the same place, a punishment which is discharged is neither remitted nor redeemed.

48. It is inferred, fourthly, that, since the hardening and blinding of the reprobate, insofar as it is the denial of grace, is from God, and since from another standpoint they in fact lead to eternal condemnation and the manifestation of divine justice, it has everything required to be numbered among the effects of reprobation.

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49. It is inferred, fifthly, that the eternal condemnation of the sinner is the final and principal effect of reprobation. For predestination and reprobation are opposed to one another and have opposed termini or effects. Hence, just as the final effect of predestination is the attainment of glory, so the final effect of reprobation is exclusion from glory and eternal condemnation.

50. It is inferred, sixthly, that the substance of the reprobate is not an effect of his reprobation, as the substance of the predestined is an effect of his predestination. The reason for the difference is that, for something to be an effect of predestination or reprobation, it is required that it be produced from its intention, or at least commanded by it. But the substance of the reprobate is not made by God from the intention of reprobation, as the substance of the predestined is made or commanded from the intention of predestination. Therefore, the substance of the reprobate is not an effect of his reprobation as the substance of the predestined is an effect of his predestination. The major premise is evident. The minor is supported by the fact that the glory of the elect is an end exceeding their substance, and hence it is most congruous and fitting that their substance should be commanded from the intention of such an end. Exclusion from glory, however, is not an end perfective of the substance of the reprobate. Hence we have no argument or ground of fittingness for asserting that God produced their substance from the intention of excluding the reprobate from glory.

§ 6.

Sufficient Helps or Means for Salvation Are Not Conferred upon All
the Reprobate, but They Are Conferred upon All the Just
Whenever the Obligation of Some Precept Is Imminent.

51. The first part is expressly taught by Augustine and his disciples, as Vásquez candidly admits in I, disp. 97, ch. 2, in these words: *On this point I would not doubt that Augustine and his disciples Prosper and Fulgentius held this position.* And certainly Augustine, in ep. 107 to Vitalis, among the twelve principal dogmas of faith which he enumerates, establishes these three as matters to be held with certainty of faith against the Pelagians: *We know that the grace of God is not given to all men. We know that to those to whom it is given, it is given by the gratuitous mercy of God. We know that to those to whom it is not given, it is not given by God's just judgment.* Fulgentius teaches the same in *De veritate praedestinationis et gratiae*, bk. 1, ch. 15, where he says: *The grace of God is not given generally to all men, for grace is a gratuitous gift.* Likewise,

Augustine says in serm. 11, *De verbis Apostoli*: *Nature is common to all, but grace is not*. St. Thomas teaches the same in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 15, in these words: *Nothing is found in which all men agree except something natural*. But these statements would be false if, in the state of fallen nature, some sufficient help common to all were given. For all men would then agree not only in something natural, but also in something gratuitous and supernatural, and such grace would be common to all just as nature is. Hence the same Holy Doctor, in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1, speaking of the help of grace without which man cannot believe, hope, and love, which is certainly sufficient help, says that it is not given to some as a punishment for preceding sin, at least original sin, as Augustine teaches.

52. Reason also supports this. First, it is evident that baptism is not conferred upon all infants, although in the New Law it is the sole sufficient means or remedy for the salvation of infants, as theologians teach with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 68. Nor is it valid to say that the defect and absence of baptism in those infants who die without it does not arise from divine providence so disposing, but from the fault or negligence of parents or ministers of the Church who neglect the application of this remedy. For Augustine expressly rejects this in *De dono perseverantiae*, ch. 12, in these words: What shall I say of the fact that an infant sometimes expires before assistance can be given to him through the ministry of one baptizing? For frequently, although the parents hasten and the ministers are prepared for baptism to be given to the infant, nevertheless, because God does not will it, it is not given, since he did not preserve that infant in this life so that it might be given. Hence Prosper says in his poem *De ingratis*: Many born of holy parents could not be saved by any diligence of their own. I add that baptism cannot be applied by human diligence to infants dying in the mother's womb. This is so both because such children cannot be subjected to the operation of the ministers of the Church, and because infants not yet born are not capable of baptism, for one cannot be reborn unless one has first been born.

53. You will say that from this it is indeed proved that infants dying in that state lack in themselves, immediately and proximately, a sufficient help for salvation, but not remotely and in their causes, because mothers could govern themselves in such a manner that the fetuses would not die in their wombs, but would be born and rendered capable of the remedy.

54. But against this: Sometimes the death of infants in their mothers' wombs occurs in such a way that it is altogether impossible for the parents, in a human manner and according to the course of natural causes, to prevent and avoid it. This is evident, first, when a pregnant woman dies from a

chance event in no way foreseen, for example, when a roof falls upon her while she sleeps or she is struck by lightning. Secondly, when, because of the weakness of the seminal power or corruption of the blood, the fetus is generated in such a manner that it cannot be delivered, or when the woman herself, because of an extremely weak constitution, lacks sufficient power to give birth. But if you press the matter and say that in these cases infants of this kind can at least be assisted in a divine manner and by a miracle, I answer that it cannot be inferred from this that they possess even remotely and in their causes a sufficient means or remedy for salvation. Otherwise, by the same reasoning, we would be said to possess sufficient help for flying, since this can be accomplished by a miracle.

55. Augustine believed this argument drawn from the example of infants to be so compelling that, addressing the Pelagians, he says: *Those who are not yet able to speak close your mouths and press down your tongues.* Hence, in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 3, he infers from this that sufficient helps for salvation are not given to all adults either: *For God is not more benevolent toward the most wicked men, who resist by their own wills, than toward the most innocent infants, who do not resist salvation by their own wills, although they are stained by original fault.* And this is certainly evident, first, in unbelievers to whom the mysteries to be believed are not proposed. For how could they believe in one of whom they have heard nothing? And how could they hear without a preacher? Moreover, according to St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 2, there are many who are negatively unbelieving, that is, persons in whom unbelief is not a sin. But unless God denies them sufficient helps for believing, they will not be negatively unbelieving, but will culpably remain ignorant of supernatural mysteries, because they could have believed, were bound to believe, and consequently will sin by not believing. Therefore, God denies them sufficient helps for believing.

56. Nor is it valid to say that, although proximately sufficient helps for believing are not given to those who are negatively unbelieving, remote helps are nevertheless given to them, and that, if they use these well, God will infallibly give them the further helps necessary for believing. This is not valid, I say, both because omission is imputed as fault to one who possesses remotely sufficient help for an act, even if he lacks proximate help, since he has the proximate help within his free power, and consequently also the act itself. Therefore, if men to whose ears the preaching of the Gospel has not come are given remotely sufficient helps for believing, even though proximate helps are denied them, their failure to believe will be imputed to them as fault. Consequently, they will not be negatively unbelieving, but privatively and contrarily unbelieving. It is also invalid because, since the

first act in the supernatural order is an act of faith, the first sufficient help of the supernatural order is a sufficient help for believing. Consequently, those who lack this help lack every supernatural help and, therefore, even a remotely sufficient help for salvation.

57. Sufficient helps are sometimes denied as a punishment for preceding sins not only to unbelievers, but also to the faithful, as Cajetan and Bellarmine hold concerning many blinded sinners, and as Augustine and Isidore intimate. For Augustine says in *De libero arbitrio*, bk. 3, ch. 18: *That punishment for sin is most just, that one who refused to act rightly when he was able should lose the ability when he wills to act.* Isidore says in *De summo bono*, bk. 2, ch. 19: *Some are so deprived of wisdom by God that they cannot lament their evils even if they will to do so.* The reason intimated by Bellarmine also supports this. For sufficient grace consists either in certain holy thoughts of the intellect and pious affections of the will, as recent authors teach, or rather, as the Thomists assert, in a certain motion or vital and supernatural quality applying the powers of the soul to those acts. But it is manifest and established by experience itself that, when many blinded and hardened sinners sin, they do not always perceive or possess those good thoughts in the mind and those pious affections in the heart, nor are they always stirred by any pangs or goads of conscience. Rather, they take pleasure in sin, delight in the worst things and in their own wounds, which they love with the greatest insensibility, and very often glory in them. Therefore, at that time they lack sufficient grace.

58. But to say, with certain recent authors, that there are sometimes thoughts in man of which he does not think and pious affections which are not perceived is an empty invention, which Bellarmine solidly refutes in *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, bk. 2, ch. 6, in these words: Some say that God indeed continually knocks at the door of the heart and calls sinners, but that, being intent upon other things, they do not perceive God's call. But this response most openly conflicts with experience itself. For since that calling, knocking, drawing, and stirring by God is our action, although not a free one—namely, a good thought and good desire suddenly and divinely infused—how can it happen that it is not perceived in us, if it is not only in us but also from us?

59. From this you understand that, when the Council of Sens says in its decree of faith that God's grace is so readily available that not even a moment passes in which God does not stand at the door and knock, this must be understood morally, not mathematically. That is, it must not be understood absolutely and universally of every instant—for God does not infuse pious thoughts into every infant, as experience makes clear—but of

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every moment in which some grave temptation presses or the obligation of some supernatural precept is imminent. For then sufficient help is not denied to the just, without which such a precept cannot be fulfilled, as is stated in the second part of our assertion. This is established both from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 11, which condemns those who say that *God's commandments are impossible for a justified man to observe*, and also from the Constitution of Innocent X, condemning as heretics those who say: *Some of God's commandments are impossible for the just who will and strive to fulfill them, and they lack the grace by which those commandments might become possible*. Hence, when Chrysostom, Augustine, and other holy Fathers assert that grace was lacking to Peter when he denied Christ, this must not be understood universally of the lack of all grace, both sufficient and efficacious, but of the denial of efficacious grace. For, since this is the noblest and most perfect species of grace, it is called grace simply and antonomastically. The holy Fathers teach that God sometimes withdraws this grace from the just in order to punish or prevent their pride and presumption. Hence Bernard says excellently in serm. 54 on the *Cantica Canticorum*: *The privation of grace is an indication of pride*.

§ 7.

Objections are Resolved.

60. You will object, first: God has an antecedent will to save all men, as was shown in the preceding treatise, Chapter III. But by reason of this will sufficient helps for salvation are given. Therefore, such helps are given to all. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 159: *God, so far as lies in him, is prepared to give grace to all, for he wills all men to be saved*. And in Heb. 12, lect. 3: *Grace is lacking to no one, but God, so far as lies in him, communicates himself to all*.

61. It is confirmed: Christ is the head of all men, even unbelievers, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 8, a. 3. But it belongs to the nature of a head to exercise influence upon its members. Therefore, Christ exercises influence upon all men, even unbelievers, by giving them some sufficient helps for salvation.

62. To the objection I answer that, through his antecedent will to save all men, God gives all men sufficient helps for salvation if the term *give* is taken as signifying the same as to prepare or offer in common. For he instituted the sacraments in the Church for all, sent Christ for all, and decreed his merits for all, which of themselves are sufficient for salvation. It is otherwise

if the term *give* is taken as meaning actually to confer, or as signifying the intrinsic reception of the helps themselves. For under that will are comprehended not only adults but also infants, as Augustine teaches in *Contra Julianum*, bk. 4, ch. 8; and this is evident from the fact that otherwise Christ would not be the Redeemer of infants, since his redemption does not extend objectively beyond the general will which he has concerning the salvation of men, since it is commanded by that will. Yet it is evident from what was said above that infants dying in their mother's womb lack every help or means necessary for salvation, since baptism, which in the New Law is the sole remedy instituted by Christ for infants, cannot be applied to them. Hence this argument, which the adversaries regard as their chief argument, *loses all its force in infants*, to use Augustine's words, *and those who are not yet able to speak close their mouths and press down their tongues*.

63. To the confirmation it must be said that Christ is not actually the head of unbelievers, but only potentially, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, in the response ad 1. Hence it is not necessary that Christ actually exercise influence upon them by giving them some supernatural help, but it is sufficient that he be able to exercise such influence. I insist upon this both in unbaptized infants and in adult reprobates who lack the use of reason. Christ is their head, and yet he actually exercises no supernatural influence upon them. Hence this argument also loses its force in infants.

64. You will object, secondly: There is no sinner, however hardened, who, as long as he lives, cannot repent of his sins. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 86, a. 1: *To say that there is some sin in this life of which a person cannot repent is erroneous*. Therefore, sufficient grace for repentance is denied to no sinner, however hardened.

65. I answer that a man can be said to be able to repent in two ways. First, intrinsically, that is, through a sufficient principle intrinsically received in him; and in this manner, ordinarily speaking, sinners are able to repent by reason of the sufficient help which they receive from God when the precept of repentance becomes imminent. Secondly, extrinsically, by a power founded upon the efficacy of grace capable of being conferred by God and upon the freedom of the will with respect to good and evil. In this second manner, hardened sinners, to whom God sometimes denies sufficient helps as a punishment for preceding sins, can be said to be able to repent, but not in the first manner. Hence what St. Thomas teaches in the cited place is most true: it is erroneous to say that there is some sin in this life of which a person cannot repent, namely, by either the intrinsic or extrinsic power just explained.

66. You will say: For someone to be inexcusable in being obligated to an act, he must be intrinsically able to elicit it. But hardened sinners are inexcusable in being obligated to repent. Therefore, they must be intrinsically able to repent through a sufficient help intrinsically received in them.

67. I answer by denying the major premise. A person can be inexcusable in being obligated to an act, although he lacks intrinsic power for it, if such defect and privation arise from his own fault. Thus a drunken man is not excused from a homicide or adultery which he commits in the state of drunkenness into which he fell through his own fault. Nor is a priest who cast his breviary into the sea in order to render himself incapable of reciting the Office released from his obligation until he has retracted that voluntary act through repentance. Likewise, although hardened sinners lack intrinsic power and sufficient help for repentance, nevertheless, because they fell into such impotence through voluntary fault and were deprived of sufficient help as a punishment for preceding sins, they are neither excused from their sins nor released from the obligation to repent. Hence Augustine says in *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*, bk. 1, p. 115, that *the necessity of sinning is the punishment for that sin which was committed without any necessity*. St. Thomas teaches the same doctrine in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, ch. 160, in these words: *Although those who are in sin cannot by their own power avoid placing or presenting an impediment to grace unless they are preceded by the help of grace, nevertheless this is imputed to them as fault, because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault. Thus a drunken man is not excused from a homicide which he commits through the drunkenness that he incurred by his own fault.*

68. You will press: From this doctrine and solution it follows that the first involuntary movements of sensuality, invincible ignorance, and negative unbelief are sins, since they proceed from a preceding fault, namely, original sin, which is voluntary in us through our head. But the consequence is denied. For, as the same Holy Doctor rightly observes in II Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, a. 2, this difference exists between original and actual sin: since the former is a certain fault of nature, a will in that nature, or in the head of that nature, is sufficient for it; but since the latter is a personal fault, it requires the will of the person. Therefore, since the foregoing things are not voluntary in us by the will of the person, but only by the will of nature or of its head, they do not have the character of fault, but of punishment. Hence the same Angelic Doctor says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 1: *Unbelief, if taken according to pure negation, as in those who have heard nothing of the faith, does not have the character of sin, but rather of punishment, because such ignorance of divine things followed from the sin of the first parent.*

TREATISE VI.
ON THE SACRED AND INEFFABLE MYSTERY
OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY.

Nazianzen rightly calls this Mystery *the most sacred enigma*, the perfect understanding of which must be deferred until the clear vision of God. Hence it is not without purpose that the Gospel says that someone came to his friend at night and asked: *Friend, lend me three loaves*. Augustine teaches, *De Verbis Domini*, sermon 29, that these loaves are nothing other than knowledge of the Trinity, which is the true food of the soul. He comes at night because, as long as we remain in this mortal life, the investigation of three persons in unity is obscure and dark, and belongs more truly to the Blessed than to those who are pilgrims here. Perhaps this was also mystically indicated in Gen. 18, where Abraham is said to have been at the entrance of his tent when he saw three and adored one, as though the soul begins to behold the unity of nature in the Trinity of Persons when, placed at the end of life, it departs from the tent of the body. Hence Augustine says excellently in *De Trinitate*, bk. VII, final chapter: *Let the Trinity be held by faith until He dawns in our hearts who says through the Prophet: Unless you believe, you will not understand*. In investigating this Mystery, therefore, the anchor of faith must be held firmly. Accordingly, before we undertake the scholastic difficulties and dispute with the Scholastics about the processions, relations, and Divine Persons and their properties, we have judged it necessary to premise certain points concerning its truth and knowability, as a preamble to the scholastic difficulties, so that faith in the truth of so great a Mystery may be established

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more firmly in our hearts, and the principal errors of the heretics against it may be uprooted at the threshold of this Treatise.

CHAPTER I.

On the Truth of the Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity.

Faith in this Mystery consists principally in firmly believing and professing one God subsisting in three persons. Hence, to establish its truth, there must first be proved, against Sabellius, a real distinction and plurality of persons, and then, against the Arians and Macedonians, their consubstantiality.

§ 1.

There Is a Real Distinction of Persons in God.

1. This truth is first intimated three times in the first chapter of Genesis. First, when it says: In the beginning He created heaven and earth. In Hebrew, it has “Elohim created,” that is, “the Gods” or “the Judges.” By the word created, which is singular, the unity of the divine nature is designated, and by the word Elohim, which is plural, the plurality of persons. Second, in the following words: Let light be made, and light was made. And God saw the light, that it was good. For, as St. Thomas notes in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 74, a. 3, ad 3, the person of the Father is intimated in God saying, Let light be made; the person of the Son, in the Word by which it is said; and the person of the Holy Spirit, in the complacency by which God saw the light, that it was good. Third, when it says in the same chapter: Let us make man to our image and likeness.... God created man to His image and likeness. For that alternate use of the plural and singular numbers signifies the mystery of the Trinity with sufficient clarity. The Jews’ reply is a fabrication, namely, that God spoke to Himself and, rousing Himself to action, said: Let us make, and so forth. Hence Basil says in homily 9 on the *Hexaemeron*: Even then, in what the Jew is accustomed to say, the absurdity was evident to the inquisitive and recognizable by all. For what craftsman, potter, or carpenter, being alone and having no one else beside him as a fellow worker, while sitting among the instruments of his craft, murmurs to himself, saying: “Let us make a sword,” or, “Let us construct a plow,” rather than silently performing at will the operation suited to his craft? It is truly conspicuous

nonsense that anyone should be found who commands himself, needs an instructor, or masterfully and vehemently urges and exhorts himself.

2. The same truth is proved by those words of the Prophet, Ps. 32: *By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of His mouth all their power.* By the name “Lord” is understood the Father, whose Word it is and who works through the Word, the first Person of the Most Holy Trinity. The Word through whom all things were made is the Son, the second Person. Finally, the third is the Spirit of the mouth of God, to whom the perfection of the divine works is attributed in a singular manner. Hence Jerome says: *The majesty of the Trinity is most clearly declared by these words: the Lord, the Word, the Spirit of the Lord.* And Gregory of Nyssa says in his *Catechetical Oration*, ch. 4: *By these words the mystery of truth is established, namely, that the Word spoken of must be acknowledged as subsisting in essence, and the Spirit in hypostasis.* The same Mystery is declared in Ps. 66, where it says: *May God bless us; may our God bless us; may God bless us, and may all the ends of the earth fear Him.* Here Jerome also says: *May God the Father bless us; our God, the Son, for He is our God. And you shall call His name Jesus; His name Emmanuel, that is, God with us. May our God bless us: God the Holy Spirit. See the Mystery of the Trinity contained in one verse.* And lest, by naming God, he should be thought to have spoken of three Gods, he immediately intimated unity by adding: *And may all the ends of the earth fear Him.*

3. Finally, in Isa. 6, the Seraphim cry one to another: Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of Sabaoth. Here the Trinity of Persons is designated by the name Holy repeated three times, and unity of essence by those singular words, the Lord God of Sabaoth. Hence Ambrose says splendidly in *De fide ad Gratianum*, bk. II, ch. 4: What does the threefold repetition of holiness under one name mean? If there is a threefold repetition, why is there one praise? If there is one praise, why a threefold repetition? Why a threefold repetition, unless because the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one in holiness? He did not say it once, lest He separate the Son; not twice, lest He pass over the Holy Spirit; not four times, lest He join creatures to Them. And to show that the Trinity has one Godhead, after saying three times, “Holy, Holy, Holy,” he added in the singular: “the Lord God of Sabaoth.”

4. The same truth is openly declared in the New Testament, especially in Matt. 28: Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. And in 1 John 5: There are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit.

Nor does the subterfuge of Sabellius have any force. He says that those things in Scripture which designate a distinction of persons must be referred, not to diversity among the persons themselves, but to a difference

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of offices or actions of the same person, so that the same person, insofar as unbegotten and the principle of creation, is called the Father; insofar as incarnate, is called the Son; and insofar as sanctifying the creature, is called the Holy Spirit, as though by a certain extension and dilation of the same person into diverse effects. This evasion has no force, I say, both because Scripture in various places admits true Paternity and Filiation in God, as is evident from 1 John, final chapter: *That we may be in His true Son*. But wherever there is true Paternity and Filiation, there must be a diverse *suppositum* or person, since these are relatively opposed. Hence Tertullian says excellently in *Adversus Praxean*, ch. 10: *For me to be a husband, I must have a wife; I shall not be my own wife. Likewise, for me to be a father, I have a son; I shall not be my own son*. It also has no force because in Scripture generation and procession are placed in the divine before all created things, and before the Incarnation and the sanctification of the creature. For the Son is said to have been begotten before the morning star, and Divine Wisdom to have come forth from the mouth of the Most High before every creature, and the Word to have been in the beginning with God, and all things to have been made through Him. Therefore, within God Himself there is a true and real distinction of persons, and not merely one arising from a diverse connotation or relation to effects *ad extra* or to the Incarnation. Hence Pope Leo says excellently in epistle 93: *The Catholic faith believes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be individual without confusion, eternal without time, and equal without difference, because unity in the Trinity is constituted, not by the same person, but by the same essence*.

5. The same truth can be commended by a threefold congruity. The first is this: perfect friendship must be found in God, since it is a pure perfection mixed with no imperfection. But friendship cannot be preserved without a real distinction between the lover and the beloved, since it implies reciprocal love and equality, as the Philosopher testifies in *Ethica*, bk. IX, ch. 3. Hence Gregory says in homily 17 on the Gospels that charity cannot exist between fewer than two. Therefore, there is a real distinction of persons in God.

6. The second is this: the supreme good must communicate itself in the supreme manner. But without a real distinction of persons, the supreme communication of God cannot be preserved, since a real distinction is required between the one communicating and the one to whom the communication is made. Therefore, a real distinction of persons must be admitted in God. Hence Cyril says in *Thesaurus*, bk. II, ch. 1: *The Godhead cannot be perfect unless it has a Son and brings forth fruit from itself*.

7. The third is this: God is most blessed. Therefore, since there is no perfect delight or true happiness without fellowship, there must be true and perfect fellowship in Him. But, apart from a real distinction of persons, perfect fellowship cannot exist in God, since creatures are unlike God and did not exist from eternity. Hence St. Thomas says here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 3, ad 1: Although the Angels and holy souls are always with God, nevertheless, if there were no plurality of persons in the divine, it would follow that God was alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with something of an alien nature. A person is said to be alone in a garden, although many plants and animals are present there. Likewise, God would be said to be alone or solitary, even with Angels and men existing with Him, if there were not several persons in the divine. Therefore, a plurality of persons must be admitted in God.

8. The arguments of the Sabellians were taken from those passages of Scripture in which God is said to be alone, as in Deut. 32: See that I alone am, and there is no other God besides Me. But it is easy to answer that the particle alone removes from God only a plurality of Gods, not a plurality of persons subsisting in one and undivided essence. Hence Bernard says excellently in *De consideratione*, bk. V, ch. 8: We are not led away from this profession of unity by the assertion of three, since in this Trinity we admit no multiplicity, just as in unity we admit no solitude. Therefore, when I say “one,” the number of the Trinity does not trouble me, because it neither multiplies, varies, nor divides the essence. Again, when I say “three,” the consideration of unity does not rebuke me, since that unity neither compels those three, whatever they are, or those three persons, into confusion, nor reduces them to singularity, and so forth.

§ 2.

The Consubstantiality of the Divine Persons
Is Shown from Scripture.

9. No one has ever doubted concerning the first Person that He is true God, for, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, bk. II, ch. 13: *The Father is God, as even all heretics concede*. It remains, therefore, only to prove the divinity of the Son against the Arians, and of the Holy Spirit against the Macedonians. Once this has been proved, the consubstantiality of the Divine Persons will also remain established.

10. I say, therefore, first, that the second Person of the Trinity is of the same substance and nature as the Father.

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It is proved first from John 10, where Christ, speaking of Himself, says: *I and the Father are one*. That He is speaking there of unity of essence is evident from the words immediately preceding: *What My Father has given Me is greater than all things*, for nothing surpasses all things except perfect divinity. Hence Augustine says in sermon 56, *De Verbis Domini*: *Let the Arians hear that He says "one"; let the Sabellians hear that He says "we are"; and let neither be vain by denying either equality or otherness*. Certain interpreters of Scripture also rightly observe that, in saying, *I and the Father are one*, Christ named Himself before the Father, which would seem to imply a certain discourtesy unless He had said this to overthrow that heresy which He foresaw would arise in the Church, asserting that the Father is prior to the Son in time, dignity, and power.

11. It is proved second from those passages of Scripture in which Christ is called *true God*, 1 John, final chapter; *the great God*, Titus 2; and *God over all*, Rom. 9. These openly declare that He is God, not by participation, adoption, or imitation, but by His own nature, and consequently equal and consubstantial with the Father. Hence the Apostle says in Phil. 2: *He did not consider it robbery to be equal to God*. And in Ps. 109, to designate the same equality of the Son with the Father, the Son is said to sit at the right hand of the Father: *The Lord said to my Lord: Sit at My right hand*, as Augustine noted on that passage. Chrysologus also observed acutely in sermon 58 that, just as in that Psalm the Father says to the Son, *Sit at My right hand*, so the Father is said to sit at the right hand of the Son: *The Lord at your right hand*, to denote that between the Father and the Son there is an equal degree of honor. *The Son of God sits at the right hand in such a way*, he says, *that the Father does not sit at the left. The divine confession is one and singular, where heavenly power admits nothing left-handed*.

12. The conclusion is proved third from John 1: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. For, as Ambrose says splendidly in *De fide Trinitatis*, bk. I, ch. 5: Our fisherman excluded all heresies in this brief chapter. For what was in the beginning is not enclosed by time or preceded by a beginning; therefore, let Arius be silent. What was with God is not confused by commingling, but is distinguished by the solid perfection of the abiding Word with the Father; therefore, let Sabellius be mute. And the Word was God. Therefore, this Word does not consist in the utterance of speech, but in that heavenly designation of power; therefore, let Photinus be confuted. But because He was in the beginning with God, the inseparable unity of eternal Godhead in the Father and the Son is taught; therefore, let Eudoxius and Eunomius blush. Finally, when all things are said to have been made through Him, He is designated as the Creator of both the

New Testament and the Old, so that the Manichaeian can find no place for temptation. Thus the good fisherman enclosed them all within one net, rendering them incapable of fraud, although they were useless for the catch.

The arguments of the Arians had no weight. They argued as follows: the Father is said to be greater than the Son in John 14: *The Father is greater than I*; in 1 Cor. 15 the Son is said to be subject to the Father, and in Phil. 1 obedient to Him; in Mark 13 Christ says that He does not know the day of judgment; and in John 5 that He can do nothing of Himself. But these statements cannot stand with the equality and consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Therefore, the Son is neither equal nor consubstantial with the Father.

13. Yet if this argument proved anything, it would establish that the Son is not the highest of all creatures, as the Arians asserted, since in Heb. 2 Christ is said to have been made lower than the Angels. Just as it does not follow from this that Christ is inferior to the Angels except according to His human nature, so from the fact that the Father is said to be greater than the Son, and that the Son is subject and obedient to Him, it can only be inferred that the Son is not equal to the Father according to His humanity, not that He is unequal to Him according to His divinity. As to what is added concerning the day of judgment, it must be said that Christ did not know it as the Envoy of the eternal Father and Teacher of the nations, namely, in relation to its publication, but knew it as under secrecy and not to be revealed to others. We often use this manner of speaking when, being asked about matters entrusted to us in confidence, we answer that we do not know them. Hence Hilary says in *De Trinitate*, bk. X: *This profession of not knowing is not the weakness of ignorance, but a dispensation of silence.* To the passage from John 5, St. Thomas replies here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 31, a. 4, ad 1: *When it is said that the Son can do nothing of Himself, no power possessed by the Father is withdrawn from the Son, since it is immediately added that whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise. Rather, it is shown that the Son has power from the Father, from whom He has His nature.* In a word, it signifies that Christ has power through generation, and not as an unbegotten Person, as does the Father.

14. I say second that the Holy Spirit is true God and consequently consubstantial with the Father and the Son. This is manifestly gathered from Sacred Scripture, in which many things are attributed to the Holy Spirit that can belong only to God. First, He is said to create the world and fill it: Ps. 103: *You shall send forth Your Spirit, and they shall be created.* Wis. 1: *The Spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world.* Second, He is said to establish and adorn the heavens. Ps. 32: *By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by*

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the Spirit of His mouth all their power. Job 26: The Spirit of the Lord adorned the heavens. Third, He is said to search the deep things of God, 1 Cor. 2: The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. Fourth, He is said to have a temple, which belongs to God alone, 1 Cor. 6: Do you not know that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit? Fifth, He is said to speak through the mouth of the Prophets and Saints, 2 Pet. 1: The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit. Sixth, He is said to be the beatitude of the Angels, 1 Pet. 1: By the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, upon whom the Angels desire to gaze. Finally, in Acts 5 the Holy Spirit is openly called God, for Peter said to Ananias: Why has Satan tempted your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit? You have not lied to men, but to God.

15. Against the divinity of the Holy Spirit Macedonius principally objected two things. First, Rom. 8: *The Spirit petitions for us.* But if He were God, He would not petition, but give. Second, John 16: *Whatever He shall hear, He shall speak and announce to you.* But one who must hear and be instructed in order to speak to others is not God, who needs no instruction. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not God.

16. To the first, it is answered from Augustine, epistle 121, that Paul asserts that the Holy Spirit petitions because He teaches us to petition. Hence it is added there: *He assists our weakness.* Or it can also be said with St. Thomas, commenting on this passage of the Apostle, that the Holy Spirit petitions, that is, He makes us petition, just as Gen. 22 says: *Now I know that you fear the Lord,* that is, I have made it known.

17. To the second, it must be said with Basil in *Adversus Eunomium*, bk. I, that the Holy Spirit hears from the Father and the Son the things He shall speak, not through the instruction and discipline of an inferior by a superior, but through the communication of the divine essence and knowledge itself, which He received from the Father and the Son through eternal procession.

CHAPTER II.

On the Knowability of the Mystery of the Trinity.

1. I say first that the Mystery of the Trinity cannot be known by the natural light.

It is proved first from Scripture and the Holy Fathers. Matt. 11 says: *No one knows the Son except the Father, and he to whom the Son wills to reveal Him.* Hence Pope Hormisdas says in his epistle to Emperor Justin: *No nature of visible or invisible creatures could investigate the secret of the Trinity.* By these words he openly declares that no human or angelic intellect can rise by the

natural light alone to knowledge of this Mystery, or even suspect it. As a figure of this, in Ezek. 10 the throne of the Most Holy Trinity is said to be placed above the heads of the four living creatures because, as certain interpreters of Scripture note, the sublimity of this Mystery transcends the four grades of created cognition: sensory cognition, figured by the ox; imagination, by the lion; rational cognition, by the man; and angelic cognition, by the eagle. Hence the Prophet added there: *When there was a voice above the firmament that was over their heads, they stood and lowered their wings*. Gregory teaches here that, when we think about the Angels, the voice is still from the firmament, not above the firmament. But when the mind considers the power of the divine nature and its other attributes, and the same must be said of the plurality of persons, *the voice is above the firmament, because it conceives an understanding of Him who, by His incomprehensibility, transcends even the understanding of the Angels*.

2. It is proved second by St. Thomas's argument here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 32, a. 1. God cannot be known naturally by us except from creatures, for we know nothing about Him *a priori* and through a cause, but only *a posteriori* and through effects produced by Him. But from created effects we cannot arrive at knowledge of so great a Mystery. Therefore, it cannot be known by us through the natural light. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved because created effects do not proceed from God precisely as triune, but as one, since they proceed from Him precisely by reason of omnipotence as the proximate power, and by reason of divinity as the radical principle. Hence, just as effects produced by an artisan, for example, a panel painted by a painter, manifest his art and skill because they proceed from and essentially depend on them, but do not manifest his color, figure, stature, clothing, and similar features, which do not essentially concur in the production of the work but belong to the artisan merely accidentally and concomitantly as he works artistically; so likewise, although from the inspection of creatures and the artistic structure of this world we know the infinite wisdom, power, and divinity of that supreme Artificer, we cannot arrive from them at knowledge of the Trinity.

3. You will say first that several vestiges of the Trinity shine forth in created things, from which we can arrive at knowledge of this Mystery. Hence some ancient Philosophers had some knowledge of it. Trismegistus said: *The Monad begot the Monad and reflected its ardor into itself*. By these words the generation of the Word and the Procession of the Holy Spirit seem clearly to be expressed. Augustine also reports in *Confessiones*, bk. VII, that he read in the books of the Platonists many things pertaining to knowledge of the Most Holy Trinity, for example, what John writes

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concerning the eternal generation of the Word: *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.*

4. I answer that, although some vestiges of the Trinity shine forth in creatures, nevertheless, apart from divine revelation, human reason cannot arrive from them at any knowledge or even the slightest suspicion of it. For, as St. Thomas teaches in I, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: *All the likenesses that can be taken from creatures to explain this Mystery contain more unlikeness than likeness. Therefore, they lead the intellect farther away from the truth of this Mystery rather than introduce it into that truth.* Hence Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, bk. I: *No totality, unity, fecundity, or anything whatsoever has disclosed that secret of the Godhead which surpasses all reason and understanding.* Therefore, if any of the ancient Philosophers had some knowledge of it, they drew it either from Sacred Scripture and the books of the Prophets, from the verses of the Sibyls, or even from the revelation of demons, who in the first instant of their creation possessed faith in and revelation of this Mystery. That demons sometimes spoke to men concerning it is indicated by the response of Serapis, who is said to have answered Thulis, king of Egypt, when asked who was more blessed than he, as Ludovicus Vives reports from Suidas in *De civitate Dei*, bk. X, ch. 23:

*In the beginning is God, Mind, Word, and Spirit with them;
It is added: these three are coeternal and tend toward one.*

5. You will say second: it is known by the natural light that to generate something like oneself is the greatest perfection. Therefore, by the same light it will be manifest that generation and, consequently, the production of the Word are found in God. Likewise, it is known by the natural light that the good is diffusive of itself, and therefore an infinite good, such as God, can diffuse and communicate itself infinitely. Hence, since only the communication of the divine nature *ad intra* is infinite without qualification, it can be demonstrated by the natural light that God communicates His nature *ad intra* to another *suppositum*, and consequently that there are several persons in God.

6. I answer by denying the antecedent. For the natural light dictates that generation cannot occur without a division of nature and substance between the one begotten and the one begetting, and consequently not without imperfection. Hence we do not know with certainty that generation is a pure perfection and involves no imperfection in its concept except through divine revelation, by which we are taught that in God there is a Son begotten by the Father before all ages and of the same substance and nature as He. As to what is added, namely, that it is known by the natural light that an infinite

good must communicate itself infinitely, it must be said that natural reason knows that an infinite good can be communicated infinitely on the part of the mode of communication, namely, by bringing things forth from nothing, for which infinite power is required, but not on the part of the thing communicated, namely, the divine nature itself. For although God can communicate it *ad intra*, nevertheless we cannot apprehend by our own powers this power He has of communicating Himself *ad intra*, because the principles of such knowledge are not available to us when natural reason alone is consulted.

7. I say second that, although the Mystery of the Trinity is above natural reason, it is not contrary to it.

Proof: as St. Thomas argues in *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. I, ch. 7, although the truth of the Christian faith exceeds the capacity of human reason, nevertheless those things naturally implanted in reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. For it is evident that those things naturally implanted in reason are most true, and, since what is held by faith has been divinely confirmed, it is impious to believe it false. Therefore, because only what is false is contrary to what is true, it is impossible for the truth of the mysteries of faith to be contrary to principles naturally known. Therefore, although the Mystery of the Trinity is above natural reason, it is not contrary to it.

8. You will say that this Mystery conflicts with the commonly known principle, evident by the natural light and foundational to the whole syllogistic art: *Things that are the same as one third thing are the same as one another*. For the Divine Persons are really identified with the essence, yet are really distinguished from one another. Therefore, the Mystery of the Trinity is not only above, but also contrary to natural reason.

9. Some, in order to extricate themselves easily from this difficulty, answer that the aforesaid axiom holds only in created things, not in God, in whom, because of His infinity, the numerically same nature can subsist in three really distinct persons. Hence Cyril of Alexandria says in his commentary on John, bk. XI: *If there is no difference between us and God, let divine things be measured by ours. But if the interval is incomprehensible, why do the defects of our nature predetermine a canon, rule, and norm for God, subjecting the nature superior to all necessity to necessity on the basis of things impossible to us?* Yet this answer is a mere evasion and an avoidance, not a solution, of the proposed difficulty. For the principle, as is said in the objection, is the principal and almost sole foundation of the entire syllogistic art, since from the identity of the extremes with a third thing established in the premises, that art infers in the conclusion their identity with one another. But the

sylogistic art has no less place in God than in creatures. Therefore, the truth of the aforesaid principle also holds in God. This solution being rejected:

10. I answer first with St. Thomas here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 38, a. 3, ad 1, that this philosophical axiom is universally true when the extremes are identified with the third thing both in reality and in formal character, but not when they are really identified with the third and distinguished from it by a formal character implying relative opposition. For by reason of such opposition, the extremes can be really identified with the middle and nonetheless differ really from one another. This occurs in the present case. For although the divine relations and persons are really identified with the essence, nevertheless, because they are virtually distinguished from it by a formal character implying relative opposition to one another, they are really distinguished from one another, although they are the same as the essence. This can be illustrated by two examples. St. Thomas gives the first in the cited place. Although action and passion are distinguished from motion only modally, they nevertheless differ really from one another by a greater real distinction because of the opposition they have. And if motion were of such perfection and amplitude that it could identify action and passion with itself entirely in reality, with only a distinction of reason remaining, action and passion would still be really distinguished from one another by reason of the opposition they possess. The other example is found in the properties of being. If, per impossibile, the three properties of being—one, true, and good—while preserving perfect identity with the formal character of being transcendently included in them, were to possess relative opposition to one another, by reason of that opposition they would be really distinguished from one another, although they would differ only by reason from the formal character of being contained in them.

11. Nor do the two objections that can be made against this solution have force. Wisdom and goodness in God are distinguished by reason from the essence, as are Paternity and Filiation, yet they do not differ really from one another. Likewise, it is rightly inferred that Peter is an animal from the fact that he is the same as man, although Peterhood and animality are distinguished by reason from man. Therefore, although the extremes differ by reason from the third thing, it is rightly inferred that they are really identified with one another from the fact that they are really identified with the third.

These objections have no force. To the first, St. Thomas replies in I, dist. 2, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4: *Although divine Wisdom differs by reason from the other attributes, it is nevertheless not opposed to them, since Wisdom is compatible with goodness and the other attributes existing in the same subject. Therefore, it does*

not have the character of distinguishing the supposita of the divine nature, as the opposed relations do. But just as divine wisdom produces the effect of wisdom because of the truth of its formal character, which remains, so relation produces a true distinction because of the true relative character that is preserved. By these words he first intimates the difference between goodness and wisdom, on the one hand, and Paternity and Filiation, on the other. It consists in this: although those attributes differ by reason from the essence, as do Paternity and Filiation, they nevertheless do not include relative opposition in their formal character, as those relations do, and therefore they do not differ really from one another as Paternity and Filiation do. He then indicates the fundamental reason why the divine relations, notwithstanding their real identity with the essence, are really distinguished from one another. It is proper to an infinite reality to identify things with itself while preserving their formal characters. Hence, just as the formal character of wisdom, which is to know things through the highest causes, is preserved most perfectly in God, notwithstanding its real identity with the essence, so also the formal character of relation must be preserved perfectly in Him, notwithstanding its real identity with the divine nature. But the proper character and essence of relation consists in opposition to its correlative and in being really distinguished from it. Therefore, although the divine relations and persons are really identified with the essence, they are nonetheless really distinguished from one another by reason of the relative opposition they possess. From this the reply to the second objection is evident. For Peterhood and animality are not distinguished from man by a formal character implying relative opposition, as Paternity and Filiation in the divine are distinguished from the essence. Hence, although it is rightly inferred that Peter is an animal because Peterhood and animality are really identified with man, it is not rightly inferred that the Father and the Son are really identified with one another because Paternity and Filiation are really the same as the essence and differ from it only by reason.

12. The difficulty can be solved in another way. I answer second that the aforesaid philosophical axiom upon which the syllogistic art rests has place only in those things that are adequately the same as one third thing, not in those identified with the third only inadequately. But the constitutive relations of the Divine Persons are not adequately identified with the divine essence, but only inadequately. Something is said to be identified inadequately with another when it is not the same as everything with which that other is identified, and when the identifying thing is not the same only as the thing identified. But every personal relation is identified with the divine nature in such a way that it is not identified with the other personal

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relations with which the essence is identified; nor is the nature so identified with one relation that it is not also identified with the others. Thus, the distinct parts of a body are present to one third thing, namely, the rational soul, without being present to one another. For the foot and head are immediately and proximately united to the soul, yet are distant from one another, because they are not united to it adequately, but only inadequately, and because the soul informs and is united not only to them but also to the other parts of the body. Likewise, Christ is present to several hosts and altars, which nevertheless are not present to one another, because He is not present adequately to those altars and hosts, and because He is present to many others. In the same way, the Divine Persons are identified with the essence without being identified with one another, because they are not identified with it adequately, but only inadequately.

13. From what has been said, you will understand why this syllogism is invalid: *This God is the Father; this God is the Son; therefore, the Son is the Father.* Its invalidity is not due to the form of an expository syllogism failing in this Mystery, but because such a syllogism is defective through a lack of perfect distribution of the term “God.” Although this term is absolutely singular, nevertheless, because of the real communicability of the divine nature to three persons, it is equivalently universal. Consequently, for it to be perfectly distributed in the premises, the syllogism would have to be formed thus: *Whatever is God is the Father; whatever is God is the Son; therefore, the Father is the Son.* In that case both the major and the minor would be false, since the Holy Spirit is God and yet is neither the Father nor the Son.

CHAPTER III.

On the Divine Processions.

The processions of God *ad intra* are the foundations of the divine relations by which the Persons are constituted. Therefore, before we discuss the divine relations and Persons, the divine processions must be treated.

§ 1.

Whether There Are Processions in God and How Many.

1. I say first that there are real processions *ad intra* in God. This is evident from Scripture, for Christ says in John 8: *I proceeded from God*, and in John 15: *The Spirit who proceeds from the Father*. Likewise, in Scripture the first Person

is frequently called Father, and the second Son. But it belongs to the character of a father to beget and of a son to be begotten. Therefore, in God there is a real procession by which the Father begets and the Son is begotten.

Reason also supports this. First, because the Divine Persons are distinguished only by relative opposition, as is stated at the Council of Florence, while the relative opposition of the Divine Persons is founded upon the origin of one from another. Second, because, as St. Thomas argues here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1, everyone who understands, by the very fact that he understands, produces a word. Hence, since God is intelligent, and indeed possesses the supreme grade of intellectuality, He must produce a word in His knowledge of Himself, not so that He may understand, for this He is presupposed to possess through essential knowledge, but because He understands, and so that from His infinite intellectual fecundity He may communicate His knowledge to another, namely, to the Word Himself, and speak to Him.

2. For the force of this inference to be better perceived, and for the objection customarily made against it to be solved, it must be noted that when St. Thomas says, *Everyone who understands, by the very fact that he understands, produces a word*, this must not be understood of every intellection. For the production of a word does not belong to the character of intellection as such, as is evident in the beatific vision, in which the Blessed produce no word, as we showed in Treatise II. Rather, it must be understood of the connatural intellection by which every intellectual creature understands itself. Hence the force of this congruity consists in this: since intellectual creatures, even the most perfect, produce a word in every connatural intellection, as we shall say concerning the Angels in the following Treatise, it is fitting that God, who occupies the supreme grade among intelligent natures, should also produce a word through His connatural intellection, which is His knowledge of Himself, not from need, but from fecundity.

3. You will object first: it is repugnant to a being that exists of itself to proceed from another. But each Divine Person is a being that exists of itself. Therefore, one cannot proceed from another.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. It is repugnant to a being that exists of itself to proceed from another by a procession from another as from a cause: I grant the major. As from a principle of origin, with all dependence and causality excluded: I deny the major. Hence, when it is said that each Divine Person is of Himself or has being of Himself, this is true if “to be of Himself” or “to have being of Himself” excludes an extrinsic principle or a principle of another nature. But it is false if it excludes a real

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principle of the same nature, for in this sense only the Father is of Himself, since He alone is unbegotten and unproduced.

4. You will object second: a procession cannot be understood without the dependence of the one proceeding upon the one producing, since to proceed from another is to be unable to exist without that other. But one Divine Person cannot depend upon another. Therefore, neither can one proceed from another.

I answer by denying the major premise, and to its proof I say that it is not sufficient for the dependence of one thing upon another that the one cannot exist without the other. For one relative cannot exist without the other, yet does not depend upon it, since relatives are simultaneous by nature. It is also required that the one be unable to exist without the other by reason of subordination, for which diversity of nature is necessarily required. Hence, although in the divine the Person proceeding cannot exist without the Person producing, He nevertheless does not depend upon that Person, because the essence of both is the same, with only a diverse mode of possessing it. The Person producing has it of Himself; the Person proceeding has it from another.

5. You will object third: among the Divine Persons there can be no priority and posteriority, since They are coeternal. But procession necessarily involves an order of prior and posterior between the Person producing and the Person produced. Therefore, there can be no procession among the Divine Persons.

I answer that, although among the Divine Persons there can be no priority of duration, there can nevertheless be a priority of origin, which is sufficient for the procession of one from another. For the light of the sun emits splendor from itself, yet the sun is not prior in time to its splendor, but only prior in origin or nature. Hence the Divine Word is called *the splendor of the Father*, because He proceeds from the Father as light from the sun and is coeternal with Him.

6. I say second that there are only two processions in God: one through the intellect, by which the Word is uttered; the other through the will, by which love is breathed forth.

Proof: procession in the divine does not occur according to a transient action, but according to an immanent action. But in God, the most perfect intellectual agent, only two virtually distinct immanent operations can be found, namely, intellection and volition. Therefore, the divine processions can only be two: one through the intellect, the other through the will.

7. You will say that this argument proves only that in God there can be procession only through the intellect and the will, but not that there cannot

be several cognitions in the divine intellect from which several words arise, or several volitions from which several loves are breathed forth.

But to the contrary: if there were several processions in the divine intellect from which several words arose, would they be diverse in species or only in number? Not the first, since the divine intellection and utterance are one in specific unity. Nor the second, both because merely numerical distinction is taken from matter or a subject, while the divine processions and their terms, since they subsist through themselves, lack matter and a subject; and also because merely numerical distinction proceeds from limitation. Hence the divine nature, which is not limited, cannot be multiplied numerically. But the divine processions and their terms are not limited realities. Therefore, they cannot be multiplied and distinguished only numerically.

8. I add that, since the Divine Word is infinite and comprehensive, and the adequate term of divine cognition, and since through Him the eternal Father knows the essence, attributes, relations, and all possible creatures, there can only be one Word. St. Thomas declares this excellently in his commentary on John, ch. 1, in these words: This is the difference between the divine word and the human word: our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect. For because we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form several words through which we express separately all that is in our knowledge. But it is not so in God. Since He understands both Himself and whatever He understands through His essence in one act, the one Divine Word expresses all that is in God, not only the Persons but also creatures; otherwise He would be imperfect.

9. This is confirmed: among the Angels, the more something excels in dignity, the fewer species and words it uses to express its own concepts. Therefore, since God reaches the supreme summit of intellectuality, by one most perfect Word He manifests all the secrets of infinite wisdom. Hence the Prophet says: *God has spoken once; these two things I have heard*. God speaks once because He uttered one Word from eternity and continuously utters Him. But the Prophet hears two things because in this one Word the Father declared all things.

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§ 2.

What Is the Proximate Principle by Which the Divine Processions Occur?

10. Durandus thinks that the divine nature is not only the radical but also the proximate and immediate principle of the divine processions, because of the fecundity that belongs to it by reason of infinity. Others teach that such a principle is absolute perfection alone, and others, relation alone. To explain the true position:

I say first that the divine nature, as presupposed to the intellect and will, is not the proximate and immediate principle by which the divine processions occur, but that the intellect and will of God are.

11. It is proved first because Scripture, the Councils, and the Holy Fathers commonly call the second Person of the Most Holy Trinity the Word and begotten Wisdom, while they call the third Charity and Love. But these names pertain to the intellect and will. Therefore, the intellect and will are the immediate principle of the divine processions. Nor does what Durandus says have force, namely, that these expressions are metaphorical. First, because Cyril says in *Thesaurus*, bk. IV, ch. 5: *God chooses the name "Word" because it is most proper*. Hence St. Thomas below, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1, calls Origen the source of the Arians because he said that the Son of God is not properly, but metaphorically, the Word. Second, because if it were permissible to interpret in a metaphorical sense those passages of Scripture in which the second Person is called the Word, then those in which He is called Son could likewise be twisted into a metaphorical sense, and thus an opportunity would be given to heretics to evade all the testimonies of Scripture by tropological and metaphorical meanings.

12. It is proved second: we must philosophize concerning divine things by analogy and likeness to created things, with imperfections excluded. But in created things, understanding and willing are not immediately from the nature presupposed to its powers and faculties, but from the intellect and will. Therefore, the same is true in God. Nor does it have force if you say that this difference exists between God and creatures: creatures, since they are potential and finite natures, need proximate principles in order to operate, while the nature of God, since it is infinite and most pure act, does not need the concurrence of a proximate principle for operations. This has no force, I say. For although the concurrence of a proximate principle really distinct

from the nature is repugnant to the infinity and purity of the divine nature, the concurrence of a proximate principle only virtually distinct from the divine nature and really identified with it is not. But the intellect and will in God differ only virtually from the divine nature. Therefore, it does not prejudice the infinity and purity of the divine nature that the divine processions proceed from the intellect and will as from their proximate and immediate principle, and from the divine nature only radically and mediately.

13. It is proved third from the unacceptable consequence following from Durandus's position. For if the divine nature, as presupposed to the divine intellect and will, were the immediate principle of the divine processions, no reason could be assigned why there are only two processions in God, why one precedes the other, and why the Word proceeds from only one Person while the Holy Spirit proceeds from two. Finally, there would be no reason why one procession is generation and not the other, since both Persons would proceed from the same nature and in the same manner. All of these consequences are wholly repugnant to the truth of the Mystery of the Trinity.

14. Durandus answers that, just as properties, although they emanate immediately from a nature, nevertheless emanate in such a way that one does so before another, and one results from the nature through another, so likewise, although the divine processions immediately arise from the fecundity of the divine nature, a sufficient reason can nevertheless be assigned for their order, for why one presupposes another, and why one belongs to God through the mediation of another. But this solution has no force. First, because properties do not require proximate intermediary principles in order to flow from a nature, as operations do. Hence, although it is not necessary to have recourse to proximate principles prior to the properties in order to assign an order of emanation among them, it is necessary in order to assign an order of prior and posterior among operations. Second, because, although a finite nature can be the root of finite perfections, one of which is prior to another because it is its cause, as rationality is the root of the capacities for wonder and laughter, nevertheless, if the nature is infinite, no reason can be given why it is not exhausted by one procession but is by two. Therefore, diversity of processions cannot arise from the nature of God precisely considered, which is infinite, but recourse must be had to the proximate principles, namely, the intellect and will.

15. I say second that the intellect and will of God are not the proximate and immediate principle by which the generation of the Word and the

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production of the Holy Spirit occur, except insofar as they are modified by the relations of Paternity and active Spiration and connote those relations.

The conclusion is proved by a fundamental argument. If the proximate and immediate principle of the generation of the Word and the production of the Holy Spirit consisted adequately in the intellect and will, or in absolute perfection, and neither required nor connoted any relation, then, since all absolute perfections are common to the whole Trinity, it would follow that the power of begetting and spirating would be found in all the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity. Consequently, the Son could beget another son, and the Holy Spirit could spirate or produce another Holy Spirit. Hence, since in God every possibility is actual, the Son would in fact beget another distinct Son, and the Holy Spirit would spirate another Holy Spirit, and thus there would be more than three Persons in God. This is repugnant to the Catholic faith and entirely destroys the Mystery of the Trinity.

16. What we have said concerning the intellect and will of God must also be said, with due proportion, concerning the divine nature. For it is not the first and radical principle of the divine processions except insofar as it is modified by the relations. Otherwise, as it is in the Son, it would have the character of a radical power to beget, and insofar as it is in the Holy Spirit, the character of a power or radical principle to spirate. Thus, in created things we see that the same form, insofar as it exists in diverse subjects and is diversely modified in them, produces diverse effects. Heat, for example, generates flesh in an animal, but not in fire; in a woman it produces milk, but not in a man; and grace in us, who are an extrinsic person, constitutes an adoptive son, but not in Christ, who is a divine Person. The same must be held proportionally in the present matter. The divine essence, as it is in the Father and modified by the relation of Paternity, has the character of the radical generative power and of the first and remote principle by which divine generation occurs. The same essence, as it is in the Father and the Son and as modified by the relation of Spirator, is the radical spirative power and the first and remote principle by which the Holy Spirit is produced. Hence St. Thomas proposes this argument to himself in *De potentia*, q. 2, a. 1: *If the Father begets in the divine, this must belong to Him according to the nature, which is the generative power and radical principle of begetting. But the same nature is in the Son and Holy Spirit. Therefore, by the same reason, the Son and Holy Spirit would beget.* He replies to this argument as follows: *It must be said that, although the nature is the same in the Father and the Son, it exists according to a different mode, namely, with a different relation. Therefore, it is not necessary*

that those things which belong to the Father through His nature also belong to the Son.

17. I say third that the principle by which the divine processions occur, whether proximate or remote, is not relation alone. The reason is that the principle by which a generative or productive action occurs is that in which the one begotten or produced is assimilated to the one begetting or producing, since the intention of the agent is to assimilate the thing produced to itself in the principle by which it acts. But in the divine, the produced Persons are assimilated to the producing Person, not in relation, but in what is absolute. Therefore, not relation, but absolute perfection connoting relation, is the principle by which the divine processions occur.

18. This is confirmed: if Paternity, for example, were the generative power in the eternal Father and the principle of divine generation, would it possess this under the expressed concept of Paternity and as an exercised relation, or under the character of a hypostatic form and insofar as it has the character of subsistence and Personality? Neither can be said. Therefore, the principle by which divine generation occurs cannot consist in relation alone. The minor premise is evident as to the first part, because Paternity, under the expressed concept of an exercised relation, is founded upon generation and presupposes it according to our mode of conceiving. Consequently, it also presupposes in the Father the generative power or the principle by which generation occurs. The second part is proved because the principle by which a production occurs must be active, at least as that by which the agent acts. But relation, insofar as it has the character of Personality or a hypostatic form, is not active even as a principle by which, but is the pure term of the nature constituting it as a person. Hence, although under this character it is a necessary condition for acting, or rather a mode intrinsically completing the power of acting, it is not the principle by which generation or spiration occurs. Hence Anselm says in *Monologion*, ch. 2, speaking of the Holy Spirit: *The Father and the Son emit so great a Good, not through Their relations, which are several, but from the essence itself, which is one.* And Dionysius in *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 2, calls the Son and the Holy Spirit *the jewels and shoots of the fruitful Godhead.*

19. You will object first against the first conclusion: Hilary says in *De synodis* that *the will of God gave substance to all creatures, but nature gave it to the Son.* And Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, bk. XV, ch. 20, that *the Word through whom all things were made is the Son of God by nature.* Therefore, according to the Holy Fathers, the procession of the Word in the divine is immediately from the nature, and not from the intellect.

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But I deny the consequence. Those Holy Fathers intend only to teach against the Arians that the Word does not proceed from the free will of God as creatures do, but that His production is natural and necessary. Hence they take nature insofar as it is opposed to what is free. Or, if they intend the procession of the Son to be from the nature of God as from a principle, they speak of the radical and remote principle influencing through the intellect as the proximate power.

20. You will object second: we must philosophize concerning divine things by analogy and likeness to created things. But generative power belongs to creatures not by reason of intellect. Therefore, neither does it belong to God by reason of intellect.

I answer that we must philosophize concerning God by analogy and likeness to the more perfect creatures, namely, spiritual and intellectual creatures. Generative power belongs to them by reason of intellect, for the production of a created word is a certain intellectual generation, because, as is commonly said: *Knowledge is begotten from the object and the power, and birth signifies generation.*

21. You will object third against the second conclusion: if the principle by which the divine processions occur did not consist adequately in absolute perfection, but in absolute perfection, namely, the intellect or will, as connoting the relations of Paternity and active Spiration by which they are modified, it would follow that the generative power is not in the Son, since the relation of Paternity is not in Him. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The consequence of the major is evident. The minor seems evident because, since generative power is a perfection, if it were not in the Son, He would not be equal to the Father in perfection, which is repugnant to the equality of the Divine Persons.

22. This difficulty will be answered at length below when we treat the equality of the Divine Persons. For now I say briefly that, although the generative power is not in the Son, it does not follow that He lacks any perfection that is in the Father, because the ability to beget and the ability to be begotten are two offices in the Divine Persons which differ not in perfection, but only in relation. For the same absolute perfection, by connoting Paternity, gives the ability to beget, and by connoting Filiation, gives the ability to be begotten.

23. You will object fourth against the third conclusion: the principle by which generation occurs is that from which the Father is denominated as able to beget. But the Father is denominated as able to beget from the relation of Paternity. Therefore, it is the principle by which divine generation occurs. The major is evident. The minor is proved: a proper denomination

must proceed not from a common form, but from a proper one. But the denomination “able to beget” is most proper to the Father. Therefore, it must proceed not from the essence, which is common, but from Paternity, which is proper to Him. Hence Athanasius says in the first dialogue *De Trinitate* that *the Father begets by hypostasis and creates by command*.

24. I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise. A proper denomination must not proceed from a common form left in its commonality: I grant the major. From a common form as appropriated: I deny the major. Granting the minor, I deny the consequence. Therefore, this argument proves only that the denomination “able to beget” does not proceed from the divine nature absolutely considered, but from the divine nature as modified by the relation of Paternity, as we explained in the second conclusion. Hence, when Athanasius says that the Father begets by hypostasis, this must not be understood of the proximate or remote principle by which generation occurs, but only of the completion of the principle by which it occurs, both proximate and remote, connoting the relation of Paternity by which it is modified and completed.

25. From what has been said it is gathered that the term by which the divine processions are terminated is something absolute directly, connoting a relation. This is evident by the same argument by which we showed it concerning the principle by which they occur. For in the term by which, or formal term, the produced term must agree with the producer. But there is no agreement in relations, although there is in what is absolute. Therefore, what is absolute, with a relation connoted, is the formal term of the divine processions.

§ 3.

Why One of the Divine Processions is
Generation but the Other is Not.

26. It is certain by faith that, besides the procession of the Word, which is true generation, as is manifestly gathered from various passages of Scripture, there is also a procession of Love, or of the Holy Spirit. For, as St. Thomas argues below in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 37, a. 1: Just as from the fact that someone understands a thing there arises in the one understanding a certain intellectual conception of the thing understood, which is called a word, so from the fact that someone loves a thing there arises in the affection of the lover a certain impression, so to speak, of the thing loved, according to

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which the beloved is said to be in the lover, as the thing understood is in the one understanding. Therefore, just as it is probably inferred that there is in God a production of the Word from the fact that God understands, as we showed in § 1, so we likewise probably establish that there is in God another procession by way of love from the fact that God loves.

27. You will say with Valentia, who dislikes this argument, that although the beloved must be present within the lover through inclination, nevertheless no term that is a weight and inclination toward the beloved need be produced by the created will, because this presence of the object is sufficiently effected through the act of love, which is an actual inclination.

But to the contrary: just as the object of intellection does not become formally present to the intellect through the intellection itself, but through some term produced by it which is its expressed image and likeness, so neither does the beloved object become formally present to the lover through the act of love, but through some term produced by it which has the character of an impulse and weight inclining toward that object, according to Augustine's words in *Confessiones*, bk. XIII, ch. 9: *My love is my weight; by love I am borne wherever I am borne*. This being presupposed:

28. We inquire why the character of generation belongs to one procession and not the other, since the definition of the generation of living things, which is the origin of a living thing from a living thing *unto the likeness of nature*, seems to belong no less to the procession of the Holy Spirit than to the production of the Word. This appeared so difficult to the Holy Fathers that Ambrose says in *De fide ad Gratianum*, ch. 3: *It is impossible for me to know the secret of generation*. And Augustine, exclaiming in wonder in *Contra Maximinum*, bk. III, ch. 14, says: *I do not know how to distinguish between that generation and this procession; I cannot do it; I am unequal to it*.

29. Nevertheless, the Scholastics devised various explanations for this enigma. I shall report here only the two modes of speaking that appear more probable, passing over the others for the sake of brevity. The first teaches that the production of the Word is generation, but not the procession of the Holy Spirit, because the Word receives by force of His procession a fecund nature capable of producing another divine *suppositum*, while the Holy Spirit does not, since He produces nothing within God.

30. But this opinion displeases many and is rejected, first, because the likeness required in a begotten person for the character of generation is not in relatives, but in what is absolute. But likeness in the fecundity productive of another *suppositum* is not in the absolute precisely, but in the absolute together with a relation indirectly and by way of connotation, as is evident

from what was said in the preceding section. Therefore, this likeness is not necessary for the character of generation.

31. Second, even if the Son were not productive of the Holy Spirit, He would still be the Son, and consequently His production would still be true generation. Therefore, the character of generation does not belong to the production of the Son precisely because He receives a fecund nature capable of producing the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. According to Augustine in *De Trinitate*, ch. 2, the Son of God *is the Son by that by which He is the Word, and the Word by that by which He is the Son*. But if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, He would still proceed through the intellect in the same way as He now proceeds, and consequently would be the Word, since a word is nothing other than the intrinsic term of intellection. Therefore, He would be the Son even if He did not produce the Holy Spirit.

This is confirmed: if, per impossibile, the spirative power were removed from the Father, He would still remain the Father through the power of begetting. Therefore, the Son would also remain the Son even if He did not produce the Holy Spirit. The consequence is evident because it is repugnant for there to be a Father without a Son. Hence, if after the spirative power were removed from the Father He still remained the Father, the Son would also remain the Son even if He did not produce the Holy Spirit.

32. Third, for true generation it is sufficient that the nature, under the concept of nature, be communicated to the produced term. But the concept of nature in the strictest sense is preserved without a power productive of another *suppositum*. Therefore, so is the true character of generation. The major premise is evident from the definition of the generation of living things. The minor is shown thus: it does not belong to the character of nature that it be a principle in another, or in relation to another; it is sufficient that it be a principle of motion in that in which it exists, as is evident in the natures of the heavens and Angels, in which the character of a most perfect nature is required without even a radical power productive of another *suppositum*. Therefore, the concept of nature in the strictest sense is preserved without a power productive of another, namely, through being the root of other immanent or transient operations. I add that, if the power productive of another *suppositum* belonged to the quidditative concept of nature, the Holy Spirit would not be of the same nature as the Father and the Son, since in Him there is no power productive of another Divine Person, as there is in the Father and the Son. Indeed, the Son would not be adequately of the same nature as the Father, since the divine nature, as it is

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in the Father, is generative and spirative, while insofar as it is in the Son it is only spirative.

33. The second mode of speaking asserts that the production of the Word is generation, but the production of the Holy Spirit is not, because, although the divine nature is communicated to each, the Son proceeds in the manner of an image, while the Holy Spirit does not, since He is related as the impulse of the lover toward the beloved thing.

But this opinion also does not seem to attain the mark of truth. The character of an image is something consequent upon passive generation and posterior to it. Therefore, it cannot be proved *a priori* that the procession of the Word is generation but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not because the Word is the image of the Father while the Holy Spirit is not. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, first, because among men a son first has that he is begotten by his father because he is produced like him in nature, before he has that he is the image of his father, since the latter follows from the former. Second, because in the divine we first understand the Person of the Son as begotten before the relation of image. For, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, bk. VII, ch. 2: *Because He was born, He is the Word; because He is the image, He is understood as the Son.* And as St. Thomas teaches here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 40, a. 4: *The signified passive origins simply precede, according to understanding, the properties of the proceeding Persons, even the personal properties.* Hence he adds there, ad 3: *Nativity, according to understanding, precedes Filiation.* For origins of this kind are conceived by us as the foundations of relations. Therefore, we first conceive the Person of the Son as begotten because the divine nature is communicated to Him by force of His procession, before we conceive in Him the relation of image. Hence we can gather only *a posteriori*, not *a priori*, that the Divine Word is begotten and is the Son, but the Holy Spirit is not, because the character of image belongs to the former and not the latter, just as it is rightly inferred *a posteriori* that a horse is not a rational animal because it is not capable of laughter. But here we are inquiring into the reason *a priori* why the production of the Word is generation but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not. To explain this:

34. I say that the proximate and immediate reason why the procession of the Word is generation but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, is that the Word proceeds unto the likeness of nature by force of the procession, while the Holy Spirit does not. The first and radical reason is taken from the fact that the procession of the Word is through the intellect, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is through the will.

The first part is proved: actions terminated at the same term are diversified by a diverse mode of proceeding and tending toward it, as the Philosophers commonly teach and declare by various examples. Therefore, the production of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit are also distinguished because of the diverse mode of tending toward the term. One has the character of generation and the other does not, because one tends formally and by its own force unto the likeness of nature, while the other does not, although through each the divine nature is communicated.

35. This argument is confirmed and further illustrated by the example St. Thomas uses in *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. IV, ch. 23, where he says that, if one man could make another man in two ways, namely, through generation or from his own flesh by a power divinely granted to him for this purpose, the former would be called his son, but not the latter, although each would be like him in substance, solely because of the diverse mode of proceeding. For the same reason, Abel is the son of Adam, but Eve, formed from his rib, is not, because, although human nature is communicated to each, it is not communicated in the same manner: to Abel by a generative and assimilative action, but not to Eve. Similarly, therefore, although the Holy Spirit receives the divine nature from the Father and the Son, because He does not receive it by force or by the mode of His procession, as the Word does, His production does not have the character of generation, as the procession of the Word does.

36. From these points the second part of the conclusion can easily be proved. The reason why the Word proceeds unto the likeness of nature by force of the procession, while the Holy Spirit does not, is that the former proceeds through the intellect and the latter through the will. Therefore, the first and radical reason why the procession of the Word is generation but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, is that the procession of the Word is through the intellect, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is through the will. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved by St. Thomas's argument here in a. 4, where he argues thus: It must be known that the difference between intellect and will is this: the intellect is made actual by the thing understood existing in the intellect according to its likeness, whereas the will is made actual, not because some likeness of the thing willed is in the will, but because the will has a certain inclination toward the thing willed. Therefore, the procession that occurs according to the character of intellect occurs according to the character of likeness, and to this extent it can have the character of generation, because every generator generates something like itself. But the procession that occurs according to the character of will is considered not according to the character of likeness,

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but rather according to the character of something impelling and moving toward another. Therefore, what proceeds in the divine after the manner of love does not proceed as begotten or as a son, but rather proceeds as Spirit, by which name a certain vital motion and impulse is designated. By these words he openly declares that the Divine Word has that He proceeds unto the likeness of nature by force of His procession, while the Holy Spirit does not, because the Word proceeds through the intellect and the Holy Spirit through the will. For intellect, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, is assimilative, because intellection occurs through assimilation of the power to the object, as is taught in the books *De anima*. Hence in its most perfect analogate, namely, the divine intellect, it is assimilative by a most perfect likeness, which is identity in nature. The will, however, is not an assimilative power, because the proper mode of operation of the will is not through assimilation to the beloved object, but through inclination and propensity toward it. Therefore, however much the perfection of the will increases, it will not have from its proper character that it produces a term like the principle or object, but a most perfect impulse toward it.

37. You will say that the intellect requires only assimilation to the object in intelligible and intentional being, not in natural and entitative being. But it belongs to the character of one begotten and of a son to be assimilated to the producer in natural and entitative being. Therefore, it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word is begotten and is the Son from the fact that He proceeds through the intellect.

I answer that, although the created intellect, because it is imperfect and produces a word from need, is assimilative of the term to the object only in intentional and intelligible being, the divine intellect, because it is most perfect and produces the Word not from need but from infinite fecundity, is assimilative not only in intelligible being, but also in natural and entitative being. This is especially so because in God intelligible and natural being are identified without even a virtual distinction, because the divine nature is constituted by the most pure and actual act of understanding itself, as was shown in *Treatise I*, ch. 3.

38. It is further objected: just as it is proper to the intellect to produce a likeness as the term of its intellection, so it is proper to the will to produce, as the term of its love, the union of the lover with the beloved thing. Hence St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2, teaches that three unions belong to the character of love: one from which it proceeds, namely, a union of likeness, which is the cause of love; another in which it consists, namely, a certain tendency and impulse toward the beloved thing; and another which it effects or desires, namely, the real union which the lover

seeks to have with the beloved thing. Therefore, just as the most perfect intellect produces a most perfect likeness, so the most perfect will produces a most perfect union. But a most perfect union no less implies identity in nature under the concept of nature than does a most perfect intellectual likeness. Therefore, it is not rightly inferred that the Divine Word is begotten and is the Son, but the Holy Spirit is not, from the fact that the procession of the former is through the intellect while that of the latter is through the will.

39. I answer that, although the more perfect the love is, the more perfect the union must be, it must nevertheless always be within the line of love and not outside it. But identity in nature is outside the line of will and love, although not outside the line of intellect and intellectual likeness, because the will in God, since it is an inclination of the divine nature, is something consequent upon it. Intellection, however, since it is that which is conceived first in God and is the root of the divine operations or of the attributes pertaining to operation, neither presupposes nor follows the nature of God, but constitutes it. Hence, although in God the most perfect intellectual likeness is identity in nature under the concept of nature, the most perfect union of love is not. For the latter signifies only the most perfect inclination of the divine nature constituted through intellection.

§ 4.

Another Objection is Solved.

40. It can further be objected against our conclusion: the Holy Spirit has the divine nature by force of His procession and origin. Therefore, His procession is no less generation than the production of the Word. The consequence is evident from what was said above. The antecedent is proved first: the Holy Spirit has the divine nature from His procession and origin, since He does not have it of Himself, but from the Father and the Son, from whom He proceeds. Therefore, He has it by force of His procession and origin. Second, divine existence is communicated to the Holy Spirit by force of His procession, since production is terminated at being. But divine existence is not distinguished even virtually from the nature. Therefore, the divine nature is communicated to the Holy Spirit by force of the procession. Third, the Father and the Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend to produce something like Themselves in nature and not only in an attribute. Therefore, the Holy Spirit has the divine nature by force of His origin. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved: every agent intends to

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produce something like itself not only in the proximate principle of acting, but especially in the radical principle. Fire, for example, in heating intends to produce something like itself not only in heat, but also in substantial form; and a father intends to assimilate his son to himself not only in generative power, but especially in nature. But the divine essence is the radical principle of the production of the Holy Spirit, just as the will is its proximate and formal principle. Therefore, the Father and the Son, in producing the Holy Spirit, intend something like Themselves in nature and not only in an attribute. Fourth, the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, proceeds as God. Therefore, by force of His procession He receives the divine nature. The consequence is manifest. The antecedent is proved: the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, proceeds as He is. But He is formally God. Therefore, by force of His procession He proceeds as God. Fifth, the Holy Spirit proceeds formally as a person. Therefore, He proceeds as possessing the divine nature. This consequence is also evident. The antecedent is proved: the Holy Spirit, by force of His procession, has relative subsistence, by which He is constituted a Divine Person. Therefore, He proceeds formally as a Divine Person.

41. I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For not everything that belongs to a produced term through a procession is communicated to it by force of the procession, but only that which is the formal character of terminating the procession. Hence, since the divine nature is not the formal character terminating the procession of the Holy Spirit, but is something identified with the formal character terminating it, namely, with the character of love or impulse, which formally terminates it, although the Holy Spirit has the divine nature from His procession and origin, He does not have it by force of the procession and origin.

42. To the second, I say that divine existence is communicated to the Holy Spirit as a general condition required for every production, but not as the formal term of His procession, which is love or impulse.

43. To the third, I deny the antecedent. To its proof I say that the major premise is true only when the agent acts through a proximate power destined to communicate the nature. When it acts through other powers, it intends at most something like itself in the proximate principle. Hence, since in the divine the intellect is a power principally and essentially destined to communicate the nature, while the will is not, the Father and the Son, in producing the Holy Spirit through the will, do not formally intend something like Themselves in nature by force of that production, although the Father does so in producing the Son through the intellect.

44. To the fourth, I deny the antecedent. For the Holy Spirit by force of His procession does not proceed formally as God, but as the love of God. To the proof to the contrary, I distinguish the major premise. The Holy Spirit by force of His procession proceeds as He is under every formality under which He is: I deny the major. Under some formality: I grant the major. Granting the minor, I deny the consequence. This solution can be illustrated by two examples. The first is found in a begotten man and a created man, to each of whom the same predicates belong as to being, yet under diverse formalities they terminate generation and creation: the latter under the common character of creatable being, the former under a particular character of being. The second is found in the body of Christ the Lord existing in the Sacrament through transubstantiation. For although the Body of Christ there is living and animated by a rational soul, it nevertheless does not formally terminate transubstantiation under the character of a living or animated thing, but under the character of a body, as is taught in the treatise on the Eucharist.

45. To the fifth, I deny the antecedent. To its proof, I say that the Holy Spirit indeed has, by force of the procession, relative subsistence by which He is constituted a person, but not formally as constituting the person. For a person is constituted from relative subsistence as modifying the nature, while the Holy Spirit does not formally have it by force of His procession as modifying the nature, but precisely as modifying love or impulse toward the beloved object. Hence the Holy Spirit proceeds formally as subsisting in love, but as subsisting in the divine nature only materially and identically, because of the identity of the divine nature with divine love.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Divine Relations.

It is certain by faith that there are real relations in God. This is expressly contained in Scripture, which explains the distinction of Persons by the relative names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and is manifestly gathered from that celebrated statement of Boethius: *Substance provides unity; relation multiplies the Trinity*. Certainly, since the Divine Persons possess the greatest unity and simplicity, They must be opposed to and distinguished from one another by the least of all oppositions. But relative opposition is the least of all. For things opposed contradictorily, contrarily, or privatively mutually exclude one another and expel one another from the same subject. But things possessing relative opposition are so far from excluding or expelling

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one another that they mutually imply and posit one another, so that, if one is destroyed, the other cannot subsist.

2. Nor is it an obstacle that relations are of the weakest and least entity, as the Philosophers say, and consequently seem repugnant to God, the most perfect and complete being. For although relation in created things, in which it has accidental being, is of almost no entity or subsistence, no activity or efficacy, and no solidity or permanence, nevertheless in the divine, in which it has substantial being, it not only lacks every imperfection, but its dignity, nobility, and majesty are so great that the most sacred Mystery of the Trinity, than which nothing in the Christian religion is nobler or more excellent, is founded and subsists in the relations of origin alone.

3. It must be held with certain faith that the divine relations are not really and entitatively distinguished from the essence. Otherwise, there would be a quaternity in God, which was condemned by the Lateran Council, and the Divine Persons would be composed of essence and relation, since composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things. I add that whatever in created things has accidental and created being, when transferred to God, has substantial and uncreated being. For, as Gregory the Great testifies, *with God fleeting things stand and changeable things remain*; so accidental things subsist and are identified with the divine essence. Hence it is stated against Gilbert of Poitiers at the Council of Rheims, who, as St. Thomas says here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2, thought that relations in the divine were assistent and, as it were, extrinsically affixed: *We believe that no realities whatsoever, whether called relations, properties, singularities, or unities, are present to God which are eternal and yet are not God.*

4. These points are certain among all Catholics. But it is disputed, first, whether there is any actual distinction between the relations and the divine essence prior to the operation of the intellect; second, whether the essence belongs to the quidditative concept of the relations and the relations to the concept of the essence; third, whether the divine relations add any relative perfection to the essence; fourth, whether the divine relations possess relative existences proper to themselves and virtually distinct from the existence of the essence. These four difficulties and controversies must be resolved briefly here.

§ 1.

Resolution of the First Difficulty.

5. I say first: prior to the operation of the intellect, the divine relations are not distinguished from the essence by a modal or formal distinction. This is against Durandus, who thinks that the relations are distinguished from the essence by a modal distinction, that is, not as reality from reality, but as reality from mode; and against Scotus and his Disciples, who assert that they are distinguished by a formal distinction, which they call *from the nature of the thing*, and which Scotus says *precedes the intellect in every way*.

It is proved first from the Council of Rheims, where it is defined against Gilbert that the relations and essence are not to be distinguished by theological reason, or from the nature of the thing, insofar as theological reason is opposed to mathematical reason, which is distinction by the intellect alone.

6. It is proved second from the Lateran Council under Innocent III, ch. *Damnamus*, *De summa Trinitate*, where it says: *Although the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Spirit another, nevertheless They are not another thing. What the Father is, the Son and Holy Spirit are, entirely the same*. Augustine asserts the same in *De Trinitate*, bk. VII, ch. 6, where he says: *For God, to be and to be a person are not different things, but entirely the same*. But things that are entirely the same are not actually distinguished prior to the operation of the intellect, since complete identity excludes every actual real distinction. Therefore, prior to the operation of the intellect, the divine relations are not distinguished from the essence by a modal or formal distinction.

7. It is proved third from the Council of Florence, sess. 18, in which John, the Latin theologian, said: *The divine substance and person are indeed the same in reality, but differ according to the mode of our understanding*. And in sess. 19, before the middle: *Do not think, however, that these differ except in apprehension and understanding alone*. The discussion concerned whether hypostasis and nature differed from one another in reality or by reason. Likewise, in the same session toward the end: *The Person of the Father is not distinguished from Paternity or from the substance except by reason alone*. These testimonies are so clear and explicit that several of the more recent authors consider the opinion of Durandus and Scotus suspect and not very safe in faith.

8. The conclusion can also be proved by the arguments with which, in the treatise on the attributes, we showed that the divine attributes are not

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distinguished from the essence by a formal distinction from the nature of the thing. They are equally conclusive in the present matter. First, if the divine essence is modally or formally distinguished from the relations, the supreme purity and actuality of the divine essence are destroyed, for it will be in potency to certain formalities really distinct from itself, or, what is worse, to certain modes. For a mode is an imperfect entity, possessing diminished and dependent being, and not far removed from the nature of an accident. Hence Durandus's modal distinction seems even worse than Scotus's formal distinction.

9. Moreover, divine simplicity is destroyed by this modal or formal distinction. For since composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things, just as the union of things entitatively distinct produces entitative composition, so the union of things modally distinct produces modal composition, and the union of things really and formally distinct causes real formal composition.

This is confirmed: the Adversaries cannot deny that, according to Scotus, God would be simpler if no real distinction existed between His essence and relations. But the greatest conceivable simplicity must be granted to God, since in the Lateran Council under Innocent III God is called *altogether simple*. Therefore, no real distinction, whether modal or formal, must be admitted between the essence and relations. This is especially so because complete simplicity is opposed no less to distinction than to composition. Hence Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 3, that in God simplicity supereminently excludes every duplicity. Therefore, since God is not only one but supremely one, as Bernard says, He excludes from Himself every real distinction except that which arises from the relative opposition of the Divine Persons.

10. Third, by the same formal distinction divine infinity is undermined. For just as infinite entity requires entitative identity with everything that implies no imperfection in its concept, so formal infinity requires formal identity with every formal character that implies no defect in its concept, and consequently with the divine relations and attributes, which imply no imperfection in their concept.

11. There are two principal foundations of Scotus and Durandus. The first is this: those things are distinguished really and prior to the operation of the intellect by a modal distinction, or at least by a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, one of which is really communicated independently of every operation of the intellect while the other is not communicated. But the divine essence is really communicated to the Son through eternal generation, independently of every operation of the

intellect, while Paternity is not. Therefore, the divine essence and Paternity are distinguished by some actual distinction, at least modal or from the nature of the thing, prior to the operation of the intellect.

12. Yet if this argument had force, it would prove not only a modal or formal distinction, but also an entitative distinction between the divine essence and Paternity, since the divine essence is communicated entitatively to the Son, while Paternity is denied of Him entitatively and not only formally. Otherwise, the Father and Son would be distinguished only formally or modally, and not entitatively. Therefore, since this argument proves too much, it proves nothing. Hence I answer by denying the major premise. For one thing to be communicated without another being communicated, a virtual distinction or plurality is sufficient, which in God can accomplish what formal multiplicity does in created things, just as the light of the sun, because it is heat virtually, accomplishes all that formal heat does. Therefore, since formal multiplicity in created things causes one thing to be communicated without another being communicated, virtual multiplicity, or the infinite eminence of the divine substance and entity, can accomplish the same in God. By reason of this eminence it perfectly equals both the absolute and the relative, and consequently both communicable and incommunicable entity. Thus we see in created things that, because the rational soul eminently contains the sensitive and vegetative souls, it does not communicate itself in the same manner to all parts of the human body, but informs some only according to the vegetative grade, others according to the sensitive grade, and exercises the operations of rational life in others.

13. From this the other foundation of Scotus and Durandus is resolved. It is taken from the fact that it is impossible for contradictories to be verified of the same thing existing in reality. But of the divine essence it is verified that it is communicable, while of relation that it is incommunicable; of the essence that it is not produced, while of relation or person that it proceeds and is produced; of the essence that it neither refers nor is referred, while of relation that it both refers and is referred. Therefore, it is impossible that essence and relation be the same in reality.

But I deny that these propositions are contradictory. For it is not sufficient for contradiction that opposites be predicated of the same thing; it is required that they be predicated of the same thing under the same formal and virtual character, since contradictories, as the Philosopher testifies, concern the same thing, in the same respect. But communicability and incommunicability, producibility and improducibility, are verified of the divine substance and entity according to diverse formal characters, formalities, or equivalences. Insofar as it is equivalent to the absolute, it is

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communicable; insofar as it is equivalent to the relative, it is incommunicable. For the divine entity and substance are formally one and virtually multiple, because in one and the same most simple formality they include the absolute and relative characters together.

But Aureolus objects, as cited by Capreolus in dist. 2, q. 3: an effect in act must have a cause in act. But affirmations and negations including contradictories are effects in act prior to the work of the intellect. Therefore, they must have a cause in act. But their cause is distinction. Therefore, there is a distinction between the divine nature and the relations prior to the work of the intellect.

15. Cajetan answers this objection by saying that an effect in act does not necessarily require a formal cause in act, or one containing the effect formally, but that a virtual cause, or one containing the effect virtually, is sufficient, as is evident in heat actually produced, which can arise not only from fire, which is formally hot in act, but also from the sun, which is only virtually hot. Hence the affirmation and negation included in contradictories do not necessarily require a formal distinction prior to the work of the intellect, but a virtual distinction, such as is found between the essence and relations, is sufficient.

Second, it can be answered with Capreolus by granting the major and denying the minor. For affirmations and negations exist only in the intellect. Hence they require no formal cause outside the intellect, but only a fundamental cause. Consequently, for affirmations and negations including contradictories, a distinction of reason in act with a foundation in reality is sufficient. This distinction is called virtual or fundamental.

16. From what has been said, it is gathered first against Durandus that active Spiration is not really distinguished from Paternity and Filiation. First, because real distinction in the divine arises only from relative opposition. But the relation of active Spiration is not relatively opposed to Paternity and Filiation, but only to passive Spiration. Second, because if it were really distinguished from them, it would constitute a fourth Person in God, since a real relation subsisting in the Godhead and really distinct from the other relations is sufficient to constitute a person in God. Nor does Durandus's answer have force when he says that active Spiration does not constitute a fourth Person because incommunicability belongs to the character of Personality, while active Spiration is common to the Father and the Son. For it is repugnant that active Spiration be really distinguished from Paternity and Filiation and yet be common to the Father and the Son, because it cannot be really distinguished from them unless it is relatively opposed to them, and it cannot be relatively opposed to them if it is

common to the Father and the Son, since incommunicability necessarily follows upon relative opposition.

17. You will say first with Durandus: whatever things are the same as one third thing are the same as one another. Therefore, if Paternity and Filiation are really identified with active Spiration, they will be the same as one another.

But we said above in ch. 2 that this principle of Dialectic must be understood only of things adequately identified with a third, not of things only inadequately identified with it, as occurs in the present case. For one must philosophize concerning active Spiration in relation to Paternity and Filiation, to which it is common, in the same proportional manner as concerning the essence, which is communicated to the three Persons. Hence, just as the essence is identified only inadequately with the three Persons, because it is not so identified with one Person that it is not also identified with the others, so active Spiration is identified only inadequately with Paternity, because it is not so identified with it that it is not also identified with Filiation.

18. You will say second: Paternity and active Spiration are two relations. Therefore, they are also two realities and consequently are really distinguished from one another. The consequence is proved from the common axiom: *When the inferior is multiplied, the superior must be multiplied.* But reality is superior to real relation. Therefore, if Paternity and active Spiration are two real relations, they will also be two realities.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For “reality,” in common usage, is taken for entity as it exists in reality, while relation expresses a pure respect toward something extrinsic correlated with it. Hence, since Paternity and Spiration are not entitatively distinguished, they cannot be called several entities or several realities, although they can be called several relations because they are respects toward diverse terms. As to the axiom alleged, it must be said that it is true only when the inferior, insofar as it is multiplied, and its superior are taken in the same manner, which does not occur here.

19. It is gathered second against Scotus that active Spiration is not formally distinguished from Paternity and Filiation from the nature of the thing. Otherwise, the eternal Father, for example, would not be altogether simple, but composed of Paternity and Spiration. For just as real entitative composition results from the union of two realities entitatively and really distinct, so modal or formal composition arises from the union of modes or formalities really distinct.

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20. This is confirmed: from Scotus's position it would follow that the Person of the Holy Spirit is simpler than the Person of the Father or of the Son, because the latter would be constituted from His proper Personality and active Spiration, formally distinct, while the former would be constituted by passive Spiration alone, without another formality.

21. It is gathered third that, just as, although one attribute is identified with another, it cannot be said that the attribute of justice, for example, is the attribute of mercy, so likewise, although Paternity and Spiration are distinguished neither really nor formally from the nature of the thing, but only virtually, it nevertheless cannot be said that the relation of Paternity is the relation of Spiration. For when they are distinguished, a respect toward the term is explicitly implied, and this term is not the same in Paternity and Spiration. The first regards Filiation; the second regards Procession or passive Spiration.

§ 2.

Resolution of the Second Difficulty.

22. For the resolution of the second difficulty, namely, whether the divine essence belongs to the quidditative concept of the relations and, conversely, whether the relations belong to the quidditative concept of the essence, two points must be briefly noted. The first is that some things can be really identified with one another, and yet one not belong to the quidditative concept of the other, as is evident in man, in whom the singular is not really distinguished from the specific and generic grades, and yet does not belong to the quidditative concept of the species, but is related to it as a logical or metaphysical accident. The second is that something can pertain to the essence or quiddity of another in two ways: either as its constitutive element or essential difference, in which way rationality pertains to the essence of man; or as an intrinsic mode or term by which it essentially requires to be modified or terminated, as the modes of existing through itself and in another are related to being.

It is certain that the divine relations do not belong to the quidditative concept of the divine nature in the first way. First, because the divine nature is not metaphysically constituted by the relations, but by some absolute perfection that is the root of the other perfections, namely, by the most pure and actual act of understanding itself, as we showed in Treatise I. Second, because what belongs in this way to the quidditative concept of the divine nature must be predicated of everything of which that nature is predicated.

But Paternity, for example, is not predicated of everything of which the divine nature is predicated, for the divine nature is predicated of the Son, of whom Paternity is not predicated. Therefore, the only difficulty is whether the relations belong to the essence and quidditative concept of God in the second way, namely, as terms or modes by which it essentially requires to be modified and terminated.

In resolving this, several more recent authors think that neither the essence belongs to the quidditative concept of the relations nor the relations to the quidditative concept of the essence. Others judge that the essence indeed belongs to the formal concept of the relations, but that the relations do not belong to the concept of the essence. The opinion more common in the School of St. Thomas, however, asserts that the essence belongs to the concept of the relations, and the relations to the concept of the essence. The first is taught by St. Thomas here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2; below, q. 39, a. 1; and in *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 2, where he asserts that, just as inherent and accidental being is related to a created relation, so divine substantial being is related to an uncreated and divine relation. But inherent and accidental being belongs to the formal concept of a created relation, since it is essentially an accident. Therefore, divine substantial being, or the character of divine and uncreated substance, belongs to the formal concept of a divine relation.

23. Reason also commends this. For, by reason of its infinity, the divine essence ought to possess that amplitude which belongs to being by reason of its transcendence. But the character of being so transcends its inferiors that it cannot be perfectly prescinded from them. Therefore, the divine essence is likewise so included in the divine relations and attributes that it cannot be perfectly prescinded from them, but, whatever precision the intellect makes, it is always implicitly included in them.

24. This is confirmed: Paternity, as virtually distinguished from the divine nature, is essentially being, since it is not pure nothing or a mere being of reason. But it is not created being, as is evident. Therefore, it is essentially divine and uncreated being, since no middle can be assigned between created and uncreated being. Consequently, the character of divine and uncreated being is so intimately included in the divine relations that it cannot be perfectly prescinded from them.

25. The second point, namely, that the relations belong to the quidditative concept of God, at least as modes and terms by which the divine nature essentially requires to be modified or terminated, is gathered from the Holy Fathers. Athanasius says in his oration against the Sabellian Gregory: *The whole fullness and integrity of the Godhead is the Father and the*

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Son. Cyril says in *Thesaurus*, bk. II, ch. 2: *The Godhead cannot be perfect unless it has a Son and brings forth fruit from itself*. And in bk. III, ch. 1: *The Holy Spirit is in God Himself essentially*. They therefore judge that the relations pertain to the fullness, actuality, and perfection of the divine essence as the terms of its fecundity and the modes by which it essentially requires to be modified. Hence St. Thomas says here in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 2, ad 3: *In the very perfection of divine being are contained both the Word proceeding intelligibly and the principle of the Word*, and so forth. Cajetan, explaining these words, asserts that, if the Godhead were defined in a manner adequate to it, its formal concept would include not only what belongs to wisdom, justice, mercy, and the other attributes, but also what belongs to Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration.

Reason also commends this. If it is admitted that the relations do not belong even to the implicit concept of the divine essence, the latter will be conceived as actualizable by the relations and as in potency to them, and some composition will arise from them and the essence, at least according to reason. This is wholly repugnant to the divine actuality and simplicity. It is also repugnant to infinity of being that every possible being not be implied in it, at least implicitly. Therefore, the relations belong to the quidditative concept of the divine essence and consequently cannot be objectively prescinded from it.

26. This is more clearly evident in the opinion of those who, with us, judge that the divine essence is essentially included in the concept of the relations. For, this being presupposed, it is manifest that the relations are likewise included in the concept of the essence and cannot be perfectly prescinded from it, because it is impossible for two objective concepts to be so compared that one is essentially included in the other without the other likewise being included in it. Hence, because being is transcendently included in all differences, those differences are likewise implicitly contained in being, so that no perfect precision can be made between being and its differences, as our Thomists teach in *Metaphysica*. The reason for this doctrine is that abstraction or precision is a certain separating motion. But the term toward which separation proceeds cannot be found in the term from which separation proceeds. Therefore, by the very fact that one thing is essentially contained in another, that in which it is included cannot be separated or prescinded from it by reason.

This is confirmed: perfect precision through concepts accomplishes what real separation does in reality. But it is impossible for one thing to be really and perfectly separated from another without the other also being perfectly separated from it. Therefore, it will likewise be repugnant for two

objective concepts to be so related that one is perfectly abstracted from the other by reason while the other is not likewise perfectly prescinded from it by reason.

27. You will object first: the relations are conceived as supervening upon the Godhead and determining it. Therefore, they do not include it in their concept.

I answer that the relations are conceived as supervening upon the Godhead and determining it as to their explicit character, but not as to their implicit character. This is sufficient for the Godhead to belong to the quidditative concept of the relations, as is evident in being, upon which, according to reason, the modes of existing through itself and in another supervene and determine it, and yet being belongs to their quidditative concept, because only according to the explicit character are they conceived as supervening upon being and determining and contracting it through greater expression.

28. You will object second: the relations constitute the Divine Persons. But they cannot constitute Them if they include the divine essence in their concept. Therefore, they do not include it in their concept. The major is evident. The minor is proved: a constitutive element cannot signify everything that is in the constituted reality. But if the relations included the divine essence in themselves, they would signify everything that the Divine Persons signify, since those Persons imply only relation together with the divine nature. Therefore, they could not constitute the Divine Persons.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. For constitution according to reason requires only two things distinct as to explicit reason. Hence, to the proof of the minor, I distinguish the major: a constitutive element cannot signify explicitly everything that is in the constituted reality: I grant. Implicitly: I deny. For the mode of existing through itself constitutes being in the character of substance, and yet implicitly includes the character of being in its concept. Why, then, can Paternity, for example, not similarly constitute the Person of the Father, although it implicitly includes the divine essence and consequently implicitly signifies everything explicitly implied in the Person of the Father?

29. You will object third: if the divine essence is predicated essentially of Paternity, it will also be predicated essentially of it that it is communicable to the three Persons. But this is repugnant, since incommunicability belongs to the character of Paternity. Therefore, the former is also repugnant. The consequence of the major is proved: of that of which the divine essence is predicated essentially, every predicate essential to it is also predicated. But to be communicable to the three Persons is an essential predicate of the

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divine essence. Therefore, if the divine essence is predicated essentially of Paternity, it will also be predicated essentially of Paternity that it is communicable to the three Persons.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise: of that of which the divine essence is predicated essentially, every predicate essential to it is also predicated, either absolutely or with an addition: I grant the major. Always absolutely: I deny the major. Distinguishing the minor in the same way, I deny the consequence. Therefore, it cannot be said absolutely and without addition of Paternity that it is communicable to the Son, but it can be said with an addition and with specification of the essence. Hence, although this proposition is false: *Paternity is communicable to the Son*, this proposition is true: *Paternity is the divine essence communicable to the Son*.

30. You will object fourth against the second part of our opinion, which asserts that the relations belong to the quidditative concept of the divine nature: whatever is predicated essentially of the Godhead is also predicated essentially of each Divine Person. But Filiation is not predicated essentially of the Father, nor Paternity of the Son. Therefore, Paternity and Filiation do not belong to the essence of the Godhead.

I answer first by distinguishing the major premise. Whatever is predicated essentially of the divine nature is also predicated essentially of each Divine Person, if it is predicated essentially of it as its metaphysical constitutive element or as its essential predicate, in the manner in which the attributes are predicated of it: I grant the major. If it is predicated essentially of it as an inadequate mode of the divine nature which essentially terminates or modifies it: I deny the major. But Paternity and Filiation are neither quidditative predicates of the divine nature nor do they pertain to its metaphysical constitution. They are only certain inadequate modes by which the divine essence, because of its fecundity, amplitude, and eminence, essentially requires to be modified and terminated.

31. Second, the same major premise can be distinguished differently. Whatever is predicated essentially of the Godhead is also predicated essentially of each Person, either absolutely or with reduplication of the essence: I grant the major. Always absolutely: I deny the major. I similarly distinguish the minor: Filiation is not predicated of the Father absolutely: I grant the minor. With reduplication of the essence: I deny the minor and the consequence. The solution is evident from what was said above. Just as this proposition, *Paternity is communicable*, cannot be granted absolutely, although it can be granted with an addition and with the essence specified on the part of the subject, namely: *Paternity is the divine essence communicable*

to several Persons, so also this proposition, *Paternity is Filiation*, must not be granted absolutely, but this proposition may be: *Paternity is the essence that essentially is Filiation*.

32. You will object fifth: the Father communicates the whole essence to the Son, and yet does not communicate Paternity to Him. Therefore, Paternity does not pertain to the essence of the Godhead.

This is confirmed: if Paternity belonged to the essence of the Godhead, the Son would not be perfect and entire God, because He would lack something pertaining to the essence of the Godhead, namely, Paternity itself.

33. I answer first that these arguments must also be solved by the Adversaries, since the same argument applies to identical inclusion as to essential inclusion. For essential inclusion does not add any greater inclusion in reality than identical inclusion itself, except that essential inclusion, besides identical inclusion, also adds objective inclusion in relation to the conceiving intellect. Otherwise, the whole difficulty concerns identical inclusion, which is the same in both opinions.

I answer second that the Father communicates the whole essence to the Son, but not totally, because, although He communicates to Him the constitutive element of the Godhead in the being of nature, and all the attributes and essential predicates, He does not communicate every essential mode. From this it follows only that Paternity does not pertain to the essence of the Godhead as its metaphysical constitutive element or as an essential predicate, but not that it does not pertain to its essence as an essential mode.

To the confirmation, I answer first by denying the major premise absolutely. First, because the relations add no perfections to the divine essence, as we shall say in the following section. Hence it does not follow from the fact that they do not belong to each Person that each Person is not entire God with integrity of perfection. Second, because every mode essential to the Godhead is not owed to each Person. Or, for greater clarity, I answer second by distinguishing the same major premise: the Son would not be perfect and entire God with the integrity of essential predicates owed to Him: I deny the major. With the integrity of essential modes owed to the Godhead, but not to each Person: I grant the major.

34. From these points you will easily understand and explain certain testimonies of the Holy Fathers in which they assert that the Trinity is not predicated substantially of God and that the relations are not predicated of God according to substance. They intend only that the Trinity or the divine relations are not predicated essentially of God by way of a constitutive

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element or by way of an essential predicate, in the manner in which the attributes are enunciated of God. They do not deny, however, that they are said essentially of God by way of termination or essential mode. Likewise, when St. Thomas taught in *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 2, ad 6, that the predication *God is the Father* is not formal but identical, he intended only that it is not formal with the formality of constitution and expression. He did not intend to deny that it is formal with the formality of inclusion and termination.

§ 3.

Resolution of the Third Difficulty.

35. The third difficulty is whether, just as the attributes add to the essence some absolute perfection virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence, so likewise the relations, besides the absolute perfection of the essence which they contain and transcendently include, express and signify, by reason of their relative concept and insofar as they are pure respects toward a term, or, as others say, according to the character of *esse ad*, some relative perfection virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence, or whether they possess only the absolute perfection of the essence.

36. This question is disputed in the School of the Thomists, some affirming and others denying that relative perfections of this kind exist in the Divine Persons. Nevertheless, the negative opinion appears more probable and more conformable to the principles of St. Thomas's doctrine. Here in a. 1 he establishes this difference between relation and the other categories: the other categories regard the subject by reason of themselves, terminating in it and placing in it something by which the subject is disposed toward itself and not toward another. This is evident in quantity, which according to its proper character places in substance extension of parts, by which it perfects the substance in itself and toward itself. Relation, however, according to the proper character of its genus, does not regard the subject by reason of itself and terminate in it, or place in it something by which it is such in itself and toward itself, but orders it toward the term and regards it by reason of the term itself.

37. From this doctrine of the Angelic Teacher, the following argument can be formed: the character of perfection must be taken through a respect to the subject considered by reason of itself, because it must regard the perfectible subject by commensuration with it. But relation, by reason of itself, regards no particular subject by terminating in it, but regards it by reason of its term or correlative. For by the very fact that a concept is

relative, even if it regards a subject, it must regard it by ordering it to a term and by reason of that term. Therefore, no relation, by force of its proper relative concept, expresses or signifies perfection. Consequently, the divine relations add no relative perfection to the essence.

38. A certain recent Thomist will answer that, although absolute perfection regards the perfectible subject by reason of itself, relative perfection regards the perfectible subject in relation to another, as is evident, he says, in powers and habits, by which man is perfected in relation to an external object.

But to the contrary: although something can regard a perfectible subject in relation to another when it signifies only a transcendental order to that other, as is evident in the example given of powers and habits, it cannot do so when it is a pure respect and regards the other under the character of a pure term, as occurs in the present case. For something is good and perfect insofar as it is in the act of existence or implies an order toward it, as St. Thomas teaches above in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 4, a. 5, and q. 5, a. 1. But a pure respect toward a term cannot receive existence from that term or from an order toward it, because that which bestows existence upon a relation must have some activity or at least exercise some causality toward it. But the term of a relation, since it only terminates and exercises the character of a pure term, lacks all activity and exercises no causality toward the relation.

39. From this a second argument can be formed for our opinion. The character of goodness and perfection is taken from an order toward being. But the divine relations, according to their relative concept and insofar as they are pure respects toward a term, do not express an order toward being, but do so only by reason of the divine essence which they include. Hence St. Thomas says in *De potentia*, q. 2, a. 2: *Relation, insofar as it is relation, does not have that it is something, but only that it is toward something*. Therefore, the divine relations, according to their relative concept and insofar as they are pure respects toward a term, signify no relative perfection, but possess only the infinite goodness of the divine essence transcendently included in them.

40. From this you will understand the notable difference between the relations and the attributes. Since the attributes regard the essence by reason of themselves and perfect it in itself, and not in relation to another that has the character of a pure term, they add to it a perfection virtually and rationally distinct. But the relations, according to their proper explicit character, do not regard the divine essence, but the term correlated with them, and consequently add to the divine essence no virtually distinct perfection, but only a pure respect abstracting from perfection and

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imperfection. Hence Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, bk. VII, chs. 1 and 6, that Goodness and Greatness, which are perfections in the divine, are said not relatively, but toward self. And in the *Quaestiunculae de Trinitate*, at the beginning, he teaches that the three Persons cannot be called three great ones or three good ones, because *great and good are substantial names and are said toward self*. From these passages a twofold argument can be taken in favor of our opinion. The first is this: relations add nothing absolute to the essence that is rationally distinct from them. But according to Augustine, the character of perfection in God is said not relatively, but absolutely. Therefore, the relations add no perfection to the essence rationally distinct from them. The second is this: if goodness were really multiplied in the Divine Persons, They could be called three good ones not only adjectivally, but also substantivally, because both the material and formal signification of the name “good” would be multiplied. But according to the cited Augustine, the three Divine Persons cannot be called three good ones, just as They cannot be called three great ones substantivally. Therefore, just as greatness is not multiplied in the Divine Persons, neither are goodness and perfection.

41. I add that the same Augustine in *De Trinitate*, bk. XV, ch. 3, so teaches that perfection in the divine is said toward self that he denies that the Father is something greater than the Son, that both together are something greater than the Holy Spirit alone, or that the three Persons are something greater and more perfect than only one. His words are: *It is clear not only that the Father is not greater than the Son, but also that both together are not something greater than the Holy Spirit alone, nor are any two in the same Trinity something greater than one, nor are all three together something greater than each singly*. But if each of Them possessed a relative perfection diverse from the relative perfection of another, He would be related to the other as exceeding and exceeded, since, as the Philosopher testifies, species are like numbers, among which numerical equality cannot coexist with essential difference. Therefore, by this very fact They could not be equal, nor could the supreme equality of the Son with the Father in perfection subsist, and much less the equality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son. For since there are two relations in the Father and the Son and only one in the Holy Spirit, there would be more relative perfections in the Father and the Son than in the Holy Spirit. Likewise, the three Persons of the Most Holy Trinity would be something greater and more perfect, at least extensively, than only one. Therefore, relative perfections diverse from one another in species must not be admitted in the Divine Persons, just as the relations themselves differ from one another in species in the character of relation, since they regard

terms diverse from one another in species under the character of term and correlative.

42. Nor does the common answer of the Adversaries have force. They say that these unacceptable consequences do not follow from their opinion because, although the relative perfection of one Person is not formally in another, it is nevertheless eminently in the other by reason of the essence, and also in some manner formally through circumincession and the reciprocal existence of one in another. This has no force, I say. First, because a supremely perfect being must contain a pure perfection, in whose concept no imperfection is found, in the most perfect manner. But the mode of containing formally and eminently is more perfect than the mode of containing only eminently. Second, because, although Paternity is in the Son through circumincession, it nevertheless does not formally perfect Him; otherwise, it would constitute Him as Father. Therefore, neither mode of possessing the relative perfection of Paternity is sufficient to preserve in the Son the character of the supremely perfect and His perfect equality with the Father.

43. The Adversaries object first by citing several testimonies of the Holy Fathers in which they assert that the Mystery of the Trinity, which is constituted through the relations, signifies supreme and infinite perfection in God. From this they infer that the relations introduce a special perfection in God. But this inference and consequence have no force. The Mystery of the Trinity implies infinite perfection from a twofold source: from the divine essence, which by reason of its infinite perfection and fecundity requires to communicate itself *ad intra* to three Persons; and from the relations, not because they add a relative perfection to the essence, but because they require to contain the divine essence in the manner of a transcendent, from which they receive infinite perfection. Therefore, just as the destruction of divine omnipotence is inferred *a posteriori* and by an extrinsic argument from the defect of the possibility of creatures, so likewise the Holy Fathers, from the denial of processions and relations in God, rightly infer argumentatively and *a posteriori* that God would not be perfect if there were no procession of the Word and Love in Him, and if, per impossibile, Paternity and Filiation were absent. From this you will easily understand that, when St. Thomas says in *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1: *Because the divine essence comprehends the perfections of all genera, nothing prevents relation from being found in it*, he does not mean that relation brings with itself a special perfection virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence. He means only that the divine essence, by reason of its infinite perfection, does not exclude relations from itself, but rather requires them as the terms of its

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fecundity, and would not be perfect if it lacked relations and Persons through whom it might diffuse itself and communicate its infinite perfection.

44. They object second: the subsistence of the Word, as virtually distinct from the essence, terminates the human nature and sanctifies it infinitely, is necessarily and infinitely loved by God, and must be adored with the worship of latria. Therefore, as such it signifies perfection.

I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequent. Therefore, as such it signifies a relative perfection virtually distinct from the perfection of the essence: I deny. An absolute perfection indistinct from the perfection of the essence: I grant. Therefore, we do not deny that the divine relations, as virtually distinct from the essence, signify perfection. For since the virtual distinction of the relations from the essence is not a distinction of reason after the manner of excluding and excluded things, as we showed in the preceding section, the divine relations, even as virtually distinct from the essence, implicitly include it and consequently contain its infinite perfection, by reason of which they can accomplish all the things enumerated in the objection.

45. They object third: the relations add to the essence an entity virtually distinct from it. Therefore, they also add perfection. The consequence seems manifest because goodness and perfection follow entity.

I answer, granting the antecedent, of which we shall speak below, and denying the consequence. To its proof, I distinguish the antecedent: goodness and perfection follow the character of being insofar as it exists in act or implies an order toward existence: I grant. Under the precise character of entity: I deny. For mathematical things, insofar as they are abstracted from sensible and singular matter, are true real beings, yet because they abstract from an order toward existence, they are not good as such, as St. Thomas teaches in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. Similarly, although the divine relations are true real and uncreated beings, nevertheless, because insofar as they are pure respects toward a term they neither express nor connote an order toward being except by reason of the essence they include, under this formality they have no relative goodness or perfection, but possess only the absolute existence and goodness of the essence transcendently included in them.

46. You will say that the character of the good and perfect is nothing other than the character of being insofar as it is fitting and consonant with the thing called good and perfect. But the divine relations, insofar as they are pure respects toward a term, are something fitting and consonant with the Persons constituted by them, since nothing can be more consonant and

fitting to a thing than its own proper constitutive and distinctive element. Therefore, the divine relations, insofar as they are pure respects toward a term, are good and perfect.

I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. For although the divine relations are in reality consonant and fitting to the Person they constitute, nevertheless, insofar as they are pure respects toward a term, they prescind from the character of fittingness and consonance with that Person. First, because under such formality and concept they prescind from existence and from an order toward it, as we saw above. But something is fitting insofar as it is in the act of existence or implies an order toward it. Second, because something is called fitting from an order toward the subject with which it is said to be consonant, so that it terminates in that subject. But the relations, insofar as they are pure respects, do not receive a subject by terminating in it, but only a term and correlative.

§ 4.

Resolution of the Fourth Difficulty.

47. The fourth difficulty is whether the divine relations carry with them relative existences proper to themselves and virtually distinct from the absolute existence of the essence. Most of the more recent authors affirm this. Since they do not distinguish existence from actual entity, they infer from the fact that there are in God three actual relative entities that three relative existences must also be admitted in Him. St. Thomas teaches the contrary in various places, especially in *De potentia*, q. 2, a. 6, where he writes: *It must not be granted that anything absolute is multiplied in the divine, as some say that there is a twofold existence in the divine, essential and personal. For all existence in the divine is essential, nor does a Person have existence except through the existence of the essence.* Hence it is permissible to argue thus: things that are absolute are not multiplied in the divine. But the existence of a relation is absolute. Therefore, it is not multiplied in the Divine Persons. The major is certain. The minor is evident from what was said in the preceding section. There we showed that existence does not belong to a relation through an order toward the term it regards, but only from the subject in which it is received, and consequently that the divine relations, insofar as they are pure respects, do not express an order toward being, but only do so by reason of the essence they include and through whose existence they exist. Therefore, relative existences are superfluous for rendering the relations existent. Indeed, they seem to imply a contradiction,

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since it is repugnant for the same reality to have two ultimate actualities and two ultimate terms.

48. I add that, since duration is nothing other than the continuation of a thing in being, there cannot be several existences in the Divine Persons unless there are also several durations and consequently several eternities, because eternity is nothing other than the duration of a wholly immutable thing. But if three relative eternities are admitted in the Divine Persons, They could be called three eternal beings, not only adjectivally and in a qualified sense, but also substantivally and without qualification. This is contrary to the Athanasian Creed, which says that the three Divine Persons are not three eternal beings, but one eternal being, just as They are not three uncreated beings or three immense beings, but one uncreated and one immense being. Nor is the answer of certain authors free from rashness when they say that Athanasius denies only three eternal beings absolutely and without qualification in the divine, but not with an addition, namely, in the relative genus. For since Athanasius, by the same words by which he denies three eternal beings, also denies three Gods and three omnipotent beings, if it is permissible to interpret him as denying three eternal beings not relatively but absolutely, it will likewise be permissible to explain him in the same way concerning three Gods and three omnipotent beings, and consequently to assert that the three Divine Persons can be called three Gods or three omnipotent beings, not absolutely but relatively.

49. You will object first: it belongs to the character of production to cause or produce existence in the thing produced. But through the productive action of the Son or Holy Spirit, the absolute existence of the essence is not produced, since it is unproducible, like the essence itself. Therefore, a personal and relative existence virtually distinct from the absolute existence of the essence is produced.

I answer by denying the major premise. For although production must be terminated at existence, it need not always produce existence, but it is sufficient that it communicate existence to the produced entity. For to produce a thing is to constitute it as existent, which can be done either by producing existence or by communicating to it an existence otherwise produced or unproduced. Therefore, it does not belong to the character of production to produce existence. Hence, through the productive action of the Son or Holy Spirit, existence is not produced, but only communicated. Certainly, production tends more principally toward the formal term than toward the existence of the thing, which is not the formal term but a condition of the term. Yet the divine essence, which, as modified by a relation, is the formal term of the divine processions, as we showed in ch. 3,

is not produced, but only communicated. Therefore, although production is terminated at existence, it is not rightly inferred that existence must be produced.

50. You will object second: existence is nothing other than actual entity. But there are three actual entities in God, namely, the three relations, which are beings in act and outside nothingness. Therefore, there are three existences in God.

I answer first by denying the major premise. For existence is not actual entity itself, but rather the actuality by which a thing stands outside its causes. Hence existence is so called because it signifies standing outside causes.

I answer second by distinguishing the minor. There are in God three actual entities through diverse actuality: I deny. Through the same actuality: I grant. For just as the Divine Persons are called three wise and omnipotent Persons adjectivally from the same wisdom and omnipotence, so They can be called three actual entities, or entities having actuality, from the same actuality and existence included in Them. From this you will understand that, although there are in the divine three modes of existing, as St. Thomas says in *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 5, ad 23, there are not three existences. For diverse modes of existing require only that the essential and absolute existence belong to the Divine Persons in diverse ways, just as the essence belongs to Them: in the Father as possessed of Himself, in the Son as communicated by the Father through generation, and in the Holy Spirit as communicated by both through Spiration.

51. You will object third: if the existence of the Divine Persons were not relative but absolute, it would follow that the eternal Father is toward Himself and not toward another, which is contrary to the character of relatives.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: the eternal Father would be toward Himself as to existence: I grant. As to quiddity or relative character: I deny.

52. You will object fourth: existence must be proportioned to the entity whose existence it is. Therefore, the existence of the divine relations must be relative.

I answer that existence must be proportioned to the entity whose existence it is according to the common character of substance and accident. Therefore, a substantial entity cannot exist through an accidental existence, nor an accidental entity through a substantial existence. But it need not be proportioned according to other particular characters. For in man the body exists through the existence of the soul, which is spiritual, as is its essence.

CHAPTER V.

The Divine Persons in Common.

Before discussing the Divine Persons individually, we must treat them in common and briefly examine certain scholastic difficulties customarily debated here.

§ 1.

The Divine Persons Are Constituted by Relations.

1. This truth is gathered first from Scripture, in which the Divine Persons are expressed by the relative names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and from the Councils. For in the Eleventh Council of Toledo, the confession of faith states: *The number is discerned in the relation of the Persons*. And below: *They intimate number solely by being referred to one another*. Likewise, at the Council of Florence, the Patriarch Bessarion, in his discourse for union, c. 6, expressly teaches that the Divine Persons are constituted by relations.

2. Reason also proves this. For that which alone distinguishes a Divine Person must constitute that Person. But relation alone distinguishes the Divine Persons. Therefore, it constitutes them. The major premise is evident from the common doctrine of the philosophers, who teach that each thing is distinguished from others by that through which it is constituted in its own being, and consequently that the same thing is both distinctive and constitutive in things. The minor premise is shown thus: distinction in the Divine Persons arises solely from that from which incommunicability arises. But incommunicability proceeds from relation alone, since all absolute formalities and perfections are common to the three Persons. Therefore, so also does personal distinction.

3. This is confirmed. Multiplication and distinction can arise only from either limitation or opposition. But in God it cannot arise from limitation. Therefore, it arises from opposition. Yet in God there can be no opposition other than relative opposition, which is the least of all oppositions and does not exclude or expel the extremes opposed, but rather so implies and posits them that, if one is destroyed, the other cannot subsist. Therefore, the Divine Persons cannot be distinguished and multiplied among themselves except through relations. Hence the celebrated pronouncement of Boethius:

Substance provides unity; relation multiplies the Trinity. And that of Anselm: All things in God are one where the opposition of relation does not intervene.

4. The same truth can further be established by this reasoning. The Divine Persons are constituted by something real. But this cannot be something absolute, because all absolute things are common to the three Persons. Yet what is common to the three Persons cannot constitute a particular Person distinct from another to whom that same perfection is common. Therefore, it must be something notional, which is only twofold, namely origin and relation. But a Divine Person is not constituted by active or passive origins. Therefore, only by relations. The subordinate minor premise, in which alone there can be difficulty, is proved first from the principles established above in c. 3. For there we showed that origin in God, both active and passive, directly imports something absolute, and only by connotation and indirectly expresses relation as modifying it. But the constitutive principle of the Divine Persons cannot directly be something absolute, but must be something respective, since it is incommunicable and really distinguishes the Person, which can belong only to something respective. Therefore, origin, whether active or passive, does not constitute the Divine Persons.

5. The same minor premise is proved secondly by the fundamental argument drawn from St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 3. A thing is constituted in its being prior to operating. Therefore, the Father is conceived as constituted in personal being prior to generating the Son, and consequently cannot be constituted as a Person through generation. The same is evident concerning the Son, for passive generation is not a form giving being formally, but only by way of a path, insofar as it is the way to filiation, which formally constitutes Him as a Person.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated from the same Holy Doctor below, q. 40, a. 2. The constitutive principle of a thing must be signified as remaining in it, not as proceeding from it or tending into it. But active origin is signified as proceeding from a Person, and passive origin as tending into a Person. Therefore, origin as such is not a form constituting a Person.

6. So that the various difficult objections customarily raised in this matter may be resolved more easily and clearly, and so that the doctrine given may be further elucidated, it must be carefully observed that a relation of origin in God is so eminent and perfect that, by reason of its perfection and eminence, it is equivalent not only to all created relations but also to all created subsistences and personalities. Hence it performs the functions of relation and personality just as though the notions of personality and

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relation were really distinguished in it. The reason is that a divine relation is not an accident inhering in a subject, as a created relation is, but is identified with the divine substance, and thus, by the force of its own line, is something substantial and subsistent. Hence theologians distinguish in divine relations, for example in paternity, two concepts or two inadequate functions, namely that of a referring form, or a pure respect toward a term, and that of a subsisting hypostatic form. Under the former consideration, they say that paternity presupposes generation and is founded upon it; under the latter, however, that it precedes generation and constitutes the Person. St. Thomas clearly gives this doctrine in various places, but especially here, q. 40, a. 4, where he says: *The personal property of the Father can be considered in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is a relation, and thus, according to our understanding, it presupposes the notional act, because a relation as such is founded upon an act; in another way, insofar as it constitutes the Person, and thus the relation must be understood as prior to the notional act, just as the acting Person is understood as prior to the action.*

7. Capreolus gives the same doctrine in other terms, In I, dist. 26, q. 1, where he teaches that relation in God is considered in two ways, namely as an individual form and insofar as it is a relation. Under the first aspect it is said to give incommunicability and constitute the Persons; under the other, to presuppose the constituted Person and origin. Similarly, Cajetan, below, q. 40, a. 4, says that paternity in God can be considered in two ways, namely as conceived and as exercised. In the first way it precedes generation, constitutes the Person of the Father, and exercises the function of a hypostatic form; in the second way it follows generation, is founded upon it, exercises the function of a relative form, and has the very act of referring. From this doctrine the principal arguments against our position are resolved.

8. It is therefore objected first: The Father is presupposed as constituted in personal being prior to generation, since a person exists before acting. But paternity does not belong to the Father prior to generation, but follows it, since generation is the foundation of paternity. Therefore, the Father is not constituted as a Person through paternity.

This argument is confirmed and pressed further. What follows something that does not constitute the person but presupposes the person cannot itself constitute him as a person. But paternity follows generation, which does not constitute the Person of the Father but presupposes Him as constituted, since the constitution of a thing is presupposed to its action. Therefore, paternity does not constitute the Father as a Person, but presupposes Him as constituted.

9. To this very difficult objection I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor: paternity does not belong to the Father prior to generation insofar as it is a relation, I grant; insofar as it is a hypostatic form, I deny. Similarly, to the confirmation I distinguish the minor premise: paternity, insofar as it is a relation or exercises the function of referring, follows generation, I grant the minor; insofar as it is a hypostatic form and performs the function of subsistence, I deny the minor.

10. You will say first: It is impossible to conceive any form as united or communicated to a subject unless it bestows its formal effect upon it. But the formal effect of a relation is actually to refer. Therefore, by the very fact that paternity is understood as united or communicated to a subject, it is understood as actually referring; and consequently it is contradictory for paternity to be understood as constituting the Father as a Person prior to generation unless, for that same priority, it is also understood as actually referring the Father to the Son.

I answer that, although a form existing in reality must in reality bestow its entire formal effect upon a capable subject, nevertheless, if several formal effects proceed from that form, it need not bestow them all upon the subject under every priority. Hence it can, under some priority, be understood as bestowing one formal effect without being understood as bestowing another. This is evident in the rational soul, which under one priority bestows the corporeal grade, under which it does not yet bestow the grades of vegetating, sensing, and reasoning. Therefore, although paternity in God has as its formal effect, or quasi-formal effect, the referring of the Father to the Son, and prior to the act of generation is understood as belonging to the first Person, it need not under that priority constitute Him as actually related. It is enough that, under a later sign following generation, it bestow such an effect.

11. You will say secondly: The constitutive principle of a thing must distinguish it from others. But paternity, under the concept of a hypostatic form and in the sign antecedent to generation, does not distinguish the Father from the Son, since under that priority the Son is not yet understood. Therefore, neither does it constitute the Father as a Person under such a sign.

I answer by denying the major premise. For although the constitutive principle of a thing must be capable of distinguishing it from others, it need not actually distinguish it from others. Thus, before other men existed, that by which Adam was constituted did not actually distinguish him from them but was merely capable of distinguishing him. Hence, although the concept of subsistence or a hypostatic form does not actually distinguish the Father

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from the Son in the sign antecedent to generation, in which the Son is not yet understood, nevertheless, because it can distinguish Him from the Son and essentially requires connection with a respect toward a term by which the Father is actually distinguished from the Son, the Father is therefore constituted as a Person through it. This solution is St. Thomas's, *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7.

12. You will say thirdly: The notion of a hypostatic form and that of a relation in paternity are not virtually distinguished, but are only two inadequate formalities and functions of it. Therefore, whatever is said of one must also be affirmed of the other; and consequently, if paternity as a hypostatic form constitutes the Person, it will also constitute Him insofar as it is a relation.

I answer that, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For it is true to say of the second Person of the Trinity that He is the Word of creatures and that He is not their son, although the notion of word and the notion of son are not virtually distinguished in Him. The divinity is also united to the minds of the blessed as a species, but not as intellection or nature; and yet, according to the more probable opinion, species, intellection, and nature are one and the same formality without virtual distinction. Likewise, in the Divine Word, the notions of vital term and representation are not virtually distinguished, and yet He can be united to the minds of the blessed insofar as He is a most actual representation, but cannot be united under the notion of the vital term of intellection. Why, then, can it not likewise be affirmed of paternity insofar as it is a hypostatic form that it constitutes the Father, while this is denied of it insofar as it is a relation, although the concepts of hypostatic form and relation are identified in it without virtual distinction?

13. It is objected secondly: The Divine Persons are constituted by origins. Therefore, they are not constituted by relations. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. The first distinctive principle of a thing is also its constitutive principle. But active generation distinguishes the Father from the other Divine Persons prior to paternity, since it is prior to paternity as its foundation. Therefore, it constitutes the Father in personal being.

The solution to this argument is evident from what has already been said. For I answer that, although the distinction given to the Father by active generation is prior to that which paternity gives insofar as it refers, or insofar as it has the mode of an exercised relation, it is not prior to that which paternity gives insofar as it has the notion of a hypostatic form.

14. You will say: Passive generation is prior to filiation, even insofar as filiation has the notion of subsistence and hypostatic form, since passive

generation is, as it were, its becoming. Therefore, the Son is constituted as a Person through passive origin.

But I deny the consequence. For although passive generation precedes filiation by a priority from which, it nevertheless has the character of something by way of a path and flowing, not of something fixed and permanent, which is required for a constitutive principle, as is evident from what was said above.

15. You will insist: Although origin under the explicit concept of flux, procession, and way cannot constitute the Person of the Son, why can it not constitute Him as a hypostatic form and under the concept of something subsistent, which it implicitly includes in itself because it is divine? Thus, in our position, although filiation insofar as it refers the Son to the Father cannot constitute the Son as a Person, it can nevertheless do so under the concept of subsistence and hypostatic form, which it implicitly imports.

I answer that this difference exists between relations and origins: the reference toward a term which relation expresses is not repugnant to inherence or subsistence; indeed, relation so expresses a respect toward a term that it requires one of these, namely created relation requires inherence and divine relation subsistence. But the explicit concept of a way does not require implicit permanence, as is evident in created generation, which, although it inheres, does not inhere permanently but by way of a path and transiently. The same must be said of divine generation, namely that, although it is in reality permanent, nevertheless by force of the concept which it expresses it does not require permanence. Yet it would have to require permanence if, according to the implicit concept, it were consequently able to have the notion of a hypostatic form and be constitutive of a Person.

16. It is objected thirdly: What is constituted is caused by its constituent principle and depends upon it. But the Divine Persons can neither be caused by nor depend upon anything. Therefore, neither can They be constituted.

I answer that real causality and dependence are not necessarily required between what is constituted and its constituent principle; virtual causality and dependence suffice. But there is no difficulty in admitting virtual causality and dependence in God, as is evident in the divine nature with respect to the attributes, and in the attribute of immutability with respect to the attribute of eternity. For by virtual causality and dependence, theologians do not understand equivalent causality and dependence, as the author of *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* supposes and therefore rejects it from God as inseparable from imperfection. Rather, they say that one thing is virtually caused by and depends upon another when it is so related to it that,

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if by impossibility it could be caused by and depend upon anything, it would be caused by and depend upon nothing other than that. In this, not even a shadow of imperfection or defect is imported.

§ 2.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

17. From what has been said, it is gathered first, against Scotus, that Divine Person does not formally signify the mere negation of communicability. For Divine Person formally signifies that by which the Divine Persons are formally constituted. But the Divine Persons are not formally constituted by the mere negation of communicability, but by something real and positive, namely relation, as was shown above. Therefore, Divine Person does not formally signify the mere negation of communicability, but something real and positive, namely divine relation.

18. You will say with Scotus: A person is an incommunicable substance of a rational nature. But the term *incommunicable* signifies only the negation of communicability. Therefore, person in common, and consequently Divine Person, formally expresses only the negation of communicability.

I answer by denying the minor premise. For just as, when an angel is said to be immaterial and a horse irrational, the terms *immaterial* and *irrational* do not formally signify mere negations, although they explain negations circumlocutively or *a posteriori*, so also, when a person is said to be an incommunicable substance of a rational nature, the term *incommunicable* does not signify a mere negation, but something positive founding the negation of communicability.

19. You will insist: In a Divine Person nothing positive can be assigned in which the negation of communicability is founded. Therefore, He formally signifies only the negation. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. If something positive were given in a Divine Person in which that negation was founded, it would especially be relation. But relation cannot found the negation of communicability. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved. Paternity, for example, founds the negation of communicability either from the notion of relation as such or from the concept of this particular relation. Not the first, otherwise the relation of spirator would also be incommunicable. Nor the second, for paternity, from the concept of paternity, imports only the order of origin of one from whom another proceeds, in which no notion of incommunicability is imported.

Therefore, divine relation cannot be the foundation of the negation of communicability.

I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I deny the minor premise; and to the proof of that, I also deny the minor premise as regards its second part. For by the very fact that paternity in God is a relation of origin through an action of the intellect, it has such a manner of belonging to one Person that it cannot belong to any other, and therefore it founds the negation of communicability. But the relation of spirator, because it is founded upon the origin of the Holy Spirit, who is the term of mutual love, requires that it be common to two Persons, and consequently cannot found the negation of communicability.

20. It is gathered secondly that Divine Person does not formally signify relation insofar as it is formally a respect toward a term, but insofar as it is substantially subsistent and performs the function of a hypostatic form. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 29, a. 4, where he says: *Divine Person signifies relation directly and essence indirectly, yet not relation insofar as it is relation, but insofar as it is signified after the manner of a hypostasis.*

21. Reason also supports this. For, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 4, ad 13, the name Divine Person does not, according to its name, refer to another and therefore is not a formally relative name but an absolute one. Therefore, its formal signification is not formally relative, nor consequently is it divine relation insofar as relation exercises the function of referring and is formally a respect toward a term. The consequence is evident, for a name is formally constituted by its signification, and consequently a name that is not relative but absolute requires as its form a signification that is not relative but formally absolute.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. If the formal signification of this name were formally relative, or divine relation insofar as it exercises the function of referring and is formally a respect toward a term, this name Divine Person would be said relatively. Consequently, just as the Father is called and is the Father of the Son, and conversely, so also the Father would be called the Person of the Son and the Son the Person of the Father. But the Father is not called the Person of the Son, and Augustine judges it absurd to assert the contrary in *De Trinitate*, l. 1, c. 6, where he says: *It is not acceptable for us to call the Father the Person of the Son.* Therefore, the formal signification of the name Divine Person is not formally relative, or divine relation insofar as it exercises the function of referring and is formally a respect toward a term, but insofar as it is subsistent and performs the function of a hypostatic form. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 4, ad 1, explaining the saying of Augustine, *In the Trinity, when we speak of the Person of the*

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Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father, for Person is said with reference to oneself, not to the Son, says that the name Person is said with reference to oneself and not to another because it signifies relation not after the manner of a relation, but after the manner of a substance which is a hypostasis.

22. From this you will understand that divine relations are signified in one way by the name Divine Person and in another by these three distinct names: *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*. For Divine Person formally and explicitly signifies the divine relations under the concept of things subsisting incommunicably, just as person in common signifies that which subsists incommunicably in any intellectual nature; but implicitly and materially it signifies them under the concept of relations and insofar as they exercise the function of referring to a term or correlative. Conversely, the three aforesaid names formally and explicitly signify the relations under the concept of relations and insofar as they are respects toward a term; but implicitly and materially they import them under the concept of subsisting things.

§ 3.

In God Considered in Himself and as Understood Prior to the Relations and Persons, There is an Absolute Subsistence.

23. St. Thomas teaches this in various places, especially in *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 5, ad 13, in these words: *The supposita of the divine nature are not the principle by which the divine essence subsists, for the divine essence is subsistent of itself*. And in *Summa contra Gentiles*, l. IV, c. 14, he says that *in God there are several subsistent realities if the relations are considered, and one subsistent reality if the essence is considered*. And In III, dist. 6, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2, he asserts that in God the essence itself is subsistent, and hence being is due to it of itself; indeed, it is its own subsistent being. From this last passage it is manifest that the Holy Doctor does not use subsistence for existence, as some interpret him, since from the fact that the divine essence itself is subsistent in God he infers that being is due to it of itself, indeed that it is its own being. This reasoning would be altogether pointless if by the term *subsistent* he understood *existing*, for it would be the same as saying that, because the divine essence itself is existing in God, existence is due to it.

24. Reason also favors this position. For God, as understood prior to the Persons, is subsistent. But not by personal and relative subsistence. Therefore, by essential and absolute subsistence. The minor premise is evident, since personal and relative subsistence constitutes a Person. If God

under that priority were subsistent by relative and personal subsistence, He would be a Person, and thus there would be four Persons in God, contrary to faith and the express definition of the Lateran Council denying a quaternity of Persons in God. The major premise, in which alone there can be difficulty, is proved first. God, as understood prior to the Persons, creates and performs works *ad extra*, otherwise the works of the Trinity *ad extra* would not be undivided. Under that priority He also understands and wills. Therefore, under that priority He is subsistent, since actions belong to subsisting things and nothing can operate unless it subsists of itself, as St. Thomas says below, q. 75, a. 2.

25. The same major premise is proved secondly. To subsist expresses the greatest perfection, for it expresses the most perfect mode of being. Therefore, it must not be denied to God considered in Himself and as understood prior to the relations and Persons. The consequence is evident, both because every imaginable perfection must be found in the divine essence, and because the relations add no perfection to the divine essence, but rather receive from it all the perfection they possess, as we showed in the preceding chapter.

The same major premise is shown thirdly. The divine essence is infinite within its own line. Therefore, it is also subsistent. The consequence is proved. A created nature does not subsist within its own line, but by reason of its suppositum, because it is finite and thus depends upon the suppositum as sustaining it. Therefore, if the divine nature within its own line is infinitely perfect, it will be subsistent within its own line.

The same major premise is established fourthly by an argument drawn from the treatise on the Incarnation. For, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 3, a. 3, with the personalities abstracted by the intellect, God can assume a created nature. Therefore, God, as understood prior to the Persons, is subsistent. The consequence is evident. For if under that priority He were not subsistent, He could not supply the function of created subsistence and render a created nature subsistent. It is contradictory for a nature to be rendered subsistent except through its own subsistence or another's. Therefore, He could not assume it, for assumption consists in God's terminating another nature and supplying the function of created subsistence.

26. Our assertion can be established by another argument. For by the absolute subsistence which we say belongs to the divine nature of itself, we understand nothing other than a perfection excluding dependence upon another as sustaining it. But the divine nature of itself, and as understood prior to the relations and Persons, possesses such perfection and

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independence, since it does not depend upon the relations for existing, but rather the relations exist through its existence, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore, the divine nature of itself, and as understood prior to the relations and Persons, possesses absolute subsistence.

27. You will say that the notion of subsistence is not preserved in such selfhood and independence, but only in the selfhood that excludes communicability to another as a suppositum. Hence, since selfhood prior to the relations does not belong to the divine nature, because it is communicable to the three Persons, under that priority it cannot be called subsistent.

But to the contrary, St. Thomas here, q. 29, a. 2, says: *Substance, insofar as it exists of itself and not in another, is called subsistence, for we call those things subsistent which exist not in another but in themselves*. Therefore, he judges that the notion of subsistence consists in selfhood of existing. Hence the rational soul separated from the body is said to subsist for no other reason than that, thus separated, it enjoys perfect independence, although it is communicable.

This is confirmed. Created subsistence gives two things to the nature which it terminates: first, that it exists of itself with the selfhood of independence; secondly, that it exists of itself with the selfhood of incommunicability. But the divine relations, because they give the second selfhood, are said to be and truly are subsistences. Therefore, if an absolute formality gives the first to the divine essence, it will truly be subsistence and will possess the name absolute subsistence, especially since such a formality gives the divine nature not only selfhood of existence, but also the notion of the principle which with respect to intellection, volition, creation, conservation, and the other operations belonging to God in Himself and as understood prior to the relations and Persons. For if, under such a priority, the divine nature were not subsistent by some absolute subsistence, it could be only the principle by which of such operations, since actions belong only to subsisting things.

28. It is objected first: If God subsisted prior to the relations, He would be a Person, since a person is nothing other than that which subsists in an intellectual nature. But this cannot be said, otherwise there would be a quaternity of Persons in God, which was condemned at the Lateran Council. Therefore, neither can the former be said.

I answer by distinguishing the major premise. If God, prior to the relations, subsisted by personal and incommunicable subsistence, He would be a Person, I grant the major. If He subsisted by absolute and communicable subsistence, I deny the major. For the notion of person requires that it subsist in an intellectual nature incommunicably.

29. You will say that He will at least be a semiperson, because He will possess one of the requirements for the notion of person, namely subsistence or selfhood in existing.

But I deny the consequence. For just as, because a horse participates in the notion of animal, which is one of the essential predicates of man, it cannot be called half a man, so likewise, although God prior to the relations possesses subsistence, which is one of the requirements for the notion of Person, He cannot be called a semiperson. The reason is that the essences of things consist in something indivisible and are like numbers, which change species by the addition or subtraction of a unit. Hence, when the essential and specific difference is removed, the species is immediately destroyed, although one of the essential predicates remains.

30. It is objected secondly: The divine nature, prior to the relations, requires to exist in the three Persons. Therefore, under that priority it does not exist independently of another as sustaining it, and consequently does not subsist by absolute subsistence.

I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For although the divine nature requires to be in the three Persons by reason of its infinite fecundity, it does not require to be in Them by reason of need and in order to exist of itself, since it has this by reason of itself. Hence it is in the three Persons precisely as terminating it, not as sustaining it. Nor is it an objection that the divine essence cannot exist without the relations. For neither can God's omnipotence exist without the possibility of creatures, nor divine intellection without the Word. Yet the possibility of creatures is not required because of any need, but because of the fecundity of omnipotence; nor is the production of the Word required because of need, but because of the fecundity of divine intellection.

31. It is objected thirdly: In creatures, personality renders the nature independent of another as sustaining it and incommunicable to another as a suppositum. Therefore, likewise in God, personality or relative subsistence gives both, and consequently absolute subsistence is posited needlessly.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. For in a created nature, what pertains to perfection, namely independence from a sustaining subject, and what pertains to incommunicability can be given by the same form. But in God, what pertains to perfection can be given only by the essence, and incommunicability can arise only from the relations.

32. From what has been said, it is gathered that there are two principal functions of absolute subsistence, namely to constitute the divine nature as existing of itself and independent of another as sustaining it, and to render God, as understood prior to the relations and Persons, the principle which of

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creation, conservation, and the other operations *ad extra*, which are undivided and common to the whole Trinity and belong to God considered in Himself and as understood prior to the Persons. Although the Deity understood prior to the Persons is subsistent and the principle which of operations *ad extra*, it cannot be the principle which of generating *ad intra*, because for this it is required that it subsist incommunicably, or by relative subsistence, since there must be a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated, which can exist only through relations, as will be clearer from what is said in the following section.

§ 4.

Besides the Absolute and Common Subsistence, There are in God Three Relative and Personal Subsistences.

33. This is gathered from various testimonies of the Councils and Holy Fathers. For in the Sixth General Synod, action 11, it is said: *The most holy Trinity is made numerable by personal subsistences*. Athanasius, in his discourse on the Mother of God, says: *We proclaim one God in three subsistences, in which there is one substance*. Cyril of Alexandria, dialogue on the Trinity, l. 3: *The whole discourse of our faith tends to this, that we behold one nature of the Deity which properly subsists in three subsistences*. Ambrose, in *Symbolum Apostolorum*, c. 2: *It is Catholic that we confess one God according to the unity of substance and acknowledge the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each in His own subsistence*. Finally, Damascene, *De fide*, l. 1, c. 9: *The Son has His own subsistence besides that which is the Father's*. And again: *Three hypostases, that is, three subsistences*. These testimonies are so clear that they cannot be obscured by any clouds of evasion. Nor is it an objection that the Fathers ordinarily take subsistence concretely, so that it is the same as person. For since concrete substantives are not multiplied unless their formal signification is multiplied, from the fact that the Fathers and Councils teach that there are three subsistences concretely in God, it is rightly inferred that, according to their mind, there are three subsistences in the abstract, just as three personalities are rightly inferred from three Persons. I add that the Sixth Synod speaks of subsistences as forms or quasi-forms by which the most holy Trinity is constituted and numbered, which is to speak of subsistences in the abstract.

34. The same truth can be established by three arguments. The first has already been indicated. For since the multiplication of a concrete substantive, such as a suppositum or person, requires multiplication of the

form, and since the name person formally signifies subsistence, if there were only one subsistence in God, just as there is one divine nature, it could no more be said that there are three Persons in God than that there are three Gods in God. Rather, we would be altogether bound to admit only one Person in God, just as we confess one God, which is completely to destroy the mystery of the Trinity.

This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. Person cannot be multiplied in God unless personality is also multiplied, for personality is constitutive of person just as humanity is constitutive of man. But personality cannot be multiplied unless subsistence is also multiplied, because when an inferior is multiplied, the superior must also be multiplied. Subsistence is something superior to personality, which adds to subsistence that it be incommunicable and of an intellectual nature, as is evident from this definition of person given by Boethius: *A person is an individual substance of a rational nature*. Therefore, Person cannot be multiplied in God unless subsistence is multiplied.

35. The second argument is that, since actions belong only to subsisting things, and in God there are not only essential operations common to the whole Trinity but also notional operations proper to the Divine Persons, such as generating and spirating, just as there is in God, as understood prior to the relations and Persons, an absolute subsistence through which He is constituted as the principle which of understanding, willing, creating, and governing the universe, so in the Father there must be a relative subsistence through which He is constituted as the principle which of generation; another in the Son through which, together with the Father, He is constituted as the principle which of active spiration; and another in the Holy Spirit through which He is constituted as the term which of this action. For just as the principle which, so also the term which of a notional action must be subsistent, since passions or quasi-passions, no less than actions, belong to subsisting things.

36. The third argument is this. The incommunicability expressed by the Divine Persons is not a mere negation but is founded upon something positive, as was shown in § 2. But this can be nothing other than subsistence. Therefore, three subsistences must be admitted in the Divine Persons. The minor premise is proved because, if that positive principle were not subsistence, it would have the mode of something adjacent; and since it is constitutive of the Person in personal being, the Divine Person would have the mode of something adjacent to an existing reality. This is absurd and approaches the error of Gilbert of Poitiers, who imagined the Divine Persons as assisting the divine essence and being, as it were, adjacent to it. Hence St.

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Thomas here, q. 40, a. 3, says that *the personal properties are not understood as coming to the divine hypostases as forms to a preexisting subject, but carry their supposita with themselves, insofar as they are the subsisting Persons themselves.*

A fourth argument can be added from the mystery of the Incarnation, in which the union of the humanity was made primarily to the personal subsistence of the Divine Word and not to the common and absolute subsistence; otherwise, the three Persons would be said to have become incarnate. But concerning this, see the treatise on the Incarnation, c. 6.

37. It is objected first: St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 5, ad 13, says that *the divine nature is subsistent of itself, but, conversely, the personal properties have from the essence that they subsist.* Therefore, he judges that the Divine Persons do not carry relative subsistences with themselves, but subsist through the absolute subsistence of the essence included in Them and modified in different ways by the divine relations. Reason also seems to favor this position. For since only two things are imported in the notion of person, namely to subsist incommunicably, the first can be given to the Divine Persons by the absolute subsistence included in Them, while the second is given by the relations, which, by reason of the relative opposition they possess, found distinction and incommunicability in the Divine Persons. Thus it seems superfluous to admit three relative subsistences in the Divine Persons besides the absolute subsistence, since the absolute subsistence, as modified by three relations, can give everything required for the notion and constitution of a Divine Person.

38. To the testimony of St. Thomas I answer that, when he says that the personal properties have from the essence that they subsist, he is not speaking of subsistence insofar as it expresses the perfection of incommunicability, but of subsistence insofar as it expresses perfect independence from another as sustaining it. For since subsistence under this aspect is the greatest perfection, it proceeds from the divine essence and not from the relations, which of themselves express no perfection. St. Augustine must be understood in the same sense when he says in *De Trinitate*, l. 2, c. 5: *Every reality subsists with reference to itself; how much more God.* For there he speaks of subsistence insofar as it expresses perfect independence from another as sustaining it, which is absolute and is said with reference to oneself, not to another.

39. The response to the argument is evident from what was said above. For we showed that the Divine Persons cannot be multiplied unless the subsistences are multiplied. Consequently, an absolute subsistence modified by relations is not enough for the constitution and multiplication of the Divine Persons; rather, the relations themselves must carry with them

relative subsistences proper to themselves, which found in Them the negation of communicability and constitute Them as the principle which of notional actions, just as absolute subsistence constitutes God, as understood prior to the relations and Persons, the principle which of the essential operations, which are undivided and common to the whole Trinity.

40. It is objected secondly: Because existence is the ultimate term, it cannot be actuated by another existence, nor is a relative existence admitted in God besides the absolute one, as was shown in the preceding chapter. But subsistence is also the ultimate term in the line of subsisting. Therefore, it cannot be terminated by another, nor can a relative subsistence be admitted besides the absolute one.

41. I answer by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. Personal subsistence is the ultimate term, I grant the minor. Nonpersonal subsistence is the ultimate term, I deny the minor. For absolute subsistence, just as it is not incommunicable, so also does not have the notion of an ultimate term.

§ 5.

Which Names Are Said Singularly or Plurally in God?

42. To discern which names are said singularly or plurally in God, theologians establish this rule as certain: those which belong to the Persons by reason of the essence alone are said only singularly. Those which belong to Them only by reason of the personal properties are said only plurally. Those, however, which belong to Them by reason of both the properties and the essence are said both plurally and singularly. The reason is that relation is multiplied in the Divine Persons, while the essence remains one in Them. Therefore, those which belong to Them by reason of the essence alone retain unity; those which belong by reason of relation alone do not possess unity, but are said only plurally; and those which belong by reason of both are said singularly insofar as they belong by reason of the essence, and plurally insofar as they belong by reason of the relations.

43. From this general rule it follows first that there are said to be three Persons in God and in no way one Person, because the notion of Person does not belong by reason of the essence, nor can it be taken for the essence, but only for a subsisting relation. Hence, since by the common consent of the Church person and hypostasis are now taken for the same thing, just as in God there are said to be three Persons and not one, so also there must be said to be three hypostases and not one hypostasis.

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44. It follows secondly that subsistence is said to be one, and that several are admitted: the first insofar as subsistence is taken for the perfection of independence; the second insofar as it is used for the perfection of incommunicability. For subsistence taken in the first way belongs to the Divine Persons by reason of the essence, but in the second acceptation belongs to Them by reason of the relations, as is evident from what was said in the preceding chapter.

45. It follows thirdly that there must be said to be one existence in God and in no way several, because, as was shown in the preceding chapter, existence is said absolutely and belongs to the Divine Persons by reason of the essence, not by reason of the relations. From this:

46. It follows fourthly that neither eternity nor duration is said plurally in God, because these attributes either are not distinguished from the divine existence or at least are modes of it; hence, since existence is not multiplied, they cannot be multiplied.

47. It follows fifthly that the three Divine Persons cannot be called three perfect beings or three good beings substantively, but only adjectivally, because, as we showed above, neither perfection nor goodness is multiplied in the Divine Persons, since they do not belong to Them by reason of the relations but only by reason of the essence.

48. It follows sixthly that in God there is not a threefold holiness, but only one, because holiness does not belong to the Divine Persons by reason of the relations, any more than perfection or goodness does, but only by reason of the nature transcendently included in Them.

49. It follows seventhly that the name *being*, if it is a concrete term signifying the same as that which has essence or existence, cannot be multiplied when taken substantively, since there is one essence and existence in the Persons; yet it can be multiplied adjectivally, because there are three possessing the divine essence and existence. But if such a name is a concrete term signifying the same as that which has entity, then it is truly multiplied even substantively, just as there are truly three really distinct entities.

50. It follows eighthly that the Divine Persons are called one reality and several realities: one reality which is the essence, and several realities which are the relations, because reality, which consists in being not fictitious but ratified, is taken both for the essence and for the relations. Hence Augustine says in *De doctrina Christiana*, c. 5: *The realities which are to be enjoyed are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.* And immediately adds: *The Trinity is a certain supreme reality.*

51. It follows ninthly that in God there are three unities and one unity: the first by reason of the relations, the second by reason of the essence, because unity consists in undivided reality. But reality and indivision belong to each of the Divine Persons not only by reason of the essence but also by reason of the relations. Therefore, unity belongs to Them by reason of both.

52. It follows tenthly that in God there is not a threefold truth, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 7. For truth is taken either for formal truth, which consists in cognition, and thus, just as there is one cognition in the three Persons, so also one formal truth in Them; or for transcendental truth, which consists in entity as intelligible, as is taught in the *Metaphysica*. But intelligibility is not multiplied in God because it belongs only by reason of the essence, since the essence alone has the notion of intelligible species and moving object with respect to itself, the attributes, and the relations, as we showed in the treatise on God's knowledge. Therefore, neither is transcendental truth multiplied.

53. It follows finally that the three Persons cannot be called three individuals, because in individuals the nature is divided. But in the Divine Persons the essence remains altogether undivided. Therefore, They cannot be called three individuals, although They can be called three Persons. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 30, a. 4, establishes this difference between person and individual: person has personality as its formal signification and nature as its material signification; individual, conversely, has nature as its formal signification and personality as its material signification. Hence, just as the nature is not multiplied in God, neither is the individual.

§ 6.

The Notions by Which the Divine Persons Can Be Known.

54. At the beginning of this treatise we discussed the knowability of the Divine Persons and showed that the mystery of the Trinity cannot be known from natural effects. We must now speak briefly of Their notions, or the marks and characteristics by which They can be known and distinguished from one another.

55. A notion, therefore, is defined by St. Thomas here, q. 32, aa. 2 and 3, as *the proper principle for knowing a Divine Person*. By *proper principle* he does not understand the formal concept by which we know one Person particularly and discern Him from another, but the objective concept, that is, the property, form, or special mark by which one Divine Person is distinguished from another and which corresponds to the formal notion.

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Hence it is described by others thus: *A notion is an objective principle making a Person known, or distinguishing one Person from another or from the others.* From this the Holy Doctor infers first, In I, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 3, that three things are required for something to be called a notion in God. The first is that it signify something pertaining to origin, because the Divine Persons are distinguished by relations of origin. The second is that it pertain to dignity, or at least denote it, because person is a name of dignity, as the same Angelic Doctor teaches here, q. 32, a. 3. The third is that it express something special, because what is common to the three Persons cannot be a principle for discerning one Person from another. Secondly, he infers in the same place that this difference exists among relations, properties, and notions: although these three belong to the same formality without virtual distinction, the first nevertheless belongs to this formality with respect to the correlative; the second by comparison with the Person whose property it is; and the third comparatively to the intellect, for which it is a principle manifesting the constituted Person. From this he also infers that in a relation the notion of respect toward the term or correlative is understood first, then the notion of property, and finally the notion of notion, because nothing can be a principle manifesting another unless it is proper to that other, nor can it be proper to that other unless it is distinguished from others, which in God is accomplished by relation.

56. Five notions are commonly assigned in God, namely paternity and innascibility in the Father, filiation in the Son, active spiration in the Father and the Son insofar as They are the principle of the Holy Spirit, and procession or passive spiration in the Holy Spirit Himself. For since the Divine Persons are constituted and distinguished by relations of origin, a Person can be known either by being the principle of a procession, or its term, or through the negation of procession. Thus, because the first Person does not proceed from another, He is known through innascibility or improducibility; and because He also produces the Son, He is made known through paternity; and because He produces the Holy Spirit together with the Son, the Father and the Son are known through active spiration. The Son, because He is the term of generation, is made known through filiation; and the Holy Spirit, who is the term of the active spiration of the Father and the Son, is known through passive spiration or procession. Thus there are five notions in God. So St. Thomas here, q. 32, a. 3.

57. You will say first: Generation and nativity are principles for knowing the Father and the Son. Therefore, they possess the notion of a notion.

I answer that, for something to possess the notion of a notion in God, it must be a principle for knowing a Divine Person in Himself. But generation

and nativity, since they are names signifying origins in becoming and tending, make known only the notional actions of the Divine Persons, not the Divine Persons Themselves in Themselves, and therefore they are not notions.

58. You will say secondly: It belongs to the notion of a notion that it pertain to dignity. But innascibility, since it is a negation, does not pertain to dignity. Therefore, it is not a notion.

59. I answer that it belongs to the notion of a notion that it either be a dignity or at least denote one, as we said above. Although innascibility by reason of itself is not formally a dignity, it nevertheless denotes and explains *a posteriori* the personal dignity of the first Person, namely the authority of a principle after the manner of the head and font of all the Divine Persons, as will be evident from what is said in the following chapter. From this you will easily understand why innascibility is a notion but inspirability is not, as Scotus supposes. For inspirability, or the negation of proceeding through the will, is neither a dignity nor does it denote dignity as innascibility does: both because, supposing that something is produced, it does not, according to our manner of conceiving, express dignity that it lacks this or that mode of production; and because inspirability, taken of itself, belongs to creatures, since they are not produced by spiration. I add that inspirability, or the negation of passive spiration, is involved in the notion of active spiration, which belongs to the Father and the Son. For by the very fact that one Person spirates, the Person spirated is opposed to Him, and consequently inspirability belongs to the one to whom the notion of Spirator belongs.

CHAPTER VI.

The Person of the Father.

1. Two names belong to the first Person, namely the name Father and the name unbegotten or innascible. The first is evident from what was said concerning the generation of the Word. For if the procession of the Word is generation, the Person from whom He proceeds is necessarily the generator and Father. The Holy Doctor observes here, q. 33, a. 2, ad 4, that since divine generation is most perfect and the generated term is most perfectly like the generator, since in Them there is numerically the same form and nature, the notion of fatherhood is found more perfectly in the first Person of the Trinity than in any creature, according to Eph. 3: *I bow my knees to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named*. From this he infers in a. 3 that the name Father is said of the first

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Person notionally prior to being said essentially, or belongs to the Father with respect to the Divine Son prior to belonging to Him with respect to creatures. For the notion of son is found perfectly in the eternal Word, since He is perfectly like the Father in nature, but imperfectly and defectively in creatures, of whom God is called Father by reason of the fourfold likeness He impresses upon them. He is called Father, first, of irrational creatures because of the likeness of a vestige: Job 38: *Who is the father of rain, or who begot the drops of dew?* Secondly, because of the likeness of the image impressed upon the rational creature: Deut. 32: *Is He not your Father, who possessed, made, and created you?* Thirdly, because of the likeness of grace found in the just: Rom. 8: *The Spirit Himself bears witness to our spirit that we are sons of God.* Fourthly, because of the likeness of glory found in the blessed: Rom. 5: *We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.* But the likeness of the Divine Word infinitely surpasses all these likenesses, since He is of the same nature as the Father.

2. Nor is it valid to say that common things in God are prior to proper and notional things. For this is true of common things taken absolutely, such as understanding and willing, but not of those which express a respect toward creatures. For since the Divine Word is the principle of the production of creatures, according to John 1, *All things were made through Him*, He proceeds from the Father prior to the creature, just as the word conceived in the mind of an artisan is conceived as proceeding from the artisan prior to the artifact produced according to its likeness.

3. For a fuller explanation of this excellent name, which possesses such religious significance and excellence that Cyril and Theodoret assert that the first Person places it before the title God and delights in the appellation Father more than Lord, it must be observed that, although Clement of Alexandria, Augustine, and other Holy Fathers call the first Person of the Trinity both father and mother, to signify the difference between the divine Father and earthly fathers—for earthly fathers generate sons outside themselves, whereas He retains the produced Word within His breast and the depths of His divinity, which is metaphorically indicated by a certain maternal property—nevertheless, the name Father is more fittingly attributed to the first Person than the name mother. Synesius, a most ancient author, alluding to this, sings in hymn 5 concerning the eternal Father: *You are father and mother, root and highest branch, female and male; in You is what begets, and in You what is begotten.* Nevertheless, the name Father is more fittingly attributed to the first Person than the name mother. St. Thomas assigns an excellent reason for this in *Summa contra Gentiles*, l. IV, c. 11, toward the end, where he reasons thus: *The carnal generation of animals is*

completed through an active and a passive power, and from the active power one is called father, while from the passive power one is called mother. Hence, of the things required for the generation of offspring, some belong to the father and some to the mother: to give nature to the offspring belongs to the father, while to conceive and give birth belongs to the mother as undergoing and receiving. But since the procession of the Word occurs through God's understanding Himself, no passive power is found there, but only active power, because the divine intellect is not in potency but solely in act. Hence, in the generation of the Word the notion of mother does not belong, but that of father. The sense of the Holy Doctor is that the first Person of the most holy Trinity is not called mother but father because mother signifies a passive and potential principle receiving fecundity from another, whereas the divine intellect, although it brings forth and conceives, does so after the manner of pure act, receiving nothing from elsewhere.

4. As regards the other name, namely unbegotten or innascible, which signifies not only the negation of generation but also of every procession and communication from another, it must be known that formerly some of the Holy Fathers rejected this name as profane and foreign to Scripture, such as Athanasius, oration 2 against the Arians, Epiphanius, heresy 73, and Ambrose, *De incarnatione*, cc. 8 and 9, where he says: *Nowhere in the Scriptures do I find "unbegotten"; I have not read it or heard it.* For the Arians misused this name, inferring from the fact that the Father was unbegotten and unmade that the Son was made and a creature. Therefore, to remove their snares, the Fathers wished such a name to be passed over in silence. Hence Basil, l. 1 against Eunomius: *Although the appellation "unbegotten" or "innascible" is most consonant with our thoughts, nevertheless, because I find it nowhere in Scripture and because it is the first element of their blasphemy, I have rightly said that it should be consigned to silence.* But when the danger of error ceased and there was no suspicion in the use of such a name, the Councils and Holy Fathers frequently employed it, as is evident from the Sixth Council of Toledo, in which it is said: *We believe the Father to be unbegotten, uncreated, the font and origin of the whole divinity.* And from Augustine, *De Trinitate*, l. 15, c. 26: *The Father alone, he says, is not from another, and therefore He alone is called unbegotten.* The Church likewise frequently employs this name as proper to the Father in her hymns.

5. There is, however, a difficulty and controversy among the Scholastics as to whether this name, insofar as it is a notion of the Father, imports something positive or only a bare negation. For the resolution:

I say briefly that the name *unbegotten*, insofar as it is a notion of the Father, formally imports a negation, but materially and fundamentally expresses something positive.

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6. The first part is from St. Thomas here, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1, where, after refuting the opinions of those who said that innascibility, insofar as it is a property of the Father, signifies either that He is from no one and is the principle of others, or universal authority, or foundational plenitude, he concludes: *Therefore, according to Augustine, it must be said that “unbegotten” imports the negation of passive generation.* And shortly afterward he adds: *Nor does it follow from this that “unbegotten” should not be posited as a proper notion of the Father, because first and simple things are made known by negation.* For the notion of a notion does not require that it be a dignity by reason of itself; it is enough that it signify or make dignity known circumlocutively, as we observed in the final section of the preceding chapter. This can also be established by reason. It is no more required for the notion of a notion that it signify something pertaining to dignity than that it signify a personal property, since the first is gathered from the second. But for something to be a notion, it is not required that it be a personal property by reason of itself; it is enough that it signify or make known a personal property circumlocutively. Therefore, neither is it required that it be a dignity by reason of itself, but only that it circumlocutively make a dignity known, which a negation can do, as will be evident immediately below. Consequently, a negation can be formally imported by the name *unbegotten* insofar as it is a notion of the Father.

7. The second part of the conclusion is therefore proved. The name *unbegotten* was imposed not only to remove every passive production and communication from the Father, but also to signify the positive perfection because of which such a negation belongs to the Father. For since we cannot conceive this positive perfection immediately and in itself in the Father, we express and explain it circumlocutively through the negation of production and communication from another. Therefore, this name materially and secondarily imports some positive perfection.

8. This is confirmed. We use similar names to explain positive perfections of the divine essence, as when we say that God is infinite and immutable. For these names, together with the negation which they explicitly and formally import, also implicitly and secondarily import the positive perfection because of which such a negation belongs to God. Therefore, similarly, the name *unbegotten* primarily and formally imports a negation, but secondarily and materially the perfection upon which such a negation is founded.

9. Yet theologians disagree and dispute concerning what that positive perfection in the Father is which constitutes the foundation of this negation. Some suppose that this positive element is nothing other than the notion of

the fontal principle of the Persons of the Deity, which the Holy Fathers attribute to the eternal Father, especially Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 2, where he says: *The Father alone is the supersubstantial font of the Deity*. And toward the end: *We have received from the Scriptures that the Father is the primordial and fontal Deity, while the Son and the Holy Spirit are, if it is lawful to say so, the shoots of the secondary Deity, planted divinely, and as it were flowers and supersubstantial lights*. But St. Thomas reports and refutes this position here, q. 33, a. 4, ad 1, in these words: *Some say that innascibility, which is signified by the name “unbegotten,” imports universal authority or even fontal plenitude. But this does not seem true, because then innascibility would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration, but would include them as the proper is included in the common*. Supreme fontality or authority signifies nothing other in God than a principle of origin.

10. Others judge that the positive element upon which the negation formally imported by the name unbegotten is founded is some transcendental relation, distinct from paternity and filiation, by which the Father indivisibly regards the Son and the Holy Spirit as the head of the divine emanations. But this position lacks probability. For just as there is in the Father no single influx tending indivisibly toward the Son and the Holy Spirit, so there is no common relation tending toward both proceeding Persons, since every divine relation is founded upon origin and procession.

11. Others hold that this negation imports as its foundation in the eternal Father the notion of being from Himself, through the exclusion of procession from another, which they call *aseity*. But since being from oneself formally imports the negation of being from another, which the notion of unbegotten formally expresses, this positive perfection by which the eternal Father is sufficient unto Himself for existing independently of every passive origin is not sufficiently explained by aseity. Hence there still remains to be explained the principle from which the eternal Father has that He is from Himself and not from another, and that positive perfection upon which the negation of being from another, formally imported by the name *unbegotten*, is founded.

12. It must therefore be said that paternity, insofar as it is subsistence or a hypostatic form first terminating and modifying the divine nature, is the foundation of the negation formally imported by the name *unbegotten*. For as such it founds in the eternal Father an incapacity for being from another and connotes the divine nature as possessed from Himself and not from another. Hence, since every foundation is prior in reason to that which is founded upon it, the notion of unbegotten and innascible is posterior to paternity, not under the explicit concept of Father insofar as He is referred to the Son,

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but under the explicit concept of the first hypostasis first terminating and modifying the divine nature.

13. You will say that it follows from this that innascibility is not a notion distinct from paternity, since paternity as a hypostatic form is not virtually distinguished from itself as referring.

But the consequence is denied. For although a virtually distinct objective concept is required to constitute a diverse notion on the part of what it formally signifies, it is not always required that it be virtually diverse on the part of what it imports only fundamentally and materially. Hence, since paternity insofar as it performs the function of subsistence and hypostatic form first terminating and modifying the divine nature is imported by the name *unbegotten* only materially and fundamentally, while the name formally signifies the negation of every procession or passive production, which is virtually distinguished from paternity, innascibility will be a notion distinct from paternity.

CHAPTER VII.

The Person of the Son.

1. The second Person of the most holy Trinity is distinguished especially by three names: Son, Word, and Image. The first is evident from what was said above, c. 3, concerning the divine processions. For if the procession of the Word is generation, it is evident that its term is a son. We shall speak of the third below. As for the second, the whole of Scripture so openly teaches that the name Word belongs to the Son that no Christian doubts it, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, l. 6, c. 12. Yet the same Holy Doctor testifies in *De haeresibus*, heresy 30, that there were formerly certain heretics who denied every Word in God and were therefore called *Alogi*, that is, without the Word. Hence they did not acknowledge as canonical books the Gospel of John and his Apocalypse, in which the Word of God is expressly mentioned. But this error most openly contradicts not only Scripture but also reason. For only two things belong to the notion of a word, namely that it be expressed and really produced by the speaker, and that it manifest the things said by the speaker. But it is evident that these two belong to the second Person of the most holy Trinity. For the Son is truly produced by the Father through diction or intellection, according to Ps. 2: *The Lord said to me: You are My Son; today I have begotten You*; and He most actually represents and manifests all things contained in the intellect of the Father, as Augustine elegantly declares in *De fide*, in these words: *He is called the Word of the Father*

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because through Him the Father becomes known. Therefore, just as by our words we bring it about that our mind becomes known to the hearer, and whatever secret we bear in our heart is brought forth through signs of this kind to the knowledge of another, so that Wisdom which God the Father begot, because through it the most secret thought of the Father becomes known, is fittingly called His Word. Therefore, the second Person of the most holy Trinity possesses not only the notion of Son but also of Word. Indeed, as the same Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, l. 7, c. 2: *He is Son by the same reason by which He is Word, and Word by the same reason by which He is Son.* For by the very fact that He proceeds through intellection, He proceeds as like the Father by force of His procession, as we explained in c. 3, and actually expresses and manifests the things contained in the intellect of the Father.

2. These things are certain and indubitable among all Catholics. But there is a difficulty and a celebrated controversy among theologians concerning the objects from the cognition of which the Divine Word proceeds of itself. I say *of itself*, for just as all things contained in the knowledge of the Father are communicated to the Son, so concomitantly He proceeds from the knowledge of all things contained in the intellect of the Father, whether necessary or free. But that is said to concur of itself in the production of the Word which is such that, if its cognition did not exist, the Word would not be produced, or at least would not be produced with all the perfection with which He is in fact produced. Conversely, that is judged to be merely concomitant in relation to His production which, even if it did not exist or were not known, the production of the Word would nevertheless still exist with entirely the same perfection with which it in fact exists. Now the things known by the Father generating the Word, which terminate His knowledge after the manner of an object, are of two kinds: either they are contained formally in God, as the divine essence, attributes, and personalities; or only eminently, as creatures, both possible and future. The question, therefore, is whether the Divine Word proceeds of itself from the cognition of all these things.

§ 1.

The Divine Word Proceeds of Himself from the Cognition of
the Divine Essence, the Attributes, and the Persons.

3. The first part is certain and is denied or called into doubt by no one. For since the cognition from which the Word proceeds is quidditative, it must of itself be terminated at those things which pertain to the quiddity of God,

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and consequently to His essence and attributes, which are, as it were, properties of the divine nature.

The second part, however, is denied by Scotus, Puteanus, and Vásquez. The first supposes that the Word proceeds of Himself only from the cognition of the essence and attributes, but not from the cognition of the Father or the other Persons. The second indeed admits that the Word proceeds of Himself from the cognition of the Father, but denies that He proceeds from the cognition of Himself or of the Holy Spirit. The third affirms that the Word proceeds of Himself from the cognition of the Father and Himself, but not of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, St. Thomas expressly teaches this part of our assertion here, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3, saying: *The Father, by understanding Himself, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, conceives the Word, so that the whole Trinity is spoken in the Word.*

4. Reason also supports this. For since the Divine Word proceeds from the most perfect cognition of the divine essence, He proceeds from a cognition of it which is quidditative, intuitive, comprehensive, and beatifying. But such cognition cannot possess these four conditions and perfections unless it is of itself terminated at the three Divine Persons. Therefore, the Divine Word proceeds of Himself from the cognition of the three Persons. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved as to each of its parts. First, it is evident from what was said above, c. 4, § 2, that if the Persons were not known, divine cognition as it is in the Father would not be quidditative. There we showed that the divine relations belong to the essence and quiddity of God as modes and terms by which the divine nature essentially requires to be modified and terminated and without which it cannot be understood as fecund. Secondly, it seems manifest that it would not be intuitive cognition of the essence. For intuitive cognition differs from abstractive cognition in that the latter is borne only toward the nature and quiddity of a thing, or abstracts from its subsistence and existence, whereas the former is borne toward the thing as subsisting and existing in itself. Hence God's knowledge, insofar as it is terminated at merely possible things, is not intuitive and of vision, but abstractive and of simple intelligence, because things under the state of mere possibility abstract from existence, as is evident from what was said in the treatise on God's knowledge. But the divine nature subsists and exists in the three Persons. Therefore, it is contradictory for there to be intuitive cognition of it unless the three Divine Persons are known. Thirdly, that it could not be comprehensive is shown thus: for something to be comprehended, everything knowable in it or from it must be known. But the divine essence is the medium in which not only the attributes but also the Divine Persons can be known. Therefore, if They

are not known, the essence cannot be comprehended. I add that the divine essence cannot be comprehended unless it is known as fecund, communicable to three Persons, and in fact communicated, and consequently unless the Divine Persons Themselves are understood as the terms of this divine fecundity and communication. Finally, it is evident from what was said in the treatise on the beatific vision that the cognition from which the Word proceeds cannot be beatifying unless it is of itself terminated at the three Divine Persons. There we showed that not only the essence but also the Persons, as modes of the divine essence which is the formal object of divine beatitude, pertain to the beatifying object. Hence the intellect of the Father producing the Word is beatified not only by cognition of the essence and attributes, but also by cognition of the Divine Persons; and consequently, if the Father's cognition were not terminated at Them, He would not be perfectly beatified.

5. This same part of our assertion can further be established by this reasoning. Cognition of the Word concurs of itself in His production, since the Father produces Him by knowing Him and knows Him by producing Him. Therefore, so also does cognition of the Father. The consequence seems manifest. For since the Word is the image of the Father, He represents not only His nature but also His paternity. Hence Christ said to Philip: *Philip, he who sees Me sees My Father also*. And Basil says in homily 16: *Because He is the image of the Begetter, He manifests the whole Begetter in Himself*. Therefore, the Father, in knowing and producing the Word, must necessarily know Himself and His paternity, since an image as such cannot be known unless the prototype which it represents and from which it is expressed is known. The same must be said of cognition of the Holy Spirit, because it is impossible for the Father to know Himself and the Son without also knowing the relation of Spirator which is in Both. But this relation cannot be known unless the Holy Spirit is known, since it regards Him as its term and correlative.

6. It is objected first: The relations and Divine Persons are not the primary but only the secondary object of the divine cognition from which the Word proceeds, since its primary and specifying object is the divine essence alone. But cognition does not depend of itself upon a secondary object, but only upon the primary and specifying object. Therefore, the Word does not proceed of Himself from cognition of the Divine Persons, but only from cognition of the essence.

7. I answer first by denying the major premise. For the divine relations are not properly the secondary object of divine cognition, but modes of the primary and specifying object, namely the divine essence, which by reason of

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its infinite fecundity essentially requires to be modified and terminated by the divine relations.

8. I answer secondly by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. Cognition does not depend of itself upon the secondary object when the primary object can be known intuitively and comprehensively without it, I grant the minor. If intuitive and comprehensive cognition of the primary object cannot be had without it, I deny the minor and the consequence. For, as was shown above, the cognition by which the Father generates the Word is neither intuitive nor comprehensive of the divine essence unless it is terminated at the three Divine Persons.

9. It is objected secondly with Puteanus: Only cognition of the essence insofar as it is in the Father is fecund for the production of the Word. For, as theologians commonly teach, the intellection fecund for generating is not common but notional and proper to the Father. Therefore, the Word proceeds from cognition of the essence and paternity alone.

10. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. Only cognition of the essence insofar as it is in the Father is fecund, if the term *insofar as* denotes the subject or generating principle, I grant the antecedent. If it denotes the object of cognition which concurs in the generation after the manner of the principle by which, I deny the antecedent. For not only the essence and paternity, but also filiation and passive spiration, concur of themselves after the manner of the known object in the generation of the Word.

11. You will say: Under that priority in which the Father generates the Word, the Word and the Holy Spirit do not exist, since under such a sign They are not yet presupposed as produced. Therefore, filiation and passive spiration cannot concur after the manner of a known object in the generation of the Word.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. Under that priority in which the Father generates the Word, the Word and the Holy Spirit do not exist by priority of origin, I grant the antecedent, since They do not exist from Themselves, which is to exist by priority of origin, but from another, which is to exist as posterior in origin. They do not exist simultaneously in duration and under the same sign in which, I deny the antecedent. For simultaneity of existence and duration is not removed by priority and posteriority of origin, as is evident in the sun emitting a ray or splendor. The ray or splendor coexists with the sun, although it is posterior to the sun in origin and causality. And generally, every actual principle of operation precedes the operation in priority of nature and causality, and nevertheless is simultaneous with the operation in time and duration, since it is contradictory for an actual principle of operation to exist without the

operation. In this argument, therefore, and in similar arguments, there are two fallacies and errors. The first is that posteriority of duration and of the sign in which is inferred from posteriority of origin and from which. For from the fact that the Father is prior in origin to the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is inferred that He, as prior in origin, cannot behold the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are posterior in origin, as existing in Themselves. The other kind of fallacy consists in the adversaries' custom of attributing to the things conceived what is proper to the one conceiving. For because our intellect, from its imperfect manner of conceiving, conceives the Father as understanding Himself prior to understanding the Son and the Holy Spirit, they suppose that the eternal Father proceeds in the same way in His eternal conception, so as to know Himself and His essence prior to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

12. From these things the principal foundation or motive by which Vázquez is led to assert that the Divine Word does not proceed of Himself from cognition of the Holy Spirit is resolved. For he argues thus: Intuitive cognition is terminated at an object as existing. But under that priority in which the Word proceeds from the Father, the Holy Spirit does not exist, since He is not yet understood as produced and His production presupposes the generation of the Word. Therefore, the Word does not proceed from intuitive cognition of the Holy Spirit.

13. But the response is easy from what has been said, by denying the minor premise. For the production of the Word precedes the procession and existence of the Holy Spirit only by priority of origin. But priority of origin, since it is not priority in which but from which, does not prevent the coexistence of the extremes, nor consequently the notion of intuitive cognition. This is evident in created intellection. For although created intellection, insofar as it has the notion of diction, precedes the mental word by priority of nature and causality, nevertheless, because it exists simultaneously in the same instant of time, it possesses the notion of intuitive cognition. Likewise, if the power of sight were powerful and efficacious to produce its object, although under the prior sign from which the object would not be understood as existing before the vision, nevertheless, because it would be posited in the same instant in which the vision occurred as its term, that vision would then be intuitive cognition, because it would be terminated at the thing as existing.

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§ 2.

The Divine Word Proceeds of Himself from the Cognition of Possible Creatures, but Not of Future or Existing Creatures.

14. The first part is proved. The Divine Word proceeds of Himself from comprehensive cognition of the divine essence and omnipotence, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section. But God's essence and omnipotence cannot be comprehended unless possible creatures are known in them as in their cause, as was shown in the treatise on God's knowledge. Therefore, the Divine Word proceeds of Himself from cognition of possible creatures.

15. The second part, concerning future and existing creatures, is established by three arguments. The first is this: The cognition from which the Word proceeds must be natural and necessary, just as the production of the Word itself. But cognition of future or existing things is neither natural nor necessary, but free, for it is the very knowledge of vision, which presupposes God's free decree. Therefore, the Divine Word does not proceed of Himself from such cognition.

16. The second argument is that something does not concur of itself in the production of the Divine Word if, were it removed, the Word would remain altogether unchanged and of the same nature as before. But if cognition of contingent future and existing things were removed from God, the Divine Word would subsist altogether unchanged, as Anselm teaches in *Monologion*, c. 30, where he says: *Whether God is conceived as existing while no other essence exists, or as existing while others exist, His Word must be coeternal with Him and exist together with Him.* Therefore, cognition of future and existing things does not concur of itself in the production of the Word, but is related to it merely accidentally and concomitantly.

17. The third argument can be proposed thus: For the Word to proceed from cognition of future or existing things, this knowledge would have to belong to the Father prior in origin to the Word. But it cannot belong to the Father prior in origin. Therefore, neither can the Word proceed from cognition of future or existing things. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Since knowledge of future and existing things rests upon a decree, as was proved in the treatise on God's knowledge, we must philosophize about it in the same way as about the decree itself. But the free decrees of the divine will do not belong to the Father prior in origin. For just

as actions *ad extra* are common to the whole Trinity, so also free decrees are undivided and common to the three Persons, and therefore do not belong to one prior in origin to another. Therefore, likewise, the knowledge of free things, resting upon the decree and founded upon it, does not belong to the Father prior in origin to the Word.

18. From these things you will understand that four terminations must be distinguished in the intellection by which the Word is produced. The first is toward the divine essence as the formal and primary object. The second is toward the attributes and relations as properties or modes of the formal and primary object. The third is toward possible creatures. The fourth is toward existing and future things. The first three belong to the Divine Word of themselves and by force of His procession; the fourth only concomitantly and, as it were, accidentally. Hence St. Thomas speaks of existing or future creatures in *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 5, when he says: *The Word is referred to creatures accidentally, as it were by consequence*. For, as is evident from the context, he speaks of creatures to which He is referred by the relation of Lord and Creator, which are certainly existing or future creatures, not merely possible ones. But when Augustine teaches in *De Trinitate*, l. 15, c. 14, that the Word is from all those things contained in God's knowledge, he is either speaking of God's necessary knowledge, which is called knowledge of simple intelligence, by which He knows merely possible things; or, if he is speaking of free knowledge and the knowledge of vision, which is borne toward existing and future things, he intends only that it is related concomitantly to the production of the Word.

19. It is objected first against the first part of the assertion: If no creatures were possible, the Word would still proceed with the same perfection with which He now proceeds. For it seems absurd to say that, if an ape or an ant were not possible, the Word would not be produced with the fullness of perfection with which He is in fact produced. Therefore, the Word does not proceed of Himself from cognition of possible creatures.

20. This is confirmed. If the Divine Word proceeded of Himself from cognition of possible creatures, He would depend upon them as possible, for that depends upon another which cannot subsist without it. But the Divine Word, since He is uncreated and independent being, cannot depend upon possible creatures. Therefore, neither can He proceed from cognition of them.

21. To the objection I answer by denying the antecedent. For if possible creatures were removed, the Word would not proceed as the exemplar, art, and productive power of creatures. Since these perfections are intrinsic to the Word, the Word would not proceed with all the perfections with which

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He in fact proceeds if possible creatures were removed. This does not arise from any need God has of creatures, but from the supreme perfection and fecundity of God and from the dependence of creatures upon Him. For He would not be God if He were not omnipotent and infinitely fecund *ad extra*, nor could He be this if possible creatures were contradictory. Hence:

22. To the confirmation I deny the inference in the major premise. For one relative cannot subsist without the other, yet does not depend upon it; otherwise, relatives would not be simultaneous in nature and cognition. Therefore, dependence requires that one thing cannot subsist without another by reason of subordination to it. But this does not belong to the Divine Word with respect to possible creatures. For the fact that He cannot subsist without them is not by reason of subordination to them, but rather by reason of the dependence of possible creatures upon God's omnipotence.

23. It is objected secondly: If the Divine Word proceeded from cognition of possible creatures, He could be called the image of creatures, just as He is called their Word. But this seems absurd and contrary to the Holy Fathers, who assert that the Word is indeed the idea and exemplar of creatures, but not their image. Therefore, neither does He proceed from cognition of them.

24. I answer by denying the inference of the major premise, because the Son of God as Word imports the notion of manifestation, while as Image He imports the notions of origin and imitation. Hence, because the Divine Word represents creatures, He is called their Word; but because He does not originate from creatures or imitate them, He neither is nor is called the image of creatures. The reason why the Word is produced from cognition of creatures and yet does not derive His origin from them is assigned by St. Thomas in *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 4, ad 7, where he teaches that the Word is said to proceed from an object only when the knowledge from which He proceeds is derived from the things. Therefore, since the divine knowledge from which the Word proceeds is not derived from creatures, the Divine Word, although He represents and manifests them, cannot be said to proceed or originate from them. Hence the objection can also be answered by distinguishing the major premise. If the Divine Word proceeded from cognition of possible creatures as from an object originating Him of itself, He would be their image, I grant the major. If He proceeded from cognition of possible creatures only as from an object terminating the cognition of itself, I deny the major.

25. It is objected thirdly against the second part of the assertion, in which we said that the Divine Word does not proceed from cognition of existing or future creatures. The Divine Word in fact represents and expresses creatures not only as possible but also as existing and future. But

such expression and representation belong to Him by force of His procession. Therefore, the Divine Word proceeds of Himself from cognition of existing and future creatures. The major premise is certain. The minor is proved. Whatever the Word has, He received from the Father through eternal generation, according to Christ's words in John 17: *All that is Mine is Yours. And: My doctrine is not Mine, but His who sent Me.* But whatever the Word received from the Father through eternal generation, He has by force of His procession. Therefore, the expression and representation of existing and future creatures belongs to Him by force of His procession.

26. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof I say that, although the Word has all that He has through His procession, He does not have all things by force of His procession; rather, some things belong to Him through His procession only identically and concomitantly. Thus we said above, c. 3, that although the Holy Spirit through His procession has the divine nature communicated to Him by the Father and the Son, He nevertheless does not receive it by force of His procession, but only identically and concomitantly.

§ 3.

The True and Proper Notion of Image Belongs to
the Son, but Not to the Holy Spirit.

27. The first part is evident from various passages of Scripture in which the Son is called the image of God and the figure or character of His substance. He is also called the seal of the Father, because just as the figure of the one sealing is customarily impressed upon a seal, so the image of the Father, sealing Himself in the Son, is impressed upon the Son. And just as the secrets of the one sealing are enclosed by a seal, so the secrets of the Father are enclosed in the Word. He is also called the face in Ps. 79: *Show Your face and we shall be saved*, because just as a man is known from his face, so the Father is known from the Son, according to Christ's words to Philip: *Philip, he who sees Me sees My Father also.* He is also called the brightness of eternal light and the splendor of glory, because just as it is proper to light and splendor to manifest things, so it is proper to the Divine Word to manifest the Father and all things contained in the Father. Finally, He is called a spotless mirror, because just as it belongs to a mirror to express all the movements and gestures of the one looking into it, so the Son of God, who is the living mirror of the Father, displays and represents all His perfections and operations, according to John 5: *The Son can do nothing of Himself unless*

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He sees the Father doing it. For whatever He does, the Son likewise does. Hence Basil, homily 16: Because He is the image of the Father, He manifests the whole Begetter in Himself.

28. Reason also supports this. For image, which is defined as *a likeness of one derived from another*, requires only two things, namely likeness and procession. Likeness alone does not suffice for the notion of image. For two eggs are alike, yet one is not the image of the other, because neither is expressed from the other. But both these conditions belong most perfectly to the Son, for He proceeds from the Father and by force of His procession is like Him in nature, as we showed in c. 3, § 5. Therefore, He is the true and perfect image of the Father, and all the more perfect to the degree that He has a more perfect likeness with Him, namely identity in nature.

29. This is confirmed. Created images either are not true, because they do not faithfully represent the prototype; or are inanimate and mute, because they lack life and the faculty of speech; or, finally, are empty and void, because they lack power and operation. *But this Image*, says Ambrose in *De fide*, l. 1, c. 4, *is Truth; this Image is the power of God; not mute, because He is the Word; not empty, because He is power; not void, because He is life; not dead, because He is the resurrection.* Therefore, the true and proper notion of image belongs to Him.

30. The second part of our assertion seems contrary to certain Greek Fathers who thought that the notion of image belongs not only to the Son but also to the Holy Spirit. For Basil says in l. 5 against Eunomius, c. 6: *Christ is the image of God, but the Spirit is the image of the Son.* And Cyril, *Thesaurus*, l. 13, c. 1: *The Holy Spirit is true God, because He is the most perfect image of the Son of God.* Likewise Damascene, *De fide*, l. 1, c. 18: *The Son is the image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit of the Son.* Nevertheless, our assertion is common among the Latins and is taught and proved by St. Thomas here, q. 34, a. 2, by this reasoning: just as the Holy Spirit, although through His procession He receives the nature of the Father as the Son does, is nevertheless not called born, so, although He receives a species like the Father, He is not called an image. For the Son proceeds as Word, to whose notion belongs likeness of species to that from which He proceeds; but this does not belong to the notion of love, although it belongs to the love which is the Holy Spirit insofar as He is divine. We examined this argument at length above, c. 3, in proving that the production of the Word is generation, but that the procession of the Holy Spirit is not.

31. You will say: The Holy Spirit is infinitely more like the Father and the Son than creatures are. Therefore, the notion of image will belong to Him much more than to creatures.

But I deny the consequence. For although creatures possess an imperfect likeness to God, they possess it by force of their production, because they are, as it were, artifacts which require to be made according to the likeness of the idea which God possessed eternally in His mind. But the Holy Spirit does not possess likeness in nature formally by force of His procession, but only identically and concomitantly. Hence St. Thomas, In I ad Annibaldum, dist. 28, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3: *The species of the art is found in the artifact even among us, but not in the love of the artisan. Therefore, creatures, insofar as they possess the species of the eternal art, which is the Son of God, are called an image and "to the image," but the Holy Spirit, who is Love, is not.* Hence, when the Greek Fathers cited above call the Holy Spirit the image of the Son, they take the name image broadly for one who proceeds with perfect likeness in nature, although not formally by force of His procession.

32. From what has been said, it is gathered first that the Word is the image of the Father alone. For although, as from an object known of itself, He proceeds not only from the Father but also from Himself, the Holy Spirit, and possible things, nevertheless, as from an originating principle, He proceeds from the Father alone. Hence, since the notion of image includes not only likeness but also procession or expression, the Son is the image of the Father alone. Therefore, what the author of *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* writes in the treatise on the Trinity, p. 300, is more than false, namely that *because the principle which of the Word is the Father, but the principle by which is the essence, the Word is called the image of the Father and of the essence.* For there must be a real relation and distinction between the image and its prototype, no less than between the Father and the Son. Therefore, just as the Word cannot be called the son of the essence but only of the Father, because of the absence of real relation and distinction between the Word and the essence, although the essence as modified by the relation of paternity is the principle by which of the generation of the Word, so for the same reason the Word cannot be called the image of the essence but only of the Father, although the essence is the principle by which of the production or expression of the Word and has the notion of the species fecundating the intellect of the Father for His production.

33. It is gathered secondly that beauty or comeliness is rightly appropriated to the Son by Hilary in *De Trinitate*, l. 2, where he says: *Eternity is in the Father, comeliness in the Image, use in the Gift.* This is so both because beauty shines principally in the face, while the Son, as we said above, is called the face of God in Scripture; and because, as St. Thomas reasons below, q. 39, a. 8, three things are required for beauty: integrity or perfection, for things that are maimed and deficient are ugly; due proportion or

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consonance, as is evident in corporeal things, for one is not called beautiful who does not have members duly proportioned and fitted together; and finally, splendor or clarity, whence things having a bright color are called beautiful. But these belong most perfectly to the second Person of the most holy Trinity. For since He is the natural Son of God, He possesses in Himself the whole nature of the Father; since He is His Image, He possesses perfect proportion, agreement, and likeness with Him; and finally, since He is the Word, He is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says.

34. It is gathered thirdly from what has been said throughout this chapter concerning the Person of the Son that He is adequately constituted by these three respects of Filiation, Word, and Image, and that all are required of themselves for the notion of an uncreated Son and Begotten One. For since the uncreated Son proceeds through the intellect, He receives the divine nature by force of His procession, which is required for the notion of Son; He intrinsically terminates the intellection of the Father, which is proper to the Word, for a word is a term produced or expressed through the intellect; and He perfectly manifests His prototype, which is required for the notion of image. These three respects are identified in the second Person of the Trinity without virtual distinction and differ only by their order toward diverse connoted things. For as Son, He more particularly expresses likeness or identity in nature; as Word, He more particularly explains the notion of manifestation of those things proper to the Father; and as Image, He more particularly declares the notion of origin and imitation or representation of His exemplar. Hence St. Thomas here, q. 34, a. 2, ad 3: *To express the diverse perfections of the Son of God, diverse names are attributed to Him. For to show that He is connatural with the Father, He is called Son; to show that He is coeternal, He is called Splendor; to show that He is altogether like Him, He is called Image; and to show that He is immaterially begotten, He is called Word.* See in *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae* the principal praises of the Divine Word drawn from the first chapter of the Gospel of St. John, which we examined at length at the end of the ninth disputation.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the Person of the Holy Spirit.

1. Just as no one knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man that is in him, so no one knows the things of God, or of the Spirit of God, except the Spirit of God. Hence, to investigate and explain the mysteries of this Divine Person, we need the special assistance of the Holy Spirit, concerning

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whom Hilary admonishes in *De Trinitate* II that *we ought neither to remain silent nor to speak at great length*.

§ 1.

Three Principal Names Belong to the Third Person of the Most Holy Trinity, Namely, Holy Spirit, Love, and Gift.

2. Three reasons are commonly assigned why the name Spirit is attributed to the third Person of the Most Holy Trinity. The first and principal reason is that it is proper to the third Person to be passively spirated, just as it is proper to the Son to be passively generated. The second, which St. Thomas gives in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 18, is that in corporeal things the name spirit signifies a certain impulse and motion, for Scripture often calls breath and wind spirit. But it is proper to love to move and impel the will of the lover toward the beloved object. Therefore, the Person who proceeds in God after the manner of love is fittingly called Spirit. The third reason is that the third Person of the Most Holy Trinity makes men spiritual by his gifts and draws them into a certain participation in divine spirituality. For, as the Master of the Sentences observes in I, dist. 18, we have received a twofold spirit from God: one by which we exist, and another by which we are made holy and spiritual. For by the created spirit, which is the rational soul, we exist; and by the uncreated Spirit, who is the Holy Spirit, we are spiritual and holy.

3. He is also fittingly called Holy because, as St. Thomas notes in *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 74, holy is taken in three ways: 1^o for what is pure and clean; 2^o for what is appointed and consecrated to divine worship; 3^o holy is the same as firm, or confirmed in good. In all three ways holiness is attributed, or appropriated, to the Holy Spirit. For he cleanses the rational soul from the stain of earthly affections, consecrates and applies it to God, and establishes and confirms it in good; these are the threefold radiance or character of holiness. Hence, the entire holiness of the Church is attributed to him as its author and cause and is said to be derived from him, as Chrysostom eloquently explains in hom. 2, *De Spiritu Sancto*, in these words: *By him the Prophets are enlightened, Kings are anointed, Priests are ordained, Doctors are illuminated, Churches are sanctified, altars are founded, chrism is consecrated, waters are purified, Demons are driven away, diseases are cured, and sinners are reconciled.*

4. The second name of the Holy Spirit is love, which belongs to him under a twofold title: 1^o by reason of his procession and personal property,

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for the term of an act of the will is fittingly called love, or a weight and impulse toward the beloved object; 2^o by reason of his operation, insofar as he makes us lovers by infusing charity into us. With this in view, Bernard exclaims in epist. 107: O twofold and most certain proof of his love for us! Christ dies, and therefore deserves to be loved; the Spirit moves the affections and causes us to love. The former causes himself to be loved; the latter causes us to love him. The former commends great love to us; the latter gives it. In the former we see what we should love; from the latter we receive that by which we love. From the former, therefore, comes the occasion of charity; from the latter, its affection.

5. The third name of the Holy Spirit is gift, which also belongs to him through his personal property. For he proceeds as love; but love is the first gift conferred upon a friend, and the other gifts follow upon it. Therefore, through his personal property, the Holy Spirit has the character of gift. Nor is it an objection that gift implies a reference to the person to whom it is given, whereas from eternity there was no creature to whom the Holy Spirit could be given. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 38, a. 1, ad 4, *something is not called a gift because it is actually given, but insofar as it has an aptitude to be given*. Hence, the Divine Person is called a gift from eternity, although he is given in time.

§ 2.

The Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father and the Son.

6. After the heresy of Macedonius, who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit, a new error concerning his procession began to spring up among certain Greeks. Although they confessed that the Holy Spirit is God equally with the Father and the Son, they nevertheless denied that he proceeds from the Son, maintaining instead that he proceeds from the Father alone. The Greeks and Armenians have suffered from this ancient error even down to the present day, and several Councils were convened to abolish it. Last among these, the Council of Florence was assembled by command of Eugene IV. There, after many careful disputes among the Fathers, the Greeks finally agreed with the Latins concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, as is evident from Eugene's decree itself and from the discourse on the union of the Greek Church with the Latin Church delivered to the Council by Bessarion, Patriarch of Constantinople. But after returning to their homeland, at the persuasion of Mark of Ephesus, they returned to their vomit and relapsed into the same error.

7. The Catholic truth asserting that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, besides having been defined in various Councils, is clearly gathered from several testimonies of Scripture, especially those in which the Holy Spirit is said to be sent by the Son, John 15: *But when the Paraclete comes, whom I shall send to you.* For one Person's being sent by another in God is one Person's proceeding from another, together with a new mode of existing in another which he did not previously have. Hence Augustine says in *De Trinitate* IV, c. 20: *He is sent by the one from whom he emanates.* For this reason, the Father is never said to be sent, even though he is made known in time, because, as the same holy Doctor says in *Contra sermonem Arianorum*, c. 4, *he alone has no author by whom he was begotten or from whom he proceeds.* Nor does it matter that the Son is sometimes said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, from whom he nevertheless does not proceed. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 24, *the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit according to the nature he assumed. But the Holy Spirit did not assume a created nature according to which he could be said to be sent by the Son, or according to which the Son could have authority with respect to him.* It remains, therefore, that with respect to the eternal Person the Son possesses the authority of a principle over the Holy Spirit and consequently sends him.

8. Another celebrated testimony occurs in John 16, where Christ, speaking of the Holy Spirit, says: *He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine and shall declare it to you. All things whatsoever the Father has are mine; therefore I said to you that he shall receive of mine.* From these words a twofold argument is constructed. The first is this: one Person in God cannot receive anything from another except through passive origin, just as, conversely, one Divine Person cannot give anything to another except through active origin, since there is no other mode of giving and receiving in God than through the active origin of the giver and the passive origin of the receiver. Therefore, the Holy Spirit, who receives from the Son what he is to declare to the Apostles, proceeds from him. Nor is it an objection that Christ says *he shall receive* in the future, because, as Augustine rightly says in tract. 99 on John, *in speaking of eternal things, a verb of any tense may be used without falsehood.* The second argument is this: all things the Father has belong to the Son, except that in which they are relatively opposed, as the words just cited testify. But active spiration belongs to the Father. Therefore, it must likewise belong to the Son, and consequently the Holy Spirit must proceed from both. The Council of Florence indicates this reasoning in the decree of holy union, in which it says: *Because all things that belong to the Father, the Father himself gave to his only-begotten Son in begetting him, except being Father, the Son eternally has from the Father this very fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.*

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9. A third testimony occurs in John 20, where Christ breathed upon the disciples, saying to them: Receive the Holy Spirit. For, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* XV, c. 26, by this it was signified that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him just as that breath proceeded from his body. Bernard teaches the same in *serm.* 54 on the *Canticle*, where, explaining the bride's words in Song 1, Let him kiss me with the kiss of his mouth, he says: A kiss is common to the one kissing and the one kissed. Therefore, if the Father and the Son kiss one another, what is their kiss except the Holy Spirit? Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as the kiss of both.

10. Finally, there are other testimonies in which the Holy Spirit is said to be the Spirit of the Son of God no less than of the Father, *Rom.* 8 and *Gal.* 4. But the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Father for no other reason than because he proceeds from the Father. Therefore, neither will he be the Spirit of the Son for any other reason than because he proceeds from the Son.

11. Nor are testimonies of the holy Fathers lacking, including those of the Greeks. Especially noteworthy is the testimony of Nazianzen, *orat.* 5, *De Theologia*, where he compares the Divine Trinity to the first three persons of the human race: namely, the Father to Adam, because the Father originates from no Person, just as Adam originated from no man; the Son to Eve, because Eve proceeded from the substance of Adam, just as the Son proceeds from the Father alone; and the Holy Spirit to Seth, because Seth originated from Adam and Eve, just as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Also noteworthy is the testimony of Athanasius in *serm.* 4, where he compares the Father to the sun, the Son to light or radiance, and the Holy Spirit to heat or warmth. He teaches that, just as light proceeds from the sun, and heat from both the sun and its light, so the Word is generated by the Father, and the Holy Spirit is produced by the Father and the Son.

12. It must not be omitted that the Greek Fathers sometimes ask why the Holy Spirit is not called the Son of the Son, as is evident from Basil, *Contra Eunomium* V, c. 12, whose title is: *Why Is the Spirit Not Called the Son of the Son?* But if this question is not to be childish and frivolous, it necessarily presupposes that the Holy Spirit is produced by the Son. Otherwise, as Bessarion notes in the discourse cited above, c. 6, it would present no difficulty at all and would resemble the question why the Holy Spirit is not the Father of the Father and the begetter of the Son. No one has ever raised that question, because it would presuppose that the Holy Spirit produces the Father and the Son.

13. Theological arguments confirming the same truth are also available. St. Thomas gives three here, q. 36, a. 2. The first and principal argument is

that, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be distinguished from him, since every real distinction among the Divine Persons arises from relative opposition, and relative opposition is founded upon the procession of one Person from another. This will be treated more fully in the following section. The second argument is that what proceeds after the manner of love must necessarily proceed from the Word, because nothing can be loved unless it is conceived by the Word. But the Holy Spirit proceeds as love. Therefore, he proceeds from the Word. Hence St. Thomas says below, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2: *The Son is the Word, not a word of any kind, but a Word breathing forth love*. Nor does it matter if you say that love does not proceed in us from the word effectively, but only objectively, insofar as the word represents the loveliness of the object by which the will is attracted to love. For besides the fact that the opinion asserting that the intellect effectively moves the will is not improbable, as we shall say in its proper place, the force of St. Thomas's argument always remains. For once it is established that the nature of love, taken analogically in common, includes proceeding from the word, it must then be inferred from the different conditions of the created and uncreated Word that the created word concurs in love as a final cause, while the uncreated Word concurs actively, even after the manner of a principle, because the uncreated Word proceeds as a Person subsisting in the divine nature and consequently as possessing the divine will, which elicits and actively spirates love. The third argument of St. Thomas may be seen in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

14. The schismatic Greeks object: in Scripture we find only that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, with no mention made of the Son, just as no mention of him was made in the Creed of the Council of Nicaea, which does not contain the phrase *and the Son*, but only *who proceeds from the Father*. Hence that phrase was added by the Latins, even though at the Council of Ephesus it had been forbidden under threat of anathema to add anything to that Creed.

15. I answer that although Scripture nowhere says formally and explicitly that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it nevertheless says this virtually and implicitly when it asserts that he is the Spirit of the Son, is sent by him, and receives from him. For from these passages it is clearly gathered that he proceeds from the Son, as is evident from what was said above. Augustine gives the reason why Christ did not wish to say openly that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself, as he said that he proceeds from the Father, in tract. 99 on John: namely, that he might refer all things to the Father as the first principle and fountain of the whole Divinity. St. Thomas gives the same reason in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 25, where he says: *It is not surprising*

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that the Lord said the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father without mentioning himself, because he customarily refers all things to the Father, from whom he has whatever he possesses. Thus he says in John 7: My doctrine is not mine, but his who sent me, the Father; and many similar statements are found in the words of the Lord, commending in the Father the authority of a principle. Yet in the authority cited above—namely, John 15, who proceeds from the Father—he did not entirely conceal that he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, since he called him the Spirit of truth, and had previously called himself the truth. To what is said concerning the Council of Nicaea and the addition to the Creed, I answer that the Council of Nicaea contains only: *I believe in the Holy Spirit*. Later, on the occasion of the heresy of Macedonius, the Fathers of the Council of Constantinople added: *Who proceeds from the Father*, making no mention of his procession from the Son because the followers of that heresy did not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but rather asserted that he was a creature of the Son alone. Finally, on the occasion of a new heresy and under the pressure of necessity, as the Council of Florence says, the phrase *and the Son* was added to the Creed at a certain Roman Council held around the year of the Lord 600, as the same Council of Florence indicates in sess. 7 and Eltius observes in dist. 11, § 2. This was not so much an addition as a fuller expression or explanation of a truth first implicitly contained in the Constantinopolitan Creed. At the same Council of Florence, sess. 5, Andrew, a Latin Doctor, produced a very ancient Greek codex of the seventh general Council, at which a very great number of Greek Fathers were present. In act. 7 of that codex it is said of the Holy Spirit: *Who proceeds from the Father and the Son*. Hence it is believed that other Greek codices lacking the phrase *and the Son* were corrupted by the schismatic Greeks.

§ 3.

The Holy Spirit Would Not Be Distinguished from the Son
If He Did Not Proceed from Him.

16. This is proved first from three Councils. First, the Second Council of Toledo, speaking of the Divine Persons in its profession of faith, says: *Number is discerned in the relation of the Persons. Their being toward one another is the only thing that indicates number.* By these words it clearly teaches that the Divine Persons are multiplied and distinguished from one another solely through relative opposition. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be relatively opposed to him, since every relative

opposition in God is founded upon the origin and procession of one Person from another. Therefore, he would not be distinguished from him.

17. Second, in the profession of faith of the Sixteenth Council of Toledo it is said of the Holy Spirit: *He is the third Person in the holy and altogether perfect Trinity because he is given by the Father and the Son.* Therefore, if he were not the gift proceeding from the Father and the Son, he would not be the third Person distinct from them.

18. Third, at the Council of Florence, sess. 18, it is proved against the Greeks that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son because *relation of procession alone, according to all the Doctors, both Greek and Latin, multiplies the Divine Persons.* Therefore, according to the Council, if procession ceases, the multiplication and distinction of Persons also cease. And although this is not a definition but the teaching of the Council, it cannot fail to possess the greatest weight and importance, since the sacred Synod uses it to define a truth of faith.

19. To these may be added the celebrated testimony of Gregory of Nyssa in his book to Ablabius, where he says: *The Spirit is distinguished from the Son by the fact that he is through him.* Therefore, if he were not through the Son, he would not be distinguished from him.

20. The fundamental argument indicated in the passages cited above is this: the Divine Persons are not distinguished except insofar as they are opposed, for in that in which they are not opposed they agree and are identified. But they cannot be opposed except relatively. This is so, first, because, as St. Thomas says in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 8, ad 4, *in other opposites one of the two is always imperfect; but this need not be the case in relatives, since each can be considered perfect.* It is so, second, because in God there is nothing except the essence, the attributes, and the relations. Therefore, since the Divine Persons are not opposed in the essence or in the attributes, which are absolute and common, they must be opposed by relation in order to be distinguished from one another. From this arose the celebrated axiom taken from Boethius and Anselm and approved by the common judgment of theologians: *In God all things are one wherever the opposition of relation does not intervene.* Since such opposition is founded only upon the origin of one Person from another, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would not be distinguished from him.

21. This is confirmed: in that hypothesis, filiation and passive spiration would be no more opposed, and consequently no more distinguished from one another, than paternity and filiation on the one side are in fact opposed to and distinguished from active spiration on the other. Therefore, just as the Spirator is not a Person distinct from the Father and the Son because he

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is not relatively opposed to them, so the Holy Spirit would not be personally distinguished from the Son if he did not proceed from him.

22. The Scotists answer that the opposition of relations is not the same as relative opposition, for, they say, a relation possesses a twofold opposition: one relative and another disparate. Hence, when the holy Fathers and theologians say that in God all things are one where the opposition of relation does not intervene, this must not be understood only of the relative opposition of relations, but either of relative opposition or of disparate opposition. The Holy Spirit would possess such a disparate opposition to the Son even if he did not proceed from him and consequently would still be distinguished from him.

23. But this solution and doctrine, which is the principal foundation of the Scotists, can easily be refuted. First, the testimonies of the Councils cited above militate against it, especially these words of the Second Council of Toledo: *Their being toward one another is the only thing that indicates number.* For being toward one another is verified only of things relatively opposed. The same is true of these words of the Council of Florence: *Relation of divine procession alone multiplies the Persons.* For procession in God is the foundation of relative, not disparate, opposition. Hence John the Theologian asserts there that *the substance is communicated with the Persons, but the properties are in no way communicable, which is believed to result from the force of relation.* But what results from the force of relation arises from relative, not disparate, opposition. Therefore, according to the Council of Florence, the incommunicability and consequently the distinction of the Divine Persons arise solely from relative opposition, not disparate opposition. This is also clearly declared by these words of Damascene in *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 11: *We understand a difference only in the properties of paternity, filiation, and procession, according to cause and caused,* and so forth. Nor can it be said that these testimonies prove only that the distinction actually found among the Divine Persons proceeds from relative opposition, but not that, on the supposition that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between them could not be preserved without relative opposition. For in God whatever is possible actually is, and whatever does not actually exist is entirely impossible. Therefore, if in fact there is no distinction among the Divine Persons except by reason of relative opposition founded upon origin, it is altogether impossible for the Divine Persons to be distinguished from one another in any other way than by relative opposition founded upon origin. Consequently, every supposition that removes this opposition between the Son and the Holy Spirit likewise removes their real distinction.

24. Next, the aforesaid solution and doctrine of the Scotists can be refuted by this argument: a distinction arising from disparate opposition proceeds from finitude and limitation. But the Divine Persons are infinite and unlimited. Therefore, they cannot be distinguished from one another by reason of disparate opposition. The major premise is evident in mercy, justice, love, and wisdom, which are disparate perfections and yet are really identified in an infinite being, in whom they are free from every imperfection and limitation. It is also evident in the notions of absolute and relative being, which in created things are supremely disparate and belong to entirely different orders, and nevertheless are not really distinguished in an infinite and unlimited being. Therefore, a distinction arising from disparate opposition proceeds from limitation and finitude and consequently can have no place in God.

25. You will object first: that which constitutes a thing is the same as that which distinguishes it from everything else. But the formal constitutive of the Son in personal being is filiation, for active spiration, since it is also common to the Father, cannot constitute the Son in the character of a Person, whose nature includes incommunicability. Therefore, the Son is distinguished by filiation from every other Person, and consequently, if filiation remained while active spiration were excluded, he would remain distinct from the Holy Spirit.

26. Some answer that the major premise is true of absolute beings but not of relatives, for just as the being of a relation is ordered to its correlative, so its distinction is only from its correlative. Hence, because filiation does not refer the Son to the Holy Spirit but to the Father, it does not distinguish him from the Holy Spirit but only from the Father. Consequently, he is distinguished from the Holy Spirit only through the relation of spiration. A better answer, however, grants the major premise and distinguishes the minor: that the formal constitutive of the Son of God is filiation precisely considered and abstracting from the order to producing the Holy Spirit, I deny the minor. That it is filiation as requiring the power of spirating and containing it radically, I grant the minor. But on the supposition that the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, filiation would not radically contain the power of spirating and consequently would not distinguish the Son from the Holy Spirit.

27. You will object second: if, per impossibile, the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father but from the Son alone, he would still be really distinguished from the Father because, once active spiration had been removed from the Father, paternity would still remain in him, by which he is constituted in the being of an incommunicable Person distinct from every

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other. Therefore, likewise, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son but from the Father alone, he would still be really distinguished from the Son.

28. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. For if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son alone, he would still be mediately relatively opposed to the Father because he would proceed mediately from him. The Father would give the Son the power by which he spirated the Holy Spirit and thus would mediately produce the Holy Spirit, which would suffice to distinguish the Father from the Holy Spirit. But in the case in which the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son neither mediately nor immediately, the Son would not be relatively opposed to him and consequently would not be distinguished from him.

29. You will object third: even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the procession of the one would differ from the origin of the other, for one would be through the intellect and the other through the will, and one would possess the nature of generation while the other would not. Therefore, the Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Son even if he did not proceed from him. Hence Anselm says in his book *De processione Spiritus Sancti* that the Son and the Holy Spirit are several *by the fact that the Son has being by being born and the Holy Spirit by proceeding*. He adds: *Even if they were not several through anything else, through this alone they would be diverse*.

30. I answer by denying the antecedent. Since procession through the will differs from procession through the intellect by reason of the order it bears to the latter, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3, if the order of origin were removed, there would not be two processions but one procession really, with only a virtual distinction, just as the will in God differs from the intellect only virtually and is posterior to it only by a virtual origin. Nor is it an objection that one would be generation while the other would not, for this argues only a virtual specific distinction between them, not a formal real distinction.

31. To Anselm it must be said, with St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 5, ad 2, that he did not utter the aforesaid words as expressing his own opinion, but only in the course of disputation, on the supposition of the Greek position distinguishing the Holy Spirit from the Son solely by the fact that the Son is produced by the Father through the intellect and by true generation, while the Holy Spirit is produced through the will, not by being born but by proceeding. That this interpretation is legitimate is gathered from the fact that otherwise Anselm would openly contradict himself, since in that book *De processione Spiritus Sancti*, which he composed against the

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Greeks, he repeatedly states and emphasizes the common axiom: *In God all things are the same where the opposition of relation does not intervene.*

§ 4.

By Virtue of His Characteristic Property, the Holy Spirit Requires That
He Proceed from Two Persons, Who Nevertheless Are
Not Two Principles of the Holy Spirit but Only One.

32. The first part is proved against the Scotists. By his personal property the Holy Spirit proceeds from the most perfect love, and consequently from the mutual and reciprocal love of friendship, which is far more perfect than the love of concupiscence or of simple benevolence. But love cannot be or be understood as mutual without a plurality of supposita, for, as St. Gregory says in hom. 17 on the Gospels, *charity cannot exist among fewer than two.* Therefore, by his personal property the Holy Spirit proceeds from two Persons.

33. This is confirmed: by his personal property the Holy Spirit is the indivisible bond of the Father and the Son, the most delightful kiss of both, their unbroken peace, firm glue, indivisible love, undivided unity, and the indissoluble bond of the whole Trinity, as St. Bernard teaches on the Canticle.

34. But these things cannot be understood without mutual love and a plurality of supposita, as is evident. Therefore, by his characteristic and personal property the Holy Spirit requires that he proceed from two Persons. Hence, if, per impossibile, he proceeded from the Father alone, he would not be adequately of the same nature as he now is, because he would lack a personal property that he possesses by virtue of his procession, namely, being the term of mutual love and the most delightful bond and kiss of two Persons. Nor is it an objection if you say that in such a case he would proceed from the love by which the Father and the Holy Spirit loved one another. For love is understood as mutual only when it belongs subjectively, or as from a principle, to two supposita, and not when it belongs to one as its principle and to the other only objectively. This would occur in the proposed case, for the love by which the Father and the Holy Spirit loved one another would belong to the Father subjectively, or as to its principle, and to the Holy Spirit only objectively or terminatively.

35. The second part of the assertion was defined at the Council of Lyons under Gregory X, where it is expressly taught that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles but as from one

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principle. Reason also supports this. For although the Father and the Son are two supposita, they possess only one spirative power, just as they possess one will. But substantive names, such as principle, are not multiplied unless the form is multiplied, just as adjectives are not multiplied unless supposita are multiplied, as philosophers teach in dialectic. Therefore, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, just as the three Persons are one principle of the production of creatures because of the same power and virtue of creating that is in them.

36. You will object first against the first part of the assertion: when one suppositum possesses an adequate power for producing a given term, a plurality of supposita is accidental to the production of that term. But in one Divine Person alone, for example, in the Father, there is an adequate spirative power, or power productive of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, a plurality of supposita is not required intrinsically for his production, but is related to it accidentally, just as the Trinity of Persons does not intrinsically concur in the production of creatures because the power productive of them resides in each Person.

37. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: if there is in that suppositum both an adequate power and every condition required by the term, I grant the major premise. If some condition is lacking, I deny the major premise. Granting the minor, I deny the consequence. For although the adequate spirative power, or power productive of the Holy Spirit, is in the Father, the condition required on the part of the term is not in the Father alone, since the Holy Spirit intrinsically and by his personal property requires for his production a plurality of Persons. From this the disparity with the example of the production of creatures is evident. Creatures do not intrinsically require that they proceed from three Persons, whereas the Holy Spirit intrinsically requires that he be produced by two because he proceeds from mutual love and as the bond and kiss of the Father and the Son. Hence St. Thomas says in I, dist. 29, q. un., last a., ad 2: *The reasoning concerning creation is not similar to that concerning spiration, because spiration presupposes distinction in the supposita. Hence it is in a certain way from several supposita insofar as they are distinct, since it is thus a personal operation. But creation is a work of the divine essence and consequently is the work of the undistinguished suppositum, insofar as the essence is signified as that which exists, as by the name God.*

38. You will object second: the character of mutuality adds no perfection to divine love. Therefore, from the fact that the Holy Spirit requires to proceed from most perfect love, it is not rightly inferred that he intrinsically requires to proceed from the mutual love by which the Father and the Son

love one another. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved from the fact that mutuality adds only a relation of reason or real personal relations, which in our opinion add no perfection to the essence.

39. I answer that although the character of mutuality adds no perfection, it nevertheless adds a mode of perfection to essential love and its complement. This suffices for the Holy Spirit intrinsically to require procession from mutual love, because he must proceed from essential love as completed and terminated and, as it were, affected with the mode due to it. Similarly, the nature of beatitude includes seeing not only the divine essence and the absolute perfections, but also the relations and Persons by which the essence is modified and terminated, as was shown in the treatise on the vision of God.

40. You will object third against the second part of the assertion: although there is one spirative power in the Father and the Son, there are nevertheless two supposita spirating and intrinsically required for spiration, as we showed in the first part of the assertion. Therefore, they are two principles of the Holy Spirit, not one. I deny the consequence, for, as we said above, the name *principle*, being substantive, requires a multiplication of the form for its own multiplication.

41. From what has been said, it is gathered first that, when the Father and the Son are called the adequate principle of the Holy Spirit, the term *principle* does not stand determinately for the Father or determinately for the Son, but for the Father and the Son after the manner of a collection. Similarly, among created things, when the father and mother are said to be the cause of their child, if the term *cause* is taken adequately for the total and adequate principle of generation, it stands neither for the father alone nor for the mother alone, but for both parents after the manner of a collection. In this sense St. Thomas must be understood when he says here, a. 4, ad 4, that the term *principle* does not possess determinate but confused supposition for the two Persons. He is not taking confused supposition in the strict dialectical sense, as when it is said, *either eye is necessary for seeing*, but by confused supposition he means copulative or collective supposition.

42. It is gathered second that the power of spirating connotes the relation of Spirator, while paternity and filiation are only conditions required in the principle which spirates. For that is connoted by the productive principle as the principle by which, through which the principle which acts regards the produced term, since no principle can be understood without an order to its term. But the Father and the Son do not regard the Holy Spirit through paternity and filiation, but through the relation of Spirator. Therefore, it is not paternity and filiation but the relation of Spirator that is

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connoted by the spirative principle as the principle by which. This is confirmed: if spirative power connoted paternity and filiation, it would not be common to the Father and the Son, because the adequate connotation of that power would belong to neither of them, since neither does filiation belong to the Father nor paternity to the Son.

43. You will say: the Holy Spirit intrinsically proceeds from mutual love. But love cannot be mutual unless paternity and filiation are understood in the spirative principle. Therefore, such a principle connotes paternity and filiation.

44. I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: unless they are understood in the spirative principle as the principle which acts, I grant the minor premise. In the spirative principle as the principle by which, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. Therefore, for love to be and to be understood as mutual, it suffices that paternity and filiation be conditions required in the principle which spirates. It is not required that they be the connotation or complement of spirative power, or of the spirative principle as the principle by which.

45. From what was said above concerning the procession of the Word, it can also easily be gathered from the love of what things the Holy Spirit proceeds. It must be said that he proceeds from the love of all things that are formally in God, that is, the essence, the attributes, and the Persons. For since the love from which he proceeds is infinite and comprehensive, it must extend to all things that are formally in God. The Holy Spirit is produced especially through the love by which the Father takes delight in the Son as in his image, and the Son in the Father as in his prototype and the principle of his origin. Hence, just as the Apostle says in Gal. 5 that joy is a fruit of the Holy Spirit, so it may also rightly be said that the Holy Spirit is the fruit of the joy by which the Father eternally rejoices and delights in the Son, and the Son in the Father, according to the words of Zeno of Verona: *The Father rejoices in another self, whom he begot from himself.*

46. As regards possible creatures, although the Word proceeds from the knowledge of them, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the love of them. For although in the state of mere possibility they are intelligible because they possess objective truth, they are not lovable, since in that state they neither exist nor express an order to existence, but abstract from it, and consequently lack all goodness, as is taught in *Metaphysica*.

47. As regards future and existing creatures, just as the Word does not intrinsically proceed from knowledge of them, neither does the Holy Spirit intrinsically proceed from love of them. For both knowledge and love of them are free in God and consequently cannot intrinsically concur in a

natural and necessary production such as the production of the Word and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Hence, with respect to each procession, they are related to it merely accidentally and concomitantly. This alone is what St. Thomas means when he says here, a. 2, ad 3: *Just as the Father expresses himself and every creature in the Word whom he begets, so he loves himself and every creature in the Holy Spirit.* By these words he intends only to declare that, just as the knowledge productive of the Word concomitantly extends to existing and future creatures, so the love by which the Holy Spirit is produced concomitantly terminates in them.

CHAPTER IX.

On the Properties of the Divine Persons.

1. We have treated the Divine Persons both in common and individually. Hence, to complete this treatise, it remains for us to discuss certain of their properties. Some of these are intrinsic to the Divine Persons, such as likeness, equality, and circuminsession, or the mutual existence of one in another. Others are extrinsic and ordered to creatures, such as their mission and indwelling in the souls of the just.

§ 1.

Among the Divine Persons There Is Most Perfect Equality and Likeness.

2. This is evident from the Athanasian Creed, which says: Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit. Again: The three Persons are coeternal and coequal with one another. Reason also supports this. For those things are called alike and equal whose quality and quantity are one, as is evident from Aristotle, *Metaphysica* V, c. 5. But since in God there is no quality strictly so called, as it belongs to created things, nor a quantity of parts and extension, but only a quantity of perfection and power, likeness must be taken from form and equality from perfection and greatness of being. But the Divine Persons communicate in the same form of Divinity and in the same perfection and greatness of being. Therefore, they are most perfectly alike and equal. Hence Bernard admirably says in epist. 190: He estimates the divine magnificence worthily, so far as he is able, who thinks of nothing unequal in that in which all is supreme; nothing distant in that in which all is one; nothing gaping in that in which all is whole; nothing

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imperfect or needy in that in which the whole is all. The Father is the whole of what the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are; the Son is the whole of what he himself, the Father, and the Holy Spirit are; the Holy Spirit is the whole of what he himself, the Father, and the Son are. The whole is one whole, neither superabundant in the three nor diminished in the individual Persons.

3. The equality of the Divine Persons is confirmed and explained in particular. If there were any inequality among the Divine Persons, it would be either in the perfection of nature, in power, or in duration, for no other inequality can be conceived that is not reduced to one of these three. But the Divine Persons are unequal in none of these. Therefore, they possess most perfect equality among themselves. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved in each of its parts. First, that they are not unequal in the perfection of nature is evident from the fact that one and the same most simple nature is found undivided in them. Although it is in the Father as possessed from himself, and in the Son as given and communicated by the Father, this does not signify greater perfection in the Father than in the Son. For it is no more perfect to give the Divinity than to receive it, to beget than to be begotten, or to spirate than to be spirated. Those modes of possessing the divine essence are pure references to a term which, as we showed above in c. 4, § 3, add no perfection to the essence but possess only the infinite perfection of the essence. Hence Augustine teaches in *De Trinitate* XV, c. 3 that goodness and perfection in God are predicated not relatively but absolutely. From this he infers that *not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but neither are both together anything greater than the Holy Spirit alone; nor are any two Persons in the same Trinity anything greater than one; nor are all three together anything greater than each individual Person*. From this you will understand that this supreme and most perfect equality of the Persons is very difficult to explain in the opinion of those who teach that relative perfections are multiplied in God and are diverse in the relations and Persons, as we showed in the place cited.

4. From this the second part of the minor remains proved, namely, that the Divine Persons are equal in power. For since power and virtue follow the perfection of nature, it is evident that the power of the Son, who possesses the same nature as the Father, is not less. Hence Ambrose says in *De Trinitate* V: *In what, then, is he less, who possesses all things that the Father possesses? For he expressed all things from the Father by right of generation*.

5. You will say: the power to beget, which is in the Father, is not in the Son, otherwise he could beget another Son like himself, which implies a

contradiction. Therefore, there is a power in the Father that is not in the Son, and consequently they are not equal in power.

6. I answer with St. Thomas, here, q. 42, a. 6, ad 3, by denying the antecedent. For *just as the same essence that is paternity in the Father is filiation in the Son, so the power by which the Father begets and by which the Son is begotten is the same*. Hence it is manifest that whatever the Father can do, the Son can do. Yet it does not follow that the Son can beget, for the argument shifts from what something is to a relation, since generation signifies a relation in God. Therefore, the Son possesses the same power as the Father, but with another relation, because the Father possesses it as giving, and this is signified when it is said that he can beget. The Son possesses it as receiving, and this is signified when it is said that he can be begotten.

7. You will press: powers are distinguished through their acts. But to beget is an act distinct from being begotten. Therefore, generative power is distinct from the power terminating generation.

8. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. For just as generative power is the divine essence with paternity connoted, and generability is the same essence with filiation connoted, so actual generation is the divine act of understanding with paternity connoted, and being begotten is passive being understood with filiation connoted. But being understood and understanding are not really distinct acts in God. Consequently, neither are begetting and being begotten really distinguished as regards what they directly import, but only as regards the relations they connote. In this same way generative power is distinguished from the power terminating generation. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas in *De potentia*, q. 2, a. 5, in the body, which he concludes as follows: *The same must therefore be said concerning action and power, for generation signifies an action together with a certain reference, and the power of begetting signifies power together with a reference. Hence generation itself is God's action, but insofar as it belongs to the Father alone; and similarly generative power is God's omnipotence, insofar as it belongs to the Father alone*. Thus St. Thomas speaks of active generation and the power of begetting. To proceed consistently, he would say the same concerning passive generation and the power terminating generation.

9. From this it is evident that, although generation actively taken is in the Father and not in the Son, there is nevertheless no perfection in the Father that is not in the Son. For active generation is not an operation taken absolutely, but an operation as modified by the relation of paternity. Hence, although under this aspect it is not in the Son, because it is nevertheless in him under the concept of actuality and operation, every perfection that is in the Father is found in the Son.

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10. The third part of the principal minor, which asserts that the Divine Persons are equal in duration, is evident from Athanasius in the Creed, where they are called *one eternal*. But unity of eternity permits no inequality of duration. Therefore, the three Divine Persons are equal in duration. The same is evident from this excellent argument of St. Thomas, here, q. 42, a. 2. If a produced term does not coexist with its principle, this results either from an imperfection of the principle, because it is not immediately perfect with every perfection from the beginning, as is evident in a child who cannot beget because of the weakness of his power; or because the agent is free and, according to its liberty, does not immediately produce the effect; or, finally, because the action through which it is produced is successive. But none of these is found in the procession of the Divine Persons. For the Father, for example, produces the Son not by free choice but naturally; his nature was perfect from eternity; and the action by which he produces the Son is not successive. Therefore, the Divine Persons are coeternal and equal in duration. Hence, as the same holy Doctor notes here, q. 34, a. 2, ad 3, the Son is called *the brightness of the Father* in Scripture to show that he is coeternal with the Father, just as brightness is coeval with light. Ambrose teaches the same in *De fide* IV in these words: *Light generates brightness, and it cannot be understood that brightness is later than light or that light is older than brightness, because wherever there is light, there is also brightness. Brightness cannot exist without light, because light is in brightness and brightness is in light*. Hence the Apostle called the Son the brightness of glory, because the Son is the brightness of the paternal light: coeternal because of the eternity of his power, and inseparable because of the unity of their radiance.

11. Chrysologus uses a similar argument in serm. 60 to prove the coeternity of the Son with the Father: Frailty is conceived and conceives; is brought forth and brings forth; is generated and generates; receives a beginning and an end; undergoes death and transmits it; and preserves in its offspring whatever belongs to its own condition and nature. But God the Father did not beget in time, because he knows no time. He did not give a beginning, who knows no beginning. He does not transmit an end, who has no end. Rather, he so begot the Son from himself that all that was in himself both existed and remained in the Son. He who believes that the Father exists confesses the Son. He who believes in the Father and the Son should not think of ages, imagine degrees, suspect times, seek a conception, or inquire into a birth. He who believes in God has confessed divine, not human, things.

12. You will say: among the Divine Persons there is a prior and posterior according to origin. Therefore, there is not perfect equality of duration among them.

I answer that some deny that priority of origin is found in God. St. Thomas appears to favor them here, a. 3, where he grants an order among the Divine Persons without priority, following Augustine in *Contra Maximinum* III, who says that between the Father and the Son there is an order of nature, not because one is prior to the other, but because one is from the other. Indeed, since Athanasius asserts in the Creed that in the Trinity nothing is prior or posterior, it seems safer to eliminate every shadow of priority and posteriority from the Divine Persons. Nevertheless, many theologians do not hesitate to admit priority and posteriority of origin among the Divine Persons. Cajetan holds that the question concerns only terminology and that speech must be restrained: real priority should not be conceded among the Divine Persons absolutely, but at most with the addition of a qualification, namely, real priority of origin. But whichever of these is asserted, the coeternity of the Divine Persons and their perfect equality in duration always remain. For these are not opposed by real priority of origin, but only by priority of duration and the real causal priority of that from which another proceeds, both of which faith excludes from the Divine Persons.

§ 2.

The Circuminsession of the Divine Persons Is Explained.

13. The circuminsession of the Divine Persons, which the Greeks call *περιχώρησις*, is nothing other than the mutual residence and indwelling of one Person in another. This is declared in Scripture, John 10, in these words: *The Father is in me, and I am in the Father*. Again, in c. 14: *Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me?* It is also affirmed by the holy Fathers, who testify that the whole Father is in the Son and the whole Son in the Father, as Ambrose does in the hymn for Monday Lauds, in which it is said: *The whole Son is in the Father, and the whole Father in the Word*. St. Thomas also explains it here, q. 42, a. 5, where he teaches that each Divine Person is in another in three ways. 1^o By reason of the essence, which is common to all the Persons. 2^o By reason of origin, which, since it is an immanent action, requires that what proceeds remain in the principle from which it proceeds and not be separated from it. Hence the Son is said to reside in the bosom of the Father, and Zeno of Verona therefore calls him *the*

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noble inhabitant of the Father's heart. For, Chrysologus says, he proceeded from the Father and did not depart from the Father in any respect. Tertullian likewise says in his book Adversus Praxean: God brought forth the Word as a root brings forth a shoot, a fountain a river, and the sun a ray. Nor do I call the shoot a separation from the root, the river a separation from the fountain, or the ray a separation from the sun. Yet neither is the shoot severed from the root, the river from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun, for, as John says, the Word was with God. 3^o One Person is said to be in another by reason of relation, which refers to its correlative. But this reason appears difficult to many. For how, they ask, can one Person be in another according to that very aspect by which he is distinguished from and opposed to the other, since it is by the relations that the Persons are distinguished from and opposed to one another? This is easily answered: the holy Doctor does not intend thereby to prove that one Person is in another according to being, but according to understanding. Thus he says in the place cited: According to the relations, it is manifest that one relative opposite is in the other according to understanding. In I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2, he says that one Person is said to be in another either as regards being or as regards understanding, because one is understood in the other by relation. I add that, although ordinary relations require only simultaneity in cognition and not real mutual existence, the relations of knower and known, and of lover and beloved, intrinsically require union and mutual real indwelling, and effect it when knowledge and love are in the supreme degree of perfection, as occurs in the present case. Hence Cornelius Musso says in his book on sacred history: Love indeed causes ecstasy, because it is the impulse of the lover; yet it introduces no separation, because it is an indivisible bond, a most delightful chain by which lovers are bound to one another so that they are no longer two but one: in us by unity of affection, and in God also by unity of substance, because of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature.

§ 3.

On the Mission of the Divine Persons.

14. Mission in general signifies procession or departure from someone, together with a new designation to some effect or place. For a person is not said to be sent to do what he was already doing or to a place where he already was. Hence four things concur in a mission: the Person sending, the Person sent, the term to which he is newly sent, and the departure or procession of the one sent to his function. Mission can occur in three ways,

as St. Thomas observes here, q. 43, a. 1: namely, by command, as a master sends a servant to an estate; by counsel, as a physician is said to send a king to the baths; and by origin, as a flower is sent forth from a tree, a ray from the sun, and a stream from a fountain. The mission of the Divine Persons can occur only in this third manner, since the first two imply imperfection. Hence it can be defined or described thus: *Mission is a procession of origin from the one sending, together with a new mode of existing in another.* From this:

15. It is gathered first that mission directly imports procession and indirectly connotes an effect newly produced in a creature. Consequently, it primarily imports something notional and secondarily something essential and common, since the power of acting and operating *ad extra* is common to the three Persons. Otherwise, if mission stood only for the production of the effect, there would be no reason why the Father should not be said to be sent, since he produces the temporal effect connoted by the mission of the other Persons, namely, grace and charity, according to 1 John 3: *Behold what manner of charity the Father has given us.*

16. It is gathered second that one Person cannot send himself, although he can give himself, because, just as no Person proceeds from himself, neither is any Person sent by himself.

17. It is gathered third that the eternal Father is sent by no one, although he gives himself or comes with the other Persons to dwell in the soul through sanctifying grace, because he proceeds from no one, being unbegotten and the fountain principle of the whole Divinity. Hence Augustine says in his sermon against the Arians, c. 4: *The Father alone is read to be unsent, because he alone has no author from whom he is begotten or from whom he proceeds.* I add that, just as every movable thing must be reduced to some first unmoved mover, lest there be a procession to infinity, so everything sent must be reduced to a sender who cannot be sent, as St. Thomas rightly observes in I *Ad Annibaldum*, dist. 15, q. un., a. 2.

18. It is gathered fourth that the Son is sent by the Father alone because he proceeds from him alone by eternal generation, while the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son because he proceeds from both. Nor is it an objection that in Scripture the Son is sometimes said to be sent by the Holy Spirit. This can either be referred to Christ's human nature or explained of the mission of the Word inadequately considered, namely, by reason of the effect connoted by it. For that effect proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Holy Spirit, and by reason of it the Son can in a certain respect be said to be sent by the Holy Spirit.

19. It is gathered fifth that the mission of the Divine Persons is rightly divided into visible and invisible. A visible mission is one that occurs in an

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effect sensibly appearing and representing the Person sent, as when the Holy Spirit appeared over the Apostles in the form of fiery tongues on the day of Pentecost. An invisible mission is one that occurs in a spiritual and invisible effect.

20. If you ask what that effect must be, I answer that it is nothing other than grace and charity. For the invisible mission of the Divine Persons occurs solely through God's existing in the rational creature in a new and special manner, dwelling in it as in his temple, and making his abode there. But God exists in the rational creature in a special and new manner, and dwells in it as in his temple, through grace and charity alone, according to Christ's words in John 14: *If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we shall come to him and make our abode with him.* Therefore, the invisible mission of the Divine Persons occurs only by reason of grace and charity.

21. This is confirmed first: through the invisible mission of the Divine Persons, God is in man and man is in God. Hence, through it there is produced in us a certain image of that admirable circuminsession by which one Person resides in another, for which reason in Song 4 those divine missions are called *a paradise*. But God is not in man, nor man in God, except through charity, as is evident from 1 John 4: *God is charity, and he who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.* Explaining these words, Bernard says most beautifully: *God is charity: what is more precious? He who abides in charity abides in God: what is more secure? And God abides in him: what is more delightful?* Therefore, and so forth.

22. This is confirmed second by the argument of St. Thomas in I, dist. 14, q. 2, a. 2. The missions of the Divine Persons are principally ordained to lead the rational creature back to God as its ultimate end, from whom it is turned away and withdraws through sin. But the return of the rational creature to God as its ultimate end occurs only through grace and charity, which unite man to God as his ultimate end. Therefore, the invisible mission of the Divine Persons occurs only by reason of grace and charity.

23. From this you will understand first that the invisible mission of the Divine Persons does not occur through unformed faith or hope, nor through graces gratuitously given, because those gifts can coexist with mortal sin. But mortal sin does not permit God to dwell specially in the rational creature as in his temple, since it is rather an aversion from and separation from God. The same reasoning proves that the invisible mission of the Divine Persons does not occur through helps remotely disposing a person toward justification. For through them God does not yet inhabit the soul, but only moves it and knocks at the door of the heart. Hence the Council of

Trent, speaking of that imperfect contrition called attrition, says that it is an impulse of the Holy Spirit, who does not yet dwell within but only moves. Nevertheless, the infusion of such helps can be called an initiatory mission, insofar as our justification and God's indwelling in us begin from these helps and pious motions.

24. You will understand second that, although a special assistance and presence of the Holy Spirit is given to the Supreme Pontiff or a General Council when defining matters of faith so that they cannot err in such definitions, an invisible mission of the Divine Persons does not therefore occur to them. For through that special assistance the Holy Spirit does not inhabit the soul as his temple, but only moves, instructs, and directs the intellect so that it does not stray in its knowledge of the truth. Hence such presence does not require a special mission but belongs to the general presence of God by which God is in things through operation.

25. You will also understand from what has been said that through the mission of the Divine Persons not only the created gift of grace and charity but the Divine Persons themselves are given to us, as is gathered from Rom. 5: *The charity of God has been poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.* For the Apostle distinguishes between charity poured forth and the Holy Spirit given. Consequently, he holds that in justification not only are grace and charity infused into us, but the Holy Spirit himself is also given to us. Hence Augustine admirably says in serm. 185, *De tempore: On this day the Holy Spirit was present to the faithful, not only through the grace of visitation and operation, but through the very presence of his majesty; and into the vessels flowed not merely the fragrance of balm, but the very substance of the sacred ointment.* This is also indicated by the words of John 14: *We shall come to him*, that is, we shall approach him personally. Explaining this, Bernard says in serm. 2, *De dedicatione: How does this happen to me, that the Majesty of God should come to me? How great is God's kindness, how great his condescension, how great the glory of souls, that the Lord of all things, who lacks nothing, commands that a temple be made for him in them!*

26. But you will ask whether that mode of presence which the Divine Persons have in the soul of the just through grace and charity is special and different from the general mode by which God exists in each thing through operation, which theologians call the presence of immensity. In other words, if, per impossibile, the Divine Persons were not within the soul by essence, presence, and power, would they nevertheless exist in it through their substance? Thus, if, per impossibile, the Divine Word were not really present to Christ's humanity by reason of his immensity, nevertheless, by the very

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fact that he was hypostatically united to it, he would become intimately and substantially present to it.

27. I answer affirmatively. For since it belongs to the nature of love to tend toward the union of lovers, and to more perfect love to tend toward a more perfect union, the most perfect love of friendship, such as that by which God loves the just, requires a union not only according to affection, or through conformity of affections, but also a real and substantial union. Hence, by virtue of the grace of charity which God causes in the soul, he is united to it not only objectively and according to affection, but really and substantially, so that, if, per impossibile, he were not present to it by reason of his immensity, he would still be in it in a most special and real manner, just as he is specially and really in the blessed through glory and in Christ's humanity through the hypostatic union. Let this suffice concerning the ineffable mystery of the Most Holy Trinity, concerning which Augustine says that *nowhere is error more dangerous, nowhere is inquiry more laborious, and nowhere is discovery more fruitful.*

TREATISE VII.

ON THE ANGELS.

After St. Thomas has contemplated God as he is in himself, one and triune, he considers him as the first principle of creatures. Because among creatures the angelic nature holds the principal place, as being more like God and the most luminous mirror of divine perfection, he treats the Angels before other purely corporeal creatures and before man, who is the bond and link between spiritual and corporeal creation. Observing the same order, after the treatises on God, one and triune, we now present the treatise on the Angels, in which we shall discuss their existence, essence, place, motion, knowledge, volition, grace, state of trial, sin and punishment, speech and illumination, orders, and hierarchies.

CHAPTER I.

On the Existence and Creation of the Angels.

1. The Sadducees formerly denied the existence of Angels, or of any intellectual and incorporeal substances, saying that there is neither resurrection, nor Angel, nor any spirit, as St. Luke relates in Acts 23. Against this error militates the whole of Scripture, both the Old and New Testaments. For, as St. Gregory says in hom. 34 on the Gospels, *almost every page of the sacred writings testifies to Angels and Archangels*. Nor was the answer of the Sadducees valid when they said that the Angels mentioned in

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Scripture were only certain movements and thoughts of the mind which God sends into men. Thus they claimed that the Angel who, according to Gen. 22, prevented Abraham from killing Isaac was the thought God aroused in Abraham's mind, by which he understood that God did not will Isaac actually to be sacrificed. This interpretation was a manifest corruption of Scripture, since Scripture says that Angels descend from heaven, appear upon earth, wrestle with Jacob, speak, work miracles, preside over men, lead the children of Israel in the pillar of cloud, and perform similar actions, all of which can belong only to persons and living substances, not to thoughts.

2. The existence of Angels is also established by the various and marvelous effects and motions we observe in the possessed and demoniacs, which surpass the powers of the whole corporeal order of nature. Hence it is ridiculous for some to say that these effects proceed from melancholy, black bile, or a disordered bodily temperament. How could melancholy make them aware of the secrets of others or, without study, skilled in foreign languages? Nor are those less deluded who attribute such effects to the influence of the stars, especially the moon. Who could imagine the efficacy of the moon where the hidden secrets of hearts are disclosed and foreign languages and diverse kinds of speech are heard? All these things exceed the power of the stars and indeed manifest something divine. Hence Tertullian admirably says in *Apologeticum*, c. 22: *Demons, taking possession of certain conditions of times, imitate Divinity when they steal divination.*

3. The argument as though a priori by which the existence of Angels may be proved is given by St. Thomas here, q. 50, a. 1, and may be briefly proposed as follows. Natural reason teaches that God made the universe perfect. But the perfection of the universe requires that there be in it certain purely intellectual substances, which we call Angels. Therefore, natural reason shows that Angels exist. The major premise is evident, for the works of God are perfect, as is said in Deut. 32. The minor is proved thus. The perfection of an effect consists in its assimilation to its cause according to the character and perfection under which the cause acts, if such assimilation is possible. But God, since he is of a purely intellectual nature, acts only through intellect and will. Therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that in some part of itself it be assimilated to God under this aspect and consequently that there be within it certain purely intellectual substances, endowed with intellect and will, which are called Angels.

4. Nor is it valid to say that this argument proves that every individual creature made perfect by God must be intellectual in order to be perfectly assimilated to God. For God does not intend the perfection of every individual creature absolutely, but only in its order to the good or perfection

of the universe. Therefore, just as the perfection of the universe does not require a perfect assimilation to God the Creator in every creature, but only in some creature, so not every creature but only some creature must be intellectual. This is especially so because otherwise there would be no distinction of grades among things, and consequently the perfection of the universe, which arises from a manifold distinction of grades, would be removed. Hence the argument of St. Thomas can be confirmed and illustrated by this reasoning. Although the perfection of the universe does not require all possible creatures, it nevertheless requires that it contain all grades of being. Otherwise, it could not be called a universe without qualification, which by its own nature, as the name itself indicates, requires a certain universality of creatures producible by God, at least according to their common grades. But if there were no purely intellectual substances in it, the most perfect grade of all, namely, the intellectual grade, would be lacking from the universe. Therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that purely intellectual substances exist in it.

5. Nor does it matter if you say that the intellectual grade is found in man according to the soul, which is intellectual, and consequently that, even if Angels did not exist, the intellectual grade would not be lacking from the universe. For the intellectual grade is participated in very imperfectly by the rational soul. Although the soul is spiritual in substance, it is corporeal in its mode, since it is the form of a body and depends upon the senses and phantasms in its intellectual operation. But it is not fitting to the perfection and beauty of the universe that the lower grades should be perfect and complete while the highest and noblest of all should remain imperfect and incomplete.

6. As regards the creation of the Angels, several of the Greek Fathers formerly taught that they were created before the corporeal world. But this opinion cannot be maintained without temerity after the definition of the Lateran Council in the chapter *Firmiter*, where it is asserted that *from the beginning of time God simultaneously created both creatures from nothing, the spiritual and the corporeal, the angelic and the earthly*. Reason also supports this. For, as St. Thomas argues below, q. 61, a. 3, the Angels are parts of the universe and, together with corporeal creation, compose a certain integral whole, as is evident from the order of one creature to another. But no part is perfect when separated from its whole. Therefore, it is not probable that God, whose works are perfect, produced the angelic creation separately before all other creatures.

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7. You will say: if the Angels had been created within the corporeal world, Moses, who carefully describes the creation of all things at the beginning of Genesis, would have made some mention of their creation.

8. I answer that Moses did not mention the creation of the Angels because the purpose of his undertaking did not require it. For, as St. Jerome says in epist. 139, Moses wished to describe only the order of the creation of corporeal things, because only among corporeal things was that series and diversity of days to be created which Moses principally intended to explain in Genesis. It may be added with St. Thomas, below, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1, *that Moses was speaking to an uncultivated people who could not yet understand an incorporeal nature. If it had been expressly stated to them that some things exist above every corporeal nature, this would have given them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were prone and from which Moses principally intended to recall them.*

9. Concerning the place in which the Angels were created, there is disagreement and controversy among authors. Rupert, in his commentary on Genesis I, c. 11, teaches that the Angels were created in the first region of the air, for he thinks they are corporeal and were formed from this dense air. Others hold that they were created in the starry heaven or in the heaven immediately below the empyrean. Thus Suárez, Lorinus, and other more recent authors. But the truer and more probable opinion is that of St. Thomas, below, q. 61, a. 4, asserting that the Angels were created in the empyrean heaven. For it is more probable that they were created on the first day of the world's creation, since the Lateran Council says that God from the beginning of time simultaneously created both creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, the angelic and the earthly. But on the first day of creation the starry heaven was not created, but only the empyrean. For in Gen. 1 it is said that the firmament was made on the second day and that the lights and stars were placed in it on the fourth; and by the firmament the starry heaven is understood, as Bede and Strabo teach, cited by St. Thomas below, q. 68, a. 1, ad 1. Therefore, the Angels were created not in the starry but in the empyrean heaven.

10. The argument of St. Thomas in the place cited also supports this. Since the Angels are the noblest part of the universe and were created to preside over the whole corporeal order of nature, it was fitting that they be created in the noblest and highest of all places, from which they could preside over the whole corporeal order of nature. This place can be none other than the empyrean heaven. Hence Strabo, commenting on the words of Genesis, *In the beginning God created heaven and earth*, says: *He does not here call the visible firmament heaven, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual*

heaven. It is so called not from heat but from splendor, and immediately upon being made it was filled with Angels.

11. You will say with Suárez: man was not created in the earthly paradise, but outside it and afterward transferred into it. Therefore, similarly, the Angels should not have been created in the place proper to their beatitude, namely, the empyrean, but outside it, so that they might later be transferred into it according to their merits. Hence Lucifer said in Isa. 14: *I shall ascend into heaven.* He adds that it belongs to the dignity of the empyrean that it should always have been entirely pure from every stain of sin. But if the Angels were created there, they consequently sinned there also.

12. These objections can easily be answered. To the first, I deny the parity. For, as St. Thomas says below, q. 102, a. 4: Paradise was a fitting place for human habitation according to the incorruption of man's first state. That incorruption, however, did not belong to man according to nature, but came from a supernatural gift of God. Therefore, so that it might be attributed to God's grace and not to human nature, God made man outside paradise and afterward placed him in paradise, that he might dwell there throughout the whole period of animal life and afterward, when he had attained spiritual life, be transferred to heaven. But the empyrean heaven, as he adds there, ad 1, is a place fitting to the Angels according to their nature, and therefore they were created there. The words of Lucifer in Isa. 14, *I shall ascend into heaven,* are explained by the same holy Doctor below, q. 61, a. 4, ad 3, as an ascent according to dignity. That this interpretation is legitimate is evident from the words that the apostate Angel adds there: *I shall be like the Most High.*

13. To the other point added by Suárez, it must be said that a corporeal place, such as the empyrean, is not defiled by a spiritual sin, such as the sin of the evil Angels. Consequently, there is no difficulty in saying that the Angels sinned in the empyrean and were cast down from it into Tartarus. Indeed, this contributes greatly to our humility and instruction. *From this we learn,* says Bernard in his sermon *De feno, ligno et stipula*, *that there is security nowhere, neither in heaven nor in paradise, and much less in the world. In heaven an Angel fell in the presence of the Divinity, Adam fell in paradise from a place of delight, and Judas fell in the world from the school of the Savior. Let us therefore ascend,* says Jerome, *through humility to the place from which Lucifer fell through pride.*

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CHAPTER II.

On the Substance or Essence of the Angels.

1. Having explained the existence and creation of the Angels, it follows that we should set forth their substance or essence and briefly declare whether they are entirely immaterial and free from all corporeity, and consequently intrinsically incorruptible and incapable of multiplication within the same species.

§ 1.

The Angels Are Entirely Free from All Corporeity.

2. Many of the holy Fathers, both Greek and Latin, formerly taught that the Angels possess aerial bodies, subtle and fine like air, and for this reason are called aerial powers in Scripture. Among the scholastics, Cajetan favors them in his commentary on Eph. 2, where he says that it accords with true philosophy that Demons are aerial spirits. Nevertheless, this opinion is now rejected by all theologians. First, because of the definition of the Lateran Council cited above, in which God is said *from the beginning of time to have created both creatures from nothing, the corporeal and the spiritual, the angelic and the earthly, and afterward the human creature as in a certain manner common to both, constituted of body and spirit*. There it opposes the angelic nature both to the purely corporeal nature and to the nature constituted of the corporeal and spiritual. Second, because of the common understanding of the Church, which, being more enlightened at the present time, commonly holds that the Angels are entirely incorporeal. This is also gathered with sufficient clarity from Scripture, in which they are called spirits without qualification. That name could not be attributed to them if they possessed any bodies naturally united to them, however subtle and fine those bodies might be. For when men possess subtle and incorruptible bodies after the resurrection, they will neither be nor be called spirits without qualification. Christ, after his resurrection, denied in Luke 24 that he was a spirit because he possessed a body: *Handle and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have*.

3. To this are added the testimonies of the holy Fathers, among whom the Areopagite possesses the greatest weight in this question. For in c. 1 of

De caelesti hierarchia he testifies that the things he is about to say concerning the heavenly spirits *were received from the Fathers either through signs or through the mysteries of a more sacred understanding*. Those Fathers were the Apostles, especially Paul, whom he calls his master and teacher in *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, c. 2, and *De divinis nominibus*, cc. 1 and 7. In c. 4 of the aforesaid *De caelesti hierarchia*, therefore, he calls the Angels *intelligible and spiritual substances, incorporeal and free from all matter*. Ignatius, the disciple of the Apostles, calls the Angels *incorporeal natures* in his epistle to the Trallians. Nazianzen says in orat. 38, *De nativitate*, that the Angels are incorporeal and free from all matter. Likewise, Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 3: *An Angel is an intellectual and incorporeal substance*. Nor is it an objection that he adds in the same place that an Angel is incorporeal with respect to us but corporeal and material with respect to God. He did not say this because he thought an Angel was constituted of any matter, but to show that the materiality and spirituality of an Angel are so inferior to the spirituality of God that, by comparison with it, an Angel scarcely appears to be a spirit. For what is intermediate, when compared with one extreme, appears to be the other extreme, just as what is lukewarm appears cold when compared with the hot and hot when compared with the cold. Finally, the two arguments given in the preceding chapter to demonstrate that the beauty and perfection of the universe require the existence within it of purely spiritual substances entirely free from corporeity prove that the Angels are entirely free from every body. Hence there is no need to dwell further upon this point.

4. But to the contrary it is objected that many things are said of the Angels in Scripture which cannot be verified unless they are corporeal. Thus it is said that they begot men, Gen. 6: *The sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they bore children*. There the Septuagint translates: *The Angels of God went in to the daughters of men*. Again, the smoke of the fish drove away Demons in Tob. 6; at the music of David's harp the evil spirit departed from Saul in 1 Sam. 16; and Demons in hell are tormented and bound by corporeal fire, 2 Pet. 2 and Rev. 21.

5. To the first I answer that by the name *sons of God*, or *Angels of God*, are understood those men who descended from Seth, the father of Enos, who, according to Gen. 4, was the first who *began to invoke the name of the Lord*. For in Scripture the just are often called sons of God and even Angels of God, as Ambrose noted in his book *De Noe*, c. 4, and Augustine proves in *De civitate Dei* XV, c. 23, from Matt. 11, where John, according to the prophecy of Malachi, is called an Angel, and Deut. 32, where the Vulgate has: *He established the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the children of*

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Israel, while the Septuagint reads: *According to the number of the Angels of God*. Those sons of Seth therefore took wives from the seed of Cain. These women are called daughters of men because, imitating the conduct of their parents, they were devoted to earthly things, like their ancestors.

6. To the second it must be said that the burning of the fish's liver in the account of Tobit did not put the Demon to flight by its corporeal power, but by divine power and because of the mystery it signified. For through it was figured the fervor of the prayer of Tobit and his holy wife, or the death of Christ the Lord, consumed by charity upon the cross, by whose power all Demons are put to flight or bound, as Augustine and other Fathers teach in Serrarius, q. 3 on Tob. 8.

7. To the third it is answered that the evil spirit departed when David sang and played the harp either by divine power, because of the hymns and psalms David sang, which were sacred words at whose invocation divine power drove away the Demons; or because that music indirectly concurred in this effect by soothing the king's sadness and tempering the melancholic humor through which the Demon tormented him, or by arousing his soul to the contemplation of divine and heavenly things.

8. To the fourth, concerning the binding of Demons by the fire of hell, I say that Demons are tormented, detained, and bound by corporeal fire as by an instrument of divine power and operation. For although corporeal things cannot act upon spirits by their own power, they can be assumed by God as instruments and elevated so as to touch a spiritual subject by a contact of power, as is evident in the water of Baptism, which is elevated by God to produce grace in the soul of a child. This will be treated more fully below when we discuss the punishment of Demons.

9. It may further be objected with Cajetan in the place cited: all the grades of corporeal living things must be admitted as necessary for the perfection and beauty of the universe. Therefore, just as there are vegetative beings without sense, as in plants; sentient beings without progressive motion, as in oysters; and the intellectual, sensitive, and locally motive powers together, as in man; so there must also be intelligences without sense but possessing progressive motion alone. Such would be Angels endowed with aerial bodies. Consequently, such beings must be admitted.

10. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although the perfection of the universe requires that all possible grades of being be found within it—and these are only three, namely, being, living, and understanding—it does not require that every mode of possessing those grades, or every species contained under those grades, be found within it, because these can be multiplied to infinity. But understanding without sense

and with progressive motion alone does not constitute a special grade, but only a certain mode of possessing the intellectual grade. I add that many hold this mode of possessing the intellectual grade to be impossible. This is gathered from St. Thomas below, q. 70, a. 3, where he proves that an intellectual form cannot be united to a body merely for the sake of local motion, because substantial union between the mover and the movable thing is not necessary for local motion, but contact between the mover and the movable thing suffices.

11. Finally, it may be objected that Augustine in *Contra Academicos* I, Bernard in *De consideratione* V, c. 4, and the same Bernard in serm. 5 on the Canticle attribute a corporeal nature to the Angels.

I answer that there were various opinions on this matter among the ancient Fathers and that Augustine suspended his judgment on this question, as is evident from *De civitate Dei* XV and XXI, c. 10, where he writes: Demons also have certain bodies of their own, as learned men have believed.... But if anyone asserts that Demons have no bodies, there is no need to labor over this matter with burdensome investigation or contend over it in contentious disputation, and so forth. Bernard was likewise doubtful concerning this question in the passages cited.

§ 2.

A Corollary of the Preceding Doctrine.

12. From what has been said, it is gathered that the Angels are incorruptible not only by grace but also by their nature, and this not merely with respect to corruption strictly so called, which is opposed to generation and occurs through the dissolution of a composite and the separation of form from matter, but also with respect to corruption broadly taken, which imports the cessation of a thing and its transition from being to non-being. For something to be called corruptible by its nature in this latter sense, it is not sufficient that it can cease to be through God's extrinsic power, which can withdraw from it his conserving concurrence. It is also required that it possess within itself some principle of corruption, or some potency to non-being. Hence, although God can absolutely destroy the heavens and separate the form of a heaven from its matter, nevertheless, because they lack an intrinsic principle of corruption strictly so called, namely, primary altering qualities and matter that desires other forms, they are called incorruptible by their nature. But there is no intrinsic potency to non-being in the Angels. Therefore, although God can absolutely deprive them of their being and

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reduce them to nothing, nevertheless they must be called, and truly are, incorruptible by their nature even according to corruption broadly taken. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Every intrinsic potency to non-being proceeds from matter. But there is no matter in the Angels, as is evident from what was said above. Therefore, neither is there any intrinsic potency to non-being in them. The major is proved: no potency and no appetite regards non-being intrinsically and primarily, as is said in *Ethica* I and as St. Thomas proves above, q. 19, a. 9, from the fact that every natural potency and inclination intrinsically tends toward the good. But non-being as such does not possess the nature of good. Hence, in created things there can be a potency or inclination toward non-being only secondarily and accidentally, insofar as there is in them a potency or appetite for some being incompatible with the being they actually possess. Thus, for example, the potency of wood is intrinsically and primarily directed toward the being of fire. But because the being of fire is incompatible with the being of wood, the potency of wood is secondarily and accidentally said to regard and tend toward the non-being of wood. But in created things no potency is secondarily directed toward non-being except prime matter, because just as prime matter alone is in potency to a substantial form incompatible with the form it possesses, so it alone is in potency to receive a being incompatible with the being that belongs to it. Therefore, every potency to non-being proceeds from matter. Hence St. Thomas rightly concludes here, a. 5: *The Angel's immateriality itself is the reason why an Angel is incorruptible according to nature.*

13. You will object first: many of the holy Fathers, especially Sophronius in the epistle recited at the Sixth Synod, act. 11, and approved in act. 13, teach that the Angels are immortal not by their nature but by grace. I answer that they do not take immortal to mean a nature lacking an intrinsic principle of mortality, but to mean a nature also lacking need of an extrinsic conserving cause. In this sense God alone is said to possess immortality in 1 Tim. 6. Hence grace is not taken by them as a gift added to nature, but as the will of God freely creating and conserving the nature he bestowed upon the Angels, with no preceding merits or positive exigency on their part, since no exigency of the thing to be created is presupposed for creation. For, as the African Fathers teach in Augustine, epist. 95, natural gifts, insofar as they are bestowed by the gratuitous will of God, are not unfittingly called grace.

14. I add that Damascene and other holy Fathers, when they teach that the Angels are not immortal by their nature, are speaking of perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability from good to evil. The Angels do not possess this unless they are confirmed in good through grace.

Hence, although by their nature they are immutable and invariable according to being, they are nevertheless subject to various changes, which can be reduced to six kinds. 1^o They are changeable as regards evening knowledge, which they possess outside the Word. This knowledge varies in them and can increase daily through their reception of new revelations from God. 2^o They are changeable as regards the will, for, as Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 3: *The nature of Angels is rational and intellectual, endowed with free power and choice, convertible according to purpose, or changeable in will.* 3^o They are changeable as regards their operation, for their act of understanding is not their being or substance, as will be evident below. 4^o They are changeable as regards place, for, as the same Damascene says: *When they are in heaven, they are not on earth; and when sent by God to earth, they do not remain in heaven.* From this follows, 5^o change as regards progressive motion, for since they are not everywhere, they are moved locally and pass from one place to another, as we shall say below. Finally, they are movable from good to evil and from grace to sin, as the unhappy fall of the evil Angels sufficiently shows.

15. You will object second: if there were no intrinsic potency to non-being in the Angels, and consequently no intrinsic principle of corruption, it would follow that God would inflict violence upon an Angel by annihilating him, because he would act against the Angel's natural inclination, by which the Angel connaturally requires to be conserved in being. I deny the consequence. Although there is no natural potency to non-being in the Angels, there is nevertheless in them an obediential potency by which every creature is subject to God, so that he may do in it or with it whatever does not imply a contradiction. Hence, if God annihilated an Angel, he would inflict no violence upon him. For although he would then act against the particular inclination the Angel possesses to endure and remain in being forever, he would not act against the universal inclination the Angel possesses as a part of the universe to obey the Creator. Similarly, no violence is done to water when it rises to fill a vacuum, because although this is contrary to its particular inclination, it thereby serves the universal good of nature and the preservation of the universe, toward which it is more inclined than toward its own particular advantage. Hence Cyril admirably says in *Thesaurus* VIII, c. 2: *The properties naturally implanted in things are nothing in relation to the Creator. Therefore, just as fire possesses the power of burning, but not with respect to God, so an Angel is immortal, but not with respect to God.* By these words he not only confirms our answer, but also indicates that the Angels are immortal and incorruptible by their nature. For this comparison can be sound only if, just as the power of burning is implanted in the nature

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of fire, so immortality is implanted in the angelic nature; and just as God, by denying fire his concurrence in burning, would deprive it of something naturally due to it, so, if he denied conservation to an Angel, he would deprive him of something he ought to possess from his nature, or which is due to him by the title of connaturality.

CHAPTER III.

The Number and Distinction of the Angels.

1. That the multitude of the angels is exceedingly great and altogether astonishing is evident from various testimonies of Scripture. For it is said in Dan. 7: "Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." And Job 25: "Is there any numbering of his soldiers?" That is, their number is plainly beyond all telling. Hence Gregory, *Moralia* XVII, c. 9: "The number of the higher spirits does not fall within the knowledge of human reason, because it does not know how great is the host of that invisible army. The number of the citizens above is expressed as both infinite and definite, so that what is numerable to God may be shown to be innumerable to men." Nevertheless, what Lyra and others teach is neither credible nor probable, namely, that their multitude is so great as to exceed the number of all the individuals in this universe. For who would believe that they are more numerous than all the sands of the sea, all the particles of the air, all the leaves of trees, and all the grains of wheat and millet; or that the angels are more numerous than ants, flies, gnats, fleas, worms, and other similar animals, whose multitude is almost innumerable? It is probable, however, that the multitude of the angels exceeds the number of material species. This is so, first, because an angel was assigned to guard each of them, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 113, a. 2. It is so also because, as the same Holy Doctor argues in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 92: "The order of the universe seems to require that what is nobler among things should exceed the less noble in quantity or number. For less noble things seem to exist for the sake of nobler things; hence the nobler things, as though existing for their own sake, must be multiplied as far as possible. Thus we see that incorruptible bodies, namely, the heavenly bodies, so far exceed corruptible bodies, namely, the elemental bodies, that the latter have, as it were, no notable quantity in comparison with the former. Now just as the heavenly bodies are worthier than the elemental bodies, as the incorruptible are worthier than the corruptible, so intellectual substances are worthier than all bodies, as the immovable and immaterial

are worthier than the movable and material. Therefore separated intellectual substances exceed in number the multitude of all material things.” Ferrariensis notes here that this reasoning of St. Thomas concerns the excess of the multitude of intellectual substances over the species, but not over the individuals, of material and corruptible things, as the same Holy Doctor expressly declares in the fourth argument of the same chapter, in these words: “Therefore the forms existing apart from matter, which we call separated substances, do not appear to be fewer in multitude than the species of material things.” And certainly, if we survey every grade of beings, we shall find that the nobler the grade to which they belong, the more numerous its species are. For there are more species of vegetative bodies, such as flowers, plants, and trees, than of purely inanimate bodies; and again, there are more species of animals living on land, in the air, or in the sea, than of vegetative things. Therefore, for this gradation to be preserved, the intellectual grade, which is the most perfect of all, must similarly, and with still greater reason, contain more species of angels than the grades of being, living, and sensing contain species of inanimate things, plants, and animals.

2. As regards the distinction of the angels, Scotus, Suárez, Vásquez, and other more recent authors hold that among the created angels there are many belonging to the same species. St. Thomas and his disciples, however, including Giles of Rome, Grenado, and others, teach that all the angels differ specifically, in such a way that it is impossible for them to be multiplied only numerically within the same species. This position appears truer and more conformable to the principles of Aristotelian doctrine, as will be evident below. St. Thomas demonstrates that all the angels created by God differ specifically from one another by five arguments in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 93, of which two are principal. The first is: “There are many individuals in one species among corruptible things so that the nature of the species, which cannot be perpetually preserved in one individual, may be preserved in many. Hence, even among incorruptible bodies, there is only one individual in one species. But the nature of a separated substance can be preserved in one individual, because such substances are incorruptible. Therefore there is no need for many individuals of the same species among those substances.” The second proceeds thus: “What belongs to the species in each thing is worthier than what is the principle of individuation and exists outside the definition of the species. Therefore the multiplication of species adds more nobility and perfection to the universe than the multiplication of individuals in one species. But the perfection of the universe consists especially in separated substances. It is therefore more

fitting to the perfection of the universe that there be many substances diverse in species than that there be many numerically within the same species.”

3. That it is impossible for there to be many angels of the same species, or for them to be multiplied within the same species, he proves in the same place by this argument: “Whatever things are the same in species but differ numerically have matter. For a difference proceeding from form introduces a diversity of species, whereas a difference proceeding from matter introduces numerical diversity. But separated substances have no matter at all, neither matter that is a part of them nor matter to which they are united as forms. It is therefore impossible for there to be many of one species.”

4. The adversaries deny the principle upon which the reasoning of St. Thomas rests as its foundation, and upon which the resolution of this celebrated question wholly depends, namely: “Whatever things are the same in species but differ numerically have matter.” They hold that it is not impossible for some principle other than matter to be added to angels, through which their individual distinction and multiplication would arise. Yet this principle is taken from Aristotle, *Metaphysica* XII, c. 8, text 49, who says: “Whatever things are many in number have matter.” From this he proves that the first mover, as spiritual and devoid of matter, can only be one. Hence those who deny this principle destroy the chief foundation from which it can be proved by the natural light of reason that there is only one God, and they lend support to polytheism. But whatever may be said of this, the principle is proved by the following fundamental argument. Matter, or an order to matter, is that from which numerical distinction is taken as from its first root. Therefore whatever things are many in number have matter or imply an order to matter. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. First, numerical distinction cannot proceed from form as from its first root. This is so, first, because every distinction proceeding from form is formal, and consequently specific and essential. It is so also because numerical distinction does not arise essentially from something that is indifferent to this or that singularity; but form of itself is indifferent to this or that singularity and does not require one rather than another. Finally, it is so because the principle of individuation and numerical distinction must be a principle of incommunicability, since an individual is incommunicable; but form is not a principle of incommunicability, since it is the principle of the specific grade, which of itself is communicable to many individuals. Second, the principle of individuation and numerical distinction cannot be existence or subsistence, both because these presuppose the individual nature already constituted, since they are the ultimate term of nature, and because Christ’s

humanity was presupposed as individuated before its assumption and yet was deprived of its own subsistence, and even of its own existence according to those who hold that existence is really distinct from essence. Third, since numerical distinction is intrinsic and substantial, it cannot be taken from something extrinsic and accidental. Therefore matter alone, or an order to matter, is that from which numerical distinction is taken as from its first root.

5. The adversaries answer this argument in two ways. First, Scotus and his disciples reply that the principle of numerical distinction in the angels is haecceity. But this reply is merely an evasion of the difficulty. For although haecceity, or the individual difference, exists in the individual, the difficulty still remains as to what is the principle multiplying haecceities: whether matter, form, subsistence, existence, or some accident. For individual unity and distinction must be founded upon something. Hence, if none of these can be the foundation of numerical distinction, it follows that this distinction can be taken only from matter as from its first root.

6. Others answer, secondly, that even if matter or an order to matter were granted to be the principle of numerical distinction, it would not thereby be efficaciously proved that angels cannot, by God's absolute power, be multiplied within the same species. For it is not impossible for some extrinsic principle other than matter to be added to angels, by which an individual distinction and multiplication would be produced in them. God could, by absolute power, add some property to the nature of Gabriel, flowing from the form considered not absolutely but as subjected to God's supernatural action, to which every creature is subject according to obediential potency, and from this property numerical distinction within that species could arise. They confirm this solution and doctrine by a celebrated testimony of St. Thomas, taken from *Opusculum* 16, where he rebukes the Averroists and calls them crude reasoners because they proved that there could be only one intellect in all men on the ground that this faculty lacks matter. He adds that although "the intellect would naturally be one in all because it would have no cause of multiplication, it could nevertheless all the more be multiplied by a supernatural cause, nor would this involve a contradiction." From this testimony, not only Suárez and other recent authors, but also some of our Thomists, such as Ferrariensis, Capreolus, and Báñez, infer that the position of St. Thomas was that many angels numerically distinct could exist by God's absolute power, though not by his ordinary power.

7. Yet this response and doctrine, which is the principal foundation of the opposing position, can be refuted in several ways. First, it conflicts with

the adversaries themselves, who teach not only that angels can be multiplied within the same species by absolute power, but also that many angels of the same species actually exist. Second, it can be attacked on the ground that, since individuation is an intrinsic and substantial grade, it also requires an intrinsic and substantial principle. But whatever is communicated to an angel preternaturally by God comes to it extrinsically and is accidental and separable from it. Therefore the substance of an angel cannot be numerically distinguished or multiplied by something communicated to it preternaturally by God. Third, it is proper to an intrinsic cause to cause through its own entity and not through something superadded. Hence it is commonly said that no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary power is found among intrinsic causes. But the principle of individuation and numerical distinction has the character of an intrinsic, not an extrinsic, cause, as is evident. Therefore it can cause individual distinction only through its own entity and not through something added to it.

8. As regards the mind of St. Thomas, it is manifest that he supports our position and teaches that angels cannot be multiplied within the same species even by God's absolute power. For below, q. 75, a. 7, he says: "It cannot be understood that there should be more than one separated form of one species." But what cannot be understood involves a contradiction and cannot be effected by God's absolute power. This is also evident from *De spiritualibus creaturis*, q. un., a. 8, where he says: "If an angel is a simple form abstracted from matter, it is impossible even to imagine that there are many angels of one species." But what is impossible even according to our imagining involves a contradiction in relation to God's absolute power. Therefore it is manifest that the position of St. Thomas is that angels cannot be multiplied within the same species even by absolute power. Hence, in the cited *Opusculum*, he rebukes only the Averroists' form of argument, by which they wrongly and crudely inferred that, if the intellect cannot by its nature be multiplied, such multiplication is also impossible by absolute power. That this is his meaning is evident from his adding that he says this "lest this form of argument be extended by others; for in this way we could conclude that God cannot cause the dead to rise, because they do not have this by their nature." I add that St. Thomas is speaking there not of angels but of human intellects, between which and the angels there is a great difference. For although the human intellect is immaterial as regards its substance, it nevertheless implies an order to matter, just as the rational soul, from which it emanates as a property, has a relation to the body. But an angel, since it is not the form of a body but is subsistent and complete in itself, not only lacks matter but also implies no order to it. Hence, although rational souls and

human intellects can be multiplied within the same species, angelic substances cannot.

9. From this, several objections are resolved by which the adversaries attempt to weaken the principal foundation of our position and to prove that numerical division is not taken from matter as from its first root. For, they say, two rational souls are numerically distinguished, and yet they are not composed of matter. Likewise, two lights of glory, two beatific visions, two acts of an angelic intellect or will tending in the same manner toward the same object, and two supernatural habits of faith, hope, or charity differ numerically, although they lack matter. Finally, Eucharistic accidents separated from their subject are distinguished only numerically from many others. But the answer is easy: although these are not composed of matter, they nevertheless connote and regard it. For rational souls imply an order to the diverse bodies they inform, while spiritual accidents imply an order to the subject in which they inhere, which, although immaterial, takes the place of matter insofar as it receives and sustains them. Eucharistic accidents, although separated from a subject, nevertheless imply a relation to the particular subject from which they have been divinely separated.

10. You will say: if individuation is taken from matter or an order to it as from its first root, it follows that there is no individuation in the angelic nature and that angels have only specific unity without numerical unity, in the manner in which Plato posited separated ideas of things, which appears ridiculous and absurd.

11. But the consequence is denied. For when we say that individuation is taken from matter or an order to it, we are speaking of individuation with multiplication of the nature. Such individuation requires matter or an order to it, because it requires a principle founding an entitative or material division of the substance without a formal division of the species. We are not speaking of individuation without multiplication of the nature, for this requires neither matter nor an order to it, as is evident in God, who possesses individuation and singularity without matter or an order to it and without any capacity for multiplication. The same must be said proportionately of the angelic nature. Individuation is found in it, but it is unique, unmultiplied, and incapable of multiplication. This individuation is taken from form insofar as it is incapable of being received and incommunicable to any nature, which it possesses because it is a complete and subsistent form. Other objections may be seen in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

12. From what has been said, it is evident how imprudently and thoughtlessly the position of St. Thomas was censured by some, since it

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rests upon the same foundation by which the Philosopher established the unity of God. Hence that censure was revoked by Stephen, Bishop of Paris, who was head of the university, while the book containing it was proscribed and entered into the catalogue of prohibited books.

CHAPTER IV.

The Assumption of Bodies by Angels.

1. It is certain that angels can assume bodies and through them make themselves visible to men. This is clearly gathered from various passages of Scripture in which angels are said to have appeared to Abraham, Lot, Tobias, and others. Nor is it probable that all those apparitions occurred only in the imagination, since Scripture presents those appearing as commonly seen by everyone; but things existing only in the imagination and through a deception of the senses are not commonly seen by everyone, as St. Thomas observes here, q. 51, a. 2. At least this cannot be said of Christ, to whom the Devil is said in Matt. 4 to have appeared and whom he took to the pinnacle of the Temple and to a high mountain. For it was not fitting that Christ should be deceived by the Devil, so that he would think something really occurred when it took place only in the imagination.

2. For an angel to be said to assume a body, it is required that he unite it to himself in some way, not as form is united to matter, since an angel is a complete and total nature; nor by hypostatic union, since no personality except an infinite one can terminate a nature other than its own, as I presuppose from the treatise on the Incarnation; but as a mover is united to what is moved. Yet this does not suffice for assumption, because angels have this presence to the heavens that they move and to possessed persons whom they torment, although they are not said to assume them. It is further required that the angel so form and move the assumed body that through it he represents to us intelligible properties, whether his own, those of higher angels, or those of God himself when he bears God's person as his emissary.

3. The matter from which angels ordinarily form the bodies they assume is dense and thickened air or vapor, reduced by their motive power into the figure of a human body or of another animal in whose body the angel wishes to appear. St. Thomas gives a sign of this in *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 3, namely, that many have tried to cut bodies of this kind with a sword and could not do so, because air, being fluid, is immediately rejoined when divided. Yet it appears difficult to explain how a body formed from air could be handled and touched like a human body, since air cannot reproduce by

touch either the softness of human flesh or the hardness of bone. To this it is answered that angels can apparently reproduce qualities of this kind to the sense of touch in assumed bodies, either by resisting and by adjusting through their motive power the motion of the body touching them, so that it penetrates the assumed body neither more nor less than is required to represent the softness or hardness of a human body; or by mixing and combining with the assumed body as much of the other elements as suffices to represent qualities apparently resembling the temperament of the human body. Nevertheless, I hold with Cajetan, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 95, a. 3, that they cannot imitate the temperament of a human body so perfectly that a fictitious body could not be distinguished from a true one by touch itself, provided the greatest care, diligence, and intellectual attention were applied, according to Christ's words to the disciples in the last chapter of Luke: "Handle and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones."

4. If you ask by what power an angel can form bodies from air and assume them, I answer that he can do this by natural power. First, because only motive power is needed to condense the air and reduce it into the figure of a man or another animal. Second, because demons assume bodies for an evil end, as is evident from histories; but God cannot concur with an evil work by an extraordinary concurrence, since he cannot be the particular and principal cause of an evil work. Hence, when St. Thomas says here, a. 2, ad 3, that "angels assume bodies from air by condensing it through divine power," either by divine power must be understood the power that the angels received from God together with their nature, or the passage must be interpreted as referring to supernatural apparitions of angels, such as those made to Abraham, Tobias, Daniel, and the Blessed Virgin. For in these cases it is very probable that the bodies assumed by the blessed angels were formed by divine and supernatural power.

5. If you ask further whether angels can exercise the operations of sensitive life in assumed bodies, such as speaking, eating, seeing, and hearing, I answer negatively with St. Thomas here, a. 3, because they do not live a sensitive life in bodies of this kind and possess no sensitive powers. Hence they perform these operations in an assumed body only by way of likeness, as the angel Raphael indicated with sufficient clarity in Tob. 6 when he said: "I did indeed seem to eat and drink with you," and so forth. Much less, therefore, can an angel generate in an assumed body, because generation requires the separation of part of one's own living substance through seed received into the womb of a woman. Angels can, however, be ministers of generation and generate ministerially. For as St. Thomas notes here, a. 3, ad 6, a demon in an assumed body can become a succubus to a

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man and receive seed from him, and afterward, making himself an incubus to a woman, can introduce the received seed into her womb. In this manner, from such seed introduced into a woman's womb through the ministry of a demon, offspring can be generated. Yet it must not be called the child of the demon, but of the man from whom the seed was received, as St. Thomas says in the same place. Observe, however, that although an incubus demon can generate human offspring in the aforesaid manner, a succubus demon cannot conceive offspring within itself through human seed transferred from elsewhere. For the organization of the human body, and of every perfect animal, requires determinate instruments of life by which it is formed and perfected. These instruments cannot be supplied by the power of a demon, since he cannot supply the vital heat by which male seed, received within a woman's womb, is nourished, made fertile, and formed into the figure of a human body. For this heat necessarily depends upon vital organs and spirits, which cannot be preserved outside an animate body. On this matter, see Delrio, *Disquisitiones magicae* II, q. 15.

CHAPTER V.

The Place of Angels.

Having considered the substance of the angels in itself and in relation to the bodies they assume, it remains for us to consider it in relation to place and to explain the formal principle by which angels are constituted in place.

§ 1.

Angels Are in Place through Operation.

1. This is proved first by the argument indicated by St. Thomas in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 68, where he reasons thus: "Whatever is in a place, or in any thing whatsoever, in some way touches it. For a corporeal thing is in something as in a place by the contact of dimensive quantity, whereas an incorporeal thing is said to be in something by the contact of power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Therefore an incorporeal thing is related to being in a place through its power as a corporeal thing is related to being in a place through dimensive quantity." Hence I argue thus: that by which an angel touches a place is the formal principle of his being in that place, as is evident in a located body. But an angel touches a place only through a transitive operation. Therefore a transitive operation alone is the formal principle by

which an angel is in a place. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Contact is twofold: one is proper and is exercised through quantity; the other is improper and metaphorical and occurs through a transitive action. But an angel cannot touch a place in the first manner, since he is devoid of quantity. Therefore he can touch it only in the second manner, through a transitive action.

2. It is proved secondly: an angel is not in a place through his substance as the formal principle, as Scotus, Molina, Valencia, and others hold; nor through a mode of ubication, as Suárez teaches; nor through some union of the angel with a body, as Vásquez contends. Therefore he is in place only through a transitive action. The consequence follows from a sufficient enumeration, for apart from these nothing else can be assigned or reasonably conceived as the formal principle by which an angel exists in a place. The antecedent is shown as follows. If an angel were in place through any of the three things assigned, he could not be at one time in a greater space and at another in a lesser one, but would be necessitated and confined always to exist in a place proportioned to his power. But this cannot be said, as will be evident from what follows. Therefore neither can the former. The consequence of the major is proved. The substance of an angel is invariable and always possesses the same substantial perfection. But location, or the mode of presence or union with a body, cannot be greater at one time and lesser at another unless some cause is given as the foundation of such change and diversity; and the adversaries can assign no such cause. It cannot be said with Suárez that this cause is the angel's will, because the will is only an applicative cause or condition of the angel's relation to place, and not the formal cause through which he exists in place. But a formal effect is not varied merely by varying the condition applying it while the formal principle remains unchanged. This is evident in us: although by free will we move ourselves and apply ourselves to a place, we cannot place ourselves in a lesser or greater place at will unless some change is made by compression or dilation in dimensive quantity, which is the formal cause by which we are constituted in place. It is therefore necessary to have recourse to the angel's transitive operation, which, since it can at his pleasure be extended to a greater or lesser space, enables him to exist at one time in a greater and at another in a lesser place. Hence St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 2: "The place of an angel can be divisible or indivisible, great or small, according as his operation is immediately terminated at something great or small." I add that it is highly fitting for a spiritual nature independent of a body also to be independent of place and not to be present to it except insofar as it makes that place depend upon itself. Hence St.

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Thomas says here, a. 1, that “an angel is said to be in a corporeal place not as contained but as in some way containing it.” But he cannot contain it formally or materially, as is evident, but only effectively, namely, by acting upon it through a transitive operation. Therefore such an operation is the formal principle by which an angel is constituted in place. Another argument will be added at the end of the following section.

§ 2.

Objections are Resolved.

3. You will object first: St. Thomas says here, q. 52, a. 1: “By the application of angelic power to some place, the angel is said to be in a corporeal place.” He teaches the same in *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 1, and frequently elsewhere. Therefore he holds that an angel is not formally in a place through the transitive operation itself, but through the application of power in first act.

Some reply with Cajetan that an angel is incompletely in a place through the application of power and completely through a transitive operation; and that his presence is begun through the application of his power but completed through the operation exercised in the place. In this way they easily explain St. Thomas, who sometimes teaches that angels are in a place through the application of power and sometimes through a transitive operation. For they explain passages of the first kind as referring to incomplete presence, and the others as referring to complete presence.

4. I answer secondly, with the Salamancans, that by the application of power to a place St. Thomas understands nothing other than the actual operation itself. This is evident from the cited passage of the *Sentences*, where he says: “The third opinion holds that an angel is in a place insofar as something is applied to the place through operation. Therefore, in following this opinion, which appears more reasonable, I say that an angel, or any incorporeal substance, cannot be in a body or place except through an operation that causes some effect in it.” Here the words “is applied through operation” plainly show that the Holy Doctor does not distinguish, in the present matter, the application of angelic power from its operation. This solution will become clearer below, for we shall show that the angel’s transitive action has three inadequate functions: the character of application to place, the character of operation in place or production of an effect, and the character of ubication or presence in place.

5. You will object secondly: an angel's being in a place is prior to his operating in it. Therefore he is not constituted in place through operation. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, first, because the angel's being is prior to his operating. Therefore likewise his being in a place is prior to his operating in a place. Second, because the approach or application of an agent to the patient is a condition necessarily presupposed for acting upon it, as the philosophers teach in *Physics* VII.

6. I answer by denying the antecedent. To its first proof, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. For, as St. Thomas says in *Quaestiones quodlibetales* I, a. 4, ad 1: "Nothing prevents something from being prior simply, although it is not prior in a particular respect. Thus the subject is simply prior to the surface, but not with respect to being colored. Likewise a body is simply prior to contact; nevertheless, it is in place through the contact of dimensive quantity, and similarly angels are in place through the contact of power." Cajetan admirably illustrates and explains this doctrine here, q. 52, a. 1. He says that just as three things are found in a located body, namely, the substance that is located, the quantity that is the principle of location, and the relation or denomination of presence that follows upon quantity as upon its proper foundation, so also these three are found in spiritual substances: the substance of the angel, which is present to and not distant from the place; the virtually transitive operation, which is the contact of power through which he is made present; and the relation or denomination of presence founded upon it. These three can be considered in different ways and, according to these different considerations, can possess the character of prior and posterior. If they are considered in the order of being, substance holds the first place; dimensive quantity in corporeal things and the contact of power in spiritual substances hold the second; and the relation or denomination of presence holds the third. It is otherwise in the order of locating. In that order, dimensive quantity in corporeal things and the contact of power in spiritual things are first; the substance itself of the corporeal or spiritual thing is second; and the relation or denomination of presence founded upon such quantitative or effective contact is third.

7. To the second proof of the antecedent, it must be said that although, among corporeal agents, the approach of the agent to the patient is a condition presupposed for operation, this is not so among spiritual agents. Corporeal agents act through a power subjected in quantity and therefore depend upon quantity and upon the place with which they are commensurated. Spiritual agents do not. Hence, in spiritual agents, approach is only a condition accompanying the operation and brought about

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through it, just as our soul, by informing the body, is brought near to it and united with it. Or again, although an organic body is required for receiving the soul, it is not presupposed as organic before the soul's entrance, but is made organic through that very entrance.

8. You will object thirdly: it cannot be assigned what angels produce in the empyrean heaven or demons in hell. Therefore they are not in a place through operation. It is confirmed: if operation were the formal principle by which angels are constituted in place, it would follow that an angel is nowhere whenever he acts nowhere, which appears absurd. For since he is a part of the universe, he must always remain within the world, even when he is in no way operating *ad extra*.

9. To the objection, I answer that the blessed angels in the empyrean heaven produce some light or ornament, or some other quality or effect hidden from us, just as the nature of the angel and of the empyrean heaven itself is hidden from us. Hence St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 1: "An angel is in a place insofar as he operates upon some located body by motion, light, or something else of this kind." Demons, however, are in hell through a violent binding and detention, which we shall explain below when treating their punishment. For although the principle of being in a connatural place is operation in angels, the principle of being in a violent place is passion, or a passive binding, by which those spirits are so detained and bound that they are not permitted to operate elsewhere. Hence it is said in Tob. 8 that the demon Asmodeus was bound by the angel Raphael in the desert of Upper Egypt, so that he could not harm anything through his action and transitive operation. For those spirits, evil in themselves, work evil in others as far as they can.

10. St. Thomas answers the confirmation in the passage just cited, *ad 4*, in these words: "To the fourth it must be said that I do not consider it unfitting that an angel can exist without place and not be in a place when he has no operation concerning a place; nor is it unfitting that he should then be said to be nowhere or in no place, just as it is not unfitting for something to be said to be colored by no color. This, however, cannot be imagined, because imagination does not transcend the continuous." He teaches the same in *Quaestiones quodlibetales* VI, a. 3, and *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 10, *ad 2*, where he says: "Nothing prevents angels from not being in a place if they so will." Certainly, if angels had been created before the world, as many of the Greek Fathers hold, they would then have been nowhere except in God, nor would God have been anywhere except in himself. From this an efficacious argument can be drawn in favor of our position. The principle giving an angel being in a connatural place must be elevated and eminent, so that by

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reason of it the angel may, whenever he wills, free himself from every place. But this can belong only to the angel's operation and not to his substance. For the substance of an angel is altogether necessary to him, and he cannot divest himself of it whenever he wills. A transitive operation, on the contrary, belongs to him freely, and he can suspend it whenever he wills or cease from it entirely. Therefore the principle giving an angel being in a connatural place is not the angel's substance but only his virtually transitive operation.

For a fuller understanding of this celebrated difficulty and the solution of other arguments, it must be observed that when we say that angels exist in place through a transitive operation, we understand an operation that proceeds immediately from the angel by immediacy of the suppositum, not one that proceeds from him immediately only by immediacy of power, that is, through a power diffused and derived from him. Hence, although an angel causes local motion throughout the whole first sphere, he is not substantially present to the whole sphere, but only to its eastern part, to which he first applies his power and upon which he acts immediately, not only by immediacy of power but also by immediacy of the suppositum, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 2.

§ 3.

Consequences of the Preceding Doctrine.

12. Everything taught by theologians concerning the place of angels, especially by the disciples of St. Thomas, follows from the principle that the Holy Doctor frequently repeats and inculcates, namely, that an angel is in a place through the application of his power, or through a virtually transitive operation. From this it follows, first, that angels are not properly in a place, but only metaphorically. First, because an angel is said to be in a place insofar as he touches it; but contact occurring through operation is not true and proper contact, but only metaphorical. Second, because for something to be properly in a place, it must be circumscribed and measured by that place. Hence the predicamental category of place is defined by Gilbert as "the circumscription of a body arising from the circumscription of the place." But an angel is neither circumscribed nor measured by a place; rather, he effectively contains and measures it. Hence angelic location is not predicamental but metaphorical. It is the angel's operation itself insofar as it possesses an analogy and likeness to corporeal location. This likeness consists in the fact that, just as corporeal and predicamental location

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renders a body really present and united to a place and limits it so that it is present to one place in such a way as not to be in another, so likewise the angel's operation upon a place renders the angel's substance present and united to that place and limits it so that it is present to the place proportioned to it in such a way as not to be elsewhere. From this you will understand that angelic operation, by reason of its eminence, has three inadequate offices or functions. First, it joins and subjects the recipient to itself; second, it produces some effect in that recipient; third, it renders the angel present and located. Hence it has the character of application to place, the character of operation in place or production of an effect there, and the character of ubication or presence in place. Although these three functions are fulfilled by the same entity of angelic operation, one nevertheless precedes another by nature. First belongs the character of application; second, the character of operation or production; third, the character of presence or ubication. In the same way, we said in the treatise on the Trinity that the divine relations possess, in an eminent manner, the character of subsistence or hypostatic form, the character of origin, both active and passive, and the character of relation or pure reference to a term, so that the first function belongs to them prior in reason, then the second, and afterward the third.

13. It follows, secondly, that since an angel is in a place only accidentally, namely, insofar as the assumed body or the body to which he is applied through operation is in a place, he will possess position, distance, and local proximity only accidentally and by reason of the corporeal place in which he exists through a virtually transitive operation. Hence, if God were to destroy the corporeal world, or if the angels had been created before the fabric of the corporeal world, as many Greek Fathers hold, they would not be positively near to or distant from one another, but only negatively, at least as regards physical proximity or distance. They could, however, possess, or could have possessed, a certain moral and metaphorical proximity to one another, because one angel could or could have acted upon another by a moral action, by illuminating or commanding him.

14. It follows, thirdly, that angels are not actually in imaginary spaces or above the heavens, since there is no body there which they might move locally or upon which they might exercise any transitive action. Nor can they be said to be there potentially. For since they do not act by a creative power but by an educing power, they can produce no body in imaginary spaces upon which they might act. If, however, God were to create some body above the heavens, an angel could then transfer himself there by local motion and

exist there as in a place, because he could move that body locally or exercise some other transitive action upon it.

15. It follows, fourthly, that angels are not everywhere, as Durandus holds. For since their operative power is finite and limited, as is their nature, they possess a determinate and limited sphere of activity and cannot at the same moment apply their operative power to every place. Hence Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* II: “While they are in heaven, they are not on earth; and when they are sent by God to earth, they do not remain in heaven.” Therefore, when Tertullian says in *Apologeticum*, c. 32, that “in a moment they are everywhere; the whole world is their place,” he intends only to express their supreme speed and agility. For they move so promptly and swiftly that they appear to be everywhere, as will be evident from what follows.

16. It follows, fifthly, that although an angel is unextended and indivisible, he can nevertheless be in an extended and divisible place, because he can apply his power to it. Hence his operative power and operation, although formally indivisible in themselves, are nevertheless virtually extended and divisible because they immediately introduce and cause a divisible and extended passion and effect in the recipient upon which they act.

17. It follows, sixthly, that an angel is neither necessitated nor confined to existing in the whole place or space proportioned to his operative power, but can place himself in a lesser one. For although the ability to exist in so great a place arises as from its first root from the quantity of the angel’s substantial perfection, the proximate principle by which he is formally constituted in a place is his operative power as freely applied and virtually extended in relation to place through a transitive operation. Hence, just as the angel can act upon a great or small quantity within the sphere of his activity without any change in his substantial perfection or operative power, so he can constitute himself now in a place proportioned to him and now in a lesser place. This occurs in a proportionate manner to the case in which a body had at its disposal the extension of quantity in relation to place and could apply it now to a greater and now to a lesser place, though always within the range of its proportionate place. For the angel’s free operation is related proportionately to his operative power as extension in relation to place is related to dimensive quantity.

18. It follows, seventhly, that an angel can place himself in a single point. For although an angel cannot move only a point, he can nevertheless impress upon a single point an impetus and impulse by which the body in which it exists is moved, and can thus apply his power to that point alone.

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For although a point cannot be the adequate subject of local motion, it can indeed be the subject of impetus and impulse. This is evident if we place a perfect plane beneath a perfectly spherical body falling downward and then repel it upward. For just as the plane would touch the spherical body only at a point, as the philosophers teach, so it would begin to impress an impulsive force upon it only through that point. Therefore, if the action of body upon body can begin immediately from a point, there is no reason why the operation of an angel cannot also begin from a point and consequently why an angel cannot place himself in a point. Hence St. Thomas says here, a. 2: "An angel is an indivisible existing outside the genus of quantity and position; hence it is not necessary that one indivisible place according to position be determined for him, but it may be either divisible or indivisible." Nor is it valid to say that, if an angel could place himself in a single point, he could also exist in another angel as in a place, because indivisibility belongs to both. The reason for the difference between a point and an angel is manifest. A point, since it is an indivisible possessing position and existing within the genus of quantity, can be touched by an angel through the contact of power and can immediately receive his impetus and impulse, as has already been explained. It is otherwise with an angel, since he is wholly spiritual and incorporeal and, as the Holy Doctor says in the cited passage, "an indivisible existing outside the genus of quantity and position." Hence, since an angel is in a place through the application and contact of his power, one angel can exist in a point, but not in another angel, as in a place.

19. It follows, eighthly, that an angel cannot naturally be in several adequate places, although he can be so supernaturally. The reason for the first part is that an angel's adequate place exhausts the whole natural power that he possesses for occupying space or place. Therefore he cannot naturally pass beyond it. Otherwise he could be in all places. For if it is once granted that he can pass beyond the adequate limit of his power in one, two, or three places, there will be no reason why he could not be in all other places. Thus it would not be necessary for him to move or transfer himself from place to place, which is contrary to Scripture, as will be evident in the following chapter.

20. The second part is proved from the fact that, since an angel is in place through operation, just as his operative power can be supernaturally increased, so he can be supernaturally extended beyond his adequate place and exist in other places. In this respect an angel differs from a body, which, according to the Thomists, cannot be circumscriptively in several places. For a body is circumscriptively in a place by reason of quantity, which cannot be multiple in one and the same body, since the body has its numerical unity

from it. But an angel is constituted in place through the application of his operative power, which God can increase, and consequently can bring it about that an angel who could act only within a space of one league, for example, may act within a much greater one. I add that there is no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary power among formal causes as there is among efficient causes. For formal causes cause only by communicating their own entity, whereas efficient causes act through a power either proper to themselves or received from another. Hence, since quantity cannot naturally fill two places, neither can it do so supernaturally, because it occupies place only in the genus of formal cause and by presenting itself. An angel, however, can be extended beyond his adequate place if his active power is increased, and no one doubts that it can be increased.

21. It follows, ninthly, that an angel can naturally be in several inadequate, discontinuous, and mutually distant places, provided they are contained within the sphere of his activity; for example, in the four corners of one hall without existing in the middle. For he is in a place through a free, not natural, application of his power, and consequently can apply his power either to his entire sphere or only to those parts with which he wishes to unite himself, leaving the intermediate parts untouched, because he is bound by no necessity to all the parts contained within his sphere of activity. Nor is he in place by information, as the soul is in the body, whose parts must be continuous, because the soul informs the body only on the presupposition of dispositions, the first of which is continuous quantity. Nor is he in place after the manner of continuous quantity, through commensuration with place, but through operation, which does not depend upon place but subjects it to itself. Hence, just as the body of Christ can be placed simultaneously through the words of consecration in several hosts separated and distant from one another, although it does not exist in the intervening space; indeed, it can cease to be in the intermediate parts of the same host if they are corrupted, while remaining in the extremities not yet corrupted, because it is not in the Eucharist by commensuration with place but in a certain more perfect and elevated manner; so likewise, because an angel does not exist in place through commensuration with it but in a certain more elevated manner, free and independent from the laws of place, he can place himself in several partial and inadequate places without existing in the middle.

22. Nor does it follow from this, as some object, that an angel can be in several places precisely as several, which St. Thomas teaches to be impossible here, a. 2. For just as the place of a rod, one half of which is in

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water and the other on land, is said to be formally one, because although the surfaces of the water and land are really distinct, they nevertheless agree in the character of one measure containing and measuring the located thing, which is the formal element in place; so likewise, although two or more inadequate places of an angel, distant from one another and contained within the sphere of his activity, are not one entitatively, continuously, or by order, they are nevertheless formally one place, because they agree in what is formal in the place of an angel, namely, in being simultaneously touched and possessed by the same power and operation of the angel. For, as the Holy Doctor says in the cited article: "The whole to which the angel's power is immediately applied is regarded as his one place." From this you will understand that an angel cannot simultaneously be in several inadequate places very distant from one another, for example, in two spaces designated in heaven and on earth, however small those spaces may be. For when the distance between certain places is extremely great, this prevents them from being contained within the sphere of the angel's activity and consequently from being related to him as one place; rather, they then possess the character of several places.

23. It follows, tenthly, that several angels can be simultaneously in the same material place, though not in the same formal place. The first part is evident, for the material place is the body or space in which an angel operates. But several angels can simultaneously apply themselves to the same body or space while producing effects specifically diverse in it; for example, if one angel produces motion in the same part of the air and another produces light or some other quality. Therefore several angels can exist simultaneously in the same material place.

24. The reason for the second part is that the formal place of angels is not taken from surface and distance from the poles of the world, for that is only the formal place of bodies, but from an operative power determined and applied through an adequate operation, so that the space to which an angel can extend himself through his operative power and adequate operation is formally one place, as is evident from the preceding consequence. But several angels cannot elicit the same operation as total causes, since the same effect cannot proceed from two total causes, at least according to the ordinary course of things, as all admit. Therefore several angels cannot simultaneously be in the same adequate formal place. Nevertheless, it is compatible with this that, if angels adjust and, as it were, temper their power and action so as to act partially, they will be partially and inadequately in the same formal place. Yet this does not ordinarily befit the good angels, as is gathered from St. Thomas here, a. 3, and *Scriptum super*

Sententiis I, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 3. For since angels are the highest beings in the universe and the most perfect agents, they do not ordinarily operate as partial causes, but each of them, after the manner of a perfect and total agent, produces, either by his own power or by divine power, the effects for which he is appointed, as the Holy Doctor says in the cited passages. Hence only one angel assists each heavenly sphere.

CHAPTER VI.

The Local Motion of Angels.

1. It is certain that angels can be moved locally, or pass from one place to another. This is clearly gathered not only from many passages of Scripture in which angels are said to descend from heaven and ascend into heaven, but is also demonstrated by an evident argument. For since angels are not everywhere because of the limitation of their substance and power, and since they are endowed with intellect and will, they can know and desire presence in some place or absence from it. But nature would give them such an appetite in vain if it denied them a power of local motion by which they could approach those places or withdraw from them. Therefore angels can be moved locally, not only accidentally through the motion of a body to which they are locally present, as the soul is moved accidentally through the motion of the body and the body of Christ in the Eucharist through the motion of the species, but also by an essential motion. For by operating successively in diverse unmoved bodies, they can become successively present to diverse places. From this you will understand, first, that the local motion of an angel by which he is moved essentially consists in diverse operations concerning diverse places without an intervening rest. For since he is in a place through operation, he is not moved locally except insofar as he varies his operation concerning diverse bodies and successively touches them without an intervening rest. You will understand, secondly, that the local motion by which an angel is moved essentially inheres in the angel himself according to what it directly signifies, but is received in the corporeal place according to what it indirectly imports. For such motion, as we have said, consists in the angel's diverse operations concerning diverse places. Since those operations are formally immanent, they are intrinsically received in the angel himself; but since they are virtually transitive, they introduce a corporeal passion and effect produced in the place to which the angel is applied. Three difficulties and controversies concerning this motion must be briefly resolved here. The first is whether an angel can be moved by

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both continuous and discrete motion. The second is whether he can be moved by discrete motion without passing through the intervening space. The third is whether the angel's motion, both continuous and discrete, can take place in an instant.

§ 1.

Resolution of the First Difficulty.

2. I say first: an angel can be moved by both continuous and discrete motion.

The first part is proved against Gregory, Hervaeus, and Vásquez. According to St. Thomas here, q. 53, a. 1, that local motion is called continuous in which the movable thing leaves the terminus from which part by part and acquires the terminus to which part by part, without an intervening rest. But an angel can leave the terminus from which part by part and acquire the terminus to which part by part, without an intervening rest. For although he is indivisible and unextended, he can nevertheless place himself in a divisible and extended place, as we showed in the preceding chapter, and consequently can leave one part of it before another and afterward occupy another part without an intervening rest. Therefore he can be moved locally by continuous motion.

3. You will say: not only the divisibility of space and the unity of time, but also the divisibility of the movable thing, is required for continuity of motion. But an angel, since he is immaterial, is wholly indivisible. Therefore he cannot be moved by continuous motion.

I answer that although an angel is not entitatively divisible or divisible as regards his substance, nevertheless, as located, he is extended and divisible, since he exists in an extended and divisible space. Or, as others say, although he is not formally divisible, he is nevertheless virtually or equivalently divisible, because the formal principle through which he is located, namely, his operation insofar as it is virtually transitive, is divisible, since it introduces and causes a divisible and extended effect in a corporeal place.

4. The second part, concerning discrete motion, is proved against Scotus and Molina. Discrete motion is that in which the movable thing leaves the whole terminus from which all at once and immediately afterward acquires the whole terminus to which all at once. But an angel can do this. Therefore he can be moved by discrete motion. The minor is proved. Since an angel does not depend upon place and is not commensurated with it, he need not exist in it according to its exigency, nor consequently be moved continuously and part by part within a place, even though that place is

continuous. Rather, he can leave that whole place all at once and immediately afterward acquire another whole place all at once, especially since the angel is indivisible and lacks extension. The rational soul, by the very fact that it is indivisible, actually informs the entire divisible body at once and leaves the entire body all at once in an instant. A body, on the contrary, because it is extended and divisible, cannot leave an entire place all at once, but the last part of the body must leave the last part of the place in which it exists and enter another place later than the first part.

5. You will say: an angel is not moved by discrete motion while he is at the terminus from which, for while a movable thing is at the terminus from which it is not yet being moved but is still at rest; nor is he moved when he reaches the terminus to which, because when the movable thing is at the terminus to which it has already been moved and is no longer being moved; nor is he moved insofar as he is partly at the terminus from which and partly at the terminus to which, because this belongs to an angel only when he is moved by continuous motion, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 1, ad 1. Therefore an angel is never moved by discrete motion, but only by continuous motion.

6. I answer that an angel is moved by discrete motion in neither terminus precisely and absolutely considered, but in both insofar as one implies a relation to the other. For the succession and relation of one terminus to the other possess the character of discrete motion, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited passage and Cajetan proves there, because discrete motion is nothing other than the number of diverse operations by reason of which an angel exists successively in diverse places. Hence, just as units constitute number not as considered absolutely but as one related to another, so also diverse operations constitute discrete motion not as taken absolutely but insofar as one implies an order to another.

§ 2.

Resolution of the Second Difficulty.

7. I say secondly: an angel can be moved by discrete motion to distant places, passing from one extreme to another without passing through the intervening space. This is against Scotus, Suárez, Molina, Valencia, and other recent authors, who say that this Thomistic passage from one extreme to another without traversing the intervening space is judged impossible as soon as it is presented to the mind. Vásquez, however, sharply rebukes them in disp. 196, c. 3, where he says: “Those recent authors philosophize about

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spiritual things in almost every respect after the manner of corporeal things; it is necessary for them to leave sensible things behind and to seek a higher manner of contemplating spiritual things.” Certainly St. Thomas, who wrote angelically about the angels, and than whom no one penetrated their nature, motions, and operations more profoundly or subtly, expressly teaches our conclusion here, a. 2; in *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, dist. 37, q. 4, a. 2; in Hannibaldus, *ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; and in *Quaestiones quodlibetales* I, a. 5, where he reasons thus: “Because a body is in place according to continuous quantity, it must therefore follow the condition of place in its motion, so that it traverses the intervening places before arriving at the extremes. But since an angel is in place through the contact of power, he is not subject to place as contained by it, but rather contains his place through a power surpassing it. Hence he need not follow the conditions of place in his motion, but it is subject to his will that he apply himself by the contact of power to this place and to that, and, if he wills, without the intervening place.”

8. The conclusion can further be proved by two arguments indicated by the Holy Doctor in the cited passages.

The first is this: an angel is in place through operation, or through the free application of his power to a place. Therefore he can be moved by discrete motion from one place to another extreme without passing through the intervening space. The consequence is proved because, just as from the fact that an angel is in place through the free application of his power to place it is free for him to apply his power either to the whole place proportioned to him or only to an inadequate part of it, so for the same reason he can freely apply the same power to the extreme parts of a space without applying it, or operating, in the intermediate parts. In that case it is evident that he will be moved from one extreme to the other without passing through the intervening space.

9. The second is this: a body cannot be moved from one extreme part of a place to another extreme part without passing through the intervening space, because, since it exists in place through commensuration with it and as subject to it insofar as it is contained by it, it must follow the laws of the place in its motion. But an angel does not exist in place in this manner, but as containing it, superior to it, and consequently independent of it. Therefore he can be moved from one extreme to another without passing through the intervening space.

10. It is confirmed: the body of Christ can cease to exist in the middle part of a consecrated host, if that part is corrupted, while remaining in the extreme parts, because it is present there in an elevated, though

supernatural, manner. But an angel exists in a place according to an elevated, though natural, manner of being. Therefore he can exist in the extreme parts of a space without existing in the intermediate parts and consequently can be moved discretely from one to another without passing through the intervening space.

11. It must nevertheless be observed that, if an angel in moving from one place to another wishes to carry some body, such as a stone, a piece of wood, or something similar, his motion must be continuous, and consequently he cannot pass from one extreme to another without traversing the intervening space. For such things, since they are corporeal and exist in place through quantitative contact, cannot be moved except by continuous motion and through the commensuration of their parts with the parts of place.

12. You will object first: an angel cannot pass from the future to the past except through the present. Therefore neither can he pass from one extreme to another except through the intervening space, for the order among the parts of space appears no less essential than that among the parts of time.

13. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. The reason for the difference is that an angel cannot, by reason of his duration, touch future parts of time before they exist. For this is proper to eternity, which embraces within its vast compass not only present things but also future and past things, as we explained in the treatise on God's knowledge. But since the extreme parts of space actually exist and are permanent, an angel can touch them without touching the intermediate parts.

14. You will say: the order assigned to the parts of this universe consists in the fact that no creature can touch a more remote thing without first touching a nearer one. Therefore, since an angel cannot omit or invert the order assigned to the parts of this universe, he cannot touch the extreme parts of space without touching the intermediate parts.

15. I answer by denying the antecedent. For, as Cajetan says very well, the positional order assigned by God to the material parts of the universe consists in fire being above, earth below, and air and water occupying the middle between them, and so forth. Hence an angel cannot invert this order by causing one element to occupy the place of another or by causing heavy things to tend upward and light things downward. Yet that order does not require that an angel touch the intermediate parts of space before the extreme parts. Rather, by reason of his immateriality and spirituality, he is exempt from such a law, to which corporeal creatures are subject.

16. You will object secondly: if an angel could be moved from one extreme to another without passing through the intervening space, he would

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not have a limited sphere of activity. For he could act beyond it, at least in the case in which the distance between the places of the angel's discrete motion exceeded the extent of his sphere of activity.

17. Because of this argument, some hold that an angel cannot be moved from one extreme to another without passing through the intervening space when the extremes are not within the sphere of his activity. But it appears more probable that he can be moved, without passing through the intervening space, across any distance whatsoever, since he is independent of any commensuration with place, however distant. Hence the consequence of the major is denied. For an angel to lack a limited sphere of activity, he would have to remain in the place in which he exists and consequently continue to operate upon it while simultaneously operating in another place, however distant. But according to our position he cannot do this. For we say that when an angel is moved by discrete motion, he must cease to exist and operate at the terminus from which in order to acquire another place and arrive at the terminus to which.

§ 3.

Resolution of the Third Difficulty.

18. I say thirdly: angelic motion, whether continuous or discrete, cannot occur in an instant.

The first part is proved by an a priori argument. Nothing successive can occur in an instant. But an angel's continuous motion is successive, since in such motion the angel applies his power first to one part of the space and afterward to another, and withdraws himself from one part of the space before touching another. Therefore an angel's continuous motion cannot occur in an instant.

19. It is confirmed: an angel passing from one place to another by continuous motion touches all the intermediate places. But an angel descending, for example, from heaven to earth cannot touch all the intermediate places in a single instant. Otherwise he would simultaneously touch several places proportioned to his natural power and would simultaneously be in heaven and in the intervening air, which is impossible, as Damascene teaches in *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 3. Therefore an angel cannot be moved by continuous motion in an instant.

20. These two arguments prove the same concerning discrete motion. For discrete motion is also successive, since it imports two operations of the angel succeeding one another, one concerning the place he leaves and the

other concerning the place he acquires. It is not understood that he is moved merely because he begins to occupy the entire subsequent place, as though the operation through which he exists in the place he leaves did not pertain to the motion. For if an angel were newly created while beginning to exist in a place, he would not on that account alone be said to be moved locally, because he would not be leaving a terminus from which. In general, every motion properly so called consists of two positive termini. By this it differs from a simple change, in which a subject passes from a simple negation to a form.

21. Furthermore, if an angel could touch two bodies by discrete motion in a single instant, he could exist in a single instant in two places proportioned to him. For we suppose that each body successively touched by the angel is an adequate place for him.

22. You will object first: an angel's local motion consists in acquiring one place and leaving another. But an angel can acquire one place and leave another in a single instant. Therefore an angel's local motion can occur in an instant. The major is evident. The minor is proved. When something is acquired in an instant, something opposed and incompatible with it is left in the same instant. For in the same instant in which form is in matter, its privation is removed; and in the same instant in which the air is illuminated, darkness is expelled. But the terminus to which of an angel's discrete motion is acquired in an instant. Therefore the opposed terminus from which is left in the same instant. Consequently, in a single instant the angel acquires one place and leaves another, which is to be moved locally.

23. I answer by denying the minor. To its proof, I distinguish the major: when something is acquired in an instant through a simple change, which proceeds from a privative or negative terminus from which, I grant the major. When something is acquired through proper motion, which proceeds from one positive terminus to another positive terminus, I deny the antecedent. For to remove a negation or privation, it suffices to posit the form. But to remove a contrary, or to overcome the interval and distance between two positive termini, time is required. Hence, because generation and illumination are simple changes, the privation of the form is removed at the same moment in which the form is in matter, and darkness is expelled in the same instant in which the air is illuminated. On the contrary, because an angel's local motion, whether continuous or discrete, is a proper motion proceeding from a positive terminus and place to another positive terminus and place, and is not a simple change, it is impossible for the terminus from which to be left in the same instant in which the terminus to which is acquired, or conversely. At least two instants are required for this, not two

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instants of our time, which cannot immediately succeed one another, but two instants of angelic and discrete time. To the first, which measures the angel's existence at the terminus from which, there corresponds a part of our time; to the second, which measures the acquisition of the terminus to which, there corresponds an instant.

24. You will object secondly: an angel is not moved locally while he is at the terminus from which, since he does not change place for as long as he exists there. Therefore he is moved only when he is at the terminus to which. But he is at the terminus to which in an instant. Therefore he is moved in an instant.

25. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. While an angel is at the terminus from which, he is not moved locally completely and terminatively: I grant the antecedent. He is not moved locally incompletely and initiatively: I deny the antecedent. For the angel then possesses the initiatory and dispositive part of his motion toward the other part. It is not required for this that he change place in that instant, but it suffices that existence at the terminus from which belong to him with an order toward the presence at the terminus to which that is to be acquired immediately. Thus an utterance, which is a kind of discrete quantity, is said to begin with the pronunciation of its first syllable insofar as that syllable implies an order toward another immediately following it.

26. From what has been said concerning angelic motion, you will understand that the speed of the angels is marvelous and altogether astonishing and incomparably exceeds the velocity of all bodies. For an angel can traverse a long space by continuous motion within a brief interval of time, and by discrete motion can transfer himself in two instants from one place to another, however distant, without passing through the intervening space, as is evident from what was said above. Hence Scripture, to declare this speed, says that they act in a moment. For Wis. 18 states that in one moment of time an angel slew all the firstborn of the Egyptians. Cyril of Alexandria, in his commentary on Habakkuk, teaches that Habakkuk was carried by the hands of an angel in a point of time to the lions' den where Daniel was, so that he might bring him a meal. The sacred text appears to indicate this when it says: "The angel of the Lord seized him by the crown of his head, carried him by the hair of his head, and set him in Babylon over the den by the force of the spirit." Similarly, the holy Fathers so emphasize this speed of the angels that they say the angels are everywhere and traverse the whole world in a moment. "Every spirit is winged," says Tertullian, "both angels and demons; therefore they are everywhere in a moment." And Gregory Nazianzen, orat. 34: "They traverse every place and tirelessly assist

all, both because of the promptness of their ministry and because of the lightness of their nature.” Likewise Chrysostom, serm. 52: “Since their subtle nature knows no flesh, it traverses the whole world in a moment of time.” Finally, Dionysius says in the last chapter of *De caelesti hierarchia*: “Theology represented the feet of the holy angels as winged, for a wing signifies speed capable of bearing one upward.”

27. If you ask in what the angel’s power of local motion consists, through which he is moved so promptly and swiftly, I answer that it is not distinct from his intellect and will, but is the angel’s practical intellect itself insofar as it operates *ad extra* through an act of command formally immanent and virtually transitive. Hence Aristotle says in *Metaphysica* XII, text 40, that the intelligences move the heavens as desiring and understanding. And St. Thomas says in *Opusculum* 11, a. 3: “The angels move the heavens through an efficacious conception of their intellect.” Reason also commends this position. For since only purely spiritual powers can exist in a simple and purely intellectual substance, and since these are only two, namely, intellect and will, whatever it does either *ad intra* or *ad extra* it must do entirely through these powers, and consequently must act through an act of command elicited by the intellect as moved and applied by the will. Nevertheless, the angel’s command differs from God’s command in this: the former is of limited and finite power and has a determinate sphere of activity, whereas the divine command is of infinite power and efficacy and extends not only to things that are but also to those that are not, as the Apostle says in Rom. 4.

28. If you ask further what measures the being of an angel and his operations, I answer that the being of an angel is measured by aeviternity. It cannot be measured by time, which is the measure of corruptible things, nor by eternity, which is the measure of a thing wholly immutable. Therefore it must be measured by aeviternity, which is the measure of a thing that, although invariable according to being, nevertheless admits variation according to its operations. For although an angel is immutable according to substantial being, he is compatible with mutability according to place and according to the diverse cognitions and affections that he can exercise or not exercise whenever he wills.

29. As regards the operations of the angels, some are measured by participated eternity, others by aeviternity, others by discrete time, and finally others by continuous time. The beatific vision enjoyed by the blessed angels is measured by participated eternity, as we explained in the treatise on the beatific vision. The natural knowledge by which they know themselves, and the love by which they naturally love themselves, are

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measured by aeviternity. For although operations of this kind are in themselves indefectible and incorruptible, they are nevertheless compatible with a certain mutability on the part of the subject in which they exist and of the other operations joined to them. But the knowledge and love by which angels know and love other things outside themselves, and their operations *ad extra*, or virtually transitive operations, are measured by discrete time if they are discrete, or by continuous time if they are continuous. This measure is called discrete time because, just as number, which is a discrete quantity, is composed of many units, so from the many successive actions of angels, or rather from their durations, there arises a certain measure of angelic operations that we call discrete time. It is called time because it is a duration possessing before and after, which is proper to time; and discrete because the actions from which it arises succeed one another not continuously but discretely, as units do in a number.

CHAPTER VII.

On the Species by Which Angels Understand.

1. Having explained what pertains to the substance of an angel, considered both in relation to itself and with respect to other things, we must now set forth what concerns its cognition. Three things chiefly pertain to this: namely, its medium, or the species through which it understands; the things or objects attained by that cognition; and the manner in which it occurs. We shall treat the first in this chapter, and the second and third in the following chapters.

§ 1.

An Angel Understands Things Other Than Himself Through an Accidental Species, but Himself Through His Own Substance, Which Takes the Place of an Impressed, but Not an Expressed, Species.

2. The first part is proved. The intelligible species through which an object is known must represent it perfectly, since it is its formal likeness, as the Philosophers teach in the books *De anima*. But the substance of an angel cannot perfectly represent things other than itself. Therefore, it cannot take the place of an intelligible species in the cognition of things other than itself; consequently, to know them an angel requires an accidental species superadded to his substance. The major premise is evident. The minor is

proved. One thing cannot perfectly represent another except either by reason of agreement and likeness with it, or by reason of causality. But the substance of an angel cannot represent things other than itself in either manner. For it does not have a formal agreement and likeness with so many beings from which it differs so greatly; nor is it their cause, as is evident, since many of them can be made only through creation. Therefore, the substance of an angel cannot perfectly represent things other than itself. In this it differs from the essence of God, which, because it causally and eminently contains all created and creatable things according to their proper differences, represents them in the most perfect manner. Hence, as St. Thomas says here, q. 55, a. 1, ad 3: "Through His essence God has proper cognition of all things, but an angel does not."

3. The second part, asserting that an angel knows himself through his own substance as an impressed species, is established as follows. For an object to perform the office of an intelligible form or species, three conditions are required and sufficient. The first is that it be intelligible in act through itself. Therefore, material things, because they are not intelligible in act but only potentially, insofar as they can be purified from matter, cannot take the place of an intelligible species. The second is that it be proportioned in immateriality to the cognitive power, so that it is at least as immaterial as the power itself. For since it must be united to the power as an intelligible form, it must at least equal it in immateriality. The third is that it be intimately present and united to it. But the essence of an angel has these three conditions. For since it is free from all matter, it is intelligible in act and has the same immateriality as the angelic intellect. And since an angel's intellect is a property flowing from his substance, that substance is intimately joined to it; for a property and an essence are most closely united, and much more so than an intellect and a species coming to it from without. Therefore, the substance of an angel performs the office of an intelligible or impressed species in the cognition of himself.

4. That it does not, however, take the place of an expressed species, which is the third part of the assertion, is proved against Cajetan and Nazarius. The following difference is found between an impressed and an expressed species: an impressed species is an intelligible form, whereas an expressed species is actually understood in second act, so that the intrinsic being of the latter is to be understood, while that of the former is to be intelligible, without yet reaching the ultimate actuality of the intelligible order. But although the essence of an angel is intelligible of itself, it is not of such perfection and actuality that it is of itself a form actually understood in second act. Therefore, an expressed species is necessary, in which it has the

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actuality that it does not possess of itself, and through which its actual cognition of itself is terminated. And certainly, if an angel is not of such perfection and actuality that he is his own act of understanding, much less can he be his own word, which is more distant from the substance of an angel than is his act of understanding, which mediates between the intelligible species and the word.

5. From this you will understand that there is a broad difference between the cognition by which the blessed see the essence of God and that by which angels know their own substance. For the blessed do not produce a word. Although the divine essence is not denominated as understood from eternity by a blessed person who did not yet exist, nevertheless, by reason of its infinite immateriality and most pure actuality, both in the intelligible and in the entitative order, as soon as the intellect of the blessed is suffused with the light of glory, it takes the place of a word and actually and intrinsically terminates the beatific vision of itself. But since the substance of an angel is not pure act either in intelligible or in entitative being, it cannot identify the notion of a word with itself, for proportionally the same reason that it cannot identify its act of understanding with itself. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 11, that in angels “the understood intention is not their substance, because in them understanding and being are not the same,” that is, because the substance of an angel is distinct from his act of understanding.

6. You will object first against the first part of the assertion. Through the species of a lion, for example, an angel perfectly knows the lion itself, and yet the lion is not contained formally or eminently in such a species, since the species is an accident while the lion is a substance. Therefore, although the substance of an angel does not contain all natural beings formally or eminently, an angel will nevertheless be able to know them through it as through an intelligible form.

7. I answer that although the intelligible species through which an angel knows a lion does not contain the nature of the lion formally in entitative being, it nevertheless contains it formally in intentional or intelligible being. Indeed, in such being it is the very substance of the lion itself, as our Thomists teach in the books *De anima*.

8. You will object secondly against the second part. It belongs to the notion of an intelligible species that it inhere in the intellect, since it cannot be united to it otherwise than by inherence; that it be subordinated to the intellect, since it is the principle by which there is an act of understanding, and every principle by which is subordinated to the principle which acts; and that it concur efficiently in the act of understanding, since cognition is born

from the object represented through the impressed species and from the power. But the essence of an angel does not inhere in his intellect, since it is a substance; nor is it subordinated to the intellect, since it does not depend upon it; nor does it concur efficiently in his act of understanding, since no created substance is immediately operative. Therefore, it does not take the place of an intelligible species in the cognition of itself.

9. I answer that it does not belong to the notion of an intelligible species that it inhere in the intellect; rather, this belongs to it accidentally, namely, when it has accidental being. Hence it is not necessary that it be united to the intellect through inherence or information; it can be united to it by another and higher union, which is sometimes identity and may fittingly be called intelligible information. Likewise, it does not belong to the notion of an intelligible species that it be subordinated to the intellect; this belongs to it only when such a species is an accident. Nor does it matter that the species is the principle by which there is an act of understanding. For the principle by which is indeed subordinated to the principle which acts when it depends upon and is sustained by it. But if it is not sustained by it and instead sustains it, it is not subordinated to it, but rather subordinates it to itself. Hence, since the essence of an angel sustains his intellect, it is in no way subordinated to it under the notion of a species. From this the answer is evident to what is added concerning the active concurrence of an intelligible species. It must be said that although it belongs to a species as such to exercise an active influence upon cognition, the manner of exercising that influence is not the same when it is a substance as when it is an accident. When it is an accident, it is subordinated to the power and consequently immediately influences the act, just as the power does. But when it is a substance, it influences only mediately and radically. Hence, from the fact that the substance of an angel takes the place of an intelligible species in his cognition of himself, it does not follow that a created substance is immediately operative, but only mediately and radically.

10. You will object thirdly against the third part of the assertion. The substance of an angel is not only intelligible in act, but is also actually understood by the angelic intellect; for that intellect is always in second act with respect to the cognition of itself, as we shall say below. Therefore, it has sufficient actuality to take the place not only of an impressed species, but also of an expressed species, in the cognition of itself.

11. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although the substance of an angel is always actually understood by the angel, this belongs to it accidentally and not essentially; otherwise it would be its own act of understanding and pure act in the intellectual order, as we

showed above. But to have the notion of a word or expressed species, it would have to be essentially understood, because it belongs to the essence of a word to be actually understood, or to terminate an actual act of understanding.

12. From what has been said, it is gathered first that one angel cannot know other angels through his own substance as through an intelligible species. For a species is a perfect and formal likeness of the object. But the substance of one angel is not perfectly assimilated to the substance of another; indeed, it differs from it in nature and species, as was shown in Chapter III. Therefore, it is not and cannot be a species representing the other angel.

13. It is gathered secondly that one angel cannot know another through the substance of the angel who is known, taking the place of an intelligible species, both for the reason already assigned and also because, since it belongs to the notion of an intelligible species that it be united to the intellective power, and since the substance of the angel who is known cannot be united to the intellect of the angel who knows through inherence or information, it would have to be united to him through inward penetration. This is impossible, as we shall show below when treating the illumination of angels. St. Thomas gives this argument in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 98, where he reasons as follows: "The intelligible is within the intellect as regards that through which it is understood. But no substance penetrates inwardly into a mind except God alone, who is in all things through essence, presence, and power. It therefore seems impossible that one separate substance be understood by another through its essence and not through a likeness of it existing in the latter."

14. It is gathered thirdly that through his own substance as through a species, an angel knows God as the author of nature. For if the substance of an angel has the notion of a species and of a principle by which with respect to the cognition of himself, it must also be a species and intelligible form with respect to the cognition of those things of which it is an image and likeness. For by the same species through which an image is seen, the thing represented by it is also seen. But the substance of an angel is an image and likeness of God, according to Ezek. 28: "You are the seal of likeness." Therefore, by the very fact that it has the notion of a species with respect to the cognition of itself, it must also be a species, or take the place of a species, with respect to the natural cognition of God. Moreover, because the essence of an angel is a most perfect effect of God, in which the power of its cause shines forth, and because a cause is known through its effects, the substance of an angel concurs in the cognition of God not only after the manner of a

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species and an unknown principle, but also after the manner of an effect and a known principle. Hence, with due proportion, we must philosophize about the essence of an angel with respect to the cognition of God in the same manner as about the divine essence with respect to the cognition of creatures. For just as the divine essence is the medium by which and in which God and the blessed know creatures, so also the substance of an angel has the notion of a medium by which and in which, in relation to the cognition of God as the author of nature.

§ 2.

The Species Through Which Angels Understand are
Infused by God, Not Received from Things.

15. This is proved first against Scotus, Gregory, and a few others, from Scripture, Ezek. 28, where Lucifer is spoken of under the figure of the prince of Tyre: “The seal of God’s likeness, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; perfect in his ways from the day of his creation.” But Lucifer could not have possessed the fullness of wisdom and been perfect from the day of his creation unless he then possessed the species of all things, which are perfections of the angelic intellect and without which there cannot be in it the fullness of wisdom. Therefore, according to Scripture, an angel possessed from the beginning of his creation species of things implanted in him, and did not receive them from things in the course of time.

16. The holy Fathers also favor this position, especially Dionysius and Augustine. For Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 7, that “angels do not gather divine cognition from divisible or sensible things.” Augustine, in *De Genesi ad litteram* II, asserts that things were made in the minds of angels before they were made in their proper natures. But they cannot be said to have been made in the minds of angels except in the intentional being that they have in species. Nor is Gregory’s answer valid when he says that Augustine is not speaking of the natural cognition of creatures, but of the supernatural cognition by which the things of this universe are known by an angel in the Word through the beatific vision. For Augustine is speaking there of the cognition that angels possessed from the time they were made, or in the first instant of their creation, and which was common to all angels before the fall of the evil angels. But angels did not have a supernatural cognition of creatures in the Word from the first instant of their creation, since they were not blessed at their creation, as we shall show below; nor was such cognition common to good and evil angels, as is evident.

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Therefore, Augustine is not speaking there of the supernatural cognition of creatures in the Word through the beatific vision. Nor is it an obstacle that he calls it cognition in the Word, for, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3, even by natural cognition an angel knows things in the Word, although imperfectly.

17. The assertion can further be proved by two arguments of St. Thomas, here, q. 55, a. 2. The first can be proposed briefly and clearly as follows. The same order must be established, with due proportion, among spiritual substances as is preserved among corporeal substances. But among corporeal things, the heavenly bodies have their whole perfection from the beginning through an inamissible form, whereas sublunary bodies successively receive diverse forms and are changed from one into another. Therefore, similarly, lower intellectual substances, such as rational souls, successively receive diverse forms or intelligible species, whereas the higher intellectual substances, namely angels, are furnished with intelligible species and forms from the first instant of their creation. Hence it is said in proposition 10 of the *Liber de causis*: “Every intelligence is full of forms.”

18. This is confirmed. Since the angelic intellect is intermediate between the divine and the human intellect, it must stand in an intermediate manner between the two with respect to intelligible species. Hence it must not be as perfect as the divine intellect, which requires no species other than its own substance in order to understand, nor as imperfect as the human intellect, which is of itself in pure potency and is called a blank tablet capable of all species. Rather, it must possess the species of all things, distinct indeed, but connatural, or implanted and infused by God from the first instant of its creation.

19. The second argument of St. Thomas proves especially that an angel cannot derive species from corporeal and sensible things. A purely immaterial substance, which is altogether separated from a body so that it is never united to one and cannot be united to one as its form, does not possess species received from corporeal things. But an angel is such a substance. Therefore, he does not derive species from corporeal and sensible things, but possesses them from God through infusion. The major premise is proved, first, because the manner of the proper operation of a thing responds proportionally to the manner of its substance and nature. Therefore, the operation of a substance altogether separate and independent from a body cannot depend upon corporeal things or upon species received from them. It is also proved because the reason why our soul is united to a body as its form is that it may receive species from corporeal things, by means of which it can understand. Therefore, a substance altogether

separate from a body, which cannot be united to one as its form, does not receive species from corporeal and sensible things.

20. Nor is it valid to say with Scotus that this argument proves indeed that an angel does not receive species from corporeal things by the ministry of the senses, as our soul receives them, but does not demonstrate that he does not receive them from sensible and corporeal things as objects. This answer, I say, is not valid. For things of a lower order cannot perfect a thing of a higher order after the manner of an object, because that which is thus perfected depends upon that by which it is perfected, since the latter stands as a formal cause with respect to the former. Therefore, since an angel belongs to a higher order than corporeal and sensible things, he cannot be perfected by them even as objects. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 96: "The perfection of a higher nature does not depend upon a lower nature. But the perfection of a separate substance, since it is intellectual, consists in understanding. Therefore, their understanding does not depend upon sensible things in such a way that they receive cognition from them." Should you say that the rational soul is immaterial and consequently belongs to a higher order than corporeal and sensible things, and nevertheless receives its intellectual perfection from them, I answer that although the rational soul belongs substantially to a higher order, insofar as it is intellectual, nevertheless, insofar as it is the form of a body, it belongs in a certain manner to the order of sensible things. Indeed, even sensible things themselves, while perfecting the soul, enter in a certain manner into its order, because they perfect it only insofar as they are subject to the light of the agent intellect and insofar as they shine forth in the phantasm, which is the highest point of the lowest sensible order, touching the lowest point of the highest intellectual nature, namely, the rational soul.

21. From this you will understand that an angel cannot, even supernaturally, understand through species received from corporeal and material things. For if something corporeal and material cannot according to the ordinary law actuate and perfect that which is purely spiritual, it cannot do so by an extraordinary way or by absolute power either. The reason is that what actuates and perfects another stands as a formal cause with respect to it, since to actuate and perfect is proper to form, just as to be actuated and perfected is proper to matter. But because a formal cause causes only through the communication of itself, it can do supernaturally nothing other than what it does naturally, as our Thomists commonly teach when they assert that in formal causes there is no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary power. Therefore, if something corporeal and material cannot according to the ordinary law actuate and perfect that which is purely

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spiritual, it cannot do so by an extraordinary way or by absolute power either. For example, because whiteness cannot by God's ordinary power perfect an angel, neither can it do so by His absolute power.

22. Had the author of *Theologia mentis et cordis* penetrated this argument, he would not have despised it, called it "exceedingly feeble," or said that the doctrine concerning formal causality is irrelevant, because an angel, he says, would not acquire those species as a formal cause, but as an efficient cause, by producing them through divine power. This argument is certainly most feeble. For even if an angel concurred efficiently in their acquisition, they would nevertheless perfect and actuate his intellect and consequently would stand as a formal cause with respect to it. Thus something corporeal and material would, in the genus of formal causality, perfect something purely spiritual, which cannot be done even by God's absolute power.

23. You will say that although a species derived from corporeal things is material, God can nevertheless purify it from all material conditions and introduce it, thus purified, into the intellect of an angel. Therefore, by God's absolute power, an angel can understand through species received from corporeal things.

24. But I deny the consequence. For in such a case the intellect of an angel would not receive that species immediately from the object itself, but from God. Hence, in receiving it, the intellect would stand just as if it had not been derived from that object at all, but had been produced by God alone. Or, secondly, it may be answered that such a species, even thus purified from material conditions, would still imply a relation to or dependence upon the corporeal object from which it had been derived, since this would be essential to it, and thus it would still remain corporeal. Consequently, not even in that case could an angel receive it divinely; otherwise, that which is corporeal and material would actuate and perfect that which is purely spiritual.

25. You will object first that if the species of an angel are essentially from God and are not received from things, they would be supernatural; for that which is infused by God and can be made by Him alone is supernatural. I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. Since species are not infused into angels by God as supernatural author, but by God acting according to the natural capacity of an angel, just as the rational soul is created and infused by Him when matter is disposed, they are not and ought not to be called supernatural.

26. You will object secondly that to abstract species from sensible things is a certain perfection belonging to the rational soul. Therefore, it ought not to be denied to the angelic intellect, which is more perfect than the human

intellect. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For just as understanding through discourse is a certain perfection of the human intellect, yet, because it is only a qualified perfection involving an admixture of imperfection, it does not belong to the angelic intellect, as we shall say below; so likewise, because having the power to draw species from sensible things does not express an unqualified perfection, but only a qualified one, since it presupposes the imperfection of potentiality and inferiority in intellectual degree, it ought not to be found in angels.

27. You will say that an intellective nature capable of reducing itself to act from its own principles is more perfect than one that cannot do so. But human nature, by reason of the agent intellect, can reduce itself to the act of understanding by acquiring species. Therefore, if angelic nature cannot do this, man will possess a more perfect nature than an angel. I answer that the major premise is not universally true. For, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 5, a. 9, ad 2, the nature that attains a nobler good is more perfect and noble, even if it attains it with external assistance, than one that attains a less perfect good by itself. For man is nobler than brute animals, although he cannot acquire his proper perfection and beatitude except with the external assistance of God.

28. You will ask first whether an angel can receive species from spiritual things, for example, from other angels. I answer negatively. For one angel to produce intelligible species in the intellect of another, he would have to penetrate inwardly into the latter's mind. But this is impossible, as we shall show below when treating the illumination of angels. Therefore, the former is also impossible. The major premise is proved. Since species of this kind, being spiritual, could not be diffused through a medium, an angel would have to produce them immediately, with the immediacy of the suppositum, within the intellect of another, and consequently be constituted as present within that intellect under the notion of the cause of such species. But this is to penetrate inwardly within its limits. Therefore, for one angel to produce intelligible species in the intellect of another, he would have to penetrate inwardly into the latter's mind.

29. You will ask secondly whether the intelligible species of an angel can be called, and truly are, his properties. I answer that they can be called his properties in a broad sense, insofar as they are forms connatural to him, and this for three reasons. First, because they are due to an angel. For since he is most perfect among intellectual creatures, he connaturally requires that he be in complete first act for understanding and for knowing all the natures of things belonging to the order of the universe. Secondly, because angels received such species together with their nature in the instant of creation. In

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this manner original justice, had Adam not sinned, would have been connatural to his descendants, because they would have been born with it. Thirdly, intelligible species are called connatural to an angel because of the natural passive potency and aptitude that the angelic intellect has for them, in the manner in which the reception of light is called connatural to a transparent body, and motion to the heavens. Hence, if an angel were produced without species, or if the species infused into him by God were removed, he would suffer a certain violence, because that is called violent which is contrary to the inclination of an active or passive principle. For although a secondary cause does not have an active inclination toward God's concurrence, nor a body toward its soul, but only a passive one, nevertheless, if such concurrence were denied to a cause duly applied and possessing a complete and proportioned power for producing an effect, or if a soul were not infused into a body ultimately organized, they would suffer a certain violence.

30. Nevertheless, the intelligible species implanted in the minds of angels cannot be called, nor are they in reality, their properties truly and strictly speaking. For properties, strictly and rigorously speaking, must be determined intrinsically and not merely extrinsically, and must proceed or flow invariably from the essence. But the intelligible species implanted in the minds of angels possess neither condition. For angelic nature is not of itself and intrinsically determined to have these species rather than others; this depends only upon the external and free will of God. Therefore, had God decreed to create another universe consisting of other species and genera of things, angels would not have possessed the species they now possess, but entirely different ones. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 56, a. 2, ad 4: "If God had determined to make more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species upon angelic minds." Therefore, intelligible species are not truly and strictly properties of angelic nature, although they are connatural to it under the three titles already explained.

31. Nor is it valid to say that the nature of an angel is determined to have the species of natural things, given that those things exist, and that this suffices for them to be called its properties truly and strictly speaking. For by the very fact that sublunary matter is created by God, it has a natural determination to possess some form; nevertheless, this does not suffice for such a form truly to flow from it after the manner of a property. Therefore, although angelic nature has the aforesaid determination toward species, this nevertheless does not suffice for them to be its true and rigorous properties. This is especially so because the intellect of an angel is determined to have the species of natural things, given that those things exist, from the fact that

it is of itself a pure potency that naturally requires to be actuated by an intelligible in act. Hence it is related to species only after the manner of a passive and potential principle, and not in any way after the manner of an active principle, which is nevertheless required for the resulting of properties, as is taught in Philosophy.

32. Another argument in favor of our position can be drawn from what was said in the preceding section. For an angel, as we showed there, does not know things other than himself through his own substance. But this would be false if his intelligible species were his true and rigorous properties. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved. Whoever comprehends an essence knows in it all its properties. Consequently, if the intelligible species of an angel are his true and rigorous properties, an angel, by comprehending his own essence, will know them all clearly and distinctly. But it is impossible for such species to be known by virtue of the cognition of the essence without the objects represented by them also being known, since intelligible species derive their species and distinction from the objects they represent. Therefore, if the intelligible species of an angel are his true and rigorous properties, it will be false that an angel does not know things other than himself through his own substance.

33. Nor is the answer of a certain recent Thomist valid, who says that when an essence is comprehended, relational properties implying an order to something extrinsic, such as intelligible species, ought not to be known, but only absolute properties independent of everything extrinsic. For if this answer were true, it would follow that an angel could comprehend the rational soul without knowing its powers, namely, intellect and will, because although they flow from the soul as its natural properties, they nevertheless imply an order to something extrinsic by which they are specified. Likewise, the divine essence could be known and even comprehended without the relations and attributes being known, at least not all of them, because the relations are pure references to a terminus, and among the attributes there are several that regard creatures and imply an order to something extrinsic, such as omnipotence, providence, justice, and mercy. All these consequences are utterly false and entirely foreign to the common judgment of theologians.

34. Nor is what the same author adds of greater weight, namely, that angels comprehend propositions concerning a future contingent and yet do not know whether they are true or false, because truth and falsity are relational properties of such propositions. For the truth or falsity of propositions concerning a future contingent, since it is free or contingent, depends upon the free decree of God as upon the first root and cause of the

whole futurition and contingency of things. Hence such truth cannot be known with certainty unless that decree becomes known through divine revelation. Natural objects, however, or the creatures of this universe, are naturally and necessarily, and consequently independently of God's decree and its revelation, represented through the intelligible species implanted in the minds of angels. Consequently, it is impossible for those species to be comprehended by an angel without the creatures of this universe represented through them being known by virtue of that comprehension.

35. The arguments commonly made against our position remain solved by what has been said, except for one, which may be proposed briefly as follows. Accidents produced by the same action by which a substance is produced are properties of that substance. But the intelligible species of angels were produced by the same action by which their substance was produced, namely, by creation. For they could not have been educed from it, because education presupposes a subject, whereas these species began together with the very substance of the angel. Therefore, they are properties of angelic nature.

36. I answer first that the major premise is not universally true. For not only properties, but also any accidents connaturally due to something, whether they are properties or not, are produced in the instant of generation by the same action through which the subject is produced.

37. I answer secondly, granting the major premise and denying the minor. For species of this kind were produced through an educative action. To the proof to the contrary, it must be said that education does not necessarily require that the subject be supposed to have been produced previously in time and to have lacked the form to be educed. It is sufficient that it precede the form by priority of nature and be produced through an action distinct from that by which the form is produced. Hence education need not always occur with an actual transmutation of the subject; it is enough that the action be of itself transmutative of it. This is evident in the grace conferred upon Adam and the angels in the instant of creation. According to the common opinion, that grace was not created, but was educed from their obediential potency. For although the subject did not precede in any instant as lacking such a form—"for God," as Augustine says, "was simultaneously creating nature in the angels and bestowing grace"—it was nevertheless produced through a distinct action. Hence, although there was no actual transmutation of the subject there, the action was nevertheless of itself transmutative of it, as productive of a form that was not necessarily connected with it and that could consequently have presupposed it as

produced previously in time. The same must be said proportionally in the present case.

§ 3.

The Species of the Angelic Intellect Are Universal in Representation, and the Higher the Angels are, the More Universal Their Species.

38. The first part is proved. The species of the angelic intellect are not derived from things, but are infused by God and immediately derived and exemplified from the divine essence, as we showed in the preceding section. Therefore, they are universal in representation. The consequence is proved. Although species caused by an object represent only the quiddity and nature by which they are caused, because they receive determination and limitation from the very object by which they are caused, nevertheless, species infused by God and immediately exemplified and derived from the divine essence can represent several natures, just as the divine essence itself, insofar as it is the species and exemplar of things, clearly and distinctly represents all created and creatable natures.

39. This is confirmed. Things dispersed among lower beings are united in higher beings. Hence all the objects that are represented distinctly to the individual external senses through individual species are presented to the common sense through a single species, and all things perceived by both the internal and external senses under really distinct specifying aspects are attained by the intellect under one formal aspect. Therefore, since angelic species are higher than ours, they will have the power to represent several things that are represented only through several lower species, and consequently they will be universal in representation.

40. The second part, which asserts that the higher angels are, the more universal are the species through which they understand, is proved by three arguments of St. Thomas. The first, which he gives here, a. 3, may be proposed as follows. The more an angel is like God in the intellectual order, the more universal must be the species through which he understands. But the higher he is in essence, the more he is like God. Therefore, the higher he is than others in essence, the more universal must be the species through which he understands. The minor premise is evident. The major is proved. The more an angel is like God in the intellectual order, the more he participates in divine perfections belonging to that order. But perfectly understanding several things through one universal species is a divine perfection belonging to the intellectual order. Therefore, the more an angel

resembles God in intellectual degree, the more he participates in a perfection of this kind, and consequently he understands through a species representing several things distinctly and thus through a more universal species.

41. Nor is it valid to say that the perfection of understanding through one most universal species cannot be participated by a creature, just as neither can the notion of being through essence. For although, as Cajetan correctly observed, such a perfection cannot be participated by a creature through approach to it, as power, wisdom, love, mercy, and similar attributes can be participated, it can nevertheless be participated through recession from the opposite, just as the notion of being through essence is participated through recession from nothingness. Therefore, the more perfect an angel is in understanding, the more like God he is through recession from the opposite, namely, from understanding through more numerous and less universal species. Consequently, he understands through fewer species that are more universal in representation.

42. The second argument, akin to the preceding one, is found in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 98, and may be formulated as follows. The angelic intellect is intermediate between the divine and the human intellect. Hence, since an intermediate must participate in something of both extremes, an angel has something of the purity and actuality of the divine intellect and something of the potentiality and composition of the human intellect. Consequently, he does not understand all things through a single species, as God does, nor through species as particular as those of our soul, but through species that are more or less universal according to his greater or lesser approach to God and his greater or lesser recession from our soul.

43. The third argument, drawn from *De veritate*, q. 8, a. 10, is proposed as follows. The more perfect an angel is in nature, the more immaterial he is, and consequently the more immaterial the species he requires. But intelligible species are more universal in representation the more immaterial they are. Therefore, the higher an angel is in nature, the more universal are the species in representation that he requires. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved, first, because it is proper to matter to contract, limit, and individuate. Consequently, the more something is abstracted from matter, the more universal it will be. It is also proved by induction. For, as we said above, because an internal sense is more immaterial than an external sense, it knows through more universal species; and the intellect knows through species still more universal, because it is more immaterial than an internal sense. Finally, because God is pure act and in the supreme degree of

immateriality, He understands Himself and all other things through one most universal species, namely, His own essence.

44. These arguments prove not only that angels of a higher order or hierarchy understand through more universal species, as Ferrariensis thinks, but also that angels more perfect in specific degree and nature do so, since they approach more closely to the divine likeness and participate more in the immateriality of God than others less perfect in specific degree and nature, even though they belong to the same order or hierarchy.

45. You will object first against the first part of the assertion. An intelligible species derives its specific unity from the object it represents. Therefore, it is impossible for one angelic species to represent several specifically diverse natures according to their proper differences, and consequently impossible for it to be universal in representation.

46. Some answer that although intelligible species received from things derive their specific unity from their objects, those that are infused by God and exemplified and derived from the divine essence, such as angelic species, do not receive their specific unity from their objects. Rather, on the contrary, the unity of the object depends upon the unity of the species, just as a seal does not derive specific unity from the thing sealed, but rather the thing sealed derives it from the seal, although the seal expresses and represents very diverse things. This solution is not without probability. Nevertheless, I answer secondly that just as the specific unity of sciences is not derived from the object considered materially and in real being, but from the object considered in knowable being and under the notion of an object, as is commonly explained in *Metaphysica*, so likewise the intelligible species of angels derive their specific unity from the natures they represent insofar as those natures are one under the notion of an object and fall under one aspect under which, which constitutes the object under the notion of an object and is specifically indivisible. But if you ask what this aspect under which is, which constitutes the diverse natures represented through an angelic species as one formally and under the notion of an object, I answer that it is a certain relation that those natures formally imply insofar as they are the object of one angelic species. Thus one species of an angel may, for example, immediately represent all stones or herbs insofar as they contribute to medicinal power or belong to the climates of a certain region; another may be a likeness of birds insofar as they serve that region or some end, or insofar as they serve man, or insofar as they belong to the ornament of an entire element, for example, air or earth; and similarly with the rest.

47. You will object secondly against the second part of the assertion. If the higher an angel is in nature, the more universal must be the species

through which he understands, then, since the multitude of angels exceeds all the species of material things that can be represented through intelligible species, as we showed in Chapter III, long before we reach the highest angel, some angel will have to be assigned who understands all material things through a single species. Similarly, descending from the higher angels through the lower to the lowest, if the first understands all things through a single species and the one next to the first through two, eventually some angel who is not the lowest will be found to possess more species in his intellect than there are species in things, because, as we taught with St. Thomas in the place cited, there are more angels than species of material things in the universe. I add that God can create an angel more perfect than the first, and consequently one who understands all things through fewer species. Hence, if the first angel knows all things through a single species superadded to his substance, a more perfect angel newly created will understand all things through his own substance taking the place of a species. This, however, must not be admitted, since it is proper to God to understand all things through His own substance as through a species.

48. I answer that although the higher angels are in nature, the fewer and more universal must be the species through which they understand, nevertheless, in ascending from lower angels to higher, before reaching the highest, one will never arrive at an angel lower than the highest who knows all inferior things through a single species. Similarly, in descending from higher angels through lower to the lowest, no angel before the last will be found to possess more species in his intellect than there are species in things. The reason is that the universality of angelic species is not taken from the representation of several natures alone, but also from the representation of several intelligible aspects, as St. Thomas teaches in *De veritate*, q. 8, a. 10, ad 2, where he says: "If a higher angel knows all species of animal through one species of animal, whereas a lower angel knows them only through many species, the higher angel also knows more intelligible aspects from the same things." Here, by several intelligible aspects, several properties of the same nature cannot be understood, because the same intelligible species represents the specific quiddity together with its properties. Nor can several accidental modes be meant, because if they belong to the order of natural providence, they are represented through the species that represent the quiddities or singulars in which they occur; but if they belong to the order of grace and supernatural providence, they do not fall under the natural cognition of angels, but are known through infused knowledge and revelations outside the Word. Finally, by several intelligible aspects one cannot mean, as some interpret it, several possible individuals.

For an angel does not possess a natural inclination to know merely possible things, since they are not parts of the universe, as will be evident from what is said below. Hence by those intelligible aspects must be understood the relations that created things have among themselves and to higher and more universal causes. These relations can increase without limit in created things, for as many things as can be made from them and through them, increasingly without limit, so many such relations can exist. Therefore, in ascending one will never arrive at an angel lower than the highest who attains them all through one species; nor, in descending, will one encounter an angel before the lowest who possesses more species in his intellect than there are relations and references in created things to other created things and to higher causes.

49. You will say that every angel comprehends all things in the universe. Therefore, he sees all the relations that created things imply among themselves and to higher causes. But I deny the consequence. Although every angel comprehends all things in the universe as regards their absolute aspects, he does not comprehend them as regards all their relational aspects. Hence, just as a carpenter indeed comprehensively knows all the absolute accidents in wood, such as length, breadth, strength, color, and the like, but does not know all its relational aspects—for example, he does not see those attained by a sculptor in relation to diverse figures, nor does the sculptor see those attained by a navigator, nor does the navigator see those that can serve other arts—so among angels the lower do not know those hidden aspects and connections of causes perceived by the higher. Or, if they do know them, they attain them through more numerous species. Thus the greater universality of species in higher angels always remains, because while a lower angel expresses two relations in one species, a higher angel represents three, and so on in ascending to the highest.

50. To what is added in the objection, Cajetan answers here, a. 3, that if a higher angel were created, a new species would necessarily be superadded to all the lower angels so that they could know him distinctly. Thus in the angel who had been highest there would be two species, supposing that previously he understood through only one, whereas in the newly made angel there would be one species through which he would know all things. The same must be said if the process continues without limit. The higher angel will always possess fewer species, not through a diminution in the highest, but through an addition or multiplication in the lower angels.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the Object of Angelic Cognition.

1. It is evident from what was said at the end of § 1 of the preceding chapter that an angel knows God, himself, and other angels. It is also certain that angels know singular things, even material ones. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, q. 57, a. 2, the Catholic faith teaches that these lower things are administered through angels, according to Heb. 1: “They are all ministering spirits.” But if angels had no cognition of singulars, they could exercise no providence over the things done in this world, since acts belong only to singulars.

2. But if you ask through what species singulars are known by angels, I answer that they are known through the same species through which their specific nature is known. For since such a species is a participation in the divine essence insofar as it has the notion of an intelligible species, just as the divine essence represents a specific nature together with all its individuals, so also does an angelic species. This is not repugnant to it, since, notwithstanding such representation, it is finite without qualification and infinite only in a qualified respect, insofar as it can extend to all possible individuals contained in the power of natural causes, which are syncategorematically and qualifiedly infinite. I add that the reason why the species used by our intellect in the present state directly represents only the common nature is that it is formed by abstraction from phantasms, and consequently from singularity. But this reason does not apply to the species used by an angel, since it is not derived from things by means of a phantasm, as was shown in the preceding chapter. Therefore, such a species represents not only the specific nature, but also all its individuals.

3. This being presupposed, in order that all the objects of angelic cognition may be explained, there remains to be resolved the celebrated difficulty whether angels naturally know future contingents and the secret thoughts of hearts.

I say first, therefore, that future things depending upon free choice cannot be known with certainty by angels through natural power. This is gathered from Sacred Scripture and the holy Fathers, who assert that the foreknowledge and prediction of such future things is so proper to God that it is a most certain sign and argument of divinity. For it is said in Isa. 41: “Announce the things that will come in the future”—he is addressing idols—

“and we shall know that you are gods.” Hence Tertullian says in *Apologeticum*, c. 20: “I consider the truth of prediction to be an adequate testimony of divinity.” And Origen says in *Contra Celsum* VI: “The prediction of future things is a mark of divine speech.” Likewise Chrysostom says in *Homiliae in Joannem*, hom. 18: “Certain prediction of future things is the work of the immortal God alone.” To this is added the common agreement of mankind. For among all nations, to know beforehand future free acts to be performed by others is called divining, to signify thereby that such foreknowledge is something divine and most proper to God.

4. The conclusion can further be proved by two arguments. The first is *a posteriori*. For if angels could know these things by natural power, God would not deny them this knowledge or perpetually prevent them from an operation naturally due to them. But it is evident from histories that the oracles of demons are full of falsehoods. This is therefore a sign that future free and contingent things cannot be known with certainty by demons. For if they could know them, they would always have predicted them, since they greatly desire by this means to imitate divinity, according to the saying of Tertullian in *Apologeticum*, c. 22: “Demons, taking certain lots of times, imitate divinity while stealing divination.”

5. The second argument is *a priori* and may be proposed as follows. Future free and contingent things can be known in only two ways: either in their causes or in themselves. But angels cannot know them with certainty in their causes, since those causes are indifferent and undetermined to their occurrence; nor can they know them in themselves, since they do not yet exist and are not present in time, but only in eternity, which is not the measure of angelic cognition, but of divine cognition alone. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 57, a. 3: “Because God sees all things in His eternity, which, since it is simple, is present to the whole of time and encompasses it, God’s gaze is therefore borne upon all things done throughout the whole of time as upon things present, and He sees all things as they are in themselves. But the angelic intellect, and every created intellect, falls short of divine eternity. Hence the future as it is in its own being cannot be known by any created intellect.” Therefore, angels cannot naturally know future free and contingent things.

6. You will say with Vásquez that although future free and contingent things cannot naturally be known by angels in their causes or in themselves, they can nevertheless be known in the objective truth of contradictory propositions that angels can form concerning them, since it is the nature of such propositions that, antecedently to every determination of causes, one is determinately true and the other false. But we refuted this solution and

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doctrine in the Treatise on God's Knowledge, where we showed that propositions concerning a future contingent are not determinately true in a sign antecedent to the decree, or the free determination of the first cause, but only indeterminately and under a disjunction, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in *De malo*, q. 16, a. 7, in these words: "Things that are open to either alternative cannot be known beforehand determinately in their causes, but only under a disjunction, namely, that they will or will not occur; for in this manner they possess truth." I add that even if a determinate objective truth were granted in future contingents antecedently to the determination of causes, angels would nevertheless not naturally know it, because it would not belong to the order of the universe, which is a physical, real, and exercised order of being, and not merely an objective order. But the intelligible species of angels represent only those things that belong to the order of the universe, as will be evident from what is said in the following conclusion.

7. What we have said of future free contingents must also be said of fortuitous or chance future events. For they possess in no secondary cause any determination in which they can be known certainly and infallibly, but occur altogether accidentally, as St. Thomas teaches below, q. 115, a. 6, where he says: "That some fiery terrestrial body is generated in the highest part of the air and falls downward has as its cause some heavenly power. Likewise, that there is some combustible matter on the surface of the earth can be reduced to a heavenly principle. But that the falling fire encounters this matter and burns it does not have a heavenly body as its cause, but occurs accidentally."

8. With respect to past things, it must likewise be said that angels cannot naturally know past contingent or free events that they did not perceive while present and that left no trace of themselves. For these stand in relation to the angelic intellect as though they had never existed. Therefore, we must philosophize about them in the same manner as about future things that do not yet exist. Hence Scripture equally denies to angels and reserves to God alone the cognition of past and future things, as is evident in Isa. 41, where the Prophet, to show that idols are not true gods, says by apostrophe: "Come near and announce to us whatever things are to come, or the former things that were"—that is, past things—"and we shall say that you are gods."

9. I say secondly that through the powers of their nature, and apart from God's revelation or a special direction by the one thinking, angels cannot know with certainty the secrets of hearts, or the thoughts and affections of a human or angelic mind. This conclusion is taught no less openly than the preceding one by Scripture and the holy Fathers, who assert that the

cognition of the secrets of hearts is proper to God. 1 Kgs. 8 and 2 Chron. 6: “You alone know the hearts of the children of men.” Jer. 17: “Depraved”—or, as the Septuagint translates—“deep is the heart of men and inscrutable; who shall know it? I, the Lord, who search the heart and test the reins.” On this passage Jerome says: “No one knows the secrets of thoughts except God alone.” And Chrysostom says in his commentary on John: “Cognition of human hearts belongs to God alone, who formed them.” The Fathers judge this to be so true that they demonstrate Christ’s divinity against the Arians from His knowledge of the secrets of hearts. For Jerome, from Luke 11, “When Jesus saw their thoughts,” reasons as follows: “No one can see their thoughts except God alone. Therefore Christ is God.” Likewise, Chrysologus says in sermon 50 to the Pharisee whose heart Christ knew in Luke 7: “Receive the marks of His divinity. Hear Him disclose the innermost secrets of your heart. Behold that He has reached the hidden places of your thoughts.”

10. The conclusion can further be proved by three arguments drawn from St. Thomas. The first is that the free acts of our will must be perfectly subject to its dominion. But the will would not have full and perfect dominion over its acts if, against its will, its choice and deliberation were naturally visible to other creatures. For this choice would be, so to speak, almost a matter of public right and would not perfectly belong to its own principle. Therefore, the secrets of the human heart are not open to the eyes of others.

11. The second is found in the commentary on the words of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 2: “Who among men knows the things of a man except the spirit of the man that is in him?” There St. Thomas reasons as follows: “Neither a good nor an evil angel can know the things hidden in the heart of men unless they are manifested through certain effects. The reason for this can be taken from the Apostle’s own words, for he says that the spirit of a man knows the things hidden in a man’s heart because the spirit of the man is in the man. But neither a good nor an evil angel can penetrate inwardly into the human mind so as to be within the human heart itself and operate intrinsically; this is proper to God alone. Hence God alone is conscious of the secrets of the human heart,” according to Job 16: “Behold, my witness is in heaven, and the one conscious of me is on high.”

12. The third is drawn from *De veritate*, q. 8, a. 13, and *De malo*, q. 16, a. 8, and may be proposed as follows. Angels naturally know nothing unless it is contained within the order of the universe of which they are parts. But free acts of a created will that remain within it and produce no effect *ad extra* do not belong to the order of the universe. Therefore, they cannot naturally be

known by angels. The major premise is commonly taught by theologians and can be proved from the fact that some limit must be assigned to angelic cognition, just as a determinate sphere is assigned to angelic activity. But no other limit can be assigned to it than the breadth of the universe of which an angel is a part. Otherwise, if it extended beyond the universe, it would have to be connaturally borne not only toward existing things, but also toward future and even merely possible things. This is impossible, since an angel does not possess species of merely possible things. The minor premise, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. The order of the universe consists in particular causes being connected with universal causes, or in lower things being governed and moved by higher things, as St. Thomas teaches in *Quodlibet* VI, a. 10. Hence, for a lower and particular cause and its operation to belong to the order of the universe, they must have a necessary connection with other natural and universal causes and must be apt to be moved by them. On the contrary, if a particular cause is of such a condition and eminence that in its operations it does not depend upon natural and universal causes, but upon God alone, who is outside and above the entire order of the universe, such operations must be outside and in a certain manner above the whole order of the universe. But the human will, by reason of its freedom and the perfect dominion it has over its free acts, is of such a nature, perfection, and eminence that in those acts it depends upon God alone, because He alone can penetrate inwardly into it and operate within it. Therefore, the free acts of a created will do not belong to the order of the universe, but exist outside it and in a certain manner above it.

13. You will say that St. Thomas says above, q. 19, a. 8: “God wills some things to occur necessarily and others contingently, so that there may be order among things for the completion of the universe.” Therefore, free acts belong to the order of the universe.

I answer that by these words St. Thomas intends only to declare that the perfection of the universe requires that there be in it some necessary acts and others contingent or free. It does not, however, require these or those determinate acts, but requires them indeterminately, according as a free cause shall will. Hence they cannot be determinately known by angels except when they are directed to them. For then, by virtue of such direction, they begin to belong to the angels and consequently to the order of the universe, because those things belong to the order of the universe that are ordered either to the universe itself or to some part of it, as will be more fully explained below when treating the speech and illumination of angels.

14. You will object first against the first conclusion. Demons sometimes foretell many future free and contingent things, either through themselves

or through men whom they inspire, such as changes of kingdoms, the outcomes of wars, and similar things that depend upon the free wills of men. But there is no supernatural light in demons, but only natural knowledge, which remained in them after sin. Therefore, angels can naturally know future contingent and free events.

15. I answer that demons sometimes predict future things not because they know them with certainty through the powers of their nature, but because God reveals them to them, either immediately or through good angels, for the hidden ends of His providence. In the same manner, He sometimes reveals many things through evil and impious men, as is evident in the cases of Balaam, Caiaphas, and the Sibyls. Thus Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* II, c. 17. Or, secondly, it can be said that demons predict true things from revelations made not to themselves but to others, whose words, writings, or other signs enable them to know these things, as Tertullian affirms in *Apologeticum*, c. 22, in these words: “They have also gathered God’s dispositions, at one time while the Prophets were proclaiming them, and at another while readings were resounding. Thus, taking from these sources certain lots of times, they imitate divinity while stealing divination.” Thirdly, it can be answered that demons know future things from conjectures and from the influences of the stars, which they know most perfectly. For since they know that the greater part of men follow the passions aroused by the influences of the stars rather than reason, they frequently foresee several things, if not with certainty, at least conjecturally, and predict them as true, although they know them only conjecturally. Thus St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 95, a. 5, ad 2. Similarly, demons sometimes reveal certain thoughts of the human heart, not because they understand them with certainty, but because they investigate and know them conjecturally from an internal alteration of bodily temperament or from certain external signs. For, as St. Thomas correctly says here, q. 57, a. 4: “Demons can perceive the affections of the mind through external indications, the pulse, an alteration of the countenance, and other bodily affections.” Physicians also do this, but demons do it better insofar as they perceive and examine such bodily changes more subtly. On this, see Cassian, *Collationes*, coll. 7, c. 15.

16. You will object secondly. The species implanted in the minds of angels represent not only existing singulars but also future ones. Therefore, since every angel comprehends his species, he naturally knows in them not only existing things but also future things.

17. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Although the species implanted in the minds of angels are of themselves representative of singulars that will possess existence in some difference of

time, they do not in fact and in exercised act represent them, because of the absence of a condition necessary for their actual representation, namely, the actual existence and duration of those singulars. For, as St. Thomas says here, a. 2, ad 3: "Things that are present possess a nature through which they are assimilated to the species existing in an angel's mind, and thus can be known through them. But future things do not yet possess a nature through which they are assimilated to those species, and hence cannot be known through them." This can be explained by the example of a mirror, which, however perfect it may be, represents only objects that exist and not those that will exist, not because of a defect in its representative power, but because of a defect in the object, which is not representable. Therefore, just as when a mirror actually represents an object that it did not represent before, this does not occur through a change in the mirror itself, but rather through a change in the object, which becomes present to it and is placed before it, so likewise an angelic species that represented only the specific nature comes to represent individuals as existing or future without any intrinsic change in itself, merely upon the positing of an extrinsic connotation, namely, the existence or futurity of the object. Hence St. Thomas says in *Quodlibet* VII, a. 3, ad 2: "When something begins anew to be present, an angel knows it anew, not because any change or innovation has occurred in the angel himself, but in the knowable thing, in which there is now something that was not there before." And in *De malo*, q. 16, a. 7, ad 13: "The reason a demon does not know that which is future does not arise from the fact that his intellect is in potency, but from the fact that the future singular does not yet participate in the form of the nature whose likeness actually preexists in the demon's intellect."

18. A certain recent Thomist did not see these testimonies of St. Thomas when he said in his *Theologia mentis et cordis* that it is difficult to understand "how a species can newly represent something that it did not represent before unless some intrinsic perfection is added to it. For the representation of a species," he says, "is something intrinsic, not an extrinsic denomination." Therefore, for the angelic intellect to represent something that it did not previously represent, either it must be suffused with new species, or those infused species that it already possesses must acquire a new perfection. But the example of the mirror adduced above, which by a change in the object alone actually represents something that it did not represent before, declares clearly enough that the matter is not so difficult to understand. It can nevertheless be explained and confirmed still further by the example of the relation of paternity, actually terminated in one son, which without any change in itself or addition of anything intrinsic is

terminated in and extended to other sons newly begotten. Likewise, it can be explained by the example of the divine essence, which, insofar as it has the notion of an intelligible species, antecedently to the decree and determination of the divine will concerning the production of things, does not represent them as existing or future, and nevertheless, after the aforesaid determination, represents those same things as existing or future without anything being understood to be superadded to it under the notion of a species. The same must be said proportionally of an angelic species, since it possesses an excellent manner of representing, insofar as it is an expression and participation of the manner of representing proper to the divine essence, from which it was exemplified and derived. Namely, without intrinsic change in itself, it can represent existing or future individuals that it did not previously represent, solely because they pass from the state of mere possibility to the state of existence or futurity. Hence what the aforesaid author says is false, namely, that actual representation in angelic species is some intrinsic perfection newly coming to them. It is only a new connotation of the object as present or future, which did not exist before because of the absence of the object's existence or futurity.

19. You will object thirdly against the second conclusion. An angel can naturally know whatever is contained within the proportionate object of his intellect. But free acts are contained within the proportionate object of the angelic intellect. Therefore, they can naturally be known by an angel. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Every natural entity is contained within the proportionate object of the angelic intellect. But free acts, since we suppose that they are not supernatural, belong to the natural order. Therefore, they are contained within the proportionate object of the angelic intellect.

20. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its proof, I distinguish the major premise. Every natural entity belonging to the physical order is contained within the proportionate object of the angelic intellect: I grant the major premise. Every natural entity belonging to the moral and free order: I deny the major premise. For, as we said above, the proportionate object of the angelic intellect is only that which belongs to this universe and has a connection with it. But things belonging to the moral and free line are outside this universe, since they do not depend upon natural and universal causes, but upon God alone, who is outside and above the whole order of the universe. Consequently, they do not belong to the proportionate object of the angelic intellect.

21. You will say that two objects of the same nature are equally proportionate or disproportioned to two minds that are likewise of the

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same species and nature. But a thought in the heart of one angel, for example Michael, and a thought of Gabriel are two objects of the same nature, while the mind of Gabriel and the mind of Michael are of the same species. Therefore, the thought in the heart of Gabriel is naturally as proportionate to Michael for him to know it as it is to Gabriel himself, who sees it in his own heart.

22. I answer with the same distinction. Two objects belonging to the physical order: I grant the major premise. Two objects belonging to the moral order: I deny the major premise. For things belonging to the moral and free order depend only upon the will from which they proceed and upon Him to whom such a will is subject and who can penetrate inwardly into it and operate within it. Consequently, a thought elicited by Gabriel is proportionate for natural cognition only to Gabriel himself and to God, who alone can penetrate inwardly into an angelic mind and operate within it.

23. From this you will understand that angels cannot naturally know the mysteries of grace, for example, the mystery of the Incarnation or of the Eucharist, since these mysteries are disproportionate to the angelic intellect not only by reason of freedom, namely, because they depend upon the divine will alone, but also by reason of their supernatural character, through which they transcend all the natural powers of every created and creatable intellect. Hence they can be known only through divine revelation and a supernatural light. On this, see more fully the Treatise on the Incarnation.

CHAPTER IX.

The Mode of Angelic Cognition.

1. Concerning the mode of angelic cognition, four difficulties arise that must be resolved briefly here. The first is whether an angel always and necessarily understands himself. The second is whether he reasons discursively, or can do so. The third is whether he understands by composing and dividing. The fourth is whether inferior angels comprehend superior angels.

§ 1.

Resolution of the First Difficulty.

2. I say first: an angel always and necessarily understands himself.

This is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 97, where he argues as follows: *Every living substance has some vital*

operation actually proceeding from its nature, which always belongs to it, although other operations sometimes belong to it only potentially; thus animals are always nourished, although they do not always sense. But separated substances are living substances, and they have no other vital operation except understanding. Therefore, they must by their nature always be actually understanding. But no other object can be assigned that angels always and necessarily understand except their own substance: both because their intellect is connaturally united to no other object than their own substance, and because they always have it present and are thereby informed in intelligible being, as is clear from what was said above in Chapter VII. Therefore, just as, if the species of some object naturally affected the pupil of the eye, the eye could not cease seeing it, so an angel cannot cease knowing himself, but always and necessarily knows himself in second act. Hence St. Thomas says in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 11, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4: *An angel is always actually considering himself.*

3. This is confirmed. Every motion, according to the order of nature, must be reduced to a first motion determined by nature itself, which is the cause of the others. Thus, in an animal all vital motions are reduced to the motion of the heart, which flows as a kind of property from the animal's nature and always belongs to it, as St. Thomas teaches in the opusculum *De motu cordis*. Therefore, similarly, every natural cognition and volition of an angel must be reduced to the cognition and love of himself as to the first operation determined by and proceeding from nature itself.

4. You will say: no object except God clearly seen can necessitate the intellect and will to know and love it. Therefore, an angel cannot be necessitated by his own substance to know and love himself. I answer that, although an angel is not necessitated to the knowledge and love of himself by his own substance as an object, since it does not possess every aspect of goodness, he is nevertheless necessitated by it as a principle, insofar as self-knowledge and self-love are properties of an angel flowing from his essence, in much the same way that the motion of the heart flows as a property from an animal's nature.

5. From this you will understand that an angel always and necessarily knows God as the author of his nature. For he cannot comprehend his own essence unless he sees the dependence it has upon God, and consequently unless he always and necessarily knows God as the author of his nature.

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§ 2.

Resolution of the Second and Third Difficulties.

6. I say second: angels do not understand through discourse properly so called, nor by composing and dividing. Thus St. Thomas here, q. 58, aa. 3 and 4.

The first part is proved by the fundamental reason. True and proper intellectual discourse requires a distinction and plurality of acts, one of which is the cause of another, namely, the act or cognition of a better-known object causing the act or cognition of a less-known object. But no such distinction and order, or causality, of cognitions is found in angels. Therefore, neither is intellectual discourse properly so called. The major premise is clear, for one cognition understanding many things in one principle is not discursive but intuitive. Similarly, two cognitions succeeding one another without the causality and dependence of one upon the other are not true and proper discourse, but only discourse improperly so called, as St. Thomas teaches above, q. 14, a. 7. Hence there is a great difference among these three: to see something in another, to see one thing after another, and to see one thing from another. God sees all things in himself, but not one after another or one from another. Angels see one thing after another, but not one from another, as will soon be clear. Men, however, see one thing after another and one from another. To see in another denotes complete simultaneity on the part of the act, and priority and posteriority, or dependence, among the objects, so that one is the reason for knowing another. To see one thing after another signifies succession on the part of the acts without the causality and dependence of one upon another. But to see one thing from another implies not only a plurality of acts but also the causality and dependence of one upon another.

The minor premise, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. An angel penetrates everything he knows by a single simple intuition, for he sees conclusions in principles, effects in causes, and causes in effects. Therefore, he does not have distinct cognitions of the things he knows such that one is caused by another. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. In us, it arises from the imperfection of our species and the weakness of our intellectual light that, by the very vision of principles, we do not immediately intuit the conclusions contained in them, and that, once the cause is known, we do not immediately know its effect, or, once the

effect is known, immediately penetrate its cause. Therefore, since an angel possesses a perfect intellectual light and is furnished with universal species representing all these things, he penetrates all things in a single intuition and immediately sees conclusions in principles, effects in causes, and causes in effects. Hence angels are called intelligences, while men are called rational, because men arrive at the knowledge of truth by reasoning, whereas angels know all things by one simple intuition. Indeed, as St. Thomas reasons, things that are perfect within a genus ought not to acquire their perfection in the same way as things that are imperfect in that order. Thus the heavens do not acquire their perfection by the motion of alteration and increase, as inferior bodies do. Therefore, since an angel is perfect in the intellectual order, he ought not to acquire his perfection by discursive motion in the manner of the human intellect, which occupies the lowest place in that genus. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter VII of *De divinis nominibus* that an angel does not gather divine cognition from diffuse discourses, that is, from discursive processes and mental speech.

7. You will say, with Suárez and other more recent authors, that these arguments of St. Thomas prove that an angel does not reason discursively about natural objects, but do not establish that he does not use discourse about supernatural things, future contingents, thoughts of hearts, and other things of this kind, since these are not evidently known as natural objects are.

8. But to the contrary: grace does not depress nature to an inferior order, but rather ennobles it and elevates it to a superior order; otherwise, through grace a man or angel would be made worse, which is absurd. Therefore, when an angel knows supernatural things, he is not depressed to a mode of knowing inferior to his nature, such as the discursive mode, but is rather elevated to the mode of knowing proper and connatural to God, which is participated from supernatural light. Hence such light is not of itself discursive, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 9, a. 1, but is so only on the part of the subject, namely, when it is in a subject that is of itself discursive. Therefore, since an angel is not discursive by his nature, he does not receive such light as discursive, and consequently does not reason discursively even about supernatural things. Rather, just as by natural light he knows by one intuition that Peter is a man and is capable of laughter, so by the supernatural light of faith he sees by one intuition, in this principle, *Christ is man*, that Christ is capable of laughter. Similarly, when he investigates future contingents and the secrets of hearts, he then indeed forms a conjecture but does not reason discursively, because by the same

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gaze and act by which he sees the effect, he sees the connection, whether necessary or probable, that it has with other things.

9. From this the second part of the conclusion remains proved, which asserts that an angel does not understand by composing and dividing. For from the same principle by which it was shown that an angel does not reason discursively, it is also deduced that he does not employ formal composition and division. For just as he sees conclusions in a principle, so, upon knowing a subject, he also knows by one simple act everything that belongs or is repugnant to it. Therefore, just as he does not reason discursively, so neither does he compose nor divide.

10. You will object first against the first part of the conclusion: an angel can, according to his freedom, use any of his species inadequately, without contemplating everything reflected in it. Therefore, from one partial object of his species first known, he can proceed to knowing another partial object of the same species, and consequently reason discursively.

11. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For when an angel uses his species inadequately, he does not do this as though he knew one thing and afterward inferred another from the connection of one with the other. Rather, according to his will, he applies the species now to one object and now to another, but he apprehends each immediately, not inferentially.

12. You will object second: angels experience wonder concerning supernatural objects, as is clear from Isa. 63: *Who is this who comes from Edom?* and from Song 3: *Who is she who ascends through the desert like a column of smoke?* But whoever is capable of wonder is also capable of discourse. Therefore, angels are capable of discourse, at least about supernatural things.

13. This is confirmed. When the demons, having seen Christ's miracles, conjectured that he was the Son of God, or when they hunt out and investigate the secrets of hearts or future contingents from certain signs or external indications, everything required for discourse is present. For there are several acts, one of which is caused by another, namely, the vision of Christ's miracles and the suspicion of his divinity; or the vision of an external sign, such as an alteration of the countenance, and the suspicion of a certain thought conceived in the mind. Therefore, angels reason discursively at least about things they cannot know naturally, such as future contingents and the secrets of hearts.

14. To the objection, I answer that wonder in us contains three things: the cognition of a hidden thing, the comparison of it with a hidden cause, and the desire to know the cause. Wonder is indeed found in angels as to the

first, but not as to the two latter, because they attain the effect and the cause by the same cognition.

15. To the confirmation, I deny the antecedent. For when the demons, upon seeing Christ's miracles, conjectured that he was the Son of God, no real plurality of acts intervened. Rather, there was one simple cognition that, from the penetration of those marvelous effects alone, conjectured that Christ was the Son of God and the promised Messiah. Similarly, when they investigate the secrets of hearts or future contingents from external signs, by the same gaze and act by which they see the effect, they understand the probable connection it has with those signs and effects.

16. You will say: it is repugnant for one and the same act to be at once evident and obscure, certain and opinative, necessary and free. But the cognition of Christ's miracles was evident, certain, and wholly necessary for the demons, whereas the cognition of his divinity was non-evident, uncertain, opinative, and contingent. Therefore, there were two acts, not one.

17. I answer by denying the major premise. For just as it is not contradictory for the same act of cognition to be simultaneously abstractive and intuitive with respect to diverse things, as is clear in the beatific vision, which is intuitive of God and existing creatures but abstractive with respect to possibles, and in angelic cognition, for an angel knows his own essence intuitively but knows God represented through it only abstractively; so also it is not repugnant for the same act of intellect to be evident and obscure, necessary and opinative, in relation to diverse objects. Indeed, acts having all these conditions are often found in us. For it happens that some principle is known evidently by natural light, and at the same time certain conclusions are known in it only confusedly and opinatively, because, together with the truth of such a principle, we have not penetrated the truth of those conclusions or the necessary connection of that principle with those conclusions.

18. You will object third against the second part of the conclusion, in which we said that an angel does not know by composing or dividing: truth and falsity are not found in simple apprehension, but only in composition or division, as is taught in logic. But truth and falsity are in the angelic intellect. Therefore, composition and division are also in it.

19. I answer by distinguishing the major premise. They are found only in formal or virtual composition and division: I grant the major premise. Only in formal composition and division: I deny the major premise. Although there is no formal composition or division in the angelic intellect, virtual composition and division are nevertheless found in it, because that simple

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penetration of quiddity proper to the angelic intellect is equivalent to our composition and division. Therefore, truth or falsity is found in it, although it cannot be found in our simple apprehension, for the opposite reason.

What we have said of composition must also be said of discourse, for virtual discourse is also found in angels, because that simple cognition by which an angel penetrates conclusions in principles and effects in their cause by a single intuition is equivalent to our discourse and suffices for the character of true and strict science. This is clear in divine knowledge, which is truly and properly science, yet is not formally discursive, because it does not attain principles and conclusions by diverse acts.

§ 3.

Resolution of the Final Difficulty.

20. I say finally: inferior angels indeed comprehend superior angels imperfectly, but not with a perfect comprehension, strictly and rigorously understood.

The first part is clear and is admitted by all. For imperfect comprehension requires only that there be nothing in the thing known that is not manifested, or that the cognition attain everything contained formally and eminently in the object. But the cognition that an inferior angel has of a superior angel attains not only the essence of the superior angel, but also all the modes formally existing in it and everything eminently contained in it, since these are objects proportioned to the intellective power of the inferior angel, inasmuch as all these things are contained under natural being universally taken, which is the proportioned object of the angelic intellect. Therefore, an inferior angel imperfectly comprehends a superior angel. St. Thomas must be understood of this imperfect comprehension when he says in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 98: *From the fact that a substance is intellectual, it is comprehensive of the whole of being.* For he intends only to declare by this that intellectual substances have the power to know all natural beings, since they possess species of them implanted by God, and consequently those beings are contained under the proportioned object of the angelic intellect.

21. The second part, however, which Báñez and the Salamancans deny, is proved as follows. For strict and proper comprehension, it is not enough that everything contained formally and eminently in an object be attained. It is further required that the object be known as perfectly as it is knowable by its own nature, or that the cognitive power of the knower be as great as the object's knowability. But inferior angels do not know superior angels as

perfectly as the latter are knowable, nor does their cognitive power equal the knowability of the superior angels. Therefore, inferior angels do not comprehend superior angels with comprehension strictly and properly understood.

The major premise is expressly taught by St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 7, in these words: That is comprehended which is perfectly known. But that is perfectly known which is known as much as it is knowable. Hence, if something that is knowable through demonstrative science is held as an opinion from some probable reason that has been conceived, it is not comprehended. For example, if someone knows through demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends this. But if someone accepts this as a probable opinion because it is so stated by the wise or by many, he does not comprehend it, because he does not attain the perfect mode by which it is knowable. And in the response ad 2: God is not called incomprehensible because something of him is not seen, but because he is not seen as perfectly as he is visible. Likewise in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 49, q. 2, a. 3: Something is said to be comprehended through cognition when the thing known stands under the act of the cognitive power and does not exceed it. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, true and strict comprehension requires that the object be known as perfectly as it is naturally knowable, or that the cognitive power of the knower equal or surpass the knowability of the object.

Reason also recommends this. For since comprehensive cognition does not, at least necessarily, add to quidditative cognition a knowledge of more things, unless it added an adequation of the mode of active cognition to the mode and perfection of the object's knowability, it would not be distinguished from quidditative cognition.

22. The minor premise, which asserts that inferior angels do not know superior angels as perfectly as the latter are knowable, but in an inferior mode, is proved first from the same Holy Doctor in *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 98, where he admits this proposition from the *Liber de causis*: *An inferior separated substance knows a superior substance according to the mode of the knowing substance, not according to the mode of the substance known.* And in *Super Librum de causis*, lect. 8, near the end, speaking of an intelligence, he says: *It knows superior things according to the mode of its own substance, in an inferior mode to that in which the superior thing is in itself.* These last words openly show that he is speaking of an inferiority in the mode of knowing considered on the part of the thing known, not on the part of the knower, as a certain recent Thomist interprets them in order to evade the force of so evident a testimony. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, an inferior angel

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does not know a superior angel in as perfect a mode as the latter is naturally knowable, but in an inferior and less perfect mode.

23. Second, the same minor premise is proved by reason. A superior angel is naturally knowable through his own cognition. But an inferior angel cannot know him with so perfect a cognition, since he does not equal him in intellectual power, just as he does not equal him in the perfection of nature. Therefore, the same conclusion follows.

24. Third, the same minor premise is supported as follows. Both intellectuality and intelligibility are derived from the same root, namely, immateriality, as St. Thomas often teaches. But a superior angel is more immaterial than an inferior angel, since he is nearer and more similar to God and understands through more universal species, which arises from his greater distance from matter, the principle of restriction and limitation, as we explained above in Chapter VII, § 3. Therefore, just as for this reason his intellectuality surpasses the intellectuality of the inferior angel, so also his intelligibility, which is equal to his intellectuality, will exceed the intellectuality of the inferior angel.

25. Nor is what the adversaries say valid, namely, that for comprehension it is sufficient that an inferior angel be in the same generic degree of immateriality as the superior angel, although they exceed one another in specific degree, because, they say, that excess according to the specific character is related accidentally and materially to comprehension. This response, I say, is not valid. For it is false that the excess in the specific degree of immateriality found between a superior and an inferior angel is related accidentally and materially to comprehension. Perfect adequation of intellectual power to the intelligibility of the object is essentially required for comprehension, as we have already shown. But this adequation is removed by a specific excess in immateriality, since, as immateriality is the root of intellectuality and intelligibility, excess in immateriality prevents an inferior angel from knowing a superior angel as much as the latter is knowable. Therefore, and so forth.

26. This is confirmed first. For an inferior angel perfectly to comprehend a superior angel, the species of the latter would have to be received wholly connaturally in the intellect of the former. But for this complete connaturality, agreement in the generic degree of immateriality is not sufficient; there is further required agreement or excess in the mode of possessing that degree. For if the mode of being of the object known is above the mode of being of the knower, the species is not received wholly connaturally in the knower, but above his nature. Therefore, for

comprehension it is not sufficient that a superior and an inferior angel be in the same generic degree of immateriality.

27. This is confirmed second. Through intelligibility according to a generic degree, the angel's entire entity is not rendered intelligible. Therefore, for inferior angels to comprehend superior angels, it is not enough that they equal their intelligibility according to its generic degree and character; adequation or excess according to the specific character is required. The consequence is evident, because comprehension must equal the intelligibility that renders the whole entity of a thing intelligible; otherwise, it would not equal the whole entity of the thing. The antecedent is proved because intelligibility, like truth, follows entity as a property and therefore extends no further than entity itself. Consequently, it is impossible that the intelligibility consequent upon the degree of immateriality common to all angels should render the entire entity of every angel intelligible.

28. The arguments of the adversaries remain solved by what has already been said. For they are all founded on these two principles, which we have shown to be false: namely, that for comprehension strictly and properly understood, it is sufficient that everything formally and eminently contained in the object be attained; and that for an inferior angel to comprehend a superior angel, it is sufficient that he be in the same generic degree of immateriality.

CHAPTER X.

The Natural Love of an Angel.

1. I say first: an angel necessarily loves himself, not only as to specification but also as to exercise.

This is proved by the fundamental reason. An angel necessarily knows and contemplates himself, even as to exercise, as was shown in the preceding chapter, § 1. Therefore, he loves himself with the same necessity. The consequence is manifest, both because, if an angel necessarily and always understands himself, he necessarily wills to understand himself, and this is to love himself, because it is to will for himself the greatest good; and because the operation of the will is proportioned to the operation of the intellect by which it is directed and regulated. Therefore, if an angel necessarily and always understands himself, he likewise necessarily and always loves himself.

Hence St. Thomas, speaking of an angel in *De malo*, q. 16, a. 2, ad 6, says: *In this respect his operation is immutable, because he always understands. The*

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same must be considered regarding the will, whose operation is proportioned to the operation of the intellect. From this it is clear that what a certain recent author says in his *Theologia mentis et cordis* is false and contrary to St. Thomas: namely, that the cognition an angel has of himself and of God is purely speculative and not practical, or does not command the love of himself and of God. For if the operation of an angel's will must be proportioned to the operation of his intellect, and consequently the angel must love himself immutably just as he understands himself immutably, it is manifest that self-cognition in an angel is practical and causes love, and is not merely speculative cognition that produces no love.

Therefore, in contemplating himself and all his perfections, an angel forms a practical judgment that he is continuously and without any interruption to love himself. This judgment is wholly immutable, since there can be no reason for forming the opposite judgment, because such love produces no weariness but the greatest delight; nor does it hinder a greater good, but assists as a means to other operations, especially the love of God, as will be clear from what must be said in the following conclusion.

2. I say second: an angel naturally loves God with a love necessary as to exercise. This conclusion follows from what was said in the preceding one. For the natural love by which an angel loves himself includes the love of God as the author and preserver of his own being, to whom, consequently, the angel cannot fail to will existence and the other perfections known by natural light. Therefore, if he loves himself necessarily as to exercise, with the same necessity he loves God as the author and natural end. This is especially so because the angel's natural beatitude consists in the natural knowledge and love of God, and every intellectual nature is borne by a natural inclination toward such beatitude as it can possess according to its state.

3. I add that an angel has from his nature that, from the first instant of his production, he is in an actual intention of his natural last end. Therefore, he is also in the love of God above all things as the author of nature. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved. An angel has from his nature that, from the first instant of his production, he is always fully capable of moving and applying himself to willing whatever he pleases. But he cannot possess this unless, from the first instant of his being, he is always in an actual intention of his natural last end. Therefore, he must be in that intention from the first moment of his creation.

The minor premise is certain. For since the angelic will tends toward and moves itself to other things, namely, means, only from the intention of the end, it is manifest that it cannot be said to be naturally and from the first

instant of its existence fully capable of moving and applying itself to will whatever it wills unless, from the first instant of its being, it is by its nature always in an actual intention of its natural last end.

The major premise is proved. Since an angel is an intellectual substance midway between God, who by his nature is always in second act, and man, who is naturally in pure potency before he is in first act, the angel, in order to participate in both extremes, must be in complete first act and consequently fully capable of moving himself to the second acts of understanding and willing.

4. Against these conclusions, the aforesaid recent author objects with two arguments, one of which he calls *a priori*, and the other *a posteriori*. The first can be proposed briefly as follows. According to St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 10, a. 2, nothing except the most universal good clearly seen can fill the capacity of the will and therefore necessitate it. But neither in himself nor in God known by natural light does an angel see every aspect of goodness. Therefore, he cannot love either himself or God necessarily with necessity as to exercise.

5. The second argument, which is *a posteriori*, proceeds as follows. If the love of God were natural in angels and necessary as to exercise, it would remain in the demons, in whom all natural things have remained. The consequent is false, both because the supreme hatred with which the demons pursue God is incompatible with the natural love of him; and because no one can be turned away from God as supernatural author without also withdrawing from God as author of nature. But through mortal sin the demons have turned away from God as supernatural author. Therefore, they cannot love him as author of nature with natural love.

6. The first argument was answered in the preceding chapter, § 1: although an angel cannot be necessitated to know and love himself or God by his own substance as an object, nor even by God known through natural light, since God is not represented under every aspect of goodness, he can nevertheless be necessitated to such cognition and love by his own substance as a principle, because such cognition and love are as properties of an angel flowing from his essence, in much the same way that the motion of the heart flows as a property from an animal's nature.

The reason is that a purely intellectual and immaterial substance naturally requires that from the beginning it possess the whole perfection belonging simply to the first act required for it to be able to reduce itself, in the mode proper to it, to second act. Hence, since the natural cognition and love of itself and of God as author of nature is the principle of all the angel's natural operations, and is related in angels as the motion of the heart is in

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animals, or as the motion of the first mobile is in relation to inferior motions, it must flow from the angel's very nature and substance in the manner of a property.

7. I add that, if this argument were valid, it would prove that an angel does not necessarily love himself, not only with necessity as to exercise but not even with necessity as to specification, and consequently that he could hate himself from displeasure at his prior being, which no theologian has hitherto imagined. The consequence is clear, because nothing except the most universal good clearly seen can necessitate the will of a man or angel, either as to exercise or as to specification, as St. Thomas teaches in the passage cited in the objection. But an angel does not see in himself every aspect of goodness. Therefore, he cannot be necessitated to love himself, even as to specification, if the adversary's argument is valid. The solution to the second argument will be clear from what must be said in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

Angels Considered in Supernatural Being.

1. Thus far we have considered angels in natural being. We must now contemplate them in supernatural being and briefly discuss their beatitude, grace, state of trial, sin, and punishment.

§ 1.

Angels Were Created in Natural Beatitude, but
Not in Supernatural Beatitude.

2. The first part is proved. From the beginning of their creation, angels had perfect knowledge and love of God as author of nature. But the angel's natural beatitude consists in this twofold operation, since it is the final perfection to which angelic nature can attain through the powers of nature. Therefore, angels were created by God in natural beatitude.

3. You will say: from this it would follow that the demons are blessed with natural beatitude, for natural knowledge and love of God remained in them, since, according to Dionysius, natural things remained intact in the demons. But I deny the consequence. In answer to its proof, I say first that it is false that the natural love of God remained in the demons. For since they sinned against God as supernatural author, they sinned indirectly, mediately,

and accidentally against God as author of nature and were turned away and disordered from him.

Hence the common saying taken from Dionysius, *Natural things remained intact in the demons*, must be understood of natural things considered in purely physical being, such as substance, power, intelligible species, and things of this kind, but not of natural things having some morality mixed with them, such as the natural love of God, practical cognition, and rectitude of the will toward the last end. For these were destroyed in the angels by sin, at least in some respect.

Second, I say that, even were it granted that the natural love of God remained in the demons, they still could not be called blessed with natural beatitude, because this beatitude implies not only the cognition and love of God as natural author, but also rectitude of will and immunity from every sorrow and torment, which are not found in the demons.

4. The second part of the conclusion, which asserts that the angels were not created in supernatural beatitude, is no less certain than the preceding part. For from the beginning they did not see God as he is in himself, but the good angels arrived at the vision through merit, whereas the evil angels, through sin, rendered themselves unworthy of it and were deprived of it forever.

Nor does it matter if you say that Lucifer is said in Ezek. 28 to have been amid the delights of God's paradise. For by the delights of paradise may be understood his dwelling in the empyrean heaven, which is a most pleasant place and filled with delights, in which Lucifer was created with the other angels, as was shown above in Chapter I. Or by the delights of paradise may be understood those gifts of grace with which the angels were adorned from the beginning and which Lucifer and the other apostate angels lost by sinning.

Nor is it an obstacle that Augustine says in *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 9, that the good angels were never pilgrims away from God. For to be a pilgrim away from God is not taken there in the sense in which Paul uses it, for walking by faith, but for being separated from or apostatizing from God through sin, according to what is said of the prodigal son in Luke 15: *And he departed as a pilgrim into a distant country*, which the Fathers understand as a pilgrimage through sin.

Finally, it is no obstacle that the same Holy Doctor teaches in *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, c. 24 and the following chapters that the angels had morning knowledge of things in the Word from the beginning. For, as St. Thomas says here, q. 62, a. 1, ad 3, there was a twofold morning knowledge in the angels, one natural and the other glorious. The natural is that by which they know

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God through his likeness shining in themselves. The glorious is that by which they know him through his essence. Through each knowledge the angels know things in the Word, but through the natural knowledge abstractively and imperfectly, and through the glorious knowledge intuitively and perfectly. The angels had the first knowledge in the Word at the beginning of their creation, and Augustine speaks of it in the cited passage. The second, however, was possessed only by the good angels after the completion of their state of trial, at their entrance into supernatural beatitude.

§ 2.

Angels Were Created in Sanctifying Grace, Which They Nevertheless Received Through Their Own Disposition, Although They Did Not Merit It.

5. The first part is gathered from Ezek. 28: *You, the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; every precious stone was your covering. You were a cherub, perfect in your ways from the day of your creation, until iniquity was found in you.* From this I argue as follows. Lucifer was perfect from the day of his creation until iniquity was found in him. Therefore, through sin he lost something he had received from the day of his creation; otherwise, he would not have been perfect from the day of his creation until iniquity was found in him. But this could not have been a natural perfection, since he lost no natural perfection through sin. Therefore, it was some supernatural perfection, which could have been nothing other than sanctifying grace, expressed under the name of the seal of God's likeness, since it is a singular participation and, as it were, a character of the divine nature. From it flow supernatural and infused virtues as properties from an essence, with which Lucifer is also said to have been distinguished and adorned as with precious stones and heavenly pearls, until iniquity was found in him.

6. The holy Fathers also favor this. Basil says on Ps. 32: *In the beginning, the Word, the maker of all things, created the angels so that they might exist, while the Holy Spirit at the same time bestowed sanctification upon them.* Similarly, Damascene says in *De fide orthodoxa* II, c. 3: *The angels were created through the Word of God and perfected through the sanctification of the Holy Spirit.* Augustine also teaches in *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 9, that the angels immediately upon their creation were made participants in eternal light. This cannot be understood of participation in natural wisdom and light, for he immediately adds: *And they remained so until those who are now evil fell by their own will from that light of goodness.* But they did not fall from natural wisdom and

light, which remained intact after sin, but from supernatural wisdom and light. Finally, the same Holy Doctor expressly says in Book XII, c. 9, that *God was in the angels, creating their nature and bestowing grace*.

7. Reason also supports this. For the angels were created by God so that through condign merits they might obtain supernatural beatitude. But habitual or sanctifying grace was necessary for this, as we shall show in the Treatise on Grace. Therefore, the angels possessed it from the beginning of their creation. Furthermore, the angels were not created in a lesser perfection than the first man. But the first man was created in grace, as will be clear from what is to be said in the following treatise. Therefore, so also were the angels.

8. St. Thomas gives another probable reason here, q. 62, a. 3, which can be proposed as follows. In the first creation of the world, God made all things according to seminal and original principles in their causes, and implanted seeds in all corporeal creatures by which they could produce their natural effects, as Augustine teaches in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, c. 3. Therefore, since grace is the seed of all supernatural gifts, for which reason it is called the seed of God in 1 John 3, it was fitting that God should infuse it into the angels in the first creation of spiritual creatures.

9. The second part, which asserts that the angels prepared themselves for grace through a movement of free choice, is gathered from St. Thomas here, a. 6, where he teaches that, the more perfect the angels were in natural gifts, the more intense the grace and glory they attained, because they turned themselves toward God more efficaciously. He consequently supposes that such conversion was a disposition for grace. And in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 95, he expressly asserts that the first man was created in grace and prepared himself for it through his own consent, as he says in the solution ad 5. Therefore, the same must be said all the more of an angel, whose nature is more perfect than man's.

10. Reason also recommends this. For it is a more perfect mode to possess grace through one's own disposition than without it, as the same Holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 19, a. 3, and q. 34, a. 3. From this he proves that Christ, in the first instant of his conception, prepared himself through an act of free choice for the habitual grace then given to him. But the more perfect mode of possessing grace must be admitted in angels, as the more perfect creatures of this universe. Therefore, in the first instant of their creation they received grace through their own disposition.

For nothing prevents the disposition and the form from existing in the same instant, because temporal precedence between the disposition and the form is not necessarily required. A priority of nature and causality is

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sufficient, as is clear in the increase of grace, which is bestowed upon the just man in the same moment in which he elicits a more intense act through a preexisting habit.

11. That they did not merit grace, as is asserted in the third part of the conclusion, is clear from that common saying of theologians: *The principle of merit does not fall under merit*. From this they infer that Christ did not merit the habitual grace received in the first instant of his conception, although he disposed himself for it through an act of free choice. The same must proportionately be said of the angels.

Hence, in the first instant of creation, they had two acts of conversion toward God. One was natural, toward God as author and end of the order of nature, which was necessary both as to specification and as to exercise, as was shown in the preceding chapter. The other was supernatural, toward God as author and end of the order of grace, which, although necessary as to specification, as will be clear below, was nevertheless free as to exercise, and consequently meritorious of glory, though not of grace, because it proceeded effectively from grace, and the principle of merit does not fall under merit. Since these two acts were subordinated to one another, concerned the same object although under a diverse aspect, and were related as one, they did not constitute two instants of angelic or discrete time, but only one.

12. You will say: an angel is of such a nature that, once he adheres to an object, he always adheres to it, as we shall say below. Therefore, if in the first instant he turned toward God through an act of charity, he could not afterward be separated and turned away from him through sin. Consequently, all the angels obtained in the second instant the beatitude they merited in the first.

I answer that an angel is of such a nature that, once he adheres to an object through perfect election and deliberation, he always adheres to it. It is otherwise, however, if he adheres to an object without perfect election and deliberation and as specially moved and applied by God, as occurs in the present case. For that act of charity and conversion toward God as supernatural author and end, which the angel elicited in the first instant, was free only as to exercise, but not as to specification, and proceeded from God as a special mover. Hence the angels did not obtain beatitude immediately after such an act, but after another act that they elicited by their own deliberation, motion, and application, and which was free not only as to exercise but also as to specification, as will be clear from what must be said in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

The Moral Instants by Which the Angels'
State of Trial Was Completed.

1. Theologians commonly teach, with few exceptions, that the state of trial of the evil angels was completed in three instants, and reason recommends this. For there are as many instants in angels as there are operations succeeding one another, since, as St. Thomas says in q. 62, a. 5: *Since an angel is above the time of corporeal things, diverse instants in matters pertaining to angels are distinguished only according to succession in their acts.*

But from the creation of the evil angels up to and including their punishment, there were three operations succeeding one another. In the first instant of creation they elicited a good and meritorious act by loving God. They then broke forth into an evil act, and finally, after committing their crime, they experienced the punishments of their wickedness. These three acts cannot fail to be really distinct and successive. For the love of God is incompatible with mortal sin, and the supreme complacency and delight in his natural perfection that an angel possessed when he sinned is incompatible with the supreme sorrow and grief from the punishments both of loss and of sense that he incurred. Therefore, the state of trial of the evil angels was completed in three instants, under the name of the state of trial including not only its intrinsic instants, but also the instant extrinsically terminating it, which in the evil angels is the instant of their damnation.

2. The principal difficulty in this question, therefore, concerns the state of trial of the good angels. For many of our Thomists think that it was completed in only two instants or operations. Although, they say, the evil angels, by eliciting an act distinct from that which they had elicited in the first instant of creation, produced two instants for themselves, after which they were damned, the good angels, by persevering in the act of love they elicited in the first instant of creation, produced only a single instant, after which they were immediately glorified.

3. Nevertheless, the opinion teaching that the state of trial of the good angels was encompassed by three instants, or that three instants elapsed from their creation up to and including their glorification, seems more probable and can be supported as follows. The instant in which the good angels merited perfectly and perseveringly is distinct from the first instant of creation, in which all merited, and from the other instant in which they

were glorified and received the reward of eternal beatitude. Therefore, the state of trial of the good angels was completed in three instants: the instant of creation and imperfect merit, the instant of perfect merit, and the instant of glorification.

The consequence is clear. The antecedent as to its second part is also manifest and is conceded by almost all. For, as St. Thomas reasons here, a. 5, ad 2: Diverse instants in matters pertaining to angels are distinguished only according to succession in their acts. But the meritorious act of beatitude and the act of beatitude, which is fruition, could not exist simultaneously in the angels, since one belongs to imperfect grace and the other to consummated grace. Hence it remains that diverse instants must be distinguished, in one of which the angel merited beatitude and in another was blessed.

4. The antecedent as to its first part is therefore proved by four reasons. The first is this. Instants are multiplied in angels according to the intrinsic variation of their operations. But when the good angels merited perfectly, they possessed an act diverse from that which they had in the first instant of creation, in which they merited imperfectly. Therefore, they also possessed a diverse instant.

The major premise is clear. The minor is proved. The good angels merited through a perfectly free and consequently deliberated act. But an act of the angelic will is deliberated in this manner through the will's moving itself from one act to another. Therefore, at that time the angel moved himself from one act to another, and consequently there were two acts: one from which he moved himself and another to which he moved himself.

5. The second reason is this. The imperfectly meritorious act that an angel elicited in the first instant of creation, since it was necessary as to specification, was directed by a cognition proposing the object only under the aspect of good. But his perfect merit, since it was perfectly free, was regulated by an indifferent judgment, or one proposing the object with indifference. But these diverse cognitions are diverse acts, repugnant and incompatible with one another, as is clear. Therefore, when the good angels merited perfectly, they had on the part of the intellect an act diverse from that which they had possessed in the first instant of creation, and consequently such merit was measured by a diverse instant. For, as we shall show below, multiplicity of acts on the part of the intellect suffices to multiply the instants of angelic time.

6. This is confirmed. *The entire reason why an act meritorious of eternal life and the beatific love cannot exist in the same instant is that they are distinguished by incompatible cognitions, although numerically the same act of living charity can*

as to its substance be continued in the fatherland. Therefore, similarly, even if it were granted that the act of charity elicited by an angel in the first instant of creation remained the same in substance throughout its continuation, nevertheless, because the judgment that the angel possessed in the first instant of creation is incompatible with that which he possessed when meriting in an entirely free manner, two diverse instants must be posited. Hence St. Thomas says here, q. 63, a. 6, ad 4, that in the angels *the first operation was common to all, but in the second they were distinguished; and therefore, in the first instant all were good, but in the second the good were distinguished from the evil.*

7. The third reason is this. In the first instant of creation, the good angels possessed on the part of the intellect a practical judgment by which they judged that their own excellence of natural beatitude was to be loved with subjection to supernatural beatitude. But when Lucifer and his followers were inordinately turned toward their own excellence, in contempt of the divine rule, and tempted the others by their example, the blessed angels possessed a practical judgment by which they judged that the excellence of natural beatitude was to be loved with subjection to supernatural beatitude, even notwithstanding the temptation of Lucifer and his followers inviting them at the opportune moment. But this judgment was intrinsically diverse from the first. Therefore, from creation to glorification, the blessed angels did not remain in the same unvaried operation, but possessed diverse acts on the part of the intellect and consequently on the part of the will, since diversity in acts of the practical intellect causes diversity in acts of the will.

The minor premise is proved. Whenever some new difficulty arises concerning an action, there is a special practical judgment by which that action is commanded and the difficulty overcome. But, from the very fact that others sinned, a new difficulty arose for the blessed angels in their conversion to God as supernatural end, a difficulty they did not possess before the fall of the others, since they were then tempted by the example and persuasion of Lucifer and his followers and incited to sin. Therefore, there necessarily had to be in them at that time some new practical judgment by which this difficulty was overcome, and consequently a new effort of the will, because these two follow one another.

8. The fourth reason is this. Not only do two operations of an angel successively existing require two instants, but so also does an intrinsic variation of the same operation according to diverse modes belonging to it. For an angelic instant is nothing other than a single operation existing in an invariable manner as to its intrinsic features, just as the instant itself is invariable as to what it intrinsically implies. But the operation by which an

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angel merited imperfectly in the first instant of creation was varied in its continuation, at least as to some intrinsic mode. Therefore, even granting that the act of love elicited by the angel in the first instant remained the same in substance, it was nevertheless measured in its continuation not by the same but by a diverse instant.

The major premise is clear. The minor is proved. The act of love elicited in the first instant of creation was necessary as to specification and free only as to exercise. But the act of charity by which the angel merited perfectly and perseveringly was free not only as to exercise but also as to specification. Now necessity and freedom are intrinsic modes of acts of the will, and not purely extrinsic denominations, because freedom of action is a special aspect of vitality, as theologians teach in the *Treatise on Human Acts*. Therefore, the operation by which an angel merited imperfectly in the first instant of creation was varied in its continuation, at least as to some intrinsic mode.

9. You will object first: St. Thomas says in q. 62, a. 5: *Immediately after one act informed by charity, the angel was blessed*. Therefore, he holds that in the good angels there were only two operations, the first of which merited the reward and the second received it, so that only one instant of merit preceded the instant of glorification. But it is easily answered that St. Thomas intends in that passage only that the angel was blessed after his first act of charity that was wholly free, that is, free both as to exercise and as to specification.

10. But a certain recent author presses the objection in his *Theologia mentis et cordis*: the Holy Doctor not only says that the good angels were glorified after the first act, but also after the first instant. For he says in q. 63, a. 6: Since angels attain beatitude through one meritorious act, if the devil, created in grace, had merited in the first instant, he would have received beatitude immediately after the first instant, unless he had immediately placed an impediment by sinning. Therefore, in the good angels, who placed no impediment, he evidently acknowledges no second instant.

11. But this testimony can also easily be explained. For when St. Thomas says, *If the devil, created in grace, had merited in the first instant*, he is speaking of perfect merit that supposes a perfectly free act, since beatitude is granted only to such merit. Hence, when he adds, *He would have received beatitude immediately after the first instant*, this must not be understood of the first instant of the angels' state of trial, but of the first instant of perfect freedom and merit, or the instant measuring the perfectly meritorious act, free not only as to exercise but also as to specification. Immediately after this the good angel received beatitude, and the devil would have received it if he had elicited such an act.

12. You will object second: the good angels continued the same act of charity that they elicited in the first instant for as long as the evil angels were sinning. Therefore, by meriting perseveringly they did not produce a new instant for themselves, and consequently their state of trial was completed in only two instants, namely, merit and glorification.

13. I answer first by denying the antecedent. For since the act by which an angel merited perfectly was deliberated, the angel's will had then to move itself, and consequently pass from one act to another, as we declared above.

14. I answer second by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For even granting that a good angel continued the same act of charity, because that act nevertheless possessed a new mode repugnant to the mode it possessed in the first instant, it was measured in its continuation by a diverse instant.

Add that there were diverse acts on the part of the intellect, which suffices to multiply the instants of angelic or discrete time, as Cajetan rightly noted above, q. 10. For since acts of the intellect are simpler and more regulative than acts of the will because of their greater excellence and perfection, angelic instants ought to be derived from the former rather than the latter. Thus, even if the act of the will is not varied, if acts of the intellect have been varied and succession is found in them, a variation and multiplication of instants must also be found.

Hence the aforesaid recent author is inconsistent when, in his Treatise on Angels, p. 655, he says: The deliberating will of the angel moved itself formally, not by proceeding from one act of the will to another, but from a new dictate and judgment by which it judged and commanded that the same act was to be continued and imposed the obligation to persevere. For if he admits a new dictate and practical judgment in the angel, a new instant must also be admitted, since multiplicity of acts on the part of the intellect suffices to multiply the instants of angelic time.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Sin of the Angels.

1. Five celebrated difficulties are commonly discussed here. The first is whether a creature can be created impeccable by its nature. The second is whether an angel can sin directly and immediately against the natural law. The third is whether he could sin in the first instant of his creation. The fourth is what the first sin of the angels was. The fifth is what excellent object the angel first regarded with pride.

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§ 1.

No Intellectual Creature Can Be Given That Is Simply Impeccable
by Its Nature, Although One Can Be Impeccable in a
Qualified Respect, or Against the Natural Law.

2. This is proved by two arguments of St. Thomas. The first is found in *De veritate*, q. 24, a. 7, and can be proposed briefly as follows. A nature that is defectible in its being is also defectible in its operations. But every created intellectual nature, by the very fact that it is from nothing, is defectible in its being. Therefore, it is also defectible in its operations, including its free operations, and consequently by the very fact that an intellectual creature is from nothing, it is capable of sinning.

The minor premise is clear. The major is proved. Operative power and the mode of operation follow the mode of being. Therefore, operative power and free operation founded in a defectible nature are also defectible.

Nor is it valid to say that they are indeed defectible physically and as to being, but not morally and as to rectitude and goodness. For by the very fact that a creature is defectible in its mode of operating, it is also defectible in attaining its object and end. But the rectitude or moral goodness of an operation is derived from its attainment of the object and end. Therefore, by the very fact that a creature is defectible in operating, it is morally defectible, or defectible as to rectitude and moral goodness.

St. Gregory suggests this argument in *Moralia* V, c. 28, where he says: Although the angelic nature remains immovably in its state by adhering to contemplation of its author, nevertheless, by the very fact that it is a creature, it has within itself the vicissitude of mutability. Likewise, Fulgentius says in *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 3: Natures made by God can advance because they began to exist, and they can fail because they were made from nothing.

3. The second argument of St. Thomas is found here, q. 63, a. 1, and is proposed as follows. A principle that is not the rule of its own operation and does not possess such a rule inseparably joined to itself can fall short of the rectitude due to such an operation and consequently sin. But no creature can be produced by God that is either the rule of its own operation or possesses that rule inseparably joined to itself. Therefore, no creature can be produced that is impeccable by its nature.

The major premise is clear and is illustrated by St. Thomas with this example: If the craftsman's hand were itself the rule of cutting, the craftsman could never cut the wood except rightly; but if the rectitude of the cutting is derived from another rule, the cutting may be either right or not right.

The minor premise is proved. The rule of the acts of the will is the last end, for this is related to practical matters as the first principle is to speculative matters. Hence, just as the first principle regulates all conclusions, so the last end regulates all operations of the will. But no creature can be its own last end, just as it cannot be its own first principle. Indeed, it cannot by its nature be united to its last end simply, that is, both natural and supernatural, because the end to which a creature is naturally, or by its nature, united is not supernatural but natural, as is clear. Therefore, no intellectual creature can be the rule of its own operation or have that rule inseparably joined to itself by its nature.

4. This is confirmed. An intellectual creature can be inseparably and immutably joined to its last end in only two ways, namely, through hypostatic union with a divine person and through the beatific vision, for no other mode can be devised. But in neither of these ways can it be naturally joined to its last end. Therefore, it is contradictory for an intellectual creature to be inseparably joined by its nature to its last end simply.

The minor premise is proved. It is contradictory for what is proper to God to become proper to a creature. But nothing is more proper to God than his own personality and the vision of his essence. Therefore, neither of these can become proper to a creature and belong to it by its nature.

5. From this the second part remains proved, which asserts that there can be an intellectual creature impeccable in a qualified respect, or against the natural law. For there can be an intellectual creature to which the love of God as author of nature is connaturally due. But the natural love of God above all things excludes all sins against the law of nature. Therefore, an intellectual creature is possible that is by its nature impeccable in a qualified respect and in relation to the law and precepts of the natural order.

The minor premise is clear, for to love God as the natural last end is virtually to will to observe all natural precepts, and the love of God above all things cannot exist without such a virtual volition, just as the efficacious intention of the end cannot exist without an efficacious volition of the means.

The major premise is proved from the fact that, if the natural love of God above all things could be connaturally due to no created or creatable nature, it would not be natural but supernatural. For that is called

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supernatural which is above the requirement or due of every created or creatable nature. This part will be clearer from what is to be said in the following section, where we shall show that an angel cannot sin directly and immediately against the natural law.

6. You will object first against the first part of the assertion, with the Master of the Sentences, from a testimony of St. Augustine taken from *De Genesi ad litteram* XI, c. 7, where he says: *God could have made man such that he could neither sin nor will to sin*. Therefore, according to Augustine, God could create an impeccable creature.

I answer by denying that words of this kind occur in that passage. Only the following are found there: *Let them also concede*—he is speaking against the heretics—that *a nature is not evil which was so made that it could avoid sinning if it willed*. But *to be able not to sin* does not signify a negation of the power to sin, but only the power not to sin, which can coexist with the power to sin, as is clear in every just man, who possesses the power not to sin together with the power to sin.

The Holy Doctor openly favors our opinion in *Contra Maximinum* III, c. 12, where he says: For any rational creature of exalted rank to be unable to sin is not proper to its own nature but belongs to the grace of God. St. Thomas almost transcribed these words here, a. 1, saying: When it belongs to a creature that it cannot sin, it has this from the gift of grace, not from the condition of nature.

7. You will object second: God can create a creature that by its nature is determined to moral good as such. Therefore, he can create a naturally impeccable creature. The consequence is clear, for every sin is some deviation from moral and honorable good. The antecedent also seems manifest. For if God can create a creature determined to a pleasurable good consonant with sensitive nature, as brute animals are, why can he not similarly create some intellectual nature determined to moral and honorable good consonant with reason?

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. God can create a creature determined to moral good as such, if by moral good as such there is understood only the moral good of the natural order taken in common, that is, honorable good consonant with natural reason: I grant the antecedent. If by moral good as such there is signified the moral good of both the supernatural and the natural order: I deny the antecedent. For this would require that the cognition and love of supernatural moral good be connatural to such a creature, which is impossible, since no created or creatable substance can connaturally require a form of the supernatural order. This argument, therefore, proves only the second part of our

assertion, in which we said that there can be a creature impeccable against the natural law.

§ 2.

An Angel Cannot Sin Directly, Immediately, and Primarily
In Itself Against the Natural Law, but He Can
Do So Indirectly, Mediatly, and Consequently.

8. The first part is proved by the fundamental reason. An angel has from his nature that, from the first instant of his production, he is always in the actual love of God above all things as author of nature. Therefore, he also has from his nature that he is impeccable directly and immediately against God as the natural last end.

The antecedent is clear from what was said above in Chapter X, conclusion 2. The consequence is proved first because a sin committed against God as natural last end is incompatible with the natural love of God, as we showed in proving the second part of the assertion in the preceding section. Second, because a will that is always in the actual love of God as author and natural end is always united to the rule of the entire moral goodness of the natural order. Hence, just as a craftsman who possessed a rule inseparably annexed to himself could never fall short of it in operating, so neither can a will that is always and necessarily in the actual love of God as author of nature sin directly and immediately against the natural law.

9. This is confirmed. As principles are related to the intellect in speculative matters, so ends are related to the will in practical matters. Therefore, just as it is repugnant for the intellect to be well disposed and fully instructed concerning principles and nevertheless to err concerning conclusions, so also it is impossible for the will to be naturally right in relation to the natural last end and not to be right concerning the means ordered to it.

10. The second part of the assertion follows from what was said in the preceding section. For an angel is directly capable of sinning against the supernatural law and end. But he cannot sin directly against the supernatural law unless he indirectly and consequently sins against the natural law. Therefore, an angel can sin against the natural law at least indirectly, mediatly, and consequently.

The minor premise is proved. Although the natural end and its law do not formally command anything concerning supernatural things, they nevertheless dictate that, by the very fact that an intellectual creature is

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ordered to a supernatural end, all natural things are to be ordered to it and used as means toward it. They likewise dictate that its law is to be observed. Hence the direct transgression of a supernatural precept is at least an indirect violation of the law of nature and of that natural dictate: every legitimate commander is to be obeyed in whatever matter he commands. Therefore, an angel can sin against the natural end and law at least indirectly and mediately, namely, by sinning against the supernatural end.

11. You will object first: the demons daily sin against the natural law and end, for they are liars and incite men to thefts, fornications, adulteries, and other sins against the law of nature. Therefore, they are not impeccable concerning the natural end and law.

12. I answer that, just as the demons, although they sometimes perform things that in their genus are only venial sins, as when they provoke men to laughter or jocose lying, nevertheless always sin mortally because of the intention with which they perform them, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 4, ad 3; so similarly, although they seem to perform certain things against the natural law, because they do these things from hatred of God as supernatural author, they always sin immediately and formally against the supernatural end, but against the natural end only materially and mediately, or indirectly and accidentally.

You will object second: if an angel could not sin against the natural law, it would follow that an angel created in a state of pure nature and not ordered to a supernatural end would be wholly impeccable, because he could sin neither against the natural nor against the supernatural end. But this cannot be said because, as we showed in the preceding section, it is repugnant for a creature to be created wholly impeccable. Therefore, neither can the former be said.

13. I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. For although an angel were not ordered to a supernatural end, nevertheless, because he would possess an obediential potency and capacity to be ordered to it, it would not be repugnant to him, considered according to his nature, to be able to sin. Consequently, he would be capable of sinning by his nature, just as, even if no law had been imposed upon him, he could sin because a law could be imposed upon him.

§ 3.

An Angel Could Not Sin in the First
Instant of His Creation.

14. The fundamental reason, taken from St. Thomas here, a. 5, is that such a sin would be attributed to God as author and special mover. For an operation that begins simultaneously with a thing's being, since it is as a kind of corollary consequent upon the nature, belongs to it from the agent from whom it has being. For this reason it is commonly said: *Whatever belongs to the consequence of being*—namely, whatever occurs in the first instant of production. Hence upward motion belongs to fire from the generator because it begins with the fire's being, and the motion of the heart in animals is attributed to the generator because it begins together with the animals themselves.

This is especially necessary in an intellectual creature, to whom the first practical judgment must indispensably and specially be infused by God. For a dictate does not command something to be executed unless there is presupposed an efficacy of the will, which does not yet exist at that time, because the will presupposes judgment, since nothing is willed unless first known. Consequently, the first volition presupposes the first judgment. Since this judgment cannot proceed from the will, lest there be a circle and a process to infinity, it must proceed from God as a special mover applying the intellect to it and producing in relation to it what the will produces in relation to subsequent judgments.

Hence, just as a defect in a dictate proceeding from the special application of the will, and in the act of the will regulated by it, is traced back to the applying will, so, if there were a defect in that first dictate to which God specially applies the intellect, and in the act of the will immediately regulated by it, the defect would be traced back to God as special mover.

15. You will say: if the first act of the angelic will were reduced to God specially applying it to the first dictate regulating it, such an act would not be free, because it would not be regulated by a dictate or practical judgment that was within the power of the angelic will, but by one proceeding from God alone as applying it.

16. I answer that such an act would not be wholly free, that is, simultaneously as to specification and exercise, but would nevertheless be free as to exercise. Although complete freedom, in which the will is said to

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move itself, requires that the act be regulated by a dictate that is within the will's power and proceeds from its application, nevertheless, for freedom of contradiction and the initial stage of complete freedom, an indifferent judgment is sufficient that proposes each alternative as suitable, while nevertheless intimating that one rather than the other is here and now, all things considered, to be chosen.

I add that, although the first dictate regulating the angelic will is not within its power simply and as to its inception, it is nevertheless within its power in a qualified respect, on the part of the object and as to continuation, which is sufficient for freedom as to exercise.

17. You will object first: man can sin in the first instant of the use of reason. Therefore, so can an angel in the first instant of creation. The consequence seems valid from parity of reason. The antecedent is proved because, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 6, a child arriving at the use of reason is bound in the first instant to turn himself toward God. Yet not all, and perhaps few, fulfill this precept.

18. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity, because of a twofold difference. The first is that an angel does not proceed from the imperfect to the perfect through a preceding process, but from the beginning possesses full understanding and the full use of freedom. Consequently, he does not move himself to this through preceding imperfect acts, but must be moved and aroused by God as special mover. But man arrives gradually at the use of reason, and before reaching the first instant of the use of reason, he has other imperfect acts of intellect and will, from which he moves himself to deliberate operation. Hence he can in the instant of the use of reason—which is not a mathematical but a moral instant—break forth into a deliberate act and sin, especially because those preceding volitions can concern, and frequently do concern, because of the bad habits of children, pleasures contrary to reason.

The second reason for the difference between an angel in the first instant of creation and a man in the first instant of the use of reason is that man in such an instant demands to be applied by God only to the cognition and volition of beatitude, or of good in common. From this he can immediately afterward move himself to seek that beatitude either in sensible goods or in honorable good, with God operating only in the manner of a universal agent. But an angel, because of the higher degree of perfection by which he exceeds man, requires in the first instant of creation to be moved by God, as a particular agent and mover, to the cognition and love of the last end in particular, because he has from his nature not to proceed from

potency to act, or from the imperfect to the perfect, as we declared in Chapter X.

19. You will object second: in the first instant of his creation, an angel was bound by divine precept to elicit an act of love of God above all things. But he could then omit this act, both because he was then free and because God could then deny him the efficacious assistance for eliciting it, since the conferral of that assistance was not due to him but purely liberal and gratuitous. Therefore, an angel could sin in the first instant of his creation, at least by a sin of omission.

20. I answer by granting the major premise and denying the minor. To its first proof, I say that, although the angel could absolutely omit the commanded act, that omission in the first instant of creation could not be privative but only negative. For an omission to be privative and sinful, it requires an act, since an omission is not voluntary without at least some presupposed act. But in the first instant there could be no evil act that would render this omission evil and culpable.

Hence Cajetan rightly says that an angel in the first instant could incur the omission of an act, because otherwise he would not have been free, but could not incur a sin of omission. This can be explained by the example of Christ, who was free as to exercise with respect to an act falling under a precept and nevertheless could not sin. For although he could omit such an act insofar as omission is a pure negation of the opposite act, he could not omit it insofar as omission is a privation of that act as due. More will be said of this in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

21. To the second proof, I answer that, although God could absolutely have denied an angel in the first instant of his creation the efficacious assistance for an act of love of God above all things, he could not do so on the hypothesis that he elevated the angel to the supernatural order. For grace perfects an angel according to the mode of his nature. But the condition of angelic nature requires that in the first instant the angel possess love of God as natural last end. Therefore, an angel elevated to the supernatural order is due an act of charity, and consequently efficacious assistance for eliciting it. Otherwise, in the first instant the angel would be turned toward God as natural last end and privatively turned away from him as supernatural end, toward whom as such he is bound to turn himself. Similarly, on the supposition that God imposes upon Christ a precept of supernatural love, he is bound to give him efficacious supernatural assistance, because the person is impeccable.

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22. You will object third: in the first instant, an angel possessed the power to sin, because he was not then the rule of all his operations. Therefore, he could then sin.

I answer first by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I say that, although an angel was not for that instant the rule of his own operation, he nevertheless had then necessarily to possess a rule of right operation joined to himself, because he could be moved by no one other than God through a right and indefectible judgment. This suffices for him not to possess at that time a power of sinning.

I answer second by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For although in the first instant there was in the angel a power to sin, that power was not reducible to act for that instant, but only for other succeeding instants. This was because the first dictate imparted to the angelic will by God, dictating that God was to be loved above all things and commanding and causing that love, prevented the power to sin from breaking forth into act in that instant.

23. You will object fourth against the reasoning of St. Thomas: granted that the first natural operation of a produced thing is attributed to the first producer, as upward motion belongs to fire from its generator, nevertheless the first free operation is not so attributed, as the first operation of an angel was. For it did not proceed necessarily from the producer in the same way as the former operation, but could, by reason of freedom itself, fail to be produced. Therefore, if the first operation of an angel were sinful, its defect would not be traced back to God as special mover, but to the angelic will alone, operating in a manner deformed from the rule of divine law.

24. I answer that, just as the first natural operation must proceed from the generator, so the first free operation necessarily requires proceeding from an extrinsic principle moving and applying the intellect to the first practical judgment indispensably required for that operation, as is clear from what has been said above. St. Thomas expressly declares this in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 3, in these words: Man is master of his acts of willing and not willing because of the deliberation of reason, which can be turned toward one alternative or the other. But that he deliberate or not deliberate, if he is also to be master of this, must be through a preceding deliberation. Since this cannot proceed to infinity, it is necessary finally to arrive at the point where man's free choice is moved by some exterior principle above the human mind, namely, by God.

I add from the same Holy Doctor, *De malo*, q. 16, a. 4, ad 6, that the angel's first operation must in some respect be natural. For just as nature is that which is first in any thing, so what pertains to nature must be first in

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each thing. Hence, in the angel's will there must first be an operation called natural because of some determination to one thing, at least as to specification, so that it precedes an operation free both as to specification and as to exercise.

§ 4.

The First Sin of the Angels Was Pride, and
Could Have Been No Other.

25. The first part is certain from the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, among whom the sin of the angels is always called pride. Isa. 14: *Your pride has been dragged down to hell, you who said: I shall ascend into heaven; I shall be like the Most High.* Ezek. 28: *Your heart was lifted up in your beauty.* Tob. 4: *Never permit pride to rule in your thought or your word, for in it all perdition took its beginning,* that is, the perdition of men and angels. Finally, in Sir. 10, pride is called *the beginning of every sin*, because, as Augustine explains in *De natura et gratia*, c. 29: *Pride cast down the devil, from whom arose the origin of sin.*

For this reason, the same Holy Doctor, explaining the words of the Psalmist, *I shall be cleansed from the greatest offense*, understands by the greatest offense the sin of pride, because, he says, it made an angel into the devil and forever barred the kingdom of heaven against him.

Hence Bernard says in *De anima* I: *Pride cast down from the heights to the depths; humility raises from the depths to the heights.* The angel fell from heaven into Tartarus; man ascends from the world into heaven. And in Sermon I for Advent: *Flee pride, my brothers; I beg you, flee it greatly.* Satan performed nothing; he only conceived pride, and in a moment, in the blink of an eye, he was irreparably cast down. The beginning of every sin is pride, which so swiftly darkened with gloom Lucifer himself, who previously shone more brightly than all.

Finally, St. Gregory, speaking of the same Lucifer in *Moralia* XXXIV, c. 17, says that while he proudly sought a private height, he justly lost the height in which he participated. For, having abandoned the principle to which he ought to have adhered, he sought in a certain manner to be his own principle. Having abandoned the one who truly could suffice for him, he judged that he could suffice for himself; and he fell all the further beneath himself, the more he exalted himself against the glory of his Creator. *For captive liberty cast down the one whom free servitude would have exalted.*

26. Reason also supports this. For since the first sin of the angels was not one of omission but of commission, as will be clear from what is said

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below, it neither was nor could have been anything but an inordinate affection for spiritual goods. For no one is affected except toward things suitable to his own nature, and only spiritual goods are suitable to angelic nature. But an inordinate affection for spiritual goods can only be a sin of pride. Therefore, the first sin of the angels neither was nor could have been anything other than a sin of pride.

The major premise is clear. The minor is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas here, a. 2. In the desire to pursue spiritual goods, there can be no sin except through failure to observe the rule of a superior. For since spiritual goods are better in proportion as they are greater, they cannot absolutely be loved too much. Hence, if there is excess in their love, it must necessarily arise from failure to observe the rule of a superior. But refusing to be subject to the rule of a superior is the sin of pride. Therefore, in the desire to pursue spiritual goods there can be no sin except pride.

27. You will object first against this reasoning of St. Thomas: to refuse subjection to the rule of a superior is the sin of disobedience, not pride. Therefore, if the angels first sinned by refusing to submit themselves to the rule of a superior, their first sin was disobedience, not pride.

I answer that to refuse subjection to the rule of a superior as legislator is indeed a sin of disobedience. But to refuse subjection to the rule of a superior as the measure of one's own dignity and excellence is a sin of pride. For just as it belongs to humility to moderate the appetite tending toward lofty things by imposing upon it the mode of subjection to the divine law, formally as the rule and measure of the creature's dignity and excellence, so it belongs to pride to impose immoderation upon such an appetite and refuse subjection to the divine law, formally insofar as it has the character of a rule and measure of one's own dignity and excellence.

28. You will object second: the sin of pride consists only in someone desiring what is not due to him and what he cannot attain by his own powers. For since to be proud signifies the same as to rise above oneself, only one who desires to be raised above himself is properly called proud, and this occurs only if he desires something not due to him and not attainable by his own powers. But in his first sin the angel did not desire anything that was not due to him and that he could not attain by his own powers. Therefore, his first sin was not pride.

The minor premise is proved. The angel first sinned by inordinately desiring his natural beatitude, as we shall say in the following section. But such beatitude was connaturally due to him, and consequently he could attain it by his own powers; indeed, he actually possessed it before sinning.

Therefore, in his first sin the angel did not desire anything undue to him or exceeding his own powers.

29. I answer by denying the major premise. For the sin of pride consists not only in someone desiring what is not due to him, but also in his inordinately intending his own excellence and perfection, even when due to him, or in his being affected toward it beyond or against the measure fixed for him by a superior. For in this way he refuses to be subject to the superior and implicitly and interpretatively despises him, and consequently rises above himself or exalts himself above himself.

30. From what has been said, it is gathered first that the first sin of the angels neither was nor could have been one of pure omission. For an omission to be sinful, it must be voluntary, or willed either directly, indirectly, or interpretatively. Therefore, it would have been willed by the angel either as an end or as a means to an end. But it could not have been first willed by him in either manner. Therefore, he could not first sin by a sin of omission.

The minor premise is proved. First, it is manifest that an omission cannot be said to be willed by an angel as an end, because an omission is of itself a negation or privation. Hence, to be appetible, it must necessarily be clothed with some apparent good and some end.

That it also cannot be first desired by him as a means is proved from the fact that an angel cannot will a means except in an end, from which he always begins to will. Therefore, a sinful omission presupposes the intention of some wicked end, and an angel does not omit referring himself to God unless he first turns himself wickedly toward himself. For there is no departure from the term from which except through conversion to the term toward which.

In this the angel differs greatly from man, who does not will the end and the things contained under the end by the same act and therefore can will an omission without a commission, although he always possesses an act that is the cause or occasion of the omission. This is discussed in the Treatise on Human Acts and the Treatise on Sins.

Therefore, the sin by which an angel loved his natural beatitude without ordering it to supernatural beatitude was a sin of commission, not of pure omission, because it was a positive, disordered act through the omission of a circumstance due to it. Thus, reciting the office without attention or celebrating Mass without sacred vestments are not sins of omission but of commission.

31. It is gathered second that the first sin of the angels could not have been hatred or despair, because hatred and despair are related as flight and

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withdrawal. But the first sin of the angels could not have been an act in the manner of flight and withdrawal. Therefore, it could not have been hatred or despair.

The minor premise is proved. Every act of not willing and flight presupposes an act of willing. For since not willing and flight regard a repugnant and unsuitable object, and nothing is called unsuitable except in relation to what is suitable, namely, because it harms or hinders what is suitable, it follows that the unsuitable is never fled except because the suitable is loved. Consequently, an inordinate love of what is suitable always precedes the inordinate flight from what is unsuitable. Therefore, the first sin of the angels cannot be an act in the manner of flight from something unsuitable, but must necessarily be the pursuit of some good suitable to their nature.

32. It is gathered third that the first sin of the angels neither was nor could have been an act of disobedience. For, as we have already shown, the first sin of the angels could not have been a disordered act in the manner of flight and withdrawal. But disobedience regards the divine law in the manner of flight and withdrawal from it. Therefore, the first sin of the angels neither was nor could have been an act of disobedience.

33. It is gathered fourth that the first sin of the angels was not envy, because, as Augustine says in *De Genesi ad litteram* XI: *Envy follows pride; it does not precede it*. For hatred of another's good, of which envy is a species, arises as from a root from the inordinate love of one's own excellence, in which the sin of pride consists.

Hence Pope Leo says in Sermon IV, *De collectis et eleemosynis*, speaking of Lucifer: That inventor and author of sin was first proud, that he might fall, and afterward envious, that he might harm. And St. Thomas says here, a. 2: After the sin of pride there followed in the angel the evil sin of envy.

It is gathered fifth that the inordinate delight the evil angels perceived from the contemplation and love of their natural perfection and beauty is not reduced to the sin of lust, and is wrongly called spiritual lust by Scotus. For not every inordinate delight is lust, but only the delight of touch. Thus, an inordinate delight of the palate is called gluttony; of praise, vainglory; of one's own excellence, pride. Finally, the inordinate delight perceived from the study and speculation of truth is reduced to the sin of curiosity and is opposed to the virtue of studiousness, which prescribes moderation in study. Hence it is absurd for the same author to say that the sin by which someone is inordinately delighted in the contemplation of a geometrical conclusion is reduced to lust.

§ 5.

What Excellent Object the Angel First Regarded with Pride.

34. Some think that the angel first sinned by desiring complete equality with God in nature, because Sacred Scripture expressly asserts that Lucifer in fact desired to be as God. Isa. 14: *I shall ascend into heaven; I shall be like the Most High.* Ezek. 28: *Your heart was lifted up as though it were the heart of God, saying: I am God.* Hence Augustine says in the book *Quaestiones Veteris Testamenti* that the devil, swollen with pride, wished to be called God.

35. Nevertheless, this opinion is rejected by St. Thomas here, a. 3, and can be briefly refuted, first from St. Anselm in *De casu Diaboli*, c. 4, where he says that the angel sinned by desiring that to which he would have attained if he had remained steadfast. But if he had remained steadfast, he would not have attained complete equality with God in nature. Therefore, he did not sin by desiring it.

Hence, in the same place, Anselm tacitly approves this reasoning of his disciple: If God cannot be conceived except as so unique that nothing like him can be conceived, how could the devil have willed what he could not conceive? For his mind was not so dull that he did not know that nothing else similar to God could be conceived.

By these words he suggests the following fundamental reason given by St. Thomas in the cited place. No one can desire what he cannot apprehend as possible. But the devil could not apprehend complete equality with God in nature as possible. Therefore, neither could he desire it.

The major premise seems certain, because the object of the will is the good and suitable. But what cannot be apprehended as possible cannot be apprehended as good and suitable, since the first root of appetibility and suitability is possibility, because something is called good insofar as it exists or implies an order to existence.

The minor premise is no less evident. For since an angel perfectly comprehends himself, he knows that he is a created and participated being and that no participated being can be of the same nature as being through essence. Consequently, he could not apprehend complete equality between himself and God in nature as possible, especially since, before his first sin, no error had preceded in his intellect by reason of which he might apprehend as possible what is in fact impossible, as sometimes occurs in us.

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36. You will say: this reasoning of St. Thomas proves indeed that the devil did not sin by desiring complete equality with God in nature with an efficacious and absolute appetite. It does not, however, prove that he did not sin by desiring it with an inefficacious and conditional appetite, since such an appetite can be borne toward impossibilities even when known as such, just as one who repents would wish that he had not sinned, and the damned wish that God were annihilated.

37. But to the contrary: the first sin of the angels necessarily had to be a disordered appetite for something as a last end, since the natural appetite of angels always begins from the end, and disorder concerning means and intermediate ends always presupposes disorder concerning the last end. But an appetite for the last end, as such, is an efficacious appetite, since it belongs to the nature of the last end that all other things be done for its sake. Therefore, the first sin of the angels cannot consist in an inefficacious and conditional appetite.

Hence, in Scripture Lucifer's sin is described as an absolute will by which he tended toward obtaining what he desired, when he is introduced speaking thus: *I shall ascend into heaven; above the stars of God I shall exalt my throne; I shall ascend above the height of the clouds; I shall be like the Most High.* These words signify absolutely, not conditionally, what Lucifer desired to obtain.

I add that Lucifer had almost innumerable angels as companions in his guilt. But it is incredible that so great a multitude of angels should have willed to lose so great a happiness forever merely because of a simple affection for a thing they could neither attain nor efficaciously will. Therefore, the first sin of the angels was not a simple affection or an inefficacious and conditional appetite for complete equality with God in nature.

Hence, to the testimonies of Scripture adduced above, in which it is asserted that Lucifer in fact desired to be as God, St. Thomas answers here, a. 3, that they signify that Lucifer wished to be as God not through equality—namely, by desiring perfect equality with God in nature—but through a certain proportional likeness. That is, he wished to possess his beatitude as God possesses his: either supernatural beatitude through his own powers, or natural beatitude without subjection to another superior and more excellent end. Of this below.

Hence, when he said, *I shall ascend into heaven*—which the same Holy Doctor explains here, q. 61, a. 4, ad 3, as the heaven of the Holy Trinity—this signifies that Lucifer indeed wished to ascend into the heaven of the Trinity,

but not by desiring absolute equality with God, but only some likeness, as St. Thomas himself interprets it in *De malo*, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3.

38. Others judge that the angel first sinned through a proud appetite for hypostatic union with the person of the divine Word. For God revealed the mystery of the Incarnation to the angels while they were in their state of trial, at least as to its substance, as St. Thomas teaches from St. Augustine in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 7, ad 1. Indeed, he imposed upon them the precept that they should adore Christ and recognize him as their own head and Lord, as is gathered from the words of the Apostle in Heb. 1: *And when he again brings the firstborn into the world, he says: And let all his angels adore him.* There the word *again* supposes that on another occasion Christ had been adored by the good angels when, at the beginning of creation, he was revealed to them through faith as the head of men and angels, while the evil angels resisted.

39. But this opinion also does not seem true. First, because the angel's first sin necessarily had to concern the last end to be attained by him, since, as St. Thomas testifies in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 1, the appetite is moved toward the end before it is moved toward what is sought for the sake of the end. But hypostatic union is not the angel's last end to be acquired or possessed by him. It is manifestly not his natural end, nor is it a supernatural end to which he was elevated. Therefore, the angel's first sin did not concern hypostatic union.

40. Second, because the motive by which the angel in fact sinned was within the angel's power, as is clear from his words, *I shall ascend, I shall exalt, I shall sit*, and from the words of Anselm quoted above: *The angel desired that to which he would have attained if he had remained steadfast.* But hypostatic union with a divine person was not within the angel's power, but God's, nor would he have attained it if he had remained steadfast. Therefore, hypostatic union was not the motive by which the angel was first moved to sin.

Hence, if some holy Fathers, such as Bernard in Sermon I for Advent and Sermon XVII on the Song of Songs, and Rupert in Book VIII on John, assert that Lucifer sinned through envy of the union of human nature with the Word, this must not be understood of his first sin, but of other sins consequent upon the first. For, as we showed in the preceding section from Augustine: *Envy follows pride; it does not precede it.*

41. Others teach that the first sin of the angels was an inordinate appetite to dominate and command the others. But St. Thomas rejects this opinion here, a. 3, where he says: Since what exists through itself is the principle and cause of what exists through another, it also followed from this

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that he desired to possess some principality over others, in which he also perversely wished to be likened to God. By these words he manifestly declares that the inordinate appetite to dominate and command the others was not the devil's first sin, but followed from the first.

42. Reason also recommends this. For inordinately to desire dominion and command over others belongs to ambition, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 131, aa. 1 and 2. But the angel's first sin could not have been ambition. Therefore, neither could it have been an inordinate appetite to dominate and command the others.

The minor premise is proved because ambition presupposes pride, and hence is called its daughter. Therefore, the angel's first sin could not have been ambition.

43. This reasoning is confirmed and further illustrated. Just as being simply necessarily precedes being in a qualified respect, so the appetite for one's own excellence simply and absolutely considered must precede the appetite for excellence in a qualified respect or with an addition, namely, excellence in honors and dignities. Hence, since pride concerns one's own excellence simply and absolutely considered, while ambition concerns excellence only in a qualified respect, namely, in dignities and honors, the sin of pride in the angels necessarily had to precede the sin of ambition and consequently the inordinate appetite to dominate and command the others.

44. The truer and more probable opinion, therefore, which the Holy Doctor suggests here, a. 3, teaches that the first sin of the angel was an inordinate appetite for supernatural and natural beatitude. For, as we said above, the angel's first sin necessarily had to concern his last end, since the appetite is moved toward the end before it is moved toward what is sought for the sake of the end. But the angel's last end is his beatitude. Therefore, the angel's first sin could have been nothing other than an inordinate appetite for his own beatitude.

First, therefore, the angel sinned by inordinately desiring supernatural beatitude, not because he formally and expressly wished to attain it through the powers of nature and without the assistance of grace—for such a volition would presuppose an error on the part of the intellect, which could not exist in the angel before sin—but because he refused to receive it as something to be acquired from grace and merits, which is virtually and interpretatively to will it without the assistance of grace.

In this sense St. Thomas must be understood when he says here, a. 3: Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is given by grace, he wished to possess it through the power of his nature, not from divine assistance according to God's disposition. For he is not speaking of a formal

and express volition of supernatural beatitude, but of a virtual and interpretative volition.

45. At that time the angel also sinned by inordinately desiring his natural beatitude, namely, by not ordering it, as he was bound, to the supernatural end revealed to him. For, as St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 110: *Just as in us sin consists in desiring inferior goods, namely, goods of the body, without the order of reason, so in the devil sin consisted in not referring his own good to the divine good.*

This opinion agrees with Scripture and the holy Fathers. For in Ezek. 28, the prophet, in order to explain the matter or object concerning which the angel became proud, enumerates the principal natural perfections he possessed, such as wisdom, strength, beauty, and other most excellent gifts in which he then abounded, and from whose aggregation and accumulation his natural beatitude arose, as is clear from these words: *Your heart was lifted up in your beauty; you destroyed your wisdom in your beauty.*

Similarly, the holy Fathers assert that the angel sinned because he took pleasure in the power and dignity he had received from God. Thus Ambrose on Ps. 118. Or because *he wished to suffice for himself for a blessed life.* Thus Augustine in *De civitate Dei* XII, c. 1. Or because *he judged that he could suffice for himself.* Thus Gregory in *Moralia* XXXIV, c. 17. Or finally, as Bernard says in Sermon III on the words of Isaiah, *I saw the Lord seated: He wished to be content with himself.*

All these statements openly signify that the angel first sinned because he took excessive complacency in himself in his natural beatitude and perfection and adhered to it as a last end, without ordering it to supernatural beatitude or observing the rule fixed for him by God.

From this you will easily understand how the angel wished to be as God, not through equality, but through proportional likeness. For just as God naturally possesses his proper beatitude in himself, so the angel, by his mode of desiring his natural beatitude, wished naturally to possess the last end in himself and to suffice for his own happiness. As St. Bernard, quoted above, says: *He wished to be content with himself, as God is content with himself.*

46. You will object first: the object of Lucifer's first sin was something not yet possessed by him. Hence Scripture explains it by words in the future tense, as is clear from Isa. 14: *I shall ascend into heaven; I shall be like the Most High.* But natural beatitude was possessed by Lucifer when he sinned, since he was created by God with it. Therefore, the object of Lucifer's first sin was not his natural beatitude.

47. This is confirmed first from Anselm, who says that the devil desired that to which he would have attained if he had remained steadfast. But he

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would not have attained natural beatitude, since he possessed it before sin. Therefore, he did not inordinately desire it.

48. This is confirmed second. An angel cannot sin concerning an object that he loves with complete necessity, because a morally evil act must be free. But natural beatitude is loved by an angel necessarily both as to specification and as to exercise. Therefore, it could not be the object of the angels' first sin.

49. To the objection, I answer by distinguishing the major premise. The object of Lucifer's first sin was something not yet possessed by him materially and as to entity: I deny. Formally, or as to the formal aspect under which it was desired by him because of his mode of willing: I grant.

I likewise distinguish the minor premise. Natural beatitude was possessed by the angel when he sinned materially and as to entity: I grant. Formally, or as to the formal aspect under which it was desired: I deny. For it was not yet possessed under the aspect of a last and perfectly satisfying end, although, because of his mode of desiring, the angel tended toward natural beatitude under this aspect by the very fact that he desired it without subordination to supernatural beatitude. Hence:

50. To the first confirmation, I distinguish the minor premise. If the angel had remained steadfast, he would not have attained his natural beatitude precisely considered in itself: I grant the minor, for he possessed it in this way before sin. He would not have attained his natural beatitude as something to be possessed in an unfailing manner and as subordinated to supernatural beatitude: I deny. For before his first sin he did not possess it under this aspect, since he could lose it and omit its ordering to the supernatural end, as in fact he did.

From this the response to the second confirmation is clear. Although natural beatitude absolutely considered in itself is an object loved by the angel with complete necessity, nevertheless, as subordinated or not subordinated to supernatural beatitude, it is loved by him freely. Consequently, under this aspect it could be the object of the angels' first sin.

51. You will object second: if the angel first sinned by refusing supernatural beatitude as something to be possessed from the grace and beneficence of God, it follows that the angel's first sin was related as withdrawal and flight, not as volition and pursuit. The consequent is false, as is clear from what was said in the preceding section. Therefore, so is the antecedent.

52. I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. For in the angel's first sin we do not assign only that flight from and refusal of supernatural beatitude as something to be acquired from grace, but also the

will to remain and rest in his natural happiness or excellence. Nor do we separate one from the other. For just as a man sinning through an appetite for sensible things simultaneously refuses spiritual and superior goods, although he would wish to possess them without labor and without being deprived of the enjoyment of sensible things, so also the angel, simultaneously and by the same act of pride, refused supernatural beatitude as something to be acquired from grace and merits and adhered to his natural happiness without ordering it to supernatural beatitude.

53. You will ask what defects on the part of the intellect preceded the angel's first sin. I answer that only the defect of inattention or inconsideration preceded it. Ignorance could not precede it, since from the beginning of his creation the angel possessed knowledge of all natural and moral things, as well as revelation and faith concerning everything required for upright operation in the supernatural order. Nor could error precede it, because error is an evil of punishment with respect to a rational nature and therefore cannot precede fault.

Hence St. Thomas says in *De malo*, q. 16, a. 2, ad 5: It is not necessary to posit in the devil's first sin such a defect of intellect that he judged something false, for example, that something evil was good; rather, the defect consisted in his failing to apprehend his rule and his order.

Only inconsideration, therefore, was the cause of sin in the angels and that hidden fissure through which this poison entered their minds, as the same Holy Doctor more fully declares in *De malo*, q. 1, a. 2, where he writes: The very fact of not actually attending to such a rule—namely, the rule of reason—considered in itself is not an evil, a fault, or a punishment, because the soul is neither bound nor able always actually to attend to such a rule. But it first acquires the character of fault from the fact that, without an actual consideration of the rule, it proceeds to an election of this kind. Thus a craftsman does not sin from the fact that he does not always hold the measure, but from the fact that, without holding the measure, he proceeds to cut.

Similarly, the angel did not sin precisely because he failed to consider the divine law forbidding him to love natural beatitude without order and reference to God as supernatural author and end. Rather, he sinned because, without considering this rule and precept, he loved that beatitude and took excessive complacency in it.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Obstinacy of the Demons.

1. That the demons are obstinate in their sin is established with the same certainty and evidence with which it is established that they are damned; for as long as damnation endures, its cause endures, which is sin committed and not retracted. Hence Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 3: *All those transgressing angels can never be without either an evil will or punishment; but while the unjust evil of their aversion remains in them, the eternal damnation of just retribution also remains.* And St. Thomas, here, q. 64, a. 2, recounts the opinion of Origen, who said that every created will, because of freedom of choice, can be turned both to good and to evil, with the exception of the soul of Christ because of the union of the Word; and he adds: *This position must, however, be regarded as erroneous and contrary to the teaching of the Catholic faith, according to which both the will of the good angels is confirmed in good and the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.* He adds in the reply ad 3 that the first sin perseveres continually in the demons not only habitually but also actually, according to Ps. 73: *The pride of those who hate you rises continually;* for the first sin of the angels was a disordered appetite for their own excellence. It is probable, moreover, that the demons perform all their actions from this motive, because it is always and necessarily known by an angel, since it is included in the knowledge of his own nature, from which he never ceases, and is of itself most apt to move their will. He also teaches in II *Sententiae*, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2, that the demons' obstinacy in evil is so great that they can perform no work morally good in every respect; for just as it is impossible for a will undeviatingly adhering to the ultimate end to produce an act of sin, so, conversely, it is repugnant that any upright act should proceed from a will immovably adhering to a perverse end. Hence Bernard, *De libero arbitrio*, after the middle: *What is so damned as a will joined to this necessity of willing and refusing, so that it is now moved toward either alternative not only perversely, but also miserably?*

2. The only difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, concerns the cause of this obstinacy. The more recent authors refer it solely to an extrinsic cause, namely, the absence of grace and the denial of divine aids, which are justly denied to the demons both as punishment for sin and because of the condition of their state. For they are at the terminus and not in the state of life, since, according to Damascene, what death is to men, the

fall is to angels. Therefore, just as heavy and light bodies existing outside their center are owed the concurrence by which they are moved toward the center, but not when they are already in the center, so also an intellectual creature existing at the terminus is not owed an aid by which it may be moved toward the terminus and ultimate end. Hence St. Thomas, *De malo*, q. 16, a. 5, in the body: *It does not belong to the order of divine wisdom that grace should subsequently be infused into the demons, by which they might be recalled from the first evil of aversion, in which they immovably persevere.* Thomists, however, besides this extrinsic cause of the demons' obstinacy, acknowledge another, intrinsic cause, with the Holy Doctor here, a. 2, and in many other places, namely, the inflexibility of their free choice after a perfect election. By reason of this inflexibility, they require the other extrinsic cause, namely, that they be outside the way and deprived of every aid withdrawing them from evil.

3. I therefore say that the will of an angel, after a complete judgment and a full and perfect election, is inflexible, and consequently that such inflexibility is the intrinsic cause and first root from which obstinacy arises in the demons.

The proof is drawn from the fundamental argument of St. Thomas here, a. 2. An angel's intellect apprehends wholly fixedly and immovably the objects that it knows certainly and perfectly. Therefore, his will also chooses them fixedly and immutably and adheres to them immovably. The consequence appears legitimate, first, because just as our will is movable from one object to another because our judgment is movable and flexible, so, conversely, if an angel's judgment is wholly fixed and immutable, his will will immovably choose and adhere to the objects that he apprehends deliberately and perfectly. Second, because, as St. Thomas observes in the cited article, the appetitive power in all things follows the apprehensive power and is proportioned to it as a movable thing to its mover. An evident sign of this is that the sensitive appetite regards particular good, whereas the intellectual appetite regards universal good, just as sense apprehends singulars, whereas intellect apprehends universals. Therefore, in angels also, the will follows the apprehension of the intellect; and consequently, if the latter is immovable, the election of the former will likewise be immutable. The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is shown as follows. An intellect apprehending an object by a single intuition and without discourse apprehends it wholly fixedly and immovably. For we apprehend first principles fixedly and immovably, but other things movably, because we know the former by simple intuition and without discourse, whereas we know the latter either imperfectly or with discourse. But an angel knows all

objects, both supernatural and natural, without discourse, as we showed in c. 9, § 2. Therefore, he apprehends them wholly fixedly and immovably.

4. This argument is confirmed and further illustrated. For an angel to withdraw and be drawn away from an object that he has chosen, he would have to discover in it some aspect that he had not previously known. But this is repugnant, because, since he knows things by simple intuition, without discourse, and by penetrating conclusions in their principles and predicates in their subjects, he attains them comprehensively, and consequently by penetrating all their aspects. Therefore, an angel cannot be drawn or moved away from an object that he has chosen. And this is especially true of withdrawal from the first intention of the end that he had in the state of probation. For in the first instant of full deliberation he apprehended, in natural principles most perfectly comprehended and in supernatural principles known by the certain light of faith, all the aspects and motives that could either induce him toward the object of sin or withdraw him from it. Therefore, by the very fact that he turned himself toward one alternative, embraced his own good, and despised the divine good, he became intoxicated with love of his own excellence and adhered immovably to his natural perfection as his ultimate end. Hence Gregory, *Moralia* 34, c. 6: *The heart of the ancient enemy will be hardened like stone, because it will never be softened by the repentance of conversion.* And Lawrence Justinian, in a sermon for the feast of St. Michael, speaking of the nature of an angel: *After an election, he says, whether in good or in evil, he possesses immutable firmness; for toward whatever he turns himself, he is inflexible.* Nothing could be said more clearly and expressly in favor of our conclusion.

5. Nor is the claim of certain more recent authors valid, namely, that St. Thomas's argument proves not physical but only moral inflexibility in an angel's will after a perfect election; that is, that it proves that an angel cannot easily retract an election already made, but does not demonstrate that he absolutely cannot do so. This answer, I say, is invalid. For since this argument is founded upon the sympathy, proportion, and dependence that the appetitive power has upon the apprehensive power, and acts of the will upon acts of the intellect, which are indeed physical and necessary, and not merely moral and ordinary, it is manifest that it proves physical and not merely moral inflexibility in an angel's will after a perfect election. And it is certain that St. Thomas cannot be explained as speaking of moral inflexibility, as some interpret him. This is evident because he establishes the difference between the human and angelic will as follows: after a perfect election, the angelic will adheres immovably to its object and consequently is incapable of retraction and repentance, whereas the human will is not. But

this distinction would in no way remain if he were speaking only of moral inflexibility, that is, of difficulty in retracting and repenting, since a man often adheres to an object in such a way that he can be moved away from it and become capable of repentance only with difficulty.

6. For a fuller understanding of this celebrated difficulty and the solution of many arguments, it must be carefully observed that two judgments concerning the objects apprehended can be found in an angel's intellect. One is perfect and wholly complete, proceeding from principles known evidently or certainly and from the angel's own deliberation and application. The other is imperfect and incomplete, proceeding from principles that are doubtful or merely conjectural, or from a special motion and application of God. Therefore, when we say that an angel cannot retract an election already made, this must be understood of an election regulated by a perfect and wholly complete judgment, as we expressly stated in the conclusion, and not of one that presupposes only an incomplete and imperfect judgment. Hence the angel who was guardian of the Persians, after hearing God's will through Michael the Archangel, changed his will and permitted the captive Israelites to be freed, whose liberation he had previously opposed, as is related in Dan. 10. Likewise, before the demons knew with certainty that Christ was God, they deliberately sought his death, John 13; yet afterward, when Christ's divinity was known from the miracles performed in attestation of it, they abandoned that will, as is gathered from Matt. 27. Finally, all the angels who sinned changed the prior will in which they were created and which they had in the first instant. The reason is that in these three cases only an incomplete and imperfect judgment preceded the election of the angelic will. For in the first two cases it proceeded from merely doubtful and conjectural principles, while in the third it arose from a special motion and application of God. Consequently, that judgment and the election following it were not fully free, but free only as to exercise and necessary as to specification, as is clear from what was said above.

7. You will object, first: Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 2, c. 3, describing the nature of an angel, says: The nature of an angel is rational and intellectual, and free in power and in the choice of his will according to his purpose; for everything created is changeable, but the uncreated alone is unchangeable. And below, speaking of the blessed angels, he says that they are immovable not by nature but by grace. Similarly, Isidore, *De summo bono*, c. 10: We say that the angels are unchangeable by grace, not by nature; for if they were unchangeable by nature, the devil certainly would not have fallen.

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8. To the first testimony of Damascene, I answer that he means only that an angel is changeable through a succession of intellections and volitions, but not that he can afterward spurn and reject an object once chosen by a full and perfect election. Or he is speaking of an angel absolutely and before a perfect election, in which state he is changeable and mutable, but not after it; for once it is posited, he is inflexible and immutable. Since an angel is intermediate between God and man, he must occupy an intermediate manner as regards his wholly deliberate elections and volitions. Hence, since God is wholly immutable both before and after election, whereas man is mutable even after election, an angel will indeed be mutable before a perfect election, but not after it.

9. To the other two testimonies, I say that Damascene and Isidore said that an angel is immovable or unchangeable not by nature but by grace because, although he has from his nature that he is inflexible regarding an object that he has once chosen with full liberty, nevertheless, that he chooses supernatural good rather than the evil opposed to it comes to him from grace. Consequently, that he persists in the aforesaid good also comes from grace; for grace perfects an angel according to his own mode and nature, namely, so that he adheres firmly to an object once chosen with full liberty.

10. You will object, second: No created object can immobilize a created will, since it cannot entirely fill its capacity. Therefore, the angelic will cannot immovably adhere to any created object.

I answer that the angelic will adheres immovably to an object once chosen with full liberty, not because of the merits of the object itself, which moves only contingently, but for another reason explained above, namely, because of the angel's manner of operating, whereby he knows things through simple intuition, without discourse, and comprehensively, and consequently penetrates in one act all the aspects and motives that can induce him toward such an object or withdraw him from it.

11. You will object, third: If an angel cannot retract an election already made and recoil from an object once chosen, he will not be fully free regarding that act and such an object; for it belongs to the nature of liberty that the will be able to suspend the act that it elicits or elicit the opposite act, and to choose or reject any created object.

12. I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. For it does not belong to the nature of liberty that the will be able to retract itself after it has willed, as is evident in God, whose decrees, once established, are immutable. Hence, for the liberty of an angelic will, it is sufficient that the angel could choose either alternative before the election and voluntarily cast

himself into that state from which he cannot return. There are therefore three degrees of liberty, corresponding to the three degrees of intellectual nature, namely, human, angelic, and divine. The first includes indifference to eliciting and not eliciting an act, and to revoking or not revoking an act already elicited; this belongs to man because of the imperfection of his knowledge. The second includes indifference to eliciting or not eliciting an act, but not to revoking it once elicited; this belongs to an angel because of his more perfect manner of knowing things without discourse and by simple intuition. The third includes indifference not to eliciting or not eliciting an act absolutely and as regards its entity, but only to terminating the act at any object either by way of volition or by way of non-volition; this degree belongs to God alone because of his supreme actuality and immutability, as we explained in the Treatise on the Will of God.

CHAPTER XV.

The Punishment of the Demons.

1. It is certain that the demons are tormented by true corporeal fire, for it is said in Matt. 25: *Depart from me, accursed ones, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels.* This concerns the fire by which human bodies will be tormented after the resurrection, and consequently true and corporeal fire. Hence Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 21, c. 10: *Why should we not say that incorporeal spirits also can, in marvelous yet true ways, be affected by the punishment of corporeal fire?* And below: *Incorporeal spirits will adhere to corporeal fires in order to be tormented.* And Gregory, *Dialogi* 4, c. 29: *If the devil and his angels, although incorporeal, are to be tormented by corporeal fire, what wonder is it if souls, before they receive their bodies, can be tormented by corporeal fire?* Nor is it an obstacle that some of the Holy Fathers, such as Ambrose and Damascene, say that the fire of hell is incorporeal; for they mean only that it is incorruptible and does not require, as our fire does, continually renewed matter for its preservation. With this presupposed, three difficulties must be briefly resolved here. The first is whether the demons are tormented by the fire of hell through being bound to it. The second is how this binding takes place. The third is whether, besides this binding, there is another kind of torment by which they are more bitterly tormented by the fire of hell.

2. I say, first, that the demons are tormented by the fire of hell through being bound to it. Thus St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, c. 90, where

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he says that *incorporeal substances suffer from corporeal fire by way of a certain binding*.

The first reason is that, without such a punishment, many passages of Scripture cannot remain true. Such are Jude: The angels who did not preserve their principality, he has reserved under darkness in eternal bonds; and 2 Pet. 2: God did not spare the angels who sinned, but cast them down with the cords of hell and delivered them to Tartarus to be tormented. Likewise, Rev. 20: He seized the dragon and bound him for a thousand years, and cast him into the abyss and shut it.

3. The second reason is that this binding of the demons is possible and highly afflictive. It is possible because it is effected not by the natural power of the fire itself, but by a supernatural power that God communicates to it as an instrument of his justice. It is afflictive because it subjects the most noble creature to an ignoble thing—as every corporeal thing is in comparison with an angel—and renders him its captive. Hence St. Thomas, *De anima*, a. 21: *Every spiritual substance, considered according to its nature, is not bound to any place but transcends the entire order of corporeal things. Therefore, that it should be bound to something and determined to some place by a certain necessity is contrary to its nature and opposed to its natural appetite*.

4. I say, second, that the fire of hell binds the demons by causing in them an intrinsic form belonging to the category of quality.

The reason for the first part is that the powers of a demon cannot be bound, or impeded from executing their operations, by a merely extrinsic form. For this is the difference between powers that operate through formally transitive actions and powers whose operations are formally immanent, such as all those with which angels are endowed: the former can be impeded from executing their operations by something purely external, but the latter cannot.

5. The reason for the second part is drawn from the fact that a form which affects and disposes its subject badly belongs to the category of quality and is placed in its first species, as is evident regarding sickness, vicious habits, deformity, and similar things. But the intrinsic form that the fire causes in the demons affects and disposes them badly, since it tortures and torments them. Therefore, it belongs to the category of quality.

6. But if you ask what its immediate subject is, I answer, according to the common doctrine of Thomists, that the motive and executive power in angels is not really distinct from the practical intellect, and that this binding quality is subjected in the demon's practical intellect. Considered as a motive and executive power, the intellect is so intrinsically bound and restrained by that quality that it cannot use its light in its species and its

power in the manner and with the efficacy required to move itself and other things at will by an act of practical command, except insofar as it is permitted by the fire itself.

7. If you ask again what the effects of that quality are, I answer that there are chiefly three. The first is to subject the demon himself to the fire by which he is to be bound, as an inferior to a superior. Although this effect is not formally the binding, nevertheless, because by its nature it is ordered to the binding and is required as a predisposition, it is included under the name of binding. The second is the binding of his powers: first, in relation to the powers themselves, insofar as the demon's intellect cannot understand many things that the demon himself would wish to understand, and conversely is compelled to advert to and is bound to meditate upon many things that he would not wish to meditate upon; second, in relation to place, insofar as he is compelled to remain so applied to one place that he cannot apply his power elsewhere. From this there results a third effect, namely, imprisonment itself, or detention in one place, and that a very confined one, as in a prison.

8. I say, third, that besides being bound to the fire of hell, there is no other punishment of sense in the demons that torments them more bitterly.

This is proved, first, from the fact that the aforesaid effects of the quality binding the demons compose a most bitter torment, so that scarcely any more bitter kind of torment can be conceived in spiritual substances. For since the cause or object of pain is an apprehended evil, and the evil of something is what is unfitting to it, the quantity of pain must be measured by the magnitude of the unfittingness, presupposing perfect knowledge, such as angelic knowledge. But those three effects of the quality binding the demons are most unfitting to the nature of the demons and to their pride. For what could be more unfitting than that the angelic nature, most excellent of all and elevated above all corporeal creatures, should be subjected to fire as an inferior to a superior, so as to be treated by it like a vile slave? What greater unfittingness and affliction can be conceived than that the demons, who are most active spirits and possess the greatest inclination toward operation, should be impeded by the fire of Tartarus from operating as and when they wish? Finally, since every spiritual substance is not by its nature bound to any place but transcends the entire order of corporeal things, it is most unfitting and painful to it that it should be imprisoned and violently detained by the fire of hell, and impeded from moving locally as and when it wishes and from enjoying the liberty that it could possess. Cajetan elegantly describes this most bitter pain, caused by those three effects of the quality binding the demons, in the address on this

subject delivered at Rome before Julius II, which is contained in vol. 3 of his *Opuscula*.

9. The conclusion is proved, second, by refuting individually the opinions of those who admit in the demons another kind of torment besides binding. First, the opinion of Henry, who thinks that the fire torments the demons by impressing its heat upon them, appears absurd. This is both because a corporeal accident cannot be received in a spiritual substance, and because, even if it were granted, though it must not be conceded, that the heat of the fire could be received in the substance or power of a demon, it would neither harm nor corrupt anything in him, and consequently would not be a cause of pain to him as it is to a corporeal substance.

10. No less improbable appears the opinion of those who assert that the demons are tormented through a species representing the fire itself as their torturer. For either such a species represents the fire to them as tormenting them through binding, or by some other kind of punishment. If the first is said, that torment is not distinct from the punishment of binding. If the second is asserted, it remains for those authors to explain that kind of torment distinct from binding.

Nor is the opinion of Soto, Valencia, and Albertini satisfactory. They teach that the fire of hell torments the demons and separated souls by causing in them pain and sorrow of the same kind as that which a soul united to a body suffers in the will when its body is burned by fire. For whatever may be true of souls, it is evident that the demons are incapable of this pain, since it arises in the soul whose body is burned because the soul is a part of the composite that is destroyed and because of the union and sympathy that it has with the body. Neither is found in the demons, since they are neither parts of any composite nor have any body naturally united to themselves as a soul does. Therefore, they cannot feel pain of the same kind as that suffered by a soul united to a body when the body is burned.

11. Finally, the kind of torment that Suárez admits in the demons appears fictitious. It consists, as he says, in a quality defiling and staining the demon's substance and consequently causing pain and affliction. For in order that a quality be afflictive, it must remove or destroy a form suitable to the subject. But it is not apparent what form suitable to an angelic substance this quality destroys. Therefore, it cannot be painful or afflictive.

12. Nor is Suárez's assertion valid that such a quality is painful and unfitting to the nature of a demon not because it deprives him of some perfection owed and suitable to him, but because it defiles, disfigures, and, as it were, stains his substance. Against this, first, since beauty consists in the integrity of a thing, or at least necessarily requires it, it cannot be

understood that any quality renders a subject deformed unless it removes something from it.

13. Against it, second, to be defiled and disfigured is to lose some beauty. But an angel cannot lose any beauty through the quality devised by Suárez. Therefore, an angel's substance cannot be defiled by it. The major premise is evident; the minor is proved. Natural beauty and perfection remained intact in the demons after sin, for it consists in the integrity of their substance, the perspicacity of their intellect, and the excellence of their will, all of which remain in the demons. Supernatural beauty, however, which proceeds from sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, is expelled only by sin opposed to them. Hence the angels were deprived of it in the second instant, in which they sinned, whereas the quality devised by Suárez was impressed upon them only in the third instant, in which they were damned. I add that, since grace is a certain participation in the divine nature, a quality opposed to grace is in some way opposed to the divine nature. But it is repugnant that God should produce a quality opposed to his own nature. Therefore, an angel can lose no beauty through the quality admitted by Suárez.

14. This defiling quality can also be rejected because of its uselessness. Suárez admits it in order to preserve the expressions of Scripture and the Fathers by which the demons are said to burn, be burned, and be tormented. But such expressions can be preserved no more by the defiling quality devised by Suárez than by the quality binding the demons to the fire of hell, which the Thomists admit and which we explained above. Therefore, the defiling quality is useless for Suárez's intended purpose. The minor premise is proved, for the impression of a quality dishonoring and defiling an angel's substance can no more be called combustion than the impression of a quality binding him to the fire of Tartarus; nor can the demons be said to be tormented through the former any more than through the latter. For the latter does not imply merely simple detention and imprisonment, as the adversaries suppose, but also the several other effects explained above, which cause most bitter pain and torment in the demons, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, and so forth.

15. You will object, first, against the first conclusion: Many of the demons are not detained in hell, namely, those who are permitted to move through our air and who are therefore called *powers of the air* by the Apostle. Therefore, it is false that the demons are tormented by the fire of hell through being bound to it.

Some answer that the demons existing in this air carry with them a certain portion of infernal fire that imprisons them there. Hence it is said in the Ordinary Gloss on Jas. 3 that *they carry the fire of Gehenna with them*

wherever they go. But this opinion multiplies miracles without necessity. For it would be a miracle that this fire, though plainly placed before our eyes, should not be seen; a miracle that, when existing near a man, it should neither burn nor warm him; and, finally, a miracle that a demon carrying fire with him should enter a wholly closed room.

16. I therefore answer with St. Thomas, here, a. 4 ad 3, that although the demons are not actually bound to the fire of Tartarus while they are in this air, nevertheless, they are tormented by the very fact that they know such binding is due to them. Likewise, the good angels lose nothing of their beatitude when they are sent to us, because they know that the heavenly place is due to them; and a captive who is outside prison for a short time suffers no lesser punishment because he knows that he must soon be imprisoned. In this sense the Holy Doctor understands the statement of the Ordinary Gloss, *they carry the fire of Gehenna with them wherever they go*, namely, because they know that being bound to it is due to them.

17. You will object, second, against the second conclusion: Higher demons sometimes bind lower demons, by their own connatural power, to certain bodies and places, yet they produce nothing real and intrinsic in them by doing so; otherwise an angel could by his own power act physically within another angel. Therefore, all the more will the fire of hell, by divine power, bind the demons without producing an intrinsic form in them.

I answer by distinguishing the antecedent. Higher demons, by their own connatural power, bind lower demons physically: I deny the antecedent. They bind them only morally, by commanding them as subjects to place themselves in some location by means of an operation and to remain there: I grant the antecedent, and deny the consequence. For the fire of hell binds the demons not merely morally, but physically.

18. You will object, third, against the third conclusion: If the punishment of sense in the demons consisted only in binding, it would be equal in all of them. But this cannot be said. Therefore, neither can the former. The minor premise is evident, for the punishment of sense must be proportioned to the demons' guilt, but their guilt or sin is not equal. The consequence of the major premise is proved because the punishment of binding or detention does not admit of more and less, for it is a positive presence in a place, indivisible and complete in each.

I answer by denying the consequence of the major premise. To its proof, I say that the binding of the demons caused by the fire of Tartarus is not, as the adversaries suppose, their bare presence in a place, but a presence that violates them and subjects them to the fire. Consequently, it is greater or lesser as binding and punishment according to the inequality of the

inclinations that it violates in them; or because it binds one demon in more operations, or subjects him to more bodies than another, for example, to fire, water, earth, sulfur, and other things.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Speech and Illumination of the Angels.

1. That angels speak to one another is established from various testimonies of Scripture. For it is said in Isa. 6: *The Seraphim cried one to another*. Rev. 7: *I saw an angel ascending from the rising of the sun, and he cried with a loud voice to the four angels*. And in Jude's canonical epistle, Michael disputes with the devil over the body of Moses; but a dispute cannot be understood without some kind of speech. Reason also commends this, because it belongs no less properly to an intellectual nature to be able, when it wishes, to manifest its secrets to another than, when it does not wish, to conceal them within itself, since the order of a perfect society requires the one no less than the other.

2. The Holy Fathers also commonly teach that illumination is found among the angels, especially Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia*, c. 7, where he writes concerning this illumination: The theologians plainly teach that the lower orders of heavenly natures learn the knowledge of divine works duly explained by the higher orders, while the highest are taught the mysteries by God himself according to their capacity. And Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* 2, c. 3: Some illuminate others because of the superiority of their order or nature. It is manifest that those who are more excellent and sublime impart splendor and knowledge to their inferiors.

3. Reason also supports this, drawn from the customary manner in which divine wisdom operates. As far as possible, it performs all things through intermediate secondary causes, subordinating the lowest to the intermediate and the intermediate to the highest, so that its goodness may shine forth more clearly. For according to the decree of its good pleasure, it not only communicates itself to creatures but also imparts to them full power to communicate to others the perfections drawn from the first source. Consequently, the higher angels can illuminate the lower, according to Ps. 75: *You illuminate marvelously from the eternal mountains*, that is, as some of the Holy Fathers interpret it, through the mediation of the highest angels, who are metaphorically called mountains. For just as mountains receive the first rays of the sun and communicate them to the lower bodies, so the highest angels immediately receive divine illuminations from God and afterward pour them forth upon the lower angels. For this reason Dionysius,

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De coelesti hierarchia, c. 8, also calls them *transparent mirrors, pure from every stain*, which first receive the ray of divine light and pour it forth without envy upon those who follow. Finally, Nazianzen, Oration 40, calls them *streams of the first light*, because just as a stream receives water from the first spring and channels it to lower places, so the highest intelligences receive supernatural influences from the first source and diffuse them into other, lower intelligences. Hence Bernard, *De consideratione* 5, c. 4: *The Cherubim, drinking from the very fountain of wisdom at the mouth of the Most High and pouring forth streams of knowledge, infuse them into all the citizens of heaven*. These things are certain and indubitable among all. Therefore, the whole force of the difficulty consists in explaining the manner in which one angel can speak to another and illuminate him.

§ 1.

The Speech of Angels Does Not Occur Through the Infusion of Species, but Through the Direction of Concepts.

4. The first part is proved against Suárez and other more recent authors by the testimony of St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 6, a. 5 ad 2, where he says: An angel who speaks causes nothing in the angel to whom he speaks, but something takes place in the speaking angel himself, so that through this he is known by the other in the manner stated above. Hence it is not necessary that the speaker infuse anything into the one to whom he speaks. And a. 6 ad 4: The angel, he says, to whom the speech is made receives nothing from the speaker, but through the species that he possesses within himself, he knows both the other angel and his speech. Nothing could be said more expressly against Suárez and others who assert that the speaking angel produces a species of his concept in the intellect of the one to whom he speaks.

5. Reason also supports this. First, because an angel does not receive species from things, even spiritual things, but has them infused by God from the first instant of his creation, as we showed in c. 7, § 2. Second, because if the speech of angels occurred through the infusion of a species, secrecy could not be preserved in such speech. For since this species is neither a future contingent, nor a free act, nor something supernatural, especially when the speech concerns natural things, it falls within the objects naturally knowable by any angel. Consequently, there would be no reason why it should be known by one rather than another. Third, since there can be no action at a distance, and an intelligible species, being spiritual, cannot be diffused through a corporeal medium, if a speaking angel produced in the

intellect of the angel to whom he speaks a species of the act that he manifests through speech, he would have to be within that angel's intellect not only through his power but also through his substance, and consequently would have to enter intimately into his mind. But this is repugnant, since this prerogative is reserved to the supreme and uncircumscribed Spirit, as Bernard expressly teaches, *In Canticum Canticorum*, Sermon 5, in these words: *Know that no created spirit is applied by itself to our minds in such a way that, with no mediation of our body or any instrument, it is mingled and infused into us so that through participation in it we become learned or more learned, good or better. No angel, no soul, is capable of entering me in this way, nor am I capable of receiving one. Nor do the angels themselves receive one another in this manner. This prerogative is therefore reserved to the supreme and uncircumscribed Spirit, who alone, when he teaches an angel or a man knowledge, does not seek the instrument of our corporeal ear, just as he does not need a mouth for himself. He is infused by himself, becomes known by himself, and, being pure, is received by the pure.* Therefore, and so forth.

6. Nor is Suárez's answer valid, namely, that the intimate entrance that the Holy Fathers say is proper to God is that which occurs by way of containing and giving being, or which is within the limits of the essence, but not that by which some quality or species is impressed upon the mind of another. For such a species, he says, stands as something surrounding the angel's existence and is received in his already existing intellect. This answer, I say, is invalid. First, because St. Bernard in the cited passage speaks expressly of the intimate entrance by which we are made more learned or better, not of that which occurs by way of containing and giving being, or which is within the limits of the essence. Second, because St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 64, a. 1, says that God alone, as principal agent, produces *the interior effect of a sacrament, because God alone enters intimately into the soul in which the effect of the sacrament exists.* Therefore, according to St. Thomas, not only the intimate entrance that occurs by way of containing and giving being, or which is within the limits of the essence, but also that by which something real and physical is impressed upon or effected in the mind of another, is proper to God alone and can belong to no creature. Third, since intelligible species are either properties of an angel in the strict sense, as some think, or at least accidents connaturally owed to him, as others probably hold, only one who can create and preserve the nature of an angel can impress them upon an angelic intellect by way of principal cause. Therefore, if one angel cannot enter intimately into the mind of another by

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way of giving and preserving his being, neither can he enter intimately into it by causing and producing intelligible species within it.

7. The second part of the assertion, which teaches that angelic speech occurs through one angel's directing and ordering his concept toward another, is taught by St. Thomas here, q. 107, a. 1. His reason is that to speak is nothing other than to manifest externally a concept of the mind hidden within. But by directing and ordering his concept toward another angel, one angel manifests it to him. Therefore, angelic speech consists in this direction and ordering. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved from the doctrine that the same Holy Doctor gives there in the reply ad 1, where he says that in us the interior concept of the mind is enclosed, as it were, by two obstacles so that it cannot become known to another. The first is the liberty of the will, by reason of which it is above the order of the universe and depends on no extrinsic cause except God. The second is the density of the body, by reason of which a man must use some sensible sign in order to manifest his concept to another man. Hence Gregory excellently says in *Moralia* 2, c. 4: *To the eyes of others, we are within the secret of the mind as though behind the wall of the body; but when we desire to manifest ourselves, we go forth, as it were, through the doorway of the tongue, so as to show externally what we are inwardly.* But in an angel, being spiritual and incorporeal, the latter obstacle is not found, but only the former. For the concept of one angel is concealed from another solely by the veil of liberty. Thus, by the very fact that this veil is removed, the concept of one angel is manifested to another. But such a veil is removed when the concept of one is directed toward another, because by that very fact the angel surrenders the dominion and right that he possesses to conceal such a concept from the other. Therefore, by directing and ordering his concept toward another angel, one angel manifests it to him.

8. This is confirmed. For a free concept of one angel to be actually known by another angel, it is sufficient that it be rendered one of the things pertaining to the latter; for by that very fact it is placed within the sphere of his intellectuality, because every angel is naturally capable, through the species that he possesses, of understanding whatever pertains to himself. But by the precise fact that one angel voluntarily orders his concept toward another in order that it may become known to him, he thereby renders such a thought one of the things pertaining to that other; for by that very fact he wills the concept to pertain to him. Therefore, by that very fact he causes that thought to be capable of being known by him.

9. This manner of speaking appears more probable than others because it explains more easily everything necessary for the free and secret speech of

angels, which the adversaries explain only with difficulty. First, it easily preserves the fact that angelic speech can be secret and known to only one, because the speaking angel can order his concept toward one and not toward others. It also easily explains how one angel can speak simultaneously to several others, even at a distance, for he can direct his concept toward several, even distant, angels. Likewise, it easily explains how the angel to whom speech is made is morally moved and aroused by the speaking angel to attend to his speech. For, as St. Thomas says in *II Sententiae*, dist. 11, q. 1, a. 3 ad 4: *An angel is always actually considering himself and consequently the things that pertain to himself, of all of which he himself is the principle of knowing.... Insofar as one angel orders his speech toward another, the speech becomes one of the things pertaining to the other, and thus it is known by him.* Hence, according to St. Thomas's doctrine, nothing physical is newly received in the hearing angel in order that he be aroused; there is merely newly posited a direction or ordering of the speaking angel's concept toward the one whom he wishes to address, which is a certain moral motion and arousal. Finally, this opinion explains without difficulty how an evil angel, when speaking to another, can lie to him. For after forming within himself a concept or affection not directed toward another, he can form another concept directed toward him, by which he denies that he has the undirected concept or affirms that he has its opposite. In that case, it is evident that he will manifest to him something other than what he has in his mind and consequently will lie to him. The good angels cannot do this when speaking among themselves, since there can be neither deception nor falsehood among them.

10. From what has been said, the opinion of Scotus is refuted. He thinks that the speaking angel produces an actual cognition of his concept in the intellect of the hearer, so that the hearer's intellect is merely passive regarding it, in no way eliciting it, but only receiving it. This opinion, I say, is refuted, first, because that intellection, since it is essentially a vital and immanent act, cannot arise from an extrinsic principle, but must be elicited by the same principle in which it is received; for living things, as such, are those that move themselves. Second, in order that a speaking angel produce an actual cognition of his concept in the hearer's intellect, he would have to be within the hearer's intellect not only through his power but also through his substance, and consequently would have to be present to him by intimate entrance, which is repugnant to every creature and reserved to God alone, as we showed above.

11. From what has been said, the opinion of certain others also remains refuted. They say that the speech of angels occurs by means of certain signs. Some hold these signs to be external and sensible and to consist in certain

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figures or characters inscribed in the heavens, just as we produce words or letters on paper in order to manifest the internal concepts of the mind. Nazarius calls this opinion foolish, both because such signs are fictitious and chimerical, and because the angels would be said to write rather than to speak. Others say that these signs are spiritual. But this is easily rejected. For would they be natural signs, or signs instituted by the angels according to convention? Not the first, for otherwise each angel would know what another was saying, and thus no secret speech could occur among them. Nor the second, because for the angels to have instituted such signs, some prior speech would have had to occur among them by which they agreed to institute them. Thus, those signs would not be necessary for angelic speech, but altogether useless and superfluous.

12. You will object, first, against the first part of the assertion: When angels speak to one another, either the one to whom another speaks possesses a species representing the speaker's concept, or he does not. If the first, nothing is lacking for him to know it independently of the speaker's will and ordering. If the second, since he cannot know the speaking angel's concept without a species of it, he must receive that species from the speaker, and consequently the speech of angels must occur through the infusion of species. This is especially so because the angel to whom speech is made must be moved and aroused to attend to the speaking angel, which cannot occur without the impression of a species. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 2, says that *just as the sense is aroused by a sensible sign, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attend through some intelligible power*.

13. I answer that the angel to whom another speaks indeed possesses within himself a species representing the speaker's concept, yet cannot know it independently of the speaker's direction and ordering. For in its actual representation, such a species depends upon the will of the one whose concept it is as a condition without which it cannot act. This is precisely the manner in which we said above that, although every angel possesses a species representing a future contingent, he nevertheless does not know it because the actual representation depends upon the existence of the aforesaid future.

14. To what is added concerning the arousal of the angel to whom speech is made, it must be said that an angel is aroused to attend to speech made to him by another, and consequently to know the other's concept, in the same manner in which he is aroused to know the individuals that, for example, newly come to exist under the species of human nature. Therefore, just as this arousal does not require the new production of individuals of human nature physically to cause or posit something in an angelic intellect, but it is

sufficient that the species that the angel innately possesses of the nature and essence of such individuals, once their production is posited as a condition without which it cannot represent them, be newly determined to represent them, so likewise, for the intellect of one angel to be efficaciously aroused and moved to attend to the speech of another and perceive that about which he speaks, it is not required that he receive something physical anew through that speech. It is sufficient that an ordering and direction newly arise on the part of the speaking angel, because through such ordering the veil concealing his concept is removed, as was shown above. Hence, regarding the passage of St. Thomas, it must be said with Cajetan that by the intelligible power through which he says the mind of an angel is aroused to attend to another speaking, the Holy Doctor understands the ordering of one angel's concept toward another. This possesses the power to arouse morally because it makes the concept one of the things pertaining to the one addressed, as St. Thomas himself teaches in the passage cited above from II *Sententiae*. The comparison of St. Thomas holds only as regards motion and arousal, but not as regards the manner of motion and arousal.

15. You will object, second, against the second part of the assertion: The ordering of a speaking angel's concept toward the one to whom he speaks is an internal and free act, and consequently hidden. Therefore, such a concept is not manifested precisely through that ordering, for what is hidden does not manifest another thing.

I answer that this ordering is indeed formally internal and immanent, but virtually transitive and external, because it removes the moral impediment by which the speaking angel's concept is concealed. Hence, although it is a free act as regards the exercise and use by which it occurs, this liberty does not prevent it from being manifest to the other, by the very fact that the speaking angel wills it to pertain to the angel to whom he speaks and consequently to be known by him.

16. From what has been said, it follows, first, that the absence of distance between angels is not necessarily required for their speech, but that one angel can speak to another at any distance, because he can direct his concept toward him. St. Thomas expressly teaches this here, a. 4, where he argues as follows: The speech of an angel consists in an intellectual operation. But an angel's intellectual operation is wholly abstracted from place and time. In what is wholly abstracted from place and time, neither diversity of time nor distance of place has any effect. Hence distance of place causes no impediment in the speech of an angel. I add that one must philosophize about angels in the same manner as about separated souls. But it is established from Scripture that the soul of the wicked rich man existing in

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hell spoke to the soul of Abraham existing in the Limbo of the Fathers. Therefore, all the more can one angel speak to another, however distant.

17. You will say: In Isa. 6 it is said of the Seraphim that *one cried to another*. But loud speech has a place only because of the distance of the one to whom we speak. Therefore, distance appears to impede the speech of angels.

I answer with St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 9, a. 6 ad 3, that this cry of the Seraphim did not signify distance of place, but the greatness of the things about which they spoke, namely, the unity of the essence and the Trinity of Persons, whose infinite holiness they praised by saying, Holy, Holy, Holy. Or it also expressed the ardor of their affection. For, as Gregory rightly says in Moralia 2, c. 4: A great cry is a great desire; for one cries the less, the less one desires, and produces a greater voice in the ear of the uncircumscribed Spirit, the more fully he pours forth his desire within himself.... The movement of the heart aroused with reverence is a great cry of the voice to the ears of the uncircumscribed Spirit. And Augustine on Ps. 37: The fragrance of charity is the cry of the heart. If charity always loves, you always cry; if you always cry, you always desire.

18. It follows, second, that the tongue of angels—of which 1 Cor. 13 says, If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels—is nothing other than the power an angel possesses to order his concept toward others. This power formally resides in the intellect as moved and applied by the will, for to order is the proper act of reason, as St. Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 17, a. 2. Hence, when he says here, a. 1, that the will orders the concept of the angelic mind toward manifestation to another, he means only that this ordering proceeds from the angel's will as moving or applying his intellect to elicit it. Therefore Theodoret, explaining the aforesaid words of the Apostle, says: The tongue of angels must be called the power of intelligence through which they manifest things perceived not by sense but by intelligence, through which they praise God and converse among themselves. And Theophylact on the same passage: A certain power of understanding, by which they communicate divine thoughts to one another, is the tongue of angels.

§ 2.

The Illumination of Angels Does Not Occur Through the Infusion of Species, the Production of Intellectual Light, or the Union of the Higher Angel's Light with the Lower Angel's Light, but Solely Through a Presentation of the Object Adapted to the Lower Angel's Capacity.

19. The first part of this assertion is expressly taught by St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 9, a. 1 ad 10, where he says: *When one angel is illuminated by another, new species are not infused into him, but through the same species that he previously possessed, his intellect, strengthened by the light of the higher angel, is rendered capable of knowing more things.* This part is also established from what was said in the preceding section concerning the speech of angels, for the same reasoning applies to illumination and speech in this respect; and all theologians who hold that the speech of angels occurs without the infusion of species likewise teach that a higher angel does not produce a new species in the intellect of the lower angel whom he illuminates.

20. That the higher angel does not illuminate the lower by producing some intellectual light in him is shown as follows. Such a light would be either natural or supernatural. It cannot be natural, because a natural light would not suffice, since illumination chiefly concerns supernatural things. Nor can it be supernatural, first, because St. Thomas here, a. 1 ad 2, says that *one angel does not illuminate another by handing on to him the light of nature, grace, or glory.* Second, because supernatural light cannot be produced except by God as supernatural author.

21. Nor is it valid to say that, although one angel cannot produce supernatural light in the intellect of another as principal cause, he can do so as an instrument of divine power. For one angel illuminates another because of the fullness of light that he abundantly receives from God, and not merely because he is moved by God as an instrument to produce light in another's intellect. In the latter manner, even a stone or any other insensible thing could produce such light.

22. The third part, which asserts that a higher angel does not illuminate a lower angel by uniting his own intellectual light with the light of the lower angel, and thus together with him producing the intellection of that concerning which he illuminates him, is proved against Báñez and Zumel. For these authors hold that the higher angel unites his intellectual light with the light of the lower angel whom he illuminates because they think that the

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latter, with his own light, is not fully capable of perceiving the truth concerning which he is illuminated. But through this union he is not rendered more capable of doing so, since nothing physical is impressed upon him through it, but the higher angel merely assists him, as they themselves say. Therefore, the illumination of angels does not occur through the union of the higher angel's light with the lower angel's light so as together with him to produce the intellection of that concerning which he illuminates him.

23. I add that, if one and the same intellection were produced by the higher and lower angel, it would be produced by them either as two total causes or as two partial causes. Not the first, since it is repugnant, at least according to the ordinary course, that one and the same effect should proceed from two total and particular causes of the same order. Nor the second, because, since the intellection of the lower angel is an immanent and vital action, it cannot proceed from an extrinsic principle, such as the higher angel, as even a partial cause.

24. From these considerations, the fourth part of the assertion remains proved. For if the illumination of angels does not occur through the infusion of species, the production of intellectual light, or the union of the higher angel's light with the lower angel's light, it remains that it occurs solely through a presentation of the object adapted to the capacity of the lower angel. This is called an artful teaching by theologians and is explained by St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 9, a. 5: The higher angel possesses knowledge of things through more universal forms. Hence the lower angel is not proportioned to receive knowledge from the higher angel unless the higher angel in some way distinguishes his knowledge, conceiving within himself that concerning which he wishes to illuminate the lower in such a manner that it is comprehensible to the lower angel; and by manifesting such a concept to the other angel, he illuminates him.... It is similar to a teacher who sees that his disciple cannot grasp the things that he knows in the same manner in which he knows them, and therefore endeavors to distinguish and multiply them through examples so that they may be comprehended by the disciple. This artful teaching therefore consists in the higher angel's distinguishing, dividing, and, as it were, partitioning the truth that he himself knows universally, and proposing it, thus divided and articulated, to the lower angel through speech, adapting himself to the latter's capacity. In this way he illuminates him, for every manifestation of truth is called light, according to Eph. 5: Everything that is manifested is light.

25. The Angelic Doctor received this sublime doctrine from Dionysius, who testifies that he received it from the supreme theologian and his most blessed teacher, Paul. For Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia*, c. 15, before the

middle, explaining the manner in which a higher angel illuminates a lower, says that it occurs through the division and partition of the understanding that the higher angel receives uniformly from a more august substance into various concepts, which by provident power he divides and proposes to the lower angel according to his capacity. Nothing could be said more clearly and expressly in favor of our opinion.

26. You will object, first: A higher angel cannot divide universal knowledge and multiply it into several concepts proportioned to a lower angel. Therefore, the illumination of angels cannot consist in this artful teaching, or in this presentation of the object adapted to the capacity of the lower angel. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved. The connatural manner of understanding proper to a higher angel requires this universal knowledge, since he understands through universal species. Therefore, he cannot divide and multiply his knowledge into several particular concepts proportioned to a lower angel.

27. I answer by denying the antecedent. To its proof, I say that although the natural manner of understanding proper to a higher angel requires this universality of knowledge, this does not prevent him from dividing and multiplying it according to the capacity of the lower angel. Hence that connatural manner does not require every concept of the higher angel to be universal, but only that he be capable of possessing a universal concept whenever he wishes.

28. You will object, second: A lower angel is intrinsically incapable of attaining the truth proposed to him through the illumination of a higher angel. For if he were capable of knowing it, he would not need illumination. Therefore, something physical must be infused into him by which he is intrinsically strengthened and rendered capable of knowing it. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 1, says that since two things concur in understanding, namely, the intellectual power and the likeness of the thing understood, one angel can make truth known to another according to both. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; second, on the part of the likeness, insofar as a higher angel receives knowledge of the truth in a certain universal apprehension that the intellect of a lower angel is insufficient to grasp, and therefore divides it in some manner so that it can be grasped by the lower. Therefore, he does not place the illumination of angels solely in a proportioned presentation or manifestation of objects, which we call artful teaching, but also in something pertaining to the intellectual power and strengthening and changing it.

29. I answer by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. For the intellect of the lower angel is sufficiently strengthened and rendered

capable of knowing the truth proposed to him by the higher angel through the fact that it is proposed in a manner proportioned and adapted to him. Just as the corporeal eye, without being changed in itself, can be rendered capable of seeing an object that it previously could not see, namely, by the object itself being changed and rendered proportioned from being disproportionate, so also the intellect of a lower angel can be rendered capable of attaining a truth that it previously could not know through the fact that, by the artful teaching of the higher angel, it is divided and multiplied into several concepts according to the capacity of the lower and is thus rendered proportioned to his intellect. Hence these two things—to propose an object in a manner proportioned to the intellect of the angel being illuminated and to strengthen his natural light—are not two distinct realities, but imply one and the same action of the illuminating angel. For by the very fact that the higher angel proposes to the lower, in a manner proportioned to him, the truth that he understands universally, the intellect of the lower angel is strengthened, just as the visual power is strengthened by the presence of exterior light through which the medium and object are illuminated, and as the mind of a disciple is strengthened when a teacher proposes to him, in a manner proportioned and adapted to his capacity, a truth that he did not previously know. From this, the doctrine that the Holy Doctor gives here, a. 1, is easily understood and explained.

30. From what has been said, it follows, first, that angelic speech differs from illumination chiefly in two respects. First, speech is the simple manifestation of the speaking angel's concept, whereas illumination, besides the manifestation of an object, includes a strengthening of the intellectual power in the manner already explained. Second, speech can concern false things, whereas illumination always concerns truths, since illumination is a perfective act, and the intellect is perfected only by knowledge of truth.

31. It follows, second, that although lower angels can speak to higher angels and manifest their concepts to them, they cannot illuminate them, because they cannot strengthen their intellect by assisting it through a clearer manifestation of the proposed truth according to their capacity, since they possess a lower light and understand through less universal species than the higher angels.

32. It follows, third, that the demons, although some are higher than others, do not illuminate those below them. For since an illuminating act, as Dionysius testifies in *De coelesti hierarchia*, c. 8, is purgative and perfective, because it purges from ignorance and perfects through the manifestation of truth, only a manifestation of new knowledge that renders the intellect of the one illuminated certain concerning the truth of the thing known will be

illumination. But this certainty cannot exist in the demons, because they can always doubt whether the one who manifested a previously unknown thing to them spoke the truth. For since one demon can lie to another, the hearer can never be certain of the truth manifested. I add that illumination properly so called is a manifestation of truth according as truth is ordered to God, from whom comes all light and truth, as St. Thomas teaches here, a. 2 ad 1, and proves from Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia*, c. 15. Although some demons perceive certain truths more clearly than others and sometimes reveal them to them, they do not order this manifestation of truth to God, but twist it toward their own wickedness. Therefore, they do not illuminate but rather induce darkness.

33. It follows, fourth, that illumination can occur not only concerning supernatural things and mysteries of grace, but also concerning natural things, such as future contingents or past things. One angel, because he knew past things while they were present, possesses complete species of them, whereas another who did not advert to them while they were present does not. Therefore, the first can manifest them through illumination, just as he can future contingents; for one angel can know certain contingent natural truths that another does not know. Hence St. Thomas here, a. 1 ad 2, says that *one angel illuminates another by manifesting to him truth concerning the things that belong to the state of nature, grace, and glory*.

34. You will say: If the mere manifestation of natural truth sufficed for illumination, an angel manifesting the secrets of his heart to another would illuminate him, which St. Thomas expressly denies in q. 107, a. 2. I answer by denying the consequence. The Holy Doctor gives the reason there: illumination, according to Dionysius, is a perfective act, for it perfects the illuminated intellect through the manifestation of truth. But it does not belong to the perfection of one angel to know what another wills or thinks of doing, which is to know the internal secrets of another, but to know what truth the thing itself possesses in itself. Hence, in the reply ad 3 there, he says that *every speech of God is illumination, because, since the will of God is the rule of truth, even knowing what he wills belongs to the perfection and illumination of a created mind. But the same does not hold of the will of an angel, because, as he had said in the body of the article, a created will is not light or a rule of truth but participates in light. Hence to communicate the things that proceed from a created will, as such, is not to illuminate*.

35. You will ask, first, whether illumination can occur among angels concerning the things known by them through the beatific vision. I answer with St. Thomas here, a. 1 ad 1, that illuminations among the blessed angels do not concern God or the divine essence, because all angels, both higher

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and lower, see the divine essence immediately. In this respect, one does not teach or illuminate another, but all are immediately illuminated by God. They can, however, concern other things that they see in the Word. For, as the same Holy Doctor argues there: *God knows within himself all the intelligible principles of divine works that are known in him as in their cause, because he comprehends himself. But among others who see God, each knows more intelligible principles in God insofar as he sees God more perfectly. Hence a higher angel knows in God more of the intelligible principles of divine works than a lower angel, and concerning these he illuminates him.*

36. You will ask, second, whether the highest angels are immediately illuminated by God or by Christ. I answer that it is probable that they are immediately illuminated by Christ, because Christ is the head not only of men but also of angels, as the Apostle teaches in Col. 2; and it belongs to the dignity of a head to exercise an immediate influx upon its members. This will be treated in the Treatise on the Incarnation.

37. You will ask, third, whether the illuminations of angels will endure throughout all eternity. I answer that they will endure only until the day of judgment, because they concern matters pertaining to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, especially the manner of assisting it to attain its end. This reason will cease after the day of judgment. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 15 that God will then *bring to nothing every Principality and Power and Virtue*, not as regards the distinction of hierarchical degree and perfection, but as regards the offices of illuminating, presiding, and governing.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Hierarchies and Orders of Angels.

1. Theologians commonly teach, following Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia*, c. 6, that there are three hierarchies of angels. St. Thomas proves this here, q. 108, a. 1, by the following argument. An ordered multitude under a prince is multiplied according to the modes in which it receives governance from him. But the angels receive divine governance, or the illuminations by which they are governed by God, in three different modes. Therefore, there are three hierarchies of angels. The major premise is evident. The minor is proved. Some angels contemplate the intelligible principles or secrets of divine providence in the first and most universal cause; others in universal secondary causes; and others in particular causes. For example, the salvation of St. Peter is known by some angels in the most universal cause, which is the will of God; by others in universal principles, such as the Passion of

Christ; and by others in a particular cause, namely, Peter's martyrdom. Therefore, there are three different modes in which angels receive divine illuminations. The first belongs to the first hierarchy, the second to the second, and the third to the third.

2. The first hierarchy, which always attends upon God, is distinguished into three orders according to the threefold manner in which the angels of that hierarchy regard God. First, some have a relation to God by reason of the most excellent union, which occurs through most ardent love; these are called Seraphim, from the Hebrew word *Saraph*, which in Latin means "to set aflame." Hence Gregory says of them in Homily 34: *The more subtly they behold the divinity, the more powerfully they burn with love for it.* Second, others regard God as peculiarly revealing his secrets to them; these are called Cherubim, which signifies the fullness and profusion of divine knowledge and wisdom. Hence Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia*, c. 7, says that they are like transparent mirrors, pure from every stain, which first receive the ray of divine light and pour it forth without envy upon those who follow. Bernard also writes of them in *De consideratione* 5, c. 4: *The Cherubim, drinking from the very fountain of wisdom at the mouth of the Most High and pouring forth streams of knowledge, infuse them into all the citizens of heaven.* Third, others regard God as peculiarly residing in them and ultimately resting in them in his illuminations; these are called Thrones, and by Dionysius, *Theophori*, or God-bearers. They are also called *seats of God*, because just as a seat receives the one sitting upon it, who can also be carried upon it, so the aforesaid angels receive God within themselves and in some manner bear him to the lower angels.

3. The second hierarchy, which presides over created things and to which belongs the general disposition of the things to be done, is also divided into three orders. The first is called Dominations, to which it belongs to distribute to others what must be done, for it belongs to lords to prescribe things to be accomplished. Hence Bernard says of them in *De consideratione* 5, c. 4: *They are so preeminent that, in relation to them, all the others appear to be ministering spirits, and the governments of the Principalities, the defenses of the Powers, the operations of the Virtues, the revelations of the Archangels, and the care and providence of the Angels refer to them as to lords.* The second order is that of the Virtues, which begin to execute general works, such as moving the heavens and performing marvelous works pertaining to the governance of the world and the rule of the Church. They are therefore called Virtues because, through the divine power with which they are endowed, they perform signs and wonders. The third is that of the Powers, to which it

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belongs to preserve the unshaken order of divine providence by removing impediments and restraining the demons so that they do not pervert it.

4. The third hierarchy, to which it belongs to put into execution and apply to particular causes the order of divine providence, is likewise distinguished into three orders. The first is called that of the Principalities, *because, as Gregory says, they preside even over the good angelic spirits*, namely, the Angels and Archangels, *because, while they dispose what must be done for the others subject to them, they exercise principality over them in accomplishing the divine ministries*. The second is called that of the Archangels, who, being conscious of the divine mysteries, are sent to announce them only for great and principal reasons, according to the saying of Gregory the Great: *Those who announce lesser things are called Angels, but those who announce the highest things are called Archangels*. The third is called that of the Angels, who announce lesser things and to whom the guardianship of private individuals is entrusted. Bernard discusses these nine choirs of angels elegantly in *De consideratione* 5, c. 4.

5. Some of these are called attendants because they continually attend upon God and receive illuminations immediately from him. Others are called ministers because they minister in the governance of the world, either by way of executing or by way of disposing, according to Dan. 7: *Thousands of thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand attended upon him*. There is, however, a difficulty and controversy among theologians as to whether, by an extraordinary law, the angels of the first hierarchy who are called attendants are sent by God to exterior ministries.

6. I answer negatively with St. Thomas here, a. 2. For the order of nature is not passed over by God, says the Holy Doctor, except because doing so is expedient for the manifestation of grace or the confirmation of faith. But these reasons cease in the ministries of angels, because those ministries pertain to the order of grace, and, moreover, the passing over of the established order cannot contribute to the confirmation of faith, since it cannot become known to men in the state of wayfarers. Therefore, the attending angels are sent to exterior ministries neither by God's ordinary nor by his extraordinary law.

7. Nor is it an obstacle that the Apostle says in Heb. 1 that all angels are *ministering spirits*. For they are called this because all minister through either a mediate or an immediate mission, as St. Thomas explains in the cited article ad 1. They either exercise an exterior ministry themselves or move others to exercise it.

8. Nor is it an obstacle that in Isa. 6 the angel who purified the Prophet's lips with a burning coal is called a Seraph, and that the one whom God

placed before the gate of the terrestrial paradise in Gen. 3 is called a Cherub. Nor is it an obstacle that Raphael says in Tob. 12: *I am one of the seven who stand before God*. These things, I say, are no obstacle. For the first angel is called a Seraph not because he belonged to the first hierarchy and the order of the Seraphim, but because he had come to inflame and purify the Prophet's lips and performed this by the power and authority of some Seraph, whose vicar and minister he was, as it were. Hence Gregory, Homily 34 on the Gospels: *The spirits who are sent receive the names of the offices that they perform. Thus the angel who carries the coal from the altar to burn away sins of speech is called a Seraph, which means a burning*. The second is likewise called a Cherub not because he belonged to the order of the Cherubim, but because he was placed before the gate of the terrestrial paradise to guard the tree of knowledge, which is attributed to the Cherubim, and so that from this it might be understood that God had appointed a most vigilant and wise guardian of Paradise, whom no one could deceive or enter Paradise by fraud or cunning. The third is said to be one of the seven who stand before the Lord, not because he is one of the angels of the first hierarchy who are called attendants—for the guardianship of Tobias was not so excellent a ministry that it could not have been performed by an angel of the lowest hierarchy—but because he is one of the many angels who stand before the Lord, always seeing his face; for, according to Gregory, Homily 33, universality is signified by the number seven. Or it may be because he is one of the seven angels appointed as princes over the whole earth, of whom mention is frequently made in Revelation.

9. It must nevertheless be observed that, although the angels of the first hierarchy are never sent to those ministries that are ordered to the salvation of men and the good of the elect—for, as Gregory says in Homily 34 on the Gospels, *Those who attend upon him so enjoy intimate contemplation that they are never sent to accomplish exterior works*—it is nevertheless probable and credible that they were sent to minister to Christ as their head after his temptation and fasting in the desert, and that they descended to earth in honor of Christ, both on the day of his Nativity, when the multitude of the heavenly army was formed to sing the canticle, *Glory to God in the highest*—which Chrysostom says was composed of all the choirs of angels—and also when Christ rose and ascended into heaven, so that they might honor his victory and triumph. For since in Christ there is the order of the hypostatic union, which is higher than the order of grace, on account of it the order observed in the ministries of angels, which is established according to gifts of grace, could be passed over, just as the order of nature is passed over on account of the order of grace.

TREATISE VIII.
ON MAN AND THE VARIOUS STATES
OF HUMAN NATURE.

Since man holds the second place after the angel among the creatures established by God, now that the treatment of the angels has been completed, it follows that we should discuss man briefly. Gregory Nazianzen calls him “another angel,” while Chrysostom calls him “an earthly angel.” He is, as it were, a compendium of the world, the horizon of time and eternity, and the bond between corporeal and spiritual things. For, as Augustine says in *De civitate Dei*, bk. 9, c. 13, he is “a mean between beasts and angels, inferior to the angels, superior to the beasts, sharing mortality with the beasts, but reason with the angels.” Hence the same holy Doctor truly said that “among all the wondrous things God made for man, the greater miracle is man himself.” But since the philosophers discuss the parts of which man is composed, namely soul and body, his powers, both spiritual and corporeal, and also his passions and affections, only one thing remains: that we briefly discuss the various states in which man is, has been, or could have been, namely the state of innocence, the state of integrity, the state of fallen nature, and the state of pure nature.

CHAPTER I.

The Creation of the First Man.

1. Although man holds the first place among corporeal creatures, he was nevertheless produced last. For it was fitting that the greater world should first be created, and afterward the lesser world, which would be, as it were, a perfect compendium of the whole greater world. Or, as Gregory Nazianzen says in Oration 43: “First the palace had to be constructed, and afterward the king introduced.” Or, as Gregory of Nyssa reasons in *De hominis opificio*, c. 2: “It was not fitting that the prince and ruler should exist before there were things over which he might rule; rather, once the kingdom had been established, the king was then at last to be proclaimed.”

2. In describing his production, Moses, in Gen. 1 and 2, introduces God speaking thus: “Let us make man according to our image and likeness,” etc. By these words the dignity and excellence of man are commended in a wonderful manner. First, because whereas God used only a command in the production of other corporeal things, in the creation of man he first employed, as it were, consultation and deliberation about establishing him. This was not because God needs consultation or deliberation, but so that the dignity of the human office might be more clearly indicated; for craftsmen are accustomed to deliberate at length when something of great importance is to be undertaken. Secondly, because whereas other corporeal things are merely certain signs and traces of the Creator, man is a certain image of the divinity, both because of the free choice with which he is endowed and because of the royal dignity he possesses over all earthly things. Hence Scripture adds: “That he may rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of heaven,” etc. He is said to have been “made according to the image of God,” but not to be the image of God, to signify that this image is not yet perfect and complete, as is the Son of God, but tends toward the perfection it will obtain through glory and the beatific vision. For then, as the Apostle says, “we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.” It is added, “according to our likeness,” because, as Bernard indicates in Sermon 1 *De Annuntiatione*, freedom of choice and the other natural gifts are understood in the image; likeness, however, refers principally to the gratuitous and supernatural gifts with which Adam was created. These were, as it were, certain ornaments and complements superadded to the image of God, wonderfully increasing its beauty and grace.

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3. Moses adds: "Therefore the Lord God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life." By these words, first of all, the matter from which man's body was formed is explained, namely the slime of the earth. God willed to employ this in producing him so that man might be humbled by the lowliness of so humble a beginning, and that consideration of his origin might be, as Basil says, "a certain salutary amulet against every sin." He then declares his form when he adds: "He breathed into his face the breath of life." Here the Hebrew reading has "the breath of lives," which Cajetan, in his commentary on this passage, thinks signifies the threefold life that the rational soul gives to the body, namely vegetative, sensitive, and rational life.

4. The place where Adam was created is entirely unknown. It is certain, however, that he was established outside the earthly Paradise, for Moses openly declares this in Gen. 3 when he says: "God cast Adam out of Paradise, that he might till the earth from which he was taken." Many of the Hebrews think this was the field of Damascus and that Adam was formed from the red earth of this field, such as unworked earth is, which is commonly called virgin soil.

5. That he was created by God perfect in the bulk and size of his body, and at an age suitable for generation, is evident from the words God spoke to our first parents after producing them: "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." Reason also commends this. For it was fitting that those first works of God, which in the production of the world were made by him directly and immediately, should be perfect. Therefore, just as he established the other animals perfect in bodily bulk and age, so too, and much more, it must be held that he established man in a perfect age and with perfect bodily size.

6. God did not produce Eve at the same time as Adam, as when he produced the other species of living beings and formed both sexes together. Rather, he brought her forth from man after he had already been produced and fashioned her from his rib. This was highly fitting: first, so that man might recognize that he was ordained to the nobler work of life, which is to understand, and not to generation and propagation, for which woman serves; secondly, so that a certain dignity of man might be preserved in this, namely that just as God is the principle of the whole universe, so man should be the principle of the whole species. Acts 17: "God made the whole race of men from one."

7. But if you ask why God employed a rib in producing Eve, I answer that God did this first to show that woman is man's companion and equal at his side, not his servant; nor, again, is she his mistress, but is inferior and subject to the man as her head. Secondly, he did so to signify mystically that

the Church derives her origin from Christ. Hence the Apostle says in Eph. 5: “This mystery is great; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.”

CHAPTER II.

The Privileges of the State of Innocence.

1. The privileges of this most felicitous state were various. The first and principal privilege was that Adam was created in the state of grace and original justice. Thus the Council of Trent expressly teaches in Session 5, in the decree on original sin, can. 1, where it says that “by sinning Adam lost the holiness and justice in which he had been established.” This is also gathered from Scripture, Sir. 7: “God made man upright.” But man’s uprightness as regards the soul, of which Scripture speaks, consists in conversion to the last end simply speaking, which is an effect of grace and charity. And certainly, if God created the other corporeal creatures in a perfect state, and established trees, for example, at a size in which they could produce the fruits proper to their nature, how much more fitting was it that he should create man in the state and perfection in which he could produce meritorious fruits of eternal life, to which God had destined him, and consequently adorn him with sanctifying grace, which is the root and principle of merit for eternal life.

2. You will ask whether original justice was a habit entitatively distinct from sanctifying grace.

I answer negatively. This is gathered from St. Thomas, here, q. 95, a. 1, where he says: “Through the grace existing in his soul, the lower things were subjected to him,” namely to Adam in the state of innocence. But they were subjected through original justice. Therefore original justice was the habit of sanctifying grace. Just as capital grace and habitual grace in Christ, and habitual grace and sacramental grace in us, are not really distinguished, but are one simple habit that nevertheless receives different names because of the different effects it produces or the different aids it connotes, so likewise original justice and sanctifying grace in Adam were the same habit in reality, which is called by different names according to its order toward the different effects it caused. For insofar as it was the cause of holiness and the principle of merit for eternal life, it is called sanctifying grace; but insofar as it was the root of a threefold subjection, namely of the body to the soul, of the lower appetite to the higher, and of the higher to God, and also of the other gifts and privileges God conferred upon Adam for himself and his descendants in his creation, it is called original justice.

Nevertheless, sanctifying grace in Adam, insofar as it was original justice itself, possessed a certain mode of perfection that it does not possess in us, nor did it possess in Adam after the fall, when he recovered it through penance. This perfection did not consist in greater intensity, for sanctifying grace is now more intense in some just persons than it would have been in some men in the state of innocence had that state persevered, and yet in the former it does not have the character of original justice as it would have in the latter. Rather, it consisted in grace's greater dominion over the soul and the soul's greater subordination to grace, in a proportionate manner to the way in which, in heaven, from the most complete dominion of grace over the soul the endowments overflow into the body, perfectly subordinating and subjecting it to the soul. For the more grace dominates the mind, the more it gives the soul dominion over the body and subjects the body to it.

3. You will say: St. Thomas, here, q. 100, a. 1, ad 2, says that the supernatural subjection of reason to God, which existed through grace making one pleasing, was the root of original justice, in whose uprightness man was made. Therefore, since nothing can be the root of itself, according to St. Thomas original justice was a habit diverse from sanctifying grace.

4. I answer that St. Thomas does not mean that original justice in its entirety was rooted in a subjection of this kind. Rather, because the uprightness of original justice embraces several things, namely the subjection of the body to the soul, of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of reason to God, he means that there is such an order among them that the subjection of the mind to God is the root of the others. It is as though he said that, among the things embraced by original justice, the first and the root of the others is the subjection of the mind to God, which is through grace. The same holy Doctor declares this here, q. 95, a. 1, in these words: "Uprightness in the first man consisted in this, that reason was subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul; but the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third."

5. The second privilege granted to Adam in the state of innocence and in his production consisted in this, that his intellect was filled with the fullness of knowledge. For it is said of our first parents in Sir. 17: "He filled them with the discipline of understanding; he created for them the knowledge of the spirit; he filled their heart with sense and showed them good and evil." St. Thomas also proves this here, q. 94, a. 3, by two arguments. The first is that Adam imposed names upon the animals, as is said in Gen. 2. But he could not do this competently unless he correctly knew their nature and properties. Therefore God infused knowledge of them into him at his creation. The second is taken from the fact that Adam was initially

established to be the principle of others not only as regards generation, but also as regards instruction and governance. Hence, just as he was established in a perfect state as regards the body so that he could generate immediately, so he had to be established in a perfect state as regards the soul so that he could immediately instruct and govern others. Therefore he received knowledge of all those things concerning which man is naturally capable of being instructed, namely those things deduced from principles naturally known in themselves.

6. Nor did Adam at his creation possess knowledge only of natural things, but also of supernatural things, especially the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which were then revealed to him. Nevertheless, he knew the latter only as regards its substance, not as regards its motive, namely insofar as it was ordained to the redemption of the human race and satisfaction for original sin. For Adam did not have foreknowledge of his own sin, as Augustine teaches in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, c. 18; otherwise he would then have been most miserable, and such misery cannot accord with the most flourishing state of innocence.

7. The third privilege granted to Adam at his creation was that his will or appetite was then furnished with all infused virtues, both moral and theological. This was so both because it was demanded by the most excellent grace with which he was then adorned, which the virtues follow as properties, and because of that most felicitous state, in which all the powers of the soul had to be disposed and adorned by virtues. Hence Augustine, in his Address to the Catechumens, c. 2, speaking of Adam in the state of innocence, says that he was then “armed with chastity, composed by temperance, and resplendent with brightness”; and St. Ambrose, in *De Elia et ieiunio*, c. 4, says that he was “covered with the veil of all the virtues.”

8. The fourth privilege was that our first parent enjoyed full and despotic dominion over all living beings, as is evident from Gen. 1: “Let us make man according to our image and likeness, and let him rule over the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the beasts, and every creeping thing that moves upon the earth.” And it was certainly most fitting that he alone should rule who was endowed with reason and prudence, who through original justice was perfectly subjected to God, and who fully dominated his own appetite and his sensitive and lower powers. As a sign of this, God brought the living beings to Adam so that he might impose names upon them as upon servants, as Chrysostom judiciously explains in Homily 14 on Genesis.

9. The fifth privilege was immunity from every error and deception. For error and deception are evils of the soul and defects or miseries of an intellectual nature, which are punishments of sin. Hence man in the state of

innocence, before he sinned, could neither err nor be deceived, as St. Thomas teaches here, q. 94, a. 4, after Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, bk. 3, c. 18, where he says: “To approve false things as true, so as to err unwillingly, does not belong to the nature of man as established, but is a punishment of man as condemned.”

You will say: Eve was deceived by the serpent. Therefore in the state of innocence deception not only could exist, but in fact did exist before sin.

But I deny the consequence, for, as St. Thomas says in the place cited, ad 1: “Although the seduction of the woman did not precede the sin of the external act, it nevertheless followed an internal sin of pride.” For Augustine says in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, c. 30, that “the woman would not have believed the words of the serpent unless there already existed in her mind a love of her own power and a certain proud presumption concerning herself.”

10. The sixth privilege was immunity from every sickness, pain, and sorrow. For the most felicitous state of innocence was, as it were, a certain foretaste and beginning of heavenly beatitude, in which there will be not only an abundance of every good, but also immunity and freedom from every evil. Hence in the state of innocence man was also immortal, not because he possessed an incapacity to die, but because he had the power not to die if he had observed the law prescribed to him, as Augustine teaches in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 7, c. 25, in these words: “The body of Adam before sin was both mortal, because it could die, and immortal, because it could avoid dying. For it is one thing not to be able to die, as God created certain natures immortal, and another thing to be able not to die. In this latter manner the first man was created immortal, which was bestowed upon him through the tree of life, not through the constitution of nature.”

11. For a better understanding of this privilege, it must be observed that there are three principal causes of human death. The first is that man’s body is composed of things that are contrary and conflict with one another, namely the four elements and the four humors, and of parts that are not only diverse, but require diverse dispositions, affections, and temperaments. The second is natural heat continually consuming radical moisture; and although this is restored through food and drink, it is not restored with the same purity and integrity it originally possessed. The third consists in extrinsic agents capable of inflicting death upon man, such as venomous or fierce animals, hostile men, demons, and so forth.

In the state of innocence, therefore, God had fortified man against these three causes of death with such powerful remedies and strong protections that, had he remained in God’s grace, he would have had nothing to fear from them. Against the first cause, God had given man a certain

supernatural power by which he could preserve the contrary things composing the human body in due temperament and equality at all times. This power was nothing other than original justice itself, which had a threefold effect, namely to subject the mind to God, the body to the soul, and the lower appetite to the higher. Therefore it was not only the root of charity, by which the will is subjected to God as its last end, and of integrity, by which the lower appetite is subjected to reason, but also of immortality and impassibility, by which the body is perfectly subordinated and proportioned to the soul as a receptive potency to the act informing it. Hence St. Thomas, here, q. 81, a. 5, ad 3, says: “The immortality and impassibility of the first state did not arise from the condition of nature, but from original justice.”

Against the second cause of death, provision was made for man in the state of innocence through the tree of life, whose fruit perfectly repaired the daily loss of radical moisture and entirely restored its original purity and integrity. Against the third, provision was made through God’s singular providence and care, through the guardianship of the angels, and through the exceptional prudence then present in man, by which he could easily foresee and avoid everything harmful and destructive.

12. The seventh privilege was immunity from every venial sin. This arose not only from God’s special providence and protection, by which man was prevented from sinning venially during that most felicitous state before he sinned mortally, but also precisely from the power of the gift of integrity, or, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 89, a. 3, because of the infallible firmness of order by which the lower was contained under the higher. By “the lower,” however, he understands not only the sensitive appetite, but also lower reason insofar as it regards the things that are means to an end; for in this respect it is in a certain manner inferior to itself insofar as it regards the end.

Therefore, just as because of the perfect subordination of the sensitive appetite to reason, which the gift of integrity provided in the state of innocence, venial sins arising from the surreption of the sensitive appetite or from lack of deliberation were intrinsically repugnant to this state, since these occur only when the sensitive appetite anticipates reason and disturbs its judgment, so also, because of the perfect subordination of lower reason regarding means to higher reason considering the end, which the gift of integrity also produced in man in the state of innocence, since in that most felicitous state all lower things were subject to their superiors, venial sins by their genus and by smallness of matter were repugnant to this state. For, as the holy Doctor says in the same place: “That the human mind should

become disordered concerning the means while preserving due order toward the end, as happens when one sins venially, even by a sin venial in its genus or because of the smallness of the matter, arises from the fact that the means are not infallibly ordered under the end, which holds the highest place as a principle among appetible things.”

13. There is also another reason why every venial sin was intrinsically repugnant to man in the state of innocence. For by the nature and condition of the state of innocence every misery, sorrow, punishment, and vicious habit from which difficulty in acting well arises was repugnant to man. Therefore so was every venial sin. The consequence is evident, for every venial sin is a misery, requires the punishment and sorrow of penance in order to be remitted, and generates a vicious habit if it is frequently committed. Hence St. Thomas, in the place cited above, proves that venial sin could not exist in the state of innocence from the fact that nothing penal could exist in it, according to Augustine’s words in *De civitate Dei*, bk. 14, c. 10: “Nothing was absent that a good will could attain, nor was anything present that could offend the flesh or mind of man living happily.”

14. You will say, first: The state of original justice did not intrinsically and by its nature preserve man from mortal sins, as the fall of our first parents sufficiently shows. Therefore much less did it preserve him from venial sins, which are smaller and lighter.

But I deny the consequence and the parity. For the state of original justice did not by its nature demand that it be incapable of being lost, and consequently did not demand that man be preserved from the sins on account of which it could be lost, namely mortal sins. But intrinsically and by its nature it did demand that man be preserved from those sins through which it would not be lost, namely venial sins, since that most felicitous state by its nature demanded the exclusion of every pain, every sorrow, and every penal condition. It could not have accomplished this if venial sins had been compatible with it, as is evident from what has been said above.

Hence Augustine, in the place cited above, describing the state of innocence, says that it was “a tranquil avoidance of sin, during which no evil whatever from any other source rushed in to cause sorrow.” The solution belongs to St. Thomas in the cited article, ad 3, where he says: “Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the first state insofar as it corrupts that state, which venial sin cannot do. And because no disorder whatever can coexist with the integrity of the first state, it follows that the first man could not sin venially before he sinned mortally.”

15. You will say, secondly: Just as God forbade our first parents to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil under pain of mortal sin, so he

could have forbidden it under pain only of venial sin, since eating of it was not evil in itself. But, granted this, Adam could have violated that precept. Therefore he could have sinned venially.

Some answer that even if God had commanded Adam under pain only of venial sin to abstain from eating of the forbidden tree, nevertheless by eating from it he would have sinned mortally, not by reason of the precept, which obligated only under venial sin, but by reason of the most grave damage and harm he would have inflicted upon himself and his descendants by such eating, depriving himself and them of original justice. Just as, they say, a Carthusian sins mortally by eating meat, not by reason of the precept of the rule forbidding such eating, since that rule does not bind under mortal sin, but by reason of the most grave punishment to which he exposes himself and the immense harm he inflicts upon himself. This solution is not without probability.

16. Nevertheless, I answer secondly, in conformity with the principles already established: granting that God could have imposed such a precept obligating only under venial sin, I deny that Adam could have transgressed it before losing original justice. For he could not become disordered concerning the means before he was turned away and disordered from the end, as is evident from what was said above. I said, “granting that God could have imposed such a precept,” because although God could absolutely have forbidden Adam to eat of the forbidden tree under pain only of venial sin, he could not have done so on the supposition of the state of innocence. For, as we have shown, in that state there was so great a subjection of the sensitive appetite to reason, and of lower reason to higher reason, that as long as it endured no venial sin could exist in man.

CHAPTER III.

A Brief Description of the Earthly Paradise.

1. It is certain that the Paradise described by Moses in Gen. 2 was a visible and corporeal place, not something purely intelligible and spiritual, as Philo the Jew, Origen, and others once thought. For many things said by Scripture cannot be drawn to a mystical and allegorical sense, but must necessarily be understood in their proper and literal sense. Thus it is said: “And the Lord God had produced from the soil of the earth every tree beautiful to sight and pleasant for food.” Here “sight” is properly taken for the corporeal sense, and “food” for corporeal eating. Otherwise, what is said in c. 3, “The woman saw that the tree was good for food and beautiful to the eyes and delightful

to behold, and she took of its fruit and ate,” etc., would have to be understood not properly but metaphorically, and thus everything the Church believes concerning the sin of our first parent would be false. Hence Epiphanius says in the *Ancoratus*: “If there is no sensible Paradise, there is no fountain, no fig tree, no leaves, and Eve did not eat,” etc. “But then the truth has become a fable.”

2. It is also evident, against others whom Hugh of St. Victor mentions in his notes on Gen. 2, that by the earthly Paradise we must understand not the whole earth adorned with flowers and trees, but a particular place situated in a determinate region of the world. For Scripture says that Paradise was planted in the East, that God transferred Adam from the place where he had established him into Paradise, that in punishment for sin he cast him out of Paradise, and that he placed a cherub before Paradise to guard the way to the tree of life. All these things can be verified only of some particular place situated in a determinate region of the world. It therefore remains only that we briefly explain the location, size, and pleasantness or beauty of this most delightful place or Paradise.

3. As regards the first, there are two extremely opposed opinions. Some once held that the earthly Paradise was so elevated as to reach the sphere of the moon. Thus Strabo on Genesis and Bede, whom St. Thomas mentions in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 1. Tostado does not seem to depart very far from this opinion in his commentary on Gen. 2, q. 9, where he asserts that the earthly Paradise does not indeed reach the orb of the moon, but is at least twenty cubits higher than all the mountains of the earth, both because it must be free from winds and earthly vapors, and because the four rivers issuing from it could not otherwise conveniently irrigate the whole earth or run through so many different regions of the world.

On the contrary, Pereira, in *Commentariorum et disputationum in Genesim*, bk. 3, disp. *De paradiso*, q. 2, judges it more probable that Paradise was situated on some plain, both because the first elevation is unhealthy because of the proximity of the stars and the element of fire, and because plains are ordinarily more fertile and for the most part possess better fruits.

Between these extremely opposed opinions, the middle position seems more probable. It asserts that Paradise is neither so low as to be situated on a plain nor so high and elevated as to reach the lunar sphere or the highest region of the air or exceed the loftier mountains of the earth, but that it is situated in the uppermost part of this lowest region of the air and almost reaches the second region. For the uppermost part of this lowest region is a most suitable place for human habitation, since it is free from the disturbances and excessive cold and moisture of the second region, and

from the excessive heat that usually arises from the reflection of the sun's rays from the earth. Nor are violent winds found there, and that place can better receive the influences of the sun and stars. Nor is this opposed by what the authors of the first opinion say concerning the four rivers issuing from Paradise, for a river descending over long distances does not necessarily require a spring of great elevation, as is evident in many rivers.

4. How great the extent of this Paradise may be is likewise a problem among theologians. Some think it is immense and equals in size a kingdom of no small dimensions, such as France or Spain. They gather this from the great river by which it is irrigated and which is divided into four heads. Others assert that it is not so large and spacious, since Scripture calls it a garden and says that it was situated in the region of Eden, on its eastern side, and that in its midst were the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Certainly, in so difficult and obscure a matter and amid so great a diversity of opinions, it is difficult to define anything with certainty. I do not see why twenty or thirty leagues would not suffice for one garden, or why, although the river by which Paradise was watered was great, the space of so many leagues would not suffice for its course. Nor was it necessary that all Adam's descendants be able to remain there, for they had to multiply and fill the earth. Nevertheless, they could all frequently have visited that place as though by hereditary right, carried away from it the fruit of the tree of life, or grafted its branches in various places.

5. Finally, the beauty and pleasantness of the earthly Paradise are evident from the various names by which it is designated. Moses calls it "the Paradise of pleasure"; the Hebrews call it Gan Eden, which is interpreted "garden of delights"; St. Basil calls it "a place overflowing in every way with delights and abounding in every beauty of sensible creation"; and St. John Damascene calls it "the complete treasury of joy and pleasure." This is also gathered from the end for which it was established by God. For God established it as a place suited to felicity and innocence and as an earthly representation of the incomparable beauty of the heavenly Paradise. Hence, according to William of Paris and Tostado, it was called "Paradise" as though "preparing for the vision of God," for dwelling there was, as it were, a certain foretaste and anticipation of heavenly glory. St. Gregory elegantly explains this in his commentary on the fifth penitential Psalm, where, speaking of Adam dwelling in the earthly Paradise before he sinned, he says:

"His bread was delight in the vision of God through the mirror of creatures, satiety in the Word of God, the joy of interior repose, the splendor of inaccessible light, the refreshment of wisdom, and the presence of the Creator. Happy were those ancient days, displaying no darkness and no

obscurity, illuminated by the presence of the divinity, purified by the serenity of security, and adorned by the immensity of joy! Days of gladness and light, days of virtue and peace, days of delight and sweetness, disturbed by no sorrow, assailed by no distress, and overshadowed by no infirmity. The soul possessed these days in Paradise before, through the guilt of transgression, it fell from the state of uprightness.”

6. Alcimus Avitus celebrates and describes the wonderful pleasantness of this Paradise in these excellent verses:

*Here heaven's mildness preserves perpetual spring.
The stormy south wind is absent, and beneath an ever-clear sky
The clouds flee away, yielding to unbroken serenity.
Nor does the nature of the place permit freezing rains,
But its plants are enriched by their own dew.
Thus, while winter is absent and scorching summer does not burn,
Autumn occupies the year with fruits, and spring with flowers.*

7. By these words he declares that the pleasantness of the earthly Paradise was principally situated in four things, namely in the heavens and the air, in the waters, and in the very soil of the earth. In the heavens there was supreme healthfulness and at all times a most delightful evenness that produced, as it were, a perpetual spring. In the air there was great serenity and purity, and consequently great clarity, because, as Bede says, the clarity of light is proportioned to the purity of the air. There was an immense abundance of waters irrigating Paradise, and in its midst burst forth a great fountain that was divided into four rivers flowing into different regions of the world.

The first is the Phison, or Ganges, which fertilizes India. The second is the Gehon, or Nile, which irrigates Egypt and Ethiopia. The third is the Tigris, running with the greatest rapidity and speed, like a tiger. The fourth is the Euphrates; these latter two water Mesopotamia, Assyria, and Chaldea.

Finally, the soil of Paradise was excellent and most fertile, spontaneously producing, without human labor or hardship, though not without cultivation, everything that could fill all man's senses with the greatest delight and pleasure. Its fruitfulness was most especially evident in the production of the tree of life, whose fruit, as we said above in n. 6, restored diminished and lost radical moisture with the same purity and integrity it had previously possessed, even at man's origin, and consequently did not permit the bloom and vigor of youth to wither. Hence Augustine, to be cited below, says that Adam possessed “stability against old age from the tree of life.”

There was also in it the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was so called, as St. Thomas teaches, because after eating from it man learned by the experience of punishment what difference there was between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. In the same way, the well dug by Isaac's servants was called "the well of contention or calumny" from the dispute and conflict that arose between the shepherds of Gerar and the shepherds of Isaac, as related in Gen. 26.

8. You will ask whether the earthly Paradise still exists.

I answer that it is probable that it still remains intact. For it is said in Sir. 44: "Enoch pleased God and was transferred into Paradise, that he might give repentance to the nations." By these words Scripture seems openly to teach that Enoch is preserved alive in Paradise so that at the end of the world and in the time of Antichrist he may come and preach repentance to all. Hence Irenaeus, in *Adversus haereses*, bk. 5, c. 5, says that it is an apostolic tradition that Enoch and Elijah now remain in Paradise, and that he learned this from presbyters who had been disciples of the Apostles. Augustine, in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, bk. 1, c. 3, says that "Enoch and Elijah are nourished in the Paradise of life, as Adam was before sin, who possessed refreshment against weakness from the fruits of the trees and stability against old age from the tree of life." Jerome, Epistle 61, calls Enoch and Elijah inhabitants of Paradise. Finally, St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 49, a. 5, ad 2, says: "Enoch was carried away into the earthly Paradise, where, together with Elijah, he is believed to live until the coming of Antichrist."

From this the principal foundation of the contrary opinion is overthrown. That opinion asserts that the earthly Paradise no longer exists because it was submerged by the waters of the flood, since those waters rose fifteen cubits, as Scripture says, above the highest mountains. For it is no more unfitting that Paradise should have been miraculously preserved from the flooding waters of the deluge than that Enoch should have been delivered from them, especially since it would have been a more fitting miracle to prevent the waters from overwhelming Paradise than to preserve Enoch for an entire year either in the air above the waters or upon the earth amid the waters, like a fish.

9. You will say, first, with Pereira: If Paradise remained untouched by the waters of the flood, Noah built the ark in vain, since he could easily have been preserved safely from the deluge in Paradise together with his family and the animals.

10. Malvenda answers that Paradise is properly a place destined for human innocence and felicity on earth, and was in no way fitting for Noah and his sons, who were subject to sin, death, and the miseries of this life. But

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it is right and fitting for Enoch and Elijah to dwell there, since they are pure candidates for eternity, exempt from the miseries of this life, and consecrated to the greatest mysteries, until in the last age they return to this world to fight against Antichrist and, as Tertullian says, extinguish him with their blood.

11. You will say, secondly: If Paradise still remained intact, someone would have discovered it, since the whole world has become known to men and some have traveled through all its parts.

St. Thomas answers in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 102, a. 1, ad 3, that this place has not yet been discovered after so many journeys because “it is separated from our habitation by certain impediments, whether mountains, seas, or some torrid region that cannot be crossed.” From this you will understand that the things read in certain apocryphal books about a certain Macarius the Roman and three other monks are fabulous and invented. They are said to have devoted themselves with every effort to discovering the location of Paradise and, after traveling through distant regions, finally reached the entrance to Paradise itself. They were nevertheless prevented from entering and did not dare approach, terrified by the dreadful guard of a cherub holding a fiery, revolving sword.

CHAPTER IV.

The State of Integral Nature.

1. The state of integral nature is constituted by a certain vigor of reason, or of the higher part of the soul, perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason and causing man to be in no way discordant with reason in any of his acts or affections. Cajetan says that this vigor belongs neither simply to nature, because it does not flow from nature, nor simply to grace, because it extends only to a good proportioned to rational nature, namely living according to reason. Rather, it belongs in a certain manner to nature and in a certain manner to grace, insofar as man never possesses and cannot possess this vigor from his natural powers, but it comes to him from conjunction with original justice.

2. From this it is evident that the state of integral nature is diverse from the state of pure nature, because the aforesaid vigor perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason is not connaturally due to human nature. Hence man could have been created without it, as we shall show in c. 6. This is also evident from the bull of Pius V and Gregory XIII by which the following proposition of Michael Baius was condemned: “The opinion of the Doctors

that the first man could have been created and established by God without natural justice is false.” Here by “natural justice” he understands the gift of integrity with which Adam was endowed at his creation.

3. Whether this same state is really distinguished from the state of innocence or original justice is a matter of disagreement and controversy among theologians, some affirming and others denying it. But the affirmative opinion seems more probable, because the state of innocence indeed includes this vigor perfectly subjecting the appetite to reason, but in addition to it includes many other gifts and privileges, namely immortality, freedom from pain, immunity from every error and deception, and the other things we explained in Chapter II. Therefore the state of integral nature is distinguished from the state of innocence as the included from that which includes it.

Hence, although in our first parents human nature possessed the gift of integrity through conjunction with original justice, and consequently the state of integral nature and the state of innocence were never separated, they are nevertheless separable from one another. For the gift of integrity can be communicated to man without original justice and the other gifts and privileges annexed to it.

CHAPTER V.

The State of Fallen Nature.

1. That Adam’s first sin was pride is openly gathered from Scripture, for it is said in Sir. 10: “The beginning of every sin is pride.” And in Tob. 4: “Never permit pride to rule in your thought or in your word, for from it every perdition took its beginning.” Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, bk. 14, c. 13, and Gregory the Great, *Moralia*, bk. 34, c. 17, understand these words of Adam’s first sin, from which all our perdition and sin derive their origin. The latter says: “It is written: ‘The beginning of every sin is pride.’ Through this the devil fell, and through it he cast down man, who followed him. For he attacked the salvation of our immortality with the same weapon by which he extinguished the life of his own beatitude.”

This is also evident from the first motive the devil proposed to our first parents for eating of the forbidden tree, namely the disordered desire for their own excellence, which is the proper object of pride, and likeness to God: “You shall be as gods.” Hence Augustine says on Ps. 68: “Adam and Eve wished to seize divinity and lost felicity.”

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This does not mean that they desired complete equality with God and wished to change their nature and become gods by essence instead of men, for otherwise they would have fallen into error and unbelief before falling into pride and self-exaltation. Rather, they wished to be gods by imitation and likeness: first, as regards knowledge of good and evil, as the serpent suggested to them, namely that through the power of their own nature they might determine for themselves what was good and what was evil in action; or also that through themselves they might foreknow what good or evil would befall them, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 163, a. 2.

Secondly, they wished to be as gods as regards the power of acting, namely that by the power of their own nature they might act so as to obtain beatitude, as the holy Doctor says in the same place. Augustine indicates this in *De Genesi ad litteram*, bk. 11, c. 30, where he says that “there existed in the woman’s mind a love of her own power and a certain proud presumption concerning herself.” And in the *Enchiridion*, c. 45, he says that “through pride man chose rather to be in his own power than in God’s.” Prosper indicates the same thing clearly in his poem *De ingratis*, c. 43, in these words:

*This counsel the sower of death insinuated into our first parents;
By this device he cast all men down in one,
When he persuaded them that prudent freedom
And desire instructed by the prohibition
Would obtain for themselves, without the Lord’s gift,
Something far more excellent.*

Hence some not unfittingly observe that our first parents were the first patriarchs of the Pelagian heresy, and may deservedly be called not only first parents but first Pelagians.

2. Adam’s sin, in addition to the deformity of pride, also possessed two other species of malice, namely disobedience and gluttony. First, he inordinately desired his own excellence as the end and primary motive. He then willed what was proposed to him as the means of possessing such excellence, namely not to be subject to the divine precept forbidding him to eat of the forbidden tree. Finally, he actually violated that precept and ate of the prohibited fruit.

By reason of the first, that act was pride, whose object is one’s own excellence desired without due measure. By reason of the second, there was in it the special malice of disobedience, for this consists in contempt and violation of a divine precept as expressly willed. By reason of the third, the same act was constituted in the species of gluttony, because, since the

precept concerned not eating, the affection by which he violated that precept was a disordered appetite for food, in which gluttony consists.

3. That sin was most grave by reason of three circumstances. First, from the circumstance of the person sinning, who excelled in grace, wisdom, virtues, and the other privileges explained above. “For what,” says Bernard in Sermon 2 *De Annuntiatione*, “was lacking to him whom mercy guarded, truth instructed, justice ruled, and peace cherished? He was an inhabitant of Paradise, lord of the earth, citizen of heaven, a member of the Lord’s household, brother of the blessed spirits, and coheir of the heavenly powers.”

Secondly, the place of Paradise, which Adam dishonored by his crime, notably aggravated his sin, since in that place there was no occasion of sin and no incitement to act evilly. On the contrary, there were very many and most powerful incitements to praise, worship, and love God and to obey his commands.

Thirdly, that sin was most grave because of the harms that followed from it, namely the loss of so many and such great goods, never afterward to be recovered, and the necessity of so many and such great evils that it produced. Nor did this harm redound to Adam alone, but by his fall and ruin he dragged all his descendants, as many as afterward existed or ever will exist, into the destruction of sin and death. Hence Bernard, in Homily 2 on *Missus est*, addressing Adam and Eve, says: “Just as you were the parents of all, so you were the destroyers of all; and what is more unhappy, you were destroyers before you were parents.”

4. The gravity of this sin will become still more evident by explaining the privations, defects, and wounds it introduced into human nature. First, therefore, it despoiled human nature of original justice and the gift of integrity, which Adam had received from God at his creation for himself and his descendants. For, as St. Thomas reasons in *Opusculum* 192: “Because so ordered an integrity was caused by the subjection of the human will to God, it followed that, when the human will withdrew from divine subjection, that perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason and of the body to the soul was lost. Hence it followed that man experienced in the lower appetite the disordered movements of concupiscence, anger, and the other passions.”

He derived this teaching from Augustine, who writes in *De civitate Dei*, bk. 13, c. 13: “After the commandment was transgressed, divine grace immediately withdrew, and our first parents were ashamed of the nakedness of their bodies. For they experienced movements of their disobedient flesh as a reciprocal punishment of their own disobedience.”

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Gregory teaches similar things in *Moralia*, bk. 26, c. 13, where, speaking of Adam, he says: “Because he refused to be subject to his Author, he lost his right over the flesh that had been subject to him and which he ruled, so that the shame of his disobedience might be repaid within himself and, once overcome, he might learn what he had lost through pride.”

5. Secondly, Adam’s sin rendered human nature subject to sicknesses, pains, and other corporeal miseries. For although death, sicknesses, and other corporeal miseries naturally befall man, since he is composed of the four elements and consequently of the four primary qualities that conflict with one another, original justice, by perfectly subjecting and subordinating the body to the soul, prevented these defects, much as a stake restrains a ship situated in the middle of a river from being carried down into the sea. Therefore, just as one who removed the stake would be the accidental cause, as removing an impediment, of the ship’s descent into the sea, so Adam’s sin, which removed original justice, is the accidental cause of death and the other corporeal defects that are means to it.

Hence Augustine says in *De civitate Dei*, bk. 13, c. 15: “It is established among Christians who hold the Catholic faith that even the death of the body itself was inflicted upon us not by the law of nature but by the desert of sin through transgression.” Hence Isidore says in the *Etymologiae* that death, *mors*, is named from biting, *mordendo*, because when our first parent bit the forbidden fruit, by that bite he incurred death.

6. Thirdly, through Adam’s sin human nature was not only despoiled of original justice, the gift of integrity, immortality and impassibility, and the other gratuitous gifts, but was also wounded in its natural goods. This is evident from the parable of the man descending from Jerusalem to Jericho, who fell among robbers; they despoiled him, inflicted wounds upon him, and departed, leaving him half-dead. On this the Venerable Bede says: “Sins are called wounds because through them the integrity of human nature is violated.”

7. St. Thomas excellently explains these wounds inflicted upon human nature through Adam’s sin in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3. He says that just as in the human body there is said to be a wound when some rupture or division occurs among continuous and united parts, so in the soul that rupture or division made by sin in its powers is deservedly called a wound. For those powers were divided and separated from the order of reason, to which they had been perfectly united through original justice and the gift of integrity, by the removal of that order.

Hence, since through original sin four principal powers were deprived of their order to their proper objects—namely the intellect, which is deprived

of its order to the true; the will, which is deprived of its order to the honorable good consonant with reason; the concupiscible appetite, which is deprived of its order to the pleasurable as moderated by reason; and the irascible appetite, which is deprived of its order to the arduous and difficult, so that it is not borne toward it promptly and readily—there are four wounds inflicted upon man through that sin. These are the wound of ignorance, by which reason is dulled in the knowledge of truth; the wound of malice, by which the will is hindered in pursuing the honorable good; the wound of concupiscence, by which the concupiscible appetite is inflamed and borne immoderately toward a pleasurable good contrary to reason; and the wound of weakness, by which the irascible appetite languishes and grows sluggish in pursuing the arduous good.

Original sin itself, however, is not properly called a wound, but rather an infirmity or languor of nature, because through it the whole man is made infirm and languishes. Thus we do not call the fever from which the whole animal suffers a wound, but a languor or infirmity.

8. That Adam obtained pardon for his sin through penance and was restored to God's grace is certain by faith. Augustine, Epiphanius, and other holy Fathers condemn the contrary as erroneous against the Encratites, who denied that Adam was freed from his sin through penance. Sacred Scripture also favors this, for Wis. 10 says: "She," that is, Wisdom, "preserved him who was first formed by God, the father of the world, when he alone had been created, and brought him forth from his sin." By these words Scripture openly testifies that God freed Adam from his sin and restored him to his former grace.

Hence Tertullian says in *Adversus Marcionem*, bk. 1, c. 25, that God did not curse Adam or Eve, but benignly restored them after their fall as candidates for restoration and as relieved through confession. Similarly, Irenaeus says in *Adversus haereses*, bk. 3, c. 37, that Adam did penance for his transgression, and that God bestows his kindness upon penitents. He asserts that Adam showed this penance by making himself a girdle from fig leaves, which could afflict the flesh.

Others add that God made garments of skins for Adam and his wife so that by this clothing he might signify their penance. For the skins of dead animals represented the virtue of penance, through which one must die to sins and subdue and mortify all carnal desires.

Finally, the holy Fathers commonly teach that Adam and Eve were freed from the final punishment through the blood of Christ and obtained eternal salvation. Hence Epiphanius, in Heresy 46, teaches that it was not without

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mystery that Adam was buried on Mount Calvary, since he was the first who was to experience the efficacy of Christ's blood.

Augustine asserts the same in Sermon 71 *De tempore*: "This also is related by the tradition of the ancients, that Adam, the first man, was once buried in the very place where the Cross was fixed, and that the place was therefore called Calvary because the head of the human race is said to have been buried there. And consider, brethren, that it is not unfittingly believed that the Physician was raised up where the sick man lay. It was fitting that where human pride had fallen, divine mercy should there bend down, and that the precious blood, while deigning to touch by its dripping even the bodily blood of the ancient sinner, should redeem the creature."

Jerome teaches similar things in Epistle 17, written in the name of Paula and Eustochium to Marcella. Speaking of Jerusalem, he says: "In this city, or rather in this very place, Adam is said both to have dwelt and to have died. Hence the place where our Lord was crucified is called Calvary, because the skull of the ancient man was buried there, so that the blood of the second Adam, that is, Christ, dripping from the Cross, might wash away the sins of the first Adam and original founder lying beneath it, and then the saying of the Apostle might be fulfilled: 'Awake, you who sleep, rise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you.'"

CHAPTER VI.

The State of Pure Nature.

1. The state of pure nature implies two things, namely nature and its purity. Nature includes the essence and the things connaturally due to it. Purity excludes everything undue, or not connaturally demanded by the essence. Such things can be of two kinds. Some perfect man in relation to an end connatural to him and to operations of the natural order, such as the gift of integrity discussed in Chapter IV. Others perfect him in relation to a supernatural end and operations proportioned to it, such as the gifts of grace strictly so called.

2. It is certain that this state never actually existed, since God created Adam with the gift of integrity and original justice, as was shown above, and the angels obtained sanctifying grace together with their nature at their creation, according to Augustine's words: "God was in the angels, establishing their nature and bestowing grace."

The sole difficulty and controversy among theologians, therefore, is whether that state is possible. That it is possible by the extraordinary and

absolute power of God, by which God can act outside the ordinary course of things and contrary to or beyond the natural inclination of created things, can hardly be called into doubt. For God freely confers supernatural gifts upon the intellectual creature, and it depends upon his free decree that it be elevated to a supernatural end. Hence the sole difficulty is whether, by God's ordinary power, that is, by God acting according to the natural course and inclination of things, man could have been created in pure nature, or without the gifts of sanctifying grace, integrity, and immortality. Some recent authors deny this with Jansenius, and among our own Vincent Contenson has lately adhered to them in vol. 5, diss. 1, spec. 2. The Thomists, however, commonly affirm it with the Angelic Doctor, whose words we shall cite below.

3. I therefore say, first: God could, even by his ordinary power, have created man without sanctifying grace and consequently not elevated him to the supernatural order and beatitude, but left him in his purely natural condition. Thus St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 113, a. 2, ad 1: "Although man before he sins could have existed without grace and without fault, after sin he cannot exist without fault." And in *Quodlibeta* I, a. 8, when about to treat the question whether man in the state of innocence loved God above all things, he resolves it thus: "I answer that, if man was made in grace, as may be gathered from the words of Basil and Augustine, this question has no place, for it is evident that one existing in grace loves God above himself through charity. But because it was possible for God to make man in his purely natural condition, it is useful to consider how far natural love can extend." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the state of pure nature, through the exclusion of grace and the other supernatural gifts, is possible.

4. Reason also supports this. For in employing his ordinary power, God is bound to confer upon creatures only those things that are connaturally due to them and are according to their connatural demand and inclination. But the gifts of grace and glory are connaturally due to no intellectual creature, since they regard not its natural potency but only its obediential potency. Moreover, it is a contradiction in terms for something to be gratuitous and supernatural and at the same time due to nature or according to its connatural demand and inclination. Therefore God could, even by his ordinary power, produce an intellectual creature without those gifts.

5. This is confirmed, first: Every creature is naturally and from its origin God's servant, since such servitude is founded upon creation. But a servant is not naturally his master's heir, as is stated in Gen. 25. Therefore no creature, however pure and innocent in its origin, demands by its nature the

gifts of grace and glory, nor is it ordained by nature to the clear vision of God and supernatural beatitude, which is God's inheritance. Consequently it could have been created by God, even by his ordinary power, without such gifts. Cyril indicates this argument in his commentary on John, bk. 1, c. 13: "Since the creature is a servant, it is elevated to the supernatural only now and by the will of the Father."

6. This is confirmed, secondly: Men, even when innocent, and the angels are only adoptive sons of God, for Christ alone is the natural Son. But an adoptive son is called to the inheritance not by right of birth, but by a gratuitous assumption that does not follow from his nature. Therefore neither the angels nor innocent men can possess the clear vision of God, which is his inheritance, through their nature; rather, they must be elevated to it through grace, that is, through some gift higher than nature and not due to them. Consequently they can be created without such a gift.

Hence St. Thomas says in *De malo*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 14: "The lack of the divine vision can belong to someone in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as he does not possess within himself that by which he can attain the divine vision; and in this way the lack of the divine vision would belong to one who existed in his purely natural condition, without sin. For in this way the lack of the divine vision would not be a punishment, but a defect consequent upon every created nature." Nothing clearer or more explicit can be said for our conclusion and for the possibility of the state of pure nature.

7. I say, secondly: By God's ordinary power, which provides for individual things according to what they naturally require, man could, even before Adam's fall, have been created in the state of pure nature as regards the gift of integrity, that is, with the unrestrained and rebellious inclination of the sensitive part against reason.

8. This is proved, first, from St. Thomas in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, where he says: "From the beginning, when God established man, he could also have formed another man from the slime of the earth and left him in the condition of his nature, namely so that he would be mortal and passible and would experience the conflict of concupiscence against reason. In this nothing would be derogated from human nature, because it follows from the principles of nature. Nevertheless, this defect would not have possessed the character of guilt or punishment in him, because it would not have been caused by his will." By these words he openly teaches our conclusion.

Nor is what the recent author cited above says of any force, namely that St. Thomas is speaking there of the possibility of the state of pure nature in relation to God's extraordinary and absolute power, not in relation to his

ordinary power. For the reason by which he proves that man could be produced with the struggle of concupiscence against reason and with desire unrestrained by the gift of integrity, namely “because it follows from the principles of nature,” clearly shows that he is speaking of the possibility of the state of pure nature in relation to God’s ordinary power, since God’s ordinary power is that by which God operates in conformity with the nature of things and what follows from it.

9. Hence the conclusion is proved, secondly, by a fundamental argument: Integrity of nature, or the perfect subjection of the lower appetite to the higher, is not connaturally due to man. Therefore man could have been created without it, not only by God’s absolute power, but also by his ordinary power. The consequence is evident, for God’s ordinary power is bound to provide for things only according to what they connaturally require, not according to those things that are undue to their nature.

The antecedent is proved, first, from Augustine, *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 5, c. 17, where, speaking of the first man before sin, he says: “The grace of God was indeed great there, where an earthly and animal body did not possess bestial lust,” that is, unrestrained concupiscence, as Jansenius himself explains. “Therefore, because he was clothed with grace, he had nothing in his naked body of which to be ashamed; when despoiled of grace, he perceived what he had to cover.” Certainly, if it was a great grace that the first man before sin did not possess bestial lust or unrestrained concupiscence, the subjection of the lower appetite to the higher is not connaturally due to man.

The same antecedent is proved, secondly, both by the authority and the argument of St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1, where he says: “It is evident that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since natural gifts remained even in the demons after sin.”

It is proved, thirdly, by this argument: A remedy for a defect connatural to a nature is connaturally due to no nature, as, for example, a remedy for corruptibility is not due to a sublimary nature. But integrity of nature, or the perfect subjection of the lower appetite to the higher, is a remedy for a defect natural to man, namely the rebellion of concupiscence against reason. Therefore it is not connaturally due to man.

The major is evident. The minor also seems manifest, for since man is composed of two contrary parts, namely rational and sensitive, he possesses two inclinations or appetites. One tends toward an honorable good consonant with reason, while the other tends toward a sensible and pleasurable good that is sometimes forbidden by the laws of reason. From

this arises the conflict and rebellion of concupiscence against reason, as unhappy experience sufficiently shows.

10. I say, thirdly: By his ordinary power God could, before Adam's fall, have created man in the state of pure nature as regards the gift of immortality, that is, with the necessity of dying.

11. This conclusion is proved in the same manner as the preceding one. Immortality, or the power not to die, is not connaturally due to man. Therefore man could have been created without it, not only by God's absolute power, but also by his ordinary power. The consequence is evident from what has been said above.

The antecedent is proved from Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, c. 15, where he says: "The power not to die was bestowed upon Adam through the tree of life, not through the constitution of nature. Man was mortal by the condition of his animal body, but immortal by the benefit of the Creator."

St. Thomas teaches the same in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 4: "That immortality and impassibility which man possessed in the first state were not present in him from the principles of nature, but from the benefit of the Creator." Therefore, according to both holy Doctors, immortality, or the power not to die, is not naturally due to man.

Reason also commends this, for, as we argued in the preceding conclusion, a remedy for a defect connatural to a nature is connaturally due to no nature. But the gift of immortality is a remedy for a defect connatural to man, namely mortality or corruptibility, which follows from his intrinsic constitution or from his natural principles, which are prime matter and the rational soul. For because prime matter is not fully satisfied by its form in any composite, but everywhere remains hungry and with an appetite for another form, it consequently gives place to contrary qualities, passions, and corruptive alterations through which composites tend toward destruction and corruption. Therefore the gift of immortality is not connaturally due to man.

12. Against the preceding conclusions Father Contenson objects, first: It is not fitting that man be produced in a state in which he cannot obtain the perfect beatitude he naturally desires; otherwise God would have implanted in men an appetite for beatitude in vain. But in the state of pure nature man could not attain the perfect beatitude he naturally desires, since it consists in the clear vision of God, which the state of pure nature could in no way attain, because that state would exclude all grace and, much more, the beatific vision, which is consummated grace. Therefore the state of pure nature is not fitting, nor is it possible by God's ordinary power.

13. I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. To its proof I say that, although in the state in which human nature is elevated to the supernatural order and end man's perfect beatitude consists in the clear vision of God, this would not be so in the state of pure nature. For man created in his purely natural condition would not be ordained to a supernatural end, but only to a natural end.

If you ask in what this beatitude would consist, I answer that theologians place it in a most perfect and delightful contemplation of God as Author of nature. This would not belong to the clear vision of God, but would be only an abstractive knowledge of him obtained from creatures, especially from separate substances, known not only through acquired species, but principally through infused species and an implanted knowledge.

They add that this most perfect knowledge or contemplation would be the root of a natural love of God and of the other natural virtues and of the entire uprightness of the will, and consequently would exclude every sin and every disquiet and anxiety.

14. But the aforesaid author presses the objection and says that a desire to see God is implanted in man by nature, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 1, from which the possibility of the beatific vision is proved. He confirms this in *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 3, c. 50, by six excellent arguments. But in the state of pure nature this desire would be vain, since it could never be fulfilled. Therefore that state is not possible by God's ordinary power.

15. I answer by denying the major. For, as the Thomists commonly teach in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision, there is in man considered in himself, or destitute of faith and grace, no appetite for the clear vision of God. Hence St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 20, a. 2, in the body, that "there is in man an innate natural appetite for natural beatitude, but not for supernatural beatitude, which consists in the clear vision of God."

And in *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 2, q1a. 3, he says: "Although the will is borne by natural inclination toward beatitude according to its common notion, that it should be borne toward this or that particular beatitude does not arise from an inclination of nature, but through the discernment of reason, by which it discovers that man's highest good consists in this or that."

To the objection from the First Part and from the *Summa contra Gentiles*, our Thomists respond in two ways. First, Ferrariensis, on the cited passage of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, says that when St. Thomas teaches that, once God's effects are seen, there arises in us a natural desire to see the cause, he

does not mean that there is in us a desire to see God arising from the powers of nature. Rather, there is in us a desire to see God connatural and proportioned to the knowledge we possess of him.

Hence, because through the natural light of the intellect we know him very imperfectly and only as Author of nature, from that knowledge there arises in us a certain imperfect desire to know and see him as natural Author and as regards those predicates and attributes reflected in creatures. On the contrary, because through faith we know him more perfectly and as Author of grace and glory, from such supernatural knowledge there arises in us a connatural desire proportioned to such knowledge, namely to see him as he is in himself.

16. Secondly, others answer that the holy Doctor means that man naturally desires the clear vision of God, not by an innate appetite but by an elicited appetite, and not by an absolute and efficacious appetite, but by an inefficacious and conditional appetite, namely if it were possible for a creature to see God intuitively.

Nor is the objection raised against this by the recent author of any force, namely that St. Thomas in the cited places proves the possibility of the vision from that appetite, whereas the possibility of the thing desired cannot be concluded from an inefficacious and conditional elicited appetite, since such an appetite is often borne toward impossibilities. For we answered this objection in the Treatise on the Beatific Vision at the end of the first chapter. We therefore refer the reader to that place, lest we uselessly repeat the same things here.

17. The same author objects, secondly: In the state of pure nature man would be subject to miseries, punishments, afflictions, and even death. But it is not just that man be afflicted by sicknesses, pains, and death unless he has merited them through sin. Therefore the state of pure nature is not consonant with God's equity and goodness, and consequently is not possible by his ordinary or ordained power.

18. I answer that corporeal miseries and afflictions are of two kinds. Some are natural defects consequent upon human nature itself or upon the matter of which men are composed, such as sicknesses and corporeal death. Others are preternatural to man, such as the punishment of eternal burning. God inflicts the second upon no one without his fault. The first, however, can befall man without his fault and consequently can exist in the state of pure nature, since God is not bound to impede the course of nature and the action of natural causes so that creatures, even rational creatures, may be free from every evil, as though, says Augustine, "they were the supreme and immutable good."

I add that irrational creatures, even harmless ones, such as doves and innocent lambs, although guilty of no sin, nevertheless suffer pain and death, because this is the natural condition of the body of which they are composed. But the human body possesses the same nature and constitution as the bodies of animals. Therefore, even if in the state of pure nature man were free from every sin, including original sin, he would nevertheless be subject to sicknesses, pains, death, and other natural miseries and defects.

19. It is objected, thirdly: That state is not possible by God's ordained power in which the resurrection of the dead would not be possible. But in the state of pure nature the resurrection of the dead would not be possible. Therefore such a state is not possible by God's ordained power.

The minor is evident, because the resurrection of the dead is supernatural and exceeds all the powers of nature, since there is no return from privation to habit. But the state of pure nature excludes everything supernatural.

The major is proved from the fact that man's natural desire tends toward felicity. But the soul cannot obtain this unless it is again united to the body, because, as St. Thomas says in *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 4, c. 79: "Ultimate felicity is the perfection of the one who is happy. Therefore, whoever lacks something required for perfection does not yet possess perfect felicity, because his desire is not yet completely at rest." Therefore the soul separated from the body desires to be reunited to it so that it may obtain complete and perfect felicity. Consequently that state is not possible by God's ordinary power in which the resurrection of the dead, or the reunion of the separated soul with the body, is not possible.

20. I answer by denying the major. To its proof I say that, although in the state in which human nature is elevated to the supernatural order the soul separated from the body desires to be reunited to it so that it may attain complete felicity, it would not desire this in the state of pure nature.

The reason is that in the first state the soul separated from the body knows through the supernatural light of faith or glory that its reunion with the body is not only possible but will also occur at some time. From this knowledge arises the desire for such reunion; and if it never obtained that reunion, its appetite would never be at rest. Consequently the resurrection of bodies is required for the soul's perfect felicity in the state of the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order. This alone is intended by the holy Doctor in the cited place, where he proves the future resurrection of the dead from man's natural desire for felicity.

But in the state of pure nature, since the soul separated from the body would lack every supernatural light and would not know that its reunion

with the body was possible, it would not desire that reunion as a complement of its felicity. Rather, its appetite would be perfectly at rest, although in that state the resurrection of the dead would not be possible.

21. You will say: This argument indeed proves that in the state of pure nature there would not be in the separated soul an elicited appetite for reunion with the body, but it does not prove that it would have no innate appetite for it, since this appetite does not presuppose knowledge, as the other does, but is implanted by nature.

22. But on the contrary: An innate appetite is a certain weight of nature toward a good connaturally due to it and attainable by the powers of nature. But the reunion of the separated soul with the body is not connaturally due to it, nor is it possible by the powers of nature, since it is eminently supernatural and miraculous and one of the principal mysteries of our faith. Therefore the separated soul does not possess an innate appetite for it, but only an elicited appetite presupposing faith and knowledge of its possibility.

23. This is confirmed: An innate appetite is from God as Author of nature. But the appetite of the separated soul for reunion with the body is not from God as Author of nature. Therefore it is not innate but elicited.

The major is evident. The minor is proved. The Author of nature does not give an appetite that he cannot fulfill. But God as Author of nature cannot fulfill or quiet the appetite the separated soul possesses for reunion with the body. Therefore such an appetite is not implanted by God as Author of nature.

The major is evident, for nature, or the Author of nature, does nothing in vain. But he would do something in vain if he gave an appetite for something to which he could not bring the creature. The minor is no less evident, since the reunion of the separated soul with the body is entirely supernatural and outside the sphere of the whole of nature, and even of the Author of the whole of nature considered precisely as such, for in this respect he is restricted to natural effects. Hence the resurrection of bodies will proceed from God as supernatural Author; otherwise it would not be a mystery of our faith, which concerns only supernatural objects.

24. Finally, the aforesaid author objects: That state is not fitting or possible by God's ordinary power in which man could not love God above all things. But man could not do this in the state of pure nature, since man cannot efficaciously love God above all things without supernatural assistance, which is incompatible with the state of pure nature because that state excludes everything supernatural. Therefore that state is not possible by God's ordained power.

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I answer by granting the major and denying the minor. For, as we shall say in the Treatise on Grace, in the state of pure nature man could for a brief time love God as Author of nature with God's general concurrence alone, although he could not long persevere in such love without special assistance of the natural order. God would grant this assistance whenever man was bound by the precept of persevering in such love, as demanded by the gentleness of his providence, which never commands impossibilities.

25. You will say: The state of pure nature excludes every special assistance, even of the natural order; otherwise it would be confused with the state of integral nature. Therefore the solution is of no force.

26. I answer by denying the antecedent. For the state of pure nature would not exclude special assistance of the natural order, but only grace that is entitatively supernatural, or natural assistance after the manner of a permanent habit and form, such as would be grace healing nature and constituting it in natural integrity, as is evident from what was said in Chapter IV. Hence we do not confuse the state of integral nature with the state of pure nature. Rather, the former is sufficiently distinguished from the latter by that habitual gift perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason. The arguments of Jansenius against the state of pure nature were proposed and answered in the *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*.

CHAPTER VII.

Whether Man in the State of Pure Nature Would Have Possessed
Greater Moral Powers for Acting Rightly Than
He Now Possesses in the State of Fallen Nature.

1. Nearly all the recent authors teach the negative position, including Suárez, Vásquez, Molina, and others. They think that human nature was not injured in its natural goods through original sin, but was only despoiled of the gratuitous gifts it possessed in the state of innocence, and that pure and fallen man differ only as a naked man differs from one who has been stripped or despoiled.

Some of the older Thomists favor this opinion, especially Cajetan, who uses this example of a naked and a despoiled man. This opinion formerly did not displease us, but appeared highly probable. Hence we taught it not only in our *Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae*, but also in the earlier editions of our *Manuale Thomistarum*.

Nevertheless, after the matter was more maturely discussed and attentively weighed, I now judge the opinion of Diego Álvarez and Thomas

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de Lemos to be altogether true. It asserts that through original sin man was not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts but also wounded in his natural goods, and consequently that the moral powers of fallen man are less than those that would have existed in a man in pure nature, or established in his purely natural condition.

They pronounce this opinion so true that the weakness of nature wounded by sin is the basis and foundation upon which Augustine's entire doctrine concerning medicinal grace rests, and that doctrine must necessarily collapse if this foundation is overthrown.

And certainly St. Prosper, in his Letter to Demetrias, openly teaches that the perverse opinion of the Pelagians, by which they said that grace is not necessary for observing the commandments and is given according to our merits, arose from another opinion by which they denied original sin, or asserted that man's free choice was not injured by it. His words are:

"From this arose that fraudulent praise of human nature and that defense of the original dignity extending through all men. From this it was asserted that Adam's sin harmed by example, not by transmission, and that just as it had been possible for him not to violate the commandment, so it remained free for each man to avoid sin. From this came the emptying of the baptism of infants, who were said to be gifted only with adoption and not absolved from any guilt. Finally, from this arose a feigned and insincere confession of divine grace, which was said to be given according to merits, rather than to be that from which merits arise."

§ 1.

The Affirmative Conclusion Is Established.

2. I therefore say that man in the state of fallen nature possesses lesser moral powers for acting rightly than he would have possessed in the state of pure nature had he been established in it.

The conclusion is proved, first, from Scripture, in which this truth seems to be foreshadowed and typically signified in Luke 10 by the parable of the man descending from Jerusalem to Jericho. Falling among robbers, he was not only despoiled, but wounded by the blows inflicted upon him and left half-dead. For the holy Fathers understand by this man the first man, and the human race in him, descending through sin from the state of innocence to the state of misery or fallen nature, in which he was both despoiled of gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural goods.

Hence, since a wounded man possesses lesser powers for acting than one who lacks wounds, it seems evident from this parable that the powers for acting rightly are less in fallen man than they would have been in pure man, or man established in his purely natural condition, in whom no wounds would have existed.

3. The adversaries answer that man in the state of fallen nature is said to have been wounded in his natural goods because he lost the integrity and union of his parts produced by the power of original justice, since a wound is nothing other than the division of a continuous thing and of parts that had been united.

4. But this explanation is foreign to the mind of the holy Fathers. For they do not refer that wounding to the loss of gratuitous gifts, but to injury as regards those things that belong to man in his natural condition.

Ambrose says on the cited passage of Luke: "These robbers, that is, the demons, first despoil us of the garments of spiritual grace that we had received, and afterward determine to inflict wounds." By these words he shows that man was first and previously despoiled of gratuitous gifts, and afterward wounded in the natural goods that remained.

Augustine teaches the same in *Quaestiones evangeliorum*, bk. 2, q. 19: "A certain man was descending from Jerusalem to Jericho: Adam himself is understood in the human race." He afterward adds: "And he fell among robbers, the devil and his angels, who despoiled him of immortality and, by inflicting wounds through persuading him to sin, left him half-dead." By these words he refers despoiling to one thing and wounding to another.

Finally, Fulgentius declares this in *De incarnatione et gratia Domini nostri Iesu Christi*, c. 13, when he says that "the first man, and in him the human race, was despoiled of the garment of faith and wounded by the wounds of carnal concupiscences." By the latter words he establishes that man was injured in his natural goods, just as by the former words he says that man was despoiled of the garment of all supernatural and gratuitous gifts, whose foundation is faith. Hence the marginal heading correctly reads: "One thing belongs to the man despoiled by the robbers, and another to the man wounded," Luke 10.

5. The Master of the Sentences distinguishes and explains this more openly in bk. 2, dist. 25, letter D, where he writes: "Through sin natural goods were corrupted in man, and gratuitous goods were depraved. For he is the man who was wounded and despoiled by robbers: wounded indeed in natural goods, of which he was not deprived, for otherwise restoration could not occur; but despoiled of gratuitous goods."

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And shortly afterward: “These are the best gifts and the perfect gifts, some of which were corrupted through sin, namely the natural gifts, such as ability, memory, and intellect, while others were withdrawn, namely the gratuitous gifts.” What could be clearer?

St. Thomas explains it still more clearly in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 29, q. 2, a. 1, in the argument “On the contrary,” where he says: “No one is despoiled of things he does not possess. But through sin man was wounded in his natural goods and despoiled of gratuitous goods, as is said in the gloss on Luke 10. Therefore he possessed grace.” In these words he manifestly distinguishes the wounding of natural goods from the despoiling of gratuitous goods, and refers despoiling to one thing and wounding to another: despoiling to gratuitous gifts and wounding to natural goods.

He teaches this still more openly in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, in these words, which are especially noteworthy:

“I answer that natural goods are spoken of in two ways. In one way, insofar as they are considered in themselves according as they are due to nature from its own principles; and in this way neither man nor angel lost anything natural through sin or was diminished in any way, because Dionysius says that the natural gifts bestowed remained intact even in the sinning angels. In another way, insofar as they are ordered to the last end; and in this way natural goods were diminished in both, although not entirely lost, insofar as each was rendered less capable and more distant from attaining the end. For this reason man is also said to have been despoiled of gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural goods,” according to the gloss on Luke 10.

Nothing could be plainer or more manifest. For he speaks of those natural goods that are due to human nature, not of original justice, which was entirely gratuitous. He says that these natural goods due to man can be considered in two ways: either in themselves, that is, insofar as they are caused by their own principles, and in this way he teaches with Dionysius that they were neither removed nor diminished through sin; or insofar as they are ordered to the end, and in this way he teaches that they were diminished through sin both in the angel and in man. Thus what is said is true, namely that man was despoiled of gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural goods.

6. The conclusion is proved, secondly, from the Council of Trent. After saying in Session 5, can. 1 and 2, that man lost the holiness and original justice in which he had been established, the Council afterward adds at the beginning of Session 6 that man’s free choice was manifestly “weakened in its powers and inclined” through original sin. Here it establishes despoiling

and wounding with respect to different things: despoiling, or the loss of holiness and justice, with respect to original justice and the gratuitous gifts; but injury, wounding, and weakening with respect to the natural powers that man's free choice possesses in itself before it is weakened and inclined toward evil through sin.

Nor can it be said that the Council is speaking of the powers of free choice that man possessed in the state of original justice, and not of those he would have possessed in the state of pure nature or that belong to him through his natural endowments. For the Council does not speak of powers of free choice that were extinguished or entirely removed, but of those that remained weakened and inclined. But the powers of free choice provided by original justice were not merely weakened and diminished, but entirely removed when original justice itself, from which they flowed, was removed. Therefore the Council is not speaking of the powers of free choice provided by original justice, but of those that belong to man from his own nature and because he is rational, and consequently of those that would belong to him in the state of pure nature if he were established in it.

7. A similar argument can be taken from the Second Council of Orange, can. 1, where it says that through the offense of Adam's transgression "the whole man, that is, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse." And in can. 25 it teaches that we must believe that "through the sin of the first man, man's free choice remained inclined and weakened."

But these things cannot be understood and explained of man by comparison with the state of integrity and original justice. Therefore they must be understood of man considered in his natural faculty, which he would possess without sin and without grace.

The minor is proved: That Council, as is evident, was celebrated against the Semi-Pelagians. Hence, when it defines that through Adam's sin man's free choice was injured, this must be understood in the sense in which the Semi-Pelagians denied it. But because the Semi-Pelagians did not deny original sin, as the Pelagians did, through which we are deprived of the gift of integrity and original justice, they did not deny that the freedom of choice remained injured by comparison with integral nature, original justice, and the powers original justice provided. Rather, they contended only that free choice did not remain injured through original sin in its natural powers. From this they inferred that it could overcome every temptation, however vehement, perform every morally good work, and love God as Author of nature above all things, and thus they denied the necessity of grace for performing these things.

Therefore, when the Council of Orange defines against them that free choice remained inclined and weakened through the sin of our first parent, this must be understood of an injury to free choice as regards the powers it possesses from nature, not as regards those it possessed from original justice.

8. The conclusion is proved, thirdly, by an argument taken from St. Thomas. For that holy Doctor teaches and proves in *Quodlibeta* I, a. 8, that if man were established in his purely natural condition, he could love God as Author of nature above all things, not with the love of concupiscence, as some contended, but with the love of friendship. But in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3, he denies that man in fallen nature can possess this natural love of God above all things by his own powers and without grace. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, man in fallen nature corrupted through original sin does not possess powers equal to those man would possess if he were established in his purely natural condition.

Nor is the response of some of any force when they say that St. Thomas does not deny natural love of God above all things to man in fallen nature because he possesses lesser powers and is weaker than he would be in his purely natural condition, but because in fallen nature natural love of God above all things is joined to supernatural love of God, a conjunction that would not exist if man were established in his purely natural condition, because in that state he would not be elevated to a supernatural end.

For this solution is openly opposed to St. Thomas in the cited q. 109, aa. 2 and 3. There, in giving the reason why man in fallen nature cannot love God with natural love above all things without grace, he assigns no other reason than that, because of the corruption of nature, man pursues a private good unless healed through grace. Therefore this inability does not arise solely from the supernatural love of God joined to that natural love, but arises in itself from the corruption of nature inclined through sin toward a private good.

9. From these things the conclusion is proved, fourthly, by a fundamental argument. One who is turned away from the last end possesses lesser powers for acting morally well than one who is not turned away, because the efficacy and powers of the will for tending toward the means are derived from love of and conversion toward the end, which, as Aristotle teaches, stands in practical matters as the first principle stands in speculative matters.

But man in the state of fallen nature is turned away from God as his last end, not only supernatural but also natural. For since Adam by his sin violated not only the supernatural law but also the natural law, he

consequently turned his whole progeny away from God as Author of nature. Man in the state of pure nature would not possess this aversion, both because no original sin would exist in that state and because, as we have shown from St. Thomas in the preceding argument, he could in that state have loved God as Author of nature with an efficacious love, which would turn him toward God as his natural end.

Therefore man in the state of fallen nature possesses lesser powers for acting morally well than he would have possessed in the state of pure nature had he been established in it.

10. Nor is what the adversaries say of any force, namely that man in both the state of pure nature and the state of fallen nature is turned away from God as Author of nature, but with this difference: in the latter he is turned away by a privative aversion arising from original sin, whereas in the former he would be turned away by a purely negative and inculpable aversion, as one not arising from a preceding fault but from a defect of natural condition. According to them, conversion to God as the ultimate natural end is not due to that condition, but only an inclination toward good as such and toward beatitude in common.

This response, I say, is of no force because it supposes something false, namely that conversion to God as Author of nature in the first instant of the use of reason is not naturally due to man or due from the condition of his nature. For an inclination toward its end is connaturally due to every thing. Consequently love of the last end is due to an intellectual nature as an endowment of the soul of which it cannot be despoiled apart from its own fault or unless it spontaneously abdicates it.

Hence St. Thomas says in *Quodlibeta* I, a. 8: "It is evident that God is the common good of the whole universe and of its parts. Hence every creature in its own manner naturally loves God more than itself: insensible creatures naturally; brute animals sensitively; but the rational creature through intellectual love, which is called dilection."

Therefore man, if established in the state of pure nature, would not be turned away from God as Author and natural end even negatively, but would be positively turned toward him, since such love is conversion toward God as the natural end.

11. The conclusion can be commended, fifthly, by another *a priori* argument. A power subject to more impediments is judged to possess lesser moral powers for acting than one free from such impediments. But in the state of fallen nature man possesses more impediments to acting rightly than he would possess in the state of pure nature. Therefore he possesses

lesser moral powers for acting rightly than he would have possessed in the state of pure nature.

The major is evident, for an unimpeded power is judged more capable of acting than a faculty that is impeded and subject to many obstacles that restrain and prevent it from proceeding into act.

The minor is proved by explaining these impediments, which can be reduced to four or five. First, in the state of fallen nature there is a great impediment such that, while it remains, man cannot turn himself toward God as Author of nature or prepare himself to elicit works of virtue from love of God as his last end. This impediment is original sin, which cannot be removed except through sanctifying grace, which exceeds every possible power of nature.

Secondly, there are the four wounds left by that sin and explained in Chapter V, which gravely wound man and consequently render him infirm and weak in acting morally rightly.

Thirdly, in the state of fallen nature concupiscence is more vehement and draws man more strongly toward pleasures contrary to reason than it would have done in the state of pure nature. In the latter the higher part would dominate the lower and the lower would be subject to the higher, although not as easily and perfectly as in the state of integrity and innocence, as will be evident from what is said below. Hence Anselm, in *De conceptu virginali*, c. 5, compares the sensitive appetite deprived of original justice to a wild beast that was formerly bound and afterward rages more fiercely when its bonds are broken.

Fourthly, through original sin human nature has been rendered deserving of less gentle protection by God's providence than pure nature would have received, and of being permitted to be more actively tempted by demons, who envy man the felicity from which they themselves fell, and of being denied several good thoughts for acting well that would have been granted to him in the state of pure nature.

Fifthly, by reason of original sin there is in fallen man an unworthiness of receiving several efficacious aids that would not have existed in the state of pure nature. Hence St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1: "The aids of grace, to whomsoever they are divinely given, are given mercifully; but when they are not given, they are withheld justly in punishment for preceding sin, at least original sin," as Augustine says in *De correptione et gratia*.

12. From these things you will understand how many and how great are the impediments to acting rightly in fallen man that would not have existed in the state of pure nature, and how truly St. Thomas said in *Scriptum super*

Sententiis II, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: “Through sin man was rendered less capable and more distant from attaining the end, and for this reason man is said to have been despoiled of gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural goods.”

13. You will also understand the excellent reasoning of the same holy Doctor in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 2, where he asks “whether the good of nature can be removed through sin.” He answers:

“Diminution can be understood in two ways: in one way on the part of the root, and in another way on the part of the terminus. In the first way it is not diminished through sin, because sin does not diminish nature itself, as was said above. But it is diminished in the second way, insofar as an impediment is placed against reaching the terminus.”

He therefore judges that the powers for acting rightly in fallen man were diminished through original sin, not physically by diminishing nature itself, but morally by placing several impediments to acting rightly that would not have existed in the state of pure nature. Thus a man bound with ropes or constrained by fetters physically possesses the same power for walking as a man free from ropes or fetters, but not morally, because such obstacles prevent the locomotive power from proceeding into act.

§ 2.

The Objections are Answered.

14. The adversaries object, first: St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 95, a. 1, that according to Dionysius the natural gifts remained intact even in the demons after sin. Therefore they likewise remained intact in men, and consequently through original sin man was not injured in his natural goods but only despoiled of gratuitous gifts.

I answer that it is surprising that the adversaries oppose these words of Dionysius to us, since St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 1, when asking “whether sin diminishes the good of nature,” first objects them to himself:

“It seems that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man’s sin is not more grave than the demon’s sin. But natural goods remained intact in the demons after sin, as Dionysius says in *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4. Therefore sin also does not diminish the good of human nature.”

He answers this argument as follows: “I answer that Dionysius speaks of the primary good of nature, which is to live and to understand, as is evident to one who considers his words.”

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Therefore the good of nature that, according to St. Dionysius and St. Thomas, remained intact after sin was being, living, understanding, and the other principles of nature and natural properties. This does not prevent another good of nature, namely the inclination toward virtue, from remaining injured, diminished, and weakened after both original and actual sin, as the same holy Doctor openly teaches in the body of the same article:

“The good of human nature may be spoken of in three ways. First, the principles of nature themselves from which nature is constituted, and the properties caused by them, such as the powers of the soul and other things of this kind. Secondly, the inclination toward virtue is a certain good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, which in the first man was conferred upon the whole of human nature, can be called a good of nature.

“The first good of nature, namely the natural principles and powers, is neither removed nor diminished through sin. The third good of nature was entirely removed through the sin of our first parent. But the intermediate good of nature, namely the natural inclination toward virtue, is diminished through sin.”

Nothing clearer or more explicit can be said.

He teaches similar things in *Scriptum super Sententiis* II, dist. 30, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: “I answer that natural goods are spoken of in two ways. In one way, insofar as they are considered in themselves, according as they are due to nature from its own principles; and in this way neither man nor angel lost anything natural through sin or was diminished in any way, because Dionysius says that the natural gifts bestowed remained intact in the sinning angels. In another way, insofar as they are ordered to the last end; and in this way natural goods were diminished in both, although not entirely lost, insofar as each was rendered less capable and more distant from attaining the end. For this reason man is also said to have been despoiled of gratuitous gifts and wounded in his natural goods,” according to the gloss on Luke 10.

By these words he openly teaches that although natural things considered in physical being, and insofar as they flow from nature as its properties or powers, were not diminished through original or actual sin, they were nevertheless diminished if considered in moral being, that is, insofar as they incline toward virtue or are ordered to the last end.

15. They object, secondly: Those defects theologians call the wounds of human nature would belong to man if he were established in his purely natural condition. Therefore man in that state would not possess greater moral powers for acting rightly than he now possesses in the state of fallen nature.

The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved, first, from St. Thomas in *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 4, c. 52, where he expressly teaches that not only bodily death but also the weakness of reason, by which man attains knowledge of the truth with difficulty and easily falls into error, and the bestial appetites that man cannot entirely overcome—which are without doubt those wounds of human nature explained in Chapter V—are natural to man and belong to human nature considered absolutely in itself.

The words of the holy Doctor are: “Thus, although defects of this kind appear natural to man when human nature is considered absolutely on the part of what is lower in it, nevertheless, when divine providence and the dignity of the higher part of human nature are considered, it can be proved with sufficient probability that defects of this kind are penal, and thus it can be gathered that the human race is originally infected by some sin.”

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, defects of this kind would belong to man if he were established in his purely natural condition.

Reason also commends this. For it is natural to an animal body endowed with sense and appetite to desire sensible good, and natural to a rational spirit to desire spiritual good. Therefore, since man is composed of both, it will be natural for him to possess diverse and mutually conflicting inclinations. Consequently the rebellion of concupiscence now existing in him in the state of fallen nature would also belong to him in the state of pure nature if he were established in it.

16. To the testimony of St. Thomas I answer that he did not assertively say that those defects called the wounds of sin are natural to man, but that “although they appear natural to man when he is considered,” etc. For he intended to answer the argument of those to whom these defects appeared natural and who inferred from this that they were not penal or derived from original sin.

To this he answers that, although they appear natural to man, or although this may be granted for the sake of argument, nevertheless, when divine providence is considered, which established man free from those defects through the wholly gratuitous gift of original justice, it is sufficiently gathered that they are penal and arise from original sin. In this way death, which would be natural to man if he were established in the things due to pure nature, is nevertheless a punishment for sin, as all are bound to admit.

Moreover, when the same holy Doctor assertively and definitively establishes his position concerning this matter, he expressly teaches that those defects or wounds of human nature were inflicted upon it through original sin. This can be seen in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3, where he reasons:

“Through original justice, reason perfectly contained the lower powers of the soul, and reason itself was perfected by being subject to God. But this original justice was withdrawn through the sin of our first parent, as has already been said. Therefore all the powers of the soul remain in a certain manner deprived of their proper order, by which they are naturally ordered to virtue; and this very privation is called the wounding of nature.”

17. To the argument appended to the testimony of St. Thomas, the holy Doctor himself answers in *De malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1: “Something can be natural to man in two ways. In one way, insofar as he is an animal; and in this way it is natural to him that the concupiscible appetite should be borne toward what is pleasurable to sense, speaking generally. In another way, insofar as he is man, that is, a rational animal; and in this way it is natural to him that the concupiscible appetite should be borne toward what is pleasurable according to the order of reason. “Therefore the concupiscence through which his concupiscible appetite is prone to be borne toward sensible pleasure outside the order of reason is contrary to man’s nature insofar as he is man, and thus belongs to original sin.”

By these words he openly teaches that concupiscence borne toward a pleasurable good outside the order of reason proceeds from original sin and does not belong to man from the condition of his nature, but is rather contrary to his nature insofar as he is rational. Consequently it could not have existed in him had he been established in his purely natural condition.

Hence in the reply ad 2 he again says: “Just as the concupiscible power is natural to man according to his established nature, so also it is natural to him that it should be subject to reason, according to what the Philosopher says in the third book of *De anima*, namely that the sensitive appetite follows the rational appetite as one sphere is moved by another sphere.”

Reason also commends this. For since man by his nature possesses a soul superior to the sensitive appetite, and it belongs to the notion of what is superior to dominate what is inferior, if man were established in his purely natural condition, the soul would from this natural order possess the power by which it could moderate the lower part, although with some difficulty. The lower part, in turn, would have to be naturally apt to be ruled by the higher, although not as easily as in the state of integrity or original justice.

18. They object, thirdly: If human nature were not only despoiled of gratuitous gifts but also wounded and corrupted in its natural goods, some cause of such injury and corruption would have to be assigned. But none can be assigned—not God, as is evident; nor the serpent’s breath; nor the forbidden fruit; nor a diseased quality derived from these things, as

theologians commonly hold. Therefore such injury and corruption in the purely natural goods appear fictitious and imaginary.

I answer that this argument is similar to that once proposed to Augustine by Julian, who argued thus: If original sin exists, “through what cracks among so many defenses of innocence do you imagine that it entered the world?” The holy Doctor answered: “Why do you seek a hidden crack when it has a most open door?”

We can answer similarly now. Why do you seek the cause of the corruption and injury of the natural powers in fallen man when you possess a most evident one, namely original sin, which, as we have shown above, both despoils man of gratuitous gifts and wounds him in his natural goods?

19. You will say, first: The power of any nature or faculty can be diminished in only two ways: either by the subtraction of some real and physical perfection of that thing, or by the addition of some habit or quality unfitting to the nature and inclining it toward evil. But neither is found in fallen man, because through original sin nothing physically real that was an intrinsic perfection of the soul or of any of its powers was subtracted from it; nor was any habit or quality unfitting to it and inclining it toward evil added. Therefore through original sin the power of human nature, or its inclination toward good, was not diminished and weakened.

I answer by denying the major. For the power or inclination of a nature can be diminished in another way, namely through the placement of an impediment, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 2, in the body: “The good of nature diminished through sin is the natural inclination toward virtue, which belongs to man from the very fact that he is rational. For from this he possesses the ability to act according to reason, which is to act according to virtue. This inclination is understood as a mean between two things, for it is founded in rational nature as in a root and tends toward the good of virtue as its terminus and end. “Its diminution can therefore be understood in two ways: in one way on the part of the root, and in another way on the part of the terminus. In the first way it is not diminished through sin, because sin does not diminish nature itself, as was said above. But it is diminished in the second way, insofar as an impediment is placed against reaching the terminus.”

Therefore the diminution through original sin of man’s natural powers, or of his inclination toward virtue, was not produced on the part of the principle or root by the subtraction of some physical perfection or the addition of some depraved habit or diseased quality, but only on the part of the terminus, through the placement of an impediment by which fallen man

was rendered “less capable and more distant from attaining the end,” as St. Thomas says in the passage cited above.

20. You will say, secondly: Original sin is nothing positive, but a mere privation of original justice, as our Thomists commonly teach in the Treatise on Sins and as the holy Doctor indicates in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 3. Therefore it cannot place in fallen man a positive impediment to the good of virtue by which he is rendered less capable and more distant from attaining the end.

But granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For although original sin is nothing positive formally, materially it consists in concupiscence and a positive inclination toward evil or toward a depraved act. This is a positive impediment to the good of virtue, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place: “Original sin materially is concupiscence, but formally is the defect of original justice.”

21. They object, fourthly: Through original sin man was not rendered worse in condition as regards the body than he would have been in the state of pure nature. Therefore neither was he rendered worse as regards the soul and its faculties. The consequence seems legitimate from parity of reasoning. The antecedent also seems certain, for through original sin the body did not become more corruptible, more infirm, or more or sooner subject to death than it would have been in the state of pure nature.

I answer by denying the antecedent. For many not improbably think that the body in the state of fallen nature is subject to greater miseries than it would have undergone in the state of pure nature. The Council of Orange seems to favor this opinion in can. 1, when it says that “through the offense of Adam’s transgression the whole man, that is, according to body and soul, was changed for the worse.” We showed above in § 1 that this is not to be understood of man solely in relation to the state of integrity, but also by comparison with pure nature, or man established in his purely natural condition.

I answer, secondly, by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence and the parity. For the worse condition of fallen man that we admit is not something physical, but moral, namely a lesser capacity for the good of virtue or for attaining the end, and a greater distance and remoteness from it because of the various impediments explained above that arise from original sin. But the body, unlike the soul, is not capable of a moral impediment with respect to attaining the end, just as it is not capable of adoption.

22. Finally, the adversaries object, and this is their principal foundation: From the removal of an impediment there does not follow a greater or lesser

natural effect than follows from nature itself. For example, when an impediment is removed, a stone does not move more swiftly than if it had been moved by its own gravity alone.

But original sin removed the impediment of original justice, which prevented the disordered movements now present in fallen nature, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3: “From original sin there follows a certain inclination toward a disordered act, not directly but indirectly, namely through the removal of an impediment, that is, original justice, which prevented disordered movements. In the same way, from corporeal sickness there indirectly follows an inclination toward disordered bodily movements.”

Therefore the movements in fallen nature are not more disordered than they would have been in the state of pure nature, but there is exactly the same disorder of appetite or concupiscence in both states.

23. This is the principal foundation on account of which some disciples of St. Thomas attribute to man, if he were established in his purely natural condition, entirely the same defects or wounds that belong to him in the state of fallen nature, and say that man in the state of pure nature is distinguished from fallen man as a naked man from one who has been stripped or despoiled, as Cajetan says.

But this foundation, upon which the contrary opinion principally rests, is weak and ruinous. For in the cited passage St. Thomas means only that, with respect to the defects human nature now suffers, original sin removed an impediment as regards something contained in them. He does not mean that it is solely and purely the removal of an impediment as regards everything contained in these defects. Rather, in relation to something it is a true cause from which they follow.

This can be explained by three examples. The first is bodily sickness, which St. Thomas employs in the passage cited above. Who doubts that sickness, by removing health, weakens nature in itself, and that from weakened nature there follows in itself a weak or disordered bodily movement? Or who would persuade himself that sickness only and purely removes health, so as to be the accidental rather than the intrinsic cause of that weak movement?

Another example is limping, which the holy Doctor also frequently employs. For the disordered motion of limping is not reduced only accidentally to a crooked leg. The first thing curvature does is to remove the soundness of the leg; the second is intrinsically to cause the defect of limping, upon which the crooked leg intrinsically exerts influence.

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In the same way, original sin first and intrinsically removes original justice. Secondly, it intrinsically inclines toward a disordered act or effect that it intrinsically causes, namely ignorance arising from a depraved disposition that obscures the natural light of reason, a propensity of the will toward evil, and concupiscence rising against reason with such vehemence that reason can in no way conquer and overcome it without the assistance of grace.

A third example can be given of a man removing a column upon which a stone rests. If he immediately impressed a great downward force upon the stone resting above and simultaneously removed the column with that force, would he be said only to remove an impediment with respect to the stone's descent? By no means.

We must reason in the same way in the present matter and say that through original sin man did not merely remove the impediment of original justice. Rather, in removing it he also infected and corrupted the powers, weakened their strength for acting well, and gravely wounded nature itself in its natural order toward the good. Hence original sin was not solely and purely the removal of an impediment in relation to these defects that human nature now suffers after sin.

24. Reason also commends this. For if God, just as he bestowed original justice through himself, were also to remove it through himself without any fault on man's part, there would not follow in the nature thus despoiled of those gratuitous gifts the positive disorder, wounding, infection, and corruption of the powers in their natural goods that is found in the state of fallen nature.

Yet if the sin of our first parent had been only the removal of an impediment with respect to this effect or defect, such corruption and infection would follow from the condition of nature no matter what cause removed the impediment, just as no matter who removed the impediment to a stone's descent, exactly the same descent would occur from the stone's natural gravity. But who does not see that this is not only false but also absurd?

For who would persuade himself that original sin, which is a true fault of the soul, inflicted no greater harm upon the human race as regards infecting, weakening, and inclining the powers of the soul than God would inflict if, through himself and without any fault on man's part, he removed original justice from him? Or who would affirm that a true sin in the soul, from its intrinsic character, weakens its powers no more than if there were no sin in it?

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Without doubt, those who think in this way scarcely acknowledge original sin and openly oppose the Councils and holy Fathers cited above, who affirm that through such sin human nature was wounded, infected, and corrupted in its natural powers and faculties.

They also oppose St. Thomas. For after teaching in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 85, a. 3, that through the sin of the first man the four aforesaid wounds were inflicted upon human nature—ignorance in the intellect, malice or proneness and inclination toward evil in the will, and weakness and concupiscence in the appetite—he immediately adds that the same wounds are also inflicted through actual sin upon the person who commits it.

But it is evident that these wounds are inflicted upon the sinning person through actual sin intrinsically, and not only accidentally or as by the removal of an impediment. Therefore they are inflicted in the same manner upon the whole of human nature through original sin.

§ 3.

Certain Things Proper to Man If He Were Established in
His Purely Natural Condition Are Explained.

25. For a perfect understanding of both the state of pure nature and the state of fallen nature, certain things remain to be briefly explained that would be proper to man if he were established in his purely natural condition, that is, only in those things due to his nature.

First, since such a man established in his purely natural condition would lack the gifts of integrity and original justice, which are entirely undue to human nature, he would also lack their proper effects. Hence the body would not be subject to the soul, but would weigh it down and would be dissolved through death, since it would be composed of contraries conflicting with one another. Similarly, the lower parts would not be perfectly subject to reason in him, but movements of the lower parts would arise outside and against reason.

26. Secondly, in that state man could for some brief time love God as Author of nature and fulfill the whole natural law with God's general concurrence proportioned to that state. This is gathered from St. Thomas, *Quodlibeta* I, a. 8, and manifest reason commends it. For since nature in that state would not be corrupted through sin, it would not pursue a private good to the neglect of the good connatural to it, but could be borne toward every good connatural to it.

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By this, such a man established in his purely natural condition would be distinguished from a man in the state of fallen nature who has not been restored through grace. For the latter cannot, even for a brief time and without the assistance of grace, love God above all things by an absolute and efficacious act or fulfill the whole law, as the same holy Doctor teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 109, a. 3. This is discussed more fully in the Treatise on Grace.

27. Thirdly, such a man in pure nature, with that same general concurrence alone, could not for long love God as Author of nature, observe the whole natural law, and much less finally persevere in the good of reason. For this he would need some special assistance within the order of nature.

For since in that state vehement passions, movements of concupiscence, and many very grave temptations would arise, although free choice by its natural powers and with God's general concurrence could resist some of them, it could by no means conquer all of them, overcome them all for a long time, and consequently attain the natural end unless God gave it special assistance of the natural order for this purpose.

Hence it would belong to divine providence to give or offer to man established in pure nature such assistance, by which he could, if he willed, observe the law for a long time, remain in the good of reason, and finally attain the natural end. Otherwise God would command impossibilities, which would be plainly repugnant to his infinite goodness and equity and to his most gentle providence. Man in that state would be the most unhappy of all creatures if God could not aid him by his providence and assist him by special means within the order of nature, or means proportioned to his natural end, so that he could attain it and escape eternal condemnation.

28. Nor is it of any force if you say that the state of pure nature excludes every special assistance, even of the natural order, since otherwise it would be confused with the state of integral nature. For we answered above that the state of pure nature by no means excludes special assistance of the natural order, but only grace that is entitatively supernatural, such as original justice, or a natural gift after the manner of a permanent habit and form, such as the gift of integrity perfectly subjecting the sensitive appetite to reason.

29. Someone will perhaps ask whether that special assistance God would give man in that state would be due to him or not. It is easily answered that such assistance would not be due to that state, since it excludes everything merely gratuitous and not connatural to man. But, supposing that God willed to establish such a man in that manner, God would owe it to himself and to his providence to give him such special assistance by which he could

for a long time observe the whole law of nature and persevere in it if he willed. In the same way, even now grace is infallibly given to one who is contrite. Yet it is not due to the contrite man; rather, God owes it to himself and to the law by which he has established that such grace be given.

30. From what has been said you will understand that a man established in his purely natural condition would possess a certain intermediate state between man established in the state of integrity, or with the vigor of original justice, and fallen man. For he would neither be as integral as the former nor as injured and corrupted in his powers as the latter. A man in the state of integrity or original justice would possess neither ignorance in the intellect nor malice in the will, nor would he experience anything in the lower appetite that was either against or outside reason; rather, the lower part would be perfectly subject to the higher. In nature fallen through original sin, however, man experiences a great conflict, contradiction, and rebellion against the spirit, so vehement that he cannot resist it by his natural powers alone.

But a man established in his purely natural condition, although he would experience movements of concupiscence arising outside reason, that is, anticipating reason's judgment, could nevertheless, once reason became advertent, restrain and overcome them even if they were more vehement. Thus, if advertent reason in fact prevented them, as it could and would be bound to do, man would preserve in himself that state of pure nature. But if he consented to them, he would sin and through that sin would lose in himself the state of purely natural goods and immediately incur the state of fallen nature.

31. You will also understand from what has been said above that movements of concupiscence can be considered in four ways: 1^o As subject to reason. 2^o As outside reason. 3^o As against reason, yet capable of being moderated and restrained by reason itself. 4^o As rising against reason so vehemently that reason cannot overcome or conquer them without the assistance of grace. In the first three ways they are not contrary to nature, but are either according to nature or outside nature. In the fourth way, however, they are contrary to nature. Hence they would not exist in pure nature, but exist only in fallen and wounded nature, and are the material element of original sin, as is evident from what was said above.

32. You will ask what would occur in the state of pure nature to infants who died before acquiring the use of reason, through which they could turn themselves toward God as Author and natural end.

I answer that they would attain natural beatitude, since it would be connaturally due to them and in the state of pure nature there would be no

original sin in punishment for which they would be deprived of such beatitude. For it seems repugnant to God's gentle providence and infinite goodness that, without any preceding fault, he should deprive man of things naturally due to him or establish man in a state in which he could not attain natural beatitude. Otherwise human nature in such a state would necessarily be miserable and consequently evil, which savors of Manichaeism.

The case is different for infants dying without baptism in the state of fallen nature. For since in such a state, before receiving the grace of regeneration, they are infected with original sin, which turns man away from God both as natural and as supernatural end, they are justly deprived in punishment for it not only of supernatural but also of natural beatitude. Thus theologians commonly teach against Catharinus, Salmerón, and Molina.

These authors think that after the day of judgment such infants, having resumed their bodies, will lead a happy and perpetual life upon the earth, enjoying natural beatitude. Except for the punishment of loss, or the absence of the beatific vision, they would in all things be situated as infants who died in the state of pure nature. But this opinion seems akin to the error of the Pelagians, who, as Augustine says in *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 13, "labored to find for their infants, outside the kingdom of God, some place of a felicity of their own devising." And in *De anima et eius origine*, bk. 2, c. 12, he says: "The authority of Catholic Councils and of the Apostolic See most justly condemned the new heretics, the Pelagians, because they dared to give unbaptized infants a place of rest and salvation. They would not have dared this unless they denied that those infants possessed original sin." Likewise, in bk. 1, c. 9, he says: "Let no one promise unbaptized infants, between condemnation and the kingdom of heaven, any place of repose or felicity whatever, wherever it might be, as though there were a middle place. For the Pelagian heresy promised this." The words "felicity whatever" must be especially noted. By them the holy Doctor openly declares that even natural felicity must be denied to those infants if we wish to avoid the heresy of Pelagius. For Pelagius did not promise them supernatural felicity outside the kingdom of heaven, but only natural felicity.

Hence Cardinal Bellarmine correctly teaches in *De statu peccati*, bk. 6, c. 1, that the opinion of the Pelagians was condemned according to which natural beatitude outside the kingdom of heaven is granted to infants dying without baptism. He says: "The second opinion, although somewhat less liberal, was nevertheless exceedingly mild. It was the opinion of those who excluded unbaptized infants from the kingdom of heaven and the blessed life promised to the saints, but nevertheless gave them eternal life and

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natural beatitude without any distress or pain, outside the kingdom of the blessed and far from the prison of the damned, that is, in a middle place between hell and heaven. It is difficult to conceive such a place as anything other than the earth. “St. Augustine teaches in *De haeresibus*, c. 88, that the Pelagians formerly held this opinion. For, he says: ‘Even if they are not baptized, they promise them outside the kingdom of God, indeed, but nevertheless a certain eternal and blessed life of their own.’ “That the Pelagians did not promise unbaptized infants supernatural eternal life, which consists in the vision of God, but only natural eternal life or natural beatitude, is evident from *Contra Iulianum*, bk. 5, c. 8. There, according to Augustine, the Pelagians alienated unbaptized infants from the life of God when they alienated them from the kingdom of God. But what is the life of God other than the vision of God? Nor does the kingdom of heaven itself signify anything else in the Scriptures than eternal felicity consisting in the vision of God.” Thus Bellarmine.

END OF THE FIRST PART.

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